IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs July 9, 2019

COURTNEY MEANS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 03-05193 J. Robert Carter Jr., Judge

No. W2018-01902-CCA-R3-HC

_____________________________

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Courtney Means, of three counts of 

aggravated robbery involving multiple victims, and the trial court sentenced him to an 

effective twenty-four-year sentence. This court affirmed his convictions and sentence. 

State v. Courtney Means, W2005-00682-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 709206, at *1 (Tenn. 

Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 21, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 5, 2006). The 

Petitioner unsuccessfully filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a Tennessee Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion for relief from an illegal sentence. The Petitioner 

then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his judgments are void 

because the court lacked authority to sentence him. After review, we affirm the habeas 

corpus court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JAMES

CURWOOD WITT, JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Josie S. Holland, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Courtney Means.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Assistant 

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Leslie Byrd, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

A. Procedural History

This case arises from the Petitioner’s robbing several elderly people over a period 

of multiple years. In case numbers 03-015190, 03-015192, and 03-015194, a Shelby 

County jury convicted the Petitioner of eight counts of aggravated robbery involving 

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three separate incidents and four victims and occurring on December 18 and 22, 2002

(“2002 convictions”). The trial court merged the convictions for each victim, and then, 

applying four enhancement factors, sentenced the Petitioner to a total effective sentence 

of eighteen years for the four remaining convictions. State v. Courtney Means, No. 

M2004-01446-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1323260, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, 

June 3, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2005). This court affirmed the 

Petitioner’s convictions and sentence. In case numbers 03-05193 and 03-05200, a Shelby 

County jury convicted the Petitioner of three counts of aggravated robbery against three 

victims, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective twenty-four-year sentence

(“2003 convictions”). This court affirmed his convictions and sentence. Means, 2006 

WL 709206, at *1. 

The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his 2002 convictions. 

Courtney Means v. State, No. W2008-01039-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2490771, at *1 

(Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 21, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2010). 

The post-conviction court denied the Petitioner’s petition, and this court affirmed. Id.

The Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus relief in Federal Court 

challenging his 2002 convictions. Means v Lester, No. 11-2646-JPM-tmp, 2013 WL 

3992506, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 2013), no perm. app. filed. The federal district court 

concluded that the trial court improperly applied two enhancement factors pursuant to 

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and it instructed the State to either reduce 

the Petitioner’s sentence from nine years for each count to eight years for each count, or 

afford the Petitioner a new sentencing hearing within 180 days of the entry of the order. 

Id. at *16. The State failed to comply with the order, and the Petitioner filed a petition 

for issuance of an unconditional writ of habeas corpus. Means v. Phillips, 136 F. Supp. 

3d 872, 892 (W.D. Tenn. 2015). The district court granted the petition and ordered that 

the Petitioner be released on these sentences. It further ordered that the State was 

permitted to re-arrest the Petitioner and resentence him for those convictions but that the 

sentence could not exceed eight years for each conviction. Id. at 896. Thereafter, by 

agreement of the parties, the Petitioner was sentenced to consecutive sentences of 7.2 

years for each conviction, for a total effective sentence of 14.4 years.

The Petitioner filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion in which 

he alleged that his twenty-four-year sentence for his 2003 convictions was illegal. State 

v. Courtney Means, No. W2016-02209-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 2482988, at *1 (Tenn. 

Crim. App., at Jackson, June, 7, 2017), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The trial 

court denied the motion after a hearing, and this court affirmed. Id.

On January 25, 2018, the Petitioner filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

that is the basis of this appeal. The crux of the Petitioner’s argument is that his sentence 
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is illegal because he was resentenced for his 2002 convictions that had previously served 

as the basis to enhance his classification for sentencing for his 2003 convictions. He 

asserts that since he obtained federal habeas corpus relief from his sentences for his 2002 

convictions, the sentences for his 2003 convictions are illegal. 

On July 25, 2018, the Petitioner filed an amended petition for habeas corpus relief 

and correction of an illegal sentence. The Petitioner maintained his habeas corpus 

grounds but additionally contended that his sentence was illegal on the grounds that it 

was not authorized by statute. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the 

Petitioner’s petition and motion to correct an illegal sentence. It is from these judgments

that the Petitioner now appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred: (1) when it 

summarily dismissed his petition for habeas corpus relief; (2) by summarily dismissing 

his 36.1 motion; and (3) when it failed to allow the Petitioner to be present at a hearing 

before summarily dismissing his petition. 

Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees the right to seek 

habeas corpus relief. See Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007). 

Although the right is guaranteed in the Tennessee Constitution, the right is governed by 

statute. T.C.A. §§ 29-21-101, -130 (2014). The determination of whether habeas corpus 

relief should be granted is a question of law and is accordingly given de novo review with 

no presumption of correctness given to the findings and conclusions of the court below. 

Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tenn. 2006) (citation omitted); Hart v. State, 21 

S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000). Although there is no statutory limit preventing a habeas 

corpus petition, the grounds upon which relief can be granted are very narrow. Taylor v. 

State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999).

It is the petitioner’s burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that 

“the sentence is void or that the confinement is illegal.” Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 

322 (Tenn. 2000). In other words, the very narrow grounds upon which a habeas corpus 

petition can be based are as follows: (1) a claim there was a void judgment which was 

facially invalid because the convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority to 

sentence the defendant; or (2) a claim the petitioner’s sentence has expired. Stephenson 

v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000); Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 

(Tenn. 1993). “An illegal sentence, one whose imposition directly contravenes a statute, 

is considered void and may be set aside at any time.” May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 

344 (Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978)). In 

contrast, a voidable judgment or sentence is “one which is facially valid and requires the 
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introduction of proof beyond the face of the record or judgment to establish its 

invalidity.” Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83 (citations omitted); see State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 

624, 633 (Tenn. 2000). The petitioner bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that the conviction is void or that the prison term has expired. Passarella 

v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Furthermore, the procedural 

requirements for habeas corpus relief are mandatory and must be scrupulously followed. 

Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 260 (Tenn. 2007); Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 165.

If, after a review of the habeas petitioner’s filings, the habeas corpus court 

determines that the petitioner would not be entitled to relief, then the petition may be 

summarily dismissed. T.C.A. § 29-21-109; State ex rel. Byrd v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 476, 

381 S.W.2d 280 (Tenn. 1964). Further, a habeas corpus court may summarily dismiss a

petition for writ of habeas corpus without the appointment of a lawyer and without an 

evidentiary hearing if nothing on the face of the judgment indicates that the convictions 

addressed therein are void. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1994).

We note first that the Petitioner failed to attach to his petition a copy of the 

judgments that he challenges. He, therefore, did not follow the mandatory requirements 

for a habeas corpus petition, which is a sufficient basis for us to affirm the habeas corpus 

court’s summary dismissal.

There is further support for the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the 

Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief. The law is settled that, even if the Petitioner 

were improperly classified when sentenced, he would not be entitled to habeas corpus 

relief. In Edwards v. State, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed whether a petitioner 

was entitled to habeas corpus relief if he had been improperly classified as a persistent 

offender by the trial court for the purposes of sentencing. 269 S.W.3d at 925. In that 

case, the petitioner had participated in a burglary of a car dealership, and the trial court 

sentenced him on the burglary conviction as a persistent offender and imposed a Range 

III, nine-year sentence. Our supreme court held, “After careful consideration we 

conclude that, even assuming the trial court erroneously classified [the petitioner] as a 

persistent offender for sentencing, this non-jurisdictional error renders the judgment 

voidable, not void, and does not entitle [the petitioner] to habeas corpus relief.” Id. at 

915. The court noted that its holding comported with other holdings by our court. Id. at 

925 n.81. Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas corpus court correctly found that the 

Petitioner had not presented a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief and that nothing 

on the face of the judgments indicated that the convictions were invalid. Further, the 

Petitioner does not cite any law, nor can we find any, to support his contention that the 

habeas corpus court erred when it failed to have him present before summarily dismissing 

his petition. 
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To the extent that the Petitioner cursorily asserts that his sentences are illegal 

pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, we conclude that this issue is 

without merit. The Petitioner failed to present a colorable claim that he is entitled to Rule 

36.1 relief. Accordingly, we conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the habeas 

corpus court’s judgment. 

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ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE