J-S03021-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOSEPH WATSON

Appellant No. 986 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 23, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1206401-1998

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2016

Joseph Watson appeals pro se from the order entered March 23, 2015, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, that dismissed as 

untimely his third petition for relief, filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. Watson claims the 

PCRA court erred “in dismissing appellant[’s] PCRA petition/application for 

reinstatement of his appellate rights, that was not addressed by the court.” 

Watson’s Brief at 6. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the procedural history of this case as 

follows:

On February 4, 2000, following a jury trial, [Watson] was 

convicted of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated 

assault, and possession of an instrument of crime. On 

September 22, 2000, [Watson] was resentenced to an aggregate 

term of twenty-two and a half to forty-five years’ incarceration. 

On September 12, 2003, following a direct appeal, the Superior 
J-S03021-16

- 2 -

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.2 [Watson] did not file 

for allowance of appeal. 

On April 15, 2004, [Watson] filed a timely PCRA petition. On May 

11, 2005, the PCRA court denied the petition. The Superior 

Court affirmed [the PCRA] court’s denial of [Watson’s] petition 

on September 29, 2006.3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied his petition for allowance of appeal on April 13, 2007.4

On July 8, 2009, [Watson] filed his second PCRA petition. 

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, 

[Watson] was served notice of the [PCRA] court’s intention to 

dismiss his PCRA petition on July 19, 2010. On June 13, 2011, 

the [PCRA] court dismissed [Watson’s] petition as untimely. On 

December 13, 2012, following a direct appeal, the Superior 

Court affirmed the dismissal of [Watson’s] PCRA petition.5

On June 4, 2014, [Watson] filed his third pro se PCRA petition, 

the dismissal of which is the subject of the current appeal. On 

September 26, 2014, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to 

dismiss pursuant to Rule 907. 

_______________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Watson, [835 A.2d 838] 3150 EDA 

2000 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super. Sept. 12, 

2003).

3 Commonwealth v. Watson, [911 A.2d 188] 1465 EDA 

2005 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super. Sept. 29, 

2006).

4 Commonwealth v. Watson, [921 A.2d 496] 602 EAL 

2006 (Pa. Apr. 13, 2007).

5 Commonwealth v. Watson, [64 A.3d 18] 1733 EDA 

2011 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super. Dec. 13, 

2012).

_____________________________________________

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/22/2015, at 1–2. On March 23, 2015, the court 

dismissed Watson’s PCRA petition as untimely. This timely appeal followed. 
J-S03021-16

- 3 -

Watson was not ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. 

The principles that guide our review are well settled:

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is 

whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination and 

whether the PCRA court’s decision is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 2011 PA Super 231, 31 A.3d 317, 

319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 2005 

PA Super 219, 877 A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support 

for the findings in the certified record. Id. (citing 

Commonwealth v. Carr, 2001 PA Super 54, 768 A.2d 1164, 

1166 (Pa. Super. 2001)).

We must first address whether Appellant satisfied the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA. The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a 

jurisdictional threshold and may not be disregarded in order to 

reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is 

untimely. Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201, 

203 (Pa. 2000). Effective January 16, 1996, the PCRA was 

amended to require a petitioner to file any PCRA petition within 

one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence “becomes final 

at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review 

in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Where a petitioner’s 

judgment of sentence became final on or before the effective 

date of the amendment, a special grace proviso allowed first 

PCRA petitions to be filed by January 16, 1997. See 

Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054, 1056-1057 (Pa. 

Super. 1997) (explaining application of PCRA timeliness proviso).

However, an untimely petition may be received when the 

petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three 

limited exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), are met. A petition 

invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within sixty days 

of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions 

to the PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead 
J-S03021-16

- 4 -

and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised 

within the sixty-day time frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Carr, 

768 A.2d at 1167.

Commonwealth v Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4–5 (Pa. Super. 2014) (footnote 

omitted).

In its opinion, the PCRA court found that Watson’s present PCRA 

petition was untimely. The PCRA court also determined that, although 

Watson advanced a claim based upon the new constitutional right 

announced in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), Watson 

failed to file his petition within 60 days of the date the claim could have been 

presented, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). See PCRA Court 

Opinion, 4/22/2015, at 3. Further, the PCRA court found Watson failed to 

satisfy the “newly recognized constitutional right” exception to the PCRA’s 

bar, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), since Alleyne has not been afforded 

retroactive effect by our Supreme Court or the United States Supreme 

Court. See PCRA Court Opinion, supra at 3–4, citing Commonwealth v. 

Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014). Finally, the PCRA court 

determined that Watson’s remaining claims, including ineffective assistance 

of counsel, malicious prosecution, trial court error, and fraud — which we 

interpret as the claims presented in support of his request for reinstatement 

of direct appeal rights — do not satisfy any exception to the PCRA’s 

timeliness requirements. Accordingly, the PCRA court concluded it lacked 

jurisdiction to entertain Watson’s third PCRA petition.
J-S03021-16

- 5 -

Having carefully reviewed the record, the applicable law, and the wellreasoned opinion of the PCRA court, we agree that Watson’s present petition 

is untimely and that no timeliness exception applies. The PCRA court’s 

opinion aptly addresses Watson’s claims. Accordingly, we affirm on the 

basis of the PCRA court’s opinion.

Order affirmed.1

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/16/2016

____________________________________________

1

In the event of further proceedings, we direct the parties to attach a copy 

of the PCRA court’s 4/22/2015 Opinion to this memorandum.
Circulated 01/19/2016 04:27 PM