EXHIBIT 3

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, BY 

LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General of the State 

of New York, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

DONALD J. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP, JR., 

ERIC TRUMP, IVANKA TRUMP, ALLEN 

WEISSELBERG, JEFFREY MCCONNEY, THE 

DONALD J. TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST, 

THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION, INC., TRUMP 

ORGANIZATION LLC, DJT HOLDINGS LLC, 

DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER, 

TRUMP ENDEAVOR 12 LLC, 401 NORTH 

WABASH VENTURE LLC, TRUMP OLD POST 

OFFICE LLC, 40 WALL STREET LLC, and 

SEVEN SPRINGS LLC,

Defendants.

Index No.: 452564/2022 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS 

OF DEFENDANTS, THE TRUMP ORGANIZATION, INC., TRUMP 

ORGANIZATION LLC, AND DONALD J. TRUMP

ALINA HABBA

MICHAEL T. MADAIO

HABBA MADAIO & ASSOCIATES LLP

1430 U.S. Highway 206, Suite 240 

Bedminster, New Jersey 07921 

-and112 West 34th Street, 17th & 18th Floors 

New York, New York 10120 

Phone: (908) 869-1188 

Email: ahabba@habbalaw.com 

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NYSCEF DOC. NO. 197 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/21/2022

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1 

STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................................................................3 

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................3 

I. THE NYAG LACKS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION ........................................3 

A. The NYAG Must Demonstrate That It Has Standing Under the Parens 

Patriae Doctrine ......................................................................................................3 

B. The NYAG Cannot Establish Parens Patriae Standing ..........................................5 

i. The Complaint Does Not Identify a Quasi-Sovereign Interest ....................6 

ii. The Subject Matter of this Action Does Not Affect a Substantial 

 Segment of the State’s Population ..............................................................8 

iii. The NYAG Seeks to Vindicate the Rights of Private Parties Who Have 

Their Own Adequate Remedy at Law .........................................................9 

II. THE NYAG IS WITHOUT LEGAL CAPACITY TO BRING THE SUIT .....................11 

III. THE NYAG HAS VIOLATED THE DEFENDANTS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 

TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS...................................................................13 

A. The NYAG is Selectively Enforcing Executive Law § 63(12) Against 

Defendants .............................................................................................................14 

i. Defendants Have Been Singled Out and Subject to Selective Treatment

by the NYAG ............................................................................................15 

ii. The NYAG’s Selective Treatment of Defendants is a Byproduct of AG 

James’s Personal and Political Animus Towards Them ............................17 

B. The NYAG is Improperly Targeting Defendants as a “Class of One” ..................20 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS .......21 

V. PLAINTIFF’S FRAUD CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY DOCUMENTARY 

EVIDENCE AND FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM ..............................................................21 

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................23 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

303 West 42nd v. Klein, 

46 N.Y.2d 686, 694 (N.Y. 1979) .......................................................................................14 

Alfred L. Snapp & Son. v. Puerto Rico, 

458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) .............................................................................................4, 5, 6 

AYDM Assocs. v. Town of Pamelia, 

205 F. Supp. 3d 252, 265 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) ................................................................14, 15 

Bizzarro v. Miranda, 

394 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005)...........................................................................................18 

Bower Assoc. v. Town of Pleasant Val., 

2 N.Y.3d 617, 631 (2004 .............................................................................................15, 18 

Caprer v. Nussbaum, 

36 A.D.3d, 176, 182 (2006). ................................................................................................3 

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne, 

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) ...................................................................................................14 

Community Bd. 7 v. Schaffer, 

84 N.Y.2d 148, 155 (1994). ...............................................................................................11 

Gerschel v. Christensen, 

128 A.D.3d 455 (1st Dep’t 2015). .....................................................................................21 

Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 

441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) ...................................................................................................4, 5 

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Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 

43 N.Y.2d 268, 273 (1977). .............................................................................................2, 8 

Harlen Associates v. Village of Mineola, 

273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001).......................................................................................14 

HSH Nordbank v. UBS, 

95 A.D.3d 185 (1st Dep’t 2012) ........................................................................................22 

Hu v. City of New York, 

927 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2019).....................................................................................15, 21 

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 

218 F.R.D. 508, 521 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ..............................................................................5 

In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 

205 F.R.D. 369, 386 (D.D.C. 2002 ......................................................................................5 

In re World Trade Ctr., 

30 N.Y.3d 377, 384 (2017). ...............................................................................................11 

Marshall v. Jericho, 

446 U.S. 238, 249-250 (1980), ..........................................................................................19 

Matter of Regina Metro. v. N.Y. State Div., 

35 N.Y.3d 332 (2020) ........................................................................................................21 

Natoli v. NYC Partnership Hous., 

103 A.D.3d 611 (2d Dep’t 2013) .......................................................................................22 

New York v. Amazon.com, 

550 F.Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) .....................................................................................16 

New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Intel Corp., 

CIV. 09-827-LPS, 2011 WL 6100446, at *6 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 2011) ..................................5 

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NRP Holdings v. City of Buffalo, 

916 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2019)...............................................................................................20 

People v. 11 Cornwel, 

695 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1982)...........................................................................................11

People v. Abram, 

178 Misc.2d 120, 125 (N.Y. City Ct. 1998). .....................................................................18 

People v. Coventry First, 

52 A.D.3d 345 (1st Dep’t 2008) ........................................................................................16 

People v. Credit Suisse Securities, LLC, 

31 N.Y.3d 622, 654-55 (2018) .......................................................................................4, 17 

People v. Domino's Pizza, 

2021 WL 39592, at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County. 2021) ...................................................9, 10 

People v. Grasso, 

54 A.D.3d 180, 198 (1st Dep’t 2008). ...................................................................4, 5, 7, 11 

People v. H&R Block, Inc., 

847 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2007) ............................................................6 

People v. Ingersoll, 

Id. at 30 ................................................................................................................................8 

People v. Litto, 

8 N.Y.3d 692, 705 (2007) ..................................................................................................11 

People v. N. Leasing Sys., 

133 N.Y.S.3d 389 (Sup. Ct. 2020) .....................................................................................16 

People v. Quality King Distribs., 

209 A.D.3d 62 (1st Dep’t 2022) ........................................................................................16 

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People v. Seneci, 

817 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir. 1987).....................................................................................9 

People v. Singer, 

193 Misc.976, 980 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ..................................................................................6, 7 

Raines v. Byrd, 

521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) .................................................................................................4, 5 

Riverhead v. Real Prop. Servs., 

5 N.Y.3d 36, 41 (2005). .....................................................................................................11 

Security Pacific v. Evans, 

31 A.D.3d 278, 279 (1st Dep’t 2006). .................................................................................3 

Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 

260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923). ..................................................................................................14 

Socy. Of Plastics v. Suffolk, 

77 N.Y.2d 761, 772 (1991) ............................................................................................4, 11 

Sonne v. Board of Trustees, 

67 A.D.3d 192, 203-204 (2d Dep’t 2009). .........................................................................18 

South Carolina v. North Carolina, 

558 U.S. 256, 266 (2010) .....................................................................................................4 

State by Abrams v. N.Y.C. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 

472 N.Y.S.2d 839, 841 (Sup. Ct. 1984) .........................................................................6, 11 

State v. Gen. Motors Corp., 

547 F.Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) .....................................................................................16 

State v. McLeod, 

2006 WL 1374014, at *7 .....................................................................................................9 

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State of N.J. v State of N.Y., 

345 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1953). ..............................................................................................4 

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 

528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). ..................................................................................................20 

Rules and Statues 

CPLR 1301.......................................................................................................................................5 

CPLR 213(9) ............................................................................................................................12, 21 

CPLR § 3211(3). ......................................................................................................................13, 23 

NYCRR 202.70.17 ........................................................................................................................24 

N.Y. Executive Law § 63(12) ....................................1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22 

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV ...............................................................................................................14 

 N.Y. Const art. I, § 11 ...................................................................................................................14 

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The defendants, Trump Organization, Inc., Trump Organization LLC and Donald J. Trump, 

hereby move to dismiss the verified complaint (the “Complaint”) filed by the Office of the New 

York Attorney General (the “NYAG”), expressly incorporate the arguments set forth in the 

memorandums of law submitted by Allen Weiselberg, Jeffrey McConney, the Donald J. Trump 

Revocable Trust, DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Member, Trump Endeavor 12 

LLC, 401 North Wabash Venture LLC, Trump Old Post Office LLC , 40 Wall Street LLC, Seven 

Springs LLC, Eric Trump, Donald Trump Jr., and Ivanka Trump (collectively, all defendants are 

referred to as the “Defendants”), respectively, and submit this memorandum of law in support.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This lawsuit is fatally flawed as a matter of law and lacks a legitimate factual basis. More 

than that, it is the culmination of a pretextual and politically-motivated prosecution which threatens 

to contravene statutory predicate, indelibly alter the NYAG’s enforcement authority, and violate 

the Defendants’ constitutional rights. 

Contrary to the NYAG’s insistence, private dealings between sophisticated parties are 

simply not within the purview of its regulatory power, nor does the NYAG have the standing or

capacity to intervene in such transactions. As the legislature made clear when passing Executive 

Law § 63(12), and as the judiciary has since confirmed, the law is meant to serve the public interest

and to protect vulnerable segments of the population from predatory and deceitful business 

practices. The NYAG, acting in its parens patriae capacity on behalf of the ‘People of the State of 

New York,’ purports to allege an ongoing pattern of “fraud” and “illegality” engaged in by the 

Trump Organization, but noticeably absent from the Complaint is any reference to how the Trump 

Organization’s alleged conduct imperiled, endangered, or otherwise affected the public at large. 

This omission speaks volumes – it lays bare the NYAG’s intent to utilize Exec. Law § 63(12) as 

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its proverbial ‘square peg in a round hole’ in the hopes of fulfilling a years-long promise to 

prosecute the Trump Organization and, more pointedly, Donald J. Trump. 

Indeed, Letitia James conceived of this action in her mind’s eye long before it was ever 

filed by the NYAG. Her promise to “get Trump” was a central theme of her campaign for Attorney 

General and the destruction of the Trump Organization has been her avowed goal since the moment 

she took office. Her public statements betray her motive and make it resoundingly clear that she is 

guided solely by animus, not the pursuit of justice. Her attempt to wield Exec. Law § 63(12) in 

such an unprecedented manner—to reach the private business dealings of a political opponent—is 

merely a means of fulfilling her agenda. Thus, by virtue of this selective enforcement of the laws, 

the Defendants’ constitutional rights are being senselessly and unduly violated, at great cost. 

The law, however, does not countenance such abuses of power. Like a river that threatens 

to break the banks and take the village under, the prosecutorial power of the state must be 

constrained. Exec. Law § 63(12) was never intended to serve as a warrant for the NYAG to 

interject in private commercial transactions. This is especially true in the context of deals between 

well represented corporations—each with innumerable resources at their disposal and highlyqualified experts in their employ—which are subject to extensive due diligence processes. These 

corporate titans are the antithesis of “the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous” members of 

the public that Exec. Law § 63(12) is intended to protect. Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 

268, 273 (1977). 

Simply put, by commencing the instant action, the NYAG has overstepped its authority 

and put its selective treatment of Defendants on full display. The Complaint fails to plead any 

connection between the predicate conduct and the broader marketplace or to otherwise explain 

how the public has been harmed. In fact, the NYAG fails to allege any harm at all, apart from a 

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bevy of speculative theories and overwrought academic hypothesis. None of the parties whose 

rights the NYAG purports to enforce by pursuing this action have ever commenced a legal action 

against the Trump Organization or, for that matter, any of the defendants. What rights, then, are 

being vindicated? And who stands to gain from this highly-politicized farse, aside from the 

politically-compromised Attorney General of the State of New York? 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The factual and procedural history is recited at length in the Affirmation of Alina Habba 

(the “Habba Aff.”), annexed hereto. 

ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE NYAG LACKS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION

A party “generally has standing only to assert claims on behalf of himself or herself... [and] 

one does not, as a general rule, have standing to assert claims on behalf of another.” Caprer v. 

Nussbaum, 36 A.D.3d, 176, 182 (2006). Standing is a “threshold determination, resting in part on 

policy considerations, that a person should be allowed access to the courts to adjudicate the merits 

of a particular dispute that satisfies the other justiciability criteria.” Id. “The most critical 

requirement of standing...is the presence of "injury in fact—an actual legal stake in the matter 

being adjudicated.” Security Pacific v. Evans, 31 A.D.3d 278, 279 (1st Dep’t 2006). 

A. The NYAG Must Demonstrate That It Has Standing Under the Parens Patriae 

Doctrine

Since the NYAG purports to bring this suit “on behalf of the People of the State of New 

York,” its standing to maintain this action must be derived from its parens patriae authority. 

Compl. ¶40 

“[W]hen a State is “a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, it is parens 

patriae and must be deemed to represent all [of] its citizens.” South Carolina v. North Carolina, 

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558 U.S. 256, 266 (2010) (quotations omitted). Parens patriae is a “common-law standing doctrine 

that permits the state to commence an action to protect a public interest, like the safety, health or 

welfare of its citizens.” People v. Credit Suisse Securities, 31 N.Y.3d 622, 654-55 (2018) (citing 

Alfred L. Snapp & Son. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)). The doctrine is “a recognition 

of the principle that the state, when a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, ‘must 

be deemed to represent all its citizens.’” State of N.J. v State of N.Y., 345 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1953). 

The NYAG may contend that it is not required to establish parens patriae standing since 

it is acting with express statutory authority under Executive Law § 63(12). However, this is simply 

not the case. While it is true that the Attorney General is a creature of statute, even express statutory 

authorization from the legislature cannot override the basic legal tenet that a party must have 

standing to maintain an action. See, e.g., Socy. Of Plastics v. Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 772 (1991) 

(“[T]he principle that only proper parties will be allowed to maintain claims is an ancient one, long 

predating the Federal Constitution.”). Indeed, there is “little doubt that a ‘court has no inherent 

power to right a wrong unless thereby the civil, property or personal rights of the plaintiff in the 

action or the petitioner in the proceeding are affected.’” Id. at 773. This holds true with respect to 

the Attorney General, who, “like all other parties to actions, must show an interest in the subjectmatter of the litigation to entitle [her] to prosecute a suit and demand relief.” People v. Grasso, 54

A.D.3d 180, 198 (1st Dep’t 2008). Thus, the “[t]he legislature, consistent with the principles of 

separation of powers underlying the requirement of standing...cannot grant the right to sue to a 

plaintiff who does not have standing,” including the Attorney General. Grasso, 54 A.D.3d at 198 

(1st Dep’t 2008) (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997)); Gladstone Realtors v. Village 

of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event...may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima: 

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a plaintiff must always have suffered a distinct and palpable injury to himself’ that is likely to be 

redressed if the requested relief is granted.”). 

Nonetheless, the question is academic here since Executive Law § 63(12) does not

authorize the NYAG to bring suit unless it does so “in the name of the people of the state of New 

York[.].” Exec. Law § 63(12); see also CPLR 1301 (“an action brought in behalf of the 

people...shall be brought in the name of the state.”). Courts have consistently interpreted this 

language as providing the NYAG with the “functional equivalent of parens patriae authority,” 

see, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 508, 521 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (stating that 

Exec. Law § 63(12) grants the NYAG with the “functional equivalent of parens patriae 

authority”); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 386 (D.D.C. 2002) 

(same); New York v. Intel Corp., CIV. 09-827-LPS, 2011 WL 6100446, at *6 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 

2011) (same), a position which has been expressly adopted by the NYAG, see id. (“[The Attorney 

General] submits that courts have determined that [Executive Law 63(12)] constitute[s]...the

functional equivalent of parens patriae authority.”). Thus, even pursuant to the NYAG’s grant of 

authority under Exec. Law 63(12), the doctrine of parens patriae governs. 

Therefore, in accordance with the traditional precepts of common law standing, as well as 

the express statutory language of Executive § Law 63(12), the NYAG must demonstrate that it has 

parens patriae standing to proceed with the instant action. 

B. The NYAG Cannot Establish Parens Patriae Standing 

To establish parens patriae standing, the “State must articulate an interest apart from the 

interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party...[it] must 

express a quasi-sovereign interest.“ Grasso, 54 A.D.3d at 198 (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. 607). The 

relevant inquiry is as follows: “[t]o bring a parens patriae action to sue in the public interest, the 

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Attorney General must: (1) identify a quasi-sovereign interest in the public's well-being; (2) that 

touches a ‘substantial segment’ of the population; and (3) articulate ‘an interest apart from the 

interests of the particular private parties[.]’” People v. H&R Block, 847 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (Sup. 

Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2007) (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607). 

Here, the NYAG has failed to plead any of the requisite elements of parens patriae 

standing. The Complaint fails to identify any quasi-sovereign interest in the public's well-being, 

much less one that touches a substantial segment of the population, and neglects to vindicate any 

right that is separate and apart from the interests of private parties. Therefore, for the reasons set 

forth below, the NYAG lacks parens patriae standing. 

i. The Complaint Does Not Identify a Quasi-Sovereign Interest 

It is axiomatic that the “interest of the state in the proper enforcement and administration 

of its laws is purely a sovereign one and cannot be the predicate for standing to protect a quasisovereign interest.” State by Abrams v. N.Y.C. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 123 Misc.2d 47, 50 

(Sup. Ct. 1984) (citing Snapp, 458 U.S. at 599). 

 “A quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy 

between the State and the defendant.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602. “The injury complained of cannot 

be to any purely sovereign or proprietary interest of the state, nor can the state assert the purely 

private claims of individual citizens.” Abrams, 123 Misc.2d at 49. In short, “it is not sufficient for 

the people to show that wrong has been done to some one; the wrong must appear to be done to 

the people, in order to support an action by the people for its redress.” Singer, 193 Misc.976, 980 

(Sup. Ct. 1949) (emphasis added). 

In People v. Singer, the Attorney General commenced an action against several directors 

of a New York membership corporation, alleging, among other things, that the directors were 

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charging excessive and unreasonable rates to its members. Singer, 193 Misc. 976. The Attorney 

General argued that it had standing “on the premise that the matters alleged in the complaint 

involve and affect the safety, health, and welfare of the people of the State.” Id. at 979. The court 

flatly rejected this argument and dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, finding that “what 

is complained of by the [Attorney General] are matters in which the State has no public interest or 

right to intervene [since] they concern the internal affairs and management of the corporation[.]” 

The court noted that these were “wrongs to individual citizens and not to the State and are 

remediable at the suit of the parties injured only” because “[t]he people of this State have no 

general power to invoke the action of the courts of justice, by suits in their name of sovereignty for 

the redress of civil wrongs, sustained by some citizens at the hands of others.” Id. at 979-980 

(emphasis added). 

Similarly, in Grasso, the NYAG commenced an enforcement action against a not-for-profit 

corporation when, during the course of the action, the corporation was converted into a for-profit 

entity. In determining that the NYAG lacked parens patriae standing, the Appellate Division found 

that the continuation of the action “would vindicate only the interests of private parties, not any 

public interest.” Grasso, 54 A.D.3d at 195. In so finding, the Appellate Division noted that, while 

“there is a substantial public interest in the management and affairs of a ... not-for-profit 

corporation,” there is “no substantial public interest in most if not all private corporations.” Id. 

at 209 (emphasis added). In other words, due to the corporation’s conversion from not-for-profit 

to for-profit, the action no longer “vindicate[d] [a] public purpose,” and the NYAG could not 

proceed forward. Id. at 196. 

Here, in that same vein, the NYAG is not seeking to serve any public interest or vindicate 

any public rights. No harm is alleged to have been sustained by anyone other than Deutsche Bank, 

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Zurich, or Mazars. The NYAG has not alleged that Defendants’ conduct was aimed at the public 

at large, nor that it affected any segment of the state’s population. Instead, the NYAG merely seeks 

to vindicate the rights of corporate titans who were fully capable of negotiating the complex 

agreements at the core of the Complaint, as well as exercising their considerable rights thereunder. 

It is plainly not within the purview of the NYAG to prosecute the claim at bar because the conduct 

complained of did not have any tendency to harm the public at large or implicate any public 

interest. Therefore, the NYAG has failed to identify a quasi-sovereign interest. 

ii. The Subject Matter of this Action Does Not Affect a Substantial 

Segment of the State’s Population 

The alleged activity that the NYAG seeks to enjoin does not touch a ‘substantial segment’ 

of New York’s population, but, rather, only a handful of private, sophisticated parties. 

In People v. Ingersoll, the NYAG sued private parties to recover funds that belonged to a 

county, received by the defendants through fraud. In finding that the NYAG lacked parens patriae

standing, the Court stated that “[i]t is not in terms averred that the money, in any legal sense or in 

equity and good conscience, belonged to the [State]...or that the wrong was perpetrated directly 

against the State or the people of the State, that is, the whole State as a legal entity, and the whole 

body of the people.” Id. at 12. The Court further noted that “a [c]orporation with full power to 

acquire and hold property, create debts, levy taxes, and sue and be sued, with a competent board 

of governors, is not within the class of incompetence in need of the exercise of this nursing quality 

of the State government.” Id. at 30.

Here, similarly, the NYAG is seeking to employ Executive Law § 63(12) in a manner that 

flies in the face of the “nursing quality” of the statute. Id. Exec. Law § 63(12) was designed to 

protect the public at large, and, more pointedly, the “ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.” 

Guggenheimer, 43 N.Y.2d at 273. It certainly is not intended to protect industry-leading 

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conglomerates, such as banks, insurers, and accounting firms, with the vast resources and expertise 

to effectively carry out their business. Yet, that is exactly what the NYAG is attempting to do: the 

Complaint only purported to enjoin conduct aimed a narrow group of a select few parties, namely 

“lenders, employees who worked for those lenders and insurers, and the accounting firm that 

compiled the Statements, and personnel of that firm.” Compl. at 200. This is simply not a 

“substantial segment of the population,” nor can any alleged wrongdoing against a limited subset 

of sophisticated private parties to complex commercial agreements possibly implicate a public 

interest. Thus, the alleged fraudulent activity that the NYAG seeks to enjoin does not touch any 

portion of New York’s general population, but, rather, only a handful of private parties. 

iii. The NYAG Seeks to Vindicate the Rights of Private Parties Who Have 

Their Own Adequate Remedy at Law

New York courts have consistently recognized that the Attorney General lacks parens 

patriae standing where, as here, the “aggrieved individual[s] ha[ve] an adequate remedy at law” 

because “then the state is merely a nominal party with no real interest of its own.” State v. McLeod, 

2006 WL 1374014, at *7 (Sup. Ct. 2006). “The state cannot merely litigate as a volunteer the 

personal claims of its competent citizens.” People v. Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir. 1987). 

The NYAG attempted to stretch its parens patriae authority in a similar manner in People 

v. Seneci, where the relief sought by the Attorney General flowed only to the benefit of certain 

private corporate and individual parties. Id. at 1017. The Second Circuit found that the NYAG 

lacked parens patriae standing, holding that “[w]here the complaint only seeks to recover money 

damages for injuries suffered by individuals, the award of money damages will not compensate 

the state for any harm done to its quasi-sovereign interests...the state as parens patriae lacks 

standing to prosecute such a suit.” Id. at 1017. 

Moreover, the recent holding in People v. Domino's Pizza, 2021 WL 39592, at *1 (Sup. 

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Ct. N.Y. County. 2021) is particularly instructive here. In Domino’s, the NYAG alleged that the 

defendants had misled their New York franchisees and sought to hold Defendants liable under 

Executive Law § 63(12). In dismissing the claim, the court noted that the cause of action fell well 

outside of the common fact pattern of § 63(12) cases that seek to redress “widespread consumer 

fraud.” Id. at *11. In doing so, the court pointed to a series of § 63(12) cases to draw the distinction 

between the typical types of widespread fraud affecting large segments of the public that the statute 

was designed to address, as compared to private contract disputes that were at issue in that case. 

Id. 

The court in Domino’s recognized that the “quite different” conduct in question in that case 

consisted of “bilateral business transactions between Domino's and its individual franchisees, 

many of whom own multiple franchises.” Id. at *12. Moreover, the court found compelling 

Domino’s argument that “that any disputes...should be in the nature of private contract litigation 

between Domino's and its franchisees, not a law enforcement action under a statute designed 

to address public harm flowing from persistent or repeated fraud and deception.” Id. at *12. 

(emphasis added).

The Domino’s decision perfectly illustrates everything that is wrong with the NYAG’s 

Complaint in this case, where the NYAG is seeking to vindicate the rights of a select few private 

parties. The Complaint identifies the purported “victims” of the alleged fraud as consisting only 

of Deutsche Bank, Zurich, and Mazars, entities that have signed extensive agreements with 

Defendants, are well-represented by counsel, and have the ability to bring an action in their own 

right. In fact, the NYAG admits as much in the Complaint, acknowledging that “[m]aterial 

misrepresentations on any loan document, including the Statements [of Financial Condition] or the 

certifications as to their accuracy, would constitute an event of default under the terms of the loan 

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agreement.” Compl. at 9. Certainly, if Deutsche Bank, Zurich or Mazars had concluded that 

Defendants had breached any loan covenant (let alone made a material misrepresentation or 

omission that put a loan at risk), it would have pursued such a claim on its own initiative. Thus, 

the NYAG simply does not have standing to vindicate the interests these private parties on behalf 

of the People of the State of New York. See Abrams, 123 Misc.2d at 39 (“If the aggrieved 

individual has an adequate remedy at law, then the state is merely a nominal party with no real 

interest of its own.”); People v. 11 Cornwel, 695 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1982) (state lacks standing 

unless it can show “that individuals could not obtain complete relief through a private suit.”). 

POINT II

THE NYAG IS WITHOUT LEGAL CAPACITY TO BRING THIS SUIT

“Although courts often use the terms interchangeably, the concepts of capacity to sue and 

standing are distinct.” Community Bd. v. Schaffer, 84 N.Y.2d 148, 155 (1994). While standing is 

“designed to ensure that the party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome,” 

Society of Plastics, 77 N.Y.2d at 772, capacity is “a threshold question involving the authority of 

a litigant to present a grievance for judicial review,” Riverhead v. Real Prop, 5 N.Y.3d 36, 41 

(2005). 

For a governmental entity, the “right to sue, if it exists at all, must be derived from the 

relevant enabling legislation or some other concrete statutory predicate.” In re World Trade Ctr., 

30 N.Y.3d 377, 384 (2017). Further, it is well-established that “a private right of action may not 

be implied from a statute where it is incompatible with the enforcement mechanism chosen by the 

Legislature.” Grasso, 11 N.Y.3d at 70. This concern is “heightened” with respect to Attorney 

General, who is responsible for enforcing statutes “while maintaining the integrity of calculated 

legislative policy judgments.” Id. (citations omitted) (cleaned up). 

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Here, based on the legislative history of Exec. Law § 63(12), and the manner in which it 

has historically been employed, it is clear that § 63(12) does not authorize the NYAG to commence 

the instant proceeding. 

New York courts have consistently recognized that Exec. Law § 63(12) is designed to 

protect vulnerable members of the public from predatory acts of fraud, not to regulate the business 

dealings between private, sophisticated parties. The historical context surrounding the passing of 

the law further cements this point. As the 1950s ushered in a boom in the purchasing power of 

consumer families, New York saw an increase in predatory and fraudulent marketing tactics by 

consumer-facing businesses, prompting then-Attorney General Jacob Javits to urge the Legislature 

to enact the 1956 bill that later became § 63(12). State Dept. of Law Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1956, ch.

592 at 94. In his memorandum supporting the bill, Javits spoke of the need to “to protect consumers 

against frauds in the sale of articles, appliances and services and against fraudulent practices such 

as ‘bait advertising.’” Id. at 92. Javits listed specific instances of successful actions taken by his 

office to protect consumers from false advertising in the sale of food freezers, storm windows, 

chinchillas, and door-to-door sale of dishes. Id. at 93. 

The Better Business Bureau submitted a similar memorandum, stating that the law would 

be “helpful in combating fraudulent advertising and selling practices on the part of certain 

corporations which have deceived or defrauded the consumers of this state.” Letter from BBB, 

4/3/1956, Bill Jacket, L 1956, ch. 592 at 5 (emphasis added). The NYS Department of Law also 

submitted a memorandum of support stating its support to “strengthen the hand of his office in 

protecting the public against consumer frauds.” State Dept. of Law Mem, L 1956, ch. 592 at 92. 

As recently as August 2019, when the legislature enacted CPLR 213(9), the legislature’s 

sponsoring memorandum described Executive Law 63(12) as “the cornerstone of the state's 

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consumer protection laws,” and referred to the NYAG as “a preeminent enforcer of consumer 

protection and securities law in New York State.” Sponsors Memorandum, 2019 S.B. 6536. In 

describing the law, which prospectively created a new six-year statute of limitations for future § 

63(12) claims, the memorandum stated that it would assist the NYAG in “achiev[ing] better results 

for New York State and its residents.” Id. 

As amply shown by both the legislative history and body of case law, the driving force 

behind the original enactment of Executive Law § 63(12) was the need to protect vulnerable 

citizens of the state and the public at large, not sophisticated financial institutions fully capable of 

discerning for themselves whether and to what extent a particular statement may be reliable. The 

NYAG’s proposed use of Exec. Law 63(12) in the instant matter not only exceeds this legislative 

intent, it goes far beyond it. Should the NYAG be allowed to employ the Executive Law in this 

way—unbound in both its use and application—it would vastly surpass the prosecutorial authority 

that the legislature intended to bestow upon the NYAG and leave it with an unchecked power that 

it was never intended to wield. 

In short, Executive Law § 63(12), considered within the context of its legislative history, 

does not provide a basis for the NYAG to proceed with this action because the conduct complained 

of did not have any tendency to harm the public at large. Thus, the NYAG’s Complaint must be 

dismissed pursuant to CPLR § 3211(3). 

POINT III

THE NYAG HAS VIOLATED THE DEFENDANTS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 

TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

The Equal Protection Clause—which is contained in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution and mirrored in Article I, § 11 of the New York State Constitution—

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guarantees that “no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 

laws.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; N.Y. Const art. I, § 11. 

“The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure 

every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, 

whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly 

constituted agents.” Sioux City v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923). In other words, the 

Equal Protection Clause is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be 

treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).1

“Although the prototypical equal protection claim involves discrimination against people 

based on their membership in a vulnerable class, [courts] have long recognized that the equal 

protection guarantee also extends to individuals who allege no specific class membership but are 

nonetheless subjected to invidious discrimination at the hands of government officials.” Harlen 

Associates v. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001). In this context, a party who is 

not a member of a constitutionally protected class, “may bring an equal protection claim pursuant 

to one of two theories: (1) selective enforcement, or (2) ‘class of one.’” AYDM Assocs. v. Town of 

Pamelia, 205 F. Supp. 3d 252, 265 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (quotation omitted). Here, for the reasons 

outlined below, both theories are viable. 

A. The NYAG is Selectively Enforcing Executive Law § 63(12) Against 

Defendants

“The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the selective enforcement or prosecution by a state 

official pursuant to a lawful regulation.” Id. at 265. 

1 New York courts have recognized that an equal protection violation warrants the dismissal of an enforcement 

action “[e]ven though the party raising the unequal protection claim may well have been guilty of violating the law.” 

303 West 42nd v. Klein, 46 N.Y.2d 686, 694 (N.Y. 1979)

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To prevail on an equal protection claim based on selective enforcement of the law, a 

defendant must prove that: “‘(i) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was 

selectively treated, and (ii) the selective treatment was motivated by an intention...to punish or 

inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights, or by a malicious or bad faith intent to injure the 

person.’” Hu v. City of N.Y., 927 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2019). Stated differently, the defendant must 

prove that he has been “singled out with an “evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to 

make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances.” Bower Assoc. 

v. Town of Pleasant Val., 2 N.Y.3d 617, 631 (2004) (citations omitted). 

i. Defendants Have Been Singled Out and Subject to Selective Treatment 

by the NYAG

To satisfy the first prong—the ‘uneven hand’—a defendant must “identify comparators 

whom a prudent person would think roughly equivalent.” AYDM Associates, 205 F.Supp.3d at 

265. 

There is no question that, when compared to others similarly situated, Defendants have 

been singled out and subject to selective treatment by the NYAG. Indeed, as detailed above, with 

the commencement of the instant action, the NYAG is disavowing its historical use of Exec. Law 

§ 63(12) and attempting to wield it in a novel fashion that is entirely inconsistent with its prior 

enforcement history against those similarly situated to Defendants, or, for that matter, any person 

or company. The reason for this gross departure is readily apparent – the NYAG’s use of Executive 

Law § 63(12) is not based in the law, legislative intent, or historical use, nor is it borne out of 

legitimate investigative findings; rather, in commencing the instant action, the NYAG has 

knowingly advanced claims that are unwarranted under existing law as a means of selectively and 

maliciously targeting Defendants. 

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Indeed, the anomalous nature of this case is proof, in and of itself, that the NYAG has 

singled out Defendants for disparate treatment. Despite extensive research, Defendants have been 

unable to locate any New York cases where the NYAG has commenced a claim under Executive 

Law § 63(12) to intervene in private transaction to enforce the contract rights of sophisticated 

financial institutions. Although the NYAG may attempt to point to several cases as constituting 

precedent for this type of claim, there is simply no on-point comparison. See State v. Gen. Motors, 

547 F.Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (involving fraudulent practices affecting a vast number of 

consumers in the automobile industry); People v. Coventry First, 52 A.D.3d 345 (1st Dep’t 2008) 

(involving bid-rigging and other anti-competitive schemes that were used to defraud policyholders 

at large); New York v. Amazon.com., 550 F.Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (Lawsuit alleging that 

Amazon failed to protect thousands of workers through inadequate disinfection and contracttracing protocols; the court found standing based on “the government’s interest in guaranteeing a 

marketplace that adheres to standards of fairness, as well [as] ensuring that business transactions

in the state do not injure public health.”) (emphasis added); People v. N. Leasing Sys., 133 

N.Y.S.3d 389 (Sup. Ct. 2020) (lawsuit where NYAG submitted “873 affidavits by equipment 

lessees or their guarantors” to allege that company was engaged in fraudulent leasing strategies.); 

People v. Quality King Distribs., 209 A.D.3d 62 (1st Dep’t 2022) (lawsuit brought on behalf of 

injured consumers alleging that company gouged prices on disinfectant prices during the Covid19 pandemic.). Given the stark contrast in how NYAG has historically enforced Executive Law § 

63(12), and how it seeks to enforce it against Defendants, it is overwhelmingly apparent that 

Defendants are being subject to differential treatment.

Another telling takeaway from the NYAG’s prior enforcement history is that it has

previously advanced the exact opposite position than that which it asserts against Defendants 

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today. In People v. Credit Suisse, the NYAG brought an action against Credit Suisse, alleging that 

the investment bank had “systematically failed to adequately evaluate [] loans” and misrepresented 

the quality of the mortgage loans and the due diligence review process to its investors. See 

Complaint, People v. Credit Suisse Sec., New York County, Index No. 451802/2022 (NYSCEF 

Doc. No. 2 at 2). In its complaint, the NYAG stressed the importance of the due diligence process 

and emphasized that the lender is “uniquely positioned through the due diligence process to obtain 

material information regarding the quality of [] loans” and has “unique access to critical 

information that enable[s] them to root out discernible problems and risks.” Id. at 13. This position 

is entirely contradictory to the NYAG’s stance as it relates to the instant action, wherein the NYAG 

has alleged that Deutsche Bank justifiably “relied” upon misleading statements contained in the 

Statements of Financial Condition, Compl. at 174, despite the fact that, as alleged by the NYAG, 

President Trump’s “desire to keep his net worth high” was “well known publicly,” id. at 192. The 

disparity between these two positions simply cannot be reconciled and is further proof that AG 

James is selectively advancing a baseless case against Defendants that is has never, and would 

never, assert against similarly situated competitors. 

Therefore, the NYAG’s anomalous use of Executive Law § 63(12) in the instant action

conclusively shows that Defendants are being selectively treated in comparison to their 

competitors writ large. 

ii. The NYAG’s Selective Treatment of Defendants is a Byproduct of AG 

James’s Personal and Political Animus Towards Them 

With respect to the second prong—the ‘evil eye’—the relevant inquiry is whether the 

defendant has been “singled out for an impermissible motive not related to legitimate 

governmental objectives, which could include personal or political gain, or retaliation for the 

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exercise of constitutional rights.” Sonne v. Board of Trustees, 67 A.D.3d 192, 203-204 (2d Dep’t 

2009). 

New York courts have recognized that “cases predicating constitutional violations on 

selective treatment motivated by ill-will, rather than by protected-class status or an intent to inhibit 

the exercise of constitutional rights, are ‘lodged in a murky corner of equal protection law in which 

there are surprisingly few cases and no clearly delineated rules to apply.’” Bizzarro v. 

Miranda, 394 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005). This is because “admission of intentional discrimination 

is likely to be rare” since “law enforcement officials are unlikely to avow that their intent was to 

practice constitutionally proscribed discrimination.” People v. Abram, 178 Misc.2d 120, 125 (N.Y. 

City Ct. 1998).

In the instant matter, there is no murkiness or lack of clarity as to AG James’s feelings 

towards Defendants. This is one of the rare circumstances in which a high-ranking law 

enforcement official has openly, publicly, and repeatedly made known her desire to selectively 

target Defendants. The many public statements made by AG James serve as compelling evidence 

that the instant action was commenced out of AG James’s “malicious[,] bad faith intent” to 

prosecute the Defendants, Bower, 2 N.Y.3d at 631, and for the purpose of achieving a “personal 

or political gain,” Sonne, supra.

Upon examination of AG James’s statements, it cannot be reasonably disputed that she has 

displayed a wanton desire to harass, intimidate, and retaliate against Defendants. Before she even 

took office, her entire campaign for Attorney General was centered around her promise to “take 

on [Trump] and his business” if elected. Habba Aff. ¶17. She even pledged, during a campaign 

speech, that she would employ her power as Attorney General as a “sword” against Donald J. 

Trump and that she “looked forward to going into the office of Attorney General every day, suing 

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him...and then going home.” Id. ¶11. Her stated objective was to “vigorously fight” against him 

by “us[ing] every area of the law to investigate President Trump and his business transactions,” 

going so far as promising to prosecute “anyone in [Trump’s] orbit.” Id. ¶22. In what can only be 

described as an overt threat, she warned that President Trump “should be scared,” about her run 

for Attorney General and threated that “[t]he president of the United States has to worry about 

three things: [Robert] Mueller, [Michael] Cohen, and Tish James. We’re all closing in on him.” 

Id. ¶12. 

AG James’s animus Defendants is perhaps best encapsulated with the following statement, 

which she made in a video promoted by her campaign: 

I believe that this president...is an embarrassment to all that we stand for. He should 

be charged with obstructing justice. I believe that the President...can be indicted 

for criminal offenses and we would join with law enforcement and other attorneys 

general across this nation in removing this President from office. [T]he office of 

attorney general will continue to follow the money because we believe he’s 

engaged in a pattern and practice of money laundering. Laundering the money from 

foreign governments here in New York State, and particularly related to his real 

estate holdings. It’s important that everyone understand, the days of Donald Trump 

are coming to an end.

Id. ¶18. These unsavory comments—which were made even before AG James was in office and 

had any reason to suspect that Defendants were involved in any wrongdoing—expose this action 

as being a political persecution intended to harass Defendants and fulfill the pre-campaign 

promises of AG James, and nothing more. 

AG James not only staked her election for Attorney General on her pursuit of President 

Trump, but since becoming Attorney General, she has unrelentingly continued to target him, his 

family, and his business. Despite the prohibition against a prosecutor “injecting a personal interest, 

financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process,” Marshall v. Jericho, 446 U.S. 238, 249-250 

(1980), AG James, shortly after swearing in as Attorney General, stated that she was “definitely 

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going to sue” President Trump and proclaimed that she was “going to be a real pain in the 

ass...[h]e’s going to know my name personally.” Habba Aff. ¶22 (emphasis added). In other 

words, she has proceeded to double down on the threats made during her campaign and has 

employed the vast array of her office’s resources to investigating and, ultimately, prosecuting, 

Defendants. All the while, she has continued to attack them publicly and malign their character, 

exposing the true purpose of this enforcement action. 

In sum, AG James’s endless public promises to investigate Defendants, her open 

disparagement of President Trump, his family, and his business, and her unfounded accusations 

that Defendants are guilty of wrongdoing despite admittedly lacking evidence to substantiate those 

claims, all lead to only one plausible conclusion: AG James has selectively targeted Defendants 

and is weaponizing her office against them as a means of fulfilling a personal and political 

vendetta. 

B. The NYAG is Improperly Targeting Defendants as a “Class of One” 

“[T]he Supreme Court has....endorsed a class-of-one theory for equal protection 

claims...based on arbitrary disparate treatment.” NRP Holdings v. City of Buffalo, 916 F.3d 177 

(2d Cir. 2019). 

To succeed on a ‘class-of-one’ theory, a party must demonstrate that he was “intentionally 

treated differently from others similarly situated and ‘there is no rational basis for the difference 

in treatment.’” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). To prevail on similarity 

alone, a plaintiff must prove as follows: “‘(i) no rational person could regard the circumstances of 

the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential 

treatment on the basis of a legitimate government policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances 

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and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendant acted on the 

basis of a mistake.’” Hu, 927 F.3d at 94. 

For the same reasons outlined above, the NYAG’s grossly divergent use of Executive Law 

§ 63(12), coupled with the litany of malicious statements levied by AG James, establish that the 

NYAG has targeted Defendants, without any rational basis, for differential treatment. 

POINT IV

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Defendants adopt and incorporate the arguments contained in the Memorandum of Law 

filed by Defendants McConney and Weisselberg regarding statute of limitations. (NYSCEF No.

199). As detailed at length therein, the recent amendment to CPLR 213(9) cannot be applied 

retroactively, nor can it revive time-barred claims. See, e.g., Matter of Regina Metro. v. N.Y. State,

35 N.Y.3d 332 (2020). Thus, the Defendants cannot be held liable for any claims that arose on or

before August 26, 2019, and even if the statute does apply retroactively, all claims accruing more 

than six years prior to this lawsuit cannot be maintained.2

POINT V

PLAINTIFF’S FRAUD CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 

AND FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM

Defendants adopt and incorporate the arguments set forth by Defendants McConney and 

Weisselberg in their Memorandum of Law regarding documentary evidence and failure to state a 

claim (NYSCEF No. 199). 

The documentary evidence of the SoFc’s, see Compl. Ex. 3-12, and the disclaimers 

explicitly set forth therein, conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law to the Executive 

2 A tolling agreement was entered into between the NYAG and Trump Organization, but President Trump was not a 

signatory thereto and therefore is not bound by its terms. 

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Law § 63(12) fraud claim alleged in the Complaint. See, e.g., Natoli v. NYC Partnership, 103 

A.D.3d 611 (2d Dep’t 2013) (agreement contained specific disclaimer provisions which 

conclusively establishing defense to claims). The unequivocal disclaimer language precludes 

Plaintiff from asserting that any corporate counter party reasonably relied upon the information 

contains in the SoFCs. See HSH Nordbank v. UBS, 95 A.D.3d 185 (1st Dep’t 2012) (sophisticated 

bank could have justifiable reliance due to disclaimer in extensively negotiated agreement).

Additionally, the SoFC’s constitute “compilation report[s]” which means they are 

unaudited statements that rely on information presented by Defendants themselves without any 

assurance from any professional regarding the accuracy of the financial statements or their 

conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. Similarly, the NYAG has failed to 

provide expert testimony supporting their fraud claim, which is based upon valuation of assets. 

Accordingly, the NYAG’s Executive Law § 63(12) claim fails as a matter of law.

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23 

CONCLUSION

Therefore, the Complaint must be dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to CPLR 

3211(a)(1),(2),(3),(5),(7) and/or (8), and such further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 

___________________________________ 

 ALINA HABBA, ESQ.

MICHAEL T. MADAIO, ESQ.

 HABBA MADAIO & ASSOCIATES LLP 

 1430 U.S. Highway 206, Suite 240 

 Bedminster, New Jersey 07921 

 -and- 

 112 West 34th Street, 17th and 18th Floors 

 New York, NY 10120 

 Phone: (908) 869-1188 

 E-mail: ahabba@habbalaw.com 

Counsel for Donald J. Trump, Allen 

Weisselberg, Jeffrey McConney, The Donald 

J. Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump 

Organization, Inc., Trump Organization 

LLC, DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings 

Managing Member LLC, Trump Endeavor 

12 LLC, 401 North Wabash Venture LLC, 

Trump Old Post Office LLC, 40 Wall Street 

LLC and Seven Springs LLC

 

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/21/2022 10:05 PM INDEX NO. 452564/2022

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 197 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/21/2022

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24 

CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL

I hereby state, pursuant to pursuant to NYCRR 202.70.17, that the foregoing Memorandum 

of Law was prepared with Microsoft Word. Pursuant to Microsoft Word’s word count feature, the 

total number of words in the foregoing brief (excluding the caption, table of contents, table of 

authorities, signature block, and this certification) is 7,000. 

Dated: November 21, 2022 

New York, New York ____________________________________ 

 Alina Habba, Esq. 

FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/21/2022 10:05 PM INDEX NO. 452564/2022

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 197 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/21/2022

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