United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

United States of America

v.

Travis Demond Rollins, Defendant

)

)

)

)

Criminal Case No. 22-20464-RNS

Order Denying Motion for New Trial

On March 22, 2023, the Court adjudicated Travis Demond Rollins guilty 

of four counts of wire fraud, one count of transactional money laundering, four 

counts of concealment money laundering, and one count of aggravated identity 

theft, after the jury returned its verdict. (Verdict, ECF No. 77.) Relying on 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, Rollins now asks the Court for a new 

trial, complaining (1) the Court improperly denied Rollins’s motions to strike 

potential jurors for cause who indicated they could not be fair based on his 

previous felony conviction; (2) his co-defendant’s name should have been 

redacted from the superseding indictment and the Government’s trial box 

before being provided to the jury; (3) based on a lack of evidence, he should 

have been granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on count ten of the 

superseding indictment, charging him with aggravated identity theft; and (4) 

the Court improperly expanded the jury instructions on wire fraud in response 

to a jury instruction. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 89.) The Government has 

responded, setting forth its opposition to all four arguments (Gov’t’s Resp., ECF 

No. 101.) The Court has carefully reviewed Rollins’s submission, as well as the 

Government’s response, the record, and the relevant legal authorities and 

denies Rollins’ motion for a new trial (ECF No. 89).

1. Legal Standard

As set forth in Rule 33, upon a defendant’s motion, “the court may 

vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Although a district court’s decision to grant a new trial 

is discretionary, the Eleventh Circuit submits such a decision to particularly 

close scrutiny. United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1336 (11th Cir. 

2005). “[A] district court may not reweigh the evidence and set aside the verdict 

simply because it feels that some other result would be more reasonable . . . 

The evidence must preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that it would 

be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.” United States v. Martinez, 

763 F.2d 1297, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 1985) (cleaned up) (reversing a district 

court’s decision to grant new trial and noting that “[c]ourts are to grant [new 

Case 1:22-cr-20464-RNS Document 105 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/30/2023 Page 1 of 6
trials] sparingly and with caution, doing so only in those really ‘exceptional 

cases.’”).

2. Discussion

As set forth below, Rollins’s claims all miss the mark. The Court has 

previously addressed his arguments during his trial and he fails to cite any 

new legal authority in support of his motion. Further, the jury rendered a just 

verdict, based on the evidence presented and properly admitted at trial. 

A. The Court’s denial of Rollins’s for-cause strikes does not warrant a 

new trial.

Rollins maintains that, during voir dire, “the Court denied [his] various 

motions to strike potential jurors for cause who had indicated they could not 

be fair to a defendant,” like Rollins, “with a previous felony conviction during 

jury selection.” (Def.’s Mot. at 1.) Accordingly, says Rollins, he was “forced” “to 

utilize p[er]emptory strikes.” (Id. at 2) As result, Rollins claims, he was deprived 

of “the ability to strike other jurors in a failed effort to keep biased jurors off the 

petit jury.” (Id.) Rollins’s argument is unavailing. 

During voir dire, the Court informed the jurors that Rollins was a 

convicted felon, pursuant to the Government’s use of his conviction under Rule 

404 of Federal Rule of Evidence. The Court emphasized that the conviction 

could only be used for certain purposes (which was explained in more detail 

through the Court’s instruction at trial). Based on their responses during voir 

dire and in their jury questionnaires, none of the selected jurors indicated that 

they would be biased against Rollins in light of his conviction. Any prospective 

jurors who indicated that they could not be impartial due to the conviction 

were either excused for cause or via a peremptory challenge.

As the Eleventh Circuit has made plain, “[i]t is not reversible error for a 

district court to deny a party’s motion to strike for cause, thus forcing the party 

to ‘use up’ its peremptory strikes.” Austin v. FL HUD Rosewood LLC, 791 F. 

App’x 819, 827 (11th Cir. 2019). Importantly, Rollins does not contend that any 

of the selected jurors were in fact biased against him based on his prior 

conviction. Indeed, he supplies no record support or even specific argument

that any of the selected jurors indicated that they would be biased given 

Rollins’s previous conviction.

Rollins’s position focuses only on the use of his peremptory challenges 

because the Court denied some of his motions to strike prospective jurors. 

Rollins’s argument is purely speculative: he provides no support for his theory 

that, had the Court excused these purportedly biased jurors—none of whom he

even identifies—then that would have changed the jury composition. But the 

Case 1:22-cr-20464-RNS Document 105 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/30/2023 Page 2 of 6
United States Supreme Court has firmly “reject[ed] the notion that the loss of a 

peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an 

impartial jury.” See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). In the end, 

Rollins’s Sixth Amendment claim based on losing preemptory challenges

ultimately falls flat as it fails to “focus . . . on the jurors who ultimately sat” on 

the jury. Id. at 86.

B. Rollins is not entitled to a new trial based on the jury’s exposure to 

his co-defendant’s name.

Rollins also seeks a new trial based on the jury’s exposure to the name of 

his co-defendant, Elrod Phillips, within a copy of the unredacted indictment 

and a trial box which were both provided to the jury during their deliberations.

The Court is not persuaded.

When a jury is exposed to extraneous material, or material not in 

evidence, the law requires a new trial “if the exposure poses a reasonable 

possibility of prejudice.” United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1291 (11th 

Cir. 2007). Here, the exposure was the co-defendant’s name in the superseding 

indictment and on one of the exhibit boxes the Government sent back to the 

jury room during deliberations. Other than Rollins’s perfunctory claims of 

prejudice, harm, and unfairness, he fails to establish any reasonable possibility 

that this exposure improperly influenced the jury’s verdict. Throughout the 

government’s case in chief, Phillips was identified as Rollins’s accomplice and 

several exhibits were introduced that named Phillips, including fraudulent tax 

documents signed by Phillips and electronic money transfers to Phillips after 

the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) funds were disbursed. 

As such, “the exposure of any juror to the unredacted indictment would 

not have provided that juror with factual information to which the juror did not

already properly have access.” United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1184 

(11th Cir. 2011) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying defendants motion for a new trial based on the jury’s exposure to

an unredacted indictment). Without any factual basis or legal support, Rollins’s 

arguments for a new trial on this basis are unavailing.

C. The evidence presented during the Government’s case in chief was 

sufficient to establish that Rollins committed aggravated identity 

theft.

Rollins maintains that he should have been granted a judgment of 

acquittal as to count ten, charging him with aggravated identity theft, because 

“the alleged victim of the ID theft”—P.R.—"testified that he was ‘OK’ with the 

Case 1:22-cr-20464-RNS Document 105 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/30/2023 Page 3 of 6
loan received through the use of his ID information.” (Def.’s Mot. at 3.) The 

Court disagrees.

Following a multiple-day trial, the jury determined that Rollins submitted 

fraudulent applications for both an Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”), 

where he impersonated P.R., and a PPP Loan. Based upon the fraudulent 

misrepresentations in those applications, Rollins received COVID-relief funds 

and wired a portion of these funds to multiple people, including those who 

aided him in the criminal conduct. The Government introduced a significant 

amount of evidence supporting the charged conduct, including seven witnesses 

and nearly forty exhibits. (See ECF Nos. 82, 85-88.) Notably, P.R. testified that 

he was the owner of the transportation company at issue, All Items Moved, 

Inc., and unaware that his identity was used in the EIDL application that 

Rollins submitted. P.R. testified that he did not authorize Rollins to apply for

an EIDL or PPP loan on All Items Moved’s behalf. Further, All Items Moved’s

company attorney, Jay Beskin, also testified and corroborated P.R.’s ownership 

of All Items Moved and his lack of knowledge regarding Rollins’s impersonating 

P.R.

Ultimately then, at trial, the Government proved that Rollins used P.R.’s 

name and birthdate without lawful authority, supporting his conviction. Rollins 

makes no showing that the evidence in this case preponderates heavily against 

the verdict. To the contrary, the Government presented P.R.’s own testimony

that he did not authorize or have knowledge of Rollins’s using his personal 

information in applying for the EIDL at issue.

Rollins improperly focuses on the fact that P.R. was aware of an 

underlying business grant that Rollins lied about in disguising All Items 

Moved’s EIDL application. According to Rollins’s theory, P.R. authorized 

Rollins’s conduct because P.R. did not try to prevent him from applying for a 

business grant. This is factually inaccurate. P.R. never “OK[ayed]” or allowed 

Rollins to apply for the EIDL loan, and, as set forth above, P.R. testified several 

times that he did not want any loans in the business’s or P.R.’s name. He even 

testified that he prevented Rollins from applying for a car loan because he was 

adamant, as All Items Moved’s business owner, that the company should not 

have any loans under its name. P.R. did not provide Rollins with lawful 

authority to apply for this business loan and, in that same breath, use P.R.’s 

name and birthdate in a business loan. As such, P.R.’s testimony and the 

documentary evidence fully support the government’s theory that Rollins

knowingly and willfully used P.R.’s name and personal information without 

P.R.’s knowledge in the fraudulent EIDL application, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 

1028A(a)(1). Rollins did not overcome the government’s theory of prosecution or 

Case 1:22-cr-20464-RNS Document 105 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/30/2023 Page 4 of 6
the weight of the evidence against him. In short, the evidence does not 

preponderate heavily against the verdict.

D. The Court properly instructed the jury as to the elements of wirefraud.

Lastly, Rollins maintains he is entitled to a new trial because the Court, 

“in responding to a question from the jury,” “gave an expanded answer, outside 

of the scope of the question, and added additional jury instructions,” over 

Rollins’s objections. (Def.’s Mot. at 3.) Rollins’s argument misses the mark.

After closing arguments, the Court provided the jury with instructions 

that contained, among other things, the elements of wire fraud. (See ECF No. 

70.) During their deliberations, the jury submitted a question regarding the 

wire-fraud instructions and asked whether personal gain could be considered 

in determining Rollins’s intent to defraud. (Jury Note and Court Resp., ECF No. 

75.) Over Rollins’s objection, the Court responded that personal gain is not a 

wire-fraud element and also noted that “if a defendant knowingly and 

intentionally uses false and fraudulent representations to deceive a lender into 

approving a loan, the issuance of a loan based upon those knowingly false 

representations is a loss or injury . . . .” (Id.) This response was legally correct, 

straight forward, and based on the Court’s instructions to the jury. Aside from 

his conclusory claims of impropriety, prejudice, and the denial of due process, 

Rollins fails to show that the Court in any way abused its discretion.

“District courts have considerable discretion regarding the extent and 

character of supplemental jury instructions, but the supplemental instructions 

cannot misstate the law or confuse the jury.” United States v. Joyner, 882 F.3d 

1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 

420–21 (6th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “it is sometimes necessary and proper 

for the trial court to re-charge a jury to correct possible misunderstandings 

based on the original instruction given” and that the court has a duty “to 

instruct the jury on the law of the case”); Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d

988, 994 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] trial judge, as governor of the trial, enjoys wide 

discretion” which “carries over to a trial judge’s response to a question from the 

jury.”).

Here, the Court fashioned a response that accurately recited the law and 

properly informed the jury that “personal gain” should not be considered an 

element of wire fraud. (Jury Note and Court Resp. at 2.) The Court made plain

that “personal gain” can be a motivation to do an act but to prove wire fraud, 

the Government is not required to prove “personal gain” so if the defendant 

“knowingly and intentionally uses false and fraudulent representations to 

deceive a lender into approving a loan, the issuance of a loan based upon those 

Case 1:22-cr-20464-RNS Document 105 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/30/2023 Page 5 of 6
knowingly false representations is a loss or injury regardless of whether the 

defendant had any personal gain.” (Id.) The Court disagrees with Rollins’s 

contention that the Court’s “expanded answer” added additional prejudicial 

instructions. The Court’s answer aligns with well-established precedent as it 

instructs the jury that Rollins’s PPP and EIDL misrepresentations have to be 

done with an intention to cause harm (in other words, the issuance of a loan).

Rollins also fails to specifically articulate how the jury was improperly 

instructed or how the instruction was applied in an improper manner. In sum, 

he fails to show that the Court abused its discretion.

3. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Rollins’s motion for a 

new trial (ECF No. 89).

Done and ordered, in Miami, Florida, on May 26, 2023.

_______________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Case 1:22-cr-20464-RNS Document 105 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/30/2023 Page 6 of 6