### THE HONORABLE HOWARD F. SACHS, United States District Judge 1 

### for the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation. The Honorab le H. David Young, United States Magistrate Judge 2 

### for the Eastern District of Arkansas, presiding by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994). _____________ No. 96-1751

_____________ Joyce Gwathney, SS #432-06-1313,* *

Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner,* Social Security Administration, * * Appellee. *

____________ Submitted: November 21, 1996 Filed: January 14, 1997

____________ Before RIC HARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, MAGILL, Circuit Judge, and SACHS, 1 District Judge.

_____________ MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Joyce Gwathney appeals the district court's decision to gran t 2 summaryjudgment and thereby affirm the administrative law judge's (ALJ) denial of social security disability benefits. Gwathney challenges th e ALJ's finding of no disability. Because the record as a whole supports th e ALJ's finding that Gwathney was not disabled, we affirm.

### -2- I.
Gwathney filed for social security d isability benefits on October 5, 1990. She claimed to be disabled since May 15, 1987, because of a poorly healed arm fracture which gave her throbbing pain, particularly when she attempted to lift heavy objects. Gwathney later claimed that she suffered from a variety of conditions that caused severe impairment, includin g obesity, hypertension, arthritis, gastritis, dermatitis, depression, an d me ntal retardation. Gwathney's initial application for benefits wa s denied , as was her petition for reconsideration. Following proceeding s before an ALJ, a social security administrative appeals council, and the district court, her case was remanded for further fact finding.
Upon remand, the ALJ considered evid ence that Gwathney, who was born in 1950 and who has a n eleventh grade education, had a verbal IQ of 69, a perf ormance IQ of 68, and a full-scale IQ of 67. In addition, the AL J considered Gwathney's subjective accounts of pain and hypertension.

The ALJ w as also presented with evidence that Gwathney successfully participated in a wide variety of activities, including housework, cooking , shoppi ng, attending GED classes, and preparing for and teaching Sunda y school classes. Gwathney testified that, for a time after she had applied for social security disability benefits, she had had a part-time jo b stocking groceries at a convenience store.
Additional evidence indicated that Gwathney had never followed a regular regime of medical treatment for her phys ical complaints. Gwathney did not report taking any prescription medication for her pain, an d although her hypertension and gastritis could have been managed by th e conserv ative use of medication, she never pursued a regular course o f medication for these conditions. Finally, there

### -3-

was n o evidence that Gwathney had ever sought treatment for her menta l health concerns, which included being prone to v arious behavioral tics and having dependent personality disorder.
Upon cons idering this evidence, the ALJ found that Gwathney did not suffer from a severe physical or mental impairme nt and accordingly was not disabled under the So cial Security Administration's regulations. Because Gwathney did not meet the regulatory definition of disabled, the ALJ found that she was not entitled to social security disability benefits. Th e Social Security Administration Appeals Council and the district cour t affirmed the ALJ's de cision, and Gwathney now brings this appeal, arguing that the ALJ's conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence.

II.

In considering whether a claimant has properly been denied socia l sec uritydisability benefits, we must determine "whether there i s subs tantial evidence based on the entire record to support the ALJ' s factual findings, and whether his decision was based on legal error. " Clark v. Chater , 75 F.3d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quotation omitted). "We must consider bot h eviden ce that supports and evidence that detracts from the Secretary' s decision, but we may not reverse merely because substantial evidence exist s for the o pposite decision." Johnson v. Chater , 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8t h Cir. 1996). The ALJ may discount subjective complaints of physical an d mental health problems that are inconsistent with medical reports, daily activities, and other such evidence. See Haynes v. Shalala , 26 F.3d 812, 814-15 (8th Cir. 1994).
A person is entitled to social security disability benefits only if he or she meets the threshold requirement of having a

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disability. See 20 C .F.R. § 404.1501 (1996). To be disabled, a claimant must have a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (1996). To qualif y as severe, an impairment must "significantly lim it [a claimant's] physical
or mental ability to do basic work activities," 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a ) (1996), which are "the abilities and aptitudes n ecessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b) (1996).

In th is case, there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ' s finding that Gwathney was not significantly limi ted by either her physical
or m ental impairments. Gwathney was able to perform such physicall y dem anding tasks as housework and employment requiring shelf-stacking , contr adicting her claim that she was unable to perform basic wor k activit ies. Cf. Roe v. Chater , 92 F.3d 672, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Mor e telling than a chronicle of [the claimant's] various ailments are hi s actual activities, which are incongruous with his contention that he canno t work."). Furthermore, and despite her low IQ, G wathney was able to engage in s uch intellectually challenging tasks as studying for her GED an d conducting Sunday school classes. Cf. Loving v. Department of Health & Human Servs. , 16 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting psychologist's conclusion that claim ant was a functional illiterate where the conclusion of functional illiter acy was contradicted by the claimant's own testimony about his reading activities).
Finall y, Gwathney's failure to seek medical assistance for he r alleged physical and mental impairments contradicts her subjectiv e complaints of disabling conditions and supports the ALJ's decision to deny benefi ts. Cf. Ostronski v. Chater , 94 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir. 1996 ) ("[Claimant's] complaints of disabling pain and functional limitations are inconsistent with her failure to take prescriptive pain medication or to seek regular medical treatment for her symptoms. "); Haynes , 26 F.3d at 814 ("A la ck of strong pain medication is inconsistent with subjectiv e complaints of disabling pain.").

### -5- III.

For th e reasons discussed above, we affirm the decision of th e district court.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.