NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0501n.06 

No. 16-4000 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PAMELA J. DANIELS, et al., 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

PIKE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, MOORE, KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges. 

MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, is not a “general civility code for the 

American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); see 

also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). Consequently, the statutory 

scheme will not protect employees from all acts of a boorish, callous, condescending, or 

overbearing supervisor. However, Title VII can, and does, protect the rights of employees not to 

be subjected to job-related discrimination on the basis of gender, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), or 

to retaliation for making a charge of discriminatory practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In this 

case, plaintiff Pamela Daniels1

 alleges, under both federal and state law, that defendant Charles 

 1

 Although the complaint and the first amended complaint were filed in the names of Pamela Daniels and 

Rachel Barron, Barron is no longer a party to this appeal. 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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Robert (Rob) Junk, Jr.,2

 the Pike County (Ohio) prosecutor, created a hostile work environment 

in his office and terminated Daniels’s employment in the office solely because of her gender, that 

Junk retaliated against her for reporting the harassment, and that Junk’s actions amounted to 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. In a thorough written opinion, the district court 

granted summary judgment to Junk on each claim, and Daniels now appeals. For the reasons 

discussed below, we conclude that Daniels has identified a genuine dispute of material fact that 

precludes summary judgment for Junk on Daniels’s claim of retaliation. Thus, we reverse the 

district court’s decision on that one cause of action but affirm the rest of the district court’s 

judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Junk hired Daniels as a secretary in the Pike County prosecutor’s office in November 

1997, a year after he first was elected as county prosecutor. By 2013, Daniels had moved into 

the victim’s-advocate/witness-coordinator position in the office and, at that time, enjoyed a 

generally good working relationship with Junk. 

 That relationship began to fray, however, in October 2013 after Junk attended a seminar 

on restoring public trust in government offices. According to Junk: 

I was sitting there, and it really embarrassed me some of the things [the speaker] 

said. And I remember what my mom said, “Every time I come [to the 

prosecutor’s office] they are having a party out front.” That’s embarrassing. 

And as luck would have it, that day Allen Smith[, a former United States 

Marshal,] and I actually had lunch together. We went to a meeting at the 

Columbus Police Academy with some of the Homeland Security people, and he 

talked about people in the office not being professional and not dressing well, and 

how they answered the phone, and things like that. 

And I was guilty of basically screwing off at work and getting on the Internet and 

things like that, too. And I did it on more than one occasion. 

 2

 The first amended complaint listed both Junk and the Pike County Commissioners as defendants; 

however, the claims against the commissioners have been dismissed, leaving only Junk as a party defendant. 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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* * * 

But I wanted to do something about it. And it was the straw that broke the 

camel’s back. I talked with Allen about it over lunch, and it’s just something that 

had been building. 

 When he returned from the seminar, Junk implemented a number of changes that 

ostensibly were designed to improve the professionalism in the office. Among those changes 

were requirements that staff work five eight-hour days (8:30 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.)—rather than 

four ten-hour days, as they had been doing for a period of time—that employees clock into and 

out of work each day, that staff no longer wear blue jeans or flip-flops in the office, and that 

office computers be used for business purposes only. Logical rationales were offered for each 

new guideline. For instance, even Daniels herself admitted that the switch back to the moretraditional five-day work week was warranted because, when scheduled to work four ten-hour 

days, “there were days people weren’t getting their full 10 hours in or working their full 10 

hours.” Furthermore, Junk deemed use of a time clock necessary because he “was having 

problems with [Barron and Daniels] showing up on time, wanting to leave early and things like 

that.” Other employees also told Junk that, when he would be in court, “[Daniels] would stroll in 

around 9:00.” Moreover, Junk himself sometimes had to answer the telephones himself because 

Daniels and Barron “left the office uncovered at times.” 

 Daniels does not dispute that office personnel often wore jeans and flip-flops to work 

because, up to that point, Junk had not implemented a dress code. After returning from the 

seminar, however, and in light of comments from Junk’s ex-mother-in-law that the officer 

personnel “never looked professional up front”, Junk required that the women wear moreprofessional office attire—“dress pants, dress clothes, no flip-flops.” Daniels “did not have a 

problem with that at all” and “was more than willing to comply with” the new dress code. 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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 The final component of Junk’s effort to improve office productivity involved a directive 

emphasizing that office computers were to be used for government work only. Even so, Junk did 

allow the computers “to be used for personal use during lunchtime and after hours.” To ensure 

compliance with the new policy, early one morning, Junk accessed the search histories on the 

work computers used by the women in the office. When the women arrived for work, the search 

histories remained on their screens to alert them that Junk indeed had checked on their 

unauthorized computer usage. 

 Clearly, none of the remedial measures undertaken by Junk were, in and of themselves, 

improper. Daniels alleged, however, that the directives were enforced in a discriminatory 

manner. Specifically, she claimed in her deposition testimony that only the female employees in 

the office were expected to abide by the 8:30–4:30 workday. But she also conceded, that 

although the male employees did not work strictly from 8:30 until 4:30, they had been working, 

and continued to work, five eight-hour days, usually from 7:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. Most of the 

men, who worked outside the office, also were not required to clock in and clock out when 

beginning and ending their workdays and were allowed to continue to wear jeans while 

performing their official duties as investigators and diversion officers. Daniels also claimed that 

Junk accessed the search histories only on the computers used by the female staff. Junk, 

however, defended that fact by explaining that the layout of the office allowed him to see what 

one of the male employees was doing on his computer during the day, and another male 

employee normally was on the road driving individuals to and from court. 

 Daniels stated that, in addition to the allegedly discriminatory office policies 

implemented by Junk, the prosecutor engaged in other actions that indicated a desire to treat 

female employees more harshly than male employees, and Daniels more harshly than even other 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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female office staff. For example, at some point after requiring employees to clock in upon their 

arrival at the office, Junk walked among the front-office staff, knowing that only the women 

employees were required to clock in, and said, “So did everybody get punched in? Everybody 

working. Nobody whining. That’s the way we like it.” 

 On other occasions, Junk allegedly tried to belittle or intimidate Daniels. Once, in the 

presence of members of the public seeking information in the office, Junk stated, “[T]hese girls 

have work they need to be doing. I’m just making sure they’re doing what they’re supposed to 

do.” On another occasion, Junk, while addressing Daniels, said, “Well, there’s a song about 

everything, and one of those songs is ‘Get the Fuck Out’ by Cee Lo Green.” 

 When Daniels and Barron inquired of their boss why he had accessed the search histories 

on their computers, Junk reportedly “flipped out and said, ‘Don’t you two think you can’t be 

replaced’” and “If you’re on the internet, then there’s things that aren’t getting done.” However, 

when pressed by Daniels to identify work that had not been completed, Junk was unable to come 

up with any instance of such a failure to perform an assigned task. 

 Daniels also highlighted in her deposition testimony the fact that, after the 

implementation of the new office dress code, she had asked Junk if she could wait until after the 

next payday to comply “so that [she] could get some additional clothing” that would fit her. 

Even though Junk acquiesced to the request, a few days later, prior to the awaited payday, Junk 

approached Daniels and inquired, “And didn’t I say we were going to change the dress code 

around here? Aren’t you wearing jeans?” When Daniels reminded Junk that he had given her 

additional time to purchase new clothes, he responded, “Well, if you say so,” and walked away. 

 Daniels also alleged that Junk enjoyed tormenting the women working in the office. As 

an example, she recounted an occasion on which Junk entered the women’s work area and 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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popped a large piece of bubble wrap, causing Daniels to jump in fear. According to Daniels, 

Junk engaged in such an action because “he wanted to see us shake or jump; he thought it was 

funny. He wanted to upset us. He did it to upset us. He enjoyed seeing us upset.” 

 Nor was it only the women in the prosecutor’s office who noticed the unequal treatment 

meted out to the female staff. Aaron Gullett, a former employee of the Pike County Sheriff’s 

Office, ultimately replaced Daniels in the prosecutor’s office and “heard Rob Junk making 

disparaging comments toward females, including, ‘That’s why I don’t like to hire women,’ 

‘That’s why it is a pain to hire women,’ and, ‘Working with men is so much easier than working 

with women.’” Gullett also stated in a sworn affidavit that Junk and Investigator Charlie Reader 

prodded him to take actions “specifically to annoy or upset Angie Farmer, the only female in the 

office [after Daniels’s employment was terminated] and also a friend to Pam Daniels and Rachel 

Barron.” Rather than do so, however, Gullett voluntarily left the prosecutor’s office after only 

eight months “because of the things [he] saw and the way [his] employer Rob Junk and his 

subordinates treated people at his behest.” 

 The event that set into motion the series of acts that ultimately resulted in Junk’s 

termination of Daniels’s employment in his office occurred sometime either on or shortly before 

January 15, 2014. According to Daniels,3

 she was working at a vacant desk due to a problem 

with her own printer when Junk called her name. When Daniels looked up, she saw Junk in the 

doorway of an office holding an AR-15 rifle4

 and heard him state, “Don’t worry. I’m not that 

 3

 Junk offers a slightly different take on the interaction; however, because this matter comes before us on an 

appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we view genuinely disputed facts in the light most favorable to Daniels, 

the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 

4

 Although Daniels claims in her appellate brief that “Junk waved an assault rifle at her,” Appellant’s Br. at 

9, the record before us does not support that assertion. Indeed, Daniels testified during her deposition that Junk held 

the gun with his right hand lower than his left hand, “meaning the gun was being held up in the air.” (Page ID 239) 

Moreover, she denied that Junk ever pointed the weapon at her. (Page ID 239) 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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mad, ha, ha, ha, ha.” Although Junk viewed the entire interaction as some sort of joke, Daniels 

felt the display of the weapon “was just an intimidation tactic on Rob’s part.” 

 On January 15, 2014, Daniels went to the county court for a hearing as part of her duties 

as a victim’s advocate/witness coordinator. While at the court, she spoke with Dominica 

Hannah, a victim’s advocate with the Pike County Partnership Against Domestic Violence, and 

with Tara Tackett, a deputy in the Pike County Sheriff’s Department. During that conversation, 

Daniels recounted the gun incident and “went on about all the changes and the treatment in the 

office,” disclos[ing] everything . . . [in the hope] that Tara was going to say something” to her 

superiors so that Junk’s actions would come under scrutiny. Tackett indeed did contact Aaron 

Gullett—then still a sheriff’s office employee—who, in turn, contacted his supervisor. 

 Within minutes, Charlie Reader, an investigator in Junk’s office, arrived at the sheriff’s 

offices and took statements from Hannah and Tackett. Shortly thereafter, while Gullett was in 

Junk’s office, Junk “fired Pam Daniels over the phone just a few hours after she reported the 

incident with the gun to Tara Tackett.” Although an intern in the prosecutor’s office claimed 

that Junk had told him that “he was firing Ms. Daniels because she was ‘disloyal’”, Junk himself 

explained that he decided to fire Daniels because of the “statements that she made to Tara 

Tackett and Dominic[a] Hannah,” and because of Daniels’s “job performance, attitude, arguing 

with [him] all the time.” In fact, Junk claimed in his deposition testimony that Daniels “was 

probably one of the least motivated people [he had] ever supervised.” 

 Daniels felt that even her termination for her alleged misconduct evidenced the differing 

treatment accorded men and women in the office. Daniels explained that although she was fired 

merely for reporting Junk’s inappropriate actions, Jason Savage, one of the male diversion 

officers, was not fired even though he had an ongoing sexual relationship with a woman under 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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his charge in the diversion program. Junk conceded that he had heard rumors about Savage’s 

alleged relationship and had called Savage into his office to confront him with the information. 

Savage admitted that he planned to marry the woman—and later did so—but denied that he had 

engaged in any inappropriate conduct. To verify Savage’s claim, Junk arranged to have a 

tracking device secretly placed on Savage’s work vehicle in an effort to document any improper 

liaisons by the employee. However, Junk maintained that he was unable to obtain any evidence 

of a relationship, other than mere rumor and opinion, and thus decided to drop the matter. 

 Daniels eventually filed a complaint and an amended complaint in federal district court, 

asserting causes of action against Junk under both Title VII and under the Ohio Civil Rights Act 

for creation of a hostile work environment, for termination on the basis of gender, and for 

retaliation for exercising a federally protected right. She also asserted a state-law tort claim 

against her former boss for alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following 

discovery, the district court granted Junk’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that 

Daniels had failed to make out any of her federal or state causes of action.5

 

 Addressing Daniels’s hostile-work-environment claims, the district court noted that some 

of Junk’s acts highlighted by the plaintiff were not truly gender-based, but rather were simply 

boorish or indicative of the interpersonal conflict between Daniels and Junk. Nevertheless, the 

district court indicated that other acts and attitudes demonstrated the anti-female animus 

necessary to proceed with a claim of a hostile work environment. But ultimately the district 

court concluded that even those incidents were sporadic at best, did not involve any physical 

 5

 Claims of gender discrimination based on a hostile work environment and of retaliation under Title VII 

and those under the Ohio Civil Rights Act are treated identically. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 

517 F.3d 321, 322 (6th Cir. 2008) (sexual harassment claims); Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC, 828 F.3d 501, 

510 (6th Cir. 2016 (retaliation claims). 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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contact or threats, and simply were not severe enough in nature or so objectively hostile “as to 

alter the terms and conditions of [Daniels’s] employment.” 

 Similarly, the district court determined that Daniels’s claim of discriminatory termination 

also fell short of the legal threshold necessary to pursue the cause of action further. Although 

Daniels did adduce sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, she was 

unable to prove that Junk’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his employment decision 

was merely a pretext for invidious, gender-based discrimination. 

 The district court also concluded that Daniels failed to offer sufficient, detailed evidence 

that she had made specific claims of harassment or sex discrimination. Consequently, the court 

held that the plaintiff did not engage in the protected activity that is essential to establishing a 

claim of Title VII retaliation. 

 Finally, the district court noted that a plaintiff may not succeed on an Ohio tort claim of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress unless that plaintiff establishes that the defendant’s 

conduct was so outrageous as to be considered intolerable in civilized society. Because Daniels 

failed to satisfy that onerous burden, the district court also granted Junk’s motion for summary 

judgment on that state-law cause of action. 

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment by a district court. See Dodd v. 

Donahoe, 715 F.3d 151, 155 (6th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment will be granted Aif the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists 

only when, assuming the truth of the nonmoving party=s evidence and construing all inferences 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is sufficient 

evidence for a trier of fact to find for that party. See Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 

(6th Cir. 2006). A nonmoving party cannot withstand summary judgment, however, by 

introduction of a Amere scintilla@ of evidence in its favor. Id. 

Hostile-Work-Environment Claims

 Pursuant to the relevant provisions of Title VII: 

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate 

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex, . . . or . . . to 

deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 

his status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted these 

provisions to provide protection to employees from a workplace that “is permeated with 

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. 

Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 

to establish a claim of a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a 

member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwanted sexual harassment; (3) the 

harassment was based on her sex; (4) the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to have 

created a hostile work environment; and (5) the employer failed to take reasonable care to 

prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior. See Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 

187 F.3d 553, 560-61 (6th Cir. 1999). 

 Before this court, the parties do not dispute that Junk did, at times, harass Daniels and 

that male and female employees in Junk’s office were treated differently. They disagree, 

however, both on whether any such harassment or disparate treatment was precipitated by anti-
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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female animus and on whether the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter the 

conditions of Daniels’s employment in the office. 

 For purposes of this case, therefore, we first must determine whether any harassment or 

disparate treatment experienced by Daniels was based on her sex or on some less suspect ground. 

Before delving into that thicket, it is wise to reiterate that harassment “based on sex” need not be 

“sexual”—as that term is understood in general parlance. As we made clear in Williams, “the 

law recognizes that non-sexual conduct may be illegally sex-based where it evinces ‘anti-female 

animus, and therefore could be found to have contributed significantly to the hostile 

environment.’” Id. at 565 (quoting Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st Cir. 

1988)). In other words, “the conduct underlying a sexual harassment claim need not be overtly 

sexual in nature. Any unequal treatment of an employee that would not occur but for the 

employee’s gender may, if sufficiently severe or pervasive under the Harris standard, constitute 

a hostile environment in violation of Title VII.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

 Although Daniels attempts to cast all challenged employment actions taken by Junk in 

sexual-harassment terms, it is clear from the record before us that other considerations influenced 

many of those decisions. For example, Daniels argues that male employees were not required to 

clock in and out of work when the women in the front office were, that the men were not 

required to maintain 8:30 to 4:30 hours when the female office staff was, and that men were 

allowed to wear jeans to work when the women were not. However, Junk explained that the 

different standards were based not on sex but, rather, on job functions and responsibilities. Junk 

admitted that Charlie Reader, Brian Reader, and Earl Swepston did not work uniform 8:30 to 

4:30 days. Charlie Reader, however, was an investigator, was not expected to perform office 

functions during normal office hours, and, thus, was allowed to work from 7:00 until 3:00. 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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Swepston, and Brian Reader also worked from 7:00 until 3:00 but, Junk said, that was because 

their responsibilities involved bringing detainees into court and fulfilling other duties that were 

performed more efficiently prior to 8:30. Moreover, other male employees did adhere to the 

8:30 to 4:30 work day, even though “[i]t didn’t work out as good as the 7:00 to 3:00” schedule. 

 As alleged by Daniels, some of the men did not have to clock in and out of work and 

were allowed to wear jeans on the job. All employees, however, were allowed to wear jeans on 

Fridays, and some of the male employees were not expected to wear office-appropriate clothing 

even on other workdays because their jobs entailed physical components incompatible with 

office dress. For example, during his deposition testimony, Junk specifically referenced Savage 

and Swepston, both of whom were diversion officers who worked with inmate crews in ditches 

throughout the county. Even so, Junk still did not want those employees “coming in just like 

they got off a Harley-Davidson or ready to go wash the car.” 

 However, other acts and comments by Junk could be construed as evidence of antifemale animus because the prosecutor did not harass, belittle, or oversee male employees in the 

same manner as he did Daniels and other female employees. Junk checked the search histories 

on only the women’s computers; he stated in front of members of the public that he needed to 

check on only the women in the office to ensure that they were completing their work; he asked 

only the female employees if they had clocked in; he expressed gratitude to only the women in 

the office that they were working and not whining; “oftentimes, instead of addressing [the female 

employees] directly, he would speak to others about them as if they were not present”; he made 

unambiguous comments that he didn’t like to hire women and that it was easier to work with 

men than women; and he once popped bubble wrap behind Daniels because he enjoyed 

tormenting and upsetting the women and “wanted to see [them] shake or jump.” 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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 In the aggregate, such behavior clearly raises at least the specter of anti-female animus. 

Such harassment is not actionable under Title VII and under the Ohio Civil Rights Act, however, 

unless Junk’s conduct also can be considered severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work 

environment. “[T]he test for a hostile work environment has both objective and subjective 

components.” Williams, 187 F.3d at 566. As explained in Harris: 

Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or 

abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find 

hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview. Likewise, if the victim does 

not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not 

actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title 

VII violation. 

510 U.S. at 21-22. 

 There can be little doubt that Daniels subjectively perceived the working environment in 

Junk’s office to be hostile and abusive. She claimed that by the end of her employment in the 

office, her “nerves were shot”, and that Junk did not seem to be happy “unless he was, he was 

upsetting [the women employees].” 

 When determining whether a working environment is objectively hostile or abusive, we 

have been directed by the Supreme Court to consider the totality of the circumstances, id. at 23, 

meaning that we cannot “disaggregrate” the alleged incidents of harassment, “divorcing them 

from their context and depriving them of their full force.” Williams, 187 F.3d at 562. Instead, 

we must examine the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 

interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also Bowman v. 

Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2000). But “Title VII does not prohibit 

‘genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members 

of the same sex and of the opposite sex,’” and “‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and 

conditions of employment.’” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82). 

 Daniels and Barron pointed to numerous incidents that they asserted were objectively 

hostile or abusive. The district court succinctly catalogued those actions by Junk as follows: 

(1) he permitted male diversion officers (excluding Jason Savage) to work hours 

other than 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.; (2) he did not strictly require male diversion 

officers (excluding Jason Savage) to punch a time clock; (3) he accessed female 

employees’ computers to check on their personal internet search histories and, on 

one occasion, he accessed and left female employees’ search histories on their 

computer screens; (4) he prohibited plaintiff Barron from cashing in her vacation 

time, but permitted male employees to do so; (5) he laughed and chatted with 

male employees, but “smirked” at female employees; (6) on one occasion, he 

commented to plaintiff Daniels that she looked like she had lost her best friend; 

(7) he loudly popped packing materials in the area where the female employees 

worked; (8) he told members of the public on one or two occasions that “these 

girls have work they need to be doing. I’m just making sure they’re doing what 

they’re supposed to do.”; (9) he stated in front of female employees, “Everybody 

working. Nobody’s whining. That’s the way we like it.”; (10) he asked, in front 

of the female employees, whether “everyone” had punched the time clock; (11) he 

spoke to others about plaintiffs as if plaintiffs were not present; and (12) he asked 

plaintiff Daniels on one occasion why she was wearing jeans and said “if you say 

so” and stomped off when plaintiff Daniels reminded him that he had given her 

additional time to comply with the dress code. 

Additionally, Daniels mentioned in her filings before both the district court and before us the 

incident in which Junk, while holding an AR-15, commented to Daniels that he was “not that 

mad” and then laughed. 

 There is little doubt that the working relationship between Junk and Daniels deteriorated 

significantly after October 2013. However, the listed instances of alleged harassment, even in 

the aggregate, would not be considered by a rational person to be sufficiently severe or pervasive 

so as to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. One of the instances of alleged 

harassment—the prohibition on Barron taking cash rather than leave time for accrued vacation 

days—did not even concern Daniels. Numerous others involved implementation of office 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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policies that reflected the realities of the responsibilities of office personnel. Others were 

relatively innocent, singular occurrences, comments that were not objectively hostile or abusive, 

or “mere offensive utterance[s].” Even the incident involving Junk’s comment while holding a 

firearm was not as severe as it might otherwise have been in a different scenario given the fact 

that the record established that guns were regularly carried (and presumably displayed) in the 

prosecutor’s office. Without question, Junk’s actions in that regard showed both immaturity and 

bad judgment. The totality of the circumstances, however, do not support the conclusion that the 

working environment was objectively hostile or abusive. The district court thus did not err in 

granting summary judgment to Junk on Daniels’s hostile-work-environment claims. 

Termination Claims 

 Daniels also asserts that Junk violated the provisions of Title VII and the Ohio Civil 

Rights Act by firing her from her job because she was a female. A plaintiff in such an 

employment-discrimination case may seek to establish her claim “either by introducing direct 

evidence of discrimination or by presenting circumstantial evidence that would support an 

inference of discrimination.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014) 

(citation omitted). Although evidence was adduced in this matter that Junk stated that he did not 

like to hire women and that he found it easier working with men, Daniels offered no direct 

evidence that she was fired due to her gender. Thus, for her to succeed on her claims of 

wrongful termination, she must seek to prove unlawful discrimination by circumstantial evidence 

utilizing the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792 (1973), and refined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 

450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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 Under that paradigm, a plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the plaintiff can do 

so, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the [alleged adverse action.]” Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 

411 U.S. at 802). The plaintiff then is required to prove that the reasons proffered by the 

defendant were not the true motivations for the defendant’s actions, but were mere pretexts for 

prohibited discrimination. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). 

 We have held repeatedly that a plaintiff’s burden of establishing a prima facie case is not 

an onerous one, see, e.g., Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660 (6th Cir. 2000) 

(citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253), and is “a burden easily met.” Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 

500 (6th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). In a gender-discrimination case, a plaintiff thus initially 

needs to show only that: “(1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to an 

adverse employment decision; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by 

a person outside the protected class . . . .” Peltier v. United States, 388 F.3d 984, 987 (6th Cir. 

2004). Daniels easily overcame that hurdle by introducing evidence that she was a woman who 

was qualified for the job she held but was fired from that position and replaced by Aaron Gullett, 

a male. 

 Junk then successfully articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination decision. 

According to the prosecutor, Daniels had problems showing up for work on time, was hostile and 

short with him, and “always wanted to argue.” He specified, however, that he fired the at-will 

employee both because of the statements she made about him to Tackett and Hannah and 

because of her poor job performance and attitude. Given the fact that Daniels then failed to offer 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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any evidence that those reasons actually were pretexts for invidious discrimination, the district 

court did not err in granting summary judgment to Junk on these causes of action as well. 

Retaliation Claims

 Title VII and the Ohio Civil Rights Act also make it unlawful for employers to retaliate 

against employees for engaging in “protected activity,” such as opposing any practice made 

unlawful by the legislation, or lodging charges of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Ohio 

Rev. Code § 4112.02(I). Daniels asserts, however, that Junk did just that by terminating her 

employment after she complained to Tara Tackett and Dominica Hannah about harassment and 

discrimination in the prosecutor’s office. 

 As with claims of disparate treatment, a plaintiff may establish a claim of retaliation in 

violation of Title VII and the Ohio Civil Rights Act through either direct or circumstantial 

evidence. Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634, 644-45 (6th Cir. 2015). 

“Direct evidence is that evidence which, if believed, requires no inferences to conclude that 

unlawful retaliation was a motivating factor in the employer’s action.” Imwalle v. Reliance Med. 

Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 543-44 (6th Cir. 2008). “If there is direct evidence of retaliation, then 

the plaintiff’s case-in-chief is met, and the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision absent the 

impermissible motive.” Yazdian, 793 F.3d at 648 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 In this case, Junk readily admits that “[o]ne of the reasons” he fired Daniels was the fact 

that she proved to be “disloyal” by making statements about him and about the office atmosphere 

to Tackett and Hannah. Although Junk then attempted to temper that assertion by claiming that 

Daniels’s job performance, her attitude, and her continual arguing also contributed to the 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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decision to terminate her employment, he conceded that he had no immediate plans to fire her 

before she made the statements. Under such circumstances, we conclude that Daniels succeeded 

in offering direct evidence of retaliation to the extent that her conversation with the other county 

employees in the courthouse could be considered “protected activity.” 

 The district court properly held that the fact that Daniels confided in a deputy sheriff and 

in a victim’s advocate of a county organization combatting domestic violence—rather than in the 

sheriff himself or in the county commissioners—did not mean that she failed to report her 

complaint to an appropriate individual. As the district court noted, we have stated clearly “that 

there is no qualification . . . on the party to whom the complaint is made known . . . .” Johnson 

v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 580 (6th Cir. 2000). Indeed, a complaint of a possible Title 

VII violation “may be made to a co-worker, newspaper reporter, or anyone else.” Id. (emphasis 

added). 

 Although the complaint need not “be lodged with absolute formality, clarity, or 

precision,” Yazdian, 793 F.3d at 645 (citation omitted), it cannot be merely a “vague charge of 

discrimination.” Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 

1989). In granting summary judgment to Junk on Daniels’s retaliation claims, the district court 

concluded that the plaintiff’s statements to Tackett and Hannah were just such vague charges. 

The district court did note that Daniels testified in her deposition that she told Tackett and 

Hannah “about the behavior in the office . . . [the] environment” and that she “just went on about 

all the changes and the treatment in the office . . . and disclosed everything to Nika and Tara.” 

(Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, the district court held that such allegations failed to state 

specifically that Daniels “was being sexually harassed or discriminated against on account of her 

sex or gender.” Furthermore, the district court refused to consider as an explanation of those 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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conversations Daniels’s subsequent statement in an affidavit that she told Tackett and Hannah 

that she “was being sexually harassed and treated differently in the office.” According to the 

district court, the statement in the affidavit contradicted Daniels’s earlier deposition testimony 

without providing an explanation for the disparity. 

 The district court’s view of Daniels’s deposition testimony appears to be too narrow, 

especially at the summary-judgment stage of the litigation when all inferences are to be viewed 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Daniels’s statement in her deposition that 

she discussed “all the changes and the treatment in the office” with Tackett and Hannah and that 

she disclosed “everything” to them encompasses more than her mere disagreement with “office 

policies and managerial style.” Indeed, Daniels’s deposition was replete with allegations of 

differing treatment of male and female employees, of efforts to harass and belittle Daniels and 

Barron, and of an intimidating atmosphere that the women were forced to endure on a daily 

basis. When Daniels referred to “the treatment in the office,” there is little doubt that she was 

referencing the alleged harassment and disparate treatment that she had described and that she 

later referenced in her affidavit before the court. Thus, we find no inconsistency or contradiction 

between Daniels’s deposition testimony and the specific allegations in her affidavit. Because 

Daniels’s complaints to Tackett and Hannah, when viewed in their full context, were not vague 

or contradictory, the plaintiff did indeed engage in protected activity when discussing the culture 

and atmosphere of the office. Combined with Junk’s admission that he terminated Daniels’s 

employment because she made those statements, we conclude that Daniels has raised at least a 

genuine dispute of material fact that precludes summary judgment for the defendant on her 

retaliation claims. 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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Claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

 In a final allegation of error, Daniels contends that the district court improperly granted 

Junk summary judgment on her state-law tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Under Ohio law, plaintiffs seeking to succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional 

distress bear a heavy burden and must establish: 

1) that the actor either intended to cause emotional distress or knew or should 

have known that actions taken would result in serious emotional distress to the 

plaintiff; 2) that the actor’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to go 

beyond all bounds of decency and was such that it can be considered as utterly 

intolerable in a civilized community; 3) that the actor’s actions were the 

proximate cause of plaintiff’s psychic injury; and 4) that the mental anguish 

suffered by plaintiff is serious and of a nature that no reasonable man could be 

expected to endure it. 

Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 619 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pyle v. Pyle, 

463 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 Daniels’s state-law cause of action fails on many fronts. First, the plaintiff failed to offer 

any evidence, other than her own conjecture, that Junk intended to cause Daniels emotional 

distress or should have known his actions would cause such a severe reaction. Furthermore, 

although many of Junk’s antics were boorish, juvenile, and perhaps even mean-spirited, we 

cannot say they were so intolerable as to go beyond all bounds of decency. Finally, “the mental 

anguish” suffered by Daniels was not so serious “that no reasonable [person] could be expected 

to endure it.” In fact, after Daniels was fired in January 2014, she waited until August 2014 to 

see a physician about her emotional state and, at that time, was prescribed only a common antianxiety drug and did not require hospitalization or intensive therapy. 

 In short, Daniels has not adduced evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact 

regarding her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court thus did not 

err in granting Junk summary judgment on that cause of action. 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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CONCLUSION

 Plaintiff Daniels has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support her allegations that 

she was fired by Junk because of her gender, that harassment in the office was so severe or 

pervasive as to create a hostile work environment, or that Junk intentionally inflicted the degree 

of emotional distress that would allow her claims in those regards to proceed to trial. However, 

Daniels did offer sufficient evidence to allow further consideration of her federal-law and statelaw retaliation claims. We thus AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 

defendant on Daniels’s hostile-work-environment, termination, and state-tort claims. We 

REVERSE the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s retaliation claims and REMAND 

the matter to the district court for such further proceedings as are appropriate. 

 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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 KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part. I concur with the majority that summary judgment is inappropriate with respect to 

Daniels’s retaliation claim. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that 

summary judgment is appropriate with respect to Daniels’s claims of a hostile work 

environment, termination on the basis of gender, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

With respect to Daniels’s hostile-work-environment claim, I believe that Daniels has 

pointed to sufficiently severe and pervasive examples of sexual harassment “to alter the 

conditions of [Daniels’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Phillips v. 

UAW Int’l, 854 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 

502, 512 (6th Cir. 2011)). “In determining whether an actionable hostile work environment 

claim exists, we look to all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory 

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id.

(quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002)). Frequent examples 

of Pike County Prosecutor Robert Junk treating women differently than men, often in 

humiliating fashion, R. 36 (Op. & Order at 23–24) (Page ID #545–46) (listing twelve instances 

of harassing or discriminatory conduct toward women in the office), alongside Junk’s 

discriminatory statements about women in the workplace, R. 31-3 (Gullett Aff. ¶ 20) (Page ID 

#407), would permit a reasonable juror to conclude that there was a hostile work environment. 

In one particularly egregious example, reasonable jurors could even find that Junk’s conduct was 

“physically threatening.” Phillips, 854 F.3d at 327. At a point when Junk and Daniels “were not 

on good terms,” Junk—while holding an AR-15—told Daniels, “Don’t worry. I’m not that mad, 

ha, ha, ha, ha.” R. 26-2 (Daniels Dep. at 30–31) (Page ID #235–36). Other courts have held 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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similar behavior to constitute a hostile work environment, and I would do the same here. See 

Cordero-Suárez v. Rodríguez, 689 F.3d 77, 79, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that a supervisor 

who approached an employee’s desk with a work-issued gun and said “I’m going to screw you 

up” contributed to a hostile work environment). 

 I would also reverse the district court’s judgment with respect to Daniels’s termination 

claim, particularly because of the genuine issues surrounding pretext. The strongest evidence of 

discriminatory pretext are Junk’s “disparaging comments toward females, including, ‘That’s why 

I don’t like to hire women,’ ‘That’s why it is a pain to hire women,’ and ‘Working with men is 

so much easier than working with women.’” R. 31-3 (Gullett Aff. ¶ 20) (Page ID #407). These 

statements are almost direct evidence that Junk made employment decisions on the basis of 

gender. At the very least, I believe that they create a genuine issue of material fact on whether 

Daniels was actually terminated because of her sex. 

 Finally, I believe that summary judgment is inappropriate on Daniels’s claim of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). An IIED claim has four elements under 

Ohio law: “1) that the actor either intended to cause emotional distress or knew or should have 

known that actions taken would result in serious emotional distress to the plaintiff; 2) that the 

actor’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency 

and was such that it can be considered as utterly intolerable in a civilized community; 3) that the 

actor’s actions were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s psychic injury; and 4) that the mental 

anguish suffered by plaintiff is serious and of a nature that no reasonable man could be expected 

to endure it.” Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 619 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Pyle v. Pyle, 463 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)). There is sufficient evidence of Junk’s 

intent to cause emotional distress to permit a reasonable juror to find in Daniels’s favor on the 
No. 16-4000, Daniels, et al. v. Pike County Commissioners, et al. 

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first element: Junk stated that he did not like working with women. R. 31-3 (Gullett Aff. ¶ 20) 

(Page ID #407). And Junk appeared to know what he was doing when he harassed Daniels. 

R. 26-2 (Daniels Dep. at 60–62) (Page ID #265–67). A reasonable juror could also find in 

Daniels’s favor on the second, third, and fourth elements: Junk repeatedly demeaned Daniels, 

threatened her with a gun, discriminated against her, and pranked her. Daniels visited a doctor 

because of “the whole stress of this whole thing” and was prescribed a drug that treats anxiety. 

Id. at 57–58 (Page ID #262–63). 

In sum, I believe that genuine issues of material fact are present in all of Daniels’s claims. 

Therefore I would reverse the judgment of the district court in its entirety.