IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 18, 2010

JOHNNY M. BURROUGHS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dickson County

No. CR-9436 Robert E. Burch, Judge

No. M2009-01466-CCA-R3-PC - Filed November 16, 2010

A Dickson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Johnny M. Burroughs, of felony murder,

especially aggravated robbery, and theft of property over $1000, and it imposed a life

sentence for his murder conviction. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years for his

robbery conviction and to two years for his theft conviction, to be served concurrently with

his life sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and

sentence. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he received

the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a

hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contendsthe post-conviction court erred when it dismissed

his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES

and JERRY L. SMITH, JJ., joined.

Mitchell B. Dugan, Dickson, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Johnny M. Burroughs.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General;

Clarence E. Lutz, Assistant Attorney General; Dan M. Alsobrooks, District Attorney

General; Suzanne Lockert-Mash, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State

of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

A. Background
On the Petitioner’s direct appeal, this Court set forth the following factual summary

of the events underlying the Petitioner’s convictions:

On May 3, 2003, Paul Totty and Grandville Johnson were hunting in the

woods in Hickman County when they discovered a red Nissan truck. The next

day, the two men noticed that the truck had been set on fire. The truck was

also seen smoldering by Robert Allen Orton. Mr. Orton called 911 to report

what he found in the woods.

The police were dispatched to the location of the burning truck and

soon discovered that the truck belonged to Jean Bowen, the victim. The victim

lived in Dickson County. According to her sister, Nell Brown, the two women

were supposed to have a picnic on May 2, 2003. Ms. Brown became

concerned when her sister did not show-up for the picnic and called Sandra

Parker, the victim’s daughter. When Ms. Parker drove by her mother’s house,

she noticed that her mother’s red Nissan truck was not parked in the driveway

and assumed that her mother was out running errands or visiting someone.

On May 4, 2003, after the authorities confirmed that the truck belonged

to the victim, Peter Rogers, a Deputy Sheriff with the Dickson County

Sheriff’s Department, was dispatched to the victim’s house. Deputy Rogers

noticed what he thought were “spots of blood” on the front porch. Deputy

Rogers knocked on the door, but received no response. When Deputy Rogers

looked through the window on the front porch of the small farmhouse, he

could see the victim lying in a pool of blood. Without entering the house,

Deputy Rogers could tell that the victim was “deceased” because “her body

was stiff, real ridged like” and “the blood on her was almost a black or a

purple color and you could tell it was dry.”

The victim’s body was found in the kitchen of the house, lying on the

floor next to the freezer. There was blood spattered on the freezer and the

wall. After talking to the victim’s daughter, the authorities were able to

determine that the victim’s purse and shotgun were missing in addition to the

victim’s red Nissan truck. There were no identifiable latent finger prints

recovered from the scene of the crime.

According to the medical examiner, the victim died as a result of

multiple injuries, including “extensive skull fractures, facial bone fractures,”

contusions to the brain and blunt force injuries to the torso. Several of the

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injuries to the face and head were consistent with being struck with a hatchet.

During the investigation, the authorities received information that the

victim’s nephew, Greg Smith, had tried to borrow money from the victim and

that he became upset when she refused to give him money. The appellant was

one of Greg Smith’s close friends.

On the evening of May 15, 2003, the appellant along with Greg Smith

and Vicki Spicer, the two co-defendants, visited Dwight Eric Halbrooks’s

home in Hickman County. The appellant came to the house to sell Mr.

Halbrooks a shotgun that the appellant claimed he got from his father. [The

shotgun actually belonged to the victim.] The appellant also offered to sell Mr.

Halbrooks a red Nissan that was stolen in Dickson. Mr. Halbrooks bought the

gun for twenty-five dollars, but declined to buy the truck.

After hearing about the robbery and murder in Dickson County, Mr.

Halbrooks had his nephew hide the shotgun, thinking that it might be the

murder weapon involved in the news reports. Mr. Halbrooks later turned the

gun over to agents from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation.

On May 15, 2003, Agent Douglas Long of the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation went with Detective B.J. Gafford of the Dickson County

Sheriff’s Department to the trailer park in Centerville, Tennessee where the

appellant lived. The two officers approached the appellant and asked him to

come in and give a statement. The appellant complied by riding in the car with

the officers to the Criminal Justice Center in Hickman County. Prior to the

statement, the officers obtained a waiver of rights from the appellant and

informed him of his Miranda rights.

The appellant’s statement reads as follows:

On Friday night, May 2, 2003, me and Greg Smith were riding

around in Marenda Campbell’s blue Thunderbird. It was around

8:00 p.m. and we were driving down I-40 heading west. He and

I had been riding around Dickson. As we were coming down

the interstate, I was driving and we noticed that the car was

running hot. The engine was about to shutdown because it was

running so hot. Greg told me to pull off the exit, so I did. We

turned left and went back over the interstate and pulled over at

the stop sign at the top of the hill. We both get out of the car

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and raised the hood. We’re checking the radiator and then go to

the trunk to see if there is any water. Greg then grabbed the

one-way lug wrench. He tells me he has an aunt that lives close

by. We could see the house from where we were. We start

walking towards her house. As we are walking towards her

house, he started telling me that he was going to jail for four or

five years because he had failed a drug test. He was on

probation for stealing a toolbox. He said he wanted to rob her,

take her money. He kept saying she had a bunch of money. He

said that he wanted to give the money to his girlfriend so she

could pay rent while he was in jail.

When we got to the house, the street light was on, and the porch

light was on. Greg knocked on the door and she came to the

door and opened the wooden door. The screen door was closed.

Greg tells her who he is and that he needs water for his car that

was parked up the street. She tells us to come in and she opens

the door. Greg goes in first and I follow him. The lug wrench

is either in his back pocket or stuck in the back of his pants.

While we were standing in the living room, he tells her he needs

a big jug to put water in. They go into the kitchen. The

doorway to the kitchen was to my right as I stood in the living

room. The TV was to my right and the couch was in front of

me. When Greg and her went into the kitchen, I heard Greg say

something about a jug and then heard some commotion. It

sounded like somebody fell on some pots and pans. It sounded

like something kept hitting pans. I heard this sound five to six

times. I was standing in the living room looking around. Greg

is in the kitchen for a minute to a minute and a half. As he

comes out of the kitchen, he has the lug wrench in his hand.

When he came out of the kitchen, he went over to the couch and

grabbed a brown paper bag that had her purse inside. I don’t

know what happened to the paper bag. After he grabbed the

purse he turns to me and says let’s go. I don’t remember if he

went anywhere else in the house. As we go towards the door, he

is in front of me. He sees the shotgun in the corner next to the

door. He grabbed the shotgun and goes outside the house, with

me following him. He has the purse, shotgun, and lug wrench

in his hand. I think he was carrying the purse and shotgun in his

left hand and the lug wrench in his right hand. Greg is right

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handed. As we leave the house, I turn and head for the street

and he goes for the truck. The truck is parked in the carport to

the right of the house as you look at it. As I am running up the

hill, he passes me in a red Nissan. The truck had a toolbox

behind the cab.

When I got to the top of the hill, I closed the hood and the trunk

and got in. Greg was already on the interstate. I get on the

interstate and start heading towards the Turney Center exit. I’m

driving about 85 to 90 trying to catch him. I finally see him

about a mile before the Turney Center exit. He had pulled over

waiting on me. He pulls out and gets off the exit. I follow him

off the interstate. When we get to the top of the exit we take a

left [and] start driving down the new highway. We finally turn

right on the backside of Beaver Dam Road. We drive down the

road and finally turn left onto an old logging road. I follow him

a little ways, until there is an open spot. I didn’t go any further

because I would have bottomed out. Greg drove the truck back

away’s [sic] through some mud holes. He is gone for about 10

minutes and comes back. He parked the truck facing me, facing

the way we came in. He has the driver’s door open and begins

throwing stuff out while he is standing outside the door. He

threw out the brown console cup holder, some papers, a bunch

of blank checks, a yellow folder, a U.S. coin collector’s kit. I

was standing in front of the truck during this. He reached

behind the seat and grabbed the shotgun. I’m not for sure what

he did with the lug wrench, he may have thrown it in the woods.

After he grabbed the shotgun he gave it to me. The shotgun was

a 20 gauge single shot. I put it in the trunk of the car. At that

time he was going through the purse. He got her money. I think

it was about $60.00. He got a ring and it had a blue setting in it.

He also got a silver watch or bracelet. He left the purse in the

truck. We got in the car and left. I was driving at that time. We

went to the trailer park. It was around 12:00 to 12:30. I went to

my trailer and he went to his.

Saturday mor[n]ing around 11:30 Greg and I left in Marenda’s

car. We went to Eric Highbrooks [sic] house on Bear Creek.

We went up to the door and asked him if he wanted to buy the

shotgun. He asked what kind and I told him it was a 20 gauge.

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He agreed and gave us a 20 sack of weed. We left and went

back to the trailer park and smoked it. We hung around the

trailer park most of the day. Later that evening, almost dark,

Greg came over asking if I knew anybody that would by [sic]

the truck and I told him no. He said he had to get rid of the

truck. As we were walking around, he said something about

burning it and I said that I had a gas can. My gas can is a one

gallon can. It’s plastic and red. I gave him the gas can and he

said he was going to burn the truck. Later that night the

Thunderbird was gone, so I assumed that he had gone to burn

the truck. I didn’t see Greg until Sunday evening.

On Sunday evening Marenda’s dad came over and said they

found the truck burnt where he worked. I guess he does some

kind of logging. On Monday or Tuesday Greg came and started

talking about what happened and I told him I didn’t want to talk

about it. I was trying to forget about it.

The appellant also made two supplements to his statement. In the first

supplement, the appellant stated the following[:]

I think Greg still has the ring and the watch or bracelet.

I saw him stick the ring and bracelet in his pocket. It was

already in a paper towel.

Greg was wearing blue jeans and a white T-shirt and a

black baseball hat that may have some racing [sic] on it. She

was wearing blue jeans. I don’t remember what type of shirt she

was wearing.

I don’t know where he got the keys to the truck. As I was

going towards my car, I had passed the 1st stop sign and was

halfway up the hill when he passed me in the truck.

The second supplement read as follows:

[Vicki stayed] with the car while it was parked at the CB shop.

She did not go to the house with me and Greg to rob Greg’s

aunt. When I got back to the car she was still waiting with the

car. Vicki did not know what had happened at that time and I

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did not tell her what happened. She did not know that Greg’s

aunt was dead until she heard the news later.

I was in the truck the night the truck was burned. Greg and I

drove Greg’s girlfriends [sic] car, a blue Thunderbird. I was

driving the car and Greg was riding as a passenger. I cannot

remember if Vicki was with us. We drove back up to where we

had left [sic] the truck on the logging road. Before we burned

the truck I drove the truck and Greg drove it. I wrecked it

maybe twice. I did the damage to the bed by backing the truck

up into a tree and by sideswiping a tree. I was in the truck by

myself when I wrecked it. Greg also wrecked the truck and did

damage to it. The wrecking and burning the truck took place

sometime between 11:30 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. on Saturday, May

3, 2003.

While inside Greg’s aunt’s house, both Greg and I saw her still

moving after Greg had already hit her and she was laying on the

floor. Greg went back over to where she was laying on the floor

and hit her with the one-way lug wrench 2 or 3 more times in the

head.

State v. Johnny M. Burroughs, No. M2005-00900-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 643161, *1-4

(Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 9, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2006).

Based upon the events outlined above, a Dickson County grand jury indicted Greg

Smith, the Petitioner, and Victoria Spicer for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first

degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated

robbery, theft of property over $1000, and conspiracy to commit theft over $1000. Smith

pled guilty and was sentenced, and the Petitioner pled not guilty and proceeded to trial. At

the close of the State’s proof, the trial court granted the Petitioner’s motion for judgment of

acquittal as to the conspiracy counts. The defense rested on the State’s proof. After

deliberating, the jury convicted the Petitioner of felony murder, especially aggravated

robbery, and theft of property over $1000 and imposed a life sentence for his felony murder

conviction. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years for his robbery conviction and two

years for his theft conviction, to be served concurrently to his life sentence. The Petitioner

filed a direct appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions

and contending that double jeopardy barred his especially aggravated robbery conviction.

This Court affirmed his convictions. Burroughs, 2006 WL 643161, *8.

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B. Post-Conviction

Following his direct appeal, the Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction

relief, and the post-conviction court appointed counsel, who amended the Petitioner’s

petition. The amended petition alleged, relevant to this appeal, that Counsel was ineffective

for failing to: (1) object to improper comments made during the State’s closing remarks; (2)

file an “adequate” motion to suppress statements made by the Petitioner to police; (3) file an

interlocutory appeal of the denial of the motion to suppress the Petitioner’s statements; (4)

call Greg Smith as a witness at trial; (5) request the jury be instructed on the lesser included

offenses of facilitation of first degree murder and solicitation of first degree murder; (6)

request that the jury be sequestered; (7) challenge the removal of an African-American from

the jury; (8) request a change of venue; (9) obtain a pre-trial order preventing the jury from

seeing the Petitioner with wrist and ankle restraints and dressed in an orange prison jumpsuit;

and (10) present evidence at trial.

At the hearing on the petition for post-conviction relief, during Counsel’s testimony,

the Petitioner’s post-conviction attorney introduced the trial transcript and had Counsel read

aloud a portion of the State’s closing remarks:

[T]hey stole everything they could get including her truck and did it in the

manner that you’ve heard described. That they took the property from the

person of another by the use of violence; and they took the property

intentionally and knowingly. What did they say when they walked down the

hill, got to have some money. They accomplished it with a deadly weapon as

I’ve described. They beat her to death.

Counsel did not specifically recall hearing the above remarks during closing arguments,

which went without objection. He said he could recall no “tactical reasons” for not objecting

to the remarks, acknowledging that, throughout his representation of the Petitioner, he had

tried to distance his client from his co-defendant’s acts, especially those of co-defendant

Greg Smith. He likewise did not raise the remarks in the motion for new trial he filed on

behalf of the Petitioner. Counsel acknowledged that either contemporaneously objecting to

the remarks or raising them in the Petitioner’s motion for new trial “would have been

appropriate.”

In order to understand the significance of the next portion of Counsel’s testimony, we

now summarize the Petitioner’s statements to police. According to this Court’s opinion on

direct appeal, the Petitioner made one particularly detailed statement to police about his

involvement in this case. This statement, however, did not indicate that the Petitioner agreed

to help Smith rob the victim before the two entered her home. He made two addenda to this

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statement, and one of these addenda suggested that the Petitioner agreed to rob the victim

before he accompanied Smith into the victim’s home. Counsel recalled that the Petitioner

signed a waiver of his Miranda rights before he made the inculpatory statements. During the

suppression hearing concerning these statements and their addenda, Counsel argued that,

because the Petitioner was high on marijuana when he executed the waivers and gave the

statements, the totality of the circumstances suggested he did not knowingly and voluntarily

waive his Miranda rights. Counsel also argued that police should have re-Mirandized the

Petitioner before he gave each of the addenda to his statement. Finally, he objected to the

proposed plan of giving each juror a copy of the Petitioner’s statement. The trial court

denied the motion to suppress, and each juror was given a copy of the Petitioner’s statement

and its addenda.

At the post-conviction hearing, Counsel acknowledged that several circumstances

surrounding the Petitioner’s statement suggested that, at the time he gave the statements, he

believed he was under arrest, when in fact he was not. Counsel explained, however, that he

did not argue for the statements’ suppression on this ground because, by this time, the

Petitioner had already waived his Miranda rights, which would have cured any infirmity

resulting from his false belief that he was under arrest. He likewise did not include this

ground for the statements’ inadmissibility in his motion for new trial.

Counsel explained that he did not file an interlocutory appeal of the denial of the

motion to suppress the Petitioner’s statements not only because he did not believe it was

likely to be granted but also because he wished to preserve the Petitioner’s ability to directly

appeal the admission of his statements in the event the Petitioner was ultimately convicted.

Greg Smith pled guilty in June 2004, over five months before the Petitioner’s trial.

Counsel recalled that he and the Petitioner considered calling Smith to testify in hopes Smith

would take full responsibility for the beating death of his aunt. These hopes were dashed,

however, when they spoke with Smith’s defense counsel, who warned them that Smith had

“mental situations” that made him a “wild card.” Counsel feared that Smith would testify

that he and the Petitioner planned to rob the victim before they entered her house, which

would bolster the State’s argument that the Petitioner possessed the intent necessary to

commit robbery and, thus, felony murder. As a result, Counsel never interviewed Smith and

did not call him as a trial witness.

Counsel did not recall whether the trial court charged the jury with solicitation of

murder and solicitation of especially aggravated robbery, which were lesser-included

offenses of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. He testified that the trial court

did, however, charge the jury with respect to a facilitation theory of responsibility for these

crimes.

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Counsel testified that he decided to not ask the trial court to sequester the jury for two

reasons: First, media coverage of the victim’s killing had been limited. The local paper, as

well as perhaps the paper of a neighboring county, ran only a few articles about the crime.

He said this case received less media coverage than other cases he had been involved in.

Second, Counsel said he wished to avoid attaching too much significance to the Petitioner’s

charges. He feared that asking for sequestration would lead the jury to believe the Petitioner

was principally responsible for the victim’s death whereas his aim was to persuade the jury

that the Petitioner only minimally participated in the events surrounding the victim’s death.

Counsel confirmed that he advised the Petitioner against testifying, despite the fact

that the State’s evidence against the Petitioner consisted mainly of the Petitioner’s own

statement. He explained he did so because, had the Petitioner testified, the State would have

been able to introduce “horrible” testimony from witnesses who observed the Petitioner and

Smith “giggle” and make sounds in the back of a squad car as they were being transported

from Hickman County to Dickson County. Counsel had already gone to “painstaking”

lengths to ensure this testimony was not independently admitted and did not want to open the

door for the State to introduce the testimony.

Counsel did not recall whether any African-Americans appeared in the jury pool in

the Petitioner’s case. He said, however, no Batson challenge was made to its makeup.

Counsel was familiar with the demographic profile of Dickson County and its surrounding

counties.

Counsel explained that he did not request a change of venue for the Petitioner’s trial

because he believed for three reasons that Dickson County would prove more favorable for

the Petitioner than Cheatham County, the venue he would likely receive if granted a change

of venue. First, the Petitioner was more likely to receive a jury containing AfricanAmericans in Dickson County. Second, juries in Cheatham County tended in his opinion to

be more of the “convicting type.” Third, the assistant district attorney general trying the

State’s case against the Petitioner hailed from Cheatham County.

Counsel confirmed he did not seek a pre-trial order preventing the Petitioner from

being transported to court in jail jumpsuit and in prison shackles. He testified, however, that,

before trial, he visited the Petitioner in jail to ensure he had alternative clothes to wear to

trial. The Petitioner indicated to him that his family would bring him clothes to wear at trial.

These arrangements apparently fell through, however, because the Petitioner arrived at court

on the first day of trial shackled and dressed in his orange prison jumpsuit. Counsel and a

colleague immediately left and purchased “street” clothing for the Petitioner, which the

Petitioner changed into before he entered the courtroom. Counsel then arranged with the

Sheriff’s Department for the Petitioner, from that day forward, to arrive at court in street

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clothes. Counsel was unsure whether the jury saw the Petitioner in his orange jumpsuit while

the Petitioner sat in a holding cell before jury selection.

Counsel confirmed that he presented no evidence in defense of the Petitioner. He

testified that he simply did not know of any witnesses whose testimony could aid the

Petitioner’s defense. He repeated his reservations about calling the Petitioner or his codefendant Greg Smith, and he explained he did not call co-defendant Victoria Spicer because

she was unlikely to “say anything” because she had not yet gone to trial on her charges. He

acknowledged that his defense strategy was to attack the State’s witnesses through crossexamination. Counsel testified that, in preparation for trial, he interviewed the State’s

witnesses, went to the scene of the crime, reconstructed the time line of the events, and

interviewed witnesses who lived near the Petitioner. He explained that none of this

investigation led to the discovery of any witness who would give testimony favorable to the

Petitioner. Based on this paucity of defense material, Counsel elected to rely on the

weakness of the State’s evidence that the Petitioner entered the victim’s home with the intent

to rob or kill her. He stated:

I didn’t want any other witnesses to talk about [a] quote unquote plan or that

this was a robbery. I want[ed] to leave it with what we had which was the one

statement by [the Petitioner] that was written by a law enforcement officer and

then he signed the statement; and I wanted to basically just be able to argue

that; and I think I did argue that; but those weren’t [the Petitioner’s] words,

that wasn’t really his statement. Yeah, he had signed it but there was an

addendum. That’s what you want to try to explain to the jury, but I didn’t need

anybody else testifying that they knew of or had heard talk about there was

going to be a supposed[] robbery.

On cross-examination, Counsel testified that he had been practicing for seven years

when he tried the Petitioner’s case and that he had tried several murder cases during his

career. Counsel testified that he spoke with co-defendant Spicer’s attorney before the

Petitioner’s trial and that she indicated Spicer would not be willing to offer “any testimony

at all.” He confirmed that both Spicer and Smith had given statements to police that

implicated the Petitioner in the victim’s death.

Counsel agreed that no evidence suggested the Petitioner actually beat the victim. He

emphasized, however, that other evidence, such as the Petitioner’s statement admitting

involvement and the testimony of witnesses who saw the Petitioner in possession of the

victim’s truck and handgun, established that the Petitioner was present during, if not

principally responsible for, the victim’s robbery and death.

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Counsel testified that, although the Petitioner’s inculpatory statements were very

harmful to his case, the State probably would have proceeded to trial on the strength of the

remaining evidence had the trial court suppressed the Petitioner’s statements. He agreed that

he also based his decision to forego an interlocutory appeal on this probability.

Counsel confirmed that, at the time of the Petitioner’s trial, he was aware that the

State was not seeking the death penalty against Greg Smith due to Smith’s low I.Q. and other

psychological indicators that made him ineligible for the death penalty. Counsel, who was

present during Smith’s plea submission hearing, recalled that Smith became hostile during

the hearing and that a recess was necessary for Smith’s attorney to calm his client down.

Counsel considered these factors in making the decision not to call Smith as a witness.

Counsel reiterated that he could not recall whether solicitation was charged as a lesser

included offense of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. He confirmed,

however, that recent caselaw held that, where the solicited offense leads to a completed act,

solicitation is not a lesser-included offense of that act. He could not recall whether this

caselaw was released before or after the Petitioner’s trial.

Counsel agreed that, before representing the Petitioner, he was involved in a case very

similar to the Petitioner’s case that received a great deal more publicity. He reiterated that,

had he believed the pre-trial publicity to be excessive, he would have moved for

sequestration of the jury.

Counsel testified he was certain that, if the Petitioner testified and denied giggling

after being arrested, the Hickman County police officers who witnessed Smith and the

Petitioner’s jovial manner would have been able to testify. He agreed that the State could

have called Smith himself to testify about how he and the Petitioner behaved shortly after

their arrest.

Counsel testified not only that did he not feel the need to bring a Batson challenge as

to any of the prospective jurors, but also that he did not even use all of his peremptory

challenges on the jury pool because he found the pool so agreeable.

Counsel elaborated on his defense strategy of discrediting the State’s witnesses,

explaining that his main goal was to demonstrate that the State’s proof did not establish the

Petitioner entered the victim’s home with the intent to rob her. Counsel emphasized that he

was able to convince the trial court to exclude “a lot of evidence” that was very damaging

to the Petitioner. Counsel testified that, despite the jury’s verdict, the exclusions he obtained

during the Petitioner’s trial were “some of the best work” he had ever done.

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Counsel said he did not meet with the Petitioner “a lot” but “plenty” to be prepared

for the motion to suppress and for trial. During their meetings, the Petitioner did not appear

to Counsel to understand the gravity of the charges against him, though Counsel attempted

to explain the concept of felony murder to his client. The Petitioner rejected any plea offer

from the State that involved a sentence greater than eight years, saying he preferred the death

penalty to serving such a sentence. Counsel said the Petitioner did not believe “for a minute”

that he would receive the fifty-one year sentence he ultimately received.

On re-direct examination, Counsel explained that the State was not interested in

downgrading the Petitioner’s charges in exchange for his testimony against Greg Smith

because the State planned to make such a deal with Victoria Spicer, who was only fifteen or

sixteen at the time.

Counsel confirmed the State presented no evidence that the Petitioner physically

participated in beating the victim, as one could infer from the State’s remark that “they beat

her to death.” He emphasized that he argued during closing statements that the Petitioner

“never laid a hand on [the victim.]”

The Petitioner testified about the events leading up to his statements to police: he was

in the company of Victoria Spicer and was working on his car in Greg Smith’s yard when

police arrived and asked for Smith. The Petitioner informed them Smith was not home, and

the police asked where the Petitioner would be in an hour. He told them he would still be in

Smith’s yard, so police left and returned later “twenty cars deep.” Police patted down

everyone present and placed the Petitioner and Spicer in separate cars. Asked whether he felt

he was under arrest at this time, the Petitioner said he “felt [he] needed to go [with them].”

Police then transported the pair to separate interrogation rooms of the Hickman County

Courthouse, and police soon informed him Spicer had disclosed what she knew of Smith and

the Petitioner’s involvement in the victim’s death. Following this news, the Petitioner

admitted his involvement to police.

The Petitioner reviewed a statement purporting to be that given by the Petitioner to

police the day he was picked up with Spicer. The Petitioner testified that the statement was

not in his handwriting, though he agreed that he initialed the statement. He testified that the

statement inaccurately reported that Smith told the Petitioner who he was going to rob. The

Petitioner insisted that Smith told the Petitioner that he was going to rob someone, but did

not identify who he planned to rob.

The Petitioner reviewed the two addenda to his initial statement and again testified

that the statements were not in his handwriting. He said these addenda likewise did not

accurately reflect the statements he gave police. The Petitioner testified that police examined

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him between six and seven hours at the Hickman County Courthouse.

On cross-examination, the Petitioner confirmed that he signed a waiver of his

Miranda rights before he gave statements to police. He also confirmed that, at his

suppression hearing, he testified about the events surrounding his statements to police.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court took the petition under

advisement and later issued a written order denying relief. It is from this judgment that the

Petitioner now appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it rejected his

claim that Counsel was ineffective and denied him post-conviction relief. Specifically, he

contends Counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) object to improper comments made

during the State’s closing remarks; (2) file an “adequate” motion to suppressstatements made

by the Petitioner to police; (3) request an interlocutory appeal of the denial of his motion to

suppress the Petitioner’s statements; (4) call Greg Smith as a witness at trial; (5) request the

jury be instructed on the lesser included offenses of facilitation of first degree murder and

solicitation of first degree murder; (6) request that the jury be sequestered; (7) challenge the

removal of an African-American from the jury; (8) request a change of venue; (9) obtain a

pre-trial order preventing the jury from seeing the Petitioner with wrist and ankle restraints

and dressed in an orange prison jumpsuit; and (10) present evidence at trial. The State

responds that Counsel was not ineffective and that the post-conviction court properly denied

the Petitioner relief.

In order to obtain post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that his or her

conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of a constitutional right.

T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2006). The petitioner bears the burden of proving factual allegations

in the petition for post-conviction relief by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-30-

110(f) (2006). Upon review, when post-conviction proceedings have included a full

evidentiary hearing, as was true in this case, the trial judge’s findings of fact and conclusions

of law are given the effect and weight of a jury verdict, and this Court is “bound by the trial

judge’s findings of fact unless we conclude that the evidence contained in the record

preponderates against the judgment entered in the cause.” Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752,

755 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Thus, this Court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence

below; all questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given

their testimony and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved by the trial

court judge, not the appellate courts. Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tenn. 1999);

Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tenn. 1997). A post-conviction court’s

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conclusions of law, however, are subject to a purely de novo review by this Court, with no

presumption of correctness. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn. 2001).

The right of a criminally accused to representation is guaranteed by both the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9, of the Tennessee

Constitution. State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d

453, 461 (Tenn. 1999); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). The following

two-prong test directs a court’s evaluation of a claim for ineffectiveness:

First, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.

This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the [petitioner] by the Sixth

Amendment. Second, the [petitioner] must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable. Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said

that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the

adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419

(Tenn. 1989).

In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine

whether the advice given or services rendered by the attorney are within the range of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936. To prevail

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that “counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” House v. State, 44

S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).

When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing court

should judge the attorney’s performance within the context of the case as a whole, taking into

account all relevant circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. Mitchell, 753

S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The reviewing court must evaluate the

questionable conduct from the attorney’s perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690;

Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982). In doing so, the reviewing court must be

highly deferential and “should indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462.

Finally, we note that a defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to perfect representation,

only constitutionally adequate representation. Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1996). In other words, “in considering claims of ineffective assistance of

15
counsel, ‘we address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally

compelled.’” Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic,

466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984)). Counsel should not be deemed to have been ineffective

merely because a different procedure or strategy might have produced a different result.

Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). The fact that a

particular strategy or tactic failed or hurt the defense does not, standing alone, establish

unreasonable representation. House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d

363, 369 (Tenn. 1996)). However, deference to matters of strategy and tactical choices

applies only if the choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation. House, 44

S.W.3d at 515.

If the petitioner shows that counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable standard,

then the petitioner must satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by demonstrating

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Nichols v. State, 90

S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002). This reasonable probability must be “sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662,

665 (Tenn. 1994).

A. Improper Closing Argument

The Defendant contends Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s

remarks during closing arguments that “they” violently robbed the victim, and “they” beat

the victim to death. He argues that, because nothing suggested the Petitioner actually

participated in the beating death of the victim, the comments were not only untrue but also

“inflammatory.” He contends Counsel was ineffective for failing to object and ask either for

a mistrial or for the jury to be instructed to disregard the State’s remarks. The State responds

that the remarks were not improper because they reflected the legal theory of criminal

responsibility for the acts of another upon which the Petitioner was being tried for his

involvement in the victim’s death.

The Tennessee Supreme Court “has long recognized that closing arguments are a

valuable privilege that should not be unduly restricted.” Terry v. State, 46 S.W.3d 147, 156

(Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tenn. 1978)). “Consequently,

attorneys are given greater leeway in arguing their positions before the jury, and the trial

court has significant discretion in controlling these arguments, to be reversed only upon a

showing of an abuse of that discretion.” Terry, 46 S.W.3d at 156 (citing Sutton, 562 S.W.2d

at 823). This Court has explained that “arguments must be temperate, based upon the

evidence introduced at trial, relevant to the issues being tried, and not otherwise improper

under the facts or law.” See State v. Goltz, 111 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (citing

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Coker v. State, 911 S.W.2d 357, 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) superseded by Rule on other

grounds as stated in State v. West, 19 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tenn. 2000)).

In this case, the post-conviction court found that the State’s assertion that “they”

robbed and killed the victim was consistent with the State’s theory of felony murder and that

Counsel, therefore, was not ineffective for failing to object to the remarks. We agree with

the post-conviction court that the State’s remarks were not improper. The State neither

argued nor presented evidence to prove that the Petitioner physically participated in beating

the victim. It presented overwhelming evidence, however, to prove that the Petitioner was

involved in her death in a way that made him guilty of felony murder, which, in essence,

made the Petitioner criminally responsible for the actions of Greg Smith. The State,

therefore, in stating that “they” robbed and killed the victim, likely was speaking in a legal

rather than a literal sense. The remarks being “based upon the evidence introduced at trial”

and “not otherwise improper under the facts or law,” we conclude that the State’s remarks

were not improper. See Goltz, 111S.W.3d at 5. Thus, Counsel was not ineffective for not

objecting to the remarks. See House, 44 S.W.3d at 515. The Petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this issue.

B. Motion to Suppress

The Petitioner contends Counsel wasineffective for failing to argue at the suppression

hearing concerning the Petitioner’s statements that the Petitioner was unlawfully arrested

before he gave the statements. The State responds that the Petitioner failed to establish by

clear and convincing evidence his claim that he was unlawfully arrested. It further responds

that, had Counsel succeeded in suppressing the statements, the State would have proceeded

with its charges against the Petitioner based upon the State’s remaining evidence.

The post-conviction court, in its written order, discredited the Petitioner’s postconviction testimony that he was arrested before he gave his statements and noted that the

Petitioner failed to present the testimony of the officers present during his statement. The

post-conviction court then found that Counsel’s decision to base his suppression hearing

argument upon the involuntariness of the Petitioner’s Miranda waivers rather than the

unlawfulness of the Petitioner’s arrest was reasonable and did not render his assistance

ineffective.

In order to prevail herein, the Petitioner must demonstrate, first, that Counsel

unreasonably failed to pursue a line of argument that would have led to the suppression of

the Petitioner’s statements and, second, that without these statements the Petitioner would

not have been convicted. T.C.A § 40-30-103; Williams, 599 S.W.2d at 279-80. The

Petitioner has demonstrated neither.

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As the Petitioner notes in his brief, a statement gathered as a result of an unlawful

arrest may be subject to exclusion pursuant to the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. See

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). The post-conviction court, however,

discredited the Petitioner’s testimony that, at the time he gave incriminating statements to

police, he believed he was under arrest. Such a credibility assessment being within its

province, we will notsecond-guessthe post-conviction court. See Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 156.

The Petitioner presented no other evidence at the post-conviction hearing that the events

leading up to his statement would have led a reasonable person to believe he or she was

under arrest. Thus, the Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that

Counsel successfully could have argued for the statements’ suppression on this basis.

Further, Counsel testified at the suppression hearing that, even had he succeeded in

suppressing the statements, the State would have tried the Petitioner based upon the

remaining circumstantial evidence against the Petitioner. Having failed to establish that

Counsel’s actions could have altered the result of the suppression hearing, the Petitioner has

failed to demonstrate prejudice from Counsel’s representation. See Nichols, 90 S.W.3d at

587. As such, we conclude Counsel was not ineffective in his advocacy on behalf of the

Petitioner during the suppression hearing. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Petitioner

is not entitled to relief on this issue.

C. Interlocutory Appeal

The Petitioner next argues that Counsel was ineffective for failing to file an

interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the Petitioner’s

statements. As discussed above, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, had his

statements been suppressed, either the State would have abandoned its charges or the jury

would have acquitted the Petitioner. Thus, the Petitioner has failed to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that he was in any way prejudiced by Counsel foregoing an

interlocutory appeal of his statements’ admission. See Nichols, 90 S.W.3d at 587. Such a

showing is essential to a finding that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. The Petitioner

is not entitled to relief on these grounds.

D. Testimony of Co-Defendant Greg Smith

The Petitioner argues Counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and call as a

witness the Petitioner’s co-defendant Greg Smith. The State responds that, given Counsel’s

conversations with Smith’s attorney, his decision to not call Smith to testify was reasonable.

It further cites the Petitioner’s failure to present Smith’s testimony at the post-conviction

hearing as justification for the post-conviction court’s denial of relief on this basis.

First, we note that in order for a petitioner to establish prejudice from his attorney’s

18
failure to call a witness, the petitioner must have this witness testify at the post-conviction

hearing. Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757. In Black, this Court established that:

It is elementary that neither a trial judge nor an appellate court can speculate

or guess on the question of whether further investigation would have revealed

a witness or what that witness's testimony might have been if introduced by

defense counsel. The same is true regarding the failure to call a known

witness. In short, if a petitioner is able to establish that defense counsel was

deficient in the investigation of the facts or calling a known witness, the

petitioner is not entitled to relief from his conviction on this ground unless he

can produce a material witness who (a) could have been found by a reasonable

investigation and (b) would have testified favorably in support of his defense

if called.

Id.

In this case, the post-conviction court found that Counsel decided to not call Smith

as a witness in the Petitioner’s trial because he believed Smith might “hurt his case more than

he would help it.” Indeed, Counsel testified at trial that Smith’s attorney told him Smith had

“mental situations” that made him a “wild card.” This suspicion was confirmed by Smith’s

outburst during his own guilty plea hearing. Fearing that Smith might testify that the

Petitioner agreed to rob and murder the victim before he accompanied Smith into the victim’s

house, Counsel decided to not call Smith as a witness in order to avoid bolstering the State’s

argument that the Petitioner was complicit in the robbery and murder. Thus, the record does

not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s finding that Counsel based his decision

not to call Smith on his belief Smith would hurt the Petitioner’s case. See Black, 794 S.W.2d

at 755. We conclude Counsel’s decision to not put Smith on the stand in the Petitioner’s

defense was a sound one, based upon reasonable trial strategy. See Hellard, 629 S.W.2d at

9. Further, assuming arguendo that Counsel was unreasonable for not to calling Smith as a

witness, the Petitioner’s did not present Smith’stestimony at his post-conviction hearing and,

therefore, has not demonstrated with clear and convincing evidence that Smith’s testimony

would have affected the outcome of his trial. See Black, 794 S.W.2d at 755. We conclude

that, because the Petitioner Counsel’s decision to not call Smith was based upon reasonable

trialstrategy, the post-conviction court properly denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner

is not entitled to relief on this issue. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

E. Instruction on Lesser-Included Offenses

The Petitioner argues Counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure the trial court

instructed the jury on two lesser included offenses of first degree murder: solicitation of first

degree murder and facilitation of first-degree murder. The State, whose brief reproduces a

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portion of the trial transcript not included in the appellate record, responds that the trial court

did indeed instruct the jury on facilitation of first degree murder but properly refused to

instruct the jury on solicitation of first degree murder, which is not a lesser included offense

of first degree murder where the solicited offense results in the death of the victim.

A conviction for solicitation may lie where a person “by means of oral, written or

electronic communication, directly or through another, intentionally commands, requests or

hires another to commit a criminal offense . . . with the intent that the criminal offense be

committed. . . .” T.C.A. § 39-12-102(a) (2003). Solicitation is only a lesser included offense

of the solicited offense where “no proof exists of the completion of the [solicited] crime.”

State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 486-87 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 719

(Tenn. 2001).

The State attached to its brief the transcript of the jury instructions given in this case,

which reveal that the trial court declined to instruct the jury on solicitation of murder.

Referencing a copy in its possession of the preliminary instructions issued to the jury, the

post-conviction court concluded that facilitation was charged to the jury. Not having in its

possession the transcript of the instructions given to the jury in this case, however, it assumed

the solicitation instruction was not issued. Based upon State v. Robinson, however, it

concluded that the Petitioner was not entitled to a solicitation instruction given that evidence

established the completion of the charged offense, i.e. the victim’s death.

As the post-conviction court noted in its written order, the Petitioner’s objection is

more properly directed toward not receiving an instruction on solicitation of felony murder

rather than first degree murder, given his ultimate felony murder conviction. We will

accordingly address his claim on this basis.

We agree with the post-conviction court that the Petitioner was not entitled to a

solicitation instruction. Because the evidence in this case clearly established the completed

offense of murder, the evidence would have precluded a conviction for solicitation, which

requires that the solicited offense not be completed. See Robinson, 146 S.W.3d at 486-87.

Accordingly, the trial court properly declined to issue the solicitation instruction, and

Counsel was in no way ineffective with respect to this issue. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

F. Jury Sequestration

The Petitioner next contends Counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the

jury be sequestered. Sequestration is available “[i]n all criminal prosecutions . . . at the

sound discretion of the trial judge, which shall prohibit the jurors from separating at times

20
when they are not engaged upon actual trial or deliberation of the case.” T.C.A. § 40-18-116

(2003).

In this case, the post-conviction court found that no significant pre-trial publicity took

place and that the Petitioner failed to present evidence that the jury received outside

information. The court found Counsel’s decision not to request sequestration was

reasonable.

At the post-conviction hearing, Counsel explained that he did not seek sequestration

not only because no pre-trial publicity had taken place that would justify sequestration but

also because he wished to avoid inflating the seriousness of the charges against the Petitioner

in the jurors’ minds. He explained that, were he to request sequestration, the jury might

believe the Petitioner was the principal offender in the murder whereas Counsel believed the

evidence would show the Petitioner was merely present during the offense. At the postconviction hearing, the Petitioner presented no evidence of excessive pre-trial publicity in

his case. Thus, the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s

finding that the Petitioner’s trial was not besieged with inordinate publicity. See Black, 794

S.W.2d at 755. Further, we conclude that Counsel’s decision not to seek jury sequestration

was an informed decision, based on his strategy of minimizing the Petitioner’s role in the

victim’s death. See House, 44 S.W.3d at 515. Thus, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

this issue.

G. Removal of African-American from Jury

The Petitioner next contends Counsel was ineffective for failing to “challenge the

removal of potential African American jurors from the jury pool . . . effectively denying the

[Petitioner] a right to a jury made up of a cross section of the community.” The State

responds that, because the Petitioner presented no evidence that an African-American was

removed from the jury, he failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the jury’s make-up.

The United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution

guarantee a defendant the right to a jury drawn from a venire that represents a fair crosssection of the community. State v. Bell, 745 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tenn. 1988). The United

States Supreme Court in State v. Duren set forth the elements of a prima facie violation of

this fair cross-section requirement:

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the

community;

21
(2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are

selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in

the community; and

(3) that this under[-]representation is due to the systematic exclusion of the

group in the jury-selection process.

439 U.S. 357 (1979).

The post-conviction court rejected this basis for post-conviction relief after finding

that the Petitioner failed to present evidence that the State removed an African-American

from his jury.

Whether the Petitioner contends that Counsel should have objected to the removal of

a specific African-American juror or to the fact that his jury venire did not reflect a fair

cross-section of the community is unclear from the Petitioner’s brief. In any case, the

Petitioner failed to present evidence to support either claim. Even had he presented evidence

that the State struck an African-American from the jury, such evidence would be irrelevant

to a fair cross-section claim, as such a claim concerns the composition only of the jury venire,

not of the petit jury. Id. Further, the Petitioner failed to present evidence that the

representation of African-Americans in the venire from which his jury was selected was not

“fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community.” Thus, he

failed to support his claim that a fair cross-section violation, to which Counsel should have

objected, occurred. Id. The record containing no proof of a constitutional flaw in the jury

venire, we conclude the post-conviction court properly rejected the Petitioner’s claim that

Counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the jury’s make-up. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 690. He is not entitled to relief on this issue.

H. Change of Venue

The Petitioner contends Counsel was ineffective for failing to request a change of

venue in his case. The State responds that, because the Petitioner failed to support this claim

with proof that the jurors who convicted him were “biased or prejudiced by outside

information,” he failed to establish that Counsel was ineffective in this regard.

The post-conviction court rejected the Petitioner’s claim that Counsel was ineffective

for failing to ask for a change of venue, finding that the Petitioner failed to support his claim

with evidence of pre-trial publicity or undue excitement in the community in which his trial

was held. Indeed, Counsel testified at trial that he was aware of only a few local articles

reporting the charges against the Petitioner and his co-defendants. He testified that the media

22
coverage of the Petitioner’s trial was slight in comparison with similar murder trials in which

he had participated. Thus, the record does not preponderate against the post-conviction

court’s finding that the Petitioner failed to show that a change of venue would have been

successful. Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757. Thus, the Petitioner failed to show how Counsel’s

decision to not pursue a change of venue prejudiced him. Further, Counsel explained at the

post-conviction hearing that any of the alternative counties to which the Petitioner’s case

could have been transferred were actually less desirable because they were prosecutionfriendly. Counsel’s decision, therefore, was based upon sound trial strategy. As such, we

conclude Counsel was not ineffective for choosing not to seek a change of venue. See

Williams, 599 S.W.2d at 279-80. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

I. Petitioner’s Appearance in Jumpsuit and Restraints

The Petitioner argues Counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a pre-trial order

preventing the Petitioner from being to brought to court in jail attire. He contends that he

was prejudiced because jurors could have seen him when he arrived in jail attire the first day

of his trial. The State responds that, because the Petitioner failed to present evidence that a

member of the jury saw him dressed in jail attire, he failed to prove he suffered prejudice

from being dressed in jail attire.

The United States Supreme Court has held that forcing a defendant to stand trial in

jail attire violates the defendant’s right to due process because “the constant reminder of the

accused’s condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror’s

judgment.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976). The post-conviction court

rejected this basis for post-conviction relief based upon the Petitioner’s failure to present

evidence that jurors saw him dressed in jail attire.

The evidence at the post-conviction hearing showed that the Petitioner did not stand

trial in jail attire. Rather, he arrived at his first day of trial wearing a jumpsuit and restraints,

and, after Counsel was alerted, Counsel immediately purchased street clothes for the

Petitioner. The Petitioner then quickly changed into the street clothes. No evidence was

presented at the post-conviction hearing that a member of the jury viewed the Petitioner

before he changed into his street clothes. Thus, the facts of this case do not the indicate that

the Petitioner suffered the prejudice Estelle v. Williams seeks to remedy. As such, no actual

harm befell the Petitioner, and Counsel, therefore, was not ineffective for not seeking a pretrial order preventing the Petitioner from being clothed in jail attire on his first day of trial.

See Denton, 945 S.W.2d at 796. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

J. Lack of Defense Proof

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The Petitioner argues Counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence in

defense of the Petitioner, instead relying upon cross-examination and impeachment of the

State’s witnesses. The State arguesthat Counsel, having no witnesses whose testimony could

aid the Petitioner’s defense, was left only to distance his client from co-defendant Smith and

limit the impact of the Petitioner’s inculpatory statements.

The post-conviction court found that Counsel called no witnesses because he was

concerned that each of the witnesses with relevant information might make the Petitioner’s

knowledge that Smith intended to rob the victim “more plainly apparent” to the jury. Indeed,

the evidence does not preponderate against this finding. See Black, 794 S.W.2d at 755. We

set out above why Counsel was loath to call Co-Defendant Smith as a witness. In essence,

Smith was unreliable, and his guilty plea itself imputed guilt to the Petitioner, who was his

companion in the victim’s beating death. For co-defendant Spicer’s part, her attorney

indicated Spicer was unwilling to “say anything.” Also, because co-defendant Spicer had yet

to reach a plea agreement with the State, she had incentive to testify disfavorably toward the

Petitioner. Counsel went to the scene of the crime, interviewed the State’s witnesses, and

interviewed people who lived near the Petitioner, but he located no one who could provide

favorable testimony for the Petitioner. We conclude that, “within the context of the case as

a whole, taking into account all relevant circumstances,” Counsel was not ineffective for

defending the Petitioner by weakening the State’s case rather than presenting new witnesses.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Mitchell, 753 S.W.2d at 149. The Petitioner is not entitled

to relief on this issue.

III. Conclusion

After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude the Petitioner

has failed to demonstrate that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition for

post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

_________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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