COUNTERNARCOTICS:

LESSONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

June 2018
Cover photo credit: 

Afghan farmers work in their poppy field in Khugyani District of Nangarhar 

Province on April 29, 2013. (AFP photo by Noorullah Shirzada)

PAKTIKA

KHOWST

TAKHAR

BADAKHSHAN

BAGHLAN

BAMYAN

FARYAB

WARDAK

KUNAR

KUNDUZ

NURISTAN

NANGARHAR

FARAH

NIMROZ

HELMAND

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

GHOR

GHAZNI

BALKH

BADGHIS

KABUL

KAPISA

PAKTIYA

LOGAR

LAGHMAN

JOWZJAN

PARWAN

SAR-E PUL

HERAT

DAYKUNDI

SAMANGAN

PANJSHIR

over photo credit: 

fghan farmers work in their poppy field in Khugyani District of Nangarhar 

rovince on April 29, 2013. (AFP photo by Noorullah Shirzada)

PAKTIKA

KHOWST

TAKHAR

BADAKHSHAN

BAGHLAN

BAMYAN

FARYAB

WARDAK

KUNAR

KUNDUZ

NURISTAN

NANGARHAR

FARAH

NIMROZ

HELMAND

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

GHOR

GHAZNI

BALKH

BADGHIS

KABUL

KAPISA

PAKTIYA

LOGAR

LAGHMAN

JOWZJAN

PARWAN

SAR-E PUL

HERAT

DAYKUNDI

SAMANGAN

PANJSHIR
Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan is the fifth 

lessons learned report issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction. Since 2002, stemming opium poppy cultivation and drug 

production in Afghanistan has been an important, though not primary, goal for 

the United States, its coalition partners, and the Afghan government. While 

very little Afghan heroin comes to the United States, the Afghan drug trade 

has undermined reconstruction and security goals in many ways, including 

by financing insurgent groups, fueling government corruption, eroding state 

legitimacy, and exacting an enormous human and financial toll. Given the 

upward trend of opium poppy cultivation and the number of Afghans who rely 

on the opium industry, it is critical that U.S. policymakers determine how best 

to mitigate the drug trade’s impact on U.S. reconstruction goals in Afghanistan. 

This report examines the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan, detailing 

how the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), and the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA) tried to deter farmers and traffickers from participating in the cultivation 

and trade of opium, build Afghan government counterdrug capacity, and 

develop the country’s licit economy. While we found several examples of 

success—some Afghans were able to move away from poppy cultivation and 

Afghan counterdrug units became increasingly capable, trusted partners—those 

successes were limited in their impact. The report identifies lessons to inform 

U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and other major drug-producing and 

transit countries, and provides 13 actionable, evidence-based recommendations 

to strengthen these efforts. 

Our analysis reveals no counterdrug program undertaken by the United 

States, its coalition partners, or the Afghan government resulted in lasting 

reductions in poppy cultivation or opium production—and, without a stable 

security environment, there was little possibility of success. We found the U.S. 

government failed to develop and implement counternarcotics strategies that 

effectively directed U.S. agencies toward shared, achievable goals. For example, 

though strategies highlighted the need for coordinated interventions, such as 

eradication and development assistance, these efforts were not consistently 

implemented in the same geographic locations. Further, eradication efforts had 

no lasting impact on the opium poppy problem. The U.S. push from 2005 to 2008 

for aerial spraying damaged U.S.-Afghan relations during that time, hindering 

cooperation on other fronts. Alternative development programs intended to 

Special Inspector General

for Afghanistan Reconstruction

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
support farmers in their transition away from poppy cultivation were often 

too short-term, relied on the simple substitution of other crops for poppy, and 

sometimes even contributed to increased poppy production. Counternarcotics 

goals were often not incorporated into larger security and development 

strategies, which hindered the achievement of those goals. 

While discussions of counternarcotics efforts generally focus on numbers—

related to drug crop cultivation, production, arrests, seizures, and cost—we 

should not forget the human element of these efforts. Many U.S. and Afghan 

security forces, Afghan civilians, DEA agents, and contractors have been killed or 

wounded in the course of counternarcotics-related missions. Similarly, this report 

attempts to ground its treatment of counternarcotics issues in an appreciation 

for the role opium poppy plays in the lives of millions of rural Afghans, whose 

livelihood may depend on the success or failure of an opium harvest and, yet, who 

also suffer from the drug trade’s corrosive effects. It is our hope that this report 

succeeds in capturing the many facets of this enduring issue.

SIGAR began its lessons learned program in late 2014 at the urging of 

General John Allen, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and others who had served 

in Afghanistan. Our lessons learned reports comply with SIGAR’s legislative 

mandate to provide independent and objective leadership and recommendations 

to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; prevent and detect waste, 

fraud, and abuse; and inform Congress and the Secretaries of State and Defense 

about reconstruction-related problems and the need for corrective action. 

Congress created SIGAR as an independent agency. Unlike other inspectors 

general, SIGAR is not housed within any single department. SIGAR is the 

only inspector general focused solely on Afghanistan reconstruction, and 

the only one devoted exclusively to reconstruction issues. While other 

inspectors general have jurisdiction over the programs and operations of their 

respective departments or agencies, SIGAR has jurisdiction over all programs 

and operations supported with U.S. reconstruction dollars, regardless of the 

agency involved. Because SIGAR has the authority to look across the entire 

reconstruction effort, it is uniquely positioned to identify and address whole-ofgovernment lessons.

Our lessons learned reports synthesize not only the body of work and expertise 

of SIGAR, but also that of other oversight agencies, government entities, current 

and former officials with on-the-ground experience, academic institutions, and 

independent scholars. The reports document what the U.S. government sought 

to accomplish, assess what it achieved, and evaluate the degree to which these 

efforts helped the United States reach its reconstruction goals in Afghanistan. 

They also provide recommendations to address the challenges stakeholders face 

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
in ensuring efficient, effective, and sustainable reconstruction efforts, not just in 

Afghanistan, but in future contingency operations. 

SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program comprises subject matter experts with 

considerable experience working and living in Afghanistan, aided by a team of 

seasoned research analysts. I want to express my deepest appreciation to the 

team members who produced this report. I thank Kate Bateman, project lead; 

David Mansfield, subject matter expert and lead researcher; Matthew Bentrott, 

Nikolai Condee-Padunov, Sonia Pinto, and Matthew Rubin, research analysts; 

Olivia Paek, graphic designer; Elizabeth Young, editor; and Joseph Windrem, 

program director. In producing its reports, the program also uses the significant 

skills and experience found in SIGAR’s Audits, Investigations, and Research 

and Analysis directorates, and the Office of Special Projects. I thank all of the 

individuals who provided their time and effort to contribute to this report. 

In addition, I am grateful to the many U.S. government officials at State, USAID, 

DOD, the Department of Justice, DEA, and other agencies who provided 

valuable insights and feedback. This report is truly a collaborative effort meant 

to not only identify problems, but also to learn from them and apply reasonable 

solutions to improve future reconstruction efforts. 

I believe our lessons learned reports will be a key legacy of SIGAR. Through 

these reports, we hope to reach a diverse audience in the legislative and 

executive branches, at the strategic and programmatic levels, both in 

Washington and in the field. By leveraging our unique interagency mandate, 

we intend to do everything we can to make sure the lessons from the United 

States’ largest reconstruction effort are identified, acknowledged, and, most 

importantly, remembered and applied to ongoing reconstruction efforts in 

Afghanistan, as well as to future conflicts and reconstruction efforts elsewhere 

in the world. 

John F. Sopko 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
TABLE OF CONTENTS | COUNTERNARCOTICS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VII

CHAPTER 1 1

INTRODUCTION

The Afghan Opium Economy 5

The U.S. Counternarcotics Response 17

Key Points for Understanding the Counternarcotics  

Effort in Afghanistan 24

CHAPTER 2 37

A CHRONOLOGY OF COUNTERNARCOTICS 

OVER THE AFGHAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT

Starting from Nothing: 2002–2003 38

Counternarcotics as a Priority: 2004–2008 44

Benefiting from Military Forces on the Ground: 

2009–2012 50

A Neglected Issue: 2013–2016 54

Back in the Sights: 2017–2018 55

CHAPTER 3 59

STRANDS OF THE COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORT: 

POLICY DEBATES AND EFFECTS ON THE GROUND 

Interdiction and Counternarcotics Law Enforcement 60

Eradication: The War on the Crop 82

Alternative Development: 

Advancing the Legal Economy 106

Mobilizing Afghan Political Support 

and Building Institutions 129

CHAPTER 4 141

MAINTAINING A COHESIVE STRATEGY

Background on Sequencing and Collocation 142

Aligning Funding with U.S. Counternarcotics Strategies 142

GIS Analysis: Using Satellite Imagery 147

Balancing the U.S. Approach to Counternarcotics: 

Finding the Right Formula 157

CHAPTER 5 161

CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

Findings 163

Lessons 171

Recommendations 178
COUNTERNARCOTICS | TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES 189

Appendix A: GIS Annex 189

Appendix B: Methodology 208

Appendix C: Abbreviations 215

Endnotes 216

Acknowledgments 249

TABLES

Table 1: Defining Four Strands of Counternarcotics Activity 3

Table 2: Counternarcotics Strands and Pillars 18

Table 3: U.S. Counternarcotics Strategies and Objectives for Afghanistan 45

Table 4: Specialized Units Within the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan 67

FIGURES

Figure 1: U.S. Counternarcotics Funding Allocations by Agency, 2002–2017 19

Figure 2: U.S. Counternarcotics Funding Allocations by Strand, 2002–2017 19

Figure 3: Afghanistan Total Poppy Cultivation Estimates, 1999–2017 31

Figure 4: Total Poppy Cultivation Estimates by Province, 1999–2017 32

Figure 5: Select Afghan and U.S./International Programs and Institutions, 2001–2018 42

Figure 6: Eradication Force Over Time 46

Figure 7: Interdiction Funding Compared to Total Counternarcotics Funding, 2002–2017 61

Figure 8: Eradication Funding Compared to Total Counternarcotics Funding, 2002–2017 90

Figure 9: Crop Mapping for Nad Ali in Helmand Province 102

Figure 10: Alternative Development Funding Compared to Total 

Counternarcotics Funding, 2002–2017 106

Figure 11: Select Alternative Development Programs, 2002–2018 112

Figure 12: IDEA-NEW Project Evaluation: Poppy Replacing Orchards 115

Figure 13: Tolukan Canal, Change in Poppy Cultivation, 2013 and 2015 117

Figure 14: Poppy Probability Maps, 2012 and 2016 122

Figure 15: Mobilizing Political Support Funding Compared to Total 

Counternarcotics Funding, 2002–2017 129

Figure 16: Mapping of Good Performers Initiative Projects 134 

Figure 17: Good Performers Initiative Irrigation Projects Used to Support Poppy Cultivation 136

Figure 18: U.S. Counternarcotics Funding Allocations by Strand, 2002–2017 145

Figure 19: Mapping of Alternative Development Projects and 

Eradication in Helmand Province, 2006–2015 149

Figure 20: Mapping of Alternative Development Projects and

Eradication in Helmand Province, 2013 150
TABLE OF CONTENTS | COUNTERNARCOTICS

Figure 21: Mapping of Alternative Development Projects and

Eradication in Nangarhar Province, 2005–2014 151

Figure 22: Crop Mapping for Khugyani in Nangarhar Province, 2006–2016 152

Figure 23: Mapping of Irrigation Projects in Nangarhar Province, 2004–2016 153

Figure 24: Crop Mapping for Helmand Food Zone, 2009–2012 154

Figure 25: Crop Mapping of Poppy Near Security Infrastructure, Nangarhar Province 158

Figure A.1: Crop Mapping for Nad Ali in Helmand Province (Site A) 190

Figure A.2: Crop Mapping for Nad Ali in Helmand Province (Site B) 192

Figure A.3: Mapping of Good Performers Initiative Projects, 2008–2015 194

Figure A.4: Helmand Food Zone Wheat Seed Distribution, 2009 195

Figure A.5: Mapping of Alternative Development Projects and Eradication 

in Helmand Province, 2006–2015 196

Figure A.6: Reduction of Alternative Development Projects in Helmand Province, 2014 197

Figure A.7: Reduction of Alternative Development Projects in Helmand Province, 2015 198

Figure A.8: Mapping of Alternative Development Projects and Eradication in 

Helmand Province, 2013 199

Figure A.9: Mapping of Alternative Development Projects and Eradication in 

Helmand Province, 2009 200

Figure A.10: Crop Mapping for Shna Jama in Helmand Province, 2008–2017 201

Figure A.11: Mapping of Alternative Development Projects and Eradication 

 in Nangarhar Province, 2005–2014 202

Figure A.12: Crop Mapping of Khugyani in Nangarhar Province, 2006–2016 203

Figure A.13: Layers of Control, Nangarhar Province, 2017 204

Figure A.14: Mapping of Irrigation Projects in Nangarhar Province, 2004–2016 205

Figure A.15: Mapping of Alternative Development Projects in Nangarhar Province, 2005 206

Figure A.16: Mapping of Alternative Development Projects and Eradication 

 in Nangarhar Province, 2007 207

HIGHLIGHTS

The Opium Trade from Farm to Arm 8

Comparisons with Plan Colombia 27

The Afghan Threat Finance Cell, 2008–2014 71

USFOR-A and ANDSF Air Interdiction Campaign, 2017–2018 75

Conditionality 108

FIGURES, CONTINUED
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 2002, stemming opium poppy cultivation and drug production in 

Afghanistan has been an important, though not primary, goal for the United 

States, its coalition partners, and the Afghan government. While very 

little Afghan heroin comes to the United States, the Afghan drug trade has 

undermined reconstruction and security goals in many ways, including by 

financing insurgent groups, fueling government corruption, eroding state 

legitimacy, and exacting an enormous human and financial toll. From fiscal 

year (FY) 2002 through FY 2017, the U.S. government allocated approximately 

$8.62 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. This included more 

than $7.28 billion for programs with a substantial counternarcotics focus and 

$1.34 billion on programs that included a counternarcotics component. 

Despite this investment, drug production and trafficking remain entrenched. 

Afghanistan is the world’s largest opium producer, and opium poppy is the 

country’s largest cash crop, with an estimated annual export value of $1.5 billion 

to $3 billion in recent years. In 2017, poppy cultivation and opium production 

reached record highs. U.S. counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan have thus 

failed to produce lasting reductions in both cultivation and production. Given 

the upward trend of cultivation figures and the number of Afghans who rely on 

the opium industry, it is critical that U.S. policymakers determine how best to 

mitigate the drug trade’s impact on U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan.

U.S. counternarcotics programs and policies over the past 16 years have 

included efforts to develop Afghanistan’s licit economy, build Afghan 

government counterdrug capacity, and deter farmers and traffickers from 

participating in the cultivation and trade of opium. This report charts how 

counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan evolved and how counterdrug 

initiatives were incorporated into the overall reconstruction effort. It categorizes 

U.S. counternarcotics efforts into four strands of activity: interdiction and 

counterdrug law enforcement, eradication, alternative development, and the 

mobilization of Afghan political and institutional support. In addition, the report 

uses Geographic Information System (GIS) imagery and analysis in new ways to 

evaluate counternarcotics program implementation and outcomes over time. 

The report draws critical lessons from the U.S. counternarcotics experience in 

Afghanistan to inform and improve ongoing counterdrug and reconstruction 

efforts. In addition, the report provides actionable, evidence-based 

recommendations that can strengthen U.S. counternarcotics programs in 

Afghanistan as well as other countries facing drug-related challenges.
viii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FINDINGS

Our report identifies 13 key findings regarding the U.S. counternarcotics effort 

in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2017 that serve as the basis for the report’s lessons 

and recommendations:

1. No counterdrug program undertaken by the United States, its coalition 

partners, or the Afghan government resulted in lasting reductions in poppy 

cultivation or opium production. 

2. Without a stable security environment, there was little possibility of 

effectively curtailing poppy cultivation and drug production in Afghanistan. 

3. The U.S. government failed to develop and implement counternarcotics 

strategies that outlined or effectively directed U.S. agencies toward 

shared goals. 

4. Eradication and development assistance efforts were not sufficiently 

coordinated or consistently implemented in the same geographic locations.

5. Counternarcotics goals were often not incorporated into larger security and 

development strategies, which hindered the achievement of those goals and 

the wider reconstruction effort.

6. Counternarcotics efforts were not a consistent priority at the most senior 

levels of the U.S. or Afghan government. 

7. Eradication efforts, including compensated eradication, had no lasting impact 

on poppy cultivation or national-level drug production.

8. The failed U.S. push for aerial spraying damaged the U.S.-Afghan relationship 

and unity of effort in the coalition’s counterdrug mission.

9. Alternative development programs were too short-term and often relied on 

the simple substitution of other crops for poppy. These programs did not 

bring about lasting reductions in opium poppy cultivation and sometimes 

even contributed to increased poppy production.

10. In limited areas with improved security and greater economic opportunities, 

some Afghans were able to diversify their livelihoods away from opium 

poppy. However, local reductions in poppy cultivation were almost always 

short-lived or offset by increases elsewhere.

11. U.S. support helped Afghan counterdrug units develop promising capacity 

and become trusted partners. However, these units did not have a strategic 

impact on the drug trade due to insecurity, corruption and poor capacity 

within the criminal justice system, and lack of high-level support from the 

Afghan government.

12. Poor-quality estimates of poppy cultivation levels, eradication numbers, and 

drug money going to the insurgency made it more difficult for policymakers 

to accurately assess the problem and determine effective policy responses.

13. The counternarcotics performance metrics used in Afghanistan, particularly 

the overemphasis on annual estimates of poppy cultivation and eradication, 

contributed to ineffective policy decisions.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | ix

When the United States and its coalition partners intervened in Afghanistan 

in 2001, poppy cultivation was at an historic low due to a successful, shortlived Taliban ban on cultivation. Afghanistan had just 7,606 hectares of 

opium poppy cultivation in 2001, or approximately 1/43rd of the estimated 

328,000 hectares in 2017.1

 This low level of cultivation was an anomaly, 

however, and policymakers knew the drug trade could pose serious challenges 

to the reconstruction effort. Counternarcotics was included as one of the five 

pillars of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) framework established at a 2002 

donor nation conference, at which the UK agreed to serve as the lead nation 

for counternarcotics.

The initial two years of counterdrug work were marked by increased poppy 

cultivation and drug production as farmers and traffickers took advantage of 

the power vacuum that followed the collapse of the Taliban government. The 

lack of functioning Afghan law enforcement and judicial institutions on which 

counternarcotics work normally relies limited the options available to address the 

drug trade. In the spring of 2002, the UK started an eradication program based on 

compensating farmers whose poppy crops were destroyed. This approach proved 

to be misguided and ineffective, as it was inconsistently applied and undercut 

by corruption. Yet, the UK embraced the unrealistic goal of eliminating poppy 

cultivation within 10 years.2

 At this stage, U.S. counternarcotics programs were 

minimal, in part due to the U.S. military’s concerns that counterdrug efforts would 

detract from higher priority counterterrorism goals.

By mid-2003, the UK had helped to establish a Counter Narcotics Directorate under 

the Afghan National Security Council and a National Drug Control Strategy for 

Afghanistan. But progress was stymied by the need to build law enforcement units 

from scratch, a fragmented SSR effort, and a lack of focus on counternarcotics 

within the Afghan government. These challenges led the UK to build the Afghan 

Special Narcotics Force, which was tasked with raiding and destroying drugproduction facilities while other counternarcotics institutions were still developing. 

Rural development programs to encourage alternative sources of income in 

poppy-growing areas were also slow to get started. The U.S. State Department’s 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) initially 

supported small-scale alternative development projects conditioned on 

reductions in poppy cultivation. However, the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) was reluctant to support these initiatives due, in part, to 

concerns that conditioning aid on reductions in poppy cultivation could be selfdefeating.3

 These conflicting approaches, coupled with growing concerns over 

the UK’s effectiveness as lead nation for counternarcotics, led to a restructuring 

of the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan in 2003 and a push by some 

U.S. officials for a greater U.S. counterdrug role.
x | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

A large increase in poppy cultivation in 2004 strengthened this push, particularly 

in Congress and the State Department. In 2005, the U.S. government put forth 

a new counternarcotics strategy that emphasized poppy crop eradication. 

To achieve eradication goals, INL strongly advocated for aerial spraying of 

chemical herbicides, a policy that proved highly divisive. When officials within 

the U.S., Afghan, and coalition governments expressed opposition to aerial 

spraying, the focus shifted to manual eradication and led to the creation of 

the Central Poppy Eradication Force. At the same time, USAID significantly 

increased alternative development programming, which aimed to reduce poppy 

cultivation and promote viable economic alternatives. 

By 2006, the initial Department of Defense (DOD) resistance to counternarcotics 

was ebbing. DOD began to give higher priority to counternarcotics objectives 

in response to rising levels of cultivation, as well as the increasingly common 

view that there was a nexus between the drug trade and the insurgency. The 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and 

Global Threats began to provide training and equipment to Afghan agencies in 

the hopes of achieving both counterdrug and counterinsurgency objectives. The 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) deployed more personnel in country, 

including agents for the recently launched Foreign-Deployed Advisory and 

Support Teams to mentor Afghan units and raid drug production sites. In 2008, 

DEA, DOD, and Treasury established the Afghan Threat Finance Cell to target 

financial flows related to terrorist and insurgent groups, the drug trade, and 

corruption. These interagency efforts reflected both an increased focus on and 

resources for U.S. counterdrug programs in Afghanistan.

A number of international partners also scaled up their counternarcotics 

efforts after 2004. The British government established a Counter Narcotics 

Trust Fund to coordinate donor financial support, as well as new counterdrug 

programs in cooperation with the United States. These programs included 

intelligence organizations and judicial reform efforts to prosecute and 

convict drug traffickers. Other donor institutions, including the World 

Bank, European Commission, and the UK’s Department for International 

Development (DFID), examined how economic development programs could 

help counter the drug trade and lent technical expertise. On the military 

side, a 2008 change to NATO’s operations plan allowed International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel to combat drug-trafficking activities 

linked to the insurgency. Despite these initiatives, poppy cultivation, the 

primary metric by which counternarcotics programs were judged, remained at 

historically high levels. 

Beginning in 2009, the U.S. counternarcotics effort underwent significant 

changes due, in part, to the surge of coalition military and civilian personnel. 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | xi

This surge coincided with a change in U.S. counternarcotics strategy overseen 

by the newly appointed Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

Richard Holbrooke. Ambassador Holbrooke’s appointment marked the end of 

the U.S. government push for aerial spraying and the disbanding of the centrally 

led eradication force. On the law enforcement side, specialized counterdrug 

institutions like the Counter Narcotics Justice Center and National Interdiction 

Unit were demonstrating increased capability, but were hindered by corruption 

within the Afghan government. 

In 2010, a new U.S. counternarcotics strategy emphasized rural development to 

provide legal economic opportunities and interdiction initiatives explicitly focused 

on cutting drug funding to the insurgency. This strategy was supported by the 

influx of thousands of ISAF and Afghan security forces into major poppy-growing 

provinces that aided programs like the Helmand Food Zone (HFZ). The food zone 

program was viewed as a comprehensive set of counternarcotics interventions 

and supported the reduction of poppy cultivation in some areas of the province. 

However, declines in poppy on higher-quality agricultural land were offset by the 

spread of cultivation to outlying desert areas. Interdiction operations increased with 

the greater security force presence, but later proved unsustainable because of their 

dependence on the temporary influx of coalition and Afghan forces.

After leveling off in 2009 and 2010, poppy cultivation began to rise again in 2011. 

In Helmand, the rise was compounded by misguided efforts to replace poppy 

with wheat, which had the unintended effect of displacing people and poppy 

to desert areas. In 2012, the U.S. government scaled back its counternarcotics 

strategy in recognition of the reduced numbers of coalition personnel and the 

shortcomings of previous efforts. The new strategy focused on two primary 

objectives: building self-sufficient Afghan counterdrug capabilities and 

weakening the links between insurgents and narcotics.

Within the reconstruction effort as a whole, the focus on counternarcotics was 

also reduced after 2012. In practice, U.S. efforts consisted primarily of supporting 

specialized counterdrug units and scaled-back eradication initiatives. USAID shifted 

away from requiring specific counternarcotics indicators in alternative development 

programs and paid little attention to drug-related impacts. Some U.S.-supported 

demand-reduction and addiction treatment programs continued, but were 

increasingly centered on Kabul. DEA’s reduced ability to conduct operations outside 

Kabul, due in part to the smaller U.S. military footprint and corruption concerns, 

illustrated the new reality on the ground.

International interest and investment in the counternarcotics effort also waned 

after 2012. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework included only a minor 

counternarcotics commitment and listed no counternarcotics-specific indicators 
xii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

under its governance, rule of law, and human rights goals. On the ground, the 

Afghan government’s ability to carry out counterdrug work was hampered 

by the need to combat an increasingly active insurgency. For example, 

specialized counternarcotics forces were often called on for general security 

and counterterrorism missions. This eroding security environment, weakening 

government control, and reduced economic growth, combined with the lack 

of attention to counternarcotics programs, contributed to poppy cultivation 

topping 200,000 hectares for the first time in 2013, according to the UN Office 

on Drugs and Crime.

From 2013 to 2016, drug production continued at or near the highest levels 

ever consistently seen in Afghanistan. The 2013 U.S. Civilian-Military 

Strategic Framework for Afghanistan included only a passing reference 

to counternarcotics, with no mention of eradication or interdiction. State 

continued to operate under its 2012 strategy, but neither State’s nor DOD’s 

efforts appeared to appreciably dampen narcotics production and trade. 

In August 2017, the Afghan government launched the Kabul Compact with 

the United States. While the compact has included a fluctuating number of 

counternarcotics benchmarks, these are non-binding commitments. 

A 2017 UN survey indicated poppy cultivation had reached a new record high of 

328,000 hectares. In November 2017, U.S. and Afghan forces initiated airstrikes 

against “Taliban narcotics production” facilities in Helmand Province. The strikes 

represented a significant use of new authorities included in the South Asia strategy, 

announced in August 2017 by the administration of President Donald Trump. DOD 

described the airstrikes as the start of a new, “sustained air interdiction campaign” 

to disrupt Taliban financial networks.4

 While U.S. and Afghan forces had targeted 

heroin laboratories in prior years, the level of attention from senior military 

commanders and use of aerial bombardment were unprecedented.

While the increases in Afghan drug production make clear that counternarcotics 

efforts have largely failed, it is important to acknowledge that these increases 

are not solely due to failures of counternarcotics programs. The exponential 

rise in opium poppy cultivation and drug production is rooted in far-reaching, 

persistent challenges in Afghanistan—namely, lack of security, a poor economy, 

weak governing institutions, and failures of the wider reconstruction effort.5

Given these challenges, there are serious limitations to the U.S. capacity to bring 

about large-scale, lasting reductions in poppy cultivation and drug production. 

The opium economy will continue to undermine U.S. goals in Afghanistan. 

Therefore, ongoing U.S. reconstruction efforts must effectively address, or at least 

attempt to mitigate, the drug-related threats to Afghan security and stability. 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | xiii

LESSONS

This report distills 11 lessons from the U.S. counternarcotics experience in 

Afghanistan to date. These lessons are intended to inform and improve ongoing 

counterdrug initiatives in Afghanistan, and those in other regions facing drug-related 

challenges. The lessons also identify key factors and principles policymakers should 

apply when making decisions about counternarcotics-related programs. 

In major drug-producing and transit countries that receive significant levels of 

U.S. foreign assistance:

1. A whole-of-government U.S. counternarcotics strategy should be developed to

coordinate various agencies around shared, long-term goals. 

2. The U.S. ambassador, in coordination with the U.S. military commander in 

country, should have responsibility for directing agencies to implement the 

counternarcotics strategy. 

3. The goals of a U.S. counternarcotics strategy should be aligned with and 

integrated into the larger security, development, and governance objectives of 

the United States and the host nation.

4. U.S. counternarcotics strategies and programs should be based on a robust 

understanding of how the illicit drug economy functions and how it relates to 

local socioeconomic and political conditions. 

5. To implement a balanced counternarcotics strategy, development programs 

and eradication should be collocated on the ground. In addition, tracking 

funding by strategy component is critical for effective oversight and 

evaluation of counternarcotics efforts. 

6. Development assistance programs should include measures to mitigate 

the risk of programs inadvertently contributing to drug production 

and trafficking. 

7. Development assistance programs that aim to incentivize a shift away from 

illicit drug production should be sustained for more than five years, support 

farmers’ household income diversification, and consider the needs of 

different socioeconomic groups. 

8. Eradication can be an effective deterrent to drug-crop cultivation when 

undertaken in areas where viable alternative livelihoods to drug-crop 

cultivation exist and the state has an enduring presence. 

9. The U.S. government should strive to reach consensus with the host nation 

and other partner countries on counternarcotics goals and measures. Lack 

of consensus can alienate host and partner governments and preclude a 

cohesive counternarcotics effort.

10. Specialized counterdrug units and targeted law enforcement interdiction 

efforts have limited impact without a competent judicial system or 

extradition agreements. 
xiv | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

11. U.S. support for host-nation counternarcotics institutions should be 

resourced according to the priority that nation is willing and able to place on 

counterdrug efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS 

This report also makes 13 recommendations intended to strengthen 

U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and in other countries facing 

drug-related challenges. To improve counternarcotics outcomes, ensure better 

returns on U.S. investments in partner nations, and advance the reconstruction 

effort in Afghanistan, SIGAR recommends the following actions that can be 

taken by Congress and executive branch agencies. 

Afghanistan-Specific Recommendations

1. The U.S. government should finalize its revised counternarcotics strategy for 

Afghanistan. This strategy should prioritize efforts to disrupt drug-related 

financial flows to insurgent and terrorist groups, promote licit livelihood 

options for rural communities, and combat drug-related corruption within the 

Afghan government.

2. The Director of National Intelligence should produce an annual assessment 

of how much funding the Afghan insurgency obtains from the drug trade and 

the extent of the insurgency’s direct involvement in that trade.

3. Given ongoing U.S. military operations and the significant numbers of 

U.S. forces in country, civilian leaders should coordinate counternarcotics 

efforts closely with the commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.

General Recommendations

Legislative Branch Recommendations

4. Congress should consider strengthening counterdrug reporting requirements, 

as set out in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and in Section 

706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 2003 (Public Law 

107-228), to include indicators of long-term drug production trends, such as 

crop diversification, income levels, and the number of people dependent on 

the drug trade for their livelihood.

5. Congress should consider requiring certification from the Secretary of 

State that viable alternative livelihoods are in place and potential negative 

outcomes have been considered prior to the obligation of funding for drugcrop eradication. 

6. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees should consider 

requiring an annual report from the Secretary of State for each country that 

has been designated a major drug-transit or drug-producing country and 

receives U.S. counternarcotics assistance. The report should detail how 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | xv

counternarcotics assistance for a given country is coordinated across U.S. 

agencies, track total U.S. counterdrug assistance to that country by fiscal 

year, and provide a breakdown of assistance supporting each objective of the 

counternarcotics strategy.

Executive Branch Recommendations

7. U.S. agencies responsible for counternarcotics efforts in major drug-transit 

or drug-producing countries should focus their eradication efforts in areas 

that are more secure, have persistent state presence, and offer more diverse 

livelihood opportunities.

8. The Secretary of State should require that, for each country designated 

a major drug-transit or drug-producing country and receiving U.S. 

counternarcotics assistance, the U.S. ambassador to that country convene all 

U.S. agencies providing counternarcotics assistance to design a strategy that 

identifies actionable steps to integrate a counternarcotics perspective into 

larger security, development, and governance objectives. This strategy should 

be devised in close cooperation with the recipient country and should set 

forth practical and sustainable counterdrug goals. 

9. The USAID Administrator should require an assessment of the potential

impact a development project could have on illicit crop cultivation prior to 

obligating funds for development programs in major drug-transit or drugproducing countries. 

10. U.S. agencies responsible for counternarcotics efforts should use geospatial 

imagery, crop mapping, and other effective monitoring and evaluation 

systems to more accurately capture both development and counternarcotics 

outcomes. This data should be shared among all U.S. agencies with 

counterdrug responsibilities.

11. U.S. agencies charged with reporting to Congress on drug-crop cultivation, 

eradication, production, and trafficking estimates should include caveats 

regarding the reliability of those figures and level of confidence in them.

12. USAID should have primary responsibility for designing and administering 

development programs in drug-producing countries. INL should focus on 

areas where it has a comparative advantage, such as strengthening the rule 

of law, building law enforcement and interdiction capacity, and initiating 

demand-reduction programs. 

13. State, DOD, and Justice should consider supporting small, specialized 

counternarcotics units as a means to build host-nation counterdrug 

capacity. However, this assistance should be proportional to the willingness 

and capacity of host-nation leaders to support such units, and should be 

coordinated with broader U.S. efforts to strengthen political, security, and 

judicial institutions.

JUNE 2018 | 1

UNODC photo

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, countering the Afghan 

drug trade was neither a primary justification nor a major focus of the 

U.S. effort. Afghan heroin did not then and does not now enter the United 

States in significant quantities.6

 Since 2002, however, stemming opium poppy 

cultivation and drug production in Afghanistan has been an important, though 

not primary, goal for the United States, its coalition partners, and the Afghan 

government. Policymakers quickly came to the consensus that the Afghan 

drug trade undermined U.S. reconstruction and security efforts and eroded 

the legitimacy of the Afghan state.7

 As the insurgency grew in strength and 

intensity in areas with high levels of poppy cultivation, links between the 

drug trade, insurgent financing, and government corruption led to a range of 

counternarcotics programs. At the same time, opium poppy is a mainstay of 

Afghanistan’s rural economy. This presented a conundrum to policymakers 

seeking to combat the drug trade without impoverishing rural communities or 

turning them against the Afghan government and its international partners. 

From fiscal year (FY) 2002 through FY 2017, the U.S. government allocated 

approximately $8.62 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. 

This included more than $7.28 billion for programs with a substantial 

counternarcotics focus and $1.34 billion for programs that included a 
2 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

counternarcotics component.8 (See page 20.) Yet, drug production and trafficking 

remain entrenched. Afghanistan is the world’s largest opium producer, and opium 

poppy is the country’s largest cash crop, with an estimated annual export value 

of $1.5 to $3 billion in recent years.9

 Given the upward trend of cultivation figures 

and the number of Afghans who rely on the opium industry, the drug trade will 

significantly influence Afghanistan’s economy, security, and governance for the 

foreseeable future.10 It is critical that U.S. policymakers determine how best to 

mitigate the drug trade’s impact on U.S. strategic interests in Afghanistan. 

This lessons learned report draws important lessons from the U.S. counternarcotics 

experience in Afghanistan since 2002. These lessons can inform and improve 

ongoing U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, where the United States will likely remain 

engaged in counterdrug and reconstruction efforts for years to come. The report 

also provides actionable, evidenced-based recommendations that can strengthen 

U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan, as well as similar efforts in 

other countries. 

At the time of publication in 2018, the report holds special relevance for U.S. policy 

in Afghanistan. With Afghan poppy cultivation and opium production reaching 

record highs in 2017, U.S. and international attention to drug-related challenges 

is heightened.11 U.S. officials are refocused on links between the drug trade and 

insurgency; for example, in November 2017, U.S. and Afghan forces began an air 

interdiction campaign against “Taliban narcotics production” facilities. The strikes 

represented a significant use of new authorities included in the South Asia strategy 

announced by the administration of President Donald Trump.12

More broadly, a revised U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan was 

undergoing interagency coordination, as of April 2018.13 This report’s analysis 

and recommendations thus provide context and insights that can be applied to 

policy decisions on and implementation of ongoing U.S. efforts to counter the 

drug trade in Afghanistan. 

The lessons and recommendations are also relevant to other countries where 

the United States seeks to reduce drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. 

The United States spends hundreds of millions of dollars per year on global 

counternarcotics efforts. In recent years, countries and regions receiving the 

highest levels of funding included Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, Central 

America, Pakistan, Peru, and the Caribbean basin.14 However, this report does 

not advocate the universal application of specific counterdrug interventions 

based on the U.S. experience in Afghanistan. As the report demonstrates, taking 

practices used in one country or region and assuming they will work elsewhere 

has often been counterproductive. Instead, we identify key factors that influence 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 3

the success or failure of counterdrug efforts, as well as principles policymakers 

should apply when making decisions about counternarcotics-related programs. 

To examine U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2017, 

we categorize these efforts into four strands of activity: interdiction and 

counterdrug law enforcement, eradication, alternative development, and the 

mobilization of Afghan political support and institution building. (See table 1.) 

Our report discusses how the U.S. government—primarily the Departments 

of Defense (DOD) and State, the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)—approached the 

Afghan drug trade, how U.S. counternarcotics efforts fit within the broader U.S. 

and international reconstruction effort, how the U.S. response evolved, and the 

effectiveness of that response. 

This report is supported by SIGAR’s access to data from the whole of the 

reconstruction effort, including from both government and nongovernment 

sources. It includes an analysis of four sources of data that have never before 

been synthesized, some of which have not been previously available: 

1. U.S. government budgetary information, disaggregated by both 

U.S. government agency and strand, or area, of counternarcotics activity

2. Official U.S. government, UK government, and UN Office on Drugs and 

Crime (UNODC) documents related to counternarcotics and reconstruction 

in Afghanistan

3. In-depth interviews of key actors who were involved in counternarcotics 

policy and practice, including individuals from DOD, State, USAID, DEA, the 

Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Security Council (NSC), as 

well as institutions within the government of Afghanistan, the government 

TABLE 1

DEFINING FOUR STRANDS OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITY

Strand Activities and Programs Included in SIGAR Analysis

Interdiction and Counterdrug 

Law Enforcement

• Seizure of illegal narcotics

• Destruction of drug production facilities

• Arrest and prosecution of those who traffic drugs

• Intelligence collection and operations to trace, freeze, or confiscate proceeds from the drug trade

• Support to Afghan units and institutions that carry out interdiction and counterdrug law enforcement activities

Eradication • Physical destruction of a standing opium crop, done manually or through aerial or ground-based spraying of herbicides

• Support to Afghan and contractor eradication forces, as well as payments, reimbursement, and assistance for conducting 

eradication 

Alternative Development • Development assistance intended to reduce poppy cultivation, contribute to rural economic development, and provide licit 

alternative livelihood opportunities

Mobilization of Afghan Political 

Support and Institution Building

• Programs to build institutional capacity at the ministerial and provincial levels

• Programs to increase political will to reduce opium production, including development assistance as a reward for local reductions 

in opium cultivation 

• Programs to raise public awareness of the costs of involvement in cultivation, production, trade, and consumption of illicit drugs
4 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

of the UK (the “lead,” then “partner” nation for counternarcotics under the 

Group of 8 Security Sector Reform framework), and UNODC15

4. Geographic Information System (GIS) data and analysis of the location, 

outputs, and outcomes of U.S. counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan

This report is organized both chronologically and by strand of counternarcotics

activity. Following this introductory section, which provides background 

information on the Afghan drug economy and efforts to combat drug production 

and trade, chapter two characterizes the different eras of the counternarcotics 

effort in Afghanistan and explores the changing policy and operational context 

that shaped counternarcotics strategy over time. 

Chapter three provides a detailed analysis of the main strands of the 

counternarcotics effort: interdiction, eradication, alternative development, and 

political mobilization. It explores the theories that underpinned each of the 

strands, how the strands evolved over time, the resources expended on them, 

and what they achieved. In addition, a detailed analysis of a sample of programs 

looks at both outputs and outcomes, including through the use of GIS imagery. 

Chapter four examines the combined effects of the different strands to 

determine their impact on the level of opium poppy cultivation, the primary 

indicator by which the success of counternarcotics efforts was judged. This 

chapter draws on GIS analysis and fieldwork to better understand the factors 

that led to reductions in poppy cultivation. 

Chapter five provides our conclusions, including key findings, lessons derived 

from our analysis, and recommendations for improving counternarcotics efforts 

in current and future contingency operations. The lessons and recommendations 

offer Congress and U.S. government agencies insights into how complex, 

cross-cutting issues such as counternarcotics can be better integrated into 

reconstruction efforts to deliver improved outcomes, with fewer negative 

impacts on the wider socioeconomic, political, and security environment. 

While the lessons and recommendations should help to improve counternarcotics 

programs and policies, sustained reductions in poppy cultivation and narcotics 

trafficking in Afghanistan will require decades of effort. As Ambassador David 

Johnson, the former head of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (INL), noted, it would be wrong to conclude that “if we were 

just to get the piping, plumbing, politics, and program design right by following the 

right ‘lessons learned,’ we would find success. That is a delusion.” He further stated:

With the right policies and programs you can improve this situation, but 

you must have the patience of Job and you must be willing to live with half 

solutions for a very long time, perhaps decades, perhaps forever.16
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 5

THE AFGHAN OPIUM ECONOMY 

Poppy cultivation, opium production, and drug trafficking are illegal in 

Afghanistan. Opium is elemental, however, to the domestic economy.17 It is 

the country’s most valuable cash crop, with an estimated annual export value 

of $1.5 to $3 billion in recent years.18 In 2017, poppy cultivation alone was 

estimated to provide up to 590,000 full-time-equivalent jobs, more than the 

number of people employed by the Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces (ANDSF).19

Opium production has also generated investments in the agricultural sector, 

such as in herbicides, fertilizers, tractors, diesel pumps, and solar panels.20

The income farmers have earned from opium has been used for maintaining 

food security and agricultural production, as well as investing in businesses, 

education for family members, vehicles, and homes for those with land and 

capital, thereby transforming the rural economy.21 The labor-intensive nature of 

opium production has also boosted the daily wages of those harvesting the crop, 

as well as those working in other sectors in opium poppy-growing areas.22 These 

benefits are not limited to the rural economy; urban areas also saw increases 

in wage labor rates and a construction boom that was attributed to both the 

international aid and opium economies.23

In 2017, poppy cultivation alone was estimated to provide up to 

590,000 full-time-equivalent jobs, more than the number of people 

employed by the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

While opium production has brought significant economic benefits, its impact 

on the political economy of Afghanistan has been deeply corrosive. Corruption 

associated with the opium economy undermines state legitimacy and public 

institutions, particularly in the security and justice sectors. It affects the police, 

judicial system, parliament, and other state institutions, at national, provincial, 

and district levels.24 While it is difficult to gather evidence on such illicit activity, 

Afghan government actors, including at the highest levels, have played a role in 

the drug trade, serving as facilitators and collecting payments from traffickers. 

In June 2005, for example, a combined DEA and Counter Narcotics Police of 

Afghanistan raid found more than 9 metric tons of opium in the offices of thengovernor of Helmand Province, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada.25

Former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan Sherard Cowper-Coles wrote that during 

his tenure from 2007 to 2009, there emerged a “belief that almost everyone in 

influential positions in public life was somehow tainted by the [opium poppy] 

trade. Some were actively involved; others (probably the majority) were 

passive shareholders, or, more often and more likely, received a cut for not 
6 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

being involved, for turning a blind eye when the container-load of drugs passed 

through their province or district.”26 As one analyst observed, “Afghan national 

police, border police, counternarcotics police, customs officials, and provincial, 

district, and municipal governors all have power within their jurisdictions to 

significantly impede or facilitate narcotics production and trafficking.”27

The Taliban and other armed opposition groups also receive funds from the 

opium industry and are believed to collect payments from those involved at 

each stage of the value chain.

28 While there is general consensus that the Taliban 

derives significant funding from the drug trade, there has been a wide range of 

estimates as to how much. In a 2012 report, the UN Security Council Taliban 

Sanctions Monitoring Committee cited the Afghan government’s estimate 

that the Taliban earned approximately $100 million from the illicit narcotics 

trade that year, or 25 percent of roughly $400 million in total income for 

2011–2012. The UN report noted, “The general notion that the poppy economy 

in Afghanistan is the main pillar of Taliban funding merits examination.”29 In 

2016, General John Nicholson, commander of NATO’s Resolute Support mission 

and of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, said the drug trade in Helmand Province 

provided about 60 percent of the Taliban’s funding.30

The opportunity to profit from the opium trade has resulted in alliances between 

corrupt government officials, drug traffickers, and insurgents. Opium has been 

described as providing “the economic glue which binds together political 

coalitions.”31 Efforts to eradicate the opium crop absorb government resources 

and can fuel rural antipathy to the Afghan government and its international 

backers.32 At the same time, armed groups offer protection to farmers from 

those state institutions charged with destroying the opium crop.33

Due in part to the illicit nature of opium production and trade, price data for 

opium are difficult to collect.34 Price data are generally derived by UNODC from 

limited survey and seizure information, and the quality of that information varies 

significantly.35 While price data are therefore relatively weak, it is still possible to 

construct a rough picture of the price structure and margins at different stages 

of the value chain.36 With these caveats, price data provide useful information 

about the opium economy. 

A value chain is 

commonly defined as 

“the range of goods 

and services necessary 

for an agricultural 

product to move from 

the farm to the final 

customer or consumer. 

It encompasses the 

provision of inputs, 

actual on-farm 

production, postharvest storage and 

processing, marketing, 

transportation, 

and wholesale and 

retail sales.”

Source: SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the 

United States Congress, January 30, 

2018, p. 206.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 7

Historical Context of Afghan Opium Production

For centuries, opium poppy has been grown in the region known as the Golden Crescent, 

stretching across Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. During King Mohammed Zahir Shah’s 

reign from 1933 to 1973, the ruling family controlled the Afghan opium trade and largely 

exported it to Iran.37 After Zahir Shah was dethroned in a 1973 coup, Afghanistan slid 

into a period of unrest and conflict that endures today. 

The 1979–1989 Soviet occupation crippled the Afghan economy and created an 

environment where illicit activity and criminal networks flourished. The war devastated the 

Afghan countryside, destroying irrigated land and smothering agricultural output. Millions 

of Afghans fled the country, while many who remained turned to poppy cultivation, since 

poppies required little water and could grow in poor agricultural conditions.38 From 

1984 to 1985, Afghan opium production was estimated to more than double, from 140 

to 400 metric tons, and in 1986, doubled again.39 Rebel mujahedeen forces, backed 

by the United States and Pakistan, relied on revenue from poppy cultivation and opium 

production to fund their operations against the Soviets.40

Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Afghanistan shifted from occupation 

and insurgency to outright civil war. In 1996, the Taliban gained control of most of 

Afghanistan. Opium production soared under Taliban rule, nearly doubling between 1996 

and 1999, from 2,248 to 4,565 metric tons.41 By 1999, Afghanistan became the world’s 

largest supplier of illicit opium.42 Despite the rise in cultivation, the Taliban prohibited 

opiate consumption and initially opposed cultivation as well.43

In 2000, the Taliban successfully carried out a ban on poppy cultivation, culminating in a 

75 percent drop in the global supply of heroin.44 The ban drove Afghan farmers into debt 

and contributed to rising unemployment and migration, exacerbating the humanitarian 

crisis in Afghanistan.45 The Taliban provided no alternative income to mitigate the 

economic impact of the ban, and instead requested greater development assistance 

from the international community.46 To make matters worse, Afghanistan was in the midst 

of a severe and worsening drought that wiped out livestock and led to famine, death, and 

a regional exodus.47

The motive behind the Taliban poppy ban remains a topic of debate. One explanation is 

the ban was an attempt to legitimize the pariah regime in the eyes of the international 

community after sweeping UN sanctions were applied.48 Another theory is the Taliban 

sought to use a temporary ban to drive up global prices dramatically and then sell 

inventory for higher profit.49 Whatever the reason for its execution, the ban became moot: 

The collapse of the Taliban government coincided with the 2001 fall growing season, 

and desperate Afghan farmers began planting poppy once again.50 After 2001, poppy 

cultivation eventually rose to the unprecedented levels described in this report.
8 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

THE OPIUM TRADE FROM FARM TO ARM

CULTIVATION

Opium poppy is an input-intensive crop that typically requires more water, fertilizer, and labor 

than other crops planted in the fall, most notably wheat.51 The majority of the opium poppy 

crop in Afghanistan is planted between October and December; there is also a spring crop 

planted in higher elevations between February and June and evidence of a summer crop 

planted in Helmand between July and August.52

Irrigation

Poppy planted in the fall needs little irrigation throughout the winter months. However, once 

the plant reaches the “cabbage” stage, farmers need to irrigate it every four to six days.53 At 

the harvest stage, farmers will irrigate the crop before the final lancing. (See page 10.) In 

the former desert areas of the southwest, opium poppy is irrigated using diesel- and solarpowered deep wells.54

Organization for Sustainable Development and 

Research (OSDR) photo

Alcis Holdings Ltd. photo

David Mansfield photo
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 9

Weeding

In the spring, poppy requires thinning and then weeding. Weeding is labor-intensive and can 

involve an entire family, particularly boys, who will often fit the task in around school and 

even weed the crop on other farms in return for daily wages. In southwest Afghanistan, a 

range of different herbicides are used on the opium crops to reduce the demand for hired 

and family labor.55

Germination

Poppy plants typically germinate two to three weeks after seeds are sown. The plants drop 

their flower petals at 12 to 14 weeks, exposing multiple capsules, which then ripen for one to 

two weeks.56

David Mansfield photo OSDR photo

OSDR photo
10 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Lancing

Once the poppy capsules have ripened, they are lanced, which allows the opium resin to seep 

out. Each capsule can be lanced several times over a two-week period.57 For poppy planted 

between October and December, the lancing process usually occurs between April and May.58

Harvest

The harvest is labor-intensive, requiring relatively skilled workers who can quickly select which 

capsules to lance and make precise incisions to maximize the flow of resin. Most farmers 

require some hired labor, but seek to reduce their costs by drawing on family labor, including 

withdrawing their children from school to help with the harvest.59

David Mansfield photo

OSDR photo
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 11

Collection and Storage

The opium resin, also called raw opium, is collected systematically. The resin is scraped from 

the capsule using simple, locally made tools, and is typically done the morning after the crop 

was lanced.60

Once the raw opium is collected, it is stored in a variety of ways. In the east, the crop is 

wrapped in opium poppy leaves and bound in 1.2-kg cakes known as chakai. In the south, 

the opium is moister and is stored in plastic bags weighing 4.5 to 9 kg. After packaging, the 

opium is then sold or kept in the home. In addition, after the harvest, some of the opium will 

be dried so it can be stored and sold at a later date, when prices rise. Once dried, opium can 

be stored for 10 years or longer.61

None of the opium poppy crop is wasted. 

A very small number of seeds are kept for 

next year’s crop; the rest of the seeds are 

used or sold to make cooking oil. The plants’ 

capsules and stalks are dried and used 

as firewood.62

David Mansfield photo

David Mansfield photo

David Mansfield photo

David Mansfield photo

OSDR photo
12 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

PROCESSING 

Morphine Extraction

The raw opium, or opium resin, is used as the base material to manufacture heroin and other 

derivative, opiate-based products. To process opium into heroin, morphine is extracted from 

the raw opium and processed into a morphine base.63

To make the morphine base, the raw opium is mixed with a calcium solution and hot water in 

large barrels. The blend sits for several hours, during which the sediment from the raw opium 

settles at the bottom of the barrel, leaving a clear liquid that contains the morphine.64

Siphoning and Filtering 

Liquid Morphine

The liquid is then siphoned out of the barrel 

and mixed with a binding chemical. This 

mixture is returned to the barrel, heated, 

and filtered.65

UNODC photo

David Mansfield photo

David Mansfield photo

DEA Museum photo

DEA Museum photo
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 13

Drying Morphine Residue

The residue is dried in the sun, resulting in a morphine base.66

Turning Morphine into Heroin

To make heroin, the morphine base is combined with several different chemical solutions to 

create a heroin paste. The heroin base is then mixed with several more chemical solutions, 

filtered, and dried to produce powdered heroin.67

UNODC photo

DEA Museum photo

DEA Museum photo
14 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

EXPORT 

The opiates produced in Afghanistan reach their primary markets in Europe, Asia, and Africa 

through several routes. The Balkan route supplies western and central Europe. The southern 

route funnels opiates through Pakistan or Iran to the Gulf region, Africa, Asia, and Western 

and Central Europe. The northern route runs through neighboring Central Asian states, Russia, 

and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. While 90 percent of the 

heroin seized in Canada originates in Afghanistan, in recent years, an estimated 1 percent or 

less of heroin seized in the United States comes from Afghanistan.68

Southern Route

Northern Route

Balkan Route

To Canada

To Canada

Pakistan

Iran

Turkey

India

Kazakhstan

Tajikistan Turkmenistan

China

Russian Federation 

East

Africa

Southern

Africa

West

Africa

Central

Asia

Southeastern

Asia

Oceania

Western,

Central &

Southeastern 

Europe

Persian Gulf 

area & 

Middle East

Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2016, June 2016, pp. xii–xiv; UNODC, World Drug Report 2015, May 2015, pp. xiii–xiv, 46.

DRUG TRAFFICKING ROUTES FROM AFGHANISTAN
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 15

The distribution of revenue within the opium industry, or “how much goes 

to farmers, traders at different levels, processors/refiners, long-distance 

traffickers and wholesalers, and retailers,” varies according to region.69 These 

regional variations might be explained by proximity to borders where transit 

occurs, distance from central markets, climate and agricultural conditions, and 

eradication and law enforcement efforts.70 For example, in 2016 the average 

farm-gate price of opium in the northern region of Afghanistan was $126 per 

kilogram, while the average reported farm-gate price in the central region was 

$280 per kilogram. The national average farm-gate price of dry opium at harvest 

time in 2016 was $187 per kilogram.71

Small-scale opium traders, typically operating on a part-time or seasonal basis, 

purchase opium directly from farmers and, depending on the arrangement, 

provide inputs or credit to the farmer before the poppy is grown. Traders in 

regional opium bazaars buy opium from farmers and small-scale traders and 

“then sell to local consumers, clandestine labs, wholesale traders, and foreign 

traffickers.”72 Moving up in scale, “at the center of the trade are bulk buyers, 

large-scale traders who buy throughout the year and organize shipments direct 

to border areas or directly abroad.”73 Along the value chain, opium products 

significantly increase in price, from farms in Afghanistan to distant consumer 

markets primarily in Europe and Asia, where wholesale and retail prices are 

considerably higher.74

In 2006, UNODC estimated that 76 percent of the income from opium produced 

in Afghanistan went to traffickers, including heroin refiners, with just 24 percent 

going to poppy farmers.75 UNODC estimated that in 2014, the value added by 

traffickers through the processing of Afghan opium into morphine and heroin 

and the export of processed and unprocessed opiates was $1.81 billion.76

Other Effects of the Opium Economy

In addition to direct economic and political effects, the opium crop has changed 

the physical geography of Afghanistan. For example, between 2003 and 2016, 

opium supported the settlement of 330,000 hectares of former desert land in 

southwest Afghanistan.77 The price premium associated with this illegal crop 

provided the money for farmers to install deep wells, purchase water pumps, 

and even invest in solar technology to draw water from underground aquifers 

and bring once-barren land into agricultural production. While the long-term 

consequences of this encroachment onto previously uninhabited land are 

unknown, the current production may not be environmentally sustainable: 

Increasing salinization, decreasing ground water, and dwindling yields may 

prompt the 1 to 2 million people who came to depend on this land and the opium 

grown on it to move elsewhere.78

The farm-gate price is 

the price of harvested 

opium at the farm, 

prior to any subsequent 

price increase due 

to transportation, 

processing, or resale.
16 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Opium production also deeply affects the health and wellbeing of the Afghan 

people. One survey estimated there were 2 to 2.5 million drug users in Afghanistan 

in 2015. Of these, 1.3 to 1.6 million—5 percent of the population—were opiate 

users.79 Exposure was particularly high among children in rural areas due to drug 

use within the household.80 Kabul also had a concentrated population of drug 

users.81 These high rates of opiate use have a devastating effect on Afghan society 

and the country’s capacity to develop its human capital and achieve economic 

growth. Overall, the Afghan population’s exposure to violence and conflict, 

experience as refugees, and poor economic prospects, as well as the availability of 

opiates and other drugs, increased the risk of drug abuse. 

Why Poppy is Cultivated

Since 2006, the UNODC’s annual Afghanistan poppy survey has asked a sample 

of farmers why they grow poppy. In 2014, a World Bank report described the 

survey responses, noting, “‘High price’ has been the most frequent response with 

the exception of 2007 and 2008, when ‘poverty alleviation’ was the most popular 

response.”82 However, distilling the numerous factors that inform decisions to 

cultivate poppy into a single answer is misleading. The prevailing assumption, 

that Afghan farmers cultivate poppy for the highest financial return, diminishes 

the multifunctional role opium poppy plays in rural livelihoods. While profit 

incentives motivate many involved in poppy cultivation, other factors also 

influence decisions to grow the crop. These factors include access to land and 

water, household assets, access to markets and transport linkages, price, the 

availability of wheat for consumption, insecurity and poor governance, and 

pressure from insurgents.83

Opium is a nonperishable, low-weight/high-value product that provides farmers 

with relative economic security in a high-risk environment. After decades of 

war-induced destruction of the rural economy, poppy has become a hedge 

against future periods of conflict, drought, and economic hardship.84 Thus, it 

is reasonable to describe some who participate in poppy cultivation as risk 

managers, rather than profit maximizers, and opium as a “low-risk crop in a 

high-risk environment.”85

For the landless or land-poor, poppy is not simply a source of income. 

Cultivation provides access to a range of assets, including land, water, credit, 

and employment.86 Landless and land-poor farmers may seek a sharecropping 

arrangement for cash income, as well as the chance to grow non-opium crops 

for household consumption and to provide residences for their families.87

Itinerant laborers who do not participate in sharecropping agreements pursue 

on-farm wage labor opportunities, such as weeding and harvesting. Cash income 

earned by non-landholding families is often used to meet household food 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 17

requirements, settle debts, and invest in education and transportation, which 

can increase off-farm employment opportunities.88

Different sharecropping agreements determine what portion of the final yield goes 

to the farmer, and what portion goes to the landowner.89 Landowning households 

with greater socioeconomic status that can afford production inputs, like land, 

water, and fertilizer, have an economic advantage over the landless and land-poor. 

For example, a sharecropper who cannot afford to contribute to the production 

cost of the land may receive only a fifth of the final crop yield.90 Inequitable 

sharecropping arrangements and the stockpiling of opium to sell at a later date 

when the prices are higher allow landowners to accrue greater profit. 

Understanding the roles of different socioeconomic groups that participate 

in poppy cultivation is critical for developing effective and sustainable 

interventions. As William Byrd and Doris Buddenberg noted, the varying levels 

of household dependency on opium and different ways they benefit from the 

crop imply “that there is diversity in households’ responses to shocks like 

elimination of opium poppy cultivation.”91 Counternarcotics efforts, such 

as crop eradication, have had unintended effects, including local economic 

contraction and increased poverty. Coercive measures have also resulted in 

poppy cultivation being pushed to other geographic areas, or even intensified. 

According to some analysts, such measures have increased support for the 

Taliban and other anti-government elements.92 Counternarcotics programs 

that ignore local variations and do not account for the reasons why certain 

groups participate in poppy cultivation run the risk of being ineffective 

or counterproductive.93

THE U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS RESPONSE

The U.S. counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan comprised four distinct 

areas of activity, which we refer to as strands. Each strand was led by a 

U.S. government agency, in coordination with other U.S. government entities, 

donor nations, the Afghan government, and international and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGO). 

U.S. counternarcotics strategies and activities have undergone significant 

changes since 2002. The United States first developed a five-pillar strategy in 

2005, following a review of previous years’ counterdrug efforts. The pillars of 

this strategy were public information, alternative livelihoods, elimination and 

eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement and justice reform.94 While these 

five pillars have served as organizing categories for the U.S. strategy since 2005, 

the level of emphasis on each pillar has significantly shifted over time. In 2012, 

a new U.S. strategy emphasized two primary goals: strengthening the Afghan 
18 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

government’s capacity to combat the drug trade and countering the link between 

narcotics and the insurgency.95

The Afghan government’s own National Drug Control Strategy was organized 

into eight pillars beginning in 2006: public awareness, international and regional 

cooperation, alternative livelihoods, demand reduction, law enforcement, 

criminal justice, eradication, and institution building.96 (See table 2.) The pillars 

were intended to support the strategy’s four priorities: disrupting the drug trade, 

strengthening and diversifying legal rural livelihoods, reducing the demand for illicit 

drugs and treatment of problem drug users, and developing state institutions.97

In 2015, the Afghan government produced an updated National Drug Action 

Plan that identified three goals: decrease opium poppy cultivation, decrease 

the production and trafficking of opiates, and reduce illicit drug demand in 

Afghanistan while increasing treatment for drug users. These goals included 

objectives that mirrored the pillars of the previous strategy, including licit 

alternatives to poppy, targeted eradication, improved capacity for interdiction 

and law enforcement, anti-money laundering and asset forfeiture, regional and 

international cooperation, expansion of drug use treatment and prevention, and 

public information campaigns.98

To better understand how resources have been allocated for the U.S. 

counternarcotics effort, this report tracks funding and program activities by 

the following four strands of activity, which together encompass the pillars and 

priorities defined by the U.S. and Afghan counterdrug strategies: 

1. Interdiction and counterdrug law enforcement 

2. Eradication 

3. Alternative development 

4. Mobilizing Afghan political support and building institutions

TABLE 2

COUNTERNARCOTICS STRANDS AND PILLARS

Afghan Strategy Pillars U.S. Strategy Pillars SIGAR Strands

1. Public awareness 1. Public information 1. Mobilizing Afghan political support and 

building institutions 2. Demand reduction

3. Institution building

4. Law enforcement 2. Interdiction 2. Interdiction and counterdrug law enforcement

5. Criminal justice 3. Law enforcement and justice reform

6. Alternative livelihoods 4. Alternative livelihoods 3. Alternative development

7. Eradication 5. Elimination and eradication 4. Eradication

8. International and regional cooperation
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 19

U.S. officials repeatedly emphasized the need for a balanced strategy—where 

each area of activity complemented the others—in order to deliver effective and 

enduring progress on U. S. counternarcotics goals.99 While U.S. counternarcotics 

strategies focused on a multi-sector, balanced approach, it is less clear 

whether implementation reflected that balance. To our knowledge, this report 

represents the first U.S. government effort to holistically analyze U.S. funding for 

counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan to determine whether resourcing for 

counternarcotics initiatives matched the intent of U.S. strategies. 

Of the more than $7.28 billion appropriated for programs specifically focused on 

counternarcotics in Afghanistan through fiscal year 2017, the majority was allocated 

for four strands of programming: interdiction ($4.5 billion), alternative development 

($1.46 billion), eradication ($938 million), and mobilizing political support 

($184 million).100 In this report, mobilizing political support includes funding for the 

Good Performers Initiative (GPI, $83 million), institution building ($40 million), and 

public diplomacy or information campaigns ($61 million). Counternarcotics justice 

reform ($11 million) is included as part of interdiction and law enforcement because 

a judicial outcome is one of the goals of successful counterdrug law enforcement. Of 

the remaining $206 million, approximately $110 million went toward drug demand 

reduction and approximately $96 million could not be categorized according to strand 

of activity.101 Figure 1 shows funding by agency and figure 2 shows funding allocations 

according to the four strands discussed in this report. A brief description of each of 

the four strands, or program areas, follows.

Note: Of the $452.5 million DEA allocated for counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan, 

$209 million was transferred to DEA from the State Department's Bureau of South 

and Central Asian Affairs.

Source: SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation and strand of effort based 

on agency data calls, budget documentation, and correspondence.

U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING ALLOCATIONS BY AGENCY, 

2002–2017 ($ MILLIONS)

Totals: $7,284.09

DEA

$452.54

DOD

$3,132.46

State

$2,267.73

USAID

$1,431.36

Note: Mobilizing Political Support includes funding for the Good Performers Initiative, 

institution building, and public information. “Other” includes funding for (1) demand 

reduction programs ($110 million) and (2) programs for which SIGAR does not have 

adequate funding information to categorize by strand ($96 million). 

Source: SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation and strand of effort based on 

agency data calls, budget documentation, and correspondence.

U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING ALLOCATIONS BY STRAND, 

2002–2017 ($ MILLIONS)

Totals: $7,284.09

Alternative

Development

$1,456.59

Eradication

$938.14 Interdiction

$4,499.71

 Mobilizing Political Support

$183.79

Other

$205.86

FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2
20 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Interdiction and Counterdrug Law Enforcement

Interdictions to destroy drug-processing labs, seize illegal narcotics, and arrest 

and prosecute those who traffic in them, as well as trace, freeze, or confiscate 

their proceeds, are the primary tools employed by the United States in its drug 

control efforts around the world. In Afghanistan, these activities were core 

components of the U.S. effort to counter the narcotics trade and were paired 

with significant work to build the capacity of Afghan institutions to carry out 

their own interdiction efforts. 

Globally, the seizure of illegal drugs and the arrest of those trafficking them in 

order to reduce supply are typically the most immediate goals of interdiction 

operations, but they are far from the only ones. Interdiction efforts also 

provide intelligence that contributes to additional seizures, arrests, and 

prosecutions that are intended to disrupt and dismantle international drug 

trafficking organizations. 

Analyzing Total Funding for Counternarcotics 

As shown in SIGAR’s October 2017 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

from FY 2002 through FY 2017, U.S. government support for counternarcotics-related 

efforts in Afghanistan totaled approximately $8.62 billion.102 The analysis in this lessons 

learned report focuses on approximately $7.28 billion of that total appropriated 

via a counternarcotics funding line or obligated to a program with a substantial 

counternarcotics focus. The analysis excludes $1.34 billion for programs that included a 

counternarcotics component—such as the $1.31 billion from the Afghan Security Forces 

Fund (ASFF) that was primarily used to purchase aviation assets for the Afghan Special 

Mission Wing (SMW).103

Originally part of the Afghan Ministry of Interior, the SMW—supported by ASFF and DOD’s 

Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities Fund (DOD CN)—was created to provide air 

support to drug interdiction and counterterrorism (CT) missions. While it still conducts 

both missions, the SMW’s focus has evolved. It is now a component of the Ministry of 

Defense and most of its missions are CT operations.104 In the last quarter of 2017, for 

example, the SMW flew 316 sorties: 92 percent were CT operations and 8 percent were 

counternarcotics operations.105 Therefore, while the SMW is discussed in this report, 

the $1.31 billion in ASFF funding—which included the purchase of aircraft and missionrelated equipment—is not part of the report’s analysis. At the same time, however, funds 

that were explicitly appropriated to the DOD CN Fund and obligated for the SMW are 

included in the $7.28 billion analyzed in this report. 

Finally, this report’s analysis does not include funding for other development assistance 

efforts that may have affected counternarcotics objectives, but was not specifically 

intended or allocated to do so. 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 21

Although interdiction is primarily a law enforcement activity, military forces 

often conduct interdiction operations in support of law enforcement. State’s 

program guidance on foreign assistance in interdiction efforts defines such 

assistance as helping countries “to prevent, interrupt, capture, or eliminate 

illegal drug production, movement or trafficking activities.”106 This assistance 

can also include technical, legal, and policy assistance, as well as the provision 

of transportation, material assistance, and personnel support.107

Although U.S. government policy includes a comprehensive view of interdiction 

that encompasses a broad set of law enforcement interventions, as indicated 

above, this was not always reflected in counternarcotics initiatives on the 

ground in Afghanistan. Interdiction has the greatest impact when senior-level 

traffickers, particularly corrupt government officials involved in the drug trade, 

are arrested and prosecuted. Unfortunately, however, the Afghan judicial system 

has developed slowly and faced pervasive corruption. Successful cases against 

high-value targets have been relatively rare.108

While a number of U.S. government entities have counterdrug responsibilities 

globally, the three primary agencies involved in counternarcotics law 

enforcement are State, DOD, and DEA. State is “responsible for coordinating 

all international drug control programs implemented by the U.S. government” 

and, within State, INL is the primary entity responsible for formulating 

and implementing international narcotics control policies.109 Within a host 

nation, the U.S. chief of mission, typically the U.S. ambassador, has ultimate 

A large cache of weapons and drugs found in Daykundi Province. (Resolute Support photo)
22 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

responsibility for all U.S. counterdrug activities that take place in that 

country and strives to ensure all U.S. agencies are working toward common 

goals. DEA is the lead agency for counterdrug law enforcement and assisting 

counternarcotics intelligence efforts in foreign countries.110 Though prohibited 

by U.S. law from taking an active part in arrests in other nations, DEA conducts 

bilateral investigations, capacity-building operations, and intelligence gathering, 

and coordinates with foreign law enforcement agencies to combat the drug 

trade.111 Finally, DOD serves as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring 

of illegal drug movements into the United States, as well as collecting, analyzing, 

and sharing intelligence on illegal drugs.112 U.S. military commanders maintain 

command of military forces involved in international drug control activities.113

In Afghanistan specifically, through these three agencies, the U.S. government 

allocated more than $4.49 billion for interdiction and counternarcotics law 

enforcement activities between 2002 and the end of fiscal year 2017.114

Eradication

Eradication is the physical destruction of a standing crop; it is a standard 

component of INL’s counternarcotics efforts overseas.115 Eradication in 

Afghanistan was typically justified as (1) destroying some of the poppy crop, 

thereby reducing the amount of opiates available for distribution, sale, and final 

consumption; (2) extending the writ of the Afghan state into rural areas where 

the government traditionally had little presence; and (3) changing the riskbenefit calculus for farmers while deterring planting in future seasons.116

While the amount of money allocated to eradication and the nature of the 

eradication strategy changed over time, crop destruction was an important 

Afghan police use sticks to eradicate a poppy field near the city of Qalat, Zabul Province. (Resolute Support 

photo by 1st Lt. Brian Wagner)
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 23

element of the U.S. government’s counternarcotics strategy—and was, by far, 

the most controversial element. Two factors, in particular, were especially 

contentious: (1) targeting, or the conditions under which eradication would 

be undertaken and where such operations would be directed, and (2) method, 

how crop destruction would be carried out, most notably whether herbicides 

should be used. Both factors generated major disagreements within the 

U.S. government, as well as between the U.S. government, the Afghan 

government, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the UK 

government, and other coalition allies. (See pages 81–105.) 

U.S. eradication efforts were led by INL, which controlled the bulk of 

eradication-related funding and designed the programs to carry out the 

effort. Between 2002 and 2017, the U.S. government allocated approximately 

$938 million for eradication in Afghanistan, including all aviation support 

to INL’s Air Wing prior to fiscal year 2010, as well as $294.6 million for the 

Poppy Eradication Force, $9.9 million for the Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) 

program, and $13 million for UNODC reporting and research that included 

eradication verification.117

Alternative Development

Alternative development refers to aid projects that explicitly aimed to reduce 

poppy cultivation and promote “viable economic alternatives to poppy 

cultivation,” especially in rural areas.118 USAID was the lead U.S. agency for 

implementing alternative development projects. The agency’s most active 

period of engagement on counternarcotics was between 2005 and 2008, when 

75 percent of its total expenditures on agriculture projects in Afghanistan was 

categorized as alternative development.119 After 2009, although USAID continued 

to allocate funding to alternative development, its agriculture programs largely 

shifted to a counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilization focus.120

Between 2002 and 2017 the U.S. government allocated $1.46 billion for 

alternative development programs.121 However, in practice these programs 

were not all designed to reduce economic dependence on opium poppy 

cultivation. Some projects were considered alternative development because 

they were being implemented in poppy-growing areas, but the projects were not 

necessarily geared toward counternarcotics goals.122 On the other hand, several 

alternative development programs specifically tied assistance to reductions 

in opium poppy cultivation; nevertheless, some of these programs did little to 

support farmers’ transition out of poppy cultivation. A persistent shortcoming in 

U.S. alternative development efforts in Afghanistan was the failure to assess and 

understand the poppy economy, its impact on any rural development program, 

and the effect of a given intervention on rural households that were dependent 

on poppy.123
24 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Mobilizing Afghan Political Support and Building Institutions 

The fourth strand of counternarcotics activity comprised a range of programs 

that sought to build support for counternarcotics efforts within the Afghan 

leadership and population. These programs typically focused on the national 

and provincial levels and aimed to build capacity and political will to reduce 

opium production. For example, the Good Performers Initiative attempted 

to incentivize change by offering rewards to both governors and local 

communities for reducing or abandoning opium production.124 Also included 

within this strand were the public awareness programs that sought to increase a 

community’s knowledge of the social costs and legal implications of involvement 

in the cultivation, production, trade, and consumption of illicit drugs. 

State had the lead for activities within this strand, but was supported by 

both DOD and USAID. From 2002 to 2017, the U.S. government allocated 

approximately $184 million to build Afghan institutions and political support to 

counter the drug trade.125

KEY POINTS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE 

COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN 

This section provides an overview of issues that shaped counternarcotics efforts 

in Afghanistan. A more detailed analysis of how they influenced particular policy 

positions is found throughout the report. 

Lack of Security, Rule of Law, and Economic Opportunities Limited the 

Impact of Counternarcotics Efforts

Significant increases in Afghan poppy cultivation and drug production make 

clear that counternarcotics efforts have largely failed in Afghanistan. However, 

those increases are not solely due to failures of the counternarcotics effort; 

they also stem from lack of security, a poor economy, and failures of the wider 

reconstruction effort. Insecurity plagues large portions of the country, as reflected 

in the March 2018 U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) assessment that the 

Afghan government controlled or influenced only 56.3 percent of the country’s 

districts.126 Adding to the security challenge is Afghan government corruption. 

In 2017, a record high of 93 percent of Afghans surveyed by the Asia Foundation 

said “corruption is a problem in their daily lives,” and 70 percent said it is a major 

problem.127 Moreover, opportunities in the licit economy remain weak. 

In other words, while the counternarcotics programs launched from 2002 to 

2017 failed to curb the Afghan drug trade, the exponential rise in opium poppy 

cultivation and drug production is due to more than just these programs’ 

failures. It is important to look beyond the narrow set of counternarcotics 

interventions and examine the context in which they were pursued.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 25

Strategies and Priorities Changed Over Time

The U.S. counternarcotics strategy was not static, but evolved over time. 

Priorities and funds shifted significantly between and within counternarcotics 

Afghan Domestic Drug Use and Demand Reduction

A 2015 drug use survey estimated there were 2 to 2.5 million drug users in Afghanistan. 

Of these, 1.3 to 1.6 million—5 percent of the population—were opiate users.128

Furthermore, the survey’s toxicology tests indicate nearly one in three households tested 

positive for one or more drugs, and one-quarter of all rural households tested positive for 

opioid use.129 This rate of drug usage is one of the highest in the world and has spillover 

effects in neighboring Iran and throughout Central Asia.130 High rates of drug abuse 

adversely impact Afghanistan’s public health and economic wellbeing. Other studies and 

reports consistently indicate high rates of drug use among the Afghan National Police 

(ANP), though estimates of the share of officers who test positive for drug use differ 

considerably.131 One study found that overall, nearly 10 percent of police officers tested 

positive for at least one drug. At the start of the study, however, when testing first began, 

the rate of drug use was observed to be greater than 20 percent.132

 According to a 2010 

report by GAO, officials at State reported that 12 to 41 percent of Afghan police recruits 

at Regional Training Centers tested positive for drugs.133

The U.S. government has provided approximately $110.3 million in support of demand 

reduction programs, including treatment programs for Afghans suffering from drug 

addiction.134 Much of this funding was provided by INL to support the work of the 

Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program (CPDAP), a regional intergovernmental program 

created in 1973 to build capacity for drug demand reduction in the Asia and Pacific 

region.135 INL’s support in Afghanistan funded dozens of substance abuse treatment 

centers, school-based prevention programs, outreach centers, women’s shelters, a mobile 

exhibit, and a drug-use survey.136 INL further supported the Colombo Plan’s Universal 

Treatment Curriculum, a national-level training and certification system for drug-addiction 

counselors aimed at improving the delivery of addiction treatment in Afghanistan, as well 

as in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.137 Additionally, INL funded several projects run by 

UNODC, including child and adolescent treatment centers across Afghanistan, and an 

assessment of drug dependence among Afghan children.138

Assessments of the effectiveness of demand reduction programs suffer from a dearth 

of reliable data. The available evidence suggests, however, that access to treatment is 

severely lacking, with treatment services believed to reach only 3 to 6 percent of those in 

need.139 At its height, INL supported treatment services for 28,000 patients per year.140

While demand reduction is a critical part of an effective counternarcotics strategy, 

funding for such initiatives has been a small part of the broader counternarcotics effort 

in Afghanistan. (See figure 2 on page 19.)

SIGAR is initiating an audit of INL drug treatment programs in Afghanistan. The audit will 

focus on INL’s efforts to expand Afghans’ access to drug treatment programs and the 

transition of these programs to the Afghan government.
26 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

activities from 2002 through 2017. The strategy’s evolution was, in part, a 

function of the steep learning curve many officials faced and addressed as 

they became more aware of the realities of operating in Afghanistan. Shifts in 

strategy were also a consequence of key actors often fundamentally disagreeing 

on the importance of counternarcotics and the priority that should be given to 

its different activities. A change of staff in Washington and Kabul often led to 

a change in priorities and understanding of what was required and what would 

work, making long-term planning for the United States and its partners almost 

impossible. As one former Afghan minister commented: 

How can you implement a national agenda like this? All the donors are 

doing different things. Many theories, many mentalities, many contextual 

misunderstandings. Even in the U.S. government, INL thinks one thing 

and USAID thinks something else. One person working in an international 

organization has one mentality; then the person leaves. A new person comes 

with different ideas and a different mentality. Some see counternarcotics 

as a law enforcement issue, others as development. Then what kind of 

development? Value chain? Others see counternarcotics as the provision 

of wheat seeds like in Helmand, then others talk of it being a problem of 

political commitment.141

An important factor in the evolution of the counternarcotics strategy was 

the U.S. interaction with the Afghan government and other Western donors, 

particularly the UK. How U.S. priorities and interests in counternarcotics 

aligned or conflicted with those of these key partners had an effect on the 

development and delivery of the overall strategy. 

Long-Term Pursuits, Measured by Short-Term Effects 

The success of counternarcotics efforts was typically measured by short-term 

effects. Eradication, for example, provided a short-term demonstrable action, 

destroying some of the opium crop each year. Yet, farmers’ transition from an 

opium-dependent livelihood to one that relied on diversified cropping systems 

and income was typically a long-term pursuit. 

Successful, sustained reductions in poppy cultivation also required a wider 

process of improved governance, security, and economic growth. Establishing 

the necessary legislative framework and judicial system to investigate, arrest, 

prosecute, and punish those responsible for processing and trading significant 

amounts of illegal drugs—some of whom had strong ties to government 

authorities—was also a long-term effort ill-suited for short-term metrics. 

Elements Necessary for Effective Counternarcotics Results Were Often 

Outside the Control of Those with Counternarcotics Responsibilities 

Many of the foundational elements necessary for enduring counternarcotics 

effects—such as a stable security environment, effective Afghan governing 

institutions, and better economic conditions—were beyond the control of those 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 27

COMPARISONS WITH PLAN COLOMBIA

Plan Colombia was a comprehensive program launched in 1999 to reduce illicit 

drug production and improve security in Colombia. The program was a state-building, 

counterinsurgency, and counterdrug initiative that included increased interdiction activities, 

aerial eradication, and alternative livelihoods projects for farmers.142

Comparisons between the war on drugs in Colombia and the counternarcotics effort 

in Afghanistan have been common. Colombia and Afghanistan share the distinction of 

being the world’s largest producers of illicit coca and opium, respectively.143 Official 

narratives compared the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) taxation of 

coca and trafficking activities with growing reports of the Taliban doing the same for 

opium in Afghanistan, and often spoke of the need for a Plan Colombia-style response 

in Afghanistan.144 The underlying logic of a “Plan Afghanistan” tied counternarcotics 

with counterinsurgency and, as with the FARC in Colombia, argued that widespread crop 

destruction would deprive the Taliban of its funding and undermine its claims that it could 

protect farmers from eradication of their crops. USAID produced a 2004 presentation, 

“Colombian Applications to Afghanistan,” that detailed these comparisons and their potential 

pitfalls.145 The first public call for a Plan Afghanistan 

was issued by Assistant Secretary of State for INL 

Robert Charles in November 2004.146

Then in 2006, the intensification of the Taliban 

insurgency and a concurrent spike in poppy cultivation 

seized the attention of President George W. Bush and 

the NSC. Inspired by the success of eradication in 

Colombia, the administration increasingly pushed for 

similar efforts, particularly spraying, in Afghanistan. A 

number of high-level U.S. officials who had worked the 

counternarcotics portfolio in Colombia were transferred 

to Kabul or covered the Afghanistan counternarcotics 

program from Washington.147 To encourage the 

Afghan government to adopt a Colombian-style 

counternarcotics policy, the administration supported 

exchanges between Afghan and Colombian officials. 

Colombian police were sent to Kabul to train the Afghan 

National Interdiction Unit of the Counter Narcotics 

Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), and Afghan government 

officials traveled to Bogotá to learn more about the 

counternarcotics campaign in Colombia.148

For some U.S. officials, the comparisons between the 

two countries were overplayed. They cited the lack 

of political commitment by the Afghan government, 

especially President Hamid Karzai, and juxtaposed 

Planes from Colombia’s drug enforcement agency spray chemicals 

to kill coca plants in the mountains of Catatumbo, northeast of 

Bogotá. (AFP photo by Marcelo Salinas)
28 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

it against the Colombian authorities’ and President Álvaro Uribe’s greater ownership of 

counternarcotics policies.149 As one former Afghan minister stated, attempting a Plan 

Afghanistan was “a total miscalculation on the part of the United States to implement a 

model that [has] worked in a functioning state, in a situation of a failed state.”150

There were far more differences between the two countries than similarities. Colombia 

was a middle-income country, while Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries in the 

world.151

 Colombia was able to contribute significant funding to counterdrug efforts on a 

scale Afghanistan could not match. In fact, the U.S. government’s contribution of $10 billion 

dollars to Plan Colombia from 2000 through 2016 represented only 5 percent of Colombia’s 

total expenditure on the plan.152 The coca economy also made up a much smaller share 

of Colombia’s gross domestic product compared to opium in Afghanistan.153 Furthermore, 

Colombia’s government institutions, particularly its state security apparatus, were well 

established. In Afghanistan, many state institutions had to be built from scratch starting 

in 2002. 

It is also important to note the structural differences between the U.S. engagement in 

Colombia and Afghanistan. As a former senior DOD official involved in the Colombian 

counterdrug effort noted, U.S. military forces worked under the direction of the State 

Department while operating in Colombia.154 In Afghanistan, the U.S. military was in the lead, 

deciding what was to be included in the military campaign and what was not. To senior 

military leadership, especially in the early years of reconstruction, drugs were largely a 

peripheral issue.155

Finally, unlike Colombia, the Afghanistan campaign had a multilateral component. In 

Afghanistan, the support of allies was critical to the mission, but also led to donors 

acting at cross-purposes, created duplication of efforts, and impeded consensus. 

Moreover, the designation of the UK as the lead nation for counternarcotics efforts had no 

parallel in Colombia, where the United States was the only country providing significant 

counternarcotics assistance.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 29

with the responsibilities for achieving counternarcotics goals, for example, INL 

and DEA. DOD and parts of the intelligence community had considerably more 

resources and influence over policies that could affect security and governance, 

but had no direct responsibility for achieving drug-control targets. 

Moreover, some security interventions delivered counternarcotics effects but 

were not explicitly designed to do so and did not draw upon counternarcotics 

funding. A notable example of this was the incursion of almost 15,000 

U.S. Marines and Afghan security forces into Helmand’s Marjah district in 

February 2010, which contributed to dramatic reductions in levels of opium 

poppy cultivation the following year.156

Interventions Were Inaccurately Described, Categorized, and Attributed

Over the course of the reconstruction effort, many programs were labeled 

as counternarcotics to obtain funding or so individuals and agencies could 

be seen as engaging with a policy priority. Some of these programs were not 

actually designed to address the production and trade of illicit drugs, despite 

the counternarcotics label and the funding they drew upon. For example, 

some rural development programs that received funding under the rubric 

of alternative development ignored opium poppy cultivation during design 

and implementation, and some inadvertently facilitated an increase in opium 

production over time.157

Counternarcotics efforts had to compete for funds and resources, particularly 

military support, with other established priorities, including those of COIN and 

counterterrorism (CT). In order to gain policy prominence for counternarcotics, 

as well as funding and support, agencies responsible for counternarcotics often 

linked drug-control objectives to COIN, CT, and other DOD priorities. This 

successfully garnered more resources, but at times resulted in counternarcotics 

objectives becoming secondary to or poorly integrated with those 

broader initiatives.

Problems with Metrics and Performance Measurement

For senior U.S. policymakers, levels of poppy cultivation came to not only 

describe the scale of the drug problem in Afghanistan, but also the progress 

toward counternarcotics and state-building objectives at the national and 

provincial level.158 While cultivation was the primary metric used to judge the 

success of U.S. counternarcotics efforts, it was not the only one. Levels of 

opium production and related measures, such as the scale of crop destruction 

and the number of poppy-free provinces, were also considered. These statistics 

were often cited as evidence of counternarcotics successes or failures, and were 

used to support particular policy arguments.159
30 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Although poppy cultivation levels served as the default measurement for 

counterdrug efforts, this metric was not necessarily the best indicator for 

gauging progress on U.S. priorities. While the 2007 U.S. counternarcotics 

strategy recognized “the Afghan opium trade is much more than a drug 

problem” and “Afghanistan’s drug money weakens key institutions and 

strengthens the Taliban,” reporting requirements did not always measure 

progress against these aspects of the problem.160 For many senior policymakers, 

and particularly members of Congress, the primary indicator of success or 

failure was cultivation, when a more comprehensive set of indicators would 

have included metrics such as denial of funding to the insurgency or the 

arrest of corrupt officials involved in the trade. As former senior advisor to 

the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Dr. Barnett 

Rubin wrote, “The urgent security interest of the United States in the drug 

trade in Afghanistan is NOT the quantity of drugs produced, but the amount of 

money from the industry that supports insurgency/terrorism and government 

corruption.”161 This misalignment between strategic priorities and reporting 

metrics was even more problematic when combined with the inaccuracies that 

plagued poppy cultivation estimates.

Data Sources

Two organizations provided the official data on national and subnational poppy 

cultivation trends and tracked this information over time. UNODC’s annual 

opium poppy survey was viewed by many as the most credible source of data 

on levels of poppy cultivation and was commonly cited. The second data 

source was the annual estimate of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Crime and 

Narcotics Center (CNC). CNC based its estimate on a well-established survey 

that drew upon high-resolution imagery over many years.162 The UNODC survey 

did not begin using satellite imagery to assess cultivation until 2002—and even 

since then, it has used a mix of methods, including a “sampling approach” of 

high-resolution imagery for major opium poppy-producing provinces and, for 

those provinces UNODC considered minor producers, a ground-based survey, 

followed by a “targeted approach” to imagery collection.163

In the early years of reconstruction, there were dramatic differences between 

the UNODC and CNC estimates of poppy cultivation. In 2002, UNODC reported 

around 74,000 hectares of poppy cultivation nationwide, while CNC estimated 

approximately 31,000 hectares.164

 (See figure 3.) In 2004, UNODC reported 

131,000 hectares, while CNC estimated 206,700 hectares of cultivation.165 The 

discrepancy between the two surveys was so great that the UK, in its capacity 

as lead nation for counternarcotics, hired a third-party expert to gain better 

insights into different survey methodologies and to support the improvement 

of the UNODC survey.166 It was not just an issue of the UN survey’s credibility, 

but, as one official noted, “There was recognition that there needed to be better 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 31

understanding of differences, for benchmarking and measuring counternarcotics 

efforts.”167 While the UK’s investments and increased cooperation between 

UNODC and CNC led to an alignment of national-level poppy estimates, 

discrepancies continued at the provincial level.168 (See figure 4).

Data on Cultivation and Eradication 

The lack of accurate data posed significant problems when poor data was used 

to judge policy options and the performance of provincial governors, as was 

the case with the Good Performers Initiative. Nonetheless, the problems with 

data were frequently glossed over in discussions with senior U.S. officials, 

and a level of certainty was attributed to the estimates that did not reflect 

reality.169 A former senior NSC official referred to the UN report as being “really 

instrumental in influencing policy: It was the core input into these policy 

conversations;” yet, the report was widely acknowledged to be flawed.170

A notable example of UNODC findings being used to support a particular policy 

position can be seen in what came to be known as the “credible threat” doctrine. 

This concept assumed it was necessary to destroy 25 percent of the standing 

poppy crop each year to deter future planting, and was attributed to UNODC.171

Those closely involved in eradication at the time questioned the figure’s veracity, 

as well as the underlying assumption that eradicating a certain fraction of the 

crop would deter planting. According to a former eradication contractor, one 

UNODC staff member admitted it was “an arbitrary number.”172 One former UK 

government contractor complained, “UNODC made it up. It was nonsense.”173 A 

former UNODC official with knowledge of the Afghanistan program reported he 

had “no idea where credible threat came from.”174 Nevertheless, the 25 percent 

Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017: Cultivation and Production, November 2017, p. 13; CNC, data provided to SIGAR, October 2015, March 2017, and March 2018.

AFGHANISTAN TOTAL POPPY CULTIVATION ESTIMATES, 1999–2017 (HECTARES)

1999

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

UNODC

CNC

FIGURE 3
32 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FIGURE 4

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

HELMAND

0

37,500

75,000

112,500

150,000

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

KANDAHAR

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

FARAH

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

NIMROZ

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

URUZGAN

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003: Cultivation and Production, October 2003, pp. 85–88; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Cultivation and Production, May 2013, p. 92; UNODC, 

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017: Cultivation and Production, November 2017, p. 16; CNC, data provided to SIGAR, October 2015, March 2017, and March 2018.

TOTAL POPPY CULTIVATION ESTIMATES BY PROVINCE, 1999–2017 (HECTARES)

NANGARHAR

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

UNODC

CNC

UNODC CNC
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 33

number formed the backbone of the argument that greater levels of crop 

destruction were required, including in the push for spraying.175

Another example of UNODC rhetoric used to support policy positions was the 

2007 UNODC poppy survey report, in which UNODC Executive Director Antonio 

Maria Costa claimed recent expansion in poppy cultivation was largely confined 

to well-off Afghan provinces and declared “opium cultivation in Afghanistan is 

no longer associated with poverty.”176

 The U.S. Coordinator for Counternarcotics 

and Justice Reform in Afghanistan, Ambassador Thomas Schweich, used 

this statement to press for eradication, particularly aerial spraying, arguing 

eradication would not harm poor farmers because it was wealthy farmers who 

were growing opium poppy.177 Costa also advocated spraying, at first privately 

to U.S. government representatives and then publicly at a NATO meeting.178

The following year, Costa’s statement on the absence of a relationship between 

poppy and poverty was challenged by a UNODC evaluation of the poppy survey 

and proven to be uninformed by independent research.179

In addition to concerns with the estimates of poppy cultivation, estimates of 

the amount of opium poppy crop destroyed were perhaps more political and 

typically less accurate. Much of the eradication data that was regarded as a 

critical measure of counternarcotics success or failure was, in fact, self-reported 

during the initial years of the reconstruction effort. For example, the hectarage 

reported as eradicated in 2002 and 2003 by the UK and the Afghan Transitional 

Authority was self-reported and unverified.180 A former UK government 

contractor described eradication reporting that, when compared to imagery 

analysis, proved to be grossly exaggerated.181 The U.S.-funded Poppy Eradication 

Force (PEF) also self-reported on the eradication it conducted.182

It was not until 2005 that UNODC attempted to verify the numbers reported 

by the Afghan government under the GLE campaign.183 Imagery collection and 

analysis by the UK proved the scale of the over-reporting in 2006 and 2007, 

contributing to friction between Kabul and London, as well as between INL and 

the UK’s Afghan drugs team.184 Furthermore, UNODC’s reluctance to engage 

in eradication verification—out of fear its surveyors would be seen as law 

enforcement personnel rather than neutral data collectors, thereby undermining 

the annual poppy survey—meant it was not until 2008 that there was greater 

confidence in the eradication estimates provided by the UN and the Afghan 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN).185

Despite concerns regarding the overall estimates of poppy cultivation and the 

veracity of the eradication data, these numbers were regularly cited in the 

media and official documents without the necessary caveats. U.S. officials often 

overlooked or were misinformed about the problems of eradication verification. 
34 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Even testimony to Congress rarely reflected doubts about the accuracy of the 

statistics that were so often used to judge the Afghan drug problem and the 

counternarcotics response.186

Poor Data Regarding Links between Poppy and Insurgents

The contribution of the Afghan opium trade to insurgent finances was routinely 

cited as a primary reason for increased counternarcotics efforts. This argument 

was the foundation for more widespread crop destruction: Destroy the crop and 

destroy the insurgency’s primary source of funds.187 However, the basis of this 

claim was disputed, and there were methodological problems with the data on 

which it was based.188 For example, U.S. officials sometimes assumed farmers 

paid 10 percent of their crop to the Taliban as ushr, a generic term for tax in 

Afghanistan. Yet in many rural areas, such payments might be in cash or in kind; 

they might be a percentage of the final crop, a fixed amount per household or 

per unit of land, or simply what a farmer can afford. If a farmer says he pays 

ushr to the Taliban, it cannot be assumed that he pays 10 percent of his crop.189

Assessments as to the amount of money the insurgency received from narcotics, 

as well as the relationship between the drug trade and the insurgency and 

terrorist groups, varied significantly over the course of the reconstruction effort. 

In October 2001, INL’s Director of the Office of Asia, Africa, Europe, and Newly 

Independent States, William Bach, testified that, “While we do not have clear 

evidence directly linking drug traffickers and terrorists in Afghanistan, Taliban 

responsibility is obvious, particularly given its de facto control over 90 percent 

of the country.”190 On the previous day, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that 

the Taliban and al-Qaeda “jointly exploit the Afghan drugs trade.”191 In February 

2004, DEA Administrator Karen Tandy stated that, in DEA’s view, “We do not 

have evidence capable of sustaining an indictment of direct links between 

terrorism and narcotics trafficking groups within Afghanistan.”192

In the early reconstruction years, there were also debates within DOD about 

the linkages between the insurgency and narcotics, debates which some have 

asserted were due to DOD’s reluctance to assume a larger counternarcotics role. 

One former DOD official stated the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

believed poppy was funding the insurgency, but there was resistance to this idea 

at U.S. Central Command because it would lead to deeper military involvement 

in counternarcotics.193

By 2007, counternarcotics-related reports made more explicit links between 

the resurgent insurgency, rising levels of drug-crop cultivation, and the funding 

the Taliban received from the crop.194 The commander of ISAF, General Dan 

McNeill, publicly stated, “When I see a poppy field, I see it turning into money 

and then into IEDs [improvised explosive devices], AKs [assault rifles], and 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 35

RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades].”195 As journalist Steve Coll recounted, 

the intensification of the insurgency in 2006 and a concurrent spike in poppy 

cultivation seized the attention of some officials in Washington, who drew 

parallels between the Taliban’s and the Colombian FARC’s reliance on drug 

revenues. (See pages 27–28.) But, these discussions occurred at the same time “a 

fierce argument erupted among U.S. intelligence agencies about whether opium 

and heroin were, in fact, a significant aspect of the Taliban’s insurgency.”196

Upon his appointment as SRAP in 2009, however, Ambassador Richard 

Holbrooke moved away from eradication; a CIA study reportedly said the 

Taliban got most of its money from illegal taxation and contributions from 

Pakistan and Persian Gulf nations, rather than drugs.197 The UN Security 

Council’s Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Team reported that Afghan officials 

estimated Taliban profits from the drug trade were around $100 million in 

2011–2012, or one-quarter of their estimated $400 million income for that year.198

In 2016, however, Resolute Support and USFOR-A commander General John 

Nicholson said that approximately 60 percent of Taliban funding came from the 

drug trade.199

The lack of consensus on the relationship between the drug trade and the 

insurgency influenced U.S. counterdrug policies. Kirk Meyer, the director from 

2008 to 2011 of the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, an interagency, Kabul-based 

unit formed to disrupt financial networks related to terrorism, the Taliban, 

narcotics trafficking, and corruption, stated, “The drug trade was really bad, but 

I personally never believed it was as big a funding source for the insurgency as 

a lot of people thought.”200 At the same time, other informed voices argued that 

opium was the critical cash source for the insurgency. In 2018, DOD pointed out 

that given the increase in levels of cultivation and production in recent years, 

and the lucrative nature of the narcotics trade, “it’s plausible the Taliban now 

place greater emphasis on narcotics as a primary source of revenue.”201 The 

range of opinion illustrates not only the challenges of accurately estimating 

the drug trade’s impact on insurgent financing, but also how policy has been 

informed by different and at times competing estimates.

JUNE 2018 | 37

DOD photo

CHAPTER 2

A CHRONOLOGY OF COUNTERNARCOTICS 

OVER THE AFGHAN RECONSTRUCTION 

EFFORT

Afghanistan produces 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium; it is the 

country’s largest export and a mainstay of the rural economy. The 

corruption associated with opium’s illegal trade permeates many levels of the 

Afghan government. Yet, counternarcotics was of necessity only one of many 

priorities for the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. That effort comprised 

a number of different agencies, each with its own view of what was important, 

its own mandate and budget, and its own reporting lines to Congress and the 

White House. This was often a competitive environment, where agencies battled 

for resources to pursue what were, or were often perceived to be, conflicting 

objectives and programs.

Within the context of the multilateral counternarcotics mission, U.S. government 

agencies, coalition partners, and Afghan authorities struggled to reach 

consensus. Opinions on the importance of counternarcotics often varied 

between partners. Even within the Afghan government, officials had significantly 

different views regarding what should be done.202 Divisions were also apparent 

within the UK’s efforts as lead nation for counternarcotics. In particular, the 

British military leadership was often firmly opposed to eradication, concerned it 

would “stir things up” in Helmand Province.203
38 | A CHRONOLOGY OF COUNTERNARCOTICS OVER THE AFGHAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Those responsible for counternarcotics fought for primacy throughout the 

reconstruction effort. Sometimes, counternarcotics concerns reached the 

highest levels of the U.S. government; other times, they barely registered. As 

one expert noted, the driving factor in attracting senior policymakers’ attention 

was typically “an increase in the level of cultivation. The rise in this metric, 

often accompanied by a narrative of the failure of the state-building project in 

Afghanistan, generated the political pressure to respond, and to respond quickly, 

with efforts that might lead to a dramatic reduction in opium production almost 

regardless of whether these reductions would endure.”204

STARTING FROM NOTHING: 2002–2003

The initial two years of counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan were 

characterized by limited attention from the U.S. government and a nonexistent 

infrastructure to deal with drug production and trafficking. There were few 

Afghan government institutions or Western donors with which to engage, 

and this institutional vacuum, coupled with low levels of funding, meant that 

coordination was largely improvised in the field, without clear guidance. 

There was also a tendency to create new, and what would often become 

parallel, structures. 

During these early years, poppy cultivation was rising rapidly, a rebound effect 

of the Taliban’s nationwide poppy ban in 2000. The Taliban used a combination 

of coercion and the promise of future development assistance to implement and 

enforce the ban. In August 2001, it was reported that cultivation had decreased 

from 82,000 hectares to 8,000 hectares between 2000 and 2001.205 Despite 

the ban’s dramatic short-term success, many in the international community 

believed the results would be short-lived.206 Poppy farmers and sharecroppers 

who had received loans prior to the ban were subsequently unable to pay 

off their debts with opium.207 Traffickers and money-lenders monetized the 

debt according to opium’s rising market value, which had increased from 

around $100 per kilogram in September 2000 to $500 in July 2001.208 The 

Taliban provided no alternative income to mitigate the economic impact and 

loss of livelihood farmers experienced because of the ban.209 According to 

Afghanistan scholar and former SRAP advisor Barnett Rubin, “The heavy debt 

of the peasantry was one of the principal factors that led to the resurgence of 

opium cultivation after the start of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.”210 By 2003, 

cultivation had spread to 28 provinces, up from 24 in 2002.211

The UK as Lead Nation for Counternarcotics

Following the rout of the Taliban regime in late 2001, NATO allies and the 

Afghan Interim Administration divided up tasks for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan. The April 2002 Group of Eight (G8) Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 39

framework gave the UK the role as lead nation for counternarcotics. 

Having assumed the lead for developing the Afghan National Army (ANA), 

the U.S. government was broadly supportive of the UK’s assumption of 

the counternarcotics role.212 INL supported the UK lead, agreeing that 

reconstruction and development were top priorities and that counternarcotics 

should be integrated into them, with “eradication as a minor piece” of the 

effort.213 Further, the UK’s leadership helped to address widespread donor 

concerns over the capacity of UNODC, which had been leading counterdrug 

efforts in Afghanistan up to that point.214

In spring 2002, the UK implemented a compensated eradication program.215

The program, Operation Drown, was designed to offer a one-time payment of 

$350 per jerib (1/5 of a hectare or almost 1/2 acre) to farmers whose crop was 

destroyed during the operation.216

 While successful in the short-term, it was 

perceived by many as setting the wrong tone.217 Operation Drown focused on 

demonstrable, short-term action to reduce cultivation levels, but gave little 

thought to long-term strategy or how these reductions could be sustained. 

Additionally, allegations of corruption and over-reporting undermined 

the program.218

The UK compounded the errors of compensated eradication by embracing 

unrealistic goals and timeframes. The UK pledged to reduce poppy cultivation 

by 70 percent in five years and eliminate the crop altogether in ten years.219

This target was later incorporated into the Afghan government’s first National 

Drug Strategy.220

U.S. Reluctance to Engage on Counternarcotics

Within the U.S. government, there was little desire to engage on 

counternarcotics during this period.221 For example, INL did not have a 

Foreign Service Officer in Kabul until the spring of 2003.222 U.S. Ambassador 

to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad referred to “purposely downplay[ing] 

counternarcotics” because of his view that many of the reconstruction projects 

already planned would “help reduce opium production.”223 Recognizing the 

UK’s lead, Khalilzad also “did not want to diminish the UK’s responsibility 

to act.”224

DOD was unwilling to be involved in counternarcotics efforts at this point, 

believing counternarcotics interfered with DOD’s mandate to defeat the 

Taliban and al-Qaeda.225

 A former senior DOD official recounted, “DOD 

fundamentally didn’t understand what getting involved in counternarcotics 

entailed. Everyone was focusing on traditional roles. They would only talk to 

those in their battlespace. From a DOD perspective, it was tactical, and about 

finding and killing al-Qaeda.”226 Several officials interviewed by SIGAR recalled 
40 | A CHRONOLOGY OF COUNTERNARCOTICS OVER THE AFGHAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

that Lieutenant General David Barno, the commander of Combined Forces 

Command–Afghanistan, was reluctant to pursue counternarcotics efforts.227

Barno himself recalled “an infinite number of different things that people 

wanted us [the coalition military] to do” in 2004, and his decision to take “any 

direct military role in counternarcotics right off the plate, because I thought that 

would be a distraction for us in 2004, especially with the elections.” The main 

effort Barno assigned to military units was to “set conditions for a successful 

Afghan presidential election” in 2005.228

The CIA adopted a similar position; it did not want to be distracted by 

counternarcotics.229 The CIA instead prioritized its relationships with significant 

traffickers, such as Haji Bashir Noorzai and Haji Juma Khan.230

Institution Building and Strand Development

Institution building and program delivery got off to a slow start during this 

period. The UK established the Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) in 

Kabul. It was placed under the Afghan National Security Council and had 

responsibilities for strategy, coordination, and monitoring. The UK also wrote 

a National Drug Control Strategy, which stated that implementation was the 

responsibility of the line ministries, including the Ministry of Interior (MOI), 

the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the Ministry 

of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), and the Ministry of Public 

Health (MOPH).231

Factionalism within the Afghanistan Interim Administration meant that, 

despite a presidential order, the CND operated in parallel with the preexisting 

State High Commission for Drug Control for nine months before absorbing 

the High Commission’s functions and staff.232 (See figure 5.) Some in the new 

Afghan government also showed little understanding of the complexity of 

counternarcotics and had unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved. 

As a senior UK official commented, “[Chairman of the Interim Administration] 

Karzai saw the issue as a simple enforcement issue, easily fixed.”233

Initial progress within the counternarcotics effort was slow, and what was 

achieved was largely a function of coordination by individuals on the ground. 

The law enforcement effort, in particular, had almost no Afghan institutions or 

resources with which to partner. A former senior UN adviser with considerable 

experience in Afghanistan described what he found at the time, noting, 

“Counternarcotics was a small department inside the Department of Smuggling 

inside general policing. It had two people serving, when there should have 

been eight. The provinces in April 2002 were even more soul-destroying. Many 

of the police stations were gutted; there was nothing in many of the provinces 

at all.”234 A former official of the UK’s revenue and customs authority described 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 41

Kabul-based officers in the CNPA in April 2002 as having “no equipment, no 

radios, and [using] their own vehicles.”235 DEA reopened its country office in 

Kabul in February 2003, but was reluctant to operate outside of Kabul because 

of security concerns and the fact that Afghan partner units did not yet exist. 

(See figure 5.) Instead, DEA focused on intelligence gathering and interdicting 

Afghan drugs as they transited through neighboring countries.236

Each lead nation assigned under the SSR framework brought different skills, 

institutions, and budgets to bear. Despite the interdependence of the SSR 

sectors, progress varied widely across them. For example, the UK’s efforts as 

the counternarcotics lead were closely intertwined with Germany’s efforts to 

reform the ANP and Italy’s role as the lead nation for judicial reform.

Cooperation between UNODC, the UK, the German law enforcement 

community, and Minister of the Interior Ali Ahmad Jalali led to the 

establishment and training of the CNPA in both Kabul and the provinces. The 

CNPA was intended to serve as a special force within the ANP, responsible for 

counternarcotics operations throughout the country.237

 While offices, equipment, 

and training courses were provided, resources were still thin on the ground, and 

ill-conceived plans led to the provision of equipment without covering recurrent 

maintenance costs. This inability to fund maintenance and consumables 

“undermined the nature of the support being provided.”238 In late 2003, CNPA did 

not have procedures in place to pay informants. They were, however, expected 

and encouraged to conduct investigations. Consequently, CNPA officers, 

particularly those in the provinces, found themselves having to pay informants 

and make deals using a portion of the opiates seized.239

The UK began to build a parallel counternarcotics force within the MOI called 

the Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF), also known as Task Force-333 

(TF-333, figure 5). This was a specialized paramilitary unit trained and equipped 

by the UK and also supported by the United States. The task force was charged 

with conducting raids and destroying heroin laboratories.240 TF-333 was modeled 

on the UK Special Forces and focused on “doing what you can do now and 

giving time for the rest of the counternarcotics pillars and effort to deliver.”241

While TF-333 proved successful in destroying labs, it was not conceived as 

part of a long-term judicial sector development effort.242 The unit’s focus on 

interdiction through raids and seizure operations resulted in tactical successes, 

but had a limited impact on the longer-term goal of dismantling and prosecuting 

drug-trafficking networks.

Similar to counternarcotics law enforcement efforts, rural development 

programs in poppy-growing areas were slow to get started. INL initially 

supported small-scale, alternative development projects implemented by NGOs 
42 | A CHRONOLOGY OF COUNTERNARCOTICS OVER THE AFGHAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

in the south of the country, conditioned on reductions in poppy cultivation.243

However, USAID was reluctant to support these initiatives and was wary of 

an INL that “wanted in on the development game where financial resources 

were being directed. Moreover, USAID believed INL took a hardline approach 

to USAID’s relatively small-scale rural development schemes focused on 

addressing food insecurity and increasing food production.”244 Some in USAID 

had already raised concerns that making assistance conditional on reductions in 

poppy cultivation was “self-defeating” and did not want to be involved in what 

USAID leadership saw as a losing effort.245 As a result, USAID withdrew from 

early alternative development efforts, “happy to step out of it,” and “recused 

[itself] from the debate;” at the same time, USAID increased its support for 

programs focused on agricultural production.246

 Even at this early stage, then, 

 ASNF/TF-333: Afghan Special Narcotics Force- 

 Task Force-333

 CND: Counter Narcotics Directorate

 CNIK: Counter Narcotics Infantry Kandak

CNJC: Counter Narcotics Justice Center

CNAT: Counter Narcotics Advisory Team

 CNPA: Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

 CJTF: Criminal Justice Task Force

 MCN: Ministry of Counter Narcotics

 NIU: National Interdiction Unit

 SIU: Sensitive Investigative Unit

 SHCDC: State High Commisssion for 

 Drug Control

 TIU: Technical Investigative Unit

 VPTF: Vertical Prosecution Task Force

 AEF: Afghan Eradication Force

 ATFC: Afghan Threat Finance Cell

 BEDT: British Embassy Drugs Team

 CPEF: Central Poppy Eradication Force

 CJIATF: Combined Joint Interagency 

 Task Force

 CNTF: Counter Narcotics Trust Fund

 DEA Kabul: Drug Enforcement Administration Kabul

 DEA FAST: DEA Foreign-Deployed Advisory 

 Support Team

 GPI: Good Performers Initiative

 GPTF: Good Performers Trust Fund

GLE: Governor-Led Eradication

 IOCC: Interagency Operations 

 Coordination Center

 JNAC: Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre

 PEF: Poppy Eradication Force

KEY & ABBREVIATIONS

U.S./INTERNATIONAL

AFGHAN

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 200

SHCDC

CND

ASNF/TF-333 ASNF/TF-333

BEDT

CNPA

DEA Kabul

GLE

CPEF

MCN

NIU

VPTF

AEF

CNTF CNTF

DEA FAST

IOCC

JNAC

CNAT

GPI

GPTF

PEF

SIU

TIU 

PEF

CNIK

GPTF

CJTF

SELECT AFGHAN AND U.S./INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS AND INSTITUTIONS, 2001–2018

FIGURE 5

Note: The State High Commission for Drug Control preceded the U.S. and international invasion of Afghanistan. The Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND) became the Ministry of Counter Narcotics 

(MCN). TF-333 did not end in 2008, but rather was re-tasked to focus on counterterrorism in 2009. The Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) was later renamed the Afghan Eradication Force 

(AEF) and then renamed the Poppy Eradication Force (PEF). The Vertical Prosecution Task Force (VPTF) was later renamed the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF). The last available record of the 

Counter Narcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK) was in 2009. In 2014, MCN began implementing a revised Good Performers Initiative (GPI) II, but this program was phased out before it came into effect 

and GPI was discontinued. 

Source: For the full list of sources, please see page 248.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 43

senior USAID and INL leaders were operating with contradictory polices 

regarding alternative development and its place within the U.S. counterdrug 

strategy. According to a former senior USAID official, “USAID was not requested 

to direct resources to programs whose goal was alternative development, 

but did work in Helmand and Kandahar on agricultural production and 

marketing schemes.”247

In summer 2003, USAID launched its own $150 million rural development 

effort, the Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP). RAMP focused 

on irrigation rehabilitation and roads, without conditioning assistance on 

reductions in poppy cultivation.248 Similarly, several programs funded by other 

donors, including the UK Department for International Development (DFID), 

the European Union (EU), and the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, 

did not include conditionality measures.249 (See pages 108–109 for a discussion 

of conditionality.)

006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

ASNF/TF-333

AEF

CNTF CNTF

DEA FAST

IOCC

JNAC

CNAT

GPI

GPTF

PEF

SIU

TIU TIU

ATFC

CJIATF Nexus

CNJC

SIU

PEF

CNIK

GPTF

GPI

CJTF

CNAT

JNAC

IOCC

DEA FAST

CJTF

NIU

MCN

GLE

DEA Kabul

CNPA

BEDT
44 | A CHRONOLOGY OF COUNTERNARCOTICS OVER THE AFGHAN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT

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At this time, many disparate counternarcotics activities were taking place. As 

one senior DOD official noted, “Everyone did their own thing, not thinking 

how it fit in with the larger effort. State was trying to eradicate, USAID was 

marginally trying to do livelihoods, and DEA was going after bad guys.”250

By the end of 2003, U.S. government officials and experts began to view this 

uncoordinated effort as ineffective and in need of significant changes. 

The United States began to take a more dominant role in counternarcotics, 

far outspending the UK, which was still designated as the lead nation. U.S. 

officials had begun to lose patience with the SSR process.251 As President Bush 

later recalled, “The multilateral approach to rebuilding, hailed by so many in 

the international community, was failing.” Bush further stated, “America had 

to take on more of the responsibility, even though we were about to undertake 

a major new commitment in Iraq as well.”252 Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy Douglas Feith argued that, “As lead nation in the counternarcotics effort, 

[the UK] failed to invest the necessary resources.”253

Robert Charles’ appointment as the head of INL in late 2003 contributed to a 

greater focus on counternarcotics within the reconstruction mission. Charles 

was one of the architects of Plan Colombia and, once at INL, pressed for 

a much more aggressive counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan, including 

aerial spraying.254 Charles looked to lead from the back, actively criticizing 

the UK in public and lobbying key members of Congress to support more 

demonstrable action.255

The late 2003 restructuring of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul by newly appointed 

Ambassador Khalilzad was part of the U.S. government’s reevaluation of the 

U.S. approach to reconstruction, including counternarcotics.256 Following a 

visit by John Walters, the director of the U.S. Office of National Drug Control 

Policy (ONDCP), Ambassador Khalilzad appointed a “drug czar” specifically 

for Afghanistan, who would serve as the director of the Kabul Counter 

Narcotics Task Force. The director was tasked with coordinating the actions 

of U.S. agencies responsible for the counternarcotics effort.257 This led to 

resentment from INL, both in Kabul and in Washington.258 Subsequent INL 

leadership sought to undermine the director, arguing that the position should 

answer to INL leadership in Washington and not to the ambassador.259

COUNTERNARCOTICS AS A PRIORITY: 2004–2008

In 2004, a spike in poppy cultivation to 131,000 hectares garnered widespread 

U.S. media attention, and members of Congress called for more progress in 

wiping out that cultivation.260 This added to the momentum already building 

within the U.S. government for placing a greater emphasis on counternarcotics. 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

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By 2006, the priority given to counternarcotics was not just a response to high 

levels of cultivation, but also a consequence of the prevailing view that the 

opium economy helped to fuel the insurgency. Counternarcotics became a 

source of tension between different U.S. government agencies, donor nations, 

ISAF, and the Afghan government. Disagreements began to emerge as the parties 

sought to balance elements of the counternarcotics effort, in particular crop 

eradication, with other strategic objectives, such as COIN and CT.

In 2005, INL’s push for aerial spraying, to the exclusion of other counterdrug 

efforts, and its effort to get DOD more involved in counternarcotics became 

major points of division within the U.S. government. (See page 93.) At a 

congressional hearing, Assistant Secretary Charles lambasted the U.S. military 

for failing to target the opium trade and make crop destruction the principal 

objective.261 As former DOD official Michael Waltz noted, “The U.S. strategy 

may have been holistic in design, but in execution one pillar quickly became the 

primary focus: eradication.”262

Also in 2005, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul issued the first U.S. counternarcotics 

strategy for Afghanistan. (See table 3.) The strategy was shaped by Ambassador 

Khalilzad, who was described by an official at the embassy as “pragmatic; 

he believed in a balanced approach and recognized there was only so much 

that could be done, and that DOD and CIA would allow.”263 Though it was not 

TABLE 3

U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGIES AND OBJECTIVES FOR AFGHANISTAN

Strategy Objectives

2005 U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy The 2005 counternarcotics strategy introduced the five pillar plan: elimination or eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public 

information, and alternative livelihoods. The strategy underscored the importance of eradication, which had not been a major focus 

of preceding counternarcotics efforts.

2007 U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy The 2007 counternarcotics strategy focused on improving implementation of the five pillars. The strategy outlined three major goals: 

1. Dramatically increasing development assistance to incentivize licit development, while simultaneously amplifying the scope 

and intensity of both interdiction and eradication operations.

2. Coordinating counternarcotics and counterinsurgency planning and operations in a manner not previously accomplished, 

with a particular emphasis on integrating drug interdiction into the COIN mission.

3. Encouraging consistent, sustained political will for the counternarcotics effort among the Afghan government, U.S. allies, 

and international civilian and military organizations.

2010 U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy The 2010 counternarcotics strategy focused on the expansion of Afghan government control and counternarcotics operations with 

a COIN nexus. Under the 2010 strategy, the United States stopped funding large-scale eradication operations, but continued to 

fund the Governor-Led Eradication effort. Two of the goals in this strategy were to: 

1. Counter the link between narcotics and the insurgency.

2. Enhance and increase agricultural development and licit alternatives to poppy.

2012 U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy The 2012 strategy maintained the U.S. commitment to support the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. It took into account the 

reduction of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the then-pending transfer of security responsibilities from ISAF to the ANDSF. 

The strategy outlined two major goals:

1. Build the government’s ability to be a self-sufficient force in reducing the drug trade, stabilizing the region, 

and improving the security situation. 

2. Further weaken the link between insurgents and narcotics, specifically targeting the funds insurgents receive from 

the narcotics industry.

Source: GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, GAO-10-291, March 2010, p. 10; State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, August 2007, p. 2; SIGAR, Quarterly Report 

to the United States Congress, July 30, 2016, p. 119; State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, March 2010, pp. 2, 7; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 

2017, p. 188. 
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included in the 2005 strategy, Assistant Secretary Charles and INL continued 

to press for aerial spraying. According to an official involved, Charles’ pitch 

on counternarcotics was “structured so that it would sound strong and stand 

even without DOD. Khalilzad presented the 2005 strategy to the U.S. cabinet 

recognizing that DOD wouldn’t necessarily engage. The strategy went straight 

to President Bush and the conversation was from Kabul to the U.S. cabinet. 

Khalilzad also had three conversations on counternarcotics with Karzai.”264

While aerial spraying was ultimately rejected, consensus for a greater U.S. 

counternarcotics role, particularly in eradication, began to emerge. (See 

pages 97–100.)

The U.S. government increased its expenditures on counternarcotics during this 

period, including greater investments in poppy eradication. A major component 

of eradication was the Central Poppy Eradication Force, later renamed the 

Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) and then the Poppy Eradication Force. 

(See figure 6.) The eradication force reported to the MOI and was managed 

by INL through a contract with DynCorp International. The eradication force 

became the bulwark of INL’s efforts in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2008 and 

served as an important way for Washington to drive counternarcotics policy 

in Afghanistan.265

As concern over the scale of poppy cultivation grew, Ambassador Khalilzad 

and others reportedly told USAID to focus on alternative development.266

The pressure in these years was such that, between 2005 and 2008, USAID 

allocated an average of 75 percent of its total agricultural program budget for 

Afghanistan to alternative development.267

 In 2005, USAID launched three large 

rural development programs: Alternative Development Program (ADP) North, 

ADP East, and ADP South, with a total of $332.78 million in funding.268 A fourth 

program, ADP Southwest, was launched in 2008.

Despite USAID’s increased expenditures, some officials within the 

U.S. government expressed doubts that these alternative development projects 

would reduce opium poppy cultivation, as well as concerns about USAID’s 

FIGURE 6

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) 

2004–2005

Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) 

2005–2007

Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) 

2007–2009

ERADICATION FORCE OVER TIME

Source: GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluations of Justice Reform 

Efforts Needed, GAO-10-291, March 2010, p. 14.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 47

commitment to achieving counternarcotics goals.269 These doubts arose, in part, 

from USAID’s inability, or unwillingness, to articulate how the development 

interventions it was funding would support a farmer’s transition out of poppy 

cultivation. USAID asserted that any rural development in a poppy-growing area 

could be considered alternative development.270

Policy disagreements between INL and USAID over the effectiveness of making 

development assistance contingent on reductions in poppy cultivation added 

to USAID’s apprehension about being too closely involved in counternarcotics. 

There was concern that “if USAID’s programs were seen as merely the 

spearhead of a poppy eradication campaign, it would undermine [USAID’s] 

efforts to build the trust with local communities needed to effectively provide 

development assistance.”271 Doug Wankel, who served as director of the Kabul 

Counter Narcotics Task Force at the U.S. Embassy, stated, “USAID mostly paid 

lip service to counternarcotics, rather than being an active participant. They 

gave the feeling they didn’t want to be in the photograph when the picture 

was taken.”272

“USAID mostly paid lip service to counternarcotics, rather than 

being an active participant. They gave the feeling they didn’t want 

to be in the photograph when the picture was taken.”

—Doug Wankel, 

former director of the Kabul Counter Narcotics Task Force, U.S. Embassy Kabul

By at least 2006, the initial DOD resistance to counternarcotics began to ebb.273

The priority given to counternarcotics was not just a function of high levels of 

cultivation, but also a consequence of the increasingly common view that there 

was a nexus between the drug trade and the insurgency.274 There was also a 

growing recognition that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (OSD/CNGT) could bring authorities 

and funds to bear that could be useful to the wider reconstruction effort in 

Afghanistan, for example, by supporting entities like the Afghan Border Police.275

DOD’s collective opposition to INL’s push for aerial spraying and concerns that 

INL was not prioritizing interdiction further empowered OSD/CNGT to take on a 

larger counterdrug role.276

UK officials also reinvigorated their counternarcotics efforts in response to 

U.S. criticism.277 They pushed for CND to become the Ministry of Counter 

Narcotics to coordinate all Afghan government counternarcotics initiatives. 

Additionally, the UK helped establish the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF), 

a UN-administered fund meant to increase the profile of the counterdrug effort 

and streamline funding of relevant ministries within the Afghan government.278
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In Kabul, counternarcotics conferences, strategies, and implementation plans 

proliferated.279 For example, the UK and United States initiated semiannual joint 

talks on counternarcotics to help align their interests and programming.280

Counternarcotics-related activities in the provinces also expanded. The creation 

of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) provided a platform for greater 

engagement with provincial authorities by military, diplomatic, and development 

professionals. In some provinces, military forces played a major role in the 

counternarcotics effort, sometimes even equating the success of their mission 

with decreased levels of opium poppy cultivation.281

Provincial governors, in particular, came to be seen as the bulwark of 

counternarcotics efforts and were asked to impose bans on opium poppy 

cultivation. Supporting efforts included the Counter Narcotics Advisory Team 

(CNAT), the Good Performers Initiative, and the integration of counternarcotics 

into provincial development planning. Some of these initiatives coincided with 

dramatic reductions in poppy cultivation, particularly in the provinces of Balkh 

in 2007 and Nangarhar in 2008, and were hailed as major successes, reinforcing 

the call to allocate greater resources directly to the provinces.282

A number of new counternarcotics institutions were also created, and existing 

institutions began to engage in counternarcotics, most notably in DOD and 

subsequently ISAF. Following a change to its operations plan in October 2008, 

ISAF military forces were permitted to directly engage in counternarcotics 

operations that were directed at targets linked to the insurgency.283 This change 

provided the military and air support to law enforcement officials that they had 

been pressing for since late 2004. Several institutions were also established to 

improve intelligence sharing, including the U.S.-UK Joint Narcotics Analysis 

Centre (JNAC) in London, and the U.S.-led Interagency Operations Coordination 

Center and the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus (CJIATF-N) in 

Kabul.284 The United States also provided military support to TF-333.285

During this time, DEA overcame its initial objections about the lack of Afghan 

law enforcement partner institutions with which to build cases and came to 

realize that, despite the CNPA’s infancy, DEA could engage more directly in 

country.286 The agency began to increase its presence in Afghanistan, with 

the number of its personnel rising from 13 to 117, including those in ForeignDeployed Advisory and Support Teams (FAST).287 FAST comprised DEA agents 

able to operate in military-style raids with Afghan or U.S. Special Operations 

Forces and to train and mentor Afghan units.288 DEA also worked to establish 

specialized units within the CNPA through programs funded by DOD and State.
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JUNE 2018 | 49

The wider development community also engaged more constructively on 

counternarcotics from 2004 to 2008. The Asian Development Bank, European 

Commission, and World Bank all pursued initiatives to more effectively address 

the causes of opium poppy cultivation.289 The World Bank developed guidelines 

for “Treating the Opium Problem in World Bank Operations in Afghanistan,” 

also known as “counternarcotics mainstreaming guidelines,” that advocated the 

integration of counterdrug programming into wider development programs and 

projects.290 Several projects developed within the rubric of the National Priority 

Programs (NPP) were evaluated during their design to ensure they accounted 

for the causes of poppy cultivation and did not unintentionally exacerbate its 

growth. This demonstrated a modest move toward mainstreaming counterdrug 

goals within the larger development effort.291 DFID and the World Bank also 

produced a report examining how development efforts might better address 

the causes of opium poppy cultivation.292 This report served as the basis for 

the design of the Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Facility, 

a rural development program funded by the British and Danish governments to 

“strengthen licit agricultural markets and minimize adverse incentives to revert 

to opium production” in rural areas where poppy had been all but eliminated.293

Two major efforts dominated the counternarcotics agenda between 2004 and 

2008. The first was INL’s sustained push to adopt a more robust eradication 

campaign, particularly aerial spraying. Assistant Secretary Charles’ initial 

push in 2005 was followed by repeated efforts to convince the Afghan 

government to spray the poppy crop, despite opposition from other parts of 

the U.S. government, the Afghan government, ISAF, other donor countries, and 

multilateral institutions.294 This pressure tracked closely with rising cultivation 

numbers, until the scale of cultivation in 2007 prompted senior U.S. officials to 

again press for aerial spraying with President Karzai, before it was rejected for 

the final time.295

While the low levels of manual eradication that had been undertaken thus 

far strengthened INL’s push for chemical eradication, there were serious and 

persistent disagreements. The UK had agreed to support ground-based spraying; 

at the same time, the contention over aerial spraying continued.296 Given 

the degree of opposition to aerial spraying in the Afghan administration and 

across the international community, many officials, including some within the 

U.S. government, questioned the wisdom of repeatedly pushing this policy. It 

consumed the time of U.S. officials and expended political capital with a number 

of major allies, including the Afghan government, to no avail.297

The second major effort that dominated the agenda at this time was the 

development of an end-to-end legal system to investigate, detain, and prosecute 

those involved in the trade, processing, and trafficking of illicit drugs. The 

National Priority 

Programs were the 

22 programs prioritized 

by the Afghan 

government to support 

the 2008 Afghanistan 

National Development 

Strategy. NPPs were 

organized into six 

areas: security, human 

resource development, 

infrastructure 

development, private 

sector development, 

agriculture and rural 

development, and 

governance. 
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U.S. government, in concert with the UK, began investing more resources 

in building the institutions necessary to convict and incarcerate criminals, 

including drug traffickers. These investments, through a State Departmentled interagency effort, were intended to “build prisons, build courthouses, 

train judges, train prosecutors . . . to create a system where the rule of law is 

a reality.”298 Newly-formed counterdrug law enforcement bodies, including the 

National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and its supporting Sensitive Investigative Unit 

(SIU) and Technical Investigative Unit (TIU), were intended to build cases to be 

tried in the strengthened Afghan judicial system.299 Additional initiatives, such 

as the Criminal Justice Task Force created in 2005 to investigate and prosecute 

major drug traffickers, required time to deliver results. 

October 2008 also saw the successful push by U.S. and Afghan officials for 

ISAF forces to take more direct action against the Afghan drug trade. Despite 

opposition from some coalition partners, ISAF forces were now explicitly 

authorized to act “with the Afghans against facilities and facilitators supporting 

the insurgency, in the context of counternarcotics, subject to authorization of 

respective nations.”300

By 2008, U.S. policymakers were increasingly concerned about the links 

between the insurgency and drug trade, and expanded U.S. efforts to sever those 

links. The NSC established the Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC), a Kabulbased unit led by DEA, with strong support from Treasury and DOD. The ATFC’s 

mission was “to identify and disrupt financial networks related to terrorism, the 

Taliban, narcotics trafficking, and corruption.”301 (See pages 71–72.) In addition, 

the unit focused on capacity building within Afghan institutions, partnering with 

specially vetted Afghan units like the SIU and TIU to conduct investigations.302

This period—in which counternarcotics was at the fore of the policy debate—

came to a close in late 2008. With the 2009 appointment of SRAP Richard 

Holbrooke, aerial eradication was off the table and the Afghan Eradication 

Force was disbanded. The administration of President Barack Obama believed 

the focus of the counternarcotics effort should be on interdiction and rural 

development, arguing that the latter was in line with COIN doctrine and its focus 

on winning the hearts and minds of the rural population.303

BENEFITING FROM MILITARY FORCES ON THE GROUND: 

2009–2012

Between 2009 and 2012, the institutions and programs that had previously 

been put in place started to pay dividends. This was, however, not necessarily 

a function of specific counternarcotics interventions, but instead, a result of 

the wider state-building project that included efforts to improve governance, 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 51

security, and development. For example, the 2009–2011 surge of military and 

civilian personnel brought a significant number of resources that enabled 

increased counterdrug activities, including a dramatic increase in troops and air 

support in the key poppy-growing provinces, such as Helmand.304 This not only 

aided interdiction efforts and the movement of DEA FAST units, but also helped 

establish the conditions for the delivery of increased development assistance in 

what had been inaccessible areas. 

During this period, the divisions that had plagued the counternarcotics 

effort subsided. Because those championing aerial spraying had departed 

from INL and the embassy, there was greater room for agreement within the 

U.S. government and with its partners on how to tackle counternarcotics. 

Nevertheless, after years of divisiveness, the UK began to extricate itself from 

counternarcotics; the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee described 

it as a “poisoned chalice” in 2009.305

Under Holbrooke’s leadership, the SRAP office took the lead on 

counternarcotics in Washington, meeting regularly with a renewed focus on 

rural development, interdiction, and the aim of significantly reducing “the 

support the insurgency receives from the narcotics industry.”306 As one SRAP 

official noted, “Holbrooke wanted INL to move away from eradication and 

move to sustainable solutions.”307 This approach proved popular with other 

U.S. government entities and officials, including senior DOD leadership. As 

William Wechsler, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for 

Counternarcotics and Global Threats, noted, “I came back into government in 

2009. One of the first conversations I had was with Holbrooke. Holbrooke said, 

‘I want to completely change the strategy on counternarcotics to get away from 

eradication.’ I wanted the same.”308

In line with the shift away from eradication, the Poppy Eradication Force was 

disbanded in 2009.309 This marked the end of the centrally planned, contractorled eradication efforts that had featured so heavily in the counternarcotics effort 

up to that point. Ambassador Holbrooke’s appointment as SRAP also brought 

the end of the U.S. push for aerial eradication. The U.S. counternarcotics 

strategies that followed did not mention aerial spraying, and in the 2009 

Appropriations Act, Congress specifically prohibited aerial spraying unless 

requested by the President of Afghanistan.310 Following these changes, 

Governor-Led Eradication, a program which reimbursed provincial governors 

based on each hectare eradicated, was the sole form of U.S.-supported 

eradication in Afghanistan.311

While policies were being refocused in Washington and Kabul, the most notable 

changes in counterdrug policy implementation on the ground were occurring in 
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Helmand Province. In late 2008, the Helmand Food Zone (HFZ) was launched 

alongside major military operations that included building a permanent 

security presence in rural areas.312 The HFZ was a focused counternarcotics 

effort comprising eradication, public awareness, and a number of development 

programs that provided agricultural inputs, such as USAID’s Afghanistan 

Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture (AVIPA). Other interventions 

sought to improve access to health care and education and to build productive 

infrastructure, including irrigation and roads.313

In February 2010, Operation Moshtarak expanded ISAF and ANDSF presence 

on the ground in Marjah in Helmand Province. The increased military presence 

had a dramatic effect on levels of cultivation in what had been one of the major 

poppy-growing districts in Helmand. Between 2010 and 2011, the share of land 

dedicated to opium poppy cultivation fell from 60 percent to less than 5 percent 

of total agricultural area.314 Overall, between 2008 and 2011, poppy cultivation in 

Helmand Province fell from 103,590 hectares to 63,307 hectares, due in part to 

the increased security force presence throughout the province.315

While progress was being made in reducing the overall level of poppy 

cultivation, particularly in Helmand, the influx of personnel and resources 

resulted in a more complex policy and institutional environment in southern 

Afghanistan. For example, in spring 2010, the U.S. Marine Corps implemented a 

program of compensated eradication called the Marjah Accelerated Agricultural 

Transition Program.316 This provoked an outcry among those in INL and the UK 

U.S. Marines investigate a possible improvised explosive device while on a patrol during Operation 

Moshtarak. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Tommy Bellegarde)
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 53

government who viewed previous compensated eradication efforts as failures.317

Despite these objections, U.S. military commanders were able to pursue this 

and other counterdrug programs in their command areas, regardless of wider 

strategy objectives or previous failed efforts. 

According to a former UK official, in Kabul the MCN and INL championed 

the food zone model without fully appreciating what had contributed to 

poppy cultivation reductions in HFZ’s target areas. Despite the lack of clear 

information as to what led to these reductions, MCN and INL called for eight 

additional provincial food zone programs to be implemented.318

The changes in U.S. strategy, combined with the influx of security forces 

in southern Afghanistan, spurred a sea change in interdiction efforts in the 

south. Wechsler, the former DASD for Counternarcotics and Global Threats, 

described this period as one of increasing alignment between DEA and DOD, 

noting, “General McChrystal liked what DEA was doing with FAST, but General 

Petraeus offered the resources DEA needed. . . . DEA then realized they could 

ask for and get support in missions. They recognized that the military mission 

and the counternarcotics mission were working together.”319 The increase in the 

number of interdiction operations, which jumped from 204 in 2010 to 521 in 2011, 

exemplifies this change.320 Wechsler further reflected on the dramatic turnabout 

within DOD, noting that “most senior military leaders talked of integrating 

interdiction, law enforcement, and even development efforts into COIN.”321

Despite increasing alignment between DEA and DOD, progress in the Afghan 

judicial sector did not keep pace. Those pursuing the arrest and conviction 

of drug traffickers, rather than the militarized disruption that characterized 

DEA FAST units and TF-333, had reached an impasse. In the absence of an 

extradition agreement, and with little confidence in an often corrupt and 

still nascent Afghan judicial system, DEA agents found it difficult to advance 

their cases.322 Their efforts suffered a significant setback with the arrest of 

Mohammed Zia Salehi, an aide to President Karzai, by the FBI-mentored Major 

Crimes Task Force in July 2010, and his subsequent release.323 Outraged by the 

arrest of Salehi on corruption charges, President Karzai ordered the seizure 

of all files related to the Salehi arrest and authorized an investigation into the 

handling of the case.324 The Afghan administration then began to dismantle 

the law enforcement infrastructure that had been established, including the 

wiretaps, polygraphs, and presence of DOJ personnel assigned to mentor Afghan 

staff.325 As a result, DEA became increasingly reluctant to invest resources in 

an environment where its agents could not develop cases. As one senior law 

enforcement official summarized, “After all of that work, all of that expense, and 

all of that danger, DEA’s Special Operations Division said we are not going to do 

it anymore.”326
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A NEGLECTED ISSUE: 2013–2016

As with other sectors of the reconstruction effort, the drawdown of U.S. troops 

in Afghanistan caused uncertainty as to what counternarcotics efforts would 

be possible in the post-2014 environment. In fact, the 2013 U.S. Civilian-Military 

Strategic Framework for Afghanistan included only a passing reference to 

counternarcotics, with no mention of the eradication or interdiction pillars.327

Additionally, many counternarcotics institutions were retasked and directed 

toward COIN or CT, including TF-333, which became an effective crisis response 

unit under the General Command of Police Special Units and used for CT 

operations.328 The Air Interdiction Unit, which had become the Special Mission 

Wing, shared the same fate and was absorbed by Afghan Special Forces.329

Although the Special Mission Wing remained a dual counternarcotics and 

CT force in name, in practice, the majority of its operations supported CT.330

Additionally, the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, which had operated in Afghanistan 

since late 2008, was shut down in 2014.331

By 2013, USAID’s decision to no longer include counternarcotics indicators 

in its alternative development programs resulted in a shift away from 

interventions specifically targeting poppy reduction. In the absence of these 

requirements, many USAID contractors shifted their focus to strengthening 

the licit economy and ignored opium poppy cultivation altogether, even when 

conducting programs in areas where opium poppy was concentrated. As of 2013, 

it appeared that USAID’s only program that directly targeted poppy cultivation 

was the Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ).332 All four of the fully developed Regional 

Agricultural Development Programs (RADP), totaling approximately $228 

million through 2017, largely ignored opium poppy cultivation, including few 

mentions of poppy in the contracts signed with implementing partners, no riskmitigation plans, and little distinction between areas with or without significant 

poppy production.333

The lack of engagement by other Western donors was notable during this 

time. The UK ambassador to Afghanistan from 2012 to 2015 saw no advantage 

in discussing counternarcotics given its trajectory and continued the trend 

away from significant programming.334 By 2013, the UK had all but abandoned 

its involvement in eradication planning and counternarcotics policy, limiting 

its investments to a small number of law enforcement and rule of law efforts 

through the UK National Crime Agency.335 The UK- and Denmark-funded 

Comprehensive Agricultural Rural Development Facility program hardly 

mentioned poppy cultivation in the design of its second phase in 2015, despite 

the return of poppy cultivation in a number of its target districts.336

Wider donor engagement on counternarcotics was also nominal. Institutions like 

the World Bank, an active participant in the policy discussions on alternative 
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development, did not include opium poppy in the initial national Agriculture 

Strategy Review in 2012.337 Perhaps most tellingly, there were only oblique 

references to counternarcotics in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework 

and its successor agreement, the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability 

Framework, indicating donors were reluctant to see it included.338 The fact that 

an agreement intended to govern donor support to Afghanistan was nearly silent 

on the issue illustrated the relatively low priority of counternarcotics.339

With donors disengaged, the Afghan government deemphasized counternarcotics. 

Even under the new president, Ashraf Ghani, who had in the early days of 

the reconstruction effort lamented the potential for Afghanistan to become 

a narco-state, counternarcotics rarely featured in his government’s priorities 

and development plans.340 For example, the 2016 Afghan National Peace and 

Development Framework, in which anticorruption featured heavily, barely 

mentioned counternarcotics or the burgeoning level of opium poppy cultivation in 

rural areas. 

The only aspect of direct counternarcotics assistance that persisted in this 

era was the enhanced interdiction effort, largely due to the increased military 

presence in the south. However, with the 2014 transition and growing insecurity 

restricting the movement of law enforcement staff, some of these investments 

also began to dwindle. By 2015, with only 33 staff in Kabul and none in the 

provinces, DEA found it increasingly difficult to mount interdiction operations 

and mentor staff. Seizures of opium fell to their lowest levels since 2008.341

By 2016, opium poppy cultivation was once again over 200,000 hectares.342

Counternarcotics had come full circle: it was rarely mentioned in policy circles 

either in Afghanistan or in Western capitals.

BACK IN THE SIGHTS: 2017–2018

By the spring of 2017, reports of a bumper poppy crop began to emerge from 

Afghanistan. Continued political fragility in the National Unity Government, a 

weak economy, lack of security, and neglect from senior policymakers all likely 

factored into record levels of Afghan drug production in 2017. 

In April 2017, the U.S. Embassy and USFOR-A began reformulating their 

counternarcotics approach. Their internal assessment, similar to estimates 

provided by UNODC, stated that 50 percent of Taliban funding came from the 

opium trade. The assessment also highlighted the fact that USFOR-A authorities, 

at the time, prohibited the targeting of drug labs and traffickers.343 The embassy 

also put forward a strategic communications strategy that highlighted the 

Taliban as a “narco-terrorist organization” and emphasized the nexus between 

the opium trade and the Taliban.344
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On November 15, 2017, the UN released its annual Afghan opium survey which 

confirmed the indications of the previous spring; opium production was at a 

record high.345

 Opium poppy cultivation had increased 63 percent from the 

previous year to 328,000 hectares, while potential opium production increased 

by 87 percent to 9,000 tons.346

Following the release of these figures, U.S. and Afghan security forces launched 

a series of airstrikes using U.S. B-52 and F-22 aircraft, as well as Afghan A-29s, 

against “Taliban narcotics production” facilities in Helmand Province.347

USFOR-A commander General Nicholson stated the strikes were intended 

to apply pressure on the Taliban and represented a significant use of new 

authorities included in the South Asia strategy, announced in August 2017 by the 

administration of President Donald Trump. These authorities allowed USFOR-A 

to target Taliban “revenue streams and support infrastructure.”348 DOD briefings 

also stated that the Taliban had evolved into a “narco-insurgency” that compels 

farmers to grow poppy and is “fighting to defend [its] revenue streams.”349

Following these initial strikes, Brigadier General Lance Bunch briefed on 

December 13, 2017, that, to date, the bombing campaign had destroyed 25 

narcotics processing labs, eliminating almost $80 million from “the kingpins’ 

pockets, while denying over $16 million of direct revenue to their Taliban 

partners.”350 By April 2018, USFOR-A had conducted as many as 75 strikes.351

Gen. John Nicholson, the Resolute Support and USFOR-A commander, briefs reporters. (DOD photo by U.S. 

Air Force Staff Sgt. Jette Carr)
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USFOR-A estimates that 20 percent of the total revenue from the domestic 

narcotics trade ends up in Taliban hands due to profits from direct ownership, 

fees for transportation and protection, licensing fees to drug traffickers, 

and taxation harvest.352 Bunch also noted that “this is the first time we have 

persistently used our airpower in this interdiction role.”353 While this is true, 

specialized counterdrug units previously pursued similar strategies via groundbased raids.354

Brigadier General Bunch stated that these strikes were the beginning of “a 

sustained air interdiction campaign”—but also described the operations as a 

“counter-threat revenue campaign,” emphasizing their goal of cutting off Taliban 

revenue, not fighting the drug trade itself.355

 In April 2018, the air campaign 

against labs was expanded into western Afghanistan and the provinces of 

Nimroz and Farah. It remains unclear whether the air interdiction campaign 

will be paired with increased activity in other areas of programming as part of a 

comprehensive counternarcotics effort. Nevertheless, the bombing of drug labs 

represents the most significant direct military action against drug-related targets 

over the course of the reconstruction effort to date. 

However, the longer-term impact of the air interdiction campaign on drug 

production, insurgent financing, government corruption, and a host of other 

drug-related challenges remains uncertain. There is also the risk that expanded 

air strikes by Afghan and international forces could result in civilian deaths, 

alienate rural populations, and strengthen the insurgency.356 Civilian casualties—

or public perceptions that the bombings were targeting rural communities with 

few viable income sources—could result in a greater long-term cost to the 

coalition than the short-term benefit of temporarily disrupting drug production 

and insurgent financing. 

Finally, as of 2018, State continued to implement counternarcotics programming 

within the framework of a counternarcotics strategy approved in 2012. A 

revised strategy has been under development since 2014. According to State, the 

current draft strategy seeks to deny the Taliban drug revenue to pressure them 

to participate in peace negotiations. The draft strategy also maintains focus on 

building and improving Afghan counternarcotics capabilities and capacity.357

JUNE 2018 | 59

DOD photo

CHAPTER 3

STRANDS OF THE COUNTERNARCOTICS 

EFFORT: POLICY DEBATES AND EFFECTS 

ON THE GROUND 

The U.S. government counternarcotics strategy comprised four major 

strands of activity which, between 2002 and 2017, absorbed approximately 

$7.28 billion. The importance of counternarcotics within the overall 

reconstruction effort, the relative priority of the different strands within 

the counternarcotics strategy, and the investments in activities within each 

strand changed over time. These shifts in focus reflected negotiations between 

different elements of the U.S. government, changes in the level of cultivation, 

the responses of key actors, and the process of learning that came with closer 

engagement on the ground. 

Given that each strand of the counternarcotics strategy was uniquely shaped 

by the agencies involved, their authorities, and the metrics by which they were 

judged, this section examines each strand individually. It places particular 

emphasis on the theory of change that underpinned counternarcotics activities 

and whether the results support the theory. Where available, high-resolution 

imagery and geospatial data are combined with analysis of programs in the three 

main poppy-growing provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar. These 

data points offer insights into whether these programs had an effect on different 

indicators and, in particular, whether they supported enduring reductions in 

poppy cultivation. 
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INTERDICTION AND COUNTERNARCOTICS LAW ENFORCEMENT

Interdiction and counternarcotics law enforcement have been consistent 

features of the counternarcotics effort, but their emphasis and methods changed 

significantly over time. (See figure 7.) Early initiatives attempted to contain the 

flow of Afghan narcotics via operations based outside the country or through 

paramilitary-style raids on drug-processing sites. Later efforts expanded to focus 

on building Afghan counternarcotics institutions, targeting high-level drug 

traffickers, and eventually the construction of an end-to-end counternarcotics 

justice system. The level of engagement from both the U.S. military and 

international coalition partners varied widely over the course of the ISAF 

mission and has continued to fluctuate during Operation Resolute Support.

Interdiction Theory and Practice

Counternarcotics law enforcement efforts are intended to increase the risks 

associated with engaging in the illegal drug trade by increasing the likelihood 

of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. The State Department defines 

interdiction as the seizure of drugs before they reach the end user to deter 

drug traffickers and take illegal narcotics out of circulation.358 In the effort to 

develop Afghan counternarcotics law enforcement capabilities, interdiction has 

long been recognized as “a step in a sequence that culminates in prosecution 

and penalty,” with the ultimate goal of “not just seizure but fair trial and 

punishment.”359 In the view of DEA, the only U.S. agency focused solely on 

drug law enforcement, the “core mission” of counterdrug law enforcement “is 

to disrupt and dismantle the most significant drug trafficking organizations.”360

Interdiction is intended to accomplish this, in part, by attempting to cause 

economic losses to drug trafficking organizations, with the additional intent of 

raising prices for drug users in the hope that higher prices will reduce use.361

Interdiction is also intended to suppress “both final demand and producer 

incentives by increasing risk [premiums] and transaction costs,” as opposed 

to eradication, which tends to raise producer prices.362 By focusing efforts on 

processed drugs, which are higher up the value chain and have moved off-farm, 

interdiction has a more direct impact on drug traffickers than farmers. 

Interdiction actions are intended to disrupt the Afghan drug trade and “deny 

narcotics-generated funding to terrorism and the insurgency, break the nexus 

between the insurgency and drug trafficking, promote the rule of law, and 

Operation Resolute Support

Operation Resolute Support began on January 1, 2015, and is the current NATO-led 

train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan. Resolute Support is the follow-on 

mission to ISAF, the NATO-led security mission established by the UN Security Council in 

December 2001, which concluded in December 2014. 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 61

expose and reduce corruption, while diminishing the overall drug threat from 

Afghanistan.”363 While initial measures of success for interdiction efforts focused 

primarily on kilos of narcotics and precursor chemicals seized by the Afghan 

government, the metrics evolved to become more comprehensive in recognition 

of the fact that drug seizures do not represent the endgame of interdiction 

efforts.364 Although the initial indicators remain important in State’s annual 

evaluation of worldwide counterdrug efforts, INL’s updated metrics include an 

array of indicators, such as building Afghan capacity.365

Throughout the reconstruction effort to date, counternarcotics law enforcement 

efforts have included some combination of programs to develop Afghan 

capacity, investigations to dismantle drug trafficking networks, work to build 

criminal cases against drug traffickers, and raids to destroy drug-production 

laboratories and stockpiles.366 These efforts within the interdiction and law 

enforcement strand can be organized into two primary categories: direct 

operations by the U.S. government and its international partners to disrupt drug 

trafficking networks, and capacity-building initiatives to strengthen the Afghan 

institutions charged with counternarcotics law enforcement. To understand how 

and why the focus has shifted between these two lines of effort, it is necessary 

to examine the evolution of counterdrug law enforcement since 2001. 

Making Do: Counternarcotics Law Enforcement at the Outset 

Prior to 2002, U.S. law enforcement activities to stem drug flows originating 

from Afghanistan were limited to transit countries, including Turkey, 

Pakistan, and a number of Central Asian states.367 Within Afghanistan itself, 

there were almost no formal counternarcotics law enforcement institutions. 

When U.S. forces swept the Taliban from power, the sole Afghan government 

counterdrug entity was a small unit embedded within the police anti-smuggling 

Source: SIGAR analysis of agency budget documentation and budget data.

INTERDICTION FUNDING COMPARED TO TOTAL COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING, 2002–2017 ($ MILLIONS)

0

200

400

600

800

$1,000

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Interdiction Total Counternarcotics Allocations

FIGURE 7
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department.368 As the international community started arriving in Kabul in early 

2002, the counternarcotics-focused stakeholders reached the consensus that 

the drug problem was “so chronic that it needed its own identity,” funded and 

administered separately from broader law enforcement efforts.369

 A UNODC tour 

of provincial counternarcotics offices revealed gutted structures and a near total 

lack of personnel to staff them. UN officials believed that a complete rebuilding 

of Afghanistan’s counternarcotics law enforcement capacity was needed.370

In addition to rebuilt Afghan counterdrug law enforcement institutions, UNODC 

officials came to the conclusion that a new framework of narcotics laws—

along with new legal and judiciary systems to administer those laws—was 

necessary.371 UNODC had already begun preliminary planning on interdiction 

and judicial capacity building when the April 2002 SSR framework established 

the UK as the lead nation for counternarcotics.372

Under the SSR framework, the UK was in charge of counternarcotics, but its 

mandate was vaguely defined—and other nations had the lead for sectors and 

institutions with counterdrug roles that had previously been consolidated under 

the UNODC effort.373 For example, at an April 2002 donor meeting, Italian and 

French officials revealed judiciary reform proposals for the Afghan Interim 

Administration that included significant overlap with UNODC’s earlier efforts.374

A similar situation developed between Germany, the lead nation for police 

reform, and UNODC, which had already begun some programs to develop 

interdiction capacity.375 The formalization of counternarcotics as a distinct line 

of the reconstruction effort, separate from larger police and judicial reforms 

that inherently touched on counternarcotics, further increased the number of 

stakeholders involved. 

Separating counternarcotics law enforcement from other sectors, while 

potentially problematic, did have precedent in other U.S. counterdrug assistance 

efforts. In order to address concerns about corruption and political pressure in 

host countries, counterdrug law enforcement agencies often push for the creation 

of specialized, vetted units.376 Due, in part, to requests from the United States and 

its coalition partners, the Afghan government agreed to place counternarcotics 

law enforcement units under the MOI, but to try to keep them financially and 

geographically separate from the rest of the Afghan police.377 These measures to 

establish independent counternarcotics units were helpful in insulating them from 

the corruption that plagued larger police and justice institutions, but also injected 

a degree of confusion into counternarcotics law enforcement programming.

This situation—where multiple actors were dedicated to establishing 

specialized counterdrug capabilities—was further complicated by the attempt 

to establish basic police and judicial institutions simultaneously. Typically, 
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existing police units would provide the building blocks for specialized drug 

units, but in Afghanistan, both had to be built from scratch. For international 

counternarcotics law enforcement officials accustomed to working cases with 

existing host country units and providing on-the-job guidance, the task in 

Afghanistan represented a new and daunting challenge. Adding to this challenge 

was the piecemeal management of the institutions responsible for counterdrug 

law enforcement. While all police units legally fell under the control of the MOI, 

in reality, a number of foreign partners were administering and mentoring the 

different units necessary for a coherent counterdrug effort.378

 As one U.S. official 

working on counterdrug law enforcement described the situation, “The closest 

analogy was Colombia, but there were so many differences. Afghanistan was 

such a large undertaking that no rule books existed.”379

Given the need to build the overall judicial system, the UK initially emphasized 

interdiction efforts as a way to achieve immediate results. In late 2002, ISAF 

requested a checkpoint program to better control entry into Kabul. The 

UK responded by training Afghan police officers, drawn from the CNPA, to 

patrol the city’s five major entry points in what became known as the Kabul 

Gates Team.380 The Kabul Gates unit patrolled the city’s entry points and ran 

intelligence-led counternarcotics operations throughout the capital. The UK also 

created a paramilitary-style unit known as the Afghan Special Narcotics Force, 

or TF-333, to operate outside of Kabul. Once trained and equipped, TF-333 

conducted raids to destroy drug-processing labs and stockpiles in more remote 

areas of the country.381 The unit’s focus on raids, rather than arrests, was forced 

by the uneven progress of drug law enforcement in Afghanistan and the lack of 

functioning judicial institutions to prosecute drug traffickers.

In July 2003, UK officials developed a preliminary plan to clarify the roles of 

each counternarcotics law enforcement stakeholder and address the existing 

divisions. This plan envisioned a force that would cover three basic counterdrug 

law enforcement functions: intelligence, operations, and investigations units, 

first based in Kabul and later replicated in the provinces.382 The UK aimed to 

set up Afghan intelligence and operations units, with German and UNODC 

assistance, to be followed by more specialized units to tackle issues like 

money laundering and chemical precursors. UK officials hoped that this larger 

counternarcotics force would eventually be made into a separate, independent 

entity reporting directly to the president.383

Given the number of actors already involved in the counterdrug effort and its 

own counterterrorism priorities, the United States played only a supporting role 

in counternarcotics law enforcement in the years immediately after the Taliban’s 

fall. INL, for example, paid UNODC to lead an interdiction unit and focused on 

efforts that were complementary to German-led counterdrug policing initiatives, 
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rather than creating the large, U.S.-led programs that would characterize 

subsequent years.384 At this time, there were also strong differences of opinion 

about how involved the U.S. government should be in the counterdrug effort. 

Within DOD, for example, there was serious disagreement about whether 

the department should have a role in the counterdrug effort. According to a 

then-senior DOD official, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had even 

considered closing the Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats.385 Until 

FY 2004, DOD was not explicitly authorized by Congress to provide counterdrug 

capacity building, transportation, and equipment support to the government of 

Afghanistan and refrained from any significant counternarcotics programming.386

Early DEA plans also were limited, with no significant Afghan capacity-building 

programming. U.S. officials who assessed the situation in 2002 were convinced 

that little immediate progress was possible given the absence of Afghan 

partners.387 DEA’s limited presence in Afghanistan was influenced by three other 

key factors: (1) DEA prioritized countering drugs trafficked into the United 

States, rather than Afghan narcotics, which made up a small percentage of the 

U.S. market; (2) the agency feared that poor access to transportation, especially 

in an environment where CT was prioritized, would mean heavy constraints on 

operations outside of Kabul; and (3) DEA viewed its primary overseas mission 

as conducting investigations and supporting interdiction operations rather than 

extensive capacity building for entire counterdrug or police units.388

DEA’s early Afghan training efforts consisted primarily of courses for high-level 

drug unit commanders conducted outside of Afghanistan and advising sensitive 

investigative units inside the country. DEA envisioned that State and DOD 

would provide the extensive support required to build and equip the institutions 

and framework on which the specialized counterdrug units would eventually 

rely.389 This meant that the absence of a basic counternarcotics interdiction 

capacity in Afghanistan was a poor match for DEA agents’ traditional role as 

specialist advisors. 

By 2005, the CNPA consisted of approximately 350 “marginally trained” officers 

in seven provinces, far short of the 2007 target that called for 1,800 personnel 

spread across 14 regional offices, and eventually all 34 provinces.390 Coordination 

between intelligence and operations units was hampered by a confused command 

structure where the CNPA commander directed the intelligence unit, while the 

CNPA operations commander reported to the head of intelligence.391

Other units with significant drug interdiction roles, such as the Afghan Highway 

Police and Afghan Border Police, were also undergoing training and being 

deployed to the field, with mixed results.392 While these police agencies were 

legally required to report drug offenses to the CNPA, communication and 
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coordination between the CNPA and other police units was problematic in 

practice.393 Furthermore, organizational deficiencies were exacerbated by 

pervasive corruption. State’s 2005 reporting on counternarcotics in Afghanistan 

highlighted corruption at the provincial and district levels, stating that officials’ 

“involvement ranges from direct participation in the criminal enterprise, to 

benefiting financially from taxation or other revenue streams generated by the 

drug trade.”394

In 2005, the passage of the Afghan Police Law spurred tensions because it did 

not differentiate between the roles and organizational positioning of the CNPA 

versus other police units.395 Article Five of the law included fighting opium 

cultivation, drug trafficking, and organized crime among the 21 duties and 

obligations of all police, but the division of labor assigning responsibility for the 

different parts of this mission were unclear. 

While tensions related to the funding and organization of counternarcotics 

law enforcement units were not unique to Afghanistan, the muddled command 

structure posed significant challenges. For example, while all CNPA personnel 

were legally under the control of the MOI, practical control fell to ANP 

provincial chiefs when the CNPA was operating outside of Kabul. As a result, 

once foreign mentors were withdrawn, CNPA personnel in the provinces 

were routinely retasked to conduct non-drug-related operations.396 This tiered 

arrangement also exposed counterdrug police to increased levels of corruption 

and political influence that undermined the CNPA’s institutional design. These 

deficiencies were apparent to at least some U.S. and ISAF officials at this stage. 

However, ambitious police-strength targets created pressure on ISAF to field 

counterdrug law enforcement units, limiting ISAF’s ability to hold corrupt actors 

accountable and push for wholesale reforms within Afghan institutions.397

U.S. Interdiction and Law Enforcement Efforts Ramp Up

As early as 2003, the increase in poppy cultivation raised alarms with officials 

in the Bush administration and members of Congress. In response, Congress 

passed a supplemental appropriations bill that included $73 million for DOD 

to provide intelligence, logistics, training, and equipment support to U.S. and 

foreign counternarcotics law enforcement officials operating in Afghanistan.398

The additional funding was soon accompanied by a National Defense 

Authorization Act that explicitly authorized DOD counterdrug assistance to 

Afghanistan.399 This legislative package allowed DOD to increase its support 

to counternarcotics law enforcement, despite widespread reluctance to do 

so within the department. Some senior policymakers were concerned that 

resources would be drawn away from the CT mission against military targets 

toward counternarcotics efforts, which were seen as a law enforcement issue to 

be tackled by civilian agencies.400
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DOD addressed its new counternarcotics charge, in part, by issuing guidelines 

for how to deal with narcotics found during operations; however, some accounts 

noted these orders were not strictly enforced and were largely ignored by units 

in the field.401 Around the same time, some entities within DOD sought to take 

on a more active counternarcotics role. One of these was OSD/CNGT, which 

was trying to find ways to spend $73 million within two years on the kind of 

counternarcotics-related training, infrastructure, intelligence, operations, and 

maintenance support it was authorized to provide to Afghanistan.402

In 2004, DEA stated it “did not have evidence capable of sustaining an 

indictment of direct links between terrorism and narcotics trafficking groups 

within Afghanistan.”403 Despite this admission, some members of Congress 

were adamant about the need to address the perceived drug-terrorism nexus in 

Afghanistan. Representative Henry Hyde, chairman of the House Committee on 

International Relations, pushed the issue with comparisons to Colombia, stating, 

“I’m reminded of the long and debilitating internal debate of an appropriate 

U.S. response to Colombia. . . . For too long, we focused U.S. resources 

separately on Colombia’s drug trade and ignored the political insurgency. In 

Afghanistan, we may make the same mistake, fighting pieces of the problem 

rather than the whole problem. In President Karzai’s words, we’re dealing with 

narco-terrorism in Afghanistan just as we faced it in Colombia.”404

Congress responded to this concern with a significant bump in funding for 

counterdrug law enforcement and interdiction operations in Afghanistan. The 

total counternarcotics law enforcement and interdiction budget for Afghanistan 

A member of the NIU burns narcotics and other items seized during a raid on a suspected opium 

production facility. (ISAF photo)
COUNTERNARCOTICS

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grew to $325 million in 2005, before peaking at nearly $627 million in 2010.405 The 

UK’s total budget for counternarcotics also rose significantly, with a three-year 

commitment of £270 million, or roughly $486 million, announced in September 

2005; however, even this larger amount was dwarfed by U.S. spending.406

 The 

significant increase in U.S. funding meant U.S. officials could now drive the 

counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan. 

This injection of funds resulted in a push to train and equip Afghan police units 

that could assist with drug interdiction. A significant portion of these funds 

went toward the Afghan Highway Police, Afghan Border Police, and ANP.407

While these units had counterdrug roles, the expenditures were also justified by 

their potential counterterrorism, revenue, and rule of law benefits, illustrating 

the fact that counterdrug law enforcement was not pursued in isolation 

from other security and governance objectives.408 Additional funds went to 

support counternarcotics-specific institutions, most notably the new National 

Interdiction Unit charged with conducting interdiction operations across the 

country.409 OSD/CNGT began to support and equip the NIU, while DEA provided 

on-the-job training and mentoring.410 (See table 4.)

In keeping with its prioritization of interdiction efforts, in March 2005 DEA 

launched a program to deploy its agents with military forces to take a more 

active operational role.411 This initiative, the Foreign-Deployed Advisory and 

Support Teams, consisted of DEA agents with specialized tactical training who 

could operate alongside NIU law enforcement officials, as well military forces, 

in interdiction operations.412

The NIU and FAST teams were intended to destroy drug labs and stockpiles, 

missions that required greater mobility than was available. INL’s Air Wing had 

supported some DEA-led operations, but was focused on eradication and not 

ideally equipped to support interdiction operations.413 To address this gap, the 

U.S. government contracted for airlift capacity and OSD/CNGT began to put in 

place the building blocks for a helicopter unit to provide air support dedicated 

to interdiction missions. Initially called the Air Interdiction Unit, this group 

would later become the Special Mission Wing.414

TABLE 4

SPECIALIZED UNITS WITHIN THE COUNTER NARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN

Unit Description

National Interdiction Unit Tactically trained sub-unit of the CNPA charged with executing search warrants, conducting raids, 

interdiction operations, and seizures based on SIU and TIU investigations.

Sensitive Investigative Unit Kabul-based vetted unit responsible for investigating high-value, drug-trafficking targets. Subject to 

background, polygraph, drug testing, and Leahy law vetting.

Technical Investigative Unit Kabul-based vetted unit responsible for electronic surveillance. Conducts judicial-approved intercepts 

of electronic communications.

Source: State, INL, "Afghanistan Program Overview," December 2008, accessed May 3, 2018.
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The United States led efforts to stand up specialized units in addition to the NIU 

to try to increase the effectiveness of interdiction operations. With significant 

assistance from both State and DOD, in 2006 DEA began training a Sensitive 

Investigative Unit that investigated significant Afghan drug-trafficking organizations 

and a Technical Investigative Unit to gather electronic evidence. Teams from these 

units worked closely with DEA officials to monitor authorized wiretaps, as well as 

to gather and analyze sensitive intelligence on drug-trafficking networks.415

The U.S. government also increased its collaboration with the UK to improve 

upon the counternarcotics law enforcement initiatives already in place. In 

2005, the United States and UK began bilateral talks on counternarcotics to 

exchange information on their respective activities. Around this time, the 

Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre was established in London to provide strategic 

analysis of the Afghan drug trade. The JNAC was a UK-led group consisting of 

staff from the UK’s Serious and Organized Crime Agency and other UK agencies, 

and representatives from the U.S. government led by the Defense Intelligence 

Agency (DIA).416 DEA’s notable absence from the JNAC reflected the tendency 

to closely hold intelligence and tactical resources at the operational level that 

resulted in a fragmented interdiction effort on the ground.417

To address this, INL and the British Foreign Office created the International 

Operations Coordinating Center in Kabul as a more operationally focused 

sister unit to the JNAC.418 The IOCC was less limited by the turf battles and 

lack of buy-in that impeded the JNAC and was able to play a more effective 

coordinating role.419 Yet, problems remained because of different objectives: 

U.S. agencies, particularly DEA, traditionally conducted interdictions with 

a strong focus on gathering evidence that would be admissible in court, 

while UK interdictions were largely for intelligence or immediate impact.420

These challenges were indicative of how differences in strategy affected 

counternarcotics law enforcement in Afghanistan.

The United States and UK sought to strengthen judicial 

reform efforts with a specific focus on building the capacity 

to try major narcotics cases in Afghan courts.

During this period of law enforcement institution building, there was a strategic 

emphasis on linking interdictions, particularly the arrest or elimination of 

high-value targets (HVT), to prosecutions in the Afghan judicial system. This 

focus on HVTs depended heavily on arrests and prosecutions, rather than just 

elimination. As one former senior DEA official noted, “In the terror model you 

kill the leader because he is against the government. In the CN model you can’t 

kill the leader because he is part of the government patronage system.”421 As 

part of this effort, the United States and UK sought to strengthen judicial reform 
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efforts with a specific focus on building the capacity to try major narcotics 

cases in Afghan courts. The pace of the reforms led by Italy, the lead nation 

for judicial reform, had been slow and the legal system was still rife with 

corruption, which led to tensions with other donors focused on drug control.422

The Afghan attorney general’s admission in 2005 that “all my prosecutors are 

corrupt in some way” clearly indicated the challenges that remained.423

 Given 

the lack of an extradition treaty, an honest, capable Afghan court system was 

critical to ensuring U.S. investments in counterdrug law enforcement could lead 

to prosecutions and convictions of high-value drug traffickers. 

The solution identified by stakeholders on the ground was to bypass the existing 

corrupt system and create trustworthy institutions to deal specifically with 

drug cases. Afghanistan’s 2005 Narcotics Law established the Central Narcotics 

Tribunal, a panel of Afghan judges who would hear cases involving more than 

2 kilograms of processed opiates or 10 kilograms of opium.424 To assist with the 

enforcement of these laws, the United States, UK, and other donors mentored and 

assisted a Criminal Justice Task Force, with vetted counternarcotics prosecutors, 

to prosecute cases in front of the tribunal.425 These programs were complemented 

by the construction of a Counter Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC) to serve as the 

consolidated hub for prosecuting serious drug crimes, which was scheduled to be 

completed in 2007 but was actually finished in 2009.426

These intensive efforts resulted in what came to be regarded as the most 

capable, least corrupt justice system in Afghanistan.427 Despite this progress, 

due in no small part to close working relationships with international mentors, 

the Afghan judicial system still faced challenges when pursuing high-ranking or 

well-connected traffickers. In 2006, just three major traffickers were convicted, 

and political interference continued to impede the prosecution of highvalue targets.428

The influx of resources enhanced Afghan counternarcotics law enforcement and 

judicial capabilities, but progress toward a strategic reduction or impact on the 

Afghan drug trade remained elusive. In 2008, a former DEA officer and advisor 

to the NIU commander assessed that, after three years of training, the NIU 

was at the “advanced crawling phase” of the crawl-walk-run continuum.429 As 

with other institution- and capacity-building initiatives, poor baseline capacity, 

lack of infrastructure, high attrition rates, corruption, and insecurity made for 

slow progress.430

Militarize and Surge, Then Transition

Up until 2008, drug interdiction and law enforcement efforts in Afghanistan 

were marked by the minimal involvement of coalition military forces. While 

OSD/CNGT made significant funding contributions to counternarcotics units, 
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ISAF military forces generally avoided counterdrug operations.431 DEA, as well 

as State and CNGT officials, had the Sisyphean task of convincing battlespace 

commanders, who often had to balance competing CT and COIN priorities, to 

provide security and logistics support for counternarcotics operations.432 This 

was true across the coalition, due in part to the legal restrictions some ISAF 

nations had on military involvement in counternarcotics missions.433 There were 

also non-legal barriers to overcome, as evidenced by one ISAF officer’s comment 

that “I don’t want my soldiers to die for the sake of a drug addict.”434

Military policy engagement with counternarcotics changed at the October 

2008 Budapest summit, where NATO agreed to allow ISAF troops to conduct 

operations with Afghan forces against counternarcotics targets that could 

be tied to the insurgency.435 Soon after, DOD specified military personnel 

could accompany “U.S. drug law enforcement agents or host national law 

enforcement and security forces on actual counternarcotics field operations” 

within presidentially declared combat zones.436 This policy emphasized that 

deployments “must be planned and executed as counter-narcoterrorism (CNT) 

deployments that support the War on Terrorism.”437

These changes helped policies keep pace with operational trends on the ground. 

In its 2007 supplemental budget request for drug interdiction and counterdrug 

activities, DOD highlighted its focus on the border with Pakistan because of the 

confluence of narcotics, terrorist, and insurgent activities there.438 The overlap 

of counternarcotics and COIN efforts had also grown significantly, in part 

because counternarcotics intelligence collection was increasingly focused on 

targets involved with both the insurgency and the drug trade.439

In 2008, the NSC established the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, a Kabul-based 

interagency unit whose mission was to identify and disrupt finance networks, 

particularly those related to drug trafficking, that were supporting terrorist and 

insurgent organizations.440 The creation of the unit grew out of the success of a 

similar threat finance cell in Iraq.441 The establishment of the ATFC also reflected 

increasing concern about the links between the insurgency and drug trade, and 

an expansion of the U.S. effort to sever those links. 

ATFC investigators soon found that threat finance networks in Afghanistan 

consisted of “mutually beneficial relationships between the insurgency, 

narcotics traffickers, unscrupulous members of the financial and commercial 

sectors, and corrupt public officials.”442 Although the unit’s mandate did not 

initially include anticorruption efforts, its analyses quickly shed light on the 

role of corrupt officials.443 ATFC operations fostered a deeper and more holistic 

understanding among U.S. agencies—both in Washington and Afghanistan—of 

the complex web of illicit financial relationships in Afghanistan. 
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THE AFGHAN THREAT FINANCE CELL, 

2008–2014

The Afghan Threat Finance Cell, formed to “identify 

and disrupt financial networks related to terrorism, the 

Taliban, narcotics trafficking, and corruption,” was an 

example of tactical success that did not translate into 

strategic success.444 Nevertheless, the unit’s tactical 

success provides important lessons about structuring and 

staffing an interagency unit in a contingency environment, 

conducting threat finance investigations, partnering with 

Afghan entities, and encouraging legal and political 

action against illicit financial networks.445

The ATFC reported to both the U.S. ambassador and 

ISAF commander.446 The unit was led by a DEA special 

agent, with one DOD deputy from U.S. Central Command 

and another deputy from Treasury’s Office of Intelligence 

Analysis facilitating interagency cooperation. Eventually, 

the ATFC included personnel from DEA, Treasury, the 

Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Homeland 

Security, FBI, DIA, the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, and 

all branches of the U.S. military, as well as threat finance 

contractors and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.447

A critical element of the ATFC was its connectivity both 

up the chain to the NSC and down to the operational 

and tactical levels in Afghanistan. The NSC designated 

Treasury and DOD co-chair the Terrorist and Insurgent 

Finance Working Group, which met monthly with senior leaders in Washington to provide 

guidance and support to the ATFC via secure video conference. These meetings helped 

ensure a coordinated, interagency decision-making process on countering threat finance. 

They also facilitated a direct line to President Obama and his staff regarding high-level ATFC 

investigations.448

 On the operational side, ATFC staff were “embedded with military commands 

across Afghanistan to improve the targeting of the insurgents’ financial structure.”449 This 

collocation provided the battlespace commander with ATFC information and analysis.450

The ATFC built target packages and provided information for U.S. financial sanctions 

designations, pursuant to the counterterrorism authority of Executive Order 13224 and the 

Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.451 Treasury personnel also served as liaisons and 

mentors to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center for Afghanistan (FinTRACA) 

at Afghanistan’s central bank. FinTRACA and ATFC investigators identified needed financial 

community reforms in Afghanistan, for example, the need for hawala dealers to register and 

comply with Afghan law by reporting money transfers.452 A hawala is an informal money 

exchange system.

U.S. personnel from the Afghan Threat Finance Cell conduct a 

field investigation. (Former director of the Afghan Threat Finance 

Cell photo)
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ATFC investigators also mentored and worked with the Afghan-led Financial Investigative Unit 

(FIU), one component of the DEA-mentored SIU. Through a judicial wire intercept program, 

the ATFC, SIU, and FIU collected tens of thousands of financial documents (including those of 

drug trafficking organizations); interviewed drug traffickers, hawala operators, insurgents, and 

corrupt officials; and developed high-level corruption investigations. A robust training program 

developed a cadre of capable Afghan financial investigators.453

One ATFC success was the targeting of a major hawala, the New Ansari Money Exchange. New 

Ansari was heavily involved in laundering proceeds from the drug trade and had links to the 

Taliban and corrupt government figures.454 According to Treasury, this hawala operated across 

Afghanistan, transferring billions of dollars in and out of the country. Its Dubai subsidiaries then 

transferred money through the U.S. and international financial systems. Between 2007 and 

2010, New Ansari used these money transfers to conceal illicit narcotics proceeds. In February 

2011, Treasury designated New Ansari, as well as 15 affiliated individuals and entities, a “major 

money laundering vehicle for Afghan narcotics trafficking organizations” under the Foreign 

Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. The effect of the designation was to bar U.S. persons or 

companies from conducting financial or commercial transactions with New Ansari and the other 

designees, and to freeze their U.S. assets.455

The ATFC achieved important successes in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating financial 

intelligence, conducting high-level investigations, and disrupting illicit financial networks, 

including those connected to the drug trade. And yet, its long-term, strategic impact is 

uncertain. Former ATFC director Kirk Meyer believed the ATFC and SIU suffered from a lack of 

consistent U.S. political commitment to pursuing corruption cases against politically-connected 

individuals. He wrote, “We were asked to identify high-profile targets that the Administration 

could then push President Karzai to take action against. . . . In each instance, once President 

Karzai resisted, our leadership folded.”456 The ATFC thus illustrates a recurring theme in U.S. 

anticorruption and counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan: In practice, when faced with a choice 

to enforce the rule of law but incur high political costs, U.S. policymakers often prioritized 

political stability. These difficult judgment calls may have undermined the long-term U.S. goal 

of establishing a culture of rule of law and accountability, which were ultimately necessary for 

lasting security and stability in Afghanistan.
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By February 2010, the Obama administration’s Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Regional Stabilization Strategy stated that one core goal was to “counter 

the insurgency-narcotics nexus,” and another core goal was to “alleviate the 

corruption-narcotics nexus.”457 The focus on these new strategic priorities, often 

referred to as the nexus policy, in concert with the decision to stop centrally 

planned eradication in 2010, resulted in a significant funding increase for 

interdiction initiatives. (See page 61.)

In December 2009, President Obama announced the military and civilian surge, 

which further increased attention on the interdiction of nexus targets and 

significantly boosted the pace of operations. Interdiction operations more than 

doubled over the next two years, from approximately 263 in 2010 to over 624 in 

2011.458 Additionally, when ISAF created the Combined Joint Interagency Task 

Force (CJIATF) Shafafiyat in August 2010 to address corruption, it included a 

specialized sub-unit, CJIATF-Nexus, to coordinate military and civilian efforts 

against drug traffickers linked to insurgents and corrupt powerbrokers.459 The 

combination of the surge and the policy changes that allowed greater military 

involvement in counternarcotics law enforcement resulted in a significant 

increase in drug seizures. Total kilograms of opium seized jumped to 79,110 

in 2009, dipped in 2010, and rose again to 98,327 in 2011, before beginning to 

decline in 2012.460

While policy changes and the surge brought increased resources for 

and attention to counternarcotics, the effects were short-lived. 

While policy changes and the surge brought increased resources for and attention 

to drug law enforcement and interdiction, the effects were short-lived. By 2012, 

the new U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan emphasized the transfer 

of responsibilities to the Afghan government and the transition to a regional 

approach to the Afghan drug trade.461 This posed new challenges, particularly 

because the interdiction build-up from 2009 onward had relied heavily on 

U.S. military and ISAF resources. The militarized approach to counternarcotics 

law enforcement had worked while coalition forces were available to provide 

airlift and security, but became less viable as these resources began to decline. In 

the eyes of some officials, the more militarized approach had also undermined the 

broader rule of law effort by diverting resources away from supporting judicial 

institutions and prosecutions.462 Finally, deploying DEA agents on FAST teams 

or in other roles that emphasized the capture or killing of HVTs meant there 

were fewer agents available for building cases against traffickers or training and 

mentoring Afghan counterdrug units, raising questions about the best use of the 

limited number of DEA billets in Afghanistan.463
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Like all sectors of the reconstruction effort, counternarcotics initiatives faced 

new constraints as resources began to decline. However, the failure to plan for 

these reductions limited the long-term effectiveness of some counterdrug law 

enforcement programs, which had achieved short-term success. 

Tactical Successes, Strategic Failures 

Interdiction and counterdrug law enforcement programs conducted in 

Afghanistan were marked by a number of tactical successes, but the programs 

were unable to achieve that same level of success at the strategic or national 

level. Put simply, interdiction efforts failed to fundamentally alter the Afghan 

drug trade or reduce drug-related threats to Afghan stability in a meaningful 

way. From 2008 through March 20, 2018, over 3,520 interdiction operations 

resulted in the seizure of 463,342 kilograms of opium. However, the sum of these 

seizures accounts for about 5 percent of the opium produced in Afghanistan 

in 2017 alone.464 Given the scale of the drug trade, pervasive insecurity, and 

fledgling Afghan police and judicial systems, it is fair to question whether 

counternarcotics law enforcement programs could have achieved a strategic 

impact. However, there were a number of factors within the counterdrug law 

enforcement and interdiction line of effort that contributed to the effort’s 

shortcomings. A close examination of these shortcomings, as well as the smallscale successes that were achieved, yields important lessons from the drug 

interdiction initiatives within the reconstruction effort to date.

The amount of opium seized from 2008 to 2018 accounts for about 

5 percent of the opium produced in Afghanistan in 2017 alone.

One reason for the failings of counterdrug law enforcement initiatives was lack 

of coordination and agreed-upon objectives among both Afghan and coalition 

entities.465 These problems were compounded by the misalignment of strategic 

objectives, program implementation, and assessments of those programs. One 

example was the failure to connect the strategic focus on cutting drug revenue 

to the insurgency with assessments that tracked progress toward this goal. By 

at least 2007, U.S. strategy called for interdiction “with a particular emphasis 

on integrating drug interdiction into the counterinsurgency mission.”466

 Despite 

this focus, however, relatively few Taliban-linked traffickers were successfully 

convicted or otherwise removed from the drug trade. Additionally, it was not 

until the lab bombing campaign that began in 2017 that interdiction efforts were 

characterized and measured in terms of revenue denied to the insurgency.467

Though this reporting has been plagued by methodological problems and 

inaccuracies, it does represent an attempt to clearly measure drug interdiction 

success by its contribution to larger objectives. 
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USFOR-A AND ANDSF AIR INTERDICTION 

CAMPAIGN, 2017–2018

Aerial Bombardment of Opium-Processing Labs 

In Pentagon press briefings in late November 2017, USFOR-A commander General Nicholson 

announced a series of airstrikes against “Taliban narcotics production” facilities in Helmand 

Province, carried out by both U.S. and Afghan forces.469 Nicholson stated the strikes were 

one part of applying pressure to the Taliban, in line with the Trump administration’s 2017 

South Asia strategy and the goal of a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. Nicholson 

also noted the strikes represented a significant use of new authorities granted under the 

strategy, including the authority for USFOR-A to target Taliban “revenue streams and support 

infrastructure.”470 By April 2018, USFOR-A had conducted as many as 75 strikes.471

Background on Drug Labs

A 2005 DEA intelligence assessment of Afghanistan-based drug production and trafficking 

asserted that “clandestine processing laboratory activity is perhaps the most vulnerable 

aspect of the drug trade.” It stated labs “are generally stationary and established facilities 

that must be accessible to operators, chemists, workers, water supply, and chemical 

suppliers—although they may only be periodically active.” The assessment described lab 

owners as providing chemicals, equipment, food, and sleeping quarters, while “cooks” 

perform the actual processing and depart upon completion. The production process 

can be “compartmentalized,” meaning cooks may not know the customer or the origin of 

the chemicals.472

In terms of assessing revenue, a joint UNODC and World Bank report found that clandestine 

laboratory owners and shop owners in regional opium bazaars appeared to accrue a 

relatively small portion of domestic trade revenue (defined as “drug export value minus farm 

Metal drums, some filled with morphine solution, under a canopy of vegetation.

(Resolute Support photo)
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gate value”). The greater share of domestic trade revenue went instead to “a limited number 

of bulk buyers and large-scale specialist traders.”473

Afghan drug-processing labs are acknowledged to have pervasive links to corrupt government 

officials. According to the DEA assessment, “UK and U.S. law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies have widely reported that police chiefs, police officers, warlords, governors, the 

Afghan military, and district administrators play an enormous role in permitting laboratory 

operations to continue.” That role ranges from providing security and even owning labs to 

accepting bribes.474

Lack of Clarity in Numbers and Taliban Involvement in Drug Trade 

In a December 2017 briefing, Brigadier General Bunch reported that, to date, the bombing 

campaign had destroyed 25 narcotics processing labs, eliminating almost $80 million from 

“the kingpins’ pockets, while denying over $16 million of direct revenue to their Taliban 

partners.”475 By April 2018, Colonel Lisa Garcia stated that “these efforts have deprived the 

Taliban of an estimated $200 million in revenue.”476 How DOD, USFOR-A, and DEA calculated 

these financial losses remains unclear and the size of these estimates, combined with 

available information on narcotics prices, raises questions about their accuracy. According 

to price data on opium in Afghanistan, the strikes would have had to destroy roughly 73 

to 80 metric tons of heroin, or more than 516 metric tons of opium, in order to eliminate 

$80 million dollars’ worth of drugs.477 This is unlikely, as 80 metric tons of heroin would 

equate to between 15 and 25 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total export quality heroin 

production in 2017.478

If USFOR-A estimates of lost revenue are based on the projected street value of heroin (in 

consumer markets in Europe and Russia), then the numbers are also misleading. Such an 

estimate would imply the Taliban are profiting throughout the entire opium value chain, from 

cultivation, refining, and trade in Afghanistan through distribution and sale in other countries. 

Yet, the extent to which the Taliban participate in the trade of narcotics is debated.479 While 

the Taliban are believed to collect payments from those involved at each stage of the value 

chain in Afghanistan, the extent of their control over the processing, sale, and distribution of 

opiates is less clear.480 A U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) report highlighted that “there is little 

concrete detail available to the public and policymakers on how the insurgents interact with 

drug traders and profit from opium.”481 Law enforcement sources also suggest the Taliban only 

profit from the drug trade until the product is sold to drug trafficking organizations outside 

Afghanistan.482 Therefore, estimating revenue denied to the insurgency based on wholesale or 

retail prices in foreign consumer markets would result in inaccurate estimates.

The November 2017 DOD briefings stated the Taliban have evolved into a narco-insurgency 

that compels farmers to grow poppy and is “fighting to defend [its] revenue streams.”483

While there is no doubt the Taliban benefit from, are complicit in, and support the narcotics 

trade, there is some dispute about the extent to which Taliban involvement in the narcotics 

trade is altering Taliban motivations and ideology. A recent International Crisis Group report 

emphasized that “it would be naive to say the Taliban [are] fighting because conflict helps 

[them] gain control over the profits of the drug trade, or that Afghanistan’s drug production 

boom is because of the Taliban.”484 Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest farmers 

are coerced into growing poppy; rather, cultivating poppy is one of the only livelihoods 
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available to many rural populations.485 As early as 2008, State acknowledged the idea 

of Afghan farmers being coerced into planting poppy was a myth.486 A robust analysis of 

poppy cultivation would ask why farmers would need to be forced to do something that 

already works. 

Finally, given the extent of government corruption, estimates of how much revenue the Taliban 

receive from the drug trade should be paired with estimates of how much money Afghan 

police, customs, district government, and other officials receive through involvement in the 

opium economy. 

Overestimating the Taliban’s reliance on the narcotics trade could produce inaccurate 

assessments of how badly Taliban finances may suffer due to the destruction of labs. As 

Afghan counternarcotics experts have pointed out, insurgents are funded through a wide array 

of activities beyond taxing the drug trade.487 Robust intelligence estimates, though hampered 

by the current security environment, are necessary to ensure the aerial bombardment of labs 

does not incur greater costs—both financially and in increased antipathy or hostility among 

rural populations—than the costs imposed on the Taliban. 

New Tactic, Similar Goals

In the December briefing, Bunch described the strikes as the beginning of a new, “sustained 

air interdiction campaign” to disrupt Taliban financial networks. Bunch stated that “this is the 

first time we have persistently used our airpower in this interdiction role.” While this is true, 

Bunch then incorrectly stated that “the Taliban have never had to face a sustained targeting 

campaign focused on disrupting their illicit revenue activities.”488

 In fact, cutting off Taliban 

financing was a key goal of the U.S. interagency Afghan Threat Finance Cell from 2008 to 

2014, and this focus on threat finance is being reinvigorated today.489 More broadly, while 

U.S. interdiction efforts in Afghanistan did not previously rely on airstrikes, they centered 

on destroying drug-processing labs, seizing narcotics, arresting and prosecuting those who 

trafficked in them, and tracing, freezing, or confiscating proceeds. 

Further, the United States and UK both invested in and provided military support to Afghan 

interdiction units. The Afghan Special Narcotics Force, also known as TF-333, a specialized 

paramilitary unit, was trained and equipped by the UK and tasked with conducting raids and 

destroying heroin laboratories.490 (See page 41.) It operated in a counternarcotics-focused 

capacity from roughly 2003 to 2008 and destroyed a number of labs.491 In addition, DEA 

used its Foreign-Deployed Advisory and Support Teams to operate in military-style raids with 

Afghan or U.S. Special Forces, and to train and mentor Afghan units from 2005 until 2015.492

This report assesses that those interdiction efforts achieved short-term tactical successes, 

but had only limited impact on longer-term efforts to dismantle drug trafficking networks and 

cut off funding for the insurgency. For example, 248 labs were destroyed in 2006, compared 

to only 26 the year before.493 However, according to UNODC, “in 2007, the number of heroin 

laboratories in Afghanistan increased.”494

In Afghanistan, drug-processing facilities are rudimentary and notoriously dynamic, easy to 

build and operate. A 2006 DEA assessment concluded that, in response to raids on drug 

labs, many laboratory operators altered their activities by “placing labs in urban areas, 

varying the locations of their labs, and operating from smaller mobile labs that process on 
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demand, rather than from larger fixed labs.”495 The report further observed that, following 

successful raids of clandestine labs, processors often rebuilt laboratories and resumed 

production after law enforcement departed an area.496 During an interview regarding lab 

destruction in October 2017, just prior to the bombing campaign, the Afghan Deputy Interior 

Minister in charge of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan stated traffickers “can build a 

lab like this in one day.”497

Uncertain Benefits 

Ultimately, it is unclear whether targeting drug labs through an aerial bombing campaign is 

cost-effective or strategically wise. The strikes have included ANDSF and U.S. forces, using 

U.S. B-52 and F-22 aircraft and Afghan A-29s. Additional support came in the form of highmobility artillery rocket systems, aircraft carrier-based F/A-18s, aircraft for inflight refueling, 

and joint surveillance radar systems.498 Operating these aircraft costs DOD anywhere from 

$9,798 per hour for an F/A-18 to $35,294 per hour for an F-22.499 Destroyed labs, on the 

other hand, are quickly and easily replaced with minimal cost.500

There is also the risk that expanded air strikes by Afghan and international forces could 

alienate rural populations and strengthen the insurgency. While USFOR-A spokeswoman 

Garcia stated that no civilian casualties resulted from the campaign in April 2018, reports 

from the ground suggested otherwise.501 Civilian casualties—or public perceptions that the 

bombings are targeting rural communities with few viable income sources—could result in a 

greater long-term cost to the coalition than the short-term benefit of temporarily disrupting 

drug production and trade.

Four U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornet aircraft fly over mountains in Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. 

Andy M. Kin)
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U.S. counternarcotics policy has long acknowledged that even the most successful 

interdiction efforts would never seize all illegal drugs, but measuring the amount 

seized against the amount produced remained one of the most commonly cited 

metrics for interdiction success or failure.468 Reporting on kilograms of opium or 

heroin seized did not distinguish between drugs funding the insurgency or corrupt 

officials and those linked to ordinary traffickers. These figures also served as 

a poor indicator of successful counterdrug law enforcement, particularly longterm, capacity-building efforts. In recognition of this problem, INL developed a 

Performance Management Plan in 2014 that accounted for more than just seizure 

numbers to better measure how programs increased interdiction capacity.502 This 

demonstration of U.S. institutional learning could serve as an example of how to 

better align program design with strategic goals. 

Like the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, the Counter Narcotics Justice Center 

was an example of a tactical and capacity-building success, but not a strategic 

one.503 Through intensive interagency efforts, the United States succeeded in 

building what is regarded by many officials as the most capable, least corrupt 

judicial institution in Afghanistan.504 Once established, the CNJC investigated 

and prosecuted a few hundred cases a year. Yet, despite a reported conviction 

rate of over 90 percent, there was little discernible impact on overall levels of 

drug production and trafficking.505 The high conviction rate, combined with low 

narcotics possession thresholds for trial, resulted in large numbers of minor 

traffickers flooding the Afghan prison system, particularly those institutions 

supposed to be reserved for the worst violators.506 Between 2005 and 2008, CNJC 

convicted approximately 1,550 traffickers, but most were low-level offenders.507

According to some U.S. officials, the CNJC served largely as a capacity-building 

exercise because major traffickers, often connected with the Afghan political 

elite, were considered untouchable.508

The case of Haji Lal Jan Ishaqzai is illustrative. A U.S.-designated drug kingpin, 

Haji Lal Jan was arrested by Afghan counternarcotics authorities in 2012, 

successfully prosecuted at the CNJC, and sentenced to 15 years in prison for 

opium trafficking.509 Unfortunately, he was subsequently able to bribe a number of 

actors in the Afghan judicial system to arrange his transfer to a prison in Kandahar 

and his release, after which he absconded to Pakistan.510 A tactical success in this 

case illustrated the strategic failures of the counterdrug law enforcement effort by 

demonstrating that well-connected traffickers could still escape justice. 

While Haji Lal Jan’s case is a recent example, the targeting of HVTs yielded 

disappointing results almost from the outset. In April 2005, drug trafficker Haji 

Bashir Noorzai was lured to New York to make a deal with U.S. officials, where 

he was convicted and sentenced.511 Another Afghan trafficker, Khan Mohammad, 

was transferred to the United States after waiving his right to an extradition 
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hearing in Afghanistan and became the first person to be convicted under the 

newly enacted narco-terrorism statute.512 However, these cases proved to be the 

exception, rather than the rule. Between 2004 and 2009, only five major Afghan 

traffickers were convicted in the United States.513 Despite the fact that all of 

these drug traffickers were closely aligned with the Taliban, President Karzai 

only approved one extradition, that of Haji Baz Mohammed.514 The remainder 

were arrested in the United States or other countries which were willing to 

extradite those traffickers to the United States. This experience demonstrated 

the limitations of pursuing HVTs without an extradition treaty or competent 

Afghan judicial and penal institutions; yet State’s 2007 counternarcotics strategy 

called for an increased focus on HVTs and allocated an additional $343 million 

to do so.515

The sometimes-conflicting approaches U.S. government agencies took toward 

certain HVTs further complicated the issue. As one former coalition official 

noted, a number of HVTs were powerbrokers who were often employed 

by one coalition agency or another, as illustrated by the case of Haji Juma 

Khan.516 Despite his known drug-trafficking activities, Khan reportedly supplied 

information to and received payments from a number of U.S. agencies, including 

CIA, DEA, and the U.S. military. He is reported to have even visited the United 

States to meet with agency representatives before being arrested in Indonesia 

and transferred to the United States for prosecution.517

 Working with an 

HVT while at the same time expending resources to build a case against him 

exemplified the conflicting U.S. approaches to this interdiction strategy.

These conflicting approaches to HVTs, combined with limited Afghan judicial 

capacity, widespread corruption, and high-level resistance to prosecuting 

certain HVTs meant resources spent building cases against these targets were 

at a significant risk of going to waste. If these resources were made contingent 

upon specific indicators of Afghan judicial progress or increased commitment 

to extradition, then investments in interdiction and investigative capacity 

might have yielded greater returns. As one former senior DEA official stated, 

“The biggest failure was not to get extradition. . . . Once we had to hand over 

information and informants to the Afghans, it wasn’t worth it.”518 While there 

were serious challenges to an extradition treaty with Afghanistan, including 

concerns about reciprocity and the nature of the Afghan justice system, U.S. 

mentors were working to reach extradition and legal assistance agreements with 

the Afghan government in 2008.519 As the case of Haji Baz Mohammed indicates, 

the lack of an extradition treaty does not preclude the Afghan government from 

sending suspected drug traffickers to the United States for trial. 
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Without a formal extradition treaty or greater willingness from the Afghan 

government to extradite drug traffickers, the chances of U.S. investments 

yielding meaningful convictions against HVTs were greatly reduced. The 

U.S. focus on HVTs identified support for drug HVT extraditions as a critical 

element of improved investigations and operations, but this support never 

materialized.520 Despite this lack of support, U.S. agencies continued to expend 

resources in building investigative and operational capacity. Had investments 

in investigating, capturing, and prosecuting HVTs been conditioned on further 

HVT extraditions, the risks of these investments going to waste could have 

been better mitigated. In the absence of extradition, building the Afghan 

judicial institutions necessary to prosecute and jail HVTs prior to implementing 

a strategy that focused on them could have increased the chances of that 

strategy succeeding.

Counternarcotics law enforcement efforts succeeded in building some of the 

most proficient police units in the country. The National Interdiction Unit, 

Sensitive Investigative Unit, and Technical Investigative Unit were regarded as 

three of the most honest, capable units in Afghan law enforcement, as evidenced 

by the fact they were sometimes retasked to higher-priority missions within the 

counterinsurgency and reconstruction effort. While their retasking is illustrative 

of a successful capacity-building effort, it also makes clear the systemic 

limitation that counterdrug law enforcement was not, and indeed could not be, 

the Afghan government’s top priority.

Resources did shift toward counterdrug law enforcement to match the increased 

strategic focus on interdiction after 2009, but the success of these efforts 

was limited by increasing insecurity across the country.521 Similar limitations 

imposed by corruption within the Afghan government meant the Counter 

Narcotics Justice Center, while highly-regarded and capable, was unable to 

achieve consistent, meaningful convictions of high-level traffickers.522

Aside from disagreements about whether to focus on disrupting the opium 

industry through military-style raids or investigative efforts working through the 

judicial process, interdiction and law enforcement efforts did not experience 

the kind of divisions that impeded other strands of the counternarcotics effort. 

Instead, the wider security and political environment imposed the primary 

obstacles to fully empowering the capable police and judicial institutions that 

were built. It remains to be seen whether the CNJC, NIU, and other capable 

units can serve as centers of excellence that improve larger ministries, or if they 

will be overtaken by the corruption and insecurity that plague the larger Afghan 

institutional framework. 
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ERADICATION: THE WAR ON THE CROP 

Eradication was a particularly divisive element, not just in the counternarcotics 

strategy in Afghanistan, but also in the overall reconstruction effort. This section 

covers the UK’s compensated eradication campaign of 2002, followed by the 

U.S. government’s efforts in crop destruction, including the Poppy Eradication 

Force, and the U.S. and UK’s joint efforts in Governor-Led Eradication. To 

fully understand these sometimes overlapping eradication campaigns, it is also 

necessary to understand some of the individuals who drove the agenda, as well 

as the institutional reasons for INL’s preference for eradication. For example, 

former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann described INL’s 

“strong ideology for eradication” that could manifest in a stubborn adherence to 

crop destruction, regardless of evidence or circumstances.523

While it is generally accepted that crop destruction can reduce 

the amount of opiates available for distribution, sale, and final 

consumption in a given year, its long-term effects are disputed. 

While it is generally accepted that crop destruction can reduce the amount of 

opiates available for distribution, sale, and final consumption in a given year, 

its long-term effects are disputed. Does eradication deter future planting by 

changing the cost-benefit ratio to farmers, as is sometimes claimed? Or, as 

opponents have argued, does it in fact lead to rising opium prices and higher 

levels of cultivation in subsequent years? Finally, does eradication “enhance the 

credibility and effectiveness of all Afghan government counternarcotics efforts,” 

as the U.S. Embassy claimed in 2003?524 The empirical evidence behind these 

claims will be reviewed in the final part of this section and in chapter 4, using 

geospatial analysis commissioned by SIGAR specifically for this purpose. 

Muddying the Water: The British Campaign of Compensated Eradication 

The first foray into eradication after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 was 

at the behest of the UK government.525 Determined to act against the opium 

crop that would be ready for harvest in the spring of 2002, UK Prime Minister 

Tony Blair agreed to Operation Drown, a $30 million compensated eradication 

program designed to offer a one-time payment of $1,750 per hectare, or $350 

per jerib (about 1/5 of a hectare) to farmers whose crop was destroyed.526 This 

campaign was initially carried out in the provinces of Nangarhar and Helmand 

in April 2002, and ultimately expanded to include Badakhshan, Uruzgan, 

Kunar, and Laghman.527 The leader of the Transitional Administration, Hamid 

Karzai, supported the plan, and local Afghan commanders were involved in 

its implementation.528
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Operation Drown was beset by difficulties from the outset. Reports of rising 

cultivation were directly attributed to the campaign amid accusations that some 

farmers were growing opium poppy in order to attract compensation.529 Farmers 

in Helmand and Nangarhar claimed they had not received their promised 

compensation, and there were reports farmers were harvesting the opium 

gum before eradication teams arrived to destroy the crop. Further, the scale of 

eradication was reported to have been exaggerated.530

Operation Drown was widely seen as a strategic misstep. While the UK reported 

that 16,500 hectares of opium poppy were destroyed in Operation Drown, others 

expressed doubts about the validity of this number.531

 Mohammed Ehsan Zia, 

former Minister of MRRD, suggested, “The first mistake was . . . compensated 

eradication. It didn’t send a message of a serious nature. Buying the crop was 

the wrong way. It was the equivalent of emergency relief, which tends to be 

associated with corruption, misuse of money, and no checks and balances.”532

One former deputy minister argued that compensated eradication was “the 

beginning of corruption in counternarcotics.”533 According to scholar Dr. Vanda 

Felbab-Brown, “Local commanders thus benefited in three ways from 

compensated eradication: by pocketing vast sums intended for compensation, 

by collecting bribes to forego eradication, and by strengthening their political 

capital with the landlords and farmers whose fields they spared.”534 The former 

deputy minister also argued that Operation Drown led to higher levels of 

cultivation in 2003.535 A senior agriculturalist with over 30 years’ experience 

working in rural Afghanistan went so far as to describe the campaign as “an 

appalling piece of complete raw naiveté.”536 Several of those involved in the 

day-to-day planning of eradication in later years believed they were “haunted by 

Drown . . . and people’s perspectives of the program.”537

Afghan police eradicate a poppy field near the city of Qalat, Zabul Province. (Resolute Support photo by 1st 

Lt. Brian Wagner)
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Despite the perceived failure of Operation Drown, Karzai remained a vocal 

proponent of this sort of eradication campaign and even suggested in 2004 that the 

opium crop could be eliminated from Afghanistan within a two-year time period.538

Rising levels of planting in late 2002 and the prospect of even higher levels of 

cultivation in 2003 prompted Karzai to call for further UK support for eradication.539

Given the UK’s role as lead nation for counternarcotics, one senior UK official 

believed he had little choice but to support Karzai’s request.540 The Blair 

administration, on the other hand, was bruised from criticisms of Operation 

Drown. It argued that the payments to farmers for eradicated crops were a onetime payment, so there was little basis to repeat the campaign. At the same time, 

there was, as one former senior UK official recalled, a sense that the UK had to 

act to prevent poppy cultivation from rising.541

In response to Karzai’s demand and pressure from Prime Minister Blair and 

Foreign Office Minister Mike O’Brien, the UK’s Foreign Office advocated 

creating a 100-soldier eradication force. In late December 2002, UK officials 

in Kabul pressed the U.S. military and Karzai for their support. A letter was 

also sent from Blair to President Bush requesting support for the eradication 

force. Inquiries by the UK confirmed Bush would respond positively and send a 

letter agreeing to the plan. While President Bush did respond positively, there 

is no indication that he issued a directive regarding such a force. The plan 

was ultimately rejected in January 2003 by Lieutenant General Dan McNeill, 

the commander of coalition forces at the time.542 One British official recalled 

McNeill “described President Bush’s letter to Blair as a mistake.”543 Another 

former UK official noted McNeill thought “the Afghans were not ready and 

eradication was not part of the U.S. Army’s responsibility.”544

Ultimately, UK officials agreed the UK would only 

eradicate opium poppy where viable alternatives existed, 

a position that led to consistent disagreements with parts 

of the U.S. government, in particular, INL.

In light of the U.S. rejection and the failed compensated eradication campaign, 

the UK began to look more closely at the efficacy of eradication and what role 

it could play. UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw commissioned a global review 

of eradication, which concluded that “premature eradication damages the 

environment in which alternative livelihood initiatives operate and undermines 

the development of long-term solutions to the causes of drug production.”545

It suggested that “eradication works where preceded by comprehensive 

development programs to promote alternative, licit livelihoods.”546 Ultimately, 

the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the UK Secretary of State for 
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International Development, and the UK Secretary of State for Defense agreed 

the UK would only eradicate opium poppy where viable alternatives existed, a 

position that led to consistent disagreements with parts of the U.S. government, 

in particular, INL, which would soon advocate for destroying as much of the 

opium crop as possible, regardless of the conditions.547

A Change in INL Leadership and the Push for Eradication 

By mid-2003, Congress was increasingly concerned about the burgeoning opium 

crop.548 However, DOD remained opposed to getting involved and the Bush 

administration as a whole was largely agnostic, content to leave counternarcotics 

to the UK. In the spring of 2003, without direct UK support for eradication, crop 

destruction was done at the behest of provincial governors.549 While the Afghan 

authorities claimed that 21,430 hectares of poppy were destroyed, there was no 

independent verification of the numbers’ authenticity.550 Moreover, by October 

2003, significant cultivation had spread to 28 provinces, from 24 in 2002 and only 

one in 2001.551 While this was on par with cultivation levels before the Taliban 

ban, it was significantly more than the 8,000 hectares recorded in 2001, while 

the ban was in effect. Although that drastic drop in cultivation was viewed as 

an unsustainable outlier, many continued to use the 2001 cultivation figure as a 

benchmark by which to judge the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan.552

Amid these rising numbers, UNODC Executive Director Costa emphasized 

“the risk that Afghanistan would turn into a failed state,” a statement that 

was also invoked by parts of the Afghan administration at the time.553 This 

sense of imminent failure coincided with an increasing frustration within 

the U.S. government regarding the SSR process and the lack of vision and 

action by several of the lead nations.554 As the Italians and Germans would 

later be criticized for their work on justice and police reform, respectively, so 

would the UK’s counternarcotics efforts. U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad referred 

to the UK counternarcotics effort as “underpowered, under-resourced, and 

conceptually misguided.”555

In October 2003, Robert Charles was tapped to replace Rand Beers as Assistant 

Secretary of State for INL. In contrast to Beers, who, according to one embassy 

official, saw widespread eradication as “bringing a country on its knees down 

even further,” Charles was adamant that a far more robust campaign of crop 

eradication was required.556

In April 2004, Charles testified before the House Subcommittee on Government 

Reform on the status of counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan. Throughout the 

testimony, provocatively titled “Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics 

Efforts Going Wobbly?,” Charles critiqued the UK’s drug control efforts, 

specifically its position on targeted eradication.557 Charles also used the hearing 
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to advance a revised eradication target of 25,000 to 35,000 hectares for 2004.558

Such targets were unrealistic; nevertheless, Charles continued to press this and 

even higher targets. Indeed, by October 2004, Charles and INL sought to revise the 

20,000 to 30,000 hectares eradication target recommended by the Kabul Counter 

Narcotics Task Force and increase it to 60,000 hectares, even raising the specter 

of a further 30,000-hectare increase, to a target of 90,000 hectares.559 By doing so, 

Charles influenced congressional expectations of the scale of eradication that 

could be achieved and denigrated the UK’s efforts as lead nation. 

The Creation of an Eradication Force 

In December 2003, the director of Afghanistan’s Counter Narcotics Directorate, 

Mirwais Yasini, requested support for an Afghan-led eradication force. He 

suggested this force would operate “for at least two growing seasons,” 

somewhat ambitiously claiming “after which, the law enforcement institutions 

will be sufficiently developed to deter and control opium poppy cultivation.”560

The initial CND proposal called for three teams of 225 specially trained MOI 

police and a protective security force of 300 men “recruited from a Muslim 

nation sympathetic to Afghanistan, but also victimized by opium products from 

Afghanistan.”561 It was estimated that the cost of this force would be “between 

$34 and $45 million for two years.”562

The CND proposal recommended a trust fund be established to support the 

formation of this eradication force, a move that was supported by both the INL 

coordinator in Kabul and the UK.563 The UK even offered to make a “significant 

contribution” to the cost.564 The UK, however, did “not want a program that 

looks like the eradication is being done by the UK or the [United States]” and 

therefore did “not want to do [eradication] by contracting with any large UK or 

U.S. logistics companies that are too often closely associated in the minds of the 

public with their respective governments.”565

 CND Director Yasini made clear 

the Afghan government wanted to run its own eradication program “without 

intervening grantees or contractors.”566 INL in Kabul agreed, stating the Afghan 

government “needs to be seen as the owner of any eradication program. . . . The 

[U.S. government] needs such an arrangement to avoid any perception that 

it, not the UK, is in the lead, or that the eradication plan is basically the 

[U.S. government] carrying out eradication.”567

Despite this consensus, in 2004 INL created an eradication force composed of 

Afghans, with Western advisors, called the Central Poppy Eradication Force. It 

was subsequently renamed the Afghan Eradication Force and then the Poppy 

Eradication Force. To create the force, INL awarded a multi-million dollar 

contract to DynCorp, a major U.S. defense contractor.568 This was in direct 

contravention of what had been requested by the Afghan authorities and the 

U.S. and UK embassies.569
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Progress on getting the eradication force into the fields to eradicate was slow. 

In 2005, as few as 210 hectares were destroyed by the force.570 In the Maiwand 

district of Kandahar, the force found itself blockaded for a week in April 2005 by 

a demonstration of farmers armed with stones.571

By late 2005, after its second lackluster season of eradication, the eradication 

force was seen by some as a “broken program.” Officially, it consisted of a 

1,000-person force, while in reality, many workers did not show up. Those who 

did only did so at the early stage of the season and were absent when it came 

time to deploy. Furthermore, many of the men recruited for the eradication 

force were ethnic Tajiks, which caused friction when they deployed into the 

poppy-growing areas of the Pashtun south.572

As the eradication force prepared for its third eradication season at the end 

of 2005, its staff were still not registered with the MOI and were therefore not 

considered ministry employees. The Ministry of Finance saw the staff as “troops 

for a special project funded by a foreign donor.”573 The INL office in Kabul 

had to pay the force’s salaries until December 2004, when UK assumed that 

responsibility until September 2005. When the United States once again took 

over paying salaries in October 2005, the force faced what it saw as a 75 percent 

reduction in salaries due to previous overpayment by the UK.574 Finally, because 

the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) did not 

recognize the eradication force, it was not providing training or uniforms. 

According to one former eradication contractor, “No one considered them 

a real police unit.”575

 These administrative challenges adversely affected the 

development of a professional, cohesive force.

Starting in 2006, INL and DynCorp invested considerable effort to regularize the 

eradication force. The force was restructured into smaller, more mobile units 

and renamed the Afghan Eradication Force. A program of intensive training was 

developed and the command structure was streamlined. Significant progress 

was made to integrate the AEF into the ANP and formalize it as a functional 

unit.576 By 2008, the entire force was enrolled in an electronic payment system 

and was recognized by CSTC-A.577

The sheer size of the eradication force at this point demonstrated the 

organizational progress that had been made. One AEF commander recalled that, 

when deployed to Helmand from Kabul in 2006, the eradication force consisted 

of 200 trucks and an accompanying military convoy stretching more than five 

miles.578 By 2006, the AEF also had the support of eight UH-1 helicopters from 

INL’s Air Wing that were intended to enhance mobility and support plans for a 

more vigorous eradication effort in subsequent years.579
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Despite these gains, the AEF still had to manage the realities of the security 

situation in Afghanistan, as well as the significant influence provincial governors, 

local powerbrokers, and the international community—particularly Western 

military forces—had on where they could go to destroy the opium crop. A 2006 

embassy review of the PEF observed that “it [had] been subjugated to provincial 

governors and their staff, some of whom [were] disingenuous in their efforts to 

direct the AEF away from priority one targeted areas and in fact, on occasion, 

completely out of targeted areas.”580 A former UN official noted, “In Helmand and 

Uruzgan, eradication [was] subject to political manipulation and corruption. It 

[was] virtually impossible to conduct in districts where the Taliban [were] relatively 

strong, thereby inevitably penalizing farmers in pro-government districts.”581

Even in late 2006, INL Assistant Secretary Anne Patterson recognized the AEF 

wasn’t “very successful so far” and talked of “hoping to improve it next year very 

dramatically.”582 She offered a candid description of the logistics and security 

problems in Afghanistan, highlighting the contrasts with Colombia: 

This is much more complex. We pay an American pilot three times [more] to 

fly in Afghanistan [than] we pay in Colombia. Unlike Colombia, where there 

were military bases we could deploy to, [eradication] requires air support, 

because helicopters have to go in there and reconnoiter the crop. They have 

to see if the security situation is proper.583

While considerable progress was made in institutionalizing the eradication force, 

which was renamed the Poppy Eradication Force in 2007, the unit never met INL’s 

expectations with regard to the rate of crop destruction that could be achieved. 

This was largely due to INL’s faulty expectations of how much crop the PEF could 

actually destroy given the terrain, insecurity, and political realities of the areas 

they worked in. An interagency assessment by the State and DOD Inspectors 

General stated, “Embassy Kabul’s tentative eradication goals for 2007 were very 

optimistic, lacking methodological planning processes to develop eradication 

plans with realistic targets and appropriate resources to achieve them.”584

The divide between targets and capabilities was most pronounced in 2007, when 

the PEF was told by INL that it needed to destroy 10,000 hectares.585 One contractor 

closely involved with the PEF referred to the target as “an operational nightmare,” 

emphasizing that “there was no physical way to meet this target. . . . Even if 

everything went right—all the tractors worked, there were no physical threats, and 

the weather was right—we could only do so much. We had 32 tractors and their 

operational rate was only ever 43 percent, depending on the stage of cultivation. 

The best that could be done was somewhere around 7,000 hectares.”586

INL’s views, however, were shaped by the desire to destroy as much of the crop 

as possible. The same contractor who worked closely with the PEF noted, 

“10,000 hectares became the answer. INL was focusing on quantitative metrics, 
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but needed to focus on qualitative aspects of eradication and integrate a cropreduction program which offered viable alternatives, public information, and 

access to markets.”587 INL continued to press for a “credible threat,” the level of 

crop destruction required, in its view, to achieve the strategic effect of deterring 

cultivation in subsequent growing seasons. The notion of a credible threat had 

arisen in 2004 when UNODC Executive Director Costa said eradication had to 

“reach a threshold of credibility,” or 25 percent of the crop.588 (See pages 31–33.)

Ultimately, the effort failed. Under acute pressure to perform, the 2007 campaign 

was beset by over-reporting.589 The PEF was still self-reporting and submitting 

flawed GPS coordinates to mark eradicated fields.590 Imagery collected by the 

UK revealed gross over-reporting.591 Researchers at Cranfield University who 

were doing imagery analysis concluded that some areas eradicated by the PEF 

were “considerably over-estimated.”592

 A former UK contractor recalled that 

the researchers discovered “the numbers were not stacking up and there was 

systematic over-reporting.”593 As in 2006, according to the UK contractor, INL 

again disputed these claims, causing a further review of the data.594 A joint U.S. 

and UK review ultimately supported Cranfield’s analysis, finding that where the 

PEF had reported 7,000 hectares destroyed, “not more than 3,000 hectares” had 

actually been eradicated.595

The disputed 2007 eradication numbers, as well as continued disagreement over 

which areas should be eradicated, strained the working relationship between UK 

and U.S. counternarcotics officials.596 Despite concerns over the actual amount 

of eradication carried out and some counterdrug officials’ doubts about the 

PEF’s effectiveness, the PEF continued for two more seasons. In 2008, the force 

encountered significant armed resistance, with its members subject to frequent 

attacks while in the field.597

The PEF’s last year of operations was 2009. With the change in the U.S. 

administration, President Obama and SRAP Holbrooke took an eradication-led 

approach to counternarcotics off the table. (See figure 8.) Previously, in a 2008 

op-ed, Holbrooke asserted that the forced eradication effort might be “the single 

most ineffective program in the history of American foreign policy.”598 Several 

U.S. government officials recalled that Holbrooke thought if eradication was 

to take place at all, it should be led and implemented by Afghans, and Afghans 

alone.599 Ultimately, the PEF was disbanded and U.S. government support was 

redirected to Governor-Led Eradication.

Over six years, $294.6 million was budgeted for the contracted eradication force, 

which destroyed a total of 9,446 hectares over those years.600 This total was far 

short of the 10,000 hectares per year envisioned by senior policymakers at INL.
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Governor-Led Eradication

In addition to the PEF, the United States supported a program called GovernorLed Eradication. To encourage GLE, the United States and UK reimbursed 

governors for the “actual expenses incurred in eradicating poppy fields.”601 This 

payment initially started at $120 per hectare in 2006, rising to $135 per hectare 

in 2009, before almost doubling—after the disbanding of the PEF—to $250 per 

hectare in 2011.602 Payments for GLE were made through the Ministry of Counter 

Narcotics, which subsequently disbursed funds to governors based on UNODC 

verification of the amount of crop destroyed.603

Building both the intent and the capacity to deliver effective crop destruction 

at the provincial level was no easy task. Allegations of corruption beleaguered 

the program. In the 2002 and 2003 growing seasons, Helmand governor Sher 

Mohammad Akhundzada was accused of circumventing areas selected by 

the MOI for eradication, instead targeting fields of political opponents and 

vulnerable farmers.604 As with the PEF, there were also allegations of overreporting the scale of eradication that occurred under GLE.605

In an attempt to align eradication policy with the Afghan National Drug Control 

Strategy, the UK established a Central Poppy Eradication Cell in the MCN 

to assist in identifying target areas in which the governors would conduct 

eradication within their provinces.606 The basis for these targets were areas 

where “the most advantaged farmers” could be found.607 A former UK contractor 

who was involved in the Eradication Cell summed up the targeted eradication 

policy as “the need to target for effect. If a province grows 5,000 hectares, 

and can’t destroy it all, you can only eradicate something, so let’s destroy 

the crop of the most advantaged farmers. Therefore, look at access to roads, 

markets, insecurity, and freedom of movement. Map rural livelihoods, risks, and 

FIGURE 8

Source: SIGAR analysis of agency budget documentation and budget data.

ERADICATION FUNDING COMPARED TO TOTAL COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING, 2002–2017 ($ MILLIONS)

0

200

400

600

800

$1,000

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Eradication Total Counternarcotics Allocations
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vulnerability, and recognize that some farmers have opportunities while others 

do not, and target those with opportunities.”608

In the early years of GLE, prior to each poppy-growing season, UK and U.S. 

officials arranged a governors’ conference with the MCN. At the conference, 

provincial leaders were encouraged to act against the crop, both before and 

after planting, and target maps developed by the Central Eradication Planning 

Cell were shared with each governor and the scale of expected eradication was 

announced.609

 Negotiations over the type of assistance to be provided by the UK 

and the United States—typically the provision of tractors—also took place.610

By 2005, the UK and the United States began pressing UNODC to develop its 

capacity to verify the hectarage of eradication undertaken by the provincial 

governments, as well as the quality of the crops eradicated (such as whether the 

crop had already been harvested).611 Prior to 2005, there was no independent 

verification of the eradication data reported by the Afghan authorities. In the 

2002–2003 growing season, the Afghan authorities reported that 21,430 hectares 

of poppy were eradicated.612 While UNODC cited these figures in its annual 

survey, it also acknowledged that “the present survey neither monitored, nor 

assessed, the effectiveness of the eradication campaign.”613 The UNODC annual 

survey for 2004 did not report any eradication figures at all.614

Despite its initial reluctance, UNODC ultimately agreed to develop its capacity 

to accurately verify eradication. It took some time for UNODC to build the 

capability to do this, leading to concerns over the accuracy of eradication 

reporting until at least 2008. Until 2007, UNODC over-relied on surveyors visiting 

rural areas after the eradication campaign had been completed, making accurate 

verification difficult because many fields were already cleared. Both the UK and 

the United States provided funds for the verification process. In total, the State 

Department reported allocating $13 million for efforts that included verification 

between 2010 and 2012.615

Despite investments in verification, there were enduring concerns regarding 

GLE over-reporting. A 2006 cable from Embassy Kabul acknowledged that 

“UNODC is officially quite skeptical of the [GLE] numbers.”616 An April 2006 

UNODC report referenced in the 2006 cable noted GLE’s “figure is considered to 

be a gross overestimate of the true area eradicated.”617

There were pervasive disagreements between the UK and the United States over 

the scale of eradication and where it would be conducted. The UK’s targeted 

eradication policy was often seen as problematic by INL—even described as 

“arcane”—and was blamed for the limited amount of eradication achieved by 

the eradication force. In order to maintain their working relationship with the 
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United States, the UK, at times, pursued an eradication campaign that was 

contrary to its own principle of targeted eradication in places where viable 

alternatives existed.618 Ultimately, despite the Central Eradication Planning 

Cell’s attempts to establish a rigorous set of constraints on what areas could be 

targeted for eradication, U.S. insistence, coupled with the political realities of 

working through Afghan interlocutors in the provinces, resulted in an ineffective 

system of targeting. 

At times, criticisms of GLE seemed unfairly biased, given that many of the same 

problems that beset GLE also beleaguered the eradication efforts of the PEF. 

Yet, the scale of the over-reporting by the eradication force in 2006 was largely 

ignored by U.S. officials, as well as by a British Embassy Drugs Team, which was 

eager to maintain cordial relations with its main ally in Kabul and to report a 

successful eradication campaign.619

Ambassador Neumann described the situation as “eradicate enough to keep 

Washington happy while buying time for other elements of the strategy to begin 

taking hold.”620 A former UK government contractor noted the challenges of 

being heard under such overtly political conditions: 

In 2005, we were seeing imagery that suggested the amount destroyed was 

less than 50 percent of what was claimed. The result was a clash with the 

head of the British Embassy Drugs Team. There was triumphant reporting 

from PEF and GLE saying a lot of crop had been destroyed. Yet, we had 

annotated imagery showing actual figures and showed them to the head of 

the British Embassy Drugs Team. We were told, ‘Your figures are wrong. 

They are not right. The guys in the field reporting these figures are right.’ 

I was insistent, I am providing you with analysis, imagery, and scientificbased accounts. But the head of the British Embassy Drugs Team wanted to 

promote big numbers, as did the United States and the UN.621

Despite concerns about over-reporting, at the end of the 2006 growing season, 

UNODC reported 15,300 hectares had been destroyed.622

By 2008, many of the problems with eradication verification had been resolved. 

Satellite imagery was more prevalent, and after the problems in 2006 and 2007, 

there was less political pressure to reach unachievable targets. GLE eradication 

verification was strengthened by the implementation of a Tractor Tracking 

Project, which was further improved by placing a GPS device on each tractor to 

track its movements.623

While eradication verification improved, disagreements continued over where 

eradication should be conducted. INL continued to favor eradication, regardless 

of conditions, in order to meet political demands and the 25 percent “credible 

threat” threshold. INL agreed to compensate the governors, regardless of whether 

the crop was in the MCN target area, undermining attempts to promote a targeted 
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campaign. One former UK official claimed, “Some in INL accepted the UK position 

on targeted eradication, but many did not. I do not believe INL ever got the idea 

that farmers could replant the next year after the crop was destroyed.”624

It was not until the 2009–2010 eradication seasons that INL aligned its policy 

with that of the UK and the Afghan National Drug Strategy and only made 

payments for eradication within the target areas identified by the MCN.625 This 

alignment proved short-lived when, in April 2014, the United States reverted 

back to the position it had held prior to 2009, agreeing to “payment for all 

UNODC verified hectares.”626

Ultimately, INL’s adamant pursuit of spraying was a key factor 

preventing the United States, UK, and Afghanistan from establishing 

a shared eradication policy.

After eradicating 9,672 hectares in 2012, GLE declined.627 Increasing levels 

of insecurity, direct attacks on the eradication teams, and the departure of 

international military forces made GLE more difficult to sustain. There were 

143 eradication related fatalities in 2013, compared to 20 in 2011.628

 The Afghan 

presidential elections in the midst of the spring eradication campaign of 2014 

made crop destruction particularly challenging, from both the perspective 

of security and winning electoral support in rural areas.629 There were also 

growing concerns over the accuracy of the reporting after the withdrawal of 

foreign forces and the loss of oversight that imagery and GPS tracking devices 

had brought. Eradication in Badakhshan, for example, had come to represent a 

significant proportion of total GLE between 2013 and 2015, claiming to destroy 

from one-quarter to one-half of the crop planted each year.630 According to one 

report, these numbers represented “an almost inconceivable level of eradication 

in the province.”631 In 2016, GLE destroyed as few as 355 hectares.632

INL’s Pursuit of Spraying 

INL’s repeated push to coerce the Afghan government to allow aerial and groundbased spraying was, by far, the most divisive position within the eradication 

effort, particularly given the widespread opposition to the use of herbicides within 

Afghanistan and among NATO allies. INL’s pursuit of spraying also generated 

impassioned opposition from many U.S. government agencies, most notably 

DOD, whose counterinsurgency strategy depended on the assistance of the 

rural population. For the UK government, the diplomatic battles over spraying 

consistently undermined its authority as lead nation on counternarcotics and 

often led to broader disunity with the Afghan government and other allies.633

Ultimately, INL’s adamant pursuit of spraying was a key factor preventing the 

United States, UK, and Afghanistan from establishing a shared eradication policy.
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Aerial Spraying

The first proposal for aerial spraying was in 2004, when the U.S. Embassy 

Interagency Planning Group developed a “Short Term Counternarcotics 

Implementation Action Plan” for September 2004 to September 2005. The 

action plan referred to a need to decide on the means to eradicate 20,000 to 

30,000 hectares, with Badakhshan and Helmand Provinces as targets for “aerial 

eradication.”634

 The plan estimated the cost of the aerial campaign at $25 to 

$30 million and anticipated a decision on eradication by October 2004, with 

deployment of an aerial eradication team between March and May 2005. While 

the plan did not address the pros and cons of aerial eradication, the inclusion 

of aerial spraying appeared to reflect an impulse to employ any means available 

to eradicate the crop and described great urgency on counternarcotics, 

stating “Time running out to create necessary impact to reverse situation—

everything threatened.”635

In December 2004, news agencies reported on an incident in Nangarhar in 

which a number of Afghan villagers and tribal leaders alleged that an 

unidentified plane sprayed opium poppy fields with a toxic chemical.636

An international senior agriculturalist working in the Rodat district of 

Nangarhar at the time of the incident also reported collecting “small dark grey 

pellets . . . scattered on the concrete in the [school] yard.”637 While U.S. officials 

adamantly denied any involvement, U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad ultimately 

acknowledged that “accusations [of spraying] were not without foundation.”638

Assistant Secretary of State for INL Charles championed the Interagency 

Planning Group’s Action Plan, which was then briefed to President Bush by 

Secretary of State Colin Powell.639 However, opposition to the plan’s proposed 

use of aerial spraying was extensive.640 A senior DOD official argued the 

initiative was opposed by many, most importantly Ambassador Khalilzad and 

President Karzai, stating, “Karzai and Khalilzad said no. It couldn’t be forced 

down their throats and no PRT wanted it in their region.”641 A former senior 

military official noted, “The U.S. military was violently against aerial spraying. 

No one in the U.S. military or OSD supported aerial spraying.” The same 

official recalled that INL’s persistence had resulted in the staging of sprayers 

in Pakistan, at which point “it took a lot of effort to stop it.”642 The opposition 

to aerial spraying was so great, some in Congress suggested Robert Charles 

be removed as Assistant Secretary of State for INL because of his support for 

the idea.643

 Due in part to this opposition, the staged sprayers never made it 

into Afghanistan, and the plan to introduce aerial spraying in the 2004 to 2005 

growing season was ultimately rejected.644

A number of sources indicate INL remained intent on aerial spraying. The 

systematic way in which levels of crop destruction were over-promised 
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to senior officials and Congress led some people who were most actively 

engaged in eradication to argue that INL’s intention was to present groundbased eradication as a failure in order to justify the move to aerial spraying.645

A 2006 GAO report stated, “The United States originally planned to use crop 

dusting airplanes to spray herbicides on the opium poppy before it could be 

harvested.”646 A subsequent 2010 GAO report also noted that “State originally 

intended a central eradication force comprised of Afghan Counternarcotics 

Police to be augmented by aerial herbicide spraying.”647 The arrival of the INL 

Air Wing in 2006 was also described by one former UK government contractor 

as the “vanguard of the planned spray program in Afghanistan—the gunships 

to protect the spray planes.”648 Discussions between INL’s Patterson and 

UNODC’s Costa in mid-2006 also indicate that aerial eradication was not yet off 

the agenda.649

Ground-Based Spraying

Recognizing the strength of the opposition to aerial spraying, INL turned its 

attention to a ground-based spraying campaign. By mid-2006, there was a 

major diplomatic effort underway to get approval for this from both the Afghan 

authorities and the UK.650 A July 2006 embassy cable underscored the fact that, 

“Although the [government of Afghanistan] did not agree to aerial spraying last 

year, the [U.S. government] was discussing with the UK ways to gain [Afghan] 

agreement for ground spraying of opium fields. This would be less expensive 

and perhaps meet less [Afghan] opposition.”651

A 2006 Embassy Kabul report estimated the costs of augmenting the PEF to 

support ground-based spraying.652

 President Karzai indicated that he would 

support ground-based spraying that same year.653 An environmental impact 

assessment of herbicide eradication was also released.654 Elements of Congress 

publicly called for INL to press Karzai on ground-based spraying.655 Once 

these initial actions were complete and interagency agreement was reached, 

the embassy was charged with convincing others that, “with the Principals’ 

November 6 [2006] decision to endorse ground-based spray in Afghanistan, 

combined with strong backing of Secretary Rice, ONDCP Director Walters, 

Under Secretary Burns, Assistant Secretary Patterson, and many others, 

there should be no doubt . . . about the [U.S. government] commitment to 

operationalizing ground-based spray as part of a forceful [government of 

Afghanistan] eradication campaign.”656

U.S. officials were so confident that a manual spraying campaign would be 

approved that they moved the equipment and glyphosate required for groundbased spraying into Kabul, with processes in place to “procure more [herbicide] 

if necessary.”657 Preparations were so advanced that the PEF reported it was 

ready to deploy in 24 hours—and, according to a Western advisor on the ground 
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at the time, would have done so if the operation had not been called off by 

President Karzai.658

Despite the endorsement of senior U.S. government officials, the UK was 

reluctant to support ground-based spraying. Officials challenged the efficiency 

of the method given that the environmental impact statement indicated 

“backpack [rather than all-terrain vehicle or tractor-mounted] sprayers would be 

the herbicide application equipment of choice for poppy eradication within 100 

meters of other crops, particularly wheat,” which was the norm in areas where 

poppy was cultivated.659 There were also concerns that the water requirements 

for ground-based spraying—between 100 and 400 liters of fresh water required 

per hectare—could pose difficulties, particularly in drought-prone areas of the 

country where water would need to be transported in.660

Most of all, there were concerns over whether ground-based spraying would be 

subject to exactly the same security, political, and logistics problems that other 

eradication campaigns had faced. The review of the PEF published by Embassy 

Kabul in 2006 acknowledged that ground-based spraying was “not a magic 

bullet,” further adding:

Hectares or acres per day are affected much more by influences outside the 

physical capability of the eradicator. If the eradication teams are released 

to select fields in heavily concentrated areas of poppy cultivation, they 

can then eradicate to their maximum capacity. If, however, they are led by 

Governor Representatives . . . to small, undersized fields which are widely 

dispersed and may have been previously harvested, then the overall work rate 

goes down.661

The same report noted, “More importantly, [ground-based spraying] is designed 

as an icebreaker to get acceptance for other than mechanical and manual 

means,” implying that ground-based spraying was designed to create a precedent 

for aerial spraying.662

Despite significant reservations, the UK eventually acquiesced and joined the 

United States in its efforts to persuade the Afghan government to permit a very 

limited ground-based spraying operation.663 Karzai had already indicated he 

would support ground-based spraying, but required “international consensus.”664

With UK support, the issue was put to the Afghan cabinet in January 2007; the 

cabinet promptly rejected the request.665

A senior British official in Kabul described the event as “the only occasion when 

the Afghan cabinet met and discussed an issue on their own terms.”666 It was 

clear there were a number of Afghan ministers who “were overwhelmingly and 

vocally against the ground-spraying proposal.”667 Doug Wankel, a former director 

of the Kabul Counter Narcotics Task Force at Embassy Kabul, reported that, 

prior to the cabinet meeting, the Deputy Minister of Health, Faizullah Kakar, 
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said, “We cannot afford to go down this path.”668 With a PhD in toxicology, Kakar 

was one of the most outspoken critics of the proposal in the cabinet meeting. 

Ambassador Neumann later wrote, “I have never seen the cabinet so eloquent, 

outspoken, and firm in their views.”669

“It wasn’t until the Afghan cabinet meeting that I realized 

there was no space for spraying at all. The cabinet were all 

against it. I thought we needed to give this one up. If we 

can’t persuade these educated people this is feasible, 

then we cannot persuade rural Afghans.”

—Ambassador Ronald Neumann

Following the Afghan cabinet’s rejection of this ground-based spraying 

operation, Ambassador Neumann became convinced that the U.S. government 

should abandon the attempt to cajole the Afghan authorities to adopt spraying. 

He later stated, “It wasn’t until the Afghan cabinet meeting that I realized there 

was no space for spraying at all. The cabinet were all against it. I thought we 

needed to give this one up. If we can’t persuade these educated people this is 

feasible, then we cannot persuade rural Afghans.”670 Neumann also described 

spraying as “one of the stupidest ideas for Afghan drug control.”671

The rejection of ground-based spraying by the Afghan cabinet, however, did 

not end the U.S. push for spraying. In Steve Coll’s account, the issue rose 

to the highest levels in the Bush administration, with many senior officials, 

including the president, convinced of the need to adopt a Colombian-style aerial 

eradication campaign: 

Bush’s adaptation of Plan Colombia for Afghanistan constituted the most 

significant change in U.S. policy in the war since 2002. . . . In late 2006 and 

early 2007, for Afghanistan, Bush advocated strongly for spraying poppy 

crops from airplanes in the heart of Taliban country.672

The administration doubled down on the pursuit of spraying with the 

appointment of William Wood as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan in 

April 2007.673 Ambassador Wood had previously served as the ambassador to 

Colombia and held firm convictions on the efficacy of aerial spraying. 

The End of the Spraying Debate

In 2007, poppy cultivation hit a new record of 193,000 hectares, further 

invigorating Ambassador Wood and Counternarcotics Coordinator Schweich. 

At a Policy Advisory Group meeting in August 2007, Wood advocated for a 

campaign of “ground-based glyphosate spray,” arguing that, “If ground-based 

eradication does not succeed in these fields, the [United States] will be prepared 
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to consider even more aggressive techniques.”674 Wood also referred to the 

unsubstantiated credible threat figure, noting, “UNODC Director Costa has 

said many times that, to be a deterrent to cultivation, eradication must reach 

at least 25 percent of the crop. . . . We will advocate a clear target for the 2008 

harvest year, in line with DG Costa’s recommendation: 25 percent of this year’s 

200,000 hectares, or 50,000 hectares.”675 Schweich wrote in the New York Times

that Wood sent him an email advocating “a massive aerial-eradication program 

that would wipe out 80,000 hectares of poppies in Helmand Province, delivering 

a fatal blow to the root of the narcotics problem.”676

Based on a visit to Washington in the summer of 2007, a former UK counterdrug 

official described Schweich as “bullish” and convinced that aerial spraying 

“would happen. He thought he had everything lined up.” The official further 

noted, “People in the U.S. government had moved from opposing to being 

neutral, but I didn’t believe conditions had changed, just the hectarage.”677

In the fall of 2007, UNODC’s Costa joined Ambassador Wood and Schweich 

in advocating for aerial spraying, including at a NATO meeting in Brussels.678

Privately, Costa told U.S. officials that “he had reached the conclusion that 

in future years, aerial eradication may provide the only tool for reversing the 

poppy cultivation trend.”679

Those advocating spraying asserted that ground-based eradication was 

“inefficient, costly, dangerous, and more subject to corrupt dealings among 

local officials than aerial eradication.”680 An essential element of the proposed 

aerial spraying campaign was what Schweich referred to as “narco-farms” and 

“industrial-size poppy farms” owned by “pro-government opportunists” and 

“Taliban sympathizers.”681

 According to the 2007 counternarcotics strategy, 

“Many of Helmand’s poppy growers are wealthy land-owners, corrupt officials, 

and other opportunists.”682 The strategy emphasized that in Helmand, “at least 

75 percent of the poppy is not being grown by poor farmers who lack licit 

economic alternatives.”683 By this reasoning, spraying would only be targeting 

“wealthy” farmers who had access to alternative livelihoods. 

Some questioned the availability and veracity of such data. Ambassador 

Neumann recalled that trying to target big producers for eradication in 2006 and 

2007 turned out to be much more difficult than anticipated:

In practice, largely because so much of the land is share-cropped or has been 

seized without documentation, or the confusion of land ownership caused by 

the war years, we found out that we often couldn’t tell who had what land. 

There were lots of statements before we started about how the big owners 

were well-known, but when we tried to target them, the certainty dissolved 

into confusion.684
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A former eradication contractor said, “In principle, eradication targeting was 

a great idea, but in reality, the information didn’t exist, for example, the data 

on landholdings. It was built on information that wasn’t there and didn’t reflect 

what was on the ground.”685

There were also concerns about the impact spraying could have on licit crops 

and the population. Licit crops were commonly grown in close proximity to 

poppy, and houses and villages were often in close proximity to crops. This 

increased the chances of aerial spraying unintentionally harming licit crops, 

counteracting the expansion of alternative livelihoods.686 Even if the chemicals 

used were not harmful to humans or livestock, there could be false public 

perceptions. Any unrelated deaths or illnesses (of humans or livestock) could 

be falsely blamed on spraying, and the Taliban would likely use this as a tool to 

expand recruitment and support.687

Despite these uncertainties, by November 2007 it became apparent that the 

U.S. plan was to test aerial spraying in Nangarhar.688 The United States had a 

significant presence in the province and the support of Governor Gul Agha Shirzai. 

The plan was to destroy 4,000 to 5,000 hectares in Nangarhar, then roll out the 

program across Afghanistan.689 For some in the Afghan government, “pilot spray 

programs” were ill-advised given the fragility of the country. As a former Afghan 

minister described, “Aerial spraying was informed by strange ideologies. It was 

like testing in a lab, but Afghanistan is not a lab, it is a tense situation.”690

The UK maintained the view that aerial eradication would have a malign effect 

on security and would only lead to short-term reductions in opium poppy 

cultivation. UK Foreign Affairs Secretary David Miliband told officials the UK 

would not support aerial spraying and that he would inform U.S. Secretary of 

State Condoleezza Rice of the UK’s decision.691 UK Ambassador Cowper-Coles 

also informed President Karzai the UK government was opposed to aerial 

spraying and would back him in his continued opposition.692 Finally, the newly 

appointed UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown also telephoned President Bush to 

request he not press Karzai on the matter.693

President Karzai was vehemently opposed to aerial spraying, telling Khalilzad 

in 2004 that, if he agreed to it, “he would be seen as a foreign agent—no better 

than Babrak Kamal, the puppet dictator the Soviets had imposed when they 

invaded Afghanistan.”694 A former senior NSC official later acknowledged it was 

a “strategic mistake” to continue to push spraying with Karzai, arguing that it 

“eroded” the relationship between Karzai and Bush.695 Moreover, when pressing 

Karzai on the matter for the final time in November 2007, one official recalled 

that President Bush said he had “gone as far with spraying as he could go” and 

that “the case was now closed.” In saying he would not press the matter further 
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with Karzai, President Bush declared, “There can only be one president in 

Afghanistan.”696 At the end of November 2007, President Karzai told Secretary 

Rice he would not allow spraying to take place.697

Eradication: Theory versus Reality

As noted earlier, three reasons were typically used to justify eradication 

in Afghanistan: 

1. It destroys some of the opium crop, thereby reducing the amount of opiates 

available for distribution, sale, and final consumption.

2. It extends the writ of the Afghan state into rural areas where traditionally the 

government had little presence. 

3. It changes the risk-benefit calculus for farmers and deters planting in 

future seasons.

However, evidence to support these arguments was thin and problematic. 

U.S. eradication efforts never destroyed enough poppy to achieve a meaningful 

reduction in the total amount of opium available for distribution, sale, and final 

consumption. Reports of eradication reached an all-time high in 2007, when 

it was claimed that 19,047 hectares of poppy were destroyed by the PEF and 

GLE. However, this had little impact on the country’s opium production, which 

increased to what was, at the time, a new high of 8,200 tons the same year—a 

100 percent increase from 2005.698 Eradication in 2012, when reports were more 

accurate, destroyed 9,672 hectares of poppy.699 By 2014, opium production rose 

73 percent over 2012 levels, to an estimated 6,400 tons.700

The argument that eradication extended the writ of the state is far from evident 

when viewed against the complaints of corruption and the targeting of vulnerable 

communities that accompanied crop destruction. A May 2006 embassy cable 

recognized these very risks, stating, “The government did extend its reach; 

however, some of this extension may have reaffirmed the long-held beliefs among 

Helmand’s citizens of the rampant corruption typical of the provincial and district 

governments.”701 As an NGO worker in southern Afghanistan noted, the “predatory 

and sneering face of the eradication team” was “not the face that should be seen 

in rural areas.”702 Afghan farmers referred to eradication operations as acting “like 

a thief stealing in the night” when not accompanied by a state presence delivering 

physical and social infrastructure and improved security.703 In many cases, farmers 

appeared to be angered by a government that placed greater priority on destroying 

their crop than protecting their welfare. 

The evidence to support the third argument used to justify eradication—that 

it deters future planting—is also limited. INL Assistant Secretary Patterson’s 

references to “the threat of eradication [being] the single largest deterrent to 
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growing poppy” had little basis in fact.704 Moreover, there is no evidence to 

support UNODC’s claim that eradicating 25 percent of the total standing crop 

would establish “a credible threat” and deter farmers from cultivating opium 

poppy in subsequent years.705 Events in one district in Afghanistan often had 

little bearing on the behavior of the population in neighboring areas, let alone 

other provinces. For example, the destruction of poppy in the districts of 

Nad Ali and Nahre-i-Saraj in central Helmand—responsible for an estimated 

29,000 hectares of opium poppy in 2015—would not necessarily have had any 

impact on farmers’ decisions in Nawzad or Baghran in northern Helmand, where 

quite different socioeconomic, political, and environmental conditions prevailed, 

on whether to grow opium poppy.706

The evidence INL draws on to support the deterrent effect of eradication is 

“geospatial analysis [that] indicates that 90 percent less poppy was planted for 

the 2011 crop on land within a half kilometer radius of poppy fields that were 

eradicated in 2010 in the Helmand Food Zone.”707 On the surface, this analysis 

appears to have merit, however, it does not account for other variables that were 

shaping the planting decisions of farmers at the time, particularly the significant 

influx of international and Afghan military forces, the establishment of security 

infrastructure, such as checkpoints and Forward Operating Bases, and the uptick 

in development spending, all of which were associated with the 2009–2011 surge. 

In Marjah, located in the opium poppy heartland of Helmand Province, the 

share of agricultural land dedicated to poppy was almost 60 percent prior to the 

major influx of U.S. and Afghan forces. After Operation Moshtarak, in which 

15,000 U.S. Marines and the ANDSF occupied the district in February 2010, 

the amount of land dedicated to poppy fell to less than 5 percent in the 

spring of 2011.708 Farmers in central Helmand referred to the prevalence of 

government and international forces within rural communities at the time—

concurring with reports of “an ISAF base on every road junction”—and how this 

deterred cultivation.709

In contrast, longitudinal research conducted in Helmand Province found, 

“where the state has not been able to establish a more permanent presence 

in an area due to the prevailing security conditions, eradication has been 

seen by farmers as a random act that can be managed through patronage and 

corruption, a perception that has led to increasing resentment.”710 These findings 

are supported by GAO’s analysis of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, 

Peru, and Bolivia, and its conclusion that “government control of drug-growing 

areas . . . is essential to counternarcotics success.”711

Geospatial analysis conducted for SIGAR indicates eradication played a less 

significant role in reducing opium poppy cultivation than INL and UNODC 
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FIGURE 9

CROP MAPPING FOR NAD ALI IN HELMAND PROVINCE

Note: Poppy cultivation in this research site in Nad Ali fell before the area was targeted for eradication, suggesting that other variables, such as security presence, influenced the reductions in 

cultivation. GIS data of this area of Nad Ali from 2002 to 2016 show opium poppy cultivation dropping by 75 percent—from 39.6 hectares to 10.1 hectares—between 2010 and 2011 during the 

influx of military forces and before any eradication took place. More marginal reductions in poppy cultivation occurred between 2011 and 2014, with a decrease from 10.1 hectares to 4.9 hectares 

after repeated years of eradication in the area.

repeatedly argued. In some research sites, cultivation fell even before the area 

was targeted for intensive and repeated eradication, suggesting that variables 

other than eradication, such as security presence, can influence reductions 

in cultivation. For example, figure 9 shows that at the time of the troop surge 

between 2010 and 2011, cultivation in Nad Ali dropped by 75 percent, from 

April 21 (1.2 ha poppy)

Poppy is 6% of total agriculture. No eradication data in grid.

April 23 (30.6 ha poppy) 

Poppy is 45% of total agriculture. No eradication within 2.5 km.

2002 2009

April 7 (39.6 ha poppy)

Poppy is 60% of total agriculture. No eradication within 3 km.

2010

April 20 (10.1 ha poppy)

Poppy is 17% of total agriculture. Eradication within vicinity, but not in grid.

2011
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Source: SIGAR visualization of imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC. For the original imagery, see figure A.1 in appendix A.

39.6 hectares to 10.1 hectares. No eradication had taken place. However, over 

the course of repeated eradication in the area between 2011 and 2014, poppy 

cultivation decreased by only about four hectares between 2011 and 2015. 

In a number of the areas in central Helmand where eradication was conducted 

intensively over consecutive years, cultivation levels did not change. Figure A.2

April 18 (4.9 ha poppy)

Poppy is 8% of total agriculture. Some eradication in vicinity, 

one grid location.

April 7 (6.1 ha poppy)

Poppy is 12% of total agriculture. No eradication data.

2014

April 29 (6.6 ha poppy) 

Poppy is 14% of total agriculture. Significant eradication in vicinity and grid.

2012

March 29 (10.6 ha poppy)

Poppy is 21% of total agriculture. Significant eradication in vicinity, 

one grid location.

2013

2015

Poppy Wheat Orchard Vineyard Other Crops Prepared Eradication
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in appendix A shows a resistance to two years of significant eradication in 

Nad Ali, maintaining levels of opium poppy cultivation at around 30 hectares 

between 2008 and 2010. A reduction in cultivation in 2011 by 66 percent to 

10.2 hectares suggested that the post-2009 surge in U.S. and Afghan military 

presence, rather than the limited eradication that occurred in 2010, was a key 

factor in the reduction. Significant eradication efforts between 2011 and 2014 

did not reduce overall opium poppy cultivation and, by 2015, cultivation still 

stood at roughly 11.1 hectares. 

Eradication: The Biggest Obstacle to a Coherent Counternarcotics Policy

Eradication, in particular aerial spraying, proved one of the most divisive aspects 

of the counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan. It undermined efforts to reach 

a common understanding of the drug problem and how to counter it, divided 

U.S. government agencies, and alienated many U.S. allies, including the Afghan 

government. There was a fundamental disagreement over the logic behind 

crop destruction and the manner in which it should be carried out. The most 

contentious aspect of eradication was the proposal to use herbicides. Aerial 

spraying was a red line for all outside the U.S. government, except UNODC. Even 

Why GIS?

GIS analysis allows program activities and outputs to be mapped and the geographic 

distribution of programs and investments to be examined. The use of high-resolution 

imagery over multiple years supports a detailed, more tangible examination of program 

outputs and outcomes. In particular, it is possible to examine whether the resources 

provided for development, such as fertilizer, saplings, and greenhouses, as well as larger 

infrastructure projects, are used at all and, if they are, whether they are sustained for the 

duration of a program and beyond. 

Geospatial analysis can confirm whether an activity took place, as well as detect secondand third-order effects. For example, in the case of an irrigation system, it is possible, 

using measures of the vegetative index, to establish whether the irrigation system led to 

an increase in the amount of land under irrigation and whether that land was producing 

better yields in both winter and summer seasons. Using crop mapping, it is possible 

to examine what crops are grown and whether households have shifted to higher-value 

horticulture, such as orchards and vineyards, are cultivating wheat, or are producing 

opium poppy and obtaining higher yields.

Ultimately, GIS analysis offers an assessment of the extent to which the different 

strands of the counternarcotics strategy were sequenced and coordinated in the same 

geographic areas and assists in determining the impact interventions had on poppy 

cultivation. GIS also supports a deeper understanding of the factors that have led to 

shifts in poppy cultivation and whether reductions in cultivation are likely to be enduring. 

See appendix B for a detailed discussion of the GIS methodology.
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ground-based spraying had a significant number of opponents, as highlighted by 

the Afghan cabinet’s unanimous rejection of the proposal in January 2007.

INL and, during periods of heightened cultivation, other parts of the U.S. 

government believed it was important to destroy as much of the crop as possible, 

wherever it was located and regardless of the economic and political conditions. 

The Afghan government, the British government, ISAF, and others argued 

eradication needed to be more strategic, targeting those who could most afford 

to lose their opium crop and in locations where other economic options were 

available. Senior military officials were reluctant to take on counternarcotics, 

in part because they wanted nothing to do with eradication.712 These underlying 

disagreements had lasting effects on the deployment of both governor-led 

and centrally planned eradication efforts. The lack of consensus on targeted 

eradication had serious ramifications on perceptions of success and failure, 

military initiatives, stabilization efforts, and major rural development programs. 

In the autumn of 2006, the commander of ISAF, British Army General David 

Richards, told President Karzai spraying was “absolutely not the right thing 

to do.”713 The push for spraying strained the U.S.-UK bilateral relationship 

and undermined the UK’s role as lead and then partner nation. According to a 

UK government official, the eradication debate “took up so much air time we 

couldn’t get on with the other strands of the strategy.”714

In February 2007, U.S. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the ranking member 

of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, wrote, “Our anti-narcotics policy 

has long been hobbled by conflicting views and bureaucratic battles between 

various players, including the Departments of Defense and State, the [DEA] 

and other U.S. agencies, along with our NATO allies, especially the British. 

There is little prospect these long-entrenched divisions will be reconciled by 

themselves.”715 At the heart of this division was eradication, a policy that many—

including some within the U.S. government—believed was driven by INL.716

As one former DOD official explained, “It was because INL had eradication 

themselves; it was their responsibility. It was driven by metrics; they were 

given money for something they wanted to deliver. Counternarcotics became 

synonymous with aerial eradication.”717

A final estimate of the amount obligated by the U.S. for eradication is $937 million 

from 2002 to 2017, or an average of $11,772 per hectare of poppy destroyed. Each 

hectare of poppy eradicated by Governor-Led Eradication cost an average of 

$70 and each hectare eradicated by Poppy Eradication Force cost an average of 

$44,000.718 Far from proving to be effective in destroying the crop, extending the writ 

of the Afghan state, or deterring future cultivation, eradication became perhaps the 

biggest obstacle to developing a coherent counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan. 
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ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT: ADVANCING THE LEGAL ECONOMY

Between 2002 and 2017, the U.S. government allocated $1.46 billion on what 

it termed alternative development: aid projects designed to reduce poppy 

cultivation by increasing licit economic alternatives. (See figure 10.) While 

INL was responsible for directing the overall counternarcotics strategy, which 

included alternative development, USAID took the lead on the delivery of 

development programs intended to address poppy cultivation. In theory, 

alternative development projects were meant to incorporate all-encompassing, 

multi-sector programs to strengthen agribusinesses, promote agricultural value 

chains, and expand credit and financial services to rural areas.719 However, 

despite the inclusion of some of these programs, in practice, the bulk of 

USAID’s alternative development programming focused on large-scale, shortterm interventions designed to find a replacement crop for poppy.720 This line 

of programming, commonly referred to as “crop substitution,” assumed that 

when farmers had greater opportunities in the licit economy, they would be 

less dependent on cultivating opium poppy.721 Other elements of alternative 

development included rehabilitating agricultural infrastructure and providing 

cash-for-work programs.722

One of the biggest challenges within this strand of counternarcotics activity 

was the disagreement and misunderstanding within the drug control and 

development communities as to what interventions would have the greatest 

impact on farmers and their decision to cultivate illicit drug crops, and how 

these interventions should be delivered and sequenced. Major strategic 

and operational errors of alternative development programming included a 

lack of long-term programmatic focus, an overreliance on short-term crop 

substitution objectives, and an inadequate consideration of how, in some cases, 

alternative development projects may have inadvertently supported a rise in 

opium poppy cultivation.723 USAID and INL also failed to adequately integrate 

FIGURE 10

0

200

400

600

800

$1,000

Source: SIGAR analysis of agency budget documentation and budget data.

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT FUNDING COMPARED TO TOTAL COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING, 2002–2017 ($ MILLIONS)

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Alternative Development Total Counternarcotics Allocations
COUNTERNARCOTICS

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counternarcotics objectives and indicators into wider development policies 

and programs being implemented in poppy-growing areas. Ultimately, USAID’s 

alternative development efforts were piecemeal and unfocused, and had 

marginal and at times counterproductive impacts on poppy cultivation.724

 This 

does not detract from the positive development impact these efforts may have 

had, but rather highlights that alternative development programming often failed 

to meet its counternarcotics goals.

Initial Reticence and the Push for Conditionality

Like some other agencies at the time, USAID was reluctant to be drawn into 

counternarcotics efforts in 2002. USAID’s immediate priority in Afghanistan 

was humanitarian work, particularly given the scale of the drought and 

conflict that had befallen the country in the 1990s.725 Funds for USAID were 

limited, and officials were reluctant to engage in a policy area where they had 

no comparative advantage.726 One former USAID official referred to USAID’s 

relationship with counternarcotics as “a forced marriage,” and another spoke 

of poppy as being considered “beyond USAID’s management interest.”727

Early alternative development efforts were further constrained by the fact 

that successful implementation and oversight of development programs were 

largely dependent upon adequate security and governance, neither of which was 

present in most poppy-producing areas at the time. 

A U.S. Marine and a farmer place a bag of fertilizer in a wheelbarrow at the Civil-Military Operations Center 

at Camp Hansen near Marjah. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)
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CONDITIONALITY

Conditionality was a way to link the provision of assistance to reductions in poppy growth. 

Despite USAID’s own analysis that conditionality was “self-defeating,” several USAID 

interventions required agreements from farmers and communities to abandon opium 

poppy cultivation in return for project benefits.728 However, conditionality proved to be an 

unworkable tool at an operational level in Afghanistan, for several reasons. First, USAID 

was often unable or unwilling to withhold assistance if conditions were not met.729 As a 

former senior official at USAID commented, “At the end of the day, USAID usually finds a 

way around conditionality.”730 Those implementing the projects also recognized the futility of 

conditionality, with one contractor noting that projects “had conditionality. We got everyone 

to sign a piece of paper in Pashto saying they would not use fertilizer to grow poppy. . . . But 

without 100 percent participation in the donor program and an overall local-level agreement 

to not grow, while access to direct benefits such as fertilizer may be limited for that minority 

of non-compliant individuals, the compliance of the majority together with a donor-funded 

public good like a road or a school does not stop the non-compliant minority [from] 

benefiting, albeit indirectly.”731

Conditionality also failed to take into account the fact that rural communities had different 

histories and dependencies on opium poppy cultivation. Conditionality expected all farmers 

to reduce opium poppy at the same pace, regardless of how dependent they were on the 

crop for their livelihood.732 As noted by a 2005 European Commission report, “Too often 

Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne, Minister 

of Counter Narcotics Khudiadad, and Helmand Governor Mohammad Gulab Mangal sign a pledge for an 

additional $38.7 million to the MCN to reward provinces for reducing poppy cultivation under GPI. 

(U.S. Embassy Kabul photo)
COUNTERNARCOTICS

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conditionality has been attached to short-term single sector initiatives that have neither 

shown the duration of commitment from implementing organisations nor delivered the lasting 

change in lives and livelihoods that households require to make a permanent shift to licit 

livelihoods.”733 Furthermore, development programs tended to benefit wealthier members of 

the community, particularly land owners, who were often the least reliant on opium poppy 

for their overall welfare. As a consequence, conditionality often had the most deleterious 

effect on the more marginal members of the community, who experienced the loss in opium 

production, but saw few project benefits.734

The push for conditionality created a rift between development practitioners and the drug 

control community. UNODC Executive Director Costa endorsed conditionality, but few in the 

development community or the Afghan government supported it.735 There was consensus 

among development practitioners that conditionality did not work and could even prove 

counterproductive.736 A 2004 Embassy Kabul cable noted that “the international donor 

community, and the UK in particular, have remained opposed to meshing development and 

[counternarcotics] goals, i.e., instituting conditionality and ‘mainstreaming.’ Until now, the 

[government of Afghanistan] has also generally resisted direct linkage of counternarcotics 

conditions to rural development.”737

UNODC’s own experience with conditionality in Afghanistan in the 1990s highlighted the 

overall weakness of the approach.738 The international Alternative Livelihoods Advisor 

to the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Anthony Fitzherbert, an 

agriculturalist with over two decades of experience in Afghanistan, concluded: 

To provide aid and development assistance on condition of abandoning poppy 

cultivation, even assuming voluntary agreement at all levels, is not realistic. 

Nominal agreement will be given by both authorities and local communities as it 

has in the past, but without the rule of law to back it up, this will remain nominal 

and worthless. In short, the conditions for conditionality do not exist.739

Mohammed Ehsan Zia, former Minister of MRRD, agreed, claiming, “Conditionality was not 

effective, as there was no implementation mechanism or monitoring system; it never worked. 

It sent the wrong message to rural communities that they could trade inputs and agreements. 

Communities put signatures on a piece of paper, but there was no way to implement it.”740
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INL was most active in alternative development in the early years of the 

reconstruction effort, allocating over $30 million for alternative development 

in 2002 alone.741 This early support focused on providing assistance to poppyproducing areas targeted for eradication.742 Yet, INL’s initial focus on directing 

and funding alternative development yielded to USAID for the majority of the 

reconstruction period.

The first major USAID effort to include projects with counternarcotics 

objectives was the Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program, which ran from 

March 2003 to September 2006 at a cost of $143.7 million.743 RAMP was a wideranging development effort that focused on three main sectors: infrastructure 

reconstruction, rural financial services, and agricultural technology and market 

development.744 The project was backed by Ambassador Khalilzad, who requested 

that initiatives like RAMP be refocused on alternative development and brought in 

USAID officers from Latin America who were more familiar with the concept.745

In the 2004–2005 growing season, RAMP funded a $17.9 million Alternative 

Income Program meant to provide “alternative employment opportunities to 

those who are dependent on or susceptible to deriving income from the illicit 

production of opium poppy.”746 RAMP also supported the provision of 40,000 

metric tons of fertilizer to an estimated 537,000 farmers, along with wheat seeds, 

largely in response to the Afghan government’s demands that international 

donors mitigate the “economic hardship resulting from a reduction in poppy 

cultivation” and “encourage the farmers not to revert to poppy planting during 

the 2005–2006 growing season.”747 But these initiatives could have only limited 

impact, as they were not designed as interventions to support farmers over the 

multi-year period needed to transition sustainably from poppy to licit crops. 

In many ways, RAMP illustrated the flawed strategy of alternative development 

projects yet to come. RAMP projects directed toward poppy-producing areas 

were piecemeal, short-term, and failed to provide sustainable livelihood options 

for farmers attempting to transition away from poppy cultivation. Furthermore, 

despite the risk that fertilizer and rehabilitated irrigation systems could be used 

to support poppy cultivation, there was little to no mention of poppy in the 

final evaluation of RAMP.748 Thus, the evaluation did not seek to determine how 

RAMP had affected poppy cultivation or drug production in the areas supported 

by the program. 

Mainstreaming Counternarcotics Within Development

The period between 2004 and 2008 saw many of the largest development donors 

in Afghanistan attempt to integrate an understanding of drug-crop cultivation 

and the multi-functional role it played in rural livelihoods into broader 

development planning. (See figure 11.) This mainstreaming concept recognized 
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that helping farmers transition to licit livelihoods would require not only crop or 

income replacement, but also support to social safety nets and greater on-farm 

and off-farm income opportunities.749 Advocates of the mainstreaming model 

asserted that a counternarcotics perspective should be integrated into all rural 

development program design, implementation, and monitoring. As a result, 

projects would be better equipped to recognize and understand the potential 

counternarcotics impacts of their interventions and take steps to ensure 

projects did not inadvertently encourage poppy production.750

Much of the assistance to support the mainstreaming concept was directed 

through DFID, as part of the UK lead on counternarcotics, and the World Bank. 

These organizations, plus the Asian Development Bank and the European Union, 

embraced efforts to mainstream counternarcotics into development programming, 

as outlined in a CND working group session of the Alternative Livelihoods Technical 

Working Group in June 2004.751 These institutions recognized the challenges 

posed by opium production and went on to produce guidelines for integrating 

counternarcotics into the design and implementation of their programs. 

The World Bank took the lead in donor engagement on the National Priority 

Programs and the administration of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, 

from which donor funds were pooled and prioritized. A number of NPPs were 

reviewed during design and implementation to assess whether their activities 

addressed the causes of poppy cultivation or, at a minimum, did not make 

matters worse, and to provide recommendations for improvements. These 

included programs such as the National Emergency Rural Access Project, the 

Emergency Horticulture and Livestock Project, and the Emergency Irrigation 

Rehabilitation Project.752

The Afghan government also took action to bring counterdrug objectives into 

its wider development strategies. The 2006 Afghan National Drug Control 

Strategy called for counternarcotics to be integrated into national and provincial 

development plans and strategies.753 The Afghanistan National Development 

Strategy of 2008 designated counternarcotics a cross-cutting issue, alongside 

gender equality, environmental management, anticorruption, and regional 

cooperation.754 These changes were meant to move alternative development 

away from a focus on specific area-based projects targeting poppy reduction 

toward consideration of opium-related impacts in all high-level policies and 

sector programming.

These mainstreaming initiatives were accompanied by USAID’s first and 

only dedicated Alternative Livelihoods Program (ALP).755 The inclusion of 

the term “livelihoods” was meant to reflect a commitment analogous to 

the mainstreaming model, in which rural development was the objective 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

and reductions in poppy cultivation an externality or side effect of that 

objective.756

 The program began in February 2005 and had projects in the 

north ($50.9 million), east ($115.48 million), and south ($166. 4 million), 

with a subsequent expansion into the southwest ($75.1 million).757

ALP funded cash-for-work initiatives that increased agricultural income and 

provided much needed infrastructure investments, including the rehabilitation 

of roads and canals.758 Agricultural efforts focused on increasing the total area 

under annual and perennial horticulture, support to staples such as wheat 

and mung beans, and improvements in the livestock sector. The investment 

in infrastructure was significant. ALP-East alone reported investing over 

$13 million in the rehabilitation of irrigation canals, benefiting 24,308 hectares, 

FIGURE 11

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 200

Badakhshan Alternative Employment for Rural Workers

Canal, Local Governance, and Alternative Crops Program in Nangarhar

Cash for Work Helmand Program

Cotton & Alternative Crops Pilot Project in Helmand Province

Incentives to Reduce Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan

Afghanistan Immediate Needs Program

Alternative Development Program-North (ADP-N)

Alternative Development Program-South (ADP-S)

Alternative Development Program-East (ADP-E)

International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC)

Environmental Assessment of the Alternative Livelihood Program

Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture Program (ASAP)

Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture (AVIPA)

Alternative Development and Alternative Livelihoods Program Expansion North and West (ADP-SW)

Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW)

Community Development Program (CDP)-Kabul

Community Development Program (CDP)-West

Community Development Program (CDP)-South-East

Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP)

Agriculture Credit Enhacement (ACE)/Agriculture Development Fund (ADF)

Helmand Food Zone (HFZ)

Southern Regional Agriculture Development Program (SRADP) 

Kandahar Food Zone (KFZ)

Regional Agriculture Development Program-South (RADP-South)

Regional Agriculture Development Program-West (RADP-West)

Regional Agriculture Development Program-North (RADP-North)

Regional Agriculture Development Program-East (RADP-East)

Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development (CBARD)

Boost Alternative Development Intervention Through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL)

Development Programs

SELECT ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, 2002–2018

Note: Badakhshan Alternative Employment for Rural Workers started and ended in 2002. Environmental Assessment of the Alternative Livelihood Program started and ended in 2005. Projects 

listed as ending in 2018 may be ongoing. 

Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID quarterly Pipeline data, September 30, 2017; USAID/Afghanistan, Agricultural Sector Assistance Strategy, Annex 5: Poppy Cultivation and USAID Alternative 

Development Efforts in Afghanistan, draft report, February 24, 2016, pp. 61–62; UNODC, “UNODC Alternative Development Programme Launched,” press release, 2017; UN Development 

Programme Afghanistan, “CBARD Factsheet,” February 14, 2018; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2018, p. 188.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

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approximately 15 percent of the region’s total irrigable land.759 In the south, 

similar efforts claimed to have rehabilitated 89,500 hectares of land and also 

supported a number of major infrastructure efforts, including an airport runway 

($11.8 million), the upgrade of an electricity substation, and the development 

of the Bolan agricultural center ($3.5 million).760 Some of these programs 

made assistance contingent on reductions in poppy cultivation.761 However, 

a 2010 evaluation report of ALP-South noted, “It is doubtful that the project’s 

conditionality agreements had any effect on the growing of opium.” The same 

report concluded that “there is no evidence that [ALP] had an impact on the 

production of opium.”762

Crop Substitution and Expansion of the Legal Economy 

Despite these early mainstreaming efforts, the bulk of USAID’s alternative 

development programming focused on large-scale, short-term interventions 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

nd ended in 2005. Projects 

n and USAID Alternative 

017; UN Development 
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designed to expand licit agricultural opportunities to compete directly with 

poppy production.763 This line of programming, commonly referred to as “crop 

substitution,” was informed by the assumption that an expansion of the licit 

agricultural economy would be sufficient to reduce levels of opium poppy 

cultivation.764 While many of these projects had a measurable development 

impact, their effect on poppy cultivation was less clear. A 2016 draft USAID 

Agriculture Assistance Strategy concluded that:

USAID’s general approach with respect to [alternative development] funding, 

therefore, has been to assume that investments to increase high value crop 

production would, as a matter of course, discourage poppy production. 

However, there has been little effort given to examining the impact of our 

programs on poppy cultivation, or, as importantly, the impact of poppy 

production on the implementation of USAID programs. This has left USAID’s 

[alternative development] efforts relatively diffused and unfocused, and, it is 

argued, led to marginal or unsustainable impacts on poppy cultivation.765

The Regional Agricultural Development Programs (RADP), the Commercial 

Horticulture and Agriculture Program (CHAMP), and Incentives Driving 

Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West (IDEA-NEW) were key 

examples of such programming. Many of these programs were based on the 

assumption that once alternative high-value and economically competitive 

crops produced income, rural households would be more willing to accept 

programs aimed at stopping poppy production.766 For example, it was often 

assumed that once a farmer planted orchards or vineyards, these crops would 

result in a lasting shift away from opium poppy in the future.767 High-resolution 

imagery shows, however, that this assumption was not always valid; opium 

poppy replaced orchards that were provided by IDEA-NEW in parts of southern 

Nangarhar.768 (See figure 12.) These programs did not directly measure changes 

in poppy cultivation, which raised questions as to how USAID assessed the 

validity of its assumption that growth in the legal economy would dissuade 

poppy cultivation. USAID’s Office of the Inspector General raised this point in its 

audit of IDEA-NEW in 2012.769

USAID appears to have underestimated the amount of time and investment 

required to establish crops that could compete with poppy. As observed in 

USAID’s 2016 draft Agriculture Assistance Strategy, “Perennial crops (vineyards 

and orchards) and off-season vegetable production (i.e., using greenhouses and 

hoop-houses to extend the summer horticultural season), represent the only 

viable agricultural alternatives to poppy cultivation.”770 However, perennial crops 

are a long-term investment that many farmers are unable to make.771

 The draft 

strategy further noted that, regarding orchards, the households making such an 

investment must either “(1) have enough land to cover household income and 

consumption requirements during the establishment period, (2) have access to 

long-term credit, or (3) have sources of non-farm income on which to rely while 

the tree crop matures.”772 Furthermore, perennial crops take four to five years 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

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to reach their full production potential, whereas most alternative development 

projects lasted an average of three and one-half years.773 As a result, according 

to a 2016 Alternative Development Options Assessment published by USAID, 

many alternative development projects were “clearly inadequate to the task of 

fomenting sustainable stakeholder commitment to transitioning permanently 

away from engagement in illicit activities.774

An overemphasis on crop substitution prevented USAID from committing 

sufficient resources to off-farm and non-agricultural income opportunities for 

rural populations.775 Reducing farmers’ dependency on opium as a livelihood 

option is not simply a matter of crop substitution. Opium poppy is just one 

crop in a larger, complex livelihood framework of agricultural commodities, 

Note: For errors or more information, contact info@alcis.org.

Source: Copyright © 2018 Alcis Holdings Ltd.

Imagery from southern Nangarhar Province shows poppy gradually replacing orchards that were provided 

by IDEA-NEW. Many alternative development programs wrongly assumed that once a farmer planted 

orchards or vineyards, they would be a lasting agricultural investment and not be replaced by poppy.

These images show another area in southern Nangarhar Province where orchards planted in 2010 by 

IDEA-NEW were replaced by opium poppy by 2014. These images demonstrate that orchards are not 

always a lasting or permanent replacement for poppy.

FIGURE 12

IDEA-NEW PROJECT EVALUATION: POPPY REPLACING ORCHARDS
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livestock, and off-farm income opportunities.776 Increased opportunities for offfarm employment can raise the opportunity costs of growing opium poppy, and 

help to draw labor away from it.777 Off-farm employment can also help subsidize 

longer-term investments in high-value perennial crops, such as orchards 

or vineyards. 

In some areas, development programs inadvertently supported poppy 

production.778 One example of this was the rehabilitation and development 

of irrigation systems. USAID reported that ADP East and South rehabilitated 

Flawed Comparisons Between Poppy and Wheat

UNODC statistics on the profitability of opium poppy versus wheat, a comparison often 

made to explain cultivation decisions and the difficulty of persuading farmers to give 

up poppy, were misleading.779 Opium poppy has significant labor requirements, while 

wheat is a less labor-intensive crop; therefore, making direct comparisons between 

the gross profit margins of poppy and wheat overstated the profitability of opium 

production. Furthermore, poppy and wheat are grown for different reasons—opium for 

cash, credit, or access to land, and wheat for household consumption—further distorting 

the comparison.780 In addition, wheat requires little long-term investment and has limited 

economic value. In many areas, wheat was easily replaced with poppy and, barring 

significant improvement in a farmer’s economic status or security situation, poppy also 

replaced wheat in abundance.781

The comparison of wheat and poppy ignored the wide range of other crops farmers could 

cultivate, including specialized horticulture, and the possibility of multiple crops on a 

single unit of land. It also failed to recognize the importance of non-agricultural income 

for rural households and the fact that the net returns on opium varied significantly 

according to the land tenure arrangements and resources of Afghan farmers. For 

example, a landowner growing poppy could earn up to four times what a sharecropper 

growing poppy on a similar piece of land could earn.782

Flawed UNODC data and analysis distilled the reasons why households cultivated opium 

poppy into a single profit motive, thereby ignoring the multifunctional role of the crop 

in rural livelihoods.783 In reality, poppy had a “multifaceted role in rural livelihoods, 

including providing access to land and housing for the landless and land-poor and 

access to liquidity,” that could not be accurately captured solely by examining the cash 

value of a poppy crop.784

Nevertheless, the perceived profitability of the opium crop shaped the policy on 

eradication and alternative development, and informed operational responses on the 

ground. Despite data that challenged UNODC’s notions of agricultural economics and 

poverty, senior policy makers continued to cite the high price of opium compared to 

alternatives as evidence of the uphill challenge faced by the development effort and the 

need for more aggressive eradication to counter opium production.785
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canals that increased the productivity of 113,808 hectares of land.786 Many more 

tens of thousands of hectares were supported by USAID’s other agricultural 

programs, as well as partner nation efforts and the National Priority Programs. 

Analysis of high-resolution imagery for KFZ and GPI shows that rehabilitated 

irrigation systems inadvertently contributed to an increase in poppy cultivation. 

(See figure 13 above and figure 17 on page 136.) This analysis illustrates the 

risks of improving irrigation systems without providing adequate support for 

agricultural diversification in the same areas. In a similar way, well-intentioned 

programs to increase wheat yields also risked freeing up land and labor for 

poppy cultivation.

This is not to say there should be no improvements in irrigation, wheat yields, 

or other development programs in poppy-growing areas. Rather, program 

designers need to consider both the intended and unintended development 

and counternarcotics outcomes. In those cases where interventions might 

lead to an increase in the production and trade of opiates, mitigating actions 

must be pursued. For example, if a project plans to reduce poppy cultivation 

by increasing wheat production, then an assessment should be included in the 

project design that accounts for the potential displacement of sharecroppers 

and itinerant workers. Subsequent program evaluations should note how these 

groups responded to the loss of land and income, and, if necessary, propose 

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.

FIGURE 13

TOLUKAN CANAL, CHANGE IN POPPY CULTIVATION, 2013 AND 2015

The areas shaded red (2013) and blue (2015) show poppy cultivation near the Tolukan Canal in 2013 and 2015. Crop analysis 

indicates a 119 percent increase in poppy cultivation from 2013 to 2015, following the canal’s rehabilitation. This increase suggests 

the KFZ’s primary focus on irrigation repair and construction contributed to rising levels of poppy cultivation.

2013 2015

April 14 (14.98 ha poppy) April 26 (32.94 ha poppy)
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programming to mitigate the risk of these groups returning to poppy cultivation 

in areas beyond the project’s zone of influence. Otherwise, as one former USAID 

staff member put it, “USAID’s efforts could make the poppy situation worse.”787

Alternative Development Programming, but Little Counternarcotics Effect

Between 2005 and 2008, 75 percent of USAID’s total expenditure on agriculture 

projects in Afghanistan was categorized as alternative development.788 However, 

a review of program documents from USAID alternative development projects 

found that few actually considered opium poppy cultivation in their design 

or during implementation, despite being funded as alternative development. 

Many programs did not incorporate opium poppy cultivation in their baseline 

studies, needs assessments, or dialogue with communities where the programs 

were implemented. Consequently, most alternative development projects 

failed to provide a clear assessment of how program activities contributed to 

reductions in opium production, or mitigated against the risk of encouraging 

poppy cultivation. Furthermore, few alternative development projects included 

area-specific indicators for monitoring the counternarcotics and alternative 

livelihoods impact of a project.789

The Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture Program (ASAP), funded at 

$132.6 million, ran from November 2006 until November 2010 and was designed 

to “revitalize and improve the regional competitiveness of Afghanistan’s 

agricultural sector.”790 The initiative focused specifically on increasing the 

production and export of the country’s high-value agricultural products, such 

as fruits, nuts, and cashmere. ASAP received $46.78 million in alternative 

development funds, or 35 percent of total project funding, yet made no explicit 

mention of opium poppy, those cultivating it, or of tailoring interventions to 

have a strategic effect on levels of cultivation or the opium economy.791

Other programs that drew on alternative development money included the 

Community Development Programs (CDP) West, South, East, and Kabul, formerly 

the Food Insecurity Response to Urban Populations program, which ran from 

March 2009 to January 2012. With a total budget of $334 million, CDP drew 

$39.5 million from alternative development funds.792 These programs were designed 

to construct or repair local infrastructure in urban areas and provided cash-for-work 

programs for vulnerable populations. Once again, however, USAID made no explicit 

mention of opium poppy cultivation in the program objectives, other than to cite the 

challenge of hiring workers during the opium harvest season.793

Another USAID program was the $469 million Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased 

Production in Agriculture, which ran from September 2008 until April 2013. This, 

too, was funded from alternative development money, at a cost of $323 million, 

or 68.7 percent of the total program costs.794 AVIPA focused on wheat seed and 
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fertilizer distribution, with the primary objective of aiding stabilization. However, 

in the southern region where an additional $300 million was focused on the poppygrowing provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, AVIPA Plus, as it came to be known, 

was closely entwined with efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation. While 

DFID largely funded the wheat seeds and fertilizer distributed in the Helmand 

Food Zone, AVIPA Plus provided grape vines, saplings, vegetable seeds, fertilizer, 

and poly-tunnels (semi-circular greenhouses) to an estimated 74,000 farmers in 

Helmand and a further 184,000 farmers in Kandahar.795 USAID reported that these 

non-wheat voucher packages supported 47,000 hectares of cultivation in Helmand 

and 106,000 hectares in Kandahar.796

Due, in part, to these efforts, the level of investment in poppy-growing areas was 

significant. Even before AVIPA was launched, the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy 

for Afghanistan reported the United States had provided more than $270 million 

for Helmand Province alone, noting that, “If Helmand were a country, it 

would be the fifth largest recipient of FY 2007 USAID funding in the world.”797

Ambassador Wood later claimed that Helmand had received “more economic 

assistance than any other province in Afghanistan for the past five years.”798

What was less clear was how these interventions actually addressed the causes 

of opium poppy cultivation. 

In 2010, several USAID rural development projects drew on alternative development 

funds and operated in poppy-growing areas, but their focus was on stabilization 

objectives and short-term income generation efforts.799 In 2011, the Post 

Performance Monitoring Plan, a tool USAID used to plan and manage the process 

of “assessing and reporting progress toward assistance/foreign policy objectives,” 

made only a nominal mention of “combating the Afghan narcotics trade” and did 

not tie this objective into any of its planning, which was a shift from earlier plans.800

USAID’s transition plan for 2015–2018 was similarly vague, providing few details on 

how its development programming would reduce poppy cultivation.801

The IDEA-NEW program was initially an extension of ALP-East, created in 2009 

and designed to increase access to legal, commercially viable sources of income. 

However, by late 2010, USAID had dropped any requirement for IDEA-NEW to 

report on its contribution to reducing opium poppy and only required data on its 

role in expanding the licit economy.802

By 2010, programs like the Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Program, 

a $40 million development program, received 40 percent of its funding from 

alternative development funds.803 However, even though CHAMP was operating 

in a number of poppy-growing provinces, including Helmand, Kandahar, 

Badakhshan, and Nangarhar, the program’s mid-term evaluation made no 

mention of opium production.804
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The Regional Agricultural Development Programs were launched in 2013 and 

2014 with a “significant degree of funding from the [alternative development] 

account.”805 None of the four programs—RADP South ($125.1 million), 

RADP West ($69.9 million), RADP North ($78.4 million), or RADP East 

($28.1 million)—was specifically targeted to address opium poppy cultivation. 

In fact, the design of these programs not only ignored opium poppy, but failed 

to consider how the programs might negatively affect counternarcotics goals. 

The lessons of some previous endeavors, including the displacement of people 

and poppy to the desert as a result of the Helmand Food Zone, did not appear to 

inform RADP’s design and implementation.806

 (See pages 15, 121–124.)

As with many previous programs funded by USAID, the RADPs focused 

primarily on wheat. Over 70 percent of the funding for each RADP was allocated 

to wheat and only 20 percent for non-wheat horticulture.807 A former USAID 

staff member commented on the design of RADPs, noting they lacked a “clear 

understanding of the socioeconomic context, and land tenure. The program was 

not . . . poppy-relevant because of the emphasis on wheat.”808 An assessment 

funded by USAID in 2016 challenged the RADPs’ effect on poppy cultivation, 

arguing, “It has been amply demonstrated that wheat does not compete directly 

or effectively against poppy, [and] the prospective effectiveness of such an 

approach is clearly open to question.”809 Despite concerns over the impact these 

programs were likely to have on opium poppy cultivation, the RADPs formed the 

bulwark of USAID’s contribution to alternative development in recent years.810

A Marjah farmer wheels bags of fertilizer and crop seeds at the Civil-Military Operations Center at Camp 

Hansen near Marjah. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)
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Food Zones

USAID supported two counternarcotics food zone initiatives after 2010; 

however, its involvement in both was more a function of politics than 

development priorities. The first initiative was USAID’s funding of the wheat 

seed and fertilizer component of the Helmand Food Zone. The HFZ was 

a comprehensive counternarcotics effort led by the provincial governor 

and supported by the UK, United States, and Denmark. It was designed to 

combine alternative development programs, a public information campaign, 

and eradication efforts to reduce opium production in the well-irrigated parts 

of Helmand Province.811 USAID’s involvement was a direct consequence of a 

budgetary problem between the UK-led PRT and the provincial governor in 

Helmand. In July 2010, Helmand Governor Mangal declared he would no longer 

be looking for support for wheat seeds and fertilizer in the 2010–2011 opium 

poppy-growing season. The UK subsequently cut its budget for HFZ from 

$12 million to $1 million. Despite some reluctance within USAID, when the 

governor changed his mind and again asked for support for wheat seeds and 

fertilizer, USAID provided $4.21 million to fill the gap in funding.812

The alternative development projects implemented as part of the HFZ largely 

consisted of providing improved wheat seed and fertilizer packages to landholding farmers.813

 Subsequent development efforts offered vegetable seeds 

for spring and summer crops.814 Local communities that received subsidized 

agricultural inputs signed conditionality agreements with the provincial 

government stating they would not grow opium poppy.815 The HFZ coincided 

with a reduction in opium poppy cultivation within the main canal-irrigated 

area of central Helmand between 2008 and 2011, with cultivation falling from 

103,590 hectares to 63,307 hectares in the province as a whole.816

However, despite these short-term reductions in cultivation, the distribution of 

wheat seed and fertilizer proved counterproductive. According to USAID’s 2016 

draft Agriculture Assistance Strategy: 

Poppy is seven times more labor intensive than wheat. So, when landowners 

[in HFZ] switched from poppy to wheat, they didn’t need to hire labor 

and could forego sharecropping or rental agreements. This left vulnerable 

landless and land poor households without work, and unable to rent or 

sharecrop land. Many also lost their homes in the process, since they were 

tied to rental or sharecropping arrangements.817

It is now widely accepted that the HFZ focus on the provision of wheat led 

to the land-poor being dispossessed and moving into the former desert areas 

north of the Boghra canal, as well as into Bakwa in Farah Province, where 

they dramatically expanded the amount of land under cultivation, much of 

it in opium poppy.818 Furthermore, imagery analysis showed a resurgence in 

opium poppy cultivation in the main canal area within the HFZ, highlighting 
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2012 Poppy Probability Map: This map shows the probability of opium poppy cultivation in Helmand Province, 

with the boundaries of the HFZ program outlined in blue. Probabilities are based on robust statistical analysis 

of areas known to grow poppy. They represent the probability of an area being under cultivation; the data do 

not represent actual locations of poppy fields. The map indicates that where opium poppy was substituted 

with wheat—through the seeds distributed by the HFZ program in 2009—the substitution was not sustained 

over time. The map also highlights the higher probability of poppy cultivation in areas to the west of the HFZ, 

suggesting that poppy cultivation relocated from the prime HFZ agricultural areas targeted by the HFZ to other 

areas outside the HFZ.

FIGURE 14

POPPY PROBABILITY MAPS, 2012 AND 2016
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2016 Poppy Probability Map: This map shows poppy’s sustained resurgence in the main canal area of the 

Helmand Food Zone, particularly in the districts of Lashkar Gah, Nad Ali, and Nawa-i-Barakzai. (Probabilities 

are based on robust statistical analysis of areas known to grow poppy. They represent the probability of an 

area being under cultivation; the data do not represent actual locations of poppy fields.)

Note: For errors or more information, contact info@alcis.org.

Source: Copyright © 2018 Alcis Holdings Ltd.
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that where opium poppy was substituted with wheat, the substitution was not 

sustained over time. (See figure 14 on pages 122–123.) The HFZ was also beset 

by accusations of corruption. According to one former UK official, “Wholesale 

fraud was uncovered under HFZ. Good seed was siphoned off and rubbish seed 

distributed. Also, threats were made. Helmand MPs [members of Parliament] 

traveled to London and met with Ministers, who said the program helped 

institute corrupt practices.”819

The second food zone effort USAID funded during this period was the Kandahar 

Food Zone. With the purported success of the HFZ, and absent a major push 

on eradication, INL sought to line up additional support for the food zone 

concept. During a visit to Washington in 2012, Afghan Minister for Counter 

Narcotics Zarar Ahmed Osmani pitched the idea of launching food zones in five 

of the other major poppy-growing provinces.820 U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein 

supported the effort and wrote to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling for 

funding for Osmani’s initiative.821 Numerous officials stated USAID was reluctant 

to get involved.822 As a former USAID staff member recalled, in reviewing the 

HFZ, it became clear to staff in USAID’s Office of Agriculture that the project 

had had a major negative and unforeseen impact: the displacement of people 

and poppy to the desert. They concluded USAID was clearly not doing enough 

analysis of the impact of poppy on programs and of the impact of programs 

on poppy.”823

Despite these concerns, there was little choice after U.S. Ambassador Stephen 

McFarland insisted.824 KFZ was an $18.7 million program designed to identify 

and address the drivers of opium poppy cultivation in the Kandahar provincial 

districts of Arghistan, Kandahar, Maiwand, Panjwai, Shahwali Kot, Zahre, and 

the sub district of Takhta Pul.825 The initial design of the KFZ further highlighted 

the challenges of single sector, short-term development initiatives conditioned 

on reductions in poppy cultivation in areas where Afghan government authority 

was tenuous. As one USAID official in Afghanistan at the time reflected, “We 

had to figure things out as we went along. No one looked at opium from a 

livelihoods perspective in USAID. It was about economics and value chains, not 

livelihoods. . . . We wanted direction from Washington, but got nothing.”826

Much of the project resources were spent on improvements to the canal system 

in the districts of Zahre and Panjwai on the assumption that this, alongside 

community commitments to reduce opium poppy cultivation, would lead to 

an increase in the amount of land allocated to legal crops.827 Improvements in 

the canal were made on the basis of a “social contract” between farmers, the 

program, and the local government, whereby farmers agreed to grow less opium 

poppy.828 According to USAID, these social contract were designed to “get local 

buy-in” and were “the result of a year-long interaction and communication.”829
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While some investments were made in greenhouses, agricultural training, and 

inputs for high-value horticulture, this was only a small part of the operational 

budget. Geospatial data derived from satellite imagery shows that, in some 

areas, the KFZ’s focus on irrigation facilitated an increase in the amount of land 

dedicated to agriculture under the improved canal systems, but also contributed 

to rising levels of opium poppy cultivation. (See on figure 13 on page 117.) 

Lessons Observed, Not Implemented: 2014 to the Present

In January 2014, following public criticism by SIGAR suggesting USAID lacked 

a strategy for dealing with poppy, USAID undertook a detailed analysis on 

alternative development as part of an Afghanistan Agricultural Sector Assistance 

Strategy.830 The analysis developed a constructive critique of USAID’s portfolio 

of programs and their impact on opium poppy cultivation, and acknowledged:

The way USAID ‘does its thing’ can have a greater or lesser impact on 

broader counternarcotics efforts. Indeed, the approach taken can be 

counterproductive in terms of helping rural communities and households 

reduce their dependency on opium as a livelihood option.831

The draft strategy reviewed the RADPs and challenged the efficacy of their 

focus on wheat. It also questioned the value of making assistance conditional on 

reductions in opium poppy, arguing that “the burden of such agreements would 

most likely fall on landless and land-poor subsistence producers, who would 

be the least likely to benefit directly from the assistance provided as a result 

of the negotiations.”832 The assessment remained in draft form and did not gain 

a formal status within the agency due, in part, to changes in Kabul staff and 

disagreements over how USAID could effectively engage on efforts to counter 

poppy cultivation. 

While INL funded alternative development programs throughout the 

reconstruction effort, it recently ramped up these efforts with a $37.8 million 

transfer to UNODC and the UN Development Program (UNDP) for two 

alternative development projects.833 The first project, titled Boost Alternative 

Development Intervention through Licit Livelihoods (BADILL), is intended 

to strengthen and diversify licit livelihoods and ensure economic growth that 

is sustainable in the long term.834 UNODC claims the “proposed activities are 

based on the lessons learned and best practices identified through earlier 

projects” and “have demonstrated a sustainable improvement in the quality 

of life of the target communities and have been proven to have an impact on 

counternarcotics at the community level.”835 The program includes a return to 

conditionality through “social contracts,” or documents that are signed by “the 

beneficiary and community representatives to ensure that the beneficiaries do 

not resume poppy cultivation or related activities.”836 A close examination of this 

proposal, however, shows it relies on the same kind of single-sector, short-term 
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interventions and conditionality agreements that previously failed to reduce 

poppy cultivation and opium production. 

The second program, titled Community-Based Agriculture and Rural 

Development (CBARD), aims to improve household income while reducing 

dependency on illicit poppy cultivation for selected communities in Farah 

and Badghis Provinces.837 Past experience combined with current security 

challenges give little reason to assume that these efforts, whatever their 

development impact, will have lasting effects on poppy cultivation.

The Role of Alternative Development in Counternarcotics Outcomes

There are a number challenges in assessing USAID’s alternative development 

programming in relation to counternarcotics outcomes. Some of these 

challenges are due to USAID’s overall performance measurement systems, 

which tend to emphasize outputs, rather than outcomes and impacts. This is not 

USAID-specific, but reflects a wider problem of measuring program outcomes 

across donor assistance to Afghanistan, where the tendency has been to report 

on program outputs, rather than impacts. Where impact was measured, it was 

largely through attitudinal surveys in more secure areas, rather than measuring 

how programs affected behavioral change in rural areas.838 There was also a 

reliance on the reports of implementing partners, rather than independent 

evaluations or research, making these reports vulnerable to bias.839

Despite the level of investment USAID and other development donors made in 

extending the production of licit crops—in large part, in the hope they would 

crowd out opium poppy cultivation—there are still no meaningful assessments 

of changing cropping patterns. USAID’s mid-term evaluation of CHAMP, for 

example, reported over 3,073 hectares of new orchards and vineyards planted 

by 2011, but did not include verification of this in the form of crop mapping or 

evidence that the crops planted were not subsequently replaced with poppy.840

Similarly, AVIPA Plus claimed it provided the seeds for the equivalent of 

153,000 hectares of non-wheat voucher packages, yet provided no evidence 

these seeds were used to cultivate 153,000 hectares of land.841

The lack of granularity of the poppy cultivation data produced by UNODC 

and the limits of that data negatively affected USAID’s reporting on its 

counternarcotics impact. Typically, USAID drew on UNODC’s district- and 

province-level data in an attempt to associate its interventions in a specific 

area with changes in opium poppy cultivation. This was done with limited 

understanding of (1) the veracity of the data, and (2) how the distribution 

of opium poppy cultivation might have changed within a given geographic 

area, even if overall levels of cultivation did not change. Furthermore, USAID 

repeatedly drew on UNODC’s data on why households cultivate opium poppy, 
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despite the data’s questionable accuracy and flawed methodology. (See 

page 116.) 

Moreover, many of the reviews and evaluations of development programs 

implemented in poppy-growing areas lacked solid empirical backing and 

relied on conjecture and speculation. For example, the final evaluation of ADP 

South published in April 2010 came to the conclusion that ADP South “had no 

verifiable impact on opium producing areas,” even arguing that “opium and 

wheat production do not have an inverse correlation. So, one is not affecting 

the other.”842 This was despite the availability of geospatial data derived from 

satellite imagery at the time that showed opium poppy had been replaced by 

wheat in many of the central irrigated valleys of Helmand.843 The 2016 USAID 

Afghanistan Alternative Development Options Assessment appeared to attribute 

a more central role to AVIPA Plus and RADP South in the “abrupt decline in 

poppy recorded for 2009–2011” than more detailed research suggested.844

With a focus on the provision of agricultural inputs and stabilization, rather 

than supporting a longer-term process of agricultural transformation, programs 

like AVIPA were limited in how much they could support farmers who were 

transitioning out of opium poppy cultivation. A recent review by USAID 

identified the limits of programs such as AVIPA, reporting: 

The [alternative development] programs implemented over the past dozen 

years have in general lacked a consistent and longer-term strategic focus. 

The programs have not been based on an integrated analysis of competitive 

constraints and opportunities and preconditions for long-term sustainability 

of alternative livelihood options. Instead, they have tended to focus on 

shorter-term approaches largely focused on crop substitution, and related 

agricultural input supply provision and cultivation practice and storage 

training activities. . . . Frequently the project vehicles through which 

[alternative development] programs are implemented have had short, two- to 

three-year life-spans—clearly inadequate to the task of fomenting sustainable 

stakeholder commitment to transitioning permanently away from engagement 

in illicit activities.845

USAID struggled to articulate how its programs impacted levels of poppy 

cultivation. Explanations often changed over time, and with changes in staff. As 

a former USAID staff member noted:

The criteria for allocating alternative development funds versus nonalternative development funds were not optimal. The allocation was 

constrained by the fact that the level of alternative development funds 

received in any given year did not necessarily coincide with where the funds 

were needed at the time. The allocations did not require that the projects 

receiving funds had substantive poppy-related activities. Nor was any attempt 

made to ensure that USAID could track poppy-relevant achievements on 

the ground.846
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Divided Approaches to Alternative Development

USAID had the technical knowledge and understanding to design effective 

alternative development programs, but rarely evaluated the programs based 

on their impact on opium production. INL lacked the expertise necessary 

for effective alternative development programs, but attempted them—and is 

currently planning to allocate significant funding to these initiatives. 

USAID’s focus on large, bilateral alternative development programs and its 

unwillingness to engage in “counternarcotics mainstreaming” contributed to the 

rift within the international development community regarding counternarcotics 

policies and programs. When other development donors participated in policy 

discussions about integrating the causes of cultivation into development 

programs and operationalizing this in the NPPs and bilateral and multilateral 

efforts, USAID was notably absent. USAID was also unreceptive to attempts by 

donors such as DFID, the World Bank, and the EU to shift the discussion away 

from unsuccessful models of alternative development and work within the 

changing development architecture in Afghanistan. 

Instead, USAID focused on responding to pressure from within the U.S. 

government to address increases in opium poppy cultivation. This led to a 

number of conventional alternative development programs that did not have 

an overall effect on poppy cultivation, but were viewed as an indicator of 

the agency’s commitment to counterdrug efforts. When pressure to commit 

resources to alternative development dissipated, USAID allocated alternative 

development funds to more generic agricultural programs, few of which 

mentioned opium poppy or its causes. In contrast, INL was under pressure to 

deliver alternative development programs that were specifically intended to 

reduce poppy cultivation, but was hobbled by its lack of knowledge on how 

best to do so. INL recently transferred $37.8 million for alternative development 

projects implemented by the UN, a return to the kind of conditional assistance 

and small-scale, single-sector development programs INL funded in 2002.847

USAID had the technical knowledge and understanding to design 

effective alternative development programs, but rarely evaluated 

the programs based on their impact on opium production. INL 

lacked the expertise necessary for effective alternative development 

programs, but attempted them—and is currently planning to 

allocate significant funding to these initiatives. 

The U.S. government’s divided approach to alternative development was driven 

by the different mandates, authorities, knowledge bases, and philosophies its 

agencies, specifically INL and USAID, brought to the task. The divisions also 
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reflected the different reporting requirements and metrics by which each agency 

was judged. These factors, combined with the failure to include counternarcotics 

indicators and risk mitigation strategies within larger development efforts, 

significantly limited the impact of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. 

While crop and livelihood diversification occurred in some of the more 

economically advantaged parts of rural Afghanistan, progress was uneven and 

limited in areas with a history of concentrated opium poppy cultivation. 

MOBILIZING AFGHAN POLITICAL SUPPORT 

AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONS

Within the fourth strand of the counternarcotics effort, a range of different 

programs sought to build political support for counternarcotics among the 

Afghan leadership and population. These programs typically focused on building 

capacity and political will to reduce opium production at both the national 

and provincial levels. (See figure 15.) Some of these interventions, such as the 

Good Performers Initiative, sought to create direct links between development 

assistance and reductions in opium poppy, while others, like the creation 

of the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund, encouraged wider ownership of the 

counternarcotics agenda among line ministries. 

Public awareness programs aimed at enhancing the Afghan population’s 

knowledge of the social costs of the cultivation, trade, and use of drugs, as 

well as the legal consequences, were further components of this strand. Each 

of these programs sought to change attitudes toward illicit drugs among the 

Afghan population and incentivize changes in behavior. 

FIGURE 15

Source: SIGAR analysis of agency budget documentation and budget data.

MOBILIZING POLITICAL SUPPORT FUNDING COMPARED TO TOTAL COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING, 2002–2017 ($ MILLIONS)

0

200

400

600

800

$1,000

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Mobilizing Political Support Total Counternarcotics Allocations
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Building Political Will and Capacity at the Center: The Ministry of 

Counter Narcotics and the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 

Building the political will of Afghan leadership to take action against drug 

cultivation and trafficking was an important part of U.S. and international 

counternarcotics efforts from 2002 through 2017. In addition to policy 

discussions with President Karzai and other senior Afghan leaders, initial 

efforts to mobilize political support for counternarcotics focused on the central 

government through the Afghan Counter Narcotics Directorate and then the 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics.848

As lead nation for counternarcotics, the UK initiated some of the earliest 

efforts to build capacity and political will. The UK was instrumental in the 

push to promote and transform the Counter Narcotics Directorate into the 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics, believing this change would raise the profile 

of counternarcotics in the Afghan government, as well as reflect the UK’s 

political commitment to the issue at a time when it was facing criticism from 

the United States.849 The UK also invested heavily in institution building for 

the Ministry of Counter Narcotics through the Strengthening CN Institutions 

in Afghanistan Program, which primarily focused on building the ministry’s 

management capacity.850

The UK was also the driving force behind the establishment of the Counter 

Narcotics Trust Fund. Launched in October 2005, the CNTF’s objective was 

“to provide greater resources for the [Afghan] government’s counternarcotics 

efforts, ensure transparency and accountability in the allocation and use of 

those resources, enable increased government ownership over counternarcotics 

implementation, and promote greater coherence in the funding of 

counternarcotics-related activities.”851 Having a dedicated funding source was 

proposed as a tool for building line ministries’ ownership of counternarcotics as 

a cross-cutting issue. The CNTF was envisioned as a $900 million trust fund.852

The UK was the largest contributor to the CNTF, committing over $44.3 million, 

followed by the European Commission ($17.6 million), Japan ($5 million), 

Sweden ($2 million), Australia ($1.5 million), and 11 other countries.853

 The 

United States issued instructions to its embassies to encourage contributions 

from G8 nations, EU member states, and others, while also pursuing a more 

narrowly tailored contribution to the fund.854

In order to tie its assistance to provinces that were “poppy-free” or had almost 

eliminated poppy production, and to have greater control over how funds were 

spent, the United States set up a Good Performers Initiative “window” within 

the CNTF.855 This window, supported in part by $8 million from USAID, had a 

fast-track procurement process designed to give preliminary approval to the 
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GPI Project Review Board and speed up the disbursement of funds.856 These 

USAID funds were designated solely for alternative livelihoods projects to 

be implemented by UNDP. A central premise of the funding was that “public 

awareness of rewards to good performers will demonstrate to others the 

benefits of reducing poppy production,” and that funded projects “are expected 

to motivate existing producers to reduce or cease production.”857

By 2008, there were allegations CNTF had “consistently underperformed.”858

Donors had committed just $83 million of the hoped-for $900 million to support 

the fund. As of June 2008, only $2.5 million had actually been spent.859 UNDP, 

which was responsible for administering the CNTF, was criticized for its 

poor financial oversight and management of the fund.860 From the start, there 

were disagreements over the wider objectives of the CNTF, how it should be 

administered, and what kind of initiatives it should fund.861 Among Afghan 

officials, some believed the CNTF should support operations that would have 

clear counternarcotics outcomes, while others saw it as just another source of 

financial assistance. MCN officials were concerned that many of the projects 

being proposed by line ministries were those that could not find funds elsewhere 

and had no discernible counternarcotics effect.862

MCN’s push for a program implementation role, rather than a coordination and 

funding role, was a major challenge for the CNTF. Despite lacking the staff and 

expertise for program implementation, the MCN sought to absorb responsibility 

for conducting eradication, management of the Counter Narcotics Police 

Agency, and implementing rural development in poppy-growing areas.863

A review commissioned by DFID in September 2007 outlined many of the 

problems with the trust fund. At a strategic level, the review criticized both 

the sub-cabinet committee on counternarcotics and the management board of 

the fund.864 With regard to programming, it pointed to the failure to “develop 

costed and thematically prioritized provincial based implementation plans,” 

arguing that this “led to the development of poorly integrated, targeted, and ad 

hoc sub-projects whose impact on [National Drug Control Strategy] objectives 

is unknown.”865 A senior Afghan official familiar with the initiative lamented 

that the “CNTF was a good modality and was designed to encourage ministries 

to engage. It would have helped mainstream counternarcotics, but no one was 

in charge.”866

The slow rate of disbursements from the CNTF provoked a former Afghan 

minister who worked with the fund to comment, “MCN behaved as if its job was 

to save money rather than spend it.”867 Others went further, suggesting there were 

more fundamental problems of corruption. A senior international consultant 

working in the MCN at the time claimed the CNTF was designed as a “funding 
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mechanism for good ideas at the provincial level, but it was actually a vehicle 

for people to gain favors. . . . The rules written for it weren’t viable and UNDP 

performed poorly. Also, there was no interest from the ministries as [the head of 

the CNTF] wanted kickbacks to put papers through. The structures were flawed, 

it was never implemented, and no one would take responsibility.”868 Frustrated 

by the delays in decisions over funding, managing director of UK-based NGO 

Afghanaid Anne Johnson noted, “There is now a widespread perception that 

the few projects ever funded through CNTF were awarded based on personal 

connections with key ministry figures, rather than more objective criteria.”869 The 

Counter Narcotics Trust Fund was subsequently closed in 2009.870

Building Political Will and Capacity in the Provinces: 

Counter Narcotics Advisory Teams and the Good Performers Initiative

In response to disappointing results from centrally led efforts, and driven by 

the belief that working more closely with provincial governors could help 

achieve its counternarcotics goals, the United States focused additional 

capacity-building efforts in the provinces.871 In 2006, the United States launched 

the Poppy Elimination Programs (PEP), later to become known as Counter 

Narcotics Advisory Teams (CNAT), in seven of the main poppy-growing 

provinces.872

 Working with provincial governors’ offices, the teams were 

responsible for advising the provincial governor and mobilizing action against 

the opium crop.873 The UK also funded provincial-level planning aimed at 

integrating counternarcotics into the development planning for a number of key 

provinces, most notably Balkh, Herat, and Helmand.874

CNAT faced significant challenges when trying to win national-level Afghan 

government support for provincial initiatives. MCN was already frustrated by 

what it saw as UNODC’s attempts to build parallel structures in the provinces 

and saw CNAT as a replication of these efforts. A senior Afghan official 

expressed his frustration, stating the United States funded “up to $40 million 

for CNAT. They created an office in Kabul and provincial offices. They operated 

parallel to the ministry and our provincial offices. The MCN had no control.”875

One UN official more intimately involved in CNAT argued it was doing “what 

MCN should have been doing in the provinces,” and that it was a “good source 

of information on what was happening in the provinces.”876 However, both 

individuals acknowledged it was a parallel institution.877 The Poppy Elimination 

Program was closed in late 2009, in tandem with the Poppy Eradication Force.878

One flagship U.S.-backed effort to build political will and capacity in the 

provinces was INL’s Good Performers Initiative. Under GPI, provinces 

were rewarded each year for (1) attaining or maintaining poppy-free status 

($1 million), (2) reducing poppy cultivation by more than 10 percent ($1,000 

for each hectare above 10 percent), and (3) exceptional counternarcotics 
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achievements ($500,000 per province for up to two provinces).879 GPI 

provided money for projects within provinces to encourage governors “to 

offer greater cooperation in reducing and eliminating opium production.”880 In 

November 2009, Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs 

Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne described GPI as an “excellent demonstration 

of Afghan leadership.”881

As of August 31, 2014, GPI had awarded a total of $108 million for more than 

221 projects in 33 provinces.882

 A 2014 embassy cable referred to GPI as “one 

of the most successful counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan.”883 Despite 

this praise and a program redesign announced in 2014, GPI was phased out in 

2016.884 U.S. officials stated that their concerns about the Afghan government’s 

capacity, specifically within MCN, to implement GPI led to the cancellation of 

the program before the redesigned GPI II had begun.885 In 2015, INL terminated a 

separate effort to improve MCN, amid concerns about the efficacy of that effort, 

but U.S. concerns that the ministry “didn’t have much capacity,” persisted.886 In 

2016 INL established a new program, the MCN Institution Building Project, to 

address shortcomings at the ministry.887

Given the specific objective of the program, it is important to examine how GPIfunded projects translated into reductions in opium poppy cultivation in rural 

Afghanistan. To date, there has not been an independent evaluation of GPI. For 

this report, SIGAR conducted a detailed review of the projects funded by GPI. 

Our review suggests that priority was given to financing infrastructure programs 

that were implemented by private sector construction companies. These 

projects were in a limited range of sectors, such as health, education, transport, 

and agriculture, and largely consisted of the construction of buildings, such as 

schools, health clinics, gymnasiums, conference centers, and meeting halls, as 

well as roads, bridges, and irrigation systems. 

It is particularly notable that very few GPI projects focused on income 

generation or helping farmers replace the income lost by abandoning opium 

poppy cultivation. It is not clear how many of the projects funded under GPI 

were actually implemented in rural areas that had a history of opium poppy 

cultivation or how specific interventions explicitly addressed the causes of 

cultivation. Analysis of geospatial data shows a preponderance of projects 

located in urban areas, primarily in close proximity to provincial centers, 

despite the claim that “GPI funding enables local communities to receive 

development assistance in return for successfully reducing poppy cultivation.”888

Figure 16 shows, however, that some GPI projects based in rural areas provided 

resources for farm equipment and irrigation. These projects could have had 

a demonstrable effect on farmers by supporting crop diversification and 
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increasing income. However, according to one review of GPI, because of GPI’s 

disproportionate focus on provincial capitals, “rural communities were not 

receiving the economic and employment benefits of GPI projects.” The same 

review noted “there were even concerns that excluding the non-growing poppy 

communities from the process might incentivize some farmer to switch from 

licit to illicit crops in order to qualify for the fund.”889

Irrigation projects were a notable example of GPI projects with the potential to have 

a more direct effect on the income of rural communities over an extended period. 

However, as noted earlier, there was a risk that such projects could inadvertently 

enable increased opium production in subsequent seasons. This risk proved 

particularly problematic in areas where irrigation improvements were not combined 

with the agricultural and market support necessary to transform improved water 

supply into increased agricultural yields and sales of licit farm produce. 

The irrigation projects in Nangarhar, Badakhshan, and Kunar—provinces where 

there was a return to opium poppy following periods of significant reductions 

in cultivation, or even after being declared poppy-free—provide examples 

FIGURE 16

GPI Sector

 Agriculture

 Health

 Transportation

 Infrastructure

 Irrigation

 Education

 Gender/Micro-Enterprise

PAKTIKA

KHOWST

TAKHAR BADAKHSHAN

BAGHLAN

BAMYAN

FARYAB

WARDAK

KUNAR

KUNDUZ

NURISTAN

NANGARHAR

FARAH

NIMROZ

HELMAND KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

GHOR

GHAZNI

BALKH

BADGHIS

KABUL

KAPISA

PAKTIYA

LOGAR

LAGHMAN

JOWZJAN

PARWAN

SAR-E PUL

HERAT

DAYKUNDI

SAMANGAN

PANJSHIR

Nerkh

Jalrayz

Maidan Shahr

Paghman

Mahmud Raqi Chaharikar

Bazarak

Mazari Sharit

Muhammad Aghah

MAPPING OF GOOD PERFORMERS INITIATIVE PROJECTS

Note: GPS data for the Good Performers Initiative (GPI) shows many of the GPI projects were located in close proximity to urban provincial centers rather than rural, poppy-dependent areas. 

Source: SIGAR visualization of imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC. For the original imagery, see figure A.3 in appendix A.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 135

where GPI may have supported increased opium production. For example, 

high-resolution imagery shows that almost all of the land under the improved 

irrigation systems funded by GPI in Bamikhel, in the district of Pachir wa Agam 

in Nangarhar Province, showed opium poppy cultivation in both 2013 and 2014. 

(See figure 17.) It is possible other areas in Nangarhar, particularly Kuz Bihar in 

Khugyani and Garatek in Chapahar, were also experiencing greater cultivation 

and higher opium yields after benefiting from irrigation projects awarded by 

GPI. Similar to irrigation projects funded under other lines of expenditure, there 

was an unmet need to include mitigating measures and apply a “do no harm” 

principle when working in areas that had a history of opium poppy cultivation.890

The GPI emphasis on the construction of buildings in the health, education, 

and transport sectors, as shown in figure 16, suggests the theory of change that 

underpinned GPI was that provincial governors could be motivated to engage 

in counternarcotics efforts through the provision of projects that increased 

their political capital and public support. The design of the program assumed 

that building schools, clinics, and other government buildings projected the 

appearance of state power, and bolstered a governor’s position in negotiations 

with rural communities to reduce opium poppy cultivation. INL noted in 2014 

that GPI “enjoys strong Afghan backing” and “a large body of embassy reporting 

confirms GPI’s value as an incentive to governors seeking validation of their 

[counternarcotics] performance and resources from the central government.”891

While State Department officials maintained in 2018 that provincial development 

councils approved GPI projects and money was not given directly to provincial 

governors, others had a different impression.892 As Ambassador Neumann noted: 

The idea was that the province would see a connection between the giving 

up of poppy and the resulting assistance. In any event, it didn’t work. 

Projects were not approved quickly. [Provincial] Councils didn’t have much 

role. The money turned into a slush fund for governors and those who were 

hurt by giving up poppy felt no connection with the rewards. For the larger 

provinces, the amounts were insignificant.893

A senior Afghan official claimed GPI sought to buy the cooperation of governors 

and expressed concerns about the interests it served.894 Mohammed Ehsan Zia, 

a former Minister of MRRD, suggested governors misappropriated money, and 

he expressed doubts about the overall efficacy of the program.895 Other officials 

familiar with the program were equally explicit, describing it as “a blank check” 

that allowed governors to offer favors to others through subcontracts.896

Given the distance and disconnect between the many projects GPI financed 

and the rural communities where poppy was grown, it is questionable whether 

GPI played a role in reducing opium poppy.897 In fact, as INL concluded 

in 2015, “While the ‘top-down’ value of GPI is clear, we have little data to 
136 | STRANDS OF THE COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORT: POLICY DEBATES AND EFFECTS ON THE GROUND

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Note: Crop mapping in the district of Pachier wa Agam, Nangarhar Province, shows land that benefited from improved irrigation systems funded by GPI was 

used to cultivate poppy. For errors or more information, contact info@alcis.org.

Source: Copyright © 2018 Alcis Holdings Ltd.

FIGURE 17

GOOD PERFORMERS INITIATIVE IRRIGATION PROJECTS USED TO SUPPORT POPPY CULTIVATION
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 137

demonstrate the causal effect of GPI awards on local communities. Nor do we 

know whether most farmers are aware that projects in their communities—or 

the lack thereof—result from their cultivation choices.”898 Even the claim of 

the “top-down value” of GPI is far from proven. Considering the tenuous and 

contested nature of a governor’s control over much of the territory where opium 

poppy was grown, a governor may not have been able to deliver anything but a 

temporary lull in cultivation.899

Given the distance between the bulk of the projects GPI financed and 

the rural communities where poppy was grown, it is questionable 

whether GPI played a role in reducing opium poppy. 

Furthermore, while a province might have achieved success in reducing opium 

poppy cultivation, GPI did not account for continued drug trafficking in the 

province. For example, while the 2008 UNODC survey proclaimed Takhar 

Province poppy-free, a different UNODC report highlighted that, in 2009, 

Takhar was a major conduit for processing and onward trafficking of opium and 

heroin.900 Thus, according to some, it was a misconception to call provinces with 

little or no poppy cultivation “opium-free.”901

In 2014, MCN and INL announced the redesign of GPI to GPI II, and a shift 

toward projects that “better meet the needs of rural communities, by prioritizing 

alternative livelihoods projects that support farmers as they transition away 

from poppy cultivation.”902 However, before this redesign could take effect, INL 

decided to end the GPI program as a consequence of MCN’s failure to spend 

allocated funding.903

Counternarcotics Public Awareness Campaigns 

INL funded a succession of counternarcotics communications and outreach 

campaigns over the course of the reconstruction effort. These projects largely 

focused on increasing awareness of the social cost of opium poppy cultivation 

and garnering public support for the Afghan government’s counternarcotics 

efforts. Initiatives included radio and television broadcasts and poster 

campaigns designed to raise the Afghan population’s awareness of the negative 

effects of opium and deter them from cultivating the crop. Many of the messages 

drew on the same themes and linked opium production with opiate use among 

the Afghan population.904

The most recent public awareness campaign was the Counternarcotics 

Community Engagement Program, a $12.6 million program designed to 

strengthen the capacity of MCN to undertake its own targeted counternarcotics 

awareness campaign. As of 2018, this program was ongoing.905
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What These Programs Achieved

Institutional capacity building within the Counter Narcotics Directorate and 

then the Ministry of Counter Narcotics yielded few tangible improvements, 

despite the United States spending considerable resources for this purpose. 

The MCN suffered from poor leadership and a lack of influence over Afghan 

line ministries.906

 The promotion from directorate to ministry created a separate 

bureaucratic entity in charge of counternarcotics policies and programs, which 

pulled responsibility away from the Afghan National Security Council and failed 

to gain the backing of the wider government. This error was compounded by the 

fact that the United States, UK, and MCN’s other main partner, UNODC, could 

not agree on a vision for the ministry that included a common counternarcotics 

strategy.907 Regardless, it was unlikely that a small coordinating ministry 

like MCN, which had no authority over the line ministries responsible for 

implementing counternarcotics programs and little political stature, could 

have succeeded in leading a strong government-wide counternarcotics effort. 

The appointment of a Deputy Minister for Counternarcotics within the MOI to 

oversee and coordinate counterdrug law enforcement activities just prior to the 

establishment of the MCN was an early harbinger of the institutional limitations 

on MCN influence.908

There is little evidence that U.S. efforts to build Afghan political support had 

measurable success in achieving long-term counternarcotics goals. Formal 

evaluations of the programs in this strand of activity were infrequent due to 

a combination of factors, including the short-lived, ad hoc nature of many of 

the initiatives, the challenges of evaluating them on site, and the difficulty of 

attribution. Rather than formal evaluations that examined causality, there was 

a tendency toward self-reporting and embassy reviews. The evidence base for 

these assessments was harder to judge, particularly when considering how 

infrequently U.S. embassy staff were able to visit the locations where program 

activities were taking place. 

The scale of security and development resources flowing into a given province 

incentivized some governors to support and undertake counternarcotics efforts. 

The most dramatic reductions in poppy cultivation occurred in Nangarhar 

and Helmand, where active, well-resourced PRTs were run by the United 

States and the UK, respectively. In Nangarhar, provincial governors were 

able to implement a ban on opium poppy cultivation through the promise of 

development assistance, the threat of military action against villages that did 

not comply with the ban, and fragile political bargains with rural elites.909 The 

temporary nature of these reductions, however, suggested the political support 

for counternarcotics was unsustainable without donor-nation resources and 

coalition security force support.
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As for the counternarcotics awareness campaigns, a late-2008 UNODC 

evaluation found, “in general, people were skeptical about the effectiveness 

of [counternarcotics] public awareness campaigns. In the first place, illiterate 

people could not understand the messages, and secondly, promises of 

alternative livelihoods made by the government were seldom kept.”910 In 

particular, the evaluation questioned the effectiveness of awareness campaigns 

that were not “accompanied by practical action from the government and the 

international community to introduce farmers to realistic alternatives to opium 

poppy cultivation as part of a comprehensive program of rural development.”911

In addition to programming shortcomings, Afghan political commitment to 

strive for counternarcotics goals was limited, in part, due to mixed signals 

from the international donor community. Senior foreign officials were faced 

with what often appeared to be conflicting objectives in the areas of politics, 

development, and security. Among U.S. ambassadors to Afghanistan, some 

were hesitant to push counternarcotics to the top of the agenda, while those 

who were willing to do so often focused on eradication, which alienated Afghan 

leadership. (See pages 95–100.) 

At both the national and provincial levels, the political support for counterdrug 

activities was often more a function of the funding available through 

counternarcotics programs than a lasting commitment from Afghan officials.

JUNE 2018 | 141

CHAPTER 4

MAINTAINING A COHESIVE STRATEGY

DOD photo

Policymakers in the United States often agreed on the need for an integrated 

and balanced counternarcotics strategy where the different strands of 

activities worked in unison.912 But what does integrated and balanced actually 

mean in the context of the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan? Moreover, 

given the diverse political, economic, and environmental topography of the 

country, how should the different strands be weighted under these different 

conditions and circumstances? 

One indicator of balance and integration is the way resources were allocated 

across the different strands of the counternarcotics strategy. Financial data offer 

some insights into how U.S. funds were allocated over time, what the priorities 

were, and whether an appropriate balance was maintained. Data on the types of 

programs funded indicate how strands evolved over time, how these programs 

addressed gaps in analysis and capacity, and how agencies learned from prior 

experience. The data also show whether gaps were filled and whether new 

programs were financed to meet recognized shortfalls.

This section examines whether and to what degree the different strands of the 

counternarcotics strategy were integrated. First, it looks at budgetary data and 

what the data reveal about both priorities and financial commitments to the 
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strands of activity. Second, it uses geospatial data to examine how the strands 

and their programs were coordinated on the ground.

BACKGROUND ON SEQUENCING AND COLLOCATION

In the counternarcotics effort, sequencing refers to the order in which 

counternarcotics interventions take place. For example, the sequencing of 

alternative development before eradication is considered especially important 

for lasting reductions in cultivation and to prevent backlash from those 

dependent on poppy farming. As a UNODC report observed, “There is a strong 

argument that enforcement efforts against opium poppy farmers should follow 

rather than precede the availability of viable alternative livelihoods.”913 Until 

approximately 2009, however, the United States emphasized eradication, 

regardless of whether or not other economic support was available for those 

farmers and laborers cultivating poppy.914

Sequencing can also be an important feature within the same strand of activity. 

For example, targeting better-off or less opium-dependent areas for eradication 

prior to moving into poorer communities can lead to more lasting transitions 

away from poppy.915

Along with sequencing, the physical collocation of the different strands of 

activity is critical for lasting success. Collocation means programming for 

different strands is implemented in the same geographic area and reaches the 

same people. In a country like Afghanistan, achieving an appropriate balance 

in the counternarcotics effort not only required a clear understanding of how 

interventions were collocated, but the circumstances and conditions under 

which they were carried out. For example, a strong eradication effort in 

Nangarhar and robust rural development programs in Helmand clearly would 

not have the combined effect that both strands of effort in the same location 

could achieve. The Helmand and Kandahar Food Zones were two examples of 

projects that attempted to collocate strands of the counternarcotics strategy 

within the same geographic area, but they were the exception, rather than the 

rule.916 And, even in those focused efforts, there were limits to the scope of the 

accompanying development effort and varying levels of success. 

ALIGNING FUNDING WITH U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS STRATEGIES 

This report’s analysis of the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan has 

focused on four strands, or areas of activity: interdiction and counterdrug 

law enforcement, eradication, alternative development, and mobilizing 

Afghan political support and building institutions. Tracking and analyzing 

counternarcotics funds by these strands is one important tool to assess whether 

Sequencing refers to 

the order in which 

counternarcotics 

interventions 

take place.

Collocation occurs 

when programming 

for different strands 

is implemented in 

the same geographic 

area and reaches the 

same people.
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JUNE 2018 | 143

U.S. efforts achieved a balance among counternarcotics activities. The 2007 

U.S. counternarcotics strategy intended to provide “the appropriate balance of 

incentives and disincentives” through the lines of effort it pursued.917

At the same time, funding alone is not an adequate measure to judge the 

appropriate balance between strands. SIGAR is not in a position to determine 

what constitutes an exact dollar-for-dollar financial balance and recognizes the 

difficulties of doing so, particularly given that funding has not been tracked 

according to strand. Additionally, an appropriate balance between the strands 

may differ by province or community, and there is no way to say, for example, 

that every dollar spent on eradication has an impact equivalent to some other 

dollar amount in alternative development. Nevertheless, an analysis of how 

counternarcotics appropriations changed over time provides insights into how 

the different strands were prioritized. 

Between 2002 and the end of fiscal year 2017, Congress appropriated 

$120.78 billion for Afghan reconstruction, of which $7.28 billion was explicitly 

made available for counternarcotics purposes. In addition to the $7.28 billion 

in funding, SIGAR recognizes that reconstruction funding that was not 

appropriated for or identified by U.S. agencies as counternarcotics funding 

had an impact on the counterdrug effort. This includes, for example, funding 

from the Afghan Security Forces Fund to establish the Special Mission Wing. 

More broadly, the roughly $750 billion in funding for the U.S. military campaign 

in Afghanistan sometimes helped to establish the security improvements that 

supported short-term reductions in opium poppy cultivation and production.918

Additionally, the air strikes against drugs labs in Helmand in late 2017 were 

supported by non-counterdrug DOD funding; while the strikes’ primary 

purpose was to counter Taliban financing, the strikes might also have had a 

counternarcotics effect. This section, however, focuses on those funds explicitly 

made available for counternarcotics purposes, according to the year in which 

they were appropriated, in order to draw lessons and make recommendations 

about how U.S. funding practices can improve counternarcotics outcomes. 

Our report focuses on the year of appropriation because of the difficulty of 

establishing actual counternarcotics spending in a particular year. For example, 

a 2014 State Inspector General report highlighted that INL’s budget practices do 

not provide a clear picture of annual spending or an effective way to measure 

obligations.919 Additionally, some counternarcotics funds were available for a 

single year, while others were available for two or even five years. Given these 

budgetary and accounting challenges, this report focuses on the fiscal year for 

which funds were appropriated as the best indicator of when policy changes 

were enacted or priorities shifted. 
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To date, there has been no detailed analysis of the counternarcotics budget 

examining how funds were allocated across the strands of the counternarcotics 

effort, primarily because the financial data were not disaggregated by strand or 

pillar across U.S. agencies. This was a problem that was identified as early as 

2007, when a State and DOD Inspectors General assessment noted:

The [counternarcotics] effort in Afghanistan suffers from the absence of 

any system of centralized records to assess what individual agencies are 

spending, where funds are being spent, funds remaining, and what is being 

accomplished. While each agency or office attempts to track funding in its 

area of responsibility, there is no central point to provide an overall picture. 

This hampers both the planning of [counternarcotics] programs and the 

evaluation of those efforts.920

In 2016, INL wrote that “agencies do not aggregate and track [counternarcotics] 

funding based on the five pillars in the U.S. CN strategy for Afghanistan, which 

is not the basis for financial reporting,” stating that a “pillar structure . . . is a 

policy perspective and irrelevant for tracking funds.”921

Balancing Eradication and Alternative Development Funding

Nearly 30 percent of the annual U.S. counternarcotics budget from 2005 to 

2009 was allocated to eradication, reaching a cumulative total of $877 million 

over those five years. Allocations for eradication declined dramatically in 2010 

with the decision to scrap the Poppy Eradication Force; dispensing with the 

enormous logistical and contractor costs associated with the PEF accounted for 

a significant portion of the funding reduction. Since 2010, eradication has been 

only 1 percent of the annual counternarcotics budget, largely because GovernorLed Eradication was considerably less costly than the centrally planned 

eradication that preceded it.922

While the funds for eradication fell from 2010 onward, the money allocated to 

alternative development increased to over $190 million in 2009, and was then 

maintained at over $150 million per year until 2012. (See figure 18.) This was 

a significant increase from 2005, when alternative development was allocated 

only $93 million of the annual counternarcotics budget of $608 million, or about 

15 percent. 

Between 2005 and 2009, annual allocations for alternative development were 

lower than those for eradication. Some years saw considerable differences, such 

as 2005, when approximately half as much money was allocated to alternative 

development as eradication. This financial emphasis on eradication over 

alternative development was misplaced in light of the extended conflict and 

drought that had severely disrupted the rural Afghan economy.923

In total, $938 million was allocated for eradication between 2002 and 2017, 

accounting for 41 percent of INL’s $2.27 billion in counternarcotics funding for 
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JUNE 2018 | 145

Afghanistan, and approximately 14 percent of the $7.28 billion that U.S. agencies 

allocated specifically for counternarcotics in Afghanistan. In contrast, 

20 percent of the total counternarcotics budget was allocated for alternative 

development over the same period, for a total of approximately $1.46 billion.924

While $1.46 billion for alternative development is a significant 

portion of U.S. counternarcotics funding over 16 years, 

it is less than the estimated $1.5 to $3 billion Afghans earn 

from the drug trade in just one year and a small fraction 

of the larger development budget for Afghanistan.

The evolution of alternative development funding from 2002 through 2017 

suggests this strand of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy was underfunded 

initially. The increases for alternative development over time demonstrate 

how U.S. strategy changed, particularly relative to eradication, and officials 

recognized more needed to be done to provide alternatives to poppy for Afghan 

farmers. For example, from 2005 to 2008 USAID allocated up to 82 percent 

of its total agriculture budget in Afghanistan on alternative development 

programming, suggesting that counternarcotics efforts were an institutional 

priority during this period.925 While $1.46 billion for alternative development is a 

Note: Mobilizing Political Support includes funding for the Good Performers Initiative, institution building, and public information. “Other” includes funding for (1) demand reduction programs 

($110 million) and (2) programs for which SIGAR does not have adequate funding information to categorize by strand ($96 million). 

Source: SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation and strand of effort based on agency data calls, budget documentation, and correspondence.

U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS FUNDING ALLOCATIONS BY STRAND, 2002–2017 ($ MILLIONS)

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Interdiction Eradication Alternate Development Mobilizing Political Support Other

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

$800

FIGURE 18
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significant portion of U.S. counternarcotics funding over 16 years, it is less than 

the estimated $1.5 to $3 billion Afghans earn from the drug trade in just one year 

and a small fraction of the larger development budget for Afghanistan.

An Evolving Interdiction Budget

U.S. government interdiction efforts were initially hampered by the lack of U.S. law 

enforcement personnel in country and virtually nonexistent Afghan counterdrug law 

enforcement counterparts. The low U.S. expenditures on interdiction from 2002 to 

2004 were indicative of the challenging circumstances that early efforts encountered, 

as well as the fact that the UK was the lead nation for counternarcotics. However, as 

poppy cultivation numbers trended upwards, so too did interdiction expenditures. 

This trend also reflected the evolution of the interdiction effort itself, from one 

focused on destroying drug-processing laboratories to one aimed at arresting, 

prosecuting, and convicting major drug traffickers.

The budget for counternarcotics law enforcement and interdiction increased 

from less than $3 million in 2003 to a peak of $627 million in 2010. Building 

capable counternarcotics law enforcement units was expensive and required a 

multi-year commitment, particularly for resource-intensive endeavors like the 

Special Mission Wing. Purchasing the Mi-17 helicopters for the SMW presented 

significant start-up costs, as seen in the initial $553.8 million contract.926 DOD 

funded the largest portion of interdiction-related expenditures from 2004 

through 2014, and was responsible for major purchases like the Mi-17s. 

From 2009 to 2010, allocations for interdiction across the U.S. government increased 

from just over $345 million to more than $627 million. This coincided with the 

appointment of Ambassador Holbrooke as SRAP and his reorientation of U.S. 

counterdrug efforts to emphasize interdiction operations over eradication. State’s 

interdiction budget remained at significantly elevated levels through 2013, tracking 

closely with the increased military presence in poppy-producing regions. The budget 

shows that the policy shift made by Ambassador Holbrooke was matched by resource 

allocation and budget planning, demonstrating an alignment of strategy and funding. 

Finally, while $452.5 million for DEA from fiscal years 2002 through 2017 may 

seem small in comparison to the allocations of State and DOD, it is important to 

note DEA’s smaller budget and agency size, as well as the fact that its primary 

expenditures were on personnel salaries. Thus, even relatively small increases 

for DEA could represent an increase in the number of agents on the ground and 

focus on Afghan interdiction efforts. Additionally, DEA benefited significantly 

from over $209 million in transferred funds from State’s Bureau of South and 

Central Asian Affairs to support DEA’s work in Afghanistan. From fiscal years 

2009 through 2015, nearly half of DEA’s budget for its work in Afghanistan 
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was provided by State, money without which DEA would have been unable to 

sustain its increased presence in Afghanistan.

Overall, U.S. investments in interdiction increased dramatically during the surge 

years of greater civilian and military presence in Afghanistan, from roughly 2009 

to 2014. This reflected the evolution of U.S. counternarcotics strategy toward 

greater reliance on interdiction efforts, but the post-2014 decline in funding 

for interdiction also illustrates the diminished U.S. footprint—and capacity to 

address Afghanistan’s drug problem—since then. 

GIS ANALYSIS: USING SATELLITE IMAGERY 

To develop a better understanding of how the counternarcotics strategy 

performed on the ground in Afghanistan, SIGAR commissioned a GIS provider 

to undertake geospatial analysis of different aspects of the drug control effort. 

This section describes the methods applied to the data, the analysis, and the 

challenges of that analysis. 

It is important to recognize that the GIS work done for SIGAR was constrained by 

the quality of data U.S. agencies could provide. Problems with the specificity of the 

GPS data for rural development programs, for example, prevented a close inspection 

of individual projects. We further recognize that the alternative development data are 

not an exhaustive list of the development programs implemented; for example, it’s 

not clear if all of the individual projects completed by implementing partners were 

included in the data provided by USAID. In addition, our analysis does not include 

alternative development projects implemented by other countries. For a detailed 

explanation of the data and methodology used for this analysis, see appendix B. 

While the GIS evaluation prepared for this report is not an exhaustive countrywide analysis, it is the first attempt to document the geographical distribution 

of major elements of the counternarcotics effort within Helmand and Nangarhar 

Provinces over a 15-year period. This is a step toward identifying whether the 

different strands of the counternarcotics strategy were collocated and achieved 

an appropriate geographic balance. 

Although the analysis focused predominantly on Helmand and Nangarhar, 

some additional work was done on a country-wide basis, including detailed 

site analysis and crop mapping of several locations to examine how different 

interventions affected the types of crops grown and whether these changes 

endured over time. A limited analysis of the Kandahar Food Zone was 

conducted to examine whether improvements in the irrigation system could be 

identified and what their effect was on the amount of land under cultivation, its 

productivity, and levels of poppy cultivation. 
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What Do the Data Show? 

Eradication and Alternative Development Efforts 

Were Not Coordinated or Sufficiently Collocated 

Policymakers have frequently emphasized the need for balance in the 

counternarcotics effort. They have argued that an effective counternarcotics 

strategy requires each of the different strands or pillars of counternarcotics 

to work together. U.S. and Afghan counternarcotics strategies further 

underscored that alternative development and eradication be collocated “in the 

same geographic areas in order to reinforce the ‘carrot and stick’ aspects of 

the program.”927

The GIS analysis highlights the degree to which eradication was conducted in 

areas where other elements of the counternarcotics effort—most importantly, 

alternative development—were not undertaken before, during, or after crop 

destruction. Many of the areas that saw high levels of eradication and little 

to no alternative development assistance comprised populations that were 

highly dependent on opium poppy for their livelihood. Compelling farmers to 

abandon their opium crop in the absence of viable alternatives has been closely 

associated with increasing insecurity and rural resistance and rebellion, as well 

as the inability to sustain reductions in poppy cultivation.928

In Helmand, the highest cumulative density of crop destruction was in the area 

just west of the city of Lashkar Gah, in the district of Nad Ali. (See figure 19.) 

This area experienced repeated crop destruction between 2006 and 2014. 

Yet, according to the available rural development data, the parts of this area 

that experienced the most intensive eradication efforts, received few, if any, 

alternative development projects. 

Data for the HFZ also suggest that communities near Lashkar Gah were not 

recipients of wheat seed distribution in 2009.929 (See figure A.4 in appendix A.) 

Alternatives to poppy cultivation were limited northwest of Lashkar Gah. 

Despite their proximity to the city and the consumer demands of the urban 

population there, farmers in that area were constrained in their choice of spring 

and summer crops due to a shortage of irrigation during the summer months.930

The area had a very low vegetative quality and saw few development programs 

due to the population not having the strong tribal and political links to power 

holders in the province, as well as because of the uncertain claim they had over 

the land.931 With lower levels of opium poppy, the population relied heavily 

on non-farm income and work opportunities in Lashkar Gah during the surge 

of military forces. Fieldwork in the area indicated that by the spring of 2015, 

“Wage labor opportunities [were] limited, and even harder to find with the 

reduction in development investment that these communities have experienced 
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in [preceding] years.”932 This reduction in development investment, which 

coincided with the 2014 drawdown, is supported by the GIS analysis for 2014 

and 2015. (See figures A.6 and A.7 in appendix A.) 

Longitudinal research has shown that the loss of the 

opium crop in parts of Nangarhar Province, and the 

resulting impact on the welfare of the population, 

contributed to a loss of support for the Afghan government 

and facilitated the penetration of insurgent groups.

Imagery from 2013 in Helmand also shows the concentration of eradication in 

Trek Nawa, the former desert area to the east of Marjah. (See figure 20.) This 

is an area that had few, if any, alternative development programs and where 

households were highly dependent on opium poppy for their livelihoods. In the 

absence of opium poppy, the households in this area were unable to fund the 

recurrent costs of their deep wells and were compelled to abandon agricultural 

production.933 A similar area with few, if any, alternative development 

FIGURE 19

MAPPING OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ERADICATION IN HELMAND PROVINCE, 2006–2015

Note: From 2006 to 2014, the district of Nad Ali was subject to the highest cumulative density of crop destruction in Helmand Province. At the same time, however, there were almost no 

alternative development projects in the immediate areas that experienced repeated eradication. This image is based on MDA analysis of SIGAR-provided data. The data set for alternative and 

rural development programs includes those programs that identified reducing poppy cultivation as a program objective. One exception is Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) South, a stabilization program 

which supported a large number of irrigation programs in Helmand Province; SIKA South GPS coordinates are included in this data set. Without the inclusion of SIKA South data, the number of 

development projects in areas with high cumulative crop destruction levels would likely be reduced.

Source: SIGAR visualization of imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC. For the original imagery, see figure A.5 in appendix A.
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programs was the border between Lashkar Gah and Nad Ali. (See figure A.9 

in appendix A.) Evidence shows that in areas that received little alternative 

development assistance, farmers persisted with opium poppy cultivation, 

despite repeated crop destruction. (See figure A.10 in appendix A.) 

The same disconnect between rural development and eradication can be seen 

in parts of Nangarhar Province. (See figure 21.) Here again, in a number of the 

areas with the highest concentration of eradication, the data indicate there 

was a paucity of alternative development assistance. The upper part of the 

district of Achin, for example, was one of the areas where eradication was most 

concentrated and alternative development projects were scarce. This might be 

appropriate if these were relatively prosperous areas where viable alternatives 

to poppy cultivation were widely available. However, Achin was an area where 

land holdings were particularly small, the availability of irrigation during the 

summer months constrained the production of spring and summer vegetables, 

and non-farm income opportunities were limited. This was also an area where 

the Afghan state traditionally had a limited presence.934 Importantly, longitudinal 

FIGURE 20

MAPPING OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ERADICATION IN HELMAND PROVINCE, 2013

Note: Mapping of alternative development programs and eradication efforts in 2013 shows high levels of eradication in eastern Marjah. At the same time, there were no alternative development 

programs undertaken in the areas with the most intense eradication in 2013, despite the fact that households were highly dependent on opium poppy. This image is based on MDA analysis of 

SIGAR-provided data. The data set for alternative and rural development programs includes those programs that identified reducing poppy cultivation as a program objective. One exception is 

Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) South, a stabilization program which supported a large number of irrigation programs in Helmand Province; SIKA South GPS coordinates are included in this data set. 

Without the inclusion of SIKA South data, the number of development projects in areas with high cumulative crop destruction levels would likely be reduced.

Source: SIGAR visualization of imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC. For the original imagery, see figure A.8 in appendix A.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

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research has shown that the loss of the opium crop in this area and its impact 

on the welfare of the population contributed to a loss of support for the Afghan 

government and facilitated the penetration of insurgent groups.935

In the Khugyani district in Nangarhar, there is further evidence of eradication 

being concentrated in areas where there was little development assistance 

between 2005 and 2014. This disconnect was at its most acute in the area of 

Mimla, where the data suggest there were very few alternative development 

programs, yet repeated instances of eradication over many years. Figure 22 shows 

how unsustainable this proved to be, with poppy cultivation rising from less 

than 1 percent of the total land in 2006 to 69 percent in 2016. This was also an 

area where eradication was associated with high levels of violence, particularly 

in April 2012.936 The areas north of the district center of Kargha also saw a high 

concentration of eradication, yet few signs of development assistance. While it 

was possible to coerce the population in Nangarhar to abandon opium poppy 

cultivation in the earlier years of reconstruction, it was not possible to sustain 

this in light of growing opposition to the government of Afghanistan and its 

increasingly limited presence, starting in 2010, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces 

after 2014.937 (See figure A.13 in appendix A and figure 25 on page 158.) 

FIGURE 21

MAPPING OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ERADICATION IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE, 2005–2014

Note: Some areas where there was a high concentration of eradication, such as the southern district of Achin and the northwestern part of Khugyani, received relatively little alternative 

development assistance.

Source: SIGAR visualization of imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC. For the original imagery, see figure A.11 in appendix A.
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The Distribution of Development Assistance by Sector and Geographic Area

A further point of interest with regard to the coordination of eradication and 

rural development is the apparent concentration of development interventions 

in the relatively resource-wealthy and more accessible areas around the 

provincial capitals of Jalalabad (Nangarhar) and Lashkar Gah (Helmand). 

In these areas, the population was less dependent on opium poppy for its 

FIGURE 22

CROP MAPPING FOR KHUGYANI IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE, 2006–2016

March 22 (0.12 ha poppy)

Poppy is <1% of total agriculture. No eradication efforts within 2 km.

April 8 (21.2 ha poppy)

Poppy is 36% of total agriculture. Significant eradication efforts in vicinity 

and within grid.

April 6 (15.4 ha poppy) 

Poppy is 24% of total agriculture. Some eradication efforts in vicinity and 

two eradication points in center of grid.

April 20 (43.8 ha poppy)

Poppy is 69% of total agriculture. No eradication data.

2006

2012

2011

2016

Note: Crop mapping shows significant growth of poppy in areas that were targeted by eradication, with poppy cultivation rising from less than 1 percent of the total land in 2006 to 69 percent in 2016. 

Source: SIGAR visualization of imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC. For the original imagery, see figure A.12 in appendix A. 

Poppy Wheat Orchard Vineyard Other Crops Prepared Eradication
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livelihood and, even prior to delivery of development assistance, showed signs 

of more diverse sources of income and cropping patterns. 

According to data made available by USAID, the largest numbers of alternative 

development projects in Nangarhar were located in prime agricultural land 

around the city of Jalalabad, comprising lower Surkhrud and the district of 

Behsud. The wide range of projects in this area included orchards, agriculture, 

infrastructure, irrigation, and agribusinesses. This is in direct contrast to the 

more limited programs implemented in districts like Khugyani, Chapahar, and 

Rodat, where the population was more dependent on poppy for their livelihood. 

Here, the bulk of the investments appear to have been in orchard development, 

much of it concentrated in 2005 and 2007 under the auspices of ALP East. (See 

figures A.15 and A.16 in appendix A.) Given the geospatial analysis of IDEANEW and the findings of its program evaluation, as well as the very high levels 

of opium poppy that have returned to these areas since 2014, there is a high 

probability that some of these orchards have been removed and replaced with 

other crops, including opium poppy.938 (See figure 12 on page 115.)

As opposed to the high levels of eradication, low levels of development 

investment, and resurgent opium poppy cultivation in the southern districts of 

FIGURE 23

MAPPING OF IRRIGATION PROJECTS IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE, 2004–2016

Note: U.S. assistance supported a number of irrigation projects in areas with a history of poppy cultivation and where populations were heavily dependent on the poppy crop. Increased poppy 

cultivation is a significant risk when irrigation improvements are implemented in these areas.

Source: SIGAR visualization of imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC. For the original imagery, see figure A.14 in appendix A.
154 | MAINTAINING A COHESIVE STRATEGY

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Nangarhar, we see the opposite pattern in the areas around Jalalabad. In fact, 

there appears to have been no eradication in lower Surkhrud, the district of 

Behsud, or the district of Kamah, a well-irrigated area to the east of Jalalabad. 

Eradication was also limited in Kuz Kunar and Darrah-ye Nur in northern 

Nangarhar. (See figure A.16 of appendix A.) It is worth noting that, according 

to UNODC, Kamah cultivated an estimated 1,898 hectares of opium poppy in 

2004, while Surkhrud cultivated 1,229 hectares that same year. In 2005, Kahmah 

cultivated small amounts of opium poppy while Surkhrud cultivated none at 

all; there was no eradication reported in these districts. Kamah today shows 

negligible levels of opium poppy cultivation, although there has been a return to 

FIGURE 24

CROP MAPPING FOR HELMAND FOOD ZONE, 2009–2012

Note: Crop analysis of the HFZ indicates much of the poppy cultivated as of 2009 was replaced with wheat by 2012. The crop analysis also shows the area cultivated with spring cultivars, 

orchards, and vineyards (represented by “other” and “prepared”), which did not increase significantly in Helmand during this period. These crops, however, are the only viable agricultural 

alternatives to poppy. For errors or more information, contact info@alcis.org.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 155

opium production in parts of Surkhrud.939 Again, the lack of correlation between 

eradication and declining poppy cultivation levels suggests eradication was not 

the determining factor in Kamah’s transition away from poppy cultivation. 

Irrigation projects were additional investments, beyond orchards and some 

agricultural projects, in the southern districts of Nangarhar. Figure 23 shows the 

number of irrigation projects reported by USAID across the province. Increased 

poppy cultivation is a risk when investing in irrigation projects in areas where 

there is such a long history of and high dependency on opium poppy cultivation, 

particularly if the support provided to perennial horticulture is limited in 

Source: Copyright © 2018 Alcis Holdings Ltd.
156 | MAINTAINING A COHESIVE STRATEGY

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duration and scope.940 Given the locations of these projects and the findings 

from the evaluation of IDEA-NEW, there is a strong likelihood that many of 

these rehabilitated or new systems are being used to grow larger amounts of 

opium poppy.941

The lack of correlation between eradication and declining poppy 

cultivation levels suggests eradication was not the determining 

factor in one area’s transition away from poppy cultivation.

Compared to southern Nangarhar, GPS data for Helmand did not show the 

same degree of investment in orchards by rural development programs.942 As 

discussed earlier, the focus in Helmand was on wheat, a winter crop, and a 

variety of spring and summer crops. (See pages 123–125.) A crop analysis of 

Helmand shows an increase in the cultivation of spring crops, but not on a 

significant scale. (See figure 24.) GIS analysis indicates that much of the land 

that was once cultivated with opium poppy was replaced with wheat, an annual 

crop, rather than multi-year, high-value horticulture. However, as previously 

noted, wheat is much more likely than high-value horticulture to be replaced by 

poppy in future years. 

The Relationship between the Presence of Security Forces 

and Poppy Cultivation in Helmand 

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics and INL touted how the HFZ reduced the 

levels of opium poppy cultivation in the main canal-irrigated areas of central 

Helmand, while UNODC hailed it as an example to be emulated by other 

counternarcotics efforts.943 These institutions argued that the combination 

of a strong governor, eradication, and the provision of agricultural inputs, 

primarily wheat seeds and fertilizer, led to opium poppy cultivation falling 

from 103,590 hectares in 2008 to 63,307 hectares in 2011.944

 Although this 

argument was based on a limited analysis of the factors at play, the MCN, INL, 

and UNODC used it as justification for the extension of the food zone concept 

to other provinces, including Kandahar. A more inclusive explanation for the 

fall in cultivation acknowledges the wider political, economic, and security 

environment.945 This includes the significant rise in the value of wheat and drop 

in opium price that occurred between October 2007 and April 2009, the dramatic 

uptick in the number of Afghan and international military forces in the area, and 

the increase in the amount of development assistance.946

The GIS analysis commissioned by SIGAR supports the more inclusive 

understanding of why there was such a dramatic shift in levels of cultivation in 

central Helmand. For example, there was a particularly high concentration of 

security infrastructure in Marjah, Nad Ali, Nawa Barakzai, and Garmsir. Crop 

mapping shows that the expansion of these bases and the inflow of international 
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military forces coincided with dramatic reductions in opium poppy cultivation 

in the area around the security infrastructure. 

This points to a more complex explanation for the fall in cultivation than a 

strong governor, eradication, and the provision of basic agricultural inputs. 

The GIS analysis supports earlier field research that argued, “It is not the act 

of crop destruction itself, but rather the ongoing presence of the state that has 

determined the level of cultivation in central Helmand.”947 In fact, farmers across 

central Helmand noted the prevalence of government and international forces 

in and around rural communities—concurring with reports of “an ISAF base 

on every road junction”—and how this deterred cultivation.948 Furthermore, 

longitudinal research found that in areas with weak governance, farmers viewed 

eradication as an act that could be managed through patronage and corruption, 

which led to increasing resentment.949

Eradication had only a limited role in the dramatic reductions in opium poppy 

cultivation in Marjah. There was no eradication in the district in 2009 or 2010, 

aside from the minimal and poorly considered Marjah Accelerated Agricultural 

Transition Program, which largely consisted of paying farmers to destroy a 

failing—and in many cases already harvested—opium crop and to plant spring 

cultivars.950 Despite these limited eradication efforts, poppy cultivation in 

Marjah fell from almost 60 percent of agricultural land to less than 5 percent 

between 2010 and 2011 after Operation Moshtarak and the influx of over 15,000 

ANDSF and U.S. Marines. It is only from 2011 onward that more significant 

eradication occurred in Marjah, largely as an attempt to destroy the residual 

crop and the concentrated cultivation in the desert area in Trek Nawa in 2013. 

Crop mapping commissioned by SIGAR also reflects the important role that the 

2010 influx of foreign military forces into Nad Ali played in reducing opium poppy 

cultivation. For example, figures A.2 and 9 show dramatic drops in cultivation 

between 2010 and 2011: figure A.2 after repeated rounds of crop destruction 

in 2008 and 2009 with no effect, and figure 9 after no eradication within three 

kilometers. (See pages 102–103.) In Nangarhar, the handover and closure of 

security bases was associated with rising levels of cultivation. (See figure 25.) 

BALANCING THE U.S. APPROACH TO COUNTERNARCOTICS: 

FINDING THE RIGHT FORMULA

Policymakers emphasized the need for balance in the counternarcotics effort, 

arguing that an effective counternarcotics strategy required each of the different 

strands or pillars of counternarcotics to work together. However, budgetary 

and geospatial data show this did not happen. Budgetary data show that in the 

early years of the counternarcotics effort, eradication was a higher priority than 
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FIGURE 25

CROP MAPPING OF POPPY NEAR SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE, NANGARHAR PROVINCE

Note: In Shinwar and Khugyani, Nangarhar Province, the closure of security bases or their handover to Afghan forces coincided with rising levels of poppy cultivation. While the above images do not 

show nearby security infrastructure, according to Alcis, security infrastructure existed a few hundred meters from the sites shown here. For errors or more information contact info@alcis.org.

Source: Copyright © 2018 Alcis Holdings Ltd.

Shinwar, Nangarhar Province Khugyani, Nangarhar Province

20132013

20152015

20162016
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alternative development. This was in the initial phase of the reconstruction 

process, when Afghanistan was just emerging from an extended conflict and 

drought that had taken a particularly heavy toll on the rural population. The 

financial data also reveal that when this imbalance was resolved at the time of 

the surge, the focus of the alternative development effort was on short-term 

development assistance, primarily the provision of agricultural inputs. This 

kind of assistance could not, nor was it intended to, bring about the long-term 

economic change required for enduring reductions in opium poppy cultivation. 

The geospatial data also reflect a divide between the policy rhetoric of a 

balanced counternarcotics strategy and its implementation on the ground. While 

many in the counternarcotics community insist eradication is just one part 

of an integrated counternarcotics strategy, the evidence suggests eradication 

has often been pursued in geographic isolation. While not exhaustive, the 

GIS analysis highlights the degree to which eradication was conducted in 

areas where other elements of the counternarcotics effort—most importantly, 

alternative development—were not undertaken before, during, or after crop 

destruction. In many of these areas, the population was highly dependent on 

opium poppy for its livelihood. 

The lack of information regarding what types of interventions were implemented 

in which locations, and whether they were coordinated or appropriately 

sequenced, weakened both planning and implementation. It also made 

meaningful impact assessment of the counternarcotics effort all but impossible. 

Moreover, the same intervention or combination of interventions may not 

have had the same effect in areas with different socioeconomic, political, and 

environmental conditions. For example, eradication, or the threat of eradication, 

in relatively resource-wealthy areas where there were improvements in 

governance, security, and economic growth did not undermine the welfare of the 

population or security. The same cannot be said in more marginal areas, where 

eradication impoverished the population and led to political instability. 

Geospatial analysis and crop mapping further show the degree to which opium 

poppy has been replaced by other crops. Together, they highlight how fragile the 

reductions in opium poppy cultivation are when the crop is replaced by wheat. 

As a low-value annual crop that requires little long-term investment and has 

limited economic value compared to specialized horticulture, wheat can easily 

be replaced with poppy the following year. Without a movement into high-value 

annual and perennial horticulture and increased non-farm income opportunities, 

there is a high likelihood that opium poppy will return in abundance.

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British Embassy photo

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

From 2002 to 2017, Afghan poppy cultivation soared and estimated opium 

production rose to historic levels, from approximately 3,400 metric tons 

in 2002 to roughly 9,000 metric tons in 2017.951 During this period, the U.S. 

government allocated approximately $8.62 billion for counternarcotics efforts 

in Afghanistan. This included more than $7.28 billion for programs with a 

substantial counternarcotics focus and $1.34 billion on programs that included a 

counternarcotics component. Our report reaches the inevitable conclusion that 

despite the U.S. investment, no counterdrug program undertaken by the United 

States, its coalition partners, or the Afghan government resulted in lasting 

reductions in poppy cultivation or opium production. 

Counternarcotics policies and programs suffered from many of the same 

obstacles that dogged the wider reconstruction effort: persistent insecurity, 

corruption, and weak rule of law; lack of consensus among senior policymakers; 

changing strategies and priorities; uneven coordination among U.S. agencies, 

Afghan stakeholders, and coalition partners; stove-piping of issues and goals; 

short-term metrics poorly suited to long-term efforts; unreliable data on 

funding levels, program outcomes, and conditions on the ground; and a weak 

understanding of the local Afghan political and socioeconomic context. 
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Our report also indicates problems specific to the counternarcotics effort. For 

example, a push for aggressive eradication was based on flawed assumptions and 

poor data that fostered unrealistic expectations. U.S. advocacy for aerial spraying 

was met with such resistance by the Afghan government and coalition partners 

that it damaged the U.S.-Afghan bilateral relationship and undermined unity of 

purpose in the counternarcotics mission. Further, geospatial imagery confirms that 

significant eradication efforts rarely led to any sustainable reductions in cultivation. 

Eradication was not consistently conducted in the same geographic locations as 

development assistance. In addition, some alternative development programs, 

intended to help farmers shift away from poppy and toward licit crops, focused 

narrowly on crop substitution. This contributed to the displacement of people and 

the relocation of poppy cultivation to areas outside government control. Other 

alternative development programs had the inadvertent effect of enabling more 

poppy production, for example, via improved irrigation systems. Many development 

programs, even though implemented in a country where illegal opium poppy was an 

economic mainstay, did not adequately account for the programs’ potential effect on 

poppy cultivation and trade. 

A key strategic U.S. interest in Afghanistan was to reduce the amount of funding 

insurgent groups received from the opium and heroin trade. However, the 

primary metric for U.S. counternarcotics efforts was levels of poppy cultivation, 

which did not effectively assess efforts to cut off insurgent financing. In 

addition, there was disagreement among U.S. intelligence and law enforcement 

agencies over the nature and level of insurgent financing from drugs. As of late 

2017, these financing estimates underpinned assumptions about the potential 

benefits of a costly air interdiction campaign that carried risks of civilian 

casualties. Without a clear understanding of how insurgents benefit from and 

participate in the narcotics trade, particularly at local levels, it is difficult to 

measure the effectiveness and impact of this campaign. 

Despite these challenges, two important positive stories emerge from 

counternarcotics efforts since 2002. First, although poppy cultivation and 

production have risen dramatically since 2002, some provinces and districts 

have seen temporary reductions in poppy cultivation. In these limited areas, 

better security and economic conditions allowed some Afghans to diversify 

their livelihoods away from opium poppy. These successes, even if shortlived, suggest U.S. agencies should consider a counternarcotics strategy that 

prioritizes activities in areas that are more secure, have greater state presence, 

and offer more diverse livelihood opportunities. 

Second, the establishment of well-trained, capable Afghan counterdrug 

institutions, particularly the National Interdiction Unit, Technical Investigative 

Unit, Sensitive Investigative Unit, Special Mission Wing, and Counter Narcotics 
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Justice Center was another positive outcome. These units are regarded as some 

of the most trustworthy and proficient in the country. Their effectiveness in 

combating the drug trade has been stymied by the lack of a competent, noncorrupt judicial system or sufficient Afghan political will to support these units, 

and by the absence of an extradition treaty between the United States and 

Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the fact that these entities have often been redirected 

to counterterrorism and other security objectives is evidence of their value to 

both the Afghan and U.S. governments. A remaining challenge is to determine 

whether the United States should continue to invest in these specialized 

counterdrug units when the wider security conditions and judicial infrastructure 

do not allow them to remain trained and effective in their counterdrug mission.

Given the difficult security and economic environment in Afghanistan today, 

particularly in many of the largest opium-producing regions, the Afghan drug 

trade will likely persist for decades. These challenges, along with political 

difficulties, corruption, and limited rule of law that plagued the reconstruction 

effort also affected the counterdrug effort. As one U.S. official who led 

counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan noted: 

Unless and until Afghanistan achieves a significant degree of security, is 

able to extend the rule of law to its 34 provinces, and is able to eliminate the 

government kleptocracy and take meaningful action against corruption in 

general, there will be no possibility of enacting strategies and programs to 

effectively fight narcotics and drug cultivation and production in Afghanistan 

for any mid-term or long-term success.952

This makes it critical that U.S. policymakers focus limited resources on those 

counternarcotics programs that directly contribute to wider U.S. strategic 

goals. The insights from this report point to several important steps that can 

improve ongoing U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, as well as inform 

U.S. efforts in other major drug-producing countries. These findings, lessons, 

and recommendations are discussed in the following section.

FINDINGS 

Our study of the U.S. experience with counternarcotics in Afghanistan from 

2002 to 2017 identified the following 13 key findings: 

1. No counterdrug program undertaken by the United States, its coalition

partners, or the Afghan government resulted in lasting reductions in 

poppy cultivation or opium production. 

Over the course of the reconstruction effort to date, poppy cultivation 

rose more than 340 percent, from roughly 74,000 hectares in 2002 to an 

estimated 328,000 hectares in 2017. Potential opium production increased 
164 | CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

by approximately 164 percent, from 3,400 metric tons to 9,000 metric 

tons over the same period.953 Although localized poppy crop reductions 

occurred in some areas, such as the Helmand Food Zone and Nangarhar 

Province, these reductions were either temporary or offset by increases in 

cultivation elsewhere. 

The overall growth of poppy cultivation and opium production was, 

in part, due to failures in the strategy, design, and implementation of 

counternarcotics efforts, as this report detailed. It was also, however, a 

function of problems much larger than counterdrug programs themselves—

namely, widespread insecurity, lack of licit economic opportunities, 

and limited government presence in areas where drug production 

was concentrated.

2. Without a stable security environment, there was little possibility 

of effectively curtailing poppy cultivation and drug production 

in Afghanistan. 

As of January 2018, approximately 14.5 percent of districts in Afghanistan 

were under insurgent control or influence, and 29.2 percent of districts 

were contested—controlled by neither the Afghan government nor the 

insurgency.954 These areas include many of the districts where opium poppy 

cultivation is most concentrated. Violence disrupted economic activity 

by preventing access to markets and destroying infrastructure that could 

otherwise help people pursue livelihoods in the licit economy. Persistent 

insecurity also precluded effective law enforcement and empowered 

criminal actors. Furthermore, drug-control efforts in insecure areas often 

met with significant resistance and failed to deliver lasting results. For 

example, in 2007 and 2008, eradication forces—including U.S. contractors—

encountered significant armed resistance and were subject to frequent 

attacks while in the field.955 Such violence limited both the efficacy and 

deterrent effect of crop destruction efforts. 

Journalist Steve Coll described the downward spiral of insecurity and 

opium production: 

Perhaps it was not that opium caused war. Perhaps it was war that caused 

opium. . . . Since the 1980s, there had been a self-reinforcing cycle in the 

opium belt: War created desperation, which made opium attractive for 

poor farmers, which created profits for warlords, who then used those 

resources to fight for greater wealth and power, which created more 

desperation for poor farmers.956

Without a stable security environment, lasting reductions in drug-crop 

cultivation and drug production could not be achieved. Until this condition 
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is met, poppy cultivation and opium production are likely to persist at high 

levels in Afghanistan. 

3. The U.S. government failed to develop and implement counternarcotics

strategies that outlined or effectively directed U.S. agencies toward 

shared goals. 

The State Department produced four counternarcotics strategies between 

2005 and 2012 that relied on coordinated efforts by State, DOD, USAID, 

and DEA. However, State, particularly INL, which often led strategy design, 

lacked the ability to direct other agencies to provide the inputs called for 

in the strategies. U.S. counternarcotics strategies also failed to establish 

consensus on goals or develop the coordinating mechanisms necessary for an 

effective interagency effort. 

The strategies called for a multi-agency, multi-pronged approach, but 

this was not delivered or implemented on the ground. Strategies also 

failed to recognize the constraints on achieving counternarcotics goals. 

They set forth counterdrug objectives that were outside the ability of 

U.S. counternarcotics institutions to achieve, did not prioritize counterdrug 

activities that supported wider U.S. strategic goals, and did not fully 

account for impacts on other reconstruction goals.

4. Eradication and development assistance efforts were not 

sufficiently coordinated or consistently implemented in the same 

geographic locations. 

U.S. counternarcotics strategies repeatedly advocated a balance of 

different counterdrug interventions, particularly eradication and alternative 

development. According to the 2007 U.S. counternarcotics strategy, 

“Coercive measures, such as eradication, must be combined with both 

short- and long-term economic incentives in order to alter the risk/reward 

calculus of rural households to be in favor of licit crop cultivation.”957

Despite U.S. policymakers’ emphasis on the need for such balance, there is 

limited evidence of a coordinated, balanced implementation effort on the 

ground—or of monitoring and evaluation to ensure communities in poppygrowing areas experienced both the deterrent of crop destruction and the 

ameliorating effects of development aid.

Geographic Information System mapping of U.S.-funded development 

projects shows that many areas that experienced significant, repeated 

eradication efforts were both highly dependent on poppy as a livelihood 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

and received relatively little development assistance. This frequent failure 

to collocate eradication and development aid reduced the chances of 

successful transitions away from poppy dependence and sustainable 

reductions in poppy cultivation. 

5. Counternarcotics goals were often not incorporated into larger

security and development strategies, which hindered the achievement 

of those goals and the wider reconstruction effort. 

Beginning with the G8 Security Sector Reform process that designated the 

UK as the lead nation for counternarcotics in 2002, the Afghan drug trade 

was generally treated as a separate concern within the reconstruction 

effort. Counternarcotics objectives were poorly integrated into the design 

and implementation of donors’ development programs and Afghan national 

development plans, and were not sufficiently considered within the wider 

context of U.S. security, development, and governance strategies. This 

improved somewhat from roughly 2009 to 2012, when agencies took steps 

to nest counternarcotics objectives within broader counter-threat finance 

and police and judicial reform efforts. 

Counternarcotics goals also became a silo on the Afghan government 

side, where those goals were not integrated into national development 

plans or various ministries’ responsibilities. For example, the Ministry of 

Counter Narcotics was charged with coordinating counterdrug activities, 

but lacked the political capital, authority, and institutional capacity to 

effectively undertake a coordinating role. Nevertheless, considerable funding 

was allocated to MCN, while other ministries that implemented policies 

and programs in areas where poppy was grown, such as the Ministry of 

Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation 

and Development, did not receive sufficient support for counternarcoticsrelated work.958 In addition, where counternarcotics capacity was built 

within capable, specialized Afghan counterdrug units, this capacity was often 

diverted for higher-priority security and counterterrorism missions.

6. Counternarcotics efforts were not a consistent priority at the most 

senior levels of the U.S. or Afghan government. 

Few U.S. ambassadors or military commanders in Afghanistan viewed 

counternarcotics as a priority line of effort. Some senior leaders, including 

officials within DOD and USAID, opposed increased engagement on the issue 

because they viewed certain counterdrug programs as detrimental to their 

mission. In the absence of sustained attention and commitment to narcoticsrelated issues at senior levels, there was little agreement across the U.S. 
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government on how counternarcotics goals should be pursued, prioritized, 

or integrated within the larger framework of counterterrorism, state building, 

and counterinsurgency. Lower-ranking officials and sub-agencies, such as 

INL, DEA, and OSD’s Office of Counternarcotics and Global Threats, were 

unable to lead or implement successful, coordinated counterdrug strategies. 

Similarly, the Afghan government, facing numerous critical challenges, did not 

bring consistent leadership to counternarcotics efforts. According to Mohammed 

Ehsan Zia, the former Minister for Rural Rehabilitation and Development, one 

of the main problems contributing to the failure of counternarcotics efforts was 

“lack of unity of purpose” within the Afghan government. As he described, “Due 

to lack of political will on the part of President Karzai, there was no government 

vision for counternarcotics. The Ministry of Finance and other technical 

ministries never subscribed to the MCN objectives.”959

7. Eradication efforts, including compensated eradication, had no lasting 

impact on poppy cultivation or national-level drug production. 

Even at its highest estimated levels, eradication never reached more 

than 10 percent of the poppy cultivated in Afghanistan. The emphasis 

on eradication was based on weak data and misguided assumptions. For 

example, the assertion that it was necessary to destroy 25 percent of the 

standing poppy crop each year to deter future planting—also known as 

credible threat—was arbitrary, unproven, and counterproductive. The 

concept of credible threat inflated policymakers’ expectations of what was 

possible, bolstered arguments for aerial eradication, and detracted from 

efforts to target eradication in areas with greater livelihood opportunities. 

The push for eradication often reflected a single-minded focus on simply 

reducing cultivation levels in the short term. Eradication efforts failed to 

mitigate the adverse impact of crop destruction on rural communities, and 

officials did not fully appreciate the risk of alienating those communities. 

Ground-based eradication efforts were plagued by corruption, overreporting, inconsistency in targeting, and unrealistic expectations of the 

hectarage that could be destroyed.

Further, eradication efforts were often undertaken without assessing 

whether viable alternative livelihood options existed for affected farmers. 

Without alternative livelihoods, there was little chance crop destruction 

would lead to sustained reductions in poppy cultivation. For GovernorLed Eradication, the UK identified target areas where farmers had greater 

economic opportunity and alternative livelihood options. For a period 

of about four years, INL agreed to only make payments to governors for 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

eradication conducted in these target areas. But for the majority of the 

years GLE was in place, INL compensated governors regardless of whether 

the destroyed crop was in the target area, undermining attempts to promote 

a targeted campaign.

8. The failed U.S. push for aerial spraying damaged the U.S.-Afghan

relationship and unity of effort in the coalition’s counterdrug mission.

The INL-led push for aerial eradication was opposed by parts of the U.S. 

government, but gained new life in 2007 when the Bush administration 

advocated for aerial spraying. Yet, President Karzai and the majority of 

key actors within the Afghan and British governments remained staunchly 

opposed. Aggressive U.S. advocacy for aerial eradication contributed to 

the lack of a unified counterdrug effort by donors and Afghans. At times, 

that advocacy drove a wedge in the U.S.-Afghan relationship, damaging 

cooperation on other fronts. As journalist Steve Coll recounted, “The 

prolonged stalemate over Plan Afghanistan during 2007 wasted American 

money and effort. It also opened a breach of trust between Hamid Karzai 

and the United States—an early episode of mutual suspicion in what would 

soon become a cascade.”960

9. Alternative development programs were too short-term and often

relied on the simple substitution of other crops for poppy. These 

programs did not bring about lasting reductions in opium poppy 

cultivation and sometimes even contributed to increased poppy 

production.

Alternative development programming was often based on a poor 

understanding of why poppy was grown and failed to address the multiple 

economic roles played by poppy in rural Afghanistan. USAID’s alternative 

development programs overemphasized crop substitution and did not 

devote sufficient resources to creating off-farm and non-agricultural income 

opportunities for rural populations.

Furthermore, USAID underestimated the amount of time and investment 

required to establish crops that could compete with poppy. For example, 

perennial crops—one of the only viable agricultural alternatives to poppy 

cultivation—take four to five years to reach their full production potential, 

whereas most alternative development projects lasted an average of three 

and one-half years.

In addition, U.S. agencies and implementing partners often failed to 

consider and mitigate the risk that alternative development programs 
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could contribute to increased poppy cultivation and drug production. 

Consequently, in some areas, alternative development programs 

inadvertently enabled more poppy production, for example, by improving 

irrigation systems that were then used for poppy cultivation.

10. In limited areas with improved security and greater economic

opportunities, some Afghans were able to diversify their livelihoods 

away from opium poppy. However, local reductions in poppy cultivation 

were almost always short-lived or offset by increases elsewhere.

Where improvements in security were combined with the development of 

legal livelihood options, localized poppy crop reductions were possible. 

Reductions were achieved within the Helmand Food Zone and in Nangarhar 

Province. In Helmand, the inflow of international military forces, coupled 

with significant development investments, primarily the provision of 

wheat seed and fertilizer, coincided with dramatic reductions in opium 

poppy cultivation. 

Those reductions, however, were either temporary or offset by increases in 

other areas. In Nangarhar, provincial leaders were able to enforce the ban 

on opium poppy cultivation through the promise of development assistance, 

the threat of military action against villages that did not comply with the 

ban, and fragile political bargains with rural elites. Nevertheless, it was not 

possible to sustain these reductions in light of growing opposition to the 

government of Afghanistan and the withdrawal of U.S. forces after 2014.

11. U.S. support helped Afghan counterdrug units develop promising

capacity and become trusted partners. However, these units did not 

have a strategic impact on the drug trade due to insecurity, corruption 

and poor capacity within the criminal justice system, and lack of highlevel support from the Afghan government.

The Afghan National Interdiction Unit, Technical Investigative Unit, and 

Sensitive Investigative Unit are regarded as some of the most trustworthy, 

proficient police units in the country. SIU and TIU teams, for example, 

investigated significant drug trafficking organizations. They worked closely 

with DEA officials to monitor authorized wiretaps, as well as to gather and 

analyze sensitive intelligence on trafficking networks.961

However, these units have not yielded large numbers of high-value target 

arrests or, according to recent U.S. military estimates, significantly reduced 

insurgency funding from the drug trade. The work of these units was 

repeatedly stymied by pervasive political interference and corruption in 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

the police and judicial system as a whole. Similarly, while the Counter 

Narcotics Justice Center was considered the least corrupt judicial entity 

in Afghanistan, political influence sometimes prevented convictions of 

senior drug traffickers and, if convictions were secured, even aided in 

their release.

In addition, Afghan counterdrug units were sometimes undercut by the 

conflicting relationships and approaches U.S. agencies took toward certain 

high-value targets. For example, despite Haji Juma Khan’s known drugtrafficking activities, Khan reportedly supplied information to and received 

payments from the CIA, DEA, and U.S. military. Yet, the U.S. government 

was also engaged in building a case against Khan, and he was eventually 

transferred to the United States for prosecution.962

12. Poor-quality estimates of poppy cultivation levels, eradication 

numbers, and drug money going to the insurgency made it more 

difficult for policymakers to accurately assess the problem and 

determine effective policy responses.

For senior U.S. policymakers, levels of poppy cultivation came to not only 

describe the scale of the drug problem in Afghanistan, but also the progress 

toward counternarcotics and state-building objectives at the national and 

provincial level. Yet, in early years, estimates by the UN and CIA’s Crime 

and Narcotics Center—the two credible sources of data on cultivation—

diverged significantly, complicating policymakers’ task of assessing the 

problem. These discrepancies reflected CNC’s better methodology and use 

of imagery. A positive development was that from 2005 on, methodologies 

for estimating cultivation at the national level were improved. However, 

challenges persisted at the provincial level. 

Poppy eradication figures were similarly problematic. Many eradication 

forces self-reported the hectarage of crops destroyed, and their numbers 

were later found to be grossly exaggerated. This contributed to inflated 

expectations of the scale of eradication that could be accomplished. Those 

inflated expectations, in turn, led some policymakers to view eradication 

as a potential panacea and to pursue eradication efforts, despite serious 

obstacles to their effectiveness.

There was also little consistency and in-depth reporting on the estimates 

of drug trade revenues flowing to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. 

Internal intelligence community debates on these estimates were often 

not reflected in policy debates, resulting in policymakers attaching more 

certainty to these estimates than was merited. 
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The ongoing U.S. and Afghan air interdiction campaign against opiumprocessing facilities is underpinned by the assumption that strikes against 

drug labs will prevent a certain amount of revenue from going to the 

Taliban—and those revenue losses will put added pressure on the Taliban 

to come to the negotiating table. If the calculation of destroyed revenues 

is markedly overestimated, as we believe to be the case and show in this 

report, policymakers are dealing with inaccurate information to judge the 

degree of harm inflicted on Taliban finances. 

13. The counternarcotics performance metrics used in Afghanistan,

particularly the overemphasis on annual estimates of poppy cultivation 

and eradication, contributed to ineffective policy decisions.

For U.S. policymakers, estimated levels of poppy cultivation served as 

the primary proxy indicator of the success or failure of counternarcotics 

efforts. The pressure to demonstrate progress, as measured by cultivation 

levels, was one factor that led to the push for increased eradication and 

cultivation bans. This overemphasis on cultivation estimates crowded 

out other indicators—such as crop diversification, income levels, and the 

number of people dependent on the drug trade for their livelihood—that 

could have given policymakers a more complete, nuanced picture of 

narcotics-related challenges in Afghanistan.

The failure to develop a comprehensive set of indicators meant 

policymakers lacked accurate data on which interventions worked and 

which ones failed. Furthermore, the overwhelming focus on cultivation as 

a performance metric did not align well with the U.S. strategic interest in 

cutting off insurgent groups’ funding from the drug trade.

LESSONS

This section distills lessons from the U.S. experience with counternarcotics 

programs and policies during the Afghanistan reconstruction effort to date. 

Some lessons are specific to Afghanistan and should be used to reevaluate 

and improve ongoing counternarcotics work there. All lessons are intended to 

inform and strengthen U.S. counterdrug policies and programs more generally. 

However, this report does not advocate the universal application of specific 

counterdrug interventions based on our experience in Afghanistan. As the report 

has demonstrated, taking practices used in one country or region and assuming 

they would work elsewhere has often been counterproductive. Instead, we 

identify key factors that influence the success or failure of counterdrug efforts, 

as well as principles policymakers should apply when making decisions. 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

In major drug-producing and transit countries that receive significant 

levels of U.S. foreign assistance:

1. A whole-of-government U.S. counternarcotics strategy should be

developed to coordinate various agencies around shared, longterm goals. 

In a major drug-producing country, illicit drug crops may form a backbone 

of the economy. This complicates U.S. and host-nation efforts to combat the 

drug trade without further impoverishing or alienating rural populations. 

Moreover, drug-related corruption may touch many parts of the hostnation government, from local to national levels. This means U.S. security, 

development, and governance efforts must account for how the drug trade 

can impact those efforts, as well as how those efforts may impact the 

drug trade.

Given the pervasive and cross-cutting effects of illicit narcotics, combating 

the drug trade inherently requires a multi-sector, interagency approach. 

Counternarcotics activities should occur across several complementary 

lines of effort, including security sector assistance, development, 

governance, and rule of law. At the same time, political will is required to 

effectively undertake a coordinated counternarcotics effort. 

A cohesive strategy is needed to coordinate and prioritize these activities, 

and ensure they are working in support of one another. In addition, 

activities should center around two long-term, generational goals: to help 

rural communities sustainably shift away from drug-crop cultivation and 

toward licit livelihoods, and to strengthen host government institutions 

to resist and prosecute drug-related corruption and crime. U.S. 

counternarcotics efforts toward these goals should be designed to endure 

for the long term. In addition, U.S. objectives should reflect reasonable 

expectations for progress that can be made in the nearer term.

While a counternarcotics strategy can be helpful in directing various 

agencies toward common goals, the existence of a strategy does not in 

itself guarantee effective implementation. What matters, rather, is that 

the strategy sets out actionable steps that diverse stakeholders—within 

State, USAID, DOD, Justice, DEA, Treasury, and other agencies—can take 

to mitigate the negative effects of the drug trade on U.S. interests and 

ensure U.S. activities do not inadvertently facilitate or worsen narcoticsrelated threats.
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2. The U.S. ambassador, in coordination with the U.S. military commander 

in country, should have responsibility for directing agencies to 

implement the counternarcotics strategy. 

Our analysis of the U.S. experience in Afghanistan indicates that only the 

ambassador, as chief of mission, has sufficient authority over all agencies in 

country to direct those agencies toward shared counternarcotics goals. With 

visibility and authority over all U.S. policies and programs in a given country, 

the ambassador is also best placed to determine what level of counterdrug 

effort is appropriate and what the priorities of that effort should be. 

Counternarcotics strategies rely on inputs from a number of U.S. agencies. 

For the best chance of successful implementation, a strategy requires 

sustained, high-level ownership—one person holding various agencies to 

account for coordination and learning from mistakes. In Afghanistan, the 

designation of a Kabul-based “drug czar” to lead counternarcotics efforts did 

not result in effective coordination or implementation, in part because the 

designee lacked the authority or ability to direct multiple U.S. agencies. 

Unity of effort is critical to prevent duplicative and wasteful programs. 

Unless the ambassador and U.S. military commander agree on 

counternarcotics goals, and coordinate efforts and resources to achieve 

these goals, their efforts are likely to be disjointed and ineffective. A 

unified effort is also important to enable U.S. agencies to coordinate 

with the host-nation government and other donors. If the ambassador is 

unable to dedicate sufficient attention to lead the implementation of a 

counternarcotics strategy, the United States should reconsider funding and 

administering a large-scale counterdrug effort

3. The goals of a U.S. counternarcotics strategy should be aligned with

and integrated into the larger security, development, and governance 

objectives of the United States and the host nation. 

In Afghanistan, the counterdrug effort was often justified as a means to 

weaken insurgent groups and strengthen the Afghan government. However, 

counternarcotics programs were commonly implemented and assessed 

independent of these strategic goals. This led to programs that were at 

times out of sync with U.S. objectives or unrealistic given the security 

situation in the country. 

Given the reality that counternarcotics goals are rarely the United States’ 

top priority in any one country, counternarcotics programs should aim 

to advance larger U.S. security and governance goals. This integration 

should help ensure that U.S. agencies maintain their support for 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

counternarcotics programs over many years and thereby avoid disjointed 

and ineffective implementation.

For example, applying only a counternarcotics lens (i.e., seeking to stem 

the drug trade), investigating and arresting any illicit drug trafficker would 

appear to be as worthwhile as investigating and arresting traffickers 

connected to an insurgency or corrupt government officials engaged 

in the drug trade. But if the policy guidance is that counternarcotics 

activities should support larger U.S. security and governance goals, then 

the insurgency-connected trafficker and corrupt official become higherpriority targets.

Similarly, systematically incorporating a counternarcotics perspective 

into all development programming would better equip agencies and 

implementing partners to recognize the potential counternarcotics impacts 

of their interventions. It would also promote steps to ensure projects do not 

inadvertently facilitate poppy production. 

4. U.S. counternarcotics strategies and programs should be based on a

robust understanding of how the illicit drug economy functions and 

how it relates to local socioeconomic and political conditions.

Policymakers and planners must consider local context when designing 

counterdrug programs and evaluating their contribution to the overall 

reconstruction effect. In Afghanistan, policymakers sometimes assumed 

that a counterdrug intervention—whether eradication, rural development, 

or interdiction—would have the same effect in different locations, 

regardless of local conditions. However, this was often not the case. 

For example, the destruction of drug crops in a district with few viable 

alternatives and where insurgent groups hold sway will likely lead to 

different outcomes than eradication in areas under government control. 

Similarly, investments in rural development, such as irrigation, might 

support agricultural diversification in an area where there are opportunities 

to produce and sell legal crops, while in other areas they may inadvertently 

support increased opium production. The failure to accurately evaluate 

the rural Afghan economy often led to overly simplistic crop replacement 

programs that failed to fill the economic gap left by decreased opium 

production or yield lasting poppy reductions. 

Further, drug production often thrives in areas of limited state presence. 

Counternarcotics programs should account for that fact and be designed 

to bolster state influence rather than deliver short-term, unsustainable 

reductions in drug production. 
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5. To implement a balanced counternarcotics strategy, development 

programs and eradication should be collocated on the ground. In 

addition, tracking funding by strategy component is critical for 

effective oversight and evaluation of counternarcotics efforts.

U.S. counternarcotics strategies for Afghanistan articulated a balance of 

different counterdrug programs, but lacked the monitoring and evaluation 

mechanisms necessary to ensure that balance was achieved on the ground. 

Without consistent monitoring of program location, including the kind of 

information available through GIS imagery, policymakers are unable to 

assess whether complementary interventions are being implemented in the 

same areas. More broadly, they are unable to assess which programs or 

combination of programs deliver the best outcomes over time. 

Similarly, the failure to track expenditures by strategy pillar made it difficult 

to assess whether the resource allocations matched strategic priorities. 

An accurate accounting of expenditures by the strategy component they 

support provides a valuable tool for both Congress and executive branch 

agencies to evaluate and adjust funding in subsequent years. 

Effective monitoring of resource allocation and physical program location 

can help ensure implementation matches strategic intent and prevent a 

disjointed counternarcotics effort.

6. Development assistance programs should include measures to mitigate

the risk of programs inadvertently contributing to drug production 

and trafficking. 

Prior to final approval of project proposals, development programs are 

typically required to address a number of cross-cutting issues, including 

human rights, poverty alleviation, gender, and the environment. In a country 

like Afghanistan, where the economy is highly dependent on the production 

and trade of illicit drugs and where the population is increasingly affected 

by problem drug use, this list of cross-cutting issues should include 

narcotics. Program designers need to consider both the intended and 

unintended development and counternarcotics outcomes. 

For example, the provision of irrigation and agricultural inputs, such 

as fertilizer, and the increase in the yield of staples, such as wheat, can 

increase poppy cultivation if not complemented by other interventions 

that support farmers in diversifying their livelihoods. In those cases where 

interventions might lead to an increase in the production and trade of 

opiates, mitigating actions must be pursued. 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

7. Development assistance programs that aim to incentivize a shift away

from illicit drug production should be sustained for more than five 

years, support farmers’ household income diversification, and consider 

the needs of different socioeconomic groups. 

Development programs should be designed to help farmers achieve a mix 

of income sources rather than attempting to replace poppy with another 

crop. Enduring reductions in drug-crop cultivation are best supported 

by diversifying farmers’ income sources, including increased high-value 

horticultural crops, reductions in dependence on staples like wheat, and 

non-farm income. Effective development programs must also account for 

all parts of the rural population that depend on drug production, not just 

landowners. Interventions that target landowners but ignore the land-poor 

can impoverish the rural population, leading to the relocation of drugcrop production and fueling instability, as was the case with the Helmand 

Food Zone. 

Furthermore, these interventions must be sustained for more than five 

years. Perennial crops take four to five years to reach their full production 

potential. To help communities permanently transition away from drugcrop cultivation, therefore, development assistance programs should be 

sustained and conduct monitoring and evaluation at least over a period of 

five years. 

8. Eradication can be an effective deterrent to drug-crop cultivation when 

undertaken in areas where viable alternative livelihoods to drug-crop 

cultivation exist and the state has an enduring presence. 

As with rural development programs, eradication efforts must account 

for variations in the socioeconomic and political realities on the ground. 

Geospatial analysis shows that poppy crop destruction in Afghanistan failed 

to deliver lasting reductions in cultivation in areas where viable economic 

alternatives did not exist. Eradication undermined economic growth and 

support for the Afghan government when conducted in contested areas 

where the Afghan state had limited influence and control. 

Practitioners must take a more holistic and long-term approach to 

assessing the effects of eradication that considers effects on other crops 

cultivated, economic growth, stability, and governance over the long 

term. When eradication is conducted in areas firmly controlled by the 

government and combined with alternative livelihood sources that provide 

sufficient replacement income, it can be an effective deterrent to drugcrop cultivation.
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9. The U.S. government should strive to reach consensus with the

host nation and other partner countries on counternarcotics goals 

and measures. Lack of consensus can alienate host and partner 

governments and preclude a cohesive counternarcotics effort.

A push for counterdrug programs that are not widely supported—or are 

opposed outright—by the host-nation government or coalition partners 

can undermine the unity of the counternarcotics effort, damage bilateral 

relationships, and complicate the pursuit of U.S. objectives on other fronts. 

Efforts to convince the host-nation government and others to support a 

polarizing program can occupy time and resources that are better directed 

toward broadly supported counternarcotics initiatives, such as bolstering 

interdiction and anticorruption efforts.

An important caveat is that the host-nation government in a major drugproducing or transit country is likely to be influenced by powerful political 

and economic elites who are themselves invested in the drug trade. In cases 

where the host-nation government obstructs a critical investigation and 

prosecution of a high-profile figure involved in the drug trade, U.S. officials 

should use available tools and leverage to try to persuade the government 

to support the law enforcement effort. 

10. Specialized counterdrug units and targeted law enforcement

interdiction efforts have limited impact without a competent judicial 

system or extradition agreements. 

The National Interdiction Unit, Sensitive Investigative Unit, and Special 

Mission Wing are examples of the highly capable counterdrug law 

enforcement units that can be stood up in places like Afghanistan. However, 

these units were built at significant cost to the U.S. government and cannot 

be fully effective without more mature, non-corrupt judicial and law 

enforcement institutions in place. If progress in these larger institutions 

is not commensurate, and if counterdrug units do not have the political 

support and legal independence to conduct investigations, then these 

units have a limited ability to achieve counternarcotics goals. If a host 

nation is unable or unwilling to provide the necessary legal infrastructure 

and political support, or commit to extradite high-value targets, the 

United States should not make significant investments in specialized 

counternarcotics units. 

In addition, the U.S. government should ensure that its various activities in 

country are not working at cross-purposes with respect to these specialized 

counterdrug units. For example, the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

agencies assisting such counterdrug units should de-conflict their efforts so 

intelligence officials are not cultivating drug traffickers as sources, while a 

U.S.-supported counterdrug unit is simultaneously trying to arrest them.

11. U.S. support for host-nation counternarcotics institutions should be

resourced according to the priority that nation is willing and able to 

place on counterdrug efforts. 

Counternarcotics institutions in host nations are ill-equipped to lead a 

successful counterdrug effort without support from senior political leaders 

and agencies that control the resources necessary for that effort. 

Counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan were marked by the creation of 

institutions that often lacked the ability to achieve counternarcotics goals. 

A coordinating agency, such as the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, that lacks 

the budgetary resources, implementing capacity, and political influence to 

direct the efforts of more powerful line ministries has limited effectiveness. 

Provincial Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan units, which fell under 

the command of provincial chiefs of police, were similarly unable to lead 

counterdrug programs without support from the MOI and ANP leadership. 

U.S. counternarcotics assistance should be directed toward creating 

partner institutions capable of achieving positive counterdrug outcomes 

and strengthening the institutions that control the resources necessary for 

those outcomes.

RECOMMENDATIONS 

These recommendations suggest actions for both Congress and executive 

branch agencies to institutionalize the lessons learned from the U.S. 

counternarcotics experience in Afghanistan. They are intended to improve 

counternarcotics outcomes and yield a better return on U.S. investments in 

partner nations. The recommendations aim to inform policy decisions and foster 

institutional improvements within the U.S. government so policymakers are 

better equipped to make the difficult decisions inherent in countering narcotics 

in reconstruction efforts.

Recommendations 1 through 3 are specific to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. 

All other recommendations apply generally to U.S. counternarcotics efforts, 

including ongoing efforts in Afghanistan.
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AFGHANISTAN-SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The U.S. government should finalize its revised counternarcotics

strategy for Afghanistan. This strategy should prioritize efforts to 

disrupt drug-related financial flows to insurgent and terrorist groups, 

promote licit livelihood options for rural communities, and combat 

drug-related corruption within the Afghan government. 

The new, revised U.S. counternarcotics strategy should focus on: 

(1) disrupting insurgent and terrorist groups’ financing from the drug 

trade, informed by a robust understanding of how these networks operate 

at local levels; (2) advancing the development of viable alternative 

livelihoods in more secure rural areas, to include steps to ensure 

development assistance programs do not inadvertently contribute to drug 

production; and (3) combating drug-related corruption within the Afghan 

government. In support of the first and third goals, U.S. agencies should 

continue to assist and mentor the small, specialized Afghan counterdrug 

units that are trusted partners. These units are an important starting point 

for improving Afghan police, investigative, and prosecutorial capacity. All the 

above measures fit within and advance larger U.S. security, development, and 

governance goals. 

Levels of opium poppy cultivation remain an important indicator of 

progress, or lack thereof, against the Afghan drug trade. However, given 

the current security situation, the entrenched nature of the drug trade, and 

limited mobility of U.S. and international actors in Afghanistan, it is not 

realistic to expect U.S. efforts to substantially reduce poppy cultivation. 

Furthermore, an overemphasis on cultivation levels skews policymakers’ 

attention toward measures, like eradication, that may produce short-term 

results, but do little to address the underlying causes of cultivation and 

drug production and may even undermine broader U.S. goals. Thus, the 

United States should not establish a near-term goal to reduce overall levels 

of poppy cultivation.

2. The Director of National Intelligence should produce an annual

assessment of how much funding the Afghan insurgency obtains from 

the drug trade and the extent of the insurgency’s direct involvement in 

that trade. 

The funding the drug trade provides to insurgent and terrorist groups has been 

one of the key justifications for the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan, 

yet there is limited consensus on the extent and nature of these financial flows. 

U.S. government officials publicly cite estimates of how much money insurgent 
180 | CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

groups obtain from the drug trade, but these estimates differ, and official 

statements rarely acknowledge the uncertainty around the figures. A better 

understanding of insurgent financing from the Afghan drug trade is critical to 

designing effective, sustainable efforts to cut off that financing.

The recommended intelligence assessment should provide a consensus 

estimate of the amount of money from Afghan drug cultivation, production, 

and trafficking that is going to insurgent and terrorist groups. The 

assessment should detail how intelligence agencies calculate the consensus 

estimate of funding amounts, and how insurgent groups obtain that money. 

It should also acknowledge the reliability and extent of available sourcing 

on these financial flows, or lack thereof.

This assessment should inform and support ongoing U.S. military and 

civilian efforts to cut off insurgent financing from the drug trade. With this 

assessment, policymakers and implementers would be better equipped 

to judge whether interdiction efforts, such as air strikes on drug labs, are 

likely to impose significant costs on insurgent groups.

The assessment should be provided to the National Security Council, 

executive branch agencies responsible for counternarcotics efforts, and 

relevant congressional committees, to include the Select Committees 

on Intelligence, the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, relevant 

authorizing and appropriating subcommittees, and others. In addition, while 

we assume this assessment would be classified, we recommend a redacted, 

unclassified version be released for public consumption, to strengthen 

understanding of these issues in Congress and among the American public.

3. Given ongoing U.S. military operations and the significant

numbers of U.S. forces in country, civilian leaders should 

coordinate counternarcotics efforts closely with the commander of 

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. 

The State Department, through the U.S. ambassador, should remain the 

lead coordinator for U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, but those 

efforts should also be integrated into military campaign and operational 

plans. Many counterdrug programs in Afghanistan were reliant on the 

security and support provided by U.S. or international coalition forces. 

Until the United States transitions to a more traditional diplomatic and 

security presence in Afghanistan, the leadership of Operation Resolute 

Support and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan will have significant influence over 

resources and factors that make U.S. counternarcotics efforts possible. 
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Additionally, U.S. programs to counter the drug trade can have significant 

effects on the security environment and stabilization goals. 

Counternarcotics efforts, therefore, should be integrated into Resolute 

Support and USFOR-A plans. Doing so would more effectively ensure that 

counternarcotics programming is aligned with broader security goals and 

prevent duplicative or contradictory efforts. 

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Legislative Branch Recommendations

4. Congress should consider strengthening counterdrug reporting

requirements, as set out in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 

amended, and in Section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization 

Act for FY 2003 (Public Law 107-228), to include indicators of longterm drug production trends, such as crop diversification, income 

levels, and the number of people dependent on the drug trade for 

their livelihood.

Section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 2003 

requires the president to submit a report—also known as the “Majors 

List”—identifying each country determined to be a major drug-transit 

country or major illicit drug-producing country. In the Majors List, the 

president identifies any country that has demonstrably failed to make 

substantial efforts to adhere to counternarcotics agreements and take 

certain measures to combat the drug trade, as set forth in U.S. law. 

Currently, the State Department prepares an annual International Narcotics 

Control Strategy Report (INCSR) that serves as the basis for these 

determinations. U.S. agencies, coordinated by the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy and based on analysis from the CIA’s Crime and Narcotics 

Center, also prepare annual drug-crop cultivation estimates. 

The INCSR and these estimates include a range of indicators on a country’s 

drug-crop cultivation, drug production, and counternarcotics efforts. 

However, the current reporting requirements should be improved to 

better assess livelihood opportunities for those most dependent on opium 

poppy. The INCSR should include an assessment of diversification in 

licit agricultural products, access to off-farm income opportunities, and 

proximity to roads and markets. These provide a more accurate indication 

of the potential for longer-term transitions away from drug production than 

cultivation and production figures do alone. 
182 | CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Inclusion of these additional indicators would enable executive 

branch agencies and Congress to better evaluate counterdrug program 

effectiveness and to make more informed funding decisions.

5. Congress should consider requiring certification from the Secretary

of State that viable alternative livelihoods are in place and potential 

negative outcomes have been considered prior to the obligation of 

funding for drug-crop eradication. 

Eradication efforts in Afghanistan did not result in lasting reductions in 

opium poppy cultivation. Where rural populations lacked viable alternative 

livelihoods, eradication efforts risked undermining the local economy, eroding 

support for the Afghan government, and increasing support for the insurgency. 

Prior to undertaking eradication in a given area, the State Department should 

consider factors related to the presence of alternative livelihoods. These 

factors include access to irrigated land, the extent and availability of highvalue horticulture, and access to education and microfinance. In addition, a 

community’s proximity to markets and roads can be used as a proxy indicator 

of access to non-farm income and sufficient job opportunities.

Congress previously restricted the use of funds for eradication programs 

through the aerial spraying of herbicides unless the State Department 

determined that the president of Afghanistan had requested such programs; this 

recommendation is modeled on that example. Where eradication is pursued, 

Congress should require a robust verification process that uses high-resolution 

imagery and field surveys. Further, multiyear impact monitoring should assess 

the overall effect of eradication on levels of poppy cultivation in subsequent 

growing seasons. Impact monitoring should also determine whether eradication 

is leading to a deterioration in welfare, governance, and security.

6. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees should consider

requiring an annual report from the Secretary of State for each country 

that has been designated a major drug-transit or drug-producing 

country and receives U.S. counternarcotics assistance. The report 

should detail how counternarcotics assistance for a given country 

is coordinated across U.S. agencies, track total U.S. counterdrug 

assistance to that country by fiscal year, and provide a breakdown of 

assistance supporting each objective of the counternarcotics strategy. 

Counternarcotics efforts involve multiple agencies, with a number of different 

funding lines that need to be well-coordinated to ensure programs build on 

one another and make the best use of financial resources. In Afghanistan, 

counterdrug programs were often marked by a lack of unified interagency 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

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goals and little shared understanding of how those programs advanced wider 

U.S. objectives. Oversight was impeded by financial management practices 

that did not account for U.S. expenditure by year, or link resource expenditure 

to different elements of the counternarcotics strategy at the time. Aside 

from planned transfers from State’s International Narcotics Control and Law 

Enforcement account to support DEA operations, interagency collaboration on 

how best to fund Afghan counterdrug programs was largely ad hoc.

Improved interagency coordination is essential to make the best use of 

U.S. resources and, as the coordinator for all counternarcotics programs, 

the State Department should lead this effort. The recommended report 

should encourage the use of counternarcotics assistance appropriated 

across multiple funding lines toward shared goals and help prevent noncomplementary, disjointed programs. 

Requiring an annual report from the Secretary would promote greater 

strategic coherence, improve interagency coordination in countries that 

receive significant counterdrug assistance, and provide Congress with 

improved tools to carry out its oversight responsibilities. 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH RECOMMENDATIONS

7. U.S. agencies responsible for counternarcotics efforts in major drugtransit or drug-producing countries should focus their eradication 

efforts in areas that are more secure, have persistent state presence, 

and offer more diverse livelihood opportunities. 

One of the positive counternarcotics stories to emerge from Afghanistan 

was that, despite overall increases in poppy cultivation and production 

since 2002, some provinces and districts saw temporary reductions in 

poppy cultivation. In these limited areas, better security and economic 

conditions allowed some Afghans to diversify their livelihoods away from 

opium poppy. Focusing eradication efforts in areas with improved security 

and where alternative livelihoods exist is more likely to achieve lasting 

results. Eradication metrics and development program plans should be 

more localized to encourage this kind of targeted intervention. Focusing on 

areas where the state has a persistent presence and where there are viable 

alternatives to illicit incomes should also help to build popular support for 

the government rather than impoverishing or alienating local populations.
184 | CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

8. The Secretary of State should require that, for each country designated

a major drug-transit or drug-producing country and receiving U.S. 

counternarcotics assistance, the U.S. ambassador to that country 

convene all U.S. agencies providing counternarcotics assistance 

to design a strategy that identifies actionable steps to integrate 

a counternarcotics perspective into larger security, development, 

and governance objectives. This strategy should be devised in close 

cooperation with the recipient country and should set forth practical 

and sustainable counterdrug goals. 

The number of agencies and offices providing counterdrug funding, 

equipment, and assistance contributed to the lack of coherence across 

the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan. The lack of a consistent, 

shared strategy was exacerbated by the low priority often given to 

counternarcotics efforts by senior U.S. officials in country. 

The U.S. ambassador is best placed to lead an interagency strategy that 

coordinates all assistance around common goals and wider security, 

development, and governance objectives. This strategy should be tailored 

and resourced according to the priority given to counterdrug efforts within 

the overall mission and by the host-nation and partner governments. Hostnation agreement and buy-in are critical to ensuring a coordinated and 

viable counternarcotics effort. The U.S. ambassador should ensure that any 

proposed strategy aligns with host-nation goals and does not inadvertently 

hinder efforts to meet these goals.

9. The USAID Administrator should require an assessment of the

potential impact a development project could have on illicit crop 

cultivation prior to obligating funds for development programs in 

major drug-transit or drug-producing countries. 

Investments in agriculture, economic growth, and governance can 

support efforts to reduce the negative impact of the drug trade, but can 

also inadvertently make matters worse. To ensure current and future 

development programs in major drug-producing countries fully factor 

in how assistance could affect the production of illicit drugs, USAID 

should adopt counternarcotics mainstreaming guidelines similar to those 

included in the 2006 World Bank article, “Treating the Opium Problem in 

World Bank Operations in Afghanistan.”963 These guidelines provide an 

analytic framework to assess how development activities may affect the 

counternarcotics effort and identify any risks that need to be managed to 

ensure development projects do not inadvertently make matters worse. 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 185

10. U.S. agencies responsible for counternarcotics efforts should use 

geospatial imagery, crop mapping, and other effective monitoring and 

evaluation systems to more accurately capture both development and 

counternarcotics outcomes. This data should be shared among all 

U.S. agencies with counterdrug responsibilities.

Current methods of assessing the performance and impact of development 

programs implemented in drug-producing areas, particularly surveys, are 

unreliable and do not provide verifiable data on program outcomes. In a 

challenging security environment like Afghanistan, it is extremely difficult 

to assess survey accuracy. In contrast, geospatial data derived from highresolution imagery provide robust insights into program outputs and 

outcomes, including livelihood diversification, which can be used to more 

objectively assess the results of both rural development investments and 

efforts to reduce farmer dependency on opium production. Nevertheless, 

USAID and State currently make very limited use of geospatial imagery as a 

tool for program coordination or monitoring and evaluation.

GIS imagery analysis can clearly link development program inputs, such 

as irrigation improvements or greenhouse construction, with drug-crop 

cultivation levels in subsequent years to determine which programs 

contributed to reduced—or increased—cultivation in subsequent years. 

This kind of monitoring and evaluation should be required for development 

assistance in drug-producing regions.

11. U.S. agencies charged with reporting to Congress on drug-crop

cultivation, eradication, production, and trafficking estimates should 

include caveats regarding the reliability of those figures and level of 

confidence in them. 

All narcotics-related reporting needs to be presented to senior policy 

makers with the appropriate caveats and warnings about the reliability 

of the data, similar to the caveats required in intelligence reporting. In 

Afghanistan, key data sets and reports that have proven methodologically 

weak or inaccurate, such as eradication figures prior to 2008, were 

detrimental to policy decisions and program design. Strengthened analytic 

and reporting standards would help prevent such problematic data from 

unduly influencing U.S. counternarcotics policymaking and program design.
186 | CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

12. USAID should have primary responsibility for designing and

administering development programs in drug-producing countries. 

INL should focus on areas where it has a comparative advantage, 

such as strengthening the rule of law, building law enforcement and 

interdiction capacity, and initiating demand-reduction programs. 

USAID has a comparative advantage over other U.S. agencies in managing 

development programs. INL and U.S. military entities should not try to 

duplicate the development expertise housed within USAID by administering 

their own development programs. INL should focus on strengthening 

the rule of law, reducing demand, and building law enforcement and 

interdiction capacity. Designating USAID as the primary agency to design 

and administer development programs in drug-producing countries would 

also encourage the agency to integrate counternarcotics measures into its 

wider program of activities.

13. State, DOD, and Justice should consider supporting small, specialized

counternarcotics units as a means to build host-nation counterdrug 

capacity. However, this assistance should be proportional to the 

willingness and capacity of host-nation leaders to support such units, 

and should be coordinated with broader U.S. efforts to strengthen 

political, security, and judicial institutions.

Even in a contingency environment such as Afghanistan, it is possible 

to develop well-trained, capable counterdrug units. However, their 

effectiveness in combating the drug trade is likely to be hampered by a 

weak judicial system and insufficient support from host-nation political 

leaders. When supporting such units, U.S. agencies must therefore set 

realistic goals and timelines that acknowledge the difficult operating 

environment. Ideally, U.S. support should be maintained over many years 

to build relationships and institutional capacity. Further, these efforts 

should be coupled with and integrated into broader U.S. and international 

efforts to advance reform in the host nation’s law enforcement and judicial 

systems. Specialized units ultimately depend on larger political, judicial, 

and security institutions to succeed.

At the same time, U.S. investments in these units should be proportional 

to the host-nation government’s level of commitment to achieving 

counternarcotics goals. If host-nation political leaders actively work to 

obstruct the activities of specialized units, U.S. agencies should reconsider 

the extent to which they support those units and consider applying more 

robust conditionality to future assistance.


JUNE 2018 | 189

USAID/Afghanistan photo

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

APPENDIX A: GIS ANNEX

This appendix contains original GIS imagery that Alcis Holdings Ltd. 

provided to SIGAR, as well as imagery that SIGAR commissioned from MDA 

Information Systems LLC. Images appear in the order in which they are referred 

to in the report. Imagery in this appendix falls into one of two categories: 

1. Some imagery serves as the basis for figures that appear in the body of the 

report. These figures were redesigned by SIGAR and retain the accuracy of 

the underlying data, but present the imagery in a manner consistent with 

SIGAR’s publication style. This category includes figures A.1, A.3, A.5, A.8, 

A.11, A.12, and A.14.

2. Other imagery informed our analysis and is referred to in the report. 

However, these images were not redesigned by SIGAR and do not appear in 

the body of the report. This category includes figures A.2, A.4, A.6, A.7, A.9, 

A.10, A.13, A.15, and A.16.
190 | APPENDIX A

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FIGURE A.1

CROP MAPPING FOR NAD ALI IN HELMAND PROVINCE (SITE A)

April 21, 2002 (1.2 ha poppy). Poppy is 6% of 

total agriculture. No eradication data in grid.

April 20, 2011 (10.1 ha poppy). Poppy is 17% 

of total agriculture. Eradication within vicinity, 

but not in grid.

April 23, 2009 (30.6 ha poppy). Poppy is 

45% of total agriculture. No eradication within 

2.5 km.

April 29, 2012 (6.6 ha poppy). Poppy is 14% 

of total agriculture. Significant eradication in 

vicinity and grid.

April 7, 2010 (39.6 ha poppy). Poppy is 60% of 

total agriculture. No eradication within 3 km.

March 29, 2013 (10.6 ha poppy). Poppy is 21% 

of total agriculture. Significant eradication in 

vicinity, one grid location.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 191

Poppy

Wheat

Orchard

Vineyard

Other Crops

Prepared

+ Eradication

April 18, 2014 (4.9 ha poppy). Poppy is 8% of 

total agriculture. Some eradication in vicinity, 

one grid location.

April 7, 2015 (6.1 ha poppy). Poppy is 12% of 

total agriculture. No eradication data.

April 22, 2016 (4.0 ha poppy). Poppy is 6% of 

total agriculture. No eradication data.

Note: At a different site in Nad Ali, poppy cultivation fell even before the area was targeted for eradication, suggesting that other variables, such as security presence, influenced the reductions in cultivation. GIS data of this area of Nad Ali from 2002 to 2016 shows opium poppy cultivation dropping by 75 

percent—from 39.6 hectares to 10.1 hectares—between 2010 and 2011 during the influx of military forces and before any eradication took place. More 

marginal reductions in poppy cultivation occurred between 2011 and 2014, with a decrease from 10.1 hectares to 4.9 hectares after repeated years of 

eradication in the area.
192 | APPENDIX A

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FIGURE A.2

CROP MAPPING FOR NAD ALI IN HELMAND PROVINCE (SITE B)

April 21, 2002 (5.7 ha poppy). Poppy is 27% of 

total agriculture. No eradication data.

April 7, 2010 (33.8 ha poppy). Poppy is 43% 

of total agriculture. Some eradication within 

vicinity, but none in grid.

April 16, 2008 (33.9 ha poppy). Poppy is 47% 

of total agriculture. Significant eradication in 

vicinity and grid.

April 20, 2011 (10.2 ha poppy). Poppy is 15% 

of total agriculture. Significant eradication in 

vicinity, some in grid.

April 23, 2009 (30.5 ha poppy). Poppy is 39% 

of total agriculture. Significant eradication in 

vicinity, two grid locations.

April 29, 2012 (9.2 ha poppy). Poppy is 13% 

of total agriculture. Significant eradication in 

vicinity, two grid locations.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
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JUNE 2018 | 193

March 29, 2013 (12.5 ha poppy). Poppy is 19% 

of total agriculture. Significant eradication in 

vicinity and some in grid.

April 18, 2014 (11.8 ha poppy). Poppy is 17% 

of total agriculture. Significant eradication in 

vicinity and grid.

April 7, 2015 (11.1 ha poppy). Poppy is 16% of 

total agriculture. No eradication data.

April 22, 2016 (15.8 ha poppy). Poppy is 20% 

of total agriculture. No eradication data.

Note: Significant eradication efforts in Nad Ali did not reduce overall opium poppy 

cultivation within the research site. GIS data shows sustained poppy cultivation from 

2008 to 2010, despite significant eradication in 2008 and 2009. Poppy cultivation 

dropped 66 percent from 2010 to 2011 despite no eradication within the grid, 

suggesting that factors other than eradication (like the post-2009 surge in U.S. and 

Afghan military presence) drove reductions. Significant eradication efforts between 

2011 and 2014 did not reduce opium poppy cultivation levels within this site. 

Poppy

Wheat

Orchard

Vineyard

Other Crops

Prepared

+ Eradication
194 | APPENDIX A

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FIGURE A.3

MAPPING OF GOOD PERFORMERS INITIATIVE PROJECTS, 2008–2015

Note: GPS data for the Good Performers Initiative (GPI) shows many of the GPI projects were located in close proximity to urban provincial centers rather than rural, poppy-dependent areas.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 195

FIGURE A.4

HELMAND FOOD ZONE WHEAT SEED DISTRIBUTION, 2009

Note: Communities near Lashkar Gah that experienced repeated crop destruction between 2006 and 2014 received a relatively small 

amount of wheat seeds distributed as part of the HFZ initiative in 2009. For errors or more information, contact info@alcis.org.

Source: Copyright © 2018 Alcis Holdings Ltd.
196 | APPENDIX A

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FIGURE A.5

MAPPING OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ERADICATION IN HELMAND PROVINCE, 2006–2015

Note: From 2006 to 2014, the district of Nad Ali was subject to the highest cumulative density of crop destruction in Helmand Province. At the same time, 

however, there were almost no alternative development projects in the immediate areas that experienced repeated eradication.

This image is based on MDA analysis of SIGAR-provided data. The data set for alternative and rural development programs includes those programs that 

identified reducing poppy cultivation as a program objective. One exception is Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) South, a stabilization program which supported 

a large number of irrigation programs in Helmand Province; SIKA South GPS coordinates are included in this data set. Without the inclusion of SIKA South 

data, the number of development projects in areas with high cumulative crop destruction levels would likely be reduced.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 197

FIGURE A.6

REDUCTION OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN HELMAND PROVINCE, 2014

Note: This figure shows alternative development and rural development programs in Helmand Province in 2014. Alternative development projects were significantly reduced after the 2014 drawdown.

This image is based on MDA analysis of SIGAR-provided data. The data set for alternative and rural development programs includes those programs that 

identified reducing poppy cultivation as a program objective. One exception is Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) South, a stabilization program which supported a 

large number of irrigation programs in Helmand Province; SIKA South GPS coordinates are included in this data set. Without the inclusion of SIKA South data, 

the number of development projects in areas with high cumulative crop destruction levels would likely be reduced.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
198 | APPENDIX A

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FIGURE A.7

REDUCTION OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN HELMAND PROVINCE, 2015

Note: This figure shows alternative development and rural development programs in Helmand Province in 2015. Alternative development projects were significantly 

reduced after the 2014 drawdown.

This image is based on MDA analysis of SIGAR-provided data. The data set for alternative and rural development programs includes those programs that identified reducing poppy cultivation as a program objective. One exception is Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) South, a stabilization program which supported a large number of irrigation 

programs in Helmand Province; SIKA South GPS coordinates are included in this data set. Without the inclusion of SIKA South data, the number of development projects 

in areas with high cumulative crop destruction levels would likely be reduced.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 199

FIGURE A.8

MAPPING OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ERADICATION IN HELMAND PROVINCE, 2013

Note: Mapping of alternative development programs and eradication efforts in 2013 shows high levels of eradication in eastern Marjah. At the same time, there were 

no alternative development programs undertaken in the areas with the most intense eradication in 2013, despite the fact that households were highly dependent on 

opium poppy. 

This image is based on MDA analysis of SIGAR-provided data. The data set for alternative and rural development programs includes those programs that identified reducing poppy cultivation as a program objective. One exception is Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) South, a stabilization program which supported a large number of irrigation 

programs in Helmand Province; SIKA South GPS coordinates are included in this data set. Without the inclusion of SIKA South data, the number of development projects 

in areas with high cumulative crop destruction levels would likely be reduced.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
200 | APPENDIX A

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FIGURE A.9

MAPPING OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ERADICATION IN HELMAND PROVINCE, 2009

Note: Mapping of alternative development programs and eradication efforts in 2009 shows a high level of eradication on the border between Lashkar Gah 

and Nad Ali in Helmand Province. Few alternative development programs took place here in 2009, despite the fact that households were highly dependent on 

opium poppy.

This image is based on MDA analysis of SIGAR-provided data. The data set for alternative and rural development programs includes those programs that 

identified reducing poppy cultivation as a program objective. One exception is Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) South, a stabilization program which supported a 

large number of irrigation programs in Helmand Province; SIKA South GPS coordinates are included in this data set. Without the inclusion of SIKA South data, 

the number of development projects in areas with high cumulative crop destruction levels would likely be reduced.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 201

FIGURE A.10

CROP MAPPING FOR SHNA JAMA IN HELMAND PROVINCE, 2008–2017

Note: Crop mapping of Shna Jama, in the Nad Ali district of Helmand Province, from 2008 to 2017 shows significant growth of poppy 

in areas that were repeatedly targeted by eradication, yet received little alternative development assistance. For errors or more 

information, contact info@alcis.org.

Source: Copyright © 2018 Alcis Holdings Ltd.
202 | APPENDIX A

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FIGURE A.11

MAPPING OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ERADICATION IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE, 2005–2014

Note: Some areas where there was a high concentration of eradication, such as the southern district of Achin and the northwestern part of Khugyani, received relatively little alternative 

development assistance.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 203

March 22, 2006 (0.12 ha poppy). Poppy is <1% 

of total agriculture. No eradication efforts within 

2 km

April 6, 2011 (15.4 ha poppy). Poppy is 24% 

of total agriculture. Some eradication efforts 

in vicinity and two eradication points in center 

of grid.

April 8, 2012 (21.2 ha poppy). Poppy is 36% of 

total agriculture. Significant eradication efforts 

in vicinity and within grid.

April 8, 2013 (24.7 ha poppy). Poppy is 39% of 

total agriculture. No eradication efforts within 

5 km.

April 20, 2016 (43.8 ha poppy). Poppy is 69% 

of total agriculture. No eradication data.

Note: Crop mapping shows significant growth of poppy in areas that were targeted by eradication, with poppy cultivation rising from less than 1 percent of the total land in 2006 to 69 percent in 2016.

FIGURE A.12

CROP MAPPING OF KHUGYANI IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE, 2006–2016

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.

Poppy

Wheat

Orchard

Vineyard

Other Crops

Prepared

+ Eradication
204 | APPENDIX A

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FIGURE A.13

LAYERS OF CONTROL, NANGARHAR PROVINCE, 2017

Note: This 2017 poppy probability map of Nangarhar Province highlights the correlation between areas of government control and the decreased likelihood 

of growing poppy. The opposite is true in areas controlled by the insurgency, except for those areas under the control of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, 

where a ban on poppy has been imposed. Limited Afghan government control in the province illustrates the difficulty of sustaining poppy reductions made 

prior to the drawdown of U.S. forces. For errors or more information, contact info@alcis.org.

Source: Copyright © 2018 Alcis Holdings Ltd.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 205

FIGURE A.14

MAPPING OF IRRIGATION PROJECTS IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE, 2004–2016

Note: Increased poppy cultivation is a risk when investing in irrigation projects in areas where there is a long history of and high dependency on opium poppy cultivation.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
206 | APPENDIX A

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

FIGURE A.15

MAPPING OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE, 2005

Note: In the districts of Khugyani, Chapahar, and Rodat, the majority of alternative development investment through 2005 was in orchard development.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 207

FIGURE A.16

MAPPING OF ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ERADICATION IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE, 2007

Note: There was a continued focus on orchard development in 2007 in the districts of Khugyani, Chapahar, and Rodat, consistent with previous years.

Source: Imagery provided by MDA Information Systems LLC.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

208 | APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY

SIGAR conducts its lessons learned program under the authority of Public 

Law 110-181 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and 

in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 

Efficiency’s Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General. 

These standards require that we carry out our work with integrity, objectivity, 

and independence, and provide information that is factually accurate and 

reliable. SIGAR’s lessons learned reports are broad in scope and based on 

a range of source material. To achieve the goal of high quality, the reports 

are subject to extensive review by subject matter experts and relevant 

U.S. government agencies. 

The Counternarcotics research team drew upon a wide array of publicly 

available sources, including reports by USAID, State, DOD, DEA, GAO, 

Congressional Research Service, UNODC, the Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan, and coalition partners. The report incorporates 

congressional testimony from many senior U.S. officials. In addition, the 

research team consulted unclassified and declassified material from an archive 

maintained by Georgetown University that contains the papers of former USAID 

Administrator Andrew Natsios. 

These official sources were complemented by hundreds of nongovernmental 

sources, including books, think tank reports, journal articles, press 

reports, academic studies, analytical reports by international and advocacy 

organizations, and nearly two decades of fieldwork conducted in Afghanistan by 

Dr. David Mansfield. 

The research team also benefited from SIGAR’s access to material that is 

not publicly available, including thousands of documents provided by U.S. 

government agencies. State provided cables, strategy documents, internal 

memos and briefings, and planning and programmatic documents. USAID 

provided GPS information and planning and program design documents for 

alternative development projects. DOD provided policy directives, strategy 

documents, and internal planning papers. DEA provided interagency agreements 

and program assessments. The CIA’s CNC provided national-level and provinciallevel data for Afghan opium poppy cultivation since 1999. The team also 

received several unpublished drafts of government papers that proved important 

to our analysis, for example, a comprehensive USAID assessment of alternative 

development programming. A body of classified material, including some U.S. 

embassy cables and intelligence reports, provided helpful context; however, as 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 209

an unclassified document, this report makes no use of that material. Finally, the 

team also drew from SIGAR’s own work, embodied in its quarterly reports to 

Congress, investigations, audits, inspections, and special project reports.

While the documentary evidence tells a story, it cannot substitute for 

the experience, knowledge, and wisdom of people who participated 

in counternarcotics-related efforts in Afghanistan. The research team 

interviewed or held informal discussions with more than 80 individuals with 

direct involvement in or knowledge of U.S., Afghan, and coalition partners’ 

counternarcotics efforts. Interviews were conducted with current and former 

U.S. civilian and military officials who deployed to Afghanistan, intelligence 

officers, and officials who oversaw the counternarcotics effort from Washington; 

current and former officials from the Afghan government, UK government, and 

international organizations like UNODC; experts from academia, think tanks, 

and NGOs; and contractors who implemented counternarcotics measures, such 

as eradication, in Afghanistan. 

Interviews provided valuable insights into the rationale behind decisions, 

debates within and between agencies, and frustrations that spanned the years, 

but often remained unwritten. Due, in part, to the politically sensitive nature 

of many counternarcotics-related policy decisions and activities, a majority 

of the interviewees wished to remain anonymous. For those still working in 

government, confidentiality was particularly important. Therefore, to preserve 

anonymity, our interview citations often cite, for example, a “senior U.S. 

official” or “former UK official.” The research team conducted its interviews 

in Washington and during research trips to Afghanistan, the UK, Austria, and 

Germany. The team also drew upon a significant body of interviews conducted 

for other SIGAR lessons learned reports, such as Corruption in Conflict: 

Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. 

While Counternarcotics reflects careful, thorough consideration of this 

wide range of sources, it is not an exhaustive treatment of the topic. Given 

the timeline and scale of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and the divided 

responsibility for counternarcotics among coalition partners, the report does 

not aim to fully address how tens of thousands of U.S. civilian and military 

officials dealt with counternarcotics on a daily basis since 2002. Rather, 

the report focuses on key events and trends, and provides context on the 

development of the counternarcotics effort, relevant U.S. policies and initiatives, 

and competing priorities. From these, we derive lessons and recommendations 

to inform ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, as well as current and future 

contingency operations. 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

210 | APPENDIX B

The report underwent an extensive process of peer review. The team sought and 

received feedback on the full draft report from 14 subject matter experts. These 

experts included Americans, Afghans, and representatives from ISAF nations, 

each of whom had significant experience working on or in Afghanistan. These 

reviewers provided thoughtful, detailed comments on the report, which we 

incorporated, as possible. 

The Departments of Defense, State, Justice, and Treasury, as well as USAID 

and DEA, were also given an opportunity to formally review and comment on 

the report, after which we met with agency representatives to receive their 

feedback. Although we incorporated agencies’ comments where appropriate, the 

analysis, conclusions, and recommendations of this report remain SIGAR’s own. 

GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM METHODOLOGY

The GIS analysis in this report uses imagery provided by MDA Information 

Systems LLC and Alics Holdings Ltd. The MDA imagery relies upon three sets 

of GPS data: (1) coordinates of USAID-funded alternative development and 

rural development programs; (2) coordinates of the plots of opium poppy crops 

destroyed by both Governor-Led Eradication and the Poppy Eradication Force; 

and (3) coordinates of projects funded by the Good Performers Initiative. 

SIGAR provided numerous alternative development and rural development 

reports to MDA which were then subset by MDA based on their relevance 

to opium poppy cultivation. The data set for USAID-funded alternative and 

rural development programs includes those programs that identified reducing 

poppy cultivation as a program objective. If the development program did 

not identify this as an objective, it was not included in our analysis. One 

exception is Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) South, a stabilization program which 

supported a large number of irrigation programs in Helmand Province; SIKA 

South GPS coordinates are included in this data set. Because these irrigation 

programs were conducted in areas with high poppy probability, ignoring them 

would overlook a key poppy-relevant development input. While SIKA South 

was included for Helmand, SIKA East was not included in the Nangarhar data 

set. MDA omitted project data for which it was not possible to match project 

names, descriptions, coordinates and other information with a high degree of 

confidence. The USAID-funded projects for which SIGAR received GPS data 

spanned 2009–2014 in Helmand Province and 2005–2014 in Nangarhar Province. 

The second data set, eradication data, contains the GPS coordinates of the 

field locations where the Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) and Governor-Led 

Eradication programs eradicated opium poppy crops from 2006 to 2014. The 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 211

data were provided to SIGAR by Alcis, a private contractor that maintained an 

inventory of eradication data, based on data collected by UNODC, the Afghan 

Ministry of Counter Narcotics, and the PEF. In Helmand, there were 29,385 

eradication points collected from 2006 to 2014, 24,841 of which were GLE 

efforts and 4,544 of which were PEF efforts. In Nangarhar, there were 14,781 

eradication points, all collected by GLE.

The third data set, coordinates of projects funded by GPI, was provided by 

INL. INL regularly reported on the status of GPI projects, which included 

photographs with embedded GPS coordinates of each GPI project. This dataset 

was used to map the GPI effort on a national map. 

One significant challenge to our GIS analysis was the quality of data U.S. 

agencies had and were willing to share. Problems with the specificity of the 

GPS data for rural development programs due, in part, to limitations of the 

data collection system, precluded a closer inspection of the outputs and 

impact of individual projects. For example, Afghan Info, a database that USAID 

uses to track development projects, does not provide the specific geographic 

coordinates of the projects implemented. Through a drop-down menu, Afghan 

Info only allows those entering GPS data to provide a province, district, and 

village name. Once a village name is entered, coordinates are automatically 

assigned. The design of Afghan Info means that only the GPS coordinates of the 

village center are recorded, even though the implementing partner may have 

the true coordinates of the irrigation system, orchard, or greenhouse provided 

by a project. This limitation of Afghan Info prevents the kind of detailed GIS 

analysis that could be conducted if GPS coordinates were collected directly and 

accurately from implementing partners.

We further recognize that the alternative development data do not constitute an 

exhaustive list of the development programs implemented in a given area. First, 

it is unclear whether all of the individual projects completed by implementing 

partners are included in the GPS data provided to us by USAID. Second, our 

analysis did not include alternative development projects implemented by 

other countries. 

The rural development data in Nangarhar also have omissions. For example, 

they do not include some of the rural development programs funded by the 

EU, which was a major contributor to such programs in Nangarhar. Additional 

data omissions include DOD’s CERP projects, which were excluded because of 

security classification.

The GIS crop mapping analysis used key locations within Helmand and 

Nangarhar. This analysis mapped the crop levels and patterns before, during, 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

212 | APPENDIX B

and after counternarcotics interventions took place to identify trends in poppy 

cultivation in the area. To minimize bias in selecting sites for our analysis, a 

grid layer was generated over areas in Helmand and Nangarhar—where each 

grid needed to contain at least some agriculture—of 1000m by 1000m, or 100 

hectares in size. Next, a weighting system that integrated different intervention 

combinations was generated and applied to the grid. To better understand 

the causal factors that led to changes in opium poppy cultivation, sites were 

then prioritized based on the presence of alternative development projects 

or eradication sites. The availability of high-resolution imagery for each site 

during appropriate time frames was assessed, further limiting the grids available 

for analysis.

Once a site was selected for analysis, the available imagery was formatted 

and examined to identify crop patterns within the grid. The six crop classes 

identified were poppy, wheat, orchard, vineyard, other crops, and prepared 

fields. To identify poppy, the analysts looked at many key indicators, including 

color, texture, image date versus crop cycle, presence of other crops in the area, 

eradicated fields in the area, and fields behind courtyard walls. After the fields 

were delineated, each field was reviewed multiple times in a rigorous, qualitycontrolled process, until analysts and subject matter experts reached consensus 

on which fields were, in fact, poppy. 

The goal of the provincial intervention maps was to chart the spatial 

distribution of alternative development projects, poppy eradication locations, 

and coalition security sites. More than 14,000 poppy eradication points were 

plotted. Each year’s eradication data were used to generate maps showing the 

density of points across the province, with red areas containing the highest 

number of eradication points and green areas containing the least. Each of the 

alternative development projects shown on the map were categorized by sector: 

agriculture, orchards, agribusiness, infrastructure, irrigation, education, and 

gender/micro-enterprise. Multiple and duplicate points per project were reduced 

wherever possible to approximately one point per project for better mapping 

clarity. The location of all known security sites, such as bases and checkpoints, 

were displayed on each provincial map with either an active or inactive/

transferred symbol. 

The goal of the national GPI map was to chart the spatial distribution of GPI 

projects from 2008 through 2015. Due to multiple and duplicate points per 

project, the original 520 points that contained GPS coordinate data were 

reduced to 292 data points, or approximately one point per project. Project 

sectors were agriculture, health, transportation, infrastructure, irrigation, 

education, and gender/micro-enterprise. 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 213

BUDGETARY ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

This report also analyzes U.S. government budget data to better understand 

how the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan was resourced across the 

U.S. government and how the allocation of resources changed over time. The 

data that serve as the basis for this analysis were provided to SIGAR by the 

four agencies responsible for the majority of counternarcotics programming 

in Afghanistan—DOD, State, USAID, and DEA—through quarterly data calls. 

The data were supplemented by written communications and meetings with 

relevant government agencies, as well as agency-produced funding documents 

such as Congressional Budget Justifications. Additionally, during the course 

of our research, we worked closely with each agency and solicited their 

feedback to ensure our budgetary figures and analysis accurately reflected true 

funding levels. 

This report’s budgetary analysis attempts to capture all funds that were 

appropriated through a counternarcotics-specific funding line, such as State’s 

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement and DOD’s Drug 

Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities (DOD CN) fund. Our analysis also 

includes funds appropriated through non-counternarcotics funding lines, 

such as the Economic Support Fund, but which went toward programs that 

demonstrated an explicit counterdrug focus. To compare funding across the 

whole of the U.S. government, SIGAR used the term “allocated,” for consistency 

and to incorporate sources that did not always clearly distinguish between 

appropriations, obligations, and disbursements. INCLE budget figures are based 

on obligations reported by INL, as well as Congressional Budget Justifications, 

and information provided by INL according to the first year in which funds were 

made available. For USAID, budget figures are based on the total obligations 

reported for selected programs divided by the program’s total months and 

spread over the lifespan of the project. DOD figures reflect the agency’s position 

that reported DOD CN fund figures are the same for both obligation and 

disbursement. Finally, DEA figures are intended to reflect funding from the DEA 

budget line, as well as transfers from State’s South and Central Asia account. 

All figures are intended to capture obligation rather than disbursement or 

appropriations in order to best reflect the point at which funding decisions were 

made at the agency level. 

DOD, State, USAID, and DEA provided SIGAR with funding data in varying 

formats, including differences in activity type, reporting style, and budget 

terminology. This report’s analysis focused solely on those programs 

implemented from FY 2002 through the end of FY 2017. Because the report’s 

scope did not include an exhaustive review of contract documents from the 

16-year period studied, we did not consider whether money was routed to 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

214 | APPENDIX B

unreported activities; the data provided by the agencies were taken at face 

value. Additionally, while the report recognizes counternarcotics appropriations 

contributed to non-counterdrug programs, SIGAR used the data provided by 

agencies rather than attempting to determine what portion of a program’s 

funding was directed toward achieving counternarcotics goals, and what portion 

was used for another purpose. 

The research team organized the budgetary data into the four strands of 

effort that characterized U.S. counternarcotics activities: interdiction and 

counternarcotics law enforcement, eradication, alternative development, and 

mobilizing Afghan political support and building institutions. Together, these 

four strands accounted for more than 97 percent of the $7.28 billion dollars 

specifically allocated for counternarcotics programming. 

While the four strands align closely with the five pillars of counternarcotics 

(public information, alternative development, eradication, interdiction, and 

justice reform) identified by State in 2005, there are important differences. 

For example, because one of the goals of drug interdiction is a successful 

prosecution and conviction of drug traffickers, the justice reform pillar 

was examined as part of a holistic interdiction and counternarcotics law 

enforcement strand. Additionally, while the Good Performers Initiative 

was sometimes presented as an alternative development program, SIGAR’s 

analysis shows it often served a more political purpose, attempting to motivate 

provincial governors to achieve drug-crop reductions rather than directly 

working to develop new livelihood sources for farmers. For this reason, 

GPI-related funding was considered to be part of the mobilizing political 

support strand. 

The U.S. counternarcotics strategy was not static, but changed over time. 

SIGAR’s analysis of the strands recognizes this evolution; the strands 

are intended to serve as useful categories through which to examine the 

programming and policies that characterized the U.S. counterdrug effort from 

2002 throughout 2017. 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 215

Acronym Definition

ACE Agriculture Credit Enhancement

ADF Agriculture Development Fund

ADP Alternative Development Program

AEF Afghan Eradication Force

AIU Air Interdiction Unit

ALP Alternative Livelihoods Program

ALP Afghan Local Police

ANA Afghan National Army

ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces

ANP Afghan National Police

AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

ASFF Afghan Security Forces Fund

ASNF Afghan Special Narcotics Force 

(or TF-333)

ATFC Afghan Threat Finance Cell

AVIPA Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased 

Production in Agriculture

BADILL Boost Alternative Development 

Intervention through Licit Livelihoods

CDP Community Development Program

CHAMP Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture 

Program

CJIATFShafafiyatCombined Joint Interagency Task 

Force-Shafafiyat

CJIATF-N Combined Joint Interagency Task 

Force-Nexus

CNAT Counter Narcotics Advisory Team

CNC Crime and Narcotics Center (CIA)

CND Counter Narcotics Directorate

CNIK Counter Narcotics Infantry Kandak

CNJC Counter Narcotics Justice Center

CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan

CNTF Counter Narcotics Trust Fund

COIN Counterinsurgency

CPDAP Colombo Plan Drug Advisory Program

CPEF Central Poppy Eradication Force

CRS Congressional Research Service

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan

CT Counterterrorism

DASD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

APPENDIX C: ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym Definition

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and 

Reintegration

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DFID UK Department for International 

Development

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DOD CN DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug 

Activities Fund

DOJ Department of Justice

EU European Union

FAST Foreign-Deployed Advisory and Support 

Teams (DEA)

FinTRACA Financial Transactions and Reports 

Analysis Center for Afghanistan

FIU Financial Investigative Unit

FY Fiscal Year

G8 Group of Eight

GAO Government Accountability Office

GIS Geographic Information System

GLE Governor-Led Eradication

GPI Good Performers Initiative

HFZ Helmand Food Zone

HVT High-Value Target

IDEA-NEW Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives 

for the North, East, and West

INCSR International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (State)

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

JNAC UK Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre

KFZ Kandahar Food Zone

LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan

MAATP Marjah Accelerated Agricultural Transition 

Program

MAIL Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and 

Livestock

MCN Ministry of Counter Narcotics

MOI Ministry of Interior

MOPH Ministry of Public Health

MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 

Development

Acronym Definition

NGO Nongovernmental Organization

NIU National Interdiction Unit

NPP National Priority Program

NSC National Security Council

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD/CNGT Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Counternarcotics and Global Threats

OSDR Organization for Sustainable Development 

and Research

PEF Poppy Eradication Force

PEP Poppy Elimination Program

PMP Performance Management Plan

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

RADP Regional Agricultural Development 

Program

RAMP Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program

SHCDC State High Commission for Drug Control

SIKA Stability in Key Areas

SIU Sensitive Investigative Unit

SMW Special Mission Wing

SRAP Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan

SSR Security Sector Reform

TF-333 Afghan Special Narcotics Force 

TIU Technical Investigative Unit

TMAF Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework

UNDCCP UN Office for Drug Control and Crime 

Prevention

UNDP UN Development Programme

UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USFOR-A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

USIP U.S. Institute of Peace
216 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

1. UNODC, Afghanistan: Annual Opium Survey 

2001, 2001, p. ii; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium 

Survey 2017: Cultivation and Production, 

November 2017, p. 5.

2. Former Afghan minister, SIGAR interview, April 12, 

2016; former Afghan deputy minister, SIGAR 

interview, April 13, 2016; Zalmay Khalilzad, The 

Envoy: From Kabul to the White House, My 

Journey through a Turbulent World, (New York, 

NY: St. Martin’s, 2016), p. 205; former senior DOD 

official, SIGAR interview, May 16, 2016; Thomas 

W. Cawkwell, UK Communication Strategies for 

Afghanistan, 2001–2014 (Farnham, UK: Ashgate 

Publishing Ltd, 2015), p. 90.

3. J. Michael Deal, “Lessons from Drug Crop

Elimination,” memorandum to USAID 

Administrator Andrew Natsios, Andrew Natsios 

Archives, Georgetown University Library, 

December 13, 2001.

4. Brigadier General Lance Bunch, “DOD Press

Briefing by Brigadier General Bunch via teleconference from Kabul, Afghanistan,” NATO Resolute 

Support press briefing, December 13, 2017.

5. For more information on these topics, see: SIGAR,

Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. 

Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-16-58-LL, 

September 2016; SIGAR, Reconstructing the 

Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: 

Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, 

SIGAR-17-62-LL, September 2017; SIGAR, Private 

Sector Development and Economic Growth: 

Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, 

SIGAR-18-38-LL, April 2018.

6. According to the DEA’s Heroin Signature Program, 

which tests seizures of heroin within the United 

States and from U.S. ports of entry, “In 2014, SWA 

[Southwest Asia, which includes Afghanistan] 

accounted for only 1 percent of the total weight 

of heroin [seized].” U.S. Department of Justice, 

DEA, 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment, 

November 2016, pp. 47–49.

7. Acting Assistant Secretary for INL Nancy J.

Powell, “United States Counternarcotics Efforts 

in Afghanistan,” testimony before the House 

International Relations Committee (September 22, 

2005); Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 205.

8. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to United States 

Congress, October 30, 2017, p. 82; SIGAR analysis of counternarcotics funding, based on State, 

DOD, USAID, and DEA responses to SIGAR data 

calls, October 2017; State, INL, FY 2004 Budget 

Justification, June 2003; State, INL, FY 2005 

Budget Justification, April 2004, State, INL, FY 

2006 Budget Justification, April 2005; SIGAR correspondence with INL, March 26, 2018. Budget data 

was organized according to year of appropriation/

allocation and strand of the counternarcotics effort.

9. “Illicit Drugs,” CIA World Factbook website, 

accessed September 29, 2017;William A. Byrd 

and David Mansfield, Afghanistan’s Opium 

Economy: An Agricultural, Livelihoods, and 

Governance Perspective, prepared for the World 

Bank Afghanistan Agriculture Sector Review, June 

23, 2014, pp. 5–6, 11; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium 

Survey Report 2016: Sustainable development in 

an opium production environment, May 2017, 

p. 45.

10. William Byrd, Disease or Symptom? Afghanistan’s 

Bourgeoning Opium Economy in 2017, 

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 

November 2017, p. 1.

11. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, 

November 2017, p. 5.

12. General John W. Nicholson, “Department of 

Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson via 

teleconference from Kabul, Afghanistan,” DOD 

press briefing, November 20, 2017.

13. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2018, p. 182. 

14. SIGAR analysis of FY 2014 budget data obtained

from Security Assistance Monitor, accessed 

February 14, 2018.

15. In March 2002, the Group of Eight (G8) nations met

in Geneva, Switzerland, to map out divided responsibilities for security sector reform in Afghanistan. 

Five independent silos with an appointed lead 

nation were created: military reform (United 

States), police reform (Germany), judicial reform 

(Italy), counternarcotics (UK), and disarmament, 

demobilization, and reintegration (DDR, Japan). 

Mark Sedra, “Security First: Afghanistan’s Security 

Sector Reform Process,” Ploughshares Monitor, 

vol. 24, no. 4 (2003). 

16. Ambassador David Johnson, former Assistant

Secretary of State for INL, correspondence with 

SIGAR, September 2, 2017.

17. U.S. counterdrug policies and programs in

Afghanistan have focused overwhelmingly on 

opium poppy and its derivatives, but Afghanistan 

also produces a significant amount of marijuana. 

Additionally, as of 2010, Afghanistan was the 

world’s largest producer of hashish. Marijuana is 

grown in many provinces and, like opium, is often 

concentrated in areas of instability. However, 

marijuana production has smaller economic and 

political impacts than opium production; the value 

of cannabis resin production has been estimated at 

only 10 to 20 percent of the farm-gate value of opium production. UNODC, Afghanistan Cannabis 

Survey 2009, April 2010, pp. 5, 7. 

18. Byrd and Mansfield, Afghanistan’s Opium 

Economy, World Bank, p. ii; UNODC, Afghanistan 

Opium Survey Report 2016: Sustainable development in an opium production environment, May 

2017, p. 45.

19. Byrd, Disease or Symptom?, AREU, p. 1; SIGAR, 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

April 30, 2018, p. 92. 

20. Edouard Martin and Steven Symansky, 

“Macroeconomic Impact of the Drug Economy and 

Counter-Narcotics Efforts,” in Afghanistan’s Drug 

Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and 

Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy, ed. 

Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd, UNODC 

and the World Bank, November 2006, pp. 27–28, 

31; David Mansfield, From Bad They Made It 

Worse: The Concentration of Opium Poppy in 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 217

Areas of Conflict in the Provinces of Helmand and

Nangarhar, AREU, May 2014, pp. 63, 77.

21. Barnett Rubin and Jake Sherman, CounterNarcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan: The False 

Promise of Crop Eradication, NYU Center on 

International Cooperation, February 2008, pp. 

33–34; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 

Report 2016: Sustainable development in an 

opium production environment, May 2017, p. 13; 

Mansfield, From Bad They Made It Worse, AREU, 

p. 32.

22. Byrd and Mansfield, Afghanistan’s Opium 

Economy, World Bank, pp. 6, 32. 

23. David Mansfield, Resurgence and Reductions: 

Explanations for Changing Levels of Opium 

Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Ghor 

in 2006–2007, AREU, May 2008, p. 27; David 

Mansfield, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: 

Counter-narcotics efforts and their effects in 

Nangarhar and Helmand in the 2010–2011 growing season, AREU, October 2011, p. 35.

24. William A. Byrd and Doris Buddenberg, 

“Introduction and Overview,” in Afghanistan’s 

Drug Industry, UNODC and the World Bank, 

pp. 1, 6; State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy 

for Afghanistan, compiled by the Coordinator 

for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in 

Afghanistan, Ambassador Thomas A. Schweich, 

August 2007, p. 15.

25. DEA Administrator Karen Tandy, testimony before 

the House Committee on Armed Services, hearing 

on “Status of Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 

(June 28, 2006). 

26. Sherard Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul: The 

inside story of the West’s Afghanistan campaign

(London, UK: Harper Press, 2011), p. 81.

27. Joel Hafvenstein, “Afghanistan’s opium strategy 

alternatives—a moment for masterful inactivity?,” 

in The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing 

in Inaction, ed. Whit Mason (New York, NY: 

Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 124–125. 

Hafvenstein cites fieldwork by David Mansfield, 

Mark Shaw, Jonathan Goodhand, and others, describing extensive direct and indirect involvement 

by corrupt officials in the drug trade. 

28. Gretchen Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban, 

U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), August 2009, pp. 

18–21; Inspectors General for State and DOD, 

Interagency Assessment of the Counternarcotics 

Program in Afghanistan, State Report No. 

ISP-I-07-34, DOD Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, 

pp. 10, 50. 

29. UN, First Report of the Analytical Support and 

Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team 

submitted pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) 

concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, September 5, 2012, pp. 13–14.

30. General John W. Nicholson, “Department of 

Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson in 

the Pentagon Briefing Room,” DOD press briefing, 

December 2, 2016; Admiral Mike Mullen, testimony 

before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 

hearing on “Hearing to Receive Testimony on the 

Situation in Afghanistan,” 115th Cong., February 

9, 2017, p. 51. Confusion around these figures 

was readily evident, however. A 2016 UN report 

cited UNODC estimates that the Taliban would 

generate up to $400 million from the drug trade that 

year, comprising half of total Taliban income. UN 

Security Council, Seventh Report of the Analytical 

Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2255 (2015) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals 

and entities, October 5, 2016, p. 9. A subsequent 

UNODC report stated that in 2016, insurgent groups 

obtained an estimated $160 million in “poppy taxes,” far below the $400 million figure; it was unclear 

how much additional revenue the UN believed the 

Taliban earned from other points in the opium/

heroin value chain. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium 

Survey Report 2016: Sustainable development in 

an opium production environment, May 2017, 

p. 14.

31. Jonathan Goodhand and David Mansfield, Drugs 

and (Dis)order: A Study of the Opium Economy, 

Political Settlements and State Building in 

Afghanistan, London School of Economics, 

November 2010, p. 32.

32. David Mansfield, A State Built on Sand: How 

Opium Undermined Afghanistan (London, UK: 

Hurst, 2016), p. 33; Graeme Smith, The Dogs Are 

Eating Them Now: Our War in Afghanistan

(Toronto, Canada: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 

pp. 206–207.

33. Taimoor Shah and Alissa J. Rubin, “In Poppy War, 

Taliban Aim to Protect a Cash Crop,” New York 

Times, April 11, 2012. 

34. William A. Byrd and Olivier Jonglez, “Prices and 

Market Interactions in the Opium Economy,” in 

Afghanistan’s Drug Industry, UNODC and the 

World Bank, p. 119. 

35. U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS),

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, RL32686, 

August 12, 2009, p. 29.

36. Byrd and Jonglez, “Prices and Market Interactions

in the Opium Economy,” in Afghanistan’s Drug 

Industry, UNODC and the World Bank, p. 130.

37. Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, 

Thugs, and Crime Are Reshaping the Afghan War

(New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), p. 35.

38. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, p. 104; Peters, 

Seeds of Terror, p. 38; Vanda Felbab-Brown, 

Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War 

on Drugs (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 

Press, 2010), p. 115.

39. Peters, Seeds of Terror, p. 37.

40. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War 

Within the War for Afghanistan (New York, 

NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), pp. 40–41; Ahmed 

Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States 

and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, 

Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York, NY: 

Viking, 2008), p. 319; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The 

Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin 

Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 

10, 2001 (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2004), 

p. 524; Peters, Seeds of Terror, p. 38; Felbab-Brown, 

Shooting Up, pp. 115–117; UNODC, The Opium 
218 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Economy in Afghanistan: An International 

Problem, 2003, p. 10; Doris Buddenberg, “On the 

Cultural History of Opium—and how poppy came 

to Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 

January 11, 2016.

41. UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan, 

pp. 5–6.

42. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR) 1999, March 2000.

43. Peters, Seeds of Terror, pp. 86–87; Rashid, Descent 

into Chaos, p. 317; Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, 

pp. 125–126.

44. Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, p. 130.

45. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 126–129.

46. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 126–129.

47. Barry Bearak, “In Crippled Afghanistan, a Torturing 

Drought,” New York Times, June 8, 2000; U.S. 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), Foreign 

Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles 

to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s 

Stability, GAO-03-607, June 2003, p. 1; UNODC, The 

Opium Economy in Afghanistan, p. 93.

48. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 125, 130–132; 

UN Security Council, “Security Council Demands 

that Taliban Turn Over Usama bin Laden to 

Appropriate Authorities,” press release, SC/6739, 

October 15, 1999; UN Security Council, “Security 

Council Imposes Wide New Measures against 

Taliban Authorities in Afghanistan, Demands 

Action on Terrorism: Resolution 1333 (2000) Calls 

for Closure of Training Camps, End to Provision of 

Sanctuary; Ban Imposed on Military Assistance,” 

press release, SC/6979, December 19, 2000; 

UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan, 

p. 93; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 320; FelbabBrown, Shooting Up, p. 131.

49. Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, p. 131; Peters, Seeds of 

Terror, p. 100.

50. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 320.

51. David Mansfield and Paul Fishstein, Time to 

Move On: Developing an Informed Development 

Response to Opium Poppy Cultivation in 

Afghanistan, AREU, October 2016, p. 18. 

52. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5: Poppy Cultivation and USAID 

Development Efforts in Afghanistan,” February 24, 

2016 (draft), p. 17; David Mansfield, Senior Fellow, 

International Drugs Policy Unit, London School of 

Economics, correspondence with SIGAR, 

April 13, 2018.

53. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 17.

54. Mansfield, correspondence with SIGAR,

April 13, 2018.

55. Mansfield, correspondence with SIGAR,

April 13, 2018.

56. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 17.

57. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 17.

58. Mansfield, correspondence with SIGAR,

April 13, 2018.

59. Mansfield, correspondence with SIGAR, April 13,

2018; USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector 

Assistance Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 17.

60. Mansfield, correspondence with SIGAR, April 13,

2018; USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector 

Assistance Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 17–18.

61. Mansfield, correspondence with SIGAR,

April 13, 2018.

62. Mansfield, correspondence with SIGAR, April 13,

2018; USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector 

Assistance Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 18.

63. UNODC, “Documentation of a heroin manufacturing process in Afghanistan,” Bulletin on Narcotics,

2005, p. 21; “Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s 

Addictive Plants: Production and Distribution,” 

DEA Museum and Visitors Center website, accessed on April 2, 2018.

64. “Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s Addictive 

Plants: Production and Distribution,” DEA Museum 

and Visitors Center website, accessed on 

April 2, 2018.

65. “Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s Addictive 

Plants: Production and Distribution,” DEA Museum 

and Visitors Center website, accessed on 

April 2, 2018.

66. “Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s Addictive 

Plants: Production and Distribution,” DEA Museum 

and Visitors Center website, accessed on April 2, 

2018.

67. “Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s Addictive 

Plants: Production and Distribution,” DEA Museum 

and Visitors Center website, accessed on 

April 2, 2018.

68. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2017, pp. 222–223; DOJ, 

DEA, 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment, 

November 2016, pp. 47–49.

69. Byrd and Jonglez, “Prices and Market Interactions

in the Opium Economy,” in Afghanistan’s Drug 

Industry, UNODC and the World Bank, 

pp. 117, 127.

70. Byrd and Jonglez, “Prices and Market Interactions

in the Opium Economy,” in Afghanistan’s Drug 

Industry, UNODC and the World Bank, p. 127. 

71. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: 

Cultivation and Production, December 2016, p. 39.

72. Christopher Ward and William Byrd, Afghanistan’s 

Opium Drug Economy, World Bank, December 

2004, p. 24.

73. Ward and Byrd, Afghanistan’s Opium Drug 

Economy, World Bank, p. 24.

74. Byrd and Jonglez, “Prices and Market Interactions

in the Opium Economy,” in Afghanistan’s Drug 

Industry, UNODC and the World Bank, p. 129.

75. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006, 

October 2006, p. 96.

76. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Socioeconomic Analysis, March 2016, pp. 9–10.

77. David Mansfield, Still Waters Run Deep: Illicit 

Poppy and the Transformation of the Deserts of 

Southwest Afghanistan, AREU, May 15, 2018, p. 2; 

“Draining the Deserts of Afghanistan,” Alcis, July 

27, 2016, accessed November 13, 2017.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 219

78. “Draining the Deserts of Afghanistan,” Alcis, July

27, 2016, accessed November 13, 2017; USAID/

Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance 

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 35–36. More recent research indicates as many as 2.2 million people may 

live in these desert areas of southwest Afghanistan. 

Mansfield, Still Waters Run Deep, p. 2.

79. SGI Global, Afghanistan National Drug Use 

Survey, prepared for the Colombo Plan, 2015, p. 4.

80. SGI Global, Afghanistan National Drug Use 

Survey, 2015, pp. 9–10.

81. Tahir Qadiry, “Afghanistan, the Drug Addiction 

Capital,” BBC News, April 11, 2013; SGI Global, 

Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey, 2015, 

pp. 12–13.

82. Byrd and Mansfield, Afghanistan’s Opium 

Economy, World Bank, p. 114.

83. William Byrd and David Mansfield, Drugs in 

Afghanistan—A Forgotten Issue? Implications 

and Risks for Transition, USIP, May 18, 2012, 

p. 2; Victoria A. Greenfield, Keith Crane, Craig A. 

Bond, Nathan Chandler, Jill E. Luoto, Olga Oliker, 

“Reducing the Cultivation of Opium Poppies in 

Southern Afghanistan,” RAND Corporation, 2015, 

pp. 5, 45–50. 

84. CRS, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, 

RL32686, August 12, 2009, p. 25. 

85. Inspectors General for State and DOD, Interagency 

Assessment of the Counternarcotics Program in 

Afghanistan, State Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD 

Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, p. 29. 

86. Rubin and Sherman, Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize 

Afghanistan, p. 7.

87. Ward and Byrd, Afghanistan’s Opium Drug 

Economy, World Bank, p. 35; USAID/Afghanistan, 

“Agricultural Sector Assistance Strategy, Annex 5,” 

2016, p. 21. 

88. Mansfield and Fishstein, Time to Move On, AREU, 

p. 59; David Mansfield, Senior Fellow, International 

Drugs Policy Unit, London School of Economics, 

SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018.

89. Mansfield and Fishstein, Time to Move On, 

AREU, p. 58. 

90. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 19; Mansfield and 

Fishstein, Time to Move On, AREU, p. 58. 

91. Byrd and Buddenberg, “Introduction and

Overview,” in Afghanistan’s Drug Industry, 

UNODC and the World Bank, p. 8. 

92. Paul Fishstein, Despair or Hope: Rural Livelihoods 

and Opium Poppy Dynamics in Afghanistan, 

AREU, August 2014, p. 2; Felbab-Brown, Shooting 

Up, pp. 150–151.

93. Fishstein, Despair or Hope, AREU, p. 3.

94. Powell, testimony before the House Foreign Affairs

Committee (September 22, 2005).

95. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan, 2012, p. 2.

96. Government of Afghanistan, MCN, “National Drug

Control Strategy: An Updated Five Year Strategy for 

Tackling the Illicit Drug Problem,” January 2006, 

p. 21.

97. Government of Afghanistan, MCN, “National Drug

Control Strategy,” January 2006, p. 8.

98. Government of Afghanistan, MCN, “Afghan

National Drug Action Plan 2015–2019,” October 14, 

2015, p. 4–6.

99. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for INL

Thomas Schweich, testimony before the House 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central 

Asia and the Oversight and Investigations of the 

Committee on International Relations, hearing on 

“Afghanistan: Progress Report,” March 9, 2006, pp. 

1, 3; CRS, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, 

RL32686, June 18, 2009, p. 39; Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for INL Brian Nichols, testimony before the Senate Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, hearing on “Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan,” July 20, 2011, p. 2.

100. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort, based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence. 

101. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort, based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence.

102. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 2017, p. 82.

103. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 2017, p. 254; SIGAR analysis 

of budget data by year of allocation and strand of 

effort, based on agency data calls, budget documentation, and correspondence. 

104. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, July 30, 2017, pp. 114, 224; SIGAR, 

Afghan Special Mission Wing: DOD Moving 

Forward with $771.8 Million Purchase of Aircraft 

that the Afghans Cannot Operate and Maintain, 

SIGAR Audit 13-13, June 2013, p. 2.

105. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2018, p. 110.

106. State, Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources,

“Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized 

Program Structure and Definitions,” April 19, 2016.

107. State, Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources,

“Updated Foreign Assistance Standardized 

Program Structure and Definitions,” April 19, 2016. 

108. Rubin and Sherman, Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize 

Afghanistan, p. 38; former DOJ official, SIGAR 

interview, April 12, 2016.

109. CRS, International Drug Control Policy: 

Background and U.S. Responses, RL34543, March 

16, 2015, p. 18.

110. Office of National Drug Control Policy, “National 

Drug Control Budget: FY 2015 Funding Highlights,” 

March 2014, p. 10. 

111. DEA, “Foreign Cooperative Investigations,” DEA

website, accessed January 5, 2016. 

112. CRS, International Drug Control Policy, RL34543, 

March 16, 2015, p. 19.

113. DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Counterdrug 

Operations, June 13, 2007, p. xi. 

114. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort, based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence. 

115. GAO, State’s Counternarcotics Performance 

Measurement System, GAO-11-564R, May 26, 2011, 

p. 11.
220 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

116. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2014, p. 9.

117. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation and strand of effort, based on agency data 

calls, budget documentation, and correspondence; 

State Office of Inspector General, Status of the 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs Counternarcotics Programs 

in Afghanistan: Performance Audit, Report No. 

MERO-A-10-02, December 2009, p. 41. Between 

2004 and 2005, the eradication force was known as 

the Central Poppy Eradication Force. It was called 

the Afghan Eradication Force between 2005 and 

2007, and the Poppy Eradication Force between 

2007 and 2009.

118. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 4.

119. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 14–15.

120. GAO, Afghanistan Development: Enhancement to 

Performance Management and Evaluation Efforts 

Could Improve USAID’s Agricultural Programs, 

GAO-10-368, July 2010, p. 11; USAID/Afghanistan, 

“Agricultural Sector Assistance Strategy, Annex 5,” 

2016, pp. 15, 17.

121. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort, based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence. 

122. Former USAID staff member, SIGAR interview, 

April 23, 2018.

123. Byrd and Mansfield, Afghanistan’s Opium 

Economy, World Bank, pp. vi, 43; former USAID 

staff member, SIGAR interview, April 23, 2018.

124. State, INL, “Good Performers Initiative Fact Sheet,”

February 13, 2013, accessed January 2, 2018.

125. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort, based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence.

126. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2018, p. 86.

127. The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2017: A 

Survey of the Afghan People, November 2017, p. 97.

128. SGI Global, Afghanistan National Drug Use 

Survey, 2015, p. 4.

129. SGI Global, Afghanistan National Drug Use 

Survey, 2015, pp. 8–9.

130. “Illicit Drugs,” CIA World Factbook website, accessed May 9, 2018; Catherine S. Todd, Naqibullah 

Safi, and Steffani A. Strathdee, “Drug use and 

harm reduction in Afghanistan,” Harm Reduction 

Journal, vol. 2 no. 13 (2005), electronic p. 4. 

131. Lt. Cdr. Darrylp. Arfsten, Lt. Joe F. Moralez II, 

Col. Linnes L. Chester, Jr., Maj. Pir Mohamad, 

Capt. Timothy H. Weber, “Drug Use among 

the Afghanistan National Police: A National 

Assessment,” Military Medicine, vol. 177 no. 1:85 

(2012), p. 86; GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: 

Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but 

Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of 

Justice Reform Efforts Needed, GAO-10-291, March 

2010, p. 33.

132. Lt. Cdr. Arfsten, Lt. Moralez II, Col. Chester, Jr., 

Maj. Mohamad, Capt. Weber, “Drug Use among the 

Afghanistan National Police,” p. 86.

133. GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy 

Evolving and Progress Reported, GAO-10-291, 

March 2010, p. 33.

134. State, INL, email to SIGAR, March 26, 2018.

135. “About DAP,” The Colombo Plan Secretariat website, accessed April 4, 2018. The Colombo Plan is an 

intergovernmental organization created in 1950 in 

Colombo, Sri Lanka, to further regional economic 

and social development. 

136. State, email to SIGAR, March 6, 2018; Acting

Assistant Secretary of State William J. McGlynn, 

INL, letter to Patricia Yoon-Moi Chia, SecretaryGeneral for the Colombo Plan, September 24, 

2010, p. 1; Assistant Secretary of State William R. 

Brownfield, INL, letter to Yoon-Moi Chia, July 20, 

2011, p. 1; Assistant Secretary of State Brownfield, 

letter to Adam Maniku, Secretary-General for 

the Colombo Plan, May 14, 2013, p. 1; Assistant 

Secretary of State Brownfield, letter to Kinley Dorji, 

Secretary-General for the Colombo Plan, June 10, 

2014, p. 1; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State Carol Z. Perez, INL, letter to Dorji, 

October 28, 2014, p. 1.

137. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2018, p. 190. 

138. Acting Assistant Secretary of State McGlynn,

letter to Antonio Costa, Executive Director of 

the UNODC, June 11, 2010, p. 1; Acting Assistant 

Secretary of State McGlynn, letter to Yury Fedotov, 

Executive Director of the UNODC, September 24, 

2010, p. 1; Assistant Secretary of State Brownfield, 

letter to Fedotov, June 10, 2013, p. 1.

139. CRS, Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and the 

2014 Transition, R43540, May 9, 2014, p. 16; 

International Narcotics Control Board, 2012 

Report, March 5, 2013, p. 96; Government of 

Afghanistan, MCN, Afghanistan Drug Report 2012,

November 2013, p. 22.

140. State, email to SIGAR, March 6, 2018.

141. Former Afghan deputy minister, SIGAR interview, 

April 13, 2016.

142. GAO, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were 

Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. 

Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing 

Assistance, GAO-09-71, October 6, 2008, pp. 1–2.

143. “Illicit Drugs,” CIA World Factbook website, accessed May 9, 2018.

144. Assistant Secretary of State for INL Anne Patterson,

testimony before the U.S. House Committee 

on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 

Operations, Export Financing and Related 

Programs, hearing on “Afghan Drug Eradication 

and Rebuilding Programs,” September 12, 2006, 

pp. 20–21.

145. USAID, Asia and Near East Bureau, USAID 

Counternarcotics Programs: Colombian 

Applications to Afghanistan, Andrew Natsios 

Archives, Georgetown University Library, 

November 18, 2004.

146. “I would go so far as to call it something tantamount to a Plan Afghanistan, which has parallels 

to the Plan Colombia effort.” Assistant Secretary of 

State for INL Robert B. Charles, “Counternarcotics 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 221

Initiatives for Afghanistan,” on-the-record briefing 

at the U.S. Department of State, November 17, 2004.

147. Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s 

Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New 

York, NY: Penguin Press, 2018), pp. 266–267, 270–

273; Phillip A. Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan: 

Anglo American Friction over Aerial Poppy 

Eradication (2004–2007),” Diplomacy & Statecraft, 

vol. 29 issue 2 (2018) p. 287.

148. Chris Kraul, “Calling in the Drug Cavalry,” Los 

Angeles Times, September 6, 2006; State, U.S. 

Counternarcotics Strategy, August 2007, p. 51; 

Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018.

149. “Plan Colombia was seen as a success, so it starts

to be seen as part of the solution. But it had very 

different conditions: (i) Uribe was a credible leader 

and linked insurgency and drugs; (ii) the Colombian 

military was competent; (iii) there was U.S. commitment, as the final product [cocaine] was going 

to the United States.” Former NSC Senior Director 

for Afghanistan John Wood, SIGAR interview, June 

17, 2015. “I believe the United States tried to make 

comparisons and transfer the CN model from 

Colombia but couldn’t. There was no ownership 

of counternarcotics by the Afghans, unlike in 

Colombia.” Senior U.S. government official, SIGAR 

interview, March 14, 2016.

150. Mohammed Ehsan Zia, former Minister for Rural

Rehabilitation and Development, correspondence 

with SIGAR, August 20, 2017. 

151. Neil Fantom and Umar Serajuddin, “The World 

Bank’s Classification of Countries by Income,” 

policy research working paper 7528, World Bank 

Group, January 2016, pp. 40, 42. 

152. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 

“Fact Sheet: Peace Colombia—A New Era of 

Partnership between the United States and 

Colombia,” press release, February 4, 2016. 

153. The IMF estimated that “as much as 50 percent of the GDP of Afghanistan is derived from

narcotics,” while the total value of coca production in Colombia for 2008 was estimated at 

about 0.21 percent of Colombia’s GDP. Assistant 

Secretary of State for INL Robert B. Charles, 

“Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics 

Efforts Going Wobbly?,” testimony before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 

Policy, and Human Resources of the Committee 

on Government Reform, hearing on “British 

Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” April 

1, 2004, p. 11; Daniel Mejía, “Plan Colombia: An 

Analysis of Effectiveness and Costs,” Brookings 

Institution, 2016, p. 7.

154. William Wechsler, former Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and 

Global Threats, SIGAR interview, 

November 1, 2016.

155. Lt. Gen. David W. Barno (U.S. Army, Ret.), quoted 

in “Planning and Directing a Campaign: General 

Barno in Afghanistan,” Enduring Voices: Oral 

Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in 

Afghanistan, 2003–2005,” ed. Christopher N. 

Koontz (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 

U.S. Army, 2008), p. 29.

156. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2014, p. 11.

157. USAID Office of Inspector General, Audit of 

USAID/Afghanistan’s Incentives Driving 

Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and 

West Program, Audit Report No F-306-12-004-P, 

June 29, 2012, p. 5; David Mansfield, Examining 

the Impact of IDEA-NEW on Opium Production: 

Nangarhar, a Case Study, USAID, 

January 11, 2015, p. 67. 

158. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 31, 116, 229.

159. Schweich, testimony before the House

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central 

Asia and the Oversight and Investigations of the 

Committee on International Relations, hearing 

on “Afghanistan: Progress Report,” (March 9, 

2006); State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan, August 2007, p. 29.

160. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan, August 2007, p. 13.

161. Dr. Barnett Rubin, correspondence with SIGAR, 

September 18, 2017.

162. CNC produces the poppy crop estimates that

are used by U.S. agencies, including the State 

Department, and presents those estimates to 

Congress. CNC uses high-resolution imagery to 

conduct a comprehensive review of Afghanistan’s 

poppy-growing areas to classify each field by poppy 

and non-poppy crop types. Former congressional 

staffer, SIGAR interview, September 16, 2016.

163. Prior to 2002, the UNODC national estimate was

based on aggregating surveyors’ visual estimates 

of the level of cultivation in each village in which 

opium poppy was reported. Consequently, it was 

impossible to establish a margin of error for the 

UNODC survey or make meaningful comparisons 

over time. J. C. Taylor and A. L. Stocker, Poppy 

Cultivation in Afghanistan: Report to UNODC, 

(Cranfield University, October 2003), p. 6; UNODC, 

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: Cultivation 

and Production, December 2016, p. 43. 

164. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002, 

October 2002, p. 4; Crime and Narcotics Center 

(CNC), data provided to SIGAR, October 15, 2015.

165. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, 

October 2007, p. 9; CNC, data provided to SIGAR, 

October 15, 2015. 

166. “UNODC didn’t like the poppy survey being verified 

by Cranfield. They also didn’t understand why the 

UK was verifying while also giving UNODC money 

to verify. Essentially we didn’t believe UNODC’s 

cultivation or eradication figures were of high 

quality.” Former UK government official, SIGAR 

interview, May 11, 2016. “The UK believed the 

poppy survey was poor, so they got Cranfield in and 

used this as [the] basis for negotiating with UNODC 

on the survey.” Former senior UK Foreign and 

Commonwealth Office official, SIGAR interview, 

April 5, 2016.

167. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

168. Former congressional staffer, SIGAR interview, 

September 16, 2016. Part of the explanation for 

the discrepancies at the provincial level lay with 
222 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

the different approaches adopted by the two 

organizations, including how they calculated the 

full extent of the agricultural areas, how samples 

were selected, and the number of satellite images 

collected. Taylor and Stocker, Poppy Cultivation 

in Afghanistan, p. 5.

169. “The trust [General] Allen placed in the virtue of

these lengthy sessions belied the presence of a key 

defect. The data always seemed suspect. Many 

metrics hung on things that defied numbers. How 

did you measure the annual poppy cultivation? 

This illegal activity provided spending money for 

Pashtun subsistence farmers and, incidentally, 

financed the Taliban. It wasn’t like the locals registered their illicit crops. Analysts resorted to guesses 

based on aerial surveillance and patrol reports. 

Then they rolled them up. Over time the numerals 

gained a certainty not present when the inputs were 

gathered.” Daniel Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s 

Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

(Boston, MA: Eamon Dolan Books, 2014), p. 389.

170. Former senior NSC official, SIGAR interview, 

June 23, 2016.

171. For examples of U.S. agencies and officials referring to the concept of eradicating 25 percent of the

poppy crop as a sufficient or credible deterrent to 

future planting, see State, U.S. Counternarcotics 

Strategy for Afghanistan, August 2007, p. 52; and 

Ambassador William Wood, statement to the Policy 

Advisory Group, August 1, 2007, p. 4.

172. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016.

173. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016. 

174. Former UNODC official, SIGAR interview, 

June 15, 2016.

175. “UNODC Director General Costa has said many

times that, to be a deterrent to cultivation, 

eradication must reach at least 25 per cent of 

the crop. . . . We will advocate a clear target for 

the 2008 harvest year, in line with DG Costa’s 

recommendation: 25 percent of this year’s 200,000 

hectares, or 50,000 hectares.” Ambassador Wood, 

statement to the Policy Advisory Group, pp. 4–6. 

176. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, 

October 2007, p. iii. 

177. Thomas Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?”

New York Times, July 27, 2008. As Coordinator 

for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in 

Afghanistan, Schweich was accorded the rank of 

Ambassador by President George W. Bush. At that 

time, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan was 

Ronald Neumann.

178. Former senior UK government official, SIGAR

interview, March 18, 2016; State, “Afghanistan 

Counternarcotics Coordinator Schweich Briefs 

New U.S. CN Strategy in Kabul, London, Berlin, and 

Vienna: Support for Forceful Poppy Eradication 

Emerging in Unexpected Quarters,” State 138384 

cable, October 1, 2007. See also: Coll, Directorate S, 

pp. 274, 277.

179. UNODC, Thematic Evaluation of the Technical 

Assistance Provided to Afghanistan by the United 

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Illicit Crop 

Monitoring Program, Volume 6, May 2008, pp. 12, 

52; Rubin and Sherman, Counter-Narcotics to 

Stabilize Afghanistan, pp. 50–56.

180. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003, 

October 2003, p. 53; State, “Joint UK-U.S. Demarche 

to President Karzai on Counternarcotics,” State 

141383 cable, July 23, 2002.

181. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

182. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018.

183. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005, 

November 2005, pp. 9, 53. “In 2005, UNODC didn’t 

want to get involved in eradication verification, 

as it would get in the way of the survey. They said 

they didn’t even want to be associated with any 

planning around eradication. They wanted nothing 

to do with it. UNODC eventually agreed to set up a 

separate project to verify eradication and bought a 

lot of imagery.” Former UK government contractor, 

SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016. 

184. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016; former UK government official, 

SIGAR interview, May 11, 2016.

185. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018; former 

UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, 

May 10, 2016. 

186. Patterson, testimony before the U.S. House

Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on 

Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 

Programs, hearing on “Afghan Drug Eradication 

and Rebuilding Programs,” September 12, 2006, 

p. 26. 

187. In his support for aerial eradication, scholar David

Kilcullen went further, claiming that “even the 

harshest efforts to eradicate the poppy would be 

highly unlikely to alienate anything like the majority 

of the population, except in the areas that already 

firmly support the Taliban and are therefore already 

alienated anyway.” David Kilcullen, The Accidental 

Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a 

Big One (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 

2009), p. 63. 

188. “Stuart Jones, the twenty-eight-year-old Treasury 

Department attaché in Kabul, recalled spending 

an excruciating day at ISAF headquarters trying 

to come to a collective agreement on how much 

money the Taliban raised each year, and where it 

came from. The soldiers and civilians made broad 

assumptions based on scant evidence. The final 

conclusion was somewhere in the hundreds of millions. ‘It was a guess in the end,’ Jones said.” Joshua 

Partlow, A Kingdom of their Own: The Family 

Karzai and the Afghan Disaster (New York, NY: 

Simon & Schuster, 2016), p. 87.

189. Mansfield, From Bad They Made It Worse, AREU, 

pp. 75–76. One example of an influential report 

that portrayed ushr as a flat 10 percent tax by the 

Taliban on poppy farmers, and likely overstated 

the revenue that the Taliban receives from farmers, 

was a 2014 report by the Financial Action Task 

Force. Financial Action Task Force, FATF Report: 

Financial flows linked to the production and 

trafficking of Afghan opiates, June 2014, pp. 42–43.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

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190. INL Director for the Office of Asia, Africa,

Europe, and Newly Independent States William 

Bach, testimony before the Committee on 

Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy 

and Human Resources, hearing on “The Taliban, 

Terrorism, and the Drug Trade,” (October 3, 2001).

191. Prime Minister Tony Blair, “Statement to the House 

of Commons, London, UK, October 4, 2001, transcript from CNN.

192. DEA Administrator Karen Tandy, “Drug 

Enforcement Administration Testimony,” testimony before the House Committee on International 

Relations, hearing on “United States Policy towards 

Narcoterrorism in Afghanistan,” February 12, 2004.

193. Former DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

May 17, 2016.

194. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, 

October 2007, pp. iii–iv. 

195. State, INL, “Fighting the Opium Trade in 

Afghanistan: Myths, Facts, and Sound Policy,” 

March 11, 2008.

196. Coll, Directorate S, pp. 266–270. 

197. Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 63.

198. UN Security Council, “First report of the Analytical

Support and Sanctions Implementation Monitoring 

Team submitted pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) 

concerning the Taliban and associated individuals 

and entities,” September 5, 2012, pp. 13–14.

199. Nicholson, “Department of Defense Press Briefing

by General Nicholson in the Pentagon Briefing 

Room,” December 2, 2016.

200. Combating Terrorism Archive Project, “Interview 

with Kirk Meyer, Former Director of the Afghan 

Threat Finance Cell,” April 2, 2014. 

201. DOD, email to SIGAR, March 13, 2018.

202. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 158, 160.

203. “When we were in Helmand there was a lot more

internal disputes about how to conduct the counternarcotics effort. . . . You had the military, in large 

numbers and at senior levels, saying we must not 

stir things up with counternarcotics.” Berry, “Allies 

at War in Afghanistan,” p. 284. 

204. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, p. 296.

205. Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban, p. 14.

206. Barbara Crossette, “Taliban’s Ban on Poppy a 

Success, U.S. Aides Say,” New York Times, May 20, 

2001; Barry Bearak, “At Heroin’s Source, Taliban Do 

What ‘Just Say No’ Could Not,” New York Times, 

May 24, 2001; Andrew Tully, “Afghanistan: Analysts 

Ponder Why Taliban Banned Poppy Cultivation,”

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, June 14, 2001; 

Luke Harding, “World’s opium source destroyed,” 

Guardian, March 31, 2001; Preston Mendenhall, 

“Afghanistan’s cash crop wilts,” NBC News, 

May 23, 2001.

207. Barnett Rubin, Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s 

Booming Opium Industry, Center for American 

Progress and the Center on International 

Cooperation, October 7, 2004, p. 4. 

208. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, p. 127.

209. Donor Mission of the UN International Drug

Control Programme, “The Impact of the Taliban 

Prohibition on Opium Poppy Cultivation in 

Afghanistan,” May 25, 2001, pp. 4, 8–9; Mansfield, A 

State Built on Sand, p. 126.

210. Rubin, Road to Ruin, p. 5.

211. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002, 

October 2002, p. 26; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium 

Survey 2003, October 2003, p. 5. 

212. Charles, “Counternarcotics Initiatives for

Afghanistan,” November 17, 2004. “The United 

States was happy to see the UK take the lead on 

counternarcotics—it was one less thing for them to 

do.” Former UK official, SIGAR interview, 

April 6, 2016.

213. U.S. Embassy official, SIGAR interview, March 15, 

2016; Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, 

pp. 147–148.

214. “The UK was keen to keep the UN on the side

at this stage; the United States was less bothered. . . . There was some increase in confidence 

with Costa’s arrival, but not much. . . . Initially, 

UNODC went through a hurt phase, upset that 

counternarcotics had been taken away from them. 

In recognition of the fact that they didn’t have a 

great reputation, the penny then dropped. They 

were dealing with powerful countries and they 

didn’t have any responsibility.” Former UK official, 

SIGAR interview, April 6, 2016. “UNODC’s policy 

influence was zero. The lead nation didn’t want interference and UNODC didn’t have skills or personality to gain influence.” Former senior UN adviser, 

SIGAR interview, May 20, 2016; former senior UK 

Foreign and Commonwealth Office official, SIGAR 

interview, April 5, 2016.

215. State, “Joint UK-U.S. Demarche to President Karzai

on Counternarcotics,” State 141383 cable, 

July 23, 2002.

216. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Counterinsurgency 

Counternarcotics, and Illicit Economies in 

Afghanistan: Lessons for State-Building” in 

Convergence: Illicit Networks and National 

Security in the Age of Globalization (Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), 

p. 190; Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers 

among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and 

Intervention,” International Peacekeeping, vol. 16, 

no. 1 (2009): p. 106. The decree announcing compensated eradication was dated April 3, 2002 and 

outlined a payment of $250 per jerib, stating, “Given 

the prevalence of drought and poverty in the last 

four years, we have decided to assist the farmers in 

the following manner: the sum of $250 per jerib will 

be given to the farmer after the destruction of his 

crop has been witnessed by a special government 

delegation. The money will be given to the farmer 

on the spot without any intermediaries. The price 

that will be paid to each farmer will exceed the revenue he would have received from growing wheat 

and the costs associated with growing opium. It 

should be clear that this is a one-time assistance. 

The ban on cultivation will be strictly enforced 

from now on.” The payment was subsequently 

increased from $250 to $350 per jerib during the 

course of the compensated eradication campaign. 

U.S. Mission to the UN in Vienna, “UNDCP Status 

Report on Afghanistan for Major Donors, April 
224 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

9 in Vienna” Vienna 000559 cable, April 12, 2002; 

Philip Berry, “From London to Lashkar Gah: 

British Counter Narcotics Policies in Afghanistan 

(2001–03),” International History Review 

(2017), p. 10.

217. Former Afghan minister, SIGAR interview, April 12, 

2016; former Afghan deputy minister, SIGAR interview, April 13, 2016; Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 205; 

former senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, May 

16, 2016; Cowper-Coles cited in Shapiro, “Politics 

of Poppy,” p. 16; Rubin, Road to Ruin, p. 15; 

Cawkwell, UK Communication Strategies for 

Afghanistan, p. 90.

218. Rubin, Road to Ruin, p. 15.

219. Peter Oborne, “A Victory for Drug Pushers,” The 

Spectator, May 31, 2003.

220. “Long term elimination of opium cultivation, with

the aim of seventy percent reduction by the year 

1386, and complete elimination by the year 1391.” 

Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, “National 

Drug Control Strategy: 5-Year Strategy (1381–1386) 

for Tackling Illicit Drug Problems in Afghanistan,” 

May 18, 2003, p. 8.

221. A UK official at the time referred to the United

States as “very quiet on counternarcotics, even 

in early 2003.” Former UK senior official, SIGAR 

interview, May 4, 2015; former senior USAID 

official, SIGAR interview, June 6, 2016; Lisa Curtis, 

“U.S. Counternarcotics Policy: Essential to Fighting 

Terrorism in Afghanistan,” Heritage Foundation, 

Backgrounder No. 2845, September 30, 2013, p. 2. 

222. Former senior USAID official, SIGAR interview, 

June 6, 2016.

223. Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 206. 

224. Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 206.

225. Michael G. Waltz, Warrior Diplomat: A Green 

Beret’s Battles from Washington to Afghanistan, 

(Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2011), pp. 29, 39; 

James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of 

the CIA and the Bush Administration, (New York, 

NY: Free Press, 2006), pp. 161–162; former UK 

senior official, SIGAR interview, May 4, 2015.

226. Andre Hollis, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense, SIGAR interview, May 16, 2016.

227. Former NSC official, SIGAR interview, June 

28, 2016; senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

June 23, 2016; former senior official, Combined 

Forces Command–Afghanistan, SIGAR interview, 

September 21, 2016.

228. Lt. Gen. Barno in “Chapter 2, Planning and

Directing a Campaign: General Barno in 

Afghanistan,” Enduring Voices, p. 29. 

229. Senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, June 23, 

2016. In terms of analysis, however, the CIA’s Crime 

and Narcotics Center (also known as the Counter 

Narcotics Center, CNC) has produced annual estimates of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan.

230. James Risen, “An Afghan’s Path from U.S. Ally to 

Drug Suspect,” New York Times, February 2, 2007; 

former UK senior official, SIGAR interview, 

May 4, 2015.

231. Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, “National 

Drug Control Strategy: 5-Year Strategy (1381–

1386),” May 18, 2003, p. 17. 

232. “President Karzai had sent an official letter to

create the CND, but Elahi and the State High 

Commission for Drug Control carried on. They 

had no salaries from the government, but got them 

from Elahi. He had his own sources. We worked 

on getting SHDC staff to move to CND. Eventually 

the SHDC disappeared.” Former Afghan deputy 

minister, SIGAR interview, April 13, 2016.

233. Senior UK official, SIGAR interview, 

August 31, 2016.

234. Former senior UN adviser, SIGAR interview, 

May 19, 2016. 

235. Former UK Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise 

official, SIGAR interview, May 11, 2016.

236. DEA Administrator Karen Tandy, testimony before 

the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 

Policy, and Human Resources for the Committee on 

Government Reform, hearing on “Afghanistan: Law 

Enforcement Interdiction Efforts in Transshipment 

Countries to Stem the Flow of Heroin,” 

February 26, 2004, p. 3.

237. SIGAR, Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan: 

U.S. Assistance to Provincial Units Cannot Be 

Fully Tracked and Formal Capability Assessments 

Are Needed, SIGAR 15-12-AR, October 29, 2014, 

p. 1. 

238. UK Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise official, correspondence with SIGAR, February 28, 2018. “The 

UK national agenda was, ‘do it quicker, do it bigger 

and make it happen.’ But they couldn’t get recurrent costs for anything. The Germans really didn’t 

get the issue of recurrent costs. They provided VW 

cars but no fuel and repairs.” UK Her Majesty’s 

Customs and Excise official, SIGAR interview, 

April 7, 2016.

239. “In October 2003, we travelled from Islamabad

to Kabul via Torkham. We visited the CNPA in 

Jalalabad. They made a seizure of 25 kg, but had to 

pay for the information with 5 kg of the seizure to 

do their job.” Former UK Her Majesty’s Customs 

and Excise official, SIGAR interview, April 6, 2016.

240. CRS, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military 

Operations, and Issues for Congress, R40156, 

December 3, 2009, p. 50; BBC News, “Panorama,” 

program transcript, October 10, 2005; CRS, 

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, RL32686, 

August 12, 2009, p. 41.

241. UK Ministry of Defence official, SIGAR interview, 

May 11, 2016.

242. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, pp. 6, 23, and 62. 

243. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “INL Program in Afghanistan:

A Revised, Accelerated and Integrated Approach,” 

Kabul 002566 cable, September 14, 2003. 

244. Former senior USAID official, SIGAR interview, 

June 6, 2016; USAID official, SIGAR interview, 

November 1, 2016.

245. J. Michael Deal, “Lessons from Drug Crop

Elimination,” December 13, 2001.

246. Elisabeth Kvitashvili, former senior USAID official,

SIGAR interview, June 6, 2016.

247. Kvitashvili, SIGAR interview, June 6, 2016.

248. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Karzai Sees Downside of

GOA Wheat Price Support Proposal,” Kabul 003459 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 225

cable, August 29, 2005; Chemonics International, 

Inc., “Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program 

(RAMP) Afghanistan,” quarterly progress report, 

prepared under contract for USAID, October 

30, 2004, pp. 4–5; Chemonics International, Inc., 

“Afghanistan RAMP Rebuilding Agricultural 

Markets in Afghanistan: Cotton Production 

Assessment,” prepared under contract for 

USAID, July 2004; Chemonics International, Inc., 

“Afghanistan RAMP Rebuilding Agricultural 

Markets in Afghanistan: Trip Report—Dried Fruit 

and Nuts Conference,” prepared under contract 

for USAID, March 2004; USAID Office of Inspector 

General, Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Rebuilding 

Agricultural Markets Program, Audit Report No. 

5-306-06-002-P, March 28, 2006.

249. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “INL Program in Afghanistan:

A Revised, Accelerated and Integrated Approach to 

Counternarcotics through Rural Development and 

Law Enforcement,” Kabul 002566 cable, September 

14, 2003; Food and Agriculture Organization of the 

UN, “Inception Report: Alternative Agricultural 

Livelihoods Programme (AALP) Strategy, 

Logical Framework and 2006 Workplan,” version 

1.4, November 5, 2005; Food and Agriculture 

Organization of the UN Afghanistan, “Development 

of Sustainable Agricultural Livelihoods in the 

Eastern Hazarajat (Saleh),” mid-term review report, 

September 23, 2006, pp. 16, 33.

250. Senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

June 23, 2016.

251. “Lead nations were failing. The Germans had eight

mentors for national support. The Italians were 

worse.” Senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

September 12, 2016. “Even if things lined up with 

the lead nation, none of them were moving at the 

same pace. The Italians and justice were particularly slow but there were growing frustrations with 

the UK approach to counternarcotics.” Former 

NSC Senior Director for Afghanistan John Wood, 

SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015; Douglas Feith, 

War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon and the 

Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York, NY: 

Harper Collins, 2008), pp. 153–155; George W. Bush, 

Decision Points (New York, NY: Crown Publishing 

Group, 2010), p. 211.

252. Bush, Decision Points, p. 211.

253. Feith, War and Decision, p. 154. 

254. Former U.S. Embassy official, SIGAR interview, 

March 15, 2016; Charles, “Counternarcotics 

Initiatives for Afghanistan,” November 17, 2004; 

Charles, “State Department’s Air Wing and Plan 

Colombia,” on-the-record briefing at the U.S. 

Department of State, October 29, 2003. 

255. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, p. 149; Charles, 

testimony before the House Subcommittee 

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resources of the Committee on Government 

Reform, hearing on “British Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan,” April 1, 2004, pp. 16, 20, 21.

256. Khalilzad, The Envoy, pp. 192, 206.

257. Former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

April 19, 2016.

258. Former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

April 19, 2016; former eradication contractor, 

SIGAR interview, November 2, 2016.

259. Former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

April 19, 2016.

260. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005, 

November 2005, p. 1; Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, 

p. 141.

261. “Let me be clear: If it is true that there is some foot

dragging by the British in this complex matter [of 

counternarcotics], the U.S. Department of Defense 

comes off far worse.” Charles, testimony before 

the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 

Policy, and Human Resources of the Committee 

on Government Reform, hearing on “British 

Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” April 1, 

2004, p. 2.

262. Waltz, Warrior Diplomat, p. 36.

263. U.S. Embassy official, SIGAR interview, 

March 15, 2016.

264. U.S. Embassy official, SIGAR interview, 

March 15, 2016.

265. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, 

August 2007, pp. 21, 49

266. Former senior USAID official, SIGAR interview, 

June 6, 2016.

267. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 14–15.

268. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 15–16.

269. USAID official, SIGAR interview, November 1, 2016; 

former Congressional staffer, SIGAR interview, 

September 16, 2016; USAID official, SIGAR interview, May 17, 2016; former senior USAID official, 

SIGAR interview, June 6, 2016; former Afghan 

minister, SIGAR interview, April 12, 2016.

270. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 14.

271. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 4.

272. Doug Wankel, former director of the Kabul Counter 

Narcotics Task Force at U.S. Embassy Kabul, 

SIGAR interview, April 19 2016.

273. Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, p. 141; CRS, 

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, RL32686, 

December 7, 2004, p. 31. Felbab-Brown points to 

greater DOD willingness to engage in counternarcotics efforts by 2004 and 2005; however, the CRS 

report cites evidence of ongoing DOD reluctance.

274. DEA Chief of Operations James L. Capra, testimony

before the Caucus on International Narcotics 

Control, hearing on “Future U.S. Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan,” January 15, 2014, p. 1; 

Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 66.

275. Senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, June 23, 

2016; senior DOD Senior official, SIGAR interview, 

September 12, 2016.

276. “There was $25 million in funding and State said,

‘No, we are going to use it for eradication.’ There 

was a huge fight. DOD said it would not do interdiction. But eradication won and State said it could 

not do both. Dumb, dumb, dumb. It wanted a spray 

program. Karzai and Khalilzad said no. It couldn’t 

be forced down their throats and no PRT wanted 
226 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

it in their region.” Senior DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, June 23, 2016; “We agreed to disagree 

with Bobby Charles on eradication. At deputies 

meetings, the discussion focused on what to do 

with $25 million. Should it go to the judicial system 

or eradication? It went to eradication.” Senior DOD 

official, SIGAR interview, September 12, 2016.

277. Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan,” p. 283; Peter 

Holland and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 

“AFG 04 Memorandum from the UK Foreign and 

Commonwealth Office,” March 2, 2006, accessed 

December 1, 2017. Further examples of the UK’s 

reinvigorated CN effort include the establishment 

of the UK Afghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit 

and the British Embassy Drugs Team. UK Foreign 

and Commonwealth Office, “Afghan Drugs InterDepartmental Unit,” April 2006, p. 1.

278. Peter J. Middlebrook, Sharon M. Miller, Thomas 

Kramer, and Michael Stone, Review of the 

Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 

(CNTF), submitted for consideration to the CNTF 

management board, September 2007, pp. iv–v. 

279. UNODC, “International Counter Narcotics

Conference on Afghanistan,” February 8–9, 

2004; Government of Afghanistan, “National 

Drug Control Strategy,” January 2006; UNODC, 

Afghanistan, 2006–2010: Strategic Programme 

Framework, September 2006.

280. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018. 

281. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 116, 229. 

282. In 2008 Nangarhar was certified as poppy free by

UNODC for the first time in the history of the UN 

monitoring program. Balkh went from 7,232 hectares of cultivation 2006 to less than 100 hectares 

(poppy free) in 2007. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium 

Survey 2008: Executive Summary, 

November 2008, p. 8. 

283. CRS, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the 

Transatlantic Alliance, RL33627, 

December 3, 2009, p. 15. 

284. One senior military official noted that in 2004,

“There was a massive communication challenge 

caused by the U.S. bureaucracy—a function of the 

competitive environment in the U.S. for raising 

resources and the number of different agencies 

who felt they had a role to play. The result was that 

the DEA would not speak to CFC Alpha Command 

Intelligence Centre. The UK would pass some 

information through. INL had different information and each institution felt they had a hand 

to play. It was a dog’s breakfast with no chance 

of working.” Former senior official, Combined 

Forces Command–Afghanistan, SIGAR interview, 

September 21, 2016.

285. Former senior official, Combined Forces

Command–Afghanistan, SIGAR interview, 

September 21, 2016.

286. “The DEA were not there in the early stage. They

worked cross border. It was unclear what they 

were doing, but it was not capacity building. It 

was not until the Attaché arrived in late 2002. 

His immediate reaction was that we couldn’t do 

anything. We convinced him to help build capacity 

and argued you can’t run before you can walk.” UK 

Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise official, SIGAR 

interview, April 7, 2016.

287. Former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016.

288. Office of Inspectors General for DOJ and State, “A

Special Joint Review of Post-Incident Responses 

by the Department of State and Drug Enforcement 

Administration to Three Deadly Force Incidents in 

Honduras,” Oversight and Review 17-02, ESP-17-01, 

May 2017, p. 17.

289. European Commission, Assessment Report: 

Development in a Drugs Environment: 

Clarifying Policy Positions and Mainstreaming 

Counternarcotics in the European Commission’s 

Programme in Afghanistan, 2005, pp. 13–16; Asian 

Development Bank, Country Partnership Strategy: 

Counter-Narcotics Mainstreaming in ADB’s 

Activities in Afghanistan, 2002–2006, February 

2007, pp. 2–5; World Bank and Department for 

International Development (DFID), Afghanistan: 

Economic Incentives and Development Initiatives 

to Reduce Opium Production, February 2008, 

pp. vii–xi.

290. World Bank, “Treating the Opium Problem in World 

Bank Operations in Afghanistan,” 2006.

291. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018.

292. World Bank and DFID, Afghanistan: Economic 

Incentives and Development Initiatives to Reduce 

Opium Production, February 2008, pp. vii–xi.

293. “About Us,” CART-F website, accessed 

March 3, 2017.

294. Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan,” pp. 274–275, 

281, 285; former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, April 19, 2016. The European Commission’s 

Franciso Bataler Martin opposed aerial spraying, 

arguing the “‘indiscriminate’ nature of [aerial eradication] would affect the weakest members of society,” and that “eradication should only take place 

when farmers have alternative legitimate sources 

of income.” U.S. Mission to the UN in Vienna, 

“Paris Pact Experts Round Table on Afghanistan 

and Neighboring Countries,” Vienna 000683 cable, 

November 13, 2007. 

295. Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan,” pp. 289, 291.

296. Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul, p. 84–87; Berry, 

“Allies at War in Afghanistan,” pp. 284–285.

297. “Eradication is so divisive. It took up so much air

time that we couldn’t get on with the other strands 

of the strategy. There was too much time spent 

arguing over whether AEF destroyed 10 hectares 

or 1,000 hectares.” Former UK government official, 

SIGAR interview, May 11, 2016.

298. Charles, “Counternarcotics Initiatives for

Afghanistan,” November 17, 2004.

299. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), 2008, p. 238.

300. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 

quoted in NATO, “NATO steps up counter-narcotics 

efforts in Afghanistan,” October 10, 2008; Deutsche 

Welle, “NATO Clinches Deal for Tougher Afghan 

Drug Action” October 10, 2008.

301. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Fact Sheet: 

Combating the Financing of Terrorism, Disrupting 

Terrorism at its Core,” September 8, 2011.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 227

302. J. Edward Conway, “Analysis in Combat: The 

Deployed Threat Finance Analyst,” Small Wars 

Journal, July 4, 2012.

303. Department of State, U.S. Counternarcotics 

Strategy, March 2010, pp. 1, 3.

304. Jeffrey Dressler, Counterinsurgency in Helmand: 

Progress and Remaining Challenges, Afghanistan 

Report 8, Institute for the Study of War, January 

2011, pp. 9, 29. 

305. “In 2009, the Foreign Affairs committee referred

to counternarcotics as a ‘poisoned chalice.’ This 

became a part of the justification for the UK 

getting out of counternarcotics.” Former Foreign 

and Commonwealth Office official, Afghan 

Inter-Departmental Drugs Unit (ADIDU), SIGAR 

interview, April 8, 2016. See also: UK House of 

Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global 

Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, Eighth 

Report of Session 2008–2009, HC 302, August 2, 

2009, p. 52.

306. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, March 2010, 

p. 2. “Under SRAP, there were regular meetings of 

the Counter Narcotics Working Group.” Former 

SRAP official, SIGAR interview, June 27, 2016.

307. Former SRAP official, SIGAR interview, 

June 27, 2016.

308. Wechsler, SIGAR interview, November 1, 2016.

309. GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy 

Evolving and Progress Reported, GAO-10-291, 

March 2010, p. 14; State, International Narcotics 

Control Strategy Report (INCSR), 2010, p. 103.

310. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan, 2010; State, U.S. Counternarcotics 

Strategy for Afghanistan, 2012; Omnibus 

Appropriations Act 2009, Pub. L. 111-8, 849 (2009).

311. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2017, p. 193.

312. The Helmand Food Zone was designed to combine

alternative-livelihood programs, a public information campaign, and eradicated efforts within specific areas of the province. It was led by the provincial 

governor and supported by the UK, United States, 

and Denmark. Greenfield, Crane, Bond, Chandler, 

Luoto, Oliker, “Reducing the Cultivation of Opium 

Poppies in Southern Afghanistan,” pp. 181–182. 

313. USAID Office of Inspector General, Audit of 

USAID/Afghanistan’s Afghanistan Vouchers 

for Increased Productive Agriculture (AVIPA) 

Program, Audit Report No. 5-306-10-008-P, April 20, 

2010, p. 1; Chandrasekaran, Little America, 

pp. 191, 195–196.

314. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2014, p. 11.

315. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: 

Cultivation and Production, December 2016, p. 61. 

316. L. Cpl. James W. Clark, “Sowing seeds of support; 

Marines facilitate crop change through agriculture 

transition program,” United States Marine Corps, 

April 20, 2010. 

317. “INL was against it; the PRT was against it; the UK

was against it, but no one could stop the Marines, 

including Petraeus.” Former UK official, SIGAR 

interview, June 17, 2015.

318. “The U.S. government stepped back due to the

Holbrooke decision on counternarcotics. Then, in 

2011, when INL did reengage, it went in the direction of the Food Zones times eight.” Former UK 

official, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015.

319. Wechsler, SIGAR interview, November 1, 2016.

320. SIGAR analysis of DOD, response to SIGAR data

call, April 6, 2010; DOD, response to SIGAR data 

call, July 16, 2010; DOD, response to SIGAR data 

call, October 6, 2010; DOD, response to SIGAR data 

call, January 6, 2011; DOD, response to SIGAR data 

call, January 4, 2012. 

321. Wechsler, SIGAR interview, November 1, 2016.

322. Former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016.

323. Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption 

Threatens Global Security (New York, NY: W. W. 

Norton, 2015), pp. 140–141; Partlow, A Kingdom of 

Their Own, pp. 83–85; DOD, email to SIGAR, March 

13, 2018.

324. Partlow, A Kingdom of Their Own, p. 106; Kirk 

Meyer, former director of the Afghan Threat 

Finance Cell, email to SIGAR, March 6, 2016.

325. “The pivot point was the Salehi case. . . . It led to

very difficult relationships. We could no longer 

meet with the CNJC without approval at the highest 

level. Afghan contacts were told they needed the 

Attorney General and President’s approval to 

meet. It led to very difficult relationships. CNJC 

were told that they couldn’t polygraph judges and 

prosecutors.” Former DOJ attaché, SIGAR interview, April 12, 2016; Partlow, A Kingdom of Their 

Own, pp. 104–107; Matthew Rosenberg and Maria 

Abi-Habib, “Afghanistan Blunts Anticorruption 

Efforts,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2010; 

Chandrasekaran, Little America, p. 268.

326. Former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016; Partlow, A Kingdom of Their 

Own, pp. 103–108. 

327. U.S. Embassy Kabul and USFOR-A, U.S. CivilMilitary Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, 

August 2013.

328. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR 

interview, May 10, 2016; SIGAR, Quarterly Report 

to the United States Congress, October 30, 2017, 

p. 254; Marty Skovlund Jr., “This elite police force 

is Afghanistan’s secret weapon against violent 

extremists,” Business Insider, November 15, 2017. 

329. Senior U.S. official, SIGAR interview, March 14, 

2016; SIGAR, Afghan Special Mission Wing, SIGAR 

Audit 13-13, June 2013, p. 2.

330. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2017, p. 254.

331. Former Deputy Director, Afghan Threat Finance 

Cell, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015; SIGAR 

internal memo on the Afghan Threat Finance 

Cell, January 25, 2017, p. 1; SIGAR, Corruption 

in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in 

Afghanistan, SIGAR-16-58-LL, p. 95.

332. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 40.

333. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence; 
228 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance 

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 47–52.

334. Former UK Government official, SIGAR interview, 

April 5, 2016. 

335. Former UK Government official, SIGAR interview, 

April 5, 2016; UK House of Commons, Home Affairs 

Committee, “Drugs: Breaking the Cycle,” written 

evidence submitted by the Serious Organised Crime 

Agency, January 2012.

336. EastWest Institute, Afghan Narco Trafficking: 

Finding an Alternative to Alternative 

Development, July 2016, p. 40. 

337. EastWest Institute, Afghan Narco Trafficking, July 

2016, p. 26.

338. Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework 

(TMAF): Senior Officials Meeting Joint Report, 

July 3, 2013; Self-Reliance through Mutual 

Accountability Framework (SMAF), 

September 5, 2015.

339. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2014, pp. 3–4.

340. George Packer, “Afghanistan’s Theorist–in-Chief,” 

New Yorker, July 4, 2016.

341. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2016, p. 144. 

342. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016, 

December 2016, p. 6.

343. Operation Resolute Support, “Counternarcotics

Concept Paper Input,” April 2017, attachment 

to U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Counternarcotics 

Strategy Coordination for Afghanistan: Strategic 

Communication,” April 4, 2017; UN Security 

Council, “Seventh Report of the Analytical Support 

and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant 

to resolution 2255 (2015) concerning the Taliban 

and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of 

Afghanistan,” October 5, 2016, p. 9; U.S. Embassy, 

Kabul, “Counternarcotics Strategy Coordination for 

Afghanistan: Interdiction,” April 4, 2017, p. 2.

344. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Counternarcotics

Strategy Coordination for Afghanistan: Strategic 

Communication,” April 4, 2017.

345. UNODC “Afghan Opium Production Jumps to

Record Level, Up 87 Per Cent: Survey,” press 

release, November, 15 2017.

346. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, 

November 2017, p. 8.

347. General Nicholson, “Department of Defense Press

Briefing by General Nicholson,” November 20, 2017.

348. General Nicholson, “Department of Defense Press

Briefing by General Nicholson,” November 20, 2017.

349. General Nicholson, “Department of Defense Press

Briefing by General Nicholson,” November 20, 2017; 

General Nicholson, “Department of Defense Press 

Briefing by General Nicholson,” November 28, 2017.

350. Brigadier General Bunch, “DOD Press Briefing by

Brigadier General Bunch,” December 13, 2017.

351. NATO Resolute Support, “U.S. airstrikes against 

Taliban revenue expand to western Afghanistan,” 

press release, April 7, 2018.

352. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2018, p. 188.

353. Brigadier General Bunch, “DOD Press Briefing by

Brigadier General Bunch,” December 13, 2017.

354. CRS, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military 

Operations, and Issues for Congress, R40156, 

December 3, 2009, p. 50; BBC News, “Panorama,” 

program transcript, October 10, 2005.

355. Brigadier General Bunch, “DOD Press Briefing

by Brigadier General Bunch,” December 13, 2017. 

Further, DOD stressed that “USFOR-A is not 

engaging in a CN campaign . . . we are engaged in a 

Counter-Threat Finance Campaign.” DOD, email to 

SIGAR, March 13, 2018.

356. David Mansfield, Bombing Heroin Labs in 

Afghanistan: The Latest Act in the Theatre of 

Counternarcotics, London School of Economics 

International Drug Policy Unit, January 2018, p. 10.

357. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2018, p. 180.

358. State, INL, “Addressing Illicit Drug Challenges:

Eradication and Interdiction,” State Department 

website, accessed on April 24, 2018.

359. Ward and Byrd, Afghanistan’s Opium Drug 

Economy, p. 57. 

360. Capra, testimony before the Caucus on

International Narcotics Control, hearing on “Future 

U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” 

January 15, 2014, p. 1. 

361. Peter H. Reuter, Gordon Crawford, Jonathan Cave, 

Patrick Murphy, Don Henry, William Lisowski, 

Eleanor Sullivan Wainstein, Sealing the Borders: 

The Effects of Increased Military Participation in 

Drug Interdiction, RAND Corporation, 1998, p. v. 

362. Ward and Byrd, Afghanistan’s Opium Drug 

Economy, p. 55. 

363. Capra, testimony before the Caucus on

International Narcotics Control, hearing on “Future 

U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” 

January 15, 2014, p. 1.

364. GAO, Department of State’s Counternarcotics 

Performance Management System, GAO-11-564R, 

May 26, 2011, p. 11. 

365. State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs Interdiction Performance 

Management Plan, 2014, pp. 8–9.

366. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2007, pp. 232–233. 

367. DEA, Global Heroin Strategy, January 2002, p. 23; 

Tandy, testimony before the House Committee on 

International Relations, hearing on “United States 

Policy towards Narcoterrorism in Afghanistan,” 

(February 12, 2004). 

368. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs: Counternarcotics—Meetings 

with UNODCCP and British,” Kabul 001348 cable, 

July 18, 2002; former Senior UN Adviser, SIGAR 

interview, May 19, 2016. 

369. Former Senior UN Adviser, SIGAR interview, May 

19, 2016; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs,” Kabul 001348 cable, July 18, 

2002. 

370. Former Senior UN Adviser, SIGAR interview, 

May 19, 2016. 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 229

371. U.S. Mission to the UN in Vienna, “UNDCP Status 

Report on Afghanistan for Major Donors,” Vienna 

000559 cable, April 12, 2002.

372. Former Senior UN Adviser, SIGAR interview, 

May 19, 2016.

373. U.S. Mission to the UN in Vienna, “UNDCP Status 

Report on Afghanistan for Major Donors,” Vienna 

000559 cable, April 12, 2002; GAO, Afghan Security: 

Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made 

Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better 

Defined, GAO-05-575, June 2005, p. 5.

374. The Italians and French were working with the

Afghan Interim Administration to launch programs 

to develop legal judicial frameworks, strengthen the 

State High Commission for Drug Control (SHCDC), 

establish provincial judicial units, and draft a national drug control policy. U.S. Mission to the UN in 

Vienna, “UNDCP Status Report on Afghanistan for 

Major Donors,” Vienna 000559 cable, April 12, 2002. 

375. U.S. Mission to the UN in Vienna, “UNDCP Status 

Report on Afghanistan for Major Donors,” Vienna 

000559 cable, April 12, 2002.

376. DOJ Office of the Inspector General, The 

Drug Enforcement Administration’s Internal 

Operations, Audit Report 07-19, February 2007, 

pp. 28–29. 

377. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs,” Kabul 001348 cable, July 18, 

2002; former senior UN adviser, SIGAR interview, 

May 19, 2016; SIGAR, Counternarcotics Police of 

Afghanistan, SIGAR 15-12-AR, October 29, 2014, 

p. 1. 

378. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs,” Kabul 001348 cable, 

July 18, 2002.

379. Former DOJ official, SIGAR interview, 

October 1, 2016.

380. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, p. 62; UK Her Majesty’s Customs and 

Excise official, SIGAR interview, April 7, 2016.

381. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, p. 62; UK Ministry of Defence official, 

SIGAR interview, March 29, 2018.

382. The three categories of units, intelligence, operations, and investigations reflect the continuum of 

law enforcement casework. Intelligence gathering 

is conducted and passed on to operations units 

that go out and interdict traffickers or labs. The evidence collected on site is then handed over to the 

investigations unit assemble a case for prosecution 

as well as feed new intelligence back into the system. Former senior UN adviser, SIGAR interview, 

May 19, 2016; former Her Majesty’s Customs and 

Excise official, SIGAR interview, May 11, 2016. 

383. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs,” Kabul 001348 cable, July 18, 

2002. Until October 2002, UN Office on Drugs and 

Crime (UNODC) was called the Office for Drug 

Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP). The 

UN entity referred to in this cable is UNODCCP. For 

the purpose of ease and consistency, UNODCCP 

has been replaced by UNODC throughout 

this report. 

384. State, INL, FY 2004 Budget Justification, May 

2003, pp. 6, 102; State, INL, FY 2005 Budget 

Justification, May 2004, p. 141.

385. Senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

June 23, 2016.

386. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2004, Pub L. No. 108-136 117 Stat. 1593 

(2003). Prior to fiscal Year 2004, the National 

Defense Authorization Act did not explicitly name 

Afghanistan as one of the countries available for 

DOD counterdrug assistance under Section 1033, 

however, some U.S. officials argued that DOD was 

able to provide assistance under other enacted 

authorities. 

387. Tandy, testimony before the House Committee on 

International Relations, hearing on “United States 

Policy towards Narcoterrorism in Afghanistan,” 

(February 12, 2004); U.S. Embassy Kabul, “The 

Spring Opium Crop: TDY Proposal by INL 

Representative William Bach,” Kabul 000385 cable, 

March 20, 2002. 

388. DEA, Global Heroin Strategy, January 2002, p. 11; 

DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, p. 3; DEA Chief of Operations Michael 

A. Braun, “U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in 

Afghanistan: Time for Leadership,” testimony 

before the House Committee on International 

Relations, p. 4 (March 17, 2005); Inspectors General 

for State and DOD, Interagency Assessment of the 

Counternarcotics Program in Afghanistan, State 

Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD Report No. IE-2007-

005, July 2007, p. 38; UK Her Majesty’s Customs 

and Excise official, SIGAR interview, April 7, 2016; 

former senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, June 

23, 2016. For percentage of Afghan heroin entering 

the United States, see: Tandy, testimony before the 

House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 

Policy, and Human Resources for the Committee on 

Government Reform, hearing on “Afghanistan: Law 

Enforcement Interdiction Efforts in Transshipment 

Countries to Stem the Flow of Heroin,” 

February 26, 2004.

389. Tandy, testimony before the House Subcommittee 

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resources for the Committee on Government 

Reform, hearing on “Afghanistan: Law Enforcement 

Interdiction Efforts in Transshipment Countries to 

Stem the Flow of Heroin,” (February 26, 2004); U.S. 

Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan: Time for 

Leadership, p. 42.

390. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, p. 60; The 2006 Afghan NDCS published 

slightly revised benchmarks for law enforcement as 

a whole including: 2,000 CNPA police, 7 provincial offices, and 5 regional bases. Government 

of Afghanistan, MCN, “National Drug Control 

Strategy,” January, 2006, p. 38.

391. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, p. 60. 

392. Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan,

Afghanistan Security Forces: IPR, July 22, 2004. 

393. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, pp. 26, 62; Government of Afghanistan,” 

Counter Narcotics Law,” December 17, 2005, p. 32. 
230 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

394. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), 2005, p. 267; State, U.S. 

Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, 

August 2007, pp. 15, 31.

395. Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice,

“Police Law,” September 22, 2005, pp. 3–5.

396. SIGAR, Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan: 

U.S. Assistance to Provincial Units Cannot Be 

Fully Tracked and Formal Capability Assessments 

Are Needed, SIGAR 15-12-AR, October 29, 2014, 

pp. 3–4. “The police shall perform their duties under the leadership of the Minister of Interior in the 

capital, and under the guidance of the governors 

and district chiefs in the provinces and districts 

respectively. The border police and highway 

security police shall perform their duties under the 

leadership of the Minister of Interior both in the 

capital and provinces.” Government of Afghanistan, 

Ministry of Justice, “Police Law,” 

September 22, 2005, p. 3. 

397. Former Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 

official, SIGAR interview, May 11, 2016; SIGAR, 

Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan: U.S. 

Assistance to Provincial Units Cannot Be Fully 

Tracked and Formal Capability Assessments Are 

Needed, SIGAR 15-12-AR, October 29, 2014, pp. 3–4; 

Government of Afghanistan, MCN, “National Drug 

Control Strategy,” January 2006, p. 38; former U.S. 

counternarcotics contractor, SIGAR interview, 

June 9, 2016.

398. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for

Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 

Afghanistan for 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106 

(2003) p. 5. 

399. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2004, Pub L. No. 108-136 117 Stat. 1593 (2003).

400. Senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, June 23, 

2016; Representative Elliot Engel, “Opening 

Statement,” testimony before the House 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, hearing on “Afghanistan: Drugs and 

Terrorism and U.S. Security Policy,” February 26, 

2004, p. 19.

401. Senior U.S. Government official, SIGAR interview, 

March 14, 2016; Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict 

Thomas W. O’Connell, testimony before the House 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, hearing on “Afghanistan: Drugs and 

Terrorism and U.S. Security Policy,” February 26, 

2004, pp. 77, 87.

402. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Counternarcotics Mary Beth Long, testimony 

before the House Committee on International 

Relations, hearing on “U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” 

June 2, 2004, p. 2.

403. Tandy, testimony before the House Committee on 

International Relations, hearing on “Afghanistan 

Drugs and Terrorism and U.S. Security Policy,” 

Government Reform, February 26, 2004, p. 27. 

404. Representative Henry Hyde, “Opening Statement,”

House Committee on International Relations, hearing on “Afghanistan: Drugs and Terrorism and U.S. 

Security Policy,” February 12, 2004, pp. 11–12. 

405. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort, based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence.

406. Holland and Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

“AFG 04 Memorandum from the UK Foreign and 

Commonwealth Office to Parliament,” March 2, 

2006; former Senior UK Government official, 

April 4, 2016.

407. Former senior official, Combined Forces

Command–Afghanistan, SIGAR interview, 

September 21, 2016; Long, testimony before the 

House Committee on International Relations, hearing on “U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” (June 2, 2004).

408. DOD, “Drug Interdiction and Counter Dug

Activities, Defense: FY 2007 Emergency 

Supplemental Request,” 2007, pp. 104–106; senior 

DOD official, SIGAR interview, September 12, 2016. 

409. CRS, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, 

RL32686, May 26, 2005, p. 28; State, International 

Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), 

2005, p. 266.

410. Inspectors General for State and DOD, Interagency 

Assessment of the Counternarcotics Program in 

Afghanistan, State Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD 

Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, pp. 38, 65; 

UNODC, Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Law 

Enforcement Update #5, January 2006, p. 2. 

411. “The FAST groups will provide guidance to their 

Afghan counterparts, while conducting bilateral investigations aimed at the region’s trafficking organizations. The FAST groups, which are supported and 

largely funded by the Department of Defense, also 

will help with the destruction of existing opium 

storage sites, clandestine heroin processing labs, 

and precursor chemical supplies. Each of the five 

FAST groups will consist of a Supervisory Special 

Agent, four Special Agents and one Intelligence 

Research Specialist. The FAST groups, who have 

received specialized training, will be deployed in 

Afghanistan, two groups at a time, and will rotate 

every 120 days. The remaining three groups will 

remain at the DEA Training Academy in Quantico, 

Virginia, where they will engage in training and provide operational support for the deployed teams.” 

Braun, testimony before the House Committee on 

International Relations, p. 5 (March 17, 2005). 

412. Braun, testimony before the House Committee on

International Relations, p. 5 (March 17, 2005); The 

FAST program closely resembled DEA’s Operation 

Snowcap, which ran in South America from 1986 

to 1994. Former DEA Agent, SIGAR interview, April 

14, 2016; Wankel, SIGAR interview, April 19, 2016. 

413. Inspectors General for State and DOD, Interagency 

Assessment of the Counternarcotics Program in 

Afghanistan, State Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD 

Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, pp. 27, 63–64. 

414. Senior U.S. government official, SIGAR interview, 

March 14, 2016; CRS, Afghanistan: Narcotics and 

U.S. Policy, RL32686, June 9, 2006, p. 36–37. 

415. DEA Chief of Operations Thomas Harrigan, testimony before the Senate Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, hearing on “Counternarcotics 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 231

Efforts in Afghanistan,” July 20, 2011, pp. 3–4; 

Capra, testimony before the Senate Caucus on 

International Narcotics Control, hearing on “Future 

U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” 

January 15, 2014 , p. 3. 

416. DOD official, SIGAR interview, March 19, 2016; 

Inspectors General for State and DOD, Interagency 

Assessment of the Counternarcotics Program in 

Afghanistan, State Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD 

Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, pp. 6, 47–48; 

DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan 

for Sustaining the Afghan National Security 

Forces, August 2008, p. 95.

417. Former senior official, Combined Forces

Command–Afghanistan, SIGAR interview, 

September 21, 2016.

418. Inspectors General for State and DOD, Interagency 

Assessment of the Counternarcotics Program in 

Afghanistan, State Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD 

Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, p. 48.

419. Former UK official, SIGAR interview, March 18, 

2016; Inspectors General for State and DOD, 

Interagency Assessment of the Counternarcotics 

Program in Afghanistan, State Report No. 

ISP-I-07-34, DOD Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, 

p. 48; former senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

September 20, 2016.

420. Former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016; former senior DOD official, 

SIGAR interview, May 16, 2016; former DOJ official, 

SIGAR interview, March 14, 2016.

421. Former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016.

422. Former senior UK government official, SIGAR

interview, March 18, 2016; DEA, Intelligence 

Assessment for Afghanistan, June 2005, p. 64; former NSC official, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015. 

423. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, p. 64.

424. Government of Afghanistan, “Counter Narcotics

Law,” December 17, 2005, p. 30.

425. State initially referred to the CJTF as the Vertical 

Prosecution Task Force, which was established 

in 2004. State, International Narcotics Control 

Strategy Report (INCSR), March 2006, p. 208; 

State, INL, FY 2007 Budget Justification, April 

2006, p. 168; State, International Narcotics Control 

Strategy Report (INCSR), March 2007, p. 228.

426. SIGAR, Actions Needed to Resolve Construction 

Delays at the Counternarcotics Justice Center, 

SIGAR 09-04-AR, August, 27, 2009, pp. ii, 1.

427. SIGAR, Inquiry Letter: Anti-Corruption Justice 

Center, SIGAR 16-52-SP, August 10, 2016.

428. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2007, p. 228, State, 

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 

(INCSR), March 2008, p. 237–238.

429. UNODC, Independent Evaluation Unit, Thematic 

Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided 

to Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on 

Drugs and Crime. Volume 3: Law Enforcement 

Program, (New York, NY: May 2008), p. 15. 

430. UNODC, Thematic Evaluation of the Technical 

Assistance Provided to Afghanistan by the United 

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, pp. 4–5.

431. NATO, Defence and Security Committee Report, 

Visit to Afghanistan, September 3–8, 2007; former 

senior UK government official, SIGAR interview, 

May 4, 2015. 

432. CRS, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, 

RL32686, April 21, 2009, pp. 15–16; former DOJ 

official, SIGAR interview, June 16, 2015.

433. Inspectors General for State and DOD, Interagency 

Assessment of the Counternarcotics Program in 

Afghanistan, State Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD 

Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, p. 49.

434. Inspectors General for State and DOD, Interagency 

Assessment of the Counternarcotics Program in 

Afghanistan, State Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD 

Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, p. 9.

435. NATO, “NATO steps up counter-narcotics efforts in 

Afghanistan,” October 10, 2008.

436. DOD, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum: 

Department of Defense International 

Counternarcotics Policy, Attachment 1, 

December 24, 2008. 

437. DOD, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum: 

Department of Defense International 

Counternarcotics Policy, Attachment 3, 

December 24, 2008.

438. DOD, “Drug Interdiction and Counter Dug

Activities, Defense: FY 2007 Emergency 

Supplemental Request,” 2007, p. 104.

439. Wechsler, SIGAR interview, November 1, 2016.

440. Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Combating the Financing 

of Terrorism,” September 8, 2011; Combating 

Terrorism Archive Project, “Interview with Kirk 

Meyer,” April 2, 2004; SIGAR internal memo on the 

Afghan Threat Finance Cell, January 25, 2017.

441. J. Edward Conway, “Analysis in Combat: The 

Deployed Threat Finance Analyst,” Small Wars 

Journal, July 4, 2012, p. 4; former Deputy Director, 

Afghan Threat Finance Cell, SIGAR interview, 

June 17, 2015.

442. Capra, testimony before the Senate Caucus on

International Narcotics Control, hearing on “Future 

U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” 

January 15, 2014, p. 4; SIGAR internal memo on the 

Afghan Threat Finance Cell, January 25, 2017, p. 1.

443. Former Deputy Director, Afghan Threat Finance 

Cell, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015; Combating 

Terrorism Archive Project, “Interview with Kirk 

Meyer”; Dexter Filkins, “The Afghan Bank Heist,” 

New Yorker, February 14, 2011, pp. 11–12.

444. Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Combating the Financing of 

Terrorism,” September 8, 2011.

445. While it is beyond the scope of this report to fully

assess threat finance activities in Afghanistan, the 

ATFC represented a significant investigative and 

intelligence effort related to overall U.S. counternarcotics goals. This brief account provides some 

analysis of why it achieved tactical success, though 

does not intend to offer a comprehensive review of 

ATFC operations.

446. SIGAR internal memo on the Afghan Threat

Finance Cell, January 25, 2017, p. 2. 
232 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

447. SIGAR internal memo on the Afghan Threat

Finance Cell, January 25, 2017, p. 2–3; former 

Deputy Director, Afghan Threat Finance Cell, 

SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015.

448. SIGAR internal memo on the Afghan Threat

Finance Cell, January 25, 2017, p. 2; former Deputy 

Director, Afghan Threat Finance Cell, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015.

449. Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Combatting the Financing of 

Terrorism,” September 8, 2011.

450. SIGAR internal memo on the Afghan Threat

Finance Cell, January 25, 2017, p. 3.

451. Capra, testimony before the Senate Caucus on

International Narcotics Control, hearing on “Future 

U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” 

January 15, 2014, p. 4.

452. SIGAR internal memo on the Afghan Threat

Finance Cell, January 25, 2017, p. 3; Capra, testimony before the Senate Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, hearing on “Future U.S. 

Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” January 

15, 2014, p. 4.

453. SIGAR internal memo on the Afghan Threat

Finance Cell, January 25, 2017, p. 4; Capra, testimony before the Senate Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, hearing on “Future U.S. 

Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” January 

15, 2014, pp. 4–5.

454. SIGAR internal memo on the Afghan Threat

Finance Cell, January 25, 2017, pp. 5–6.

455. Treasury, “Treasury Designates New Ansari Money 

Exchange,” February 18, 2011.

456. Meyer, email to SIGAR, March 6, 2016.

457. State, SRAP, Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional 

Stabilization Strategy, February 24, 2010, p. 17.

458. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2017, p. 201.

459. CRS, Department of Defense Contractors in 

Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis, 

R40764, May 13, 2011, pp. 12–13. 

460. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 2018, p. 200. Between the years 

of high seizures in 2009 and 2011, seizures were 

down to 49,750 in 2010.

461. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan, 2012, pp. 3–4.

462. U.S. Counternarcotics official, SIGAR interview

October 2015. former director of the Kabul Counter 

Narcotics Task Force, SIGAR interview, April 19, 

2016; former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016.

463. Former director of the Kabul Counter Narcotics

Task Force, SIGAR interview, April 19, 2016; former 

senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016.

464. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2018, p. 185.

465. Former senior official, Combined Forces

Command–Afghanistan, SIGAR interview, 

September 21, 2016; former Afghan deputy minister, 

SIGAR interview, April 13, 2016.

466. Patterson, testimony before the U.S. House

Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on 

Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 

Programs, hearing on “Afghan Drug Eradication 

and Rebuilding Programs,” September 12, 2006, 

p. 1; State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan, August 2007, p. 2. 

467. General Nicholson, “Department of Defense Press

Briefing by General Nicholson,” November 20, 2017; 

Brigadier General Bunch, “DOD Press Briefing by 

Brigadier General Bunch,” December 13, 2017.

468. For example, see: ONDCP, 1999 National Drug 

Control Strategy, 1999; Patterson, testimony before 

the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 

Financing and Related Programs, hearing on 

“Afghan Drug Eradication and Rebuilding 

Programs,” September 12, 2006, p. 2; State, 

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 

(INCSR), March 2010, p. 107; State, International 

Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), 

March 2008, p. 238. 

469. General Nicholson, “Department of Defense Press

Briefing by General Nicholson,” November 20, 2017.

470. General Nicholson, “Department of Defense Press

Briefing by General Nicholson,” November 28, 2017; 

General Nicholson, “Department of Defense Press 

Briefing by General Nicholson,” November 20, 2017.

471. NATO Resolute Support, “U.S. airstrikes against 

Taliban revenue expand to western Afghanistan,” 

April 7, 2018.

472. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, p. 21. Given the secrecy surrounding 

illicit activities and the sharply reduced international presence in Afghanistan today, there is little comprehensive, unclassified reporting on Afghan drug 

laboratories’ operations and operating procedures. 

Nevertheless, this DEA assessment and other 

publications, such as the 2006 UNODC/World Bank 

report cited below, provide a fairly detailed picture 

of how labs function and are protected. While some 

analysts point to an upward trend in consolidation 

of the Afghan drug trade in recent years, it is unlikely that the core features of drug labs have changed 

appreciably since the 2005–2006 period.

473. Byrd and Buddenberg, Afghanistan’s Drug 

Industry, UNODC and the World Bank, p. 30.

474. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, p. 23.

475. Brigadier General Bunch, “DOD Press Briefing by

Brigadier General Bunch,” December 13, 2017.

476. Kyle Rempfer, “US airstrikes against Taliban drug 

labs extend to western Afghanistan,” Military 

Times, April 10, 2018.

477. Price data from Helmand on the average value of

one kilogram of heroin is estimated at between 

$1,000 and $1,090 dollars per kilogram. Mansfield, 

Bombing Heroin Labs in Afghanistan, p. 19. 

According to UNODC’s 2017 survey, the average 

price of dry opium at harvest time was $155 per 

kilogram. SIGAR analysis of UNODC’s 2017 Survey 

suggests at this rate, a total of 516,129 kilograms of 

dried opium would need to be destroyed to equal 

$80 million dollars. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium 

Survey 2017, October 2017, p. 8. 

478. UNODC estimated potential heroin production

from Afghan opium at 320–530 metric tons in 2017. 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 233

Export quality heroin is assumed to be 50 percent 

to 70 percent pure. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium 

Survey 2017, October 2017, p. 44.

479. Combating Terrorism Archive Project, “Interview 

with Kirk Meyer” April 2, 2014; Borhan Osman, U.S. 

Bombing of Afghan Drug Labs Won’t Crush the 

Taliban, International Crisis Group, December 11, 

2017; Coll, Directorate S, pp. 268–270. 

480. “David Dadge, a spokesman for UNODC, says there

is ‘anecdotal evidence’ that Taliban commanders 

are involved in the manufacture of opiates, but 

says that stops short of proving that the Taliban as 

an organization has a systematic programme of running factories.” Anne Chaon, “The Taliban appears 

to have made a big move into Afghanistan’s drug 

production,” Agence France Presse, August 8, 2017.

481. Gretchen Peters, How Opium Profits the Taliban, 

USIP, August 2009, p. 3. 

482. Former DEA Official, correspondence with SIGAR,

January 2, 2018.

483. General Nicholson, “Department of Defense Press

Briefing by General Nicholson,” November 20, 

2017; General John W. Nicholson, “Department 

of Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson,” 

November 28, 2017.

484. Osman, U.S. Bombing of Afghan Drug Labs Won’t 

Crush the Taliban. 

485. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan’s opium production is through the roof—why Washington shouldn’t 

overreact,” Brookings Institution, 

November 12, 2017.

486. State, INL, “Fighting the Opium Trade in 

Afghanistan: Myths, Facts and Sound Policy,” 

March 11, 2008.

487. Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan’s opium production is 

through the roof–why Washington shouldn’t overreact,” Brookings Institution, November 12, 2017.

488. Brigadier General Bunch, “DOD Press Briefing by

Brigadier General Bunch,” December 13, 2017.

489. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan: INL October

2017 Highlights: Policy Coordination, Interdiction, 

and Equipment Donations,” Kabul 005444 cable, 

November 25, 2017; SIGAR internal memo on the 

Afghan Threat Finance Cell, January 25, 2017, 

p. 1; SIGAR correspondence with former Director, 

Afghan Threat Finance Cell, May 10, 2011. 

490. CRS, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military 

Operations, and Issues for Congress, R40156, 

December 3, 2009, p. 50; BBC News, “Panorama,” 

program transcript, October 10, 2005.

491. Former UK and UN counterdrug official, SIGAR

interview, June 16, 2016; Holland and Foreign and 

Commonwealth Office, “AFG 04 Memorandum 

from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to 

Parliament,” March 2, 2006.

492. Office of Inspectors General for DOJ and State, A 

Special Joint Review of Post-Incident Responses 

by the Department of State and Drug Enforcement 

Administration to Three Deadly Force Incidents 

in Honduras, Oversight and Review 17-02, ESP-17-

01, May 2017, p. 17.

493. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2010, p. 107.

494. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, 

October 2007, p. 24.

495. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, p. 21. Similarly, a 2006 UNODC/World 

Bank report observed, “An investigation of the 

spatial pattern of opium prices suggests that opium 

markets are flexible and mobile. While actions 

against the opium economy in a given area can be 

effective locally and in the short run (including 

having an impact on local prices), they tend to 

encourage a shift of production and trade to other 

areas.” Buddenberg and Byrd, Afghanistan’s Drug 

Industry, UNODC and the World Bank, p. 13.

496. DEA, Intelligence Assessment for Afghanistan, 

June 2005, p. 23. The 2006 UNODC/World Bank 

report also noted that the “the high mobility and 

flexibility of opium production may well reduce 

the effectiveness” of efforts to destroy processing 

labs. Buddenberg and Byrd, Afghanistan’s Drug 

Industry, UNODC and the World Bank, p. 143.

497. Mujib Mashal, “Afghan Taliban Awash in Heroin 

Cash, a Troubling Turn for War,” New York Times, 

October 29, 2017. 

498. Brigadier General Bunch, “DOD Press Briefing by

Brigadier General Bunch,” December 13, 2017.

499. DOD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense,

Memorandum: Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Department 

of Defense (DOD) Fixed Wing and Helicopter 

Reimbursement Rates, Tab F, October 3, 2017, 

pp. 2, 4.

500. Mohammad Stanekzai and Girish Gupta, “U.S.

strikes on Taliban opium labs won’t work, say 

Afghan farmers,” Reuters, November 23, 2017, p. 2.

501. Rod Nickel, “U.S., Afghan forces expand air

strikes on Taliban drug labs,” Reuters, April 8, 

2018; Andrew Cockburn, “Mobbed Up, How 

America boosts the Afghan opium trade,” Harper’s 

Magazine, April 208, p. 34.

502. ONDCP, 1999 National Drug Control Strategy, 

1999; State, Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs Interdiction 

Performance Management Plan, 2014, pp. 8–9.

503. Former DOJ official, SIGAR interview, 

March 14, 2016.

504. SIGAR, Inquiry Letter: Anti-Corruption Justice 

Center, SIGAR 16-52-SP, August 10, 2016, p. 1.

505. State, INL, “Fact Sheet: Counternarcotics Programs

in Afghanistan,” May 4, 2012; UNODC, Afghanistan 

Opium Survey 2017, October 2017, p. 44.

506. SIGAR, Documenting Detention Procedures Will 

Help Ensure Counter-Narcotics Justice Center is 

Utilized as Intended, SIGAR Audit 09-7, September 

30, 2009, p. 1; former DOJ official, SIGAR interview, 

March 14, 2016. 

507. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), February 2009, p. 109; Inspectors 

General for State and DOD, Interagency 

Assessment of Afghanistan Counternarcotics 

Programs, State Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD 

Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, p. 40.

508. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction John Sopko, testimony before 

the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 

hearing on “Future U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in 
234 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Afghanistan,” January 15, 2014, p. 12; former DOJ 

official, SIGAR interview, March 14, 2016; former 

SRAP official, SIGAR interview, April 12, 2016.

509. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2015, p. 97.

510. Joseph Goldstein, “Bribery Frees a Drug Kingpin in

Afghanistan, Where Cash Often Overrules Justice,” 

New York Times, December 31, 2013, p.3.

511. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2007, pp. 229–230.

512. DOJ, “Member of Afghan Taliban Sentenced to Life 

in Prison in Nation’s First Conviction on Narcoterror Charges,” press release, December 22, 2008.

513. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), February 2009, p. 110.

514. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2007, pp. 229–230; DOJ, 

United States Attorney, Southern District of New 

York, “First Heroin Kingpin ever Extradited from 

Afghanistan Pleads Guilty to Smuggling Heroin into 

United States,” press release July 11, 2006.

515. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan, August 2007, pp. 6–7. 

516. Former senior UK government official, SIGAR

interview, May 4, 2015.

517. Peters, Seeds of Terror, p. 159; James Risen, 

“Propping up a Drug Lord, Then Arresting Him,” 

New York Times, December 11, 2010.

518. Former senior DEA official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016.

519. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2008, p. 239.

520. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan, August 2007, p. 7; State, International 

Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), 

February 2009, p. 110.

521. State, SRAP, Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional 

Stabilization Strategy, February 24, 2010, p. 17.

522. Lisa Curtis, U.S. Counternarcotics Policy: 

Essential to Fighting Terrorism in Afghanistan, 

Backgrounder No. 2845, The Heritage Foundation, 

September 30, 2013, p. 14.

523. Ronald Neumann, Former U.S. Ambassador to

Afghanistan, SIGAR interview, June 18, 2015.

524. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghan Government Request

for U.S. Support for Proposed Afghan Poppy 

Eradication Plan,” Kabul 003008 cable, December 

18, 2003. 

525. Former UK senior official, SIGAR interview, May 4, 

2015. 

526. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Joint UK-U.S. Demarche

to President Karzai on Counternarcotics,” Kabul 

141383 cable, July 23, 2002; Berry, “From London to 

Lashkar Gah,” p. 10; Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, 

p. 138.

527. Berry, “From London to Lashkar Gah,” p. 21.

528. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Joint US-UK Drug Demarche

Delivered,” Kabul 00326 cable, March 10, 2002; 

Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, p. 139. “The compensated eradication project was approved at a high 

level.” Former Afghan deputy minister, SIGAR 

interview, April 13, 2016.

529. Cawkwell, UK Communication Strategies for 

Afghanistan, p. 90; Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, 

p. 139.

530. UNODC, “Mission Report to Afghanistan,”

December 13, 2002, p. 3; Pamela Constable, “Afghan 

Farmers Threatening to Replant Opium Poppies,” 

Washington Post, August 17, 2002; Felbab-Brown, 

Shooting Up, p. 139.

531. Berry, “From London to Lashkar Gah,” p. 10; former 

UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, 

May 10, 2016.

532. Mohammed Ehsan Zia, former Minister of MRRD,

SIGAR interview, April 12, 2016.

533. Former Afghan deputy minister, SIGAR interview, 

April 13, 2016.

534. Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, p. 139.

535. Former Afghan deputy minister, SIGAR interview, 

April 13, 2016.

536. Anthony Fitzherbert, former agricultural consultant

to MRRD, SIGAR interview, June 21, 2016. 

537. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016. “In 2006, we had people come 

out to us with chips of paper and ask whether we 

were here to pay for the crop eradicated under 

the British compensated eradication campaign.” 

Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016.

538. Nat Ives, “Karzai Plans to Destroy Poppy Fields in 2

Years,” New York Times, December 13, 2004.

539. Senior UK official, SIGAR interview, 

August 31, 2016.

540. Senior UK official, SIGAR interview, 

August 31, 2016.

541. Former UK senior official, SIGAR interview, 

May 4, 2015.

542. Berry, “From London to Lashkar Gah,” p. 14; former 

UK senior official, SIGAR interview, April 4, 2016.

543. Former UK senior official, SIGAR interview, 

April 4, 2016. 

544. Peter Holland, Head of Afghan Drugs and

Interdepartmental Unit, FCO, UK Government, 

SIGAR interview, May 4, 2015.

545. UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Impact 

of Eradication on Illicit Drug Crop Cultivation, 

(unpublished manuscript, April, 2003), p. 10.

546. UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Impact 

of Eradication on Illicit Drug Crop Cultivation, 

p. 1.

547. “All three [UK officials] made it clear that the UK

will not engage in, or support, any general program 

of poppy eradication, whether conducted by 

TISA or not. They said the UK will only support 

‘targeted eradication’ meaning the UK will support 

eradication only where development projects 

can simultaneously provide economically viable 

alternatives to poppy production.” U.S. Embassy 

Kabul, “INL Program in Afghanistan: A Revised, 

Accelerated and Integrated Approach,” Kabul 

002566 cable, September 14, 2003; Cawkwell, UK 

Communication Strategies for Afghanistan, p. 94; 

Charles, testimony before the House Subcommittee 

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resources of the Committee on Government 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 235

Reform, hearing on “British Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan,” April 1, 2004, pp. 20, 25.

548. Acting Assistant Secretary for INL Paul E.

Simons, “Disrupting the Market: Strategy, 

Implementation, and Results in Narcotics 

Source Countries,” testimony before the House 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy 

and Human Resources of the Committee on 

Government Reform, 108th Cong., July 9, 2003, 

pp. 5, 8.

549. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003, 

October 2003, p. 9.

550. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003, 

October 2003, p. 53.

551. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002, 

October 2002, p. 26; UNODC, Afghanistan 

Opium Survey 2003, October 2003, p. 5; UNODC, 

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2001, 2001, p. 11. 

Note: While there were several provinces cultivating poppy in 2001 only one, Badakhshan, was 

cultivating a significant amount. 

552. Tandy, testimony before the House Committee on 

International Relations, hearing on “United States 

Policy towards Narcoterrorism in Afghanistan,” 

February 12, 2004, pp. 1–2; Mansfield, A State Built 

on Sand, pp. 121–122.

553. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003, 

October 2003, p. 1; BBC News, “Opium Crop Clouds 

Afghan Recovery,” September 22, 2003.

554. Feith, War and Decision, pp. 153–154; Bush, 

Decision Points, p. 211.

555. Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 205. 

556. US Embassy Official, SIGAR interview, March 

15, 2016; Charles, testimony before the House 

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, 

and Human Resources of the Committee 

on Government Reform, hearing on “British 

Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” April 1, 

2004, p. 12.

557. Charles, testimony before the House Subcommittee

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resources of the Committee on Government 

Reform, hearing on “British Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan,” April 1, 2004, pp. 16, 20, 21, 

25, 27. 

558. Charles, testimony before the House Subcommittee

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human 

Resources of the Committee on Government 

Reform, hearing on “British Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan,” April 1, 2004, p. 30. In 

February 2004, Robert Charles had already testified 

to the House International Relations Committee, 

“We hope to destroy a portion of the current year’s 

crop—perhaps 10–15%—and to prepare for a largescale eradication campaign against the 2004–2005 

crop.” Assistant Secretary of State for INL Robert 

B. Charles, “U.S. Policy towards Narcoterrorism in 

Afghanistan,” testimony before the Committee on 

International Relations, hearing on “Afghanistan: 

Drugs and Terrorism and U.S. Security Policy,” 

(February 12, 2004). 

559. Harold D. Wankel and L. R. Hughes, “Winning the 

Opium Wars,” memorandum to Marc Grossman 

and Zalmay Khalilzad, Andrew Natsios Archives, 

Georgetown University Library, October 20, 2004. 

560. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghan Government Request

for U.S. Support for Proposed Afghan Poppy 

Eradication Plan,” Kabul 003008 cable, 

December 18, 2003. 

561. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghan Government Request

for U.S. Support for Proposed Afghan Poppy 

Eradication Plan,” Kabul 003008 cable, 

December 18, 2003. 

562. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghan Government Request

for U.S. Support for Proposed Afghan Poppy 

Eradication Plan,” Kabul 003008 cable, 

December 18, 2003. 

563. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update on Afghan

Government Request for U.S. Support for Proposed 

Afghan Poppy Eradication Plan,” Kabul 003108 

cable, November 24, 2003.

564. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update on Afghan

Government Request,” Kabul 003108 cable, 

November 24, 2003.

565. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update on Afghan

Government Request,” Kabul 003108 cable, 

November 24, 2003.

566. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update on Afghan

Government Request,” Kabul 003108 cable, 

November 24, 2003.

567. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update on Afghan

Government Request,” Kabul 003108 cable, 

November 24, 2003.

568. State Office of Inspector General, Status of the 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs Counternarcotics Programs 

in Afghanistan: Performance Audit, Report No. 

MERO-A-10-02, December 2009, p. 27. 

569. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update on Afghan

Government Request,” Kabul 003108 cable, 

November 24, 2003.

570. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008, 

November 2008, p. 74.

571. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

572. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016.

573. U.S. Embassy Kabul Afghan Eradication Force

(AEF), A Critical Review of Support and Delivery 

to Illicit Crop Eradication Programs in the 

Periods of 2005 and 2006: 2007, The Way Ahead,

2007, pp. 6, 20, 17. 

574. U.S. Embassy Kabul AEF, A Critical Review of 

Support and Delivery to Illicit Crop Eradication 

Programs in the Periods of 2005 and 2006, p. 7.

575. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016.

576. U.S. Embassy Kabul AEF, A Critical Review of 

Support and Delivery to Illicit Crop Eradication 

Programs in the Periods of 2005 and 2006, 

pp. 19–20, 26, 47.

577. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016. 

578. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016. 
236 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

579. U.S. Embassy Kabul AEF, A Critical Review of 

Support and Delivery to Illicit Crop Eradication 

Programs in the Periods of 2005 and 2006, p. 11.

580. U.S. Embassy Kabul AEF, A Critical Review of 

Support and Delivery to Illicit Crop Eradication 

Programs in the Periods of 2005 and 2006, p. 29.

581. Jon Lee Anderson, “The Taliban’s Opium War: 

The difficulties and dangers of the eradication 

program,” New Yorker, July 9, 2007. 

582. Patterson, testimony before the U.S. House

Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on 

Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 

Programs, hearing on “Afghan Drug Eradication 

and Rebuilding Programs,” September 12, 2006, 

p. 34. 

583. Patterson, testimony before the U.S. House

Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on 

Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 

Programs, hearing on “Afghan Drug Eradication 

and Rebuilding Programs,” September 12, 2006, 

p. 34. 

584. Inspectors General for State and DOD, Interagency 

Assessment of the Counternarcotics Program in 

Afghanistan, State Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD 

Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, pp. 4–5. 

585. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016. 

586. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016. 

587. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016. 

588. Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN),

“Poppy Eradication: The Issues, the Players and the 

Strategies,” August 24, 2004. 

589. J. Taylor, “Verification of AEF Eradication in 

Helmand Province 2007,” Cranfield University 

(2007), p. 45; former UK government contractor, 

SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

590. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

591. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

592. Taylor, “Verification of AEF Eradication in Helmand 

Province 2007,” Cranfield University (2007), p. 45.

593. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

594. “INL said, ‘How dare you? Our guys are in the

field at personal risk. How dare you?’ INL said the 

science is wrong. We said, ‘These are U.S. satellites, 

U.S. GPS systems. It is your science. What about 

the science is wrong?’ INL still said it was wrong. 

So Charles Helling was brought in country and 

chose 5 locations to examine.” Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

595. Dr. Charles S. Helling, Helmand Field Visit Report, 

May 21–22 2007, p. 1; former UK government 

contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016; UK 

government official, SIGAR interview, May 11, 2016. 

596. Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan,” p. 275; UK 

government official, SIGAR interview, May 11, 2016.

597. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016.

598. Richard Holbrooke, “Still Wrong in Afghanistan,” 

Washington Post, January 23, 2008.

599. “Holbrooke announced the United States wasn’t 

doing eradication anymore. It wasn’t going to 

spend on AEF/PEF. His attitude was that it was 

just pissing off farmers. Not giving them a realistic 

alternative and denying them their livelihood. If 

eradication was going to happen, it needed to 

be handled by governors at the governor level.” 

Former SRAP official, SIGAR interview, June 27, 

2016. “Holbrooke’s view was to get the gringos’ face 

off eradication—GLE, GPI, but no heavy foreign 

footprint on anything to do with eradication.” 

Former INL official, SIGAR interview, May 13, 2016. 

“One of first conversations I had with Holbrooke, 

Holbrooke said, ‘I want to completely change the 

strategy on counternarcotics to get away from 

eradication.’ I wanted the same. I was writing about 

how to align the CN effort with the military effort 

and deny adversaries the benefits of drugs trade. 

Holbrooke was taking on the administration at 

the time. Holbrooke zeroed in on the eradication 

budget. I was happy about this as no one from 

the Pentagon would complain.” Wechsler, SIGAR 

interview, November 1, 2016.

600. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation and strand of effort, based on agency data 

calls, budget documentation, and correspondence; 

State Office of Inspector General, Status of the 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs Counternarcotics Programs 

in Afghanistan: Performance Audit, Report No. 

MERO-A-10-02, December 2009, p. 41; UNODC, 

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010, 

December 2010, p. 42.

601. Government of the United States of America,

“Governor Led Eradication Implementing 

Instructions for the Letter of Agreement on Police 

Criminal Justice and Counter Narcotics Support 

Programs,” letter to Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan, signed March 9, 2006 and 

amended April 2009.

602. Government of the United States of America,

“Governor Led Eradication Implementing 

Instructions for the Letter of Agreement on Police 

Criminal Justice and Counter Narcotics Support 

Programs,” letter to Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan, signed March 9, 2006 and 

amended April 2009; Government of the United 

States of America, “Governor Led Eradication 

Implementing Instructions for the Letter of 

Agreement on Police Criminal Justice and Counter 

Narcotics Support Programs,” letter to Government 

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, signed 

March 9, 2006 and amended February 2011.

603. Government of the United States of America,

“Governor Led Eradication Implementing 

Instructions for the Letter of Agreement on Police 

Criminal Justice and Counter Narcotics Support 

Programs,” letter to Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan, signed March 9, 2006 and 

amended April 2009.

604. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018.

605. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 237

606. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018; 

UNODC, MCN, Periodical Report on Poppy 

Eradication Verification in Afghanistan, March 

2008; CRS, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. 

Policy, RL32686, August 12, 2009, p. 40.

607. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016. 

608. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016. 

609. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018.

610. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016; Mansfield, SIGAR interview, 

April 11, 2018.

611. “In 2005 UNODC didn’t want to get involved in 

eradication verification, as it would get in the way 

of the survey. They said they didn’t even want to be 

associated with any planning around eradication. 

They wanted nothing to do with it. UNODC eventually agreed to set up a separate project to verify 

eradication and bought a lot of imagery.” Former 

UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 

10, 2016; Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018.

612. “The Afghan authorities reported a total of 21,430

ha eradicated. The present survey neither monitored, nor assessed the effectiveness of the eradication campaign, but the timing of the survey and 

the methodology employed ensure that the results 

presented in this report are post-eradication and 

reflect the net amount of opium poppy which was 

harvestable.” UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 

2003, October 2003, p. 10.

613. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003, 

October 2003, p. 10.

614. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, 

November 2004, p. 6.

615. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort, based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence from 

State in response to SIGAR data call, 

January 17, 2018.

616. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “PRT/Helmand: Helmand

Eradication Wrap Up,” Kabul 002008 cable, 

May 3, 2006.

617. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “PRT/Helmand: Helmand

Eradication Wrap Up,” Kabul 002008 cable, 

May 3, 2006.

618. State, “Moving Forward on Herbicide Eradication,”

State 190725 cable, November 22, 2006. “This year 

the AEF utilized exclusively the UK targeting criteria and were able to more than double all previous 

year’s eradication efforts combined. Therefore the 

AEF had no problem with the concept of Targeting 

Criteria or even how it is developed. There is 

cultivation in all the places where the targeting 

criteria indicate and there is also cultivation in 

areas outside of those areas, which have been 

determined to fit within the targeting model. The 

real issue this year was the British Embassy Drugs 

Team’s decision to disregard the criteria, which 

had been established by their home office and 

attempt to embroil the AEF in counterinsurgency 

and extension of governance in areas outside the 

targeted areas, which also did not fit within the areas that are deemed permissible. This was evident 

in Helmand province both in the Dishu district and 

Sangin which obligated the AEF to bypass and 

ignore poppy rich priority one targeted areas and 

create security situation that UK forces now are 

complaining that they are left to deal with.” U.S. 

Embassy Kabul AEF, A Critical Review of Support 

and Delivery to Illicit Crop Eradication Programs 

in the Periods of 2005 and 2006, p. 28.

619. “But the head of the British Embassy Drugs Team 

wanted to promote big numbers as did the United 

States and the UN. They wanted to be seen doing 

something. UNODC show eradication in 2006 

and 2007 at their highest levels. 2006 eradication 

in Helmand was a photos debacle. UNODC were 

using GPS photos but they were carefully taken 

to allow exaggeration. We were reporting GLE 

over-reporting. There were huge rows with UNODC 

regarding data. UNODC were trying to dismiss it as 

not representative, as classified. Even in 2006, PEF 

eradication was exaggerated but the UK drugs team 

wouldn’t have it. INL didn’t want to hear that the 

numbers were exaggerated. There was systematic 

over-reporting and intimidation but no one wanted 

to hear it. We ended up with absurd numbers.” 

Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

620. Ronald E. Neumann, The Other War: Winning 

and Losing in Afghanistan, 1st ed. (Dulles, VA: 

Potomac Books, 2009), p. 10.

621. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

622. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006, 

September 2006, p. 1.

623. Alcis, “GLE Tractor Tracking and GIS Support to 

CN Team, Helmand PRT, Final Report,” May 2013.

624. Former UK official, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015.

625. Government of the United States of America,

“Governor Led Eradication Implementing 

Instructions for the Letter of Agreement on Police 

Criminal Justice and Counter Narcotics Support 

Programs,” letter to Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan, signed March 9, 2006 and 

amended February 2011.

626. Government of the United States of America,

“Governor Led Eradication Implementing 

Instructions for the Letter of Agreement on Police 

Criminal Justice and Counter Narcotics Support 

Programs,” letter to Government of the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan, signed March 9, 2006 and 

amended April 2014. 

627. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, 

November 2017, p. 36.

628. CRS, Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and the 2014 

Transition, R43540, May 9, 2014, p. 12.

629. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018.

630. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: 

Cultivation and Production, December 2016, 

p. 29. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: 

Cultivation and Production, November 2014, p. 26.

631. Paul Fishstein, A Little Bit Poppy-Free and a Little 

Bit Eradicated: Opium poppy cultivation in 

Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces in 2011–2012, 

AREU, May 2013, p. 43.
238 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

632. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: 

Cultivation and Production, December 2016, p. 6.

633. Cawkwell, UK Communication Strategies for 

Afghanistan, p. 92. “The Push for spraying started 

in 2004. Karzai resisted and this resistance built 

over time as other frictions started to grow. Karzai 

was more strident in his opposition in 2007, probably emboldened by the British.” John Wood, Former 

National Security Council Senior Director for 

Afghanistan, SIGAR interview, May 19 2016; Berry, 

“Allies at War in Afghanistan,” pp. 275, 277–278.

634. U.S. Embassy Kabul, Embassy Interagency

Planning Group, “U.S. Counternarcotics 

Implementation Action Plan: Short Term Plan, 

September 2004–September 2005,” electronic p. 13.

635. U.S. Embassy Kabul, Embassy Interagency

Planning Group, “U.S. Counternarcotics 

Implementation Action Plan: Short Term Plan, 

September 2004–September 2005,” electronic pp. 2.

636. Jonathan Landay, “U.S. Ignores Angry Reaction 

to secret poppy Spraying Test”, McClatchy 

Newspapers, October 25, 2007; BBC News, “Afghan 

Concern at Opium Spraying,” November 30, 2004.

637. Senior agriculturalist, correspondence with SIGAR,

August 6, 2016.

638. Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 207.

639. Risen, State of War, pp. 159–161.

640. To ensure that aerial eradication was not pursued 

unilaterally the U.S. Senate report on the FY 2005 

supplemental appropriation Bill (Senate 109-52) 

specified that ‘none of the funds recommended by 

the Committee may be available for aerial eradication programs within Afghanistan absent a formal 

request by the President of Afghanistan seeking 

such support.’ State, INL, “Environmental Impact 

Statement: Ground-Based Herbicide Eradication 

of Opium Poppy in Afghanistan,” November 2006, 

p. 2–8.

641. Senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

June 23, 2016.

642. Former senior official, Combined Forces

Command–Afghanistan, SIGAR interview, 

September 21, 2016.

643. Representative Mark Kirk stated, “I think we even

sacked [Robert Charles] on that subject because he 

was a little out of control, wanting aerial spraying. 

And the policy of the U.S. government wasn’t.” 

Representative Mark Kirk, testimony before the 

House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 

Export Financing, and Related Programs of 

the Committee on Appropriations, hearing on 

“Afghanistan Drug Eradication and Rebuilding 

Programs,” September 12, 2006 , p. 39. 

644. Senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, June 23, 

2016; Risen, State of War, p. 162. 

645. “From 2006 to 2008 there were increased discussions on aerial. I believe there was a deliberate 

attempt to inflate numbers and costs to say ground 

based eradication was not efficient.” Former UK 

government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 

10, 2016. “The 2007 Helling review was ‘front end 

loaded.’ It was designed to show PEF did not work. 

I believe he was there to justify aerial spraying.” 

Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016. 

646. GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite 

Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security 

Threatens Success of U.S. Goals, GAO-07-78, 

November 15, 2006, p. 10. 

647. GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy 

Evolving and Progress Reported, GAO-10-291, 

March 2010, p. 15. 

648. Former UK government contractor, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2016.

649. State, “INL A/S Anne Patterson’s Meeting with 

UNODC Executive Director Costa,” State 109683 

cable, July 3, 2006. 

650. State, “INL A/S Anne Patterson’s Meeting with 

UNODC Executive Director Costa,” State 109683 

cable, July 3, 2006; “The Ambassador or other 

senior embassy officer should seek an appropriate 

early opportunity to broach with President Karzai 

the development of ground-spray eradication 

capability within the Afghan Eradication Force for 

potential use in 2007.” State, “Developing Options 

for Enhanced Eradication,” State 128156 cable, 

August 4, 2006.

651. State, “INL A/S Anne Patterson’s Meeting with 

UNODC Executive Director Costa,” State 109683 

cable, July 3, 2006.

652. U.S. Embassy Kabul AEF, A Critical Review of 

Support and Delivery to Illicit Crop Eradication 

Programs in the Periods of 2005 and 2006, 

pp. 56–57.

653. State, “Moving Forward on Herbicide Eradication,”

State 190725 cable, November 22, 2006.

654. State, INL, “Environmental Impact Statement,”

November 2006. 

655. “Lastly I hope we do move in the interagency to see

if we can get President Karzai to approve a manual 

pilot spraying program, because I think we’ve really 

underscored how that is the essential step that then 

convinces other farmers in the region to embrace 

[USAID]’s alternative development program and 

move forward.” Kirk, testimony before the House 

Committee on appropriations Subcommittee on 

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 

Programs, p. 58 (September 12, 2006). 

656. State, “Moving Forward on Herbicide Eradication,”

State 190725 cable, November 22, 2006.

657. State, “Helping GOA Formulate Its CN Plans,” State

12958 cable, December 6, 2006; former eradication 

contractor, SIGAR interview, November 2, 2016.

658. Former DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

November 3, 2016.

659. “The use of backpack sprayers, which would be

associated with less chance of off-target drift, 

would be preferred in fields that are intercropped 

with non-poppy plants or along the edges of fields 

that are adjacent to field or legal crops. The section 

of equipment that minimizes drift while meeting 

operation needs and the use of backpack sprayers 

in sensitive areas, are expected to control the overall potential impact of herbicide use on non-target 

vegetation.” State, INL, “Environmental Impact 

Statement,” November 2006, Chapter 4, pp. 18–19. 

This was a point the U.S. government later agreed 
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 239

to. For example, “Embassy Kabul reporting subsequent to the IG assessment team’s departure from 

Afghanistan indicated that GBS is less promising 

than hoped for. Field tests revealed a number of 

problems with the equipment that resulted in taking 

longer to spray each hectare of poppy than would 

be the case with manual eradication (about 75 minutes per hectare as opposed to about 12 minutes 

using manual eradication.” Inspectors General for 

State and DOD, Interagency Assessment of the 

Counternarcotics Program in Afghanistan, State 

Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD Report No. IE-2007-

005, July 2007, p. 35, footnote 36. 

660. State, INL, “Environmental Impact Statement,”

November 2006, pp. 4–14. 

661. U.S. Embassy Kabul AEF, A Critical Review of 

Support and Delivery to Illicit Crop Eradication 

Programs in the Periods of 2005 and 2006, p. 56.

662. U.S. Embassy Kabul AEF, A Critical Review of 

Support and Delivery to Illicit Crop Eradication 

Programs in the Periods of 2005 and 2006, p. 56.

663. Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan,” pp. 284–286.

664. State, “Moving Forward on Herbicide Eradication,”

State 190725 cable, November 22, 2006.

665. Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan,” p. 286; 

Neumann, SIGAR interview, June 18, 2015.

666. Former UK senior official, SIGAR interview, 

May 4, 2015. 

667. Neumann, The Other War, p. 148. 

668. Wankel, SIGAR interview, April 19 2016.

669. Neumann, The Other War, p. 148. 

670. Neumann, SIGAR interview, June 18, 2015.

671. Neumann, correspondence with SIGAR,

February 21, 2018. 

672. Coll, Directorate S, p. 271.

673. “Ron Neumann was replaced by Bill Wood. This 

changed the demand on the CN effort. Aerial 

spraying was seen as a route to ‘quick results’ 

Aerial spraying was seen as ‘demonstrable action’ 

and evidence of money spent.” Former NSC official, 

SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015; see also: Coll, 

Directorate S, pp. 272–273. 

674. Wood, statement to the Policy Advisory Group, 

August 1, 2007, pp. 5–6. 

675. Wood, statement to the Policy Advisory Group, 

August 1, 2007, pp. 4, 6. 

676. Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?” New 

York Times, July 27, 2008.

677. Former senior UK government official, SIGAR

interview, May 4, 2015. 

678. Antonio Maria Costa, “Counter-narcotics policy in 

Afghanistan,” NATO, September 5, 2007.

679. State, “Afghanistan Counternarcotics Coordinator

Schweich Briefs New U.S. CN Strategy in Kabul, 

London, Berlin, and Vienna: Support for Forceful 

Poppy Eradication Emerging in Unexpected 

Quarters,” State 138384 cable, October 1, 2007. 

680. Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?” New 

York Times, July 27, 2008.

681. Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?” New 

York Times, July 27, 2008.

682. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, August 2007, 

p. 53.

683. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, August 2007, 

p. 53.

684. Ambassador Ronald Neumann, correspondence

with SIGAR, April 23, 2017.

685. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016.

686. William Byrd, Afghanistan and the International 

Drug Control Regime: Can the ‘Tail’ Wag the 

‘Dog’? USIP, April 16, 2003, p. 3. 

687. Byrd, Afghanistan and the International Drug 

Control Regime, USIP, April 16, 2003, p. 3.

688. Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan,” p. 290.

689. Berry, “Allies at War in Afghanistan,” p. 290.

690. Former Afghan deputy minister, SIGAR interview, 

April 14, 2016.

691. Former senior UK Government Official, SIGAR

interview, May 4, 2015. 

692. Former senior UK Government Official, SIGAR

interview, May 4, 2015; Cowper-Coles, Cables from 

Kabul, p. 51 

693. Kirk Semple and Tim Golden, “Afghans Pressed by 

U.S. on Plan to Spray Poppies,” New York Times, 

October 8, 2007. 

694. Khalilzad, The Envoy, p. 208.

695. During the course of the research for early Lessons

Learned reports, SIGAR held several roundtables 

with more than three dozen civilian and military experts on lessons learned from U.S. reconstruction 

efforts in Afghanistan. Former senior NSC official, 

SIGAR roundtable, January 14, 2015.

696. Former NSC official, SIGAR interview, 

June 17, 2015. 

697. Former DOD official, SIGAR interview, May 17, 

2016. Condoleezza Rice suggests, “[Karzai] did 

not want to even acknowledge the possibility 

of dramatic measures such as crop destruction 

thorough aerial spraying,” saying, “the issue would 

be a source of tension between our two countries for the remainder of the President’s term.” 

Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of 

My Years in Washington (New York, NY: Broadway 

Paperbacks, 2011), p. 446. 

698. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, 

November 2017, p. 36; UNODC, Afghanistan 

Opium Survey 2013, December 2013, p. 35; 

UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, 

October 2007, p. 86.

699. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, 

December 2013, p. 35.

700. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014, 

November 2014, pp. 6, 34.

701. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “PRT/Helmand—Helmand

Eradication Wrap Up,” Kabul 002008 cable, 

May 3, 2006.

702. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2014, p. 11. 

703. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2014, p. 11. 

704. Patterson, testimony before the U.S. House

Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on 

Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related 

Programs, hearing on “Afghan Drug Eradication 

and Rebuilding Programs,” September 12, 2006, 

p. 4.
240 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

705. “UNODC calculates that eradicating 25% of the

opium crop will introduce sufficient fear of future 

eradication into farmers’ minds to prevent planting 

next year.” State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy 

for Afghanistan, August 2007, p. 52.

706. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015, 

October 2015, p. 65. 

707. INL, programmatic response to SIGAR data call,

October 2014.

708. David Mansfield, “Briefing Paper 3: Central

Helmand in the 2011/12 Growing Season,” report 

for the British Embassy Kabul, p. 3. 

709. Mike Martin, An Intimate War: An Oral History 

of the Helmand Conflict (New York, NY: Oxford 

University Press, 2014) p. 249; David Mansfield, 

Managing Concurrent and Repeated Risks: 

Explaining the Reductions in Opium Production 

in Central Helmand Between 2008 and 2011, 

AREU, August 2011, p. 3.

710. Mansfield, Managing Concurrent and Repeated 

Risks, p. 3. 

711. GAO, Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy 

Evolving and Progress Reported, GAO-10-291, 

March 2010, p. 13.

712. Senior U.S. government official, SIGAR interview, 

March 14, 2016; Former senior DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, May 16, 2016; former DOD official, 

SIGAR interview, May 17, 2016; senior DOD official, 

SIGAR interview, June 23, 2016; former senior DOD 

official, SIGAR interview, November 1, 2016.

713. General the Lord Richards, Former ISAF

Commander, SIGAR interview, September 21, 2016. 

714. Former UK government official, SIGAR interview, 

May 11, 2016.

715. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, “Losing

Afghanistan to Opium?” Washington Times, 

February 15, 2007. 

716. “INL is responsible for controlling the amount of

poppy crop and therefore pushed spraying.” Senior 

U.S. government official, SIGAR interview, 

March 14, 2016.

717. Former senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

September 20, 2016.

718. SIGAR analysis of counternarcotics funding,

January 24, 2018; State, response to SIGAR data 

call, January 17, 2018; DOD, response to SIGAR 

data call, January 11, 2018, and March 8, 2016; 

USAID, response to SIGAR data call, January 18, 

2018 and January 17, 2018; DOJ, response to SIGAR 

data call, June 30, 2017; State, INL, FY 2004 Budget 

Justification, June 2003; State, INL, FY 2005 

Budget Justification, April 2004, State, INL, FY 

2006 Budget Justification, April 2005.

719. CRS, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, 

RL32686, August 12, 2009, p. 44.

720. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 9.

721. EastWest Institute, Afghan Narco Trafficking: 

Finding an Alternative to Alternative 

Development, July 2016, p. 13; USAID/Afghanistan, 

“Agricultural Sector Assistance Strategy, Annex 5,” 

2016, pp. 21, 54.

722. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 27; CRS, Afghanistan: 

Narcotics and U.S. Policy, RL32686, August 12, 

2009, p. 44.

723. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” pp. 9–10.

724. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 4; Pragma Corporation, 

“Afghanistan Alternative Development Options 

Assessment,” p. 10. 

725. Former senior USAID official, SIGAR interview, 

June 6, 2016.

726. Former senior USAID official, SIGAR interview, 

June 6, 2016.

727. Former USAID official, SIGAR interview, May 17, 

2016; former USAID staff member, SIGAR interview, April 19, 2016.

728. J. Michael Deal, “Lessons from Drug Crop

Elimination,” December 14, 2001. 

729. “There also aren’t any examples we know of where 

we were denying development assistance due to 

conditionality.” SIGAR meeting with USAID, 

March 13, 2018.

730. Kvitashvili, SIGAR interview, June 6, 2016.

731. Former alternative development contractor, SIGAR 

interview, June 8, 2016.

732. European Commission, “Development in a Drugs

Environment: Clarifying Policy Positions and 

Mainstreaming Counter Narcotics in the European 

Commission’s Programme in Afghanistan,” 2005, 

p. 10.

733. European Commission, “Development in a Drugs

Environment,” 2005, p. 10.

734. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 57.

735. For example, in the 2005 Opium Survey for

Afghanistan Costa called for “A commitment 

by farming communities to refrain from drug 

cultivation as a condition for the receipt of future 

development assistance.” UNODC, Afghanistan 

Opium Survey 2005, November 2005, p. iv.

736. A number of papers making this point were

introduced at the Working Group Session of the 

Alternative Livelihoods Technical Working Group 

meeting on “’Counternarcotics Mainstreaming’ and 

‘Conditionality,’” June 22–23, 2004, pp. 15, 22, 29. 

These include papers on the problems of conditionality written by participants from the World Bank, 

GIZ, the UK, and the MRRD AL adviser. 

737. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Update on Status of Work 

Plan Update for Embassy Kabul Short-Term 

Counternarcotics Strategy,” Kabul 002205 cable, 

July 14, 2004.

738. For a detailed review of UNODC’s experience of 

conditionality in the 1990s see: David Mansfield, 

Alternative Development in Afghanistan: The 

Failure of Quid Pro Quo, August 2001. 

739. Anthony Fitzherbert, “Conditionality: Some

Thoughts on ‘Conditions for Conditionality,” 

presentation for the Working Group session of the 

Alternative Livelihoods Technical Working Group, 

2004, p. 31.

740. Zia, SIGAR interview, April 12, 2016. 

741. State, INL, FY 2004 Budget Justification, 

June 2003.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 241

742. State, INL, FY 2004 Budget Justification, 

June 2003.

743. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 37; USAID/

Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance 

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 61. 

744. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., “Impact

Evaluation: Rebuilding Agriculture Markets 

Program (RAMP),” prepared for USAID, 2007, p. 3.

745. Former senior USAID official, SIGAR interview, 

June 6, 2016.

746. Chemonics International, Inc., “Alternative Income

Project (AIP): Helmand, Afghanistan,” final report 

prepared for USAID/Afghanistan, September 

2005; USAID Office of Inspector General, “Audit 

of USAID/Afghanistan’s Rebuilding Agricultural 

Markets Program,” Audit Report No. 5-306-06-002-P, 

March 28, 2006, p. 15. 

747. Chemonics International, Inc., “Agricultural Input

Supply Programme (AISP),” p. 1.

748. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., “Impact

Evaluation: Rebuilding Agriculture Markets 

Program (RAMP),” prepared for USAID, 2007.

749. David Radcliffe and Erick Zeballos, “How to

Tackle Illicit Narcotics in Afghanistan: Alternative 

Livelihoods in Afghanistan,” Department for 

International Development 2004.

750. Working Group Session of the Alternative 

Livelihoods Technical Working Group 

“’Counternarcotics Mainstreaming’ and 

‘Conditionality,’” June 22–23, 2004, p. 17. 

751. The papers for this meeting contain a number of

papers on mainstreaming counternarcotics into development programming. Working Group Session 

of the Alternative Livelihoods Technical Working 

Group “’Counternarcotics Mainstreaming’ and 

‘Conditionality,’” June 22–23, 2004.

752. World Bank, “Technical Annex for a Proposed 

Grant in the Amount of SDR $71.4 Million (US 

$112 Million Equivalent) to the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan for a National Emergency Rural Access 

Project (NERAP),” Sustainable Development 

Department, Afghanistan Country Management 

Unit, South Asia Region, November 14, 2007, 

pp. 148–157; World Bank, “Treating the Opium 

Problem in World Bank Operations in Afghanistan,” 

2006, p. 7. 

753. Government of Afghanistan, MCN, “National Drug

Control Strategy,” January 2006, pp. 7, 31.

754. Government of Afghanistan, “Afghan National

Development Strategy: A Strategy for Security, 

Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty 

Reduction (2008–2013),” 2008, p. 143. 

755. The Alternative Livelihoods program was later

retitled Alternative Development Program.

756. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2014, p. 14.

757. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 15–16.

758. The objectives were to: “Help accelerate licit economic growth and business activity in areas where 

poppy is thriving,” and to “provide an immediate 

alternative source of income to poor households 

whose livelihoods depend on the ‘temporary’ opium 

economy.” Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., 

“Evaluation Report for Alternative Development 

Program (ADP) Southern Region by USAID in the 

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” p. 1.

759. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., “Evaluation

Report for Alternative Development Program 

(ADP) Eastern Region by USAID in the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan,” p. 12. 

760. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., “Evaluation

Report for Alternative Development Program 

(ADP) Southern Region by USAID in the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan,” pp. 25, 77–78.

761. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., “Evaluation

Report for Alternative Development Program 

(ADP) Southern Region by USAID in the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan,” p. 50. The project 

completion report for ADP North also refers to the 

fact that “Conditionality may be imposed in the 

second year of project implementation.” USAID, 

“Alternative Development Plan for Northeastern 

Afghanistan (ADP/N),” p. 5.

762. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., “Evaluation

Report for Alternative Development Program 

(ADP) Southern Region by USAID in the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan,” pp. 5–6. 

763. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 9. 

764. EastWest Institute, Afghan Narco Trafficking: 

Finding an Alternative to Alternative 

Development, July 2016, p. 13; USAID/Afghanistan, 

“Agricultural Sector Assistance Strategy, Annex 5,” 

2016, p. 54.

765. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 4.

766. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 4.

767. USAID, response to SIGAR data call, June 30, 2014.

768. Mansfield, Examining the Impact of IDEA-NEW 

on Opium Production, pp. 54–59.

769. The USAID OIG reported that “In addition, in

December 2010 USAID/Afghanistan reportedly 

directed DAI to focus only on expanding the licit 

economy, in keeping with the emphasis of the mission’s new performance management plan (PMP) 

for the agriculture sector. (Neither DAI nor USAID 

could provide a written copy of this significant 

instruction.) As a result, two intermediate goals 

(termed ‘intermediate results’) that dealt with 

assistance to the voluntary opium poppy eradication community and to farms in the aftermath of 

opium poppy eradication/destruction programs 

were deleted from the program PMP. By dropping 

these intermediate results, the mission not only 

shifted focus but also deprived itself of information 

needed to make sound programming decisions. It 

has indicated that the underlying objective of the 

program remains dissuading Afghans from growing 

poppies and that the program continues to attempt 

to reduce poppy production. Nevertheless, the current PMP does not include performance measures 

such as intermediate results, and performance 

indicators and targets linked to those results, to 

identify and facilitate the program’s contribution 

to either that underlying objective or to reducing 
242 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

poppy production. As a result, the mission was 

unable to provide evidence of its progress in either 

of these areas.” USAID Office of Inspector General, 

Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Incentives Driving 

Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and 

West Program, Audit Report No. F-306-12-004-P, 

June 29, 2012, p. 5. 

770. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 6.

771. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 22–23.

772. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 23–24.

773. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 7, 55.

774. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 9. 

775. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 11.

776. Mansfield and Fishstein, Time to Move On, 

AREU, p. 1.

777. Mansfield and Fishstein, Time to Move On, 

AREU, p. 3.

778. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 43; 

Mansfield, Examining the Impact of IDEA-NEW 

on Opium Production, pp. 50–51.

779. As an example see UNODC, Afghanistan Opium 

Survey 2008, November 2008, p. 124.

780. Byrd and Mansfield, Afghanistan’s Opium 

Economy, World Bank, p. 129. 

781. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018; Sopko, 

testimony before the Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, hearing on “Future U.S. 

Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” January 

15, 2014, p. 13.

782. Mansfield and Fishstein, Time to Move On, 

AREU, p. 38. 

783. Byrd and Mansfield, Afghanistan’s Opium 

Economy, World Bank, pp. 114–116.

784. Mansfield and Fishstein, Time to Move On, 

AREU, p. 2. 

785. For more on UNODC’s argument that there was 

no relationship between poverty and poppy, see 

Appendix C of Rubin and Sherman, CounterNarcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan, pp. 50–56. 

This offers a detailed critique of UNODC’s claim 

that there is no relationship between opium poppy 

and poverty. “USAID’s assistance does not reach 

one fourth of what farmers are currently earning 

from poppy production. Similarly, one jerib (1/5 

hectare) of poppy will earn an estimated $4,000 

($2,000 after labor cost) whereas one jerib of wheat 

will only earn a farmer $ 400. . . . Poppy will always 

be a more lucrative crop until farmers decide that 

the risk of growing poppy outweighs the financial 

benefit. . . . Alternative livelihoods cannot have a 

significant impact on poppy reduction as a standalone activity. Without sustained enforcement and 

eradication campaigns it is not likely that farmers 

will cease poppy cultivation and chose livelihoods in the licit economy.” U.S. Embassy Kabul, 

“Alternative Livelihoods Programs in Afghanistan 

Require Strong Eradication and Law Enforcement 

to Achieve Impact,” Kabul 001970 cable, May 2, 

2006. 

786. This consists of 24,308 hectares under ALP East,

89,500 hectares under ALP South. See: Checchi 

and Company Consulting, Inc., “Evaluation Report 

for Alternative Development Program (ADP) 

Eastern Region by USAID in the Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan,” prepared for USAID, January 

10 – April 18, 2010, p. 12; Checchi and Company 

Consulting, Inc., “Evaluation Report for Alternative 

Development Program (ADP) Southern Region 

by USAID in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” 

prepared for USAID, January 11 – April 19, 2010, 

p. 7. 

787. Former USAID staff member, SIGAR interview, 

April 19, 2016.

788. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 14–15. 

789. GAO, Afghanistan Development: Enhancement 

to Performance Management and Evaluation 

Efforts, GAO-10-368, July 2010, pp. 57–63.

790. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., “Final

Performance Evaluation: Accelerating Sustainable 

Agriculture Program (ASAP),” prepared for USAID, 

April 2012, p. 3; USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural 

Sector Assistance Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 61.

791. Opium poppy is mentioned only twice in a 164 page

evaluation report. Both times on page 75 relating 

to the payment of an M&E specialist for ADP SW. 

Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., “Final 

Performance Evaluation,” p. 75. 

792. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 61–62.

793. Management Systems International, “Community

Development Program: Final Performance 

Evaluation,” prepared for USAID, February 12, 

2014, p. 17.

794. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 61.

795. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” final report 

prepared for USAID, March 2016, p. 39.

796. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 39.

797. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, August 2007, 

p. 47.

798. Wood, statement to the Policy Advisory Group, 

August 1, 2007, p. 2.

799. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 17.

800. U.S. Mission Afghanistan, “U.S. Foreign Assistance

for Afghanistan: Post Performance Management 

Plan, 2011–2015,” pp. 1, 5.

801. The USAID/Afghanistan Plan for Transition 2015–

2018, August 2, 2016 makes only four references to 

poppy (pp. 4, 8) in a 29-page report. 

802. USAID Office of Inspector General, Audit of 

USAID/Afghanistan’s Incentives Driving 

Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and 

West Program, Audit Report No. F-306-12-004-P, 

June 29, 2012, p. 5.

803. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 62.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 243

804. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.,

Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture 

Marketing Program (CHAMP) Mid-Term 

Evaluation, final report prepared for USAID Office 

of Agriculture, March 31, 2012. 

805. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 40.

806. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 45–51.

807. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 40.

808. Former USAID staff member, SIGAR interview, 

April 19, 2016.

809. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 40.

810. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 45. 

811. Greenfield, Crane, Bond, Chandler, Luoto, Oliker, 

“Reducing the Cultivation of Opium Poppies in 

Southern Afghanistan,” pp. 181–182.

812. Former senior UN adviser, SIGAR interview, May 

20, 2016; USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector 

Assistance Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 32; former 

USAID staff member, SIGAR interview, 

April 19, 2016.

813. David Mansfield, Truly Unprecedented: How the 

Helmand Food Zone supported an increase in 

the province’s capacity to produce opium, AREU, 

October 31, 2017, p. 5.

814. Mansfield, Truly Unprecedented, AREU, p. 5.

815. Greenfield, Crane, Bond, Chandler, Luoto, Oliker, 

“Reducing the Cultivation of Opium Poppies in 

Southern Afghanistan,” p. 182.

816. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, 

October 2013, p. 99.

817. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 5

818. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 5; Pragma Corporation, 

“Afghanistan Alternative Development Options 

Assessment,” p. 24; former USAID staff member, 

SIGAR interview, April 19, 2016.

819. Former UK government official, SIGAR interview, 

June 17, 2015.

820. USAID official, SIGAR interview, May 17, 2016; 

former congressional staffer, SIGAR interview, 

September 16, 2016. 

821. Senator Dianne Feinstein, “Support Afghan

Farmers, Cut off Taliban’s Drug Funding,” letter to 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, February 7, 2012.

822. Former USAID staff member, SIGAR interview, 

April 19, 2016; USAID official, SIGAR interview, 

May 17, 2016; USAID official, SIGAR interview, 

November 1, 2016.

823. Former USAID staff member, SIGAR interview, 

April 19, 2016.

824. USAID official, SIGAR interview, November 1, 2016. 

825. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, pp. 40–41.

826. USAID official, SIGAR interview, November 1, 2016.

827. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 41.

828. ”Irrigation projects should provide more affordable

water for farmers in poppy-producing areas. This 

should decrease poppy cultivation so long as communities stay true to their social contract with the 

government.” Management Systems International, 

“Kandahar Food Zone: Mid-Term Performance 

Evaluation,” March 2015, p. 25.

829. SIGAR meeting with USAID, March 13, 2018.

830. NPR, “Opium Poppy Growth Booming in

Afghanistan,” January 14, 2014; USAID/Afghanistan, 

“Agricultural Sector Assistance Strategy, 

Annex 5,” 2016. 

831. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 54. 

832. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 57. 

833. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2018, p. 209.

834. UNODC, Quarterly Report, INL Funded 

Alternative Development Programme, Boost 

Alternative Development Intervention through 

Licit Livelihoods (BADILL), Period covered: JulySeptember 2017, p. 1. 

835. UNODC, UNODC Sub-Program 3—Alternative 

Development, INL Proposal, Strengthen and 

Diversify Licit Livelihoods through Alternative 

Development Interventions, September 2016–

August 2020.

836. UNODC, UNODC Sub-Program 3—Alternative 

Development, INL Proposal, Strengthen and 

Diversify Licit Livelihoods through Alternative 

Development Interventions, September 2016–

August 2020. 

837. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2018, p. 209.

838. For a detailed critique of the limitations of attitudinal surveys in conflict affected areas see: David 

Mansfield, Effective Monitoring and Evaluation 

in Conflict-Affected Environments: Afghanistan 

Post-2014,” USIP, November 12, 2015, pp. 7–10.

839. Mansfield, Effective Monitoring and Evaluation in 

Conflict-Affected Environments, USIP, pp. 6–7.

840. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.,

Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture 

Marketing Program (CHAMP) Mid-Term 

Evaluation, final report prepared for USAID Office 

of Agriculture, March 31, 2012, p. 1.

841. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” p. 39.

842. Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., “Evaluation

Report for the Alternative Development Program 

(ADP) Southern Region by USAID in the Islamic 

Republic of Afghanistan,” pp.44, 45.

843. At the time the Survey, Monitoring, Targeting and 

Verification project of Alcis Ltd was providing GIS 

support to the Helmand PRT, as well as to the UK 

British Embassy Drugs Team. The analysis they 

produced highlighted how opium poppy was being 

replaced by wheat. Alcis, Helmand Food Zone Crop 

Interpretation and Analysis: All areas by district, 

August 2010. 

844. The USAID assessment states that “AVIPA Plus 

South and SRAD projects appear to have contributed to the abrupt decline in poppy recorded 

for 2009–11 (presumably along with the major 

increase in wheat prices and the influence of the 
244 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

surge and related state presence factors.” Pragma 

Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative Development 

Options Assessment,” p. 40. This is in contrast to a 

detailed study of Helmand that drew on hundreds 

of household interviews over a four year period 

and detailed crop mapping from 23 research sites 

that concluded “two other factors have been more 

important in driving the significant decline in opium 

poppy cultivation since 2008: the dramatic increase 

in wheat prices, and the governor’s counter-narcotics stance backed by an increased national 

and international security presence.” Mansfield,

Managing Concurrent and Repeated Risk, p. 2.

845. Pragma Corporation, “Afghanistan Alternative

Development Options Assessment,” pp. 42–43. 

846. Former USAID staff member, SIGAR interview, 

April 19, 2016.

847. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2018, p. 209.

848. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Karzai Government

Convenes Provincial Governors,” Kabul 

001745 cable, September 5, 2002; State, U.S. 

Counternarcotics Strategy, August 2007, p. 68; 

Ambassador William Brownfield, testimony before 

the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics 

Control, hearing on “Future U.S. Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan,” January 15, 2014, p. 6.

849. Middlebrook, Miller, Kramer, and Stone, Review 

of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 

(CNTF), pp. 1, 9, 10, 13; “Strengthening CounterNarcotics Institutions in Afghanistan,” Adam Smith 

International website, accessed on May 11, 2018.

850. “Strengthening Counter-Narcotics Institutions in 

Afghanistan,” Adam Smith International website, 

accessed on May 11, 2018.

851. Middlebrook, Miller, Kramer, and Stone, Review 

of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 

(CNTF), p. 1, 9, 13; Anila Khan, “Afghanistan: 

Next Steps on Counter Narcotics Work and the 

Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF),” memorandum to Marshall Elliott, Jim Drummond, and the 

Secretary of State, UK Department for International 

Development, June 2008, p. 2.

852. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Embassy Hosts

Afghan Ministers to Discuss Way Forward on 

Counternarcotics,” Kabul 000174 cable, January 

15, 2005; Middlebrook, Miller, Kramer, and Stone, 

Review of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Trust 

Fund (CNTF), p. 13.

853. UNDP, “Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF),” 

accessed August 30, 2010; Khan, “Afghanistan: Next 

Steps on Counter Narcotics Work,” p. 2.

854. State, “Follow-Up on British Request for

Counternarcotics Contributions to Afghanistan,” 

State 058810 cable, March 30, 2005. 

855. UNODC coined this term in 2007 and used it to

categorize those provinces with less than 100 hectares of cultivation. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium 

Survey 2007, October 2007, pp. 36, 135. 

856. Middlebrook, Miller, Kramer, and Stone, Review 

of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 

(CNTF), pp. viii, 11, 13.

857. Gerald Andersen (Acting Director, USAID Office of 

Economic Growth), Action Memorandum to Carl 

Rahmann (Deputy Mission Director), February 13, 

2007, pp. 1, 5

858. Khan, “Afghanistan: Next Steps on Counter

Narcotics Work,” p. 2.

859. Khan, “Afghanistan: Next Steps on Counter

Narcotics Work,” p. 2.

860. Middlebrook, Miller, Kramer, and Stone, Review 

of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 

(CNTF), pp. 15, 26.

861. Former senior UN adviser, SIGAR interview, May 

19, 2016; former World Bank Official, SIGAR interview, April 18, 2016.

862. “Donors have their own priorities and ministries

were introducing their own projects. MCN was only 

managing the money; implementation was with 

ministries. But they were just existing projects that 

were not funded, [they] did not consider CN effect.” 

Former Afghan Deputy Minister, SIGAR interview, 

April 14, 2016; Zia, SIGAR interview, April 12, 2016. 

863. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018; former 

World Bank Official, SIGAR interview, 

April 18, 2016.

864. Middlebrook, Miller, Kramer, and Stone, Review 

of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 

(CNTF), pp. 26–27.

865. Middlebrook, Miller, Kramer, and Stone, Review 

of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 

(CNTF), p. vi. 

866. Former Afghan Deputy Minister, SIGAR interview, 

April 14, 2016. 

867. Zia, SIGAR interview, April 12, 2016.

868. Former senior UN adviser, SIGAR interview, May 

19, 2016. Accusations of corruption in the CNTF 

were also made by another senior Afghan official 

interviewed. Former Afghan Deputy Minister, 

SIGAR interview, April 14, 2016.

869. Afghanaid Managing Director Anne Johnson,

“Afghanaid’s Experience with CNTF,” note, 

September 17, 2007.

870. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2010, p. 55.

871. Schweich, testimony before the House

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central 

Asia and the Oversight and Investigations of the 

Committee on International Relations, hearing on 

“Afghanistan: Progress Report,” (March 9, 2006).

872. CRS, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, 

RL32686, January 25, 2006, p. 32; CRS, Afghanistan: 

Narcotics and U.S. Policy, RL32686, 

July 15, 2010, p. 19.

873. State, INL, “Afghanistan Program Overview,” 

December 2008, accessed May 3, 2018; Schweich, 

testimony before the House Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and Central Asia and the Oversight and 

Investigations of the Committee on International 

Relations, hearing on “Afghanistan: Progress 

Report,” (March 9, 2006).

874. Khan, “Afghanistan: Next Steps on Counter

Narcotics Work,” p. 2. 

875. Former Afghan deputy minister, SIGAR interview, 

April 13, 2016.

876. Former senior UN adviser, SIGAR interview, 

May 20, 2016.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 245

877. Former Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs official, SIGAR interview, May 20, 2016; former Afghan 

deputy minister, SIGAR interview, April 13, 2016.

878. INL contractor, SIGAR interview, 

September 16, 2016.

879. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan: 2013 Good

Performers Initiative Awards and Program 

Redesign Announced,” Kabul 005018 cable, 

September 15, 2014.

880. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Proposal for Good

Performers Fund to Reduce Poppy Cultivation,” 

Kabul 005298 cable, October 31, 2006.

881. State, “The United States and Afghanistan: the

Good Performer’s Initiative,” The INL Beat, winter 

2010, p. 2.

882. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 2014 p. 12.

883. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan: 2013 Good

Performers Initiative Awards and Program 

Redesign Announced,” Kabul 005018 cable, 

September 15, 2014.

884. After the closure of GPI, INL transferred approximately $20 million to UNODC for the Boost 

Alternative Development through Licit Livelihoods 

(BADILL) initiative and $17.8 million went to UNDP 

and UNODC for the Community-Based Agriculture 

and Rural Development (CBARD) project in part to 

replace funding lost because of GPI’s cancellation. 

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2017, p. 196–197.

885. INL officials, SIGAR interview, April 14, 2016.

886. INL officials, SIGAR interview, April 14, 2016.

887. State INL, email to SIGAR, April 10, 2018.

888. Government of the United States of America,

“Amendment to the Letter of Agreement on Police 

Criminal Justice and Counter Narcotics Support 

Programs of March 9, 2006,” letter to Government 

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 

September 23, 2010.

889. Aga Khan Foundation, “Strengthening Sub-National

Governance in Afghanistan,” final report covering 

the period: April 1, 2010–May 28th, 2014, Grant No. 

SINLEC10GR0034, 2014, p. 5.

890. Byrd and Mansfield, Afghanistan’s Opium 

Economy, World Bank, pp. 98–99. 

891. State, INL, “Program Review of INL’s Afghanistan 

Counternarcotics Efforts,” 2014, electronic p. 5.

892. U.S. Department of State, email to SIGAR,

March 6, 2018.

893. Neumann, correspondence with SIGAR,

April 23, 2017.

894. Former Afghan Deputy Minister, SIGAR interview, 

April 14, 2016.

895. GPI was a “deal between Governors and the MCN.

It funded a library in Wardak. In Uruzgan, it funded 

a guesthouse in the governor’s provincial compound. There was no direction for GPI; no criteria 

to rule out certain projects. There was no process 

for community consent. Governors were given a 

blank check. MCN, being a weak ministry, thought 

it was a good project if it kept a governor happy 

and the governor reduced poppy. 50 percent of the 

project money was taken by governors.” Zia, SIGAR 

interview, April 12, 2016. 

896. Former senior UN adviser, SIGAR interview, May 

20, 2016; former DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

May 17, 2016. However, State Department officials 

maintained that “governors approved GPI project 

proposals but had no part in bid evaluation or 

contractor selection.” State, email to SIGAR, 

March 6, 2018.

897. Aga Khan Foundation, “Strengthening SubNational Governance in Afghanistan,” 2014, p. 5;

Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan Trip Report 

VI: Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan: A 

Good Strategy Poorly Implemented,” Brookings 

Institution, May 10, 2012, p. 13. 

898. State, INL, “Program Review of INL’s Afghanistan 

Counternarcotics Efforts,” electronic p. 5. 

899. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, p. 170.

900. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008, 

November 2008, p. 8; UNODC, “The Global Afghan 

Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment,” p. 29. 

901. Rubin and Sherman, Counter-Narcotics to Stabilize 

Afghanistan, p. 49.

902. State, INL response to SIGAR data call,

October 14, 2014.

903. “GPI is being turned off as the MCN has no capacity

to implement. GPI had five-year funding. The money was put in a pot and INL worked through GPI 

architecture to spend the money. Early on, it built 

buildings but INL was not so keen and wanted to 

do more interventions in rural areas. The problem 

lay with the government’s capacity to solicit and 

review quality programs and then implement them. 

Eventually, they ran into the problem of expiring 

funds, so the program was cancelled.” INL officials, 

SIGAR interview, April 14, 2016; SIGAR, Quarterly 

Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 

2017, p. 195. 

904. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2006, p. 211; State, 

International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), February 2009, p. 112; State, 

International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2015, pp. 96–97; State, 

International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2016, p. 94; State, 

“U.S. Department of State Award Provisions: 

Sayara Media and Communications,” Award No. 

SINLEC13CA0034-A001, April 16, 2015.

905. State, email to SIGAR, March 6, 2018; State,

INL, “Program Review of INL’s Afghanistan 

Counternarcotics Efforts,” electronic p. 10. 

906. Former UK official, SIGAR interview, June 17, 2015; 

former NATO official, SIGAR interview, April 5, 

2016; former Afghan Minister, SIGAR interview, 

April 12, 2016; former Afghan deputy minister, 

SIGAR interview, April 14, 2016; former UNODC official, SIGAR interview, June 15, 2016; former senior 

official, Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan, 

SIGAR interview, September 21, 2016; Mansfield, 

SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018.

907. Former UK official, SIGAR interview, June 17, 

2015; former NATO official, SIGAR interview, April 

5, 2016; former UNODC official, SIGAR interview, 

June 15, 2016.
246 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

908. State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report (INCSR), March 2005, p. 266.

909. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 139, 165.

910. UNODC, The Impact and Effectiveness of Various 

Counter Narcotics Media Campaigns, 

October 2008, p. 13. 

911. UNODC, The Impact and Effectiveness of Various 

Counter Narcotics Media Campaigns, p. 25.

912. Ambassador Thomas Schweich, testimony

before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

South Asia of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, 

hearing on “Counternarcotics Strategy and 

Police Training in Afghanistan,” October 4, 2007, 

p. 35; State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan, August 2007 p. 28; State Coordinator 

on Afghanistan Maureen E. Quinn, testimony 

before the House Committee on International 

Relations, hearing on “U.S. Counternarcotics Policy 

in Afghanistan: Time for Leadership,” (March 17, 

2005); Nichols, testimony before the Senate Caucus 

on International Narcotics Control, hearing on 

“Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” (July 

20, 2011); CRS, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. 

Policy, RL32686, June 8, 2009, p. 39.

913. Byrd and Buddenberg, Afghanistan’s Drug 

Industry, UNODC and the World Bank, p. 19.

914. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Design and Resourcing 

of Supply-Side Counternarcotics Policies,” 

Brookings Institution, April 14, 2010, accessed 

October 27, 2017; State, Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Regional Stabilization Strategy, February 2010, 

p. vi.

915. Byrd and Buddenberg, Afghanistan’s Drug 

Industry, UNODC and the World Bank, p. 19.

916. State, “Afghan Counternarcotics Minister Osmani

Previews Drug Control Strategy During Visit to 

Washington,” State 015231 cable, February 17, 2012; 

U.S. Embasy Kabul, “Afghanistan: INL Monthly 

Activity Report for September 2012,” Kabul 007084 

cable, October 6, 2012. 

917. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, 

August 2007, p. 1.

918. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction John F. Sopko, “Oversight of U.S. 

Spending in Afghanistan,” testimony before the 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Federal 

Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, 

p. 3 (May 9, 2018).

919. State and Broadcasting Board of Governors

Office of Inspector General, Inspection of the 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, ISP-I-14-24, September 

2014, p. 18; State and the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors Office of Inspector General, Audit 

of Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs Counternarcotics Assistance 

to Afghanistan, AUD-MERO-15-02, November 2014, 

pp. 5–7.

920. Inspectors General for State and DOD, Interagency 

Assessment of the Counternarcotics Program in 

Afghanistan, State Report No. ISP-I-07-34, DOD 

Report No. IE-2007-005, July 2007, p. 26. 

921. SIGAR correspondence with State INL,

December 16, 2016.

922. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort, based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence.

923. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort, based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence.

924. SIGAR analysis of budget data by year of allocation

and strand of effort, based on agency data calls, 

budget documentation, and correspondence.

925. USAID/Afghanistan, “Agricultural Sector Assistance

Strategy, Annex 5,” 2016, p. 15.

926. SIGAR, Afghan Special Mission Wing, SIGAR 

Audit 13-13, June 2013, p. 4.

927. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for 

Afghanistan, August 2007 p. 28; Schweich, 

testimony before the Subcommittee on the Middle 

East and South Asia of the Committee of Foreign 

Affairs, hearing on “Counternarcotics Strategy 

and Police Training in Afghanistan,” October 4, 

2007, p. 35; Quinn, testimony before the House 

Committee on International Relations, hearing on 

“U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan: Time 

for Leadership,” (March 17, 2005); Nichols, testimony before the Senate Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, hearing on “Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan,” (July 20, 2011); CRS, 

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, RL32686, 

June 8, 2009, p. 39.

928. Rubin and Sherman, Counter-Narcotics in 

Afghanistan, p. 6; Anderson, “The Taliban’s Opium 

War”; Mansfield, Examining the Impact of IDEANEW on Opium Production, p. 68; Mansfield, 

A State Built on Sand, pp. 201–202; Graeme 

Smith, “Graeme Smith on Canada’s Mission in 

Afghanistan,” Globe and Mail Update, March 2, 

2007; Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, pp. 140, 144, 

150–153.

929. Mansfield, Managing Concurrent and Repeated 

Risk, p. 20.

930. David Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, p. 213.

931. David Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, 

pp. 267–269.

932. David Mansfield, Helmand on the Move: Migration 

as a Response to Crop Failure, AREU, October 

2015, pp. 4–5.

933. Mansfield, SIGAR interview, April 11, 2018.

934. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 77, 162, 188.

935. David Mansfield, All Bets Are Off! Prospects 

for (B)reaching Agreements and Drug Control 

in Helmand and Nangarhar in the Run up to 

Transition, AREU, January 2013, pp. 13, 37. For 

additional analysis on eradication undermining 

popular support for the Afghan government 

and facilitating the penetration of insurgent, 

see Vanda Felbab-Brown, “No Easy Exit: Drugs 

and Counternarcotics Policies in Afghanistan,” 

Brookings Institution, 2016, pp. 7, 13.

936. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 201–202.

937. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 162, 170. 

938. Mansfield, Examining the Impact of IDEA-NEW 

on Opium Production, p. 54.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 247

939. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016, 

December 2016, p. 62.

940. Mansfield, Examining the Impact of IDEA-NEW 

on Opium Production, p. 9.

941. Mansfield, Examining the Impact of IDEA-NEW 

on Opium Production, p. 72.

942. This is perhaps a function of the conglomerate that

lies beneath the top soil in Nad Ali. This can cause 

waterlogging and salinization, which adversely 

impacts agricultural production. Nick Cullather, 

“Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer 

State,” Journal of American History, vol. 89, no. 2 

(2002): p. 532.

943. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “INL Assistant Secretary

Brownfield visit, April 14–16, 2011,” Kabul 002360 

cable, April 24, 2011; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Moving 

Forward on the Kandahar Food Zone,” Kabul 

000360 cable, January 24, 2013; U.S. Mission to 

the UN in Vienna, “Afghan Counternarcotics: 

UN Efforts Energized by December 7–8 Paris 

Pact Consultative Group,” Vienna 000524 cable, 

December 20, 2011; U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Senator 

Kirk’s Meeting with Minister of Counternarcotics 

Osmani,” Kabul 006256 cable, September 1, 2011; 

U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Afghanistan: Discussion with 

UNODC on Making Counternarcotics a National 

Priority,” Kabul 007464 cable, October 23, 2011.

944. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 211, 228–229; 

UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2013, 

October 2013, p. 99; former congressional staffer, 

SIGAR interview, September 16, 2016. INL has 

drawn on GIS data to argue for the deterrent effect 

of eradication, claiming “geospatial analysis indicates 90 per cent less poppy was planted in 2011 

on land within half kilometer radius of poppy fields 

that were eradicated in 2010 in the Helmand Food 

Zone.” State, INL, response to SIGAR data call, 

October 2014.

945. “In 2012, DFID didn’t do counternarcotics. FCO 

was winding down on counternarcotics already, 

partially because of a change in policy priorities 

and relabeling of existing projects. DFID got its 

fingers burned with counternarcotics. The wheat 

seed program in Helmand used DFID and USAID 

money. They backed Mangal but recognized he was 

corrupt. Wholesale fraud was uncovered under 

HFZ. Good seed was siphoned off and second-rate 

seed distributed. Also, arrests of were made of 

farmers who complained. Helmand MPs travelled 

to London and met with senior officials, raising 

concerns about corruption. The PRT also acknowledged that one of the risks of the program was 

the public acceptance of corruption.” Former UK 

Government official, SIGAR interview, April 5, 2016.

946. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand, pp. 238–239.

947. Mansfield, Managing Concurrent and Repeated 

Risk, p. 3.

948. Martin, An Intimate War, p. 249.

949. Mansfield, Managing Concurrent and Repeated 

Risk, p. 3. For additional analysis on corruption 

around eradication contributing to resentment 

toward the Afghan government, see Byrd and 

Buddenberg, Afghanistan’s Drug Industry, 

UNODC and the World Bank, p. 20.

950. Clark, “Farmers transition to different crops.” “The

policy of offering payments for clearing the land of 

opium poppy and preparing it for a summer crop 

was also subject to problems. For example, with 

the harvest beginning in Marjah on 12/13 April 2010 

and disease drying the opium capsule (allowing 

only two to three lancings) and shortening the 

harvest season to only 7–10 days for each plot of 

land, many farmers would have finished the harvest 

by around 23 April 2010. Consequently were fields 

not verified promptly after the harvest had finished 

it would have been possible for farmers to lance 

their opium crop, clear their land and receive a 

payment. Furthermore were fields not verified as 

having been cultivated with opium poppy during 

the winter season farmers could claim payments 

for land that had previously been wheat or another 

winter crop other than opium poppy. While during 

the course of fieldwork there were reports of fields 

having been harvested prior to being cleared, it is 

unclear to what extent this took place. However, 

it would seem that rumors of the provision of 

payments to undeserving recipients under this program, as well as under other initiatives, are serving 

to undermine confidence in the integrity of the 

wider effort in Marjah.” David Mansfield, Helmand 

Counter Narcotics Impact Study, Foreign and 

Commonwealth Office, May 2010, p. 10.

951. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, 

November 2017, pp. 13, 43.

952. SIGAR correspondence with former U.S. counterdrug official, August 31, 2017.

953. UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002: 

Cultivation and Production, October 2002, p. 4; 

UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017: 

Cultivation and Production, November 2017, 

pp. 5, 43.

954. SIGAR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2018, p. 86.

955. Former eradication contractor, SIGAR interview, 

November 2, 2016 [LL-04-73, p. 4]; Anderson, “The 

Taliban’s Opium War.”

956. Coll, Directorate S, p. 275.

957. State, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy, August 2007, 

p. 39. 

958. Zia, SIGAR interview, April 12, 2016.

959. Zia, correspondence with SIGAR, August 20, 2017.

960. Coll, Directorate S, p. 277. “Plan Afghanistan” 

refers to the U.S. vision for an Afghan counternarcotics effort modeled on “Plan Colombia,” which 

included extensive aerial spraying to destroy coca 

in Colombia. 

961. DEA Chief of Operations Thomas Harrigan, testimony before the Senate Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, hearing on “Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan,” July 20, 2011, pp. 3–4; 

Capra, testimony before the Caucus on 

International Narcotics Control, hearing on “Future 

U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan,” 

January 15, 2014, p. 3.

962. Peters, Seeds of Terror, p. 159; James Risen, 

“Propping up a Drug Lord, Then Arresting Him,” 

New York Times, December 11, 2010.

963. World Bank, “Treating the Opium Problem in World 

Bank Operations in Afghanistan,” 2006.
248 | ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Graphic Endnotes

Figure 5:

State, International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report, 1998; UNODC Kabul, “Terminal Evaluation 

Report: Capacity Building for Drug Control: 

Strengthening of the CND and Six Provincial 

Offices,” March 2006, p. 4; Mansfield, A State Built 

on Sand, p. 113; State, U.S. Counternarcotics 

Strategy for Afghanistan, August 2007, p. 22; 

CRS, War in Afghanistan, R40156, December 3, 

2009, p. 50; David Mansfield, Bombing Heroin 

Labs in Afghanistan: The Latest Act in the 

Theatre of Counternarcotics, LSE International 

Drug Policy Unit, January 2018, p. 6; SIGAR, 

Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan: U.S. 

Assistance to Provincial Units Cannot Be Fully 

Tracked and Formal Capability Assessments 

Are Needed, SIGAR 15-12-AR, October 2014, p. 1; 

State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report: Volume 1—Drug and Chemical Control, 

March 2008, p. 238; CRS, Afghanistan: Narcotics 

and U.S. Policy, RL32686, August 12, 2009, pp. 

12–13; Harry Spiller, The Afghanistan Poppy 

Eradication Campaign: Accounts from the 

Black Hawk Counter-narcotics Infantry Kandak 

Team in Helmand Province (Jefferson, NC: 

McFarland & Company, Inc., 2017) pp. 157–158; 

State, INL, “Afghanistan Program Overview,” 

accessed May 11, 2018; State, INL, “Program and 

Budget Guide: Fiscal Year 2011,” p. 133; Powell, 

“Situation in Afghanistan,” testimony before the 

House Armed Services Committee, June 22, 2005; 

State, International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report: Volume 1—Drug and Chemical Control, 

2006, p. 208; State, International Narcotics 

Strategy Report: Volume 1—Drug and Chemical 

Control, 2007, p. 228; State, INL, “International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY2007 Budget 

Justification,” April 2006; State, INL, “International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY2008 Program 

and Budget Guide,” September 18, 2007; SIGAR, 

Actions Needed to Resolve Construction Delays 

at the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, AR-09-4, 

August 27, 2009, p. 1; UNODC, “About UNODC,” 

accessed May 11, 2018; UK House of Commons, 

Defence, “Memorandum from the Afghan Drugs 

Inter-Departmental Unit (ADIDU),” May 2, 2007; 

David Mansfield, correspondence with SIGAR, 

May 22, 2018; DOJ Office of the Inspector General, 

Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

Aviation Operations with the Department of 

Defense in Afghanistan, Audit 16-16, March 2016, 

p. 2; DEA, “DEA to Play Key Role in New Heroin 

Interdiction Program for Afghanistan,” press 

release, November 17, 2004; DOJ and State Offices 

of the Inspectors General, A Special Joint Review 

of Post-Incident Responses by the Department 

of State and Drug Enforcement Administration 

to Three Deadly Force Incidents in Honduras, 

Oversight and Review 17-02, Office of Evaluations 

and Special Projects ESP-17-01, May 2017, p. 17; 

State and DOD Offices of the Inspector General, 

Interagency Assessment of the Counternarcotics 

Program in Afghanistan, State Report No. 

ISP-I-07-34, DOD Report No. IE-2007-005, July 

2007, p. 48; IRIN, “Donor-supported approaches to eradication,” August 24, 2004; Ministry of 

Counter Narcotics, “Good Performance Initiative,” 

accessed May 22, 2018; INL officials, SIGAR 

interview, April 14, 2016; GAO, Afghanistan Drug 

Control, GAO-10-291, March 2010, p. 14; State, 

U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, 

August 2007, pp. 48–49; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to 

the United States Congress, January 30, 2010, p. 55; 

SIGAR analysis of USAID quarterly Pipeline data, 

September 30, 2017; Principal Director for OSD/

CNGT Erin Logan, statement for the record before 

the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics 

Control, hearing on “Future U.S. Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan,” January 15, 2014, p. 10; 

former director of the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, 

email to SIGAR, May 10, 2018; Joint Staff, Joint and 

Coalition Operational Analysis, Operationalizing 

Counter/Anti-Corruption Study, February 28, 

2014, p. 4; SIGAR, Inquiry Letter: DOD Anti/

Counter Corruption Efforts, SIGAR-14-88-SP, 

July 31, 2014.
COUNTERNARCOTICS

JUNE 2018 | 249

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

SIGAR acknowledges the valuable contributions to this report from scores 

of individuals. 

We thank Peter Bergen, Vice President and Director, International Security 

and Future of War Programs, New America; Richard Brittan, GIS specialist and 

former contractor to the British Embassy Drugs Team; William Byrd, senior 

expert at USIP; Paul Crawford, former senior agriculture advisor in Kabul 

for USAID; Anthony Fitzherbert, former alternative development advisor to 

the Afghan government; Peter Holland, CEO, International Agency for the 

Prevention of Blindness, and former head of the Afghan Inter Departmental 

Drugs Unit, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office; David Johnson, former 

Assistant Secretary of State for INL; Ronald Neumann, president of the 

American Academy of Diplomacy and former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan; 

Peter Reuter, professor at the School of Public Policy and Department of 

Criminology, University of Maryland; Barnett Rubin, associate director and 

senior fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University; Harold 

D. “Doug” Wankel, former chief of operations and chief of intelligence for DEA, 

and former director of the Kabul Counter Narcotics Task Force, U.S. Embassy 

Kabul; and Mohammed Ehsan Zia, CEO, Tadbeer Consulting, and former 

Minister for Rural Rehabilitation and Development. We express our special 

gratitude to Vong Lim and James Misencik for their support with design and 

analysis.

We thank and acknowledge the more than 80 individuals who gave generously 

of their time and allowed us to interview them. We appreciate the efforts of all 

those at the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, as well as 

USAID and DEA, who provided valuable feedback on the report. 

In addition, we thank the geospatial teams at Alcis Holdings Ltd. and MDA 

Information Systems LLC. In particular, we wish to recognize Richard Brittan, 

Tim Buckley, and Matt Angell at Alcis Ltd. for their support and collaboration. 

The mapping and geospatial products they provided were a fundamental 

part of the project’s effort to introduce novel ways of assessing program 

implementation and outcomes. 

Finally, we appreciate the support of Scott Worden, former director of SIGAR’s 

Lessons Learned Program and current director of Afghanistan and Central Asia 

Programs at USIP, and Kim Corthell, former acting director of SIGAR’s Lessons 

Learned Program; both were instrumental in getting this report off the ground.
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

250 | ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Report Staff

Kate Bateman, Project Lead

Matthew Bentrott, Research Analyst

Nikolai Condee-Padunov, Research Analyst 

David Mansfield, Subject Matter Expert and Lead Researcher

Olivia Paek, Senior Visual Information Specialist

Sonia Pinto, Senior Analyst

Matthew Rubin, Research Analyst

Joseph Windrem, Lessons Learned Program Director

Elizabeth Young, Editor
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-181) 

established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR).

SIGAR’s oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the 

independent and objective 

• conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs 

and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available 

for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

• leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed 

to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the 

programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse 

in such programs and operations.

• means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully 

and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the 

administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and 

progress on corrective action.

Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, 

or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the 

U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made 

available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 

As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (P.L. 115-91), 

this report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality Standards for 

Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on 

Integrity and Efficiency.

Source: P.L. 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,” January 28, 2008; P.L. 115-91,”National 

Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018,” December 12, 2017.
SIGAR

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

2530 Crystal Drive

Arlington, VA 22202

www.sigar.mil

FRAUD, WASTE, OR ABUSE MAY BE REPORTED TO SIGAR’S HOTLINE

By phone: Afghanistan

Cell: 0700107300

DSN: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303

All voicemail is in Dari, Pashto, and English.

By phone: United States

Toll-free: 866-329-8893

DSN: 312-664-0378

All voicemail is in English and answered during business hours.

By fax: 703-601-4065

By email: sigar.hotline@mail.mil

By web submission: www.sigar.mil/investigations/hotline/report-fraud.aspx

SIGAR-18-52-LL