UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

CASE NO. 1:22-cv-22307-BB 

MARIA FERNANDA SOTO LEIGUE, 

individually and on behalf of all 

others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

EVERGLADES COLLEGE, INC. d/b/a 

KEISER UNIVERSITY, 

Defendant. 

CLASS ACTION 

REQUEST FOR HEARING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 

 

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EXHIBIT LIST

Exhibit Description 

A 

Transcript of Deposition of Teri del Vecchio, Defendant’s Corporate 

Representative, dated December 8, 2022 (“del Vecchio Dep.”)

B 

Transcript of Deposition of Christopher Coleman, Defendant’s 

Corporate Representative, dated December 8, 2022 (“Coleman Dep.”) 

C 

Transcript of Deposition of Cristina Caras, Defendant’s Director of 

Admissions, dated January 17, 2023 (“Caras Dep.”) 

D 

Transcript of Deposition of Ines Melendez, Defendant’s Admissions 

Counselor, dated January 17, 2023 (“Melendez Dep.”) 

E 

Transcript of Deposition of Shawn Bowen, Corporate Representative 

for Avisan Design Group, dated January 27, 2023 (“Bowen Dep.”) 

F 

Transcript of Deposition of Gene McDonnell, Defendant’s Vice 

Chancellor of High School Relations, dated January 19, 2023 

(“McDonnell Dep.”) 

G 

Transcript of Deposition of Maria Fernanda Soto Leigue, dated 

December 21, 2022 (“Soto Leigue Dep.”) 

H 

Internal e-mail communications produced by Defendant: 

o Keiser004257 

o Keiser004457 

o Keiser004480 

o Keiser004600 

o Keiser004673 

o Keiser005010 

o Keiser005020 

o Keiser005058 

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I 

Supplemental Declaration of Plaintiff’s Expert, Aaron Woolfson, 

(“Woolfson Decl.”), including the following exhibits: 

J 

Resume of Law Firms Representing Plaintiff (“Law Firm Resumes”) 

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................1 

II. BACKGROUND AND FACTS....................................................................3 

A. Defendant’s Admissions Counselors Aggressively Solicit Consumers..............4 

B. Defendant Harassed Plaintiff and the Class Members Even After they Asked for 

Defendant to Stop its Text Messaging...................................................8 

III. ARGUMENT.........................................................................................9 

 A. The Class is Adequately Defined........................................................10 

 B. The Rule 23(a) Requirements are Satisfied.............................................11 

 1. The Class is Sufficiently Numerous............................................11 

 2. There are Common Questions of Law and Fact..............................12 

 3. Plaintiff’s Claims are Typical...................................................13 

 4. Plaintiff and her Counsel are Adequate........................................14 

 C. The Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements are Satisfied.........................................15 

 1. Common Questions Predominate...............................................15 

 2. A Class Action is Superior......................................................17 

 

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 Melendez Dep. at 

68:5–69:7. 

 Despite Defendant’s claim that it is not engaged in telephone solicitations and that it is 

simply trying to provide prospects with the information they have requested, internal 

communications between Defendant’s employees show the relentless solicitation of consumers, 

even when they hang up on Defendant’s Admissions Counselors or tell them that they are not 

interested in Defendant’s services. The following are a few examples of those internal 

communications: 

Keiser004318. 

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Keiser004325. 

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Keiser005420. 

B. Defendant Harassed Plaintiff and the Class Members Even After They 

Asked for Defendant to Stop its Text Messaging 

. Coleman 

Dep. at 94:10–19; del Vecchio Dep. at 20:12–21:6, Ex. 14 at No. 2. 

. Coleman Dep. 

at Ex. 12. 

. Id. On 9/23/21, 

. Id. 

. del Vecchio Dep. at 21:3-6, 22:16–23:3, 

24:10–25:3. 

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. Caras Dep. at 27:14–19, 30:8–

20, 32:13–21. 

. Melendez Dep. 

at 22:7–11. 

. Bowen Dep. at 45:4–5, 60:11–18. 

. Bowen 

Dep. at 59:11–60:6. 

, Bowen Dep. at 40:7–41:8, 

 Woolfson Decl. at ¶¶41, 61; Ex. 13. 

III. ARGUMENT 

All of the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3) are satisfied in this case. 

And because of the small damages available to individual Class members, a class action is the 

only realistic way that the hundreds of affected consumers will get their day in Court to 

challenge Defendant’s unwanted text messages. 

10 A “successfully delivered” disposition in the text log spreadsheet means that the message was 

successfully delivered to the consumer. Id. at 46:2–10. 

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A. The Class is Adequately Defined 

The Eleventh Circuit held in a published opinion “that administrative feasibility is not 

a requirement for certification under Rule 23[,]” and it “limit[ed] ascertainability to its 

traditional scope: a proposed class is ascertainable if it is adequately defined such that its 

membership is capable of determination.” Cherry v. Dometic Corp., 986 F.3d 1296, 1304 

(11th Cir. 2021). In other words, “[p]roof of administrative feasibility cannot be a 

precondition for certification.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit further explained that, 

A class is “clearly ascertainable” if we are certain that its membership is 

“capable of being” determined. Ascertain, Webster’s New International 

Dictionary (3d ed. 1993); Ascertainable, Webster’s New International 

Dictionary (3d ed. 1993). But membership can be capable of determination 

without being capable of convenient determination. Administrative feasibility 

is not an inherent aspect of ascertainability. 

Id. at 1303 (emphasis in original). This means that “the party seeking certification need not 

establish its ability to identify class members in a convenient or administratively feasible 

manner.” Rensel v. Centra Tech., Inc., 2 F.4th 1359, 1361 (11th Cir. 2021). To the extent 

administrative feasibility has any role, “[the district court] may consider administrative 

feasibility as part of the manageability criterion of Rule 23(b)(3)(D).” Cherry, 986 F.3d at 

1304. 

Moreover, a plaintiff is not “required to limit their proposed class to the one that is the 

easiest to figure out. ‘[N]either foreknowledge of a method of identification nor confirmation 

of its manageability says anything about the qualifications of the putative class 

representatives.’” Harris v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., No. 5:18-cv-00365-TES, 2021 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 247124 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 2021) (quoting Cherry, 986 F.3d at 1303). “A[t] this stage 

of the proceedings, Plaintiffs are only required to show that the class is ‘not defined through 

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vague or subjective criteria[]’ so that it is ‘capable of being determined.’” Harris, 2021 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 247124, at *31 (quoting Cherry, 986 F.3d at 1302-03). 

To “the extent that Defendant[] argue[s] that this class is not ascertainable because it 

requires individualistic determinations...the Court [should] find[] such an argument to be 

grounded in administrative feasibility concerns and not relevant to the ascertainability 

analysis.” Id. at *32 (citing McCullough v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:15-cv-463-RCL, 2021 

WL 20449900, at *11 (M.D. Ala. May 21, 2021) (noting that the argument that a class is not 

ascertainable if individual inquiries are necessary to determine class membership is simply a 

“repackag[ing of] the administrative feasibility test that Cherry rejected[]”)). 

The Class here is ascertainable because it is adequately defined such that class 

membership is capable of determination. Indeed, no element of the Class definition is vague 

or subjective. 

. Coleman 

Dep. at 29:11–30:5. Accordingly, providing notice to Class members will be a simple 

administrative task that can be handled by a class administrator. 

B. The Rule 23(a) Requirements are Satisfied 

1. The Class is Sufficiently Numerous 

To satisfy the numerosity requirement, Plaintiff must show that the Class is so 

numerous that “joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Plaintiffs 

“seeking class certification do not need to know the ‘precise number of class members,’ but 

they ‘must make reasonable estimates with support as to the size of the proposed class.’” 

Rosenberg v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., No. 19-61422-CIV-CAN, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

210775, at *15 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 21, 2021). Although “[a] plaintiff must present some evidence 

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that the class to be certified will satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23[,]” it need only 

“reasonably estimate[] a class larger than 40 members[,]” and need “not be able to produce a 

precise, uncontested number of class members.” Id. Indeed, when evaluating numerosity a 

“court may make common sense assumptions[.]” Barnes v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 310 

F.R.D. 551, 557 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 

The Class here satisfies the numerosity requirement as it contains at least 40 members. 

. Woolfson Decl. at ¶¶41, 61; Ex. 13. Thus, Defendant cannot reasonably dispute that 

the numerosity requirement is satisfied. 

2. There are Common Questions of Law and Fact

The test for commonality is whether the class claims present “questions of law or fact 

common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). This test presents a “low hurdle.” Williams v. 

Mohawk Indus., 568 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009). To satisfy it, Plaintiff need only show 

that the Class claims present “at least one issue whose resolution will affect all or a significant 

number of the putative class members,” or that their claims “are susceptible to class-wide 

proof.” Id. at 1355. In other words, “[t]he plaintiff’s and class members’ ‘claims must depend 

upon a common contention’ that is ‘of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolutionwhich means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 

validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.’” Wesley v. Snap Fin. LLC, 339 F.R.D. 277, 

291 (D. Utah 2021). 

Commonality “‘does not require that all the questions of law and fact raised by the 

dispute be common,’ or that the common questions of law or fact ‘predominate’ over 

individual issues.” Rothenberg, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210775 at *15 (emphasis added). 

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“What matters to class certification...is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in 

droves—but rather, the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt 

to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id., at *16. 

Here, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant raises multiple common legal and factual 

issues capable of generating common answers, including: (1) whether Plaintiff and the Class 

members communicated to Defendant that they did not wish to receive text messages; (2) 

whether Defendant nevertheless continued to send text messages to Plaintiff and the Class 

members after the opt-out requests; (3) the total number of text messages Defendant sent in 

violation of section 501.059(5); (4) whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful 

such that the Court should award treble damages pursuant to section 501.059(10)(b); and (5) 

the total amount of damages the Court should award to Plaintiff and the Class members. 

Thus, commonality is satisfied in a case such as this alleging violations of the FTSA, 

which is patterned after the analogous TCPA, as other courts have recognized. See, e.g., 

Mohamed v. Off Lease Only, Inc., 320 F.R.D. 301, 313 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (commonality 

satisfied in TCPA class action where “[t]he entire case revolves around an alleged common 

course of conduct performed by” defendant and its vendor); C-Mart, Inc. v. Metro. Life Ins. 

Co., 299 F.R.D. 679, 690 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (holding in TCPA class action that “the legal 

questions that the instant matter presents will be common to all class members”); Manno v. 

Healthcare Rev. Recovery Grp., LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 686 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (finding consent 

defense to be common where all class members were subject to the same TCPA related 

disclosures). 

3. Plaintiff’s Claims are Typical 

The typicality requirement of Rule 23 requires that the claims of the representative 

plaintiffs be typical of the claims of the class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “‘[T]ypicality 

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measures whether a sufficient nexus exists between the claims of the named representatives 

and those of the class at large.’” Rosenberg, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210775, at*17. Like 

commonality, typicality is not a demanding test.” Id. at *18. Notably, “[c]lass members’ 

claims need not be identical to satisfy the typicality requirement[.]” Ault v. Walt Disney World 

Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012). 

In this case, Plaintiff and the Class members were subjected to the same unwanted text 

messages and their claims rely on the same legal theory: that Defendant violated the FTSA by 

sending text messages to individuals who had requested for the messages to stop. As such, 

Plaintiff and the Class members will need to prove the same elements to establish Defendant’s 

liability under the FTSA, and Plaintiff and the Class members seek the same statutory relief. 

Thus, the typicality requirement is satisfied. See, e.g., Vance v. DIRECTV, LLC, No. 5:17-

CV-179, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140518, at *22 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 1, 2022). (“Here, the 

named plaintiffs, like all purported class members, allegedly received telemarketing calls 

form AC1 on numbers listed on the Do-Not-Call Registry. The named plaintiffs must prove 

the same elements as every class member. Moreover, the named plaintiffs seek the same 

statutory relief as the putative class. By proving their own legal claims, plaintiffs may also 

prove the class claims. Accordingly, typicality is satisfied.”). 

4. Plaintiff and her Counsel are Adequate 

Representative plaintiffs must also show that they will “fairly and adequately protect 

the interests of this class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). “The adequacy of representation 

requirement encompasses two factors: ‘(1) whether any substantial conflicts of interest exist 

between the representatives and the class; and (2) whether the representatives will adequately 

prosecute the action.’” Rosenberg, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210775, at *20. Plaintiff satisfies 

this test because her interests are squarely aligned with those of the Class because, like the 

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rest of the Class, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated her rights under the FTSA by 

continuing to send unsolicited text messages after they opted out of further communications. 

Further, Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, understands her 

role as class representatives, and is willing to devote time and resources to this matter. Indeed, 

Plaintiff regularly communicates with her attorneys regarding the status of the case. Soto 

Leigue Dep. at 32:3–11. And she is aware of the claims in her case and the statute under which 

it was filed, including that it is a state law that prohibits unsolicited text messages. Id. at 

34:14–35:8. Moreover, Plaintiff has a bachelor’s degree in business administration and a 

minor in economics, she has no arrests or convictions, and has never been charged with a 

crime. Id. at 26:12–14, 30:13–19. 

In addition, the firms and counsel representing Plaintiff—Hiraldo P.A., Shamis & 

Gentile P.A., and Edelsberg Law, P.A—are adequate. All three firms have extensive 

experience in the areas of consumer rights and class action litigation. See Law Firm Resumes. 

They have litigated multiple cases nationally and have the resources necessary to conduct 

litigation of this nature. Plaintiff’s counsel have been appointed as lead class counsel in 

numerous cases. Plaintiff’s counsel have diligently investigated and dedicated substantial time 

and financial resources to the investigation and prosecution of the claims at issue and will 

continue to do so. 

C. The Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements are Satisfied 

1. Common Questions Predominate 

An inquiry into the predominance of common questions of law or fact under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23(b)(3) “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 

adjudication by representation.” Prindle v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., LLC, 3:13-CV-1349-

J-34PDB, 2016 LEXIS 112881, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2016). Rule 23(b)(3) does not 

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require all issues presented in the case to be common among the class; it requires only that 

the common issues predominate over any individual issues. Klay, 382 F.3d at 1254 (“it is not 

necessary that all questions of fact or law be common, but only that some questions are 

common and that they predominate over individual questions.”), abrogated on other grounds 

by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). Here, it happens to be that all 

issues are common to the Class. 

Common issues predominate if those issues that are subject to generalized proof 

predominate over those that are subject to individualized proof. Id. (citing Veal v. Crown Auto 

Dealerships, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 572, 579 (M.D. Fla. 2006)). Predominance is not defeated 

simply by showing that the case will require some—or even substantial—individualized 

inquiry. And, notably, “[t]he ‘black letter rule’ in every circuit is that “individual damage 

calculations generally do not defeat a finding that common issues predominate.” Brown v. 

Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting William B. 

Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:54 (5th ed.)); see also Allapattah Services, Inc. v. 

Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 

Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (noting that “numerous courts have recognized 

that the presence of individualized damages issues does not prevent a finding that the common 

issues in the case predominate” and citing cases). 

In this case, the common questions identified above are all subject to class-wide proof. 

See Mohamed, 320 F.R.D. at 316 (“The resolution of each issue will directly impact the 

resolution of the claims of the modified class and whether each can establish liability against 

[the defendant] under the TCPA.”). Specifically, as discussed above, Plaintiff will prove her 

FTSA claim and at the same time the FTSA claim of every Class member with common 

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evidence establishing that Defendant continued to send text messages to Plaintiff and the Class 

members after they opted out of further communications. 

There are no individual issues that predominate. First, issues related to Defendant 

texting Plaintiff and the putative Class members “can be established through common 

evidence, namely [Defendants’] business records.” Wesley, 339 F.R.D. at 297. Second, the 

text messages Defendant sent to Class members were all sent after opt-out requests. Third, 

statutory damages will not vary among Class members (and even if they did, as noted above, 

individual damages calculations do not defeat predominance). Fourth, the Court will be able 

to rely on common evidence with respect to whether damages should be trebled. And, lastly, 

there are no unique defenses that Defendant has with respect to Plaintiff or any Class member. 

Thus, the questions here will be resolved using common class-wide evidence 

applicable to all of the claims and will not involve undue individualized questions. Krakauer, 

925 F.3d at 658-59 (explaining why predominance was satisfied in similar TCPA class 

action). “At bottom, the advantages of class resolution follow directly from the [] statute. The 

statute creates a simple scheme for determining if a violation occurred, whether a defense is 

available, and what the damages ought to be.” Id., at 659. 

2. A Class Action is Superior 

“When evaluating the superiority inquiry, courts focus on ‘whether there is a better 

method of handling the controversy than through the class action mechanism.’” Rosenberg, 

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210775, at *22 (citations omitted). “The most relevant consideration 

in the superiority analysis is whether class certification would result in case management 

issues that render the proceedings less fair and efficient than other available forums for 

adjudicating the class members’ claims.” Id. 

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Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that the superiority inquiry requires a 

comparison of the superiority of proceeding as a class action as compared to an individual 

action and has emphasized that “manageability problems will ‘rarely, if ever, be in 

[themselves] sufficient to prevent certification’”: 

The manageability inquiry focuses on whether a class action “will create relatively 

more management problems than any of the alternatives,” not whether it will create 

manageability problems in an absolute sense. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 

1273 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix 

Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). And the district court must balance its 

manageability finding against other considerations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). So 

administrative difficulties—whether in class-member identification or 

otherwise—do not alone doom a motion for certification. Indeed, we have made 

clear that manageability problems will “rarely, if ever, be in [themselves] 

sufficient to prevent certification.” Klay, 382 F.3d at 1272. 

* * * 

A district court must evaluate this issue in comparative terms; that is, because the 

superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) turns on whether a class action is better 

than other available methods of adjudication, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) it involves 

two forms of comparison. First, would a class action create more manageability 

problems than its alternatives? Klay, 382 F.3d at 1273. And second, how do the 

manageability concerns compare with the other advantages or disadvantages of a 

class action? See id. Administrative feasibility alone will rarely, if ever, be 

dispositive, id. at 1272–73[.] 

Cherry, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 2809, at *14-15, 17. 

Because in this case the amount of damages available to each individual Class member 

under the FTSA is modest (statutory damages of $1,500 per text, and only $500 per text if the 

conduct was not willful and knowing), a denial of class certification will effectively result in 

no one being compensated for Defendant’s FTSA violations as no individual would bring a 

suit to attempt to recover this amount because court costs alone would result in the plaintiff 

losing money even if they won. Consequently, “[c]lass actions were designed for these types 

of claims.” G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Grp. C Commc’ns, Inc., No. 08-cv-4521, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

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17843, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2010) (“Rule 23(b)(3) was designed for situations...in which 

the potential recovery is too slight to support individual suits, but injury is substantial in the 

aggregate.”). Moreover, the “prosecution and adjudication of each of these individual claims, 

rather than disposition of the matter on a class-wide basis, would be judicially inefficient and 

a waste of this Court’s resources.” Mohamed, 320 F.R.D. at 317. 

And although the Eleventh Circuit held in Cherry that administrative feasibility should 

rarely result in denial of class certification, this Court should be satisfied that there are no 

administrative feasibility issues with respect to providing notice to the Class members or 

otherwise managing the Class. As it pertains to notice, courts have regularly approved text 

message notice containing a hyperlink to a website, which constitutes direct notice to Class 

members. See Pryke v. First Solar, Inc., No. 3:21-CV-00681-JGC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

208794 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2021) (“District courts in other circuits have authorized service 

of the FLSA notice by text message as well as by email and ordinary mail. As one district 

court reasoned, ‘there is no denying that potential plaintiffs are more likely to receive notice 

of the collective action if a court allows text-message notice, in addition to e-mail and mail.’ 

Thrower v. UniversalPegasus, Int’l Inc., 484 F. Supp. 3d 473, 490 (S.D. Tex. 2020)). 

This is because even email has become ‘saturated and unwieldy,’ with people 

receiving, at times, hundreds of messages daily across various accounts. Id. (“A text message, 

on the other hand, is more likely to grab the recipient’s attention. In light of the remedial 

purpose of the FLSA, many courts have found that notice by text message, in addition to email 

and U.S. mail, is prudent and appropriate.”) (citing Felps v. Mewbourne Oil Co., Inc., 460 F. 

Supp. 3d 1232, 1241 (D.N.M. 2020); Mahrous v. LKM Enterprises, LLC, No. CV 16-10141, 

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97918, 2017 WL 2730886, at *4 (E.D. La.); Bhumithanarn v. 22 

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Noodle Mkt. Corp., No. 14-CV-2625 RJS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90616, 2015 WL 4240985, 

at *5 (S.D.N.Y.); Irvine v. Destination Wild Dunes Mgmt., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 707, 711 

(D.S.C. 2015)); see also Mazariegos v. Pan 4 Am., LLC, No. DLB-20-2275, 2021 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 208378, at *20 (D. Md. Oct. 28, 2021) (authorizing text message notice to class 

members); Young v. Energy Drilling Co., No. 4:20-cv-1716, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76659, 

at *11 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2021) (“Furthermore, courts in this district have recognized that 

email is already outmoded and text messages are more likely to actually reach the intended 

recipients.”) (citing Dickensheets v. Arc Marine, LLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 670, 672 (S.D. Tex. 

2020) (“In light of [the reality that text messaging and cell phones are now the primary means 

of communication] and the overarching goal of providing potential class members the 

opportunity to join the case, I find that providing notice via text message in addition to other 

traditional notice methods will almost always be appropriate in modern society.”). 

Given that Defendant possess telephone numbers, names, emails, and addresses for 

everyone in the Class, the process of providing notice to the Class members simply requires 

a class administrator to establish a website containing a long-form notice and relevant case 

documents, and then send a text message, email, and/or mail notice to each Class member 

containing a link to website. “At the very least, the proposed process is ‘a starting point from 

which’ Plaintiff can use other methods if necessary, such as ‘self-identifying affidavits and 

subpoenas.’” Scoma Chiropractic, P.A. v. Dental Equities, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-41-JLB-MRM, 

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 245025, at *28 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2021); see also Lenorowitz v. 

Mosquito Squad of Fairfield & Westchester Cty., No. 3:20-cv-01922 (JBA), 2022 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 170384, at *14 (D. Conn. Sep. 21, 2022) (citations omitted). 

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WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests for the Court to 

grant her Motion and enter an Order certifying the Class, appointing Plaintiff as Class 

representative, and appointing Plaintiff’s counsel and Class Counsel. 

REQUEST FOR HEARING 

Plaintiff respectfully submits that this Court would benefit from oral argument on 

Plaintiff’s Motion. Plaintiff estimates that the time required will be one hour. 

DATED: February 16, 2023 

Respectfully submitted, 

HIRALDO P.A. 

/s/ Manuel S. Hiraldo 

Manuel S. Hiraldo, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 030380 

401 E. Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400 

Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 

Email: mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com 

Telephone: 954.400.4713 

SHAMIS & GENTILE P.A. 

Andrew J. Shamis, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 101754 

ashamis@shamisgentile.com 

Garrett O. Berg, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 1000427 

gberg@shamisgentile.com 

14 NE 1st Ave., Suite 705 

Miami, Florida 33132 

Telephone: 305-479-2299 

EDELSBERG LAW P.A. 

Scott Edelsberg, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 0100537 

Chris Gold, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 88733 

20900 NE 30th Ave., Suite 417 

Aventura, Florida 33180 

Case 1:22-cv-22307-BB Document 70 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/16/2023 Page 25 of 26
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Telephone: 305-975-3320 

Email: scott@edelsberglaw.com 

 chris@edelsberglaw.com 

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Proposed 

Class 

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