A Discourse on Winning and Losing

Col John R. Boyd, USAF, Retired

Edited and Compiled by

Dr. Grant T. Hammond

Air University Press

Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

March 2018
Content Editor

James S. Howard

Copy Editor

Tammi K. Dacus

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Boyd, John, 1927–1997, author. | Hammond, Grant Tedrick,

 1945- editor. | Air University (U.S.). Press, publisher.

Title: A discourse on winning and losing / John R. Boyd ; edited

 and compiled by Grant T. Hammond.

Description: First edition. | Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama :

 Air University Press, [2017]. | Includes bibliographical references

 and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017039845 | ISBN 978585662791 (paperback)

Subjects: LCSH: Military art and science. | Strategy. | Command

 of troops.

Classification: LCC U162 .B76 2017 | DDC 355.001—dc23 |

 SUDOC D 301.26/6:D 63 LC record available at https://lccn.

 loc.gov/2017039845

Published by Air University Press in March 2018

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 

are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official 

policy or position of the organizations with which they are associated or the 

views of the Air University Press, Air University, United States Air Force, 

Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. This publication is cleared for public release. Air University Press
Editorial Note: Colonel Boyd’s typography, spellings, and punctuations have been retained for the sake of historicity. 

Copy the graphic below to make an aid for scanning the QR codes.

iii

Contents

 

Introduction 1

A Discourse on Winning and Losing 13

Patterns of Conflict 17

Organic Design for Command and Control 217

The Strategic Game of “ ? and ? ” 255

Destruction and Creation 315

Conceptual Spiral 327

Revelation 365

Bibliography 367

Afterword 381

Appendix The OODA Loop 383

Index 387

v

Having written the first book on John Boyd that focused more on his ideas than his personal story, I have 

been asked by colleagues at Air University Press to edit 

and introduce the publication of John Boyd’s famous 

briefing entitled “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” 

I am happy to do so. This is an important event and will 

make Boyd’s original presentation of his ideas available 

to a wider audience. Moreover, it will allow readers to 

have their own interaction directly with Boyd’s thought 

rather than through an interlocutor. For those who 

know of Boyd and/or his ideas, you may want to skip 

this introduction and go directly to the briefings. This 

would not be as good as a conversation with Boyd, but 

it is as close as we can have.

In introducing the 327 slides of “A Discourse on 

Winning and Losing,” I am hesitant. Boyd’s briefings 

were never meant to be a compilation of doctrine or 

dogma about how to fight and win wars. They were 

meant to be conversations between him and his audiences. He never gave a briefing in which he did not 

learn something. He might have poorly conveyed a 

particular idea or skipped a step in the logic trail. Alternatively, perhaps, he forgot something or someone had 

added to the examples he used, the references he had 

consulted, or provided a different interpretation that he 

should have considered more deeply. Consequently, the 

briefings were always in flux. He would agonize for weeks 

over a single word for just the right meaning. The 

Introduction to “A Discourse on Winning and Losing”

August 1987 briefing reproduced here is but one of 19 

different versions that I have seen. However, it is the 

most widely distributed one and has become the touchstone of Boyd’s thinking and most readily referred to 

corpus for many.

What follows is only a thin veneer, to whet your appetite for Boyd in the “original,” an effort to allow you 

to have your conversation with his ideas. I do not wish 

to poison the well with my own interpretations. They 

are available in more detail elsewhere. Rather, I seek to 

give a brief overview of the richness of some of his ideas 

as an invitation to explore further. To give you a flavor 

of Boyd’s briefings, the staff at Air University Press has 

inserted QR codes for YouTube clips of portions of the 

briefings as Boyd gave them in the early 1990s. You may 

not be able to have a conversation with Boyd yourself, 

but you can partake of the experience vicariously as he 

interacts with his audiences in the “Discourse.”

While Boyd’s initial focus was a 193 slide summation 

of military history in the “Patterns of Conflict” brief, 

his effort soon expanded dramatically. As he read, he 

thought, and as he thought, he tried to explain the connections, the anomalies, the advantages, and limitations of various forms, styles, and strategies of military 

conflict. His insights led him to introduce the theory of 

maneuver warfare as critical to military success in general 

as it had been for successful air-to-air tactics where his 

intellectual journey began. His study and thought led 
2 │ INTRODUCTION

him to produce a series of other briefings becoming 

parts of the larger “Discourse.” They included a 37 slide 

briefing entitled “Organic Design for Command and 

Control,” a 58-slide briefing entitled “The Strategic 

Game of ? and ?,” a 27-slide briefing entitled “Conceptual 

Spiral,” and one of the few essays he ever wrote called 

“Destruction and Creation.” This latter piece, placed 

near the end of the compilation, was actually the beginning of Boyd’s intellectual odyssey in earnest, as it was 

written and mimeographed on 3 September 1976, only 

a year after his retirement. It was for Boyd, in many 

ways, the alpha and omega, the beginning and the end 

of his thinking. He debated where it belonged in the 

sequence but chose ultimately to place it near the end. 

The larger “Discourse” ends with his summation entitled 

“Revelation.” To this we have added a four slide brief on 

“The Essence of Winning and Losing” produced on 28 

June 1995. It is an effort to compress all that he had 

learned into a simple, yet elegant and comprehensive, 

conclusion embedded in his concept of OODA Loops, 

what they mean and why they are important. Combined with the “Discourse,” this is the main body of 

Boyd’s thinking, leaving his “Aerial Attack Study,” and 

“Fast Transients,” essays he wrote while on active duty.1

For those unfamiliar with John Boyd or his importance in military thought, I wish to present a succinct 

introduction to the man and his accomplishments as I 

did in my book about him, The Mind of War: John Boyd 

and American Security. The reader can find a great deal 

more in the bibliography of materials about Boyd and 

the influence of his ideas at the end of this volume.

John R. Boyd

This nation lost an incredible array of talent in 1997. 

A premier fighter pilot, a man of legendary skill and 

scholarship who wrote the first manual on jet aerial 

combat, developed tactics against Soviet planes and 

surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and thereby saved innumerable lives in Vietnam, died. So too did one of the 

nation’s premier aircraft designers whose work on 

something called Energy-Maneuverability Theory changed 

the way aircraft were designed and tested. He, more 

than anyone else, was largely responsible for the development of both the US Air Force’s premier fighters, the 

F-15 Eagle and the F-16 Fighting Falcon.

One of the more original students of military history 

was also lost. His studies of war and warfare through 

the ages changed how the US armed forces prepared for 

warfighting in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 

His views on maneuver warfare helped change the US 

Marine Corps and the US Army. He succumbed laboring 

behind the scenes, waging a more-than-decade-long 

campaign to change how the US military went about 

the business of defense, changing the procurement 

process, and helping to improve the weaponry in the 

US arsenal.

A great original thinker, whose views on learning 

and thinking, surviving, and prospering in a complex 

world have infected American business and education, 

also passed from the scene. His notions of competition 

and time cycles—observation, orientation, decisions, 

action, the OODA Loop—have followers around the 

2 │ 

Fast Transients

Aerial Attack Study
INTRODUCTION │ 3

world who study and employ his insights in a variety of 

ways and professions. Lastly, a paragon of virtue—loved 

by many in politics, business, and the military for his 

character and integrity—was gone. He shunned personal wealth and private gain for service to his country. 

That the nation is less for the passing of all of these 

should be obvious. That they were little honored is regrettable, but perhaps understandable. None was a 

published author, decorated hero, high-ranking government official, or academician of renown. They were one 

man—Col John R. Boyd, USAF (ret.).2

John Boyd spent 25 years on active duty and 22 more 

years of his retirement in service to the nation. He spent 

the first 12 of those retirement years working on his 

magnum opus, a set of briefings collectively entitled “A 

Discourse of Winning and Losing.” His original 

90-minute briefing, called “Patterns of Conflict,” had 

grown considerably. It was now 327 view graphs and 

was the focal point of an interactive discussion with a 

variety of audiences. These ranged from impromptu 

Saturday morning sessions with interested officers in 

the Pentagon, presentations at the Army War College, 

the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton, people in 

the defense industry, newspapermen, politicians, and 

academics. Boyd arranged the briefings into a sequence 

he thought appropriate and shared with friends and 

colleagues, his disciples, and audiences inside and outside the military. Nearly twenty years after his death, 

there are scores of articles, PhD dissertations, and more 

than a dozen books about Boyd and his ideas. There are 

numerous courses about him and his ideas taught in 

business schools and war colleges around the globe. 

There are hundreds of websites, blogs, and sources of 

commentary and discussion about Boyd and his ideas 

on the Internet in several languages.3 However, until 

now; there has not been a book publication of “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” This Air University 

Press volume reproduces an enhanced facsimile of 

Boyd’s August 1987 version of “A Discourse.” This is the 

most widely disseminated and copied version, passed 

from one person to another over the years until it was 

made widely available on the Internet from a variety of 

sources. 

It is about time; one would think, and fitting that his 

beloved Air Force, which he mercilessly criticized as he 

strove to make it better, would, at long last, accept his 

ideas as worthy. In the service and retirement, Boyd 

was a thorn in the side of senior Air Force leadership 

and was either loved or hated by them. The maverick 

that helped design the F-15 earned unending scorn 

from the plane’s champions. They despised Boyd’s effort 

to design and promote the lightweight fighter that became the F-16. His criticisms of the military and leadership as part of the Defense Reform Movement from the 

mid-1970s to mid-1980s did not endear him to the Air 

Force. Nevertheless, the power of his insights and ideas 

gradually took hold on those, not only throughout the 

Air Force and the US military but also from all walks of 

life and among strategists around the world.

Boyd was recognized shortly after his death, largely 

as the result of a Congressional inquiry, with the naming 

of a building at Nellis AFB, Nevada, for him. Colin 

│ 3

the OOda Loop
4 │ INTRODUCTION

Gray, the distinguished British academic and the most 

quoted author about strategy since Clausewitz, bestowed an encomium on Boyd in praising his concept 

of the OODA Loop, saying that it “may appear too 

humble to merit categorization as grand theory, but 

that is what it is. It has an elegant simplicity, an extensive domain of applicability, and contains a high quality 

of insight about strategic essentials, such that its author 

well merits honorable mention as an outstanding 

general theorist of strategy.”4

 Boyd was studied over the 

years at various USAF professional military education 

schools, most notably as part of the curriculum of the 

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies that awards 

both master’s and doctoral degrees. His full and formal 

rehabilitation came when I was asked to deliver the 

prestigious Harmon Memorial Lecture about him at 

the US Air Force Academy in 2012—finally, 15 years 

after Boyd’s death.

John Boyd was a maverick fighter pilot who challenged orthodoxy.5

 In the hierarchy of the military, doing 

this once and getting away with it is possible, though 

risky. Doing so two or more times is not conducive to 

career advancement. Doing so routinely courts dismissal. John Boyd challenged Air Force orthodoxy continuously and did so at the heart of the service’s very 

identity. He challenged fighter tactics in his “Aerial Attack 

Study,” revolutionized fighter aircraft design with 

Energy-Maneuverability Theory, and developed the 

F-15 and F-16 aircraft themselves with his design work. 

Moreover, he challenged the theory of how wars were 

to be fought and won in his 15-hour briefing, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.”

If he had been less pugnacious, if he had not been so 

cocksure of himself, if he had not end run the system 

constantly, if he had played by the rules, he might not 

have had the difficulties he had. However, then, he 

would not have been successful either. Revolutions are 

neither begun nor won by moderates. They require 

zealots committed to the cause. Boyd was passionately 

committed to being the best at his craft. He was devoted 

to the Air Force and its mission—air superiority with 

the best aircraft, training the best pilots, and developing 

the best military strategy—to fly, fight, and win. He just 

happened to be convinced that the Air Force had it all 

wrong. Understandably, the Air Force did not appreciate 

being told so.

To accept Boyd’s ideas was an indictment of the service, its leadership, its tactics, technique, and procedures (TTP) and its doctrine. That sort of thing is not 

easy to admit, or even to suspect, and Boyd’s era was a 

rough time for the Air Force. Coping with the disaster 

of Vietnam was difficult. Though air support was a major 

contribution on the ground, the Air Force did not distinguish itself in the air. Half of our F-105s were lost, 

the 10 to 1 kill ratio against MiGs in Korea came closer 

to 1 to 1 in Vietnam, the air-to-air missiles were not 

nearly as good as claimed, and ground-based fires—

antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and SAMs—took a heavy 

toll.6

 This experience meant tactical air operations had 

to be greatly improved if the Air Force was to be successful in the future. From 1965 until 1982, the Air 

maverick fighter pilot
INTRODUCTION │ 5

Force chiefs of staff and most of their senior officers 

were bomber generals from Strategic Air Command, 

who had risen under the tutelage of Gen Curtis LeMay. 

Reinventing tactical aviation was difficult, particularly in that environment, and John Boyd was at the 

heart of it.

Boyd had briefly served in the Army in occupation 

forces in Japan after WWII. He joined the Air Force in 

1951 and retired in 1975 as a colonel. His military career spanned the Cold War from the Berlin Airlift to 

the fall of Saigon. He flew briefly in Korea at the very 

end of the war and became fascinated with air-to-air 

tactics. He went to the Fighter Weapons School, teaching 

and studying aerial tactics for six years, flying the F-100 

Super Sabre like no one else. He had a standing $40 bet 

with all comers at Nellis AFB that he could put them on 

his “six” and outmaneuver them for a kill in less than 40 

seconds. He never lost the bet. A demanding instructor 

in the air and the classroom, he questioned the tactics 

of the day. At night and on his initiative, he wrote the 

“Aerial Attack Study,” the first manual on air-to-air jet 

combat. It was rejected, at first; then distributed surreptitiously, pilot to pilot, squadron to squadron until the 

Air Force decided to adopt it. He left Nellis AFB for 

Systems Command at Eglin AFB, Florida, where, with 

civilian mathematician and later Defense acquisition 

chief, Tom Christie, he developed the Energy-Maneuverability Theory. Using stolen computer time in dummy 

accounts, Boyd diverted several hundred thousand dollars of computer time to studying the comparative flight 

performance envelopes at different speeds, altitudes, 

and G-forces for every American fighter and plotted 

them against every Soviet fighter. He discovered that 

every Soviet fighter had greater maneuverability when 

compared to its American counterpart. He was nearly 

court-martialed for theft before being presented two 

Air Force awards for his work.

Sent to the Pentagon to assist in the development of 

the next Air Force fighter, which became the F-15, Boyd 

was given the materials submitted to that date, told to 

review them, and report back in a couple of weeks. 

When asked for his opinion, he replied, “I’ve never designed an airplane before, but I could f--- up and do 

better than this.”7

 Thus began his work on the F-15 and 

his change of the original design of an 80,000-pound 

swing-wing F-111 based “fighter” to the smaller, twin 

tailed, twin-engine F-15 we know today. Along the way, 

he thought the F-15 was too big and too costly. Too few 

could be built to allow for the inevitable losses in 

Europe against the Warsaw Pact ground and air defenses. 

He quietly, without approval, began to design the Light 

Weight Fighter that became the F-16. It nearly cost him 

career and promotion. The F-15 was the “Holy Grail” 

for the Air Force. Opposing the plane, the size of the 

buy, or proposing an alternative to it was simply unacceptable and treasonous in the eyes of most of his 

superiors. However the F-16 was adopted, over the 

objections of the Air Force leadership. The secretary of 

defense made the decision. It is the only fighter in Air 

Force history that cost less than its predecessor. Nearly 

5,000 have been built, and it has been purchased by 25 

countries, making it the most widely adopted fighter 
6 │ INTRODUCTION

since World War II. That is quite an accomplishment 

for a plane the Air Force thought it did not need and 

didn’t want.

To one senior Air Force four-star, Boyd was “a 24 

karat pain in the ass.” To a Marine four-star he was “the 

quintessential soldier-scholar.” While one fellow student 

called him “the ‘cussingest’ man I ever met,” another 

four-star called him “Christ-like.” To those in the Pentagon whose ire he garnered, he was “that f------ Boyd.” 

He was known by various names including “the 

Mad-major,” “the Ghetto colonel,” and “Genghis John.”8

To those who believed in him and his causes, he was 

more than a hero, he was a virtual saint and they would 

have followed him anywhere and taken on any foe, 

regardless of the odds.

How did one man inspire such radically different 

opinions? Boyd was both brilliant and a misfit who was 

his own worst enemy. He did not do things by the book 

or play by the rules. He did not care much for shined 

shoes, immaculate uniforms, or protocol niceties. On a 

visit to the Air Force Academy driving with his host, he 

noticed the superintendent in the car behind him on 

base. Boyd rolled down the window in the cold and 

snow and started pumping his middle finger in the air 

at the car behind, in front of several dozen cadets. His 

host, appalled by the action, tried to stop him, but Boyd 

said, “Aw hell, we were in pilot training together and 

this is just a fighter pilot greeting.” After that, the superintendent decided to approve all visitors to the Academy 

in advance.9

Boyd was both vilified and respected by those who 

knew him. To many, he was not very likable. He smoked 

smelly cigars, talked loudly, and got right in your face 

when he argued with you, spittle flying. He was pushy, 

arrogant, and profane in the extreme and would frequently end run his boss, or his boss’s boss, up to, 

and including, the secretary of the Air Force and the 

secretary of defense. He had the courage to state his 

views—and defend them regardless of consequence. 

His supporters admired and respected his integrity and 

willingness to challenge and persevere. He was totally 

incorruptible, had little use for money, and refused to 

cash dozens of TDY reimbursement checks for speaking 

engagements after he retired. He inspired intellectual 

respect and virtual awe, intense loyalty, and unbounded 

compassion for those who became “the acolytes” of 

Boyd’s small but intense following on his various crusades.

Despite his often prickly personality and somewhat 

eccentric habits, Boyd received numerous Air Force 

awards during his career. He won the Air Force Systems 

Command Scientific Achievement Award, the USAF Research and Development Award, the Arnold Society 

Hoyt S. Vandenberg Award, and the Dr. Harold Brown 

Award for his work on energy maneuverability, fighter 

design, and air tactics. After his retirement, he remained 

a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He 

wanted this to be unpaid but accepted a day’s pay per pay 

period to be on the rolls, which was required to access to 

the Pentagon. He continued to work on a variety of 

projects and stay close to the circle of friends, defense correspondents, industry people, academics, and politicians. 
INTRODUCTION │ 7

In the process, he became the power behind the throne 

for a major effort to reform the US military.

Boyd led a diverse group of people, known as the 

Defense Reform Movement, behind the scenes from 

1975–1985, by orchestrating staffers, congressional 

representatives, and senators on the Hill, journalists, 

and those in other services. Among them were Congressmen Norman Dicks, Dick Cheney (future secretary 

of defense), Newt Gingrich (future speaker of the 

House), and some 130 members of the House of Representatives in the Military Reform Caucus, along with 

Senators Gary Hart (future presidential candidate), 

Charles Grassley, William Cohen (future secretary of 

defense), Sam Nunn, and others. He developed a national 

network of defense correspondents and influential 

writers—George Wilson of the Washington Post, James 

Fallows of The Atlantic, and reformers inside and outside the military. Along the way, he was largely responsible, along with Gen Al Gray and Col Mike Wyly, for 

the adoption of Maneuver Warfare Doctrine of the US 

Marine Corps and had frequent talks with Army generals 

Donn Starry and Huba Wass de Czege regarding the 

development of AirLand Battle. Fallows wrote a number 

of articles for which Boyd was largely the source, and 

an award-winning book, The National Defense, that 

raised the views and charges of the defense reformers 

to national attention.10

Boyd railed against gold-plated weapons systems 

with 20-plus-year acquisition cycles and no fly-offs or 

testing in their selection processes. He worried about 

the Army trying to fit synchronization into its doctrine. 

For five years, a retired Air Force colonel taught every 

Marine officer that went through the Basic Course at 

Quantico about maneuver warfare. Moreover, he kept 

in touch with those concerned about these and other 

issues, visiting then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 

with some frequency before the First Gulf War. Boyd 

was pleased when military commanders and news 

anchors explained the US victory as being attributable 

to “getting inside the enemy’s decision cycle,” a phrase 

from his strategic insight and briefings. Some of the 

ideas seemed to have hit home; others fell on deaf ears. 

John Boyd died wondering if he had made a difference. 

His legacy was largely unknown. Nearly 20 years after 

his death, he has a global reputation and his ideas have 

influenced business, politics, education, and strategy as 

well as the militaries of the world.

The Origins of the “Discourse”

As important as all of these accomplishments in the 

Air Force may have been, Boyd’s real importance came 

after he retired with his work on a series of briefings that 

eventually became known as “A Discourse on Winning 

and Losing.” The endeavor began, as with most things 

with Boyd, his concern for air tactics and work with 

Pierre Sprey on the design of the A-10, the first specifically designed ground attack aircraft since the Douglas 

Invader A-26 of 1942. As a part of the discussions for 

the design of a ground attack aircraft, Sprey and others 

consulted German armor commanders from World 
8 │ INTRODUCTION

War II, Stuka pilots, and others to refine the details of 

attack profiles, speeds, and times to acquire and successfully attack tanks and other targets. Boyd participated in 

these sessions and became interested in German armor 

tactics, the concept of blitzkrieg, and its origins. Pierre 

Sprey said he should go back and read about German 

infiltration tactics in World War I as the origin of the 

ideas incorporated into blitzkrieg. Upon retirement, 

Boyd began to spend many hours in the Pentagon library 

reading military history. He read and read about Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, Erwin Rommel, Erich 

von Manstein, Hans Rudel, and World War II. Then he 

went back to study the 1930s, the theories of B. H. Liddell-Hart, Heinz Guderian, Charles de Gaulle, and how 

German ideas had developed about blitzkrieg and infiltration tactics in World War I. He kept going backward 

reading military history—all the way back to Sun Tzu.

Doing it backward emphasized continuity, not 

change. He pondered what the essence of success was 

for those who won battles and wars across different 

times and continents. He began to focus on maneuverability, quickness, attacks in flank or rear, and rapid 

adaptation to tactical developments. These were the 

constants, and winning was often about getting inside 

the adversary’s decision cycle, controlling the tempo of 

battle, being unpredictable, causing friction for the adversary, and taking advantage of the element of surprise. He noticed that the larger forces did not always 

win battles. Attacks from the flank or the rear, contrived 

misdirection, timing, and deception all played important 

parts in achieving victory. These became the themes of 

the “Patterns of Conflict” briefing that grew from 90 

minutes to more than four hours. It was frequently 

given both inside and outside the Pentagon, on the Hill, 

to academic groups, and interested others.

Along the way, as Boyd studied patterns of conflict 

and military history more intensely, he became concerned about better understanding the orientation of 

an adversary. This was critical to success in war. What 

does he value? What does he fear? How has he acted in 

the past? What does he seek to do? For Boyd, cultural 

anthropology and ethnography became more important 

than military intelligence. The latter developed a 

physical order of battle, but Boyd wanted to develop a 

psychological order of battle. He wanted to know intentions as well as capabilities to devise a strategy that 

would allow moral and psychological leverage, as well 

as the physical capability to defeat an opponent. A 

strategy to be successful had to account for the moral/

mental/physical aspects of competition and conflict 

along with another of Boyd’s frequent trinities, the 

mind/time/space components of those interactions.

Central to Boyd’s view of conflict is the fact that organisms and organizations seek to survive and prosper. 

Doing so generally depends on maximizing freedom of 

action or by making common cause with those who seek 

the same goals. Boyd understood and emphasized that 

war is a human endeavor begun and ended for moral 

purposes. It involves mobilizing people to fight and sacrifice for a cause. You need to understand why and how 

they fight if you seek to defeat your opponents. This 

simply cannot be ignored. Along the way, Boyd devel-
INTRODUCTION │ 9

oped the most important of his many trinities: people 

first, ideas second, and things third. That is the priority 

for developing successful strategies. It is also good advice 

for leading a successful life. Most militaries, however, do 

it in reverse—people must be interchangeable parts to 

avoid single-point failures in combat. However, Boyd 

wanted to emphasize the human dimension of conflict.

The essence of Boyd’s strategy for accomplishing goals 

can be summarized by the combination of variety, rapidity, 

harmony, and initiative. Variety entails denying pattern 

recognition and predictability to an adversary, adopting 

multiple, simultaneous actions to confuse and confound 

an opponent, and being able to transition from one initiative to another sequentially or concurrently. Rapidity

means the ability not only to act quickly but also to act to 

modulate the tempo of action, to know when to speed up 

or slow down. Harmony refers to the ability to blend 

one’s actions to fit time and circumstance, to co-evolve 

with the strategic landscape and the tactical realities. It is 

achieving the “fit” of what Boyd called the mind/time/

space arena where thought and action converge appropriately. Initiative is the willingness to lead, to take 

action, to identify and act upon the mismatches, and to 

do so at the right time. One achieves advantage by 

causing friction for an adversary, by oscillating between 

interaction and isolation over time, and by modulating 

time to one’s advantage. For Boyd, time and timing were 

weapons that did not have to be logistically supported. 

They were free goods and bestowed advantage upon 

those who understood how to use them well.

Taken together, these were the keys to a successful 

strategy. Boyd tested these concepts on blitzkrieg, the 

defense against it—“counterblitz,” guerilla warfare, and 

counterinsurgency. He was fascinated with them and 

sought to understand how to prosecute and defeat each. 

That said, like the Chinese colonels who wrote Unrestricted Warfare in 1999,11 Boyd was concerned about 

the wider arena of competition and conflict. At the 

base, in his view, was the constant reminder that war is 

a human activity begun and ended ultimately for what 

is seen as moral purpose. Ultimately, one’s target was 

always the same: the perception of the adversary leadership. If you could change their minds, you could change 

their behavior. If you could change their behavior, you 

might not need to defeat their fielded forces or occupy 

their capitol. The enemy always has a vote and must decide 

to end the conflict for you to win. Boyd was always 

reminding others, “Terrain does not fight wars. Machines do not fight wars. People fight wars. It is in the 

minds of men that war must be fought.”12

His study of military history and the synthesis he 

made using the insights of Sun Tzu, Liddell-Hart, 

Miyamoto Musashi, Carl von Clausewitz, and others 

led Boyd to believe that the Germans had gotten it right. 

Commander’s intent was the key. To have a force well 

schooled and trained in doctrine, well rehearsed or experienced, to understand perfectly the commander’s intent and implement it through mission-type orders was 

essential. Such a force must be grounded in the empowerment of subordinates to do what the situation requires 

and to trust in their ability to make the right decisions. 
10 │ INTRODUCTION

This decentralization enables variety, rapidity, harmony, 

and initiative. Everything begins with increased situational awareness and the OODA Loop process.

This was an expansion on his experience of air-to-air 

combat in Korea: commander’s intent, good TTP, and 

understanding where and when advantage could be had 

leads to achieving a successful kill. One should seek out 

the disposition of the enemy, much as Napoleon’s skirmishers had done, then infiltrate and penetrate, as the 

Germans had learned in World War I and World War II, 

to exploit the surfaces and gaps, the strong and weak 

points, of opposing forces. Maneuver warfare was the 

way to do so, and learning how to do it quickly and well 

was the key to victory.

Boyd, Science, and Synthesis

Along the way, as Frans Osinga so thoroughly details 

in his book, Science, Strategy, and War, Boyd read widely 

in science and philosophy. Boyd retired in 1975, but he 

read voraciously all the major books and articles on 

science that appeared in the last 20 years of his life. He 

engaged in numerous studies and discussions, ranging 

from mathematics to psychology, physics to biology, 

computing, and cosmology. He would call distinguished 

scientists to ask a question, stating he “was just a retired 

fighter pilot who reads a lot.”13 He addressed a collection 

of Nobel Prize winners at the Santa Fe Institute and the 

Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton. Unable to 

buy all the books in which he was interested, he hung out 

in bookstores and read whole volumes, transfixed in the 

subject matter and unperturbed by the entreaties of store 

owners to simply purchase the book and leave. He was 

interested in neuroscience and how the brain worked, 

how scientific progress was made, and in fields as disparate as epistemology and relativity. He explored a variety 

of concepts, trying to integrate them into his understanding of how the world and its conflicts worked. 

These included the essence of such things as numerical 

imprecision, quantum uncertainty, entropy, the causes of 

irregular or erratic behavior, Heisenberg’s uncertainty 

principle, incomprehensibility, mutations and how and 

why they occur, the nature of ambiguity and its effects, 

and the origins of novelty.

In doing so, he created what he came to call the “Conceptual Spiral,” in which he tried to explain how we learn 

and why constant learning and refinement of the process 

are so important. One began with a question and set 

about to find answers. It was a spiral process that included a series of processes as follows:

Table 1: The Conceptual Spiral

Exploration Discovery Innovation

Thinking Doing Achieving

Learning Unlearning Relearning

Comprehending Shaping Adapting

Insight Imagination Initiative

Adapted from John Boyd, “The Conceptual Spiral,” Slide 34.

For Boyd, these insights were critical in explaining 

how he had come to fashion the ideas that he had and 
INTRODUCTION │ 11

to understand better how people learn. More important 

was to learn how to learn.

Boyd wrote little. Most important is a short 15-page 

essay on “Destruction and Creation,” which several 

notable physicists have thought a brilliant work. A few 

articles and a handbook on aerial combat are the only 

things he penned other than his 327-slide magnum opus 

briefing, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing.” He could 

not bring himself to publish anything because it was 

never complete. Coming from an essentially oral culture 

of briefings in the military, Boyd put carefully chosen 

words on view-graphs, but never in print. The “Discourse” was an unfinished conversation with each audience, part of a perpetual learning experience. He learned 

every time from each discussion with his audiences, and 

this necessitated changes for the next iteration. There 

was a succession of unfinished OODA Loops.

Boyd’s counsel for winning is first to understand 

the strategic context of the contest. You could have a 

perfectly well defined objective, all the resources and 

capabilities required, and an excellent and detailed 

plan to accomplish your mission—but if you do not 

fully understand the tactical, operational, and strategic 

environments, you would not contend successfully. If 

you understand the context and the setting of the contest, 

you can shape the battle space and manage the opponent’s cycle time. Look for mismatches, places where 

things do not fit. Analysis of “big data” does this—

finding anomalies and correlations to explore. Exploit 

the mismatches. Use mission-type orders. Maneuver 

your adversary to where he decides he cannot win. 

Chairman of the Joint Chief Gen Martin Dempsey’s directives on Mission Command seem to indicate the 

adoption of Boyd’s advice.14 However, making such 

actual by studying, practicing, exercising, war gaming, 

and in routine operations according to those directives 

and their spirit will be a never ending process, searching for the excellence required to survive and prosper.

It is my hope that the ideas and legacy of Col John R. 

Boyd, USAF, retired, will become even better known, 

more studied, and heeded with Air University Press’s 

making this work available with the video clips and 

bibliography that support it. So I end this introduction as I did my book, The Mind of War: “Rest in peace, 

John. The discourse on winning and losing continues. 

Semper Fi.”15

The author of three books and numerous articles, 

book chapters, briefings, and studies for the 

USAF and other government agencies, Dr. Grant 

T. Hammond has taught at the Air War College 

and led and worked at the USAF Center for 

Strategy and Technology and its Blue Horizons 

Program at Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. 

The views expressed here are his own and do not 

necessarily reflect those of the Department of 

Defense, the US Air Force or Air University.
12 │ INTRODUCTION

Notes

1. These are available from several online sources.

2. Grant T. Hammond, Mind of War: John Boyd and American 

Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2001), 1–2.

3. See the bibliography for a complete listing of these sources.

4. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1999), 91.

5. Much of the next few paragraphs are excerpts from my Harmon 

Memorial Lecture, “On Making History: John Boyd and American Security,” US Air Force Academy, 12 January 2012. Available at http://www.

usafa.edu/df/dfh/docs/Harmon54.pdf. Other paragraphs are interwoven with portions published as “The Essential Boyd,” available at

http://radio-weblogs.com/0107127/stories/2002/12/20/theEssentialBoyd.html.

6. “List of Aircraft Losses of the Vietnam War,” Wikipedia, 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_losses_of_the_Vietnam_

War; Robert D. Goertz, “Analysis of Air-to-Air Missile Capability in 

Southeast Asia” (research report, Air Command and Staff College, 

June 1968), 1–2; and Christopher Hobson, Vietnam Air Losses: USAF, 

Navy, and Marine Corps Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses in SE Asia 1961–

1973, North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 2002.

7. Hammond, Mind of War, 77.

8. Ibid., 2–4.

9. Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art 

of War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 342–43.

10. James Fallows, National Defense, (New York: Vintage Books, 

1982).

11. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: 

People’s Liberation Army, 1999).

12. John Boyd quoted in Henry Eason, “New Theory Shoots 

down Old War Ideas,” Atlanta Journal–Constitution, 22 March 1981.

13. Hammond, Mind of War, 171–92.

14. Gen Martin E. Dempsey, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

“Mission Command White Paper,” 3 April 2012, http://www.dtic.

mil/doctrine/concepts/white_papers/cjcs_wp_missioncommand.pdf.

15. Hammond, Mind of War, 211.

Much 1

Much 2

Aircraft

Gen Dempsey
A

Discourse

on

Winning and Losing
14 │ ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT │ 15

To flourish and grow in a many-sided, uncertain and 

ever-changing world that surrounds us, suggests that 

we have to make intuitive within ourselves those many 

practices we need to meet the exigencies of that world. 

The contents, hence the five sections that comprise this 

Discourse, unfold observations and ideas that contribute 

toward achieving or thwarting such an aim or purpose. 

Specifically:

• “Patterns of Conflict” represents a compendium of 

ideas and actions for winning and losing in a 

highly competitive world;

• “Organic Design for Command and Control” surfaces the implicit arrangements that permit cooperation in complex, competitive, fast moving situations;

• “The Strategic Game of ? and ?” emphasizes the 

mental twists and turns we undertake to surface 

schemes or designs for realizing our aims or purposes;

• “Destruction and Creation” lays out in abstract 

but graphic fashion the ways by which we evolve 

mental concepts to comprehend and cope with 

our environment;

• “Revelation” makes visible the metaphorical message that flows from this Discourse.

As one proceeds from Patterns through Organic Design, Strategic Game, and “Destruction and Creation” to 

“Revelation” he or she will notice that the discussion 

goes from the more concrete and obvious to the more 

abstract. In this sense, one will notice the rise away 

from many particular actions and ideas to fewer and 

more general concepts to account for these many actions 

and ideas. In this context, Patterns emphasizes historical 

readings, primarily military, as the backdrop for its discussion, while the final four sections draw away from 

the historical framework and increasingly emphasize 

theory spread over a scientific backdrop as the medium 

for discussion.

Yet, the theme that weaves its way through this Discourse on Winning and Losing is not so much contained 

within each of the five sections, per se, that make up the 

Discourse; rather, it is the kind of thinking that both lies 

behind and make-up its very essence. For a process of 

the interested, a careful examination will reveal that 

the increasingly abstract discussion surfaces reaching 

across many perspectives; pulling each and every one 

apart (analysis), all the while intuitively looking for 

those parts of the disassembled perspectives which 

naturally interconnect with one another to form a 

higher order, more general elaboration (synthesis) of 

what is taking place. As a result, the process not only 

creates the Discourse but it also represents the key to 

evolve the tactics, strategies, goals, unifying themes, 

etc., that permit us to actively shape and adapt to the 

unfolding world we are a part of, live in, and feed upon.

PATTERNS OF 

CONFLICT

PATTERNS OF CONFLICT
18 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

OUTLINE

• Point of departure • Historical snapshots • Categories of conflict • Synthesis • Application • Wrap-up • Epilogue • Sources
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 19

FOCUS AND DIRECTION

Mission

• To make manifest the nature of Moral-Mental-Physical Conflict

• To discern a Pattern for Successful Operations

• To help generalize Tactics and Strategy

• To find a basis for Grand Strategy

Intent

• To unveil the character of conflict, survival, and conquest
20 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

POINT OF DEPARTURE

Air-to-Air
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 21

GENERALIZATION

• Need a fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more quickly while outturning an adversary.

• In other words, suggest a fighter that can pick and choose engagement opportunities—yet has fast transient (“buttonhook”) characteristics that can be used to either force an overshoot by an attacker or stay 

inside a hard turning defender.
22 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

IDEA EXPANSION

• Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than 

our adversaries—or, better yet, get inside adversary’s Observation–Orientation–Decision–Action time 

cycle or loop.

• Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and 

disorder among our adversaries—since our adversaries will be unable to generate mental images or 

pictures that agree with the menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are competing 

against.

IDEA
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 23

EXAMPLES

• Blitzkrieg vs. Maginot Line mentality (1940)

• F-86 vs. MiG-15 (1951–53)

• Israeli raid (1976)
24 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Action

• Exploit operations and weapons that:

− Generate a rapidly changing environment 

(quick/clear observations, orientation, and 

decisions, fast tempo, fast transient maneuvers, 

quick kill)

− Inhibit an adversary’s capacity to adapt to 

such an environment (cloud or distort his 

observations, orientation, and decisions 

and impede his actions)

Idea

• Simultaneously compress own time and stretchout adversary time to generate a favorable 

mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to 

change

Goal

 Collapse adversary’s system into confusion and disorder causing him to over and under react to activity 

that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or misleading.

NEW CONCEPTION
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 25

A–to–A and A–to–G

RECIPE FOR GENERATING CONFUSION AND DISORDER

Observations

• Quick/Clear Scanning Sensors

• Suppressed/Distorted Signatures

Activity

• Fire

— Quick shoot fire control systems and high speed weapons

• Movement

— High Speed (supercruise)

— Rapid energy gain and rapid energy loss coupled with high turn rates and low turn radii

— High pitch rates/high roll rates/high yaw rates coupled with ease of control
26 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

HISTORICAL SNAPSHOTS
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 27

HUMAN NATURE

Goal

• Survive, survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for independent action.

The competition for limited resources to satisfy these desires may force one to:

• Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action, or deny him the opportunity to survive on his 

own terms, or make it impossible for him to survive at all.

Implication

• Life is conflict, survival, and conquest.
28 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

COMMENT

In addressing any questions about conflict, survival, and conquest one is naturally led to the

Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection

and

The Conduct of War

 since both treat conflict, survival, and conquest in a very fundamental way. In this regard, many sources (a 

few on natural selection and many on war) are reviewed; many points of view are exposed.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 29

IMPRESSION

• In examining these many points of view one is bombarded with the notion that:

— It is advantageous to possess a variety of responses that can be applied rapidly to gain sustenance, avoid danger, and diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action.

— The simpler organisms—those that make up man as well as man working with other men in a 

higher level context—must cooperate or, better yet, harmonize their activities in their endeavors 

to survive as an organic synthesis.

— To shape and adapt to change one cannot be passive; instead one must take the initiative.

• Put more simply and directly: the above comments leave one with the impression that variety/rapidity/

harmony/initiative (and their interaction) seem to be key qualities that permit one to shape and adapt to 

an ever-changing environment.

• With this impression in mind together with our notion of getting inside an adversary’s OODA loop we 

will proceed in our historical investigation.
30 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Theme

 • Harmony

 • Deception

 • Swiftness-of-Action

 • Fluidity-of-Action

 • Dispersion and concentration

 • Surprise

 • Shock

Strategy

• Probe enemy’s organization and dispositions to 

unmask his strengths, weaknesses, patterns of 

movement and intentions.

• “Shape” enemy’s perception of world to manipulate his plans and actions.

• Attack enemy’s plans as best policy. Next best 

disrupt his alliances. Next best attack his army. 

Attack cities only when there is no alternative.

• Employ Cheng and Ch’i maneuvers to quickly 

and unexpectedly hurl strength against weaknesses.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

SUN TZU—“THE ART OF WAR”—C. 400 BC

Desired Outcome 

 • Subdue enemy without fighting

 • Avoid protracted war

HISTORICAL PATTERN
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 31

 Early Commanders

 • Alexander

 • Hannibal

 • Belisarius

 • Jenghis Khan

 • Tamerlane

Impression

• Early commanders seem consistent with ideas 

of Sun Tzu

• Western commanders more directly concerned 

with winning the battle

• Eastern commanders closer to Sun Tzu in attempting to shatter adversary prior to battle

* Cheng/Ch’i maneuver schemes were employed by early commanders to expose adversary vulnerabilities and 

weaknesses (a la Cheng) for exploitation and decisive stroke (via Ch’i).

Action

Cheng and Ch’i*

HISTORICAL PATTERN
32 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

HISTORICAL PATTERN

Keeping in mind the ideas of Sun Tzu and our comments about Early Commanders, let’s take a look at an early 

tactical theme and some battle (grand tactical) situations to gain a feel for the different ways that the Cheng/Ch’i 

game has been (and can be) played.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 33

HISTORICAL PATTERN

Tactical Theme (from about 300 B.C. to 1400 A.D.)

• Light troops (equipped with bows, javelins, light swords, etc.) perform reconnaissance, screening, and 

swirling hit-and-run actions to:

 − Unmask enemy dispositions and activities.

 − Cloud/distort own dispositions and activities.

 − Confuse, disorder enemy operations.

• Heavy troops (equipped with lances, bows, swords, etc.) protected by armor and shields:

 − Charge and smash thinned-out/scattered or disordered/bunched-up enemy formations generated by 

interaction with light troops; or

 − Menace enemy formations to hold them in tight, or rigid, arrays thereby make them vulnerable to 

missiles of swirling light troops.

• Light and heavy troops in appropriate combination pursue, envelop, and mop-up isolated remnants of 

enemy host.

Idea

• Employ maneuver action by light troops with thrust action of heavy troops to confuse, break-up, and 

smash enemy formations.
34 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

GREEKS

PERSIANS

PERSIAN FLEET

Battle of Marathon

(490 BC)
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 35

SPARTANS

THEBANS

BATTLE OF LEUCTRA

(371 BC)
36 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Y. E. SAVKIN—“THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONAL ART AND TACTICS”—(1972)

PAGES 7 and 203

Battle of Leuctra (371 BC)

 At this battle Frederick Engels (according to Savkin) credited Epaminondas for having first discovered and 

employed an unequal or uneven distribution of forces across a front as basis to concentrate forces for the 

main attack at the decisive point.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 37

BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA

MAZEUS DARIUS BESSUS

CHARIOTS

ALEXANDER

RESERVE LINE

COMPANIONS

PARMENION

(331 BC)
38 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

PERSIAN FLEET

Battle of Arbela

(331 BC)

MAZAEUS

DARIUS

BESSUS

COMPANIONS

ALEXANDER

PARMENION

RESERVE

LINE
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 39

AUFIDUS RIVER

Battle of Cannae

(216 BC)

OPENING PHASE
40 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

AUFIDUS RIVER

FINAL PHASE

BATTLE OF CANNAE

(216 BC)
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 41

IMPRESSION

• Battles of Marathon, Leuctra, Arbela, and Cannae emphasize an unequal distribution as basis for local superiority and decisive leverage to collapse adversary resistance.

on the other hand

• The discussion (so far) provides little insight on how these battle arrangements and follow-on maneuvers 

play upon moral factors such as doubt, fear, anxiety, etc.
42 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Key Asymmetries

• Superior Mobility

• Superior Communications

• Superior Intelligence

• Superior Leadership

Theme

• Widely separated strategic maneuvers, with appropriate stratagems, baited retreats, hard-hitting tactical 

thrusts, and swirling envelopments to uncover and 

exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses.

in conjunction with

• Clever and calculated use of propaganda and terror 

to play upon adversary’s doubts, fears, and superstitions in order to undermine his resolve and destroy 

his will to resist.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

CHINGIS KHAN AND THE MONGOLS

Aim

Conquest, as basis to create, preserve, and expand Mongol nation. 
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 43

Aral

CASPIAN

SEA

ARAL

SEA

Mongol Strategic Maneuver

(1219-1220)

GENGHIS

KHAN

CHAGATAI

JOCHI JEBE

OXUS RIVER

KIZYL KUM

BUKHARA

SAMARKAND

500 miles
44 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

? – RAISES NAGGING QUESTION – ?

Even though outnumbered, why were Mongols able to maneuver in widely scattered arrays

 without being defeated separately or in detail?
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 45

HISTORICAL PATTERN

CHINGIS KHAN AND THE MONGOLS

Message

• By exploiting superior leadership, intelligence, communications, and mobility as well as by playing 

upon adversaries’ fears and doubts via propaganda and terror, Mongols operated inside adversary observation–

orientation–decision–action loops.

Result

• Outnumbered Mongols created impressions of terrifying strength—by seeming to come out of nowhere 

yet be everywhere.

hence,

• Subversive propaganda, clever stratagems, fast breaking maneuvers, and calculated terror not only created 

vulnerabilities and weaknesses but also played upon moral factors that drain-away resolve, produce 

panic, and bring about collapse.
46 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Scheuberg

Hill

Borna Frobelwitz

Sagschutz

LEUTHEN

FREDERICK

AUSTRIANS

Reserve

BRESLAU

ADVANCE

GUARD

Battle of Leuthen

December 5, 1757
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 47

18th Century Theoreticians

 • Saxe

 • Bourcet

 • Guibert

 • Du Teil

Theme

• Plan with several branches

• Mobility/fluidity of force

• Cohesion

• Dispersion and concentration

• Operate on a line to threaten alternative objectives

• Concentrate direct artillery fire on key points to 

be forced

Action

• Napoleon was deeply influenced by the ideas of the above men. In early campaigns (as a general) he applied 

these ideas of ambiguity, deception, and rapid/easy movement to surprise and successively defeat fractions 

of superior forces. In later campaigns (as emperor) he relied increasingly on massed direct artillery fire, 

dense infantry columns, and heavy cavalry going against regions of strong resistance—at an eventually crippling cost in casualties.

• American colonists, Spanish and Russian Guerrillas, in unexpected ways, used environmental background

(terrain, weather, darkness, etc.) and mobility/fluidity as basis for dispersion and concentration to harass, 

confuse, and contribute toward the defeat of the British and French under Napoleon.

HISTORICAL PATTERN Historical Pattern
48 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Action

• Napoleon was deeply influenced by the ideas of the above men. In early campaigns (as a general) he exploied 

these ideas of variety and rapidity with harmony for ambiguity, deception, and rapid/easy movement in 

order to surprise and successiely defeat fractions of superior forces. In later campaigns (as emperor) he 

exchanged variety and harmony for rigid uniformity via massed directed artillery fire, dense infantry columns, 

and heavy cavalry going against regions of strong resistance—that resulted in an evern higher and cripping 

cost in casualties.

• American colonists, Spanish and Russian guerrillas exploited variety and rapidity associated with environmental background (terrain, weather, darkness, etc.) and mobility/fluidity of small bands with harmony of 

common cause against tyranny/injustice as basis to harass, confuse, and contribute toward the defeat of the 

British and French under Napoleon.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

 18th Century Theoreticians

 • Saxe

 • Bourcet

 • Guibert

 • Du Teil

Theme

• Plan with several branches

• Mobility/fluidity of force

• Cohesion

• Dispersion and concentration

• Operate on a line to threaten alternative 

objectives

• Concentrate direct artillery fire on key points 

to be forced
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 49

IMPRESSION

The ideas of Sun Tzu, Saxe, Bourcet, and Guibert seem to be at home with either

Regular or Guerrilla warfare.
50 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Revolutionary Army Gifts to Napoleon

• Moral and physical energy of citizen–soldiers and 

new leaders generated by the revolution and magnified by successes against invading allied armies

• Subdivision of army into smaller self-contained 

but mutually supporting units (divisions)

• Ability to travel light and live-off countryside 

without extensive baggage, many supply wagons, 

and slow-moving resupply efforts

• Rapid march associated with “120” instead of the 

standard “70” steps per minute

• Discontinued adherence to 1791 Drill Regulations 

pertaining to the well-regulated and stereotype 

use of column and line formations for movement 

and fighting

Beneficial Asymmetry

• Mobility/fluidity of force dramatically better 

than that possessed by potential adversaries.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

NAPOLEON’S ART OF WAR

? – Raises Question – ?

How did Napoleon exploit this superior mobility/fluidity of force?
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 51

General Features

• Plan and Resolution

 Evolve plan with appropriate variations each of 

which correspond to probable or possible actions. 

Employ Intelligence/recce units (spies, agents, cavalry, etc.) in predetermined directions to eliminate 

or confirm hypotheses concerning enemy actions 

thereby reduce uncertainty and simplify own plans 

as well as uncover adversary plans and intentions.

• Security

 Generate misinformation, devise stratagems, and 

alter composition of major formations to confuse 

and baffle enemy agents, spies, etc. Employ screens 

of cavalry, infantry, or both and make rise of natural 

features such as terrain, weather, and darkness to 

mask dispositions and cloak movements against 

enemy observation.

• Strategic Dispersion and Tactical Concentration

Expand then contract intervals between force 

components in an irregular and rapid fashion to 

cloud/distort strategic penetration maneuvers yet 

quickly focus tactical effort for a convergent blow 

at the decisive joint.

• Vigorous Offensive Action

 Seize initiative at the outset by attacking enemy 

with an ever-shifting kaleidoscope of (strategic) 

moves and diversions in order to upset his actions 

and unsettle his plans thereby psychologically unbalance him and keep initiative throughout.

Strategic Theme

• Use unified (or single) line of operations as basis 

for mutual support between separated adjacent 

and follow-on units.

• Menace (and try to seize) adversary communications 

to isolate his forces from outside support or reinforcement and force him to fight under unfavorable circumstances by the following actions:

— Employ fraction of force to hold or divert adversary attention—by feints, demonstrations, pinning maneuvers, etc.

— Exploit “exterior maneuvers” against exposed 

flanks or “interior maneuvers” thru a weak 

front to place (bulk of) forces in adversary’s 

flank and rear.

• Set-up supporting “centers (bases) of operation” and 

alternative lines of communication and keep (at least 

some) safe and open as basis to maintain freedom of 

maneuver.

HISTORICAL PATTERN 

NAPOLEON’S ART OF WAR

 Aim

 Destroy enemy army
52 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Line of Def e nseLine of Def e nse

THE ENVELOPMENT MARCH

Strategy of Envelope

(Idealized Schematic)

Cheng

pinning force

Maneuver force Ch’i

Corps of

Observation

Curtain of Maneuver

Main

Attack

Secondary

Attack

Strategic Barrier

THE REVERSED FRONT BATTLE

pinning force

Corps of

Observation

Curtain of Maneuver

Strategic Barrier
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 53

xxxx

xxxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xx

xx

xxx xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxxx

xxx

xxx xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

A

xxxx

A

B

xxxx

B N

Base Base

LOC

Base

SA MA

LOC

LOC

Base

LOC

Calvary

Screen

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx xxx

xxxx

A

xxxx

B

Base

LOC

Base

LOC

Overnight forced march

The Strategy of Central Position

(Idealized Schematic)

Advance to Contact

The Double Battle

The Coup de Grace
54 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Early Tactics

“The action was opened by a cloud of sharpshooters, 

some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to 

carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping from 

his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of 

his cannon by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they also 

received considerable reinforcement to increase their 

overall effect . . . Once the chink in foe’s armour had been 

revealed . . . the horse artillery would gallop up and open 

fire with canister at close range. The attacking force would 

meantime be moving up in the indicated direction, the 

infantry advancing in column, the cavalry in regiments or 

squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or 

everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy 

bullets or cannon balls began to slacken . . . The soldiers 

would begin to run forward, those in the front ranks 

crossing their bayonets, as the drums beat the charge; the 

sky would ring a thousand battle-cries constantly repeated: ‘En avant. En avant. Vive la Republique.’”

Later Tactics

“At the outset, a heavy bombardment would be loosed 

against the enemy formations, causing fearful losses if 

they failed to seek shelter, and generally lowering their 

power of resistance. Under cover of this fire, swarms of 

voltigeurs would advance to within musketry range and 

add a disconcerting ‘nuisance’ element by sniping at officers and the like. This preliminary phase would be followed by a series of heavy cavalry and infantry attacks. 

The secret of these was careful timing and coordination. 

The first cavalry charges were designed to defeat the hostile cavalry and compel the enemy infantry to form 

squares,” thereby reduce fire in any one direction and 

enable the columns to get to close grips before the enemy 

could resume his linear formation. The infantry (deployed or not) and accompanying horse artillery would 

then blaze a gap in the enemy formation and finally the 

cavalry would sweep forward, again, to exploit the breakthrough.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

NAPOLEON’S ART OF WAR

Essential Point

Early tactics, without apparent design, operate in a fluid, adaptable manner to uncover, expand and exploit adversary 

vulnerabilities and weaknesses while later tactics emphasize massed firepower and stereotyped formations working formally 

together to smash adversary strength.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 55

Critique

• Napoleon exploited ambiguity, deception, and 

mobility at the strategic level,

whereas,

• He increasingly emphasized formal battering 

ram methods and de-emphasized loose, irregular 

methods (e.g. skirmishers) at the tactics level—

via a return to, and increasingly heavy-handed 

application of, the 1791 Drill Regulations.

Why?

• Napoleon emphasized the conduct of war from the 

top down. He created and exploited strategic success to procure grand tactical and tactical success.

• To support his concept, he set up a highly centralized 

command and control system which, when coupled 

with essentially unvarying tactical recipes, resulted 

in strength smashing into strength by increasingly 

unimaginative, formalized, and predictable actions 

at lower and lower levels.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

NAPOLEON’S ART OF WAR

Result

• Strategic maneuvers ambiguous and deceiving prior to tactical concentration; after concentration, “maneuvers” 

stereotyped and obvious. 

hence

• Tactical “maneuvers” could not easily procure the victory because of their obvious, predictable nature.
56 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WHICH UNVEILS

The Napoleonic Spirit

Strategic “fog” followed by stereotyped and ruinous tactical assaults.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 57

Character/Nature of War

• An act of policy to use violence to impose 

one’s will upon another.

• Duel or act of human interaction directed 

against an animate object that reacts.

• Uncertainty of information acts as an impediment to vigorous activity.

• Psychological/moral forces and effects (danger, 

intelligence, emotional factors, . . .) either impede or stimulate activity.

• Friction (interaction of many factors, including 

those above) impedes activity.

• Genius (harmonious balance of mind/

temperament that permits one to overcome 

friction and excel at the complex activity of 

war) changes the nature and magnifies the 

scope of operations.

Strategy

• Exhaust enemy by influencing him to increase 

his expenditure of effort.

• Seek out those centers of gravity upon which all 

power/movement depend and, if possible, trace 

them back to a single one.

• Compress all effort, against those centers, into 

the fewest possible actions.

• Subordinate all minor, or secondary, actions as 

much as possible.

• Move with the utmost speed.

• Seek the major battle (with superiority of number 

and conditions that will promise a decisive victory).

HISTORICAL PATTERN

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ—“ON WAR”—1832

Aim

“Render enemy powerless”—with emphasis on “the destruction of his armed forces.”

Historical Pattern
58 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Critique

• Clausewitz overemphasized decisive battle 

and underemphasized strategic maneuver.

• Clausewitz emphasized method and routine 

at the tactical level.

Why?

• Clausewitz was concerned with trying to overcome, or reduce, friction/uncertainty. He failed 

to address the idea of magnifying adversary’s 

friction/uncertainty.

• Clausewitz was concerned with trying to exhaust 

adversary by influencing him to increase his 

expenditure of effort. He failed to address, or 

develop, the idea of trying to paralyze adversary 

by denying him the opportunity of expend effort.

• Clausewitz incorrectly stated: “A center of gravity 

is always found where the mass is concentrated 

most densely”—then argued that this is the place 

where the blows must be aimed and where the decision should be reached. He failed to develop 

idea of generating many non-cooperative centers 

of gravity by striking at those vulnerable, yet critical, 

tendons, connections, and activities that permit 

a larger system to exist.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ—“ON WAR”—1832

? – Raises question – ?

What does all this mean?
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 59

HISTORICAL PATTERN

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ—“ON WAR”—1832

Message

 Clausewitz did not see that many non-cooperative, or conflicting, centers of gravity paralyze adversary 

by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directed fashion, hence they impede vigorous activity 

and magnify friction. 

 

Likely Result

 Operations end in a “bloodbath”—via the well-regulated stereotyped tactics and unimaginative battles of 

attrition suggested by Clausewitz.
60 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

HISTORICAL PATTERN

Jomini — 1861

Secret of Success

 “. . . the narratives of Frederick the Great: commenced to initiate me in the secret which had caused him to 

gain the miraculous victory of Leuthen. I perceived that this secret consisted in the very simple maneuver 

of carrying the bulk of his forces upon a single wing of the hostile army. . . . I found again, afterwards, the 

same cause in the first successes of Napoleon in Italy, which gave me the idea that by applying, through 

strategy, to the whole chess-table of a war this same principle which Frederick had applied to battles, we 

should have the key to all the science of war.”

Historical Pattern
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 61

Key Idea and Supporting Mechanism

• Generalize oblique order associated with 

Battles at Leuctra and Leuthen.

• Divide theater and its subordinate components (zones, fronts, positions, etc.) into 

three-subdivisions—a center and two wings— 

as basis to apply the Leuctra/Leuthen concept 

in strategic and grand tactical maneuvers.

• Set-up base(s) of operations and (alternative) 

lines of communication for freedom to shape 

and shift flow/direction of operations as basis 

to apply Leuctra/Leuthen strategic and 

grand tactical maneuvers.

Strategy/Grand Tactics

• By free and rapid movements carry bulk of the 

forces (successively) against fractions of the 

enemy. 

• Strike in the most decisive direction—that is to 

say against the center or one wing or the center 

and one wing simultaneously.

• If possible, seize adversary’s communications 

(without losing one’s own) and force him to 

fight on a reverse front, by using bulk of forces 

to hit his flank and take him in the rear—while 

using detachments, as needed, to block the 

arrival of reinforcements as well as draw his 

attention elsewhere.

• If the enemy’s forces are too much extended, 

pierce his center to divide and crush his fractions separately.

• To outflank and turn (envelop) a wing, hit enemy 

in the flank and also contain him at the front.

• An attack may be made simultaneously upon 

both extremities but not when the attacking 

force is equal or inferior (numerically) to the 

enemy.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

JOMINI — THE ART OF WAR — 1836Aim

Aim

To make evident a “secret” for success in war.
62 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

HISTORICAL PATTERN

JOMINI — “THE ART OF WAR” — 1836

 Critique

• Preoccupation with form of operations, spatial arrangement of bases, formal orders of battle, and tactical formations.

• Lack of appreciation for the use of loose, irregular swarms of guerrillas and skirmishers to mask own 

dispositions, activities, and intentions as well as confuse and disorder enemy operations.

 Likely Result

• Operations become stereotyped—unless one can appreciate Jomini’s ideas outside their formal underpinnings.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 63

HISTORICAL PATTERN

NAPOLEON — CLAUSEWITZ — JOMINI

Key Point

 Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini did not appreciate importance of loose, irregular tactical arrangements and activities to mask or distort own presence and intentions as well as confuse and disorder 

adversary operations.

? — Why — ?

Major Flaw

 

Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini viewed the Conduct of War and related operations in essentially one direction—from the top down—emphasizing adaptability at the top and regularity at 

the bottom.
64 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

EMIL SCHALK — “SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR” — 1862

“There are three great maxims common to the whole science of war; they are: 

1st — Concentrate your force, and act with the whole of it on one part only of the enemy’s 

force.

2nd — Act against the weakest part of your enemy—his center, if he is dispersed; his flank or 

rear, if concentrated. Act against his communications without endangering your own.

3rd — Whatever you do, as soon as you have made your plan, and taken the decision to act 

upon it, act with the utmost speed, so that you may obtain your object before the enemy 

suspects what you are about.”

CAUTION

While these maxims by Schalk portray, in a general way, physical maneuvers that can be used to realize one’s 

purpose in war at the strategic level, they do not address the non-adaptability and predictability (via the drill regulation mind-set) that permeated 19th century “maneuvers” at the tactical level. 
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 65

Key Ingredients

 • Railroad/telegraph 

 • Quick fire artillery 

 • Machine gun 

 • Repeating rifle 

 • Barbed wire 

 • Trenches 

Early Trends

• Emphasis toward massed firepower and large 

armies supported by rail logistics

• Increased emphasis on a holding defense and 

flanking or wide turning maneuvers into adversary 

rear to gain a decision

• Continued use of frontal assaults by large stereotyped infantry formations (e.g. regiments, battalions), 

supported by artillery barrages, against regions of 

strong resistance

IMPACT OF 19TH CENTURY TECHNOLOGY ON WAR

Result

Huge armies, and massed firepower and other vast needs supported through a narrow fixed logistics network, 

together with tactical assaults by large stereotyped formations, suppressed ambiguity, deception, and mobility

hence surprise of any operation.
66 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

TECHNOLOGY AND THE ART OF WAR

• The legacy of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini’s tactical regularity and the continued use of large stereotyped formations for tactical assault, together with the mobilization of large armies and massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network, “telegraphed” any punch hence minimized the possibility 

of exploiting ambiguity, deception, and mobility to generate surprise for a decisive edge.

• In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and debilitating casualties 

on all sides during the:

— American Civil War (1861–65) 

— Austro–Prussian War (1866) 

— Franco–Prussian War (1870) 

— Boer War (1899–1902) 

— Russo–Japanese War (1904–05) 

— World War I (1914–18) 

POINT

• Evolution of tactics did not keep pace with increased weapons lethality developed and produced by 19th 

century technology.

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

• Why were the 19th century and early 20th century commanders unable to evolve better tactics to avoid over 

a half century of debilitating casualties?
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 67

IMPACT OF 19TH CENTURY CAPITALISM ON INSURRECTION/REVOLUTION

(with a Marxian flavor)

Comment

• A look back reveals that we have been speaking of conflict between social systems, rather than within

social systems. With the explosive expansion of capitalism in the 19th century we begin to see the rise 

of much turmoil and attendant conflict due to opposing tendencies contained within capitalism itself.

Trend

• Without going into explicit detail we find (according to many investigators, including Karl Marx): that 

the interaction of competition, technology, specialization (division of labor), concentration of production in large scale enterprises, and the taking and plowing back of profits into this interaction produce 

opposing tendencies and periodic crises that leave in their wake more and more workers competing for 

jobs in fewer and fewer, but larger, firms that increasingly emphasize (percentage-wise) the use of more 

machines and less labor.

Result

• Low paid wage earners exhibit discontent and hatred for a system that permits others to live in comfort 

or luxury while they must live a life of toil, subject to strict and frequently harsh factory discipline.

• Witnessing these unfolding circumstances disillusioned intellectuals, bankrupt owners, and others take 

the side of the workers, as an enlightened vanguard, to mold them into a powerful opposition.

Raises Question

• How should such an unpleasant situation be corrected?
68 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

IMPACT OF 19TH CENTURY CAPITALISM ON INSURRECTION/REVOLUTION

(with a Marxian flavor)

Message

• According to Marx/Engels and their followers, the only way out is via revolution and dictatorship of the 

proletariat (workers) to smash the capitalistic system and replace it with one that does not exploit and 

oppress masses for the benefit of a ruling elite or class.

Necessary Conditions for Success

• Crisis generated by discontent/misery of masses and vacillation by authorities who indicate unwillingness or inability to come to grips with existing instability.

• Vanguard, or disciplined hard core, that offers leadership, provides a way out, and has support of 

masses.

Why

• Crises represent height of confusion/disorder due to many opposing tendencies (centers of gravity) 

that magnify friction, hence paralyze efforts by authorities to dominate such surges of turmoil. In this 

sense, crises are periods of vulnerability/weakness that beg to be exploited.

• Vanguards represent disciplined moral/mental/physical bodies focused to shape and guide masses as 

well as participate in action to exploit and expand confusion/disorder of crises that shake adversary’s 

will to respond in a directed way.

Key Insight

• Crises and Vanguards are the golden keys that permit us to penetrate to the core of insurrection/

revolution and, as we shall see later, modern guerrilla warfare.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 69

CAPITALISM, TECHNOLOGY AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR

• The creation of crises and vanguards, via 19th century capitalism, make evident the foundations upon which 

to conduct insurrection/revolution in order to destroy a society from within.

On the other hand

• It is not yet clear how these notions change or fit into the way we exploit technology and conduct war against 

societies from within as well as from without. To gain such an appreciation we must look at the period containing World War I, World War II, and their aftermath.
70 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WORLD WAR I

• Plans and Execution

• Stagnation

• Finale

World War I
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 71

AMIENS

PARIS

FRANCE

GERMAN

EMPIRE

METZ

BELGIUM

NETHERLANDS

LUXEMBOURG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

5 9 4

3

2

7

BEF

BEF

Schlieffen Strategic Maneuver

(1914)
72 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WORLD WAR I

Action

• Offensives conducted on wide frontages—

emphasizing few, rather than many, harmonious yet independent thrusts.

• Evenness of advance maintained to protect 

flanks and provide artillery support as advance 

makes headway.

• Reserves thrown in whenever attack held-up—

against regions or points of strong resistance.

Reaction

• Defense organized into depth of successive belts of 

fortified terrain.

• Massed artillery and machine-gun fire designed to 

arrest and pin down attacker.

• Counterattack to win back lost ground.

Result

Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected along paths of hardened resistance

because of dependence upon railroads and choice of tactics of trying to reduce strong points by massed firepower 

and infantry.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 73

WORLD WAR I

A Way Out

Idea

 • Infiltration Tactics

 • Guerrilla Tactics

Authors

• Capt. Andre Laffargue

• Gen. von Hutier

• Gen. Ludendorff

• T.E. Lawrence

• Paul von Lettow–Vorbeck
74 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

IWORLD WAR I

INFILTRATION TACTICS

Action

• Brief but intense artillery bombardment that includes gas and smoke shell to disrupt/suppress defenses 

and obscure the assault.

• Stosstruppen (small teams or squads of thrust troops equipped with light machine-guns, flame-throwers, 

etc.) thrust forward close behind rolling artillery barrage, without any “effort to maintain a uniform 

rate of advance or align formations”. Instead, as many tiny, irregular swarms spaced in breadth and 

echeloned in depth, they seep or flow into any gaps or weaknesses they can find in order to drive deep 

into adversary rear.

• Kampfgruppen (small battle groups consisting of infantry, machine-gunners, mortar teams, artillery 

observers and field engineers) follow-up to cave-in exposed flanks and mop-up isolated centers of resistance from flank and rear.

• Reserves and stronger follow-on echelons move through newly created breaches to maintain momentum and exploit success, as well as attack flanks and rear to widen penetration and consolidate gains 

against counter-attack.

Idea

• Hurl strength (echeloned in great depth), via an eruption of many thrusts, thru weaknesses along 

(many) paths of least resistance to gain the opportunity for breakthrough and envelopment.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 75

WORLD WAR I

INFILTRATION TACTICS

Note

• Such classic descriptions, often repeated, create in listeners or readers minds vivid images of the infiltration technique.

Critique

• Unfortunately this depiction does not address how and why infiltration fire and movement schemes 

work.
76 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WORLD WAR I

INFILTRATION TACTICS

Key Points

• Fire at all levels by artillery, mortars, and machine-guns is exploited to hold adversary attention and pin 

him down hence—

• Fire together with gas and smoke (as well as fog and mist) represent an immediate and ominous threat 

to capture adversary attention, force heads down and dramatically obscure view, thereby cloak infiltrators 

movements.

• Dispersed and irregular character of moving swarms (as opposed to well defined line abreast formations) permit infiltrators to blend against irregular and changing terrain features as they push forward.

• Taken together, the captured attention, the obscured view, and the indistinct character of moving dispersed/irregular swarms deny adversary the opportunity to picture what is taking place.

Result

• Infiltration teams appear to suddenly loom-up out of nowhere to blow thru, around, and behind disoriented defenders.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 77

WORLD WAR I

INFILTRATION TACTICS

Essence

• Cloud/distort signature and improve mobility to avoid fire yet focus effort to penetrate, shatter, envelop, 

and mop-up disconnected or isolated debris of adversary system.

Intent

• Exploit tactical dispersion in a focused way to gain tactical success and expand it into a grand tactical 

success.

Implication

• Small units exploiting tactical dispersion in a focused way—rather than large formations abiding by the 

“Principle of Concentration”—penetrate adversary to generate many non-cooperative (or isolated) 

centers of gravity as basis to magnify friction, paralyze effort, and bring about adversary collapse.
78 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

? — NATURAL QUESTION — ?

 Are infiltration tactics a rejection of the Napoleonic methods—

or are they application of these methods under a different guise?
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 79

RESPONSE

 Infiltration fire and movement schemes can be viewed as Napoleon’s multi-thrust strategic penetration 

maneuvers being transformed into multi-thrust tactical penetration maneuvers down to the lowest operational/ 

organizational level—the squad.

POINT

 Until the rise of the infiltration tactics (and the use of tanks by the allies) in the latter part of WWI, neither 

the 19th century nor the 20th century commanders were able to evolve effective tactical penetration maneuvers 

that could offset the massive increase in weapons lethality developed during this same period.

WHY

 The aristocratic tradition, the top-down command and control system, the slavish addiction to the “Principle 

of Concentration,” and the drill regulation mind-set, all taken together, reveal an “obsession for control” by 

high-level superiors over low-level subordinates that restrict any imagination, initiative, and adaptability 

needed by a system to evolve the indistinct-irregular-mobile tactics that could counter the increase in 

weapons lethality.
80 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WORLD WAR I

INFILTRATION TACTICS

Result

• Immediate success at platoon/company/battalion level coupled with ultimate failure at corps/army 

level.

Why

• Ludendorff violated his own concept by his tendency to use strategic reserves to reinforce against hardened

resistance—hence, at the strategic level; he seduced himself into supporting failure not success.

• Exhaustion of combat teams leading the assault.

• Logistics too inflexible to support rapid/fluid penetration and deeper exploitation of breakthrough.

• Communications too immobile to allow command to quickly identify and reinforce successful 

advances.

• Elastic zone defense, when used, (as developed by the Germans and practiced by Pétain) that emphasizes artillery and flank attacks against penetrations when they stretch beyond their own artillery support.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 81

WORLD WAR I

GUERRILLA WARFARE

(á la T. E. Lawrence)

Action

• Gain support of population. Must “arrange the minds” of friend, foe and neutral alike. Must “get inside 

their minds”.

• Must “be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas” (inconspicuousness and fluidity-of action). Must be an “attack-in-depth”.

• Tactics “should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes” with “use of the smallest force in the quickest 

time at the farthest place”.

• Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a threat everywhere) using mobility/

fluidity-of-action and environmental background (vast unknown desert) as basis for “never affording a 

target” and “never on the defensive except by accident and in error”.

Idea

Disintegrate existing regime’s ability to govern.
82 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

IMPRESSION

• Infiltration tactics á la Ludendorff seem to be similar in nature to irregular or guerrilla tactics á la Lawrence.

• Why? Both stress clouded/distorted signatures, mobility and cohesion of small units as basis to insert an 

amorphous yet focused effort into or thru adversary weaknesses.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 83

MAJOR ADVANCES

BETWEEN WORLD WAR I AND II

Soviet Revolutionary Strategy

• Lenin, and after him Stalin, exploited the idea of crises and vanguards—that arise out of Marxian contradictions within capitalism—to lay-out Soviet revolutionary strategy.

• Result:

 — A scheme that emphasizes moral/psychological factors as basis to destroy a regime from within.

Lightning War (Blitzkrieg)

• Infiltration tactics of 1918 were mated with: 

 — Tank

 — Motorized Artillery J.F.C. Fuller

 — Tactical Aircraft by 

 — Motor Transport Heinz Guderian

 — Better Communications

• Result:

 — Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region with multiple narrow thrusts using 

armor, motorized infantry, and follow-up infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft.

Guerrilla War

• Mao Tse–Tung synthesized Sun Tzu’s ideas, classic guerrilla strategy and tactics, and Napoleonic style 

mobile operations under an umbrella of Soviet revolutionary ideas to create a powerful way for waging 

modern (guerrilla) war.

• Result:

 — Modern guerrilla warfare has become an overall political, economic, social and military framework 

for “total war”.

Major Advances
84 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

SOVIET REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

(á la Lenin/Stalin)

Tasks

• Employ agitation and propaganda in order to exploit opposing tendencies, internal tensions, etc. Object is to bring about crises, to make revolution ripe as well as convince masses that there is a way out. 

This is accomplished when the vanguard is able to:

 — Fan discontent/misery of working class and masses and focus it as hatred toward existing system.

 — Cause vacillation/indecision among authorities so that they cannot come to grips with existing instability.

 — “Confuse other elements in society so that they don’t know exactly what is happening or where the 

movement is going.”

 — Convince “proletariat class they have a function—the function of promoting revolution in order to 

secure the promised ideal society.”

• Concentrate “the main forces of the revolution at the enemy’s most vulnerable spot at the decisive 

moment, when the revolution has already become ripe, when the offensive is going full-steam ahead, 

when insurrection is knocking at the door, and when bringing the reserves up to the vanguard is the 

decisive condition of success.” To quote Lenin on paraphrasing Marx and Engels:

 — “Never play with insurrection, but, when beginning it, firmly realize that you must go to the end.”

 — “Concentrate a great superiority of forces at the decisive point, at the decisive moment, otherwise the 

enemy, who has the advantage of better preparation and organization, will destroy the insurgents.”

 — “Once the insurrection has begun, you must act with the greatest determination, and by all means, 

without fail, take the offensive. ‘The defensive is the death of an armed rising.’ ”

 — “You must try to take the enemy by surprise and seize the moment when his forces are scattered.”

 — “You must strive for daily successes, even if small (one might say hourly, if it is the case of one town), 

and at all costs retain the ‘moral ascendancy.’”
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 85

SOVIET REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

(á la Lenin/Stalin)

Tasks

• Select “the moment for the decisive blow, the moment for starting the insurrection, so timed as to coincide with the moment when the crisis has reached its climax, when the vanguard is prepared to fight 

to the end, the reserves are prepared to support the vanguard, and maximum consternation reigns in 

the ranks of the enemy.” According to Lenin the decisive moment has arrived when:

 − “All the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads, 

have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength;”

 − “All the vacillating, wavering, unstable, intermediate elements—the petty bourgeoisie, the pettybourgeois democrats as distinct from the bourgeoisie—have sufficiently exposed themselves in the 

eyes of the people, have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy;”

 − “Among the proletariat a mass sentiment in favor of supporting the most determined, supremely 

bold, revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has arisen and has begun to grow vigorously. Then 

revolution is indeed ripe. Then, indeed, if we have correctly gauged all the conditions indicated 

above . . . and if we have chosen the moment rightly, our victory is assured.”

• Pursue “the course adopted, no matter what difficulties and complications are encountered on the road 

towards the goal. This is necessary in order that the vanguard not lose sight of the main goal of the 

struggle and the masses not stray from the road while marching towards that goal and striving to rally 

around the vanguard.”

• Maneuver “the reserves with a view to effecting (sic.) a proper retreat when the enemy is strong . . . 

when, with the given relation of forces, retreat becomes the only way to escape a blow against the vanguard

and retain the vanguard’s reserves. The object of this strategy is to gain time, to disrupt the enemy, and 

to accumulate forces in order later to assume the offensive.”

Goal

• Destroy capitalism as well as its offspring imperialism and replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat.
86 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

BLITZKRIEG AND GUERRILLA STRATEGY

Infiltration and Isolation

• Blitz and guerrillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to soften and shatter the moral fiber of the 

political, economic and social structure. Simultaneously, via diplomatic, psychological, and various 

sub-rosa or other activities, they strip-away potential allies thereby isolate intended victim(s) for forthcoming blows. To carry out this program, a la Sun Tzu, blitz, and guerrillas:

 — Probe and test adversary, and any allies that may rally to his side, in order to unmask strengths, 

weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.

 — Exploit critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc., in order to 

foment mistrust, sow discord and shape both adversary’s and allies’ perception of the world thereby:

 — Create atmosphere of “mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness, panic,” . . .

 — Manipulate or undermine adversary’s plans and actions.

 — Make it difficult, if not impossible, for allies to aid adversary during his time of trial.

Purpose

• Force capitulation when combined with external political, economic, and military pressures

or

• Weaken foe to minimize his resistance against military blows that will follow.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 87

BLITZKRIEG

Action

• Intelligence (signal, photo, agent . . . ), reconnaissance (air and ground), and patrol actions probe 

and test adversary before and during combat operations to uncover as well as shape changing patterns of strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.

• Adversary patterns, and associated changes, are weighed against friendly situation to expose attractive, 

or appropriate, alternatives that exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence help shape 

mission commitment and influence command intent.

• Mission assigned. Schwerpunkt (focus of main effort) established before and shifted during combat 

operations to bypass adversary strength and strike at weakness. Nebenpunkte (other related or supporting 

efforts) employed to tie-up, focus, or drain-away adversary attention and strength (elsewhere). 

• Special seizure/disruption teams infiltrate (by air or other means) enemy rear areas where, with agents 

already in place, they: seize bridges and road crossings, sever communications, incapacitate or blow up 

power stations, seize or blow up fuel dumps, . . . as well as sow confusion/disorder via “false messages 

and fake orders.”

• Indirect and direct air firepower efforts together with (any needed) sudden/brief preliminary artillery 

fires are focused in appropriate areas to impede (or channel) adversary movement, disrupt communications, suppress forward defensive fires, obscure the advance, and divert attention.

• Armored reconnaissance or storm trooper teams, leading armored columns, advance rapidly from least 

expected regions and infiltrate adversary front to find paths of least resistance.

• Armored assault teams of tanks, infantry, antitank guns, and combat engineers as well as other specialists, 

together with close artillery and air support, quickly open breaches (via frontal/flank fire and movement 

combinations) into adversary rear along paths of least resistance uncovered by armored reconnaissance 

or storm troopers.

• When breakthrough occurs, relatively independent mobile/armored teams led by armored recce with 

air support (recce, fire, and airlift when necessary), blow-through to penetrate at high speed deep into 
88 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

adversary interior. Object is to cut lines of communication, disrupt movement, paralyze command and 

envelop adversary forces and resources.

• Motorized or foot infantry further back supported by artillery and armor pour-in to collapse isolated 

pockets of resistance, widen the breaches and secure the encirclement or captured terrain against possible counterattack.

Idea

• Conquer an entire region in the quickest possible time by gaining initial surprise and exploiting the fast 

tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams, with air support, as basis to repeatedly penetrate, splinter, 

envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out disconnected remnants of adversary organism in order to confuse, disorder, and finally shatter his will or capacity to resist.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 89

IMPRESSION

Reflection upon discussion, so far, reveals that Blitzkrieg generates many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as 

well as undermines or seizes those that adversary depends upon, in order to impede vigorous activity and 

magnify friction, thereby paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directed way.

? — RAISES NAGGING QUESTION — ?

How do blitzers simultaneously sustain rapid pace and abruptly adapt to changing circumstances without

losing cohesion or coherency of their overall effort?
90 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

BLITZ OPERATING PHILOSOPHY

Key Point

• Each level from simple to complex (platoon to theater) has their own observation–orientation–decision–

action time cycle that increases as we try to control more levels and details of command at the higher 

levels. Put simply, as the number of events we must consider increase, the longer it takes to observe–

orient–decide–act.

Idea

• This brings out the idea that faster tempo, or rhythm, at lower levels should work within the slower 

rhythm but larger pattern at higher levels so that overall system does not lose its cohesion or coherency.

Raises question

• How do blitzers harmonize these differing tempos/rhythms so that they can exploit the faster rhythm/

smaller pattern (of the lower-level units) yet maintain the coherency of the rhythm/pattern for the 

larger effort?

Response

• Give lower-level commanders wide freedom, within an overall mind-time-space scheme, to shape/direct 

their own activities so that they can exploit faster tempo/rhythm at tactical levels yet be in harmony 

with the larger pattern/slower rhythm associated with the more general aim and larger effort at the 

strategic level.

Shaping Agents

• Shape overall scheme by using mission concept or sense of mission to fix responsibility and shape commitment at all levels and through all parts of the organism. Likewise, use Schwerpunkt concept through 

all levels to link differing rhythms/patterns so that each part or level of the organic whole can operate 

at its own natural rhythm—without pulling organism apart—instead of the slower pace associated with 

a rigid centralized control.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 91

? — RAISES QUESTIONS — ?

• What does an overall mind-time-space scheme imply or presuppose?

• How do mission and Schwerpunkt concepts give shape to this overall scheme?
92 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

OVERALL MIND–TIME–SPACE SCHEME

Message

• According to General Gunther Blumentritt, such a scheme presupposes a common outlook based upon 

“a body of professional officers who have received exactly the same training during the long years of 

peace and with the same tactical education, the same way of thinking, identical speech, hence a body 

of officers to whom all tactical conceptions were fully clear.”

• Furthermore, a la General Blumentritt, it presupposes “an officers training institution which allows the 

subordinate a very great measure of freedom of action and freedom in the manner of executing orders 

and which primarily calls for independent daring, initiative and sense of responsibility.”

Point

• Without a common outlook, superiors cannot give subordinates freedom-of-action and maintain coherency of ongoing action.

Implication

• A common outlook possessed by “a body of officers” represents a unifying theme that can be used to 

simultaneously encourage subordinate initiative yet realize superior intent.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 93

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

Very nice, but how do the German concepts of mission and Schwerpunkt give shape to this scheme?
94 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

MISSION

Message

• The German concept of mission can be thought of as a contract, hence an agreement, between superior 

and subordinate. The subordinate agrees to make his actions serve his superior’s intent in terms of what 

is to be accomplished, while the superior agrees to give his subordinate wide freedom to exercise his 

imagination and initiative in terms of how intent is to be realized.

• As part of this concept, the subordinate is given the right to challenge or question the feasibility of mission if he feels his superior’s ideas on what can be achieved are not in accord with the existing situation 

or if he feels his superior has not given him adequate resources to carry it out. Likewise, the superior 

has every right to expect his subordinate to carry-out the mission contract when agreement is reached 

on what can be achieved consistent with the existing situation and resources provided.

Limitation

• While this concept of mission gives form and expression to what is expected between an individual 

superior and subordinate, it does not suggest ways to coordinate or harmonize activities among many 

superiors and subordinates as a collective group.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 95

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

With this limitation in mind how does Schwerpunkt play into or add to this concept?
96 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

SCHWERPUNKT (FOCUS OF MAIN EFFORT)

Message

• Schwerpunkt acts as a center or axis or harmonizing agent that is used to help shape commitment and 

convey or carry-out intent, at all levels from theater to platoon, hence an image around which:

 — Maneuver of all arms and supporting elements are focused to exploit opportunities and maintain 

tempo of operations,

and

 — Initiative of many subordinates is harmonized with superior intent.

• In this sense Schwerpunkt can be thought of as:

 — A focusing agent that naturally produces an unequal distribution of effort as a basis to generate 

superiority in some sectors by thinning-out others,

as well as

 — A medium to realize superior intent without impeding initiative of many subordinates, hence a 

medium through which subordinate initiative is implicitly connected to superior intent.

Implication

• Schwerpunkt represents a unifying concept that provides a way to rapidly shape focus and direction of 

effort as well as harmonize support activities with combat operations, thereby permit a true decentralization of tactical command within centralized strategic guidance—without losing cohesion of overall effort.

or put another way

• Schwerpunkt represents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of many 

subordinate actions with superior intent as a basis to diminish friction and compress time in order to 

generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 97

GERMAN OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

Impression

• The German operational philosophy based upon a common outlook and freedom-of-action, and realized 

through their concepts of mission and Schwerpunkt, emphasized implicit over explicit communication.

which suggests

• The secret of the German command and control system lies in what’s unstated or not communicated to 

one another—to exploit lower-level initiative yet realize higher-level intent, thereby diminish friction 

and reduce time, hence gain both quickness and security.

Result

• The Germans were able to repeatedly operate inside their adversary’s observation–orientation–decision–

action loops.

or as stated by General Blumentritt,

• “The entire operational and tactical leadership method hinged upon . . . rapid, concise assessment of 

situations . . . quick decision and quick execution, on the principle: ‘each minute ahead of the enemy is 

an advantage.’ ”
98 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Impression of the Blitzkrieg Penetration

Thrust and Roll-out/Roll-up Tactics
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 99

Impression of the Pincer

(Envelopment)

PENETRATION PENETRATION

Impression of a Pincer
100 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Impression of the Envelopment

PENETRATION PENETRATION
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 101

Typical Impression of Blitzkrieg Envelopment

PENETRATION PENETRATION
102 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

ENVELOPMENT

(Leuctra, Cannae)

FLYING COLUMNS

(Mongols)

TANK ATTACK

with Motorized Vehicles

(J. F. C. Fuller)

INFILTRATION

(Ludendorff)

BLITZKRIEG

(Heinz Guderian)*

• Narrow Thrusts

• Armed Recce

• Commanders Forward

• Extensive Communication Network

• Air in lieu (or with) artillery

*

Creation of the Blitzkrieg
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 103

? — NATURAL QUESTION — ?

Why employ multiple thrusts, bundles of multiple thrusts, or bundles of thrusts inside bundles of thrusts?
104 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

RESPONSE

• Present many (fast breaking) simultaneous and sequential happenings to generate confusion and disorder—

thereby stretch-out time for adversary to respond in a directed fashion.

• Multiply opportunities, to uncover, create, and penetrate gaps, exposed flanks, and vulnerable rears.

• Create and multiply opportunities to splinter organism and envelop disconnected remnants thereby 

dismember adversary thru the tactical, grand tactical, and strategic levels.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 105

WHICH LEAD TO:

Essence of Blitzkrieg

Employ a Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt maneuver philosophy to generate ambiguity, realize deception,

exploit superior mobility, and focus violence as basis to quickly:

• Create many opportunities to penetrate weaknesses in the form of any moral or mental inadequacies 

as well as any gaps or exposed flanks that open into adversary’s vulnerable rear and interior, hence-

• Create and exploit opportunities to repeatedly penetrate adversary organism, at all levels (tactical, 

grand tactical, and strategic) and in many ways, in order to splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out 

isolated remnants, thereby generate confusion and disorder, hence-

• Create and exploit opportunities to disrupt his system for communication, command, and support, as 

well as undermine or seize those connections or centers that he depends upon, thus shake his will or 

capacity to decisively commit his back-up echelons, operational reserves, and/or strategic reserves, 

thereby magnify adversary’s confusion and disorder and convince him to give up.

Intent

• Create grand tactical success then exploit and expand it into strategic success for a decisive victory.

Implication

• Blitzers, by being able to infiltrate or penetrate or get inside adversary’s system, generate many 

moral–mental–physical noncooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as undermine or seize 

those centers of gravity adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, produce paralysis, and 

bring about adversary collapse.
106 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WORLD WAR II

BLITZKRIEG

Keys to Success

• Emphasis on a common outlook and freedom-of-action that are exploited by mission and Schwerpunkt 

concepts to fix responsibilities as well as to rapidly shape, focus, and shift operations and support at 

all levels.

• Flexible command—based on a common outlook and freedom-of-action that are exploited by mission 

and Schwerpunkt—that encourages lower-level combat leaders (forward) to exploit opportunities generated by rapid action within a broad loosely woven scheme laid down from central command.

• Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem emphasized before and during combat 

operations to unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.

• Broad use of Schwerpunkt concept coupled with fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams and 

air support permit blitzers to repeatedly reshape strength and rapidly shift it against, or through, weaknesses thereby generate doubt and uncertainty which magnify into panic and chaos.

• Superior mobile communications to maintain cohesion of overall effort and to enable higher command 

levels to allocate reserves and support and to reshape as well as shift focus of main effort.

• Essential and only essential logistics tail (using airlift when appropriate and necessary) to support highspeed movement and rapid shift among routes of advance.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 107

BLITZ RESULTS

Successful Unsuccessful

• Poland 1939 • Russia Winter 1941–42

• France 1940 • Russia Fall, Winter 1942–43

• Balkans 1941 • North Africa 1942

• Russia 1941 • Russia Summer 1943

• North Africa 1941–42 • Ardennes Winter 1944–45

• Russia Summer 1942

• Russia Feb–March 1943

• Advance thru 

France 1944

• Manchuria 1945

• Middle East 1967

• Czechoslovakia 1968

• Middle East 1973
108 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

MODERN GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

Action

• Capitalize on discontent and mistrust generated by corruption (real or imagined), exploitation, oppression, incompetence, and unwanted presence of existing regime to evolve a common cause or unifying 

theme as basis to organize and maintain mass popular support through a militant political program.

• Set-up administrative and military organization, sanctuary, and communications network under the 

control of the guerrilla political leadership without arousing regime’s intelligence and security apparatus. 

Build-up a shadow government, with “parallel hierarchies”, in localities and regions that can be made 

ripe for insurrection/revolution by infiltrating cadres (vanguards) who can not only subvert existing 

authority but also convert leaders and people to guerrilla cause and organizational way.

• Exploit subversion of government and conversion of people to guerrilla cause to create an alien atmosphere of security and intelligence in order to “blind” regime to guerrilla plans, operations, and organization yet make “visible” regime’s strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.

• Shape propaganda, foment civil disorders (such as rallies, demonstrations, strikes, and riots), use 

selected terrorism, perform sabotage, and exploit resulting misinformation to expand mistrust and 

sow discord thereby magnify the appearance of corruption, incompetence, etc., and the inability of 

regime to govern.

• Employ tiny cohesive bands for surprise hit-and-run raids against lines of communications to gain 

arms and supplies as well as disrupt government communication, coordination, and movement. 

Retreat and melt into environment when faced by superior police and armed forces.

• Disperse or scatter tiny guerrilla bands to arouse the people (and gain recruits) as well as harass, wearout, and spread-out government forces while larger bands, or mobile formations, concentrate to wipeout his dispersed, isolated, and relatively weak fractions by sudden ambush or sneak attack.

• Play upon the grievances and obsessions of people (via propaganda, re-education, and selected successes) 

as well as encourage government to indiscriminately take harsh reprisal measures against them in order 

to connect the government with expanding climate of mistrust, discord, and moral disintegration. Simultaneously, show (by contrast) that guerrillas exhibit moral authority, offer competence, and provide 
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 109

desired benefits in order to further erode government influence, gain more recruits, multiply base 

areas, and increase political infrastructure hence expand guerrilla influence/control over population 

and countryside.

• Demonstrate disintegration of regime by striking cheng/ch’i fashion, with small fluid bands and ever 

larger mobile formations, to split-up, envelop, and annihilate fractions of major enemy forces.

Idea

• Defeat existing regime politically by showing they have neither the moral right nor demonstrated ability

to govern and militarily by continuously using stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of 

small bands and larger units in cooperation with political “agitprop” (agitation/propaganda) teams as 

basis to harass, confuse and ultimately destroy the will or capacity to resist.
110 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

MODERN GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

Essence

• Capitalize on corruption, injustice, incompetence, etc., (or their appearances) as basis to generate atmosphere of mistrust and discord in order to sever moral bonds that bind people to existing regime.

Simultaneously,

• Share existing burdens with people and work with them to root out and punish corruption, remove 

injustice, eliminate grievances, etc., as basis to form moral bonds between people and guerrillas in order 

to bind people to guerrilla philosophy and ideals.

Intent

• Shape and exploit crises environment that permits guerrilla vanguards or cadres to pump-up guerrilla 

resolve, attract the uncommitted, and drain-away adversary resolve as foundation to replace existing 

regime with guerrilla regime.

Implication

• Guerrillas, by being able to penetrate the very essence of their adversary’s moral–mental–physical being, 

generate many moral–mental–physical non-cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as subvert 

or seize those centers of gravity that adversary regime must depend upon, in order to magnify friction, 

produce paralysis, and bring about collapse.

Yet,

• Guerrillas shape or influence moral–mental–physical atmosphere so that potential adversaries, as well as 

the uncommitted, are drawn toward guerrilla philosophy and are empathetic toward guerrilla success.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 111

LOOKING BACK

Now, if we look at the ingredients that make up modern guerrilla campaigns as well as refer back to our discussion about Soviet revolutionary strategy and the impact of 19th century capitalism on insurrection/revolution, we 

gain some insight into the strategic philosophy that underlies today’s guerrilla efforts.
112 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

MODERN GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

Underlying Strategic Philosophy

• Guerrilla vanguards employ a variety of means to play-upon regime’s internal frictions, obsessions, etc., 

as well as stimulate discontent/mistrust of people. In this way, vanguards sow discord that in turn magnifies regime’s internal frictions, obsessions, etc., thereby paralyze its ability to come to grips with crises 

that further fan atmosphere of mistrust and discord that feed crises—hence push them out-of-control.

Simultaneously,

• Guerrilla vanguards share burden as well as help people cope with turmoil—that vanguards keep fanning and enmesh people into—in order to demonstrate ability to deal with surging crises as well as 

shape image that only guerrillas offer a way out of existing unpleasant circumstances.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 113

INSIGHT

Insurrection/revolution becomes ripe when many perceive an illegitimate inequality—that is, when the people 

see themselves as being exploited and oppressed for the undeserved enrichment and betterment of an elite few. 

This means that the guerrillas not only need an illegitimate inequality but they also need support of the people; 

otherwise, insurrection/revolution is impossible. 

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

In the deepest possible sense what does it mean to have support of the people?
114 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

MESSAGE

• Guerrillas must establish implicit connections or bonds with people and countryside.

In other words

• Guerrillas must be able to blend into the emotional–cultural–intellectual environment of people until 

they become one with the people.

In this sense

• People feelings and thoughts must be guerrilla feeling and thoughts while guerrilla feelings and thoughts 

become people feelings and thoughts; people aspirations must be guerrilla aspirations while guerrilla 

aspirations become people aspirations; people goals must be guerrilla goals while guerrilla goals 

become people goals.

RESULT

• Guerrillas become indistinguishable from people while government is isolated from people.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 115

MODERN GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

Keys to Success

• Ability to continuously demonstrate government weakness, erode government influence, and cause 

government to alienate itself from people.

• Support of people (both psychological and physical) for intelligence, recruits, shelter, transportation, 

refuge, food, money, and medical aid.

• Access to (more or less permanent) safe sanctuaries or base areas and/or fluid bases that can be shifted 

from place to place, away from enemy forces—in order to rest, recuperate, repair materiel, etc., as well 

as indoctrinate, train, and equip recruits.

• Use of stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action coupled with cohesion of guerrilla bands as basis for:

 — dispersion, to arouse people, to avoid adversary strength, and to force government to thin-out, or 

disperse, its strength;

 — concentration, to hit and wipe-out isolated fractions;

 — shifting of effort (in these as well as other activities), in order to gain and keep initiative.
116 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Successful Unsuccessful

• American Colonies 1775–81 Philippines 1899–1902

• Spain 1808–14 South Africa 1900–02

• Russia 1812 Greece 1944–49

• German East Africa 1914–18 Philippines* 1946–54

• Arabia 1916–18 Malaya* 1948–60

• China 1927–49

• Russia 1941–45

• Yugoslavia 1941–45 *Regime exercised particular care not to inflict

 casualties and to protect population.

• Indochina 1945–54

• Algeria 1954–62

• Cuba 1956–59

• South Vietnam 1958–75

GUERRILLA RESULTS
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 117

BLITZ/GUERRILLA THEME

Essence

• Avoid battles—instead penetrate adversary to subvert, disrupt, or seize those connections, centers, and 

activities that provide cohesion (e.g., psychological/moral bonds, communications, lines of communication, command and supply centers . . .)

• Exploit ambiguity, deception, superior mobility, and sudden violence to generate initial surprise and 

shock followed by surprise and shock again, again, again . . . 

• Roll-up/wipe-out the isolated units or remnants created by the subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, 

and seizure.

Intent

• Exploit subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure to generate confusion, disorder, panic, etc., 

thereby shatter cohesion, paralyze effort, and bring about adversary collapse.
118 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

DISRUPT THE CONNECTIONS AND CENTERS THAT PROVIDE COHESION

Israeli example (á la Gen Y. Yadin – 1949)

 “To exploit the principles of war for our purpose and base ourselves upon (the) strategic indirect approach, so 

as to determine the issue of the fighting even before fighting has begun, it is necessary to achieve the three 

following aims:

(a) to cut the enemy’s lines of communications, thus paralyzing his physical build-up;

(b) to seal him off from his lines of retreat, thus undermining the enemy’s will and destroying his morale;

(c) to hit his centers of administration and disrupt his communications, thus severing the link between 

his brain and limbs.”
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 119

? — KEY QUESTION — ?

Why have blitz and guerrilla tactics been so extraordinarily successful?
120 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

MESSAGE

• Blitz and guerrillas, by being able to operate in a directed, yet more indistinct, more irregular, and 

quicker manner than their adversaries, can:

 — Repeatedly concentrate or disperse more inconspicuously and/or more quickly from or to lower 

levels of distinction (organizational, operational, and environmental) without losing internal harmony, as well as,

 — Repeatedly and unexpectedly infiltrate or penetrate adversaries’ vulnerabilities and weaknesses in 

order to splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm disconnected remnants of adversary organism.

or put another way

• Blitz and guerrillas, by operating in a directed, yet more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker manner, 

operate inside their adversaries’ observation–orientation–decision–action loops or get inside their 

mind–time–space as basis to penetrate the moral–mental–physical being of their adversaries in order 

to pull them apart, and bring about their collapse.

UNDERLYING IDEA

• Such amorphous, lethal, and unpredictable activity by blitz and guerrillas make them appear awesome 

and unstoppable which altogether produce uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic . . . 

and ultimately collapse—a notion implied by Sun Tzu around 400 B.C. and more recently by J.F.C. 

Fuller after observing the impact of Ludendorff ’s infiltration tactics in 1918.

Message
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 121

? — NATURAL QUESTIONS — ?

• How can we defend against or counter the blitz?

• How can we defend against or counter the guerrilla movement?
122 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Where are the weaknesses

of the Blitzkrieg?

PENETRATION PENETRATION
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 123

KEY POINT

Difficult to sustain fast-tempo and maintain cohesion of blitz effort when forced to repeatedly and rapidly shift 

concentration of strength against weakness.
124 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

COUNTERBLITZ

(Variation of German Experiences during WWII)

Posture

• Emphasize intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and set-up screen of forward outposts and 

patrols to report on adversary activity and warn of any impending or actual incursions.

• Deploy, disperse, and frequently redeploy/redisperse reconnaissance and mobile antitank/infantry/armored 

teams together with artillery in region behind screen, so that they can mask dispositions, as well as 

move inconspicuously/quickly to focus and shift local main efforts against adversary thrusts.

• Place armored teams, as mobile reserve, in echelon behind recce, antitank/infantry/armor and artillery 

so that they can easily focus effort, and quickly move-in to decapitate any local breakthrough—or pushoff for a blitz counterstroke.

Action

• Employ air and fast moving mobile/armored reconnaissance teams to determine direction/strength of 

thrusts and to continuously harass by repeated delaying actions and hit-and-run attacks in order to 

slow momentum and erode cohesion of blitz attack.

• Inconspicuously move-in with high-speed mobile antitank/infantry/armored teams, together with air 

and artillery support, to strengthen favorable sectors. Hit adversary thrusts and resupply efforts with 

ambuscades and with repeated sudden/sharp flank and rear counterthrusts to channel as well as drainaway momentum and break-up cohesion of blitz thrusts.

• Concentrate swift armored combat forces (held in reserve) and use with air to rapidly drive a shallow 

and/or deep flank counterstroke in order to swing in behind and roll-up blitz offensive in detail (counterstroke launched while adversary is moving forward).

Idea

• Smash blitz offensive by inconspicuously using fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of counterblitz combat teams as basis for shifting of forces and quick focus of air and ground effort to throttle 

momentum, shatter cohesion, and envelop blitz in order to destroy adversary’s capacity to resist.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 125

BLITZ AND COUNTERBLITZ

Main Features and Emphasis

• Intelligence and recce action

• Infiltration/penetration and isolation

• Ambiguity, deception, speed, and violence to generate surprise and shock

• Mission/Schwerpunkt philosophy

• Acceptance of “gaps” and (related) “risks” in support of mission/Schwerpunkt philosophy

• Echelon-in-depth (offense and defense)

• Reserves reconstituted and accumulated (at all levels) to support or generate success

• Posture of positions, alternative positions, dummy positions and roving positions to mask maneuvers 

and intentions

Blitz and Counterblitz
126 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

GUERRILLA/COUNTERGUERRILLA CAMPAIGNS

Key Points

• Guerrilla vanguards need cause and support of people that is dependent upon regime’s unwillingness/

inability to come to grips with crises of its’ own making.

or more simply

• Crises and vanguards represent the marriage of instability and initiative that create and expand guerrilla effort.

hence

• The thought occurs that in order to dry-up a guerrilla upsurge one should strike at those root causes or 

illegitimate inequalities that generate and exacerbate crises as well as provide a favorable climate for 

vanguards to form or operate in.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 127

COUNTERGUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

Action

• Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of 

government to represent and serve needs of people—rather than exploit and impoverish them for the 

benefit of a greedy elite.*

• Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized 

competence as well as popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.*

• Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and organization.

• Seal-off guerrilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities 

that strip-away potential allies as well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect 

these regions with outside world.

• Deploy administrative talent, police, and counterguerrilla teams into affected localities and regions to: 

inhibit guerrilla communication, coordination and movement; minimize guerrilla contact with local 

inhabitants; isolate their ruling cadres; and destroy their infrastructure.

• Exploit presence of above teams to build-up local government as well as recruit militia for local and 

regional security in order to protect people from the persuasion and coercion efforts of the guerrilla 

cadres and their fighting units.

• Use special teams in a complementary effort to penetrate guerrilla controlled regions. Employ (guerrillas’ 

own) tactics of reconnaissance, infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to: keep roving 

bands off-balance, make base areas untenable, and disrupt communication with outside world.

• Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected region after affected region in 

order to undermine, collapse, and replace guerrilla influence with government influence and control.

• Visibly link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect central government with hopes and needs of people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.
128 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Idea

• Break guerrillas’ moral–mental–physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring 

about their collapse via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and 

cohesion of overall effort.

___________

* If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 129

NOTE

 We have indicated again and again the importance of popular support for guerrilla or counterguerrilla

success. Why?

INSIGHT

 Without support of people the guerrillas (or counterguerrillas) have neither a vast hidden intelligence network nor an invisible security apparatus that permits them to “see” into adversary operations yet “blinds” 

adversary to their own operations.
130 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 131

CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT

• Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we can imagine three kinds of 

human conflict:

 — Attrition warfare—as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all sides during the 19th century and 

during World War I, by the Allies during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners.

 — Maneuver conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, General Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler’s Generals (in particular Manstein, Guderian, 

Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under Generals Patton and MacArthur.

 — Moral conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, most guerrilla leaders, a very few counterguerrillas 

(such as Magsaysay) and certain others from Sun Tzu to the present.

• With these comments in mind let’s look into the essentials of each.
132 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

ATTRITION OBSERVATIONS

• Firepower, as a destructive force, is king.

• Protection (trenches, armor, dispersion, etc.) is used to weaken or dilute effects of enemy firepower.

• Mobility is used to bring firepower to bear or to evade enemy fire.

• Measures of success are (now) “body count” and targets destroyed.

• Seize and hold terrain objectives replaces Napoleon’s dictum: Destroy enemy army.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 133

Create and Exploit

• Destructive Force:

 Weapons (mechanical, chemical, biological, 

nuclear, etc.) that kill, maim, and/or otherwise 

generate widespread destruction.

• Protection:

 Ability to minimize the concentrated and 

explosive expression of destructive force by 

taking cover behind natural or manmade obstacles, by dispersion of people and resources, 

and by being obscure using camouflage, 

smoke, etc., together with cover and dispersion.

• Mobility:

 Speed or rapidity to focus destructive force or 

move away from adversary’s destructive focus.

Payoff

• Frightful and debilitating attrition via widespread destruction as basis to:

 — Break enemy’s will to resist

 — Seize and hold terrain objectives

ESSENCE OF ATTRITION WARFARE

Aim

Compel enemy to surrender and sue for peace.
134 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

OBSERVATIONS REGARDING MANEUVER

• Ambiguity, deception, novelty, mobility, and violence (or threat thereof) are used to generate surprise 

and shock.

• Fire and movement are used in combination, like Cheng/Ch’i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt, to tie-up, 

divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength in order to expose as well as menace and exploit 

vulnerabilities or weaknesses elsewhere.

• Indications of success tend to be qualitative and are related to the widespread onset of confusion and 

disorder, frequent envelopments, high prisoner counts, or any other phenomena that suggests inability 

to adapt to change.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 135

Create, Exploit, and Magnify

• Ambiguity:

 Alternative or competing impressions of 

events as they may or may not be.

• Deception:

 An impression of events as they are not.

• Novelty:

 Impressions associated with events/ideas that 

are unfamiliar or have not been experienced 

before.

• Fast Transient Maneuvers:

 Irregular and rapid/abrupt shift from one

maneuver event/state to another.

• Effort (Cheng/Ch’i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt):

 An expenditure of energy or an eruption of 

violence—focused into, or thru, features that 

permit an organic whole to exist.

Payoff

• Disorientation

 Mismatch between events one (seemingly) 

observes or anticipates and events (or efforts) 

he must react or adapt to.

• Surprise

 Disorientation generated by perceiving extreme change (of events or efforts) over a 

short period of time.

• Shock

 Paralyzing state of disorientation generated 

by extreme or violent change (of events or efforts) over a short period of time.

• Disruption

 State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn 

asunder.

ESSENCE OF MANEUVER CONFLICT

Aim

 Generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as disorient or disrupt those that adversary depends 

upon, in order to magnify friction, shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse.

Essence of Maneuver Conflict
136 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

NOTE

 Surprise and shock can also be represented as an overload beyond one’s immediate ability to respond or adapt. 

In this context, we may view the “Essence of Maneuver Conflict” a bit differently—
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 137

Create, Exploit, and Magnify

• Ambiguity

 A lternative or competing impressions of events as 

they may or may not be.

• Deception

 An impression of events as they are not.

• Novelty

 Impressions associated with events/ideas that are 

unfamiliar or have not been experienced before.

• Fast transient maneuvers

 Irregular and rapid/abrupt shift from one maneuver event/state to another.

• Effort (Cheng/Ch’i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt)

 An expenditure of energy or an eruption of violence—focused into, or thru, features that permit an 

organic whole to exist.

 Aim

• Generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as disorient, disrupt, or overload those that adversary 

depends upon, in order to magnify friction, shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse;

or equivalently,

• Uncover, create, and exploit many vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence many opportunities, to pull adversary 

apart and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption.

Payoff

• Disorientation:

 Mismatch between events one observes or 

imagines and events (or efforts) he must react or adapt to.

• Disruption:

 State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn 

asunder.

• Overload:

 A welter of threatening events/efforts beyond one’s mental or physical capacity to 

adapt or endure.
138 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

GEN. HERMANN BALCK

Theme

• No fixed recipes for organization, communications, tactics, leadership, etc.

• Wide freedom for subordinates to exercise imagination and initiative—yet harmonize within intent of 

superior commanders.

• Heavy reliance upon moral (human values) instead of material superiority as basis for cohesion and 

ultimate success.

• Commanders must create a bond and breadth of experience based upon trust—not mistrust—for cohesion.

How is this Atmosphere Achieved?

• By example leaders (at all levels) must demonstrate requisite physical energy, mental agility, and moral 

authority, to inspire subordinates to enthusiastically cooperate and take initiative within superior’s intent.

What is the Price?

• Courage to share danger and discomfort at the front.

• Willingness to support and promote (unconventional or difficult) subordinates that accept danger, 

demonstrate initiative, take risks, and come-up with new ways toward mission accomplishment.

• Dedication and resolve to face-up to and master uncomfortable circumstances that fly in the face of the 

traditional solution.

Benefit

• Internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 139

OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

CYRIL FALLS—THE ART OF WAR FROM THE AGE OF 

NAPOLEON TO THE PRESENT DAY—1961

Page 124

 “In the First World War ‘cellar life’ had been a feature of the adversities of Paris, which actually came under 

the fire of specially built long-range guns in 1918, as well as aircraft bombing. In the East End of London air 

raids cause a tendency to panic in the latter part of 1917, and, whether there was a raid or not, some 300,000 

people crowded each night into the underground railway stations and slept on the platforms. . . . There was 

little organized civil defence beyond the reduction of lights.”

Page 161

 “The Germans, who were far ahead of any rival in the science of lighter-than-air construction, refused to accept the general belief that the future lay entirely with the heavier-than-air. Their Zeppelins. . . . were employed chiefly in night attacks on England. On one occasion a single airship did a million pounds worth of 

damage in a raid, but on the whole their success was mainly moral and measured in terms of absenteeism in 

factories and sensational drops in production of warlike material.”

Page 165

 “Early in the war the German Armies owed much in their victories in Poland, Belgium, and France to their 

dive-bombers. These aircraft acted in close support to the armour and infantry . . . . . They often put hostile 

artillery out of action, but generally by driving the detachments from their guns. The successes were won for 

the most part by moral rather than material effect. To troops unused to them, especially the French division 

of low categories, they proved extremely unsettling.”
140 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

Insights Regarding Falls’ Statements and Balck’s Ideas

 • From Falls’ comments we note (with slight alteration) the following words and phrases: panic . . . moral . . . 

absenteeism . . . sensational drops in production . . . dive bombers success were for the most part moral–

to troops unused to them . . . they proved extremely unsettling. A quick glance shows that all these words 

and phrases are directly related to one another.

 • Going even further we can say: Falls’ comments on pages 124, 161, and 165 suggest that moral effects are 

related to the menace posed by the Zeppelins and dive bombers, and the uncertainty associated with not 

knowing what to expect or how to deal with this menace. Put simply: Moral effects are related to menace 

and uncertainty.

 • For a first cut this suggests that moral strength represents mental capacity to overcome menace and 

uncertainty.

 • On the other hand, this first cut seems to leave out something that humans either need or must overcame 

for collective moral strength. Fortunately, we have some clues:

 — First: Remember that guerrilla commanders (see Modern Guerrilla Campaign) stress use of propaganda, civil disorders, selected terrorism, etc., as basis to generate mistrust and discord.

 — Second: Balck emphasizes the importance of trust—not mistrust—for cohesion.

 • Now, recognizing that both Balck and guerrilla commanders work in a hostile environment (of menace 

and uncertainty) that naturally breeds mistrust, it is clear that moral effects must include this factor.

 • This suggest moral strength represents mental capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 141

OBSERVATIONS RELATED TO MORAL CONFLICT

 • Now by using moral strength as a point of departure—and by feeding in those unsettling or threatening 

experiences (á la Clausewitz) that either bring out fear, anxiety, and alienation, or their more noble counterweights: courage, confidence, and esprit—we can evolve the following related notions: Moral strength: 

Mental capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.

 — Moral victory: Triumph of courage, confidence, and esprit (de corps) over fear, anxiety, and alienation 

when confronted by menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.

 — Moral defeat: Triumph of fear, anxiety, and alienation over courage, confidence, and esprit when confronted by menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.

 — Moral values: Human values that permit one to carry on in the face of menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.

 — Moral authority: Person or body that can give one the courage, confidence, and esprit to overcome 

menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.

 • Finally, by stripping away and recombining essentials—from these notions as well as from the ideas and 

experiences of Clausewitz, Balck, and Falls—we can evolve the Essence of Moral Conflict.
142 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

Create, Exploit, and Magnify

• Menace:

 Impressions of danger to one’s well-being 

and survival.

• Uncertainty:

 Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by 

events that appear ambiguous, erratic, contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc.

• Mistrust:

 Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens 

human bonds among members of an organic 

whole or between organic wholes.

Idea

• Surface, fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to 

generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, 

as well as subvert those that adversary depends 

upon, thereby magnify internal friction.

Aim

 Destroy moral bonds that permit an organic whole to exist.

ESSENCE OF MORAL CONFLICT 
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 143

SUSPICION

 The essence of moral conflict, as presented, seems to be one-sided and emphasizes the negative or dark side 

of one’s moral make-up.

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

 How do we bring out the positive side? In other words—if courage, confidence, and esprit represent the positive 

counterweights to fear, anxiety, and alienation—what are the positive counterweights to menace, uncertainty, 

and mistrust?
144 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

INSIGHT

• In addressing this question we find that the counterweights to menace and uncertainty are not at all 

obvious unless we start with mistrust and work in reverse order. Proceeding in this way we note that:

 — The presence of mistrust implies that there is a rupture or loosening of the human bonds or connections that permit individuals to work as an organic whole harmony with one another. This suggests 

that harmony itself represents an appropriate counterweight to mistrust.

 — In dealing with uncertainty, adaptability seems to be the right counterweight. Otherwise, how can 

one adjust to the unforeseen or unpredictable nature of uncertainty?

 — Finally, with respect to menace one cannot be passive. Instead, initiative is needed otherwise menace 

may obliterate the benefits associated with harmony and adaptability. Intuitively, this suggests that 

initiative is the right counterweight here.

• Using these ideas, together with the previous ideas already uncovered, we can modify and enrich the 

essence of moral conflict as follows:
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 145

Negative Factors

• Menace:

 Impressions of danger to one’s well-being 

and survival

• Uncertainty:

 Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by 

events that appear ambiguous, erratic, contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc.

• Mistrust:

 Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among members of an organic whole or between organic wholes.

Counterweights

• Initiative:

 Internal drive to think and take action without 

being urged

• Adaptability:

 Power to adjust or change in order to cope with 

new or unforeseen circumstances

• Harmony:

 Interaction of apparently disconnected events 

or entities in a connected way

ESSENCE OF MORAL CONFLICT 

Aim

• Pump-up friction via negative factors to breed fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby sever moral bonds 

that permit adversary to exist as an organic whole.

Simultaneously,

• Build-up and play counterweights against negative factors to diminish internal friction, as well as surface 

courage, confidence, and esprit, thereby make possible the human interactions needed to create moral bonds 

that permit us, as an organic whole, to shape and adapt to change.
146 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

SYNTHESIS
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 147

PATTERN FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

• Goal

• Plan

 • Action

 • Support

 • Command
148 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

PATTERNS FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

Goal

• Diminish adversary’s freedom-of-action while improving our freedom-of-action, so that our adversary 

cannot cope—while we can cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.

Plan

• Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.

• Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace–uncertainty–mistrust with tangles of ambiguity–

deception–novelty as basis to sever adversary’s moral ties and disorient or twist his mental images, hence 

mask–distort–magnify our presence and activities.

• Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.

• Establish focus of main effort together with other (related) effort and pursue directions that permit many 

happenings, offer many branches, and threaten alternative objectives.

• Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).

• Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions, obsessions, etc., of adversary organism 

that interfere with his ability to cope with unfolding circumstances.

• Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary’s vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and 

activities that provide cohesion and permit coherent observation–orientation–decision–action in order 

to dismember organism and isolate remnants for absorption or mop-up.

Action

• Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or 

gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities 

and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention 

(and strength) elsewhere.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 149

Support

• Superior mobile communications

• Only essential logistics to maintain cohesion of overall effort and sustain appropriate pace of operations within available resources.

Command

• Decentralize, in a tactical sense, to encourage lower-level commanders to shape, direct, and take the 

sudden/sharp actions necessary to quickly exploit opportunities as they present themselves.

• Centralize, in a strategic sense, to establish aims, match ambitions with means/talent, sketch flexible 

plans, allocate resources, and shape focus of overall effort.
150 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

IMPRESSIONS

• Plan and Action statements suggest that we are trying to:

 — Penetrate adversary system and mask own system against his penetration;

 — Create a variety of impressions of what is occurring and what is about to occur;

 — Generate mismatches between what seems to be and what is;

 — Push adversary beyond his ability to adapt.

• Intentions that make up Plan cannot happen without application of transients that make up Action.

Impressions
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 151

FIRST IMPRESSION

• Note how these strategic and tactical ideas, that we evolved from the Plan and Action statements, fit in nicely 

with the following comments by Napoleon:

 — “The art of land warfare is an art of genius, of inspiration. . . . A general never knows anything with 

certainty, never sees his enemy clearly, never knows positively where he is. When armies are face to 

face, the least accident in the ground, the smallest wood, may conceal part of the enemy army. The 

most experienced eye cannot be sure whether it sees the whole of the enemy’s army or only three–

fourths. It is by the mind’s eye, by the integration of all reasoning, by a kind of inspiration that the 

general sees, knows, and judges.”

 — “The first quality for a commander in chief is a cool head which receives a just impression of things; 

he should not allow himself to be confused by either good or bad news; the impressions which he 

receives successively or simultaneously in the course of a day should classify themselves in his mind 

in such a way as to occupy the place which they merit; because reason and judgment are the result 

of the comparison of various impressions taken into just consideration.”

• Above comments, by Napoleon, reveal ever-present vulnerabilities and weaknesses that commanders and 

subordinates alike must accept.

hence

• If we turn these comments around and connect them with the tactical and strategic ideas presented thus far, 

we surface a modern notion of grand tactics.
152 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WHICH BECOMES:

Grand Tactics

• Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his 

mind- time-space, to create a tangle of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as 

well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or 

anticipates, and those he must react to, to survive; 

thereby

• Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, 

doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos . . . and/or fold adversary back inside 

himself; 

thereby

• Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he 

can neither divine our intentions nor focus his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic 

design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 153

Transients

• Observe, orient, decide, and act more

inconspicuously, more quickly, and with 

more irregularity . . .

 or put another way permits 

 one to 

• Operate inside adversary’s observation–

orientation–decision–action loops or get 

inside his mind-time-space.

Intentions

• Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, 

weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.

• Employ a variety of measures that interweave 

menace–uncertainty–mistrust with tangles of 

ambiguity–deception–novelty as basis to sever 

adversary’s moral ties and disorient . . .

• Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.

• Establish focus of main effort together with other 

effort and pursue directions that permit many 

happenings, offer many branches, and threaten 

alternative objectives.

• Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce 

and exploit success).

• Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions, and obsessions of adversary 

organism that interfere with his ability to cope . . .

• Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary’s 

vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and 

activities . . . in order to dismember organism and 

isolate remnants for wrap-up or absorption.

•

• Become an extraordinary commander.

SECOND IMPRESSION

Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, 

chaos . . . to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis 

and bring about collapse.
154 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WHICH LEADS TO:

Strategy

 Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his 

mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system—as well as subvert, shatter, 

seize, or otherwise subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities 

that he depends upon—in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and 

collapse adversary’s will to resist. 
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 155

NOW ALTOGETHER

Tactics

• Observe–orient–decide–act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to 

keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate 

vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away 

adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.

Grand Tactics

• Operate inside adversary’s observation–orientation–decision–action loops, or get inside his mind–time–

space, to create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate 

mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or imagines, and those he must react to, to 

survive;

thereby

• Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos . . . and/or fold adversary back inside himself;

thereby

• Maneuver adversary beyond his moral–mental–physical capacity to adapt or endure so that tie can 

neither divine our intentions nor focus his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related 

decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.

Strategy

• Penetrate adversary’s moral–mental–physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental 

images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise 

subdue those moral–mental–physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, in order 

to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary’s will to resist.

Strategic Aim

• Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our 

adversary cannot cope—while we can cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.
156 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

! — AN ALTERNATIVE PORTRAIT — !

Now, after some introspection, it is not difficult to see that these tactical and strategic statements are very definitely destructive in nature. Keeping these words in mind, while working backwards thru this presentation, one is 

left with the impression that the destructive attrition–maneuver–moral ideas played-out in the “Categories of 

Conflict” aren’t much different than the tactical and strategic ideas that we have just discussed. As a consequence, 

by stripping-down and recombining the ideas associated with both these conceptual streams, we can evolve an 

alternative portrait of ruin as follows:
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 157

Synthesize

• Lethal Effort:

 Tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention 

and strength as well as (or thereby) overload critical 

vulnerabilities and generate weaknesses.

• Maneuver:

 Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize 

those vulnerable yet critical connections, centers, 

and activities as basis to penetrate, splinter, and isolate 

remnants of adversary organism for mop-up or 

absorption.

• Moral:

 Create an atmosphere of fear, anxiety, and alienation to sever human bonds that permit an organic 

whole to exist.

THEME FOR DISINTEGRATION AND COLLAPSE

Idea

• Destroy adversary’s moral–mental–

physical harmony, produce paralysis, 

and collapse his will to resist.

Aim

Render adversary powerless by denying him the opportunity to cope with unfolding circumstances.
158 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

UNDERLYING INSIGHT

which leads to

THE NAME-OF-THE-GAME

 Unless one can penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being, and sever those interacting bonds that 

permit him to exist as an organic whole, by being able to subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those 

moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, one will find it exceedingly 

difficult, if not impossible, to collapse adversary’s will to resist. 

 Morally-mentally-physically isolate adversary from allies or any outside support as well as isolate elements 

of adversary or adversaries form on another and overwhelm them by being able to penetrate and splinter 

their moral-mental-physical being at any and all levels.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 159

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

How do we connect the tactical and strategic notions, or the theme for disintegration and collapse, with the 

national goal? 
160 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

—VIA A SENSIBLE GRAND STRATEGY THAT WILL:

• Support national goal.

• Pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversary resolve, and attract the uncommitted.

• End conflict on favorable terms.

• Ensure that conflict and peace terms do not provide seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 161

GRAND STRATEGY

Essence

 • 

Basis

• An appreciation for the underlying self-interests, critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, 

obsessions, etc., that we as well as the uncommitted and any potential or real adversaries must contend with.

Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.
162 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

PATTERN

National Goal

• Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment.

Grand Strategy

• Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining 

and isolating our adversaries) but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they 

are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.

Strategic Aim

• Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our 

adversary cannot cope—while we can cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.

Strategy

• Penetrate adversary’s moral–mental–physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental 

images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise 

subdue those moral–mental–physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary’s will to resist.

Grand Tactics

• Operate inside adversary’s observation–orientation–decision–action loops, or get inside his mind–

time–space, to create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly 

generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or imagines, and those he must 

react to, to survive;

thereby

• Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos . . . and/or fold adversary back inside himself;

thereby

• Maneuver adversary beyond his moral–mental–physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can 

neither divine our intentions nor focus his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related 

decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 163

Tactics

• Observe–orient–decide–act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to 

keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate 

vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away 

adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.
164 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

INSIGHT

On one hand, as shown on the previous chart, the national goal and grand strategy tend to be constructive in 

nature. On the other hand, the strategic aim, strategy, grand tactics, and tactics are destructive in nature and operate 

over a shorter time frame. In this sense, the upper two and the latter four notions, as expressed, appear to be in 

disharmony with one another. Yet, application of these latter four strategic and tactical notions permit real leadership 

to avoid high attrition, avoid widespread destruction, and gain a quick victory. This combined with shattered 

cohesion, paralysis, and rapid collapse demonstrated by the existing adversary regime, makes it appear corrupt, 

incompetent, and unfit to govern. Under these circumstances, leaders and statesmen offering generous terms 

can form the basis for a viable peace. In this sense, the first two and the latter four notions can be in harmony 

with one another.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 165

FURTHER ELABORATION

Up to this point—by repeatedly adding, stripping-away, and recombining many different, yet similar, ideas and 

thoughts—we have examined the nature of conflict, survival, and conquest in many different ways. A review and 

further manipulation of the ideas and thoughts that make up these different ways suggests that, for success over 

the long haul and under the most difficult conditions, one needs some unifying vision that can be used to attract 

the uncommitted as well as pump-up friendly resolve and drive and drain-away or subvert adversary resolve and 

drive. In other words, what is needed is a vision rooted in human nature so noble, so attractive that it not only 

attracts the uncommitted and magnifies the spirit and strength of its adherents, but also undermines the dedication and determination of any competitors or adversaries. Moreover, such a unifying notion should be so compelling that it acts as a catalyst or beacon around which to evolve those qualities that permit a collective entity or 

organic whole to improve its stature in the scheme of things. Put another way, we are suggesting a need for a supraorientation or center-of-gravity that permits leaders, and other authorities, to inspire their followers and members 

to enthusiastically take action toward confronting and conquering all obstacles that stand in the way. Such a 

scheme can be portrayed as follows:
166 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

THEME FOR VITALITY AND GROWTH

Aim

Improve fitness as an organic whole to shape and expand influence or power over the course of events in 

the world.

Unifying Vision

• A grand ideal, overarching theme, or noble 

philosophy that represents a coherent paradigm 

within which individuals as well as societies can 

shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances—

yet offers a way to expose flaws of competing or 

adversary systems.

Ingredients Needed to Pursue Vision

• Insight

 Ability to peer into and discern the inner nature 

or workings of things.

• Initiative

 Internal drive to think and take action without 

being urged.

• Adaptability

 Power to adjust or change in order to cope with 

new or unforeseen circumstances.

• Harmony

 Power to perceive or create interaction of apparently disconnected events or entities in a 

connected way.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 167

APPLICATION
168 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

COUNTERBLITZ

á la SUN TZU
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 169

COUNTERBLITZ

á la Sun Tzu

Maneuver Scheme

• Employ cheng/Nebenpunkte as basis to repeatedly and unexpectedly tie-up, divert, stretch-out, or 

drain-away adversary attention and strength in order to expose vulnerabilities and weaknesses for decisive stroke(s) by ch’i/Schwerpunkt.

Aim

• Blind-side adversary regardless of circumstances.
170 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

COUNTERBLITZ

á la Sun Tzu

STRATEGY

Shape Adversary Impression

Arrange elements of defense (in harmony with penchant for humans to generate mental patterns), as basis to 

guide adversaries to form or project patterns on the environment they are facing. In other words, emphasize certain features so that adversary intelligence, recce, patrols, and other observation activity generate mental pictures 

of what we seem to be doing. In this sense, we cause adversary to project tempo or rhythm as well as a sense of 

form or gestalt upon the environment. Naturally, this raises the question: How do we want our posture to appear 

to an adversary—or put another way, what kind of mental picture do we want him to generate in his mind?
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 171

COUNTERBLITZ

á la Sun Tzu

STRATEGY

How?

 Set-up positions echeloned–in-depth (similar to German philosophy) with flexibility to quickly rotate or shift 

both front and flank maneuver schemes–yet convince adversary (with help from “shaping” and “disruption” 

agencies/activities—intelligence, electronic warfare, etc.) that he is facing, for example, an in-depth strongpoint/checkerboard or multiple belts of an in depth linear or elastic defense. In this sense, we suggest three 

belts or bands behind the front as follows:

• Emphasize intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and set-up screen of forward outposts and 

patrols to report on adversary activity and warn of any in pending or actual incursions.

• Deploy, disperse, and frequently redeploy/redisperse reconnaissance and mobile antitank/infantry/

armored teams together with artillery in region behind screen, so that they can mask dispositions, as 

well as move inconspicuously/quickly to focus and shift local main efforts against adversary thrusts.

• Place armored teams, as mobile reserve, in echelon behind recce, antitank/infantry/armor and artillery 

so that they can easily focus effort, and quickly move-in to decapitate any local breakthrough—or pushoff for a blitz counterstroke.
172 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

COUNTERBLITZ

á la Sun Tzu

STRATEGY

Game

• Shift from such an ambiguous or misleading posture into a gauntlet defense with alternate channels, 

sectors, or zones by thinning-out some sectors or zones in order to strengthen others.

• Basic notion is to think in terms of channels, avenues and gauntlets (instead of just belts, bands and 

fronts) so that ambush gauntlets will naturally evolve or be set-up to deal with forward as well as lateral 

(roll-out) thrusts of adversary. In this way, ambush gauntlets can then be set-up at any level from 

platoon to theater.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 173

COUNTERBLITZ

á la Sun Tzu

TACTICS

Basic Maneuver

• Use obstacles, delaying actions, hit-and-run attacks, and/or baited retreats in thinned-out sectors/

zones together with “shaping” and “disruption” activities to disorient adversary as well as pile-up or 

stretch-out his maneuver. Combine this action with fire and movement into adversary flank and/or 

rear from strengthened adjacent sectors/zones to:

 — slow momentum and blow adversary away (during pile-up) or

 — channel momentum then decapitate and break-up cohesion of thrust (during stretch-out).

Mental Picture

• Think of obstacles, delay, hit-and-run, and baited retreats together with “shaping” and “disruption” 

activities as cheng or Nebenpunkte to create caps, exposed flanks, and vulnerable rears by the pile-up/

congestion or stretch-out of adversary maneuver.

• Think of ch’i or Schwerpunkt maneuver (fire and movement) hitting unexpectedly thru gaps into adversary flank/rear, or blind-side, as a decisive stroke to pull enemy apart and roll-up his isolated remnants.
174 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

COUNTERBLITZ

á la Sun Tzu

TACTICS

Action

• Employ air and fast moving mobile/armored recce teams, with mobile antitank teams, artillery, and 

“shaping”/”disruption” activities in support, as Nebenpunkte to determine direction/strength of thrusts 

and (by local front/flank combinations) to continuously harass with repeated delaying actions and hitand-run attacks. Object is to:

 — disorient adversary;

 — provide information to senior commanders to help them decide which sectors to thin-out and 

which to strengthen;

 — pile-up or stretch-out adversary maneuver to “shape” (or disrupt) tempo/rhythm and pattern of 

blitz attack as well as create gaps, exposed flanks, and vulnerable rears.

• Inconspicuously move-in with high-speed mobile antitank/infantry/armored teams together with air 

and artillery support as Schwerpunkt to strengthen appropriate sectors that flank adversary thrusts. 

From here, exploit gaps, or any other vulnerabilities and weaknesses, to ambush adversary with fire 

together with sudden/sharp flank and rear counterthrusts into his forward, roll-out, and resupply efforts moving through out thinned-out sectors. Object is to work Schwerpunkt in harmony with 

Nebenpunkte in order to break-up cohesion and roll-up isolated remnants of blitz thrusts.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 175

COUNTERBLITZ

á la Sun Tzu

GRAND MANEUVER

Mental Picture

• Imagine the fluid cheng/ch’i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt counteroperations just discussed to be super 

Nebenpunkte operations that are used to tie—up or drain-away adversary strength. Idea is to set-up 

and launch a blitz counterstroke, or super Schwerpunkt, deep into adversary weakness while he (with 

his strength) is preoccupied in overcoming the challenge posed by the super Nebenpunkte operations.

Action

• Keep pressure on and continually force adversary to adapt to many abrupt and irregular changes generated by the ongoing super Nebenpunkte operations.

• When adversary is strung-out, or disconnected, and vulnerable: Unleash swift armored forces (held in 

reserve) together with air to hook-in behind and roll-up adversary blitz as well as push-off for a blitz 

counteroffensive. Shift forces, as appropriate, from local Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt operations (as 

well as from other sectors) into this super Schwerpunkt to both generate and exploit a decisive success.
176 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

COUNTERBLITZ

á la Sun Tzu

CAUTION

• Extensive use of many shallow, lower-level Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt actions across many sectors/

zones drains-away resources needed for fewer but decisive large scale Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt operations.

• Furthermore, experience has shown, when under active pressure, it is difficult to disengage forces committed to these local efforts and shift them to the larger operation.

• In this sense, these many shallow lower-level actions or maneuvers across a broad front tend to take-on 

the character battle or attrition warfare while deep, large scale (up to theater level) Nebenpunkte/

Schwerpunkt operations take-on the character of strategic maneuver.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 177

COUNTERBLITZ

á la Sun Tzu

Underlying Idea

• Pull adversary apart and bring about his collapse by causing him to generate or project mental images 

that agree neither with the faster tempo/rhythm nor with the hidden form of the transient maneuver 

patterns to must compete against.
178 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

BLITZ/COUNTERBLITZ STRATEGIC DESIGN

OR

MANSTEIN DIVINED
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 179

OUTLINE

 • BACKGROUND

 • STRATEGIC DESIGN
180 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

BACKGROUND

 • BATTLE OF LEUCTRA AND LEUTHEN

 • BATTLE OF CANNAE

 • SCHLIEFFEN STRATEGIC MANEUVER
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 181

OBSERVATION

 Single envelopment schemes (á la Leuctra, Leuthen, or Schlieffen) take less force than double envelopment 

schemes (á la Marathon or Cannae) to achieve the same benefit.
182 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

STRATEGIC DESIGN

 • POLAND

• FRANCE

• RUSSIA
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 183

POLAND 1–19 SEPTEMBER 1939

0

0 Kilometers

60

120

Major Polish defence groups German attack Miles

Baltic Sea

EAST PRUSSIA

GERMANY

POLAND

POMERANIA

LITHUANIA

POZNAN

ARMY

NAREW

ARMY

LODZ

ARMY

CARPATHIAN

ARMY

KRAKOW

ARMY

POMORZ

ARMY

Bialystok Bydgoszcz

Poznan

Koch

Lublin

Breast

Litovsk

Chelm

Lwow Przemyal

Warsaw

SEPT 21

Lodz

Krakow

Sandomierz

Radam

Kolidz

Konigsberg

ARMY GROUP

NORTH

ARMY GROUP

SOUTH

FOURTH

ARMY

EIGHTH

ARMY

TENTH

ARMY

FOURTEENTH ARMY

THIRD

ARMY

Bug

R. Bzura

Jablunka

Pass

R. Brda

Vistula

Narew

SLOVAKIA

SILESIA

MODLIN

ARMY

Danzig

CONCENTRIC CANNAE WITH LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN UNDERTONE
184 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

POLAND (1939)

KEY POINT

GERMANS HAD MORE FORCES THAN POLES.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 185

FRANCE (1940)

 PHASE I Phase II

Rotterdam

Dordrecht

Moerdijk

FT. EBEN

EMAEL

Dunkirk

Montherme

Charleville St Menges

Dover

Boulogne

Calais

Abbeville

Namur

Maastricht

Dinant Givet

Amiens

Aire

Arras

St Omer

Antwerp

Rhine

Aisne

Albert Canal

ARMY GROUP B

(back)

ARMY GROUP A

(Rundstedt)

XXXIX PZ.CP.

(Schmidt)

XVI PZ.CP.

(Höppner)

XV PZ.CP.

(Hoth)

XLI PZ.CP.

(Reinhardt)

XIX PZ.CP.

(Guderian)

KLEIST’S

PZ. GROUP

MAGINOT LINE FR. 2nd

MAY 20

FRONT LINE JUNE 5

MAY 26–JUNE 2

EVACUATED FROM

DUNKIRK

FR. 7th

FR. 9th

FR. 1st

FR. 1st

B.E.F.

BELG. ARMY

LUX

HOLLAND

ENGLAND GERMANY

FALL OF FRANCE 1940 (PHASE 1)

GERMAN INFANTRY & ARMORED ATTACKS ALLIED LINES AFTER FORWARD

PANZER ATTACKS MOVEMENT OF LEFT SHOULDER

GERMAN AIRBORNE LANDINGS MAY 10 ARDENNES

The Hague

Brussels

B

E

L G I U M

Cherborg

Abbeville

Langres

Nancy

Laon

XIV & XVI

PZ.CP.

(Kleist) XXXIX & XLI

 PZ.CP.

(Guderian)

JUNE 20

JUNE 19

GERMANY

BAY OF

BISCAY

ENGLISH CHANNEL Péronne

FRANCE

Rotterdam

Dordrecht

Moerdijk

Rennes Alencon

Cherborg

Abbeville

Amiens

Compiégne

Orleans Langres

Geneva

Grenoble

Nancy

Reims

Châlons

Creil

Laon

FT. EBEN

EMAEL

Dunkirk

Montherme

Charleville St Menges

Dover

Boulogne

Calais

Abbeville

Namur

Maastricht

Dinant Givet

Reims

Amiens

Lille Aire

Arras

St Omer

Antwerp

Rhine

Rhine

Aisne

Albert Canal

ARMY GROUP B

(back)

ARMY GROUP A

(Rundstedt)

XXXIX PZ.CP.

(Schmidt)

XVI PZ.CP.

(Höppner)

XIV & XVI

PZ.CP.

(Kleist)

XV PZ.CP.

(Hoth)

XV PZ.CP.

(Hoth)

XLI PZ.CP.

(Reinhardt)

XIX PZ.CP.

(Guderian)

XXXIX & XLI

 PZ.CP.

(Guderian)

KLEIST’S

PZ. GROUP

MAGINOT LINE

MAGINOT LINE

FR. 2nd

MAY 20 Nantes Tours

Argenton

Clermont

Ferrand

Limoges

Royan

Angoulême

Limoges

Lyons

Vichy

June 14

2nd & 9th ARMIES

JUNE 18

Dijon

JUNE 16

JUNE 20

JUNE 19

FRONT LINE JUNE 5

LINE OF GERMAN FORCES

JUNE 25

MAY 26–JUNE 2

EVACUATED FROM

DUNKIRK

FR. 7th

FR. 9th

FR. 1st

FR. 1st

B.E.F.

BELG. ARMY

LUX

HOLLAND

ENGLAND GERMANY

GERMANY

BELGIUM

SWITZERLAND

ITALY

LUX

FALL OF FRANCE 1940 (PHASE 1)

FALL OF FRANCE 1940 (PHASE 2)

GERMAN INFANTRY & ARMORED ATTACKS ALLIED LINES AFTER FORWARD

PANZER ATTACKS MOVEMENT OF LEFT SHOULDER

PANZER ATTACKS

FRONT LINE JUNE 5 FRENCH FORCES

GERMAN AIRBORNE LANDINGS MAY 10 ARDENNES (SURROUNDED)

The Hague

Brussels

Brussels

Paris

0 150 KM 0 150KM

B

E

L G I U M

BAY OF

BISCAY

ENGLISH CHANNEL Péronne

FRANCE

 LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN ECCENTRIC CANNAE WITH

 LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN WINGS
186 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

FRANCE (1940)

KEY POINTS

• GERMANS HAD FEWER FORCES THAN ALLIES BEFORE PHASE I.

• GERMANS HAD MORE FORCES THAN ALLIES BEFORE PHASE II.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 187

RUSSIA JUNE 22–DECEMBER 5, 1941

ARMY GROUP

CENTRE (Bock)

inc. THIRD PZ. GR,

(Hoth)

SECOND PZ. GR.

(Guderian)

ARMY GROUP

NORTH (Leeb)

inc. FOURTH PZ. GR,

(Hoepner)

ARMY GROUP

SOUTH (Rundstedt)

inc. FIRST PZ. GR,

(Kleist)

Riga

SWEDEN

UKRAINE

POLAND RUSSIA

HUNGARY

RUMANIA CRIMEA

FINLAND

LATVIA

ESTONIA

LITHUANIA

GERMANY

YUGOSLAVIA

EAST

PRUSSIA

BALTIC

SEA

BLACK

SEA

Pripet

Marshes

Leningrad

Dvinsk

Rzhev Klin

Kaunus

Grodno

Vitebsk

Minsk Mogilev

Slonim

Kobryn

Luck

Lwow Brody

Korosten

Kiev

Bobruisk

Rogachev

Gomel

Bialystok

Vyasma

Smolensk

Roslavl

Briansk

Tula

Novgorod Severski

Kharkov

Dnepropetrovsk

Odessa

Rostov

Sevastopol

Mariupol

Orsha

BrestLitovsk

Tallinn

Moscow

Warsaw

SWEDEN

UKRAINE

POLAND RUSSIA

HUNGARY

RUMANIA CRIMEA

FINLAND

LATVIA

ESTONIA

LITHUANIA

GERMANY

YUGOSLAVIA

EAST

PRUSSIA

BALTIC

SEA

BLACK

SEA

Pripet

Marshes

Leningrad

Dvinsk

Rzhev Klin

Kaunus

Grodno

Vitebsk

Riga

Minsk Mogilev

Slonim

Kobryn

Luck

Lwow Brody

Korosten

Kiev

Bobruisk

Rogachev

Gomel

Bialystok

Vyasma

Smolensk

Roslavl

Briansk

Tula

Novgorod Severski

Kharkov

Dnepropetrovsk

Odessa

Rostov

Sevastopol

Mariupol

Orsha

BrestLitovsk

Tallinn

Moscow

Warsaw

0 Miles 200

0 Kilometers 300

The Drive into Russia

Main German attacks

Front line September 1, 1941

Russian counterstrikes

Main Russian pockets

Front line December 5, 1941
188 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

RUSSIA 1941

KEY POINT

GERMANS HAD FEWER FORCES THAN RUSSIANS.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 189

CAUCASUS/STALINGRAD

28 MAY–28 NOVEMBER 1942

N Volchansk

Izyum

Kerch

Novorossiysk

Taupse

Batumi

MAY 8

11th ARMY

BLACK SEA

CASPIAN

SEA

SEA OF AZOV

Armavir

Belgorod

Volchansk

Kharkov

Kharkov

Taganrog

Belgorad

Kupiansk

May 26

Krasnograd Kursk

Voronezh

May 12

Slavyansk

Stalingrad

Izyum

Izyum

Rostov

Krasnodor

Kerch

Novorossiysk Maikop

Taupse

Grozny

Ordzhenikidze

Tbilisi

Alagir

Stavropol

Armavir

Batumi

Kamersk

Millerovo

Rossosh

Chertkovo

Kotelnikovo

Proletarskaya

Budenovak

Astrakhan

Pyatigorsk

Nalchik

Mozdok

Kalach

8th Army

RUSSIAN DEFENSIVE MAY 12, 1942

GERMAN C/ OFFENSIVE MAY 17/26

8th ARMY

8th ARMY

2nd ARMY

17th ARMY

MAY 8

11th ARMY

ARMY GROUP B

ARMY GROUP B ARMY GROUP A

4th PANZER

ARMY

1st PANZER

ARMY

ARMY GROUP A

ARMY GROUP

SOUTH

4th PANZER ARMY

1st PANZER

ARMY

KALMUK

STEPPE

TURKEY

BLACK SEA

CASPIAN

SEA

SEA OF AZOV

ROSTOV-TBLISI

HIGHWAY

GERMAN ARMOURED ATTACKS

GERMAN INFANTRY ATTACKS

GERMAN ADVANCE TO STALINGRAD

FRONT LINE MAY 28, 1942

FRONT LINE JULY 22, 1942

FRONT LINE NOV 18, 1942

Volga

Don

Kuban

Manych

M o u n t a i n s

C A U C A S U S

0 100 200 300 KM
190 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

BLITZ/COUNTERBLITZ STRATEGIC DESIGN

Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen

• Manstein – France (Phase I) 1940

• ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

• Manstein – Kerch Peninsula 1942

• OKW/OKH – Caucasus/Stalingrad counterstroke 1942

• Manstein – Donetz counterstroke 1943

• Manstein proposal – counterstroke from Kharkov to Sea of Azov 1943

• Rundstedt/Rommel proposal – Normandy 1944

• Ardennes – 1944–45

Cannae—with Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen Undertone

• Poland – 1939

• France (Phase II) – 1940

• Russia – 1941

• Kursk – 1943
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 191

? — NATURAL QUESTION — ?

HOW COME GERMANS DID NOT ATTEMPT A LEUCTRA/LEUTHEN

STRATEGIC MANEUVER AGAINST RUSSIA IN 1941?
192 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

B. H. LIDDELL HART — THE GERMAN GENERALS TALK — 1948

Page 184

Rundstedt

 “The 1941 operations in Russia should, in my opinion have had their main effort directed, not at first 

towards Moscow, but towards Leningrad. That would have linked up with the Finns. Then, in the next 

stage, should have come an attack on Moscow from the north, in cooperation with the advance of Field 

Marshal von Bock’s Army Group from the west.”
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 193

BLITZ/COUNTERBLITZ STRATEGIC DESIGN

Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen

• Manstein – France (Phase I) 1940

• Rundstedt proposal – thrust to Leningrad followed by thrust (roll-up) to south and take

 Moscow – 1941

• Manstein – Kerch Peninsula 1942

• OKW/OKF – Caucasus/Stalingrad counterstroke 1942

• Manstein – Donetz counterstroke 1943

• Manstein proposal – counterstroke from Kharkov to Sea of Azov 1943

• Rundstedt/Rommel proposal – Normandy 1944

• Ardennes – 1944–45

Cannae—with Leuctra/Leuthen/Schlieffen Undertone

• Poland – 1939

• France (Phase II) – 1940

• Russia – 1941

• Kursk – 1943
194 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

MESSAGE

Only Manstein (and few others) knew how to synthesize and apply the experiences and ideas of Napoleon, 

Clausewitz, Jomini, Moltke, and Schlieffen in a strategic as well as a grand tactical sense.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 195

WRAP-UP
196 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WRAP-UP

Message

• He who is willing and able to take the initiative to exploit variety, rapidity, and harmony—as the basis 

to create as well as adapt to the more indistinct — more irregular — quicker changes of rhythm and 

pattern, yet shape the focus and direction of effort—survives and dominates.

or contrariwise

• He who is unwilling or unable to take the initiative to exploit variety, rapidity, and harmony . . . goes 

under or survives to be dominated.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 197

WRAP-UP

Game

• Create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes or imagines (Cheng/Nebenpunkte) and those 

he must react to (Ch’i/Schwerpunkt)

as basis to

• Penetrate adversary organism to sever his moral bonds, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral–

mental–physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon

thereby

• Pull adversary apart, produce paralysis, and collapse his will to resist.

How

• Get inside adversary observation–orientation–decision–action loops (at all levels) by being more subtle, 

more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker—yet appear to be otherwise.
198 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WRAP-UP

Implications

• In a tactical sense, these multi-dimensional interactions suggest a spontaneous, synthetic/creative, and 

flowing action/counteraction operation, rather than a step-by-step, analytical/logical, and discrete

move/countermove game.

 — In accepting this idea we must admit that increased unit complexity (with magnified mental and 

physical task loadings) does not enhance the spontaneous synthetic/creative operation. Rather, it 

constrains the opportunity for these timely actions/counteractions.

or put another way

 — Complexity (technical, organizational, operational, etc.) causes commanders and subordinates alike 

to be captured by their own internal dynamics or interactions—hence they cannot adapt to rapidly 

changing external (or even internal) circumstances.

• In a strategic sense, these interactions suggest we need a variety of possibilities as well as the rapidity to 

implement and shift among them. Why?

 — Ability to simultaneously and sequentially generate many different possibilities as well as rapidly

implement and shift among them permits one to repeatedly generate mismatches between events/

efforts adversary observes or imagines and those he must respond to (to survive).

 — Without a variety of possibilities, adversary is given the opportunity to read as well as adapt to 

events and efforts as they unfold.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 199

WRAP-UP

• Alternatively—by stripping away and recombining some of the comments associated with 

“Clausewitz”, “Grand Tactics”, “Message”, “Game”, “How”, and “Implications”—we can say:

 — Variety/Rapidity allow one to:

 Magnify adversary friction hence stretch-out his time to respond in a directed way.

 — Harmony/Initiative permit on to:

 Diminish own friction hence compress own time to exploit variety/rapidity in a directed way.

 — Altogether Variety/Rapidity/Harmony/Initiative enable one to:

 Operate inside adversary’s observation–orientation–decision–action loops to enmesh adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos, . . . and/

or fold adversary back inside himself so that he cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold.

• Simultaneously—by repeatedly rolling-thru OODA loops while appealing to and making use of the 

ideas embodied in “Grand Strategy” and “Theme for Vitality and Growth”—we can:

 — Evolve and exploit Insight/Initiative/Adaptability/Harmony as basis to:

 Shape or influence events so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while isolating our 

adversaries and undermining their resolve and drive) but also influence the uncommitted or 

potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward 

our success.
200 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

WRAP-UP

—or summarizing in another, yet similar way—

We have in a nutshell:

The Art of Success

• Appear to be an unsolvable cryptogram while operating in a directed way to penetrate adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses in order to isolate him from his allies, pull him apart, and collapse his will 

to resist.

yet

• Shape or influence events so that we not only magnify our spirit and strength but also influence potential adversaries as well as the uncommitted so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 201

EPILOGUE
202 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

COMMENT

• Reflection upon the previous discussion and reflection upon the various principles of war that are bandied about leave one unsettled about the real value associated with these principles.

• To illustrate, let’s take a look at some of the principles of war (or military art).
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 203

 PRINCIPLES OF WAR

USA United Kingdom Soviet Union France

• Objective • Aim/goal • Mobility/tempo • Concentration of efforts

• Offensive • Coordination • Concentration of efforts • Freedom of action

• Mass • Offensive • Surprise • Economy of forces

• Economy of forces • Freedom of action • Combat activeness

• Maneuver • Concentration • Preservation of combat 

effectiveness

• Unity of command • Economy of efforts • Conformity of goal/plan 

to actual situation

• Security • Surprise • Coordination/interworking

• Surprise • Security

• Simplicity • Morale

• Control of rear
204 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

CRITIQUE

• A list of principles does not reveal how individual principles interact nor the mechanism for doing so.

• Scientific laws and principles are the same for all countries and tend to change little over time. On the other 

hand, we note that the principles of war are different for different countries and change more dramatically 

over time. Furthermore, they do not make evident the importance of variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative as 

basis to shape and adapt to circumstances—a necessary requirement for success in the uncertain and ever-changing 

environment of conflict or war.

• This would suggest that the principles are not principles. Instead, they seem to be some kind of a (shifting) 

static checklist or laundry list of what should be adhered to.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 205

ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY

• With this critique in mind, if we still feel we need some guidance, why not evolve statements that reflect 

the essence of conflict dynamics in a connected sense?

or put another way

• Why not collect appropriate bits and pieces and assemble them in a coherent way to present a more 

satisfying picture?
206 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

APPROPRIATE BITS AND PIECES

• Compress own time and stretch-out adversary time.

• Generate unequal distributions as basis to focus moral–mental–physical effort for local superiority and decisive leverage. 

• Diminish own friction (or entropy) and magnify adversary friction (or entropy).

• Operate inside adversary’s observation—orientation–decision–action loops or get inside his mind–time–

space.

• Penetrate adversary organism and bring about his collapse.

• Amplify our spirit and strength, drain-away adversaries’ and attract the uncommitted.
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 207

CENTRAL THEME

Evolve and exploit insight/initiative/adaptability/harmony together with a unifying vision, via a grand ideal or 

an overarching theme or a noble philosophy, as basis to:

• Shape or influence events so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength but also influence the 

uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success,

yet be able to

• Operate inside adversary’s observation–orientation–decision–action loops or get inside his mind–

time–space as basis to:

• Penetrate adversary’s moral–mental–physical being in order to isolate him from his allies, pull him 

apart, and collapse his will to resist.
208 │ PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

SOURCES

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PATTERNS OF CONFLICT │ 209

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ORGANIC DESIGN

for

COMMAND AND CONTROL
218 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

THE TITLE CHART PROVOKES A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS:

• Why the focus on command and control (C&C)?

• What do we mean by organic design?
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 219

FAILURES

The past few years have seen the fiascos associated with Nifty Nugget and Proud Spirit C&C exercises together 

with the real world fiascos epitomized by the evacuation of Saigon, Desert I, and others.

RESPONSE

The institutional response for overcoming these fiascos is: more and better sensors, more communications, 

more and better computers, more and better display devices, more satellites, more and better fusion centers, 

etc.—all tied into one giant, fully informed, fully capable C&C system. This way of thinking emphasizes hardware as the solution.

ANOTHER WAY

I think there is a different way—a way that emphasizes the implicit nature of human beings. In this sense, the 

following discussion will uncover what we mean by both implicit nature and organic design.
220 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

IMPLICATIONS

• Need insight and vision, to unveil adversary plans and actions as well as “foresee” own goals and appropriate 

plans and actions. 

• Need focus and direction, to achieve some goal or aim.

• Need adaptability, to cope with uncertain and ever-changing circumstances.

• Need security, to remain unpredictable.
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 221

ELABORATION

• Why insight and vision? Without insight and vision there can be no orientation to deal with both present and 

future.

• Why focus and direction? Without focus and direction, implied or explicit, there can be neither harmony of 

effort nor initiative for vigorous effort.

• Why adaptability? Adaptability implies variety and rapidity. Without variety and rapidity one can neither be 

unpredictable nor cope with changing and unforeseen circumstances.

• Why security? Without security one becomes predictable, hence one loses the benefits of the above.
222 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

Comment

With these thoughts in mind let’s take a look at some appropriate samples from the historical environment that 

will, as we shall see, prove useful before trying to evolve any operational philosophy or command and control 

concept.
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 223

SAMPLES FROM HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT

• Sun Tzu (around 400 BC)

 Probe enemy to unmask his strengths, weaknesses, patterns of movement and intentions. Shape enemy’s 

perception of world to manipulate/undermine his plans and actions. Employ Cheng/Ch’i maneuvers to 

quickly and unexpectedly hurl strength against weaknesses.

• Bourcet (1764–71)

 “A plan ought to have several branches. . . . One should . . . mislead the enemy and make him imagine 

that the main effort is coming at some other part. And . . . one must be ready to profit by a second or 

third branch of the plan without giving one’s enemy time to consider it.”

• Napoleon (early 1800s)

 “Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less chary of the latter than the former. Space 

we can recover, time never. . . . I may lose a battle, but I shall never lose a minute. The whole art of war 

consists in a well-reasoned and circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack.”

• Clausewitz (1832)

 Friction (which includes the interaction of many factors, such as uncertainty, psychological/moral forces 

and effects, etc.) impedes activity. “Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors 

that distinguish real war from war on paper.” In this sense, friction represents the climate or atmosphere 

of war.

• Jomini (1836)

 By free and rapid movements carry bulk of the forces (successively) against fractions of the enemy.
224 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

SAMPLES FROM HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT (continued)

• N. B. Forrest (1860s)

 “Git thar the fustest with the mostest.”

• Blumentritt (1947)

 “The entire operational and tactical leadership method hinged upon . . . rapid, concise assessment of 

situations . . . quick decisions and quick execution, on the principle: ‘each minute ahead of the enemy is 

an advantage.’ ”

• Balck (1980)

 Emphasis upon creation of implicit connections or bonds based upon trust, not mistrust, that permit 

wide freedom for subordinates to exercise imagination and initiative—yet, harmonize within intent of 

superior commanders. Benefit: internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability.

• Yours Truly

 Operate inside adversary’s observation, orientation, decision, action loops to enmesh adversary in a 

world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic chaos . . . and/or fold adversary 

back inside himself so that he cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold.
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 225

KEY POINTS

• The atmosphere of war is friction.

• Friction is generated and magnified by menace, ambiguity, deception, rapidity, uncertainty, mistrust, etc.

• Friction is diminished by implicit understanding, trust, cooperation, simplicity, focus, etc.

• In this sense, variety and rapidity tend to magnify friction, while harmony and initiative tend to diminish 

friction.
226 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

IN OTHER WORDS

• Variety/rapidity without harmony/initiative lead to confusion, disorder, and ultimately to chaos.

on the other hand

• Harmony/initiative without variety/rapidity lead to (rigid) uniformity, predictability, and ultimately to 

non-adaptability.

? — RAISES THE QUESTION — ?

• How do we generate harmony/initiative so that we can exploit variety/rapidity?

COMMENT

• We must uncover those interactions that foster harmony and initiative—yet do not destroy variety and rapidity.
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 227

INTERACTIONS

Positive

Activities Linkages

• Radio transmission/reception • Common frequencies

• Conversation/writing • Common language

• Operational Intelligence Center • Correlation among multiple sources

• Teamwork • Harmony of different efforts

• Tradeoffs • Inversely related characteristics

• Hans Rudel • Image of activities and changes thereto

Negative

• Compartmentation • Disconnected bits and pieces

• Noncooperative centers of gravity • Islands of disconnected effort

• Alienation • Disconnected from other humans

• Nonadaptation • Disconnected from environment

• Fixed recipe • Disconnected from environment, but connected 

to some formality
228 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

INSIGHT

 Interactions, as shown, represent a many-sided implicit cross-referencing process of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection. 
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 229

SUSPICION

Seems as though this insight is related in some way to orientation, hence it . . .

? — RAISES THE QUESTION— ?

What do we mean by orientation?
230 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

MESSAGE

 Orientation, seen as a result, represents images, views, or impressions of the world shaped by genetic heritage, 

cultural tradition, previous experiences, and unfolding circumstances.
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 231

? — RAISES ANOTHER QUESTION — ?

How are these images, views, or impressions created?
232 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

MESSAGE

 Referring back to our previous discussion, we can say: orientation is an interactive process of many-sided 

implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections that is shaped by and shapes the 

interplay of genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous experiences, and unfolding circumstances.
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 233

ILLUMINATION

• Orientation is the Schwerpunkt (or focal point). It shapes the way we interact with the environment—hence 

orientation shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act. In this sense

• Orientation shapes the character of present observation, orientation, decision, action loops—while these 

present loops shape the character of future orientation.

IMPLICATION

• We need to create mental images, views, or impressions, hence patterns that match with activity of world.

• We need to deny adversary the possibility of uncovering or discerning patterns that match our activity, or 

other aspects of reality in the world.
234 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

ESSENTIAL IDEA

 Patterns (hence, orientation), right or wrong or lack thereof, suggest ability or inability to conduct many-sided 

implicit cross-references.

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

 How do we set-up and take advantage of the many-sided implicit cross-referencing process of projection, 

empathy, and correlation, rejection that make appropriate orientation possible?
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 235

MESSAGE

 Expose individuals, with different skills and abilities, against a variety of situations—whereby each individual 

can observe and orient himself simultaneously to the others and to the variety of changing situations.

? — WHY — ?

 In such an environment, a harmony, or focus and direction, in operations is created by the bonds of implicit 

communications and trust that evolve as a consequence of the similar mental images or impressions each 

individual creates and commits to memory by repeatedly sharing the same variety of experiences in the same

ways.

BENEFICIAL PAYOFF

 A command and control system, whose secret lies in what’s unstated or not communicated to one another (in 

an explicit sense)—in order to exploit lower-level initiative yet realize higher-level intent, thereby diminish 

friction and compress time, hence gain both quickness and security.
236 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

 What happens if we cannot establish these implicit connections or bonds—via similar mental images or impressions—as basis to cope with a many-sided uncertain and ever-changing environment?
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 237

ILLUMINATION

• The previous discussion assumes interaction with both the external and internal environment. Now, let us 

assume, for whatever reason or combination of circumstances, that we design a command and control system 

that hinders interaction with external environment. This implies a focus inward, rather than outward.

• Picking up on this idea, we observe from Darwin that:

 — The environment selects.

 — Ability or inability to interact and adapt to exigencies of environment select one in or out.

• Furthermore, according to the Gödel Proof, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, and the Second Law of 

Thermodynamics:

 — One cannot determine the character or nature of a system within itself.

 — Moreover, attempts to do so lead to confusion and disorder. Why? Because in the “real world” the environment intrudes (my view).

• Now, by applying the ideas of Darwin, the Second Law, Heisenberg, and Gödel to Clausewitz one can see 

that:

 He who can generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity magnifies friction. Why? Many 

noncooperative centers of gravity within a system restrict interaction and adaptability of system 

with its surroundings, thereby leading to a focus inward (i.e., within itself), which in turn generates confusion and disorder, which impedes vigorous or directed activity, hence, by definition, 

magnifies friction or entropy.
238 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

POINT

• Any command and control system that forces adherents to look inward, leads to dissolution/disintegration 

(i.e., system comes unglued).

IN A MUCH LARGER SENSE

• Without the implicit bonds or connections, associated with similar images or impressions, there can be neither

harmony nor individual initiative within a collective entity, therefore, no way that such an organic whole can 

stay together and cope with a many-sided uncertain and ever-changing environment. Or equivalently,

• Without implicit bonds or connections, we magnify friction, produce paralysis, and get system collapse.
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 239

INSIGHT

 The key idea is to emphasize implicit over explicit in order to gain a favorable mismatch in friction and time

(i.e., ours lower than any adversary) for superiority in shaping and adapting to circumstances.

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

How do we do this?
240 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

MESSAGE

• Suppress tendency to build-up explicit internal arrangements that hinder interaction with external world.

Instead

• Arrange setting and circumstances so that leaders and subordinates alike are given opportunity to continuously 

interact with external world, and with each other, in order to more quickly make many-sided implicit 

cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections as well as create the similar images or 

impressions, hence a similar implicit orientation, needed to form an organic whole.

Why?

• A similar implicit orientation for commanders and subordinates alike will allow them to:

 — Diminish their friction and reduce time, thereby permit them to:

 — Exploit variety/rapidity while maintaining harmony/initiative, thereby permit them to:

 — Get inside adversary’s OODA loops, thereby:

 — Magnify adversary’s friction and stretch-out his time (for a favorable mismatch in friction and time), 

thereby:

 — Deny adversary the opportunity to cope with events/efforts as they unfold.
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 241

CIRCLING BACK TO THE BEGINNING

• We can see that implicit orientation shapes the character of:

 — Insight and vision

 — Focus and direction

 — Adaptability

 — Security

IMPLICATION

• Since a first rate command and control system should possess above qualities, any design or related

operational methods should play to and expand, not play down and diminish, implicit orientation.
242 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

COMMENT

 Up to this point we have shown orientation as being a critical element in command and control—implying 

that without orientation there is no command and control worthy of the name.

VERY NICE

 But, simply stated, what does this comment and everything else we’ve discussed so far tell us about command 

and control?
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 243

ILLUMINATION

• The process of observation, orientation, decision, action represents what takes place during the command 

and control (C&C) process—which means that the OODA loop can be thought of as being the C&C loop.

• The second O, orientation—as the repository of our genetic heritage, cultural tradition, and previous 

experiences—is the most important part of the OODA loop since it shapes the way we observe, the way we 

decide, the way we act.

IMPLICATION

• Operating inside adversary’s OODA loop means the same thing as operating inside adversary’s C&C loop.
244 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

WHICH

? — RAISES THE QUESTION — ?

How can we get effective command and control?
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 245

SOME HISTORICAL SNAPSHOTS

In responding to this question let us take a look at some evidence (provided by Martin van Creveld as well as 

myself) that may help in this regard: 

• Napoleon’s use of staff officers for personal reconnaissance

• Moltke’s message “directives” of few words

• British tight control at the Battle of the Somme in 1916

• British GHQ (general headquarters) “phantom” recce regiment in WW II

• Patton’s “household cavalry”

• My use of “legal eagle” and comptroller at NKP.✴

*

Nakohon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand
246 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

A RICHER VIEW

(á la Martin Creveld—“Command”—1982)

In the June 1967 War, “ . . . General Yeshayahu Gavish spent most of his time either ‘accompanying’ units down 

to brigade level—by which, according to his own definition, he meant staying at that unit’s command post and 

observing developments at first hand—or else helicoptering from one unit to another; again, in his own words, 

‘there is no alternative to looking into a subordinate’s eyes, listening to his tone of voice.’ Other sources of information at his disposal included the usual reporting system; a radio network linking him with three divisional 

commanders, which also served to link those commanders with each other; a signals staff whose task it was to 

listen in to the divisional communications networks, working around the clock and reporting to Gavish in writing; 

messages passed from the rear, i.e., from General Headquarters in Tel Aviv, linked to Gavish by ‘private’ radiotelephone circuit; and the results of air reconnaissance forwarded by the Air Force and processed by Rear Headquarters. 

Gavish did not depend on these sources exclusively, however; not only did he spend some time personally listening 

in to the radio networks of subordinate units (on one occasion, Gavish says, he was thereby able to correct an 

‘entirely false’ impression of the battle being formed at Brigadier Gonen’s headquarters) but he also had a ‘directed 

telescope’ in the form of elements of his staff, mounted on half tracks, following in the wake of the two northernmost divisions and constantly reporting on developments.”
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 247

POINT

 The previous discussion once again reveals our old friend—the many-sided implicit cross-referencing process 

of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection.

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

Where does this lead us? 
248 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

EPITOME OF “COMMAND AND CONTROL”

Nature

• Command and control must permit one to direct and shape what is to be done as well as permit one to modify 

that direction and shaping by assessing what is being done.

What does this mean?

• Command must give direction in terms of what is to be done in a clear unambiguous way. In this sense, 

command must interact with system to shape the character or nature of that system in order to realize what 

is to be done; whereas

• Control must provide assessment of what is being done also in a clear unambiguous way. In this sense, control 

must not interact nor interfere with system but must ascertain (not shape) the character/nature of what is 

being done.

Implication

• Direction and shaping, hence “command”, should be evident while assessment and ascertainment, hence 

“control”, should be invisible and should not interfere—otherwise “command and control” does not exist as 

an effective means to improve our fitness to shape and cope with unfolding circumstances.
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 249

ILLUMINATION

• Reflection upon the statements associated with the Epitome of “Command and Control” leave one unsettled 

as to the accuracy of these statements. Why? Command, by definition, means to direct, order, or compel 

while control means to regulate, restrain, or hold to a certain standard as well as to direct or command.

• Against these standards it seems that the command and control (C&C) we are speaking of is different than 

the kind that is being applied. In this sense, the C&C we are speaking of seems more closely aligned to leadership

(rather than command) and to some kind of monitoring ability (rather than control) that permits leadership 

to be effective.

• In other words, leadership with monitoring, rather than C&C, seems to be a better way to cope with the 

multi-faceted aspects of uncertainty, change, and stress. On the other hand, monitoring, per se, does not 

appear to be an adequate substitute for control. Instead, after some sorting and reflection, the idea of appreciation seems better. Why? First of all, appreciation includes the recognition of worth or value and the idea 

of clear perception as well as the ability to monitor. Moreover, next, it is difficult to believe that leadership can 

even exist without appreciation.

• Pulling these threads together suggests that appreciation and leadership offer a more appropriate and richer 

means than C&C for shaping and adapting to circumstances.
250 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

Where does this lead us?
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 251

APPRECIATION AND LEADERSHIP

Nature

• Appreciation and leadership permit one to discern, direct, and shape what is to be done as well as permit one 

to modify the direction and shaping by assessing what is being done or about to be done (by friendlies as well 

as adversaries).

What does this mean?

• Appreciation, as part of leadership, must provide assessment of what is being done in a clear unambiguous 

way. In this sense, appreciation must not interact nor interfere with system but must discern (not shape) the 

character/nature of what is being done or about to be done;

whereas

• Leadership must give direction in terms of what is to be done also in a clear unambiguous way. In this sense, 

leadership must interact with system to shape the character or nature of that system in order to realize what 

is to be done.

Implication

• Assessment and discernment should be invisible and should not interfere with operations while direction 

and shaping should be evident to system—otherwise appreciation and leadership do not exist as an effective 

means to improve our fitness to shape and cope with unfolding circumstances.
252 │ ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

SUSPICION

 The previous discussion suggests that the title “Organic Design for Command and Control” is not appropriate.

? — WHY — ?

 C&C represents a top-down mentality applied in a rigid or mechanical (or electrical) way that ignores as well 

as stifles the implicit nature of human beings to deal with uncertainty, change, and stress. (Examples: The 

Battle of the Somme, Evacuation of Saigon, Mayaguez Affair, Desert I, Nifty-Nugget, and Proud Spirit C&C 

exercises, etc.).

RESOLUTION

 With these thoughts in mind, I suggest that the following title more clearly reflects the spirit and content of 

this presentation.
ORGANIC DESIGN FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL │ 253

APPRECIATION AND LEADERSHIP

DEFINITIONS

• Understanding — means to comprehend or apprehend the import or meaning of 

something.

• Command — refers to the ability to direct, order, compel with or without authority 

or power.

• Control — means to have power or authority to regulate, restrain, verify, (usually 

against some standard) direct or command. Comes from medieval Latin 

contrarotulus, a “counter roll” or checklist (contra, against plus rotulus, list).

• Monitoring — refers to the process that permits one to oversee, listen, observe, or 

keep track of as well as to advise, warn, or admonish.

• Appreciation — refers to the recognition of worth or value, clear perception, understanding, comprehension, discernment, etc.

• Leadership — implies the art of inspiring people to cooperate and enthusiastically 

take action toward the achievement of uncommon goals.

THE STRATEGIC GAME

OF

? AND ?
256 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

What lies hidden under the question marks?

Put Simply

 That is what the aim or purpose of this presentation is all about—to find and make evident what lies hidden 

under the question marks!
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 257

FOR OPENERS

What is Strategy?
258 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

Outline

• What is strategy?

• What is the aim or purpose of strategy?

• What is the central theme and what are the key ideas that underlie strategy?

• How do we play to this theme and activate these ideas?
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 259

APPROACH

• Make a general survey • Condense to essential elements • Place in strategic perspective • Implementation
260 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

Why do we want to use this approach?
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 261

ILLUSTRATION

• Imagine that you are on a ski slope with other skiers—retain this image.

• Imagine that you are in Florida riding in an outboard motorboat—maybe even towing water-skiers—retain 

this image.

• Imagine that you are riding a bicycle on a nice spring day—retain this image.

• Imagine that you are a parent taking your son to a department store and that you notice he is fascinated by 

the tractors or tanks with rubber caterpillar treads—retain this image.
262 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

NOW IMAGINE THAT YOU:

• Pull skis off ski slope; discard and forget rest of image.

• Pull outboard motor out of motorboat; discard and forget rest of image.

• Pull handlebars off bicycle; discard and forget rest of image.

• Pull rubber treads off toy tractors or tanks; discard and forget rest of image.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 263

THIS LEAVES US WITH

Skis, outboard motor, handlebars, rubber treads

PULLING ALL THIS TOGETHER

What do we have?
264 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

SNOWMOBILE
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 265

? — WHAT DOES THIS EXAMPLE SUGGEST — ?

To discern what is going on we must interact in a variety of ways with our environment.

IN OTHER WORDS

 We must be able to examine the world from a number of perspectives so that we can generate mental images 

or impressions that correspond to that world.

MORE TO THE POINT

 We will use this scheme of pulling things apart (analysis) and putting them back together (synthesis) in new 

combinations to find how apparently unrelated ideas and actions can be related to one another.
266 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

GENERAL SURVEY
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 267

DISCIPLINES OR ACTIVITIES TO BE EXAMINED

 • Mathematical Logic

• Physics

• Thermodynamics

• Biology

• Psychology

• Anthropology

• Conflict
268 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

VERY NICE

BUT

? — WHERE DO WE BEGIN — ?
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 269

HUMAN NATURE

Goal

• Survive, survive on our own terms, or improve our capacity as independent action.

The competition for limited

resources to satisfy these

desires may force one to:

• Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action, deny him the opportunity to survive on his terms, or 

make it impossible for him to survive at all.
270 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

? — RAISES THE QUESTION — ?

In a most fundamental way how do we realize this goal or make it difficult for others to realize this goal?
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 271

SELECTIONS FROM NEWSPAPERS

The Washington Post

“Nerve Cells Redo Wiring . . . ,” by Boyce Rensberger

 Dale Purvis and Robert D. Hadley . . . have discovered that a neuron’s fibers can change significantly in a few 

days or weeks, presumably in response to changing demands on the nervous system. . . . Research has shown 

neurons continually rewire their own circuitry, sprouting new fibers that reach out to make contact with new 

groups of other neurons and withdrawing old fibers from previous contacts. . . . This rewiring process may 

account for how the brain improves one’s abilities such as becoming proficient in a sport or learning to play a 

musical instrument. Some scientists have suggested that the brain may use this method to store facts. . . . The 

research was on adult mice, but since all mammalian nervous systems appear to behave in similar ways, the 

researchers assume that the findings also apply to human beings.

The Washington Post Book World

“The Soul of the Machine,” by Richard M. Restak,

(Review of “Neuronal Man,” by Jean-Pierre Changeux)

 Changeux suggests that the complexity of the human brain is dependent upon the vast number of synapses 

(connections) between brain cells . . . these synaptic connections are established or fall by the wayside according 

to how frequent they’re used. Those synapses which are in frequent use tend to endure (‘are stabilized’) while 

others are eliminated. . . . In other words, . . . interactions with the environment . . . [exert] . . . tremendous 

influence on the way the human brain works and how it has evolved.
272 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

SELECTIONS FROM NEWSPAPER (continued)

The Washington Post

“Brain Cells Try To Battle Alzheimer’s . . .” by Jan Ziegler

 A post mortem study of brains of Alzheimer’s victims, (reported on by Dr. Carl Cotman and colleagues) 

showed that cells tried to repair connections destroyed by the disease by sprouting new branches. . . . A progressive, degenerative disease, it can cause memory loss, confusion, difficulty in speech and movement, inability to recognize even family members. . . . A characteristic of the disease is the death of neurons, or nerve 

cells, that connect to each other by long fibers, which forces the brain to live with fewer and fewer connections. Analyzing cells from the hippocampus of six deceased Alzheimer’s patients, Cotman and colleagues, 

found that axons—the output fibers of nerve cells, responsible for transmitting signals through the nervous 

system—start to sprout, reforming the connections between remaining cells. . . . Ultimately however, the 

sprouting process cannot keep up with destruction. Either, the sprouting stops, or too many nerve cells die.

Erie Daily Times

“Rats Lost Muscle, Bone Strength in Space Flight,” by Paul Recer

 Space rats that spent seven days in orbit suffered massive losses of muscle and bone strength, suggesting that 

astronauts on long voyages must be protected from debilitating effects of zero gravity. . . . The young space rats 

experienced a bone strength loss of up to 45 percent and a muscle tissue loss of up to 40 percent . . . older rats . . . 

suffered bone and muscle strength losses of about 15 percent. . . . Soviet space scientists reported a similar 

amount of muscle and bone loss in rats that were in space for more than 20 days.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 273

SELECTIONS FROM BOOKS

“Order Out of Chaos,” by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers

 “Equilibrium thermodynamics provides a satisfactory explanation for a vast number of physicochemical 

phenomena. Yet it may be asked whether the concept of equilibrium structures encompasses the different 

structures we encounter in nature. Obviously the answer is no.”

 “Equilibrium structures can be seen as the results of statistical compensation for the activity of microscopic 

elements (molecules, atoms). By definition they are inert at the global level. . . . Once they have been formed 

they may be isolated and maintained indefinitely without further interaction with their environment. When 

we examine a biological cell or a city, however, the situation is quite different: not only are these systems open, 

but also they exist only because they are open. They feed on the flux of matter and energy coming to them 

from the outside world. We can isolate a crystal, but cities and cells die when cut off from their environment. 

They form an integral part of the world from which they can draw sustenance, and they cannot be separated 

from the fluxes that they incessantly transform.”
274 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

SELECTIONS FROM BOOKS (continued)

“Looking Glass Universe, by Jon P. Briggs and F. David Peat”

 “Prigogine called far-from-equilibrium forms like the vortex, ‘dissipative structures.’ The name comes from 

the fact that to keep their shape these structures must constantly dissipate entropy so it won’t build up inside 

the entity and ‘kill’ it with equilibrium. . . . [These dissipative structures] can survive only by remaining open 

to a flowing matter and energy exchange with the environment. . . . The structure is stabilized by its flowing. 

It is stable but only relatively stable—relative to the constant energy flow required to maintain its shape. Its 

very stability is also paradoxically an instability because of its total dependence on its environment. The dissipative structure is autonomous (separate) but only relatively separate. It is a flow within a flow.”
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 275

SELECTIONS FROM BOOKS (continued)

“The War of the Flea,” by Robert Taber

 “Almost all modern governments are highly conscious of what journalism calls ‘world opinion.’ For sound 

reasons, mostly of an economic nature, they cannot afford to be condemned in the United Nations, they do 

not like to be visited by Human Rights Commissions or Freedom of the Press Committees; their need of foreign 

investment, foreign loans, foreign markets, satisfactory trade relationships, and so on, requires that they be 

members in more or less good standing of a larger community of interests. Often, too, they are members of 

military alliances. Consequently, they must maintain some appearance of stability, in order to assure the other 

members of the community or of the alliance that contracts will continue to be honored, that treaties will be 

upheld, that loans will be repaid with interest, that investments will continue to produce profits and be safe.”

 “Protracted internal war threatens all of this . . . no ally wishes to treat with a government that is on the point 

of eviction.”

“It follows, that it must be the business of the guerrilla, and of his clandestine political organization in the 

cities, to destroy the stable image of the government, and so to deny its credits, to dry up its source of revenue, 

and to create dissension within the frightened owning classes, within the government bureaucracy (whose 

payrolls will be pinched), and within the military itself.” 

 “Isolation, military and political, is the great enemy of guerrilla movements. It is the task of the urban organization to prevent this isolation, to provide diversions and provocations when needed, to maintain contact, 

to keep the world aware of a revolution in progress even when there is no progress to report.”
276 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

SELECTIONS FROM BOOKS (continued)

Social Order and the Theory of Strategy, by Alexander Atkinson

 “Moral fiber is “the great dam that denies the flood of social relations their natural route of decline towards 

violence and anarchy.”. . . In this sense, “moral order at the center of social life literally saves society from 

itself.” 

 “Strategists must grasp this fact that social order is, at once, a moral order. . . . If the moral order on which rests 

a fabric of social and power relation is compromised, then the fabric (of social order) it upholds goes with it.”

 “In other words, “the one great hurdle in the strategic combination (moral and social order) is the moral order. 

If this remains untouched the formation of new social relations and social ranking in status and power either 

never gets off the ground or faces the perennial specter of backsliding towards the moral attraction of established social and power relations.”

 “The strategic imperative, then, becomes one of trying “to achieve relative security of social resources by subverting and reweaving those of the opponent into the fabric of one’s own social order.”
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 277

SELECTIONS FROM BOOKS (continued)

Beyond Culture, by Edward T. Hall

 “Everything man is and does is modified by learning and is therefore malleable. But once learned, these behavior 

patterns, these habitual responses, these ways of interacting gradually sink below the surface of the mind and, 

like the admiral of a submerged submarine fleet, control from the depths. The hidden controls are usually 

experienced as though they were innate simply because they are not only ubiquitous but habitual as well.”

“. . . the only time one is aware of the control system is when things don’t follow the hidden program. This is 

most frequent in intercultural encounters. Therefore, the great gift that the members of the human race have 

for each other is not exotic experiences but an opportunity to achieve awareness of the structure of their own 

system, which can be accomplished only by interacting with others who do not share that system.”
278 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

SELECTIONS FROM AN UNPUBLISHED ESSAY

“Destruction and Creation,” by Yours Truly

 According to Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, and the Second Law of 

Thermodynamics one cannot determine the character or nature of a system within itself. Moreover, attempts 

to do so lead to confusion and disorder.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 279

SELECTION FROM A SPEECH

“A Model of Soviet Mentality,” by Dmitry Mikheyev

 “Interaction between the individual and his environment starts with his perception of himself as a separate 

entity and the environment as everything outside of self. He learns his physical limits and desires, and how to 

fulfill them through interaction with the physical and social environment. . . . I maintain that the way the individual perceives the environment is crucial for his orientation and interaction with it.”

 “Man’s orientation will involve perceptions of self as both a physical and a psychological entity, as well as an 

understanding of the environment and of the possibilities for achieving his goals (FROMM, 1947). Society, 

meanwhile, has goals of its own—preservation of its physical integrity and spiritual identity. Pursuing these 

goals involves mobilizing and organizing its inner resources and interaction with the outside environment of 

other societies and nations. . . . An individual becomes a member of the society when he learns to act within 

its limits in a way that is beneficial to it.”
280 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

SOME FAVORITE SELECTIONS

Old Fable

• “But sir, the emperor is naked, he has no clothes.”

Sun Tzu

• “Know your enemy and know yourself; in one hundred battles you will never be in peril.”

• “Seize that which your adversary holds dear or values most highly; then he will conform to your desires.”

Jomini

• “The great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to establish them in reference to the 

bases and to the marches of the army as to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling 

one’s own, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy.”

Leadership

• The art of inspiring people to cooperate and enthusiastically take action toward the achievement of 

uncommon goals.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 281

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

Remembering that we are trying to see how the preceding selections are related to one another, where do

we go next?
282 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

CONDENSATION

TO

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 283

COMPRESSION

• Physical as well as electrical and chemical connections in the brain are shaped by interacting with the environment. Point: Without these interactions we do not have the mental wherewithal to deal or cope with that 

environment.

• Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, all taken together, show that we cannot determine the character or nature of a system within itself. 

Moreover, attempts to do so lead to confusion and disorder—mental as well as physical. Point: We need an 

external environment, or outside world, to define ourselves and maintain organic integrity, otherwise we 

experience dissolution/disintegration—i.e., we come unglued.

• Moral fiber or moral order is the glue that holds society together and makes social direction and interaction 

possible. Point: Without this glue social order pulls apart towards anarchy and chaos leaving no possibility 

for social direction and interaction.

• Living systems are open systems; closed systems are non-living systems. Point: If we don’t communicate with 

outside world—to gain information for knowledge and understanding as well as matter and energy for 

sustenance—we die out to become a non-discerning and uninteresting part of that world.
284 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

! — SIMPLY STATED — !

 As human beings, we cannot exist without an external or surrounding environment from which we can draw 

sustenance, nourishment, or support.

IN OTHER WORDS

 Interaction permits vitality and growth while isolation leads to decay and disintegration.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 285

SUCH A SIMPLE STATEMENT REVEALS THAT:

The theme associated

with

D & C, P O C, C & C

is one of

Interaction and Isolation

• “Organic Design for Command and Control” (C&C) emphasizes interaction.

• “Patterns of Conflict” (POC) emphasize isolation.

• “Destruction and Creation” (D&C) is balanced between interaction and isolation.
286 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

NOW WE CAN SEE BY

GOING BACK TO THE BEGINNING

The Strategic Game

is one of

Interaction and Isolation

 A game in which we must be able to diminish adversary’s ability to communicate or interact with his environment while sustaining or improving ours.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 287

KEEPING TRACK OF ALL THESE IDEAS

Let’s move on and place them in a—
288 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 289

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

How do we do this?

THREE WAYS COME TO MIND

 • Moral

• Mental

• Physical
290 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

? — WHY SHOULD WE USE THESE — ?

• Physical represents the world of matter-energy-information all of us are a part of, live in, and feed upon.

• Mental represents the emotional/intellectual activity we generate to adjust to, or cope with, that physical 

world.

• Moral represents the cultural codes of conduct or standards of behavior that constrain, as well as sustain and focus, our emotional/intellectual responses.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 291

UPON FOLDING THESE IDEAS INTO OUR

INTERACTIONS/ISOLATION THEME WE CAN SAY:

• Physical Isolation occurs when we fail to discern, perceive, or make sense out of what’s going on around 

ourselves.

• Mental Isolation occurs when we fail to gain support in the form of matter-energy-information from 

others outside ourselves.

• Moral Isolation occurs when we fail to abide by codes of conduct or standards of behavior in a manner 

deemed acceptable or essential by others outside ourselves.
292 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

WHILE IN OPPOSITE FASHION WE CAN SAY:

• Physical Interaction occurs when we freely exchange matter-energy-information with others outside ourselves. 

• Mental Interaction occurs when we generate images or impressions that match-up with the events 

or happenings that unfold around ourselves.

• Moral Interaction occurs when we live by the codes of conduct or standards of behavior that we 

profess, and others expect us, to uphold.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 293

! — FINE — !

But how do we play to this theme and exploit these ideas?

HINTS

• Recall how we mentally constructed a snowmobile.

• Remember how we looked at ideas in mathematical logic, physics, thermodynamics, biology, psychology, 

anthropology, and conflict to surface a central theme.

• Remember our whole approach has been one of pulling things apart and putting them back together until 

something new and different is created.
294 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

ILLUMINATING EXAMPLE

? — What does the Second Law of Thermodynamics say — ?

All natural processes generate entropy.

? — What did Heisenberg say — ?

One cannot simultaneously fix or determine precisely the momentum and position of a particle.

? — What did Gödel say — ?

One cannot determine the consistency of a system within itself.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 295

ILLUMINATING EXAMPLE (Continued)

Point

As they appear, these statements and the ideas they embody seem unrelated to one another.

? — Raises Question — ?

Can these statements be related to one another; and, if so, how?

in other words

Taken together, what do Gödel, Heisenberg, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics say?
296 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

ILLUMINATING EXAMPLE (Continued)

Message

One cannot determine the character or nature of a system within itself.

Moreover, attempts to do so lead to confusion and disorder.

Keeping this statement in mind,

? — Let’s ask another question — ?

What do the tests of the YF-16 and YF-17 say?
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 297

ILLUMINATING EXAMPLE (continued)

Message

The ability to shift or transition from one maneuver to another more rapidly than an adversary enables one to 

win in air-to-air combat.

Now

? — What do we have — ?

A statement drawn from the ideas of Gödel, Heisenberg, and the

Second Law of Thermodynamics (First Message).

as well as

A statement drawn from the tests of YF-16 and YF-17 (Second Message).
298 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

ILLUMINATING EXAMPLE (Continued)

Point

Once again, it appears that these two messages seem unrelated to one another.

? — Raises Question — ?

Can these statements be related to one another; and, if so, how?

in other words

Taken altogether, what do Gödel, Heisenberg, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and the tests of the 

YF-16/YF-17 say?
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 299

ILLUMINATING EXAMPLE (Continued)

Overall Message

• The ability to operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than an adversary enables one to fold adversary back inside 

himself so that he can neither appreciate nor keep-up with what’s going on. He will become disoriented or 

confused;

which suggests that

• Unless such menacing pressure is relieved, adversary will experience various combinations of uncertainty, 

doubt, confusion, self-deception, indecision, fear, panic, discouragement, despair, etc., which will further:

Disorient or twist his mental images/impressions of what’s happening;

thereby

Disrupt his mental/physical maneuvers for dealing with such a menace;

thereby

Overload his mental/physical capacity to adapt or endure;

thereby

Collapse his ability to carry on.
300 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

? — WHAT’S THE POINT OF ALL THIS — ?

• We can’t just look at our own personal experiences or use the same mental recipes over and over again; we’ve 

got to look at other disciplines and activities and relate or connect them to what we know from our experiences 

and the strategic world we live in.

if we can do this

• We will be able to surface new repertoires and (hopefully) develop a Fingerspitzengefühl for folding our adversaries back inside themselves, morally-mentally-physically—so that they can neither appreciate nor cope 

with what’s happening—without suffering the same fate ourselves.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 301

WHICH CARRIES US TO THE

? — QUESTION — ?

• How do we fold adversaries back inside themselves, morally-mentally-physically . . . without suffering the 

same fate ourselves?

or put another way

• How do we physically isolate our adversaries yet interact with others outside ourselves?

• How do we mentally isolate our adversaries yet keep in touch hence interact, with unfolding events?

• How do we morally isolate our adversaries yet maintain the trust/confidence of others and thereby interact

with them?
302 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

ILLUMINATION

• Physically we can isolate adversaries by severing their communications with outside world as well as by 

severing their internal communications to one another. We can accomplish this by cutting them off from 

their allies and the uncommitted via diplomatic, psychological, and other efforts. To cut them off from one 

another we should penetrate their system by being unpredictable, otherwise they can counter our efforts.

• Mentally we can isolate our adversaries by presenting them with ambiguous, deceptive, or novel situations, 

as well as by operating at a tempo or rhythm they can neither make out nor keep up with. Operating inside 

their OODA loops will accomplish just this by disorienting or twisting their mental images so that they can 

neither appreciate nor cope with what’s really going on.

• Morally adversaries isolate themselves when they visibly improve their well-being to the detriment of others 

(i.e. their allies, the uncommitted, etc.) by violating codes of conduct or behavior patterns that they profess 

to uphold or others expect them to uphold.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 303

EXPECTED PAYOFF

 Disintegration and collapse, unless adversaries change their behavior patterns to conform to what is deemed 

acceptable by others outside themselves.
304 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

ILLUMINATION (continued)

• Physically we interact by opening-up and maintaining many channels of communication with the outside 

world, hence with others out there, that we depend upon for sustenance, nourishment, or support.

• Mentally we interact by selecting information from a variety of sources or channels in order to generate 

mental images or impressions that match-up with the world of events or happenings that we are trying to 

understand and cope with.

• Morally we interact with others by avoiding mismatches between what we say we are, what we are, and the 

world we have to deal with, as well as by abiding by those other cultural codes or standards that we are expected to uphold.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 305

EXPECTED PAYOFF

 Vitality and growth, with the opportunity to shape and adapt to unfolding events thereby influence the ideas 

and actions of others.
306 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

PULLING ALL THIS TOGETHER

WE HAVE IN A NUTSHELL

The Art of Success

• Shape or influence the moral-mental-physical atmosphere that we are a part of, live in, and feed upon so that 

we not only magnify our inner spirit and strength, but also influence potential adversaries and current adversaries as well as the uncommitted so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic 

toward our success; yet be able to.

• Morally-mentally-physically isolate our adversaries from their allies and outside support as well as isolate 

them from one another, in order to: magnify their internal friction, produce paralysis, bring about their collapse; and/or bring about a change in their political/economic/social philosophy so that they can no longer 

inhibit our vitality and growth.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 307

IMPLEMENTATION

an

example
308 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

A

MORAL DESIGN

FOR

GRAND STRATEGY
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 309

NAME-OF-THE-GAME

• Use moral leverage to amplify our spirit and strength as well as expose the flaws of competing or adversary 

systems, all the while influencing the uncommitted, potential adversaries and current adversaries so that 

they are drawn toward our philosophy and empathetic toward our success;

or put another way

• Preserve or build-up our moral authority while compromising that of our adversaries’ in order to pump up 

our resolve, drain away adversaries’ resolve, and attract them as well as others to our cause and way of life.

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

• How do we evolve this moral leverage to realize the benefits cited above?
310 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

MORAL LEVERAGE

With respect to ourselves we must:

• Surface as well as find ways to overcome or eliminate those blemishes, flaws, or contradictions that generate 

mistrust and discord so that these negative qualities neither alienate us from one another nor set us against 

one another, thereby destroy our internal harmony, paralyze us, and make it difficult to cope with an uncertain, ever-changing world at large.

In opposite fashion we must:

• Emphasize those cultural traditions, previous experiences, and unfolding events that build-up harmony and 

trust, thereby create those implicit bonds that permit us as individuals and as a society, or as an organic 

whole, to shape as well as adapt to the course of events in the world.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 311

MORAL LEVERAGE (Continued)

With respect to our adversaries we should:

• Reveal those harsh statements that adversaries make about us—particularly those that denigrate our culture, 

our achievements, our fitness to exist, etc.—as basis to show that our survival and place in the scheme of 

things is not necessarily a birthright, but is always at risk.

Likewise, we should:

• Reveal those mismatches in terms of what adversaries profess to be, what they are, and the world they have 

to deal with in order to surface to the world, to their citizens, and to ourselves the ineptness and corruption 

as well as the sub-rosa designs that they have upon their citizens, ourselves, and the world at large.

Moreover, we should:

• Acquaint adversaries with our philosophy and way of life to show them that such destructive behavior works 

against, and is not in accord with, our (or any) social values based upon the dignity and needs of the individual 

as well as the security and well-being of society as a whole.
312 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

MORAL LEVERAGE (Continued)

With respect to others (i.e., the uncommitted or potential adversaries) we should:

• Respect their culture and achievements, show them we bear them no harm and help them adjust to an unfolding world, as well as provide additional benefits and more favorable treatment for those who support our 

philosophy and way of doing things;

yet

• Demonstrate that we neither tolerate nor support those ideas and interactions that undermine or work 

against our culture and our philosophy hence our interests and fitness to cope with a changing world.
THE STRATEGIC GAME │ 313

NOW

GOING BACK TO THE BEGINNING

? — What is Strategy — ?

 A mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonizing and focusing our efforts as a basis for realizing 

some aim or purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events and many contending interests.

? — What is the Aim or Purpose of Strategy — ?

 To improve our ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances, so that we (as individuals or as groups 

or as a culture or as a nation-state) can survive on our own terms.

? — What is the Central Theme and What Are the Key Ideas that Underlie Strategy — ?

 The central theme is one of interaction/isolation while the key ideas are the moral-mental-physical means 

toward realizing this interaction/isolation.

? — How Do We Play to this Theme and Activate these Ideas — ?

 By an instinctive see-saw of analysis and synthesis across a variety of domains, or across competing/independent 

channels of information, in order to spontaneously generate new mental images or impressions that match-up 

with an unfolding world of uncertainty and change.
314 │ THE STRATEGIC GAME

DEFINITIONS

• Evil Occurs when individuals or groups embrace codes of conduct or standards of behavior 

for their own personal well-being and social approval, yet violate those very same codes 

or standards to undermine the personal well-being and social approval of others.

• Corruption Occurs when individuals or groups, for their own benefit, violate codes of conduct or 

standards of behavior that they profess or are expected to uphold.
DESTRUCTION AND

 CREATION

by

John R. Boyd

3 September 1976
316 │ DESTRUCTION AND CREATION

DESTRUCTION AND CREATION

ABSTRACT

To comprehend and cope with our environment, we 

develop mental patterns or concepts of meaning. The 

purpose of this paper is to sketch out how we destroy 

and create these patterns to permit us to both shape 

and be shaped by a changing environment. In this 

sense, the discussion also literally shows why we cannot 

avoid this kind of activity if we intend to survive on our 

own terms.

The activity is dialectic in nature generating both 

disorder and order that emerges as a changing and expanding universe of mental concepts matched to a 

changing and expanding universe of observed reality.

GOAL

Studies of human behavior reveal that the actions we 

undertake as individuals are closely related to survival, 

more importantly, survival on our own terms. Naturally, such a notion implies that we should be able to act 

relatively free or independent of any debilitating external influences—otherwise that very survival might be 

in jeopardy. In viewing the instinct for survival in this 

manner we imply that a basic aim or goal, as individuals, 

is to improve our capacity for independent action. The 

degree to which we cooperate, or compete, with others 

is driven by the need to satisfy this basic goal. If we believe that it is not possible to satisfy it alone, without 

help from others, history shows us that we will agree to 

constraints upon our independent action—in order to 

collectively pool skills and talents in the form of nations, 

corporations, labor unions, mafias, etc.—so that obstacles standing in the way of the basic goal can either be 

removed or overcome. On the other hand, if the group 

cannot or does not attempt to overcome obstacles 

deemed important to many (or possibly any) of its individual members, the group must risk losing these 

alienated members. Under these circumstances, the 

alienated members may dissolve their relationship and 

remain independent, form a group of their own, or join 

another collective body in order to improve their capacity 

for independent action.

ENVIRONMENT

In a real world of limited resources and skills, individuals and groups form, dissolve and reform their 

cooperative or competitive postures in a continuous 

struggle to remove or overcome physical and social environmental obstacles.11/13 In a cooperative sense, where 

skills and talents are pooled, the removal or overcoming 

of obstacles represents an improved capacity for independent action for all concerned. In a competitive 

sense, where individuals and groups compete for scarce 

resources and skills, an improved capacity for independent 
DESTRUCTION AND CREATION │ 317

general-to-specific or from the specific-to-general. A 

little reflection here reveals that deduction is related to 

proceeding from the general-to-specific while induction 

is related to proceeding from the specific-to-general. In 

following this line of thought can we think of other activities that are related to these two opposing ideas? 

Is not analysis related to proceeding from the general-to-specific? Is not synthesis, the opposite of analysis 

related to proceeding from the specific-to-general? Putting 

all this together: Can we not say that general-tospecific is related to both deduction and analysis, while 

specific-to-general is related to induction and synthesis? 

Now, can we think of some examples to fit with these 

two opposing ideas? We need not look far. The differential calculus proceeds from the general-to-specific—

from a function to its derivative. Hence is not the use or 

application of the differential Calculus related to deduction and analysis? The integral calculus, on the 

other hand, proceeds in the opposite direction—from a 

derivative to a general function. Hence, is not the use or 

application of the integral calculus related to induction 

and synthesis? Summing up, we can see that: generalto-specific is related to deduction, analysis, and differentiation, while, specific-to-general is related to induction, 

synthesis, and integration.

Now keeping these two opposing idea chains in 

mind let us move on a somewhat different tack. Imagine, 

if you will, a domain (a comprehensive whole) and its 

constituent elements or parts. Now, imagine another 

domain and its constituent parts. Once again, imagine 

even another domain and its constituent parts. Repeataction achieved by some individuals or groups constrains that capacity for other individuals or groups. 

Naturally, such a combination of real world scarcity 

and goal striving to overcome this scarcity intensifies 

the struggle of individuals and groups to cope with 

both their physical and social environments.

NEED FOR DECISIONS

Against such a background, actions and decisions become critically important. Actions must be taken over 

and over again and in many different ways. Decisions 

must be rendered to monitor and determine the precise 

nature of the actions needed that will be compatible with 

the goal. To make these timely decisions implies that we 

must be able to form mental concepts of observed reality, 

as we perceive it, and be able to change these concepts as 

reality itself appears to change. The concepts can then be 

used as decision-models for improving our capacity for 

independent action. Such a demand for decisions that 

literally impact our survival causes one to wonder: How 

do we generate or create the mental concepts to support 

this decision-making activity?

CREATING CONCEPTS

There are two ways in which we can develop and manipulate mental concepts to represent observed reality: 

We can start from a comprehensive whole and break it 

down to its particulars or we can start with the particulars 

and build towards a comprehensive whole.29/25 Saying it 

another way, but in a related sense, we can go from the 
318 │ DESTRUCTION AND CREATION

ing this idea over and over again we can imagine any 

number of domains and the parts corresponding to 

each. Naturally, as we go through life we develop concepts of meaning (with included constituents) to represent observed reality. Can we not liken these concepts 

and their related constituents to the domains and constituents that we have formed in our imagination? Naturally, 

we can. Keeping this relationship in mind, suppose we 

shatter the correspondence of each domain or concept 

with its constituent elements. In other words, we 

imagine the existence of the parts but pretend that the 

domains or concepts they were previously associated 

with do not exist. Result: We have many constituents, 

or particulars, swimming around in a sea of anarchy. 

We have uncertainty and disorder in place of meaning 

and order. Further, we can see that such an unstructuring

or destruction of many domains—to break the correspondence of each with its respective constituents—is 

related to deduction, analysis, and differentiation. We 

call this kind of unstructuring a destructive deduction.

Faced with such disorder or chaos, how can we reconstruct order and meaning? Going back to the idea 

chain of specific-to-general, induction, synthesis, and 

integration the thought occurs that a new domain or 

concept can be formed if we can find some common 

qualities, attributes, or operations among some or 

many of these constituents swimming in this sea of anarchy. Through such connecting threads (that produce 

meaning) we synthesize constituents from, hence 

across, the domains we have just shattered.25 Linking 

particulars together in this manner we can form a new 

domain or concept—providing, of course, we do not 

inadvertently use only those “bits and pieces” in the 

same arrangement that we associated with one of the 

domains purged from our imagination. Clearly, such a 

synthesis would indicate we have generated something 

new and different from what previously existed. Going 

back to our idea chain, it follows that creativity is related to induction, synthesis, and integration since we 

proceeded from unstructured bits and pieces to a new 

general pattern or concept. We call such action a creative

or constructive induction. It is important to note that 

the crucial or key step that permits this creative induction 

is the separation of the particulars from their previous 

domains by the destructive deduction. Without this 

unstructuring the creation of a new structure cannot 

proceed—since the bits and pieces are still tied together 

as meaning within unchallenged domains or concepts.

Recalling that we use concepts or mental patterns to 

represent reality, it follows that the unstructuring and 

restructuring just shown reveals a way of changing our 

perception of reality.29 Naturally, such a notion implies 

that the emerging pattern of ideas and interactions 

must be internally consistent and match-up with reality.14/26

To check or verify internal consistency we try to see if 

we can trace our way back to the original constituents 

that were used in the creative or constructive induction. 

If we cannot reverse directions, the ideas and interactions do not go together in this way without contradiction. Hence, they are not internally consistent. 

However, this does not necessarily mean we reject and 

throw away the entire structure. Instead, we should 
DESTRUCTION AND CREATION │ 319

attempt to identify those ideas (particulars) and interactions that seem to hold together in a coherent pattern 

of activity as distinguished from those ideas that do not 

seem to fit in. In performing this task we check for reversibility as well as check to see which ideas and interactions match-up with our observations of reality.28/14/15

Using those ideas and interactions that pass this test 

together with any new ideas (from new destructive deductions) or other promising ideas that popped out of 

the original destructive deduction we again attempt to 

find some common qualities, attributes or operations 

to recreate the concept—or create a new concept. Also, 

once again, we perform the check for reversibility and 

match-up with reality. Over and over again this cycle of 

Destruction and Creation is repeated until we demonstrate internal consistency and match-up with reality.19/14/15

SUSPICION

When this orderly (and pleasant) state is reached the 

concept becomes a coherent pattern of ideas and interactions that can be used to describe some aspect of observed reality. As a consequence, there is little, or no, 

further appeal to alternative ideas and interactions in 

an effort to either expand, complete, or modify the concept.19 Instead, the effort is turned inward towards fine 

tuning the ideas and interactions in order to improve 

generality and produce a more precise match of the 

conceptual pattern with reality.19 Toward this end, the 

concept—and its internal workings—is tested and 

compared against observed phenomena over and over 

again in many different and subtle ways.19 Such a repeated 

and inward-oriented effort to explain increasingly more 

subtle aspects of reality suggests the disturbing idea that 

perhaps, at some point, ambiguities, uncertainties, 

anomalies, or apparent inconsistencies may emerge to 

stifle a more general and precise match-up of concept 

with observed reality.19 Why do we suspect this?

On one hand, we realize that facts, perceptions, 

ideas, impressions, interactions, etc. separated from 

previous observations and thought patterns have been 

linked together to create a new conceptual pattern. On 

the other hand, we suspect that refined observations 

now underway will eventually exhibit either more or a 

different kind of precision and subtlety than the 

previous observations and thought patterns. Clearly, 

any anticipated difference or differences, suggests we 

should expect a mismatch between the new observations and the anticipated concept description of these 

observations. To assume otherwise would be tantamount to admitting that previous constituents and interactions would produce the same synthesis as any newer 

constituents and interactions that exhibit either more 

or a different kind of precision and subtlety. This would 

be like admitting one equals two. To avoid such a discomforting position implies that we should anticipate a 

mismatch between phenomena observation and concept description of that observation. Such a notion is 

not new and is indicated by the discoveries of Kurt 

Gödel and Werner Heisenberg.
320 │ DESTRUCTION AND CREATION

INCOMPLETENESS AND CONSISTENCY 

In 1931 Kurt Gödel created a stir in the world of 

mathematics and logic when he revealed that it was 

impossible to embrace mathematics within a single 

system of logic.12/24 He accomplished this by proving, 

first, that any consistent system—that includes the 

arithmetic of whole numbers—is incomplete. In other 

words, there are true statements or concepts within 

the system that cannot be deduced from the postulates that make up the system. Next, he proved even 

though such a system is consistent, its consistency 

cannot be demonstrated within the system.

Such a result does not imply that it is impossible to 

prove the consistency of a system. It only means that 

such a proof cannot be accomplished inside the system. 

As a matter of fact, since Gödel, Gerhard Gentzen and 

others have shown that a consistency proof of arithmetic can be found by appealing to systems outside 

that arithmetic. Thus, Gödel’s Proof indirectly shows 

that in order to determine the consistency of any new 

system we must construct or uncover another system 

beyond it.30/28 Over and over this cycle must be repeated to determine the consistency of more and 

more elaborate systems.30/28

Keeping this process in mind, let us see how Gödel’s 

results impact the effort to improve the match-up of 

concept with observed reality. To do this we will consider two kinds of consistency: The consistency of the 

concept and the consistency of the match-up between 

observed reality and concept description of reality. In 

this sense, if we assume—as a result of previous destructive deduction and creative induction efforts—

that we have a consistent concept and consistent 

match-up, we should see no differences between observation and concept description. Yet, as we have seen, on 

one hand, we use observations to shape or formulate a 

concept; while on the other hand, we use a concept to 

shape the nature of future inquiries or observations of 

reality. Back and forth, over and over again, we use observations to sharpen a concept and a concept to 

sharpen observations. Under these circumstances, a 

concept must be incomplete since we depend upon an 

ever-changing array of observations to shape or formulate it. Likewise, our observations of reality must be incomplete since we depend upon a changing concept to 

shape or formulate the nature of new inquiries and observations. Therefore, when we probe back and forth 

with more precision and subtlety, we must admit that 

we can have differences between observation and concept description; hence, we cannot determine the consistency of the system—in terms of its concept, and 

match-up with observed reality—within itself.

Furthermore, the consistency cannot be determined 

even when the precision and subtlety of observed phenomena approaches the precision and subtlety of the 

observer—who is employing the ideas and interactions 

that play together in the conceptual pattern. This aspect 

of consistency is accounted for not only by Gödel’s 

Proof but also by the Heisenberg Uncertainty or Indeterminacy Principle.
DESTRUCTION AND CREATION │ 321

INDETERMINACY AND UNCERTAINTY

The Indeterminacy Principle uncovered by Werner 

Heisenberg in 1927 showed that one could not simultaneously fix or determine precisely the velocity and position of a particle or body.14/9 Specifically he showed, 

due to the presence and influence of an observer, that 

the product of the velocity and position uncertainties is 

equal to or greater than a small number (Planck’s Constant) divided by the mass of the particle or body being 

investigated. In other words,

ΔV*ΔQ ≥ h/m

where ΔV is velocity uncertainty, ΔQ is position 

uncertainty, and h/m is Planck’s constant (h) divided by 

observed mass (m).

Examination of Heisenberg’s Principle reveals that 

as mass becomes exceedingly small the uncertainty or 

indeterminacy, becomes exceedingly large. Now—in 

accordance with this relation—when the precision or 

mass of phenomena being observed is little, or no different than the precision or mass of the observing phenomena, the uncertainty values become as large as, or 

larger than, the velocity and size frame-of-reference 

associated with the bodies being observed.9

 In other 

words, when the intended distinction between observer 

and observed begins to disappear,3

 the uncertainty values hide or mask phenomena behavior; or put another 

way, the observer perceives uncertain or erratic behavior 

that bounces all over in accordance with the indeterminacy 

relation. Under these circumstances, the uncertainty 

values represent the inability to determine the character or nature (consistency) of a system within itself. On 

the other hand, if the precision and subtlety of the observed phenomena is much less than the precision and 

subtlety of the observing phenomena, the uncertainty 

values become much smaller than the velocity and size 

values of the bodies being observed.9

 Under these circumstances, the character or nature of a system can be 

determined—although not exactly—since the uncertainty values do not hide or mask observed phenomena 

behavior nor indicate significant erratic behavior.

Keeping in mind that the Heisenberg Principle implicitly depends upon the indeterminate presence and 

influence of an observer,14 we can now see—as revealed 

by the two examples just cited—that the magnitude of 

the uncertainty values represent the degree of intrusion 

by the observer upon the observed. When intrusion is 

total (that is, when the intended distinction between 

observer and observed essentially disappears3

) the uncertainty values indicate erratic behavior. When intrusion is low, the uncertainty values do not hide or mask 

observed phenomena behavior, nor indicate significant 

erratic behavior. In other words, the uncertainty values 

not only represent the degree of intrusion by the observer upon the observed but also the degree of confusion and disorder perceived by that observer.

ENTROPY AND THE SECOND LAW OF THERMODYNAMICS

Confusion and disorder are also related to the notion 

of entropy and the Second Law of Thermodynamics.11/20
322 │ DESTRUCTION AND CREATION

Entropy is a concept that represents the potential for 

doing work, the capacity for taking action, or the 

degree of confusion and disorder associated with any 

physical or information activity. High entropy implies a 

low potential for doing work, a low capacity for taking 

action or a high degree of confusion and disorder. Low 

entropy implies just the opposite. Viewed in this context, the Second Law of Thermodynamics states that all 

observed natural processes generate entropy.20 From 

this law it follows that entropy must increase in any 

closed system—or, for that matter, in any system that 

cannot communicate in an ordered fashion with other 

systems or environments external to itself.20 Accordingly, whenever we attempt to do work or take action 

inside such a system—a concept and its match-up with 

reality—we should anticipate an increase in entropy 

hence an increase in confusion and disorder. Naturally, 

this means we cannot determine the character or nature

(consistency) of such a system within itself, since the 

system is moving irreversibly toward a higher, yet unknown, state of confusion and disorder.

DESTRUCTION AND CREATION

What an interesting outcome! According to Gödel 

we cannot—in general—determine the consistency, 

hence the character or nature, of an abstract system 

within itself. According to Heisenberg and the Second 

Law of Thermodynamics any attempt to do so in the 

real world will expose uncertainty and generate disorder. Taken together, these three notions support the 

idea that any inward-oriented and continued effort to 

improve the match-up of concept with observed reality 

will only increase the degree of mismatch. Naturally, in 

this environment, uncertainty and disorder will increase as previously indicated by the Heisenberg Indeterminacy Principle and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, respectively. Put another way, we can expect 

unexplained and disturbing ambiguities, uncertainties, 

anomalies, or apparent inconsistencies to emerge more 

and more often. Furthermore, unless some kind of relief is available, we can expect confusion to increase 

until disorder approaches chaos—death.

Fortunately, there is a way out. Remember, as previously shown, we can forge a new concept by applying 

the destructive deduction and creative induction mental 

operations. Also, remember, in order to perform these 

dialectic mental operations we must first shatter the 

rigid conceptual pattern, or patterns, firmly established 

in our mind. (This should not be too difficult since the 

rising confusion and disorder is already helping us to 

undermine any patterns). Next, we must find some 

common qualities, attributes, or operations to link isolated facts, perceptions, ideas, impressions, interactions, observations, etc. together as possible concepts 

to represent the real world. Finally, we must repeat this 

unstructuring and restructuring until we develop a 

concept that begins to match reality. By doing this—in 

accordance with Gödel, Heisenberg and the Second 

Law of Thermodynamics—we find that the uncertainty 

and disorder generated by an inward-oriented system 

talking to itself can be offset by going outside and creating 
DESTRUCTION AND CREATION │ 323

a new system. Simply stated, uncertainty and related 

disorder can be diminished by the direct artifice of creating a higher and broader more general concept to 

represent reality.

However, once again, when we begin to turn inward 

and use the new concept—within its own pattern of 

ideas and interactions—to produce a finer grain match 

with observed reality we note that the new concept and 

its match-up with observed reality begins to self-destruct 

just as before. Accordingly, the dialectic cycle of destruction and creation begins to repeat itself once again. 

In other words, as suggested by Gödel’s Proof of Incompleteness, we imply that the process of Structure, Unstructure, Restructure, Unstructure, Restructure is 

repeated endlessly in moving to higher and broader 

levels of elaboration. In this unfolding drama, the alternating cycle of entropy increase toward more and more 

disorder and the entropy decrease toward more and 

more order appears to be one part of a control mechanism that literally seems to drive and regulate this alternating cycle of destruction and creation toward higher 

and broader levels of elaboration.

Now, in relating this deductive/inductive activity to 

the basic goal discussed in the beginning, I believe we 

have uncovered a Dialectic Engine that permits the 

construction of decision models needed by individuals 

and societies for determining and monitoring actions 

in an effort to improve their capacity for independent 

action. Furthermore, since this engine is directed toward satisfying this basic aim or goal, it follows that the 

goal seeking effort itself appears to be the other side of 

a control mechanism that seems also to drive and regulate the alternating cycle of destruction and creation 

toward higher and broader levels of elaboration. In this 

context, when acting within a rigid or essentially a 

closed system, the goal seeking effort of individuals and 

societies to improve their capacity for independent action 

tends to produce disorder towards randomness and 

death. On the other hand, as already shown, the increasing disorder generated by the increasing mismatch 

of the system concept with observed reality opens or 

unstructures the system. As the unstructuring or, as we 

call it, the destructive deduction unfolds it shifts toward a creative induction to stop the trend toward 

disorder and chaos to satisfy a goal-oriented need for 

increased order. Paradoxically, then, an entropy increase permits both the destruction or unstructuring of 

a closed system and the creation of a new system to 

nullify the march toward randomness and death.

Taken together, the entropy notion associated with 

the second law of thermodynamics and the basic goal 

of individuals and societies seem to work in dialectic 

harmony driving and regulating the destructive/creative 

or deductive/inductive action—that we have described 

herein as a dialectic engine. The result is a changing 

and expanding universe of mental concepts matched to 

a changing and expanding universe of observed reality.29/28

As indicated earlier, these mental concepts are employed 

as decision models by individuals and societies for 

determining and monitoring actions needed to cope 

with their environment—or to improve their capacity 

for independent action.
324 │ DESTRUCTION AND CREATION

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3rd ed. NY: Vintage Books, 1957.

2. Boyd, John R. “Destruction and Creation.” 23 March 

1976.

3. Brown, G. Spencer. Laws of Form. Julian Press, 1972.

4. Conant, James Bryant. Two Modes of Thought. Credo 

Perspectives, Simon and Schuster, 1970.

5. DeBono, Edward. New Think. Avon Books, 1971.

6. — . “Lateral Thinking: Creativity Step by Step. Harper 

Colophon Books, 1973.

7. Foster, David. The Intelligent Universe. Putnam, 

1975.

8. Fromm, Erich. The Crisis of Psychoanalysis. Fawcett 

Premier Books, 1971.

9. Gamow, George. Thirty Years That Shook Physics. 

Anchor Books, 1966.

10. Gardner, Howard. The Quest for Mind. Vintage 

Books, 1974.

11. Georgescu–Roegen, Nicholas. The Entropy Law 

and the Economic Process. Harvard U. Press, 1971.

12. Gödel, Kurt. “On Formally Undecidable Propositions 

of the Principia Mathematica and Related Systems.” 

pages 3–38, The Undecidable. Raven Press, 1965.

13. Heilbroner, Robert L. An Inquiry into the Human 

Prospect. Norton and Co., 1974.

14. Heisenberg, Werner. Physics and Philosophy. 

Harper Torchbooks, 1962.

15. — . “Across the the Frontiers. World Perspectives, 

Harper and Row, 1974.

16. Hoyle, Fred. Encounter with the Future. Credo Perspectives, Simon and Schuster, 1968.

17. — . The New Face of Science. Perspectives in Humanism, World Publishing Co., 1971.

18. Kramer, Edna E. The Nature and Growth of Modern 

Mathematics. Fawcett Permier Books, 1974.

19. Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, 1970.

20. Layzer, David. “The Arrow of Time.” Scientific 

American 233, no. 6 (December 1975): 56–69.

21. Levinson, Harry. The Exceptional Executive. Mentor 

Books, 1971.

22. Maltz, Maxwell. Psycho–Cybernetics. Wilshire 

Book Co., 1971.

23. Nagel, Ernest and Newman, James R. Gödel’s Proof. 

New York University Press, 1958.

24. Osborne, Alex F. Applied Imagination. Scribners 

and Sons, 1963.

25. Pearce, Joseph Chilton. The Crack in the Cosmic 

Egg. Pocket Book, 1975.

26. Pearce, Joseph Chilton. Exploring the Crack in the 

Cosmic Egg. Pocket Book, 1975.

27. Piaget, Jean. Structuralism. Harper Torchbooks, 

1971.

28. Polanyi, Michael. Knowing and Being. University of 

Chicago Press, 1969.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
DESTRUCTION AND CREATION │ 325

29. Singh, Jagjit. Great Ideas of Modern Mathematics: 

Their Nature and Use. Dover, 1959.

30. Skinner, B.F. Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Bantom/

Vintage Books, 1972.

31. Thompson, William Irwin. At the Edge of History. 

Harper Colophon Books, 1972.

32. — . “Evil and World Order. World Perspective, 

Harper and Row, 1976.

33. Tse–Tung, Mao, Four Essays on China and World 

Communism, Lancer Books, 1972.

34. Waismann, Friedrich. Introduction to Mathematical 

Thinking. Harper Torchbooks, 1959.

35. Watts, Alan. The Book. Vintage Books, 1972.

36. Yukawa, Hideki. Creativity and Intuition. Kodansha 

International Ltd., 1973.

CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

 Conceptual Spiral A

 Conceptual Spiral B
328 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

FOCUS

To make evident how science, engineering, and technology influence our ability to interact and cope with an unfolding reality that we are a part of, live in, and feed upon.
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 329

FOR OPENERS

Let’s reexamine our abstract

 

 ? — ? ? — ?

 

What do we find?
330 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

KEY PASSAGE

. . . the theme that weaves its way through this “Discourse on Winning and Losing” is not so much contained 

within each of the seven sections, per se, that make up the “Discourse”; rather, it is the kind of thinking that both 

lies behind and makes up its very essence. For the interested, a careful examination will reveal that the increasingly 

abstract discussion surfaces a process of reaching across many perspectives, pulling each and every one apart 

(analyses), all the while intuitively looking for those parts of the disassembled perspectives which naturally interconnect with one another to form a higher order, more general elaboration (synthesis) of what is taking place. As 

a result, the process not only creates the “Discourse” but it also represents the key to evolve the tactics, strategies, 

goals, unifying themes, etc., that permit us to actively shape and adapt to the unfolding world we are a part of, live 

in, and feed upon.
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 331

? — WHY IS THIS PASSAGE KEY — ?

• Because it suggests a general way by which we can deal with the world around us.

More specifically, we

shall show that:

• By exploiting the theme contained within this passage and by examining the practice of science/engineering 

and the pursuit of technology, we can evolve a conceptual spiral for comprehending, shaping, and adapting 

to that world.

Why is This Passage Key
332 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

NOW

If the practice of science/engineering and the pursuit of technology are going to be a key for unveiling this

 “conceptual spiral,”

we should ask ourselves:

In speaking of science, engineering, and technology,

what do we mean?
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 333

SIMPLE-MINDED MESSAGE

• Science can be viewed as a self-correcting process of observation, hypothesis, and test.

whereas

• Engineering can be viewed as a self-correcting process of observation, design and test.

while

• Technology can be viewed as the wherewithal or state of the art produced by the practice of science and

engineering.
334 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

What has the practice of science, engineering and the pursuit of technology given us or done for us?
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 335

EXAMPLES FROM SCIENCE

Some Outstanding Contributors

• Isaac Newton (1687)

• Adam Smith (1776)

• A.M. Ampere/C.P. Gauss (1820’s/1830’s)

• Carnot/Kelvin/Clausius/Boltzman

 (1824/1852/1865/1870s)

• Faraday/Maxwell/Hertz (1831/1865/1888)

• Darwin & Wallace (1838/1858)

• Marx & Engels (1848–1895)

• Gregory Mendel (1866)

• Henri Poincare (1890s)

Contributions

• “Exactness”/predictability via laws of motion/

gravitation

• Foundation for modern capitalism

• Exactness/predictability via electric/magnetic laws 

• Decay/disintegration via second law of thermodynamics

• Union of electricity & magnetism via field theory

• Evolution via theory of natural selection

• Basis for modern “scientific socialism”

• Inherited traits via his laws of genetics

• Inexactness/unpredictability via gravitational influence of three bodies
336 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

 Examples from Science Some Outstanding Contributors

• Max Planck (1900)

• Albert Einstein (1905/1915)

• Bohr/de Broglie/Heisenberg/Schrodiger/

 Dirac/et al (1913/1920’s . . .)

• L. Lowenheim & T. Skolem (1915–1933)

• Godel/Tarski/Church/Turing/et al (1930’s . . .)

• Claude Shannon (1948)

• Crick & Wilson (1953)

• Lorenz/Prigogine/Mandelbrot/

Feigenbaum/et al (1963/1970’s . . .)

• G. Chaitin/C. Bennet (1960/1985)

Contributions

• Discreteness/discontinuity via his quantum 

theory

• Exactness/predictability via his special and 

general relativity theories

• Uncertainty/indeterminism in quantum 

physics

• Unconfinement (non-categoricalness) in 

mathematics & logic

• Incompleteness/undecidability in mathematics & logic

• Information theory as basis for communication

• DNA spiral helix as genetically coded information for life

• Irregularity/unpredictability in nonlinear dynamics

• Incompleteness/incomprehensibility in information theory
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 337

EXAMPLES FROM ENGINEERING

Some Outstanding Contributors Contributions

• Savery/Newcomen/Watt (1698/1705/1769) • Steam engine

• George Stevenson (1825) • Steam railway

• H. Pixii/M. H. von Jacobi (1832/1838) • AC generator/AC motor

• Samuel Morse • Telegraph

• J. N. Nieqce/J. M. Daguerre/Fox Talbot (1839) • Photography

• Gaston Plante (1859) • Rechargeable battery

• Z. Gramme/H. Fontaine (1869/1873) • DC generato/DC motor

• Nicholas Otto (1876) • Four-cycle gasoline engine

• Alexander G. Bell (1876) • Telephone

• Thomas A. Edison (1877) • Phonograph

• Thomas A. Edison (1879) • Electric light bulb

• Werner von Siemens (1879 • Electric locomotive

• Germany (1881) • Electric metropolitan railway

• Charles Parsons (1884) • Steam turbine

• Benz/Daimler (1885/1886) • Gasoline automobile

• T.A. Edison/J. LeRoy/T. Armat/et al (1890-1896) • Motion picture camera/projector

• N. Tesla/G. Marconi (1893/1895) • Wireless telegraph

• Rudolf Diesel (1897) • Diesel locomotive

• Italy (1902) • Electric railway
338 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

EXAMPLES FROM ENGINEERING

Some Outstanding Contributors Contributions

• Wright Brothers (1903) • Gasoline powered airplane

• Christian Hulmeyer (1904) • Radar

• V. Paulsen/R.A. Fessenden (1904/1906) • Wireless telephone

• John A. Fleming/Lee De Forest (1904/1907) • Vacuum tube

• Tri Ergon/Lee De Forest (1919/1923) • Sound motion picture

• USA―Pittsburgh (1920) • Public radio broadcasting

• American Car Locomotive (1925) • Diesel-electric locomotive

• J.L. Baird (1926) • Television

• Warner Brothers (1927) • Sound motion picture, “The Jazz Singer”

• Germany/USA (1932/1934) • Diesel-electric railway

• Britain/USA/Germany (1935/1936/1939) • Operational radar

• Germany/Britain/USA (1935/1936/1939) • Television broadcasting

• Hans von Ohain/Germany (1939/1939) • Jet engine/jet airplane

• Eckert & Mauchly (1946) • Electronic computer

• Bardcen & Brattain & Shockley (1947) • Transistor

• Ampex (1955) • Video recorder

• J. Kilby/R. Noyce (1958/1959) • Integrated electronic circuit

• T.H. Maiman (1960) • Laser

• Philips (1970) • Video cassette recorder

• Sony (1980) • Video camcorder
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 339

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

Looking at the past via the contributions these people have provided the world:

What can we say about our efforts for now and for the future?

Raises Question
340 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

GRAND MESSAGE

In a mathematical/logical sense we can say:

• Taken together, the theorems associated with Godel, Lowenheim & Skolem, Tarski, Church, Turing, Chaitin, 

and others reveal that: NOT only do the statements representing a theoretical system for explaining some 

aspect of reality explain that reality inadequately or incompletely but, like it or not, these statements spill 

out beyond any one system and do so in unpredictable ways;

or conversely,

• These theorems reveal that: WE can neither predict the future migration and evolution of these statements 

nor just confine them to any one system nor suggest that they fully embrace any such system.

Now if we extend these ideas and build upon them in a scientific/engineering sense, we can say:

• Any coherent intellectual or physical systems we evolve to represent or deal with large portions of reality 

will at best represent or deal with that reality incompletely or imperfectly.

• Moreover, we neither have nor can we create beforehand a supersystem that can forecast or predict the kind of 

systems we will evolve in the future to represent or deal with that reality more completely or more perfectly.

• Furthermore, such a supersystem can neither forecast nor predict the consequences that flow from those 

systems that we create later on.

• Going even further, we cannot determine or discern the character or nature of such systems (super or 

otherwise) within themselves.

Which altogether imply that:

• People using theories or systems evolved from a variety of information will find it increasingly difficult 

and ultimately impossible to interact with and comprehend phenomena or systems that move increasingly 

beyond and away from that variety—that is, they will become more and more isolated from that which 

they are trying to observe or deal with, unless they exploit the new variety to modify their theories/

systems or create new theories/systems.
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 341

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

Taken together, what do the many contributions and Grand Message suggest?
342 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

IMPRESSION

 While we can comprehend and predict some portions of the everchanging world that unfolds before us, other 

portions seem forever indistinct and unpredictable.
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 343

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

Very nice, but what does all this have to do with our ability to thrive and grow in such a world that is seemingly

orderly and predictable yet disorderly and unpredictable?
344 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

COMMENT

• To get at this question let’s take a closer and more general look at what science, engineering, and the pursuit 

of technology produce and how this is accomplished.

• Furthermore, suspecting that these practices and pursuit are not wholly accidental nor obvious and that they 

seem to change us in some ways, let’s also examine what keeps the whole enterprise going and how this 

enterprise affects us personally.
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 345

• What do science, engineering and technology produce?

• How is this accomplished?

• What is the driving mechanism that keeps the process alive and ongoing; or put another way, what phenomena sustain or nourish the whole enterprise?

• Finally, how does this enterprise of science, engineering, and technology affect us personally as individuals, 

as groups, or as societies?

In other words, In order to gain a richer image of

science, engineering, and technology we will

address the following questions:
346 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

FIRST OF ALL

 ? — ? ? — ?

 If we examine the contributions from the practice of science and engineering and generalize from these individual 

contributions, what do we see? We see new ideas, new systems, new processes, new materials, new etc.

In other words,

Science, engineering, and technology produce change via novelty.

What do science, engineering, and technology produce?
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 347

 ? — — ?

• To examine novelty, we speak of it in terms of those features that seem to be part of that novelty. In other 

words, we reduce a novel pattern down to some features that make up that pattern. Different people in examining 

such a pattern may see differing features that make it up. In other words, there are different ways by which a 

pattern can be reduced hence the possibility for differing features or parts. Regardless of how it comes out, 

we call this process of reduction, analysis.

• Pushing this process even further, we can reduce many different patterns (analyses) to parts that make up 

each pattern and use these parts, or variations thereof, to make a new pattern. This is done by finding some 

common features that interconnect some or many of these parts so that a new pattern—whether it be a new 

concept, new system, new process, new etc.—can be created. We call this process of connection, synthesis.

• Now if we test the results of this process with the world we’re dealing with, we have an analytical/synthetic 

feedback loop for comprehending, shaping, and adapting to that world.

How is This Novelty Produced? 
348 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

 

 Novelty is produced by a mental/physical feedback process of analyses and synthesis that permits us to interact 

with the world so that we can comprehend, cope with, and shape that world as well as be shaped by it.

which carries us to the question

Pulling all this together, we can say that:
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 349

? — — ?

• One thing is clear: If our ideas and thoughts matched perfectly with what goes on in the world; and if the 

systems or processes we designed performed perfectly and matched with whatever we wanted them to do, 

what would be the basis for evolving or creating new ideas, new systems, new processes, new etc.? The answer: 

There wouldn’t be any!

In other words,

• The presence and production of mismatches are what sustain and nourish the enterprise of science, engineering, and technology, hence keep it alive and ongoing—otherwise there would be no basis for it to continue.

What is the driving mechanism that keeps the process alive 

and ongoing; or put another way, what phenomena sustain or 

nourish the whole enterprise.
350 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

VERY NICE,

BUT

 ? — — ?

• As already shown, the practice of science/engineering and the pursuit of technology not only change the 

physical world we interact with—via new systems, new processes, new etc.—but they also change the mental/ 

physical ways by which we think about and act upon that world.

In this sense

• The practice of science/engineering and the pursuit of technology permit us to continually rematch our mental/

physical orientation with that changing world so that we can continue to thrive and grow in it.

Put simply

• The enterprise of science, engineering, and technology affects us personally as individuals, as groups, or as 

societies by changing our orientations to match with a changing world that we, in fact, help change.

How does this enterpriseof science, engineering, and technology affect 

us personally as individuals, as groups, or as societies?
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 351

NOW

• If we reverse direction and reexamine where we have been, we can see that without the intuitive interplay of 

analyses and synthesis, we have no basic process for generating novelty, no basic process for addressing mismatches between our mental images/impressions and the reality it is supposed to represent; and no basic 

process for reshaping our orientation toward that reality as it undergoes change.

Put simply

• Without the interplay of analyses and synthesis, we have no basis for the practice of science/engineering and 

the pursuit of technology—because novelty, mismatches, and reorientation as the life blood ingredients that 

naturally arise out of such practice and pursuit can no longer do so.

NOW
352 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT

 The preceding statements seem to suggest that the “Simple-Minded Message” presented near the beginning 

whereby:

Science can be viewed as a self-correcting process of observation, hypothesis, and test

whereas

Engineering can be viewed as a self-correcting process of observation, design, and test

 should be modified as follows:

Science can be viewed as a self-correcting process of observations, analyses/synthesis, hypothesis, 

and test

whereas

Engineering can be viewed as a self-correcting process of observations, analyses/synthesis, design, and 

test.

? — Why — ?

 Without the interplay of analyses and synthesis, one can evolve neither the hypothesis or design and follow-on test, nor the original “Simple-Minded Message,” nor this presentation itself.
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 353

? — RAISES QUESTION — ?

What bearing does all this have

on

Winning and Losing?
354 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

ILLUMINATION

Novelty is not only produced by the practice of science/engineering and the pursuit of technology, it is also produced by the forces of nature, by our own thinking and doing as well as by others. Furthermore, novelty is produced continuously, if somewhat erratically or haphazardly. Now, in order to thrive and grow in such a world, we 

must match our thinking and doing, hence our orientation, with that emerging novelty. Yet, any orientation constrained by experiences before that novelty emerges (as well as by the Grand Message discussed earlier) introduces 

mismatches that confuse or disorient us. However, the analytical/synthetic process, previously described, permits 

us to address these mismatches so that we can rematch thereby reorient our thinking and action with that novelty. 

Over and over, this continuing whirl of reorientation, mismatches, analyses/synthesis enables us to comprehend, 

cope with, and shape as well as be shaped by the novelty that literally flows around and over us.

Illumination
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 355

MAYBE SO

Yet, upon reflection, we still have a puzzle: Why does our world continue to unfold in an irregular, disorderly, 

unpredictable manner even though some of our best minds try to represent it as being more regular, orderly, and 

predictable?
356 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

MORE POINTEDLY

With so much effort over such a long period by so many people to comprehend, shape, and adapt to a world that 

we depend upon for vitality and growth, why does such a world, although richer and more robust, continue to 

remain uncertain, everchanging, and unpredictable?
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 357

RESPONSE

Very simply, review of “Destruction and Creation,” this presentation, and our own experiences reveal that the 

various theories, systems, processes, etc. that we employ to make sense of that world contain features that generate 

mismatches that, in turn, keep such a world uncertain, everchanging, and unpredictable.
358 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

THESE FEATURES INCLUDE

• Uncertainty associated with the unconfinement, undecidability, and incompleteness theorems of mathematics and logic.

• Numerical imprecision associated with using the rational and irrational numbers in the calculation and 

measurement processes.

• Quantum uncertainty associated with Planck’s Constant and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle.

• Entropy increase associated with the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

• Irregular or erratic behavior associated with far-from-equilibrium, open, nonlinear processes or systems 

with feedback.

• Incomprehensibility associated with the inability to completely screen, filter, or otherwise consider spaghettilike influences from a plethora of everchanging, erratic, or unknown outside events.

• Mutations associated with environmental pressure, replication errors, or unknown influences in molecular 

and evolutionary biology.

• Ambiguity associated with natural languages as they are used and interact with one another.

• Novelty generated by the thinking and actions of unique individuals and their many-sided interactions with 

each other.
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 359

UNDERLYING MESSAGE

There is no way out, unless we can eliminate the features just cited. Since we don’t know how to do this: we 

must continue the whirl of reorientation, mismatches, analyses/synthesis over and over again ad infinitum

as a basis to comprehend, shape, and adapt to an unfolding, evolving reality that remains uncertain, everchanging, unpredictable.

Underlying Message

posttext1

posttext2

posttext3

posttext4
360 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

NOW

If we connect this continuing whirl of reorientation, mismatches, analyses/synthesis and the novelty that arises 

out of it with the previous discussion we can see that we have:

A

Conceptual Spiral

for

• Exploration - Discovery - Innovation

• Thinking - Doing - Achieving

• Learning - Unlearning - Relearning

• Comprehending - Shaping - Adapting

hence a

Conceptual Spiral

for generating

• Insight - Imagination - Initiative
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 361

WHICH

? — RAISES THE QUESTION — ?

Can we survive and grow without these abilities?
362 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL

! NO !
CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL │ 363

Which Suggests

The conceptual spiral also represents:

A

Paradigm

for

Survival and Growth
POINT

Since survival and growth are directly connected with the uncertain, everchanging, unpredictable world of winning and losing, we will exploit this whirling (conceptual) spiral of orientation, mismatches, analyses/synthesis,

reorientation, mismatches, analyses/synthesis ... so that we can comprehend, cope with, and shape, as well as be 

shaped by that world and the novelty that arises out or it.

364 │ CONCEPTUAL SPIRAL
REVELATION
366 │ REVELATION

METAPHORICAL MESSAGE

• A loser is someone is someone (individual or group) who cannot build snowmobiles when facing uncertainty and unpredictable change;

whereas,

• A winner is someone (individual or group) who can build snowmobiles, and employ them in an appropriate fashion, when facing uncertainty and unpredictable change.
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Wilson, G. I. “Maneuver/Fluid Warfare: A Review of 

the Concepts,” Marine Corps Gazette 66, no. 1 (January 

1982): 54–61.

———. “The Gulf War, Maneuver Warfare, and Operational Art.” Marine Corps Gazette 75, no. 6 (June 

1991): 23–34.

Willbanks, Maj James H., USA. “AirLand Battle Tactical 

Command and Control: Reducing the Need to 

Communicate Electronically in the Command and 

Control of Combat at the Tactical Level.” Thesis no. 

84-3482, US Army Command and General Staff 

College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 1984.

Wilson, George C. This War Really Matters: Inside the 

Fight for Defense Dollars. Washington, DC: CQ 

Press, 2000.

Wilson, G. I. “The Gulf War, Maneuver Warfare, and 

the Operational Art.” Marine Corps Gazette. 75, no. 

6 (June 1991): 23–4.

Wirls, Daniel. Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan 

Era. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.

Woolsey, R. James. “Billions for Defense: A New Kind 

of Reformer.” The Washington Post, 13 March 1981.

Wilcox et al.

When John Boyd died in March of 1997, he wondered if he had made any real difference. He worked 

on the designs of the A-10, F-15, and F-16 in his last 

years on active duty and which reinvented tactical air 

power—TACAIR—for the US Air Force. Then there 

were the large numbers of foreign military sales of both 

the Fighting Falcon and the Eagle in their various configurations. His work on energy-maneuverability theory 

changed the way in which military aircraft were designed 

and built. However, Boyd had a different standard. He 

wanted to know that his ideas about warfighting, 

strategy, deception and how to defeat guerilla warfare, 

had made a difference in how people thought about 

and prepared for war. He labored 22 years on “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” briefed it nearly fifteen 

hundred times across the country and in the Department of Defense (DOD). His ideas about maneuver 

warfare were adopted by the US Marine Corps and subsequently by the DOD in general. His work behind the 

scenes in the Military Reform Movement should also 

have been the source of some sense of accomplishment 

in contributing to the defense intellectual debates on 

the future of US security. However, it was not. 

He felt he was an outcast, a would-be prophet without honor, largely shunned by his service, and neither 

he nor his ideas not very well known at home or abroad. 

All that changed over the next decade. Colin Gray bestowed an accolade in his Modern Strategy that Boyd 

“well merits the honourable mention as an outstanding 

general theorist of strategy.” My first book on John—The 

Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security—was 

printed in 2001 and reprinted in 2004 and 2007. Robert 

Coram’s book BOYD: The Fighter Pilot Changed the Art 

of War followed in 2002 to great acclaim and large sales, 

and Frans Osinga’s more intellectually oriented Science 

Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd was 

published in 2007. It took fifteen years for the US Air 

Force to accept Boyd. This acceptance was not actualized 

until I was invited to give annual the Harmon Memorial 

Lecture at the US Air Force Academy in January 2012 

entitled “On the Making of History: John Boyd and 

American National Security.”

However, the real and lasting impact of John Boyd 

and his thought on the USAF and the US defense establishment is the broad acceptance and understanding of 

his ideas and their institutionalization in the Professional Military Education (PME) of the USAF. Boyd is 

taught and discussed in multiple schools and centers at 

Air University at Maxwell AFB, the home of Air Force 

PME. Not only that, but he and his ideas are well known 

in far corners of the globe, from Singapore to Romania, 

Denmark to the UAE. The influence is particularly profound at the Center for Strategy and Technology 

(CSAT), the home of the Air Force’s Blue Horizons 

Program. A group majors and lieutenant colonels take 

a year-long study of strategy and technology culminating in a specialized degree in Airpower Strategy and 

Technology Integration. These officers conduct careful 

Afterword
382 │ AFTERWORD

research to produce prototypes—of strategies, concepts 

of operations or CONOPS, changes in organizational 

structures, or new technologies—for the USAF to test 

and implement to prepare for the future. Blue Horizons 

maintains an iconic lithograph of one very bad-ass 

looking black snowmobile, tail number BH 001, emblazoned “Col John R. Boyd” to honor of Boyd’s encouragement of synthetic thinking of the kind that could 

take disparate things and create a snowmobile. Boyd’s 

ideas—the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) Loop, 

his emphases on time and timing, the strategy of isolation and interaction, on information, maneuver, deception, and so on, are all the key components of the 

course of study in Blue Horizons. 

But, it is more than the ideas, the master’s theses, and 

the prototypes that emerge from individual Blue Horizons fellows’ research that matter. Rather it is the habit 

of mind and pattern of thought that owes so much to 

John Boyd and how he thought that makes the graduates of the program special. Each year some 16–17 

majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels pass through 

the only mixed-rank Intermediate Developmental Education and Senior Developmental Education courses in 

the DOD. These officers have been thoroughly schooled 

and have become individually adept at the practices of 

the habits of mind, patterns of thought, and the necessity 

of asking the right questions following the patterns set by 

John Boyd. 

Loyal heretics all, they go forth and infect those with 

whom they work and lead over the rest of their careers 

with, at least some of, the insight, spirit, analytical, and 

synthetic capabilities of John Boyd.

That spirit of inquiry is a gift that keeps on giving, 

and one in which Boyd would be justly proud. The 

“Discourse on Winning and Losing” continues, and 

this volume published by Air University Press ensures 

that this is so. It makes his work available in multiple 

dimensions to a much larger audience. We owe Dr. Ernest 

Rockwell, director of the Air University Press, Mr. James 

Howard, the indefatigable creator of this work replete 

with QR code access to videos, and so much more, and 

the staff who assisted in bringing this volume to fruition, a debt of gratitude for their role in ensuring that 

the “Discourse” continues with easy access and low cost 

and as a volume unto itself. That the US Air Force helps 

spread his ideas and discusses them, adopts some of his 

insights in policy and tactics, and shares his ideas with 

new generations of Air Force officers routinely would 

please Boyd greatly. Fear not, John. The “Discourse on 

Winning and Losing” continues—and will for a long 

time to come.

 Grant T. Hammond

 Air University

 Maxwell AFB, AL

 August 2017

382 │ 
Probably the most readily associated term with John 

Boyd is the concept of the OODA Loop (observation, 

orientation, decision, act), which does not appear in the 

“Discourse on Winning and Losing” in the August 1987 

version that was so widely distributed. Instead, it was a 

part of the last update that John Boyd made to the Discourse on 28 June 1995 in a boiled down version of 

things entitled “The Essence of Winning and Losing.” 

Boyd referred to this as “the big squeeze,” the ultimate 

compression of his ideas. It is a synthesis of all that 

Boyd had learned from his early “Aerial Attack Study” 

to his later interests in coevolution, sociobiology, genetic 

engineering, chaos, and complexity. For Boyd, OODA 

Loops are a composite of how we think and learn, the 

source of who we are, and the potential we possess. It is 

a profoundly simple explanation of the nearly infinite 

variety that is possible. It is a shorthand for life itself, a 

model for how we think, and the means by which we 

both compete and collaborate.

In a portion of the “Essence of Winning and Losing,” 

Boyd describes the centrality of the OODA Loop as follows:

Without our genetic heritage, cultural traditions, and 

previous experiences, we do not possess an implicit 

repertoire of psycho-physical skills shaped by environments and changes that we have previously experienced.

Appendix

The OODA Loop

Without analysis and synthesis across a variety of domains or across a variety of competing independent 

channels of information, we cannot evolve a new repertoire 

to deal with unfamiliar phenomena or unforeseen change.

Without a many-sided implicit cross referencing process of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection 

(across many different domains or channels of information), we cannot even do analysis and synthesis.

Without OODA Loops, we can neither sense, hence 

observe, thereby collect a variety of information for the 

above process, nor decide as well as implement actions 

in accord with these processes.

Or, put another way, without OODA Loops embracing 

all the above and without the Ability to get inside other 

OODA Loops (or other environments), we will find it 

impossible to comprehend, shape, adapt to, and in turn 

be shaped by an unfolding, evolving reality that is uncertain, ever changing, and unpredictable.

The OODA Loop was originally known as the “Boyd 

cycle.” OODA loops are descriptions of tactical air-toair engagement, means of adjusting strategies in constant coevolution with one’s strategic environment, and 

metaphors for life itself. The concept of an OODA loop 

is an extended biological metaphor of stimulus and response, but an organic model, not a mechanistic one. It 
384 │ APPENDIX

is an integration of Boyd’s “mind/time/space” and a key 

to successful adaptation.

When Boyd first developed the idea, “sensing” was 

used instead of “observation.” But “SODA Loops” didn’t 

pass the giggle test, as Boyd said. It all begins with 

Observation—assessing the environment, one’s place 

in it, and the interaction of the two. It is scanning for 

threats and opportunities and provides a base from 

which to proceed feeding forward into Orientation. 

What Boyd called “the big ‘O’.” It is the amalgamation of 

genetic heritage, cultural traditions, previous experience, 

education, and new information and the analysis and 

384 │ 

Observations Decision

(Hypothesis)

Action

(Test)

Genetic

Heritage

New

Information

Previous

Experiences

Analyses/

Synthesis Feed

Forward

Feed

Forward

Feed

Forward

Implicit

Guidance

and Control

Implicit

Guidance

and Control

Unfolding

Environmental

Interaction

Unfolding

Interaction with

Environmental

Feedback

Feedback

Outside

Information

Unfolding

Circumstances

Observation Orientation Decision Action

Culture

Traditions

Boyd’s OODA Loop

The OODA Loop. Boyd’s final sketch of the OODA Loop, as presented in his summation of “A Discourse on Winning 

and Losing,” which he referred to as “the big squeeze,” 28 June 1995. Adapted from Hammond, Mind of War, 190.
APPENDIX │ 385

synthesis that follows. These are a complex set of filters 

that condition action and reaction to various stimuli. In 

processing all this information a menu of responses is 

developed.

These responses are then sorted, analyzed, and 

synthesized for a Decision on a preferred procedure—

least harmful, quickest, most consequential, and so on. 

As Boyd described it: “A many sided implicit cross 

referencing process of projection, empathy, correlation, 

and selection.” Decision is a choice of a course of 

action, a trade-off in a wider trade space about some 

future state of affairs and their consequences. It becomes 

a hypothesis to be tested by the Action that implements 

the made decision—a testing of our hypothesis about 

how best to shape and to be shaped by the environment.

The OODA Loop process was a nonlinear process 

with constant feedback and feed-forward channels of 

implicit guidance and control. For Boyd, it was “an 

evolving, open-ended, far from equilibrium process of 

self-organization, emergence, and natural selection.” 

OODA Loops explain actions and reactions and explain 

how others—adversaries, allies, and bystanders—operate. 

Understanding other orientations and circumstances is 

critical for successful competition with others.

The OODA Loop provides an analytical tool as well 

as a model. It is not disciplinary dependent, provides 

context, emphasizes the temporal dimension, and provides insight into a decision calculus. As a theory, it is 

an effort to describe, explain, and predict a future 

course of events. Many ascribe the Gulf War of 1991 

victory to getting “inside the adversary’s decision cycle”—

modulating operational tempo—slowing things down 

and speeding things up to sow confusion and disorder 

in the enemy. 

An assessment of the OODA Loop concept was 

given by Colin Gray: “The OODA Loop may appear 

too humble to merit categorization as grand theory, but 

that is what it is. It has elegant simplicity, an extensive 

domain of applicability, and contains a high quality of 

insight about strategic essentials, such that its author 

well merits honourable mention as an outstanding general 

theorist of strategy.”1

 Though it is the most well-known 

term associated with Boyd, it is also the least understood. 

It is often referenced with a diagram of four circular arrows which Boyd never created and which grossly oversimplifies the concept and its importance. It is hoped 

that this volume of Boyd’s work will rectify the many 

misconceptions of what it is and why it is important.

*Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 91.

│ 385

AAA, (antiaircraft artillery), 4

achieving, 8-10, 15, 279

act, 9, 57, 64, 84, 90, 153, 155, 163, 233, 243, 279, 316, 350, 382-83

action, 3, 6, 8-9, 22, 24, 27, 29, 31, 33, 45, 47, 48, 51, 54, 68, 72, 74, 

81, 85, 87, 90, 92, 97, 106, 108, 120, 124, 125, 127, 139, 145, 147, 

148, 150, 151, 153, 155, 162, 165, 166, 173-175, 197-199, 203, 

206, 207, 209, 224, 233, 243, 253, 269, 280, 316-318, 322, 323, 

354, 385

activities, 29, 33, 58, 62, 63, 86, 90, 94, 96, 115, 117, 127, 148, 153-

155, 157, 158, 162, 171, 173, 174, 197, 216, 227, 267, 300, 317

adaptability, 63, 79, 138, 144, 145, 166, 199, 207, 220, 221, 224, 237, 

241

adapting, 10, 239, 249, 331, 347

adversary collapse, 77, 105, 117

Alexander, the Great, 31, 209, 276, 337

Algeria, 116

alienation, 141-143, 145, 157, 227

ambiguity, 10, 47, 48, 55, 65, 66, 105, 117, 125, 134, 135, 137, 148, 

153, 225, 358

analysis, 11, 15, 210, 265, 313, 317, 318, 347, 369, 375, 376, 383, 384

American Civil War, 66

American Colonies, 116

analysis, 11, 15, 210, 265, 313, 317, 318, 347, 369, 375, 376, 383, 384

appreciation, 62, 69, 161, 249, 251, 253

Arabia, 116

Arbela, 41

Art of Success, 200, 306

Art of War, The, 66, 139, 210, 213, 374

Atkinson, Alexander, 209, 276, 378

attrition, 59, 72, 131-133, 156, 164, 176

Austro–Prussian War, 66

Balck, Hermann, 131, 138, 140, 141, 209, 213, 215, 224, 367

Belisarius, 31, 216

Beyond Culture, 211, 277

Index

big data, 11

Blitz, 86, 89, 90, 121, 123

Blitz-Counter Blitz strategic design, 178, 190, 193

Blitz/Guerrilla Theme, 117, 119, 120

Blitz Results, 107

Blitzkrieg, 8, 9, 23, 83, 86, 87, 89, 105, 106, 212, 214

Blitzkrieg vs. Maginot Line mentality, 23

Blumentritt, Gunther, 92, 97, 209, 224

body of officers, 92

Boer War, 66

Bourcet, Pierre-Joseph, 47-49, 223

Boyd, John R., i, iii, 1-11, 216, 315, 324, 367-378, 381-385

Brain Cells Try to Battle Alzheimer’s, 272

Briggs, John P., 209

Britain, 338

buttonhook, 21

Cannae, 40, 41, 180, 181, 183, 185, 190, 193

capacity for independent action, 27, 29, 269, 316, 317, 323

Capitalism, 67-69, 83, 85, 111, 335

categories of conflict, 18, 130, 131, 156

center of gravity, 58

Central position, 53

Changeux, Jean-Pierre, 271

Cheng, 30-32, 109, 134, 135, 137, 169, 173, 175, 197, 223

Ch’i, 30-32, 109, 134, 135, 137, 169, 173, 175, 197, 223

China, 116, 212, 325

Clausewitz, Carl von, 209

cohesion, 47, 48, 82, 89, 90, 96, 106, 109, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, 

127, 128, 135, 137, 138, 140, 148, 149, 153, 164, 173, 174, 210

Cold War, 5

collapse, 24, 41, 45, 77, 88, 105, 110, 117, 120, 127, 128, 135, 137, 153-

155, 157-159, 162, 164, 177, 197, 200, 206, 207, 238, 299, 303, 306
388 │ INDEX

command, v, 2, 5, 6, 11, 15, 55, 79, 80, 87, 88, 90, 96, 97, 105, 106, 

117, 147, 149, 203, 209-211, 214, 215, 217, 218, 222, 235, 237, 

238, 241-244, 246, 248, 249, 252, 253, 285, 367-371, 373, 376-379

communications, 42, 45, 51, 61, 64, 80, 83, 87, 106, 108, 117, 118, 

127, 138, 149, 219, 235, 246, 280, 302

commander’s intent, 9, 10

communications, lines of, 117

comprehending, 10, 331, 347, 360

Conceptual Spiral, v, 2, 10, 216, 327, 331, 332, 360, 363, 364

Conduct of War, 28, 55, 63, 69, 210

conflict, survival, and conquest, 19, 27, 28, 165

confusion and disorder, 22, 24, 25, 104, 105, 134, 237, 278, 283, 

296, 321, 322, 385

connections, 1, 58, 105, 114, 117, 118, 144, 148, 153-155, 157, 158, 

162, 197, 224, 236, 238, 271, 272, 283

consistency, 294, 318-322

constructive induction, 318

control, v, 2, 15, 25, 55, 79, 90, 97, 108, 109, 127, 203, 215, 217, 218, 

222, 235, 237, 238, 241-245, 248, 249, 252, 253, 277, 285, 323, 

367, 368, 375, 376, 378, 379, 385

correlation, 227, 228, 234, 247, 383, 385

corruption, 108, 110, 127, 311, 314

Counterblitz, 9, 124, 125, 168-178, 190, 193

Counterguerilla, 126, 127, 129, 131

creative induction, 318, 320, 322, 323

Creveld, Martin van, 214

Cuba, 116

cultural tradition, 230, 232, 243

Darwin, Charles., 237, 335

The Daily Erie, 272

deception, 8, 30, 47, 48, 55, 65, 66, 105, 117, 125, 134, 135, 137, 

148, 153, 210, 211, 215, 225, 381, 382

decide, 9, 90, 153, 155, 163, 174, 233, 243, 382, 383

decision, 5, 7, 8, 22, 45, 58, 64, 65, 90, 97, 120, 148, 153, 155, 162, 

197, 199, 206, 207, 224, 233, 243, 323, 368, 371, 376, 383, 385

decision making, 368

deduction, 317-320, 322, 323

Dempsey, Martin E., 11

Destruction and Creation, v, 2, 11, 15, 216, 278, 285, 315, 316, 319, 

322-324, 357

Destruction and Creation bibliography, 324, 325

destructive deduction, 318-320, 322, 323

determination, 84, 165

dialectic engine, 323

discontinuity, 336

discourse, i, v, 1-4, 7, 11, 13, 15, 330, 368, 381-384

Discourse on Winning and Losing, i, v, 1, 3, 4, 7, 11, 13, 15, 330, 

368, 381-384

discovery, 10

disintegration and collapse, 157, 159, 303

disorient, 135, 137, 148, 153-155, 157, 162, 173, 174, 197, 299, 354

disrupt, 30, 74, 85, 87, 88, 105, 108, 117, 118, 127, 135, 137, 148, 

153-155, 157, 162, 171, 173, 174, 197, 299

disrupt cohesion connections and center, 30, 74, 85,87, 88, 105, 

117, 118

Destruction and Creation, v, 2, 11, 15, 216, 278, 285, 315, 316, 319, 

322-324, 357

doing, 4, 8, 10, 170, 204, 312, 322, 354

domain, 4, 317, 318, 385

empathy, 228, 234, 247, 383, 385

energy maneuverability, 6, 368, 371

energy-maneuverability theory, 2, 4, 5, 381

engineering, 215, 328, 331-334, 337, 338, 340, 344-346, 349-352, 

354, 383

engineering contributions, 337, 338

Engels, Friedrich, 36, 68, 84, 335

Entropy, 10, 206, 209, 210, 213, 237, 274, 294, 321-324, 358

Envelope, strategy of, 52

Envelopment, 74, 181

Epaminondas, 36

Epilogue, 18, 201

equilibrium, 273, 274, 385

388 │ 
INDEX │ 389

erratic behavior, 10, 321, 358

essence, 2, 8-10, 15, 77, 105, 110, 117, 133, 135, 136, 141-145, 161, 

205, 330, 383

evil, 209, 314, 325

Theory of Evolution, 28

exploration, 10, 360

F-86, 23

Falls, Cyril, 210

fast transient, 21, 24, 135, 137

Fighter Weapons School, 5, 368

fire and movement, 75, 79, 87, 134, 173

Fluid, 54, 80, 109, 115, 175, 379

Fluidity, 30, 47, 48, 50, 54, 80, 81, 88, 106, 109, 115, 124, 128, 175

focus and direction, 19, 96, 196, 220, 221, 235, 241

Forrest, Nathan Bedford, 224

France 1940, 107, 185, 186

Frederick the Great, 60

friction, 8, 9, 57-59, 68, 77, 89, 96, 97, 105, 110, 135, 137, 142, 145, 

199, 206, 223, 225, 235, 237-240, 306, 376, 378

Franco, Francisco, 66

Fuller, J. F. C., 83, 120, 210

Gaugamela, 37

Gavish, Yeshayahu, 246

genetic heritage, 230, 232, 243, 383, 384

German East Africa, 116

German operational philosophy, 97

Ghengis (TimÜjin) Khan, alternatively, Chingis Khan, Genghis 

Kahn, and Jengis Khan,, 31, 42, 43, 45, 189, 210, 211

Godel, 336, 340

Grand Message, 199, 340, 341, 354

Grand Strategy, 19, 160-162, 164, 199, 308

grand tactical, 32, 55, 61, 77, 104, 105, 194

Grant, Ulysses S., i, 11, 131, 210, 372, 382

Gaugamela, 37

Gray, Colin, 4, 7, 371, 381, 385

Greece, 116

Guerrilla results, 116

guerrilla warfare, 49, 68, 81, 83, 209, 211-213

Guibert, Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, Comte de, 47-49

Hall, Edward T., 211

Hammond, Grant T., i, 11, 372, 382, 384

Hannibal, 31

hard turning defender, 21

harmony, 9, 10, 29, 30, 48, 90, 120, 144, 145, 154, 155, 157, 162, 

164, 166, 170, 174, 196, 199, 204, 207, 221, 225-227, 235, 238, 

240, 310, 323

Heavy troops, 33

Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, 10, 237, 278, 283, 358

Heisenberg, Werner, 324

high, 4, 25, 87, 134, 164, 322, 370, 373, 385

high pitch rates, 25

high roll rates, 25

high yaw rates with ease of control, 25

historical pattern, 30-33, 42, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 57-63

human nature, 27, 165, 214, 269

Hutier, Oskar von, 73

incompleteness theorem, 278, 283, 320, 323, 336, 358

Indeterminacy, 320-322

information warfare, 367, 377

interactions, 8, 145, 198, 226-228, 271, 283, 291, 312, 318-320, 323, 

358

imagination, 10, 79, 94, 138, 224, 318, 324

implicit connections, 114, 224, 236

implicit orientation, 240, 241

impressions, 45, 135, 137, 142, 145, 150, 151, 230, 231, 233, 235, 

236, 238, 240, 265, 292, 299, 304, 313, 319, 322, 351

independent action, 27, 29, 269, 316, 317, 323

Indochina, 116

induction, 317, 318, 320, 322, 323

infiltration tactics, 8, 73-80, 82, 83, 120

information warfare, 367, 377

│ 389
390 │ INDEX

initiative, 5, 9, 10, 29, 51, 79, 92, 94, 96, 97, 115, 126-128, 138, 144, 

145, 148, 153, 155, 163, 166, 196, 199, 204, 207, 221, 224-226, 

235, 238, 240

innovation, 10, 374

insight, 4, 7, 10, 41, 68, 111, 113, 129, 144, 158, 164, 166, 199, 207, 

220, 221, 228, 229, 239, 241, 360, 382, 385

insight and vision, 220, 221, 241

interaction, 1, 9, 29, 33, 57, 67, 145, 166, 223, 237, 240, 273, 279, 

283-286, 292, 313, 382, 384

Isolate, 51, 86, 120, 127, 137, 148, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 162, 200, 

207, 273, 301, 302, 306

Isolation, 9, 86, 125, 275, 284-286, 291, 313, 382

Israeli Raid, 23

Jomini, Antoine-Henri, 60-63, 66, 194, 211, 215, 223, 280

Kampfgruppen, 74

Korea, 4, 5, 10

Laffargue, Andre, 73

Lawrence, T. E., 211

Leadership, 3-5, 9, 42, 45, 68, 97, 108, 138, 164, 224, 249, 251, 253, 280

learning, 2, 10, 11, 271, 277, 360, 371

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (Ulyanov), 83-85

Lettow-Vorbeck, Paul von, 73

Leuctra, 35, 36, 41, 61, 180, 181, 183, 185, 190, 191, 193

Leuthen, Battle of, 180

Liddell Hart, B. H., 192, 212

Light troops, 33

linkages, 227

Lorenz, Konrad, 212

loser, 366

Ludendorff, Erich, 73, 80, 82, 120

Ludendorff ’s infiltration tactics, 120

Maginot, 23, 185

Manstein, Erich von, 8, 131, 178, 190, 193, 194, 212

Mao Tse Tung, 83, 212, 213

Marathon, 41, 181

Marine Corps, 2, 7, 209, 369, 374, 377, 379, 381

Marx, Karl, 67, 68, 84, 335

Mazaeus, alternatively Mazeus, 37, 38 

Menace, 33, 51, 134, 140-145, 148, 153, 225, 299

Mental interaction, 292

mental isolation, 291

MiG-15, 23

Mikheyev, Dmitry, 212

mind-time-space, 90, 91, 153

mismatches, 9, 11, 150, 152, 155, 162, 197, 198, 304, 311, 349, 351, 

354, 357, 359, 360, 364

Mission Command, 11

mission type orders, 9

mistrust, 86, 108, 110, 112, 120, 138, 140-145, 148, 152, 153, 155, 

162, 199, 224, 225, 310

Miyamoto Musashi, 9, 212, 213

Moltke, Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Graf von (the “Elder”), 194, 245

Mongol Strategic Maneuver, 43

Mongols, 42, 44, 45, 131

Monitoring, 249, 253, 323

moral bond, 110, 117, 142, 145, 147

moral design for grand strategy, 308

moral interaction, 292

moral isolation, 291

moral leverage, 309-312

moral order, 276, 283

moral-mental-physical conflict, 19, 68, 105, 110, 120, 128, 152, 

154, 155, 157, 162, 206, 207, 290, 291, 292, 300, 301, 304, 306

Musashi Miyamoto, 9, 212, 213

Mutations, 10, 358

Napoleon, 10, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 55, 60, 63, 66, 79, 131, 132, 139, 

151, 194, 209-213, 223, 245

Napoleonic warfare, 56, 78, 83

Nebenpunkte, 87, 105, 134, 135, 137, 169, 173-176, 197

Nifty Nugget, 219

Nineteenth Century Capitalism, 67, 68, 69, 83, 85, 111, 335

Nineteenth Century Technology, 65, 66, 67, 69
INDEX │ 391

non-cooperative centers of gravity, 58, 89, 135, 137, 142, 145, 237

novelty, 10, 134, 135, 137, 148, 153, 346-348, 351, 354, 358, 360, 364

observation/ observe, 3, 15, 22, 24, 25, 45, 51, 52, 90, 97, 120, 132, 

134, 138-141, 148, 152, 153, 155, 162, 170, 181, 197, 199, 206, 

207, 224, 233, 243, 333, 352, 383, 384 

OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) Loop, v, 3, 4, 11, 29, 243, 

368, 370, 374, 375, 383-385

order out of chaos, 213, 273

organic design, v, 2, 15, 217-219, 252, 285

Organic Design for Command and Control, v, 2, 15, 217, 252, 285

orientation, 3, 8, 22, 24, 45, 90, 97, 120, 148, 153, 155, 162, 197, 

199, 206, 207, 221, 224, 229, 230, 232-234, 240-243, 279, 350, 

351, 354, 364, 376, 383, 384

paralyze effort, 77, 117

patterns, v, 1, 3, 8, 15, 17, 22, 30, 87, 90, 106, 148, 170, 177, 216, 

223, 233, 234, 277, 285, 302, 303, 316, 318, 319, 322, 347, 382

Patterns of Conflict, v, 1, 3, 8, 15, 17, 216, 285

Patton, George S., 131, 214, 245

Peat, David, 209, 274

penetrate, 10, 68, 77, 87, 88, 104, 105, 110, 117, 120, 127, 148, 150, 

152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 162, 163, 197, 200, 206, 207, 302

perceptions, 279, 319, 322

Philippines, 116

Physical interaction, 292

Physical isolation, 291

Planck’s Constant, 321, 358

Point of Departure, 18, 20, 141

Poland, 107, 139, 182-184, 190, 193

Prigogene, Ilya, 213, 273

Principles of War, 118, 202-204, 209

projection, 228, 234, 247, 383, 385

quantum uncertainty, 10, 358

sensors, 25, 219

quick, 24, 25, 65, 97, 124, 140, 164, 224, 373, 375

quick kill, 24

rapidity, 9, 10, 29, 48, 133, 196, 198, 199, 204, 221, 225, 226, 240

Recer, Paul, 272

rejection, 78, 228, 234, 247, 383

relearning, 10

Rensberger, Boyce, 271

Reorientation, 351, 354, 359, 360, 364

Restak, Richard, 213

Revelation, v, 2, 15, 365

Reversed Front, 52

roll-up, 88, 105, 117, 124, 173-175, 193

Rudel, Hans-Ulrich, 8, 227

Runstedt, Gerd von, 185, 187, 190, 192, 193, 192

Russia, 107, 116, 182, 187, 188, 190-193, 209, 215

Russo–Japanese war, 66

SAM, (surface-to-air missile), 2, 7

Savkin, V. Ye., 36, 213

Saxe, Maurice de, 47-49

Schalk, Emil, 64

Schlieffen Strategic Maneuver, 180, 181, 190, 193, 194, 215

Schwerpunkt, 87, 90, 91, 93, 95-97, 105, 106, 125, 134, 135, 137, 

169, 173-176, 197, 233

science, 10, 60, 64, 139, 210, 212, 324, 328, 331-336, 344-346, 349-

352, 354, 367, 373, 375, 376, 381

second law of, 237, 278, 283, 294, 295, 297, 298, 321-323, 335, 358

Second Law of Thermodynamics, 237, 278, 283, 294, 295, 297, 298, 

321-323, 335, 358

security, 2, 51, 97, 108, 127, 129, 203, 220, 221, 235, 241, 276, 311, 

367, 369, 371, 372, 374, 376, 381

seize, 51, 61, 84, 87, 105, 110, 117, 132, 133, 148, 153-155, 157, 158, 

162, 197, 280

shaped by, 230, 232, 283, 316, 348, 354, 364, 383, 385

shapes, 232, 233, 241, 243

Shaping, 10, 90, 171, 173, 174, 239, 248, 249, 251, 331, 347

Shatter cohesion, 117, 124, 135, 137, 153

snowmobiles, 366

Somme, 245, 252

sources, 3, 18, 28, 208, 209, 215, 227, 246, 304
392 │ INDEX

Theory of Evolution, 28

Teil, Jean du 47, 48

thinking, 1, 2, 10, 15, 92, 219, 324, 325, 330, 354, 358, 360, 382

time and timing, 9, 382

time cycle or loop, 22

tradeoffs, 227

transient rhythm, 22

trust, 10, 138, 140, 224, 225, 235, 301, 310

TTP, (tactics, technique, and procedures), 4, 10

uncertainty, 10, 51, 57, 58, 106, 120, 140-145, 148, 152, 153, 155, 

162, 199, 223-225, 237, 249, 252, 278, 283, 299, 313, 318, 320-

323, 336, 358, 366

uncertainty principle, 10, 237, 278, 283, 358

unfolding circumstances, 67, 96, 148, 157, 166, 230, 232, 248, 251, 313

Unlearning, 10

Unpredictable, 8, 22, 120, 144, 152, 155, 162, 220, 221, 302, 340, 

342, 343, 355-357, 359, 364, 366, 383

understanding, 8, 10, 225, 253, 279, 283, 367, 374, 381, 385

variety, rapidity, harmony, and initiative, 9, 10

Vietnam, 2, 4, 116, 211, 213, 214, 369, 376

vitality and growth, 166, 199, 284, 305, 306, 356

Hutier, Oskar von, 73

Washington Post, 7, 210, 213, 271, 272, 371, 375, 379

Winning and Losing, Discourse on, v, 1-4, 7, 11, 13, 15, 330, 353, 

364, 368, 381-384

Winners, 10

World War I, 8, 10, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75-77, 80, 81, 83, 131

World War II, 6, 8, 10, 69, 106, 131, 210-212

Wrap-up, 18, 153, 195-200

Yadin, Yigael, 118

YF-16, 296-298

YF-17, 296-298

Yugoslavia, 116

Ziegler, Jan, 272

South Africa, 116

South Vietnam, 116

Soviet Revolutionary Strategy, 83-85, 111

Spain, 116

Stosstruppen, 74

Strategic Game of ? and ?, The, 2, 5, 15, 255

Strategy, 4, 7-11, 19, 30, 57, 60, 61, 83-86, 111, 154, 155, 160-162, 

164, 170-172, 199, 209-215, 223, 257, 258, 276, 280, 308, 313, 

367, 371-378, 381, 382, 385

Strategy of Central Position, 53

Strategy of Envelope, 52

Stengers, Isabelle, 213, 273

Subvert, 108, 110, 117, 142, 145, 148, 153-155, 157, 158, 162, 165, 197

Success, the Art of, 200, 306

successful operations, 19, 147, 148

Sun Tzu, 8, 9, 30-32, 49, 83, 86, 120, 131, 168-177, 214, 223, 280, 

367, 369, 375, 376

supercruise, 25

suppressed, 25, 65

surprise and shock, 117, 125, 134, 136

Survival, 19, 27, 28, 142, 145, 165, 311, 316, 317, 363, 364

synchronization, 7

synthesis, 9, 10, 15, 18, 29, 146, 265, 313, 317-319, 330, 347, 348, 

351, 352, 354, 359, 360, 364, 368, 383, 385

systems, 5-7, 25, 67, 166, 271, 273, 283, 309, 320, 322, 324, 340, 

346, 349, 350, 357, 358, 371

Taber, Robert, 214

Tactics and Strategy, 19

Tamerlane, 31

teamwork, 227

technology, 11, 65-67, 69, 211, 328, 331-334, 344-346, 349-351, 

354, 367-369, 371, 372, 374-376, 381

theoretician, 47, 48

thermodynamics, 237, 267, 273, 278, 283, 293-295, 297, 298, 321-

323, 335, 358