IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

Case No. 22-cv-23753-MOORE/BECERRA

EDWIN GARRISON, et al., on behalf of 

themselves and all other similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAM BANKMAN-FRIED, et al.,

Defendants.

/

MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY (INCLUDING INITIAL DISCLOSURES)

BY DEFENDANTS THOMAS BRADY, GISELE BÜNDCHEN, STEPHEN CURRY, 

LAWRENCE DAVID, THE GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS, LLC,

UDONIS HASLEM, WILLIAM TREVOR LAWRENCE, SHOHEI OHTANI,

KEVIN O’LEARY, DAVID ORTIZ, AND NAOMI OSAKA

Defendants Thomas Brady, Gisele Bündchen, Stephen Curry, Lawrence David, the Golden 

State Warriors, LLC (“GSW”), Udonis Haslem, William Trevor Lawrence, Shohei Ohtani, Kevin 

O’Leary, David Ortiz, and Naomi Osaka (collectively, the “Non-FTX Defendants”) move to stay 

discovery—including initial disclosures under Rule 26—pending the Court’s rulings on Movants’ 

Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), ECF 154 (“12(b)(6) Mot.”), certain Defendants’ Motion 

to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(2) (ECF 139 (“PJ Mot.”)), and the 

individual motions to dismiss (ECFs 156-59) (collectively, the “Motions to Dismiss”). 

INTRODUCTION

This is exactly the type of case where a stay of discovery pending the Court’s rulings on 

case-dispositive motions to dismiss is warranted. In this putative class action, Plaintiffs bring

claims against the Non-FTX Defendants—a group of eleven current or former professional 

athletes, a professional basketball team, a supermodel, a television personality, and a comedian—

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 1 of 22
- 2 -

based on their involvement in FTX advertisements and other marketing by FTX, the now-defunct 

cryptocurrency platform. Plaintiffs’ allegations are extraordinary and unfounded. They contend 

that because the Non-FTX Defendants appeared in or were mentioned in advertisements, postings, 

or other statements by FTX—or, in the case of GSW, because FTX’s logo was displayed at its 

arena—they are liable for Plaintiffs’ alleged losses stemming from their claimed “purchases” of 

Yield Bearing Accounts (“YBAs”) offered by FTX. Plaintiffs make these claims even though they 

have not alleged a single statement by any of the Non-FTX Defendants regarding YBAs, and for 

many, not a single statement regarding FTX at all. The blame for Plaintiffs’ alleged losses falls on 

FTX, not on the Non-FTX Defendants, who Plaintiffs have needlessly dragged into this case in 

search of deep pockets following FTX’s Chapter 11 proceedings.

On April 14, 2023, the Non-FTX Defendants filed the Motions to Dismiss. As set forth in 

the Motions, Plaintiffs fail to state any claim against the Non-FTX Defendants. Each of Plaintiffs’ 

inadequate claims, including their lead securities claim, is subject to dismissal on multiple grounds. 

See ECF 154. In addition, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over five of the Non-FTX 

Defendants.

1 Plaintiffs have failed to—and could not—plead any basis for the Court to exercise 

personal jurisdiction over these defendants, who are non-residents with no alleged (or actual) ties 

1 Defendants Curry, David, GSW, Ohtani, and Osaka (collectively, the “Non-Florida 

Defendants”) seek dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. PJ Mot. 1. By seeking a stay, no 

Defendant intends to waive or waives any of their personal jurisdiction arguments, each of which 

is reserved. See, e.g., Modis, Inc. v. Amir, No. 3:06-cv-483-J-25HTS, 2006 WL 8439290, at *3 

(M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2006) (no waiver where defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction in conjunction with seeking to stay action).

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 2 of 22
- 3 -

to or relevant conduct in Florida. See PJ Mot. 6-15. A quick “peek” at the Motions to Dismiss

shows that Plaintiffs’ claims are nonmeritorious and the Motions are likely to be granted. 

As for the other defendants, one (Sam Trabucco) has also moved to dismiss on personal 

jurisdiction and other grounds, see Def. Sam Trabucco’s Mot. Dismiss (ECF 155 (“Trabucco 

Mot.”)) 6-12, one (Sam Bankman-Fried) has moved to stay the case against him, see Mot. Stay

(ECF 152), and the remaining defendants have not yet appeared.2 The U.S. Attorney’s Office has 

moved to stay discovery related to these and other FTX Insiders in other matters and potentially 

will in this case as well.

The Court has already recognized this is a “complex and costly litigation for all parties 

involved[.]” Order at 3, ECF 133. Because the Plaintiffs’ claims are nonmeritorious, the Court 

would be well within its broad discretion to—and should—stay all discovery pending its rulings

on the Motions to Dismiss. Absent a stay, the Non-FTX Defendants will be subjected to expensive, 

excessive, and burdensome discovery regarding claims that are likely to be dismissed. After the 

Non-FTX Defendants filed the Motions, Plaintiffs sent correspondence indicating that they seek 

to take seventeen separate depositions, including depositions of all eleven Non-FTX Defendants,

within the next 45 days and to propound written discovery requests to all eleven Non-FTX 

2 The only “celebrity” defendant who has not yet appeared is Shaquille O’Neal, who was 

allegedly recently “served” through the process server throwing papers at his moving vehicle. See 

ECF 161. Four of the “FTX Insider Defendants” (Gary Wang, Caroline Ellison, Nishad Singh, 

and Dan Friedberg) also have not appeared.

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 3 of 22
- 4 -

Defendants.

3 Then, on April 21st, Plaintiffs sent proposed deposition notices and proposed broad 

requests for production to Defendants Curry, David, GSW, Ohtani, and Osaka—which Plaintiffs 

claim is “jurisdictional discovery”—even though they are not permitted to serve discovery because 

the parties have not yet held the initial Scheduling Conference. See Rule 26(d)(1).4 Copies of these 

discovery requests, which establish the burden the Non-FTX Defendants face absent a stay, are 

attached as Composite Exhibit A.

The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that the Court should exercise its broad discretion 

to stay discovery in this very circumstance: where Plaintiffs have brought a nonmeritorious action 

and seek to impose significant discovery burdens and costs on the Non-FTX Defendants prior to 

the likely dismissal of the case. As stated by the Eleventh Circuit:

Allowing a case to proceed through the pretrial processes with an 

invalid claim that increases the costs of the case does nothing but 

waste the resources of the litigants in the action before the court, 

delay resolution of disputes between other litigants, squander scarce 

judicial resources, and damage the integrity and the public’s 

perception of the federal judicial system.

Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Isaiah v. 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 960 F.3d 1296, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Chudasama, 123 

F.3d at 1367); Diulus v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 823 F. App’x 843, 847 (11th Cir. 

2020) (same); Redford v. Gwinnett Cty. Jud. Cir., 350 F. App’x 341, 346 (11th Cir. 2009) (same). 

All the factors that the Court must consider in exercising its broad discretion favor a stay 

3 Because Local Rule 7.7(b) prohibits attorneys from furnishing the Court with copies of 

correspondence between or among counsel, Movants do not attach the email exchange, but will 

promptly do so at the Court’s request. 

4 Since Defendant O’Neal was only recently “served,” see n.2 supra, the deadline to hold 

the Scheduling Conference and submit the joint scheduling report is May 8, 2023. See ECF 101.

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 4 of 22
- 5 -

of discovery. First, a “preliminary peek” at the Motions to Dismiss shows that they are meritorious 

and, if granted, would dispose of all claims against the Non-FTX Defendants. See Lewis v.

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 19-cv-81220, 2020 WL 4923640, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2020)

(Ruiz, II, J.) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Second, without a stay, the Non-FTX Defendants would be subject to the considerable 

burden and expense of discovery in a case with seven named plaintiffs and eighteen defendants, 

and where there are parallel bankruptcy and criminal proceedings—all to litigate nonmeritorious 

claims that should be dismissed. Plaintiffs’ proposed discovery—both “initial” merits and socalled “jurisdictional” discovery—demonstrates the substantial and needless burden that would be 

imposed upon the Non-FTX Defendants if discovery is not stayed. Plaintiffs’ fishing expedition, 

if allowed, includes “initial” merits discovery consisting of depositions of all eleven Non-FTX 

Defendants within 45 days, extensive written discovery, and depositions and discovery requests 

from FTX’s accountants, advertisers, and non-party FTX employees (for a total of seventeen 

depositions). Plaintiffs also have provided proposed notices for so-called “jurisdictional”

depositions of Defendants Curry, David, GSW, Ohtani, and Osaka for the coming weeks, and also 

provided these Non-FTX Defendants with proposed exceedingly broad requests for production.

The Non-FTX witnesses would have to prepare and sit for these proposed depositions—

which would be attended by counsel for all other Non-FTX Defendants—and address substantial 

discovery requests that will unquestionably involve objections and discovery litigation. In 

addition, as Plaintiffs’ response to the Order to Show Cause issued in the Norris action shows, 

Plaintiffs intend to seek a delay in briefing the Motions to Dismiss for this proposed 

“jurisdictional” discovery to occur. See Norris ECF 47 at 1. All this means that the Non-FTX 

Defendants could collectively spend (at least) hundreds of thousands of dollars participating in 

depositions and responding to discovery centered on nonmeritorious claims. 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 5 of 22
- 6 -

Third, there will be no prejudice to Plaintiffs. A stay of discovery would not deny Plaintiffs

the right to take discovery: if the Court denies the Motions to Dismiss and finds that Plaintiffs have 

stated plausible claims—which the Non-FTX Defendants submit is unlikely—Plaintiffs will have 

the opportunity to take the discovery that they seek. Moreover, the duration of the proposed stay 

is modest—the Motions to Dismiss have already been filed and should be fully briefed and ripe 

for adjudication in short order. A minimal delay in discovery follows the precedent laid down by 

the Eleventh Circuit in Chudasama and its progeny and is not at all prejudicial to Plaintiffs.

In short, the Court should not allow Plaintiffs to proceed with expensive, wide-ranging, 

and burdensome discovery unless and until the Court finds Plaintiffs have stated any claim for 

relief and that the Court has jurisdiction over each Non-FTX Defendant which has moved to 

dismiss on that basis. The Court’s discretion to stay discovery exists for this exact reason: to 

prevent unnecessary and costly discovery with respect to nonmeritorious claims. 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

A. The Court Has Broad Authority To Stay Discovery 

District courts possess “broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to [their] power 

to control [their] own docket[s].” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997); see Johnson v. Bd. 

of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001). This includes “‘broad discretion 

to stay discovery pending decision on a dispositive motion.’” Internaves De Mexico s.a. de C.V.

v. Andromeda Steamship Corp., No. 16-cv-81719, 2017 WL 7794599, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 

2017) (Middlebrooks, J.) (quoting Panola Land Buyers Ass’n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1560 

(11th Cir. 1985)). To that end, the Eleventh Circuit held in Chudasama that “[f]acial challenges to 

the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense, such as a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a 

claim for relief, should . . . be resolved before discovery begins.” 123 F.3d at 1367 (footnote 

omitted). This principle equally applies where there is a pending motion to dismiss for lack of 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 6 of 22
- 7 -

personal jurisdiction. See Lewis, 2020 WL 4923640, at *2-3.

A stay of discovery pending a ruling on a case-dispositive motion is appropriate because 

the mere filing of a complaint should not “unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with 

nothing more than conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Indeed, 

“discovery follows the filing of a well-pleaded complaint. It is not a device to enable the plaintiff 

to make a case when his complaint has failed to state a claim.” Carter v. DeKalb Cty., 521 F. App’x 

725, 728 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 

1309 (“[T]he District Court . . . did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery pending resolution 

of [defendant’s] 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenging the legal sufficiency of [plaintiff’s]

claims.”); Diulus, 823 F. App’x at 847 (“[B]ecause their complaint failed to state a claim, 

[plaintiffs] were not entitled to discovery[.]”); Redford, 350 F. App’x at 346 (affirming discovery 

stay where motion to dismiss “raised serious questions regarding the viability of [plaintiff’s] 

complaint”). 

In Chudasama, the Eleventh Circuit elaborated on why a stay of discovery in the 

circumstances before the Court here is proper:

If the district court dismisses a nonmeritorious claim before 

discovery has begun, unnecessary costs to the litigants and to the 

court system can be avoided. Conversely, delaying ruling on a 

motion to dismiss such a claim until after the parties complete 

discovery encourages abusive discovery and, if the court ultimately 

dismisses the claim, imposes unnecessary costs. For these reasons, 

any legally unsupported claim that would unduly enlarge the scope 

of discovery should be eliminated before the discovery stage, if 

possible. Allowing a case to proceed through the pretrial processes 

with an invalid claim that increases the costs of the case does 

nothing but waste the resources of the litigants in the action before 

the court, delay resolution of disputes between other litigants, 

squander scarce judicial resources, and damage the integrity and the 

public’s perception of the federal judicial system.

In sum, as the burdens of allowing a dubious claim to remain in the 

lawsuit increase, so too does the duty the district court finally to 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 7 of 22
- 8 -

determine the validity of the claim. Thus, when faced with a motion 

to dismiss a claim for relief that significantly enlarges the scope of 

discovery, the district court should rule on the motion before 

entering discovery orders, if possible. The court’s duty in this regard 

becomes all the more imperative when the contested claim is 

especially dubious.

Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1368 (footnotes omitted).

A court should enter a discovery stay under Chudasama where the movant shows “good 

cause and reasonableness.” Taylor v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, No. 20-cv-60709, 2020 WL 6118779, at *1

(S.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2020) (Ruiz, II, J.) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Courts have found 

good cause to stay discovery exists when the resolution of a preliminary motion may dispose of 

the entire action.” Pierce v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-22691, 2014 WL 12528362, 

at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2014) (Williams, J.) (citation omitted). In making this determination, the

Court must take a “preliminary peek at the merits of the dispositive motion to see if it appears to 

be clearly meritorious and truly case dispositive.” Taylor, 2020 WL 6118779, at *3 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); see also Rodriguez v. Imperial Brands PLC, No. 20-cv-23287, 2022 

WL 2231504, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 25, 2022) (Otazo-Reyes, M.J.) (same).

In addition, courts “must balance the harm produced by a delay in discovery against the 

possibility that the [dispositive] motion will be granted and entirely eliminate the need for such 

discovery.” Rodriguez, 2022 WL 2231504, at *3 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (alteration 

in original). This balancing test also involves assessing “the likely costs and burdens of proceeding 

with discovery” on claims that may be dismissed. Dayem ex rel. Dayem v. Chavez, No. 13-cv62405, 2014 WL 12588513, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2014) (Cooke, J.) (citation and quotation

marks omitted).

Applying these principles, the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed Chudasama’s

central holding that a stay of discovery is proper where a case may be dismissed or materially 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 8 of 22
- 9 -

narrowed at the threshold stage. See Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1309 (“[T]he failure to consider and rule 

on . . . potentially dispositive pretrial motions [before discovery] can be an abuse of discretion.”); 

Lawrence v. Governor of Ga., 721 F. App’x 862, 864 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming partial stay 

because the district court “specifically identified our warnings in Chudasama, and heeded them”);

Rivas v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 676 F. App’x. 926, 932 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Granting a discovery stay 

until an impending motion to dismiss is resolved is a proper exercise of th[e Court’s]

responsibility.”); Roberts v. FNB S. of Alma, Ga., 716 F. App’x 854, 857 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[I]n 

general, motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be resolved before discovery 

begins.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 

1267, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting the importance of resolving facial challenges before discovery 

begins, “especially when the challenged claim will significantly expand the scope of allowable 

discovery”). In accordance with these rulings, this Court (as discussed below) and other Judges in 

this District have often stayed discovery when presented with legitimate facial challenges to a 

complaint that could dispose of the entire case or greatly narrow the issues.

5

Further, discovery stays are “particularly appropriate in large putative class action cases

such as this,” where discovery will be sought from multiple defendants, Taylor, 2020 WL 

6118779, at *3, and “has the potential to consume vast resources,” In re Mednax Servs. Inc. 

5 See, e.g., Padilla v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., No. 18-cv, 24988, 2019 WL 1281484, at 

*1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2019) (Moreno, J.) (noting that “[i]n a series of rulings, the undersigned has 

consistently followed Chudasama’s guide”); Zinn v. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., Inc., No. 12-cv80788, 2013 WL 12080175, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2013) (Ryskamp, J.) (citing Chudasama in 

granting discovery stay); Staup v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 08-cv-60359, 2008 WL 1771818, at 

*1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2008) (Cohn, J.) (staying all discovery, including Rule 26 disclosures).

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 9 of 22
- 10 -

Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 21-md-02994, 2021 WL 10428229, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 

2021) (Ruiz, II, J.) (citation and quotation marks omitted);see also, e.g., Lewis, 2020 WL 4923640, 

at *4; In re Managed Care Litig., 00-md-1334, 2001 WL 664391, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 2001)

(Moreno, J.).

B. The Court Should Stay Discovery Pending a Ruling on the Motions to Dismiss

As shown below, good cause to stay discovery exists because (i) there is a strong likelihood 

that the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim and on jurisdictional 

grounds, (ii) the Non-FTX Defendants face intrusive, needless, and expensive discovery with 

respect to claims that should be dismissed with prejudice at the threshold pleading stage, and 

(iii) Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by a short stay of discovery.

1. The Motions to Dismiss are Clearly Meritorious and Case Dispositive 

In taking a “preliminary peek” at the Motions to Dismiss, the Court need not “offer any 

substantive opinion on the merits of said Motion[s].” In re Mednax Servs., Inc., 2021 WL 

10428229, at *3 n.2. Rather, if, after a preliminary peek, the Court finds that the Non-FTX 

Defendants have raised “significant questions” about the viability of Plaintiffs’ claims and have 

identified “notable pleading deficiencies,” the Court is well within its authority to—and, indeed, 

should—stay discovery pending resolution of the threshold challenges. Id. at *2. Here, even a 

cursory review of the Motions to Dismiss shows that that they would dispose of this action as to 

the Non-FTX Defendants. 

The Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

As set out in full detail in the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, each of Plaintiffs’ claims

is likely to be dismissed on several independent grounds. Plaintiffs’ theory of this case is 

fundamentally untenable and unprecedented—the Non-FTX Defendants cannot be held liable for 

securities violations (and other alleged claims) related to the YBAs offered by FTX simply because 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 10 of 22
- 11 -

the Non-FTX Defendants are alleged to have been involved in advertisements and marketing by

FTX, none of which is even alleged to have mentioned (or did mention) a YBA. 

Plaintiffs’ lead cause of action is a claim under the Florida Securities and Investor 

Protection Act, Fla. Stat. § 517.07, where Plaintiffs allege that the Non-FTX Defendants were 

“agents” of FTX who personally participated in the sale of YBAs. See 12(b)(6) Mot. 6. This claim 

fails for several reasons. First, the Non-FTX Defendants are not persons who can be held liable 

under Section 517.07 because none of the Non-FTX Defendants was in privity with Plaintiffs (who 

are alleged buyers of YBAs) and because the Non-FTX Defendants do not qualify as officers, 

directors, or agents of FTX merely by virtue of their involvement in FTX advertisements or 

marketing. See id. at 6-7. Second, none of the Non-FTX Defendants is alleged to have personally 

participated or aided in the sale of YBAs to Plaintiffs—nor could any such allegation be made. 

The Non-FTX Defendants only allegedly appeared in FTX advertisements or had a business

agreement with FTX regarding FTX’s marketing efforts—but crucially, none of the Non-FTX 

Defendants ever mentioned YBAs. See id. at 7-8.

Plaintiffs’ other claims are also fundamentally defective. The FDUTPA claim is barred as 

a threshold matter because claims related to securities transactions, as alleged here, cannot be 

brought under FDUTPA. See id. at 9-10. Additionally, the alleged deceptive conduct was not pled 

with particularity in satisfaction of Rule 9(b). See id. at 11. This, by itself, is a basis for the 

requested stay, because a stay of discovery is appropriate “especially where, as here, Defendants 

are alleging that Plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with particularity as required by” Rule 9(b). Tradex 

Global Master Fund SPC Ltd. v. Palm Beach Cap. Mgmt., LLC, No. 09-cv-21622, 2009 WL 

10664410, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2009) (Moreno, J.). In addition, the claim is based on 

statements that are non-actionable puffery, 12(b)(6) Mot. 11, the Non-FTX Defendants did not 

participate in the alleged misconduct underlying the claim, id. at 12-13, and the Non-FTX 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 11 of 22
- 12 -

Defendants were not the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ alleged losses, id. at 13-14. Finally, the 

claims for civil conspiracy and declaratory judgment likewise fail, including because the 

underlying securities and FDUTPA claims upon which they are based fail. Id. at 14-16.

In sum, there is good cause for a threshold stay of discovery because the Court is faced 

with a lawsuit that is likely to be dismissed.

The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Five out of eleven Non-FTX Defendants, as well as Defendant Trabucco, moved to dismiss 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. See PJ Mot.; Trabucco Mot. 6-12. This fundamental jurisdictional 

challenge serves as an alternative and independent basis to stay discovery.

As this Court has recognized, “‘when faced with legitimate jurisdictional challenges . . .

discovery should not commence until such challenges are resolved.’” Oueiss v. al Saud, No. 20-

cv-25022 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2021) (Moore, J.) (copy attached as Exhibit B) at 5 (quoting Lewis, 

2020 WL 4923540, at *3); see also Gillier v. Servicios Agecom, LLC, No. 17-cv-23155, 2017 WL 

6994217, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2017) (Scola, J.) (staying discovery given “strong likelihood” 

that motions to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction would be granted, in which case 

“proceeding in this forum . . . would be improper”). This is true even where a threshold 

jurisdictional challenge is brought by some (but not all) defendants because “[a] stay of discovery 

may logically be applied to all parties in an action, even those who do not raise jurisdictional 

challenges.” Oueiss, No. 20-cv-25022 at 5 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685-86). 

In Oueiss, the plaintiff, an international journalist, sued eighteen domestic and foreign 

defendants for, inter alia, hacking and defamation. See id. at 2. All defendants brought a motion 

to stay discovery pending resolution of various motions to dismiss. Id. at 3. Certain foreign 

defendants argued that their personal jurisdiction issues necessarily had to be resolved before the 

Court could require them to engage in discovery. Id. at 3-4. While the U.S. defendants did not raise 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 12 of 22
- 13 -

personal jurisdiction challenges, they still joined the motion to stay based on the jurisdictional 

challenges, arguing that “discovery should not proceed in piecemeal fashion.” Id. at 4. This Court 

found that discovery could not commence against the foreign defendants who raised personal 

jurisdiction challenges. Id. at 5. As a result, the Court stayed discovery entirely, even as to the nonmovants, because it would be inefficient to proceed otherwise. See id. at 5-6.

Here, where almost half of the Defendants who have appeared have brought meritorious 

challenges to the exercise of personal jurisdiction—in part, based on the complete absence of any 

adequate allegations, see, e.g., PJ Mot. 7-11—the Court should stay all discovery, as it did in 

Oueiss. There is no dispute that the Court does not have general jurisdiction over the Non-Florida 

Defendants, who are non-resident individuals and a California professional sports team. See id. at

6-7. And there is no specific jurisdiction because Plaintiffs do not allege that any of these 

defendants marketed or sold YBAs (or even generically promoted FTX) in Florida, which means 

that Plaintiffs do not satisfy the “connexity” requirement; plus, Plaintiffs’ allegations fall severely 

short of satisfying the “minimum contacts” test. See id. at 8-15. 

Plaintiffs should not be permitted to avoid a stay—or delay the adjudication of the Motions 

to Dismiss—through purported “jurisdictional discovery.” Review of Composite Exhibit A shows 

that the highly burdensome and expansive requests are not “jurisdictional discovery,” but, instead, 

go to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. See id. Beyond that, however, Plaintiffs’ “jurisdictional 

discovery” requests are premature. No Rule 26(f) conference has occurred and a plaintiff seeking 

jurisdictional discovery “must move the Court to grant the jurisdictional discovery it seeks.” 

Zamora Radio, LLC v. Last.fm LTD., No. 09-cv-20940, 2011 WL 2580401, at *12 (S.D. Fla. June 

28, 2011) (Torres, M.J.) (citing United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1280-1281 (11th 

Cir. 2009)). 

Finally, no such “jurisdictional discovery” could be appropriate because Plaintiffs fail to 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 13 of 22
- 14 -

plead a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Butler v. Sukhoi Co., 579 F.3d 1307, 

1314 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Inasmuch as the complaint was insufficient as a matter of law to establish 

a prima facie case that the district court had jurisdiction, the district court abused its discretion in 

allowing the case to proceed and granting discovery on the jurisdictional issue.”); Diulus, 823 

F. App’x at 847 (“because their complaint failed to state a claim, [plaintiffs] were not entitled to 

discovery”). As this Court has ruled, a plaintiff “is foreclosed from pursuing jurisdictional 

discovery in an attempt to marshal facts that he ‘should have had—but did not—before coming 

through the courthouse doors.’” Thompson v. Carnival Corp., 174 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1339 (S.D. 

Fla. 2016) (Moore, J.) (quoting Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1216 (11th Cir.2007)).

That principle fully applies here.

2. Without a Stay, the Court and the Non-FTX Defendants Will Be Unduly 

Burdened By Needless and Expensive Discovery 

Without the requested stay, the Non-FTX Defendants will be subject to the unnecessary, 

expensive, and significant burden of engaging in discovery in this “complex and costly litigation,” 

Order at 3, ECF 133, which the Court should dismiss with prejudice at the threshold stage. This 

factor—the “likely costs and burdens of proceeding with discovery” on nonmeritorious claims—

weighs heavily in favor of a stay. And, of course, the Court would have to expend the time and 

effort involved in addressing a substantial number of discovery challenges, given the excessive 

breadth of Plaintiffs’ supposedly-limited “jurisdictional discovery.” See Comp. Ex. A.

In Chudasama, the Eleventh Circuit highlighted that discovery “imposes several costs on 

the litigant from whom discovery is sought,” which is a strong basis to stay discovery. 123 F.3d at 

1367. As the court explained:

[Discovery] burdens include the time spent searching for and 

compiling relevant documents; the time, expense, and aggravation 

of preparing for and attending depositions; the costs of copying and 

shipping documents; and the attorneys’ fees generated in 

interpreting discovery requests, drafting responses to interrogatories 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 14 of 22
- 15 -

and coordinating responses to production requests, advising the 

client as to which documents should be disclosed and which ones 

withheld, and determining whether certain information is privileged. 

The party seeking discovery also bears costs, including attorneys’

fees generated in drafting discovery requests and reviewing the 

opponent's objections and responses. Both parties incur costs related 

to the delay discovery imposes on reaching the merits of the case. 

Finally, discovery imposes burdens on the judicial system; scarce 

judicial resources must be diverted from other cases to resolve 

discovery disputes.

Id. at 1367-68 (footnote omitted).

As noted above, the burdens of discovery are especially apparent in this litigation. 

Composite Exhibit A shows the expansive nature of just the “jurisdictional discovery” Plaintiffs 

seek, which belies any assertion by Plaintiffs that they seek only “narrow” discovery “at this stage” 

of the proceedings. On top of the “jurisdictional discovery,” Plaintiffs intend to seek “initial” 

merits discovery that would involve (i) merits depositions of all eleven Non-FTX Defendants, 

(ii) requests for production for all documents related to the Non-FTX Defendants’ endorsement, 

sponsorship, or other agreements with FTX, (iii) interrogatories regarding persons involved in the 

Non-FTX Defendants’ decision to enter into agreements with FTX; (iv) non-party discovery and 

depositions of two purported “FTX Insiders”—Constance Wang and Lou Frangella; (v) non-party 

discovery and depositions of FTX’s accountants—Aranino and Prager Metis; and (vi) non-party 

discovery and depositions of advertising companies—Wassernman and dentsuMB.

Thus, before the Court has determined that they state any claim, Plaintiffs seek to take 

multiple party and non-party depositions—all of which each of the Non-FTX Defendants’ counsel 

would have to attend—and to propound extensive written discovery going to the merits, all of 

which would be subject to potential objections and extensive discovery proceedings before the 

Court and/or Magistrate Judge. The costs of Plaintiffs’ proposed discovery (as well as inevitable 

discovery battles over the excessive proposed discovery) will unnecessarily burden the Court and 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 15 of 22
- 16 -

the litigants, which further warrants a stay. See, e.g., Taylor, 2020 WL 6118779, at *3 (stay 

“particularly appropriate in large putative class action cases. . . wherein Plaintiff seeks a significant 

swath of [discovery] from multiple entities”); Soldevilla v. On the Barrelhead, Inc., No. 19-cv14462, 2020 WL 597317, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2020) (Marra, J.) (“By staying discovery until 

the motion to dismiss is resolved, the parties will avoid the burden of potentially unnecessary, 

expensive and fruitless discovery.”).

Further, the Court should also consider the significant and unnecessary burdens already 

placed upon the Non-FTX Defendants to defend these lawsuits.

6 See, e.g., Chevaldina v. Katz, No. 

17-cv-22225, 2017 WL 6372620, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2017) (Torres, M.J.) (staying discovery 

and noting that defendants “have already incurred tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees 

for an action that is not properly before this Court”). This significant burden has been particularly 

exacerbated by Plaintiffs’ counsels’ efforts to forum shop. Norris v. Brady, No. 23-cv-20439, also 

pending before this Court (and just stayed pending resolution of this action, see Norris ECF 48), 

is a duplicative action originally brought in Florida state court after Plaintiffs’ counsel first filed 

this putative class action in this Court, apparently to shop for a different judge to issue threshold 

rulings on Plaintiffs’ nonmeritorious claims. As a direct result, three Non-FTX Defendants (Brady, 

O’Leary, and Ortiz) were forced to incur significant costs addressing Norris while it was in state 

court, removing Norris to this Court, and opposing Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, as well as dealing 

with the procedural complexities of two duplicative actions. See Norris ECF 46 at 2-6.

In sum, the costs and burden that would be placed upon the Court and the Non-FTX 

6 These proceedings have a complex procedural history, which is described in detail in 

Defendants’ Brady, O’Leary, and Ortiz’s response to the order to show cause issued in Norris. See 

Norris ECF 46 at 2-6. The Non-FTX Defendants do not repeat that history here.

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 16 of 22
- 17 -

Defendants in proceeding with discovery on Plaintiffs’ nonmeritorious claims is indisputably 

onerous, and substantially outweighs any (non-existent) prejudice to Plaintiffs. 

3. Plaintiffs Will Not Be Prejudiced by a Temporary Stay

Balanced against the strong legal basis of the Motions to Dismiss and the significant

burdens and costs of discovery that would be imposed on the Non-FTX Defendants and the Court, 

a brief stay of discovery will not cause material—or, in reality, any—prejudice to Plaintiffs.

First, a stay of discovery will not prejudice Plaintiffs because discovery is not needed at 

this stage, where the Court is making threshold evaluations of whether Plaintiffs have stated a 

claim and whether the Court has jurisdiction over the Non-Florida Defendants. These are “purely 

legal question[s]” and, thus, “neither the parties nor the court have any need for discovery before 

the court rules on the” Motions to Dismiss. Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1367; see also, e.g., Torongo 

v. Robert G. Roy, D.V.M., M.S., P.A., No. 15-cv-81490, 2016 WL 10706286, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 

28, 2016) (Middlebrooks, J.) (“Given that [defendant’s] Motion to Dismiss raises substantial 

questions as to the legal sufficiency of the Complaint, a stay of discovery is appropriate.”). 

Second, the prejudice to Plaintiffs is non-existent because they will have the opportunity 

to take discovery if the Court finds that they have brought a viable lawsuit, as several Judges in 

this District have recognized. See, e.g., Marchand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 19-cv-80955, 2019 

WL 13279818, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2019) (Scola, J.) (granting stay because it would “not 

cause any prejudice to the Plaintiff who will be afforded sufficient opportunity to conduct 

discovery if any of her claims advance”); Borislow v. Canaccord Genuity Grp. Inc., No. 14-cv80134, 2014 WL 12580035, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2014) (Ryskamp, J.) (stay of discovery would 

cause no prejudice; “[s]hould this Court deny the Motion to Dismiss, any discovery to which 

Plaintiff may ultimately be entitled will be available following the stay”). And the duration of the 

proposed stay would be modest given that the Motions to Dismiss will be fully briefed and ripe 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 17 of 22
- 18 -

for decision in a matter of weeks. See Paperless Order, ECF 132.

But, as the baseline principle of Chudasama recognizes, if Plaintiffs have not stated a 

claim—and the Non-FTX Defendants submit the Motions to Dismiss show Plaintiffs have not 

done so—then Plaintiffs have no entitlement to discovery at all.

CONCLUSION

This is the exact type of case where a Court should exercise its discretion to enter a stay of 

discovery. A quick “peek” at the Motions to Dismiss demonstrates that this case will likely be 

dismissed at the threshold stage; the burdens of discovery upon the Court and the Non-FTX 

Defendants would be significant and unnecessary absent a stay; and the prejudice to Plaintiffs is 

non-existent. Therefore, the Court should stay discovery—including Rule 26 initial disclosures—

pending its rulings on the Motions to Dismiss.

WHEREFORE, Defendants Thomas Brady, Gisele Bündchen, Stephen Curry, Lawrence 

David, the Golden State Warriors, LLC, Udonis Haslem, William Trevor Lawrence, Shohei 

Ohtani, Kevin O’Leary, David Ortiz, and Naomi Osaka request that the Court stay all discovery 

and (including initial disclosure obligations) pending its rulings on the Motions to Dismiss, and 

grant the Non-FTX Defendants such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) Certification

On April 24, 2023, beginning at 3:00 p.m. EDT, counsel for Defendants Curry, David, 

GSW, Haslem, Ohtani, Osaka, and Ortiz attended an approximately hour-long Zoom with 

Plaintiffs’ counsel to discuss (i) issues related to Plaintiffs’ requests for jurisdictional and other 

discovery from the Non-FTX Defendants and (ii) the Non-FTX Defendants’ request to stay all 

discovery pending rulings on the Motions to Dismiss. Counsel for the parties resumed the 

discussions via Zoom on April 26, 2023, also at 3:00 p.m. EDT. Plaintiffs stated that they oppose 

a stay of discovery. 

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 18 of 22
- 19 -

 Respectfully submitted,

COLSON, HICKS, EIDSON, P.A.

255 Alhambra Circle, Penthouse

Coral Gables, Florida 33134

(305) 476-7400

By: /s/ Roberto Martinez

Roberto Martínez

Florida Bar No. 305596

 bob@colson.com

Stephanie A. Casey

Florida Bar No. 97483

 scasey@colson.com

Zachary Lipshultz

Florida Bar No. 123594

 zach@colson.com

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

Andrew B. Clubok (pro hac vice) andrew.clubok@lw.com

Susan E. Engel (pro hac vice)

 susan.engel@lw.com

Brittany M.J. Record (pro hac vice)

 brittany.record@lw.com

555 Eleventh Street, N.W., Suite 1000

Washington, D.C. 20004-1304

Tel: +1.202.637.2200

Fax: +1.202.637.2201

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

Marvin S. Putnam (pro hac vice) marvin.putnam@lw.com

Jessica Stebbins Bina (pro hac vice)

 jessica.stebbinsbina@lw.com

Elizabeth A. Greenman (pro hac vice)

 elizabeth.greenman@lw.com

10250 Constellation Blvd., Suite 1100

Los Angeles, California 90067

Tel: +1.424.653.5500

Fax: +1.424.653.5501

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

Michele D. Johnson (pro hac vice)

 michele.johnson@lw.com

650 Town Center Drive, 20th Floor

Costa Mesa, California 92626-1925

Tel: +1.714.540.1235

Fax: +1.714.755.8290

Attorneys for Defendants Thomas Brady, Gisele 

Bündchen, and Lawrence David

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 19 of 22
- 20 -

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

555 Mission Street, Suite 3000

San Francisco, CA 94105-0921

Phone: 415.393.8379

By: /s/ Matthew S. Kahn

Matthew S. Kahn (pro hac vice)

 MKahn@gibsondunn.com

Michael J. Kahn (pro hac vice)

 MJKahn@gibsondunn.com

Michael Dore (pro hac vice forthcoming)

 MDore@gibsondunn.com

Jamila MacEbong (pro hac vice)

 JMacEbong@gibsondunn.com

333 South Grand Avenue

Suite 4600

Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197

Phone: 213.229.7155

Attorneys for Defendants Golden State 

Warriors, LLC and Naomi Osaka

DIMOND KAPLAN & ROTHSTEIN, P.A.

Offices at Grand Bay Plaza

2665 South Bayshore Drive, PH-2B

Miami, Florida 33133

Telephone: (305) 374-1920

Facsimile: (305) 374-1961

By: /s/ David A. Rothstein

David A. Rothstein, Esq.

Fla. Bar No. 995762

 DRothstein@dkrpa.com 

Alexander M. Peraza, Esq.

Fla. Bar No. 107044

 APeraza@dkrpa.com

Eshaba Jahir-Sharuz, Esq.

Fla. Bar No. 1038846

 Eshaba@dkrpa.com

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 20 of 22
- 21 -

MCANGUS GOUDELOCK & COURIE LLC

2000 Market Street, Suite 780

Philadelphia, PA 19103

(484) 406-4334

By: /s/ Eric A. Fitzgerals

Eric A. Fitzgerald (pro hac vice)

 eric.fitzgerald@mgclaw.com

Hillary N. Ladov (pro hac vice)

 hillary.ladov@mgclaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant William Trevor 

Lawrence

WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP

1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1200

Miami, FL 33131-3368

Phone: (305)-577-3100

By: /s/ Edward Soto

Edward Soto (Fla Bar. No. 0265144)

 edward.soto@weil.com

Attorney for Defendant Shohei Ohtani

McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP

333 SE 2nd Ave., Suite 4500

Miami, Florida 33131

Telephone: (212) 547-5768

Facsimile: (305) 347-6500

By: /s/ Nathan Bull

Nathan Bull (Fla. Bar No. 1029523)

 nbull@mwe.com

McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP

Jason D. Strabo (pro hac vice pending)

 jstrabo@mwe.com

Ellie Hourizadeh (to file pro hac vice)

 ehourizadeh@mwe.com

2049 Century Park East, Suite 3200

Los Angeles, CA 90067

Telephone: (310) 788-4125

Facsimile: (310) 277-4730

McDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP

Sarah P. Hogarth (pro hac vice pending)

 shogarth@mwe.com

500 North Capitol Street NW

Washington, DC 20001

Telephone: (202) 756-8354

Facsimile: (202) 756-8087

Attorneys for Defendant Stephen Curry

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 21 of 22
- 22 -

AKERMAN LLP

350 East Las Olas Boulevard – Suite 1600

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301

Tel.: 954-463-2700

Fax: 954-468-2454

By: /s/ Christopher S. Carver

Christopher S. Carver, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 993580

 christopher.carver@akerman.com

Jason S. Oletsky, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 9301

 jason.oletsky@akerman.com

Katherine A Johnson, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 1040357

 katie.johnson@akerman.com

Attorneys for Defendant David Ortiz and 

Udonis Haslem

MARCUS NEIMAN RASHBAUM 

& PINEIRO LLP

100 Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 805

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394

Tel: (954) 462-1200

2 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2530

Miami, Florida 33131

Tel: (305)-400-4260

By: /s/ Jeffrey Neiman

Jeffrey Neiman 

Fla Bar. No. 544469

jneiman@mnrlawfirm.com

Jeffrey Marcus 

Fla. Bar No. 310890

jmarcus@mnrlawfirm.com

Michael Pineiro

Fla. Bar No. 041897

mpineiro@mnrlawfirm.com

Brandon Floch

Fla. Bar No. 125218

bfloch@mnrlawfirm.com

BERK BRETTLER LLP

9119 Sunset Boulevard

West Hollywood, CA 90069

Tel.: (310) 278-2111

Andrew B. Brettler (pro hac vice)

 abrettler@berkbrettler.com

Attorneys for Defendant Kevin O’Leary

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 162 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/26/2023 Page 22 of 22