UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 

STACEY CLARK, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

THE AUTO CLUB GROUP, INC., a Michigan Corporation 

 

Defendant.

________________________________/ 

COMPLAINT

The Plaintiff, STACEY CLARK by and through her undersigned counsel, hereby sues 

the Defendant, THE AUTO CLUB GROUP, INC. a Michigan Corporation, (Hereinafter referred 

to as “AAA”) and as grounds thereof states as follows: 

PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS

1. Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant to recover damages and for other 

relief. Plaintiff seeks damages in the form of back pay and unpaid earned bonuses and 

liquidated damages and injunctive relief caused by Defendants’ interference and retaliation for 

Plaintiff’s taking and/or seeking necessary protected leave in violation of Section 102 of the 

Family Medical Leave Act (hereinafter “FMLA”) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §2615 et seq.

JURISDICTION/VENUE

2. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §2617. 

3. Defendant, THE AUTO CLUB GROUP, INC. a is a Michigan corporation. 

Defendant, at all times material hereto conducted business in and throughout the State of Florida

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and particularly, as it relates to the claims herein, within Indian River County, Florida and was 

and is in the business of providing automobile insurance services, to citizens and entities located 

in Indian River County, Florida. 

4. All causes of action arose in Indian River County in that Plaintiff performed work 

for Defendant in Indian River County and all violations of law alleged herein occurred in Indian 

River County, Florida. 

5. Plaintiff is a resident of Indian River County, Florida, over the age of eighteen

and otherwise sui juris. 

COMMON ALLEGATIONS

6. Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative or statutory prerequisites prior to 

initiating this action and has fulfilled all conditions precedent.

7. Plaintiff is employed by Defendant working with AAA from approximately 

November 2017 through present. Plaintiff was hired as an Insurance Agent and has worked full 

time as such for AAA since being hired. 

8. On or about October 7, 2019, Plaintiffs applied for Intermittent Family Medical 

Leave due to an ongoing permanent serious medical condition. The Request for medical leave 

under the FMLA (hereinafter “First Request”) was granted on or about October 10, 2019 and 

covered the period of time from September 19, 2019 through September 19, 2020. 

9. Pursuant to the First Request, absences from work between 10/7/2019 and 

10/11/2019 were considered covered FMLA leave under the First Request and Plaintiff was

permitted to take FMLA leave for episodic flare ups: 4 times per month, up to 2 days per episode

going forward. Plaintiff through the effective time period covered by the First Request regularly 

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averaged taking at least one day off from work per week because of her serious medical 

condition and Defendant regularly approved of the same as permitted FMLA leave without issue.

10. When the First Request leave expired, Plaintiff sought to renew the request for 

continued intermittent medical leave. On or about November 11, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a 

Certification of Health Care Provider of Employees Serious Medical Condition, Form WH-380-

E, to Defendant seeking to continue the previously requested and granted FMLA leave for the 

next year (herein after referred to as “Second Request”). The Certification indicated that Plaintiff 

had been seen by the certifying physician to treat her on-going serious medical condition on 

multiple prior dates, including on November 2, 2021. 

11. Plaintiff’s request to extend her intermittent FMLA leave was granted on 

November 12, 2021. The Designation Notice Plaintiff received acknowledged that because her 

leave would be “intermittent and unscheduled”, it would not be possible to provide the hours, 

days, or times that would be counted against her FMLA leave entitlement in advance and only 

required that she substitute and use any paid leave when using her FMLA leave in accordance 

with AAA policy. 

12. On or about November 17, 2021, plaintiff received a write up for failure to follow 

company policy and procedures related to her doctor’s appointment absence from work on 

November 2, 2021. As a result of the write up Plaintiff was denied a substantial bonus she would 

have otherwise received. Plaintiff disputed the November 17, 2021 write up and demanded that 

the November 2, 2021 absence be treated as FMLA leave and that she be paid the bonus she 

earned, but Defendant has refused to do either despite multiple demands. 

13. The Family Medical Leave Act does not require any particular prior notice when 

taking approved intermittent FMLA leave beyond “reasonable notice” to the employer when 

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possible. Nor does the FMLA require advance notice or approval for emergency medical care 

covered under the act. The FMLA specifically allows for an individual to use intermittent FMLA 

leave for medical appointments, which may either be planned in advance or for emergency 

medical care for an on-going serious medical condition. 

14. Plaintiff experienced a Medical/Dental Emergency that required immediate 

medical care and ongoing care and treatment to treat and surgically correct a dental issue that 

was causing plaintiff extreme pain and discomfort and hindered her ability to eat, talk or chew 

until corrected (hereinafter “Emergency Dental Care”). As a result, Plaintiff had to seek 

unplanned and planned emergency care and treatment for her Emergency Dental Care on 

3/16/22, 3/18/22 ,3/21/22, 4/5/22 and 6/9/22. 

15. Plaintiff provided Defendant with as much advance notice as possible of the need 

for the Emergency Dental Care and even submitted to Defendant a doctor’s letter detailing the 

need for the medical care and treatment and seeking her excusal from work for the care and 

treatment required and requested that the same be treated as permitted leave under the FMLA. 

16. The absence from work on 11/2/2021 was specifically covered under the 

approved First Leave Request and Second Leave Request and the absences on 3/16/22, 3/18/22. 

3/21/22 and 6/9/22 were for emergency care and treatment of a serious medical condition and 

thus covered under the FMLA. 

17. Plaintiff has at all times given as much advance notice as possible directly to her 

supervisor of her intent to take any protected time off from work under the FMLA. She, 

however, was unable to document the FMLA absences as she was denied access the Defendant’s 

HR software “People Soft ‘, a matter that is well documented and due to no fault of the Plaintiff

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and received conflicting directives from her employer on who or to whom such requests must be 

made or submitted.

18. Despite giving notice, when possible, Plaintiff on or about April 8. 2022 received 

a Performance Improvement Plan/Write Up (hereinafter “PIP”) for multiple absences which 

included for absences for taking protected leave under the FMLA. A Copy of the PIP is attached 

hereto as Exhibit ”A.” Additionally, Plaintiff’s supervisor, Bud Clark, made it known to Plaintiff 

and others that he did not approve of Plaintiff taking any time off from work for permitted 

FMLA leave and began a campaign to harass, exclude, ostracize plaintiff and issue false write 

ups against Plaintiff for taking or seeking protected FMLA leave, including the PIP. 

19. The PIP asserted that on March 21, 2022 plaintiff arrived late and left work early 

for a medical appointment allegedly without prior approval from management and/or allegedly 

not notifying management of the same. The allegation, as contained within the write up, was and 

is deliberately and intentionally false. Plaintiff had prior approval for intermittent FMLA leave 

and as such was not required to obtain any additional approval to take the same. Second, 

Plaintiff did in fact notify her manager in advance by e-mail of the fact that she would be 

required to have an emergency medical visit for Emergency Dental Care that afternoon and 

would be leaving the office early. Copies of e-mails in Plaintiff’s possession show that 

Plaintiff’s supervisor Bud Clark was put on prior notice of her having to leave the office for the 

Emergency Dental Care. In fact, Mr. Clark responded to the e-mail by e-mailing Plaintiff back 

“good luck”. As such Defendant was in fact informed prior of the need for the Emergency 

Dental Care received on March 21, 2022. Accordingly, the inclusion of that absence in the PIP 

was an intentional and deliberate act of interference and retaliation against Plaintiff for taking or 

seeking protected leave under the FMLA.

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20. The PIP next indicates that Plaintiff was being written up for arriving late to work 

on March 28, 2022 while “customers were waiting for their appointment”. This allegation is 

demonstratively false. On the date in question Plaintiff in fact clocked in at exactly 8:31 a.m., 

which was the exact time that she was required to start work. A review of the camera footage 

from the office will also verify this fact. Additionally, the office door requires an electronic 

entry passcode that Plaintiff used at that time which will prove and establish that she was on time 

on that date and that inclusion of this false allegation in the PIP was another act of deliberate 

interference with and retaliation against Plaintiff for exercising her rights under the FMLA.

21. Mr. Clark, via the PIP, next alleged that Plaintiff left work early without making 

prior arrangements or notifying management on March 30, 2022. This is a false allegation given 

documentation Plaintiff possess that directly refutes the same. Specifically, documents show that 

on March 30, 2022 at exactly 2:46 p.m. Plaintiff sent out a Teams Chat message to her 

supervisor Mr. Clark and management stating “heads up, I have to leave at 4:15 today”. Plaintiff 

actually left work at 4:45 that day as she was with a client until that time. As such, the assertion 

that Plaintiff did not give prior notice of the need to leave, which leave was necessary to attend a 

charity event on behalf of the company, is provably false and was intentionally included in the 

PIP as an act of interference with and retaliation for my client exercising her rights under the 

FMLA.

22. Mr. Clark also falsely alleged in PIP that Plaintiff allegedly took an extended 

lunch without making arrangements with or notifying management on April 4, 2022. Again, this 

allegation is provably false. Specifically, a review of the work phone log for Plaintiff shows that 

not only did she not take an extended lunch on that date, she took no lunch at all and in fact 

worked through the same. Also, Team Chat messages sent by Plaintiff to her supervisor during 

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this point also establish that she was at work during lunch and did not take any extended lunch as 

falsely accused of doing. This allegation was included in the PIP as an intentional act of 

interference and retaliation against Plaintiff for exercising her rights under the FMLA.

23. Finally, Mr. Clark falsely accused Plaintiff of leaving early without making prior 

arrangements or notifying management on April 5, 2022. This allegation is demonstratively 

false. First, on April 4, 2022 at 5:14 p.m. Plaintiff sent to Mr. Clark a text message stating “I 

need to leave at 12:45 tomorrow extended lunch be back by 4 p.m.”. This text was in regard to

her ongoing Emergency Dental Care that Plaintiff had to schedule for the following day wherein 

she received and provided to Defendant a doctor’s note dated April 5, 2022 stating “please 

excuse Stacy Clark from work today Tuesday April 5 as she had an emergency dental 

appointment at my office, if you have any questions please give my office a call 772-567-2237”. 

Thus, not only was prior notice given to management of the need for the additional emergency

FMLA leave prior to taking the same, but Plaintiff followed up by providing documentation 

demonstrating that absence was for an emergency medical dental appointment. Thus, the 

assertions made by Defendant in the PIP are deliberately false, and retaliatory and intended to 

interfere with and retaliate against Plaintiff for exercising her rights under the FMLA.

24. Plaintiff objected to and appealed the PIP and made multiple demands of 

Defendant to remove the same from her employment record and that no further acts of retaliation 

or interference be taken against her. Defendant has and continues to refuse to meet her demands 

or otherwise cease and desist from taking acts of interference and retaliation against Plaintiff in 

violation of the FMLA.

25. Defendant has an continues to retaliate against and interfere with Plaintiffs rights

and efforts to exercise her rights under the FMLA by falsely accusing her of violating various 

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company policies and procedures, denying her benefits and services provided to other employees 

and creating a hostile work environment because of Plaintiff’s efforts to exercise her rights under 

the FMLA or because of her objections to Defendants violation of the same. 

26. Plaintiff remains in fear that at any given time Defendant will seek her dismissal 

from work without cause or reason, falsely accuse of her violating company policies and/or 

procedures or otherwise deny her benefits and compensation she is due or has earned. 

27. The Family Medical Leave Act specifically prohibits an employer from 

interfering with an employee’s rights to exercise their rights under the FMLA including the right 

to take intermittent medical leave for a serious medical condition or seek and take leave for 

emergency medical services or care. 

28. Instead of permitting Plaintiff to exercise those rights freely and without 

interference she has been met with extreme hostility, anger, and write ups and has suffered 

additional anxiety and depression as a result of the actions that have been taken against her, 

which have in fact necessitated the need for additional emergency medical care and treatment. 

Further, Plaintiff has also been denied benefits and compensation that she is entitled to in 

retaliation for exercising her rights. 

COUNT I: INTERFERENCE WITH FMLA PROTECTED LEAVE

29. The allegations in paragraphs 1 through 28 are reasserted herein.

30. This is an action for damages and injunctive relief caused by Defendant’s 

interference with Plaintiff’s attempts to take the necessary medical leave, and the subsequent 

disciplinary action taken against her for taking protected leave and the denial of benefits and 

compensation earned in violation of Section 102 of the Family Medical Leave Act (hereinafter 

“FMLA”) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §2615 et seq. 

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31. The jurisdiction of this Court over this controversy is invoked pursuant to 29 

U.S.C. §2617.

32. Plaintiff was an “employee” of Defendant within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §2611 

(2) (A) during all times material hereto.

33. Defendant was an “employer” of Plaintiff within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §2611 

(4) (A) at all times relevant hereto.

34. During all times material, Plaintiff suffered from multiple “serious health 

conditions” as defined by the FMLA in that Plaintiff (a) experienced periods of incapacity due to 

a serious medical condition (b) required continuing treatment by a health care provider; and/or

(c) required emergency medical care and treatment.

35. During all times material, Plaintiff provided notice to her employer regarding her

need for protected leave under the FMLA, as such notice was practicable, pursuant to the 

requirements of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.

36. Defendant failed to comply with all notice requirements pursuant to the FMLA, 

and is therefore precluded from taking any adverse employment action against Plaintiff for any 

failure on Plaintiff’s part to comply with the FMLA.

37. During all times material, Plaintiff was willing and able to provide medical 

certification from her health care providers justifying Plaintiff’s need for such leave and in fact 

did so on more than one occasion. 

38. During all times material, Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s use of FMLA 

protective leave by failing or refusing to allow Plaintiff to take FMLA leave, by failing to

approve FMLA leave, by interfering with Plaintiff’s attempts to take FMLA leave, by issuing 

formal disciplinary write ups of Plaintiff for taking and using protected leave and by denying her 

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benefits and compensation earned as a result of such write up and refusing to rescind the write 

ups or pay the compensation due and owed after demand was made all in violation of Section 29 

U.S.C. §2615 et seq., as Plaintiff was disciplined, subjected to retaliation and denied benefits and 

compensation as a direct result of her exercise of her rights under the FMLA act. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court will:

A. Enter a judgment that Defendant’s discipline and denial of earned benefits and 

compensation as more fully set forth hereinabove, violated Title 29 U.S.C. §2615 of the Family 

and Medical Leave Act of 1993; 

B. Enter a judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §2616 (a)(1)(A)(i)(II) against the 

Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff for monetary losses Plaintiff sustained as a direct result of 

Defendant’s illegal acts against Plaintiff;

C. Enter a judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §2617 for reinstatement of all unpaid 

benefits due Plaintiff, with a mandate that she be paid all future benefits and wages earned; 

D. Enter a judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §2617 against the Defendant and in favor 

of Plaintiff for the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in connection with 

the instant action;

E. Enter a judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §2617 (a)(1)(A) in favor of Plaintiff for 

liquidated damage to be an additional amount equal to the sum of actual damages plus interest; 

and

F. Award Plaintiff such further and additional relief as this Court deems just and 

proper. 

COUNT II: FMLA RETALIATION BY DEFENDANTS

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39. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 28 and 30 to 38 as if fully set forth 

herein.

40. During all times material, Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff because of 

Plaintiff’s use of FMLA protected leave by writing up disciplining, denying benefits and bonuses 

and subjecting Plaintiff to a hostile work environment because of her attempts to exercise her

rights under the FMLA.

41. Further, as a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff’s use of job protected medical 

leave, Defendant, its agents, and/or employees, who were at all times acting in the course and 

scope of their employment with Defendant, subjected plaintiff to the illegal acts of retaliation as 

alleged herein.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court will:

A. Enter a judgment that Defendant’s discipline and denial of earned benefits and 

compensation as more fully set forth hereinabove violated Title 29 U.S.C. §2615 of the Family 

and Medical Leave Act of 1993;

B. Enter a judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §2617 (a)(1)(A)(i)(II) against Defendant 

and in favor of Plaintiff for monetary losses Plaintiff sustained as a direct result of Defendant’s 

illegal retaliation;

C. Enter a judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §2617 for reinstatement of all unpaid 

benefits due Plaintiff, with a mandate that she be paid all future benefits and wages earned;

D. Enter a judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §2617 against Defendant and in favor of 

Plaintiff for the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in connection with the 

instant action;

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E. Enter a judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §2617 (a)(1)(A) in favor of Plaintiff for 

liquidated damages to be an additional amount equal to the sum of the actual damages plus 

interest; and

F. Award Plaintiff such further and additional relief that this Court deems just and 

proper. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands jury trial on all issues so triable as a matter of right.

 CHRISTOPHER C COPELAND, P.A.

 1003 W Indiantown Road, Ste 208 

 Jupiter, FL 33458 

 561-691-9048 (office) 

 866-259-0719 (fax)

 Chris@CopelandPA.com 

__/s/ Christopher C Copeland_________ 

 CHRISTOPHER C. COPELAND 

 Florida Bar #938076 

 Attorney for Plaintiff

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Exhibit "A"

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Exhibit "A"

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