UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

West Palm Beach Division

Case No. _____________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, 

45th President of the United States

1100 S. Ocean Boulevard

Palm Beach, Florida 33480

Plaintiff,

v.

SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE

THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK 

ON THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL,

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

NANCY PELOSI, in her official capacity

as Speaker of the United States 

House of Representatives,

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, in his official

capacity as Chair of the Select Committee 

to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the

United States Capitol,

ELIZABETH CHENEY, in her official 

capacity as a member of the United States 

House of Representatives,

ADAM B. SCHIFF, in his official 

capacity as a member of United States 

House of Representatives,

JAMIE B. RASKIN, in his official capacity

as a member of the United States 

House of Representatives,

SUSAN E. LOFGREN, in her official 

capacity as a member of the United States

House of Representatives,

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ELAINE G. LURIA, in her official capacity 

as a member of the United States House of 

Representatives,

PETER R. AGUILAR, in his official capacity

as a member of the United States House 

of Representatives,

STEPHANIE MURPHY, in her official 

capacity as a member of the United States 

House of Representative, and

ADAM D. KINZINGER, in his official capacity 

as a member of the United States House

of Representatives.

Defendants.

____________________________________________/

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiff Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States, hereby sues the Select 

Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, et al. (the 

“Committee”), for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 57 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and,

in support, states as follows:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States, was issued a subpoena (the 

“Subpoena”) by the Committee to turn over documents and to testify in a closed-door deposition 

about events that occurred while he was President of the United States. While other Presidents 

and former Presidents have voluntarily agreed to testify or turn over documents in response to a 

congressional subpoena, no President or former President has ever been compelled to do so. 

2. To the contrary, for a half-century the Department of Justice has consistently opined 

that Presidents and former Presidents have absolute immunity from compelled Congressional 

testimony. See infra ¶¶ 82-91 (citing 50 years of OLC opinions and collecting cases and other 

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authorities). In a formal opinion, Attorney General Janet Reno wrote that this immunity “is 

absolute and may not be overborne by competing congressional interests.” Assertion of Executive 

Privilege with Respect to Clemency Decisions, 23 Op. O.L.C. 1, 5 (Sept. 16, 1999). 

3. The Supreme Court has held, “Congress and the President have an ongoing 

institutional relationship as the ‘opposite and rival’ political branches established by the 

Constitution. . . . As a result, congressional subpoenas directed at the President differ markedly 

from congressional subpoenas we have previously reviewed . . . and they bear little resemblance 

to criminal subpoenas issued to the President in the course of a specific case.” Trump v. Mazars 

USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2033-34 (2020) (citations omitted).

4. “Without limits on its subpoena powers, Congress could ‘exert an imperious 

control’ over the Executive Branch and aggrandize itself at the President’s expense, just as the 

Framers’ feared.” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2034 (quoting The Federalist No. 71, at 484 (A. 

Hamilton)).

5. The separation of powers concerns raised by congressional aggrandizement at the 

expense of the Executive Branch do not expire when a President leaves office. As President 

Truman, a Democrat, wrote in response to a subpoena from the U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Un-American Activities:

It must be obvious to you that if the doctrine of separation of powers and the 

independence of the Presidency is to have any validity at all, it must be equally 

applicable to a President after his term of office has expired when he is sought to 

be examined with respect to any acts occurring while he was President. The 

doctrine would be shattered, and the President, contrary to our fundamental theory 

of Constitutional Government, would become a mere arm of the Legislative Branch 

of the Government if he would feel during his term of office that his every act might 

be subject to official inquiry and possible distortion for political purposes. 

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Letter from the Honorable Harry S. Truman to the Honorable Harold H. Velde (Nov. 11, 1953), 

https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/harry-s-truman-harold-hvelde?documentid=NA&pagenumber=2. 

6. This long-held view was reiterated in open court by the Department of Justice as 

recently as September 2022. See infra. ¶ 82.

7. The only possible exception to this absolute testimonial immunity—an exception 

which is itself hotly contested in academic circles—is for testimony in connection with the House 

of Representatives’ impeachment jurisdiction. But the Subpoena issued by the Committee to 

“President Donald J. Trump” does not arise from an impeachment inquiry. For the reasons 

explained below, the Committee lacks authority to issue the Subpoena and, in any event, President 

Trump is not required to comply.

8. As a result of the Committee’s self-described “unprecedented” action, President 

Trump has been put in the untenable position of choosing between preserving his rights and the 

constitutional prerogatives of the Executive Branch, or risking enforcement of the Subpoena issued 

to him. Accordingly, Former President Trump turns to the courts to preserve his rights and

Executive Branch independence consistently upheld by the courts and endorsed by the Department 

of Justice.

9. This lawsuit—a matter of first impression arising from unprecedented facts—seeks 

to declare President Trump’s rights and obligations and, through an injunction, to defend them 

from violation by the Committee’s Subpoena.

10. Prior to filing suit, President Trump attempted to resolve this dispute with the 

Committee through various proposals that would simultaneously have provided the Committee 

with information it claims it needs while protecting and preserving the interests of the Executive 

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Branch under our constitutional system of separation of powers. The Committee, however, insists

that the Executive, in the person of President Trump, must yield to the demands of the Legislative 

Branch and comply with its Subpoena.

11. The Committee’s Subpoena is invalid because, as explained below, the Committee 

did not issue the Subpoena to further a valid legislative purpose; the Subpoena is unwarranted 

because other sources can provide the information the Subpoena seeks; the Subpoena is broader 

than reasonably necessary; the Subpoena infringes on executive privilege; the Subpoena infringes 

President Trump’s First Amendment rights; the Committee is not duly authorized; and the 

Committee lacks the authority to issue subpoenas.

12. Accordingly, President Trump turns to the courts to preserve his rights and, in so 

doing, the separation of powers essential to our constitutional order.

PARTIES

13. Plaintiff, Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States, served between 

January 20, 2017, and January 20, 2021. President Trump remains a prominent figure in the 

Republican Party and remains eligible to run for president in 2024. He is a resident of Palm Beach 

County, Florida.

14. Defendant Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United 

States Capitol (“Committee”) was created by House Resolution 503 (“H. Res. 503”), passed by 

the United States House of Representatives on June 30, 2021.

15. Defendant U.S. House of Representatives is one of two houses of the legislative 

branch of the Federal Government.

16. Defendant Nancy Pelosi (“Speaker Pelosi”) is Speaker of the United States House 

of Representatives.

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17. Defendant Bennie G. Thompson (“Chairman Thompson”) is a Democrat member 

of the United States House of Representatives and Chair of the Committee. The Subpoena 

challenged herein was issued with his purported authority as Chair.

18. Defendant Elizabeth L. Cheney (“Congresswoman Cheney” or “Rep. Cheney”) is 

a Republican member of the United States House of Representatives and Vice Chair of the 

Committee. Congresswoman Cheney, an avowed political opponent of President Trump, was 

placed on the Committee by the fiat of Speaker Pelosi in contravention of the normal practices of 

the House and over the opposition of its Minority Leader.

19. Defendant Adam B. Schiff (“Congressman Schiff” or “Rep. Schiff”) is a Democrat 

member of the United States House of Representatives and member of the Committee.

20. Defendant Jamie B. Raskin (“Congressman Raskin” or “Rep. Raskin”) is a 

Democrat member of the United States House of Representatives and member of the Committee.

21. Defendant Susan E. Lofgren (“Congresswoman Lofgren” or “Rep. Lofgren”) is a 

Democrat member of the United States House of Representatives and member of the Committee.

22. Defendant Elaine G. Luria (“Congresswoman Luria” or “Rep. Luria”) is a 

Democrat member of the United States House of Representatives and member of the Committee.

23. Defendant Peter R. Aguilar (“Congressman Aguilar” or “Rep. Aguilar”) is a 

Democrat member of the United States House of Representatives and member of the Committee.

24. Defendant Stephanie Murphy (“Congresswoman Murphy” or “Rep. Murphy”) is a 

Democrat member of the United States House of Representatives and member of the Committee.

25. Defendant Adam D. Kinzinger (“Congressman Kinzinger” or “Rep. Kinzinger”) is 

a Republican member of the United States House of Representatives and member of the 

Committee. Congressman Kinzinger, an avowed political opponent of President Trump, was 

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placed on the Committee by the fiat of Speaker Pelosi in contravention of the normal practices of 

the House and over the opposition of its Minority Leader.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

26. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal 

question). This Court has federal question jurisdiction to resolve disputes under either federal law 

or the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

27. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events 

giving rise to this claim, including the fact that President Trump—whose testimony and records 

the Subpoena demands—resides in the Southern District of Florida within the West Palm Beach 

Division, the official office of the 45th President of the United States pursuant to the Former 

President’s Act, 3 U.S.C. § 102, is located within this District and Division, and service of the 

Subpoena upon President Trump occurred in the District and Division.

RELEVANT FACTS

28. On January 20, 2017, President Trump was sworn in as the 45th President of the 

United States. President Trump served as President until January 20, 2021.

29. Pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, “[t]he executive power shall be 

vested in a President of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl.1.

30. “The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United 

States, and of the militia of the several states when called into the actual service of the United 

States.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

31. The President “may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each 

of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.” 

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

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32. On January 6, 2021, a large group of people in Washington, D.C, entered the United 

States Capitol and breached security, disrupted and delayed the counting of electoral college votes. 

The United States Department of Justice has charged more than 900 individuals in connection with 

events that occurred on January 6, 2021.

33. Following the events of January 6, 2021, President Trump was impeached by the 

House of Representatives and acquitted by the Senate. President Trump was not issued a 

subpoena in connection with the January 2021 impeachment inquiry or the February 2021 Senate 

trial.

A. Formation, Composition, and Authority of the Committee

34. After a failed attempt to establish a bipartisan commission, on June 28, 2021, 

Speaker Pelosi introduced H. Res. 503, “Establishing the Select Committee to Investigate the 

January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.” Two days later, the House passed H. Res. 503 

on a near party-line vote of 222 yeas and 190 nays. Only two Republicans, Reps. Cheney and 

Kinzinger, voted in favor of H. Res. 503.

35. H. Res. 503 establishes three “functions” of the Committee: (1) to “investigate the 

facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the domestic terrorist attack on the Capitol”; (2) to 

“identify, review, and evaluate the causes of and the lessons learned from the domestic terrorist 

attack on the Capitol”; and (3) to “issue a final report to the House containing such findings, 

conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures described in subsection (c) as it may 

deem necessary.”

36. Subsection (c) of Section 4 describes three categories of “corrective measures”: 

“changes in law, policy, procedures, rules, or regulations that could be taken” (1) “to prevent future

acts of violence, domestic terrorism, and domestic violent extremism, including acts targeted at 

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American democratic institutions”; (2) “to improve the security posture of the United States 

Capitol Complex while preserving accessibility of the Capitol Complex for all Americans”; and 

(3) “to strengthen the security and resilience of the United States and American democratic 

institutions against violence, domestic terrorism, and domestic violent extremism.”

37. H. Res. 503 provides that “[t]he Select Committee may not hold a markup of

legislation.”

38. H. Res. 503 provides that “[t]he chair of the Select Committee, upon consultation 

with the ranking minority member, may order the taking of depositions, including pursuant to 

Subpoena, by a Member or counsel of the Select Committee, in the same manner as a standing 

committee pursuant to section 3(b)(1) of House Resolution 8, One Hundred Seventeenth 

Congress.” Section 3(b)(1) of H. Res. 8 provides that, “[d]uring the One Hundred Seventeenth 

Congress, the chair of a standing committee . . . , upon consultation with the ranking minority 

member of such committee, may order the taking of depositions, including pursuant to subpoena, 

by a member or counsel of such committee.”

39. H. Res. 503 instructs the Speaker to appoint thirteen members to the Committee, 

only five of which “shall be appointed after consultation with the minority leader.”

40. Speaker Pelosi appointed Chairman Thompson to serve as chair of the Committee

and appointed six additional Democrat members: Reps. Lofgren, Schiff, Aguilar, Murphy (FL), 

Raskin, and Luria. She also appointed Republican Rep. Cheney without any designation of 

position. 167 Cong. Rec. H3597 (2021).

41. House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy recommended five Republican members 

to serve on the Committee, consistent with H. Res. 503: Rep. Jim Banks of Indiana to serve as 

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Ranking Member and Reps. Rodney Davis of Illinois, Jim Jordan of Ohio, Kelly Armstrong of 

North Dakota, and Troy Nehls of Texas to serve as additional minority members.

42. Speaker Pelosi did not appoint Rep. Banks to serve as Ranking Member, nor did 

she appoint any of Minority Leader McCarthy’s other recommended minority members. In a

public statement, she acknowledged that her refusal to appoint the members recommended by the 

Minority Leader was an “unprecedented decision.” Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. 

House of Representatives, Pelosi Statement on Republican Recommendations to Serve on the 

Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (July 21, 2021), 

https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.

43. Instead, Speaker Pelosi appointed Rep. Kinzinger—the only other Republican other 

than Rep. Cheney who voted in favor of H. Res. 503—and left four vacancies. See 167 Cong. Rec. 

H3885 (2021).

44. The result is that the Committee effectively lacks minority party representation.

45. House Rule XI(2)(d) instructs that a committee chair shall designate “[a] member 

of the majority party . . . as vice chair of the committee.” On September 2, 2021, Chairman 

Thompson announced in a press release that “he has named Representative Liz Cheney (R-WY) 

to serve as the Vice Chair of the Select Committee.” See Press Release, Bennie Thompson, 

Chairman, Select Comm. to Investigate the Jan. 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Chairman 

Thompson Announces Representative Cheney as Select Committee Vice Chair (Sept. 2, 2021), 

https://january6th.house.gov/news/pressreleases/chairman-thompson-announces-representativecheney-select-committee-vice-chair. Rep. Cheney is a member of the Republican Conference of 

the House of Representatives, and thus not a member of the current majority party.

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46. H. Res. 503 provides: “The chair of the Select Committee, upon consultation with 

the ranking minority member, may order the taking of depositions.”

47. Neither H. Res. 503 nor the House Rules define the term “ranking minority 

member.” That term, by custom and practice of the House, is defined by the parties themselves in 

their respective Conference and Caucus Rules. Under Rule 14 of the Republican Conference Rules 

of the 117th Congress, a member’s designation as the ranking Republican member of a Committee 

comes only through nomination by the Steering Committee and election by the Conference. Rule 

13 provides that, for a Select Committee, such nominations shall be made by the minority leader. 

No ranking minority member was ever designated in accordance with the Republican Conference 

Rules for the Committee. Therefore, the Committee has no ranking minority member. 

48. The Committee held its first hearing on July 27, 2021. See Press Release, Select 

Committee, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol to 

Hold First Hearing July 27th (Jul. 20, 2021), https://january6th.house.gov/news/pressreleases/select-committee-investigate-january-6th-attack-united-states-capitol-hold-first

49. After the hearing, Chairman Thompson reportedly “told reporters the select 

committee could have another hearing in August while the House is scheduled to be in a sevenweek recess.” Melissa Macaya et al., Capitol Riot Committee Holds First Hearing, CNN (Jul. 27, 

2021), https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/jan-6-house-select-committee-hearing-07-27-

21/h_f000be289ea8ac4e1fb4b992b3d0b80e.

50. But the Committee did not have another hearing in August 2021; nor did it have 

another hearing for the remainder of 2021.

51. Instead, the Committee waited almost a year to hold a second hearing, holding it on 

June 9, 2022, right at or before the majority of the 2022 midterm primary and primary runoff 

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elections. See Select Committee, Past Hearings, https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings

/06092022-select-committee-hearing (last visited Nov. 10, 2022).

52. The Committee subsequently held seven additional hearings during the summer of 

2022: on June 13, 2022, June 16, 2022, June 21, 2022, June 23, 2022, June 28, 2022, July 12, 2022, 

and July 21, 2022. Select Committee, Past Hearings, https://january6th.house.gov

/legislation/hearings (last visited Nov. 10, 2022).

53. At no time during more than a year of hearings did the Committee formally request 

that President Trump voluntarily testify or provide documents. 

54. On September 19, 2022, Committee members Congresswoman Lofgren and 

Congresswoman Cheney introduced House Resolution 8873, Presidential Election Reform Act 

(“H.R. 8873”), to amend the Electoral Count Act.

55. Representatives Lofgren and Cheney made clear that H.R. 8873 is an outgrowth of 

the Committee’s work, stating in the Wall Street Journal that “[t]he committee will have more to 

say in the months to come about the full extent of Mr. Trump’s plans to overturn the 2020 election, 

but we also have an obligation to recommend legislation to make sure such an attack never happens 

again. . . . To address this prospect, this week we will propose reforms to the Electoral Count Act 

to protect the rule of law and ensure that future efforts to attack the integrity of presidential 

elections can’t succeed.” Liz Cheney and Zoe Lofgren, We Have a Bill to Help Prevent Another 

Jan. 6 Attack, Wall. St. J. (Sept. 18, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/we-have-a-bill-toprevent-another-jan-6-attack-cheney-committee-electoral-count-president11663535092?mod=opinion_lead_pos5. 

56. On September 21, 2022, Congresswoman Cheney, speaking on the floor of the 

House, stated “[t]his bill [H.R. 8873] is a very important and crucial bill to ensure that what 

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happened on January 6th never happens again.” See Press Release, Liz Cheney, Cheney Delivers 

Closing Remarks Prior to House Vote on Presidential Election Reform Act (Sept. 21, 2022), 

https://cheney.house.gov/2022/09/21/cheney-delivers-closing-remarks-prior-to-house-vote-onpresidential-election-reform-act/. 

57. On September 21, 2022, H.R. 8873 passed the House of Representatives.

B. The Decision to Subpoena President Trump

58. After holding no hearings for two and a half months and after two members of the 

Committee drafted and introduced a bill to “to ensure that what happened on January 6th never 

happens again,” which passed the House of Representatives, the Committee decided to hold one 

more hearing on October 13, 2022—less than one month before the 2022 midterm elections.

59. At the October 13, 2022, hearing of the Committee, Chairman Thompson explained 

the purported need to subpoena President Trump as follows: 

[T]he need for this committee to hear from Donald Trump goes beyond our fact 

finding. This is a question about accountability to the American people. He must 

be accountable. He is required to answer for his actions. He’s required to answer 

to those police officers who put their lives and bodies on the line to defend our

democracy.

He’s required to answer to those millions of Americans whose votes he wanted to 

throw out as part of his scheme to remain in power. And whatever is underway to 

ensure this accountability under the law, this committee will demand a full 

accounting to every American person of the events of January 6th. So, it’s our 

obligation to seek Donald Trump’s testimony. 

60. Chairman Thompson also stated, “I’ve served in Congress a long time I can tell you 

it’s tough for any Congressional investigation to obtain evidence like what we’ve received, least 

of all such a detailed view into a president’s inner circle.”

61. At that same hearing, Congresswoman Cheney stated, “[o]ur committee now has 

sufficient information to answer many of the critical questions posed by Congress at the outset. 

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We have sufficient information to consider criminal referrals for multiple individuals and to 

recommend a range of legislative proposals to guard against another January 6th, but a key task 

remains. We must seek the testimony of January 6th’s central player.”

62. Congresswoman Cheney further noted, “[o]ur committee may ultimately decide to 

make a series of criminal referrals to the Department of Justice, but we recognize it is not our role 

to make decisions regarding prosecutions.”

63. Congresswoman Cheney also stated: “We’ve already proposed and the House has 

now passed a bill to amend the Electoral Count Act to help ensure that no future plots to overturn 

an election can succeed.” 

64. During the October 21, 2022, hearing, Congressman Kinzinger specifically 

referenced his policy disagreements with President Trump’s orders pursuant to his authority as 

commander in chief of the armed forces, stating “President Trump issued an order for large-scale 

US troop withdrawals. He disregarded concerns about the consequences for fragile governments 

on the front lines of the fight against ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorists.”

65. Congressman Kinzinger further referenced conversations between the President 

and his subordinates, including General Keith Kellogg, National Security Advisor to the Vice 

President, and General Mark Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

C. The Subpoena to President Trump

66. The Subpoena issued to President Trump (attached as Exhibit A) leaves no doubt 

that its focus is on President Trump’s action as President. 

67. The Subpoena is addressed to President Trump in his capacity as the “45th 

President of the United States.” Ex. A.

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68. The Subpoena refers to President Trump’s “obligation as President to ensure that 

the laws of our nation are faithfully executed.” Ex. A (emphasis added).

69. The Subpoena alleges that President Trump was “at the center of the first and only 

effort by any U.S. President to overturn an election.” Ex. A (emphasis added).

70. The Subpoena claims that the Committee is “considering multiple legislative 

recommendations intended to provide further assurances that no future President could succeed at 

anything even remotely similar to the unlawful steps you took to overturn the election.” Ex. A

(emphasis added).

71. “Historically, disputes over congressional demands for presidential documents 

have not ended up in court. Instead, they have been hashed out in the ‘hurly-burly, the give-andtake of the political process between the legislative and the executive.’” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2029

(quoting Hearings on S. 2170 et al. before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of 

the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 87 (1974) (A. Scalia, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel)).

72. President Trump has sought to resolve disputes regarding the Committee’s 

demands through the “political process” and through negotiation with the Committee.

73. To that end, President Trump’s legal team reached out to the Committee to discuss 

its “demands” and, on November 1, 2022, discussed the Subpoena on a phone call with Select 

Committee staff.

74. President Trump followed up on this call on November 2, 2022, by sending a letter 

to Select Committee staff (attached as Exhibit B) reiterating some of his concerns and seeking 

clarification on the scope of the Committee’s “demands.”

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75. On November 4, 2022, the Committee responded by letter (attached as Exhibit C)

requesting that President Trump initially focus on two document requests—requests number 1 and 

19—which the Committee narrowed, and that he respond to those requests by November 9, 2022. 

The Committee did not disclaim or withdraw its other sweeping document requests or 

substantively answer any of President Trump’s concerns regarding the scope and authority for the 

Subpoena.

76. President Trump responded via letter (attached as Exhibit D). Without waiving any 

objections, President Trump voluntarily responded to requests 1 and 19—as described in and 

narrowed by the Committee’s November 4, 2022, letter—stating in response to each “as a sign of 

good faith and as a courtesy to the Committee, President Trump has voluntarily directed a 

reasonable search for documents in his possession. The search found no documents responsive to 

this request.”

77. Consistent with the constitutional separation of powers and the learned opinion of 

the Department of Justice, as stated for the past fifty years and reiterated just this past September, 

President Trump asserted his absolute immunity from compelled testimony before Congress 

regarding his actions while serving as President.

78. President Trump also further stated his concerns and objections regarding the 

remainder of the Committee’s vague and sweeping document requests.

79. Finally, President Trump offered to consider responding in writing to specific 

written questions submitted to him by the Committee. 

80. The Committee has not replied to President Trump’s letter other than to 

acknowledge receiving it. Nor has the Committee submitted written questions to President Trump.

Pursuant to the terms of the Subpoena, President Trump’s deposition is scheduled for Monday, 

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November 14, three calendar days from the date this Complaint was filed, and the Committee has 

not withdrawn its demand that he appear.

THE SUBPOENA TO PRESIDENT TRUMP IS INVALID

A. The President has Absolute Testimonial Immunity from Compelled Appearances 

Before Congress

81. “The President is the only person who alone composes a branch of government.” 

Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2034.

82. The Department of Justice made clear in September 2022 that a subpoena seeking 

to compel the testimony of “a former president . . . presents an appearance issue of the dignity of 

the Office of the President” in a way that a subpoena to a president’s former aides does not. See 

Transcript of In-Person Motions Hearing Before the Honorable Carl J. Nichols, Meadows v. Pelosi, 

Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-03217 (Sept. 7, 2022).

83. This is consistent with the Department of Justice’s longstanding view that 

Presidents and former Presidents are absolutely immune from compelled testimony before 

Congress. To wit, “[s]ince the 1970s, [the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice] 

has consistently advised that ‘the President . . . [is] absolutely immune from testimonial 

compulsion by a Congressional committee’ on matters related to their official duties.” Testimonial 

Immunity Before Congress of the Former Counsel to the President, 2019 WL 2315338 at *2 

(O.L.C. May 20, 2019) (“Testimonial Immunity Before Congress”) (quoting Memorandum for All 

Heads of Offices, Divisions, Bureaus and Boards of the Department of Justice, from John M. 

Harmon, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Executive Privilege at 

5 (May 23, 1977) (“Harmon Memorandum”)).

84. The Office of Legal Counsel “has endorsed that legal principle on more than a 

dozen occasions, over the course of the last eight presidential administrations” prior to the Biden 

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Administration. Id. (citing Immunity of the Assistant to the President, 38 Op. O.L.C. at *1; Letter 

for Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel at 1–2 (Aug. 1, 2007); Immunity of the 

Former Counsel, 31 Op. O.L.C. at 191; Reno Opinion, 23 Op. O.L.C. at 4; Immunity of the Counsel 

to the President from Compelled Congressional Testimony, 20 Op. O.L.C. 308, 308 (1996) 

(“Immunity of the Counsel to the President ”); Letter for Jack Brooks, Chairman, Committee on 

the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, from Nicholas E. Calio, Assistant to the President 

for Legislative Affairs at 1 (June 16, 1992); Memorandum for Edward C. Schmults, Deputy 

Attorney General, from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel 

at 2 (July 29, 1982); Memorandum for Rudolph W. Giuliani, Associate Attorney General, from 

Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Congressional 

Demand for Deposition of Counsel to the President Fred F. Fielding at 2 (July 23, 1982); 

Memorandum for Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Congressional Testimony by Presidential 

Assistants at 1 (Apr. 14, 1981); Memorandum for Margaret McKenna, Deputy Counsel to the 

President, from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: DualPurpose Presidential Advisers at 5 (Aug. 11, 1977); Harmon Memorandum at 5; Letter to Phillip 

E. Areeda, Counsel to the President, from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

Legal Counsel (Sept. 25, 1974); Memorandum for John W. Dean III, Counsel to the President, 

from Roger C. Cramton, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Availability of 

Executive Privilege Where Congressional Committee Seeks Testimony of Former White House 

Official on Advice Given President on Official Matters at 6 (Dec. 21, 1972); Memorandum for 

John W. Dean III, Counsel to the President, from Ralph E. Erickson, Assistant Attorney General, 

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Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Appearance of Presidential Assistant Peter M. Flanigan Before a 

Congressional Committee at 1 (Mar. 15, 1972); Memorandum for John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant 

to the President for Domestic Affairs, from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Power of Congressional Committee to Compel Appearance or 

Testimony of ‘White House Staff’ at 7 (Feb. 5, 1971) (“The President . . . should be deemed 

absolutely immune from testimonial compulsion by a congressional committee.”)).

85. As Attorney General Janet Reno stated, “requiring the President himself to appear 

before Congress on matters relating to the performance of his constitutionally assigned executive 

functions . . . would, in my view, violate the constitutionally mandated separation of powers 

principles.” Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to Clemency Decisions, 23 Op. O.L.C. 

1, 5 (Sept. 16, 1999) (opinion of Attorney General Janet Reno).

86. Thus, “[t]he rationale for the immunity is plain. The President is the head of one 

of the independent Branches of the federal Government. If a congressional committee could force 

the President’s appearance, fundamental separation of powers principles—including the 

President’s independence and autonomy from Congress—would be threatened.” Immunity of 

Former Counsel to the President from Compelled Congressional Testimony, 31 U.S. Op. O.L.C. 

191, 2007 WL 5038035 at * 2 (Jul. 10, 2007) (“Immunity of Former Counsel”). Put differently, 

“[t]he President is a separate branch of government. He may not compel congressmen to appear 

before him. As a matter of separation of powers, Congress may not compel him to appear before 

it.” Memorandum for Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, from Theodore B. Olson, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel at 2 (Jul. 29, 1982). 

87. “[A]llowing Congress to subpoena the President to appear and testify would 

‘promote a perception that the President is subordinate to Congress, contrary to the Constitution’s 

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separation of governmental powers into equal and coordinate branches.’” Testimonial Immunity 

Before Congress at *3 (quoting Immunity of the Assistant to the President, 38 Op. O.L.C. at *2). 

88. Moreover, as a practical matter, “[t]here are dozens of congressional committees 

and subcommittees with the authority to conduct hearings and subpoena witnesses.” Testimonial 

Immunity Before Congress at *3. The ability of any one of them—or worse, all of them—to 

compel the President of the United States to appear and testify “would allow congressional 

committees to ‘wield their compulsory power to attempt to supervise the President’s actions, or to 

harass those advisers in an effort to influence their conduct, retaliate for actions the committee 

disliked, or embarrass and weaken the President for partisan gain.’” Id. (quoting Immunity of 

Assistant to the President, Op. O.L.C. at *3).

89. As Attorney General Reno recognized, this immunity “is absolute and may not be 

overborne by competing congressional interests.” Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to 

Clemency Decisions, 23 Op. O.L.C. at 5; see also Immunity of Former Counsel to the President 

from Compelled Congressional Testimony, 2007 WL 5038035 at * 1.

90. Moreover, testimonial immunity continues to apply after a President has left office. 

As President Truman wrote in response to a subpoena from the U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Un-American Activities:

It must be obvious to you that if the doctrine of separation of powers and the 

independence of the Presidency is to have any validity at all, it must be equally 

applicable to a President after his term of office has expired when he is sought 

to be examined with respect to any acts occurring while he was President. The 

doctrine would be shattered, and the President, contrary to our fundamental 

theory of Constitutional Government, would become a mere arm of the 

Legislative Branch of the Government if he would feel during his term of office 

that his every act might be subject to official inquiry and possible distortion for 

political purposes. 

Letter from the Honorable Harry S. Truman to the Honorable Harold H. Velde (Nov. 11, 1953), 

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velde?documentid=NA&pagenumber=2. Importantly, former President Truman’s letter was no 

academic exercise; it was his explanation for his absolute refusal to appear to testify in response 

to a subpoena issued by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In refusing Congress’s 

demand that he appear to testify, President Truman noted: 

I am carrying out the provisions of the Constitution of the United States; and 

am following a long line of precedents commencing with George Washington 

himself in 1796. Since his day, Presidents Jefferson, Monroe, Jackson, Tyler, 

Polk, Fillmore, Buchanan, Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Cleveland, Theodore 

Roosevelt, Coolidge, Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt have declined to 

respond to subpoenas or demands for information of various kinds by Congress.

Id. at 1. In justifying his decision to the American public, President Truman further explained it 

“is just as important to the independence of the Executive that the actions of the President should 

not be subjected to questioning by the Congress after he has completed his term of office as that 

his actions should not be questioned while he is serving as President.” Text of Address by Truman 

Explaining to Nation His Actions in the White Case, N.Y. Times at 26 (Nov. 17, 1953).

91. Consistent with President Truman’s words and deeds, the Department of Justice 

has consistently advised that testimonial immunity applies to former Presidents and their senior 

advisors. See Testimonial Immunity Before Congress at *10 (“[the Department of Justice] ha[s] 

recognized that testimonial immunity continues after the tenure of a particular Counsel to the 

President”); Immunity of Former Counsel at *2 (“Separation of powers principles dictate that 

former Presidents and former senior presidential advisers remain immune from compelled 

congressional testimony about official matters that occurred during their times as President or 

senior presidential advisers.”); see also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966) (applying 

the speech and debate clause to a former member of Congress).

92. The Committee has purported to subpoena President Trump to appear at a 

deposition and testify regarding his actions as President of the United States. As a co-equal branch 

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of government, Congress—and particularly a partisan committee thereof—lacks authority under 

the Constitution to do so. President Trump therefore has what Attorney General Reno 

characterized as “absolute” testimonial immunity. The Subpoena’s demand for compelled 

testimony is thus invalid.

B. The Committee Did Not Issue the Subpoena to Further a Valid Legislative Purpose

93. Even if President Trump did not have absolute testimonial immunity, the Subpoena

would be invalid for other reasons. Congress has no freestanding power to investigate and issue 

subpoenas. Instead, its investigative powers are ancillary to its legislative authority. Mazars, 140 

S. Ct. at 2031. Because of this tie between the investigative and legislative powers, Congress may 

only issue subpoenas that serve a valid legislative purpose.

94. The legislative purpose inquiry analyzes whether a particular subpoena serves a 

valid purpose, not whether an investigation as a whole serves a valid purpose. See id. at 2031.

95. Particularly where a subpoena involves the President, “courts should be attentive 

to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid 

legislative purpose. The more detailed and substantial the evidence of Congress’s legislative

purpose, the better. . . . That is particularly true when Congress contemplates legislation that raises 

sensitive constitutional issues, such as legislation concerning the presidency.” Mazars, 140 S.Ct. 

at 2036. 

96. In cases involving legislation concerning the presidency, “it is ‘impossible’ to 

conclude that a subpoena is designed to advance a valid legislative purpose unless Congress 

adequately identifies its aims and explains why the President’s information will advance its 

consideration of the possible legislation.” Id. (citations omitted). “Vague” or “loosely worded” 

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evidence of Congressional purpose is insufficient. Id. (quoting Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 

178, 201, 205 (1957)).

97. The Committee’s purported legislative purpose for subpoenaing President Trump

is to “consider[] multiple legislative recommendations intended to provide further assurance that 

no future President could succeed at anything remotely similar to the unlawful steps you took to 

overturn the election.” See Ex. A (emphasis added).

98. This is a vague and loosely worded purpose. 

99. To the extent a purported legislative purpose is discernable, the claimed purpose is 

to directly regulate future Presidents.

100. At no point does the Committee describe how the testimony of President Trump is 

necessary to further this purported purpose.

101. As described above, the Committee held eight hearings in June and July 2022.

102. Following those hearings, two members of the Committee introduced legislation 

with the stated goal of preventing another incident like the one that occurred on January 6, 2021.

103. That legislation passed the U.S. House of Representatives.

104. To the extent that it had one, the Committee has fulfilled its legislative purpose.

105. The Committee has provided no (nor could it provide any) specific information 

regarding what additional legislative proposals necessitate documents or testimony from President 

Trump.

106. Instead, the Committee provides ample evidence that its purported legislative 

purpose is pretextual, and that its true purpose is non-legislative.

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107. The Subpoena itself highlights that the requested deposition “will be lead [sic.] by 

the professional staff of the Select Committee—including multiple former federal prosecutors—

as well as Members.” See Ex. A (emphasis added).

108. The Committee makes no effort to identify why former prosecutors are relevant or 

necessary to elicit information for legislative drafting. Their potential value for eliciting 

information for punitive purposes, including potential criminal referrals, is obvious.

109. At the October 13, 2022, hearing where the Committee voted to authorize the 

Subpoena to President Trump, Chairman Thompson described the purpose of issuing the Subpoena

as “a question about accountability to the American people” and stated that President Trump “must 

be accountable” and “is required to answer for his actions.” 

110. This continues a long history of public statements by Speaker Pelosi and members 

of the Committee suggesting, if not outright stating, that their purpose is partisan, not legislative—

to punish President Trump, and to score political points. 

111. In an interview on December 29, 2021, Rep. Kinzinger stated, “We’ll be able to 

have out on the public record anything Justice Department needs maybe in . . . pursuit of [a 

potential criminal prosecution of former President Trump].” Zachary Cohen & Annie Grayer, 

January 6 committee says it would make criminal referrals if ‘appropriate,’ but that could be a 

long way off, CNN (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/21/politics/january-6-

committee-criminal-referrals/index.

112. Chairman Thompson noted on October 24, 2021, “obviously we are pursuing 

evidence” leading to “former President Trump or anyone else.” Transcript: Rep. Bennie Thompson 

on “Face the Nation”, CBS News (Oct. 24, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcriptrepbennie-thompson-on-face-the-nation-october-24-2021/. Chairman Thompson also tweeted on 

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January 6, 2022, “We have been working diligently to bring justice to [those responsible for Jan. 

6].” Bennie Thompson (@BennieGThompson), Twitter, (Jan. 6, 2022 8:31 AM), 

https://twitter.com/BennieGThompson/status/1479083311163232258. 

113. During a meeting of the Committee, Rep. Schiff explained that “exposing all the 

malefactors and bloodshed that went on here is really important.” Mary Clare Jalonick, Capitol 

riot committee has interviewed 250 people so far, Associated Press (Dec. 2, 2021), 

https://apnews.com/article/steve-bannon-donald-trump-elections-capitolsiege36b68bd9e0c701fea8e6b11f00292604. 

114. Rep. Schiff also tweeted on November 12, 2021, “We will expose those responsible 

for Jan 6. No one is above the law.” Adam Schiff (@RepAdamSchiff), Twitter (Nov. 12, 2021, 

4:54 PM), https://twitter.com/RepAdamSchiff/status/1459278425118625794. 

115. Rep. Raskin has also implied a law enforcement purpose of the investigation when 

he stated on multiple occasions that no privilege (neither attorney-client nor executive) “operate[s] 

to shield participants in a crime from an investigation into a crime.” Hugo Lowell, Capitol panel 

to investigate Trump call to Willard hotel in hours before attack, Guardian (Dec. 27, 2021), 

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/dec/27/capitol-attack-panel-investigate-trumpcallwillard-hotel-before-assault. See also Jamie Raskin (@RepRaskin), Twitter (Dec. 2, 2021, 

5:40PM), https://twitter.com/RepRaskin/status/1466537815185891329 (“Exec. privilege doesn’t 

cover criminal misconduct, like insurrections or coups . . . .”). 

116. At the October 21, 2022, hearing Congresswoman Cheney raised the prospect of 

criminal referrals to the Department of Justice multiple times and noted “[w]e have sufficient 

information to consider criminal referrals for multiple individuals and to recommend a range of 

legislative proposals to guard against another January 6th.” In fact, Rep. Cheney doubled down on 

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the prosecutorial purpose behind the Committee’s request of President Trump. When specifically 

asked about this Subpoena and its requests to President Trump regarding document production and 

testimony, Rep. Cheney admitted that the Committee was “already considering” criminal referrals. 

November 11, 2022 C-Span Interview with Representative Liz Cheney https://www.cspan.org/video/?c5040513/rep-cheney-jan-6-committee (last visited Nov. 11, 2022).

117. The Supreme Court has clearly stated “there is no congressional power to expose 

for the sake of exposure.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200.

118. Holding President Trump “accountable” is not a legislative purpose. 

119. Holding an individual “accountable” as the Committee describes it is a facially 

punitive purpose and exposure for the sake of exposure.

120. “Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of ‘law enforcement,’ because 

‘those powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary.’” Mazars, 

140 S. Ct. at 2032 (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955)).

121. Conducting federal investigations to facilitate referrals for prosecution to the 

Department of Justice is not a proper legislative purpose.

122. The Subpoena to President Trump lacks a basic valid legislative purpose, let alone 

a legislative purpose sufficiently detailed to justify an unprecedented intrusion on the Presidency 

by Congressmen hand-selected by the Speaker of the House, who is also a leading member of the 

opposing party. Accordingly, it is invalid.

C. The Subpoena’s Request for a President’s Testimony and Documents is Unwarranted 

Because There Are Other Sources for the Requested Information

123. Even if the Court finds that the President does not have immunity and/or finds that 

Congress has a valid legislative purpose, the Court should still declare the Committee’s Subpoena

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for the President’s testimony and/or his documents invalid because Congress has other sources 

who can provide this information.

124. Even when Congress has a valid legislative purpose (which it does not), “courts 

should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of 

involving the President and his papers.” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2035. “While we certainly 

recognize Congress’s important interests in obtaining information through appropriate inquiries, 

those interests are not sufficiently powerful to justify access to the President’s personal papers 

when other sources could provide Congress the information it needs.” Id. at 2036. Therefore, 

“Congress may not rely on the President’s information if other sources could reasonably provide 

Congress the information it needs in light of its particularly legislative objectives.” Id. at 2035-

36. 

125. By its own admission, other sources can and have provided the Committee with the 

information it needs to pursue its purported legislative purpose.

126. According to the Subpoena, the Committee has “interviewed more than a thousand 

witnesses, reviewed over a million documents, conducted public hearings, and vindicated [its] 

rights in court.” The Subpoena further states, “[a]s demonstrated in our hearings, we have 

assembled overwhelming evidence, including from dozens of your former staff, that you 

personally orchestrated and oversaw a multi-part effort to overturn the 2020 presidential election 

and to obstruct the peaceful transfer of power.” 

127. At the October 13, 2022, hearing, Chairman Thompson attested “I’ve served in 

Congress a long time. I can tell you it’s tough for any Congressional investigation to obtain 

evidence like what we’ve received, least of all such a detailed view into a president’s inner circle.” 

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128. At that same hearing, Congresswoman Cheney stated “[o]ur committee now has 

sufficient information to answer many of the critical questions posed by Congress at the outset.” 

129. Moreover, two committee members already proposed, and the House already 

passed, legislation directed at fixing the issue at the center of the Committee’s purported legislative 

purpose, H.R. 8873. 

130. According to Congresswoman Cheney, H.R. 8873 would “help ensure that no 

future plots to overturn an election can succeed.” 

131. By the Committee’s own admission, it has nearly unprecedented levels of 

information and insight into the President’s inner circle that is sufficient to “to answer many of the 

critical questions posed by Congress at the outset” and influence the drafting and passage of 

legislation.

132. The Committee has provided no justification or explanation (because it cannot) for 

how the President’s testimony and documents are necessary for the Committee’s claimed 

legislative purpose above and beyond the information already received from “thousands” of other 

witnesses and “over a million documents,” including extensive government records. 

133. Moreover, President Trump has proposed an alternative means for the Committee

to request and receive information. President Trump offered to consider responding in writing to 

specific questions submitted by the Committee. The January 6th Committee has not submitted 

such questions or even responded to the proposal.

134. Even if the Committee has a valid legislative purpose in issuing its Subpoena, it 

plainly fails to satisfy the requirement in Mazars that the President and his papers only be 

subpoenaed when Congress cannot obtain the relevant information from other sources. The 

Subpoena is thus invalid.

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D. The Subpoena is Broader than Reasonably Necessary

135. “[T]o narrow the scope of possible conflict between the branches, courts should 

insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative 

objective.” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2036. “The President’s unique constitutional position means that 

Congress may not look to him as a ‘case study’ for general legislation.” Id. Yet the breadth of 

information requested makes clear that Congress is seeking to do precisely that. 

136. The Subpoena for testimony is nearly unlimited, concerning all issues “touching 

matters of inquiry committed to said committee.”

137. The Committee has made clear that it takes a broad view of issues “touching matters 

of inquiry committed to said committee.” To wit, Congressman Kinzinger’s statements show that 

the Committee views decisions concerning the deployment of U.S. armed forces, a quintessential 

exercise of the unreviewable Article II authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the 

U.S. armed forces, as touching matters of inquiry committed to the Committee. The Committee

has also sought to inquire into Presidential appointments, a matter constitutionally committed to 

the President and the Senate, not a partisan committee of the House of Representatives.

138. There is nothing in the Subpoena limiting the inquiry to matters related to the 

Committee’s legislative purposes. 

139. Similarly, the Subpoena’s request for documents is incredibly broad, seeking nearly 

all communications from November 3, 2020 through January 6, 2021, concerning the 2020 

election, including conversations with President Trump’s legal team, government officials, and 

members of Congress. 

140. Incredibly, request number 14 demands production of all communications with 13 

people, including attorneys, for more than two and a half months, regardless of the subject matter.

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141. Accordingly, the Subpoena is overly broad and invalid. See also Ex. D (detailing 

specific concerns with each document request).

E. The Subpoena Violates the Separation of Powers by Infringing Upon Executive 

Privilege

142. Executive privilege allows a President to protect “documents or other materials that 

reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should 

remain confidential” from disclosure. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

Such privilege is “fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the 

separation of powers under the Constitution.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). 

“A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping 

policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except 

privately.” Id.

143. The Subpoena seeks to depose President Trump about events that occurred while 

he was President, and in his capacity as President. It expressly seeks information from President 

Trump about conversations and deliberations that occurred while he was President, and concerning

his exercise of Article II authority.

144. The Subpoena seeks documents that plainly reflect Presidential decision making 

and deliberations including, but not limited to, discussions with subordinate officials in the 

Department of Justice concerning the 2020 election and conversations with members of Congress 

regarding pending governmental business. 

145. As even the Committee’s cover letter acknowledges, the Supreme Court has held 

that “[f]ormer Presidents retain the limited ability to assert executive privilege[.]” See Ex. A.

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146. Through its broad request for documents and unbounded request for testimony, the 

Subpoena seeks information that is protected by the executive privilege and is invalid with respect 

to such information.

F. The Subpoena Infringes Upon President Trump’s First Amendment Rights to Speech 

and Association

147. “Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, 

there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the 

free discussion of governmental affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).

148. “When it comes to ‘a person’s beliefs and associations,’ ‘[b]road and sweeping 

state inquiries into these protected areas . . . discourage citizens from exercising rights protected 

by the Constitution.” Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2385 (2021) 

(quoting Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (plurality opinion)).

149. The Supreme Court has held that a citizen’s duty to cooperate with a Congressional 

subpoena “within the province of proper investigation . . . of course, assumes that the constitutional 

rights of witnesses will be respected by the Congress as they are in a court of justice. The Bill of 

Rights is applicable to investigations as to all forms of governmental action. Witnesses cannot be 

compelled to give evidence against themselves. They cannot be subjected to unreasonable search 

and seizure. Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political belief 

and association be abridged.” Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187–88 (1957).

150. Thus, “the provisions of the First Amendment . . . of course reach and limit 

congressional investigations.” Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).

151. While there are special separation of powers concerns relating to President Trump’s 

role as head of the executive branch that counsel against disclosure of presidential records of a coCase 9:22-cv-81758-RAR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/11/2022 Page 31 of 41
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equal branch of government, President Trump is also an American citizen. He did not check his 

constitutional rights to speech and association at the Oval Office door.

152. The broad scope of the Subpoena’s request for documents and testimony threatens 

to force President Trump to reveal the inner workings of his Presidential campaign, including his 

political beliefs, strategy, and fundraising.

153. The Committee’s quasi-criminal inquest into matters beyond violence during the 

Capitol riot infringe upon his First Amendment rights to hold whatever political views he would 

like, to express those views—especially including criticism of government actions like the conduct 

of elections—and to associate with whomever he chooses. 

154. To the extent it seeks information beyond that directly related to violent actions on 

January 6, 2021, the Subpoena infringes upon President Trump’s First Amendment rights and is 

invalid.

G. The Committee is Not a Duly Authorized Committee and Thus Lacks the Authority 

to Issue the Subpoena

155. The composition of the Committee is governed by Section 2 of H. Res. 503. Section 

2(a) states “Appointment Of Members.—The Speaker shall appoint 13 Members to the Select 

Committee, 5 of whom shall be appointed after consultation with the minority leader.” H. Res. 503 

117th Cong. (2021).

156. Speaker Pelosi has appointed only nine members to the Committee: seven 

Democrats and two Republicans. None of these members was appointed from the selection of five 

GOP congressmen put forth by Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy.

157. While the Court has determined authorized congressional committees have certain 

subpoena authority implied by Article I of the Constitution, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 

174 (1927), the Committee is not an authorized congressional committee. 

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158. The Committee fails to comport with its own authorizing resolution, H. Res. 503.

159. Congress’ failure to act in accordance with its own rules is judicially cognizable. 

Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963). This is particularly significant where a person’s 

fundamental rights are involved.

160. Speaker Pelosi failed to appoint members consistent with the authorizing resolution 

of the Committee. Speaker Pelosi has appointed only nine members of Congress to serve on the 

Committee; whereas the authorizing resolution instructs that the Speaker “shall” appoint thirteen 

members. H. Res. 503 § 2(a), 117th Cong. (2021).

161. Thus, the Committee as it currently stands—and stood at the time it issued the 

Subpoena in question—has no authority to conduct business because it is not a duly constituted 

Select Committee. Chairman Thompson’s purported Subpoena is invalid and unenforceable. 

H. The Committee Lacks Authority to Conduct Compelled Depositions

162. The taking of depositions by the Committee is governed by Section 5(c)(6) of H. 

Res. 503, which states:

(A)The chair of the Select Committee, upon consultation with the ranking 

member, may order the taking of depositions, including pursuant to 

subpoena, by a Member or counsel of the Select Committee, in the same 

manner as a standing committee pursuant to section 3(b)(1) of House 

Resolution 8, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress.

(B) Depositions taken under the authority prescribed in this paragraph shall be 

governed by procedures submitted by the chair of the Committee on Rules 

for printing in the Congressional Record on January 4, 2021.

163. Section 3(b)(1) of House Resolution 8 (H. Res. 8), concerning the adoption of rules 

of the 117th Congress, provides “[d]uring the One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, the chair of a 

standing committee (other than the Committee on Rules), and the chair of the Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, upon consultation with the ranking minority member of such 

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committee, may order the taking of depositions, including pursuant to a subpoena, by a member 

or counsel of such committee.”

164. The Procedures for the Use of Deposition Authority submitted by the Chair of the 

Committee on Rules for printing in the Congressional Record on January 4, 2021, provide in part:

2. Consultations with the ranking minority member shall include three days’ 

notice before any deposition is taken;

. . . .

5. A deposition shall be conducted by any member or committee counsel 

designed by the chair or ranking member of the Committee that noticed the 

deposition. When depositions are conducted by committee counsel, there shall 

be no more than two committee counsel permitted to question a witness per 

round. One of the committee counsel shall be designated by the chair and the 

other by the ranking minority member per round.

. . . .

6. Deposition questions shall be propounded in rounds. The length of each 

round shall not exceed 60 minutes per side, and shall provide equal time to the 

majority and the minority. In each round, the member(s) or committee counsel 

designated by the chair shall ask questions first, and the member(s) or 

committee counsel designed by the ranking minority member shall ask 

questions second.

10. The chair and the ranking minority member shall consult regarding the 

release of deposition testimony, transcripts, or recordings, and portions thereof. 

If either objects in writing to a proposed releases of a deposition testimony, 

transcript, or recording, or a portion thereof, the matter shall be promptly 

referred to the committee for resolution.

165. Under the Rule 13 of the House Republican Conference Rules for the 117th 

Congress, the highest-ranking Republican official in the House “shall recommend to the House all 

Republican Members of such joint, select, and ad hoc committees as shall be created by the House, 

in accordance with law.” Conference Rules of the 117th Congress, 

https://www.gop.gov/conference-rules-of-the-117th-congress/. Except as provided in Rule 13, the 

Republican Steering Committee nominates the highest-ranking Republican on each Committee, 

Case 9:22-cv-81758-RAR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/11/2022 Page 34 of 41
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and the Republican Conference votes to approve the nomination. Id. at Rule 14. That did not 

happen with respect to the Committee. 

166. There is no—nor given Speaker Pelosi’s exclusion of members selected by the 

Minority Leader could there be any—“ranking minority member” on the Committee. See Select 

Committee, Membership, https://january6th.house.gov/about/membership (last visited Oct. 27, 

2022). 

167. To wit, both on the Subpoena and at the October 21, 2022, hearing, 

Congresswoman Cheney was referred to as the “Vice Chair”—not the ranking member.

168. Chairman Thompson has not complied—and could not comply—with the 

requirement of Section 5(c)(6)(A) of H. Res. 503 to consult with the ranking minority member 

prior to ordering the taking of a deposition.

169. Chairman Thompson has not complied—and could not comply—with the 

requirement of Section 3(b)(1) of H. Res. 8, to consult with the ranking minority member prior to 

ordering the taking of a deposition.

170. Chairman Thompson has not complied—and could not comply—with the 

requirement of Section 2 of the Procedures for the Use of Deposition Authority submitted by the 

Chair of the Committee on Rules for printing in the Congressional Record on January 4, 2021, to 

consult with the ranking minority member prior to ordering the taking of a deposition.

171. Chairman Thompson could not comply with the requirement of Section 6 of the 

Procedures for the Use of Deposition Authority submitted by the Chair of the Committee on Rules 

for printing in the Congressional Record on January 4, 2021 because as there is no ranking minority 

member, there is no committee counsel designated by a ranking minority member to ask questions 

in the second half of each round of questions.

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172. Chairman Thompson and the Committee only have authority to order a deposition 

after consulting with the ranking minority member of the committee. There is no ranking minority 

member of the Committee. Thus, Chairman Thompson and the Committee do not have authority 

under the House Rules to order a deposition nor can it conduct any such deposition according to 

its own rules.

COUNT I 

DECLARATORY RELIEF

(28 U.S.C. § 2201(a))

173. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if fully 

set forth herein.

174. This matter presents an actual controversy between the parties within the Court’s 

jurisdiction and therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), the Court may declare the rights and 

other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration. There are several reasons 

the Committee’s Subpoena is invalid and President may not be compelled to testify or otherwise 

comply with its demands.

175. President Trump, as a former President of the United States, has absolute immunity 

from being compelled to testify before Congress regarding his actions while in office.

176. The Committee’s Subpoena is explicitly addressed to President Trump in his 

capacity as a former President, seeking information about his actions while President, and for the 

purpose of regulating future Presidents and is therefore invalid.

177. The Committee did not issue the Subpoena to President Trump to further a valid 

legislative purpose. The apparent purposes of the Committee are political and punitive, not 

legislative. The Committee seeks to embarrass President Trump and to damage his political 

prospects. That is, the Subpoena seeks exposure for the sake of exposure and is therefore invalid. 

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178. The Subpoena’s request for testimony and documents from President Trump is an 

unwarranted intrusion upon the institution of the Presidency because there are other sources of the 

requested information, including the thousand-plus witnesses the Committee has contacted and 

one million documents that the Committee has collected. The Committee also may obtain abundant 

government records relevant to its inquiry. Because of this obvious availability to obtain testimony 

and documents from other readily available sources, the Subpoena is invalid.

179. The Subpoena is “broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s 

legislative objective,” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2036, and Congress is impermissibly “look[ing] to 

him as a ‘case study’ for general legislation,” id. 

180. The Subpoena’s requests are not limited to matters related to the Committee’s 

legislative purposes. The Subpoena seeks nearly all President Trump’s communications from 

November 3, 2020 through January 6, 2021, concerning the 2020 election, including conversations 

with his legal team, government officials, and members of Congress. Indeed, Request 14 demands 

production of all communications with 13 people, including attorneys, for more than two and a 

half months, regardless of the subject matter. As a result, the Subpoena is invalid.

181. Executive privilege protects from disclosure a President’s “documents or other 

materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes 

should remain confidential” from disclosure. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 

1997). This privilege extends to a President’s communications with others so they are free to 

candidly consider and make policies. Id. 

182. The Subpoena seeks to depose President Trump about events that occurred while 

he was President, and in his capacity as President. It expressly seeks information from President 

Trump about conversations and deliberations with others in his administration, including 

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communications concerning his exercise of Article II authority. It also seeks documents that reflect 

decision making and deliberations including, but not limited to, discussions with subordinate 

officials in the Department of Justice concerning the 2020 election and conversations with 

members of Congress regarding pending governmental business. This intrusion violates Executive 

Privilege and renders the Subpoena invalid.

183. “[T]he provisions of the First Amendment . . . of course reach and limit 

congressional investigations.” Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).

184. The broad scope of the Subpoena’s request for documents and testimony threatens 

to force President Trump to reveal the inner workings of his Presidential campaign, including his 

political beliefs, strategy, and fundraising. President Trump did not check his constitutional rights 

at the Oval Office door. Because the Committee’s Subpoena to President Trump infringes upon 

his First Amendment rights it is invalid. 

185. Further, Congress’ failure to act in accordance with its own rules is judicially 

cognizable, Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963), particularly where a person’s 

fundamental rights are involved.

186. Speaker Pelosi has appointed only nine members of Congress to serve on the 

Committee; whereas the authorizing resolution mandates that the Speaker “shall” appoint thirteen 

members. H. Res. 503 § 2(a), 117th Cong. (2021). Thus, the Committee has had no authority to 

conduct business, including issuing subpoenas.

187. Section 3(b)(1) of H. Res. 8 requires the Committee’s Chair to consult with the 

“ranking minority member” of the Committee to issue a subpoena ordering a deposition. Because 

the Committee has no ranking member, the Committee cannot issue deposition subpoenas, nor can 

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it conduct its proposed depositions in a manner consistent with its own Rules. Therefore, this 

Court should declare that the Committee’s Subpoena to President Trump is invalid.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Donald J. Trump asks this Court to enter Judgment in his favor 

and against Defendants and to order the following relief:

a. A declaratory judgment that the Subpoena and any subpoena similar in form and content 

to the Subpoena is invalid, unlawful, and unenforceable because President Trump, as a 

former President of the United States, has absolute immunity from being compelled to 

testify before Congress or a committee thereof regarding his actions as head of a co-equal 

branch of government;

b. A declaratory judgment that the Subpoena and any subpoena similar in form and content 

to the Subpoena issued to President Trump is invalid, unlawful, and unenforceable because 

it does not further a valid legislative purpose;

c. A declaratory judgment that the Subpoena and any subpoena similar in form and content 

to the Subpoena issued to President Trump is invalid, unlawful, and unenforceable as an 

unwarranted intrusion into the Executive Branch;

d. A declaratory judgment that the Subpoena and any subpoena similar in form and content 

to the Subpoena issued to President Trump is invalid, unlawful, and unenforceable as 

broader than reasonably necessary;

e. A declaratory judgment that the Subpoena, and any subpoena similar in form and content 

to the Subpoena issued to President Trump is invalid, unlawful, and unenforceable because 

it seeks documents and testimony protected from disclosure by Executive Privilege;

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f. A declaratory judgment that the Subpoena and any subpoena similar in form and content 

to the Subpoena issued to President Trump is invalid, unlawful, and unenforceable because 

it violates President Trump’s First Amendment rights;

g. A declaratory judgment that the Subpoena and any subpoena similar in form and content 

to the Subpoena is invalid, unlawful, and unenforceable because Congress failed to comply 

with resolutions regarding the creation of the Committee and the issuance of subpoenas;

h. An injunction prohibiting the enforcement or the imposition of sanctions for 

noncompliance with the Subpoena and any subpoena similar in form and content to the 

Subpoena.

i. An award in favor of President Trump for his reasonable expenses, including attorney’s 

fees and costs incurred as a result of the Subpoena; and

j. Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: November 11, 2022 /s/ Matthew Sarelson

Matthew Seth Sarelson

Florida Bar 888281

DHILLON LAW GROUP INC.

1601 Forum Place, Suite 403 

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(305) 773-1952

msarelson@dhillonlaw.com

Harmeet K. Dhillon (pro hac vice 

forthcoming)

DHILLON LAW GROUP INC.

177 Post Street, Suite 700

San Francisco, California 94108

(415) 433-1700

harmeet@dhillonlaw.com

David A. Warrington (pro hac vice 

forthcoming)

Gary M. Lawkowski (pro hac vice 

forthcoming)

DHILLON LAW GROUP INC.

Case 9:22-cv-81758-RAR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/11/2022 Page 40 of 41
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2121 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 402

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

(703) 574-1206

dwarrington@dhillonlaw.com

glawkowski@dhillonlaw.com

Case 9:22-cv-81758-RAR Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/11/2022 Page 41 of 41