United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 12, 2008 Decided November 14, 2008

No. 07-3045

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WALTER ANDERSON,

APPELLANT

No. 07-3053

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT

v.

WALTER ANDERSON,

APPELLEE

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cr00066-01)
2

Tony Axam Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for the appellant/cross-appellee. A. J. Kramer, Federal

Public Defender, was on brief. Neil H. Jaffee and Michelle M.

Peterson, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, entered

appearances.

Elissa R. Hart-Mahan, Attorney, United States Department

of Justice, argued the cause for the appellee/cross-appellant.

Nathan J. Hochman, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey A.

Taylor, United States Attorney, and Alan Hechtkopf, Attorney,

were on brief.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Walter

Anderson pleaded guilty to two counts of federal income tax

evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and one count of first degree fraud

in violation of the Code of the District of Columbia. D.C. Code

§ 22-3221(a). The district court sentenced Anderson to 108

months’ imprisonment on the federal counts and four years’

imprisonment (concurrent) on the fraud count and ordered him,

on the fraud count, to pay restitution in the amount of

$22,809,032 to the District of Columbia (District). The district

court utilized the 2001 version of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines (2001 Guidelines) but also made clear that the same

sentence was appropriate under the 2000 version thereof (2000

Guidelines). Anderson appeals his sentence, arguing that the

district court’s use of the 2001 Guidelines violated the Ex Post

Facto Clause of Article I, Section 9 of the United States

Constitution and in the alternative that the sentence of

imprisonment is unreasonable. The government cross-appeals

the district court’s denial of restitution to the United States as

part of Anderson’s sentence on the two federal counts. We

affirm the sentence of imprisonment but remand the federal
3

restitution issue to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 

I.

On September 30, 2005, a federal grand jury returned a

superseding indictment charging Anderson with one count of

corruptly obstructing, impeding and impairing the due

administration of the Internal Revenue laws, 26 U.S.C.

§ 7212(a), five counts of federal tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201,

and six counts of fraud in the first degree in violation of section

3221(a) of Title 22 of the D.C. Code. The 29-page indictment

charged Anderson with using a complex scheme involving

several foreign corporations to conceal approximately $450

million in earnings between 1995 and 1999. Anderson was

charged with not reporting the earnings to the United States or

to the District and evading payment of more than $200 million

in federal income taxes and District use taxes.

On September 8, 2006, Anderson and the government

entered into a plea agreement. Anderson agreed to plead guilty

to two counts of federal income tax evasion covering the 1998

and 1999 tax years and one count of fraud in the first degree

based on conduct occurring from January 1999 through

approximately October 23, 2000. Anderson and the government

agreed to a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years. They

agreed that the district court “is obligated to calculate and

consider, but is not bound by, the United States Sentencing

Guidelines (2001).” Plea Agreement at 1, United States v.

Anderson, Cr. No. 05-0066 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 8, 2006) (Plea

Agreement) (emphasis added). They also agreed that the federal

tax loss exceeded $100 million for the purpose of calculating a

sentence under the Guidelines. And finally, Anderson “agree[d]

that the court may order restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572

and 16 D.C. Code § 711.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). On

September 8, 2006, Anderson pleaded guilty to the three counts

pursuant to the plea agreement. 
4

1

The district court concluded that under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), the parties to a plea agreement must agree to

a term of supervised release for the court to order supervised release.

Anderson did not agree to supervised release. Because the district

court concluded it lacked authority to order supervised release, it also

concluded it was without authority to order restitution as a condition

of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d) and

3563(b)(2). As the government does not appeal these decisions, we

express no opinion as to their merits.

2

The government subsequently moved, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.

P. 35(a), to correct clear error, which motion the court denied. It

In its sentencing memorandum, the government requested

a ten-year term of imprisonment and full restitution to the

United States and to the District on the counts to which

Anderson pleaded guilty. The government also asserted that the

plea agreement obligated the district court to calculate and

consider the 2001 Guidelines. In his reply to the government’s

sentencing memorandum, Anderson argued for the first time that

the 2000 version of the Guidelines should apply because the

2001 Guidelines were not in effect at the time the federal

offenses were committed. The district court decided to use the

2001 Guidelines as specified in the plea agreement.

At the sentencing hearing, the government requested

restitution as a condition of supervised release. The district

court concluded that it could impose neither supervised release

nor restitution as a condition of supervised release, an issue the

government does not appeal.1

 The government then requested

restitution to the United States, relying on the plea agreement

and on 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). Nevertheless, the district court

held that, because the plea agreement referenced 18 U.S.C.

§ 3572, which covers fines, and not 18 U.S.C. § 3663, which

covers restitution, it could not order restitution on the federal

counts.2
5

observed, however, “I hope the government will appeal me on [the

federal restitution issue].” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 627, United States

v. Anderson, Cr. No. 05-0066 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2007) (3/27/07 Sent.

Tr.).

3

Anderson does not challenge the court’s ordering him to pay

$22,809,032 in restitution to the District. 

The district court sentenced Anderson to 60 months’

imprisonment on the 1998 count and 48 months’ imprisonment

on the 1999 count, to be served consecutively. It also imposed

a four-year concurrent sentence of imprisonment on the fraud

count. The judge spelled out the factors that influenced his

sentencing decision under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Finally,

Anderson was ordered to pay $22,809,032 in restitution to the

District. In its Memorandum Opinion and Order filed the day

after sentencing, the district court stated that it would have

imposed the same sentence if it had used the 2000 Guidelines

“after consideration of all factors under Section 3553(a).” Mem.

Op. & Order at 2, United States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 05-0066

(D.D.C. filed Mar. 28, 2007) (Mem. Op.). Anderson timely

appealed his sentence and the government timely crossappealed.

II.

Anderson makes two challenges to his sentence to wit: (1)

the district court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the

2001 Guidelines and (2) the sentence of 108 months’

imprisonment is unreasonable.3

 The government cross-appeals

the district court’s failure to order restitution on the two federal

counts. 

A. Ex Post Facto Clause

Anderson first contends that the district court violated the

Ex Post Facto Clause when it used the 2001 Guidelines in
6

determining his sentence on the two federal counts. Our review

of this question of law is de novo. United States v. Dorcely, 454

F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Alexander, 331

F.3d 116, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Anderson was sentenced on March 27, 2007 and, at that

time, the 2006 version of the Guidelines was in effect. It

directed the court to “use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the

date that the defendant is sentenced.” U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(a) (2006) (U.S.S.G.). It also

directed the court to apply the Guidelines Manual in effect when

the “offense of conviction was committed” if applying a later

version would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at

§ 1B1.11(b); see also United States v. Bolla, 346 F.3d 1148,

1151 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[C]ourts must apply the Guidelines

in effect on the date the offense was committed if using the

Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing would yield a

longer sentence.”). 

Anderson’s plea agreement recited that the district court “is

obligated to calculate and consider, but is not bound by, the

United States Sentencing Guidelines (2001).” Plea Agreement

at 1. In his Reply to the Government’s Memorandum in Aid of

Sentencing filed before sentencing, however, Anderson asked

the district court to consider the 2000 Guidelines because he

committed the offenses in 1998 and 1999. At the sentencing

hearing, the district court concluded that Anderson had waived

any objection to its use of the 2001 Guidelines by entering into

the plea agreement, which specified the 2001 version. The

district court also indicated at the hearing that a 71-month

sentence, the top of the sentencing range suggested under the

2000 Guidelines, would be insufficient. As noted earlier, the

district court subsequently ruled in the alternative that it would

have imposed the same sentence if it had consulted the 2000

version of the Guidelines. Because the district court determined

Anderson’s sentence using both the 2001 Guidelines and, in the
7

4

In its Memorandum Opinion and Order filed the day after

sentencing, the district court imposed an alternative sentence using the

2000 Guidelines. Mem. Op. at 2. Because Anderson did not object

to the court’s alleged failure to explain the alternative sentence, we

apply plain error review to this challenge. See In re Sealed Case, 527

F.3d 188, 191-92 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Appellant did not object to the

district judge’s failure to explain his reasons [for an above-Guidelines

sentence] either orally or in writing . . . . We therefore review the

sentence for plain error.”).

alternative, the 2000 Guidelines, which alternative sentencing

we affirm as set forth infra at II.B., we need not reach

Anderson’s Ex Post Facto Clause challenge.

B. Reasonableness of Sentence

Anderson next argues that his nine-year imprisonment

sentence is unreasonable. In reviewing his sentence, we

undertake a two-part inquiry of any legal error and of the

“overall reasonableness” of the sentence in light of statutory

sentencing factors. United States v. Olivares, 473 F.3d 1224,

1226 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see United States v. Lawson, 494 F.3d

1046, 1056-57 (D.C. Cir. 2007). We review substantive

reasonableness under the abuse of discretion standard. Gall v.

United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007).

Anderson first argues that the district court did not explain

its upward departure from the recommended sentencing range

under the 2000 Guidelines.4

 The sentencing court commits

procedural error if it “fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen

sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the

Guidelines range.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597; see also In re Sealed

Case, 527 F.3d 188, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating sentence

based on failure to explain upward deviation from advisory

Guidelines range). The district court here held in the alternative

that it “would have imposed the same sentence, even if the

[2000 Guidelines] were applicable, by varying upward under
8

Booker and the Section 3553(a) factors.” Mem. Op. at 2. It

further noted “after consideration of all factors under Section

3553(a) that [the nine-year imprisonment] sentence is the one

that is ‘sufficient but not greater than necessary.’” Id. (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 3533(a)). The district court had expressly

considered the section 3553(a) factors during the sentencing

hearing and it was therefore unnecessary to repeat them in its

memorandum opinion and order issued thereafter.

Section 3553(a)(1) of Title 18 directs the district court to

consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant.” The sentence must

be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary . . . to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to

provide just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2)(A). The sentence should also “afford adequate

deterrence to criminal conduct,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and

“protect the public from further crimes.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 

Anderson points to several mitigating factors that he claims

the district court did not properly consider in sentencing him.

According to Anderson, these factors included his exceptional

work history in the telecommunications industry, favorable

reputation as an honest and fair businessman, contributions to

the development of outer space through commercial and nonprofit entities, assistance to other inmates during his time in

prison, strong relationships with family, relatively modest

lifestyle and the fact that he did not embezzle money from an

employer or harm individuals. Anderson also argued that the

conditions of his pre-sentencing incarceration, which included

seven months in solitary confinement, and a sealed matter

supported a reduced sentence. Anderson further argued that his

age and lack of a criminal history suggested a low probability

for recidivism. He noted that he had already suffered severe

collateral damage due to market forces, the IRS investigation

and his criminal convictions. He also claimed that a lengthy
9

5

The district court observed, “This offense is serious. [Anderson]

may be the largest tax evader in the history of the country. If not, he’s

close.” 3/27/07 Sent. Tr. at 627.

sentence was not necessary to promote respect for the law or to

deter others from similar conduct.

 In express recognition of the conditions and length of

Anderson’s pre-sentence incarceration and the sealed matter, the

district court sentenced Anderson to one year less than the tenyear maximum permitted by the plea agreement. The district

court emphasized the extent and seriousness of Anderson’s

conduct5 and the need to promote respect for the law and deter

others from similar conduct. Considering the magnitude of

Anderson’s crimes and the need for deterrence, we believe the

district court justified the upward deviation from the 2000

Guidelines’ advisory sentence range and, accordingly, the

district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Anderson

to 108 months’ imprisonment. 

C. Government’s Cross-Appeal

 (Restitution on Federal Counts)

The government cross-appeals the district court’s ruling that

it lacked authority to order restitution to the United States.

While it ordered Anderson to pay $22,809,032 in restitution to

the District on the fraud count, it concluded that the plea

agreement did not authorize restitution to the United States.

United States v. Anderson, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2007).

We interpret the terms of a plea agreement de novo. United

States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Federal courts have authority to order restitution solely

pursuant to statute. United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 166 (2d

Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 101

(2d Cir. 1991)). Section 3663(a)(1)(A) of Title 18 authorizes the

court to order restitution if the defendant violates certain
10

criminal statutes set forth therein. The statutes do not include 26

U.S.C. § 7201, the statute Anderson pleaded guilty to violating.

Nevertheless, the district court may also “order restitution in any

criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea

agreement.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3).

Anderson argues that the plea agreement is ambiguous as to

restitution on the federal counts and should be interpreted

against the government. See United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d

247, 253 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In determining whether any particular

plea agreement has been breached, we look to the reasonable

understanding of the parties and resolve any ambiguities in the

agreement against the government.”) (internal citation omitted).

If the parties make clear that the district court is authorized to

order restitution, however, then the use of an interpretive rule for

resolving ambiguities is unnecessary. See United States v.

Heard, 359 F.3d 544, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding no

ambiguity in plea agreement because defense counsel made

clear at sentencing hearing that both parties agreed to leave

resolution of issue to district court); United States v. Gary, 291

F.3d 30, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (declining to construe plea

agreement against drafter because agreement was not

ambiguous); United States v. Sparks, 20 F.3d 476, 478 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) (same).

In the section of the plea agreement entitled “Restitution,”

Anderson “agree[d] that the court may order restitution pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and 16 D.C. Code § 711.” Plea Agreement

at 2. But section 3572 of Title 18, titled “Imposition of a

sentence of fine and related matters,” addresses, unsurprisingly,

the imposition of a fine only. Subsection (a) lists several factors

the district court should consider in imposing a fine. Subsection

(b) states, “the court shall impose a fine or other monetary
11

6

In contrast, the provision of the D.C. Code referenced in the plea

agreement, D.C. Code § 16-711, authorizes the court to order

“reasonable restitution or reparation.” D.C. Code § 16-711 (“In

criminal cases in the Superior Court, the court may, in addition to any

other sentence imposed as a condition of probation or as a sentence

itself, require a person convicted of any offense to make reasonable

restitution or reparation.”).

penalty only to the extent that such fine or penalty will not

impair the ability of the defendant to make restitution.”6

The parties’ citation to 18 U.S.C. § 3572 instead of 18

U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) in the plea agreement does not preclude our

finding that the parties nonetheless agreed that restitution could

be ordered on the federal counts. First, section 3663(a)(3) does

not require that the plea agreement expressly include the

statutory basis for restitution. Moreover, the government

persuasively explained the reference to section 3572 as a

drafting mistake. If the parties had intended to authorize

restitution to the District only, it would have been unnecessary

to include any statute other than D.C. Code § 16-711. The

reference to a federal statute, albeit an incorrect one, indicates

the parties intended to authorize restitution to the United States

as well as to the District. Most important, the conduct of the

parties plainly reflects their understanding that the district court

had the authority to order restitution to the United States in an

amount to be determined by the court. During the plea hearing,

the assistant United States attorney stated, “The only other thing

I’d ask, that the government is also free to ask for restitution.”

Plea Tr. at 6, United States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 05-0066

(D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2006). Anderson’s counsel stated that the

parties had not agreed on an amount but that “[t]he government

is free to seek restitution under the plea agreement, and we’re

free to propose alternatives or other suggestions to the Court.”

Id. at 16. Anderson’s counsel later argued at sentencing that

Anderson would be better able to make restitution if he served
12

a shorter sentence. Specifically, counsel stated, “If Mr.

Anderson is locked up for an extended period of time, he has

very little likelihood of being able to . . . generate wealth with

which to pay back the money that he owes the U.S. Government

and the DC government.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 476, United

States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 05-0066 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2007)

(3/23/07 Sent. Tr.). And in his sentencing memorandum

submitted before sentencing, Anderson claimed that he could

not “be directed to pay restitution in an amount exceeding the

tax loss related to the tax evasion counts to which he pleaded

guilty.” Def. Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 58, United States v.

Anderson, Cr. No. 05-0066 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 2, 2007).

In addition, Anderson’s presentation of evidence at

sentencing regarding the amount of federal tax loss supports the

conclusion that restitution to the United States was contemplated

by the parties. On the second day of the sentencing hearing,

Anderson’s expert witness proposed a lower federal tax loss and

a higher D.C. tax loss than the losses the government had

proposed. Anderson’s overall proposed tax loss was lower than

the government’s proposal. Anderson had no reason to propose

a higher D.C. tax loss if he believed that the district court had

authority to order restitution to the District only. Nor did he

have any reason to propose a lower federal tax loss if he did not

believe the court had authority to order him to make restitution

to the United States. Anderson’s response that he presented

evidence regarding the federal tax loss only because the D.C. tax

loss depended on the federal loss is not supported by the record.

Anderson’s expert witness determined a lower federal tax loss

by classifying certain income as long-term capital gains, which

are taxed at a lower rate. According to Anderson’s expert, the

government classified the income differently, resulting in a

higher tax rate and higher federal tax loss. Nevertheless, based

on our review of the transcript portions included in the record on

appeal, Anderson’s expert did not testify that calculation of the

federal tax loss was necessary to determine the District tax loss.
13

7

The district court also concluded that it was without authority to

order restitution on the separate ground that the parties had not agreed

to an amount of restitution or to a method to determine restitution.

Interpreting the phrase “to the extent agreed to by the parties” in 18

U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3), the district court stated that “even if . . . the plea

agreement had been an agreement by [Anderson] that he would pay

restitution, and even if it had cited to 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) instead

of to 18 U.S.C. § 3572, there still would be no unambiguous meeting

of the minds as to what was agreed.” Anderson, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 11

(emphasis in original). To have a meeting of the minds on all essential

terms, the court concluded, the parties had to have a “mutual

understanding that [Anderson] would pay restitution and in what

amount or, at the very least, how the amount of restitution would be

determined.” Id.

 

And the government’s expert witness testified that he used

Anderson’s federal adjusted gross income computed by the IRS,

not the federal tax loss, as a starting point to determine the taxes

Anderson owed the District.

On the third day of the sentencing hearing, Anderson argued

for the first time that 18 U.S.C. § 3572 related to fines and did

not authorize the court to order restitution. His counsel then

said, “But we’re not arguing that that means he . . . can’t be

required to pay restitution if the court orders it.” 3/23/07 Sent.

Tr. at 521.

We conclude that the district court was authorized to order

restitution to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3663(a)(3). The parties’ conduct plainly evinced their intent

that the district court could order restitution to both the United

States and the District under the plea agreement. See Heard,

359 F.3d at 554 (parties’ conduct at sentencing hearing clarified

plea agreement).7
14

Although we have not interpreted the phrase “to the extent agreed

to by the parties,” two of our sister circuits have. The Ninth and

Second Circuits have upheld restitution orders under section

3663(a)(3) notwithstanding the parties did not specify an amount of

restitution or a method to determine restitution. See United States v.

Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1999) (restitution

authorized when defendant agreed to plea agreement that recited, in

part, “that the Court can order you to pay restitution for the full loss

caused by your activities”); United States v. Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682,

685, 690 (2d Cir. 1994) (restitution authorized when defendant agreed

“to make full restitution to the Social Security Administration for the

full amount of the loss suffered by the Social Security Administration

said amount of restitution and loss to be determined by the Court”).

We believe that, while the parties may agree to a specific amount or

to a cap on restitution, such an agreement is not required under section

3663(a)(3). Cf. United States v. Gottesman, 122 F.3d 150, 152 (2d

Cir. 1997) (suggesting in dicta that phrase “to the extent agreed to by

the parties” means court can “order restitution only in an amount not

to exceed that agreed upon by the parties” but expressing no opinion

as to whether parties must agree to amount); United States v. Bartsh,

985 F.2d 930, 932-33 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding restitution order for

amount below maximum amount agreed to by parties). The Seventh

Circuit has also concluded that parties to a plea agreement need not

agree to an amount of restitution under a statute in pari materia, 18

U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3), which reads, “The court shall also order, if

agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, restitution to persons

other than the victim of the offense.” United States v. Peterson, 268

F.3d 533, 534-35 (7th Cir. 2001). While section 3663A(a)(3) does not

contain the phrase “to the extent agreed to by the parties,” the Seventh

Circuit’s observation that it may be impossible in some cases for

parties to reach an agreement if they are required to specify an amount

of restitution would seem to fit section 3663(a)(3) as well. See id.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment and its order of
15

8

As we have noted, the district court sentenced Anderson to four

years’ imprisonment (concurrent) on the fraud count. In its

Memorandum Opinion and Order filed the day after sentencing,

however, the district court increased the sentence on the fraud count

to eight years’ imprisonment. The original judgment, filed March 30,

2007, reflected the increased sentence on the fraud count. Also on

March 30, 2007, Anderson moved to vacate that portion of the

Memorandum Opinion and Order increasing the sentence on the fraud

count. Anderson then filed his appeal on April 9, 2007. On April 16,

2007, the government joined in Anderson’s motion to vacate the

increased sentence of imprisonment on the fraud count. The

government filed its appeal on May 1, 2007. On June 15, 2007, the

district court granted Anderson’s motion to vacate the increased

sentence on the fraud count and filed an amended judgment reinstating

the four-year sentence. We conclude that the district court was

without jurisdiction to enter an amended judgment after the parties

appealed and, accordingly, we vacate it. See United States v. DeFries,

129 F.3d 1293,1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The filing of a notice of

appeal . . . ‘confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the

district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the

appeal.’” (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459

U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam))); cf. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(5) (court

can correct sentence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) notwithstanding

filing of notice of appeal but only within seven days after sentencing).

We also vacate that portion of the judgment entered on March 30,

2007, imposing an eight-year sentence on the fraud count and remand

for resentencing on the fraud count consistent with this opinion. 

restitution to the District of Columbia. We reverse the district

court’s holding that it lacks authority to order restitution to the

United States and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.8

So ordered.