UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION 

CASE NO.: 9:22-cv-81780-MIDDLEBROOKS/MATHEWMAN 

DONALD J. TRUMP, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

LETITIA JAMES, 

 Defendant. 

________________________________/ 

DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S EMERGENCY 

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION 

BILZIN SUMBERG BAENA PRICE 

& AXELROD LLP 

Attorneys for Defendant 

1450 Brickell Ave., Suite 2300 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Melissa Pallett-Vasquez 

 Florida Bar No. 715816 

Jeffrey Snyder 

 Florida Bar No. 21281 

Robert Turken 

 Florida Bar No. 306355 

LETITIA JAMES 

 Attorney General 

 State of New York 

28 Liberty Street 

New York, NY 10005 

Andrew S. Amer 

 admitted pro hac vice

Colleen K. Faherty 

 admitted pro hac vice

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ................................................................................................................... 1

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 2

A. OAG’S INVESTIGATION AND THE NEW YORK SUBPOENA ACTION .......... 2

B. MR. TRUMP’S FEDERAL NEW YORK ACTION ................................................... 4

C. OAG’S NEW YORK ENFORCEMENT ACTION ..................................................... 6

D. MR. TRUMP’S FLORIDA ACTION........................................................................... 7

STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................................ 8

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................................... 9

I. PLAINTIFF HAS NO SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 

ON THE MERITS FOR MULTIPLE, INDEPENDENT REASONS ................. 9

A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over AG James ................................. 9

B. This Action Is Barred By New York’s Interstate Sovereign Immunity ........ 12 

C. This Action Is Barred By Issue And Claim Preclusion ................................. 14 

D. This Action Is Barred Under The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine ....................... 17 

II. THERE IS NO IRREPARABLE HARM ........................................................... 18

III. THE EQUITIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST WEIGH IN OAG’S 

FAVOR ............................................................................................................... 19

CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................. 20

 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) ........................................................................................... 12 

All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535 (11th 

Cir.1989) ............................................................................................................................. 8 

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) .......................................................................................... 16 

Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami–Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177 

(11th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................................... 8 

Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir.1985) ................................... 14 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ........................................................................................... 9 

Attwood v. Clemons, 818 F. App'x 863 (11th Cir. 2020) ........................................................ 13, 14 

Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1990) ............................................. 13, 14 

Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Celotex Corp., 56 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 1995) ............................... 16 

Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2018) ................................................... 18 

Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624 (11th Cir.1997) ........................................................................ 17, 18 

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)............................................................ 19 

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ........................................................................................... 14 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) .................................. 17 

Franchise Tax Board of Ca. v. Hyatt, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) .................................. 12 

Georgia Muslim Voter Project v. Kemp, 918 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2019) ................................... 18 

Gonzalez v. Governor of Georgia, 978 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2020) ......................................... 8, 19 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) ..................................... 9 

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ..................................................................................... 11 

Horne v. Potter, 392 F. App'x 800 (11th Cir. 2010) ....................................................................... 6 

In re New York (Walsh), 256 U.S. 490 (1921) .............................................................................. 13 

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ....................................................... 10 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 3 of 27
iii 

Kizzire v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 441 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2006) ............................................ 14 

Lapides v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002) ................................ 12 

Lewis v. Clarke, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) .............................................................. 13 

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2013) ................................... 10 

MC Tr. v. De Mishaan, 273 So. 3d 1065 (Mem) (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) ........................................... 9 

Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Education, 465 U.S. 75 (1984) ............................. 14, 15 

Mirka United, Inc. v. Cuomo, No. 06-cv-14292, 2007 WL 4225487 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 

2007) ................................................................................................................................. 19 

Noble House, LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, No. 20-62080-CIV, 2021 WL 

896219 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2021) ....................................................................................... 10 

O’Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353 (1981) ..................................................................... 16 

Page v. Hicks, 773 F. App’x 514 (11th Cir. 2019) ....................................................................... 12 

Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir.2002) ........................................................................... 8 

Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d 343 (1999) ............................................... 15, 16 

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) ................................. 13, 14 

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) ........................................................................... 17 

People by James v. Donald J. Trump, No. 452562/2022 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Nov. 3, 

2022) ............................................................................................................................... 6, 7 

People by James v. Trump Org., Inc., 205 A.D.3d 625 (1st Dep’t 2022), appeal 

dismissed, 38 N.Y.3d 1053 (2022)................................................................................ 4, 15 

People by James v. Trump Org., Inc., 38 N.Y.3d 1053 (2022) ...................................................... 4 

Pinnacle Advert. & Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Pinnacle Advert. & Mktg. Grp., LLC, No. 18-cv81606, 2019 WL 3890368 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2019) ....................................................... 18 

Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1999) ............................................................ 10 

PTI, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ...................................... 12 

Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 356 (2012) ............................ 10 

Ryzhov v. Mayorkas, No. 21-CV-23596, 2022 WL 10869910 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2022) ................ 6 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 4 of 27
iv 

San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) ......................... 15 

Schultz v. Alabama, 42 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2022)..................................................................... 14 

Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 1996) .......................................... 10 

Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) .............................................................. 8, 17, 18 

Silver v. Glinkenhouse, No. 06-cv-81025, 2007 WL 9701847 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2007) ............. 10 

Simmons v. Trans Express Inc., 37 N.Y.3d 107 (2021) ................................................................ 16 

State v. Great Lakes Mins., LLC, 597 S.W.3d 169 (Ky. 2019) .................................................... 13 

Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2008) ........................................... 11, 12 

Stroud v. McIntosh, 722 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2013) .................................................................... 12 

The People of the State of New York v. The Trump Organization, Inc., No. 451685/2020, 

2022 WL 489625 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Feb. 17, 2022), aff’d, 205 A.D.3d 625 (1st 

Dep’t 2022), appeal dismissed, 38 N.Y.3d 1053 (2022) .......................................... 3, 5, 15 

Trump v. James, No. 21-cv-1352, 2022 WL 1718951 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2022) ......... 4, 5, 16, 17 

Trump v. U.S., No. 22-13005, 2022 WL 17352069 (11th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022) ........................ 10, 18 

Tuna Fam. Mgmt Inc. v. All Tr. Mgmt. Inc., No. 20-cv-14017, 2021 WL 4775076 (S.D. 

Fla. Oct. 13, 2021) ............................................................................................................ 19 

United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) ................................................... 10 

Virginia Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247 (2011) ............................................... 14 

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) ................................................................. 19 

Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................ 13 

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) ....................................... 19 

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) .............................................. 11 

Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2016) .............................................. 19 

Statutes

FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) .................................................................................................... 9, 10 

FLA. STAT. § 736.0202 .................................................................................................................... 9 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 5 of 27
v 

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) ............................................................................................................... 9 

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

There is no emergency requiring the Court to grant the extraordinary relief of a temporary 

injunction. Instead, there is a just a disgruntled litigant, Donald J. Trump, who impermissibly seeks 

to evade the jurisdiction of a New York state court that is presiding over an enforcement action 

alleging pervasive fraud and illegality by him and others in the conduct of his New York-based 

business and has issued a number of rulings that he considers unfavorable. 

In this attempted end-run around the jurisdiction of the New York state court, Mr. Trump 

seeks by “emergency motion” to interfere with the discovery process in the New York state court 

proceedings by obtaining an injunction from this Court to preclude Defendant Attorney General 

(“AG”) James from “requesting, demanding, obtaining, possessing, or disclosing a copy of the 

2020 and 2022 amendments to” his revocable trust, see Motion for Temporary Injunction 

(“Motion”) at 1 (D.E. 1-1 at 113), which owns all of the assets that are valued in Mr. Trump’s 

financial disclosures that are the subject of the fraud allegations at the center of the New York 

enforcement action. Mr. Trump’s Motion should be denied because he fails to satisfy any of the 

well-established criteria for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief – a substantial likelihood of 

success on the merits, a showing of irreparable harm, and a balance of the equities and public 

interest tipping in his favor. 

Mr. Trump has no substantial likelihood of success on the merits because there are at least 

four independent grounds for dismissing this action. First, the Court has no personal jurisdiction 

over AG James because the actions of the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) in pursuing the 

New York state court proceedings (which form the predicate for the claims in this action) do not 

meet the requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under Florida law, and additionally 

do not establish the necessary minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy the Due Process Clause. 

Second, because Mr. Trump’s requested relief is against OAG and not AG James individually, the 

action is barred by New York’s interstate sovereign immunity, which is independent of Eleventh 

Amendment immunity and remains preserved notwithstanding removal of the action to this Court. 

Third, the issues and claims asserted in the Amended Complaint are precluded by final orders 

issued in the New York state court proceedings and an action Mr. Trump filed against AG James 

in the Northern District of New York to enjoin OAG’s state court proceedings; Mr. Trump had a 

full and fair opportunity to litigate in both New York forums all of the issues and claims asserted 

here. And fourth, the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman

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doctrine because Mr. Trump improperly seeks here to collaterally attack orders issued by the New 

York state court where he was the losing party. 

Mr. Trump also fails to demonstrate that he will suffer any irreparable harm if there is no 

preliminary injunction. As a threshold matter, Mr. Trump’s claim of irreparable harm rests entirely 

on his baseless allegation in his Amended Complaint that if his trust documents were obtained by 

AG James in the New York proceedings, she would “widely publish” them. Amended Complaint 

(“Am. Compl.”) (D.E. 1-1 at 56) at ¶ 112. Such a conclusory allegation is legally insufficient to 

support a motion for a preliminary injunction and belied by the documentary record. Moreover, 

Mr. Trump fails to acknowledge that appropriate reasonable redactions are available to him in 

order to mitigate against any purported, albeit speculative, harm related to his estate planning 

information. In fact, the last word on the subject from Mr. Trump’s lawyer indicated her intent to 

produce the material subject to such redactions, Am. Compl. at Exh. A (September 16, 2022 email 

from Alina Habba, Esq.), which should put to rest his concerns about any hypothetical disclosure 

of his estate planning information. OAG still awaits production of the redacted trust documents as 

of the date of filing this opposition, and Mr. Trump cannot claim any irreparable harm from having 

to produce the trust documents to OAG in redacted form as promised by his counsel. 

Finally, the balance of the equities and public interest tip sharply in favor of OAG, which 

has uncovered considerable evidence of fraudulent and misleading conduct engaged in by Mr. 

Trump and his affiliates in the conduct of his New York-based business. Indeed, the New York 

state court recently confirmed that OAG is likely to succeed on the merits of its enforcement action 

based on this evidence in its decision granting OAG preliminary injunctive relief. In light of that 

“likelihood of success” finding, the public interest is far better served by denying the extraordinary 

relief sought here that would interfere with the ongoing discovery process in OAG’s enforcement 

action pending in New York state court. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. OAG’s Investigation and the New York Subpoena Action 

OAG opened an investigation into Mr. Trump and his New York-based business operations 

in March 2019 (the “Investigation”), after Michael Cohen, a former senior executive of the Trump 

Organization and Special Counsel to Mr. Trump, produced to Congress copies of Mr. Trump’s 

financial statements for a number of years and testified that these financial statements inflated the 

values of Mr. Trump’s assets to obtain favorable terms for loans and insurance coverage, while the 

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Trump Organization also deflated the value of the same assets to reduce real estate taxes. See The 

People of the State of New York v. The Trump Organization, Inc., No. 451685/2020, 2022 WL 

489625, at *2, 5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Feb. 17, 2022), aff’d, 205 A.D.3d 625 (1st Dep’t 2022), 

appeal dismissed, 38 N.Y.3d 1053 (2022). 

On August 24, 2020, OAG commenced a special proceeding in the New York Supreme 

Court, New York County, styled People v. The Trump Organization, Index No. 451685/2020 (“NY 

Subpoena Action”), to address subpoena enforcement issues arising during the course of the 

Investigation. Id. at *1-2. Justice Arthur Engoron was randomly assigned to preside over the case. 

Id. One enforcement issue presented to Justice Engoron involved a December 1, 2021 subpoena 

OAG served on Mr. Trump requiring him to produce responsive documents and provide deposition 

testimony. Id. Mr. Trump moved to quash the subpoena, arguing among other things that the 

Investigation was purportedly predicated on improper animus towards him and amounted to 

selective prosecution in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at *4-5. As support for these 

assertions, he relied on many of the same public comments by AG James cited in the Amended 

Complaint in this action. Compare id. at *4 with Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-73. OAG cross-moved to 

compel compliance with the subpoena, and in a decision and order dated February 17, 2022 (the 

“February 2022 Order”), Justice Engoron denied the motion to quash and granted OAG’s 

cross-motion to compel. 2022 WL 489625, at *1. 

In the February 2022 Order, the court rejected all of Mr. Trump’s arguments, finding that 

OAG’s Investigation had “uncover[ed] copious evidence of possible financial fraud” by the Trump 

Organization, giving OAG the “clear right” to question Mr. Trump under oath. Id. at *6. The court 

also found that “the impetus for the investigation was not personal animus” or alleged “campaign 

promises, but was sworn congressional testimony by former Trump associate Michael Cohen” that 

the Trump Organization was “‘cooking the books.’” Id. at *5. Based on the court’s own review of 

“thousands of documents responsive to OAG’s prior subpoenas,” the court confirmed that OAG 

had a “sufficient basis for continuing its investigation,” which further undermined any claim that 

the “ongoing investigation is based on personal animus.” Id. at *4. The court also noted in rejecting 

Mr. Trump’s selective prosecution claim the lack of “any evidence that the law was not applied 

[by OAG] to others similarly situated.” Id. at *5. 

Mr. Trump appealed the February 2022 Order to the New York Appellate Division, First 

Department, which unanimously affirmed. People by James v. Trump Org., Inc., 205 A.D.3d 625, 

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625 (1st Dep’t 2022), appeal dismissed, 38 N.Y.3d 1053 (2022). The appellate court concluded 

that the “political campaign and other public statements” by AG James did not support a claim that 

OAG was improperly using civil subpoenas to undermine Mr. Trump’s rights. Id. at 626. The 

appellate court also determined that OAG’s Investigation—which followed the “public testimony 

of a senior corporate insider” Michael Cohen that the Trump Organization “had issued fraudulent 

financial statements”—was “lawfully initiated at its outset and well founded.” Id. And the court 

noted that OAG had reviewed “significant volumes of evidence” before subpoenaing Mr. Trump, 

who had not shown that any “similarly implicated” businesses or executives were treated 

differently. Id. at 627. Mr. Trump’s appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, New York’s highest 

court, was dismissed. People by James v. Trump Org., Inc., 38 N.Y.3d 1053 (2022). 

Based on information collected during the Investigation, OAG determined that Mr. Trump 

is the beneficial owner of the collection of entities he styles the “Trump Organization,” which 

includes the parent company The Trump Organization, Inc., a New York-based corporation. Until 

May 2016, Mr. Trump was the sole owner of The Trump Organization, Inc. As of at least 2017, 

The Trump Organization, Inc. has been wholly owned by DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC 

(a Delaware corporation), which in turn is owned by the “Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust” dated 

April 7, 2014 (the “Revocable Trust”). Mr. Trump is the donor and the sole beneficiary of the 

Revocable Trust, which was originally created and was operating under the laws of New York 

until sometime prior to December 2021 when it apparently became a Florida trust. 

B. Mr. Trump’s Federal New York Action 

In December 2021, the Trump Organization LLC and Mr. Trump filed a federal lawsuit 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against AG James in her official capacity in the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of New York styled Trump v. James, No. 21 Civ. 1352 (the “NDNY 

Action”). See Trump v. James, No. 21-cv-1352, 2022 WL 1718951, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 

2022). The lawsuit was filed nearly three years after OAG commenced its Investigation and more 

than a year after OAG commenced the NY Subpoena Action, but just weeks after OAG served its 

subpoena on Mr. Trump. By then, OAG had obtained through subpoenas more than 900,000 

documents, interviewed dozens of witnesses (including many senior officers of the Trump 

Organization), and litigated numerous subpoena-compliance issues before Justice Engoron in the 

NY Subpoena Action. 

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The NDNY Action sought declaratory relief and an injunction halting or limiting OAG’s 

Investigation. Id. The complaint raised four nominally separate but overlapping claims, alleging 

that: (i) OAG launched the Investigation in bad faith, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

Due Process Clause: (ii) the Investigation was intended to retaliate against Mr. Trump’s political 

speech, in violation of the First Amendment; (iii) the document subpoenas to Mr. Trump and the 

Trump Organization were overbroad, unduly burdensome, and sought irrelevant material, in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (iv) OAG’s subpoenas constituted abuse of process. Id. 

at *4. In support of each of these claims, Mr. Trump and the Trump Organization relied on many 

of the same public comments by AG James cited in Mr. Trump’s motion to quash filed in the NY 

Subpoena Action and referenced in the Amended Complaint in this action. Compare id. at *1-4 

with February 2021 Order, 2022 WL 489625, at *1 with Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-73. 

Shortly after commencing the NDNY Action, Mr. Trump and the Trump Organization filed 

a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin OAG’s Investigation or disqualify AG James from 

involvement in the Investigation. 2022 WL 1718951, at *1. OAG opposed the motion and crossmoved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) based on abstention and under Rule 12(b)(6) 

based on preclusion and failure to allege a plausible claim for relief. See Id. at *8. By decision and 

order dated May 27, 2022 (“May 2022 Order”), the court granted the motion to dismiss and denied 

the motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. Id. at *20. In dismissing the complaint, the district 

court held that res judicata barred the action based on the preclusive effect of Justice Engoron’s 

February 2022 Order. Id. at *19. The court observed that Mr. Trump and the Trump Organization 

already had raised or “could have raised the claims and requested the relief they seek in the federal 

action” in the NY Subpoena Action, which it held arose from the same series of transactions—

OAG’s Investigation into the Trump Organization—and involved the same or related facts. Id. at 

*19. The court also concluded that dismissal was warranted under Younger abstention, finding that 

the NY Subpoena Action was a pending civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in 

furtherance of the state court’s ability to perform its judicial functions – namely, a prior ruling by 

Justice Engoron holding Mr. Trump in civil contempt. Id. at *10-14. The court explained that 

enjoining OAG’s Investigation “would have the practical effect of interfering with the contempt 

ruling in the New York proceeding” and would risk negating that order. Id. at *11. Mr. Trump and 

the Trump Organization appealed the May 2022 Order, which is currently sub judice. 

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C. OAG’s New York Enforcement Action 

Based on the findings of the Investigation, on September 21, 2022, OAG commenced an 

enforcement action pursuant to New York Executive Law § 63(12) (“NY Enforcement Action”) 

alleging that Mr. Trump, other individuals affiliated with his New York-based business, and 

various Trump Organization entities engaged in repeated and persistent fraud and illegality by 

inflating asset values on Mr. Trump’s annual statements of financial condition (“Statements”) 

covering at least the years 2011 through 2021 and presenting those Statements to lenders and 

insurers licensed in New York to obtain favorable loan and insurance terms they would otherwise 

not have been entitled to receive. See People by James v. Donald J. Trump, No. 452562/2022 (Sup. 

Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Nov. 3, 2022), slip op. at 1-2 (“November 2022 Order”), available at 

https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/ecf_-_decision_on_pi.pdf.1

On October 13, 2022, based on certain actions taken by Mr. Trump and the Trump 

Organization—including the formation of a new corporate entity in Delaware named “The Trump 

Organization LLC” and the registration of that entity as a foreign corporation in New York the 

same day that OAG filed the NY Enforcement Action—OAG filed a motion for a preliminary 

injunction to maintain the status quo and obtain a court-appointed independent monitor to oversee 

the Trump Organization’s future transfer of assets and financial disclosures, including any 

continued use of the Statements to meet loan covenants and to obtain new loans and insurance 

coverage. Id. at 1-2. By Decision and Order dated November 3, 2022 (the “PI Order”), Justice 

Engoron granted OAG’s motion, finding that the evidence presented by OAG was “more than 

sufficient to demonstrate OAG’s likelihood of success on the merits” and “the balancing of the 

equities tips, strongly, if not completely, in favor of granting a preliminary injunction, particularly 

to ensure that defendants do not dissipate their assets or transfer them out of this jurisdiction.” Id. 

at 9. Additionally, the court ordered the appointment of an independent monitor, finding it ‘the 

most prudent and narrowly tailored mechanism to ensure there is no further fraud or illegality . . . 

                                                            

1 A district court may take judicial notice of public records that are “not subject to reasonable 

dispute” because they are “‘capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 

accuracy could not reasonably be questioned.’” Horne v. Potter, 392 F. App'x 800, 802 (11th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). This includes “information readily available on the websites 

of government agencies” because “such information [is] not subject to reasonable dispute and [i]s 

capable of accurate and ready determination.” Ryzhov v. Mayorkas, No. 21-CV-23596, 2022 WL 

10869910, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2022).

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pending the final disposition” of the action, and ordered Mr. Trump and the other defendants to 

produce to the monitor, among other things, a “full and accurate description of the structure and 

liquid and illiquid holdings and assets of the Trump Organization, its subsidiaries, and all other 

affiliates.” Id. at 10. On November 14, 2022, Justice Engoron appointed the Honorable Barbara 

Jones, a retired federal judge and the consensus candidate of all parties, to serve as monitor, and 

on November 17, 2022, he ordered that defendants provide the corporate structure documents to 

the monitor by no later than November 30, 2022. See Supplemental Decision + Order on Motion 

(NYSCEF No. 193) and Supplemental Monitorship Order (NYSCEF No. 194) (“Supp. Monitor 

Order”), copies of which are attached as Composite Exhibit 1. 

Mr. Trump and the other defendants appealed the PI Order to the New York Appellate 

Division, First Department, and simultaneously moved before the appellate court for a stay pending 

appeal and an interim stay pending a decision on the stay motion. The First Department denied the 

request for an interim stay on November 9, 2022, and the defendants withdrew their motion for a 

stay pending appeal on December 1, 2022 (although they are continuing to pursue their appeal of 

the PI Order on the merits). 

D. Mr. Trump’s Florida Action 

 Mr. Trump filed this action in Florida state court on November 2, 2022, just prior to 

argument on OAG’s preliminary injunction motion in the NY Enforcement Action. Then on 

November 15, 2022, less than two weeks after Justice Engoron granted OAG’s preliminary 

injunction motion and ordered the appointment of an independent monitor, Mr. Trump filed his 

Amended Complaint along with his Motion, and OAG removed the action to this Court. 

 In the Amended Complaint, Mr. Trump asserts three causes of action. In “Count I” he 

alleges that AG James’s conduct “in commencing and continuing” the NY Subpoena Action and 

NY Enforcement Action (collectively, the “NY Proceedings”), seeking discovery of his Revocable 

Trust documents (which he alleges is “reasonable to conclude” AG James would “widely 

publish”), and making referrals to other law enforcement agencies based on her findings from the 

Investigation violate his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 

Constitution, including freedom of speech and association, privacy, due process, equal protection, 

and privileges and immunities. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 112-14. On this count he seeks compensatory and 

punitive damages along with unspecified declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at p. 31 (Wherefore 

clause). In “Count II” and “Count III” Mr. Trump alleges that AG James’s discovery of his 

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Revocable Trust documents and public disclosure of those documents (presumed based on AG 

James’s “past conduct”) would violate his rights to privacy and property (Count II) and his rights 

as grantor and beneficiary of the Revocable Trust (Count III) protected by Florida law. Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 136-37, 139, 147. On these counts he seeks an injunction restraining AG James and “all other 

persons in active concert or participation with her . . . from requesting, demanding, obtaining, 

possessing, or disclosing a copy of his” Revocable Trust documents or restraining his “ability to 

amend, modify or revoke the Trust” and a declaration that AG James “has no authority to supplant 

or control the powers of the trustee” of his trust. Am. Compl. at pp. 35-36 (Wherefore clauses). 

 In his Motion, Mr. Trump seeks an order temporarily enjoining AG James and “any other 

persons in active concert or participation with her . . . from requesting, demanding, obtaining, 

possessing, or disclosing the 2020 or 2022 amendments” to his Revocable Trust. Motion at 1. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The decision of whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is within the sound 

discretion of the district court. Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir.2002). A district 

court may grant a preliminary injunction only upon a showing by the moving party that: (1) it has 

a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the 

injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed 

injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to 

the public interest. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami–Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 

1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000)). The 

third and fourth factors merge where, as here, the government is the opposing party. Gonzalez v. 

Governor of Georgia, 978 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020). 

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless 

the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to the four requisites.” Am. Civil 

Liberties Union, 557 F.3d at 1198 (quoting All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., 

Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir.1989)). “Failure to show any of the four factors is fatal, and 

the most common failure is not showing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. 

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ARGUMENT 

I. PLAINTIFF HAS NO SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE 

MERITS FOR MULTIPLE, INDEPENDENT REASONS 

A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over AG James 

A federal court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction 

of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(k)(1)(A). Accordingly, personal jurisdiction in this District may be established under Florida 

law. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 

Mr. Trump alleges two bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over AG James under 

Florida law: (i) Florida Statute § 736.0202 (“Trust Code”), see Am. Compl. ¶ 18; and (ii) Florida 

Statute § 48.193(1)(a)(2) (“Long-Arm Statute”), see Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Neither statute provides a 

basis for the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over AG James. 

First, Mr. Trump relies on a provision of the Trust Code stating that a person “submits to 

the jurisdiction of the courts of” Florida by “[a]ccept[ing] or exercis[ing] a delegation of powers 

or duties from the trustee of a trust having its principal place of administration in” Florida. FLA.

STAT. § 736.0202(a)(4); Am. Compl. ¶ 18. Mr. Trump’s reliance on this provision is unavailing as 

he fails to allege that AG James has made any attempt to accept or exercise a delegation of powers 

or duties delegated to the trustee of the Revocable Trust. Instead, Mr. Trump alleges that AG James 

seeks certain relief in the NY Proceedings that he contends would amount to “oversight and 

control” of the Revocable Trust “threatening to substantially interfere with the ability of the trustee 

. . . to carry out its provisions and discharge his duties in accordance with Florida law.” Am. Compl. 

¶ 88. But this is a conclusory allegation that is entitled to no weight, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009), and in any event does not amount to accepting or exercising a delegation of 

powers or duties delegated to the trustee as required under Fla. Stat. § 736.0202(a)(4) to subject a 

party to the jurisdiction of a Florida court. See MC Tr. v. De Mishaan, 273 So. 3d 1065 (Mem) 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (affirming dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under Trust Code in suit 

against non-resident trustee because plaintiff “failed to meet his burden of establishing that 

[defendant] had the requisite minimum contacts with the State of Florida or that the alleged 

actionable tort was committed in Florida”). 

Second, Mr. Trump relies on the specific jurisdiction provision of the Long-Arm Statute 

subjecting a nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction in Florida “for any cause of action 

arising from . . . [c]ommitting a tortious act within [Florida].” FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a)(2); Am. 

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Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.2 A nonresident defendant commits “a tortious act within [Florida]” when she 

commits an act outside the state that causes injury within Florida. See Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 

1353; Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1215-17 (11th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). “A 

plaintiff seeking to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ‘bears the initial 

burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.’” 

Louis Vuitton , 736 F.3d at 1350 (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th 

Cir. 2009)).

The Amended Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish any tortious acts by AG 

James outside Florida causing injury to Mr. Trump within Florida. Mr. Trump’s claims appear to 

be based entirely on actions taken by AG James in New York in connection with the Investigation 

and NY Proceedings, but he fails to articulate how such actions have caused him any injury at all, 

much less injury in Florida; Mr. Trump being investigated and sued for fraud and OAG receiving 

trust documents in discovery is not “injury.” See Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 850-51 (11th 

Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 356 (2012) (holding there is no clearly established right to be free from 

an investigation, even if retaliatory); cf. Trump v. U.S., No. 22-13005, 2022 WL 17352069, at *7 

(11th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022) (holding there is no irreparable harm from prosecutors reading 

unprivileged sensitive documents lawfully obtained). Thus, Mr. Trump fails “to make out a prima 

facie case of jurisdiction” under the Long-Arm Statute. United Techs. Corp., 556 F.3d at 1274. 

But even if the exercise of personal jurisdiction over AG James would be permitted under 

Florida law (which is not the case), there are insufficient minimum contacts between AG James 

and Florida to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Sculptchair, Inc. 

v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir. 1996); Silver v. Glinkenhouse, No. 06-cv-81025, 

2007 WL 9701847, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2007). A court's jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies 

due process when there are “minimum contacts,” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 

310, 316 (1945), between the defendant and the forum “such that [s]he should reasonably anticipate 

                                                            

2

 Mr. Trump understandably does not allege that AG James is subject to general jurisdiction in 

Florida under the Long-Arm Statute – which requires “substantial and not isolated activity within 

[Florida] . . . whether or not the claim arises from that activity,” §48.193(2). See Louis Vuitton 

Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 2013) (discussing general and specific 

personal jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute); Noble House, LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 

London, No. 20-62080-CIV, 2021 WL 896219, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2021) (same). 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 16 of 27
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being haled into court there,” World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 

(1980). Such minimum contacts must show that “the defendant purposefully avail[ed] [her]self of 

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 

Here, Mr. Trump alleges no contact by AG James with Florida, and the NY Proceedings 

focus on fraud and illegality in Mr. Trump’s financial statements presented in New York to 

lenders and insurers licensed in New York. All of the actions by AG James alleged in the 

Amended Complaint as the bases for Mr. Trump’s three causes of action relate to conduct 

undertaken by AG James and OAG in the NY Proceedings in New York – pursuing the 

Investigation, seeking to enforce subpoenas in the NY Subpoena Action, commencing the NY 

Enforcement Action, and seeking discovery of the Revocable Trust documents in the NY 

Proceedings. Nor does it matter under a minimum contacts analysis that Mr. Trump unilaterally 

decided to change his residency to Florida and amend the situs of his Revocable Trust from New 

York to Florida after the Investigation was well underway. Simply put, nothing about AG James’s 

pursuit of an investigation and enforcement action in her role as New York’s Attorney General, 

authorized by New York law, and occurring entirely within New York and focusing on fraud and 

illegality committed in New York as part of business transactions with lenders and insurers in New 

York creates any contact between her and Florida “such that [she] should reasonably anticipate 

being haled into court” in this District, World–Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297, or supports a 

finding that she “purposefully avail[ed] [herself] of the privilege of conducting activities within 

the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,” Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. 

Finally, considerations of federalism and state sovereignty — implicated here because 

AG James is, despite Mr. Trump’s characterization otherwise, being sued in her official capacity, 

see, infra, at 13-14 — provide further bases for finding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

over AG James would be unreasonable under the Due Process Clause. “Federalism and state 

sovereignty are an essential part of the constraints that due process imposes upon personal 

jurisdiction,” and they prevent a federal district court from exercising personal jurisdiction “over 

a nonresident state official.” Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Wercinski, 513 F.3d 476, 488 (5th Cir. 2008). 

“The sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister 

States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” World–Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293. “The effect of holding that 

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a federal district court in [Florida] had personal jurisdiction over a nonresident state official would 

create an avenue for challenging the validity of one state’s laws in courts located in another state. 

This practice would greatly diminish the independence of the states.” Stroman, 513 F.3d at 488; 

see also PTI, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1189 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2000) 

(requiring one state to submit to the long-arm jurisdiction of another state “constitutes an extreme 

impingement on state sovereignty”).

Because there is no personal jurisdiction over AG James, Mr. Trump has no substantial 

likelihood of success on the merits and the Court has no jurisdiction to enter the requested 

temporary injunction. 

B. This Action Is Barred By New York’s Interstate Sovereign Immunity 

A state’s “sovereign immunity is a historically rooted principle embedded in the text and 

structure of the Constitution” that bars private suits against a state in the courts of other states. See

Franchise Tax Board of Ca. v. Hyatt, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492, 1499 (2019). This 

“interstate sovereign immunity [] preserved in the constitutional design,” id. at 1496, derives from 

the centuries-old view that no sovereign may “be sued without its consent,” which was “universal 

in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–

16 (1999). As the Supreme Court announced in Hyatt, “States retain their [interstate] sovereign 

immunity from private suits brought in the courts of other States.” 139 S. Ct. at 1492. The Hyatt 

Court rested its decision on the recognition that the Constitution “‘preserve[s] the States’ 

traditional immunity from private suits,’” which “‘neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms 

of the Eleventh Amendment.’” Id. at 1496 (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 723-24). 

While a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit upon removing a case 

to federal court, Lapides v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 618 (2002), it 

does not “waive[] any defense it would have enjoyed in state court,” including interstate sovereign 

immunity independent of the Eleventh Amendment, Stroud v. McIntosh, 722 F.3d 1294, 1302 (11th 

Cir. 2013) (quoted in Page v. Hicks, 773 F. App’x 514, 518 (11th Cir. 2019)). Accordingly, 

notwithstanding the removal of this case to federal court, New York retains its interstate sovereign 

immunity, which serves as a bar to a court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over all types 

of official capacity claims against a state official, regardless of whether the claims seek damages 

or injunctive or declaratory relief. See Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1496 (“The sovereign immunity of the 

States, we have said, neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. 

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Consistent with this understanding of state sovereign immunity, this Court has held that the 

Constitution bars suits against nonconsenting States in a wide range of cases.”); State v. Great 

Lakes Mins., LLC, 597 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Ky. 2019) (“The U.S. Supreme Court in [Hyatt] made 

no distinction between claims seeking monetary damages and claims seeking other types of 

relief.”). 

Sovereign immunity applies here because the action seeks relief against AG James in her 

official capacity, and so is a suit against New York State as the “real, substantial party in interest.” 

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984); Carr v. City of 

Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990). Mr. Trump cannot overcome New York’s 

interstate sovereign immunity from suit by characterizing the action in the caption of the Amended 

Complaint as being against AG James “individually,” Am. Compl. at p. 1, because the “complaint 

itself, not the caption, controls the identification of the parties and the capacity in which they are 

sued,” Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1995). “[C]ourts should look to whether the 

sovereign is the real party in interest to determine whether sovereign immunity bars the suit.” Lewis 

v. Clarke, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1290 (2017). In making this assessment, courts must 

determine in the first instance whether the remedy sought is against the sovereign rather than the 

named defendant herself. See In re New York (Walsh), 256 U.S. 490, 500–502 (1921); see also

Lewis, 137 S. Ct. at 1291 (“In an official-capacity claim, the relief sought is only nominally against 

the official and in fact is against the official's office and thus the sovereign itself.”). A court must 

“analyze the complaint to determine whether the requested relief operates against the office the 

individual holds—or rather, against the individual [her]self.” Attwood v. Clemons, 818 F. App'x 

863, 872 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). 

Here, the relief sought is against OAG, not AG James herself. In count one of the Amended 

Complaint, Mr. Trump alleges AG James’s “conduct in commencing and continuing the [NY 

Proceedings], making numerous referrals to other agencies” based on OAG’s findings, and using 

“her authority and deployment of state power” have purportedly violated his constitutional rights. 

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 113, 116. Based on this alleged conduct, Mr. Trump seeks compensatory damages 

“potentially as high as $250,000,000 in confiscation from the [NY Enforcement Action],” legal 

fees and costs in defending against the NY Proceedings, and other damages to be proven at trial. 

Id. ¶ 120. In counts two and three, Mr. Trump’s allegations of purported state law violations focus 

on OAG’s conduct in the NY Proceedings, and more specifically OAG’s efforts to obtain in 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 19 of 27
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discovery documents related to his Revocable Trust and to have Justice Engoron appoint an 

independent monitor in the NY Enforcement Action. Id. ¶¶ 136, 147. Based on this alleged 

conduct, Mr. Trump seeks to restrain AG James and OAG attorneys from seeking or obtaining 

through discovery in the NY Proceedings the Revocable Trust documents or seeking any relief in 

the NY Proceedings that would purportedly interfere with his rights or the rights of the trustee with 

respect to the Revocable Trust. Id. at p. 35-37 (“Wherefore” clauses). All of this relief is against 

the office that AG James holds, not against her individually, Attwood, 818 F. App'x at 872, and 

therefore this is an official capacity suit where New York is the real, substantial party in interest, 

Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101, and Carr v., 916 F.2d at 1524 (citing Pennhurst). 

Finally, even if the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity recognized in Ex parte 

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), were extended to apply to interstate sovereign immunity, it would not 

change the outcome; the exception applies only to federal law claims seeking prospective 

injunctive relief, see Virginia Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011), and 

Schultz v. Alabama, 42 F.4th 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2022), and therefore would not apply to Mr. 

Trump’s second and third counts based exclusively on state law or his claim for money damages 

in his first count, and his claim for prospective injunctive relief in his first count is otherwise not 

viable because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction, and the claim is otherwise barred by issue and 

claim preclusion and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for the reasons set forth below. 

C. This Action Is Barred By Issue And Claim Preclusion 

Mr. Trump’s action fails to state a claim because it is barred by the preclusive effect of a 

prior final orders in the NY Subpoena Action and the NDNY Action. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738, 

the federal courts “must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be 

given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. 

Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); see also Amey, Inc. v. Gulf 

Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1509 (11th Cir.1985) (cleaned up) (cited in Kizzire v. Baptist 

Health Sys., Inc., 441 F.3d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)). Here, the doctrines of claim and issue 

preclusion under New York law apply to bar this action. 

Because Mr. Trump’s claims are predicated on AG James’s public statements and supposed 

animus against him in commencing and pursuing the NY Proceedings, they are barred by issue 

preclusion, or collateral estoppel. Under collateral estoppel, “issues actually decided in valid 

state-court judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of the ‘right’ to have their federal claims 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 20 of 27
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relitigated in federal court.” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 

323, 342 (2005). That is so because adverse findings “are entitled to the same preclusive effect in 

a subsequent federal § 1983 suit as they enjoy in the courts of the State where the judgment was 

rendered.” Migra, 465 U.S. at 83. New York will bar relitigation of an issue that “is identical to an 

issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action,” if “the plaintiff had a 

full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.” Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d 

343, 350 (1999). 

Collateral estoppel applies here because all of Mr. Trump’s claims depend on two key 

issues—each of which was fully litigated and necessarily decided twice, once in the NY Subpoena 

Action and again in the NDNY Action. First, Mr. Trump’s claims are based on the contention that 

OAG’s Investigation has an improper purpose of “intimidating and harassing” Mr. Trump and the 

Trump Organization based on “personal and political animus.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 72. Second, and 

relatedly, his claims are premised on the theory that OAG’s Investigation and pursuit of the NY 

Subpoena Action are an “unlawful abuse of [AG James’s] authority and deployment of state 

power” to discriminate against him in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. ¶116. Mr. Trump 

raised and litigated these same issues in the NY Subpoena Action on his motion to quash, arguing 

among other things that the Investigation was purportedly predicated on improper animus towards 

him and amounted to selective prosecution in violation of his constitutional rights. February 2022 

Order, 2022 WL 489625, at *4-5. These arguments in the NY Subpoena Action rested almost 

entirely on the same public comments by AG James cited in the Amended Complaint in this action. 

Compare id. at *4 with Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-73. Justice Engoron rejected these arguments, finding 

that “the impetus for the investigation was not personal animus” and confirming that OAG had a 

“sufficient basis for continuing its investigation.” February 2022 Order, 2022 WL 489625, at *4-

5. On appeal from the February 2022 Order, the appellate court similarly concluded that the 

“political campaign and other public statements” by AG James did not support a claim that OAG 

was improperly using civil subpoenas to undermine Mr. Trump’s rights and that OAG’s 

Investigation was “lawfully initiated at its outset and well founded.” People v. Trump, 205 A.D.3d 

at 626. 

Mr. Trump attempted to relitigate these same issues for a second time in the NDNY Action, 

asserting in his complaint there that AG James commenced the Investigation in bad faith and an 

abuse of power to retaliate against Mr. Trump in violation of his constitutional rights. See, supra, 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 21 of 27
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at 5. More specifically, in opposing AG James’s motion to dismiss the NDNY Action on Younger

abstention grounds, Mr. Trump argued that the bad faith exception to Younger abstention applies 

because OAG’s Investigation lacked a legitimate basis when commenced and “was brought for a 

retaliatory, harassing, or other improper purpose.” Trump v. James, No. 21-cv-1352, 2022 WL 

1718951, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2022). In rejecting Mr. Trump’s argument, the court found 

that the statements by AG James – which are largely the same statements by AG James referenced 

in the Amended Complaint (compare id. at *1-4 with Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-73) – did not establish 

“that the [NY Subpoena Action] was commenced for the purpose of retaliation” and had a 

“legitimate factual predicate,” namely, the congressional testimony of Michael Cohen. 2022 WL 

1718951, at *13. As noted by the court, “[w]hile [AG James’s] public statements make clear that 

she disagrees vehemently with Mr. Trump’s political views, [Mr. Trump does] not identify what 

protected speech or conduct [AG James] allegedly retaliated against [him] for or demonstrate any 

causal connection between any such protected activity and the decision to commence” the NY 

Subpoena Action. Id. Finally, the court found that Mr. Trump “submitted no evidence that the [NY 

Subpoena Action] has been conducted in such a way as to constitute harassment.” Id. 

Mr. Trump cannot plausibly contend that he lacked a fair opportunity to litigate these issues 

having chosen to raise the same arguments and rely on the same evidence in both the NY Subpoena 

Action and the NDNY Action he now seeks to raise here. A party cannot base an action on 

“virtually a verbatim repetition” of allegations from prior proceedings that resulted in adverse 

rulings on “dispositive factual and legal issues.” Parker, 93 N.Y.2d at 350; see also Allen v. 

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980). 

Claim preclusion, or res judicata, also applies to bar this action. Under New York law, the 

doctrine of res judicata applies where: (1) the previous action involved an adjudication on the 

merits; (2) the previous action involved the plaintiffs or those in privity with them; and (3) the 

claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action. See 

Allen, 449 U.S. at 94; Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Celotex Corp., 56 F.3d 343, 345–46 (2d Cir. 

1995). Under New York’s transactional approach to res judicata, “‘once a claim is brought to a 

final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are 

barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy’” from the prior 

action. Simmons v. Trans Express Inc., 37 N.Y.3d 107, 111 (2021) (quoting O’Brien v. City of 

Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357 (1981)). 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 22 of 27
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As already held by Judge Sannes when dismissing Mr. Trump’s NDNY Action, all three 

elements are satisfied here based on Justice Engoron’s February 2022 Order. Trump v. James, 

2022 WL 1718951, at *16-19. First, the February 22 Order, which denied Mr. Trump’s motion to 

quash OAG’s subpoena and granted OAG’s cross-motion to compel compliance, is a final 

judgment on the merits which brought the parties’ claims regarding compliance with the subpoena 

to a final conclusion. Id. at *17. Second, there is an identity of parties because the February 2022 

Order decided Mr. Trump’s motion. Id. Third, Mr. Trump had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 

in the NY Subpoena Action the propriety of OAG’s Investigation and OAG’s document demands. 

Id. at *18-19. Just as the court in the NDNY Action applied the doctrine of res judicata to preclude 

Mr. Trump from interfering in the NY Proceedings, so to should this Court. 

D. This Action Is Barred Under The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil 

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 281 (2005); Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1172. The 

doctrine extends to claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment. Dale v. 

Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir.1997). A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state 

court judgment “if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided 

the issues before it.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). 

Here, Mr. Trump is a state-court loser subject to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because this 

action, by expressly seeking compensatory and punitive damages for AG James’s “conduct in 

commencing and continuing” the NY Proceedings, Am. Compl. ¶ 113, and otherwise seeking to 

enjoin OAG from pursuing discovery of trust-related documents in the NY Proceedings, invites 

the Court to reject multiple orders issued by Justice Engoron: (i) the February 2022 Order 

upholding the bona fides of OAG’s Investigation, rejecting Mr. Trump’s selective prosecution 

claim, and compelling Mr. Trump to comply with OAG’s subpoena; (ii) the PI Order granting 

preliminary injunctive relief to maintain the status quo and require Mr. Trump to produce to the 

monitor documentation providing a “full and accurate description of the structure and liquid and 

illiquid holdings and assets of the Trump Organization, its subsidiaries, and all other affiliates,” 

November 2022 Order at 10; and (iii) the orders appointing the monitor and detailing the monitor’s 

duties, Supp. Monitor Order (Exhibit 1). Effectively, Mr. Trump is asking this Court to override 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 23 of 27
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Justice Engoron’s rulings that Mr. Trump claims will injure him by making him defend against a 

civil enforcement proceeding and, as relevant to this motion, disclose business-oriented 

information that he would rather shield from view. The exclusive means to challenge these prior 

state determinations would be to appeal within the New York state court system—not to seek a 

preliminary injunction from a federal district court sitting over a thousand miles away. At 

minimum, Mr. Trump’s claims here are “inextricably intertwined” with the prior state court 

determinations. Dale, 121 F.3d at 626. 

II. THERE IS NO IRREPARABLE HARM 

“[E]ven if [a party] establish[es] a likelihood of success on the merits, the absence of a 

substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive 

relief improper.” Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176 (quoted in Georgia Muslim Voter Project v. Kemp, 918 

F.3d 1262, 1267 (11th Cir. 2019)). That is because “[a] showing of irreparable injury is the sine 

qua non of injunctive relief.” Id. (cleaned up). “[T]he asserted irreparable injury must be neither 

remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” Id. (cleaned up); Pinnacle Advert. & Mktg. Grp., 

Inc. v. Pinnacle Advert. & Mktg. Grp., LLC, No. 18-cv-81606, 2019 WL 3890368, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 

June 27, 2019) (same). 

Mr. Trump fails to establish he will suffer any injury in the absence of the requested 

temporary injunction, much less injury that is irreparable. That is because his counsel advised she 

would be producing the trust documents to OAG in redacted form, “without disclosing estate 

planning information.” Am. Compl., Exh. A at 2 (September 16, 2022 email from Alina Habba, 

Esq.). Although counsel has not yet produced the redacted trust documents as promised, Mr. 

Trump has not asserted any basis to presume that OAG will object to his counsel’s production of 

a set of the trust documents redacted to protect just the estate planning information – the only 

information he contends will result in constitutional harm to him if publicly disclosed. Similarly, 

there is no factual basis to suggest that any trust documents to be produced to OAG in the NY 

Proceedings in whatever form they take will be “widely publish[ed],” Am. Compl. ¶ 112. See 

Trump, 2022 WL 17352069, at *7 (“The district court's unsupported conclusion that government 

possession of seized evidence creates an ‘unquantifiable’ risk of public disclosure is not enough 

to show that Plaintiff faces irreparable harm.”); cf. Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374, 

385 (2d Cir. 2018) (rejecting as “not well pled” a conclusory allegation that there is the possibility 

that the NY Attorney General might publicize donors’ identities). Indeed, the defendants in the 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 24 of 27
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NY Proceedings have already made a partial production of the Revocable Trust documents to 

OAG, see Am. Compl. at Exh. A (September 8, 2022 email from Colleen Faherty, Esq. describing 

excerpted trust documents received), and Mr. Trump does not (and cannot) allege that OAG has 

“widely publish[ed]” any of that material. 

Finally, “a preliminary injunction is premised on the need for speedy and urgent action to 

protect a plaintiff's rights before a case can be resolved on its merits.” Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, 

Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Therefore, “a party's failure to act with 

speed or urgency in moving for a preliminary injunction necessarily undermines a finding of 

irreparable harm.” Id. (quoted in Tuna Fam. Mgmt Inc. v. All Tr. Mgmt. Inc., No. 20-cv-14017, 

2021 WL 4775076, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2021)). Here, OAG requested on September 1, 2022 

that Mr. Trump produce as soon as possible “the documents establishing” his Revocable Trust, 

noting that these are “basic, foundational documents” because the trust “holds all of the assets 

valued in the [Statements] and its Trustees are responsible for presentation of the [S]tatements 

from 2016 forward.” See Am. Compl., Exh. A at 5 (September 1, 2022 email from Colleen Faherty, 

Esq.). Yet Mr. Trump waited over two and a half months, until November 15, 2022, to file his 

Motion. This delay “militates against a finding of irreparable harm.” Wreal, 840 F.3d at 1248. 

III. THE EQUITIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST WEIGH IN OAG’S FAVOR 

Preliminary injunctive relief may be awarded only if the “public interest would not be 

disserved” by the issuance of a preliminary injunction. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 

U.S. 388, 391 (2006)); see also Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 

(2008) (“In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the 

public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.”) (quoting Weinberger 

v. Romer-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). 

The equities and public interest, which merge because the government is the opposing 

party, Gonzalez, 978 F.3d at 1271, weigh strongly in favor of having AG James and OAG continue 

pursuing the NY Proceedings that are focused on preventing further fraud and misrepresentation 

by Mr. Trump and his company in financial disclosures provided to financial institutions doing 

business in New York. See November 2022 Order, slip op. at 9 (finding that the evidence presented 

by OAG in support of its preliminary injunction motion was “more than sufficient to demonstrate 

OAG’s likelihood of success on the merits”); Mirka United, Inc. v. Cuomo, No. 06-cv-14292, 2007 

WL 4225487, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007) (holding New York has an important interest in 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 25 of 27
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“investigating and preventing fraudulent conduct”). In contrast, Mr. Trump’s argument that the 

public would be better served by the Court’s interference with the NY Proceedings rests entirely 

on rank speculation that he will be compelled to provide an unredacted set of his trust documents 

to OAG (contrary to his counsel’s stated intentions) and that OAG will widely publish the 

documents when obtained, neither of which has any evidentiary support. 

CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s Motion in its entirety, 

along with any other relief the Court deems necessary and appropriate. 

Dated: December 7, 2022 LETITIA JAMES 

Attorney General of the State of New York 

BILZIN SUMBERG BAENA PRICE & 

AXELROD LLP 

1450 Brickell Avenue, Suite 2300 

Miami, Florida 33131-3456 

Tel: (305) 374-7580 

By: Melissa Pallett-Vasquez 

 Melissa Pallett-Vasquez 

 Fla. Bar No. 715816 

 Robert W. Turken 

 Fla. Bar No. 306355 

 Jeffrey Snyder 

 Fla. Bar No. 21281 

 mpallett@bilzin.com

 rturken@bilzin.com

 jsnyder@bilzin.com

 stapanes@bilzin.com

 vlopez@bilzin.com

 eservice@bilzin.com 

Andrew S. Amer (admitted pro hac vice) 

 Special Counsel 

Colleen K. Faherty (admitted pro hac vice) 

 Assistant Attorney General 

28 Liberty Street 

New York, New York 10005 

(212) 416-6127/6046 

andrew.amer@ag.ny.gov 

colleen.faherty@ag.ny.gov 

Attorneys for Defendant Letitia James 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 26 of 27
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing was served this 7th day of 

December, 2022 upon all counsel of record via CM/ECF. 

 

 /s/Melissa Pallett-Vasquez 

 Melissa Pallett-Vasquez 

Case 9:22-cv-81780-DMM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2022 Page 27 of 27