Filed 10/19/20 P. v. Guzman CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LEONARDO GUZMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

B299861

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. TA146738

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Allen J. Webster, Jr., Judge. Affirmed as 

modified with directions. 

Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2

INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Leonardo 

Guzman of assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a 

felon, and unlawful possession of ammunition. The jury also

found true allegations that he personally used a firearm and 

inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the assault. 

The trial court sentenced him to 17 years in state prison. 

Guzman testified at trial. On appeal, he argues the trial 

court prejudicially abused its discretion under Evidence Code 

section 352 by ruling Guzman’s 2003 automobile theft conviction

was admissible for impeachment purposes. He also raises several 

arguments related to various assessments and a restitution fine

the trial court imposed. We reject his arguments, correct the 

amounts of certain assessments in the oral pronouncement of 

judgment, and affirm the judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an amended 

information charging Guzman with assault with a firearm (Pen. 

Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count one),

1 possession of a firearm by a 

felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count two), unlawful possession of 

ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count three), and attempted 

murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count four). The information 

further alleged Guzman personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, 

subd. (a)) and inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) 

during the commission of count one and sustained five prior 

prison term convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
3

The trial court granted the prosecution’s oral motion to 

dismiss count four. The jury convicted Guzman on the remaining 

three counts. The jury found the firearm use and great bodily 

injury allegations true, and found Guzman sustained six prior 

felony convictions for purposes of the possession of a firearm by a 

felon charge. Guzman admitted the prior prison term allegations. 

The court sentenced Guzman to 17 years in state prison, 

consisting of an upper term of four years on count one, plus 10 

years for the firearm enhancement and three years for the great 

bodily injury enhancement. The court imposed concurrent threeyear upper terms on counts two and three. The court dismissed

the prior prison term enhancements. 

Guzman timely appealed. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Prosecution’s case

Wilber Lozano lived on South Broadway Street in Los 

Angeles. He often saw Guzman riding his bicycle on the street. 

He knew Guzman as “Shorty.” Guzman was missing the middle 

and ring fingers from his right hand. 

At approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 15, 2018, Lozano was 

lying down in the back bedroom of his house. Rolando Gomez, 

Lozano’s friend, was drinking beer on the patio. Guzman rode up 

on his bicycle and told Gomez he was looking for “Poncho,” which 

was Lozano’s nickname among friends. 

Gomez told Lozano someone was looking for him. Lozano 

went outside. Guzman claimed Lozano stole his bicycle and 

needed to pay him $40. Lozano did not steal Guzman’s bicycle 
4

and did not know what Guzman was referring to. Guzman took a 

gun out of his jacket and shot Lozano two or three times. After 

shooting him, Guzman told Lozano: “Now you don’t owe me 

anything,” and left on his bicycle. One of the bullets hit the artery 

in Loranzo’s leg. Gomez found Lozano passed out behind the 

house. He put a tourniquet on Lozano’s leg. 

Los Angeles Police Department Officers Lugo and Herrera 

arrived at the scene. They followed a blood trail to the back of the 

house where they found Lozano lying unconscious in a pool of 

blood. Paramedics took Lozano to the hospital. Lozano had to 

have two surgeries. He had scarring on both his legs. At the time 

of trial, Lozano still had pain in his legs, and he could not feel his 

right leg from his knee to his ankle. 

On July 17, Detectives Hyoung and Langsdale contacted 

Lozano. Detective Hyoung asked Lozano several times who the 

shooter was, and Lozano did not give a straight answer. Detective 

Hyoung interviewed Gomez, who identified the shooter. 

At 1:00 p.m. on August 1, Lozano and his friend Humberto 

Hernandez went looking for Guzman. They located Guzman and 

called the police. Officers Mejia and Andrade found Guzman and 

handcuffed him to a gate. Officer Mejia took Lozano to where 

Guzman was detained, and Lozano identified Guzman as the 

man who shot him. Lozano said Guzman had difficulty getting 

the gun out of his pocket because of his missing fingers. In a 

recorded interview from August 15 that was played for the jury, 

Lozano again told Detective Hyoung that Guzman was the 

shooter. Lozano also told Detective Hyoung that while he was in 

the hospital, Guzman’s brother went to his house and shot it up.

Ronald Morales knew Lozano, Gomez, and Guzman. When 

shown a surveillance video of the shooting, Morales identified 
5

Guzman as the shooter. When Morales testified, he was in 

custody for a felon in possession of a firearm charge. Prior to 

testifying, Morales was placed in the same cell with Guzman,

who told Morales to testify Guzman was not the shooter.

The prosecution introduced evidence showing Guzman 

sustained prior felony convictions. Los Angeles Police 

Department fingerprint technician Nina Kaminsky took 

Guzman’s fingerprints, compared them to the fingerprints in 

Guzman’s prior prison packet and other documents showing his 

prior convictions, and concluded the fingerprints all matched. 

II. Defense case

Guzman testified that he knew Lozano as an acquaintance, 

but did not shoot him. 

DISCUSSION

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion

Guzman’s prior felony convictions were introduced to 

impeach him. On appeal, Guzman argues the trial court abused 

its discretion by denying his motion to exclude a 2003 auto theft 

conviction without considering that five more recent convictions 

would also be used to impeach him. The Attorney General 

contends the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 

the 2003 conviction, and even assuming it did, the error was 

harmless. We agree with the Attorney General.
6

A. Background

During a break in the prosecution’s case, defense counsel 

objected to the admission of Guzman’s convictions from 2003 for 

auto theft and 2008 for possession of a firearm by a felon, arguing 

their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger 

of creating undue prejudice under Evidence Code section 352 

because the convictions were more than 10 years old. The 

prosecution argued the 2003 conviction was not sufficiently 

remote to warrant exclusion because it was probative to show 

Guzman continuously engaged in illegal activity. The prosecution

argued the 2008 conviction was not remote because it occurred 

within 10 years of the shooting for which Guzman was on trial. 

The experienced trial judge ruled the convictions 

admissible under Evidence Code section 352. The court correctly 

concluded Guzman’s priors from 2003 and 2008, as well as his 

other priors, were crimes of moral turpitude. The court

acknowledged the 2003 conviction was more than 10 years old, 

but concluded the conviction was not remote because the 

additional convictions Guzman sustained in 2008, 2010, 2012, 

2013, and 2015 demonstrated continuous criminal conduct 

affecting his credibility.

2

Guzman testified at trial. On direct examination, he 

admitted that he sustained prior felony convictions. On crossexamination, the prosecution asked Guzman about his prior 

felony convictions, including the 2003 conviction for vehicle theft 

2 Although the court did not explicitly say so, it appears the 

court agreed with the prosecution that the 2008 conviction was 

less than 10 years old. Guzman now concedes that point and does 

not assert that admission of the 2008 conviction was error.
7

and the 2008 conviction for being a felon in possession of a 

firearm. Guzman answered the prosecution’s questions by 

admitting he sustained the prior felony convictions. 

B. Analysis 

“A witness may be impeached with any prior conduct 

involving moral turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony 

conviction, subject to the trial court’s exercise of discretion under 

Evidence Code section 352. [Citations.]” (People v. Clark (2011) 

52 Cal.4th 856, 931.)3 “When determining whether to admit a 

prior conviction for impeachment purposes, the court should 

consider, among other factors, whether it reflects on the witness’s 

honesty or veracity, whether it is near or remote in time, whether 

it is for the same or similar conduct as the charged offense, and 

what effect its admission would have on the defendant’s decision 

to testify. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “Because the court’s discretion to 

admit or exclude impeachment evidence ‘is as broad as necessary 

to deal with the great variety of factual situations in which the 

issue arises’ [citation], a reviewing court ordinarily will uphold 

the trial court’s exercise of discretion [citations].” (Id. at p. 932.)

Applying these principles, we reject Guzman’s argument 

that the trial court abused its discretion by finding his 2003

vehicle theft conviction admissible under Evidence Code section 

3 Evidence Code section 352 provides: “The court in its 

discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 

will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 

substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or 

of misleading the jury.”
8

352. “California courts have repeatedly held that prior 

convictions for burglary, robbery, and other various theft-related 

crimes are probative on the issue of the defendant’s credibility. 

[Citations.]” (People v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 925

(Mendoza).)

On appeal, Guzman does not challenge the trial court’s 

conclusion that the 2003 conviction was not sufficiently remote to 

warrant exclusion. Instead, relying on Mendoza, supra, 78 

Cal.App.4th 918, Guzman argues the trial court erred by not 

explicitly considering the “numerosity” of the prior convictions in 

deciding to admit the 2003 conviction. We disagree. “[T]here is no 

limitation on the number of prior convictions with which the 

defendant’s credibility can be impeached. [Citations.]” (Mendoza, 

supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 927.) Guzman appears to be arguing 

the trial court was required to explicitly state on the record that 

it had considered the possibility that the 2003 conviction might 

be inadmissible because other prior convictions were being 

admitted. Here, we reject both Guzman’s premise and conclusion. 

The court obviously considered the 2003 conviction in light of the 

later convictions. The test is not whether the trial court stated 

every possible reason to admit the evidence or every possible 

reason not to. The test is whether the court abused its broad 

discretion. We find no error in the court’s conclusion that the 

probative value of the 2003 conviction was not substantially 

outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.4

4 Even if we were to find error, we would find no prejudice.

The evidence presented against Guzman was very strong, and 

included direct testimony from the victim and Gomez that

Guzman was the shooter. It is not reasonably probable that 

excluding one of his six prior felony convictions would have 
9

II. Guzman’s unauthorized sentence argument

Guzman next points out that although the abstract of 

judgment reflected that the trial court imposed $120 in court 

security assessments (one $40 assessment for each of Guzman’s 

three convictions; § 1465.8, subd. (a)) and $90 in court facilities

assessments (one $30 assessment for each conviction; Gov. Code, 

§ 70373), this is inconsistent with the court’s oral pronouncement 

of judgment, in which the court imposed $60 ($20 per count) in 

court security assessments and one $30 court construction fee.

Citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), 

Guzman argues: “Implicit in the court’s failure to orally impose 

the assessment[s] was a finding that appellant lacked the ability 

to pay.” He argues that because the assessments listed on the 

abstract of judgment were not orally pronounced as part of the 

sentence, and because they were statutorily unauthorized, they 

must be stricken.

We reject Guzman’s argument that the trial court stated 

and imposed the correct assessment amounts in the abstract of 

judgment and minute order but incorrect amounts during the 

oral pronouncement of judgment based on an implicit finding of 

an inability to pay. Instead, it appears the court made a slight 

error during oral pronouncement of judgment. The assessment 

amounts stated in the abstract of judgment and minute order 

were correct. (See § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1) [“To assist in funding 

court operations, an assessment of forty dollars ($40) shall be 

imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense . . . .”]; Gov. 

resulted in a more favorable outcome for him. (See People v. 

Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
10

Code, § 70373 [“To ensure and maintain adequate funding for 

court facilities, a[] [$30] assessment shall be imposed on every 

conviction for a criminal [misdemeanor or felony] offense.”].) We 

order the oral pronouncement of judgment modified to impose a 

$30 court facilities assessment and a $40 court operations 

assessment for each count. (See People v. Rosales (2014) 222 

Cal.App.4th 1254, 1263.)

III. Guzman’s Dueñas arguments

As discussed above, the trial court imposed three $40 court 

security assessments (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)), and three $30 court 

facilities assessments (Gov. Code, § 70373). The court also 

imposed a $300 restitution fine. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) Relying 

on Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, Guzman now challenges 

the assessments and fine on due process grounds. Guzman 

concedes he did not object to the imposition of the assessments or 

fine. Guzman was sentenced over three months after Dueñas was 

decided. Guzman thus has forfeited his Dueñas argument by 

failing to object. (See People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 

455, 464; People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-

1155.)

We also reject Guzman’s contention, raised in the 

alternative, that his counsel’s failure to object constituted 

ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, an appellant bears the burden of showing 

prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability that but for the 

challenged act or omission of counsel, the appellant would have 

obtained a more favorable result. (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 

Cal.4th 659, 674-676 (Centeno); see also In re Crew (2011) 52 
11

Cal.4th 126, 150 [“If a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

can be determined on the ground of lack of prejudice, a court need 

not decide whether counsel’s performance was deficient. 

[Citation.]”].) Although Guzman asserts he was prejudiced 

because the lack of objection deprived him of a Dueñas hearing, 

he does not address whether the record contains any support for 

the assertion that the trial court would have granted him Dueñas

relief. Upon reviewing the record, we find no indication that 

Guzman was unable to pay the fine and assessments. (Cf. People 

v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1075-1076 [inability to pay 

costs of appointed counsel does not establish inability to pay 

restitution fine or other court-imposed fees].) Further, the court 

could have found him able to pay the fine and assessments from 

prison wages. (See id. at pp. 1075-1077 [any Dueñas error was 

harmless due to defendant’s ability to earn prison wages equaling 

amount of fine and assessments]; People v. Jones (2019) 36 

Cal.App.5th 1028, 1035 [same]; People v. Johnson (2019) 35 

Cal.App.5th 134, 139-140 [same].) Guzman has failed to satisfy 

his burden to show prejudice.
12

DISPOSITION

The oral pronouncement of judgment is ordered modified to 

reflect a $30 court facilities assessment and a $40 court security

assessment for each count. In all other respects, the judgment is 

affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, J. 

We concur: 

MANELLA, P.J. 

WILLHITE, J.