1

19-931-cr

United States v. Stanley

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 10th day of April, two thousand twenty.

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

ROBERT D. SACK,

Circuit Judges,

KATHERINE POLK FAILLA,

District Judge.

*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee, 19-931-cr

v.

ARTHUR STANLEY, AKA WIGGS,

Defendant-Appellant.

FOR APPELLEE: Peter S. Jongbloed, (Marc H. Silverman on 

the brief), Assistant United States 

Attorneys, for John H. Durham, United 

States Attorney for the District of 

Connecticut, New Haven, CT.

* Judge Katherine Polk Failla, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York, sitting by designation.
2

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Arza Feldman, Feldman and Feldman, 

Attorneys at Law, Uniondale, NY.

Appeal from an April 4, 2019 amended judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Connecticut (Jeffrey A. Meyer, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and hereby is

AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Arthur Stanley (“Stanley”) challenges his conviction, after a jury trial, 

for murdering Keith Washington in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), the Violent Crimes in Aid of 

Racketeering (“VCAR”) statute. Stanley argues, first, that the District Court erroneously admitted 

certain evidence; second, that the evidence, taken as a whole, was insufficient to prove four of the 

five elements of the charged crime; and third, that three eye-witnesses delivered testimony so 

inconsistent that it amounted to perjury. 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the 

case, and the issues on appeal. 

I. Admission of Evidence

Stanley argues that the District Court wrongly admitted evidence relating to a 2008 seizure of 

a cache of firearms and ammunition in the territory of the Westhell gang. The District Court denied

Stanley’s motion to limit the use of this evidence at trial and permitted its admission to illustrate “the 

nature . . . of the enterprise at issue here.” Gov. App. 6.

We review the District Court’s evidentiary determination for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682, 687-88 (2d Cir. 2010). “We will . . . only hold that the district court abused its 

discretion in making an evidentiary ruling where the ruling was arbitrary and irrational.” Restivo v. 

Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 573 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, even if 

we find that the District Court abused its discretion, we will not reverse it if the error made was 

harmless. United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2009).

We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence 

relating to the 2008 seizure. The evidence was clearly relevant to an element of the crime, as is 

required for admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, and the evidence was not likely to 

have caused the type of “unfair prejudice” to Stanley that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 prohibits. 

Specifically, the evidence was relevant because it provided information about the existence and 

nature of the racketeering enterprise—in this case, the Westhell gang—which is a necessary element 

of proving any VCAR murder. United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting 
3

that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a racketeering 

enterprise). The jury could infer from the information that the Westhell gang engaged in activity 

requiring the use of such weapons, since the weapons were stored near a building with graffiti 

indicating the gang’s presence.

Importantly, the District Court applied the correct law when it undertook a “conscientious 

assessment of whether”—in admitting such evidence—“unfair prejudice substantially outweigh[ed] 

[its] probative value.” United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). It then reasonably concluded that the likelihood of prejudice did not outweigh the 

probative value of the evidence, given the fact that the evidence was directly related to a particular 

element of the crime. 

Accordingly, because the District Court admitted the evidence without acting arbitrarily or 

irrationally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Stanley contends that the Government failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove the 

following four elements of VCAR murder: (1) that the Westhell gang was a continuously operating

racketeering enterprise; (2) that the Westhell gang engaged in racketeering conduct; (2) that Stanley 

had a position in the Westhell gang; and (4) that a purpose for Stanley’s murder of Washington was 

to increase his position in the Westhell gang.

1

“We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de novo.” United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 

832, 837 (2d Cir. 2015). “In considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict, 

the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Government. To avoid usurping the 

role of the jury, the Court must resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the jury’s verdict. The 

Court must also credit every inference that the jury might have drawn in favor of the government.” 

United States v. Cuti, 720 F.3d 453, 461-62 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal citations, alterations, and quotation 

marks omitted). We will not upset a verdict if “any rational trier of fact could have found the 

1 Five elements must be proved in a VCAR case: “(1) that the Organization was a [Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)] enterprise, (2) that the enterprise was engaged 

in racketeering activity as defined in RICO, (3) that the defendant in question had a position in the 

enterprise, (4) that the defendant committed the alleged crime of violence, and (5) that his general 

purpose in so doing was to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise.” Concepcion, 983 F.2d 

at 381. Stanley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for all elements except the fourth: he does 

not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he committed the alleged crime of violence, in this 

case murder. 
4

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979). 

1. Evidence that the Westhall gang was a racketeering enterprise

First, Stanley argues that the Government failed to produce enough evidence to establish 

that the Westhell gang was a racketeering enterprise. He suggests, among other things, that the 

Government failed to show that the gang had the necessary traits of a coordinated organization or

that it operated as a continuous unit engaged in some racketeering activity. 

We disagree. VCAR defines an enterprise as any “partnership, corporation, association, or 

other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, 

which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1959(b)(2). In analogous prosecutions under RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, we have said that 

“[t]he existence of a RICO enterprise may be proved by evidence of an ongoing organization,

formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” United 

States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Since we have held

that “a § 1959 [VCAR] enterprise is plainly a RICO enterprise” we apply the same standard here. 

Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Using that standard, and drawing all inferences in favor of the Government, we conclude 

that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the Westhell gang was a racketeering enterprise. 

Such evidence included various testimony about the Westhell gang’s existence; testimony that the 

alleged gang members shared an automobile and made a public display of support during a prior 

legal proceeding involving one alleged member; and the aforementioned evidence about the 2008 

seizure of weapons from Westhell gang territory. It also included testimony from Brandyn Farmer

(“Farmer”), who recounted Stanley’s own admission that he was involved in the Westhell gang.

Although Stanley contends that, under Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954), such an admission 

should not have been let in because of a lack of corroboration, we find that corroboration—in the 

form of other trial evidence—was sufficiently present to indicate that the testimony was trustworthy. 

See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) (“To determine that an admission has 

been adequately corroborated, we must find in the record ‘substantial independent evidence which 

would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement.’” (quoting Opper, 348 U.S. at 93)).

Taken together, all of this evidence was enough for a rational juror to conclude, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the Westhell gang was a racketeering enterprise. 

2. Evidence that the Westhell gang engaged in racketeering activity

Second, Stanley argues that the Government failed to produce enough evidence to establish 

that the Westhell gang engaged in racketeering activity. He contends, among other things, that the 
5

Government did not demonstrate that Westhell—or Stanley on behalf of Westhell—distributed or 

conspired to distribute controlled substances, the racketeering activity alleged in the indictment. 

We disagree. VCAR defines “racketeering activity” by reference to the RICO definition. 18 

U.S.C. § 1959(b)(1). This includes “offenses involving the illegal distribution of controlled 

substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846.” Stanley App. 25.

Construed in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that there was 

sufficient evidence to find that the Westhell gang engaged in such activity. That evidence included, 

among other things, testimony from police officers familiar with drug activity in the area occupied 

by the Westhell gang, and evidence that the Westhell gang was engaged in a violent conflict with 

other gangs, of the sort frequently engaged in by drug-dealing enterprises. Although Stanley argues 

that the Government needed to prove that he engaged in such activity, this is not the law. The 

Government only needed to prove that the Westhell gang did so. Based on the evidence adduced, a 

rational juror could have so concluded. 

3. Evidence of Stanley’s position within the Westhell gang

Third, Stanley argues that the Government failed to produce enough evidence to establish 

that he held a position within the Westhell gang. He contends, among other things, that the 

testimony offered, by police officers and others, merely showed his association with members of the 

Westhell gang, not his membership in the gang. 

We disagree. We have previously “recognize[d] that evidence of a person’s membership in or 

association with a criminal enterprise may be circumstantial because Section 1959(b)(2) defines 

enterprise in part as a ‘group of individuals associated in fact.’” United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 

135 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2)). 

Here, when considered in the light most favorable to the Government, there was sufficient 

evidence for Stanley’s membership. This included testimony that he shared a car with other alleged 

gang members and made a public display of support during one’s prior legal proceeding, in addition 

to the aforementioned admission to Farmer, which we have already found was properly 

corroborated, of his role within the Westhell gang. A rational juror could have concluded, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that this evidence confirmed Stanley’s position within the racketeering enterprise. 

4. Evidence of Stanley’s purpose for committing the murder 

Fourth, Stanley argues that the Government failed to produce sufficient evidence to 

establish that he murdered Washington in order to maintain or increase his position in the Westhell 

gang. Stanley contends, among other things, that the Government could prove, at most, that his 

purpose for committing the murder was to exact personal revenge on Tyquan Lucien (“Lucien”), his 

intended target, after Lucien had allegedly shot at Stanley earlier that evening (“the Vine Street 
6

shooting”). He claims that because the Government could prove, at most, that he acted only due to

such a personal motivation, he cannot properly be charged with acting in order to advance the aims 

of the Westhell gang.

We disagree. “This Court has rejected the notion that the ‘for the purpose of’ element must 

be the defendant’s sole or principal motive. We consider the motive requirement satisfied if the jury 

could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was 

expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in 

furtherance of that membership.” United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 220 (2d Cir. 2010) (second set 

of internal quotation marks omitted). 

The jury could properly have inferred as much here. When considered in the light most 

favorable to the Government, several pieces of evidence, taken together, were sufficient to prove 

that Stanley acted, in part, because of his membership in the Westhell gang. This included both the 

corroborated admission by Stanley to Farmer that Stanely was a “shooter” for the Westhell gang and 

the cell phone data indicating Stanley’s contact with another alleged gang member, first around the 

time of the Vine Street shooting and then around the time that he shot Washington. Even if he was 

motivated, in part, by a personal conflict with Lucien, a rational juror could conclude that this other 

evidence demonstrated a secondary motivation. They could have concluded from the evidence that 

Stanley worked on behalf of the Westhell gang and that his actions were consistent with an interest 

in maintaining or improving his position within it. 

III: Witness Credibility

While challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Stanley also argues that the three eyewitnesses presented by the Government—Lucien, Willie Brown, and Al-Malik Sherrod—provided 

such inconsistent testimony that it constituted perjury. He notes that the District Court itself 

referred to “night and day differences” between the accounts of the witnesses, Stanley App. 215, 

even though it ultimately decided, when disposing of a Rule 33 motion, that the three eye-witnesses 

were not so unreliable in their testimony as to warrant a new trial. Stanley App. 267-69. Stanley 

contends that the District Court was wrong to make this ruling, and highlights the fact that the eyewitnesses’ stories conflicted on several key datapoints, among them: whether Stanley was alone or 

accompanied by another person in the car on the way to the shooting of Washington; where the car 

was located; whether the car was moving; and whether Stanley exited the car to discharge his 

weapon or did so from within it.

“This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a Rule 33 motion only for abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2007). “Because the courts generally 

must defer to the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence and assessment of witness credibility, it is 

only where exceptional circumstances can be demonstrated that the trial judge may intrude upon the 

jury function of credibility assessment. An example of exceptional circumstances is where testimony 
7

is patently incredible or defies physical reality.” United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458, 475-76 (2d 

Cir. 2009) (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that no such exceptional 

circumstances existed. The District Court, in its findings, appropriately deferred to the jury’s 

conclusions about witness credibility while reasonably determining that the eye-witnesses’ testimony 

did not “def[y] physical reality or otherwise cross[ ] the line from questionable to inherently 

unbelievable.” Stanley App. 267.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Stanley on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the April 4, 2019 amended judgment of the 

District Court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk