UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ 

)

Sharyl Attkisson, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Civil No. 14-cv-01944 (APM)

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U.S. Department of Justice, )

)

Defendant. )

_________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

This matter is before the court on the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. 

See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 26 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot]; Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for 

Summ. J. and Cross-Motion for Summ. J, ECF No. 27 [hereinafter Pls.’ Opp’n]. 

In September 2014, Plaintiffs—Judicial Watch, Inc., and Sharyl Attkisson—submitted to 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a joint request under the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) and the Privacy Act, seeking information and records pertaining to Attkisson. Compl.,

ECF No. 1, ¶ 6; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 26 [hereinafter 

Def.’s Stmt.], at 4-5. Plaintiffs’ request, which was subsequently narrowed, sought “any and all 

[FBI] records concerning, regarding or relating to Sharyl Attkisson” and records specifically 

pertaining to her involvement in two particular FBI investigations. Def.’s Stmt. at 5-6. On 

December 16, 2014, the FBI released records responsive to Plaintiffs’ FOIA request—six redacted 

pages that the FBI previously had produced to Attkisson in response to a previous FOIA request. 
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Id. at 6. Five months later, on May 14, 2015, the FBI released one additional responsive,

unredacted, page. Id. 

Before the FBI had released those responsive records, on November 19, 2014, Plaintiffs

filed suit in this court alleging that Defendant was unlawfully withholding records in violation of 

FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et. seq., and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. See Compl. On August 21, 

2015, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, in which it argued that it had conducted 

a reasonable and adequate search for the requested records and had produced all responsive and 

nonexempt documents under both FOIA and the Privacy Act. See generally Def.’s Mot. On 

September 21, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a consolidated Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming that the FBI had failed 

to conduct a reasonable and adequate search for records because it: (1) had failed to conduct its 

search using phonetic alternatives to Attkisson’s name, and (2) had failed to uncover during its 

search responsive documents that Plaintiffs believe should be in the FBI’s possession. 

See generally Pls.’ Opp’n. The parties’ cross-motions are now ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). To make this determination, the court must “view the facts and draw reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the [non-moving] party.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 

378 (2007) (citations and internal quotations omitted). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable 

fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a fact is “material” only if it is capable of 

affecting the outcome of litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A non-
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material factual dispute must not prevent the court from granting summary judgment. See id. at 

248–50.

Most FOIA cases are appropriately decided on motions for summary judgment. See 

Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C.2009). A court may 

award summary judgment in a FOIA case by relying on the information included in the agency's 

affidavits or declarations if they are “relatively detailed and non-conclusory,” SafeCard Servs., 

Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citations and internal quotations omitted), and 

describe “the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, 

demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are 

not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith,” 

Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs offer only one argument in response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment: that Defendant’s search for responsive records was inadequate.

1

 Pls.’ Opp’n at 3-9. 

Plaintiffs make two contentions to support that claim: (1) the FBI failed to use phonetic 

alternatives to Attkisson’s name, as well as her date of birth and social security number, in its 

electronic records search, id. at 4-8; and, (2) the search failed to uncover responsive documents 

that Attkisson, based on her past experiences, believes should be in the FBI’s possession, thus 

 1 Plaintiffs did not respond to Defendant’s arguments regarding the nondisclosure of otherwise responsive records 

under either FOIA or the Privacy Act, Def.’s Mot. at 11-22, and thus the court will treat those arguments as conceded. 

See Wilkins v. Jackson, 750 F. Supp. 2d 160, 162 (D.D.C. 2010) (“It is well established that if a plaintiff fails to 

respond to an argument raised in a motion for summary judgment, it is proper to treat that argument as conceded.”); 

Sykes v. Dudas, 573 F. Supp. 2d 191, 202 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[W]hen a party responds to some but not all arguments 

raised on a Motion for Summary Judgment, a court may fairly view the unacknowledged arguments as conceded.”). 

Additionally, based on Defendant’s declarant’s statements, see Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1., Decl. of David M. Hardy, ECF 

No. 26-1 [hereinafter Hardy Decl.], ¶ 48, which Plaintiffs have not challenged, the court finds that Defendant has 

complied with its obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material, see Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 

1106, 1116-17 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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demonstrating the inadequacy of the search, id. at 8-9. The court finds both arguments 

unpersuasive. 

Plaintiffs’ first argument is unsupported by the facts—which, in fairness to Plaintiffs, fully 

came to light only after Defendant’s declarant, David Hardy, supplemented his initial declaration. 

In his second declaration, Hardy attested that the FBI did in fact use phonetic alternatives during 

the records search: “The phonetic search of the [Central Records System “CRS”] automated 

indices systematically broke down common spelling variations of the names ‘Sharyl’ or 

“Attkisson,’ making it unnecessary for [the FBI] personnel to predict the possible spelling 

variations of Plaintiff’s names.” Def.’s Reply, Ex. 2, Second Decl. of David M. Hardy, ECF No 

31-2 [hereinafter Second Hardy Decl.], ¶ 9. In addition, as Hardy further explained, the FBI did 

not in this case need to resort to Attkisson’s date of birth or social security number to conduct its 

search. According to Hardy, a requestor’s date of birth and social security number becomes 

relevant only to distinguish among the “‘hits’ returned from the phonetic name breakdowns to 

identify records that actually pertain to the requester and not another individual indexed within the 

vast CRS.” Id. ¶ 10. Because a phonetic name search in this case only yielded a small number of 

records, the court finds that it was reasonable for the FBI not to rely on the requestor’s date of birth 

and social security number to identify responsive material. 

Plaintiffs’ remaining argument—that Defendant’s search was inadequate because it did not 

uncover documents Attkisson believes must exist—is similarly unconvincing. “The adequacy of 

a FOIA search is generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness 

of the methods used to carry out the search.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of the Currency, 315 F.3d 

311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Steinberg v. DOJ, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Simply 

put, Defendant has met its evidentiary burden under FOIA by presenting the affidavits of David 
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Hardy, see Hardy Decl.; Second Hardy Decl., which illustrate in “relatively detailed and nonconclusory” terms that the FBI’s search was both reasonable and adequate. SafeCard Servs., Inc. 

926 F.2d at 1200. That is all that is required under FOIA. Id. Hardy’s affidavits are afforded “a 

presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims,” id. (internal 

quotations omitted), such as Plaintiffs’ contention that certain records should exist, Pls.’ Opp’n at 

8-9. Such an argument “amounts to nothing more than mere speculation . . . [and] is not enough 

to undermine the determination that the agency conducted an adequate search for the requested 

records.” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotations 

omitted); see also Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 641 F.3d 504, 514 (D.C.

Cir. 2011) (holding that, although it was “unexpected” that the agency’s search turned up only a

few emails, that fact alone does not render the search inadequate).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

and denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. A separate order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

 

Dated: September 7, 2016 Amit P. Mehta

United States District Judge