UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-1046

JUDESHIEA QUARLES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

C.W. WEEKS, individually and officially,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:16-cv-00304-MR-WCM)

Submitted: June 1, 2020 Decided: June 16, 2020

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cheyenne N. Chambers, S. Luke Largess, TIN, FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, PLLC, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Alesha S. Brown, Patrick H. Flanagan, 

CRANFILL SUMNER & HARTZOG LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Judeshiea Quarles filed suit against C.W. Weeks for malicious prosecution under

North Carolina law and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). Quarles’ suit stemmed from 

his state prosecution and acquittal for breaking and entering and larceny. The district court 

granted summary judgment to Weeks after finding that Weeks was entitled to qualified 

immunity and that Quarles’ state law claim failed on the merits. On appeal, Quarles argues

that the district court failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to him, that

probable cause did not support his arrest, and that Weeks was not entitled to qualified 

immunity. We affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment, “applying 

the same legal standards as the district court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Grutzmacher v. Howard 

Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 341 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary 

judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The relevant inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to 

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a 

matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). To 

withstand a motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must rely on more than 

conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or 

the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 

(4th Cir. 2013). 
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“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional violations but 

who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were 

lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine 

whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether 

the plaintiff has demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether 

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. 

Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine 

“gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, 

and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Smith 

v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 “is properly understood as a Fourth 

Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of the 

common law tort” of malicious prosecution. Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. 

City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail on 

such a claim, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the 

plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal 

proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Here, it is undisputed that Weeks obtained a warrant to arrest Quarles and 

that the jury subsequently found Quarles not guilty on all charges. Thus, we review 

whether probable cause supported Quarles’ arrest.

“Probable cause to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the 

officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable 
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caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed an 

offense.” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 555 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

We evaluate probable cause under an objective standard, considering the totality of the 

circumstances known to the officers at the time of the seizure and without consideration of 

the subjective beliefs of the officers involved. See Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 

(4th Cir. 2017); see Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016). 

Our review of the record demonstrates sufficient facts within Weeks’ knowledge to 

establish probable cause. At the time Weeks obtained a warrant to arrest Quarles, Weeks 

knew that an eyewitness identified Quarles as one of two perpetrators and that the 

homeowner placed Quarles at the home two weeks before the break-in. Quarles, 

nevertheless, asserts that the district court erroneously treated the magistrate judge’s arrest 

warrant and the grand jury’s subsequent indictment as conclusively establishing probable 

cause. Although a magistrate judge’s probable cause determination when issuing an arrest 

warrant is entitled to great deference and a grand jury’s indictment conclusively establishes 

probable cause, we conclude that Quarles’ argument is misplaced, as his arrest 

independently was supported by probable cause. See Munday, 848 F.3d at 255. 

Next, Quarles argues that Weeks misrepresented a witness’ statement and omitted 

information when applying for Quarles’ arrest warrant. False statements or omissions 

violate the Fourth Amendment only if they are both “material, that is, necessary to the 

finding of probable cause,” and “made deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the 

truth.” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 357 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “Reckless disregard can be evidenced” if the officer “entertained serious doubts 
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as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the 

information he reported,” Humbert, 866 F.3d at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted), or 

“failed to inform the judicial officer of facts he knew would negate probable cause,” Miller 

v. Prince George’s Cty., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007) (alteration and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Our review of the record reveals that, even if the information Weeks omitted and

misrepresented was material, Quarles failed to establish that Weeks acted deliberately or 

with reckless disregard. See Miller, 475 F.3d at 627-28 (noting that “[a] plaintiff’s 

allegations of negligence or innocent mistake by a police officer will not provide a basis 

for a constitutional violation” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Furthermore, because Quarles’ arrest was supported by probable cause, and did not violate 

Quarles’ Fourth Amendment rights, Weeks was entitled to qualified immunity. See

Dolgos, 884 F.3d at 178.

Turning to Quarles’ state law claim, we have determined that the existence of 

probable cause to arrest Quarles renders his malicious prosecution claim meritless. To 

establish a claim for malicious prosecution under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show 

that the defendant caused a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff without probable cause 

and with malice, and that the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. See Evans v. 

Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 657 (4th Cir. 2012). In determining whether probable cause 

exists, the North Carolina Supreme Court employs the same totality of the circumstances 

test utilized in a Fourth Amendment probable cause analysis. State v. Allman, 794 S.E.2d 

301, 303 (N.C. 2016). Quarles correctly contends that under North Carolina law, the 
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issuance of an arrest warrant or indictment does not bar malicious prosecution claims as a 

matter of law. See Turner v. Thomas, 794 S.E.2d 439, 445 (N.C. 2016); Johnson v. 

Whittington, 255 S.E.2d 558, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). However, because Quarles’ arrest 

was supported by probable cause, and Quarles cannot establish that Weeks acted with 

malice when obtaining the arrest warrant, the district court properly granted summary 

judgment.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgement. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED