UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

West Palm Beach Division 

BRITTANY ROBERSON, REBECCA 

FREEMAN, BIANCA VIÑAS, TIFFANY 

KING, and TRESHA THOMPSON, 

individually and on behalf of others similarly 

situated,

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

HEALTH CAREER INSTITUTE LLC (dba 

HCI COLLEGE LLC and HCI 

ACQUISITION LLC), FLORIAN 

EDUCATION INVESTORS LLC, and 

STEVEN W. HART,

 Defendants. 

Civil Action No. 9:22-cv-81883-RAR

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION 

TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................... 1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................ 1

ARGUMENT............................................................................................................................................. 2

I. Plaintiffs Have Established Personal Jurisdiction over Florian and Hart. .................. 2

II. Plaintiffs’ Complaint Is Not a Shotgun Pleading. ....................................................... 7

III. Each of Plaintiffs’ Counts States a Claim for Relief. .................................................. 7

A. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States Contract Claims. .......................................................... 11

B. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States FDUTPA Claims. ......................................................... 15

C. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States a Claim for Unjust Enrichment. ................................. 20

D. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States a Claim Under ECOA. ................................................... 22

E. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States a Claim Under Title VI. ................................................. 28

CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................................28

REQUEST FOR HEARING................................................................................................................31

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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 40 (“FAC”), describes a pattern of predatory 

conduct by a for-profit nursing school, Health Career Institute LLC, dba HCI College LLC and HCI 

Acquisition LLC (“HCI”); its parent company, Florian Education Investors LLC (“Florian”); and 

the chief executive of both organizations, Steven W. Hart (“Hart”). HCI operates a professional 

nursing program that it advertises as being “designed to provide educational and clinical experiences 

preparing students for employment positions as a Registered Nurse (RN) in hospitals or comparable 

facilities.” It also claims that the program is accelerated, offered at convenient schedules, and 

includes tutoring assistance. But instead of preparing students for careers as RNs and helping them 

to achieve economic advancement, Defendants provide an insufficient product financed by federal 

and private loans they know students will be unable to repay, place arbitrary barriers in the way of 

student advancement, and ultimately trap students in debt. Worse, Defendants target their predatory 

product to Black students, believing that such students will be more likely to require an extension of 

credit and will thus provide a steady stream of federal money. 

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 

12(b)(6). ECF No. 55 (“MTD”). None of their arguments is availing. Plaintiffs have established 

that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants, who regularly avail themselves of the 

forum state, and each claim is well pleaded. Defendants’ motion should be denied. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Brittany Roberson, Rebecca Freeman, Bianca Viñas, Tiffany King, and Tresha 

Thompson (“Plaintiffs”) were students in HCI’s Associate of Science in Nursing Program (the 

“RN Program”) between 2020 and 2022. FAC ¶¶ 37– 41. Plaintiffs Roberson, Freeman, Viñas, and 

King attended HCI’s West Palm Beach campus (“HCI-WPB”), while Plaintiff Thompson attended 

HCI’s Ft. Lauderdale campus (“HCI-FTL”). Id. Defendant Florian controls and manages 

Defendant HCI, and Defendant Hart directs both companies; together, Defendants are engaged in 

a scheme to enrich themselves while damaging students. Id. ¶¶ 5, 42– 44, 81. 

Each Plaintiff entered into a contract with Defendants HCI and Florian. Id. ¶¶ 121, 133, 

255, 303, 349, 375, 417. These contracts consist of the terms of each Plaintiff’s enrollment 

agreement, the terms of the college catalog that each Plaintiff received, and other college 

publications. Id. ¶¶ 121, 133. Among other things, these contracts state that the RN Program “is 

designed to provide . . . clinical experiences leading to employment in entry-level positions as 

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registered nurses in hospitals or comparable facilities,” id. ¶ 128; that “[a] grade of (80%) or higher 

is required for all Nursing Core” courses and “all written and practical examinations,” id. ¶¶ 211, 

132; and that students would have to pass the Assessment Technologies Institute (“ATI”) 

Comprehensive Predictor exam with a stated minimum score, with one retake permitted, in order 

to graduate, id. ¶ 130. Defendants HCI and Florian breached these contracts by failing to provide 

meaningful clinical experience, enforcing new, arbitrary grading requirements, and erecting new, 

arbitrary barriers to graduation. E.g., id. ¶¶ 190– 91, 194, 204, 237– 39, 267, 321, 358, 383, 424. 

Defendants also engaged in deceptive and unfair trade practices. They misrepresented the 

quality of the RN Program and the qualifications of their instructors, id. ¶¶ 187– 89, 195, 423; and 

the availability of meaningful clinical experiences, id. ¶¶ 190– 91, 194, 267, 321, 358, 383, 424. 

When it became clear that the HCI-WPB RN Program was at risk of termination by the Florida 

Board of Nursing (“BON”) in 2018 for failure to achieve programmatic accreditation, Defendants 

designed and implemented a two-pronged scheme to continue enrolling students and taking their 

money, without actually improving the program or brining it in line with BON requirements: they 

created a sham “new” RN Program at HCI-WPB, e.g., id. ¶¶ 93– 95, 105– 06, 261, 301, 308, 351, 

388; and they placed uniform, yet arbitrary and unannounced, obstacles in front of students that 

effectively blocked them from graduating from the RN Program and sitting for the NCLEX-RN, 

the licensure exam for registered nurses, e.g., id. ¶¶ 203– 205. Defendants steered students into 

risky retail installment contracts despite lacking the license required by Florida law. Id. ¶¶ 137–

140. And Defendants blocked students’ advancement through the RN Program, and refused to 

release their academic transcripts, until they paid payments on their retail installment contracts. Id.

¶¶ 167– 69. 

Defendants sell a predatory product, and they intentionally focus their marketing on a 

Black audience. Id. ¶ 527. The vast majority of the models featured in their advertisements are 

Black. Id. ¶¶ 113– 14. And their enrollment demographics show that their racial targeting is 

successful, as Black students are disproportionately represented among RN Program enrollees 

when compared to the demographics of the surrounding geographical area. Id. ¶ 26(e).

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs Have Established Personal Jurisdiction over Florian and Hart. 

In their FAC, Plaintiffs named HCI’s parent corporation, Florian Education Investors LLC 

(“Florian”), and its chairman and owner, Steven Hart, as Defendants. Although both are domiciled 

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in Connecticut, Plaintiffs lay out enough factual allegations to support a finding that these parties 

are subject to personal jurisdiction in this matter. 

A. Legal Standard 

When assessing whether personal jurisdiction exists over a non-resident defendant, the 

Eleventh Circuit first looks to the requirements of the operative state’s long-arm statute and then 

to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires that the defendant have

minimum contacts with the forum state. SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Narra, 58 F.4th 1211, 1222 (11th 

Cir. 2023). Further, “[w]hen a federal court uses a state long-arm statute, because the extent of the 

statute is governed by state law, the federal court is required to construe it as would the state’s 

supreme court.” Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir.1998). See also Venetian 

Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989). 

Under the Florida long-arm statute, there are two ways to establish jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant—specific and general. Fla. Stat. § 48.193. General jurisdiction requires a 

showing that “the defendant’s connections with the forum state are so substantial that it is 

unnecessary to establish a relationship between this state and the alleged wrongful actions.” Aegis 

Def. Servs., LLC v. Gilbert, 222 So. 3d 656, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). The requirements of 

general jurisdiction are satisfied “where a nonresident defendant’s activities are ‘extensive and 

pervasive, in that a significant portion of the defendant’s business operations or revenue [are] 

derived from established commercial relationships in the state.’” Id (quoting Trs. of Columbia 

Univ. v. Ocean World, S.A., 12 So.3d 788, 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)) (alteration in original). 

When a corporate parent exercises sufficient control over a subsidiary, that control establishes an 

agency relationship and supports the exercise of general jurisdiction over the parent based on the 

presence in the state of the subsidiary. TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc. v. Santiso, 980 So. 2d 

1149, 1153 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 2008). Specific jurisdiction requires a showing that “the alleged 

activities or actions of the defendant are directly connected to the forum state.” Aegis Def. Servs., 

LLC, 222 So. 3d at 659. As relevant here, specific jurisdiction can be established if a defendant or 

its agent “[o]perat[es], conduct[s], engag[es] in, or carryi[es] on a business or business venture in 

[Florida] or ha[s] an office or agency in [Florida],” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), and such activities

are connected to the cause of action, Yarger v. Convergence Aviation Ltd, 310 So. 3d 1276, 1280 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021). “[W]hether a nonresident is conducting business in Florida for purposes 

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of the long-arm statute turns on the nature, not the extent, of the nonresident’s activities in Florida.” 

Oriental Imports & Exps. v. Maduro & Curiel’s, 701 F.2d 889, 892 (11th Cir. 1983). 

A plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant. Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268–69 (11th 

Cir. 2002). Where the defendant submits affidavits contesting personal jurisdiction, “the burden 

traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction unless those 

affidavits contain only conclusory assertions that the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction.” Id.

at 1269 (citing Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir.1999)). And if the 

allegations from a plaintiff's complaint and supporting evidence conflict with the defendant’s 

submitted affidavit, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. 

(citing Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510 at 1514 (11th Cir. 1990)).

B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Support Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant Florian. 

The FAC alleges that Florian maintained sufficient control over HCI, its subsidiary, to

establish an agency relationship and support the exercise of general jurisdiction over Florian, based 

on HCI’s presence in Florida. A subsidiary’s contacts with the forum state may be imputed to the 

foreign parent and subject the parent to personal jurisdiction. See Meier, 288 F.3d at 1272. This 

agency theory of personal jurisdiction also extends to other relationships, such as the relationship 

between members of a limited liability company and the company itself. Hard Candy, LLC v. Hard 

Candy Fitness, LLC, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1240–41 (S.D. Fla. 2015). Florian was co-founded by 

Steven Hart and Larry Brown and was “established to build a multi-campus and online school 

group focused on the allied health sector.” FAC ¶ 24. And Florian did just that by acquiring HCI 

College (then known as Health Career College) on December 31, 2013. FAC ¶ 80. HCI’s statement 

of legal control, which it included in its college catalogs, describes HCI as a “for-profit Limited 

Liability Corporation and a subsidy [sic] of Florian Education Investors LLC.” FAC ¶ 43. Plaintiffs 

allege that Florian is a managing member of HCI, id, and that “Florian is an active owner [of the 

school] and has been intimately involved in the operation of HCI since 2013,” FAC ¶ 81. Plaintiffs 

further alleged that both Florian and HCI share a corporate director in the person of Steven Hart, 

and that Hart “can direct” the president of HCI. FAC ¶ 44. HCI’s CEO is given autonomy from 

Florian but is subject to “Authorization Guidelines” that are presumably promulgated by Florian 

and/or Hart. Hart Decl., ECF No. 55-1, ¶ 13. Finally, Plaintiffs submitted proof of Florian’s deep 

financial connection to its subsidiary in the form of a Florida UCC financing statement wherein it 

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obtained a loan in exchange for assignment of student debt obligations originated by HCI, FAC ¶ 

31, and did so as “Florian Education Investors LLC dba Heath Careen Institute LLC,” UCC Filing, 

ECF No. 40-1. These relationships are sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction 

over Florian. See TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc., 980 So. 2d at 1153.

In the alternative, the nature of Florian’s business activities in Florida subjects it to the 

specific jurisdiction of this Court, see Oriental Imports & Exps., 701 F.2d at 892, and the FAC 

alleges a significant connection between the causes of action and Florian’s activities in Florida,

see Yarger, 310 So. 3d at 1280. As noted in Plaintiffs’ FAC, Florian has and exercises control over 

HCI, its wholly owned Florida subsidiary. FAC ¶¶ 43, 81. HCI’s business operations in Florida 

are at the center of each count in the FAC. E.g., ¶¶ 461, 466, 470, 492 (counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 concern 

“the provision of educational services by HCI’s RN program”); ¶¶ 475, 482 (counts 4 and 5 

concern contracts for products or services); ¶ 501 (count 8 concerns the sale of products or 

services), ¶¶ 513, 527 (counts 9 and 10 concern the extension of credit for educational services).

Florian’s control over HCI thus supports the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Florian under 

section 48.193(1)(a)(1). Cf. MacMillan-Bloedel v. Canada, 391 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1980) (a nonresident corporation was not “doing business” for jurisdictional purposes even though 

its wholly-owned subsidiary was engaged in business in Florida, because the nonresident 

corporation was not shown to have “control” over the subsidiary).

Finally, exercising personal jurisdiction over Florian would comport with the due process 

requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a three-part test to 

determine whether this test is satisfied: (1) whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to at 

least one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum; (2) whether the nonresident defendant 

purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus 

invoking the benefit of the forum state’s laws; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. 

Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of Florian’s control of HCI, a Florida company, and Florian 

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Florida when it purchased 

and operated HCI, and when it obtained a loan in exchange for assignment of student debt obligations 

originated by HCI. And “Florida has a significant interest in adjudicating a dispute involving services 

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provided by [an] out-of-state [corporation] to its residents, concerning [schools] located within its 

borders.” See Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 259 (11th Cir. 1996). 

C. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Support Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant Hart. 

Defendants submitted an affidavit from Hart, on behalf of Florian, in support of their 

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In it, Hart confirms that: (1) he is currently the 

Chairman of HCI and that this role permits him to direct the CEO of HCI; (2) he is also the CEO 

of Florian; (3) HCI is wholly owned by Florian; (4) and HCI’s CEO is given autonomy from 

Florian but is subject to “Authorization Guidelines” that are presumably promulgated by Florian 

and/or Hart. ECF No. 55-1. Notably absent from Hart’s affidavit is clarification on what his role 

at HCI was. The relevant time period of this action reaches back to 2019 and on his own LinkedIn 

page, Hart describes himself as being “Co-CEO” of HCI from 2013 to 2019.

1 Additionally, in its 

Annual Reports to the Florida Board of Nursing, HCI lists its owner as Steven Hart. FAC ¶ 42.

Hart also founded Hart Capital LLC, which is allegedly an investment company but, for unclear 

reasons, operates under the North American Industry Classification System (“NAICS”), code 

611310, which is the NAICS code reserved for Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools. 

FAC ¶ 45. Implicit in these overlapping corporate roles and layers of authority is the fact that Mr. 

Hart directed HCI’s wrongful actions that are at the heart of the matter at hand.

As stated supra, Part I.A, a showing of specific personal jurisdiction requires that “the 

alleged activities or actions of the defendant are directly connected to the forum state.” Aegis Def. 

Servs., LLC, 222 So. 3d. at 659. Specific jurisdiction can be established if a defendant or its agent 

“[o]perat[es], conduct[s], engag[es] in, or carryi[es] on a business or business venture in [Florida] 

or ha[s] an office or agency in [Florida],” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), and such activities are 

connected to the cause of action, Yarger, 310 So. 3d at 1280. The connections between the causes 

of action and business actions of HCI spelled out supra in Part I.B doubly apply to Hart, given his 

instrumental role as the head of both Florian and HCI. Here, Plaintiffs allege key elements of 

Hart’s relationship with his agent, HCI. At present, he maintains the ability, as the Chairman, to 

direct HCI’s CEO, FAC ¶ 44; was formerly the “Co-CEO” himself; and presumably oversees 

HCI’s broader policies and business priorities through Authorization Guidelines, ECF No. 55-1, 

¶ 13. 

1 https://perma.cc/J5HD-B7FF?type=image, as preserved on April 13, 2023. 

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These factors satisfy the requirements of Florida’s long-arm statute, and also fulfill the 

requirements of Due Process. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A., 736 F.3d at 1355. The acts forming 

the basis for the claims at issue did occur in Florida. They were done by HCI under the direction of 

its parent company, Florian, and by Hart as Chairman (and former Co-CEO) of HCI and CEO of 

Florian. These causes of action arose there because Hart purposefully availed himself of this forum 

state as the home of his business, HCI. Furthermore, Florida has a reasonable interest in exercising 

jurisdiction over businessmen like Mr. Hart, who avail themselves of the state for the engagement 

of business ventures and, in so doing, affect Florida residents. See Robinson, 74 F.3d at 259. 

For these reasons, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over all three Defendants is 

appropriate. Given the degree and extent of corporate control that Plaintiffs allege Florian and Hart 

wield and exercise over HCI, Plaintiffs assert that it would be improper to remove either of these 

co-Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. At a minimum, Plaintiffs should have the 

opportunity to engage in discovery with respect to the issue of jurisdiction. 

II. Plaintiffs’ Complaint Is Not a Shotgun Pleading. 

A. The FAC Provides Defendant Fair Notice of Plaintiffs’ Allegations.

Above all, in considering whether the FAC is a “shotgun pleading,” the most fundamental 

question is whether “it affords [the d]efendant fair notice of [the p]laintiff’s allegations against it.” 

Hunter v. Carnival Corp., 609 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2022). While Defendants make a 

litany of complaints about the FAC, and claim to be left confused by it, the Partial Motion to Dismiss 

that Defendants filed on January 31, 2023 (ECF No. 27) in response to the initial Complaint tells 

a different story. The first six paragraphs of that filing accurately summarize nine of the ten counts 

contained in the FAC, even citing paragraphs in the initial Complaint (which is substantially 

similar to the FAC) that support each count. Similarly, the below excerpt from Defendants’ 

February 3, 2023, media response to this lawsuit also makes clear Defendants understand the 

claims against them:

The facts are that HCI College has never . . . sought to block its nursing students 

from graduating or passing the NCLEX exam. HCI College has also never 

misrepresented its accreditation status . . . HCI is accredited, and its graduates are 

fully prepared and eligible to sit for the NCLEX-RN.2

2 HCI College Important Information Regarding Nursing Schools in Florida and HCI 

College, located at https://www.hci.edu/area-news/25144-important-information-regardingnursing-schools-in-florida-and-hci-college.com (last accessed Apr. 11, 2023). 

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Defendants cannot plausibly claim that they do not have notice of Plaintiffs’ 

allegations against them.

B. Plaintiffs Did Not Commit the “Sins” That Characterize Shotgun Pleadings. 

As this Court recently explained, The Eleventh Circuit has identified four “sins” that 

characterize shotgun pleadings: (1) “containing multiple counts where each count adopts the 

allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and 

the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; (2) “being replete with conclusory, vague, 

and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) “not separating 

into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief”; and (4) [a]sserting multiple claims 

against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which 

acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” In re Mednax Servs., 

Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 603 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (quoting Weiland 

v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321– 23 (11th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiffs’ FAC 

commits none of these sins.

1. The FAC Does Not Adopt Allegations of Preceding Counts into Each Count. 

While Plaintiffs’ FAC does contain multiple counts, ten to be exact, not one of those counts 

adopts the allegations of all previous counts; therefore, Plaintiffs have not committed Sin #1. 

2. The FAC is Not Replete with Conclusory, Vague, and Immaterial Facts Not 

Obviously Connected to Any Particular Cause of Action. 

Defendants’ Motion is full of “buzz words” used to describe shotgun pleadings, such as 

“conclusory,” “vague, and “immaterial.” MTD. at 7, 8, 11– 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 27, 33–

35. Upon closer inspection, however, Defendants’ “conclusory, vague, and immaterial” argument 

is targeted at only two issues in the FAC; each addressed in turn below. 

a. The Court’s Jurisdiction Over Defendants Florian and Hart 

Defendants argue that the FAC does not establish that the Court has personal jurisdiction 

over Florian and Hart. MTD at 5– 17. This issue is addressed in detail supra Part I, and Plaintiffs 

reiterate here that the FAC states sufficient factual allegations to support the extension of personal 

jurisdiction to both non-resident Defendants.

b. Ambiguity As to Grading/Advancement Policy and Testing Policy

Defendants claim to not understand Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning changes to its 

grading/advancement and testing policies. MTD at 18– 19. Defendants’ feigned confusion is replete 

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with irony given that the FAC merely repeats the terminology used in Defendants’ enrollment

agreements and catalogs. Indeed, the materials published by Defendants, by design, contain nearly 

enough double speak and contradiction for Defendants to deny any “policy” a student might 

challenge. However, as explained in the FAC, the enrollment agreement signed by class members

before beginning the RN Program, FAC ¶ 121—which is only a few pages long, which Defendants 

did not reserve the right to amend, id. ¶ 127, and which Defendants themselves say binds the 

students and the Institution, id. ¶ 134—sets forth the following “Graduation Requirements:”3

I understand that in order to graduate from the program and to receive a certificate 

of completion, diploma or degree I must successfully complete the required number 

of scheduled credit/clock hours as specified in the Catalog and on the Enrollment 

Agreement, pass all written and practical examinations with a minimum score of 

80%, pass the ATI Predictor with a minimum score of 95% with only two attempts 

permitted (second attempt is at the sole cost of the student), complete all required 

clinical hours, achieve “Green Light” status with Virtual ATI (VATI), and satisfy 

all financial obligations to the College.

Id. ¶ 257. This graduation requirement imposes two separate exam obligations on students. One is 

an obligation to achieve a minimum score on the “ATI Predictor,” and second is the obligation to 

achieve a minimum of 80% on “all other written and practical exams.” The college catalog states 

that “[a] grade of 80% or higher is required for all Nursing Core” courses. FAC ¶ 132.

Defendants complain that “it is impossible to determine which of any of the particular 

exams alleged is a ‘specialty exam,’ ‘predictor’ exam, or ‘exit exam,’ or all three.” MTD at 19. 

For the sake of clarity, Plaintiffs provide the following explanation of these terms, referencing 

Defendants’ own published material as outlined in the FAC. When used in the FAC, the term 

“predictor exam” refers to an exam that “serve[s] as a predictor of the student’s success on the 

NCLEX and a guide on what to focus on before the NCLEX.” FAC ¶ 222. The ATI exam is one 

such “predictor exam.” As explained in the FAC, “the ATI Comprehensive Predictor exam [was] 

the only exam-related graduation requirement for the RN Programs listed in their corresponding 

HCI enrollment agreements and college catalogs.” FAC ¶ 232. When used in the complaint, the 

term “exit exam” refers to the exam administered at the end of the Capstone course, passage of 

which is required before a student may graduate and take the NCLEX. Id. ¶ 220. The phrase 

3 To the extent that some enrollment agreements did not include reference to the 80% 

requirement, this was set forth in the HCI College catalog and the “50% Rule” was never disclosed. 

FAC ¶¶ 203, 204, 211. 

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“specialty exam” refers to the end of semester exams, usually created by ATI or Kaplan, which 

students had to pass at the end of Nursing I, Nursing II, and Nursing III. FAC ¶¶ 204-209. Plaintiffs 

understand these “specialty exams” to be the “other written and practical exams” referenced in the 

enrollment agreement. The FAC explains that these are the tests on which Defendants imposed the 

“50% Rule.” FAC ¶¶ 211, 363, 368, 427– 429. For these reasons, Plaintiffs have not committed 

Sin #2. 

3. The FAC Separates Each Cause of Action into a Different Count. 

In paragraphs 460-528 of the FAC, Plaintiffs allege ten distinct counts against Defendants. 

Each count clearly sets forth which Plaintiffs bring the claim, the law Plaintiffs allege Defendants 

violated, and a summary of the material elements and facts corresponding with each count. 

Defendants complain that, “[a]s to each count, Plaintiffs fail to specify which allegations support 

same, which leaves the Court and Defendants to parse through some 500 paragraphs to search for 

allegations that could conceivably serve as basis for the claims.” MTD at 17. The defendant in 

Melillo v. Shendell & Assocsiates, P.A., No. 11-cv-62048, 2012 WL 253205, (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 

2012), used a similar argument when seeking dismissal based on plaintiff’s alleged shotgun 

pleading, asking “to have [the p]laintiff replead each violation as a separate count, with each count 

specifying which paragraph from the fact section applies.” Id. at *2. In Melillo, the court found 

that “the claims are already clear” even though the plaintiff had not specified which count each 

fact in the complaint supported. Id. The same is true here.

“The essence of a shotgun pleading is ‘that it is virtually impossible to know which 

allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.’” Vujin v. Galbut, 836 F. App’x 

809, 814–15 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. District Bd. Of Trustees of Cent. Florida Cmty. 

Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)). This does not describe Plaintiffs’ FAC in the least. To 

the contrary, as made clear in the index below, the FAC sets forth facts in an organized and logical 

order, using clear headings and clarifying sub-headings, making it easy for the reader to locate the 

facts relevant to each count. 

Background (¶¶ 46– 250): 

o Rules Governing Nursing Programs and the Nursing Profession in Florida (¶¶ 46– 69), 

o Federal Requirements (¶¶ 70– 78), 

o Evolution of HCI’s RN Program (¶¶ 79– 109), 

o Programs and Practices of HCI’s RN Program (¶¶ 110– 250):

 Advertising & Target Marketing (¶¶ 110– 118), 

 Enrollment Paperwork (¶¶ 119– 135), 

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 Financial Aid (¶¶ 136– 170), 

 Misrepresentations & Omissions (¶¶ 171– 202), 

 Imposition of Unfair & Arbitrary Requirements on Students (¶¶ 203– 250); 

Facts as to Named Plaintiffs (¶¶251– 441): 

o Brittany Roberson (¶¶ 251– 292),

o Rebecca Freeman (¶¶ 293– 346),

o Bianca Viñas (¶¶ 347– 372),

o Tiffany King (¶¶ 373– 405)

o Tresha Thompson (¶¶ 406– 441). 

This clear organization is sufficient; Plaintiffs are not required to specify which paragraph from 

the fact section applies to each count. Melillo, 2012 WL 253205 *2. The FAC is not a shotgun 

pleading as Plaintiffs have not committed Sin #3. 

4. The FAC Provides Defendants Adequate Notice of the Claims Against 

Them and the Grounds Upon Which They Rest.

Defendants take issue with the fact that the FAC does not specify Defendants’ names in 

each count; however, there are only two corporate Defendants, which are closely related. 

Additionally, the suit is brought against Defendant Hart in his official capacity as head of each of 

these companies. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs clarify that counts 4 (Breach of Contract as to Grading 

and Advancement), 5 (Breach of Contract as to Clinical Placement), and 8 (Unjust Enrichment)

are asserted against Defendants HCI and Florian, and counts 9 (ECOA) and 10 (Title VI) are 

asserted only against Defendant HCI. The remaining counts 1 (FDUPTA as to Grading and 

Advancement), 2 (FDUPTA as to Misrepresentation of Educational Services Provided), 3 

(FDUPTA as to Unauthorized Retail Installment Contracts), 6 (FDUPTA as to the “New” 

Program), and 7 (FDUPTA as to Withholding Advancement and Transcripts) are brought against 

all three Defendants. 

III. Each of Plaintiffs’ Counts States a Claim for Relief. 

A. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States Contract Claims. 

1. Plaintiffs’ Contract Claims Are Proper as to Defendants HCI and Florian. 

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ contract claims must be dismissed as to Florian because 

the company “was not party to any alleged contracts at issue.” MTD at 21 (citing Vega v. T-Mobile 

USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009). But this is the extent of their argument—

Defendants do not attempt to establish that Florian was not party to the contracts at issue, and the 

FAC plausibly alleges that it was. “On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the complaint 

are taken as true, even if they are subject to dispute,” Devengoechea v. Bolivarian Republic of 

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Venezuela, 889 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2018), and “a court must view the complaint in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff,” Goldstein v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 559 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1319 

(S.D. Fla. 2021). Although “the court’s review is generally ‘limited to the four corners of the 

complaint,’ . . . the court may also consider ‘documents incorporated into the complaint by 

reference.’” Baitner v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., No. 21-cv-60687, 2021 WL 7368734, at *2 

(S.D. Fla. May 12, 2021) (quoting Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 

2009), and Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). Here, Plaintiffs 

allege that Florian is a managing member of HCI, FAC ¶ 43, and that the companies share a 

corporate head, id. ¶ 44. Plaintiffs allege that “Florian is an active owner and has been intimately 

involved in the operation of HCI since 2013.” Id. ¶ 81. Significantly, Plaintiffs allege that HCI’s 

catalogs—incorporated by reference into the complaint—state that HCI is “a subsidy [sic] of 

Florian,” id. ¶ 43, and inform students that Florian has legal control over HCI, id. Together, these 

allegations plausibly support the conclusion that Florian is a party to the implied-in fact contract 

arising from HCI’s publications. See Ferretti v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1334 

(S.D. Fla. 2022) (terms of implied-in-fact contract “may be derived from university publications 

such as the student handbook and catalog”); see also Goldstein, 559 F. Supp. 3d at 1319. 

2. Count 4 States a Contract Claim.

Count 4 states a claim based on Defendants Florian and HCI’s breaches of contract 

provisions relating to requirements for advancement through and graduation from the RN program. 

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs have not identified contractual grading requirements for end-ofsemester or specialty exams, MTD at 21,4 but this is facially false. The FAC explains that, to the 

extent the “Graduation Requirements” section of the enrollment agreements referenced 

advancement through the RN Program, it stated that a student must “pass all written and practical 

examinations with a minimum score of 80%,” and also achieve a minimum score of 95% on the 

exit exam, the ATI Predictor. FAC ¶ 257. To the extent enrollment agreements did not reference 

the 80% requirement at all, one can look to the catalogs and see that they consistently stated that 

“[a] grade of (80%) or higher is required for all Nursing Core” courses. FAC ¶ 132. It is also clear 

4 Notably, Defendants do not contest that Proposed Class Members’ enrollment agreements 

stated that students would have up to two attempts to achieve the minimum score on the ATI exam, 

FAC ¶ 131, or that Proposed Class Members were not given an opportunity to retake that exam, 

id. ¶¶ 233, 398. 

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from the FAC what specific changes were made to the grading requirements (in practice, not in 

writing): instead of needing a score of 80 percent to pass exams other than the exit exam, “[u]nder 

the new policy, students were required to achieve both an 80 percent overall score and at least 50 

percent in every subcategory.” FAC ¶ 204. 

Defendants’ reliance on Lamb v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc., No. 8:13-cv-794, 

2014 WL 12689882 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2014), is misplaced. In Lamb, the plaintiff conceded that 

her employment contract “d[id] not explicitly discuss renewal,” but argued that the term’s 

omission made the contract ambiguous. Id. at *7. Here, by contrast, the contract created by the 

enrollment agreements and the catalog explicitly discusses grading requirements. FAC ¶¶ 132, 

257, 305. Interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the contract establishes, 

“by reasonable implication,” that 80 percent was the required passing score for all exams in core 

nursing courses. See Lamb, 2014 WL 12689882, at *8. 

Defendants suggest that the 80 percent requirement was “a floor and not a ceiling.” MTD 

at 21. This is an argument that the contracts are ambiguous, not silent, as to grading requirements. 

Interpreting an ambiguous contract “is typically inappropriate at the motion to dismiss stage.”

Ferretti, 604 F. Supp. 3d at 1333. 

Finally, Defendants assert that there can be no breach of the grading requirements because 

“the enrollment agreements state that HCI ‘reserves the right to modify the rules and policies 

outlined in the Catalog with or without notification.’” MTD at 22. First, as Plaintiffs alleged and 

Defendants confirmed, Defendants reserved the right to modify “the Catalog”—they did not 

reserve the right to modify the enrollment agreements. FAC ¶¶ 126– 27. In fact, the college catalog 

itself indicates that where the terms of the enrollment agreement and catalog differed (Plaintiffs 

do not concede that this was the case), the terms of the Enrollment Agreement at the time it was 

signed by the student would control. FAC ¶ 134. Second, Defendants did not modify the college 

catalog: as stated above, Plaintiffs allege that HCI’s college catalog consistently stated that “[a] 

grade of (80%) or higher is required for all Nursing Core” courses. FAC ¶ 132. Third, and most 

important, Defendants’ right to modify the contract is not unrestricted. Jallali v. Nova Southeastern 

University, Inc., upon which Defendants rely, stands for the proposition that a university may 

change degree requirements only “if such changes are not arbitrary or capricious.” 992 So. 2d 338, 

343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Plaintiffs plainly allege that the changes to the grading requirements 

were arbitrary and capricious because, inter alia, they were “significant, disruptive, and served no 

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educational or pedagogical purpose” and “were not promoted by the requirements of any 

regulatory bodies.” FAC ¶¶ 237– 39. Count 4 thus states a plausible claim for relief.

3. Count 5 States a Contract Claim.

Count 5 states a claim based on Defendants Florian and HCI’s breaches of contract 

provisions relating to the provision of clinical training. Florida law defines “clinical training” as 

“direct nursing care experiences with patients or clients which offer the student the opportunity to 

integrate, apply, and refine specific skills and abilities based on theoretical concepts and scientific 

principles.” § 464.003(10), Fla. Sta. Class Members’ enrollment agreements state that the RN 

Program “is designed to provide . . . clinical experiences leading to employment in entry-level 

positions as registered nurses in hospitals or comparable facilities.” FAC ¶ 128. And Florida law 

requires that a program’s nursing curriculum consists of at least 50 percent clinic training and that

“[n]o more than 50 percent of the program’s clinical training consists of clinical simulation.” FAC 

¶ 54(a) (quoting §§ 464.019(1)(b)(1), (2)(c), Fla. Stat.). Thus, Defendants Florian and HCI were 

contractually obligated to provide meaningful, hands-on clinical experience to nursing students in 

a manner that complied with Florida law governing nursing programs. 

Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, the FAC plainly supports Plaintiffs’ allegations that 

what little clinical experience they received was far from what was promised. For example, 

Plaintiffs allege that “[s]tudents in the RN Program did not spend at least 50 percent of their class 

time in clinical training, and significantly more than 50 percent of the clinical training they did 

have was—at best—clinical simulation,” FAC ¶ 190; that HCI’s clinical relationships are 

extremely limited because of the school’s poor reputation and standards, id. ¶ 191; and that Class 

Members spent their clinical hours in study hall, not at clinical sites or in clinical simulations, id.

¶ 194. Plaintiff Roberson alleges that “Defendants never provided her with an official clinical 

placement at a care facility.” Id. ¶ 267. Plaintiff Freeman alleges that although her “limited clinical 

experience was more extensive than what most of her classmates received[,] . . . her curriculum 

still did not consist of at least 50 percent of clinical training,” and “more than 50 percent of [her] 

clinical education featured simulated, not actual, clinical experience.” Id. ¶ 321. Plaintiff Viñas 

alleges that her “only hands-on clinical experience consisted of an unofficial visit to a psychiatric 

facility, Ambrosia Treatment Center, for just one day out of the entire semester.” Id. ¶ 358. Plaintiff 

King alleges that her only clinical experience consisted of “limited practice on medical dummies.” 

Id. ¶ 383. Finally, Plaintiff Thompson alleges that “she was almost exclusively provided simulation 

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clinicals on-campus at HCI, with inadequate supplies and faulty software,” and that she spent no 

more than two days in on-site clinical placements. Id. ¶ 424. Viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Plaintiffs, Count 5 thus clearly states a claim for breach of contract.

B. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States FDUTPA Claims. 

1. Plaintiffs’ FDUTPA Claims Are Proper as to Defendants HCI, Florian, and 

Hart. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Defendant Hart is individually 

liable under FDUTPA. MTD at 25. To establish individual liability for FDUTPA violations, a 

plaintiff must allege that the individual “(1) participated directly in the deceptive acts or practices; 

or (2) possessed the authority to control them; and (3) had some knowledge of the practices.” Fed. 

Trade Comm’n v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (citations 

omitted). Plaintiffs allege that Hart possessed the authority to control the Corporate Defendants’ 

deceptive acts: “[i]n his role as Chairman of HCI, Hart directs HCI’s President and CEO.” FAC 

¶ 44. Implicit in this is the allegation that Hart directed each of the actions described in the 

complaint. See Goldstein, 559 F. Supp. 3d at 1319 (“[A] court must view the complaint in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.”). 

2. Count 1 States a Claim Under FDUTPA. 

Defendants argue that “Count 1 is no more than an allegation that Defendants intentionally 

breached the enrollment agreement with a nefarious motive and therefore fails as a claim for 

FDUTPA,” MTD at 25, citing Epoch International Partners, LLP v. Bigfoot Inc., 587 F.Supp.3d 

1214, 1219 (S.D. Fla. 2022), and Virgilio v. Ryland Group, Inc., 680 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 

2012). Both cases are plainly distinguishable. Under Epoch International, allegations that simply 

mirror a breach of contract claim are insufficient to state a claim under FDUTPA, but “allegations 

of wrongdoing that exceeded the terms of the contract” can bring a contract-related claim within 

the ambit of the statute. 587 F.Supp.3d at 1219 (discussing Kenneth F. Hackett & Assoc., Inc. v. 

GE Capital Information Tech. Solutions, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2010)). Here, 

Plaintiffs do not simply allege that HCI changed the grading requirements—they allege that they 

change occurred “without notice” (and thus denied students the opportunity to prepare or change 

their approach), FAC ¶ 461; that Defendants “force[d] students to retake, and pay again for, 

courses,” id.; and that the change was motivated by “HCI’s need to evade the consequences of its 

failure to attain programmatic accreditation and a sufficient pass rate of its graduates,” FAC ¶ 463. 

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As the concepts of deception or unfair methods of competition are “extremely broad,” Count 1 

thus states a claim of for relief that goes beyond a claim for breach of contract. See Kenneth F. 

Hackett & Assocs., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d at 1313 (quoting Siever v. BWGaskets, Inc., 669 

F.Supp.2d 1286, 1293 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 2009)). 

In Virgilio, the court explained that “the sole basis alleged for [homebuyers’] FDUTPA 

claim is [vendors’] breach of ‘an affirmative duty of disclosure’ when [vendors] ‘knowingly 

omitted any disclosure of the existence of [an adjacent WWII bombing site].’” Because the court 

had already held that “the alleged duty of disclosure did not exist under Florida law,” the 

unelaborated FDUPTA claim necessarily failed. Here, it has been established that arbitrary and 

capricious changes to graduation requirements are actionable contract claims under Florida law. 

Jalalli, 992 So. 2d at 343. But more importantly, Plaintiffs did not frame their claim as “breach of 

a contractual duty”—they described the deceptive act. Had the homebuyers in Virgilio described 

the deceptive omission without reliance on another duty, their claim would have survived. See, 

e.g., Harris v. Nordyne, LLC, No. 14-cv-21884, 2014 WL 12516076, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 

2014) (allegation of deceptive omission states claim under FDUTPA). Thus, if Defendants are 

correct (which they are not) that there is no breach of contract claim for changes to grading 

requirements and if Defendants are correct (which they are not) that Count 1 is a “mirror” of Count 

4, Count 1 can stand alone—just as an omission can be deceptive even if it does not violate a duty 

of disclosure, a change of course can be deceptive even if it does not breach a contract. 

3. Count 2 States a Claim Under FDUTPA. 

Count 2 alleges FDUTPA violations related to the misrepresentation of the educational 

services provided at HCI. Numerous factual allegations in the FAC support this count. Plaintiffs 

allege that they were misled as to the quality and qualification of instructors.5 See, e.g., FAC ¶ 187 

(high turnover); ¶ 188 (part-time or adjunct personnel who were not supported by the school); ¶ 

189 (far fewer than 50 percent of the faculty members at either campus were registered nurses who 

have a master’s or higher degree in nursing or a bachelor’s degree in nursing and a master’s or 

higher degree in a field related to nursing, as required by law); ¶ 195 (clinical instructors cancelled 

even simulated clinical sessions “so that they did not have to drive to campus and sent students 

5

 That Ms. Thompson’s teachers were “qualified on paper” in no way contradicts 

allegations of inferior instruction—the allegation is that they were unqualified in fact. Contra

Motion at 22. 

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instructions to complete their clinical timesheets from home”); ¶ 423 (Plaintiff Thompson’s 

instructors “Were not experienced in teaching” and her cohort had to teach themselves medical 

surgery). As detailed supra, in Part III.A.3, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants advertised that they 

provide the clinical experience required by F.S. § 464.019(1)—on-site clinical experience that 

would prepare students for job—but wholly failed to do so. With respect to high pressure sales 

tactics, Plaintiffs apologize for the error: the intended citation was FAC 6E-2.004(5)(b)(3), which 

prohibits “false or misleading statements about the institution, its personnel, its programs, its 

services, its licensure status, its accreditation, or any other pertinent information”—the basis of 

this Count. Finally, the allegation that Defendants offered an insufficient product that trapped 

students in debt and inflated the value of the product to inflate tuition is not “vague,” MTD at 26; 

it is the thrust of the entire complaint. Together, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for 

relief under FDUTPA. See Lewis v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 530 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1233 (S.D. 

Fla. 2021) (“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices by 

representing that the Class Vehicles have safety features that they do not have and representing 

that the Class Vehicles are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, when they are not.”)

4. Count 3 States a Claim Under FDUTPA. 

Defendants argue that the law prohibiting the sale of retail installment contracts without a 

license is not the kind that proscribes unfair trade practices and thus cannot support a per se

FDUPTA violation. MTD at 26– 27. “Violations of laws or statutes that give rise to a FDUTPA 

claim must be of the kind that proscribe unfair trade practices or unfair methods of competition; 

not . . . a violation of any law or statute that may have some benefit to consumers.” In re Edgewater 

By The Bay, LLLP, 419 B.R. 511, 516 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009). But the retail installment contract 

licensing law is a consumer protection standard: it sets forth rules and regulations designed to 

protect consumers from unscrupulous actors. And failure to maintain a required license has been 

held to be a per se FDUPTA violation. Anden v. Litinsky, 472 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 

1985) (engaging in the business of contracting without a license). 

Further, Plaintiffs do not only allege a per se violation of FDUTPA: they specifically argue 

that offering retail installment contracts without a license and collecting on unlawful retail 

installment contracts was deceptive under FDUPTA, because the misrepresentations and/or 

omission regarding the legality of the contracts caused students to enter into, and pay money 

towards, contracts that were not actually legally enforceable. FAC ¶¶ 471– 72. While Defendants 

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argue that “nothing in the statute provides that the failure to obtain a license renders the contracts 

‘illegal’ or otherwise enforceable,” MTD at 28, they are plainly wrong. The statute makes clear 

that “[a] person may not engage in or transact the business of a retail seller engaging in retail 

installment transactions as defined in this part or operate a branch of such business without a 

license.” § 520.32(1), Fla. Stat. A violation of Section 520.32 is a misdemeanor. § 520.39, Fla. 

Stat. “Where a statute imposes a penalty for an act, a contract founded upon said act is considered 

void in Florida.” Thomas v. Ratiner, 462 So.2d 1157, 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (citations 

omitted).

Finally, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged damages. The amount that Class Members paid 

pursuant to the illegal contracts, amount they currently “owe,” and any fees, FAC ¶ 474, are plainly 

connected to the statutory violation—Plaintiffs would not have paid on, or owe anything towards, 

the contracts had they known that they were illegal. That these damages are not directly connected 

to the value of the RN Program is not important: while FDUTPA damages are generally related to 

the diminution in value of the product sold, in appropriate circumstances, other actual damages are 

appropriate. See Buckley v. Moore, No. 20-cv-61023, 2021 WL 3173185, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 

2021) (finding FDUTPA claim properly stated where the “Plaintiffs allege that as a direct result 

of Defendants’ publication and to combat its negative effects, the Plaintiffs expended money on 

reputation management services”). Because Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of Defendants’ 

actions, they expended money that they should not have had to pay, and otherwise would not have 

paid, they have stated a claim for damages under FDUTPA. See id.

5. Count 6 States a FDUTPA Claim.

Count 6, asserted by the proposed WPB Subclass, alleges FDUPTA violations related to 

Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions regarding the “new” RN Program at HCI-WPB. 

Defendants assert that the FAC “fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that Defendants 

misrepresented that the ADN programs Plaintiffs attended had programmatic accreditation or 

improperly failed to disclose that the programs attended did not.” MTD at 29. This is false: Plaintiff 

Roberson alleges that she was not told that the “old” program was terminated because of failure to 

obtain programmatic accreditation, FAC ¶ 261; Plaintiff Freeman alleges that she was told that 

HCI was “in the process” of receiving ACEN accreditation, id. ¶ 301, and that she was not told 

that the “old” program was terminated because of failure to obtain programmatic accreditation, id. 

at ¶ 308; Plaintiff Viñas and Plaintiff King also allege that they were not told that the “old” program 

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was terminated because of failure to obtain programmatic accreditation, id. at ¶¶ 351, 377; and 

Plaintiff Thompson alleges that her admissions representative implied that HCI had programmatic 

accreditation, id. at ¶ 412. Furthermore, misrepresentations and omissions about accreditation are 

not the only deceptive practices alleged in Count 6: the core allegations relate to Defendants’ 

presentation of the new NCLEX code as a new ADN program and the obfuscation of the “old” 

program’s poor performance. E.g., id. ¶¶ 178– 180 (Defendants provided WPB Subclass Members 

with disclosures misstating the number of program graduates who took the NCLEX in the 

preceding year); ¶ 183 (Defendants failed to disclose that the “old” program had a 55 percent 

passage rate in 2018); ¶ 184 (Defendants failed to disclose that the “old” program was on probation 

in 2019). 

Plaintiffs also sufficiently allege causation and damages. With respect to causation, 

“federal courts and Florida courts alike have stated that ‘FDUTPA does not require a plaintiff to 

prove actual reliance on the alleged conduct.’” Lewis, 530 F. Supp. 3d at 1234 (collecting cases). 

Rather, a plaintiff must simply allege that the conduct was likely to deceive a consumer acting 

reasonably in the same circumstances. Id. Plaintiffs have done so. FAC ¶ 493. Moreover, the FAC 

does allege reliance. Id. ¶¶ 13, 412. As to damages, Plaintiffs allege that RN Program was 

“functionally valueless,” id. ¶ 494, because of its true NCLEX scores and accreditation status. 

“Generally, actual damages constitute ‘the difference in the market value of the product or service 

in the condition in which it was delivered and its market value in the condition in which it should 

have been delivered according to the contract of the parties.’” In re Mednax Servs., Inc., 603 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1212 (quoting Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860, 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). 

Thus, the WPB Subclass’s damages equal the amount charged for admission. Id. 

6. Count 7 States a FDUTPA Claim.

Count 7, asserted by the Withholding Subclass, alleges FDUTPA violations related to 

Defendants’ policy of withholding advancement and/or transcripts until students paid the balance 

on their retail installment contracts. Defendants argue that this claim fails as a matter of law 

because the alleged conduct is not a violation of established public policy and is not “inherently 

unfair.” MTD at 27. But Plaintiffs allege that the conduct has been deemed abusive by the 

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), an allegation substantiated by the CFPB 

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publication cited at footnote 22.6 That publication states that “blanket policies to withhold 

transcripts in connection with an extension of credit are abusive under the Consumer Financial 

Protection Act.” CFPB, Supervisory Highlights: Student Loan Servicing Special Edition, at 9 (Sep. 

2022), available at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_student-loan-servicingsupervisory-highlights-special-edition_report_2022-09.pdf. Plaintiffs have thus alleged that the 

practice is unfair as a violation of public policy.7

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs have failed to allege actual damages caused by 

withholding transcripts, MTD at 29, also fails. Count 7 alleges that Defendants withheld students’ 

advancement or transcripts “until they paid the balance on their retail installment contracts,” FAC 

¶ 497, and alleges that the resulting damages equal “any amounts they paid on their retail 

installment contracts in order to access their education or to obtain their academic transcripts,” id.

¶ 499. Because Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of Defendants’ actions, they expended money that 

they should not have had to pay, and otherwise would not have paid, they have stated a claim for 

damages under FDUTPA. See Buckley, 2021 WL 3173185, at *8. 

C. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States a Claim for Unjust Enrichment. 

Under Florida law, to state a claim for unjust enrichment a plaintiff must allege: (1) a 

benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s acceptance and retention of 

the benefit; and (3) the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the defendant to 

retain this benefit without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit. Omnipol, A.S. v. 

Multinational Defense Services, LLC, 32 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2022); BluestarExpo, Inc. v. Enis, 

568 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2021). Further, the claim of unjust enrichment is one of equity. 

Unjust enrichment is available “‘to prevent the wrongful retention of a benefit, or the retention of 

6 At ¶ 496, the FAC quoted language that was included the CFPB’s announcement of the 

special edition of Supervisory Highlights rather than in the report itself. See CFPB, Newsroom: 

CFPB Supervisory Examinations Find Violations of Federal Law by Student Loan Servicers and 

University-Owned Lenders (Sep. 29, 2022), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-supervisory-examinations-find-violations-of-federal-law-by-student-loanservicers-and-university-owned-lenders./ Plaintiffs’ counsel apologizes for the error. 

7 Defendants state that “the Bureau does not have any authority to deem anything 

unlawful.” Motion at 27. In addition to being supported by no authority, this assertion is patently 

false: the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq, states that “[t]he Bureau may prescribe rules 

applicable to a covered person or service provider identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or 

abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer 

financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.” § 55 31(b).

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money or property of another, in violation of good conscience and fundamental principles of 

justice or equity.’” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Silver Star Health & Rehab, 739 F.3d 579, 584 

(11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Henry M. Butler, Inc. v. Trizec Props., Inc., 524 So.2d 710, 711 (Fla. 

Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).

The uncontested facts laid out in Plaintiffs’ FAC allege that Defendants were unjustly 

enriched through their unconscionable pricing of one of the final courses Plaintiffs were required to 

take and pass, the Capstone VATI program. Defendants charged over $4,000 for this course, which 

is owned and administered by an outside third-party vendor, ATI Testing. The retail price of this 

course is just $525, when purchased directly from ATI Testing. The difference in these price points, 

which students are not able to negotiate or contest, is objectively unjust. There is no dispute that the 

first two elements required for an unjust enrichment claim are satisfied. As to the third element, 

allowing Defendants to pocket this monetary chasm as profit is an inequitable result, which should 

warrant preservation of this cause of action. “The most significant requirement for a recovery [for 

unjust enrichment] is that the enrichment to the defendant be unjust.” 14th & Heinberg, LLC v. 

Terhaar & Cronley Gen. Contractors, Inc., 43 So. 3d 877, 881 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed because 

Plaintiffs “received what they bargained for.” MTD at 30. “[A] plaintiff cannot pursue a quasicontract claim for unjust enrichment if an express contract exists concerning the same subject 

matter.” Diamond “S” Dev. Corp. v. Mercantile Bank, 989 So. 2d 696, 697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 

2008) (emphasis added). “It is only upon a showing that an express contract exists that [an] unjust 

enrichment . . . count fails. Until an express contract is proven, a motion to dismiss a claim for . . 

. unjust enrichment on these grounds is premature.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dade Cnty. Esoil Mgmt. 

Co., 982 F. Supp. 873, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (internal citation omitted); see also Saxon Fin. Grp., 

Inc. v. Rath, No. 11-cv-80646, 2012 WL 3278662, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012) (“[I]t is not the 

allegation of the existence of a contract, but the showing that an express contract exists that will 

cause the unjust enrichment count to fail.”). Defendants have not shown that an express contract 

exists governing the sale of the VATI program. And Plaintiffs allege that “[n]either Defendants’ 

Enrollment Agreements nor Defendants’ college catalogs contained express provisions relating to 

the charges for the VATI program.” FAC ¶ 505. Thus, although an implied-in-fact contract existed 

between Defendants HCI and Florian, on the one hand, and Plaintiffs, on the other, see Ferretti,

604 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1334, it has not been established that there was an express contract between 

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the parties concerning the purchase of the VATI program. Because there was no express contract, 

Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment should not be dismissed. See Diamond “S” Dev. Corp., 989 

So. 2d at 697; Mobil Oil Corp., 982 F. Supp. at 880. 

Additionally, Florida case law supports the allowance of alternative claims. See Salerno v. 

Fla. S. Coll., 488 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1218 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (defendant’s attempt to dismiss both 

an unjust enrichment claim and a claim for breach of contract claim was improper because plaintiff 

was entitled to “allege alternative claims in her complaint”); Nuwer v. FCA US LLC, 552 F. Supp. 

3d 1344, 1361–62 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (noting that Florida law permitted plaintiffs to plead unjust 

enrichment as alternative theory of recovery in consumer case alleging violations of the Florida 

Deceptive and Unfair Practices Act).

Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim fails because they “in 

essence allege they paid too much for a product they claim is worthless.” MTD 30. But this is 

facially untrue. Count 8 alleges that Defendants charged over $4,000 for access to a program that 

costs only $525, pocketing the difference, and does so by obscuring the nature of what is being 

sold. FAC ¶¶ 501, 503. This sort of deceptive overcharge is a textbook form of unjust enrichment. 

See, e.g., Donoff v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 18-cv-81258, 2019 WL 9091763, at *9 (S.D. Fla. 

July 9, 2019) (allegation that defendant overcharged plaintiffs for trip insurance and kept that 

overcharge “suffices to show unjust enrichment at the pleading stage”); Zamber v. Am. Airlines, 

Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (same).

Finally, Defendants rely on ASD Specialty Healthcare, Inc. v. Jupiter Hematology & 

Oncology Assocs., P.A., No. 10-cv-80534, 2010 WL 11596318 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2010), to posit 

that Hart should not be subject to Plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment. As discussed supra, Part 

II.B.4, Plaintiffs are not asserting unjust enrichment claims against Defendant Hart.

“Because unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy, the entirety of the circumstances must 

be considered.” In re Univ. of Miami COVID-19 Tuition & Fee Refund Litig., No. 20-cv-22207, 

2022 WL 18034457, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2022). At this early stage, it would be improper to 

dismiss a cause of action without first permitting the discovery process unfold and reveal what the 

entirety of the circumstances are.

D. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States a Claim Under ECOA. 

Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), it is “unlawful for any creditor to 

discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction, (1) on the basis 

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of race.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). Plaintiffs have plausibly stated an ECOA claim against Defendant 

HCI.As explained in the FAC, “ECOA defines ‘creditor’ as ‘any person who regularly extends, 

renews, or continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or 

continuation of credit; or any assignee of the original creditor who participates in the decision to 

extend, renew, or continue credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e); FAC ¶ 508. 

1. Defendant HCI Is a “Creditor” under ECOA. 

As explained in the FAC, “ECOA defines ‘creditor’ as ‘any person who regularly extends, 

renews, or continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or 

continuation of credit; or any assignee of the original creditor who participates in the decision to 

extend, renew, or continue credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e); FAC ¶ 508. The FAC alleges specific facts 

that, if proven true, support a finding that Defendant HCI is a creditor because it regularly extends 

debt through its Tuition Options retail installment contract program and because it advertises the 

availability of Federal student loans to HCI students, submits paperwork and formsto the government 

to qualify students for Federal student loans, and directly receive the proceeds of those loans. FAC ¶¶ 

136, 137, 513–514, 527. Notably, Defendants do not argue otherwise. A school’s involvement in the 

financial aid process makes it a creditor under ECOA. See Brook v. Sistema Universitario Ana G. 

Mendez, Inc., No. 8:17-cv-171, 2017 WL 1743500, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2017) (finding that “[t]he 

[c]omplaint alleges facts sufficient to demonstrate that [defendant] is a ‘creditor’ as defined by 

ECOA” because by encouraging students to apply for federal student loans “it did refer prospective 

loan applicants to creditors.”). The FAC also explains that “nearly all of the students who enrolled in 

the RN Program between September 2019 and the present entered into a retail installment contract 

with Defendants, serviced by Tuition Options” and that Defendants “steer[ed] students into retail 

installment contracts even when other, more favorable financing options exist.” FAC ¶¶ 160, 162, 

163, 263, 311, 355, 379, 413–414. These retail installment contracts are an extension of “credit” as 

that term is used in ECOA. 15 U.S.C. ¶ 1691a(d) (defining “credit” to mean “the right granted by a 

creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debts and defer its payment or to purchase 

property or services and defer payment therefor”). 

2. Defendant HCI Discriminated with Respect to an Aspect of a Credit Transaction 

through Reverse Redlining.

Defendants argue for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ ECOA claim by alleging that Plaintiffs “fail to 

specify any aspect of any credit transaction that they allege is discriminatory based on race . . . and 

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fail to identify any specific loan term that they allege was unfair or predatory, let alone unfair or 

predatory based on race.” MTD at 28. Defendants are wrong on both counts because the FAC explains 

Defendant HCI offered and arranged credit in a manner that constitutes reverse redlining under 

ECOA. The FAC shows that: (i) HCI’s lending practice and loan terms were ‘unfair’ and 

‘predatory,’ and (ii) HCI either intentionally targeted on the basis of race, or there is a disparate 

impact on the basis of race.”8 See Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 F. App’x 364, 369 (11th

Cir. 2009) (citing Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D.D.C. 2000)). 

Specifically, HCI deliberately targets students for recruitment and enrollment into their RN 

Program on the basis of race, and/or conduct their marketing in a manner that has a disparate 

impact on the basis of race. FAC ¶¶ 26(e), 512. HCI knows and intends that practically every

student enrolled in the RN Program will rely on credit, in the form of Federal student loans, retail 

installment contracts, or both, to pay for the RN Program. Id. ¶¶ 5, 26(b), 136–38. HCI induces 

students into these credit transactions on the premise that completion of the RN Program will 

afford students professional opportunities sufficient to allow them to repay these loans. Id. ¶¶ 110, 

11, 264, 313, 356, 380, 416. HCI precludes students from completing the RN Program. Id. ¶¶ 4, 

14, 277, 331, 394. As a result of these practices, HCI both intentionally discriminated against the 

targeting subclass and created a disparate impact based on race. Id. ¶¶ 26(e), 512. 

Defendants concede that reverse redlining is unlawful under ECOA. MTD at 32–33. To date, 

two federal court cases (one cited in Defendants’ Motion) have found that a for-profit school offering 

or arranging credit through practices, and/or on terms, adequately described as predatory and/or unfair 

can constitute reverse redlining under ECOA if credit is directed towards a protected class or results 

in a disparate impact on a protected class. Carroll v. Walden Univ., LLC, No. 1:22-cv-00051, 2022 

8 On page 33 of their Motion, Defendants inexplicably cite the standard for proving reverse 

redlining as set forth in a 2010 Northern District of California case; however, Steed is the leading 

reverse redlining case in the Eleventh Circuit. As the Nothern District of Georgia explained in 

Horne v. Harbour Portfolio VI, LP, 304 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2018): 

In Steed, the Eleventh Circuit applied the analysis of Hargraves in a reverse

redlining case. To state a plausible reverse redlining claim, Plaintiffs must allege 

that the defendants’ lending practices and loan terms were unfair and 

predatory, and that the defendants either intentionally targeted on the basis of race, 

or that there is a disparate impact on the basis of race . . . . Whether the practices 

alleged occurred, and whether the practices were unfair and predatory, is a jury 

question. 

Id. at 1339–40 (internal citations omitted).

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WL 17252556, at *10 (D. Md. Nov. 28, 2022) (“Walden is targeting Black and female students with 

a predatory program designed to hoodwink students and saddle them with onerous student debt. This 

is not laudable; instead, it constitutes illegal reverse redlining and racial discrimination.”); Brook,

2017 WL 1743500, at *3 (dismissing ECOA claim without prejudice because plaintiff did not 

“explicitly describe the credit transaction she believe[d] was unlawful”). 

a. Defendant HCI’s Lending Practices and Loan Terms Are Unfair and 

Predatory.

The credit transactions at issue in this case include class members taking federal student loans 

arranged by Defendants and borrowing private loans through HCI’s retail installment contract 

program known as “Tuition Options.” FAC ¶¶ 5, 162–170, 514–518. Defendants claim that in this 

case, as in Brook, the ECOA claims should be dismissed because plaintiffs “fail to specify any aspect 

of any credit transaction that they allege is discriminatory based on race . . . and fail to identify any 

specific loan term that they allege was unfair or predatory, let alone unfair or predatory based on 

race.” MTD at 28. They are incorrect on both counts.

i. Federal Student Loans

“ECOA violations are not necessarily restricted to consideration of the four corners of the 

paper bearing a student borrower’s signature.” Carroll, 2022 WL 17252556, at *10 (D. Md. Nov. 

28, 2022). Because “the definition of credit transaction includes every aspect of an applicant’s 

dealings with a creditor,” id., a credit transaction may be unlawful even where the terms of the 

loan extended are facially neutral. In Carroll, Black women who had enrolled in a graduate degree 

program at Walden University alleged that the school had “engaged in a consistent and 

longstanding pattern of fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the requirements of the . . . 

degree—including the required credits, the length of time required for completion, and, most 

consequentially, the cost of the degree—for the purposes of enticing students to enroll in the . . . 

degree program” and take out federal student loans to pay their tuition. Id. at 10–11. Finding that 

the plaintiffs had stated a claim of reverse redlining under ECOA, the court observed: “Plaintiffs 

allege that Defendants intentionally targeted Black and female prospective students for the 

[degree] program by marketing and advertising their predatory program to a protected class; and 

in reliance on their false representations, Plaintiffs entered into credit transactions and sustained 

considerable financial harm as a result.” Id. at 11. 

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Plaintiffs make similar allegations, which similarly state a claim for relief under ECOA. 

As alleged in the FAC, Defendants induce students to take out federal student loans on the premise 

that completion of the RN Program will afford them professional opportunities sufficient to allow 

them to repay these loans. FAC ¶¶ 110, 11, 264, 313, 356, 380, 416. In fact, Defendants offer a

valueless education, id. ¶¶ 464, 468, 494, and preclude students from completing the RN Program,

id. ¶¶ 4, 14, 277, 331, 394. The admissions process and financial aid process are one and the same, 

such that the lies and omissions used to convince students to enroll in the RN Program were used at 

the same time to convince students to take out loans that Defendants knew they could likely never 

pay back. FAC ¶¶ 254–265; 303–315, 349–357, 411–417. And while Defendants portrayed the RN 

Program as costing a specific amount at the time of enrollment and financial aid sign-up, it ultimately 

cost much more because students were forced to repeat failed classes or be dropped from the program. 

FAC ¶¶ 5, 116-118, 203, 212, 284, 323, 364, 367, 431. Finally, because of Defendants’ actions ,

students are unable to seek employment as RNs and unable to afford their federal loan payments.

FAC ¶ 289, 292, 245–46, 370–72, 404–05, 439-41.9

The alleged unfavorable terms, and unlawful aspects of the credit transaction, thus include

the predatory nature of the financed product, see Carroll, 2022 WL 17252556, at *10; the inflated

sales price of the financed product, see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Cooper v. Auto Fare, Inc., No. 14-cv0008, 2014 WL 2889993, at *3 (W.D.N.C. June 25, 2014) (plaintiffs stated a reverse redlining 

claim based on predatory installment loan terms, including inflated sales prices); Barkley v. 

Olympia Mortg. Co., No. 04 CV 875 RJD/KAM, 2007 WL 2437810, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 

2007) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged that their mortgages contained 

unfavorable terms, “particularly because [they were] based on a grossly inflated appraisal”); and 

Defendants’ misrepresentations regarding Plaintiffs’ ability to repay their federal loans, cf.

Cooper, 2014 WL 2889993, at *1, 3 (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, 

“that [d]efendants extended credit without properly assessing the purchasers’ creditworthiness or 

9 Payments on most federal student loans have been suspended since March 2020 in 

response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Payments will restart when the U.S. Department of Education 

is permitted to implement President Biden’s loan relief program or the litigation over the program 

is resolved. If the debt relief program has not been implemented and the litigation has not been 

resolved by June 30, 2023, payments will resume 60 days after that. Federal Student Aid, COVID19 Emergency Relief and Federal Student Aid, https://studentaid.gov/announcementsevents/covid-19.

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ability to repay”); Jones v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No.18-cv-1023, 2019 WL 3366104, at *6 

(M.D. La. July 25, 2019) (discussing ability to repay in context of ECOA reverse redlining claims). 

ii. Retail Installment Contracts

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant HCI committed reverse redlining through its private 

lending program referred to as “Tuition Options.” FAC ¶¶ 5, 162–170, 514–518. The FAC describes 

the credit transactions at issue in detail, explaining how Defendants “encouraged students to 

supplement federal aid with institutional loans, which are made through retail installment contracts 

and require students to make monthly payments while attending school.” Id. ¶ 137. The contracts 

contain the unfair terms described above, including the predatory nature and inflated price of the 

financed product and misrepresentations regarding Plaintiffs’ ability to repay their loans.

Additionally, the FAC explains that “Defendants steer students into retail installment contracts even 

when other, more favorable financing options exist” and identifies the unfair terms of HCI’s retail 

installment contracts, which “require immediate payment while students are in school, do not offer 

income-sensitive repayment options, and have a risky acceleration clause that makes the entire 

balance due upon a single missed payment.” Id. ¶ 162–64. The Enrollment Agreements require 

students to “satisfy all financial obligations to the College” prior to graduation. Id. ¶ 257. And, in 

perhaps the greatest display of predatory lending, Defendants would not permit students to enter 

campus, and threatened to dismiss them from the RN Program, if they were not caught up on their 

retail installment loan payments. Id. ¶¶ 165-166. 

b. Defendants Intentionally Targeted on the Basis of Race and Caused a 

Disparate Impact on the Basis of Race.

The FAC explains in detail how the offering of credit was intentionally discriminatory 

because of the way in which Defendant HCI targeted prospective Black students. Specifically, the 

FAC explains that HCI encouraged the borrowing of federal student loans and private retail 

installment contracts; that these were taken on by nearly all students, id. ¶¶ 137, 162–163; and that 

the student body was disproportionately Black due to Defendants’ targeted marketing, advertising, 

and recruiting, ¶¶ 113–114. Rather than conclusory allegations of disproportionality, the FAC sets 

forth publicly available data supporting the disparate impact claim by showing that Black students 

were disproportionately represented in Defendants’ RN Program (42% of the program’s enrollees are 

Black) when compared to Black individuals residing where Defendants’ campuses are located, in 

Palm Beach County and Broward County (17% and 27% of the populations are Black, respectively). 

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Id. ¶¶ 26(e), 113. In Carroll, the district court allowed plaintiffs to proceed with ECOA claims against 

their for-profit school where plaintiffs similarly alleged that “[d]efendants[] intentionally targeted 

their protected status group through various forms of marketing and advertising to ensnare them in a 

credit transaction to enable them to enroll in the [degree] program on a false and fraudulent premise” 

and that this conduct “had a disproportionate injurious impact on their protected class.” 2022 WL 

17252556, at *9. 

E. Plaintiffs’ Complaint States a Claim Under Title VI. 

Title VI prohibits subjecting any person to discrimination based on race under a program or 

activity receiving Federal financial assistance. “To survive a motion to dismiss under Title VI, a 

plaintiff must plead sufficient facts supporting that (1) the defendant is a recipient of federal financial 

assistance; and (2) the defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of race, 

color, or national origin.” Carroll v. Walden, at *10 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 

(2001); Evans v. 7520 Surrats Rd. Ops., LLC. No. 21-cv-1637, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221041, at *9 

(D. Md. Nov. 16, 2021)).

1. Defendants Receive Federal Assistance.

Plaintiffs allege, and Defendants do not (and cannot) deny, that Defendant HCI is subject to 

Title VI because “their students receive federal student aid, including need-based grants and student 

loans, under Title IV of the Higher Education Act.” FAC ¶ 70; see Peters v. Molloy Coll. of Rockville 

Ctr., No. 07-cv-2553, 2008 WL 2704920, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2008) (rejecting dismissal of Title 

VI claims against defendant college that received federal financial assistance in the form of student 

loans and grants). 

2. Defendant HCI Committed Intentional Discrimination 

Intentional discrimination on the basis of race under Title VI can be established by finding 

that the recipient of Federal funds committed reverse redlining. See Brook, 2017 WL 1743500, at *4

(not allowing reverse redlining claims under Title VI “would mean that Title VI, part of the Civil 

Rights Act ‘created to be an instrument for the abolition of discrimination, allows injustice so long as 

it is visited exclusively on one ethnic group’”). 

In Brook, cited in Defendants’ Motion, the court found that the plaintiff sufficiently plead a 

Title VI claim by alleging that the for-profit school defendant targeted her with its sham educational 

program because of her ethnicity. Id. Declining to dismiss her Title VI claims, the court explained, 

“[t]he discrimination claim arises from the harmful product being peddled; the targeted advertising 

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simply helps to prove that the discrimination was intentional.” Id. Similarly, in this case, the FAC 

alleges that Defendants intentionally discriminated against the targeting subclass by using marketing, 

advertising, and recruiting techniques to target their subpar nursing program to Black individuals on 

the basis of their race. FAC ¶ 456.

a. Defendants Intentionally Targeted Black Individuals.

“In analyzing whether a plaintiff alleges discriminatory intent under Title VI, the court takes 

an ‘expansive approach . . . as ‘plaintiffs in discrimination suits often must rely on the cumulative 

weight of circumstantial evidence.’” Carroll, 2022 WL 17252556, at *5 (quoting Wang v. Bethlehem 

Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 21-cv-1023, 2022 WL 3154142 at *35 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2022)) (omission in 

original). In their Motion, Defendants ask the Court to take a narrow, rather than expansive, approach 

and find that this case somehow differs from Brook because, according to Defendants, “there is no 

allegation Defendants made any specific statement that Black people are its target market or focused 

on marketing to channels that disproportionately reached a Black audience.” MTD at 30. 

Defendants’ argument fails because, as in Brook, the FAC “makes factual allegations from 

which the Court can reasonably infer intentionality.” Brook, 2017 WL 1743500, at *3. The Brook 

court inferred intentionality because, “[t]he [c]omplaint alleges that [defendants’] student population 

is disproportionately Latino” and “that this disproportionality is due to intentional targeting.” Id. 

Similarly, Plaintiffs allege disproportionality achieved via targeting, from which the Court can infer 

intentionality, by including in their FAC: (a) concrete examples of advertising targeted at Black 

women and (b) U.S. Census data and IPEDS data10 in support of their allegation that Defendants’ 

targeting is “evidenced by the fact that 42 percent of HCI’s RN Program is Black, while census data 

shows that Palm Beach County is only 17 percent Black and Broward County is only 27 percent 

Black.” FAC ¶¶ 26(e), 113.

Defendants imply that dismissal of the Title VI claim is warranted absent Plaintiffs alleging 

certain details about Defendants’ advertising by citing Steed, in which the Eleventh Circuit upheld 

the district court’s summary judgment on plaintiff’s reverse redlining claims because he “did not 

establish a prima facie case of reverse redlining” because “he provided no evidence of where 

[defendant] advertised or that [it] made an unusual number of loans in majority [B]lack areas or 

targeted those debtors . . . in the way he alleged he was targeted.” 308 Fed. App’x at 379 (emphasis 

10 IPEDS is the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.

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in original). As an initial matter, a complaint “need not allege facts sufficient to make out a classic 

McDonnell Douglas prima facie case . . . because McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework 

is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 

1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). Further, the complaint contains allegations 

relating both to the method of advertising and to its disparate impacts, FAC ¶¶ 26(e), 113, 114, 

allegations similar to those that the district court found sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss in 

Steed. Steed v. Everhome Mortg. Co., No. 1:06-cv-3064, 2007 WL 9703390, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 12, 

2007). 

b. Plaintiffs’ FAC Sufficiently Describes Harmful Products that Defendants 

Intentionally Peddled Toward a Protected Class.

Defendants claim that its RN Programs cannot be “shams” because “it is undisputed that the 

programs were BON approved with NCLEX codes and students could be eligible to sit for NCLEXRN.” MTD at 35. First and foremost, as Defendants’ own history demonstrates, approval to operate 

from the BON is not synonymous with a quality program. Knowing this, the BON has procedures in 

place to terminate programs not in compliance with laws and regulations, which is exactly what 

happened to Defendants’ “old” HCI-WPB RN Program. FAC ¶¶ 181,185. 

Furthermore, Defendants’ claim that Plaintiffs’ attempt to characterize Defendants’ nursing 

programs as a “sham” is “unsupported by any specific facts” entirely ignores Plaintiffs’ allegations 

that the RN Programs were “functionally valueless” because, inter alia, the programs did not allow 

students to graduate and did not provide the type of clinical placements students were required to have 

by law to become RNs in Florida. Id. ¶¶ 460–464; 465–468; 491–494. Beyond conclusory allegations, 

the FAC details the methods Defendants used to keep students from graduating, id. ¶¶ 129–132, 203–

212, 220–238, 277–285, 331–339, 362–368, 397–399; the abysmally low number of HCI students 

who went on to become RNs, id. ¶¶ 19, 20, 23, 83–90, 98–101, 247–250, and the fact that the 

programs did not satisfy Florida law for nursing curriculum because they consisted of less than 50% 

clinical training, of which more than 50% was clinical simulation, id. ¶¶ 26(c), 54(a), 65(a-b), 190, 

268–269, 321, 322, 360, 362, 385, 386, 425, 426. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the motion to dismiss. In the event the 

Court is inclined to grant the motion in any respect, Plaintffs respectfully request leave to amend. 

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REQUEST FOR HEARING

In accordance with Local Rule 7.1(b)(2), Plaintiffs request a one-hour hearing focused on 

the factual, legal, and procedural issues raised by the motion to dismiss. The claims involve myriad 

complicated regulatory frameworks and several novel issues of law, and Plaintiffs would 

appreciate the opportunity to resolve any confusion that the pleadings may have caused. 

Dated: April 13, 2023 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Nicole Mayer 

NICOLE MAYER 

Florida Bar No. 012035 

Nicole@MayerLawFlorida.com 171 

Dommerich Drive. 

Maitland, Florida 32751 

(352) 494-3657 

REBECCA EISENBREY 

(pro hac vice) 

reisenbrey@ppsl.org 

ERIC SCHMIDT 

(pro hac vice) 

eschmidt@ppsl.org 

Project on Predatory Student Lending 

769 Centre Street, Suite 166 

Jamaica Plain, MA 02130 

(617) 390-2669 

Case 9:22-cv-81883-RAR Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/14/2023 Page 33 of 33