United States District Court 

for the 

Southern District of Florida 

Curtis J. Jackson, III a/k/a 

50 CENT, Plaintiff, 

v. 

Angela Kogan and Perfection 

Plastic Surgery, Inc. d/b/a 

Perfection Plastic Surgery & 

Medspa, Defendant. 

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Civil Action No. 22-22972-Civ-Scola 

Order Denying Dismissal 

 This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by 

Defendants Angela Kogan and Perfection Plastic Surgery, Inc. (Mot., ECF No. 

16.) Having carefully considered the briefing and relevant legal authorities, the 

Court denies the motion for the reasons below. 

1. Background

Plaintiff Curtis J. Jackson III, popularly known as 50 CENT, is a worldfamous artist and businessman. (Compl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 1.) His decades-long 

career has rendered him a following of 41 million users on Facebook, 28.2 

million on Instagram, and 12.5 million on Twitter. (Compl. ¶ 24.) 

Defendant Perfection Plastic Surgery & MedSpa (“MedSpa”) is operated 

by Defendant Angela Kogan. (Compl. ¶ 26.) MedSpa offers plastic surgery and 

minimally invasive procedures such as Botox treatments. (Compl. ¶ 29.) It 

operates in Sunny Isles Beach and Las Vegas, and has nearly 360,000 

Instagram followers. (Compl. ¶ 30.) Kogan herself has 114,000. (Compl. ¶ 28.) 

 On or about February 1, 2020, Jackson “happened to be in the 

proximity” of MedSpa’s location in Sunny Isles Beach. (Compl. ¶ 31.) At 

Kogan’s request, Jackson posed for, and took, a picture with Kogan in front of 

a backdrop stamped with the words “PERFECTION MED SPA” throughout. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 32 – 34.) Jackson believed that Kogan “simply wanted a photograph 

with [him] exclusively for her own private enjoyment.” (Compl. ¶ 33.) But later 

that day, MedSpa uploaded the photo to one of its public Instagram accounts. 

(Compl. ¶ 34.) The photo’s caption reads “Thank you @50cent for stopping by 

the number one med spa @bh_perfection_medspa [ ] [ ] #50cent 

#bhperfectionmedspa #perfectionmedspa #medspa #celeb #vip #facial #laser.” 

(Compl. 10.) Kogan posted a version of that same photo on to her public 

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Instagram account two days later. (Compl. ¶ 34.) Her caption reads the same 

but adds “#power” after “#laser.”

MedSpa repeatedly posted the photo on its accounts afterward, including 

on May 27, 2020, February 22, 2021, August 2, 2021, December 14, 2021, and 

March 11, 2022. (Compl. ¶¶ 35-36.) Kogan also shared the photo for articles 

published by a magazine and an online blog. (Compl. ¶¶ 45-46.) At no relevant 

point did MedSpa or Kogan ask Jackson for permission to use the photo or his 

name for a commercial purpose. (Compl. ¶ 37.)

On August 17, 2022, a celebrity gossip media outlet known as The Shade 

Room (“TSR”) published an article titled “Penis Enhancements Are More 

Popular Than Ever & BBLs Are Dying Out: Cosmetic Surgery CEO Angela 

Kogan Speaks On It.” (Compl. ¶ 48.) The article was the result of the efforts of 

Kogan’s talent agent, Carissa Rossi, who introduced Kogan to TSR 

representatives. (Compl. ¶ 51.) 

TSR posted a link to the article on its Twitter account that same day. 

(Compl. ¶ 49.) On Twitter, the link’s thumbnail image was composed of two 

side-by-side images: on the left was Kogan’s photo with Jackson, and on the 

right was a “close-up shot of a medical provider presumably performing a 

penile enhancement procedure on a patient whose face is not visible and whose 

genitals are obscured by an eggplant emoji.” (Compl. ¶ 49.) Also on that day, 

Kogan posted a screen capture video scrolling through the TSR article on her 

Instagram account. (Compl. ¶ 54.) 

The video begins with a shot of the Tweet itself, which reads: “More men 

are getting surgery (down there) than ever before, and BBLs are fading away! 

The CEO of the leading med spa for celebrities in South Florida dishes on the 

latest surgery trends with The Shade Room.” (Compl. 18.) Immediately below is 

the thumbnail image described above, which links to the TSR article. (Id.)

Next, the video clicks into the article and scrolls through it. Visible in the 

video is a portion of the article that quotes Kogan as saying, “At the moment we 

are seeing a major shift in men getting plastic surgery . . . [m]en have really 

stepped up and are getting more surgery than we think.” (Compl. 18.) And 

directly beneath that quote is Kogan’s photo with Jackson. (Id.) The article 

includes MedSpa’s phone number, statements entreating readers to call for a 

free consultation, and offers of promotional discounts on cosmetic surgeries 

and procedures. (Compl. ¶ 52.) The article closes with the following: “Those 

interested in a consult with Dr. Kogan, the ‘first and only plastic surgery in 

Sunny Isles,’ can do so by filling out a form here.” (Compl. ¶ 53.)

Kogan’s caption for the video, as posted on her Instagram account,

includes hashtags such as #plasticsurgery, #theshaderoom, #celebrity, and 

#penis. (Compl. ¶ 55.) MedSpa also posted the video on Instagram with a 

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substantially similar caption. (Compl. ¶ 56.) Users responded to the video with 

crude commentary such as “@50cent Can I see the before and after pics?”,

“Call him 50 inch [ ]”, and “Why they got 50 cent up there talking bout [ ] 

enlargement[.]” (Compl. ¶ 59.)

Jackson brings this action alleging the Defendants’ unauthorized use of 

his likeness for their commercial gain. He says these posts falsely suggest that

he received penile enhancement surgery from MedSpa at the expense of his 

reputation and dignity. The Defendants respond by moving for dismissal under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

2. Legal Standard

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court 

must accept all of the complaint’s allegations as true, construing them in the 

light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 

(11th Cir. 2008). A pleading need only contain “a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual 

allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(cleaned up). The Plaintiff must offer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Threadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id. Thus, a pleading that offers mere “labels and 

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will 

not survive dismissal. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Rule 8 marks a notable 

and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a 

prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed 

with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

Yet, where the allegations “possess enough heft” to suggest a plausible 

entitlement to relief, the case may proceed. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. 

“[T]he standard simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation 

that discovery will reveal evidence of the required element.” Rivell v. Private 

Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).

“And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy 

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judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very 

remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (cleaned up). 

3. Analysis

Jackson asserts the following claims against both Defendants: 

(1) unauthorized misappropriation of his likeness under Fla. Stat. § 540.08; 

(2) invasion of privacy; (3) false endorsement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); 

(4) false advertising under the same statute; (5) conversion; and (6) unjust 

enrichment. The Defendants seek dismissal of all counts. 

A. Unauthorized Misappropriation Under Fla. Stat. § 540.08 (Count I)

Florida law prohibits the unauthorized publication of a person’s name or 

likeness for a commercial or advertising purpose. The relevant statute reads: 

“No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for 

purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the 

name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any natural person 

without the express written or oral consent to such use . . .” 

Fla. Stat. § 540.08(1). Throughout the complaint, Jackson says he never 

consented to having his photo with Kogan used for advertising or promotional 

uses. This would ostensibly include the actual publication of the photo on the 

Defendants’ Instagram accounts, its use in the TSR article (which article 

Jackson says Kogan’s agent orchestrated), and its use in the screen capture 

video of the TSR article and related Tweet. (See Compl. ¶¶ 66-67.) 

Yet, the Defendants’ motion focuses on the posting of the photo to the 

Defendants’ Instagram accounts alone. (See Mot. 6-7.) They weakly argue that 

Jackson consented to the photo’s being uploaded on to Instagram while 

making no mention of Jackson’s consent/non-consent as to the screen capture 

video and the promotional value it doubtlessly served.1

That omission is fatal. Both the Tweet and the article, which appear in 

the video posted by the Defendants, indisputably place Kogan’s photo with 

Jackson next to images and text that promote penile enhancement surgery and 

the Defendants’ business. (See Compl. ¶¶ 52, 53.) Because the Defendants took 

it upon themselves to post the video onto their Instagram accounts, Jackson 

can plausibly argue that the Defendants unauthorizedly used his likeness to 

promote their business regardless of whether the Defendants had any role in 

1 The Defendants also rely on Valentine v. C.B.S. Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983) to argue 

that the photo serves no promotional purpose. The Court disagrees and addresses the photo’s 

promotional value below at Section 3.C(I) (False Endorsement) of this Opinion.

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TSR’s publication of either the Tweet or the article. That conclusion makes 

sense because: (1) the Defendants’ video served as their own promotion of 

TSR’s content to their Instagram followers, and (2) the Defendants do not argue 

that Jackson consented to their re-publications of TSR’s content. 

But even if Jackson’s misappropriation claim were limited to the 

Defendants’ posting of the photo to Instagram alone, the question of Jackson’s 

consent is a factual issue that the Court must construe in his favor at this 

juncture. So, despite the Defendants’ repeated assertions that Jackson at least 

implicitly consented to having his photo used on Instagram in exchange for 

“free medspa services,” the Court is bound to follow—at least for now—

Jackson’s side of the story, which is that he only consented to Kogan’s private 

use of the photo. For these reasons, Count I survives. 

B. Invasion of Privacy (Count II) 

“In Florida, the common law tort of invasion of privacy [covers] four 

distinct claims: (1) appropriation—the unauthorized use of a person’s name or 

likeness to obtain some benefit; (2) intrusion—physically or electronically 

intruding into one’s private quarters; (3) public disclosure of private facts—the 

dissemination of truthful private information which a reasonable person would 

find objectionable; and (4) false light in the public eye—publication of facts 

which place a person in a false light even though the facts themselves may not 

be defamatory.” Clark v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 07-22892-CIV, 2009 WL 

10668971, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2009) (Hoeveler, J.) (cleaned up). 

Taken in the light most favorable to him, Jackson’s allegations support 

misappropriation and false light theories, at minimum. The Defendants, 

however, only address the former. (See Compl. ¶¶ 77-80.) Their failure to 

consider the false light theory is, again, alone a sufficient basis upon which to 

deny their motion. But putting that fact aside, “[t]he elements of common law 

invasion of privacy for commercial misappropriation of likeness are the same as 

the elements of unauthorized publication of a likeness under 

§ 540.08.” Id. So, the Defendants merely repeat their above consent argument 

in respect of misappropriation. (See Mot. 16.) And for the same reasons the 

Court cites above, that argument fails here. Count II survives. 

C. Lanham Act Claims 

Next, the Defendants also fail at challenging Jackson’s Lanham Act 

claims. The Lanham Act assesses civil liability upon: 

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“[a]ny person who, in connection with any goods or services, or any 

container for goods, uses in commerce any . . . false or misleading 

representation of fact, which—

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 

the affiliation . . . of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 

sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods or services, or commercial 

activities by another person, or 

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 

characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 

person’s goods, services, or commercial activities[.]”

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). As noted, Jackson asserts claims for false endorsement 

(Count III) and false advertising (Count IV). False endorsement claims arise 

under Section 1125(a)(1)(A) whereas false advertising claims arise under 

Section 1125(a)(1)(B). See Edmonson v. Velvet Lifestyles, LLC, No. 15-24442-

CIV, 2016 WL 11783348, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2016) (Lenard, J.).

(1) False Endorsement (Count III)

A “plaintiff alleging false endorsement of goods must show a likelihood of 

consumer confusion, mistake, or deception as to the origin, sponsorship, or 

approval of goods being sold.” Webster v. Dean Guitars, 955 F.3d 1270, 1278 

(11th Cir. 2020). Jackson’s allegations—particularly those concerning the 

video—sufficiently do so. 

This is made evident by a comment to one of the Defendants’ first posts

of Kogan’s photo in which an Instagram user deduces that Jackson was the 

Defendants’ paid promoter. (Compl. ¶ 42.) Even more clear are the crude 

comments connecting Jackson to Defendants’ penile enhancement services, 

which followed the Defendants’ video publication. Again, Instagram users 

publicly responded with comments like “@50cent Can I see the before and after 

pics?”, “Call him 50 inch [ ]”, and “Why they got 50 cent up there talking bout [ 

] enlargement[.]” (Compl. ¶ 59.) 

Yet, the Defendants’ challenge against Jackson’s false endorsement 

count turns on the fact that courts in the Eleventh Circuit treat false 

endorsement claims as ones for trademark infringement. See, e.g., Edmonson, 

2016 WL 11783348 at *3 (quoting Univ. of Ala. Bd. Of Trs. V. New Life Art, Inc., 

683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012) (“we have never treated false 

endorsement and trademark infringement claims as distinct under the Lanham 

Act.”)). And to prevail on a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff must 

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show, “(1) that it had trademark rights in the mark or name at issue and 

(2) that the other party had adopted a mark or name that was the same, or 

confusingly similar to its mark, such that consumers were likely to confuse the 

two.” Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 773 (11th Cir. 2010).

Approaching Jackson’s claim on a technicality, the Defendants cite 

Lancaster v. Bottle Club, LLC for the proposition that “a person’s image or 

likeness cannot function as a trademark.” No. 8:17-CV-634-T-33JSS, 2017 WL 

3008434, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 2017). (See Mot. 9.) However, in doing so, 

they misrepresent the actual holding in Lancaster. That case involved 

professional model plaintiffs who sued operators of a swingers’ club for 

unauthorizedly using their images in advertisements. The models, like 

Jackson, asserted claims for false endorsement. In summarizing the parties’ 

positions on a motion to dismiss, the Lancaster court said: “Defendants rely on 

ETW Corp v. Jierh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) for the proposition 

that, ‘as a general rule, a person’s image or likeness cannot function as a 

trademark.’” Lancaster, 2017 WL 3008434 at *6. It is this portion of the opinion 

that the Defendants present to this Court as the basis of their argument above.

Yet, nowhere did the Lancaster court make that holding. (See Mot. 9.) In 

fact, the Lancaster court actually rejected that argument for a reason this 

Court finds applicable here. In sustaining the models’ claims for false 

endorsement, the Lancaster court said: “But, unlike the plaintiff in ETW Corp., 

Plaintiffs are not asserting they have trademark rights in every image of 

themselves; rather, as a basis for their false endorsement claims, Plaintiffs 

point to specific photographs Defendants used without permission and which 

allegedly confused viewers about Plaintiffs’ association with EYZ Wide Shut.” 

2017 WL 3008434 at *6 (emphasis added). The same is true of Jackson. And 

aside from their failed reliance on Lancaster, the Defendants present no 

convincing argument as to why Jackson cannot be said to have trademark 

rights in the use of the photo, his likeness, or name.

Instead, they further try to undermine the false endorsement claim by

offering two theories as to why no “implied endorsement” exists. (Mot. 9-10.) 

First, the Defendants assert that because Kogan’s photo does not show 

Jackson’s “name or image in the promotion of any of Defendants’ products or 

services (as the caption simply thanks Plaintiff for visiting Defendants’ office),” 

no endorsement exists. (See Mot. 9.) 

That is simply wrong. As the proverbial saying goes, a picture is worth a 

thousand words. This one in particular depicts a worldwide celebrity next to 

Kogan with MedSpa’s name repeated all throughout the background. The 

promotional value is evident. Elsewhere in their motion, the Defendants cite 

Valentine v. C.B.S. Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983) for the premise that 

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Jackson’s mere inclusion in the photo does not constitute “direct” promotion. 

(Mot. 6.) However, the facts of Valentine are fully distinguishable. That case 

involved the song “Hurricane” by Bob Dylan, in which he depicts the murder 

trial of prizefighter Rubin “Hurricane” Carter. The song mentions a witness in 

the trial, Patty Valentine, who later sued him on, among others, an 

unauthorized misappropriation claim under Florida Statutes Section 540.08. 

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Valentine because it 

found that mere inclusion of her name in the song did not establish a 

promotional purpose. See Valentine, 698 F.2d at 433. Here, however, Jackson 

cannot be said to “merely” be present in the photo. Its import—and arguably 

the reason why Defendants repeatedly published it—derives from the very fact 

that he is in it. 

Even more, the photo’s caption also directly promotes the Defendants’ 

business. It does more than just thank Jackson. It says “Thank you @50cent 

for stopping by the number one med spa @bh_perfection_medspa [ ] [ ] #50cent 

#bhperfectionmedspa #perfectionmedspa #medspa #celeb #vip #facial #laser.” 

Read in the light most favorable to Jackson, the Defendants’ “thanks” serves as 

a humblebrag.2 It is self-promotion. But even if the Court afforded the “thanks” 

portion of the caption no promotional value, the remainder clearly promotes 

the Defendants by referring to MedSpa as “the number one med spa” and 

associating it with a “#celeb” and “#vip.” This argument fails. 

Second, the Defendants say, “because the [p]hoto does not . . . contain 

any statements that may be attributed to Plaintiff as endorsing Defendants’ 

plastic surgery services or penile enhancement surgery, there can be no 

implied endorsement.” (Mot. 10.) But again, the photo is not the only object at 

issue. The video is also at play. And by Jackson’s allegations, so is the TSR 

article itself, insofar as Kogan or her agent procured its publication. Both the 

video and the article surround the photo of Jackson with images and text that 

promote penile enhancement surgery and the Defendants’ business. An implied 

endorsement is, at minimum, reasonably deducible such that the Defendants’ 

second argument must fail. Jackson’s false endorsement claim survives. 

(2) False Advertising (Count IV) 

To state a claim for false advertising, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) the 

advertisements of the opposing party were false or misleading; (2) the 

2 A “humblebrag” refers to “a seemingly modest, self-critical, or casual statement or reference 

that is meant to draw attention to one's admirable or impressive qualities or achievements.”

Humblebrag, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/humblebrag. 

Case 1:22-cv-22972-RNS Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/12/2022 Page 8 of 11
advertisements deceived, or had the capacity to deceive, consumers; (3) the 

deception had a material effect on purchasing decisions; (4) the misrepresented 

product or service affects interstate commerce; and (5) the [plaintiff] has been—

or is likely to be—injured as a result of the false advertising.” Edmonson, 2016 

WL 11783348 at *7 (citing Hickson Corp. v. Northern Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 

F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004)). 

The Defendants argue that Jackson fails on this claim because nothing 

about the photo or their sharing of it was false or misleading. (See Mot. 11.) 

They present this argument on three grounds. First, they say, neither the photo 

nor their sharing of it implied that Jackson received penile enhancement 

surgery from them or otherwise contained false or misleading statements. (Id.) 

Second, the Defendants assert that they never shared the photo with any 

online publication for the purpose of suggesting that Jackson received such 

services from them. (Id.) Last, they say that Jackson agreed to the taking and 

use of the photo in exchange for “free medspa services.” (Id.) 

 The Defendants’ first argument fails by reason of the Court’s above 

findings concerning the Defendants’ use of the video. The second is irrelevant 

because nothing about Section 1125(a)(1)(B)’s text places any legal value on the 

Defendants’ subjective intent. And the third fails because, at this juncture, the 

Court is required to accept as true Jackson’s representation that he “never 

would have consented to Kogan taking a photograph with him had he been 

informed that Kogan and MedSpa would use the [p]hoto or his name for 

promotional or commercial purposes.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) 

 Jackson’s claim for false advertising survives. 

D. Conversion (Count V) 

Next, it “is well settled that a conversion is an unauthorized act which 

deprives another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time.” Souza 

v. Nowhere Bottle & Soc. Club, Inc., No. 19-24692-CIV, 2020 WL 13420543, at 

*5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2020) (Altonaga, J.) This and other courts in the Eleventh 

Circuit have recognized conversion claims in the context of intangible property 

rights. See, e.g., id.; Taylor v. Trapeze Mgmt., LLC, 0:17-CV-62262-KMM, 2018 

WL 9708619, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2018) (Moore, J.); Krupa v. Platinum 

Plus, LLC, 8:16-CV-3189-T-33MAP, 2017 WL 1050222, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 

20, 2017). 

According to the Defendants, Jackson is “unable to allege that [they] 

wrongfully asserted dominion over [his] name and image,” because he 

consented to their taking and sharing of the photo. (See Mot. 12) But, as noted, 

Jackson alleges that he only consented to the taking and the use of the photo 

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for Kogan’s private use. Jackson says he would have never consented to the 

photo had he known it would be used promotionally. (See Compl. ¶ 44.) At this 

stage, the Court must credit his allegation over the Defendants’ assertion that 

Jackson—at least tacitly—consented to the photo’s being used in exchange for 

“medspa services.” (Mot. 12.) Thus, Jackson’s conversion claim must survive. 

E. Unjust Enrichment (Count VI) 

Last, “[t]here are three elements of an unjust enrichment claim under 

Florida law: first, the plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant; second, 

the defendant voluntarily accepted and retained that benefit; and, finally, the 

circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the defendants to 

retain the benefit without paying for it.” Dolan v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 385 F. 

Supp. 3d 1338, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (Scola, J.) (citing City of Miami v. Bank of 

Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1287 (11th Cir. 2015)). The Defendants say that 

Jackson fails to state an unjust enrichment claim under the last element 

because he “received value in exchange for the [p]hoto—namely, free medspa 

services[.]” (Mot. 12.) 

Yet, to restate the obvious: this case is about much more than the 

Defendants’ posting of Kogan’s photo onto Instagram. The crux of Jackson’s 

claims—including his count for unjust enrichment—stems from the photo’s use 

in the Defendants’ video and TSR article, which associate him with penile 

enhancement surgery. So, the question is not whether Jackson received 

adequate value in exchange for the photo. It is whether he received adequate 

value in exchange for the Defendants’ use of his image—including in the video. 

Even assuming that the scope of Jackson’s unjust enrichment claim was 

limited to the Defendants’ posting of Kogan’s photo, the Court would find that 

Jackson does sufficiently allege inequitable circumstances. Again, Jackson is 

adamant that he did not consent to having the photo’s being used in a 

promotional manner. (Compl. ¶¶ 112.) Further, the promotional value that the 

Defendants have received from repeatedly sharing Kogan’s photo with Jackson 

is surely great. Although the Court has no reason to doubt the quality of the 

“free medspa services” that the Defendants provided Jackson, the record is not 

sufficiently established to substantiate the Defendants’ suggestion that their 

services equitably compensated Jackson. 

Accordingly, Jackson’s claim for unjust enrichment stands.

4. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court denies the Defendants’ motion to dismiss in 

its totality. (ECF No. 16). All of Jackson’s claims remain viable. The parties will 

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continue to observe the deadlines set forth in the Court’s Scheduling Order 

(ECF No. 24), and are reminded that they may, at any time, file a motion 

requesting a settlement conference before United States Magistrate Judge 

Jonathan Goodman. 

Done and ordered in Miami, Florida, on December 12, 2022.

________________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

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