UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

INEZ BROWN CROUCH; RONALD S.

GARMON; RONALD H.

MIDDLETON, SR.; JOHN C. MIZZELL;

JOAN M. SOOY; ANN V. PADGETT;

WILLIAM C. WILDER; JERRY LEE

RICHARDSON; PARRIS L. WILLIAMS;

JOHN DOE, an individual affected by

the re-zoning decision; TOWN OF

JAMES ISLAND,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 97-1118

v.

SECRETARY OF STATE, in his official

capacity,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

CITY OF CHARLESTON; ROBERT B.

KIZER,

Parties in Interest.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.

(CA-96-3786-2-23)

Argued: May 7, 1997

Decided: August 5, 1997

Before RUSSELL and HALL, Circuit Judges, and

TRAXLER, United States District Judge for the

District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: William Andrew Gowder, Jr., PRATT-THOMAS,

PEARCE, EPTING & WALKER, P.A., Charleston, South Carolina,

for Appellants. Bruce Edward Miller, BARNWELL, WHALEY,

PATTERSON & HELMS, L.L.C., Charleston, South Carolina, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Andrew K. Epting, G. Trenholm Walker,

Gregg Meyers, PRATT-THOMAS, PEARCE, EPTING & WALKER,

P.A., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellants. James E. Reeves,

BARNWELL, WHALEY, PATTERSON & HELMS, L.L.C.,

Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In this case we consider whether litigants who lost in state supreme

court have a federal cause of action on the same facts. The district

court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs

below appeal.

I.

In 1992, some residents of James Island, an area near Charleston,

South Carolina, filed a petition with the South Carolina Secretary of

State, seeking to incorporate the area into a town. The South Carolina

Secretary of State appointed a commission to conduct a referendum,

and a majority of the residents of the area voted in favor of incorporation. The Town of James Island came into existence in January 1993

and began operations as a municipality. Opponents of the incorpora-

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tion filed suit in state circuit court. They argued, inter alia, that the

Town lacked the contiguity of area required for lawful incorporation.

The state circuit court agreed, and declared the Town's incorporation

invalid. In Glaze v. Grooms,1 the Supreme Court of South Carolina

affirmed the judgment.

The plaintiffs in this action then filed suit in federal district court

to stop the dissolution of the town, claiming the dissolution would

violate certain of their rights under the United States Constitution and

federal statutes. They sued for declaratory and injunctive relief to stop

the South Carolina Secretary of State from carrying out the mandate

of the Glaze decision.2

The district court ruled that the plaintiffs were essentially seeking

federal appellate review of the Glaze decision and that their constitutional claims were inextricably intertwined with claims in the state

court proceeding. It dismissed the plaintiffs' action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, because federal courts may not review decisions

of the highest court of a state.

The plaintiffs appeal the district court's dismissal of their suit. We

review the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.3

II.

Only the Supreme Court of the United States may review "[f]inal

judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State."4 In the

line of reasoning known as the Rooker-Feldman 5 doctrine, the

Supreme Court has established that United States District Courts are

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1 478 S.E.2d 841 (S.C. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1845 (1997).

2 We are unsure what the exact status of the Town is at this point, and

what steps, if any, must be taken to dissolve it. We do not need this information, however, to decide the case before us.

3 Hager v. Gibson, 108 F.3d 35, 38 (4th Cir. 1997).

4 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257 (West 1993).

5 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

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"without authority to review final determinations" of state supreme

courts.6 Rooker-Feldman prevents district courts from entertaining

cases that present challenges to state supreme court judgments that

arise out of particular adjudications, although general challenges to

state court action are permissible.7

Furthermore, even if a claim does not raise a challenge to a state

court judgment, Rooker-Feldman may still deprive the district court

of jurisdiction. "If the constitutional claims presented to a United

States district court are inextricably intertwined with the state court's

denial in a judicial proceeding [of the requested relief], then the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court

decision. This it may not do."8 In other words, if the appellants in this

case were seeking to challenge a state court decision arising from a

particularized adjudication, or if their federal claims were inextricably

intertwined with the state-court proceedings, the district court was

without subject matter jurisdiction and was required to dismiss the

case.

The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions "preventing the Secretary of State from decertifying the Town," or requiring recertification if the Secretary had already decertified it. They also

sought a declaratory judgment that decertification of the town would

violate their constitutional rights, "and that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction" in the Glaze case. They also demanded the

district court declare the Glaze decision"nonbinding and void as to

these plaintiffs." Finally, they asked the district court to prevent the

decertification of the town on the theory that decertification would

violate the Voting Rights Act.9

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6 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476.

7 See id. at 486. See also Stern v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 1988)

(allowing general challenge to state bar rules promulgated by state court

in nonjudicial proceeding).

8 Id. at 482 n.16.

9 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 1994).

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A.

To the extent the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief preventing or

reversing the implementation of the mandate of the Glaze decision,

they were seeking federal review of that decision. If the district court

had issued the requested injunction, that very act would have negated

the decision of the state court in Glaze.

In Stern v. Nix,10 an attorney was disbarred by the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court following a hearing and oral argument before that

court. Dissatisfied with the result of his case, the attorney, Stern, initiated a case in federal court, claiming a "general challenge" to state

court rules.11 Looking beyond the pleadings, however, the Third Circuit found that Stern's request for a permanent injunction preventing

his disbarment amounted to a particularized challenge to the Pennsylvania court order. The Third Circuit rejected Stern's appeal and

ordered the case dismissed. It reasoned that "Stern's complaint [was]

simply a skillful attempt to mask the true purpose of the action, which

essentially [was] to reverse the judicial decision of the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania, in contravention of Rooker-Feldman."12

Like Stern, the appellants in the instant case have mounted a challenge to a particularized state court adjudication. Federal district

courts "do not have jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state-court

decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even

if those challenges allege that the state court's action was

unconstitutional."13

We read the appellants' complaint in this case to seek reversal of

the Glaze decision. Glaze ordered the decertification of the Town of

James Island. The appellants asked the district court to prevent the

decertification of the town so that it could continue to exist. This is

nothing more than an attempt to overturn Glaze and is prohibited by

Rooker-Feldman.

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10 840 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1988).

11 Id. at 211.

12 Id. at 212.

13 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486.

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B.

The appellants also sought federal court review on constitutional

and statutory claims that the district court ruled were "inextricably

intertwined" with the Glaze decision. We have noted that RookerFeldman extends to such matters, and we agree with the district court

that the appellants presented inextricably intertwined claims. For

example, Glaze ordered the decertification of the town based on the

town's failure to satisfy the contiguity requirement of South Carolina

law.14 The plaintiffs now challenge the contiguity requirement on the

basis that it is "not reasonable and necessary to carry out a legitimate

government purpose." In Glaze, however, the court relied on case law

from South Carolina, and implicitly upheld the contiguity requirement.15

Thus, the plaintiffs' challenge to the contiguity requirement would

require the district court to examine Glaze, the underlying state court

precedent,16 and the South Carolina municipal incorporation statute.17

Therefore, the challenge is "inextricably intertwined" with the state

court's judicial proceedings and cannot be heard in federal court.18

The balance of the plaintiffs' challenges likewise fail.

III.

The appellants present two arguments that they contend will defeat

the application of Rooker-Feldman to their lawsuit. We reject both of

them.

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14 Glaze, 478 S.E.2d at 843 n.4.

15 Id. (citing Tovey v. City of Charleston, 117 S.E.2d 872 (S.C. 1961)

(requiring contiguity of areas for incorporation)).

16 Tovey, 117 S.E.2d 872.

17 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 5-1-10 to 110 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1995).

18 We also note that the South Carolina General Assembly is currently

considering revising the incorporation statute to create and define a contiguity requirement. See H.B. 3986, 112th Sess. Gen. Assembly (S.C.

introduced Apr. 10, 1997); S.B. 63, 112th Sess. Gen. Assembly (S.C.

introduced Jan. 14, 1997) (adding contiguity requirement in S.C. Code.

Ann. § 5-1-30). It appears the proposed revisions would allow James

Island to incorporate.

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A.

The plaintiffs in the instant case include some litigants from the

state court action and new plaintiffs. These new plaintiffs argue that

they must be afforded an opportunity to present their constitutional

claims in federal court. They are wrong. In Guess v. Board of Medical

Examiners,19 we applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to the claims

of a doctor whose license had been revoked by state authorities, and

affirmed the district court's judgment that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to hear the doctor's claims. Patients of the doctor sought

injunctive relief in federal court that would have allowed the doctor

to continue to treat them. We ruled that because the patients' claims

were merely derivative of the doctor's claims, they were rendered

moot by our application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.20 Even

though none of the plaintiffs had been parties to the doctor's original

state court action, we reasoned that the patients"effectively [sought]

to relitigate the claims of Guess that were previously decided and

which this court ha[d] no jurisdiction to review."

Likewise, the new plaintiffs in this case seek review of the

Supreme Court of South Carolina decision in Glaze. As discussed

above, the district court had no jurisdiction to review the Glaze decision. The addition of new plaintiffs does not create jurisdiction.

B.

The appellants also argue that they are entitled to litigate in federal

court any constitutional claims not considered in the state-court proceedings. The Supreme Court specifically addressed this contention

in Feldman.21 It criticized a Fifth Circuit decision allowing a plaintiff

to present constitutional claims in federal district court even though

the plaintiff failed to raise these claims in a previous adjudication by

the Texas Supreme Court. The Court declared that"[b]y failing to

raise his constitutional claims in state court a plaintiff may forfeit his

right to obtain review of the state-court decision in any federal court.

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19 967 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1992).

20 Id. at 1005.

21 460 U.S. at 482 n.16.

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This result is eminently defensible on policy grounds. We have noted

the competence of state courts to adjudicate federal constitutional

claims."22 As in Feldman , the appellants here failed to raise their federal constitutional claims in the state court proceedings. They may not

do so now in federal court.

IV.

We find no error by the district court in applying the RookerFeldman doctrine, and affirm the judgment below.

AFFIRMED

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22 Id. (citations omitted).

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