2015 UT App 121

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF T.W., A PERSON UNDER 

EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

K.W.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20150063-CA

Filed May 14, 2015

Fourth District Juvenile Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Brent H. Bartholomew

No. 1080697

Erik G. Jacobson and Margaret P. Lindsay, Attorneys

for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys

for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Before JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., STEPHEN L. ROTH, and 

JOHN A. PEARCE.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 K.W. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental 

rights. She asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support 

the grounds for terminating her parental rights. Mother also 

alleges that the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) 

did not make reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with T.W.
In re T.W.

20150063-CA 2 2015 UT App 121

¶2 ‚*I+n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision *to 

terminate a person’s parental rights,+ ‘the result must be against 

the clear weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with 

a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.’‛ In 

re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation omitted). We 

‚review the juvenile court’s factual findings based upon the 

clearly erroneous standard.‛ In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 

P.3d 680. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when, in 

light of the evidence supporting the finding, it is against the 

clear weight of the evidence. See id. Further, we give the juvenile 

court a ‚‘wide latitude of discretion as to the judgments arrived 

at’ based upon not only the court’s opportunity to judge 

credibility firsthand, but also based on the juvenile court judges’ 

‘special training, experience and interest in this field.’‛ Id.

(citations omitted). Finally, ‚*w+hen a foundation for the court’s 

decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may not 

engage in a reweighing of the evidence.‛ In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, 

¶ 12.

¶3 Mother initially argues that DCFS did not make 

reasonable efforts to reunify her with T.W. The juvenile court 

‚has broad discretion in determining whether DCFS has made 

reasonable efforts at reunification.‛ In re A.C., 2004 UT App 255, 

¶ 12, 97 P.3d 706. The reason for this discretion is that ‚*t+he 

factual situations that give rise to the termination of parental 

rights vary greatly; thus, the number, quality, and array of 

services that should be provided for reunification also vary 

greatly.‛ Id. ¶ 11. The record demonstrates that Mother was 

offered extensive services, some of which she took advantage of 

and some of which she did not. Further, due to Mother’s delay in 

accessing some of the services she did not progress to the point 

that she could access other available services, such as family 

counseling. Mother also argues that it was unfair that T.W.’s 

foster parents were offered some services that she was not. The 

services offered to the foster parents to assist them in caring for 

T.W. are immaterial to the determination of whether Mother 
In re T.W.

20150063-CA 3 2015 UT App 121

received reasonable services. Under the circumstances we cannot 

say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining 

that the services offered to Mother by DCFS were reasonable.

¶4 Mother next asserts that there was insufficient evidence to 

support the determination that Mother was an unfit parent. The 

evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s 

determination.1 When T.W. was removed from Mother’s care the 

evidence demonstrated that he was not receiving the care he 

needed. Specifically, T.W. was barely verbal and he was 

emotionally and developmentally delayed. He also had 

untreated ear and sinus infections. Soon thereafter, T.W. was 

diagnosed with austism. Over the course of the next year while 

in the care of his foster parents, T.W. progressed significantly in 

his development. Meanwhile, Mother failed to complete certain 

aspects of her service plan that were important to develop her

ability to parent T.W. given his special needs. Accordingly, even 

though Mother had made significant progress in her plan, she 

had not yet progressed to the point that she could have 

unsupervised visits with T.W., despite the fact that Mother had 

received reunification services for the maximum time allowed by 

law. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-312(13)(a) (LexisNexis Supp.

2015) (limiting reunification period to twelve months plus 

extensions allowed by the statute). Further, testimony indicated 

that Mother had not yet learned to implement some of the 

information she was learning, nor was she ready to provide T.W. 

 

1. The court also determined that other grounds supported the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights. Mother alleges that 

there was insufficient evidence to support those grounds. 

However, because the evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

determination that Mother was unfit, we do not review these 

other grounds. See In re F.C., 2003 UT App 397, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d 790 

(noting that any single ground is sufficient to terminate parental 

rights).
In re T.W.

20150063-CA 4 2015 UT App 121

with the stability he needed in his life. Thus, evidence in the 

record supports the juvenile court’s determination that Mother 

was unfit. See In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12. Because evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s determination, this court may not 

engage in reweighing the evidence, even though the case may 

present a close call.

¶5 Finally, Mother does not allege that the juvenile court 

erred in determining that it was in T.W.’s best interest to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights. Accordingly, we do not 

address that issue.

¶6 Affirmed.