UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

Case No.: 0:22-CV-62076-WPD/PAB

GREGORY TONY, in his official capacity

as Sheriff of Broward County,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

EVANSTON INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant. 

___________________________________________/ 

PLAINTIFF’S REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER 

SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 

Plaintiff, Gregory Tony, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Broward County (“BSO”), 

submits this reply memorandum of law in further support of BSO’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 48].

I. INTRODUCTION

None of Evanston’s arguments warrants a change in this Court’s prior ruling that the 

Parkland Shooting Incident constitutes a single “occurrence” under the Policy [ECF No. 38]1

, or 

provides a basis to deny BSO’s Motion. It is instead clear from the pleadings and this Court’s 

Order that BSO is entitled to a judgment on the pleadings declaring that the Parkland Shooting 

Incident constitutes a single “occurrence” under the Policy, and that BSO must exhaust only a 

single Self-Insured Retention (“SIR”) of $500,000. 

Evanston first argues that BSO seeks an impermissible “advisory opinion.” But the 

Amended Complaint alleges an actual controversy between the parties concerning the proper 

interpretation of the Policy and the parties’ rights and obligations thereunder. “[F]ederal courts 

long have held that the Declaratory Judgment Act is an appropriate vehicle through which to 

determine litigants’ rights and/or liabilities arising from contracts of insurance.” Gerdau 

1 See Order on Defendant Evanston’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike (the “Order”). 

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Ameristeel US Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins Co., No. 20-82217, 2021 WL 7682525, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 

25, 2021). 

Evanston next argues that the doctrine of contra proferentem does not apply, 

notwithstanding this Court’s prior—and correct—determination that it was required to interpret

the ambiguous policy term in BSO’s favor. Evanston’s argument ignores well-settled Florida law 

holding that any ambiguity in insurance policy language “must be liberally construed in favor of 

coverage and strictly against the insurer.” Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 

943, 949-50 (Fla. 2013) (emphasis added). Evanston’s argument that the Court must consider 

extrinsic evidence before interpreting the Policy is simply contrary to binding Florida law. As the 

Florida Supreme Court also made clear in Ruderman, when “the policy is ambiguous it must be 

construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage without resort to consideration of extrinsic

evidence.” Id. at 945 (emphasis added). Evidence of BSO’s supposed subjective intent and its 

purported “sophistication” are “not relevant” and are “immaterial to a proper construction of the 

[P]olicy.” Atlantic Marine Fla., LLC v. Evanston Ins. Co., 775 F.3d 1268, 1277 n.25 (11th Cir. 

2014) (citing Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 948, 952). The Court can therefore interpret the Policy now 

as a matter of law. 

The remainder of Evanston’s Response regurgitates the same legal arguments Evanston 

previously made and which this Court has now twice rejected. As this Court already determined, 

the term “occurrence” is ambiguous as applied to the facts of this case. It “reasonably can be 

interpreted to mean either the entire shooting spree by Cruz or each shot he fired that resulted in 

separate injuries to a separate victim.” (Order at p. 12). And because BSO favors the Parkland 

Shooting Incident be a single “occurrence” under the Policy, that is the interpretation this Court 

must “adopt[] under Florida’s well-settled principles of insurance policy interpretation, which 

require ambiguity in an insurance policy to be construed in favor of the insured.” (Id. at p. 18). 

BSO’s Motion should therefore be granted. 

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Amended Complaint Alleges an Actual Controversy Between the Parties 

Concerning the Interpretation of the Policy

Under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, “a court may declare the 

rights and other legal relations of any interested party in the case of an actual controversy within 

its jurisdiction.” (Order at p. 5). “For a controversy to exist, ‘the facts alleged, under all the 

Case 0:22-cv-62076-WPD Document 53 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/17/2023 Page 2 of 11
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circumstances, [must] show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse 

legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 

judgment.’” (Id. at pp. 5-6) (quoting Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 68 F.3d 409, 

414 (11th Cir. 1995)). Stated differently, “[a] party seeking a declaratory judgment must allege 

facts in a complaint from which it appears that there is a substantial likelihood that it will suffer 

injury in the future that can be remedied or redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Maryland 

Cas. Co. v. Smartcop, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-10100-KMM, 2012 WL 2675476, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 6, 

2012) (complaint stated claim for declaratory relief where parties had bona fide dispute concerning 

the proper interpretation of insurance policy). “[F]ederal courts long have held that the Declaratory 

Judgment Act is an appropriate vehicle through which to determine litigants’ rights and/or 

liabilities arising from contracts of insurance.” Gerdau Ameristeel US Inc., 2021 WL 7682525, at 

*2 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the claim for declaratory judgment regarding parties’ 

rights and obligations under insurance policies was an “improper advisory opinion”).

Evanston’s argument that BSO is merely seeking an “advisory opinion” with respect to a 

“hypothetical claim” is belied by the allegations of the Amended Complaint. The Amended 

Complaint specifically alleges that Evanston “continues to refuse to accept the Parkland Shooting 

Incident as one occurrence under the Policy,” such that “BSO has directly incurred what it believes 

is a direct contractual obligation of [Evanston].” [ECF No. 20 at ¶ 30]. In other words, BSO 

alleges a present dispute concerning the parties’ rights and obligations under the Policy. As alleged 

in the Amended Complaint, Evanston has taken the position that each victim constitutes a separate 

occurrence under the Policy such that BSO must exhaust the $500,000 SIR for each complaint 

filed against BSO. [ECF No. 20 at ¶ 23].2 BSO, on the other hand, contends that the Parkland 

Shooting Incident constitutes a single occurrence such that BSO must exhaust only a single SIR

under the Policy. [Id. at ¶ 21]. As such, there presently is an actual controversy between the parties 

regarding the proper interpretation of the Policy. This is a justiciable controversy that the Court 

may resolve by declaratory judgment. Smartcop, 2020 WL 2675476, at *2.

2

 See also Evanston’s Answer and Affirmative Defensesto Amended Complaint (“Answer”) [ECF 

No. 40 at p. 5, Nos. 5 and 6] (Affirmative Defense No. 5: “The Parkland Shooting Incident 

constitutes more than one occurrence under the Evanston commercial general liability excess 

policy.” and Affirmative Defense No. 6.: “BSO is required to satisfy more than one SIR under 

the Evanston excess policy in connection with the Parkland Shooting Incident.”).

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B. Evanston’s Purported Affirmative Defenses Do Not Prevent Entry of Judgment on 

the Pleadings in Favor of BSO

Evanston next argues that the Motion should be denied because Evanston has asserted 

defenses to the Amended Complaint. Evanston, of course, has the burden of establishing the 

applicability of its affirmative defenses. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Al. v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 

1552 (11th Cir. 1990). “[A]ffirmative defenses must be adequately pled to withstand the motion 

for judgment on the pleadings.” CMZ Enterprises, Inc. v. Spyker USA, LLC, No. 19-61782-CIV, 

2020 WL 9458888, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (affirmative defenses did not defeat entry of judgment 

on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff) (citing Ameriserv Tr. V. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 733, 742 

(2016) (“At a minimum, affirmative defenses must be pled in sufficient detail “to give the opposing 

party notice of the affirmative defense and a chance to respond.’”) (citations omitted); Mortgage 

Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Koeppel, No. 5:18-cv-03443-EJD, 2020 WL 1233925 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2020) (affirmative defenses did not preclude judgment on the pleadings); 

Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Good Karma Holdings LLC, 500 F. Supp. 3d 634, 644 (W.D. Ky. 2020) 

(affirmative defenses did not prevent court from granting plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings).

The only defense that Evanston substantively addresses in its Response is its fourteenth 

defense that “the doctrine of contra proferentum does not apply to BSO and/or the policy is not 

interpreted against Evanston or in favor of BSO.” (Response at p. 1). Specifically, Evanston 

contends that this well-settled principle of insurance policy interpretation should not apply here 

because BSO is a “sophisticated insured who participated in policy negotiations.” (Id. at p. 6). 

First, Evanston did not plead these or any other “facts” in its Answer. [ECF No. 40]. Second, and 

most importantly, the Florida Supreme Court has never articulated a “sophisticated insured” 

exception to the rules of construction applicable to ambiguous insurance policy provisions. To the 

contrary, it has consistently made clear (both before and after Ruderman) that ambiguous policy 

provisions must be liberally construed in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. See 

Ruderman, 117 So. 3d at 949-50 (collecting cases); Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Macedo, 228 So. 

3d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 2017).3

3 Evanston’s argument is based on an overly generous reading of RTG Furniture Corp. v. Indus. 

Risk Insurers, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2008) – a non-binding pre-Ruderman decision that 

is contrary to controlling law from the Florida Supreme Court. In any event, RTG Furniture did 

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Evanston’s reliance on School Bd. of Broward Cnty. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 807 So. 2d 750 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), to argue otherwise is misplaced. In that case, the insurance company

argued that any ambiguity should be construed against the insured. Id. at 752. The Fourth DCA 

disagreed, because “Florida’s policy is to construe any ambiguity in a [policy] ‘in favor of granting 

the broadest possible coverage to those intended to be benefitted by protection of the [policy].’” 

Id. (citations omitted). Indeed, as the Fourth DCA explained, “the burden is on the [insurer], who 

is in the business, to include the appropriate language in its [policies] if it seeks to narrow its 

obligations . . .” Id. In other words, it was on Evanston to include clearer language in its Policy 

if it wanted to avoid the term “occurrence” being ambiguous when applied to a mass shooting like 

the Parkland Shooting Incident. Having failed to do so, Florida law is well-established that the 

Policy must be strictly construed against Evanston and liberally in favor of BSO. Ruderman, 117 

So. 3d at 949-50; Macedo, 228 So. 3d at 1113.

4

 

Evanston’s argument that the Court should consider extrinsic evidence before interpreting 

the Policy is also contrary to Florida’s well-settled rules of insurance policy interpretation. 

Because, as this Court already found, the term “occurrence” is ambiguous when applied to the 

facts of this case, “it must be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage without resort 

to consideration of extrinsic evidence.” Ruderman, 117 So. 3d at 945 (emphasis added).5 While 

Evanston argues that Ruderman is somehow “non-binding,” the Eleventh Circuit disagrees. As 

the Eleventh Circuit recently stated unequivocally in Shiloh Christian Center v. Aspen Specialty 

Ins. Co., 65 F.4th 623 (11th Cir. 2023), “Florida law is clear that when an insurance policy is 

facially ambiguous, the ambiguity is resolved in favor of coverage and against the insurer, 

not, as Evanston suggests, state that contra proferentum has no application where the insured has 

“participated in policy negotiations.” It stated that the rule “has no logical application where the 

insured is a sophisticated commercial entity which has participated in drafting of the policy.” 616 

F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (emphasis added). Neither Evanston’s Response nor its Answer ever alleges 

that BSO participated in the drafting of the Policy. 

4 While Evanston cites to numerous decisions from other jurisdictions to argue that contra 

proferentum should not apply, those out-of-state decisions are entirely irrelevant given controlling 

Florida law on this issue. 

5 Nearly all of the cases Evanston cites for the proposition that extrinsic evidence should be 

considered to decide intent do not involve a court’s interpretation of an insurance policy, where 

the interpretive rules regarding ambiguous provisions are well-established.

Case 0:22-cv-62076-WPD Document 53 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/17/2023 Page 5 of 11
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without regard to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ supposed intentions or expectations.” Id. at 

630-31 (emphasis added) (citing Ruderman and Macedo). 

Consistent with this controlling law, evidence of the parties’ intent, including BSO’s 

supposed subjective intent, as well as evidence of BSO’s supposed “sophistication” is irrelevant 

and “immaterial to a proper construction of the [P]olicy.” Atlantic Marine Fla., LLC, 775 F.3d at

1277 n.25 (citing Ruderman). Therefore, no discovery is needed for the Court to interpret the 

Policy now as a matter of law.6

And, even though Evanston references certain other of its purported defenses on page 1 of 

its Response, it never actually addresses them or explains why they prevent entry of judgment on 

the pleadings. They don’t. These defenses simply are inapplicable to the judicial declaration BSO 

seeks. For example, Evanston’s defenses that BSO has not alleged that it has satisfied the SIR or 

the applicable deductible (Defenses 3, 7, 8, and 9) are irrelevant. BSO is not asking the Court to 

determine whether BSO has met the SIR; it is asking the Court to adjudicate how many SIRs must 

be met by BSO. Similarly, the fact that there have been no judgments entered against BSO related 

to the Parkland Shooting Incident (Defense 10) is irrelevant to the determination of whether BSO 

must exhaust one or multiple SIRs. Likewise, the application of sovereign immunity (Defenses 

11 and 12) is irrelevant to the judicial declaration being sought by BSO. Therefore, none of 

Evanston’s defenses can prevent the entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of BSO. 

C. The Court Has Already Correctly Found the Policy Ambiguous

Evanston again argues that Koikos v. Travelers Inc. Co., 849 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2003), 

requires the Court to conclude that each shooting is a separate “occurrence” under the Policy and 

was not decided based on ambiguity. As this Court already determined, however, the Florida 

Supreme Court in Koikos reached the conclusion it did because it determined identical policy 

language to be ambiguous, and “construing the policy language to mean that each shooting was a 

separate occurrence was a construction determination in favor of the insured and against the 

insurer.” (Order at p. 9) (emphasis in original). This Court already expressly rejected Evanston’s 

argument that the Florida Supreme Court did not determine the term “occurrence” to be ambiguous 

6 Evanston admits that a true and correct copy of the Policy is attached to the Amended Complaint 

as Exhibit “C.” [ECF No. 20 at ¶ 10; ECF No. 40 at ¶ 10]. The interpretation of the Policy is a 

question of law for the Court. Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1985). 

Case 0:22-cv-62076-WPD Document 53 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/17/2023 Page 6 of 11
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when applied to a mass shooting:

7

The policy’s definition of occurrence as applied to the facts of this case is 

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. “Occurrence” can 

reasonably be stated to refer to the entire shooting spree or to each separate shot 

that resulted in a separate injury to a separate victim. Accordingly, we construe the 

term “occurrence” in [the insurer’s] policy in favor of the insured.

(Order at p. 10) (emphasis in original) (quoting Koikos, 849 So. 2d at 273).8

Altogether ignoring this language, Evanston bizarrely argues that “BSO cannot point to an 

alternate reasonable interpretation of the term ‘occurrence’ found by the Florida Supreme Court.” 

(Response at p. 13). The Florida Supreme Court in Koikos expressly held that that the term could 

reasonably mean either the entire shooting spree (the interpretation advocated by the insurer) or 

each separate shot (the interpretation advocated by the insured). 849 So. 2d at 267.9 Were this

language not clear enough (and it is), the Florida Supreme Court subsequently confirmed in Taurus 

Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2005), that the holding in Koikos 

was based on this ambiguity. “[B]ecause the term ‘occurrence’ was ambiguous, we construed it 

in the insured’s favor.” Taurus Holdings, Inc., 913 So. 2d at 534. Evanston asks this Court to 

ignore this explicit statement regarding Koikos because it is not helpful to Evanston.

Evanston likewise asks the Court to ignore the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal’s 

decision in Maddox v. Fla. Farm Bureau Gen., 129 So. 3d 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)—again 

7 That the certified question in Koikos did not mention the term ambiguity is entirely beside the 

point. The court in Koikos answered the certified question the way it did because of ambiguity.

8 Evanston elevates form over substance by observing that the Koikos court stated that it was 

reaching its “decision by looking at the language of the policy in a manner consistent with

precedent regarding the construction of insurance policies in this State.” (Response at p. 12) 

(quoting Koikos, 849 So. 2d at 273). The court in Koikos made that statement immediately after 

it made the pronouncement highlighted by this Court in its Order. And, indeed, one such precedent 

regarding the construction of insurance policies in Florida is that ambiguous policy provisions 

must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. 849 So. 2d at 

271 (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000)).

9 As it did previously, Evanston again argues that the Parkland Shooting Incident constitutes 

multiple occurrences under the “cause theory” adopted in Koikos. But the Court already 

acknowledged that the Florida Supreme Court adopted the “cause theory” in Koikos. (Order at 

p. 9). The Court then concluded that the court in Koikos reached the holding it did because that 

was the construction favored by the insured. (Id.). Here, too, the Court already correctly reached 

the result favored by the insured, BSO.

Case 0:22-cv-62076-WPD Document 53 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/17/2023 Page 7 of 11
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because it reaches a conclusion contrary to the result Evanston wants—in arguing that no case 

applying Florida law since Koikos has found the term “occurrence” ambiguous. (Response at p. 

13). But Maddox did find ambiguity. As this Court already explained, Maddox, “expressly 

following Koikos, ruled that it must construe the policy’s definition of occurrence, which was 

ambiguous as to the facts of that case, against the insurer and in favor of the insured.” (Order at 

p. 11) (emphasis added). Indeed, as the court in Maddox explained in rejecting the insurer’s 

argument that the “dog attack” constituted one occurrence, “the Koikos Court rejected a similar 

argument, concluding that there was no unambiguous language in the policy. . . .” 129 So. 3d at 

1182. “Likewise, in this case it is reasonable to construe the occurrence as the entire dog attack 

or as each separate dog bite.” Id. (emphasis added).

10

Evanston next recycles the inapposite cases that found multiple occurrences under the 

specific facts of those cases. This Court already thoroughly analyzed many of these decisions in 

its Order and found them “distinguishable.” (Order at pp. 12-15).11 The additional cases Evanston 

cites in its Response are also distinguishable. In Bray & Gillespie IX, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. 

Co., No. 6:07-cv-326-Orl-DAB, 2009 WL 1953649, (M.D. Fla. July 6, 2009), for example, “three 

separate hurricanes [that] struck the property at different points in time and caused separate and 

distinct damages,” were found to be separate occurrences under the policy. Id. at *1. Mid10 In Dep’t of Fin. Services v. Barnett, 262 So. 2d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018), the Fourth DCA 

agreed that the court in Koikos reached the conclusion it did because the term “occurrence” was 

ambiguous. Id. at 754.

11 State Nat. Ins. Co. v. Lamberti, 362 F. App. 76 (11th Cir. 2010) involved FTAA lawsuits brought 

by many plaintiffs, each of whom had their own separate interactions with different members of

the BSO. Id. at 81-82. In that instance, because “each interaction with the individual officers is 

the cause of the claim, and is distinguishable in time and space,” the Eleventh Circuit held that

there was more than one occurrence. Id. at 82. In State Nat. Ins. Co. v. City of Miami, No.08-

22861-CIV-SEITZ, 2010 WL 11506250 (S.D. Fla. May 10, 2010), Judge Seitz erroneously 

concluded that the Florida Supreme Court in Koikos did not find this precise policy language

ambiguous when applied to a multiple shooting incident. Id. at *5, n.11. This Court already 

determined that the Florida Supreme Court did find the term occurrence ambiguous in Koikos, as it 

explicitly confirmed in Taurus Holdings. Port Consolidated, Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co. of Hannover,

PLC, 826 F. App. 822 (11th Cir. 2020), moreover, found each separate fuel theft from the insured

by numerous different truck drivers over the span of nearly a year to be a separate occurrence under

the policy. Id. at 824, 829. And, Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 

420 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2005), found that separate criminal acts “separated by sufficient ‘time 

and space’” constituted separate occurrences. Id. at 1332.

Case 0:22-cv-62076-WPD Document 53 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/17/2023 Page 8 of 11
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Continent Cas. Co. v. Basdeo, 742 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (S.D. Fla. 2010), found two separate 

occurrences where the insured did substantially different work on different parts of the building

such that its work on each separate part of the building “set in motion a separate force 

distinguishable in space and time.” Id. at 1348. Similarly, in Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. State 

Farm Fla. Ins. Co., No. 20-12970, 2022 WL 1025164 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 2022), multiple 

occurrences were found where the complaint alleged “four distinct groupings of misconduct” that 

were not “so temporally close to blend into a single ‘occurrence.’” Id. at *7. Finally, in Travelers 

Indem. Co. v. Garcia, No. 20-14387, 2021 WL 2935425 (11th Cir. July 13, 2021), one occurrence 

was found where the insured “was involved in only one accident” giving rise to his injuries. Id. at 

*2. These cases are all distinguishable from a mass shooting that involved a single perpetrator.12 

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, this Court has already correctly determined that “the term ‘occurrence’ within the 

meaning of the Policy is ambiguous as applied to the facts in this case, as it reasonably can be 

interpreted to mean either the entire shooting spree by Cruz or each shot he fired that resulted in 

separate injuries to a separate victim.” (Order at p. 18). “[U]nder Florida’s well-settled principles 

of insurance policy interpretation,” the Parkland Shooting Incident must be construed as a single 

“occurrence” under the Policy because that is the reasonable interpretation favored by BSO. (Id.). 

The Court should therefore grant BSO’s Motion and enter judgment in favor of BSO declaring 

that, as a matter of law, the Parkland Shooting Incident constitutes a single occurrence under the 

Policy, and that BSO is required to exhaust only a single SIR of $500,000. 

12 Evanston further argues that the Florida Supreme Court’s sovereign immunity decisions are 

“inapposite” and that cases from other jurisdictions are “unhelpful.” But, as this Court already 

recognized, these decisions, including one stemming from the Parkland Shooting Incident, further 

support the conclusion (already announced in Koikos) that the term “occurrence” in the Policy is 

ambiguous when applied to a mass shooting. 

Case 0:22-cv-62076-WPD Document 53 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/17/2023 Page 9 of 11
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Dated: August 17, 2023. Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jason S. Mazer__________ 

Jason S. Mazer, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 00149871 

Joshua R. Alhalel 

Florida Bar No. 0016320 

Cimo Mazer Mark PLLC

255 Alhambra Plaza, Suite 1160 

Coral Gables, Florida 33134 

Telephone: (305) 374-6481 

jmazer@cmmlawgroup.com 

-and- 

 David Lawrence Ferguson, Esq. 

 Seth D. Haimovitch, Esq. 

 Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert

One West Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 500 

 

 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

 Telephone: (954) 525-4100 

 ferguson@kolawyers.com

haimovitch@kolawyers.com

9002577420@filings.docketbird.com

nunez@kolawyers.com

Chaparro@kolawyers.com

fields@kolawyers.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 17, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk 

of Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on 

parties listed in the below Service List via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated 

by CM/ECF or in some other manner.

 /s/ Jason S. Mazer__________ 

Case 0:22-cv-62076-WPD Document 53 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/17/2023 Page 10 of 11
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SERVICE LIST

David Lawrence Ferguson, Esq. 

Seth D. Haimovitch, Esq. 

Kopelowitz Ostrow Ferguson Weiselberg Gilbert

One West Las Olas Boulevard 

Suite 500 

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 

Telephone: (954) 525-4100 

ferguson@kolawyers.com 

haimovitch@kolawyers.com 

9002577420@filings.docketbird.com 

nunez@kolawyers.com 

Chaparro@kolawyers.com 

fields@kolawyers.com

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff, Gregory Tony, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Broward County

Kristin D. Perkins, Esq. 

Jordan H. Lewis, Esq. 

Kennedys CMK, LLP 

1395 Brickell Avenue

Suite 610

Miami, FL 33131

Telephone: (305) 371-1111 

Kristen.Perkins@KennedysLaw.com 

Jordan.Lewis@KennedysLaw.com 

Tracy.Gowen@KennedysLaw.com 

Counsel for Defendant, Evanston Insurance Company

Case 0:22-cv-62076-WPD Document 53 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/17/2023 Page 11 of 11