63300 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 205 / Thursday, October 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

1. In the header of the document, 

‘‘Notice No.’’ should have been ‘‘Special 

Conditions No.’’ 

2. In one instance, one of the airplane 

model numbers was published as ‘‘BD– 

500–1A1’’ instead of ‘‘BD–500–1A11.’’ 

Correction 

In Final special conditions document 

(FR Doc. 2014–21789) published on 

September 12, 2014 (79 FR 54574), 

make the following corrections: 

1. On page 54574, second column in 

the header information, correct ‘‘Notice 

No.’’ to read ‘‘Special Conditions No.’’ 

2. On page 54575, third column, last 

line in the introductory text in the 

section titled, ‘‘The Special 

Conditions,’’ correct ‘‘BD–500–1A1’’ to 

read ‘‘BD–500–1A11.’’ 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

16, 2014. 

Michael Kaszycki, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–25241 Filed 10–22–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0666; Special 

Conditions No. 25–566–SC] 

Special Conditions: Bombardier 

Aerospace, Models BD–500–1A10 and 

BD–500–1A11 Series Airplanes; 

Isolation or Airplane Electronic System 

Security Protection From Unauthorized 

Internal Access 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions; 

corrections. 

SUMMARY: This document corrects two 

errors that appeared in Docket No. 

FAA–2014–0666, Special Conditions 

No. 25–566–SC, which was published in 

the Federal Register on September 12, 

2014 (79 FR 54572). There is an error in 

the header information and in one 

instance of one of the airplane model 

numbers in the publication. 

DATES: The effective date of this 

correction is October 23, 2014. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and 

Flight Crew Interface Branch, ANM– 

111, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–1298; 

facsimile (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

September 12, 2014, the Federal 

Register published document 

designated as ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2014– 

0666, Notice No. 25–566–SC,’’ (79 FR 

54572). The document issued special 

conditions pertaining to network 

security in the digital systems 

architecture, access from internal 

sources, on the BD–500–1A10 and BD– 

500–1A11 series airplanes. 

As published, the document 

contained two errors: 

1. In the header of the document, 

‘‘Notice No.’’ should have been ‘‘Special 

Conditions No.’’ 

2. In one instance, the airplane model 

number was published as ‘‘BD–500– 

1A1’’ instead of ‘‘BD–500–1A11.’’ 

Correction 

In Final special conditions document 

(FR Doc. 2014–21788), published on 

September 12, 2014 (79 FR 54572), 

make the following corrections: 

1. On page 54572, third column in the 

header information, correct ‘‘Notice 

No.’’ to read ‘‘Special Conditions No.’’ 

2. On page 54574, first column, last 

line in the introductory text of the 

section titled, ‘‘The Special 

Conditions,’’ correct ‘‘BD–500–1A1’’ to 

read ‘‘BD–500–1A11.’’ 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

16, 2014. 

Michael Kaszycki, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2014–25240 Filed 10–22–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0434; Special 

Conditions No. 25–544–SC] 

Special Conditions: Bombardier 

Aerospace, Models BD–500–1A10 and 

BD–500–1A11; Composite Wing and 

Fuel Tank Structure Post-Crash Fire 

Survivability 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Bombardier Aerospace, 

Models BD–500–1A10 and BD–500– 

1A11 series airplanes. These airplanes 

will have novel or unusual design 

features when compared to the state of 

technology envisioned in the 

airworthiness standards for transport 

category airplanes. These design 

features are composite materials used in 

the construction of the fuel tank skin 

and structure, which may behave 

differently in a post-crash fire than 

traditional aluminum construction. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Effective Date: This action is 

effective on November 24, 2014. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Alan Sinclair, FAA, Airframe and Cabin 

Safety Branch, ANM–115 Transport 

Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–2195; facsimile 

425–227–1232. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On December 10, 2009, Bombardier 

Aerospace applied for a type certificate 

for their new Models BD–500–1A10 and 

BD–500–1A11 series airplanes (hereafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘CSeries’’). 

The CSeries airplanes are swept-wing 

monoplanes with an aluminum alloy 

fuselage sized for 5-abreast seating. 

Passenger capacity is designated as 110 

for the Model BD–500–1A10 and 125 for 

the Model BD–500–1A11. Maximum 

takeoff weight is 131,000 pounds for the 

Model BD–500–1A10 and 144,000 

pounds for the Model BD–500–1A11. 

Conventional airplanes with 

aluminum skin and structure provide a 

well-understood level of safety during 

post-crash fire scenarios with respect to 

fuel tanks. This is based on service 

history and extensive full-scale fire 

testing. The CSeries airplanes will not 

be fabricated primarily with aluminum 

for the fuel tank structure. Instead, they 

will be fabricated using predominantly 

composite structure and skin for the 

wings and fuel tanks. Composites may 

or may not have the equivalent 

capability of aluminum, and current 

regulations do not provide objective 

performance requirements for wing and 

fuel tank structure with respect to postcrash fire safety. Because the use of 

composite structure is novel and 

unusual with respect to the designs 

envisioned when the applicable 

regulations were promulgated, 

additional tests and analyses 

substantiation will be required to show 

that the CSeries airplanes will provide 

an acceptable level of safety with 

respect to the performance of the wings 

and fuel tanks during an external fuelfed fire. 


wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 205 / Thursday, October 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 63301 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of Title 14, Code 

of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17, 

Bombardier Aerospace must show that 

the CSeries airplanes meet the 

applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25 

as amended by Amendments 25–1 

through 25–129. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the CSeries airplanes because of a 

novel or unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the CSeries airplanes must 

comply with the fuel vent and exhaust 

emission requirements of 14 CFR part 

34 and the noise certification 

requirements of 14 CFR part 36, and the 

FAA must issue a finding of regulatory 

adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92– 

574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’ 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type-certification basis under 

§ 21.17(a)(2). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The CSeries airplanes will incorporate 

the following novel or unusual design 

features: The structural elements and 

skin of the wings and fuel tanks will be 

fabricated using predominantly 

composite materials rather than 

conventional aluminum. 

Discussion 

Transport category airplanes in 

operation today have traditionally been 

designed with aluminum materials. 

Conventional airplanes with aluminum 

skin and structure provide a wellunderstood level of safety during postcrash fires with respect to fuel tanks. 

Current regulations were developed and 

have evolved under the assumption that 

wing construction would be of 

aluminum materials. 

Aluminum has the following 

properties with respect to fuel tanks and 

fuel-fed external fires: 

• Aluminum is highly thermally 

conductive and readily transmits the 

heat of a fuel-fed external fire to fuel in 

the tank. This has the benefit of rapidly 

driving the fuel tank ullage to exceed 

the upper flammability limit of fuel 

vapors prior to fuel tank skin burnthrough or heating of the wing upper 

surface above the auto-ignition 

temperature, thus greatly reducing the 

threat of fuel tank explosion. 

• Aluminum panels at thicknesses 

previously used in wing lower surfaces 

of large transport category airplanes 

have been fire resistant as defined in 14 

CFR 1.1 and Advisory Circular (AC) 20– 

135, Powerplant Installation and 

Propulsion System Component Fire 

Protection Test Methods, Standards, 

and Criteria. 

• Heat absorption capacity of 

aluminum and fuel prevent burnthrough or wing collapse for a time 

interval that generally exceeds the 

passenger evacuation time. 

The ability of aluminum wing 

surfaces to withstand post-crash fire 

conditions when wetted by fuel on their 

interior surface has been demonstrated 

by tests conducted at the FAA Technical 

Center. Results of these tests have 

verified adequate dissipation of heat 

across wetted aluminum fuel tank 

surfaces so that localized hot spots do 

not occur, thus minimizing the threat of 

explosion. This inherent capability of 

aluminum to dissipate heat also allows 

the wing lower surface to retain its loadcarrying characteristics during a fuel-fed 

ground fire and significantly delay wing 

collapse or burn-through for a time 

interval that usually exceeds evacuation 

times. In addition, as an aluminum fuel 

tank is heated with significant 

quantities of fuel inside, fuel vapor 

accumulates in the ullage space, 

exceeding the upper flammability limit 

relatively quickly and thus reducing the 

threat of a fuel tank explosion prior to 

fuel tank burn-through. 

Fuel tanks constructed with 

composite materials may or may not 

have equivalent properties. AC 20–107B 

(Change 1), Composite Aircraft 

Structure, section 11b, ‘‘Fire Protection, 

Flammability and Thermal Issues,’’ 

states: ‘‘Wing and fuselage applications 

should consider the effects of composite 

design and construction on the resulting 

passenger safety in the event of in-flight 

fires or emergency landing conditions, 

which combine with subsequent egress 

when a fuel-fed fire is possible.’’ 

Pertinent to the wing structure, postcrash fire passenger survivability is 

dependent on the time available for 

passenger evacuation prior to fuel tank 

breach or structural failure. Structural 

failure can be a result of degradation in 

load-carrying capability in the upper or 

lower wing surface caused by a fuel-fed 

ground fire and also as a result of overpressurization caused by ignition of fuel 

vapors in the fuel tank. 

For the CSeries airplanes, composite 

materials will be used to fabricate the 

majority of the wing fuel tank. Hence, 

the current regulations may not be 

adequate for the certification of the 

CSeries airplanes featuring wing fuel 

tanks fabricated with composite 

material. Therefore, Bombardier must 

present additional confirmation by test 

and analysis that the CSeries airplanes’ 

design provides an acceptable level of 

safety with respect to the performance 

of the wing fuel tanks when exposed to 

the direct effects of post-crash ground 

fire or under-wing fuel-fed fires. 

These special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 25–14–08–SC for the Bombardier 

CSeries airplanes was published in the 

Federal Register on July 16, 2014 (79 FR 

41457). No comments were received, 

and the special conditions are adopted 

as proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the Models 

BD–500–1A10 and BD–500–1A11 series 

airplanes. Should Bombardier 

Aerospace apply at a later date for a 

change to the type certificate to include 

another model incorporating the same 

novel or unusual design feature, the 

special conditions would apply to that 

model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on two 

model series of airplanes. It is not a rule 

of general applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

■ The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Bombardier 

Aerospace Models BD–500–1A10 and 

BD–500–1A11 series airplanes. 


wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
63302 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 205 / Thursday, October 23, 2014 / Rules and Regulations 

Composite Wing and Fuel Tank PostCrash Fire Survivability 

1. The wing fuel tank structure must 

withstand an external fuel-fed pool fire 

for a minimum of 5 minutes. 

2. The integrity of the wing fuel tank 

structure must be demonstrated at: 

• Minimum fuel load, not less than 

reserve fuel level; 

• Maximum fuel load equal to the 

maximum range fuel quantity; and 

• Any other critical fuel loads. 

3. The demonstration must consider 

fuel tank flammability, burn-through 

resistance, wing structural strength 

retention properties, and auto-ignition 

threats from localized heating of 

composite structure, fasteners, or any 

other feature that may produce an 

ignition source during a ground fire 

event for the required time duration. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

16, 2014. 

Michael Kascycki, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate. 

[FR Doc. 2014–25239 Filed 10–22–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. FAA–2014–0421; Special 

Conditions No. 25–571–SC] 

Special Conditions: Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Model 767–2C 

Airplane; Interaction of Fuel Systems 

and Structures 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Boeing Model 767–2C 

airplane. This airplane will have novel 

or unusual design features when 

compared to the state of technology 

envisioned in the airworthiness 

standards for transport category 

airplanes. These design features include 

the addition of four body fuel tanks and 

a modified fuel management system 

that, directly or as a result of failure or 

malfunction, could affect the airplane’s 

structural performance. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for these design features. These special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Effective Date: This action is 

effective on November 24, 2014. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mark Freisthler, FAA, Airframe and 

Cabin Safety Branch, ANM–115, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; 

telephone 425–227–1119; facsimile 

425–227–1232. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On January 18, 2010, Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes applied for an 

amendment to Type Certificate No. 

A1NM to include the new Model 767– 

2C. The Boeing Model 767–2C, which is 

a derivative of the Model 767–200 

currently approved under Type 

Certificate No. A1NM, is a transport 

category airplane, intended for use as a 

freighter, powered by two PW4062 

engines with a maximum takeoff weight 

of 415,000 pounds. 

The Boeing Model 767–2C will have 

more fuel capacity than a traditional 

freighter through the addition of four 

body fuel tanks. The Model 767–2C 

contains fuel systems that could, 

directly or as a result of failure or 

malfunction, affect the aircraft’s 

structural performance. Current 

regulations do not take into account 

loads for the airplane due to the effects 

of fuel system failures on structural 

performance; therefore, special 

conditions are needed. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of Title 14, Code 

of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.101, 

Boeing must show that the Model 767– 

2C meets the applicable provisions of 14 

CFR part 25, as amended by 

Amendments 25–0 through 25–130, 

except for earlier amendments as agreed 

upon by the FAA. These regulations 

will be incorporated into Type 

Certificate No. A1NM after type 

certification approval of the Model 767– 

2C. 

In addition, the certification basis 

includes other regulations, special 

conditions, and exemptions that are not 

relevant to these special conditions. 

Type Certificate No. A1NM will be 

updated to include a complete 

description of the certification basis for 

these model airplanes. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the Model 767–2C because of a novel 

or unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, or should any 

other model already included on the 

same type certificate be modified to 

incorporate the same or similar novel or 

unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Model 767–2C must 

comply with the fuel vent and exhaust 

emission requirements of 14 CFR part 

34 and the noise certification 

requirements of 14 CFR part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type-certification basis under 

§ 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Boeing Model 767–2C will 

incorporate the following novel or 

unusual design features: Fuel system 

changes including the addition of 

forward and aft body fuel tanks, a mainto-center-tank gravity transfer system, 

hydraulically-powered-pumps for 

jettison, a nitrogen generation system for 

inerting of all fuel tanks, and a pressureregulating closed fuel tank vent system. 

Digital electronic controls (i.e., fuel 

management systems) are added for 

control and monitoring of these systems. 

Discussion 

The fuel management system is 

designed to keep the fuel distributed in 

accordance with fuel usage 

requirements. System failures of these 

new and modified systems may result in 

adverse fuel distributions or center-ofgravity excursions that increase the 

airplane loads. For example, a failure of 

the main tank gravity drain valve may 

result in less wing main tank fuel than 

normal management; or failure of the 

body auxiliary tank transfer systems 

may result in excessive body fuel at 

landing. Additionally, failures of the 

nitrogen generation system, fuel transfer 

system, or vent/pressure regulating 

system may result in excessive fuel tank 

pressures. These types of failures are 

addressed by these special conditions. 

Special conditions have been applied 

on past airplane programs in order to 

require consideration of the effects of 

systems on structures. These special 

conditions are similar to those 

previously applied except that the scope 

is limited to new fuel system features 

unique to the Model 767–2C. These 


wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES