Note: Decisions of a three

- justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2015

- 300

JANUARY TERM, 20 1 6

Betty Atkins d/b/a Westbury Park } APPEALED FROM: } } Superior Court, Chittenden Unit

,

v. } Civil Divisio n } }

E rin Witham and Robert Witham } DOCKET NO. 497

- 5

- 13 Cncv

Trial Judge: Helen M. Toor

In the above

- entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Defendants in th is mobile

- home eviction action appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff Betty B. Atkins, the owner of the mobile home park where defendants reside

. Defendants contend the trial court erred in : (1) concluding that they committed a substantial

violation o f the lease terms; (2) rejecting their claim that plaintiff had failed to uniformly enforce the lease terms; and (3) denying their counterclaim for discriminat ion based on marital status.

We affirm.

The facts may be summarized as follows. In 2004, defen dant Erin Witham  applied to

lease a mobile home lot in the Westbury Park mobile home park owned by plaintiff, and simultaneously entered into a purchase and sale agreement to buy the mobile home already on

the lot. The application was approved, and she e ntered into a lease providing, in the first paragraph under a section entitled “Application/Occupancy

, ” that “[m]anagement must approve the application of prospective purchaser of mobile home prior to purchase and entrance,” and further providing that appr oval was “contingent upon” a number of factors, including “completion of an accurate application,” “[s]atisfactory character, credit and rental history,” and “[n]o past criminal prosecution.” The second paragraph of the section provided that “[o]ccupancy of home is restricted to persons listed on the application form,” and that “[a]ny changes must be submitted on a ‘Service Request/Occupancy Change Form.’ ”

In June 2005, defendant Erin Witham submitted an Occupancy Change Form seeking permission for her th en

- boyfriend to move into the home. At some point thereafter , however, her boyfriend left, and in January 2013, defendant Robert Witham submitted an occupancy application, identifying himself as a n occupant of the mobile home and listing the mobile home

a s his current address since July 2011. He listed his occupation as owner of a mobile home repair business. Plaintiff ran a background check of Robert Witham’s credit

, criminal, and rental history, which revealed a 2005 conviction for contractor fraud in connection with his mobile

 Erin Witham was known as Erin Davis in 2004, but we will refer to her as Erin Witham, her married n ame, for purposes of clarity.2

hom e repair business, as well as a credit history showing multiple collection judgments against him, including one as recently as July 2011, and a bankruptcy.

Plaintiff , through counsel, notified defendants that they were in vi olation of the lease as a result of the “unauthorized occupation of the mobile home lot by Robert Witha m ,” and further

indicated that his application ha d been denied because of his criminal conviction and unsatisfactory credit history. Plaintiff directed defendants to cure the lease violation by having

Robert Witha m vacate the premises by March 1, 2013, or face an eviction action. He did not vacate, and plaintiff filed this action against defendants in April 2013, alleging a substantial

violation of the lease based on Robert Witha m ’s continued occupancy. Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim, alleging that they had become married in December 2012, and that the action violated their constitutional right to marry.

The partie s filed cross

- motions for summary judgment, which the court addressed in a written decision in May 2015. The court concluded that Robert Witham’s occupancy of the

home without a

pproval was a substantial violation of the lease; rejected defendants’ claim that plaintiff was not applying the lease terms uniformly to all leaseholders; and determined that no

evidence supported defendants’ discrimination claim. The court denied a sub sequent motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.

We review a summary judgment under the same standard as the trial court, giving the benefit of all doubts and inferences to the nonmoving party, and granting the motion only when there are not genu ine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. C N A Ins. Co. , 2004 VT 93, ¶ 8, 177 Vt. 215. “When both parties have moved for summary judgment, we resolve all doubts and inferences i n favor of the party opposing the motion being judged.” In re Ambassador Ins. Co.

, 2008 VT 105, ¶ 10,

184 Vt. 408. We construe a lease agreement applying the same interpretive standards applicable

to contracts. O’Brien Bros. P’ship, LLP v. Plociennik , 2 007 VT 105, ¶ 9, 182 Vt. 409. Whether the language of a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id

.

As they argued bel ow, defendants c laim on appeal that the trial court erred in finding a

violation because the lease does not clearly state whether the criteria for approval of an application of a prospective purchaser in the first paragraph of the section entitled “Application/Occupancy” apply to an application for a change of occupancy under the second paragraph. The trial court concluded that the argument was essentially immaterial, as the lease plainly and unambiguously required that any occupants be “approved by management,” which

had indisputably not occurred here. The court also determined that the violation was subst antial, noting that a determin ation of who may live in a leased premises is a “crucial aspect[] of any

landlord

- tenant relationship.” See 10 V.S.A. § 6237(a) (providing that “[a] leaseholder may be evicted only for nonpayment of rent or for a substantial violation of the lease term s of the mobile home park”). The trial court’s reading of the lease and reasoning in this regard w ere sound, and

defendants have not identified any basis to disturb the conclusion that they committed a

substantial violation.

Defendants also contend the trial court erred in rejecting their claim that plaintiff had not uniformly applied the lease terms, as required under 10 V.S.A. § 6237(b) (“A leaseholder shall not be evicted when there is proof that the lease terms

. . . are n ot enforced with respect to the other leaseholders or others on the park premises.”). Plaintiff provided evidence that in evaluating requests for occupancy, she has consistently done a credit check, a criminal history3

check, and a rental history check. I n response, d efendants rely on plaintiff’s admission that she approved an application in 2012 by a person who had committed a drug possession offense twenty years earlier, in 1992, and who had filed for bankruptcy in 2008. The trial court
concluded that t his tenant and Mr. Witham were not comparable . It noted evidence that the other tenant’s drug conviction was twenty years old, and that since his one

- time bankruptcy he had “cleaned up” his credit. By contrast, Mr. Witham’s consumer fraud conviction was in 2005

, he

was current ly engaging in home improvement work at the mobile home park, and he had multiple collection judgments against him, including one as recently as 2011. Given th ese undisputed facts in the record, we agree with the trial court that d efendants have failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to their claim that plaintiff did not apply the lease terms uniformly to other tenants.

Defendants further contend that the trial court erred in rejecting their claim of discrimination based on marital status. Apart from the allegation, defendants cite no evidence to support the claim, or to undermine the trial court’s finding that defendants had “put forth no evidence at all to support their claim that the eviction is based on their marital status.” Accordingly, we find no error.

Finally, defendants assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because plaintiff’s motion did not comply with V.R.C.P. 56, making it difficult for defendants to dispute or reply to all of plaintiff’s factual allegations. The trial court here prefaced its decision by noting that neither plaintiff nor defendants had followed the formatting and citation rules of V.R.C.P. 56 with care or precision, but that despit e the errors the court had managed to align the disputed and undisputed facts, and determine that summary judgment for plaintiff was appropriate. Defendants have not shown any error in this regard. Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the judgment.

A ffirmed

.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________ Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

_______________________________________ John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

_______________________________________ Beth Robinson, Associate Justice