UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WINFORD T. HOUDESHELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 96-1355

ARTERY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,

INCORPORATED; FAIRLAND GARDENS

ASSOCIATES, LIMITED,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.

Peter J. Messitte, District Judge.

(CA-94-2939-PJM)

Submitted: February 13, 1997

Decided: February 27, 1997

Before WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Sheldon L. Gnatt, REICHELT, NUSSBAUM, LAPLACA & MILLER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. William J. Chen, Jr., John

B. Walsh, Jr., CHEN, WALSH, TECLER & MCCABE, L.L.P.,

Rockville, Maryland, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Winford T. Houdeshell sued his employer alleging a violation of

the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102-

12213 (1994). After a hearing, the district court granted summary

judgment to the employer because it found that Houdeshell had failed

to timely file suit within ninety days of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") "right-to-sue" letter and

because the court found no grounds meriting the application of the

doctrine of equitable tolling. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

An ADA claimant who fails to file a complaint within the ninetyday statutory time period mandated by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f) (1994),* generally forfeits the right to pursue his claim. See

Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-51

(1984). Although the ninety-day time period is subject to equitable

tolling, one who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse lack of diligence. Id. at 151. We have held that the

actual receipt of the right to sue letter is not necessary to trigger the

limitations period, because to do so would allow for manipulation of

the limitations period. See Watts-Means v. Prince George's Family

Crisis Ctr., 7 F.3d 40, 42 (4th Cir. 1993) (delivery of a notice to pick

up a certified letter at the post office triggers the ninety-day limitations period--not the date when the letter is actually picked up);

Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Dep't., 813 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir.

1987) (90-day period began when wife received letter not six days

later when she informed claimant of letter).

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*ADA claims utilize the powers, remedies and procedures outlined in

Title VII discrimination actions so that an ADA claimant has 90 days

after the EEOC's issuance of a right-to-sue letter to file suit. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12117(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

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Reviewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party, we review a district court's grant of summary

judgment de novo. Donmar Enters., Inc. v. Southern Nat'l Bank of

N.C., 64 F.3d 944, 946 (4th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the record

reveals that on July 8, 1994, the EEOC mailed its right-to-sue letter

to the address Houdeshell had provided. Because, however, Houdeshell moved and failed to provide the EEOC with his new address, he

did not actually receive the letter until July 26. Notwithstanding the

fact that Houdeshell, who was represented by counsel, had seventytwo days in which to timely file suit, he did not file suit in the district

court until October 24, 1994.

We find that the district court performed a thorough hearing and

correctly found no grounds which would require an equitable tolling

of the filing period. Houdeshell, himself, was responsible for the

eighteen-day delay in actual receipt of the EEOC letter. See Baldwin

County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. at 151 (one who fails to act

diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse lack of diligence). Further, Houdeshell failed to show why the remaining

seventy-two days was not sufficient time in which to file his action.

Harvey, 813 F.3d at 654; see also Irwin v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (noting that principles of equitable

tolling do not generally extend to garden variety claims of excusable

neglect). Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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