USCIS Needs a Better 

Approach to 

Verify H-1B Visa 

Participants 

October 20, 2017 

OIG-18-03 
 

 

 

 

 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
 

USCIS Needs a Better Approach

To Verify H-1B Visa Participants 

October 20, 2017 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

We conducted this audit 

to determine whether the 

U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services’ 

(USCIS) Administrative 

Site Visit and Verification 

Program (ASVVP) and 

targeted site visits are 

safeguarding the integrity 

of the H-1B Program. The 

H-1B is a non-immigrant 

visa that allows U.S. 

employers to temporarily 

employ foreign workers in 

“specialty occupations.”

What We 

Recommend 

We made four 

recommendations that, 

when implemented, 

should help USCIS 

improve the H-1B site visit 

program. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 254-4100, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

USCIS site visits provide minimal assurance that H-1B visa 

participants are compliant and not engaged in fraudulent 

activity. These visits assess whether petitioners and 

beneficiaries comply with applicable immigration laws and 

regulations. USCIS can approve more than 330,000 H-1B 

petitions each year and, as of April 2017, reported more than 

680,000 approved and valid H-1B petitions. USCIS conducts a 

limited number of visits and does not always ensure the 

officers are thorough and comprehensive in their approach. 

Further limiting the site visits’ effectiveness, USCIS does not 

always take proper action when immigration officers identify 

potential fraud or noncompliance. USCIS also uses targeted 

site visits to respond to indicators of fraud; however, the 

agency does not completely track the costs and analyze the 

results of these visits. 

These shortfalls exist for various reasons. USCIS does not 

ensure that petitioners who previously abused the program 

are denied new petitions. USCIS could also do more to prevent 

approving petitions for recurring violations and collaborate 

more with external stakeholders. Additionally, the agency 

does not provide comprehensive guidance for how USCIS 

personnel resolve site visit findings. It does not have a process 

to collect and analyze key data elements to help guide the H1B site visit program. Lastly, the agency lacks performance 

measures to show how site visits contribute to improving the 

H-1B Program. 

Without addressing the challenges, USCIS site visits do not 

fully safeguard the H-1B Program, and the agency misses 

opportunities to ensure funds are put to better use through 

more robust site visits. 

USCIS Response

USCIS concurred with all four recommendations and has 

begun corrective actions to address the findings in this 

report. 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-18-03 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

OCT 20 2017 

MEMORANDUM FOR: James McCament 

Deputy Director 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

FROM: 	 John E. McCoy II tJ-1 { /J'J--:.ZCActing Assistant InsCto-;--Gen'lfral for Audits 

SUBJECT: 	 USCIS Needs a Better Approach to 

Verify H-lB Visa Participants 

Attached for your action is our final report, USCIS Needs a Better Approach to 

Verify H-lB Visa Participants. We incorporated the formal comments from your 

office in the final report. 

The report contains four recommendations aimed at identifying actions the 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services can take to improve the 

Administrative Site Visit and Verification Program and targeted site visits to 

better safeguard the integrity of the H-lB Program. Your office concurred with 

all recommendations. Based on information provided in your response to the 

draft report, we consider all four recommendations open and resolved. Once 

your office has fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal 

closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. 

The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreedupon corrective actions. Please send your response or closure request to 

OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will 

provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will 

post the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact 

Donald Bumgardner, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at 

(202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 
 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

Background .................................................................................................... 1 

Results of Audit .............................................................................................. 3 

Site Visits Have Limited Impact on H-1B Program Integrity .................... 4 

ASVVP Needs Improvement ................................................................... 9 

USCIS Needs a Better Approach to Allocate Resources ......................... 16 

Recommendations......................................................................................... 17 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis .................................................... 18 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................. 22 

Appendix B: USCIS Comments to the Draft Report .............................. 24 

Appendix C:H-1B Process ................................................................... 29 

Appendix D Stakeholder Involvement and Legislative Limitations ........ 30 

Appendix E: Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report ........... 32 

Appendix F: Report Distribution .......................................................... 33 

Abbreviations 

ASVVP Administrative Site Visit and Verification Program 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

DOL Department of Labor 

DOS Department of State 

FDNS Fraud Detection and National Security 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IO Immigration Officer 

LCA Labor Condition Application 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

SCOPS Service Center Operations 

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

VIBE Validation Instrument for Business Enterprises 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Background 

The H-1B is a non-immigrant visa category authorized under the Immigration 

and Nationality Act (Act). It allows U.S. employers (petitioners) to temporarily 

employ foreign workers (beneficiaries) in “specialty occupations.” The Code of 

Federal Regulations (CFR)1 defines a “specialty occupation” as requiring 

theoretical and practical application of a body of specialized knowledge. The 

beneficiary usually requires a bachelor’s degree or higher in a specialty 

occupation (or equivalent) as a minimum requirement. U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (USCIS) approves each H-1B petition for up to 3 years.2 

However, the program does allow the beneficiary to stay beyond 3 years 

through extensions and exceptions. Even though legislation3 protects the H-1B 

non-immigrant workers, it also provides standards to protect similarly 

employed U.S. workers from being adversely affected by the employment of 

non-immigrant workers. 

The number of initial H-1B petitions filed and approved annually exceeds 

85,000. The Immigration Act of 1990 initially limited the number of 

beneficiaries who obtain new visas or 

otherwise provided H-1B status each fiscal 

year to 65,000 visas. Extensions of the 

initial visa for an additional 3 years, or an 

amendment, for reasons such as change of 

employer, are not counted against the limit. 

Additionally, the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 

2004 allowed for up to 20,000 more visas for beneficiaries with a master’s 

degree or higher from an American institution of higher education.4 As of April 

2017, USCIS reported more than 680,000 approved and valid H-1B petitions. 

Table 1 provides the number of H-1B petitions filed and number approved in 

fiscal years 2014–16, based on USCIS reported data. 

Since the H-1B Program’s 

inception in 1990, statutory 

changes raised the number of 

H-1B visas allowed several times; 

however, in FY 2004, the limit 

reverted to the original limit. 

 1 20 CFR 655.715, Specialty occupation. Other categories of temporary workers under an H-1B 

classification include Department of Defense cooperative research and development project 

workers and fashion models (8 CFR 214.2(h)(4)). 

2 USCIS is largely funded by immigration and naturalization benefit fees from individuals or 

organizations filing immigration benefit requests.

3 Section 212(n) of the Act and 20 CFR Part 655, subparts H and I 4 Individuals being hired by institutions of higher education, as well as non-profit and 

government research organizations are also exempt from the annual limit.

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Figure 1. H-1B Visa Issuance Process 

Source: DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) analysis of CFR and program information. 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table 1. Total H-1B Petitions Filed and Approved 

Fiscal Year Petitions Filed Petitions Approved 

2014 325,971 275,080 

2015 368,852 251,380 

2016 399,352 333,104 

Source: USCIS data as of June 2017.
 

The H-1B Program relies on efforts from many Federal agencies (see figure 1). 

The Department of Labor (DOL) ensures that foreign workers do not displace or 

adversely affect wages or working conditions of U.S. workers by certifying Labor 

Condition Applications (LCA). Employers submit LCAs attesting to various 

requirements to protect both U.S. and temporary workers. The Department of 

Homeland Security includes USCIS, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which all 

have enforcement roles in the program. ICE detects, deters, and conducts 

criminal investigations of immigration benefit fraud. CBP officials determine 

whether H-1B workers can be admitted into the United States upon arriving at 

a port of entry. The Department of State (DOS) issues visas through U.S. 

embassies and consulates. The Department of Justice investigates complaints 

made by U.S. workers alleging that they have been displaced or otherwise 

harmed by the H-1B Program. (Appendix D provides more details about each 

agency’s role.) 

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USCIS is responsible for adjudicating the validity of H-1B petitions. Prospective 

employers submit H-1B petitions on behalf of foreign workers to USCIS. USCIS’ 

Service Center Operations (SCOPS) Directorate is responsible for processing 

and adjudicating the petitions. However, if fraud indicators exist, USCIS’ Fraud 

Detection and National Security (FDNS) Directorate may conduct an 

administrative investigation, which could include a targeted site visit. 

USCIS FDNS employs nearly 600 Immigration Officers (IO), most of whom 

conduct site visits. FDNS IOs conduct site visits to verify information and 

identify fraud issues pertaining to various visa classifications, including the H1B. USCIS primarily uses the Administrative Site Visit and Verification 

Program (ASVVP) to assess whether petitioners and beneficiaries comply with 

applicable immigration laws and regulations. More than 80 IOs are assigned to 

the program. While on site, IOs may verify H-1B petition information and 

supporting documents, verify the organization exists, visit the beneficiary’s 

workstation, take photographs, and interview personnel to confirm information 

about the beneficiary’s position. Each site visit focuses on one petition and 

beneficiary. The IOs determine whether the H-1B petition information can be 

verified or not. Although ASVVP site visits are compliance-based and random, 

USCIS also uses targeted site visits to respond to indicators of fraud. USCIS 

reported spending approximately $8 million in 2016 for ASVVP site visits alone; 

however, the agency does not track the specific costs associated with all site 

visit activities. 

The H-1B Program has been subject to criticism regarding allegations of 

improper use or fraud by individuals and companies. The program’s purpose is 

to help employers recruit highly-skilled foreign workers when they cannot hire 

qualified workers from the United States. Nevertheless, companies such as 

Disney and Hewlett Packard have been criticized for replacing qualified 

American workers through this program. The program has regulations built in 

to protect American workers from displacement by H-1B beneficiaries. Site visit 

programs are a tool USCIS uses to ensure H-1B participants are complying 

with the program’s requirements and to prevent fraud. 

Results of Audit 

USCIS site visits provide minimal assurance that H-1B participants are 

compliant and not engaged in fraudulent activity. These visits assess whether 

petitioners and beneficiaries comply with applicable immigration laws and 

regulations. USCIS can approve more than 330,000 H-1B petitions each year, 

which could include extensions and amendments. As of April 2017, USCIS 

reported more than 680,000 approved and valid H-1B petitions. However, 

during FYs 2014–16, USCIS conducted an average of 7,200 ASVVP site visits 

annually. For the limited number of visits conducted, USCIS does not always 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

ensure the IOs are thorough and comprehensive in their approach. Further 

limiting the site visits’ effectiveness, USCIS does not ensure the agency always 

takes proper and timely action when IOs identify potential fraud or 

noncompliance. USCIS also uses targeted site visits to respond to indicators of 

fraud; however, the agency does not completely track the costs and analyze the 

results of these visits. 

USCIS could do more to prevent approving petitions for recurring violations 

and collaborate more with external stakeholders. The agency does not provide 

comprehensive guidance for how USCIS personnel resolve site visit findings. 

USCIS does not have a process to collect and analyze key data elements to help 

guide the H-1B site visit program. The agency lacks performance measures to 

show how site visits contribute to improving the H-1B Program. Without 

addressing the challenges, USCIS site visits do not fully safeguard the H-1B 

Program, and the agency misses opportunities to ensure funds are put to 

better use through more robust site visits. 

Site Visits Have Limited Impact on H-1B Program Integrity 

Site visits, whether ASVVP or targeted, are USCIS’ primary method to assess 

compliance with applicable laws and requirements once the petition has been 

approved. 

ASVVP Site Visits 

For FYs 2014–16, FDNS conducted ASVVP site visits on approximately 

3 percent of all approved H-1B petitions. Just a fraction of these site visits 

resulted in revocation or petitioner withdrawal of the H-1B visa when the site 

visits identified noncompliance or fraud. During FYs 2014–16, FDNS conducted 

an average of 7,200 of these site visits annually. This was based on an agency 

goal of completing 9,000 in FY 2014 and 10,000 in FY 2016, covering multiple 

visa categories. According to USCIS officials, the agency did not set a goal in FY 

2015 because policy and program staffing changed. These site visits are 

compliance based, and participation by both the petitioner and beneficiary is 

voluntary. Figure 2 shows the disparity between H-1B petitions approved, 

ASVVP H-1B site visits conducted, the number of unverified site visits, and the 

ASVVP H-1B site visits resulting in revocation. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Figure 2. Limited Impact of ASVVP 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of data from multiple USCIS databases. 

During ASVVP site visits, IOs use general criteria, which provide the main 

requirements that must be verified. Some of these requirements include salary, 

job duties, presence of an organization, and the beneficiary. The IO documents 

the results in a Compliance Review Report after completing the site visit. The 

report results are a collective determination based on all resources, including 

Headquarters FDNS, Service Centers, regional and field offices. 

Targeted Site Visits

Targeted site visits are generated in one of three ways: 

1. Site Inspection and Evaluation of Validation Instrument for Business 

Enterprises (VIBE) Entities — the VIBE system5 identifies potentially 

fraudulent entities. 

2. External Source Site Visit Program — the DOS Consulate Offices refer 

fraud concerns. 

3. Administrative Investigations — USCIS adjudicators who find fraud 

indicators in benefit applications and petitions make referrals for 

investigations to FDNS. Law enforcement entities, the public, or other 

government agencies may also provide tip letters and referrals. 

USCIS was unable to provide complete and accurate records for the total 

number of H-1B targeted site visits conducted during FYs 2014–16 because it 

does not systematically track site visits resulting from administrative 

investigations. During FYs 2014–16, USCIS tracked 577 targeted site visits — 

433 visits conducted for the State Consulate Offices and 144 based on the Site 

 5 The VIBE system is a tool that allows USCIS to verify petitioners’ business information.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Inspection and Evaluation of VIBE Entities. USCIS was unable to quantify the 

total number of targeted site visits based on administrative investigations. 

USCIS does not have a reliable and comprehensive 

system to track all three types of its targeted site 

visit activities. The agency uses spreadsheets to 

manually track site visit work resulting from the 

Site Inspection and Evaluation of VIBE Entities and 

the DOS Consulate Offices. However, for tracking 

targeted site visits resulting from administrative 

investigations, USCIS relies on the FDNS-Data 

System. The system’s current capabilities are 

unable to identify whether a targeted site visit was 

for an H-1B visa or another visa6 because multiple 

visas could be involved in these types of site visits. 

Therefore, we were unable to identify how many of these visits focused solely 

on H-1B petitions. 

FDNS-Data System is 

USCIS’ case management 

system to record, track, 

and manage immigration 

inquiries, investigative 

referrals, law enforcement 

requests, and case 

determinations involving 

benefit fraud, criminal 

activity, public safety, and 

national security 

concerns. 

According to USCIS officials, as a result of Executive Order 13768, Enhancing 

Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, signed January 25, 2017, the 

agency has recently implemented plans to increase targeted site visits. This will 

include: 

x a greater focus on cases in which the employer’s basic business 

information cannot be verified through commercially available data; 

x H-1B dependent employers who have a high ratio of H-1B workers 

compared to U.S. workers; and 

x employers petitioning for beneficiaries who work offsite at another 

company or organization’s location. 

USCIS has also created an email inbox to report suspected H-1B fraud and 

abuse and plans to issue a public report on H-1B petition data submitted for 

FY 2018. 

Limited Effort to Prevent Recurring Violators 

USCIS could do more to prevent recurring violations with H-1B petitioners. 

According to the CFR,7 DHS (USCIS) has authority to approve or deny a 

petition. USCIS’ Adjudications Field Manual also states that even if adjudicators 

have some doubt as to the petition’s validity, if the claim is probably true 

 6 Targeted site visits are also conducted on other benefit types, including L-1A Intracompany 

Transferee Executive or Manager or R-1 Non-immigrant Religious Workers.

7 20 CFR 655.705, What Federal agencies are involved in the H-1B and H-1B1 programs, and 

what are the responsibilities of those agencies and of employers? 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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(greater than 50 percent), the petition cannot be denied or revoked. Despite 

this important function, USCIS does not always ensure that petitioners who 

were recurring violators are not approved for new petitions or that USCIS is, at 

a minimum, using all site visit data during the adjudication process. USCIS 

may use information on matters such as whether the business is in operation, 

has committed fraud, is under investigation by a law enforcement agency, or 

was debarred by DOL. However, the data we reviewed shows the agency does 

not adequately use revocations resulting from ASVVP site visits to further 

assist during adjudications to eliminate recurring violators. 

According to DHS officials, adjudicators do not consider unverified results and 

revocations from ASVVP site visits when approving or denying H-1B 

petitions. Accordingly, USCIS reviews each petition to ensure that the 

information provided satisfies the criteria for approval. This includes 

determining whether an LCA supports the petition, the occupation is a 

specialty occupation, and the non-immigrant’s qualifications meet the H-1B 

Program’s statutory requirements. It does not consistently consider material 

information about the petitioner beyond what is provided on the form, 

including whether the petitioner previously demonstrated non-compliance with 

program rules and regulations. Thus, USCIS has approved petitioners from 

certain industries that have high rates in which IOs were unable to verify 

petition information during site visits. For example, USCIS and CBP officials 

reported that many information technology consulting petitioners regularly 

submit petitions for beneficiaries with the intent of contracting them out to 

third-party clients. Additionally, in many cases, the projects provided within 

the petition are non-existent. This allows beneficiaries to arrive in the country 

and not work in accordance with the H-1B agreements. 

Table 2 illustrates two information technology consulting petitioners with the 

most ASVVP site visits over the past 3 years. In these two examples, USCIS 

approved between 31,000 and 57,000 petitions for petitioners for which 

petitions were previously revoked due to an unverified site visit (i.e., the site 

visit confirmed that the petitioners were noncompliant in some material respect 

with H-1B program rules and regulations). Although USCIS conducted site 

visits on only 1–2 percent of the approved petitions submitted by these two 

entities, these relatively few site visits yielded unverified rates of 14–16 percent. 

The firms continue to file numerous petitions, which USCIS continues to 

approve despite the heavy pattern of violations. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Table 2. ASVVP Results - Information Technology Consulting Industry 

FYs 2014–2016 

Petitioner Technology 

Industry Firm A 

Technology 

Industry Firm B

Total Petitions Submitted 68,579 37,193

Total Petitions Approved 56,707 31,771

Total ASVVP Site Visits 1,351 499

Total Unverified Site Visits 214 71

Information Information 

Total Petitions Revoked 85 30

Source: DHS OIG analysis of data from multiple USCIS databases. 

USCIS conducted fewer ASVVP site visits for other industries in correlation to 

the total number of H-1B petitions approved. Site visits for these other 

industries resulted in a lower unverified outcome. Table 3 provides an 

illustration of two corporations operating in two separate industries that had 

site visits at their locations. 

Table 3. ASVVP Results - Other Industries FYs 2014–16 

Manufacturing 

Industry Firm A 

Financial Services 

Industry Firm B Petitioner

Total Petitions Submitted 2,429 4,115

Total Petitions Approved 2,289 3,922

Total ASVVP Site Visits 108 110

Total Unverified Site Visits 3 2

Total Petitions Revoked 0 0

Source: DHS OIG analysis of data from multiple USCIS databases. 

By failing to take more proactive steps to identify petitioners with prior 

unverified site visit results and ensure that subsequent petitions submitted by 

these petitioners are not approved, USCIS permits noncompliance — including 

fraud — to perpetuate in the H-1B program. To the extent limited resources 

play a part in USCIS’ ability to detect and prevent program abuse, USCIS could 

do a better job of utilizing its information-sharing relationships with other 

agencies. Currently, USCIS and stakeholders, such as DOS, DOL, and ICE, 

have Memorandums of Agreement in place ensuring regular communication 

and information sharing regarding fraud. There is also a mechanism in place 

for USCIS to meet with other Federal agencies throughout the year specifically 

related to visa classifications like the H-1B visa. USCIS also informed us that 

they work with other stakeholders, such as State, local, and tribal partners. 

Leveraging these relationships would help USCIS better identify high-risk 

petitioners to target for site visits. It would also enhance USCIS’ ability to take 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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action against petitioners who, because of demonstrated recurrent 

noncompliance, should not be permitted to participate in the H-1B program. 

Even though the agencies have demonstrated some collaborative effort, 

additional cooperation and communication would help. For example, USCIS 

and DOL could share information to increase awareness regarding recurring 

violators identified through site visits post adjudication. DOL has the authority 

to debar petitioners for a period of time from filing new H-1B petitions when 

those petitioners have been found to be noncompliant or fraudulent with their 

LCA. By working more with DOL, debarment of petitioners submitting 

fraudulent H-1B petitions would help USCIS reduce H-1B Program 

noncompliance or fraud. 

According to the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) Framework for 

Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs, results of monitoring such as the 

data collected during site visits should be used to improve fraud prevention 

and detection. After the collection of data and results, USCIS management 

should develop a plan describing how the program will respond to instances of 

noncompliance and fraud. Specifically, management should collaborate with 

external stakeholders and communicate quality information such as 

noncompliance and fraud data collected during site visits. 

ASVVP Needs Improvement 

Ineffective Sampling of Petitions for Site Visits 

ASVVP site visit sampling methodology for H-1B petitions limits opportunities 

to identify potential noncompliance or fraud indicators. USCIS uses a random 

sampling methodology that does not consider other factors such as risk, size of 

organization, or history of petitioners’ activities. For example, USCIS’ ASVVP 

sampling also does not include the entire universe of approved H-1B petitions 

or consider additional factors in the selections, unlike targeted site visits, 

which are based on referral and identified risk factors. 

In FYs 2014–2016, USCIS’ sampling methodology for identifying H-1B ASVVP 

site visits excluded 61 percent, 59 percent, and 64 percent, respectively, of the 

entire H-1B population. According to USCIS’ draft 2013 ASVVP Workload 

Balancer Database guide, which provides an overview of how the database 

generates a list of receipt numbers eligible for an ASVVP site visit, the sampling 

excludes amended petitions and approved petitions in which the beneficiary is 

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Petition Population and Exclusions FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 Total 

Entire Population of Approved Petitions * 281,461 260,650 346,709 888,820 

Total Excluded by FY 171,280 154,448 222,492 548,220 

61% 59% 64% 61% 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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located outside of the United States.8 According to USCIS officials, extended 

petitions for the same job and employer as initially approved, known as 

same/same, are also excluded manually outside of the Workload Balancer due 

to staffing limitations at one service center. USCIS plans to improve its 

sampling methodology by including amended petitions and same/same 

petitions in the sampling, but has not incorporated these changes as of May 

2017. Table 4 shows the total H-1B approved petitions excluded based on 

USCIS’ methodology in FYs 2014–16. 

Table 4. Total Approved Petitions Excluded from ASVVP Sampling 

FYs 2014–16 

Total % Excluded from Population

Source: DHS OIG analysis of USCIS data. 

*Note: The entire population of approved petitions varies slightly from the numbers presented 

in table 1 based on revocations and the timing of when the data was run and provided. 

ASVVP site visit sampling does not take a risk-based approach or differentiate 

between low- and high-risk petitioners. USCIS does not stratify and select H1B ASVVP site visits to identify and review petitions for prior offenders. For 

example, if the recurring violators in the information technology industry 

discussed earlier file future petitions, they will have the same chance of being 

selected for an ASVVP site visit as those in compliance, such as the petitioners 

in the manufacturing and financial services industries. If there is no pattern of 

abuse found at those companies after multiple site visits, the agency could 

reduce resources spent by removing or limiting the reputable companies from 

their sampling selection. USCIS has recently identified risk factors to 

incorporate into their targeted site visit program. Nevertheless, USCIS has not 

shared evidence of plans to include these risk factors into sampling for the 

ASVVP. Although there is value in maintaining a random sampling, risk-based 

sampling could also be incorporated into the program. 

 8 An amended petition for a previously approved petition is filed due to a change of the 

employee’s work location or any other material change in the terms and conditions of 

employment. Same/same are petition extensions for the same job and employer, as initially 

approved. The other excluded category, beneficiary located outside the United States until they 

start work, represents petitions for beneficiaries residing outside of the United States at the 

time the petition is approved. 

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Lack of Timely Adjudicative Action on Noncompliant ASVVP Site Visits 

USCIS does not promptly take action and report resolution when H-1B ASVVP 

site visits identify potential fraud or noncompliance. Of the 2,331 site visits 

that FDNS determined were unable to be verified during FYs 2014–16, we 

identified 996 beneficiaries, or 43 percent, who showed an approved and active 

H-1B status as of April 2017. We reviewed all site visits unable to be verified in 

which USCIS processed a revocation for noncompliance or fraud for FYs 2014– 

16. The revocation process averaged 339 days from the time an unverified site 

visit was referred to adjudications (see figure 3). Without timely resolutions for 

site visit findings and with continued participation of violators in the program, 

ineligible participants may continue to abuse the program while working in the 

country. 

Figure 3. Number of Days to Revoke Petitions in FYs 2014–16 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of data from multiple USCIS databases. 

USCIS makes the adjudication of new petition filings a priority over resolving 

issues identified during ASVVP site visits. ASVVP site visits in which IOs were 

unable to verify petition information focus on previously approved petitions and 

are not subject to internal processing timeframes. According to USCIS officials, 

adjudicative action on these site visit cases can be suspended to complete 

higher priority tasks. They also explained that revocations can take longer for 

reasons such as the complexity of the case, which requires more analysis. 

USCIS does not always take timely action on unverified site visits. At one 

location, an IO provided three examples of unverified site visits that were 

currently in approved status. We followed up with USCIS on the status of these 

site visits, and learned that the SCOPS had not reviewed or taken action on two 

of the three files. The files were erroneously shipped to a storage facility in 

Virginia, where USCIS stores files after they have been closed. Subsequent to 

our inquiry, USCIS retrieved the files from storage and began the revocation 

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process by issuing Notices of Intent to Revoke. Figure 4 shows the revocation 

process. 

Figure 4. Revocation Process after Unverified ASVVP Site Visits 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of USCIS policies.

USCIS does not have policies or procedures to ensure proper actions are taken 

timely in response to the site visit process from initiation to adjudicative action. 

We identified H-1B petitions reported as noncompliant or fraudulent are in 

approved status for an average of approximately 415 days, or almost half of the 

petition’s 3-year validity period. 

USCIS Takes Adjudicative Actions on Simple Noncompliant Cases 

The ASVVP identifies a variety of noncompliance cases, but primarily takes 

action on one simple type of noncompliance — a beneficiary not employed by 

the approved employer. The program rarely revokes petitions for the more 

complex noncompliance and fraud cases. In 81 percent of the cases, a 

beneficiary that is “not employed by petitioner” was used as the basis for 

revocation. Conversely, when USCIS identified all other noncompliance or fraud 

schemes, including improper wage payment, misrepresentation of job duties, 

non-existent employee/employer relationship, and others, the agency revoked 

only 29 percent of the petitions (see figure 5). 

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Figure 5. Top Results for ASVVP Site Visits during FY 2014–16 

 Source: DHS OIG analysis of data from multiple USCIS databases.
 

*Note: The “Other” column represents an average of the 12 other unverified reasons listed in 

the figure.
 

The disparities shown in figure 5 exist, in part, because USCIS does not 

provide comprehensive guidance to FDNS and SCOPS to ensure consistent 

determinations on ASVVP site visits. Through these site visits, FDNS 

establishes the legitimacy of the petitioning organization and verifies the 

accuracy of the employment offer. FDNS personnel conclude that a site visit is 

unverified if the information at the time of adjudication does not match the 

findings of the site visit or could not be verified. SCOPS personnel reopen these 

petitions based on agency manuals, the CFR, the Immigration and Nationality 

Act, precedent decisions, and other SCOPS guidance. As previously noted, if 

the claim is probably true, the petition cannot be denied or revoked, even if 

adjudications has some doubt as to the petition’s validity.

USCIS issued guidance that aligns FDNS and SCOPS determinations on one 

issue. A precedent decision9 taking effect April 9, 2015, clarified what 

constitutes a material change in the beneficiaries’ work location. If a site visit 

identified that a beneficiary was not working at the location reported on the 

LCA and petition, the site visit would be unverified. Prior to the decision, 

USCIS allowed the petitioner to submit a new LCA within 30 days of the move, 

with the updated work location after the unverified site visit took place, and 

would take no action on the petition. After the decision, a change of work 

location outside the previous commuting area is considered a material change 

 9 Matter of Simeio Solutions, LLC, USCIS Administrative Appeals Office, 26 I&N Dec. 542, 

Interim Decision #3832, decided April 9, 2015. 

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to the original petition and would result in a revocation if an amended or new 

petition was not filed before the employee started working at the new location. 

USCIS does not address when the beneficiary is inappropriately paid in 

accordance with the local wage scale and their experience. When submitting a 

prevailing wage level on the LCA, the petitioner is permitted to select a wage 

based on the beneficiary’s experience, provided it falls within range for the 

specified occupation. FDNS may report the site visit as unverified if a 

beneficiary receives an incorrect wage level.10 Current SCOPS guidance 

instructs adjudicators to not pursue adjudicative action on these cases, and 

SCOPS personnel explained these are DOL matters. However, during fieldwork, 

USCIS officials said these cases were not always referred to DOL; rather, they 

were returned to FDNS and no action was taken. 

Limitations to ASVVP Policies and Training 

The lack of a standardized process across the agency and country allows 

inconsistencies in how ASVVP site visits are conducted. We observed a varying 

degree of effort in how IOs conducted 26 site visits throughout the country. For 

example, IOs at one location did not obtain any documentation on site. Instead, 

they requested all documentation be emailed at a later date. Obtaining this 

information via email after the site visit could allow the opportunity for the 

petitioner to alter or forge the documents. We also noted that not all IOs are 

inspecting workstations or physically verifying the beneficiary’s job duties to 

validate the work being performed and identify potential fraud indicators. 

The IOs rely on the ASVVP Standard Operating Procedures, training material, 

and other informal documents to conduct site visits. However, this guidance is 

very broad and leaves room for varied interpretation, which can fluctuate with 

experience level. Specifically, the Standard Operating Procedures direct IOs to 

verify H-1B requirements through interviews, document reviews, and 

observations during site visits and to document the results in a Compliance 

Review Report. According to the Standard Operating Procedures, Section 1.7.4 

Review Records, when possible, IOs obtain legible photocopies or photographs 

of the documents for uploading into the FDNS-Data System. However, it does 

not require the IOs to obtain the documentation on site. Additionally, Section 

1.5.1 allows site visits to be waived under certain conditions and conducted 

telephonically, eliminating other critical physical verification elements from the 

process, including validating work performed. 

 10 Incorrect wage levels would include an experienced manager/supervisor who would normally 

be paid at a higher level based on experience level but is being paid at the lowest wage 

permitted, normally reserved for entry-level employees with a basic or limited understanding.

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Fiscal Year Turnover Filled Percentage 

2014 16 69 23% 

2015 32 60 53% 

Employee Average Positions Turnover 

2016 31 58.5 53% 

 

 

 

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IOs may be missing key fraud findings because of the lack of training 

associated with the ASVVP site visits. Although USCIS reports to Congress 

claimed that these site visits can detect fraud schemes and are a fraud 

deterrent, the agency does not provide training to IOs to assist them with 

detecting potential fraud during site visits for referral to more experienced IOs. 

Also, USCIS does not train IOs dedicated 

to conducting ASVVP site visits on what 

fraudulent documents look like, how to 

detect fraud, or potential fraud 

indicators. IO training materials 

specifically state that “ASVVP is low-level 

verification, NOT fraud detection work.” 

This statement directly contradicts the agency’s own representations to 

Congress about the purpose and utility of the program. 

USCIS’ FY 2016 annual report to 

Congress states: 

“While these reviews do not directly 

detect fraud, they allow USCIS to 

identify fraud schemes that were not 

identifiable in the past.” 

Improvements to training, as well as better policies and procedures will help 

IOs detect fraud during site visits. A better understanding and awareness of 

potential fraud within the H-1B Program could lead to more targeted site visits, 

fraud findings, and revocations. 

Turnover 

As currently designed, the ASVVP has high turnover that hinders IOs’ ability to 

understand complex visa categories, and gain experience in identifying fraud 

and noncompliance issues. For each IO that leaves, expertise is lost. Table 5 

illustrates the turnover rates for IOs conducting ASVVP site visits during FYs 

2014–16. 

Table 5. ASVVP Site Visit IO Turnover Rates in FYs 2014–16 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of USCIS data. 

USCIS has not conducted an assessment to evaluate the cause and levels of 

turnover of IOs and the impact turnover may have on the effectiveness of site 

visits and associated costs. Despite the lack of an assessment, based on an 

FY 2016 USCIS report to Congress11 and our interviews with IOs and upper 

management of USCIS, high turnover rates may be due to upward mobility 

limitations. In the report to Congress, USCIS recognized the ASVVP had high 

 11 USCIS, FY 2016 H-1B and L-1A Compliance Review and Site Visits Report to Congress, 2016.

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vacancy rates for IOs. The agency attributed the rate to IOs pursuing 

promotions in other USCIS positions because the IO promotion potential is 

limited. The report also noted that attrition rates impacted performance 

numbers for FY 2015. As of April 2017, USCIS planned to hire IOs at a higher 

grade level because they plan to take a more targeted approach on employers 

for site visits. This may impact turnover rates in the future, but has not yet 

been fully implemented or evaluated. 

USCIS Needs a Better Approach to Allocate Resources 

USCIS has not developed an approach to allocate its site visit resources in the 

most effective and efficient manner. Specifically: 

x USCIS lacks performance measures to show how site visits add value to 

the H-1B Program; and 

x USCIS does not have a process to collect and analyze key data elements 

to help guide the H-1B site visit program. 

USCIS conducts limited performance measuring to show how site visits add 

value to the H-1B Program and cannot determine its overall effectiveness to 

improve the program. USCIS’ only performance goals and outcome indicators 

for site visits are based on quantity and timeliness of site visits completed. 

USCIS tracks the total number of ASVVP site visits conducted by FDNS and 

sets a goal of 30 days to complete each site visit report. Once FDNS provides 

SCOPS with unverified site visit results, USCIS does not require SCOPS to take 

final adjudicative action in a timely manner. 

USCIS does not assess output or outcome 

indicators, such as how many site visits lead 

to revocations, revised petitions, or fraud 

detection. FDNS does not fully track and 

analyze data on ASVVP and targeted site 

visits. Thus, USCIS was unable to provide 

data on its site visits, including total number 

of H-1B site visits and site visit costs. Data 

collected for both types of site visits and 

program costs are incomplete and not used 

to assess the program’s effectiveness. 

The Government Performance and 

Results Modernization Act of 2010 

requires that Federal agencies create 

a performance plan covering each 

program activity. The performance 

plan should include indicators to 

measure or assess progress toward 

performance goals including 

efficiency, output, and outcome 

indicators. 

Although the agency does collect some information from the site visits, USCIS 

does not assess the results. Without ensuring a set of performance indicators 

such as data accuracy and reliability are being used to measure progress 

toward performance goals, USCIS cannot ensure funds are spent efficiently. 

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Additionally, USCIS does not monitor H-1B beneficiaries upon expiration or 

revocation to assist DHS with tracking visas. For example, USCIS has failed to 

produce documentation illustrating that it is actively tracking expired or 

revoked H-1B beneficiaries, allowing them to remain in the United States 

illegally. We recently reported shortfalls with how DHS is tracking this and all 

visa activity.12

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Deputy Director, U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, develop a process to collect and analyze 

complete and accurate data for all H-1B site visit activity. At a minimum, 

USCIS should: 

a.	 track targeted site visits as well as program costs associated with 

Administrative Site Visit and Verification Program and targeted site 

visits; 

b. analyze adjudicative actions for unverified site visits; and 

c.	 use data collected above to develop performance measures to assess the 

effectiveness of the site visit programs and assist with oversight 

improvements. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Deputy Director, U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, identify data and assessments obtained 

through site visit programs post adjudication and implement measures to 

systematically share this information with external stakeholders as 

appropriate.

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the Deputy Director, U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, conduct an assessment of the H-1B 

Administrative Site Visit and Verification Program to: 

a.	 identify the best allocation of resources for oversight of the H-1B 

Program. This should include an adjustment of the number of required 

site visits per year, and the time and effort spent at each site visit;

b. update policies, procedures, and training to ensure consistent 

approaches and proper documentation for site visits; 
 

c.	 enhance the random sampling procedures to also include a more riskbased approach that prioritizes the recurring violators within the 

universe of H-1B holders and a random stratified selection of small or 

 12 DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays is Hindered by Insufficient Technology, OIG-17-56, May 1, 

2017.

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high risk petitioners; and assesses available information and data on 

petitioners; and

d. ensure immigration officers have a career path that will encourage them 

to remain in the position and enable them to develop, enhance, and 

contribute to identifying and addressing noncompliance or fraud for the 

long term. 

Recommendation 4: We recommend that the Deputy Director, U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, develop comprehensive policies across 

Directorates to ensure adjudicative action is prioritized on fraudulent or 

noncompliant immigration benefits identified by the H-1B ASVVP and targeted 

site visits. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Recommendation 1. 

USCIS Response: Concur. USCIS recognized the benefits of collecting and 

analyzing key data elements to help guide the H-1B site visit activity. The 

FDNS Mission Support Division has assigned funding codes to the ASVVP to 

allow for enhanced reporting. USCIS launched the Targeted Site Visit and 

Verification Program in phases to develop effective and systematic targeting of 

potential and unknown fraud. Under this new program, site visits are visaspecific and rely on screening using risk criteria, allowing for the systematic 

tracking of resources required to conduct them and providing clear outcomes 

to estimate the impact of the program. This is considered a hybrid program 

between randomly selected “Compliance” visits and “For Cause” site visits that 

are based on fraud elements discovered through benefit processing. 

FDNS will issue guidance to help ensure more consistency in how the time 

associated with “For Cause” site visits for travel and on-site time is recorded in 

the FDNS-Data System. This will advance FDNS’ ability to capture the travel 

and on-site time as a subset of the total resources required for administrative 

investigations. FDNS expects to develop and issue guidance related to tracking 

the activities and costs related to site visits by June 30, 2018. USCIS’ Center 

Fraud Detection Operations and SCOPS use data on adjudicative actions from 

the Comprehensive ASVVP Reporting System during compliance reviews. The 

USCIS FDNS Fraud Division will include data collected through this reporting 

system to assess how to improve its capabilities, site visit policies, training, 

and set performance goals. Expected completion date is June 30, 2018. The 

new Targeted Site Visit and Verification Program will provide the 

comprehensive data needed to measure performance and assess the 

effectiveness of the site visit programs. FDNS Fraud Division will review the 

data and propose performance measures for consideration. FDNS plans to 

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incorporate Targeted Site Visit and Verification Program performance goals in 

its annual set of performance measures by September 30, 2018. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open. We will need to 

confirm that USCIS has fully implemented all planned actions successfully, 

and developed a process to collect and analyze complete and accurate data for 

all H-1B site visit activities. Specifically, we will need to: 

x validate the assigned funding codes and how the Targeted Site Visit and 

Verification Program provides effective and systematic targeting of 

potential and unknown fraud; 

x review the FDNS guidance to confirm it will ensure more consistency in 

how the time associated with “For Cause” site visits for travel and on-site 

time is recorded in the FDNS-Data System; 

x assess how the data collected through the Comprehensive ASVVP 

Reporting System is used to improve capabilities, site visit policies, 

training, and set performance goals; and 

x review the process of how the new Targeted Site Visit and Verification 

Program data contributes to performance measures and the effectiveness 

of the site visit programs. 

Recommendation 2. 

USCIS Response: Concur. USCIS agreed that greater coordination with other 

Federal agencies; specifically, coordination with the Department of Justice, 

Department of Labor, and Department of State is critical for ensuring the 

integrity of the H-1B program. The enhanced sharing of information will 

facilitate investigations and sanctions of those who violate the rules of the H1B Program. USCIS and DOL executed a Memorandum of Agreement in 

January 2017 to allow access to agency systems that contain certain labor 

condition application and employment-based petition information, including 

USCIS’ VIBE system. VIBE would allow DOL to access information on 

petitioners that have been identified as having committed fraud or that are 

under investigation by a law enforcement agency. Consistent with Executive 

Order 13788, USCIS and DOL are evaluating statutory authorities to allow for 

the systematic sharing of USCIS site visit information with DOL. 

USCIS and DOS are working to further enhance the sharing of USCIS site visit 

information through the External Source Site Visit and Verification Program. 

USCIS is in the final stages of providing DOS access to the FDNS-Data System 

database. Through the FDNS-Data System, DOS will have access to USCIS site 

visit information, and will be in a position to use this information when 

adjudicating visa applications. USCIS and DOS are also working on a number 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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1B program, including mechanisms for DOS to share with USCIS derogatory 

information uncovered during the visa adjudication process. Finally, USCIS is 

in the process of establishing a Memorandum of Understanding with the 

Department of Justice Civil Rights Division’s Immigrant and Employee Rights 

Section, which is responsible for enforcing the anti-discrimination provisions of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act. USCIS plans to share site visit information 

that may be helpful in identifying, investigating, and prosecuting H-1B 

employers that intentionally discriminate against U.S. workers. Expected 

completion date is March 31, 2018. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open. We need to confirm 

USCIS can systematically share data and assessments obtained through site 

visit programs post adjudication and implement measures with external 

stakeholders as appropriate. 

Recommendation 3. 

USCIS Response: Concur. USCIS responded that it is adopting a more targeted 

approach when making site visits to H-1B petitioners and the worksite of H-1B 

employees as part of increased efforts to combat fraud and abuse in the H-1B 

program. FDNS Fraud Division plans to conduct more site visits and began 

reviewing a potential increase in site visits through the creation of the Targeted 

Site Visit and Verification Program that would double the overall number of site 

visits to 20,000. The annual target for site visits will be set each year based on 

executive priorities and available resources. FDNS has proposed increasing the 

number of site visits and awaits decisions on the FY 2018 budget to see 

whether resources will be available. This increase will be dependent on the 

availability of new positions and infrastructure. Expected completion date is 

September 30, 2018. 

On March 31, 2017, USCIS issued Policy Memorandum 602-0142, Rescission 

of the December 22, 2000 “Guidance memo on H1B computer related positions.” 

The FDNS Fraud Division finalized operational guidance for conducting H-1B 

site visits that aligns with policy and conducted a series of trainings to 

familiarize IOs with both the guidance and the policy. These efforts ensure a 

more consistent approach to the conduct of H-1B site visits so that 

adjudicators are better able to use the results of these visits for adjudicative 

purpose. FDNS expects to complete any additional guidance and training by 

June 30, 2018. 

The Targeted Site Visit and Verification Program incorporates risk-based 

criteria into threat-based assessments. FDNS plans to expand the program to 

include additional risk-based criteria by March 31, 2018. To address retention 

issues, USCIS has implemented a strategy to hire IOs at a higher grade level in 

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order to improve retention rates. USCIS has begun hiring IOs at the GS-11 

level, and the number of positions at this level is expected to increase in 

FY 2018 and beyond as future vacancies will have the option to advertise at 

this GS-11 level. As the number of GS-11 IOs increase, so will the capacity of 

USCIS to conduct fraud-based targeted site visits. FDNS expects full 

implementation by December 31, 2017. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open. USCIS should 

provide support to demonstrate a better allocation of resources for oversight of 

the H-1B Program; revised policies, procedures, and training; enhanced 

random sampling procedures; and an official updated immigration officer 

career path. 

Recommendation 4. 

USCIS Response: Concur. FDNS IOs will continue to transmit compliance 

reviews and administrative investigations results to USCIS Service Centers for 

action, as per ongoing practice. FDNS has recently taken measures to align 

itself with current USCIS policy for reviewing H-1B petitions filed for workers in 

the information technology industry. These measures should make for more 

consistent site visit results, which should assist Service Centers to more 

efficiently assess the viability of adverse administrative action. FDNS expects to 

complete the additional guidance and training, if needed, by June 30, 2018. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open until USCIS 

demonstrates the actions taken ensure adjudicative action is prioritized on 

fraudulent or noncompliant immigration benefits identified by the H-1B ASVVP 

and targeted site visits. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107ï296) by 

amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. 

We conducted this audit to determine whether the USCIS ASVVP and targeted 

site visits are safeguarding the integrity of the H-1B Program. The scope of the 

audit focused on the process after USCIS approved H-1B petitions. To 

accomplish our objective, we reviewed Federal laws and regulations related to 

the H-1B Program; USCIS’ strategic plan; policies, procedures, and guidance 

associated with the H-1B Program, the ASVVP, and targeted site visits; prior 

OIG and GAO audit reports; USCIS’ Memorandums of Agreement with other 

agencies; Congressional testimony; media articles; and USCIS’ reporting and 

available data on site visit results and outcomes. 

We interviewed USCIS Headquarters officials in the FDNS, the SCOPS, the 

Field Operations Directorate, the Management Directorate’s Office of 

Performance and Quality, and the Office of Policy and Strategy. We also 

interviewed USCIS personnel in Mount Laurel, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Santa 

Ana, CA; Chicago, IL; and the Vermont, California, and Nebraska Service 

Centers in St. Albans, VT; Laguna Niguel, CA; and Lincoln, NE. We also 

interviewed personnel from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of 

Field Operations at Chicago O’Hare International Airport; U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations’ Document and 

Benefit Fraud Task Force; Social Security Administration OIG; and DOL’s 

Employment and Training Administration and Wage and Hour Division to 

identify these stakeholders’ role in the administration and enforcement of H-1B 

Program and their relationship with USCIS. 

We observed 21 ASVVP and 5 targeted site visits in the following locations: New 

Jersey, Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, and Indiana. We relied on the IOs and 

their planned schedule for the visits selected. We observed and obtained FDNS 

officers’ perspectives on site visits conducted pertaining to approved H-1B 

petitions issued by USCIS. We used our limited observations on site visits to 

supplement other information collected and analysis conducted; we did not use 

it as the basis for overall conclusions. 

We obtained USCIS data on ASVVP and targeted site visits, ASVVP staffing and 

costs, and H-1B revocations. Specifically, we analyzed the following data for 

FYs 2014–16: 

ASVVP and targeted site visits to include determinations made after site 

www.oig.dhs.gov 22 OIG-18-03 

x
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

visits by the field offices and the Service Centers contained in the FDNSData System; 

x consolidated information on FDNS determinations and actions taken of 

ASVVP site visits contained in the Comprehensive ASVVP Reporting 

System; and 

x current status and adjudicative actions for unverified ASVVP site visits in 

Computer Linked Application Information Management System 3. 

We were unable to validate ASVVP and targeted site visit program and staffing 

costs. FDNS does not track specific costs of IOs conducting targeted site visits; 

therefore, we were unable to report on the targeted site visit costs. We also 

observed queries run by USCIS to generate the site visit data from the FDNSData System and Comprehensive ASVVP Reporting System and determined 

what controls are in place for both systems. We believe the data to be 

sufficiently reliable to support our audit conclusions. 

To determine the outcomes and adjudicative actions resulting from ASVVP site 

visits identified as fraudulent or noncompliant, we analyzed data for 2,331 

unverified site visits during FYs 2014–16. We evaluated USCIS internal 

controls to the extent necessary to accomplish our objective. We developed an 

understanding of the internal controls over the ASVVP and targeted site visits 

by reviewing USCIS guidance and interviewing Headquarters and field officials. 

We conducted this performance audit between November 2016 and June 2017 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. 

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Appendix B 

USCIS Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

H-1B Process 

HǦ1B VISA PROGRAM ISSUANCE PROCEDURES

Prospective Employer

Employer files Labor Condition

Application (LCA) with Labor

who checks for completeness,

obvious errors and inaccuracies.

Not

Certified

Employer is notified

of error or inaccuracy

and can immediately

submit a corrected

LCA unless the

employer is notified

of disqualification.

Petitioner (Employer)

receives a letter of

denial with an

explanation and if

applicable how to file

a motion or appeal.

Not

Certified

LCA is NOT Certified

Employer Submits Certified LCA and IǦ129

Petition toDHS requestingHǦ1B Classification.

DHS determines:

x Whetherthe LCA and IǦ129 correspond

with one another

x Whetherthe occupation named in the LCA

is a specialty occupation

x Whetherthe individual is a fashion model

of distinguished merit and ability

x If the qualifications of the nonimmigrant

meets the statutory requirements of the HǦ

1B classification

Certified

Certified

Approved,

nonimmigrant located

within United States.

Currentlyworking in a

different status.

Deny

Deny

HǦ1B classification is

NOT issued.

Nonimmigrant applies for a

status change of their current

classification to HǦ1B.

Approved,nonimmigrant

located outside the United

States. Applies for HǦ1B Visa

abroad at consular office.

Appeal

Approved

Prospective HǦ1B Visa

Holder fills out online

application, gathers

required documentation,

and attends an interview

with State. State consular

office will determine if they

are qualified for a visa.

Approve Deny

Applicant is

notified if

they can

apply for a

waiver of

ineligibility

Waiver

Approved

Deny

Applicant is

ineligible for a Visa

Applicant pays Visa Issuance fee

(if applicable) and is informed how

their passport and visa will be returned

to them.

Source: DHS OIG analysis of CFR and program information. 

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Appendix D 

Stakeholder Involvement and Legislative Limitations 

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Source: DHS OIG analysis of CFR and program information. 

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Appendix E 

Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report 

Patrick O'Malley, Director 

Paul Streit, Audit Manager 

Kristine Odiña, Analyst-in-Charge 

Paul DeLuca, Auditor 

Ryan McCarthy, Auditor 

Christine Meehan, Auditor 

Zachary Wilkolaski, Auditor 

Henry Kim, Auditor 

Kevin Dolloson, Communications Analyst 

Kendra Starkus, Independent Referencer 

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Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

www.oig.dhs.gov 33 OIG-18-03 
Additional Information and Copies 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: 

www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click 

on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at 

(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 

Attention: Hotline 

245 Murray Drive, SW 

Washington, DC 20528-0305