alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Hillsborough County Probate Court

No. 7956

#### *In re*Estate of Agnes Constan

March 24, 1978

*Joseph J. Betley,*of Manchester, by brief and orally for the administrator.

*David I. Cohen,*of Massachusetts, by brief, for nonresident alien heirs.

Per curiam.

The question presented is whether nonresident alien heirs are entitled to share in the proceeds when real estate in New Hampshire is sold to pay debts of the estate.

Agnes Constan, a.k.a. Agnes Konstantacopoulos, of Manchester, died intestate on July 1, 1971. The deceased left a sister and eleven nephews and nieces as heirs. Eight of the heirs, including the sister, are aliens living in Communist Poland. An administrator was appointed who, because the personal estate was insufficient to pay the New Hampshire inheritance tax, sold the real estate under a license from the probate court.

He has filed a petition for a decree of distribution in which he seeks to distribute the entire net proceeds of the sale of the realty to the resident heirs in the United States, and none to the nonresident alien heirs. The nonresident alien heirs, who are represented by the Polish Peoples Republic through its New York counselor’s office, object. All questions of law were certified to this court under RSA 547:30 by *Copadis,*J.

At common law, aliens were incapable of taking real estate by descent, but this right could be conferred by statute or treaty. There was no treaty in existence between Poland and the United *167States on July 1, 1971, which would confer any such rights on the nonresident claimants.

RSA 477:20 provides: “An alien resident in this state may take, purchase, hold, convey or devise real estate; and it may descend in the same manner as if he were a citizen.” This statute, however, has been held not to confer any rights on nonresident aliens. *Lazarou v. Moraros,*101 N.H. 383, 143 A.2d 669 (1958), *Hanafin v. McCarthy,*95 N.H. 36, 57 A.2d 148 (1948). The claimants do not contest the constitutionality of our statute in not providing for nonresident aliens but ask us to reconsider the decision in the above-cited cases. We are of the opinion, however, that the statute was properly construed in our prior cases. The argument made by the claimants for a contrary ruling is appropriate for the legislature, but not for this court in construing the statute.

Real estate vests in the heirs at the time of death, and because the nonresident heirs could not inherit, they have no interest in the proceeds of the sale of the real estate. Their exclusion from the distribution of those funds is proper.

*Remanded.*
[if !vml]>[endif]>

[if !vml]>[endif]>

You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title: Scientificassessment of ozone depletion. Twenty questions and answers about the ozonelayer.**
 
2002 | 2006 | 2010 | 2014
 
SuDoc Number:C 55.2: SCI 2/2/QUESTIONS/
Item Number:0250-E-02 (online)
CGP systemNumber:001061282
 
June 19, 2018
The Honorable Michael James Davis, United States District 1

Judge for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and

recommendation of the Honorable Raymond L. Erickson, United

States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

___________

No. 96-1027

___________

Julius Addison, *

 *

Appellant, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * District of Minnesota.

Joseph M. Brooks, Warden, F.C.I.,*

Sandstone, Minnesota, * [UNPUBLISHED]

 *

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: October 17, 1996

 Filed: November 1, 1996

___________

Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Julius Addison appeals the district court's dismissal of his 28

1

U.S.C. § 2241 petition without an evidentiary hearing. Having carefully

reviewed the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude the district court

correctly dismissed Addison's petition for the reasons stated in the

magistrate judge's report and recommendation. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

We decline to grant Addison's request for appellate counsel.
-2-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Opinion issued June 27 , 2013.

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 13 - 00485 - CR

——————————— IN RE ELDRIDGE MCKNI GHT, JR. , Relator

O riginal Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION Eldridge McKnight, Jr., pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child. 1 In January 2001, the trial court accepted McKnight’s plea, deferred adjudication on the charge, and sentenced McKnight to six years’ community supervision. In December 2005, the trial court revoked McKnight’s community supervision and sentenced him to eig ht years’ confinement. McKnight

1 The underlying case is State v. McKnight , No. 31,585, in the 240th District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas.2 has filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus , contending that his conviction and sentence are void because (1) a person convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child is not eligible for community supervision, (2) the statute of limitations expired before he was indicted, and (3) an associate judge rendered the judgment
. McKnight seeks relief from a final felony conviction. This Court is without jurisdiction to grant such relief because t he exclusive remedy for final felony convictions is a writ of habeas corpus. See T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . art. 11.07 (West 2005) ; Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dist. , 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); In re McAfee , 53 S.W.3d 715, 717

− 18 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding)
. And
o nly the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction in final post

- conviction habeas corpus proceedings. See T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . art. 11.07 ; Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Ke ene , 910 S.W.2d at 483; In re McAfee , 53 S.W.3d at 717

− 18. Accordingly, w e dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus for lack of jurisdiction , and we dismiss all pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Brown, and Huddle. Do not publish. T EX . R. A PP . P. 47.2( b).
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 24.7

                                POWER OF ATTORNEY



         KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned hereby constitutes
and appoints Mark A. Kopser and John J. Wellik, and each of them, his true and
lawful attorneys-in-fact, with full power of substitution and resubstitution,
for him and in his name, place and stead, to sign on his behalf, as a director
or officer, or both, as the case may be, of United Surgical Partners
International, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Corporation"), the
Corporation's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003,
and to sign any or all amendments to such Form 10-K, and to file the same, with
all exhibits thereto, and other documents in connection therewith, with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, granting unto said attorneys-in-fact, and
each of them with or without the others, full power and authority to do and
perform each and every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and
about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do
in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that each of said
attorneys-in-fact or its substitute or substitutes may lawfully do or cause to
be done by virtue hereof.



                                                /s/ Thomas L. Mills
                                                -------------------------------
                                                Thomas L. Mills


                                                February 18, 2004
I

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 5675

To amend title 39, United States Code, with respect to ‘‘cooperative

mailings’’.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 15, 2000

Mr. EHRLICH introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Government Reform

A BILL

To amend title 39, United States Code, with respect to

‘‘cooperative mailings’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represent

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assem

3 SECTION 1. COOPERATIVE MAILINGS.

4 Section 3626(j) of title 39, United States Code, 

5 amended by adding at the end the following:

6 ‘‘(4)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of thi

7 section or any rule or regulation of the Postal Servic

8 the case of mail matter sent, or proposed to be sent

9 (or on behalf of) an authorized organization having a 

10 tractual or any other business relationship with an en
2

•HR 5675 IH

1 described in subparagraph (B)(ii), rates of postage un

2 former section 4452(b) or 4452(c) of this title shall 

3 if those rates would apply in the case of identical 

4 matter sent by such organization absent such relationsh

5 ‘‘(B) For purposes of this paragraph—

6 ‘‘(i) the term ‘authorized organization’ means

7 an organization authorized to mail at the rates f

8 mail under former section 4452(b) or 4452(c) of thi

9 title; and

10 ‘‘(ii) an entity described in this clause is any

11 ganization or other person (within the meaning of

12 section 1 of title 1) that is not an authorized org

13 zation.’’.

14 SEC. 2. PURPOSE; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

15 (a) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to clarify

16 section 3626(j)(1)(D)(ii) of title 39, United States C

17 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the

18 Congress that nothing in this Act should be consider

19 to alter the authority of the United States Post

20 Service—

21 (1) to apply regular rates of postage, rather

22 than nonprofit rates, to mail matter described i

23 subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D)(i) of section

24 3626(j)(1) of title 39, United States Code; or
3

•HR 5675 IH

1 (2) to enforce any criminal law within its juri

2 diction.

fi
§ 102-2.85 What are the reasons for writing to GSA about FMR deviations? The reasons for writing are to: ( a ) Explain your agency's rationale for the deviation. Before it can adequately comment on a potential deviation from the FMR, GSA must know why it is needed. GSA will compare your need against the applicable policies and regulations.
( b ) Obtain clarification from GSA as to whether statutes, Executive orders, or other controlling policies, which may not be evident in the regulation, preclude deviating from the FMR for the reasons stated.
( c ) Establish a timeframe for using a deviation.
( d ) Identify potential changes to the FMR.
( e ) Identify the benefits and other results that the agency expects to achieve.
Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of First Physicians Capital Group, Inc.;
 2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to
the period covered by this report;
 3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows
of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;
 4.
    
    I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls
and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a.
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to
us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;
 b.
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
 c.
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the issuers disclosure controls and
procedures over financial reporting and presented in this report our
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and
procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based
on such evaluation; and
 d.
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in
the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal
control over financial reporting.
 5.
    
    I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors:
 a.
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
 b.
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting.
  By:
    
    /s/ David HirschhornDavid HirschhornChief Executive Officer
§ 102-118.140 What are the major mandatory terms and conditions governing the use of GBLs and bills of lading? The mandatory terms and conditions governing the use of GBLs and bills of lading are: ( a ) Unless otherwise permitted by statute and approved by the agency, the TSP may not demand prepayment or collect charges from the consignee. The TSP, providing service under the bill of lading, must present a legible copy of the bill of lading or an original, properly certified GBL attached to Standard Form (SF) 1113, Public Voucher for Transportation Charges, to the paying office for payment. An agency may choose not to require that an SF 1113 be attached to the bill of lading and invoice if the TSP submits invoices using the agency's approved third-party payment system (TPPS);
( b ) The shipment must be made at the restricted or limited valuation specified in the tariff or classification or limited contract, arrangement or exemption at or under which the lowest rate is available, unless indicated on the GBL or bill of lading. (This is commonly referred to as an alternation of rates);
( c ) Receipt for the shipment is subject to the consignee's annotation of loss, damage, or shrinkage on the delivering TSP's documents and the consignee's copy of the same documents. If loss or damage is discovered after delivery or receipt of the shipment, the consignee must promptly notify the nearest office of the last delivering TSP and extend to the TSP the privilege of examining the shipment;
( d ) The rules and conditions governing commercial shipments for the time period within which notice must be given to the TSP, or a claim must be filed, or suit must be instituted, shall not apply if the shipment is lost, damaged or undergoes shrinkage in transit. Only with the written concurrence of the Government official responsible for making the shipment is the deletion of this item considered to be valid;
( e ) Interest shall accrue from the voucher payment date on the overcharges made and shall be paid at the same rate in effect on that date as published by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the Debt Collection Act of 1982 31 U.S.C. 3717); and
( f ) Additional mandatory terms and conditions are in this part and the “U.S. Government Freight Transportation—Handbook.”
[65 FR 24569, Apr. 26, 2000, as amended at 69 FR 57619, Sept. 24, 2004; 87 FR 32324, May 31, 2022]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 1:22-CV-23580-MARTINEZ/BECERRA

MANUEL CHAVES,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BASILICO RISTORANTE AT 

DORAL, INC., RODRIGO R. 

GONZALEZ, AND CARLOS 

LOYA,

Defendants.

______________________________/

JOINT CONSENT TO U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE JURISDICTION

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(c), the undersigned parties voluntarily 

waive their right to proceed before a District Judge of this Court and consent to have the United 

States Magistrate Judge currently assigned to these proceedings (Magistrate Judge Jacqueline 

Becerra) conduct all further proceedings in this case, including the trial and order the entry of a 

final judgment. The parties do not consent to reassignment to any other or successor Magistrate 

Judge.

Dated this 24th day of January 2023.

s/Toussaint Cummings, Esq.

Toussaint Cummings Esq. (119877)

toussaint@fairlawattorney.com

FAIRLAW FIRM

135 San Lorenzo Avenue

Suite 770

Coral Gables, FL 33146

Tel: 305.230.4884

Counsel for Plaintiff

COLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A. 

Counsel for Defendant INC.; BASILICO 

RISTORANTE AT DORAL, INC., 

RODRIGO R. GONZALEZ and 

CARLOS LOYA

Cole, Scott & Kissane Building

9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 

1400 P.O. Box 569015

Miami, Florida 33256

Telephone (786) 268-6785

Case 1:22-cv-23580-JEM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/24/2023 Page 1 of 1
#### § 102-36.105 Who is authorized to screen and where do we go to screen excess personal property on-site?

You may authorize your agency employees, contractors, or non-federal recipients that you sponsor to screen excess personal property. You may visit Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices (DRMOs) and DOD contractor facilities to screen excess personal property generated by the Department of Defense. You may also inspect excess personal property at various civilian agency facilities throughout the United States.
#### § 102-38.150 How long is the inspection period?

The length of the inspection period allowed depends upon whether the inspection is done electronically or physically. You should also consider such factors as the circumstances of sale, volume of property, type of property, location of the property, and accessibility of the sales facility. Normally, you should provide at least 7 calendar days to ensure potential buyers have the opportunity to perform needed inspections.
2007 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

12-20-2007

USA v. Geddes

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 06-3335

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"USA v. Geddes" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 25.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/25
Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge of the United States Court of *

International Trade, sitting by designation.

1

 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______

No. 06-3335

______

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee

v.

AARON GEDDES,

Appellant

 

Appeal from the

United States District Court for the 

District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 02-cr-00705)

District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper

 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 11, 2007

 

Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI , Judge *

(Filed: December 20, 2007)

 

OPINION

 
Judge Sloviter agrees that Grier represents the law of the Circuit. Nonetheless, 1

she believes that Geddes’ argument represents the better view, as set forth in her dissent

in Grier.

2

RESTANI, Judge.

This appeal challenges a sentence imposed after remand to apply the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines in an advisory manner as required by United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005). Defendant Aaron Geddes was found guilty of violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm). In calculating the Guidelines

range, the District Court imposed a four-level enhancement for using a firearm in

connection with another felony. The District Court found that the facts necessary to the

enhancement were established by a preponderance of the evidence.

Geddes’ sole argument on appeal is that due process requires that if a separate

crime is the basis for a sentencing enhancement, the elements of that crime must be found

by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Sitting en banc, we recently rejected this

argument, see United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2007), and held that

sentencing enhancements, whether constituting a separate offense or not, do not implicate

rights to a jury trial or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 567. 1

Accordingly, we will affirm.
|   | 1. | The      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:      August 12, 2009 | /s/      Dirk L. Benschop                                                  |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                       | Dirk      L. Benschop, Director, Chief Executive Officer, and    President |

| Date:      August 12, 2009 | /s/      Alfonso de Borbón                                                                                                                                       |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                       | Alfonso de Borbon, Vice President of Corporate Development, Chief FinancialOfficer,      and principal accountingofficer |

----
#### § 958.23 Settlement.

Either party may make offers of settlement or proposals of adjustment at any time. The Determining Official has the exclusive authority to compromise or settle any determinations of liability for civil penalties, clean-up costs and/or damages for mailing hazardous materials and/or related violations under 39 U.S.C. 3018, without the consent of the Presiding Officer or Judicial Officer.