[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 119 (Tuesday, June 20, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 38182-38191]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-15544]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

RIN 3150-AG22


Elimination of the Requirement for Noncombustible Fire Barrier 
Penetration Seal Materials and Other Minor Changes

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its fire 
protection regulations to remove the requirement that fire barrier 
penetration seal materials be noncombustible, and to make other minor 
changes. The final rule removes a requirement that has a negligible 
contribution to safety and includes editorial changes designed to meet 
the intent of the Presidential memorandum dated June 1, 1998, entitled, 
``Plain Language in Government Writing.''

EFFECTIVE DATE: July 20, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Daniele Oudinot, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, telephone 301-415-3731; e-mail <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4004080f002e32236e272f36"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="75313d3a351b07165b121a03">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The NRC conducted a technical assessment of fire barrier 
penetration seals. The NRC documented the results of its assessment in 
SECY-96-146, ``Technical Assessment of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 
in Nuclear Power Plants,'' July 1, 1996; in NUREG-1552, ``Fire Barrier 
Penetration Seals in Nuclear Power Plants,'' July 1996; and in NUREG-
1552, Supplement 1, January 1999. On the basis of its findings, the NRC 
concluded that the noncombustibility criterion for penetration seal 
materials that is specified in the NRC fire protection regulation and 
review guidance had a negligible contribution to safety, and 
recommended that this noncombustibility criterion be deleted. Copies of 
NUREG-1552 and NUREG-1552, Supplement 1, may be purchased from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 
37082, Washington, DC 20402-9328. Copies are also available from the 
National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, 
Springfield, VA 22161. A copy of each document is also available for 
inspection and/or copying at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L 
Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. NUREG-1552, Supplement 1, is 
also available through the Technical Reports area of the NRC Reference 
Library accessed through the NRC Website: http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/NUREGS/index.html.

II. Analysis of Public Comments and Staff Response

    The proposed rule was published for public comment in the Federal 
Register on August 18, 1999 (64 FR 44860). The comment period ended on 
November 1, 1999. The NRC received eight comment letters. Six 
commenters supported the proposed amendment; two commenters objected to 
the changes. This section discusses the comments received, how the NRC 
staff was able to incorporate some comments into the final rule and, if 
not, why a comment was not accepted. This section addresses all 
comments, but specific commenters are not identified.
    A commenter suggested that footnote 1 to Section I, ``Introduction 
and Scope,'' of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, be deleted because its 
wording is identical to footnote 4 to Sec. 50. 48(b). This commenter 
stated that the basis for deleting footnote 4 to Sec. 50.48 also 
applies to footnote 1 to Section I of Appendix R. The NRC agrees with 
this comment and footnote 1 to Section I of Appendix R is deleted.
    One of the commenters who endorsed the proposed rule stated that, 
in particular, (1) There are no reports of fire that have challenged 
the ability of fire-rated penetration seals to confine a fire; (2) 
numerous fire endurance tests have confirmed the fire-resistive 
capabilities of the penetration seal materials, designs, and 
configurations installed in nuclear power plants; and (3) if 
penetration seals are properly designed, installed, and maintained, 
there is reasonable assurance that they will provide the fire-resistive 
integrity of the fire barriers in which they are installed, and confine 
a fire to its area of origin.
    A commenter objected to the rule change, but did not identify any 
specific technical or safety information for NRC staff consideration. 
Therefore, the comment did not result in changes to the rule.
    One commenter provided multiple comments in opposition to the 
proposed rule. Each of these comments are discussed below. None of the 
comments resulted in any changes from the proposed rule.
    1. Comment. The non-combustibility requirement for fire seals is 
key in providing a high level of confidence in the operability 
determination for a fire seal.
    Response. The Commission disagrees. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, 
General Design Criteria (GDC), Criterion 3--Fire Protection states: 
``Noncombustible and heat resistant materials shall be used wherever 
practical throughout the unit. * * *'' Thus, the Commission's most 
fundamental requirements with respect to fire protection do not mandate 
the exclusive use of noncombustible materials. The Commission's 
implementing requirements on fire protection in 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 
Part 50, Appendix R, require the use of fire barriers that meet 1-hour 
or 3-hour fire ratings; while the current regulation requires the use 
of noncombustible materials it is also clear that the 1-hour and 3-hour 
ratings can be achieved with the use of properly tested, rated and 
qualified material that is ``combustible.'' Penetration seals used as a 
part of the rated fire barrier assembly are required to meet the 
acceptance criteria of Nationally Recognized Testing Standards that are 
specifically designed to test these components. Examples of these 
standards include American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E-
814, ``Standard Test Method for Fire Tests of Through-Penetration Fire 
Stops,'' and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
634, ``Standard Cable Penetration Fire Stop Qualification Test.'' These 
nationally recognized testing standards do not require the penetration 
seal material to be noncombustible, but rather focus on the penetration 
seals ability to prevent flame travel through the opening and limit the 
heat transfer through the penetration seal assembly by measuring the 
cold-side temperature. As such, ``noncombustibility,'' as defined in 
ASTM-136, ``Standard Test Method for Behavior of Materials in a 
Vertical Tube Furnace at 750  deg.C,'' is not a necessary requirement 
for an adequate fire barrier or a penetration seal that is part of this 
barrier. Penetration seal assemblies, when properly tested, qualified, 
and installed, meet this requirement as a fire (heat) resistant 
material. In fire protection engineering design, this can be thought of 
as analogous to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Life 
Safety Code, NFPA 101,

[[Page 38183]]

which allows certain wooden doors to be used as 20-minute fire 
protection-rated doors. (See NFPA 101, Section 6-2.3.2.3.2.) The NFPA 
Code recognizes that even though the wooden door assembly is 
unquestionably combustible, as long as that fire door assembly can 
provide the required level of protection (20 minutes in this example) 
the wooden door assembly is acceptable. In sum, the current Appendix R 
requirement for noncombustible fire barrier penetration seals is not an 
inherent part of the NRC's overall regulatory approach on fire 
protection, and is not necessary to provide reasonable assurance of 
adequate protection against fire spread in nuclear power plants.
    2. Comment. The NRC has not analyzed the risk associated with the 
use of combustible fire seal material as it provides a fuel supported 
pathway or ``wick'' for flame and hot gas to burn through wall 
penetrations into adjacent fire zones that contain vital safety 
systems, structures or components.
    Response. As discussed in NUREG-1552 and its supplement, the NRC 
has evaluated fire barrier penetration seals and concluded that 
properly tested, configured, installed, and maintained penetration seal 
assemblies will not provide a fuel supported pathway or ``wick'' for 
flame and hot gas to burn through wall penetrations. Hundreds of fire 
endurance qualification tests have been performed by materials 
manufacturers, installation contractors, test laboratories, research 
organizations, licensees, and others. These qualification tests 
involved a wide variety of penetration seal designs and materials, in 
configurations which are found at nuclear power plants, including the 
actual cables that run through the fire barrier penetration seal. These 
tests also maximize the fire severity by subjecting the penetration 
seals to a rapidly rising temperature in a relatively small and 
confined space. Note that with few exceptions, nuclear power plant fire 
loads are not great enough to produce a fire approaching the severity 
of the Standard Time/Temperature test curve. In the unlikely event that 
a large fire exposes a qualified combustible or noncombustible 
penetration seal to high temperatures for an extended period of time, 
the seal will perform as rated. For the case of a silicone-based 
material, the silicone will ablate by design and be replaced with char 
or ash. The silicone foam material is sacrificial by design in 
preserving the integrity of the fire barrier. This sacrificial behavior 
and charing has been observed during full-scale qualification fire 
endurance tests of a wide variety of silicone-based penetration seal 
configurations. Other combustible penetration seal materials have also 
been qualified. For example, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company 
(3M) has over 25 years of experience with combustible penetration seal 
designs using their intumescent materials (caulks, putty, wrap strips, 
and composite sheets). The intumescent material swells when heated, 
which causes the seal to expand and protect the penetration. 
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL), has qualified dozens of 
combustible penetration seal designs and lists and classifies these 
designs in a full volume of their Fire Resistance Directory (Volume 2). 
The NRC concludes that these tests have demonstrated that combustible, 
limited combustible or noncombustible penetration seals can provide the 
necessary fire resistance and provide reasonable assurance that a fire 
will not spread from one side of the fire barrier to the other side of 
the barrier within the 1- or 3-hour time period required by the NRC.
    3. Comment. The NRC's technical assessment does not offer any 
evaluation or analysis regarding the contribution to severe accident 
risk evolving from a quick burn-through of fire seals resulting from 
the use of combustible penetration sealant material and other generic 
problems widely experienced with the Dow Corning product.
    Response. As stated above, a large body of fire test results have 
proven the capabilities and effectiveness of penetration seals in 
maintaining the fire-resistive integrity of the barriers in which they 
are installed, typically for 1 or 3 hours, which precludes a quick 
burn-through scenario, i.e., if the penetration seal assembly has 
passed the testing criteria to be rated, it could not experience a 
``quick burn-through''. Further, the nature of combustible penetration 
seal materials and the limited air supply in penetration seals preclude 
a ``quick burn-through,'' and an analysis of the contribution to severe 
accident risk evolving from a quick burn-through of fire seals 
resulting from the use of combustible penetration sealant material is 
not relevant. For instance, silicone-based penetration seal materials 
are relatively difficult to ignite and ablate slowly at a rate of about 
3 inches per hour when exposed to the Standard Time/Temperature fire 
curve of ASTM E-119.
    Fire barrier penetration seals are not considered in the assessment 
of postulated fire scenarios that are the major contributors to core 
damage for most plants, because the major contributors are those in 
which the redundant divisions of post-fire safe-shutdown components and 
systems are located in the fire affected area. Scenarios involving the 
spread of fire from one area of a plant to another and evolving to core 
damage (scenarios that could potentially involve penetration seals) are 
also of low frequency. It is the NRC's judgment that considering the 
probability of failure of a plant's passive fire barrier penetration 
seals would not significantly alter the overall contribution of fire 
risk to the plant's total calculated core damage frequency.
    4. Comment. Given the combustibility of the silicone material, the 
industry has also widely documented improperly installed seals (less 
than sufficient sealant material, varying size voids created by 
problematic installation procedures and cracks). By providing for the 
acceptance of combustible penetration seals, the NRC is reducing the 
level of defense-in-depth without fully analyzing the risks associated 
with accelerated burn-through of seals from the combination of these 
widely documented factors.
    Response. The NRC disagrees with the commenter's implication that 
there are widespread and numerous instances of improperly-installed 
silicone fire barrier seals. First, while plant-specific deficiencies 
of fire barrier penetration seals have been and will likely continue to 
be found, they have been isolated and not tied to any installation 
problems generic to this material. Installation deficiencies that have 
been identified to date have been or are in the process of being 
corrected by licensees.
    Second, the NRC disagrees with the commenter's apparent argument 
that combustible fire seals that meet the NRC's 1- and 3-hour fire 
rating significantly decreases the safety of a nuclear power plant as 
compared to fire seals which are ``noncombustible'' as defined by ASTM 
E-136. Fire seals are one passive sub-component of fire protection 
provided by the defense-in-depth concept, the others being fire 
prevention, detection, suppression and plant-design features. As 
discussed in the response to Comment 2, the NRC also believes that it 
is highly unlikely that fire barriers in a nuclear power plant would be 
exposed to fires of sufficient temperature and duration such that the 
silicone fire seals that fail before their rated 1- or 3-hours. Thus, 
consideration of the probability of failure of properly-qualified 
penetration seals that meet the NRC's requirements for 1- or 3-hour 
protection would not significantly alter the overall contribution of 
fire risk to the plant's total calculated core damage frequency.

[[Page 38184]]

Finally, the practical benefits of the silicone-based penetration seal 
materials (e.g., easy installation, compatibility around safety-related 
cables, and reasonable cost) far outweigh concerns regarding material 
combustibility. Thus, the NRC concludes that properly qualified fire 
barriers will provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to 
public health and safety.
    5. Comment. The NRC does not offer any analysis and evaluation of 
how a combustible penetration sealant could also harbor a fire as it 
moves through a penetration seal. The fire could leave a protective 
barrier of insulating ash in its trail making it difficult to identify, 
locate and extinguish. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to move forward 
with this rule change without analysis on the quick burn-through of 
seals under the above stated conditions.
    Response. A properly designed, tested, and installed penetration 
seal will maintain the fire resistive integrity of the wall/ceiling/
floor assembly in which it is installed. During this time, automatic 
and/or manual fire suppression activities will be used to control and 
extinguish the fire. After the fire is extinguished, standard fire 
fighting procedures would require that the fire brigade perform the 
``overhaul'' firefighting function of ensuring all combustibles have 
been extinguished. During this firefighting, if the fire brigade were 
to identify ash or swelled material in a penetration seal, procedures 
would require that the fire brigade take appropriate action either to 
identify whether the seal is continuing to combust (by removal), or to 
promptly implement extinguishing activities. This is a standard 
firefighting operation to check for any possible fire extension. 
Therefore, the NRC concludes that it is not inordinately difficult to 
identify and extinguish fires in combustible fire barrier penetration 
seals.
    6. Comment. The basic premise of the NRC rule change fails to 
address industry experience in properly bounding fire tests for the 
myriad of fire seal configurations deployed throughout nuclear power 
stations. In one case, the licensee improperly used a single test to 
bound 2000 fire barrier penetration seals in many different fire seal 
configurations. This omission does not lend to the credibility of the 
agency's argument. Such evidence documents improperly tested seal 
configurations.
    Response. The Browns Ferry fire of March 22, 1975, demonstrated the 
weakness in penetration seals to the nuclear and general building 
industry. After the fire, specific testing methods were developed by 
nationally recognized testing organizations to test and qualify 
penetration seals. The American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM) first issued their standard E-814, ``Standard Test Method for 
Fire Tests of Through-Penetration Fire Stops,'' in 1981. The Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) first issued their 
standard IEEE 634, ``Standard Cable Penetration Fire Stop Qualification 
Test,'' in 1978. In regard to the commenter's assertions regarding ``a 
single test to bound 2000 fire barrier penetration seals * * *,'' the 
first penetration seal fire tests were often used to bound numerous 
configurations. This issue of bounding fire tests was addressed in 
Information Notice (IN) 88-04, ``Inadequate qualification and 
documentation of fire barrier penetration seals,'' dated February 5, 
1988. Since that time, decades of experience with the test standards by 
the nuclear and general building industries have provided adequate 
assurance that such standards are appropriate for qualifying fire 
barrier penetration seals. Hundreds of qualification-type fire 
endurance tests of a wide variety of penetration seal designs and 
materials have been performed by material manufacturers, installation 
contractors, test laboratories, research organizations, licensee, and 
others. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL) alone publishes a complete 
volume of Listed and Classified rated through-penetration fire stop 
systems. Additionally, the NRC staff has observed fire endurance tests 
of fire barrier penetration seals, and reviewed fire test reports 
during licensing reviews and inspections. On the basis of these 
eyewitness accounts and reviews, the NRC staff has concluded that fire 
endurance tests have established the fire-resistive capabilities of 
numerous penetration seal materials, designs, and configurations as 
installed in the nuclear power plants. The NRC staff provided guidance 
on the bounding of plant-installed configurations with tested 
configurations in Generic Letter 86-10, ``Implementation of Fire 
Protection Requirements,'' dated April 24, 1986. Subsequently, the 
industry used this guidance in inspecting plant designs. As licensees 
identified potential penetration seal issues, the staff informed the 
industry through numerous INs, including: (1) IN 88-04, and Supplement 
1, dated August 9, 1988; (2) IN 88-56, ``Potential Problems with 
Silicone Foam Fire Barrier Penetration Seals,'' dated August 4, 1988; 
(3) IN 94-28, ``Potential Problems with Fire-Barrier Penetration 
Seals,'' dated April 5, 1994; and (4) IN 97-70, ``Potential Problems 
with Fire Barrier Penetration Seals,'' dated September 19, 1997. These 
potential problems were brought forward by licensee inspections and NRC 
staff observed weaknesses discovered during some of its inspections.
    7. Comment. The basic premise of the NRC rule change fails to take 
into account ongoing industry-wide discovery of insufficient material 
fill, large voids and cracking in seals as the result of the 
problematic installation of the silicone foam penetration seal material 
in the field. In numerous cases, licensees have reported universal fire 
seal installation problems involving the silicone foam material. Such 
evidence documents improperly installed silicone-based penetration 
seals. The NRC also fails to take into account that licensees are using 
the same problematic material to replace inoperable fire seals. Given 
these recurring and what appears to be ongoing failures, the NRC does 
not offer any method for determining how it is achieving properly 
tested, configured, installed and maintained silicone-based penetration 
seals. Given the apparent lack of reasonable assurance that fire 
barrier seals are adequately inspected to determine that they have been 
properly tested, configured, installed and maintained, it is 
inappropriate to reduce the fire protection standard by removing the 
non-combustibility standard. Similarly, it is inappropriate to maintain 
a policy of enforcement discretion for the same noncombustibility 
standard.
    Response. The NRC disagrees with the commenter's implicit argument 
that historical problems with installation of silicone fire barrier 
penetration seals have not been rectified, and, as a result, the 
Appendix R non-combustibility requirement should be retained.
    The NRC disagrees with the commenter's assertion that improper 
installation and maintenance of fire barrier penetration seals is a 
reasonable basis for retaining the current noncombustibility 
requirement. First, proper installation of fire barrier penetration 
seals is necessary in order for the seals to perform their intended 
safety function, regardless of whether the seals are made of 
combustible or noncombustible materials. Licensees must have 
appropriate procedures for installation of Appendix R-required fire 
barrier penetration seals and implement corrective action if improperly 
installed seals are discovered, regardless of the combustibility of the 
fire barrier penetration seal material. Thus, while improperly 
installed fire barrier penetration seals raise valid concerns with 
respect to their functionality, these concerns are not relevant to the 
issue of

[[Page 38185]]

the need for a noncombustibility requirement.
    Second, the NRC disagrees with the commenter's implicit argument 
that there are widespread problems with the installation, inspection, 
and maintenance of fire barrier penetration seals that remain 
uncorrected. While there have been historical problems with the 
installation of silicone fire barrier penetration seals, the NRC has 
taken a series of regulatory actions in response to instances of 
improper fire barrier penetration seal installation. These actions 
include the issuance of the information notices discussed above to 
alert nuclear power plant licensees of potential problems with silicone 
fire barrier penetration seal installation and inspection, changes to 
the NRC resident inspector inspection program to include fire barrier 
penetration seals as part of the NRC's inspection program, and 
continued NRC review and oversight of licensees' corrective actions. 
The NRC has confirmed that licensees have taken appropriate action to 
identify and correct improperly installed silicone-based fire barrier 
penetration's seals, as discussed in NUREG-1522 and its supplement. 
Based upon NRC inspections and audits, the NRC believes that licensees 
and vendors understand the fire-resistive capabilities and limitations 
of the penetration seal materials, and that existing licensee and 
vendor seal installation programs are adequate to prevent potential 
penetration seal installation problems. Potential penetration seal 
problems are understood; industry standards are available and licensees 
are complying with them. In regard to installation, maintenance, and 
in-service inspection, the NRC's comprehensive reassessment of fire 
barrier penetration seals included the review of procedures, 
specifications, and training programs for installation, surveillance, 
maintenance, and repair of penetration seals at both nuclear power 
plants and the facilities where seals are manufactured. Overall, the 
NRC concluded that licensees and vendors are aware of the importance of 
proper design, installation, surveillance, maintenance, and repair of 
penetration seals, including training of installers and inspectors. 
Therefore, based on inspections and review of the licensees' corrective 
action programs, the NRC concludes that historical problems with the 
installation of silicone-based fire barrier penetration seals have been 
corrected. Many plants include fire barrier penetration seals that are 
required by Appendix R in their Maintenance Rule's requirements program 
(10 CFR 50.65). This requires monitoring of the performance or 
condition of relevant structures, systems and components (SSCs) unless 
there is a continuing basis for concluding that the performance or 
condition of the SSCs is being effectively controlled. This provides 
additional regulatory assurance that fire barrier penetration seals are 
being properly installed, inspected, and maintained. For these reasons, 
the NRC concludes that historical problems with fire barrier 
penetration seal installation and inspection does not provide an 
appropriate basis for retaining the current noncombustibility 
requirement in Appendix R.
    8. Comment. Visual industry reliance upon walk-downs of fire 
barrier penetration seals installed in walls, ceilings and floors, in 
many cases behind a series of obstacles, is not sufficient in 
determining the reliability and operability of a silicone foam fire 
barrier penetration seal. Non-destructive examination of installed 
seals (e.g., ultrasound techniques) can provide a greater measure of 
confidence in determining if a seal has been properly installed.
    Response. The NRC believes that existing inspection techniques 
developed by the manufacturers of silicone fire barrier penetration 
seals for evaluating the adequacy of installation of seals are 
adequate. The vendor requirements for physical parameters for the 
installation of seals include attributes such as density of the mixed 
material, cell structure, texture, and color. These are the same 
parameters used in the construction of the penetration seals for 
testing and, as such, ensure that the seals installed in the plant are 
representative of those qualified during testing. The installed 
penetration seals are passive fire barriers and remain unchanged after 
proper installation. The commenter did not provide any credible 
information showing that the manufacturer-developed installation 
inspection methodology (which may include visual examinations) is 
inadequate to detect improper installation. In the absence of such 
information, the NRC does not believe that any consideration should be 
given to requiring non-destructive examination, which is outside of the 
scope of the rule change. When the NRC discovers a problem with 
penetration seals, such as can occur in the area of surveillances, the 
NRC alerts licensees and advises them to evaluate whether the potential 
problem exists at their plants. Licensees typically evaluate this 
information for applicability to their plants as a part of their 
Nuclear Experience Review Program and take corrective actions when 
necessary. For example, fire penetration seal surveillance problems 
were discussed in IN 88-56 which examines in detail visual inspection 
information regarding voids, gaps, and splits in the material.
    9. Comment. Because of the evidence of recurring non-compliance 
with testing, configuration, installation and maintenance, retaining 
and enforcing the non-combustibility standard is an essential component 
in establishing confidence in fire barrier penetration seal operability 
at nuclear power stations.
    Response. As discussed above, the NRC does not agree that there are 
recurring, generic problems with fire barrier penetration seal 
qualification, configuration and installation throughout the nuclear 
power plant industry. The NRC believes that the proper amount of 
attention is being provided by licensees and will be provided for in 
the future. Additionally, to prevent any possible deficiencies in the 
penetration seal program, the NRC will continue to provide regulatory 
oversight.
    10. Comment. In making the claim that combustible materials are 
already used in nuclear power stations, NRC attempts to circumlocate 
(sic.) the significant safety issue on how combustible cable jacketing 
installed through a penetration surrounded in a combustible fire 
barrier material with additional documented problems can contribute to 
an accelerated burn through thus failing as a rated fire barrier.
    Response. As discussed in the response to Comment 2, the fire 
endurance tests for qualifying fire barrier penetration seals were 
conducted using the cable which would be used in the actual plant 
configurations. Thus, the contribution of the cable jacketing to 
combustion of the fire barrier penetration seal was an inherent part of 
the fire endurance qualification tests.
    11. Comment. NRC provides no reference to what degree staff and 
Commission went to arrive at the determination that no technical 
argument exists for the fire barrier penetration seals non-combustible 
materials requirement.
    Response. The primary documents reviewed by the NRC in attempting 
to identify the basis for the current noncombustibility requirement 
were the statements of consideration for the proposed and final Fire 
Protection rules, May 29, 1980; 45 FR 36082, and November 19, 1980; 45 
FR 76608 and the Commission papers that led to these proposed and final 
rules. The primary

[[Page 38186]]

technical documents and rationales for the Commission's determination 
that no technical basis exists for the noncombustibility requirement 
are contained in NUREG-1552 and Supplement 1 to that document.

III. Summary of Changes

    This final rule amends Section III.M in Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 
50 (Appendix R), removes footnotes 3 and 4 from Sec. 50.48, removes 
footnote 1 from Section I in Appendix R, removes Sec. 50.48 (c), (d), 
and (e), corrects a grammatical error in footnote 2 to Section III.G. 3 
in Appendix R, and makes editorial changes.
    1. In Appendix R, Section III.M, the words ``shall utilize only 
noncombustible materials and * * *'' are removed.
    The technical basis for removing the noncombustibility requirement 
for fire barrier penetration seal materials is documented in NUREG-1552 
and NUREG-1552, Supplement 1. A summary of the technical basis for this 
action follows.
    NRC requirements and guidelines for penetration seals appear in a 
number of documents. In 1971, the NRC promulgated General Design 
Criterion (GDC) 3, ``Fire protection,'' and subsequently developed 
specific guidance for implementing GDC 3; Branch Technical Position 
(BTP) Auxiliary Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1, 
``Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants,'' May 1, 
1976; and Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, ``Guidelines for Fire 
Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976,'' 
February 24, 1977. Most licensees complied with most of the 
implementing guidance. To resolve the contested issues, the NRC 
published the final fire protection rule (10 CFR 50.48) and Appendix R 
to 10 CFR Part 50 on November 10, 1980 (45 FR 76602). It is important 
to note that Appendix R is not a set of generically applicable fire 
protection requirements and applies only to plants that were operating 
before January 1, 1979.
    The record for Appendix R does not disclose the technical basis for 
including the noncombustibility criterion in Appendix R. The 
noncombustibility criterion is not included in BTP APCSB 9.5-1, 
Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, or in the industry fire endurance test 
standards. Section 50.48 does not address the use of combustible 
materials. Although GDC 3 states that noncombustible and heat-resistant 
materials must be used wherever practical, GDC 3 does not preclude the 
use of combustible materials. In general, when these materials are 
incorporated as integral components of the plant fire protection 
program, including the fire hazard analysis, they are acceptable.
    Fire barrier penetration seals are one element of the defense-in-
depth concept at nuclear power plants. The objectives of the defense-
in-depth concept as applied to fire protection are to:
    (1) Prevent fires from starting;
    (2) Promptly detect, control, and extinguish those fires that do 
occur; and
    c. Protect structures, systems, and components important to safety 
so that a fire that is not extinguished promptly will not prevent the 
safe shutdown of the plant.
    To achieve defense in depth, each operating reactor maintains an 
NRC-approved fire protection program. Nuclear power plants are divided 
into separate areas by structural fire barriers, such as walls and 
floor-ceiling assemblies whose fire-resistance rating, typically 1, 2, 
or 3 hours, is determined by testing. The function of these structural 
barriers is to prevent a fire that starts in one area from spreading to 
another area. Penetration seals are used to close openings through the 
structural fire barriers. The intended design function of the 
penetration seal is to confine a fire to the area in which it started 
and to protect important equipment within an area from a fire outside 
the area. As for other fire barriers, the fire-resistance rating of the 
penetration seals is determined by testing.
    The ability of a particular penetration seal to achieve its 
intended design function (i.e., to contain a fire), as determined by a 
fire endurance test conducted in accordance with an industry standard, 
is the foremost design consideration. In NUREG-1552 and NUREG-1552, 
Supplement 1, the NRC concluded:
    (1) There are no reports of fires where fire-rated penetration 
seals failed to confine a fire at a nuclear power plant;
    (2) A large body of fire endurance tests has confirmed the fire-
resistive capabilities of the penetration seal materials, designs, and 
configurations installed in nuclear power plants; and
    (3) If penetration seals are properly designed, tested, installed, 
inspected, and maintained, there is reasonable assurance that they will 
provide the fire resistance of the tested design, maintain the fire-
resistive integrity of the fire barriers in which they are installed, 
and confine a fire to its area of origin.
    The NRC evaluated silicone-based penetration seal materials that 
are combustible and are the most widely used materials for penetration 
seals throughout the commercial nuclear power industry. In presenting 
the results of its evaluation in NUREG-1552 and in NUREG-1552, 
Supplement 1, the NRC concluded:
    (1) Properly designed, tested, installed, and maintained silicone-
based penetration seals are not credible fire hazards;
    (2) Despite the fact that a silicone-based penetration seal could 
contribute some fuel to a fire, its relative contribution to overall 
fire severity would be negligible;
    (3) Qualified silicone-based fire barrier penetration seals can 
accomplish their intended design function; and
    (4) The benefits of combustible or limited combustible penetration 
seal materials outweigh any potential concerns regarding material 
combustibility. For example, the penetration seal material must be 
compatible with the penetrating item material. In the case of 
electrical cables, the 3M intumescent material or the Dow Corning 
Silicone will not damage the cable jacket and flows between the 
individual cables during installation. Likewise, the flexible 
combustible seal materials allow for normal pipe movement due to 
heating and cooling of the pipe. The combustible seal materials are 
economical to install and remove/replace during plant modifications. In 
short, silicone foam and silicone elastomer can fill complex irregular 
openings and adhere to the penetration and the penetrants; cure 
rapidly; have high-temperature stability; are flexible; and resist the 
effects of radiation exposure and aging.
    2. In Sec. 50.48, footnotes 3 and 4 are removed.
    Footnote 3 to Sec. 50.48(a) stated that basic fire protection 
guidance for nuclear power plants is contained in two NRC documents: 
Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary Power Conversion System 
Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1, ``Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear 
Power Plants'' (for new plants docketed after July 1, 1976), dated May 
1976, and Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9,5-1, ``Guidelines for Fire 
Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976'' 
(for plants that were operating or in various stages of design or 
construction before July 1, 1976), dated August 23, 1976. Footnote 3 
also referred to footnote 4 to Sec. 50.48(b), that lists four 
additional documents related to permissible alternatives to satisfy 
Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1. The documents listed in footnote 4 were: 
``Supplementary Guidance on Information Needed for Fire Protection 
Evaluation,'' dated October 21, 1976;

[[Page 38187]]

``Sample Technical Specification,'' dated May 12, 1977; ``Nuclear Plant 
Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Control and 
Quality Assurance,'' dated June 14, 1997; and ``Manpower Requirements 
for Operating Reactors,'' dated May 11, 1978. The six documents that 
were referred to in footnotes 3 and 4 no longer reflect accurately the 
current NRC guidance.
    Footnotes 3 and 4 were not intended to be rulemaking requirements 
but rather statements of fact. The footnotes reflected the Commission's 
approval of the NRC staff's practice, as reflected in Branch Technical 
Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 and in its Appendix A, that the date of the 
docketing of the construction permit would determine the NRC staff's 
review criteria for verifying compliance with General Design Criterion 
(GDC) 3, and that compliance with the guidance of BTP APCSB 9.5-1 or 
its Appendix A and the other listed guidance documents would establish 
compliance with GDC 3. The NRC has completed its review of the fire 
protection programs at all operating reactors and has issued license 
conditions that establish the licensing bases for each reactor. The 
licensing bases may include the documents listed in footnotes 3 and 4, 
but typically include a number of other guidance documents that the NRC 
issued after it promulgated Sec. 50.48. In addition, the licensees 
included the fire protection licensing basis for each reactor in the 
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility. Footnotes 3 and 
4 have served their purpose and are not needed by the NRC or the 
licensees to maintain the fire protection licensing bases for the 
reactors.
    The change does not affect or change the licensing basis for any 
plant. However, it makes 10 CFR 50.48 consistent with other reactor 
regulations that do not identify guidance documents. It also eliminates 
the need to update the footnotes to include the large number of 
guidance documents that the NRC has issued since it promulgated 
Sec. 50.48 and to conduct future rulemakings to add new guidance 
documents as they are issued. The change also resolves an inconsistency 
between the information in footnote 3 to Sec. 50.48 and the regulatory 
requirements of Sec. 50.34(g)(1)(ii). Specifically Sec. 50.34(g)(1)(ii) 
states, in part, that ``Applications for light water cooled nuclear 
power plant construction permits, manufacturing licenses, and 
preliminary or final design approvals for standard plants docketed 
after May 17, 1982, shall include an evaluation of the facility against 
the SRP * * *,'' whereas, footnote 3 indicated that the fire protection 
portions of these applications would be reviewed against BTP APCSB 9.5-
1.
    3. In Section I of Appendix R, footnote 1 is removed.
    Footnote 1 to Section I in Appendix R is identical to footnote 4 to 
Sec. 50.48(b). The reasons given above for the removal of footnote 4 to 
Sec. 50.48(b) also apply to footnote 1 to Section I in Appendix R.
    4. In Sec. 50.48, paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) are removed.
    Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 50.48 contained schedule 
requirements that were added to the Code of Federal Regulations when 
Appendix R became effective on February 17, 1981. These requirements 
applied to nuclear power plants licensed before January 1, 1979, and 
involved fire protection installation modifications, revisions of 
administrative controls, manpower changes, and training. These 
requirements were to be completed on a schedule determined by the 
provisions specified in Sec. 50.48 (c) and (d). All scheduler 
requirements of Sec. 50.48 (c) and (d) have been implemented and need 
not be retained.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The removed paragraphs read as follows:
    (c) All fire protection modifications required to satisfy the 
provisions of appendix R to this part or directly affected by such 
requirements shall be completed on the following schedule:
    (1) Those fire protection features that involve revisions of 
administrative controls, manpower changes, and training, shall be 
implemented within 30 days after the effective date of this section 
and appendix R to this part.
    (2) Those fire protection features that involve installation of 
modifications that do not require prior NRC approval or plant 
shutdown shall be implemented within 9 months after the effective 
date of this section and appendix R to this part.
    (3) Those fire protection features, except for those requiring 
prior NRC approval by paragraph (c)(5) of this section, that involve 
installation of modifications that do require plant shutdown, the 
need for which is justified in the plans and schedules required by 
the provisions of paragraph (c)(5) of this section, shall be 
implemented before startup after the earliest of the following 
events commencing 180 days or more after the effective date of this 
section and appendix R to this part:
    (i) The first refueling outage;
    (ii) Another planned outage that lasts for at least 60 days; or
    (iii) An unplanned outage that lasts for at least 120 days.
    (4) Those fire protection features that require prior NRC 
approval by paragraph (c)(5) of this section, shall be implemented 
within the following schedule: Dedicated shutdown systems -- 30 
months after NRC approval; modifications requiring plant shutdown--
before startup after the earliest of the events given in paragraph 
(c)(3) commencing 180 days after NRC approval; modifications not 
requiring plant shutdown--6 months after NRC approval.
    (5) Licensees shall make any modifications necessary to comply 
with these requirements in accordance with the above schedule 
without prior review and approval by NRC except for modifications 
required by section III.G.3 of appendix R to this part. Licensees 
shall submit plans and schedules for meeting the provisions of 
paragraphs (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) within 30 days after the 
effective date of this section and appendix R to this part. 
Licensees shall submit design descriptions of modifications needed 
to satisfy section III.G.3 of appendix R to this part within 30 days 
after the effective date of this section and appendix R to this 
part.
    (6) In the event that a request for exemption from a requirement 
to comply with one or more of the provisions of Appendix R filed 
within 30 days of the effective date of this rule is based on an 
assertion by the licensee that such required modifications would not 
enhance fire protection safety in the facility or that such 
modifications may be detrimental to overall facility safety, the 
schedule requirements of paragraph (c) shall be tolled until final 
Commission action on the exemption request upon a determination by 
the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation that the licensee has 
provided a sound technical basis for such assertion that warrants 
further staff review of the request.
    (d) Fire protection features accepted by the NRC staff in Fire 
Protection Safety Evaluation Reports referred to in paragraph (b) of 
this section and supplements to such reports, other than features 
covered by paragraph (c), shall be completed as soon as practicable 
but no later than the completion date currently specified in license 
conditions or technical specifications for such facility, or the 
date determined by paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(4) of this section, 
whichever is sooner, unless the Director of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation determines, upon a showing by the licensee, that there is 
good cause for extending such date and that the public health and 
safety is not adversely affected by such extension. Extensions of 
such date shall not exceed the dates determined by paragraphs (c)(1) 
through (c)(4) of this section.
    (1) Those fire protection features that involve revisions of 
administrative controls, manpower changes, and training shall be 
implemented within 4 months after the date of the NRC staff Fire 
Protection Evaluation Report accepting or requiring such features.
    (2) Those fire protection features involving installation of 
modifications not requiring prior approval or plant shutdown shall 
be implemented within 12 months after the date of the NRC staff Fire 
Protection Safety Evaluation Report accepting or requiring such 
features.
    (3) Those fire protection features, including alternative 
shutdown capability, involving installation of modifications 
requiring plant shutdown shall be implemented before the startup 
after the earliest of the following events commencing 9 months or 
more after the date of the NRC staff Fire Protection Safety 
Evaluation Report accepting or requiring such features:
    (i) The first refueling outage;
    (ii) Another planned outage that lasts for at least 60 days; or
    (iii) An unplanned outage that lasts for at least 120 days.
    (4) Those fire protection features involving dedicated shutdown 
capability requiring new buildings and systems shall be implemented 
within 30 months of NRC approval. Other modifications requiring NRC 
approval prior to installation shall be implemented within 6 months 
after NRC approval.
    (e) Nuclear power plants licensed to operate after January 17, 
1979, shall complete all fire protection modifications needed to 
satisfy Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part in accordance with 
the provisions of their licensees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (e) of Sec. 50.48 specified that nuclear power plants 
licensed after January 1, 1979, were to complete all fire protection 
modifications needed to satisfy GDC 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 
in accordance with the provisions of their licenses. License

[[Page 38188]]

conditions pertaining to fire protection have been implemented at all 
plants. Therefore, Sec. 50.48(e) has been implemented and need not be 
retained.
    5. In Section III.G.3 of Appendix R, a grammatical error is 
corrected.
    Footnote 2 to Section III.G.3 of Appendix R read, ``Alternative 
shutdown capability is provided by rerouting, relocating, or 
modificating of existing systems; dedicated shutdown capability is 
provided by installing new structures and systems for the function of 
post-fire shutdown.'' This final rule replaces the words ``modificating 
of'' with ``modifying.''

IV. Plain Language

    The Presidential memorandum dated June 1, 1998, entitled, ``Plain 
Language in Government Writing,'' directed that the Federal 
Government's writing be in plain language (63 FR 31883, June 10, 1998). 
In compliance with this directive, editorial changes have been made in 
these amendments to improve the readability of the existing language of 
the provisions being revised. These types of changes are not discussed 
further in this document.

V. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations

    Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of 
Agreement State Programs'' approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997, 
and published in the Federal Register September 3, 1997 (62 FR 46517), 
Part 50 is classified as compatibility Category ``NRC.'' The NRC 
program elements in this category are those that relate directly to 
areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA or provisions of 
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

VI. Voluntary Consensus Standards

    The National Technology Transfer Act of 1995, Public Law 104-113, 
requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that are 
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards that are 
developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless the 
use of such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise 
impractical. The NRC is deleting the Government-unique standard in 10 
CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.M, which requires that fire 
barrier penetration seals utilize only noncombustible materials. The 
NRC is not aware that deletion of this requirement is inconsistent with 
any voluntary consensus standard.

VII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact

Environmental Assessment

    The NRC has determined, in accordance with the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's 
regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that the amendments are not 
a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment; therefore, an environmental impact statement is not 
required.
1. The Action
    The NRC is amending its regulations that require fire barrier 
penetration seal materials to be noncombustible and making minor 
changes to Sec. 50.48 and to Appendix R to Part 50.
    These minor changes are to remove footnote 3 from Sec. 50.48(a), 
footnote 4 from Sec. 50.48(b), and footnote 1 from Section I in 
Appendix R; remove paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) from Sec. 50.48; 
correct a grammatical error in footnote 2 to Section III.G.3 of 
Appendix R; and make editorial changes.
2. Need for the Rulemaking Action
    The technical basis for removing the noncombustibility requirement 
for fire barrier penetration seal materials is documented in NUREG-
1552, ``Fire Barrier Penetration Seals in Nuclear Power Plants,'' July 
1996; and in NUREG-1552, Supplement 1, January 1999. In these reports, 
the NRC staff documented the results of a technical assessment of fire 
barrier penetration seals. On the basis of its findings, the NRC 
concluded that the noncombustibility criterion for penetration seal 
materials specified in the NRC fire protection regulations and review 
guidance has a negligible contribution to safety and recommended that 
this noncombustibility criterion be deleted. In a staff requirements 
memorandum dated June 30, 1998, the Commission directed the NRC staff 
to amend Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 (Appendix R) to 
eliminate the noncombustibility requirement for penetration seal 
material and to make other minor changes to the fire protection 
regulations. These minor changes include the deletion of references 
that no longer reflect accurately the guidance documents published by 
the NRC in footnotes 3 and 4 of Sec. 50.48 and in footnote 1 to Section 
I of Appendix R, the deletion of schedular requirements that have been 
implemented in Sec. 50.48(c) and (d), and a grammatical correction in 
footnote 2 to Section III.G.3 of Appendix R. The NRC also took 
advantage of this rulemaking to make editorial changes to comply with 
the Presidential memorandum dated June 1, 1998, entitled, ``Plain 
Language in Government Writing.'' The deletion of the noncombustibility 
criterion removes a requirement that has a negligible contribution to 
safety. It constitutes a burden reduction for the NRC and for the 
licensees.
3. ``No Regulatory Action'' Alternative
    No regulatory action would have continued the regulatory burden on 
licensees and on the NRC. Silicone-based material is currently the 
material of choice for fire barrier penetration seals and is 
combustible. The NRC has performed an assessment of silicone-based 
penetration seal materials and concluded that the benefits of the 
silicone-based materials in penetration seals, such as high-temperature 
stability, flexibility, and resistance to the effects of radiation 
exposure and aging, outweigh any potential concerns regarding material 
combustibility. In the past, licensees using silicone-based penetration 
seal materials have requested and been granted exemptions from the 
requirement of Section III.M of Appendix R to Part 50, regarding the 
use of noncombustible materials, provided the seals are qualified by 
fire endurance tests conducted in accordance with an industry standard. 
Under the previous rule, a licensee that chose penetration seals made 
of silicone-based materials to replace existing seals or to install new 
seals would have had to request an exemption from the requirement of 
Section III.M of Appendix R to the extent that the silicone-based 
material is combustible. This request for an exemption would have 
increased the regulatory burden on both the NRC and the licensees, and 
would have presented no safety benefit. No regulatory action regarding 
the removal of footnote 3 to Sec. 50.48(a), footnote 4 to Sec. 50.48 
(b), footnote 1 to Section I of Appendix R, and Sec. 50.48 (c), (d), 
and (e) would have had a negative regulatory impact for the following 
reasons. Footnotes 3 and 4 in Sec. 50.48 and footnote 1 to Section I of 
Appendix R were inaccurate and incomplete. In addition, the information 
in footnote 3 was inconsistent with the regulatory requirements 
contained in Sec. 50.34(g)(1)(ii). The requirements in Sec. 50.48 (c), 
(d), and (e) had been implemented and need not be retained. No 
regulatory action regarding the correction of a grammatical error in 
footnote 2 to Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to Part 50, which was 
administrative in nature, would not have had any regulatory impact.

[[Page 38189]]

4. Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Amendment and the Alternative
    The environmental impacts of this amendment, as well as the 
alternative, are considered negligible by the NRC. The NRC has 
determined that the ability of a particular penetration seal to achieve 
its intended design function (i.e., to contain a fire), as determined 
by a fire endurance test conducted in accordance with an industry 
standard, is the foremost design consideration. The amendment will not 
impact the ability to shut down the plant safely in the event of a fire 
and will provide a level of safety equivalent to that attained by 
compliance with Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. There is 
no environmental impact associated with the other changes which are 
administrative in nature. On this basis, the NRC concludes that there 
are no radiological environmental impacts associated with this 
amendment. If no regulatory action had been taken in regard to the 
noncombustibility requirement of Section III.M of Appendix R there 
would have been no radiological environmental impact, the same as the 
action. No regulatory action regarding the changes in Sec. 50.48 and in 
Appendix R (and the correction of an error in footnote 2 to Section 
III.G.3 of Appendix R, which is administrative in nature) would have 
had no radiological impact on the environment.
    With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the amendment 
does not affect nonradiological plant effluents and has no other 
environmental impact. Therefore, the NRC concludes that there are no 
significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the 
amendment.
5. List of Agencies and Persons Consulted
    Much of the technical information required for this rulemaking was 
obtained directly from technical experts within the NRC. No other 
agencies were consulted in preparing this environmental assessment.

VIII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This final rule does not contain a new or amended information 
collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011.

Public Protection Notification

    If a means used to impose an information collection does not 
display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct 
or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information 
collection.

IX. Regulatory Analysis

    The NRC has prepared the following regulatory analysis for the 
rule.
1. Statement of the Problem
    The NRC is amending its regulations regarding the requirement for 
fire barrier penetration seal materials to be noncombustible and is 
also making minor changes to Sec. 50.48 and to Appendix R to 10 CFR 
Part 50. The changes remove footnote 3 from Sec. 50.48(a), footnote 4 
from Sec. 50.48(b), and footnote 1 from Sect. I. of Appendix R; remove 
paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) from Sec. 50.48; correct a grammatical 
error in footnote 2 to Section III.G.3 of Appendix R; and make 
editorial changes to comply with the Presidential memorandum dated June 
1, 1998, entitled, ``Plain Language in Government Writing.''
2. Objectives of the Rulemaking
    The main objective of the rule is to remove the requirement of 
Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 that fire barrier 
penetration seal materials be noncombustible. In addition, this rule 
removes certain parts of Sec. 50.48 and of Appendix R, corrects a 
grammatical error in Appendix R, and makes editorial changes.
3. Alternative
    The alternative of no regulatory action would have continued the 
unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees and on the NRC.
4. Consequences
    Removing the requirement that fire barrier penetration seal 
materials be noncombustible from Section III.M of Appendix R to Part 50 
lessens the unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees and on the NRC 
staff. It allows licensees to use combustible materials in penetration 
seals without requesting an exemption from the requirement in Section 
III.M of Appendix R regarding the noncombustibility of penetration seal 
materials, provided the seals are qualified by fire endurance tests 
comparable to those used to rate fire barriers and conducted in 
accordance with an industry standard. The other minor changes are 
administrative and do not affect the regulatory burden on licensees.
5. Value Impact Analysis.
    The value (benefit) and impact (cost) of the changes are estimated 
below. Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 applies to the 
plants that were operating before January 1, 1979, and had open items 
when Appendix R was published. As detailed in NUREG-1552, Supplement 1, 
Section III.M of Appendix R applies to 5 operating reactors. In order 
to estimate the benefit of the change, the NRC assumes that the 
licensees for these plants may want to replace some of their 
penetration seals with penetration seals made of silicone-based 
combustible material and that these licensees would request an 
exemption from the technical requirements of Section III.M of Appendix 
R. Labor cost is $145/hr for a power reactor licensee and $75/hr for 
NRC. The change to Section III.M of Appendix R would save licensees the 
cost of preparing an exemption request and would save the NRC the cost 
of preparing a safety evaluation and processing the request. Assuming a 
cost saving of approximately $7500 for licensees and approximately 
$2500 for NRC for each exemption request, the total cost saving from 
the change to Section III.M would be approximately $50,000. There would 
be no benefit or cost associated with the other proposed changes.
6. Decision Rationale
    The NRC reviewed the requirement of Section III.M of Appendix R 
during its reassessment of fire barrier penetration seals and 
determined that this requirement has a negligible contribution to 
safety. The removal of the requirement of Section III.M reduces the 
regulatory burden on the licensee without reducing safety. In addition, 
the rule makes the following minor changes: removes footnote 3 from 
Sec. 50.48(a), footnote 4 from Sec. 50.48(b), and footnote 1 from 
Section I of Appendix R; removes paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) from 
Sec. 50.48; corrects an error in footnote 2 to Section III.G.3 of 
Appendix R; and makes editorial changes to comply with the Presidential 
memorandum dated June 1, 1998, entitled, ``Plain Language in Government 
Writing.'' The other changes as discussed above do not change the 
regulatory burden on the licensees and do not affect safety.

X. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule does not have a 
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.

[[Page 38190]]

Nuclear power plant licensees do not fall within the definition of 
small businesses as defined in Sect. 3 of the Small Business Act (15 
U.S.C. 632) or the Commission's size standards at 10 CFR 2.810 (60 FR 
18344; April 11, 1995).

XI. Backfit Analysis

    The NRC has determined that these amendments do not involve any 
provisions that impose backfits because it does not meet the definition 
of backfit contained in Sec. 50.109(a)(1) for the following reasons. 
The removal of the requirement that fire barrier penetration seals be 
noncombustible is a permissive relaxation of an existing requirement 
and does not constitute imposition of a new requirement. The removal of 
footnotes 3 and 4 from Sec. 50.48 and of footnote 1 from Section I of 
Appendix R does not affect the licensing basis for existing plants, 
does not constitute a change in design requirements for existing 
plants, and is not applicable to future plants. The schedular 
requirements contained in paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 50.48 apply to 
plants licensed before February 17, 1981, and have been implemented at 
these plants. The requirements contained in paragraph (e) of Sec. 50.48 
apply to existing plants and have been implemented at all applicable 
plants. Therefore, the removal of paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) from 
Sec. 50.48 does not affect the licensing basis and does not constitute 
a change in design or optional requirements for these plants. The 
correction of a grammatical error in footnote 2 to Section III.G.3 of 
Appendix R and the changes in the language of Sec. 50.48 in accordance 
with the Presidential memorandum entitled ``Plain Language in 
Government Writing,'' are administrative changes that do not change any 
requirement and need not be considered in this backfit determination. 
For the reasons stated above, a backfit analysis has not been prepared 
for this rulemaking.

XII. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a 
major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50

    Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire 
prevention, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and 
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.
    For the reasons given in the preamble and under the authority for 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting 
the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 50.

PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 
FACILITIES

    1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 102, 103, 104, 105, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 
Stat. 936, 937, 938, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 
83 Stat. 444, as amended, (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2201, 
2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846).
    Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 
2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Section 50.10 also issued under secs. 101, 
185, 68 Stat. 955 as amended (42 U.S.C. 2131, 2235), sec. 102, Pub. 
L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332). Sections 50.13, 50.54(dd), 
and 50.103 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 
U.S.C. 2138). Section 50.23, 50.35, 50.55, and 50.56 also issued 
under sec. 185, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2235). Sections 50.33a, 
50.55a, and Appendix Q also issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190, 
83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.Q. 4332). Sections 50.34 and 50.54 also issued 
under sec. 204, 88 Stat. 1245 (42 U.S.Q. 5844). Sections 50.58, 
50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (42 
U.S.Q. 2239). Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 
(42 U.S.Q. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec. 184, 
68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.Q. 2234). Appendix F also issued 
under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 954 (42 U.S.Q. 2237).


    2. Section 50.48 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 50.48  Fire protection.

    (a)(1) Each operating nuclear power plant must have a fire 
protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part. 
This fire protection plan must:
    (i) Describe the overall fire protection program for the facility;
    (ii) Identify the various positions within the licensee's 
organization that are responsible for the program;
    (iii) State the authorities that are delegated to each of these 
positions to implement those responsibilities; and
    (iv) Outline the plans for fire protection, fire detection and 
suppression capability, and limitation of fire damage.
    (2) The plan must also describe specific features necessary to 
implement the program described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section 
such as--
    (i) Administrative controls and personnel requirements for fire 
prevention and manual fire suppression activities;
    (ii) Automatic and manually operated fire detection and suppression 
systems; and
    (iii) The means to limit fire damage to structures, systems, or 
components important to safety so that the capability to shut down the 
plant safely is ensured.
    (3) The licensee shall retain the fire protection plan and each 
change to the plan as a record until the Commission terminates the 
reactor license. The licensee shall retain each superseded revision of 
the procedures for 3 years from the date it was superseded.
    (b) Appendix R to this part establishes fire protection features 
required to satisfy Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part with respect 
to certain generic issues for nuclear power plants licensed to operate 
before January 1, 1979.
    (1) Except for the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J, and 
III.O, the provisions of Appendix R to this part do not apply to 
nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, to the 
extent that--
    (i) Fire protection features proposed or implemented by the 
licensee have been accepted by the NRC staff as satisfying the 
provisions of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 
reflected in NRC fire protection safety evaluation reports issued 
before the effective date of February 19, 1981; or
    (ii) Fire protection features were accepted by the NRC staff in 
comprehensive fire protection safety evaluation reports issued before 
Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 was published 
in August 1976.
    (2) With respect to all other fire protection features covered by 
Appendix R, all nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 
1, 1979, must satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix R to this 
part, including specifically the requirements of Sections III.G, III.J, 
and III.O.
    (c) [Reserved].
    (d) [Reserved].
    (e) [Reserved].
    (f) Licensees that have submitted the certifications required under 
Sec. 50.82(a)(1) shall maintain a fire protection program to address 
the potential for fires that could cause the release or spread of 
radioactive materials (i.e., that could result in a radiological 
hazard).
    (1) The objectives of the fire protection program are to--

[[Page 38191]]

    (i) Reasonably prevent these fires from occurring;
    (ii) Rapidly detect, control, and extinguish those fires that do 
occur and that could result in a radiological hazard; and
    (iii) Ensure that the risk of fire-induced radiological hazards to 
the public, environment and plant personnel is minimized.
    (2) The licensee shall assess the fire protection program on a 
regular basis. The licensee shall revise the plan as appropriate 
throughout the various stages of facility decommissioning.
    (3) The licensee may make changes to the fire protection program 
without NRC approval if these changes do not reduce the effectiveness 
of fire protection for facilities, systems, and equipment that could 
result in a radiological hazard, taking into account the 
decommissioning plant conditions and activities.

    3. In Appendix R, Section I, footnote 1 is removed and footnotes 2 
through 5 are redesignated as footnotes 1 through 4, respectively. New 
footnote 1 to Section III.G.3, and Section III.M are revised to read as 
follows:

Appendix R to Part 50--Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power 
Facilities Operating Before January 1, 1979

* * * * *
    III. Specific Requirements * * *
    G. * * *
    3. Alternative of dedicated shutdown capability and its 
associated circuits,\1\ independent of cables, systems or components 
in the area, room, zone under consideration should be provided: * * 
*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Alternative shutdown capability is provided by rerouting, 
relocating, or modifying existing systems; dedicated shutdown 
capability is provided by installing new structures and systems for 
the function of post-fire shutdown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
    M. Fire barrier cable penetration seal qualification. 
Penetration seal designs must be qualified by tests that are 
comparable to tests used to rate fire barriers. The acceptance 
criteria for the test must include the following:
    1. The cable fire barrier penetration seal has withstood the 
fire endurance test without passage of flame or ignition of cables 
on the unexposed side for a period of time equivalent to the fire 
resistance rating required of the barrier;
    2. The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed side are 
analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature is 
sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature; and
    3. The fire barrier penetration seal remains intact and does not 
allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the 
hose stream test.
* * * * *

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of June, 2000.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 00-15544 Filed 6-19-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P


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