* Honorable Tom Stagg, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-6673. Ronald A. REDD, Thomas A. Anderson, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v. CITY OF ENTERPRISE, a municipality organized under the laws of the State of Alabama, Anthony Nelms, et al., Defendants-Appellants. May 13, 1998. Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Middle District of Alabama. (No. CV-94-A1224-S), W. Harold Albritton, Judge. Before TJOFLAT and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and STAGG * , Senior District Judge. TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: This appeal arises out of the arrest of Thomas A. Anderson by police officers Anthony Nelms, Robert Crawford, and Robe rt Braun, of the city of Enterp rise, Alabama. Anderson and his colleague Robert A. Redd filed a complaint in the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) asserting several constitutional clai ms and a pendent state law claim. The complaint sought damages against each defendant. The police officers severally moved the district c ourt for summary judgment on Anderson's and Redd's constitutional claims on the ground that they we re entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified i mmunity and therefore denied the officers' motions for summary judgment insofar as the motions re lied upon qualified immunity grounds. The officers now appeal. We conclude that the officers are entitled to qualified i mmunity on the Fourth Amendment claims of plaintiff Anderson, and re verse the denial of summary judgment on thatclaim. We also conclude that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims and therefore reverse the distri ct court's denial of summary judgment on those claims as well. We have jurisdiction to consider an interl ocutory appeal of an order denying a motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310-14, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2155-56, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). We review such orders de novo, and resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff. See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1486 & n. 3 (11th Cir.1996). We then answer the legal question of whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under that version of the facts. Id. Accordingly, in part I we state the facts of the case in the light most favorable to Anders on and Redd. In part II, we explain why, on that version of the facts, the defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity against, and therefore to summary judgment on, plaintiff Anderson's FourthAmendment claim and on both plaintiffs' First Amendment claims. We therefore reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment.
I. Anderson and Redd, the plaintiffs in this case, are traveling ministers. On March 24, 1994 (the Thursday before Good Friday), Anderson and Redd arrived at the corner of West College and South Main Streets in Enterprise—the busiest intersection in town—and set about preaching to passers-by. The two men took turns preaching on th e sidewalk, speaking loudly to pedestrians and to drivers passing through the busy intersection. Anderson admits that he was speaking loudly enough to be heard across the street, but not so loudly as to be heard over the noise of passing trucks. Anderson held a Bible in his hands, and he would wave it as he preached. No one approached Anderson to complain about his preaching, but some pedestrians did complain to a passing police officer. The officer relayed the citizen's complaint to the dispatcher,and Officer Anthony Nelms was dispatched to a ddress the matter. While Anderson preached, Redd went over to talk to Nelms, who had exited his patrol car. Redd identified himself and Anderson to Nelms and explained that they were minister s who were preaching. Nelms told Redd that there had been a complaint that the two men had been stepping into the roadway while preaching; Redd stated that he and Anderson had not done so. Anderson did not hear any of the colloquy between Redd and Nelms and continued to preach. Nelms observed Anderson for the next five minutes; Crawford then arrived, and he and Nelms observe d Anderson for several more minutes. Crawford informed Redd that he and Anderson would have to stop preaching. Redd asked to speak with Crawford's superior, Braun, in pe rson, and Crawford tried to call Braun. Braun called back a few minutes later and told Crawford that he would be unable to come to the scene and that Crawford should use his own discretion in deciding whether to arrest either or both of the ministers. At this point, Anderson ceased preaching and went over to ask what was going on. According to the ministers' testimony, Crawford th en told Anderson and Redd that they would have to stop preaching or they would be arrested. Anderson asked if they were standing on a public sidewalk. Crawford answered that they were. A nderson asked if the officers intended to arrest him for preaching on a public sidewalk. Crawford answered in the affirmative. Anderson walked back to the street corner and recommenced preaching loudly. Nelms then arrested Anderson. Redd was not arrested or charged. While in jail, Anderson told officers that he believed his arrest to have been in violation of the Constitution and that he would su e the city if the matter could not be resolved to his satisfaction. Upon hearing of Anderson's statements, defendant-appellant Michael Lolley, the Police Chief of1 Police Chief Lolley is listed as an appellant. The district court, however, dismissed all claims against Lolley, in both his individual and official capacities, arising out of the March 24 arrest. As explained infra, this appeal only addresses the officers' requests for qualified immunity from claims arising out of the March 24 arrest. We therefore conclude that Lolley has no interest in this appeal.

2 The complaint also asserted various claims under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. The district granted summary judgment to the defendants on these claims. Similarly, the complaint asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, and 1988, in addition to the claims brought pursuant to section 1983. The district court granted summary judgment on these claims as well. Enterprise, ran a criminal history check on Anderson. 1 The background check revealed that one Thomas A. Anderson was wanted on a felony warrant in Beaufort, South Carolina for check fraud. The Beaufort County Sheriff's Department supplie d a description of the man they wanted, and a social security number; both matched the intake information supplied to the EPD by the appellee Anderson. The Beaufort Sheriff's Department re quested that the EPD arrest Anderson again for extradition on the check fraud warrant. A warrant was issued in Enterprise and Anderson was arrested again on the night of April 8, 1994. Anders on insisted that the Beaufort warrant was for his father, not for him. Several days later, on April 11, the Beaufort Sheriff's Department informed the EPD that this was in fact true. The case against appellee Anderson on the second warrant was immediately dropped and he was promptly released. Anderson and Redd then filed suit in the distri ct court. The complaint asserted several claims. Count One of the complaint brought clai ms against the officers in their individual and official capacities, asserting that (in accordance withthe policy of the City of Enterprise) the police officers violated Anderson's rights under the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution 2 by arresting him for disorderly conduct without probable cause, and that the arrest violated Redd's First Amendment rights by "chilling" his speech. Counts Two and Three alleged that the EPD's investigation and second arrest of Anderson, pursu ant to the South Carolina warrant, constituted a3 No appeal is taken from this holding. "malicious prosecution" that violated the Fourth Am endment. Count Four asserted a tort claim for malicious prosecution under Alabama state law. The police officers moved for summary judgm ent on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity from suit on the constitutional cl aims. The district court concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualifie d immunity on the plaintiffs' Fi rst and Fourth Amendment claims arising out of the March 24 street-corner arrest, and denied summary judgment on those claims. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' Fourth Am endment claims arising out of the April 8 arrest, however, on the ground that the second arrest was effected pursuant to the facially valid warrant from South Carolina, and that relief under section 1983 was therefore unavailable. 3 This left for trial: 1) Anderson's and Redd's section 1983 First Amendment claims; 2) Anderson's section 1983 Fourth Amendment clai m arising out of the March 24 arrest; and 3) Anderson's state law claim for malicious prosecution. The defendants now appeal the district court's denial of qualified immunity, and therefore of summary judgment, on the First Amendment and Fourth Amendment claims arising out of the March 24 arrest.
II. "That qualified immunity protects government actors is the usual rule; only in exceptional cases will government actors have no shield against claims made against them in their individual capacities." Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (citations and emphasis omitted). A public official is entitled to qualified immunity from a section 1983 damages action if his actions di d not violate clearly established law. See Thornton4 That statute provides: § 13A-11-7 Disorderly conduct. (a) A person commits the crime of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (1) Engages in fighting or in violent tumultuous or threatening behavior; or v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1399 (11th Cir.1998). Taking the facts as asserted by the plaintiffs, we conclude that the officers' actions in this case did not clearly violate either the First Amendment or the Fourth Amendment. We ther efore conclude that th e officers are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff Anderson's FourthAmendment claim and on both plaintiffs' First Amendment claims.
A. We first address plaintiff A nderson's false arrest claim agai nst the officers under the Fourth Amendment. It is clearly established that an arrest made without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. See Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir.1990). An officer is entitled to qualified immunity, however, where the officer had "arguable probable cause," that is, where "reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest" the plaintiffs. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Taking the facts of the case in the light most favor able to the plaintiffs, we conclude that the EPD officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Anderson for disorderly conduct on March 24th, that is, that the officers could reasonably have be lieved that Anderson's actions on that date violated Alabama's disorderly conduct statute. 4 Anderson admittedly was attempting to be heard over the(2) Makes unreasonable noise; or (3) In a public place uses abusive or obscene language or makes an obscene gesture; or (4) Without lawful authority, disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of persons; or (5) Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic, or a transportation facility; or (6) Congregates with other person in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse. Ala.Code§ 13A-11-7 (1994). The officers assert that they had probable cause to believe that Anderson was "mak[ing] unreasonable noise." The district court noted that there remained a factual dispute as to precisely how loudly Anderson was speaking. Anderson admits, however, that he was speaking at least loudly enough to be heard across a busy intersection. We believe that this admission is sufficient to establish that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Anderson. traffic at the intersection, and admits that he succeeded in speaking loudly enough to be heard across the street. The uncontroverted testimony of Officer Jimmy Hutto (not a party to this litigation) establishes that passers-by complained of the loudness of Anderson's speech. On these facts, we cannot say that the officers could not reasonably have believed Anderson's conduct to be in violation of the disorderly conduct statute. The officers ar e therefore entitled to qualified immunity from suit on Anderson's false arrest claim. We thus concl ude that the district court erred in denying summary judgment to the defendants on that claim.
B. We next address the defendants' request for qualified immunity from the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims. At the time of Anderson's arrest, the plaintiffs were clearly engaging in protected speech in a traditional public forum. See Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2563, 69 L.Ed.2d 298, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2563-64 (1981) (stating that oral and written dissemination of religious views and doctrines isprotected by the First Amendment); Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954-55, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 ( 1983) (holding that traditional public fora include public streets). "In these quintessential public for[a], the government may not prohibit all communicative activity." Id. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955. Even in traditional public fora, however, "the state may "enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication.' " Crowder v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 990 F.2d 586, 590 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46, 103 S.Ct. at 954-55). As the district court held, the arrest of A nderson was content-neutral; nothing in the record indicates that the plaintiffs were selectivel y arrested for engaging in religious speech while non-religious speakers went unmolested. Moreove r, the Alabama disorderly conduct statute is presumptively valid. The plainti ffs do not attack the disorderly conduct statute as unconstitutional, and we note that the Alabama disorderly conduct st atute has recently been held constitutional by the Alabama courts. See Sterling v. State, 701 So.2d 71 (Ala.Crim.App.1997) (holding that Alabama's disorderly conduct statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad). Because we hold that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Anderson for disorderly conduct, we must hold that the officer s are also entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims. When a police officer has probable cause to believe that a person is committing a particular public offense, he is justified in arresting that person, even if the offender may be speaking at the time that he is arrested. See United States v. Rubio, as modified, 727 F.2d 786, 791 (9th Cir.1984) (" We strongly disagree with any inference that criminal investigation is somehow prohibited when it interf eres with ... First Amendment interests. When activity protected by the First Amendment becomes the subject of a criminal investigation, theprotections afforded by the Fourth Amendment come into play."); see also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 1981-82, 56 L. Ed.2d 525 (1978) (holding that Fourth Amendment requirements regarding search and seizur e pursuant to warrant are sufficient to protect First Amendment interests that may be implicated in the search and seizure). Likewise, when an officer has arguable probable cause to believe that a person is committing a particular public offense, he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit, even if the offender may be speaking at the time that he is arrested. We therefore conclude that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, and that the district court erred in denying summary judgment to the defendants on those claims.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the di strict court's denial of summary judgment on both plaintiff Anderson's Fourth Amendment fa lse arrest claim and on the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims.
SO ORDERED.