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# OAR Box 1830 Prepped by Ollie Stewart



### Document

Number: 

# 24 ) IV-B-2 0 Docket Number: 

# A-87-1 1

Printed 11/13/20087:20:52 AM Sheet 24 of 232

# use ; P. 2 

# A-V7~lj UNITE D STATE S ENVIRONMENTA L PROTECTIO N AGENC Y

AN N ARBO R MICHIGA N 4810 5 / V "[5~~7_(_ 3 

### NO V

### 3 0 199 0

MEMORANDU M 

### AUG 

### - I 199 1 OFFIC E O F AI R AN D RADIATIO N

SUBJECT : Evaporativ e Caniste r Vapo r Fire s Followin g NHTS A

Cras hImpac t Test s FROM : Charle s L . Gra yJr. , Directo r

Emissio n Contro l Technolog yDivisio n ORIGINA L_"-N£ D B Y CHARLE S L GHA rJ R
TO : Richar d D . Wilson , Directo r

Offic e o f Mobil e Source s

I n Marc han d Apri l o f thi s year , Calspa n Corporatio n conducte d 3 5 mp hfronta l barrie r impac t test s fo r th e Nationa l Highwa yTraffi c Safet yAdministratio n o n a 199 0 Chrysle r Lebaro n Convertibl e an d a 199 0 Chrysle r Impe n Afte r impac t occurre d o n eac hvehicle , a large , bu t brief , flas ho f flam e wa s witnessed . Thi s flam e wa s produce d b yth e ignitio n o f vapo r release d fro ma n undetermine d amoun t o f activate d charcoa l whic hha d falle n fro mth e evaporativ e caniste r ont o lightin g use d t o fil mth e test . NHTS A investigate d th e test s afte r i t wa s learne d tha t th e canister s wer e place d i n a n uncommo n positio n (i n th e fron t whee l well ) o n thes e particula r Chrysle r vehicles . A conversatio n wit hVinc e Quarle s o f NHTS Ao n Novembe r 9 , 199 0 reveale d th e followin g detail s concernin g thei r investigatio n o f th e incidents :

• Caniste r Location . Du e t o th e locatio n o f th e caniste r i n th e fron t whee l well , th e caniste r wa s completel y crushe d o n impact , allowin g a larg e amoun t o f th e activate d charcoa l t o fal l t o th e ground . Th e exac : amoun t o f charcoa l release d fro mth e rupture d caniste r wa s no t determined , sinc e th e NHTS Ainvestigatio n wa s no t initiate d unti l som e tim e (unknown ) ha d passe d afte r th e tes t wa s performed . EP Aha s determine d fro m certificatio n record s tha t bot hvehicle s us e 1.3 5 lite r canister s holdin g 34 3 g o f activate d charcoa l wit h desig n workin g vapo r capacitie s o f 5 0 g .P. 3

• ;Open Lighting . The charcoa l fel l ont o ope n lightin g use d b yCalspan Corporatio n t o fil mthe tes t fro munderneat h the vehicle . Thi s lighting had onl yminima l shielding an d th e filament s wer e expose d t o th e outsid e air . NHTS Afoun

d i n it s investigatio n tha t Calspa n wa s the onl yNHTS Acontracto r using ope n lighting t o fil mit s cras htest s an

d ha s subsequentl ydirecte d Calspan t o us e covere d lighting in the future .
• L_j_a

_Filament . Temperatures . Thermocouples , use d b y NHTS Ai n it s investigatio n o f th e incident , reveale d tha t th e temperatur e i n the nea r vicinit yo f the the filament s i s betwee n 150 0 an d 200 0 °F .
• NHTSA' s Investigation . Th e inciden t di d no t receiv e muc hattentio n fro

mNHTSAunti l i t wa s learne d tha t the caniste r wa s locate d i n th e fron t whee l well , an uncommo n placement . Also , Calspan technician s indicate d tha t the fir e flashe s wer e no t a majo r probleman d tha t fir e incidence s o f a simila r natur e had occurre d befor e i n othe r cras htests , althoug hth e flame wa s les s dramati c i n thos e cases .

• NHTSA' s Conclusion . Th e conclusio n o f th e NHTS A investigatio n wa s tha t th e occurrenc e wa s laboratory
specifi c an

d tha t n o in-us e problem s o f thi s natur e ar e expected . Thi s conclusio n i s base d largel yon the fac t tha t a n ignitio n sourc e unde r the vehicl e i s require d t o releas e an d ignit e th e vapo r fromth e activate d charcoal . The existenc e o f sucha n ignitio n sourc e in norma l us e i s highl yimprobable . Furthermore , othe r Chrysle r vehicle s wit hsimila r caniste r placemen t had bee n teste d a t othe r facilitie s wit hn o incidenc e o f fire .
• Recommendation s t o Chrysler . NHTS Adi d no t recommen d tha t Chrysle r chang e th e placemen t o f it s canister s becaus e i t wa s determine d tha t a safet yproblem di d no t exist . NHTS Ai s confiden t tha t the fir e incidence s wer e relate d onl yt o th e us e o f ope n lighting a t Calspa n Corporation . Relevanc e t o Onboar d Refuelin g Vapo r Contro l AlthoughNHTSA' s initia l investigatio n ha s determine d tha t th e placemen t o f evaporativ e canister s i n unprotecte d crus hzones , sucha s the whee l well , doe s no t creat e a safety problem , i t i s possibl e tha t some concer n wil l b e raise d regarding the saf e placemen t o f canister s in propose d onboard refueling vapo r recover ysystems . The incident s involving the Chrysle r vehicle s quickl yreceive d the attentio n o f NHTS AP. 4

rr personne l involve d wit hthe onboar d safetyissues . In fact , the entir e investigatio n wa s turne d ove r t o Scot t York , who ha s worke d extensivel yin the are a o f onboard safetyove r th e pas t fe wyears . T o addres s an

yconcern regarding caniste r placemen t i n onboar d systems , tw o ke yobservation s ca

n b e made . First , becaus e NHTS Aha s determine d tha t th e existenc e o f a n ignitio n sourc e sufficien t t o ignit e vapo r fro ma rupture d caniste r i s highl yunlikely , a crash-relate d safet yproblem doe s ho t exis t fo r evaporative canisters . Sinc e the presenc e o f a n ignitio n sourc e woul d b e jus t a s improbabl e fo r the content s o f onboar d canisters , i t woul d b e difficul t t o justif ycrash-relate d safet yconcern s regardin g onboar d caniste r placement . Second , i t mus t b e emphasize d tha t i f NHTS Aultimatel yview s caniste r locatio n a s a safet yissue , i t i s withi n thei r authorit yt o establis h requirement s t o ensur e no in-us e problemexists .