THE JOINT STAFF 

 

The Post-Arcadia Conference: January–May 1942 

Only nine days after the Arcadia Conference (also known as the First Washington Conference) 

was held in Washington, DC, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) again convened for a series of 

twenty meetings between January 23 and May 19, 1942. All of these meetings were held in 

Washington, DC, most of them in the Public Health Building, which was renamed the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff Building after the Post-Arcadia Conference began. 

During these meetings, the CCS focused on the situation in the Southwest Pacific area 

known as the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) area, which included Burma; support 

of Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek; and the possibility of a German attack on 

England. The use of US Army and Navy aviation against Japan was also discussed. In addition to 

the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, some of these CCS 

meetings were attended by members of Allied and Commonwealth countries when issues 

relating to their national interests were considered. 

The Post-Arcadia Conference was the second in a series of high-level conferences held in 

Washington, DC; Casablanca; Quebec; Cairo; Tehran; Malta; Yalta; and Potsdam to formulate 

the Allied grand strategy. Reports, memorandums, position papers, and maps were prepared by 

the CCS for the conferences, and minutes were taken at the accompanying CCS meetings. Taken 

together, these documents address virtually every policy and strategy issue of the war, from troop 

deployments, to debates about the location and timing of key Allied offensives, to discussions 

about postwar occupation boundaries. Thus, they record the early years of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and serve as an indispensable primary source on the planning and conduct of World War II. 
Originally highly classified, the conference materials were declassified on October 3, 

1973. The Joint History Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is publishing these documents as 

eBooks and web-ready PDFs to make them widely available to historians, faculty and students at 

the joint and service schools and other institutions of higher learning, and the general public. 

In addition to Post-Arcadia, the other conferences are available as eBooks in Mobi, ePub, 

and PDF formats: 

Arcadia Conference (Washington, DC), December 24, 1941–January 14, 1942: ISBN 

978-0-16-093887-0 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093886-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093888-7 (PDF) 

Casablanca Conference (Morocco), January 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093893-1 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093892-4 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093894-8 (PDF) 

Trident Conference (Washington, DC), May 12–25, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093879-5 

(Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093878-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093880-1 (PDF) 

Quadrant Conference (Quebec City, Canada), August 14–24, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-

093882-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093881-8 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093883-2 (PDF) 

Sextant Conference (Cairo, Egypt), Eureka Conference (Tehran, Iran), and the Second 

Cairo Conference (Egypt), November 22–December 7, 1943: ISBN 978-0-16-093885-6 (Mobi); 

ISBN 978-0-16-093884-9 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093926-6 (PDF) 

Octagon Conference (Quebec City, Canada), September 12–16, 1944: ISBN 978-0-16-

093925-9 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093927-3 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093928-0 (PDF) 

Argonaut Conference (Malta and Yalta, Soviet Union), January 30–February 11, 1945: 

ISBN 978-0-16-093930-3 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093929-7 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093924-2 

(PDF) 
Terminal Conference (Potsdam, Germany), July 17–August 2, 1945: ISBN 978-0-16-

093923-5 (Mobi); ISBN 978-0-16-093931-0 (ePub); ISBN 978-0-16-093932-7 (PDF) 

David B. Crist, PhD 

Director for Joint History 
MINUTES of MEETINGS 

of the 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

POST-ARCAD I A 

VOtUME I 

Recorded and Printed tn the 

Offzce of the Combzned Chiefs of Staff 

ii'ashington, D. C. 

1942 
TABLE OF 

TWENTY MEETINGS OF THE 

JANUARY 23rd, 1942, 

MEETING KINUTES 

1st 

2nd 

3rd 

4th 

5th 

6th 

7th 

8th 

9th 

10th 

11th 

12th 

13th 

14th 

15th 

16th 

17th 

18th 

19th 

20th 

Index 

CONTENTS 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

to MAY 19th, 1942. 

PAGE NUMBER 

1 

. 12 

. 22 

. 33 

. 42 

. 52 

. 56 

. 60 

. 69 

. 76 

. a5 

. 91 

. 101 

. 111 

. 119 

. 127 

. 134 

. 142 

. 147 

. 152 

. I-XIV 
U. S. SECRET 

BRITISK MOST SECRET 

C.C.S. 1st Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of a 

Federal Reserve 

23, 

Adm.ira1 H. R. Stark, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

tt. General H.H. Arnold, USA 

Meeting held in Room 1202, 

Euilding, on Friday, January 

1942, at 3:OO p.m. 

PRESENT 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Lt.Genera1 Sir Colville Wemyss 

Group Captain S. C. Strafford 

(representing Air Marshal 

Harris) 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, USN Captain C. E. Lambe, RN 

Brig. General L. T. Gerow, USA 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, USN 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, USK 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier v. Dykes 

Commander L.R. KcDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. GENERAL. WAVELL'S APPRECIATION OF SITUATION IN ABDA AREA. 

(ABDACO~! 00053 of January 15, 1942) 

GENERAL M-mSHALI. read to the Committee a document containing 

the comments of the U.S. War gepartment on General Wavell's Appreciation. 

A convoy containing 22,000 U.8. reinforcements had sailed that 

day. It was hoped that these reinforcements would arrive in Australia 

on February 20.. With regard to supplies for the Philippines, which were 

short of A.A. ammunition and rations, U.S. officers were endeavoring to 

buy up local craft in order to break the Japanese blockade, thereby providing supplies and encouragement to the Philippine garrison. 

ADMIRAL KING mentioned that he had that day seen hfr. Casey, 

rho had stated that, in his opinion, the Australian Government would be 

unable to provide any relief for the United States garrison which was 

being sent to New Caledonia. 

SIR JOHN DILL explained the Australian position with regard to 

man-power, and stated that they had only 130,000 troops to protect the 

whole of the Australian Continent. Australia was undoubtedly fearful of 

Japanese raids, and Nr. Gasey had asked him to take action to provide 

tanks for Australia; to which he had replied that the Australian requirement could not be dealt with as an isolated case, and must be considered in conjunction with our many other commitments. 

SIR JOHN DILL then mentioned the question of Timor. The Portuguese had agreed to Staff discussions, but were anxious to undertake the 

garrisoning of their own half of the island. 

He asked General Marshall if he were satisfied with General 

Wavell's arrangement, whereby General Brett was in charge of the administration. He himself had been inclined to feel that General Brett 

should not be asked to shoulder this responsibility, in view of his impottant task as Deputy Commander. 

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GENERdL MARSHALL said that he had taken the same view himself, 

but was loath to interfere with General Wavell's arrangements, in view 

of the difficulty he must be experiencing in initiating his command. 

THE COMMITTEE. 

Took note that a despatch had been sent by General Marshall to 

General Prett through General Wavell, containing the main 

points of the Memorandum read to the Committee by General 

Mars ha11. 

2. NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS FOR ABDA AREA. 

(a) C.C.S. 2; ABDACOhi 00053, para. 1l(a). 

(b) C.C.S. 2/1. 

(C) ABDACOM 00235 of January 22. 

(d) ABDACOM 00200 of January 21. 

(e) C.C.S. 7. 

With regard to reference (d) above, Admiral King said that he 

felt there must be some misapprehension with regard to U.S. Naval forces 

in the Area. These consisted of 3 Cruisers, 13 Destroyers, 3 Gunboats, 

and other small craft. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE said that he realized that the Naval forces in 

the ABDA Area must be considered in conjunction with those allocated to 

the ANZAC Area; and in this connection he drew the attention of the Committee to C.C.S. 7 which contained a telegram from the Government of 

Australia to the Prime Minister. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that this telegram purported to lay 

down the tasks of the Commander in Chief, U.S Pacific Fleet. The ANZAC 

Area "as merely an adjunct to the Pacific Command. The responsibility 

for the safe escort of convoys arriving in Australia from the westward 

lay either with the ABDA Command or with the Commander in Chief, Eastern 

Fleet. h!r. Casey had expressed surprise when he had suggested to him 

that forces in the ANZAC Area would escort U.S. convoys through that 

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Area to Australia. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE said that in discussions during the recent Conferences, when the question of building up Australia as a base for 

future operations had been discussed, he had had the impression that 

units of the Pacific Fleet would escort westbound convoys right through 

to Australia. 

ADMIRBI, ICING stated that this had not been his impression, and 

it would be difficult, in view of the many commitments of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Naval reinforcements for the ABDA Area must, however, be 

reconsidered, in order that the best possible use could be made of the 

available forces. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE stated that the British ChiefsofStaff had commented on the Australian telegram contained in C.C.S. 7, in two respects. First, they had suggested that the U.S. Commander in the ANZAC 

Area should be situated ashore at Melbourne, in order that he would be 

in clo6e contact with the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board on the 

subject of convoys; and secondly, that as the command of the Commander 

in Chief, Eastern Fleet, would extend to the western limit of the ABDA 

Area, and on the South and West of Australia to the western limit of the 

ANUC Area, it would be necessary for the provision of escort$ for convoys proceeding to the ABDA Area to be arranged between the Commander in 

Chief, Eastern Fleet, and the Naval Commanders in the ANZAC and ABDA 

Areas. 

ADMIRAL KING expressed his agreement with both the above 

points. 

THE COLLVITTEE was informed that a telegram had just arrived 

Prom London, giving the British ships allocated to the ABDA Area. 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a] Instructed the Secretaries to circulate a Memorandum* showing the British Naval forces stationed 

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in the ABDA AREA. 

@) Agreed to reconsider the question of Naval reinforcements for the ABDA Area at their next meeting. 

^Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 10. 

3. SITUATION IN PHILLIPPINE AREA. 

(ABDACOM 00100 of January 17, 1942) 

GENERAL MARSHALL read to the Committee a telegram which he had 

received from General MacArthur containing extracts from a telegram to 

General MacArthur from General Wavell giving his appreciation of the 

general situation and containing a suggestion that he (General Wavell) 

should visit General LlacArthur. General \lacArthur had begged General 

Wavell not to undertake this hazardous journey. 

With regard to paragraph8 of ABDACOM 00100, the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff were considering the possibility of getting further supplies into 

Mindanao, and would draft a reply to that part of General Wavell's message. 

ADMIRAL KING said that in addition to the action outlined by 

General Marshall with regard to small native vessels for running the 

blockade, he had instructed Admiral Hart, prior to General Wavell's assumption of command, to send 2 submarines with .50 caliber and A.A. 

ammunition to the Philippines. A further submarine had been despatched from Sawaii on January 12 with supplies of 3-inch ammunition. The estimated length of the passage was 22 days, and Admiral Hart had been informed of this action. 

THE CONKITTEE:-

Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would prepare a draft 

reply to paragraph 8 of AI?DACOM 00100. 

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4. EMPLOYMENT OF A.V.G. IN BURMA AND CHINA. 

(C.C.S. 4) 

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum on the subject 

of the proposed amendments to C.C.S. 4. 

GENERAL AMSHALL explained that General Magruder was under the 

direct control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. He felt it essential to 

retain the phrase "on call from Chiang Kai-Shek" in the penultimate sentence of paragraph (b) of the draft contained in C.C.S. 4. This he 

thought was important for political reasons and in order not to discourage Chiang Kai-Shek. 

SIR JOHN DILL suggested the substitution of the words "The operations" for "his control" in the latter half of the second sentence of 

*paragraph (b) ._He further suggested that a personal telegram should be 

despatched from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to General Magruder explaining 

that, in spite of the fact that American forces despatched to Burma must 

be returned to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek "on call from him," yet 

this should only be done after due notice had been given to General 

Wavell. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Instructed the Secretaries to despatch the telegram 

toGeneral Wavell as amended in the course of discussion*. 

(b) Took note that General Marshall would despatch apersonal telegram to General Magruder on the lines suggested by Sir John Dill. 

(c) Instructed the Secretaries to inform General Wavell 

of the terms of the personal message to General 

Magruder . 

*Subsequently despatched as D.B.A. 1 

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5. SUPER GYMNAST 

(a) C.C.S. 5/1 

THE COMMITTEE was informed that the first line of the enclosure to C.C.S. 5/1 should read “U.S. Navy Cornhat Loaded Ships.” 

ADMIRAL STMI< and GENERAL MARSHALL stressed the present shortage of U.S. shipping. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that Admiral Land had reported a present 

shortage of 92 ships. While it had been agreed that the reinforcements 

to the Far East should be expedited, the President and Prime Minister 

had given a ruling that this should entail no stoppage of supplies to 

Russia or the Middle East. The only method of obtaining additional ships 

appeared to be to request the President and the Prime Minister to approve of the use of the special combat loaded ships detailed for modified Super Gymnast. This would have the effect of postponing D date for 

this Operation until about March 20. 

SIR JOHN DILL mentioned the risk of losing this valuable type 

of special ship if they were employed in conveying U.S. troops to Northern Ireland. 

ADMIRAL KING said that there were additional points to be reaeinbered, such as the U.S. inability to undertake the shipping of troops 

to northeast Brazil, and also the fact that if these ships were used in 

the North Atlantic all training of the Amphibious force would of necessity be stopped. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a memorandum 

for the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting out the implications 

of the proposal contained in C.C.S. 5/1. 

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5. @) C.C.S. 5. 

THE COMMITTEE considered the draft terms of reference of the 

Coabined Staff Planners contained in C.C.S. 5. 

ADMIRAL KIP!G pointed out that if it were decided to use the 

U.S. combat loaded ships for Operation "Magnet," the earliest date at 

which modified Super Gymnast could be undertaken would be about Marcha. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Agreed that the terms of reference contained in C.C.S. 

should be remitted to the Combined Staff Planners as their 

directive. 

8. CHANGE IN hESTERN A'PLANTIC AREA AS DEFINED IN ABC-1. 

(C.C.S. 1) 

ADMIFW. KING stated that he had hopes that the Rio de Janeiro 

Conference might achieve some arrangement whereby the Brazilians, Argentines and Uruguayans would undertake naval patrolling duties off 

their own coasts thereby freeing U.S. and British ships for other 

duties. He was anxious, therefore, that no alteration at present should 

be made in the existing arrangements for the dividing line in the Atlantic. 

THE COMHITTEE: -

Agreed that the division of responsibility in the Atlantic 

should remain as at present, pending further consideration in 

the light of the results of the Rio de Janeiro Conference. 

7. FREE rmENCH FORCES IN THE PACIFIC. 

(C.C.S. 6) 

ADMIRAL LITTLE informed the Committee that the New Zealand 

Government had made representations that they should be relieved of the 

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U. S. SECRET 

BRITISH MOST SECRET 

responsibility for assisting in the defense of Tahiti. It was hoped to 

present a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject 

shortly. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed that consideration of the approach by the Free French, 

contained in the enclosure to C.C.S. 6, should be deferred for 

the present. 

8. U.S. TRANSPORTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. 

(C.C.S. 3) 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above paper. 

g. POST ARCADIA COLLABORATION 

(W.W. 16) 

ADMIRAL KING said that W.W. 16, as agreed by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, had not yet received the approval of the President or 

Prime Efinister. He felt that before presenting it for approval, certain 

revisions should be made to it. It seemed unnecessary that individuals 

should be mentioned by name, and the wording of paragraph 5 whereby the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington were responsible only by implication for areas other than the ABDA Area, should be reworded. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a redraft 

of W.W. 16 for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

prior to its being laid before the President and Prime !tinister. 

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10. SUPPLIES FOR THE DUTCH IN THE ABDA AREA. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he was continuing to receive direct 

requests from the Dutch for supplies, such as bombs, for their aircraft 

operating in the ABDA Area. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Lieutenant Governor of the 

Netherlands East Indies had been to see him and appeared worried on the 

subject of allocation of material to the Netherlands East Indies forces. 

The Lieutenant Governor was not satisfied that the Dutch Government in 

London was in a position to handle the matter of allocations, and was 

anxious that it should be centralized in Washington. 

THE COMMITTEE. 

Agreed that material arriving in the ABDA Area should be considered as available for use by any of the United Nations and 

should be allocated in accordance with strategic needs by General Wavell who would issue the necessary directions to General Brett, his Intendant General. 

11. DESPATCHES TO GENERAL BRETT. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that there were many subjects, such as 

the establishment of U.S. bases in Australia, with which he had to deal 

direct with General Brett. In order, however, that General Wavell should 

not be short-circuited, he was sending these telegrams from himself personally to General Wavell for General Brett. 

Copies of these messages would in future be sent to the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff. 

THE COXMITTEE: 

Took note of the above statement. 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

12. INFORMATION FROM THE ABDA AREA. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that he had sent a personal telegram to 

General Wavell, reminding him of the necessity for keeping the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in Washington fully informed of the situation, and of 

his plans. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Took note of the above statement. 

13. NEXT MEETING. 

The Committee agreed to meet at 3 p.m. on Monday, January 28, 

1842, in the Federal Reserve Building. 

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C.C.S. 2nd Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Room 2907, 

Navy Department, on Tuesday, January 27, 1942, 

at 3:OO p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss 

Lt. General H.H. Arnold, USA Air Marshal A. T. Harris 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN Captain C. E. Lambe, RN 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN Captain G.D. Belben, RN 

Brig. General L.T. Gerow, USA 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Commander L. R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R. D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE ABDA AREA. 

(C.C.S.2, C.C.S. 2/1, ABDACOM 00235 of January 22, 1942, 

ABDACOM 00200 of January 21, 1942, and C.C.S. 10). 

After a short discussion -

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer consideration of the question of naval reinforcements for the ABDA Area until a satisfactory solution had been 

reached over the ANZAC Area. 

2. ANZAC AREA. 

(C.C.S. 7) 

ADMIRAL KING said that he had discussed the question of the 

ANZAC Area at considerable length with Admiral Little, and as a result 

Certain proposals had been referred to all the parties concerned. The 

Australian Government had raised two points which still had to be settled. First, they wished to retain one cruiser in the ANZAC Area until 

H.M.A.S. "CANBERRA" had been repaired, and second, they wished to keep 8 

anti-submarine craft under their own control for the protection of 

Coastal convoys instead of allotting them to the ANZAC Area. If these 

vessels were retained, there would only be two Australian and two U.S. 

destroyers at the disposal of the Admiral in Command of the ANZAC Area. 

In his view it would be a far more satisfactory solution to place the 

whole responsibility on the Commander of the ANZAC Area. The ships in 

question could operate under a suitable subordinate commander. This 

wouldbe a much more flexible arrangement. On the question of the cruiser, he felt that it was a very unsound principle that the ANZAC Area 

should not take its fair share of deficiencies due to ships being under 

repair. These deficiencies must occur in every area and each Commander 

in Chief had tomake the best dispositions possible in the circumstances. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE said that the Australian Commonwealth Naval 

Board was probably under the impression that coastal convoys would be 

their responsibility, and if they were relieved of this it seemed quite 

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likely that they would accept Admiral King's proposal regarding the 8 

Mti-submarine vessels. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the matter would be further discussed between 

Admiral King and Admiral Little, who would draw up in consultation the necessary telegrams to the various authorities concerned, and despatch them in the names of the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff. 

3. MODIFIED SUPER GYMNAST. 

(C.C.S. 6/1 and C.C.S. 11) 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of a report by the Combined Staff Planners 

(C.C.S. 11) on the implications of employing the 

U.S. Navy combat loaded ships and accompanying cargo 

vessels for the movement of one convoy of troops to 

Northern Ireland. 

Took note that the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff, in view of the political implications, would refer the proposal to London and obtain 

the views of the Prime Minister prior to the submission of the proposal by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

to the President. 

4. SUPPORT OF CHIANG MI-SHEK. 

(C.C.S. 13) 

SIR JOHN DILL. said that, since the draft telegram to General 

Wavell, which was under discussion, had been drafted, a telegram had 

been received from London saying that General Wavell had been asked to 

keep Chiang Kai-Shek fully informed of the situation in the ABDA Area 

through the British Military Attache at Chungking. It was hoped that, by 

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this means, any resentment on the part of Chiang Kai-Shek at his being 

kept in the dark on the war situation would be removed. In these circumstances he suggested that any further telegram to General Wave11 was unnecessary. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Agreed that in the circumstances the proposed telegram should 

not be despatched. 

5. DEFENSE OF TAHITI. 

(C.C.S. 12) 

THE COMMITTEE had under consideration a memorandum by the 

Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff on the Defense of Tahiti 

(C.C.S. 12). 

ADMIRAL KING said that the U.S. Forces would shortly be established in the Society Islands at Bora Bora. In these circumstances he 

saw no objection to an announcement in general terms of the intention of 

the U.S. to relieve the New Zealand Government of their responsibility 

for assistance to these Free French possessions. 

ADMIRAL STARK said that it would be undesirable to make any 

announcement of the details of the U.S. forces which were being sent 

until after they were fully established. 

THE COMMITTEE AGREED:. 

(a) To recommend to the President and to the Prime Minister that a public announcement should be made to 

the effect that the U.S. had relieved the New Zealand Government of the responsibility for providing 

assistance to the Free French Colonies in the Society Islands, in the event of attack. 

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5. (b) That the Representatives of the British Chiefs of 

Staff should arrange for a draft announcement on 

these lines to be telegraphed from London to the 

President for his approval before publication. 

6. INCLUSION OF OARWIN IN THE ABDB AFIEA. 

(C.C.S. 8 and D.B.A. No. 2 to As;jACOkf) 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Took note that D.B.A. No. 2 had been despatched from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Wavell. 

7. SUPPLIES FOR THE DUTCH IN THE ABDA AREA.. 

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 1st Meeting, Item 10) 

ADMIFAL STARK presented a draft telegram from the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff to General Wavell, resulting from the representations of 

the Lieutenant-Governor of the Dutch East lndies (Van Mook). 

AIR MARSHAL HARRIS suggested that before sending aircraft to 

be operated by Dutch personnel, it would be essential for General Brett 

to make sure that the Dutch had the necessary fully trained pilots and 

ground organization. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Took note that the Representatives of the British Chiefs of 

Staff would further study this telegram, and inform the U-S. 

Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible as to their agreement, or 

otherwise, with the terms of it. 

8. MALAYA AND NEVJ GUINEA SITUATION. 

(C.C.S. 14) 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the telegram contained as an 

enclosure to C.C.S. 14 had been despatched by the Prime Minister of flus­

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tralia to the Prime Minister of Great Britain on January 23, 1942, 

and a copy of it had been given to the President by Mr. Casey. The President had instructed the Combined chiefs of Staff to study this telegram. 

THE COW!ITTEE agreed that Parts 1 and 2 of the telegram were 

of a political nature, to which the Prime Flinister would undoubtedly be 

replying direct to the Prime Minister of Australia. 

GENESAL hlhRSHALL then read to the Committee a telegram, not 

completely decipherable, from General Erett containing a message from 

General Brereton in Australia commenting on the unsatisfactory state of 

Australian defenses, and the necessity for some form of unified command 

in Australia. 

GENERAL ARNOLD suggested that perhaps the extension of the 

ABDA Area already agreed to did not go far enough. The Southern Celebes 

Md New Guinea contained bases from which the Japanese could attack both 

Darwin and Timor. The inclusion of the Northeastern peninsula of Australia within the responsibility of General \l'avell would allow him to 

base aircraft there, and might thus render it unnecessary to divert 

fighters to the Australians. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that by the terms of his Directive, General 

Wave11 was allowed to operate forces outside his own Area, and could 

therefore, should he see fit, make use of bases in the Northeastern peninsula of Australia. He doubted the wisdom of increasing the coastal 

frontiers of General Wavell's command. 

GENERM, hiARSHALL pointed out that when the planned aircraft 

reinforcements to the ABDA Area had arrived, there could be no new shipment of fighter aircraft to either the ABDA Area or Australia for two 

months. Anything that was given to Australia must of necessity be at the 

expense of the ABDA Area. 

SIR JOHN DILL pointed out that in view of the importance of 

General Wavell's lines of communication to him, he might see fit, whether it were included in his Area or not, to base some of his fighter 

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aircraft in the Northeastern peninsula of Australia. 

GENERAL. ARNOLD suggested that the Australian request might be 

referred to General Wavell; at the same time it being explained to him 

that no additional aircraft other than those already assigned to his 

Area could be forthcoming, for at least two months. 

SIR JOHN DILL welcomed this proposal, but pointed out that the 

terms of this telegram would have to be referred to the Prime Minister 

in view of the fact that the original telegram had been addressed to him 

by the Prime Minister of Australia. 

THE COU1YITTEE:­

(a) Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would prepare a draft telegram to General Wavell, informing 

him of the Australian request for fighter aircraft, 

and that no additional aircraft other than those assigned to himself were available; and asking him to 

take such action as he might see fit. 

(b) Took note that this draft telegram would be referred 

to the British Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Blinister before its despatch by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff. 

(1. EBIF'LOYhiENT OF A.V.G. IN BURhlA AND CHINA. 

(ABDACOh: W. 2/00357 of January 26, 1942) 

SIR JOHN DILL referred to the request contained in W. 2 dated 

January 26, 1942, from General Wavell, that he might be informed under 

whose orders the A.V.G. Squadron was to be regarded as operating. As 

this telegram had crossed the Combined Chiefs' of Staff telegram D.B.A. 

No. 1, which explained the position with regard to the U.S. forces in 

China and Burma, he felt that no answer was now required. 

He then drew attention to a telegram received from the British 

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Chiefs of Staff, saying that Burma had reported that all A.V.G. units 

would be withdrawn by January 31, 1942, on account of continued loss. As 

this withdrawal would leave Rangoon defended only by 2 Hurricanes and 4 

Buffaloes, the Chiefs of Staff had requested that this matter should be 

taken up with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, and that the A.V.G. should remain at Rangoon pending the arrival of 36 Hurricanes which would arrive 

there by February 1, 1942. 

GENERAL ARNOLD explained that in an effort to speed up the reinforcements to the A.V.C., 51 aircraft were going to be erected at 

Takoradi, and flown across. It was a difficult flight, and the serviceability of those which arrived would not be high. He also mentioned the 

recent attack on Fort Lamy, which form of attack, if continued, might 

jeopardize the Takoradi route. 

THE C0MhfITTEE:­

(a) Took note that General Marshall would despatch a 

telegram to General hfagruder for Generalissimo 

Chiang Kai-Shek, reminding him of the importance of 

Rangoon as the port of entry for all his supplies, 

and informing him that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

hoped that the A.V.G. unit could be retained at Rangoon until the arrival of the 36 Eritish Hurricanes 

on February 1, 1942. 

(b) Took note that General hlarshall would send a personal telegram to General \Yavell, informing him of 

the action he had taken with Generalissimo Chiang 

Kai-She k. 

10. RUSSIAN ATTITUDE TO JAPAN. 

(ABDACOM 00278 of January 23, 1942) 

SIR JOHN CILL drew attention to the above telegram from Generalwavell suggesting that the Russians should be urged to take steps 

to keep the Japanese forces in Manchuria in constant apprehension of 

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attack. He felt that this matter was political and diplomatic rather 

than one for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that successful defense of our Far Eastern position was likely to weigh far more with the Russians than any 

diplomatic approach at this state. There had recently been violent remonstrances from the Russians on what they considered to be a breach of 

faith in that the complete equipment promised at the Moscow Protocol had 

not been forthcoming. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Agreed that no action on ABDACOAl 00278 should be taken by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

11. ALLOCATION OF Lm'ITED STATES HEAVY BOMBARDMENT GROUPS. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that in the recent discussions, Air-Chief 

Marshal Portal had asked that 20 United States Heavy Bombardment Groups 

should be operating from the United Kingdom by ,December 1942. It now appeared that 16 Groups would be available for use outside the United 

States by that date, but the ground forces to maintain them would amount 

to approximately 80,000 men and it would be necessary to consider the 

shipping problem resulting from the necessary maintenance of these 16 

Groups overseas. 

Both Admiral King and Sir John Dill felt that it was too early 

at this state to reach a decision as to the best area in which these 16 

Heavy Bombardment Groups should operate. It might be better to send certain of them to the Far East. 

ADMIRAL KING said that apart from purely strategical considerations it was obviously necessary for political reasons, in order to 

stress solidarity of purpose between the United Nations, that at least 

certain of these aircraft should operate from bases in the United Kingdom at the earliest possible date. 

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GENERAL ARNOLD said that a decision as to the employment of 

the Bombardment Groups was required well in advance, in order that the 

necessary ground facilities should be provided beforehand. 

THE COMMITTEE:. 

(a) Agreed that the first two United States Heavy Bombardment Groups should be assigned for operations 

from United Kingdom bases. 

(b) Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to study and 

report on the arrangements for this move. 

(c) Agreed to defer consideration of the allocation of 

the remaining 14 Heavy Bombardment Groups for a 

later date. 

12. NEXT MEETING. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Agreed, that unless urgent business necessitated an earlier 

meeting, to meet at 3:OO p.m. on Tuesday, February 3, 1942, in 

Room 2907 in the Navy Department. 

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C.C.S. 3rd Meeting 

COhlBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Room 340, 

Public Health Building, on Tuesday, February 

3, 1942, at 3:00 p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General G. C. karshall, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss 

Lt. General H.I-I. Arnold, USA Air Marshal A. T. Harris 

THE FOLIBWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Brig. General L.T. Gerow, USA 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Lt. Colonel E. L. Sibert, USA 

Air Karshal D. C. S. Evil1 

Captain G. D. Belben, RN 

Group Captain S.C. Strafford 

For Item 8: 

R. Adm. J.E.M. Ranneft, RNN, 

Dutch Naval Attache 

Col. F.G.L. Weijerman, RNIA 

Dutch Military Attache 

H. E. Dr. H. Van hlook, 

Lieutenant-Governor, NEI 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. hlcDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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BRITISE HOST SECRET 

1. U. S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. 

SIR JOHN DILL offered the congratulations of the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff to Admiral. Stark and Admiral King 

on the successful U.S. naval operations in the Japanese mandated islands. 

2. CABLE SHIP "J.W. 31ACILiY. " 

ADhiSRAc LITTLS, on behalf of sir Cudley Pound, thanked Admiral 

Stark for releasing this ship for important work in the Indian Ocean. 

3. NAVAL REINFORCWENTS FOR THE ABDA AREA. 

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 2nd Meeting, Minute 1, C.C.S. 2, 

2/1, 10; ABDACOMS 00235 of 22/1 and 00200 of 21,'l) 

ADIIIRAL KING said that since the institution of the ANZAC Area, 

the ABDA Area had been reinforced by 2 Light Cruisers, 2 Destroyers, and 

3 Sloops from Australia. One further British Cruiser might be made 

available if, as a result of satisfactory negotiations with the South 

American Republics, British ships could be released from the east coast 

of South America. 

ADMIT& LITTLE said that Sir Dudley Pound did not at present 

intend withdrawing the four modern destroyers from the ABDA Area. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above statements. 

4. REPRESENTATION 01 THE BRITISH DOMINIONS AND DIJTCH. 

(C.C.S. 21) 

SIR JOHN DILL said he had had a telegram from the Prime Minister, asking him to delay a decision on this matter pending the result 

of his approaches to the Australian and New Zealand Governments. 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

ADMIRAL STARK said that he was most anxious to have some form 

of review of the matter by the Combined Chiefs of Staff available for 

the President at short notice. 

ADYIRAL ICING stressed the necessity for finally approving the 

revised Charter for the Combined Chiefs of Staff at an early date. 

THE COhlhfITTEE then considered C.C.S. 21, and made certain 

amendments to it. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Instructed the Secretaries to circulate the enclosure to C. 

C.S. 21, as amended in the course of discussion, as a hlemorandurn* by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

*Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 21/1. 

6. RELATIONS WITH VICHY FRANCE. 

GENERAL GEROW outlined a conversation he had had with Mr. 

Hull. 

Admiral Museller's coup d'etat in St. Pierre and hliquelon, and 

General Rommel's recent counter attack in Libya had stiffened the Vichy 

attitude. Information from secret sources suggested that unless there 

was a return to the status quo in St. Pierre and hiiquelon, Vichy might 

not only eject U.S. Consuls and Observers in France and North Africa, 

but also collaborate with the Japanese in regard to NewCaledonia. Mr. 

Hull feared that Vichy might go so far as to turn over the Fleet and 

bases to the Germans. Re was most anxious that the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff should give an opinion as to the military dangers of further Vichy 

collaboration with Germany, in order that the British Government might 

be urged to take further action to restore the status quo in St. Pierre 

and Miquelon. 

SIR JOHN DILL agreed with the importance of retaining rela­

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tlons with Vichy France, particularly in view of the 3anger of the 

French Fleet and bases being turned over to the Germans, as well as losing Important information should the Consuls and Observers be ejected. 

THE C0hfMITTEE:­

(a) Agreed that with reference to the crisis which had 

arisen in the relations of Great Britain and the 

United States with the Vichy Government over the occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon, the situation 

was exceedingly grave in its possible military consequences, and that a further determined effort 

should be made to adjust the present differences, in 

order that existing rel.ations between the United 

States and Vichy France might be maintained. 

(b) Invited Sir John Dill to represent the views of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, %s set out above, to 1i.F. 

the British Ambassador. 

6. POSSIBLE JAPANESE ACTION AGAINST AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. 

(C.C.S. 18) 

SIFi JOIiN DILL felt that this Appreciation could be improved, 

and that it took too narrow a view of the situation. 

ADMIRAL STARK said that it was at present being considered by 

the Joint U.S. Intelligence Committee, and that he would prefer to defer 

a full discussion on it. 

After discussion, THE C0MKITTEE:-

Agreed that the Appreciation contained in C.C.S. 18, together 

with the comments and criticisms of the Joint U.S. Intelligence Committee, should be considered, and reported on by the 

Combined Staff Planners, 

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7. DEFENSE OF N.E. APPROACHES TO AUSTRALIA. 

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 2nd Meeting, Minute 8, D.B.A. 4, 

5, and 7; ABDACOM 00649) 

SIR JOHN DILL said that he felt it essential that as the responsibility for the allotment of forces to the ABDA and ANZAC Areas lay 

with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, they should have before them a full 

picture of the forces at present in the Area, en route for the Area, and 

of reinforcements projected during the next three months. 

GENERAL ARNOLD then informed the Committee of the U.S. air reinforcements now in the Area, in passage, or projected. 

AIR MARSHAL HARRIS said that with regard to the Australian and 

New Zealand requests for fighter aircraft, the British Chiefs of Staff 

were proposing to allocate 125 Kittyhawks to Australia and 18 to New 

Zealand within the next three months. This wasbasedon the assumption 

that two U.S. pursuit groups would reach Egypt in April. Be felt that 

these, and other ad hoc requests, could be dealt with only if the Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a complete picture of the planned 

reinforcements of the ABDA and ANZAC Areas. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he regretted that General Wavell had not 

felt able, in view of his many other commitments, to take over the .defense of N.E. Australia, but that as the successful defense of this Area 

was so vital to the lines of communication to the ABDA Area, he suggested that an allotment of fighters should be made to the Royal Australian 

Air Force from those fighters now in Australia which had been previously 

intended for the ABDA Area. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then presented a draft telegram to General 

Wavell. 

(a) Instructed the Combined Staff Planners, as a matter 

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of urgency, to draw UQ a comprehensive statement 

with respect to the ABDA and ANZAC Areas, and of 

Australia and New Zealand, showing the Naval, Air, 

and Land forces of the United Nations in or assigned 

to these Areas, under the following headings:­

(1) Forces at present in the Areas. 

(2) Forces en route for the Areas. 

(3) Reinforcements projected during the next three 

months. 

(fieallocation of forces between Areas which may 

shortly become necessary, or at present under discussion, should not be taken into account.) 

(b) Instructed the Secretaries to despatch to General 

Wavell the draft telegram" presented by General Marshall, as amended in the course of discussion. 

"Subsequently despatched as D.B.A. 8. 

(At this point, H.E. Dr. Van Mook, Lieutenant Governor of the 

Netherlands East Indies, R. Adm. Ranneft and Colonel Weijerman 

entered the meeting.) 

8. REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE ABDA AREA. 

SIR JOHN DILL outlined the course of the war, and the present 

strategic situation. He then dealt in some detail with the situation in 

the ABDA Area. 

DR. VAN MOOK thanked Sir John Dill for his explanation of the 

situation. He had been most anxious to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

as, while the responsibility for the employment of the available forces 

in the ABDA Area rested with General Wavell, the forces to be allocated 

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BRITISH XOST SECRET 

to the Area were the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He 

realized that the defense of the Netherlands East Indies was only part 

of a much wider problem. 

There were two particular points he wished to raise. First, he 

felt that the drive to Singapore would not end with the investment ofthe 

island, and if the Japanese isolated Singapore and could with reasonable safety move South, he wished to stress the value of the islands 

of Banka and Billiton as possessing the only remaining tin in the Area, 

and of Palembang, the largest oilfield in the Netherlands East Indies, 

possessing a large refinery which was the only one capable of producing 

high octane spirit. 

Secondly, he felt that the United Nations should concentrate 

on Japanese communications, which were their main weakness. He considered that they should be attacked not only by air and submarines, but 

also by a striking force of surface vessels. The success achieved against the Japanese convoy in the hIacassar Strait, which was not very 

strongly escorted, might have been far greater had a stronger surface 

striking force been available to us. 

GENERAL ARNOLD and AIR hlARSWAL HARRIS then outlined the air 

forces available, and en route to the Area from U.S. and British resources. 

With regard to the Naval striking force, ADMIRAL KING said 

that the Cruiser PHOENIX had been sent to replace the BOISE, though this 

could not be taken as a precedent that all ships lost or damaged in the 

ABDA Area could be replaced. He hoped to send a further six small sub 

marines to the ABIjA Area. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE explained that the Naval forces of the United 

Nations had to keep open the sea communications of the world. From this 

task there were at present no forces available to be diverted to the new 

theater of war. Production of new ships was a far longer process than 

the production of aircraft or Army weapons, but it was hoped that should 

the United States be able to relieve certain British vessels in other 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

Areas, then further British ships might be made available for the ABDA 

Area. 

DR. VAN MOOK expressed his gratitude to the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff for allowing him to have the opportunity of discussing the 

situation with them, and said that he hoped that the Dutch Military 

Authorities in Washington might be afforded further opportunities to 

discuss the problems in which they were vitally interested. 

(At this point, Dr. Van hlook, R. Adm. Ranneft and Colonel 

Weijerman left the meeting.) 

9. MUNITIONS ASSIGNMENTS BOARD. 

(C.C.S. 19) 

THE COMMITTEE had before them C.C.S. 19, containing an Order 

establishing the Munitions Assignments Board. 

THE COMiYITTEE: -

Instructed the Secretaries to circulate this Order:: as amended in the course of discussion. 

"Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 19/1. 

10. MOVE OF U.S. TROOPS TO NORTH ImLAND. 

(C.C.S. 11/1) 

ADMI.IIRAL LITTLE explained that Sir Dudley Pound, in answer to 

M inquiry from himself, had explained that only long-legged destroyers 

were suitable for the escort, and all those available in the Western 

Approaches were being used with WS convoys. In view of the fact that 

the TIFPITZ was at Trondjem, and German vessels might break out at 

Brest, Sir Dudley Pound was unwilling to immobilize the Home Fleet 

by diverting any destroyers from it. Ile was not clear as to the meaning 

of paragraph 1 of the Note, as the delay in the arrival of U.S. troops 

in Ireland was by no means ''willingly" accepted by the British. 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was in some doubt as to whether 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff were authorized to incur this additional 

delay to the combat-loaded ships required for GYA!NAST. 

SIR JOHN DILL explained that, as he saw it, GMfNAST would not 

be delayed, but rather that the period during which the necessary ships 

would be unavailable would be moved forward by nine days. He felt that 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff should accept the responsibility for this 

alteration, and that the combat-loaded ships should be used to convey 

U.S. troops to North Ireland on the later date necessitated by the fact 

that no escorts were available before then. 

THE C0XMITTEE:­

(a) Agreed that the U.S. combat-loaded ships should be 

used for the transfer of troops to Northern Ireland 

on the new date. 

@) Agreed to inform the President and the Prime Minister of the change of date, and of the effect on 

GYMNAST. 

11. COOPERATION WITH GENERALISSIMO CBIANG KAI-SHEK. 

(C.C.S. 22) 

SIR JOHN DILL presented a draft telegram to General Wavell, 

informing him of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek's views as set out in the 

enclosure to C.C.S. 22. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Secretaries to despatch the draft telegram on 

receipt of the concurrence of the British Chiefs of Staff in 

London to its corftents. 

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12. NAVAL ACTION IN THE PACIFIC 

ADMIRAL LITTLE reminded the Committee that both the United 

States and British Chiefs of Staff in London had expressed their concern 

st the strategical situation now developing in the ABDA Area in almost 

identical terms. It was essential to halt the Japanese advance. The 

recent U.S. naval action in the Japanese mandates would have a most useful effect, and further action on the Japanese flank was the surest way 

of diverting the Japanese from their almost unmolested move to the 

South. 

ADMIRAL KING said that as soon as possible he proposed to 

undertake further Naval action in the Japanese mandated area. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Took note of the above statements. 

INSTITUTION OF THE. ANZAC AREA. 

(C.C.S. 15 and D.B.A. 7) 

THE C0kMITTEE:-

Took note that C.B.A. 7 had been despatched to General Wavell. 

EhPLOYMENT OF A.V.G. IN EUWA ANIi CHINA. 

(C.C.S. 20) 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of this paper. 

PORTUGUESE TIMOh. 

(C.C.S. 16 and D.B.A. 6) 

SIR JOHN DILL and ADMIRAL LITTLE felt that the present threat 

to Timor was such that under the terms of the agreement with the Portu­

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

guese, it would be unnecessary to withdraw the Australian and Dutch 

forces. 

THE COkiVITTEE: 

Took note that C.B.A.' 6 had been despatched to General Wavell. 

16. COMhlUNICATIONS BETWEEN GENERAL WAWLL AND GENERALISSIMO CHIANG 

IUI-SWK. 

(Previous reference: 11.S. ABC4/9, British W.W. 10, paragraph4d) 

In reply to a question by Sir John Dill, GENERAL MARSHALL said 

that there would be no objection to General Wavell communicating direct 

with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, using existing wireless communications through the British Military Attache at Chungking, the Senior U.S. 

Liaison Officer with the Generalissimo being kept informed. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above statement. 

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C.C.S. 4th Meeting. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Room 340, 

Public Health Building, on Tuesday, February 

10, 1942, at 3:OO p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold,USA Air Marshal D. C. S. Evil1 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, INN 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Brig. General L.T. GeroW, USA 

Cagtain F.C. Denebrink, USN 

Commander R.E. Libby, USN 

Lt. Col. E.L. Sibert, IJSA 

Captain 0. D. Belben, RN 

Captain J. A. Grindle, RN 

Group Captain S. C. Strafford 

Lt. Col. G. K. Bourne 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. MCDowell, USN 

Commander R.9. Coleridge, RN 

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BRITISH KOST SECRET 

1. ACCOMMOEATION IA PUBLIC �EALTH BUILDING FOR JOINT STAFF MISSIOA. 

SIR JOHN DILL expressed the appreciation of himself and the 

Keads of the Joint Staff Mission for the generous offer of accommodation 

in the Public Health Building made by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff-­

an offer which the Joint Staff Mission most gratefully accepted. 

2. APPOINTMENTS OF BRITISH FLAG OFFICERS. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE stated that Admiral Somerville would be leaving 

the United Kingdom on about February 15, 1942, in H.h!.S. FORMIDABLE to 

assume command of the Eastern Fleet, with his Headquarters in Ceylon. 

Admiral Tennant was proceeding in H.Lf.S. NEWCASTLE to assume command of 

the British Naval forces in the ABDA Area. 

THE C0MKITTEE:-

Took note of the above statements. 

3. WAR COLLABORATION BETWEN UNITED NATIONS. 

(Previous reference: C.C,.S. 1st Meeting, Minute 9, C.C.S.9) 

The Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff presented 

certain amendments to C.C.S. 9. 

After discussion, THE COMMITTEE:-

Approved C.C.S. 9, as amended in the course of discussion, and 

instructed the Secretariat to issue the amended version.* 

"Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 9/1 

4. COhB INED INTELLIGENCE. 

(C.C.S. 23) 

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BRITISH NOST SECRET 

THE C0MtVITTEE:-

Accepted this Paper. 

5. COMBINED MILITARY TRANSPORTATION COBWITTEE. 

(C.C.S. 24) 

The Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff presented 

certain minor amendments to this Paper. 

THE COMXITTEErAccepted C.C.S. 24, as amended in the course of discussion, 

and instructed the Secretariat to issue the amended version of 

this Paper, in form of a Directive.* 

*Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 24/1. 

6. THE ECONOMICAL EBIP1,OYNENT OF AIR FORCES AGAINST JAPAN. 

(C.C.S. 34) 

THE COKKITTEE: 

Agreed to refer the paper to the Combined Staff Planners for 

examination, as a basis for a comprehensive review of the 

strategical situation in the Japanese Theater of N'ar (including the entire Pacific area) and the preparation of a combined 

plan for the forces of the United Nations in the area, including: ­

(a) The roles to be played by the Eastern and Pacific 

fleets, the broad distribution of naval forces and 

the naval bases which must consequently be held and 

developed. 

@) The air forces required to defend essential naval 

and air bases, for the control of sea areas, and for 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

building up the air offensive. 

(c) The land forces required to hold base areas in the 

first defensive stage and the organization of amphibious striking forces for the assumption of the offensive. 

This plan would lead up to the determination of the total 

forces required and the manner of their provision. 

7. AIR REQUIREhENTS FOR AUSTFULIA AND NEW ZEALAND. 

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 3rd Meeting, Minute 7, C.C.S. 30) 

AIR MARSHAL EVI1,L explained that the estimated requirements 

for Australia and New Zealand had altered somewhat since the paper under 

discussion had been drafted. The Australian requirement was now considered to be 250 pursuit aircraft, whereasNew Zealand was asking for four 

fighter squadrons as formed units. 

GENERAL ARNOLD presented a memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff." Ke said that the United States production of pursuit planes was 

now at its lowest ebb, but from now on would increase. He felt that a 

complete study of the aircraft production of the United Nations, to include medium and heavy bombers as well as pursuit planes, should be undertaken at once; and that only with this review before them could the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff deal with the whole problem of the allocation 

of our production. 

+subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 30/1. 

AIR h!ARSIlAL EVILL said that the diversion of the P-40's set 

out in paragraph 2 of C.C.E. 30 from British resources would go forward. 

THE COMMITTEE:­

(a) Instructed the Combined Staff Planners, in collab­

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oration with the Munitions Assignments Board, to 

prepare a review of the aircraft production of the 

United Nations and the requirements of the various 

theaters of war as early as possible. 

(b) Took note that pending the completion of this review, 

the United States could not immediately allocate any 

pursuit aircraft to Australia and New Zealand, except possibly atthe expense of pursuit squadrons 

now set up for "IIAGPIET," a suggestion which the 

British Chiefs of Staff would examine. 

8. ADDITIOMAL FIGIJTER TYPE AIRCRAFT TO THE NETHERLANDS EAST 

INDIES. 

(C.C.S. 33) 

ADMIRAL KIKG pointed out that in this case the Munitions Assignments Board appeared to be initiating action, instead of following a 

Directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said he understood that the ?,!unitions Assignments Board had given a provisional promise to the Dutch authorities 

that at least the original 36 of these aircraft would be forthcoming. If 

this were so, any reversal of this promise, however informal, would 

cause considerable embarrassment. The Munitions Assignments Board were 

under constant fire from the Russians, and resulting from the Rio de 

Janeiro Conference, many other demands, particularly for aircraft and 

spare parts, had been made by the South American nations taking part in 

it. As far as shipping the aircraft was concerned, the Dutch authorities 

in Washington had informed him that they had available space in Dutch 

ships. 

It was suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve the allocation of the first 36 P-40 fighters, but that they should 

be allocated to the AEDA Area, and not specifically to the Dutch. 

ADMIRAL TOWERS however, pointed out the difficulties in this 

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procedure, particularly with regard to certain special equipment which 

would have to be fitted to the aircraft before they left this country if 

they were to be used by Dutch personnel. 

THE COMXITTEE: ­

(a) Approved the despatch of the first 36 P-40 fighters 

to the ABDA Area for the use of the Dutch--these 

aircraft to be transported in Dutch bottoms. 

(b) Agreed to reconsider the question of the second 36 

P-40 aircraft in two weeks' time. 

9. SITUATION IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. 

(C.C.S. 31) 

ADMIRAL KING explained that the enclosure to C.C.S. 31 contained a translation of a despatch from the Commander in Chief of the 

Netherlands East Indies Fleet (Admiral Helfrich) to the Secretary of the 

Dutch Navy in London. The Dutch Naval Attache had given him (Admiral 

King) a copy of this despatch. 

Both ADKIRAL STARK and ADMIRAL KING were of the opinion that 

the views expressed in the latter part of Admiral Helfrich's despatch 

should more properly have been referred by him in the first instance to 

General Wavell. 

THE CONNITTEE:-

Invited Admiral King, on behalf of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, to ask the Dutch Naval Attache to find out whether Admiral Helfrich had represented these views to General Wavell. 

10. NAVAL COMMAND IN THE ABDA AREA. 

(C.C.S. 32) 

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THE COhlhJITTEE were informed that the announcement of the designation of vice Admiral Belfrich as Acting Commander of the Combined 

Naval Forces in the ABEA Area would be released at 2 p.m. G.C.T. on the 

following day, Wednesday, February 11, 1942. 

ADMIRAL KING stated that Admiral Hart would return home and 

make his report in his status as Commander In chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet. 

THE COKMITTEE: -

Took note of the above statements. 

11. PROPOSAL FOR BLOCKING TORRES STRAIT WITH MINES. 

(C.C.S. 36) 

ADkfIP& STARK stated that the word “main” should be inserted 

before the words “Naval base” in line 5 of paragraph 2 of this paper. 

It was felt that General Wavell’s concurrence to the proposal 

to block the Torres Strait should be sought prior to a decision being 

given. 

THE C0MkITTEE:­

(a) Instructed the Secretaries to despatch the draft 

telegram” contained in C.C.S. 36 to General Wavell, 

as amended in the course of discussion. 

@) Took note that Admiral King would despatch the draft 

telegram’:” contained in C.C.S. 36 to Admiral Leary, 

as amended in the course of discussion. 

” Subsequently despatched as D.B.A./4. 

““Subsequently despatched as Cominch’s 102115 to 

COMANZAC Force. 

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12. CHANGE IN WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA AS DEFINEO IN ABC-1. 

(C.C.S. 1/1) 

THE C0WMITTEE:-

Took note that Admiral King and Admiral Little would give 

further consideration to these proposals. 

13. PROPOSALS TO BOLSTER CHINESE MORALE. 

ADMIRAL STARK presented a memorandum prepared by the U.S. 

Special Study Group containing a proposal that both the President and 

the Prime Minister should send telegrams to Generalissimo Chiang KaiShek expressing their appreciation of the importance of the role which 

had been, and was being played by the Chinese armies and peoples under 

his leadership. 

THE CO#,VITTEE:­

(a) Expressed the opinion that any action designed to 

improve Chinese morale was militarily desirable. Approved in principle the proposals contained in the 

memorandum. 

(b) Agreed that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff should submit 

the proposal to the President and that the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff should 

take parallel action with respect to the Prime Minister. 

14. TEZEGRAM TO GENEnAL WAVELL EXPRESSING THE APPRECI4TION OF THE 

COE3INED CHIEFS OF STAFF. 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

should send a telegram to General Wavell, expressing their appreciation 

of his handling of the difficult situation in the ABDA Area. 

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GENERAL LZARSIIALL then presented a draft telegram. 

THE COdMMITTEE: ­

(a) Expressed their approval of the terms of the telegram as drafted by General Marshall. 

@) Took note that the draft telegram would be refsrred 

to the British Chiefs of Staff in London for their 

approval prior to its despatch. 

16. SECRECY OF GENERAL WAVELL'S A.W. TELEGRAMS. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that he had received a personal message 

from General Wavell, requesting that particular care should be taken to 

mure that his A.W. series of telegrams was given only a very limited 

circulation, and handled with particular care from the point of view of 

secrecy. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above statement. 

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C.C.8. 5th Meeting. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Room 340, 

Public Health Building, on Tuesday, February 

17, 1942, at 3:OO p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss 

Lt. General H.H. Arnold, USA Air Marshal D. C. S. Evil1 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, USN Captain G. D. Belben,RN 

Rear Admiral R. I(. Turner, USN Group Captain S.C. Strafford

Captain F. C. Denebrink, USN 

Colonel T. T. Handy, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

It. Col. E. L. Sibert, USN 

Major J. C. Holmes, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W. B. Snith,USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Connaander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE ABDA AND ANZAC AREAS. 

(ABDACOM Signals C.C.O.S. 4, 7 and 8) 

SIR JOHN DILL drew attention to a personal telegram* from General Wave11 to the Prime Minister and himself, copies of which had been 

sent to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. 

He said that he felt that fromapurely military point of view, 

General Wavell's recommendation that at least the first Oivision of the 

Australian Corps should be sent to Burma was the correct one. To accept 

the fact that no further reinforcements should be put into Java was a 

hard decision to take, but he felt sure it was the right one. The ulti­

&ate defeat of Japan depended upon the United Nations holding Burma and 

Australia. There might be a strong political pull from Australia to divert the whole of the Australian Corps to Australia, rather than to 

Burma. The political aspect would have to be considered in London. The 

disposal of the second Australian Division could be considered at a 

later date, as it was not due in the Area for from three to four weeks. 

SIR JOHN DILL emphasized the importance of having good fighting troops in Burra, inview of the doubtful value of the Burmese troops. 

ADhIRAL STARK stated that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had come to 

the same conclusion, i.e., that the reinforcement of Java was not a 

sound military proposition. 

SIR JOHN DILL then raised the question of Burma reverting to 

the India Command. With the loss of Java, the AEIDA Area would be cut in 

hlf, and the control of Burma could be more effectively exercised from 

India. 

Sir John Dill then presented a draft telegram. He felt that at 

sow later date the boundaries of the ABDA Area might have to be reconsidered, but that the elimination of Burma from the AEIDA Command should 

be dealt with first. 

(ABDACOM 01288 of 16/2. 

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ADMIFIAL KING stated that the Northern ANZAC Area was vital to 

the maintenance of our position in Australia. The center of gravity of 

the U.S. Pacific Fleet was moving to the southward. It was essential to 

get an articulated series of strong points between Hawaii and Australia. 

Units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, together with ANZAC Naval forces, were 

now operating in this area. It might be necessary to consider whether it 

were not desirable that the ANZAC Area should be regarded as a U.S. 

sphere of activity, in that the operations therein were closely related 

to those of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Burma, India, and China spheres 

on the other hand, could only be regarded as primarily British. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that with regard to the Eastern AFJDA 

Area, we had now reached the point where strong naval operations in the 

waters northeast of Australia might have to be undertaken with light air 

support; whereas it had previously been envisaged that the naval forces 

would not be strong, and that the operations would be undertaken mainly 

by air forces. 

AIR MARSHAL EVILL said that he felt it was essential to consolidate our base for an offensive. Bases in eastern Australia were relatively adequate, but in northern Australia the bases would have to be 

built up, and Darwin might have to be covered from bases well in the 

rear. Naval operations without strong air support were, he felt, a most 

unwise undertaking. The enemy fully appreciated this point, and his air 

bases had advanced step by step in conformity with the areas used for 

his naval operations. We were now at a stage where we must build up a 

strong force with adequate bases, and then pass to a combined and interdependent air and naval offensive. We had previously made the mistake of 

moving air forces too far forward, and operating them from inadequately 

protected bases. 

ADMIRAI. STARK drew attention to General Wavell's request contained in C.C.O.S. 4 for an appreciation from the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff on their views on the strategy to be adopted vis-a-vis Japan. 

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THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Instructed the Secretaries to despatch the draft 

telegram* to General Wavell, as amended in the 

course of discussion. 

@) Agreed that on the facts as presented by General 

Wavell, it appeared militarily unsound to reinforce 

Java, and that at least the first Australian Division should be diverted to Burma; but that in view 

of the political considerations involved, no final 

decisions could be taken until the recommendations 

of the Pacific Council in London were available. 

(c) Took note that the Combined Staff Planners were preparing an apnreciation of the Japanese situation, 

which, when approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

could be sent to General Wavell in reply to his telegram No. C.C.O.S. 4. 

*Subsequently despatched as D.B.A. 17. 

2. RELATION OF hlERC�iANT SHIPPING LQSSES TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE 

WAR. 

(C.C.S. 39) 

SIR JOHN DILL said that though the subject of shipping was being discussed at a meeting of the Munitions Assignments Board on the 

following day, at which Sir Arthur Salter would be present, he felt it 

Important that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should give preliminary consideration to the very important implications of the present shipping 

situation brought to light in C.C.S. 39. 

SIR JOHN DILL added that the representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff had also received a telegram on the shipping position 

from the Chiefs of Staff in London pointing out that we should be unable 

to provide amply to meet the full scale of attack in both the Middle 

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East and Far East, and might well be faced with the great problem of deciding between them. A strong committee, under the Minister of War 

Transport, was now investigating the problem, and it was most unlikely 

that any remedies, including the most drastic inroads in the British import program, could bridge the gap between requirements and capacity. 

The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff were invited to bring 

this position to the notice of the U.S. chiefs of Staff, and to emphasize that unless it was found possible to produce more shipping, particularly personnel shipping from United States sources, we might shortly 

be faced with the choice of risking either the Middle East or Far East. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that he felt that possibly the losses for 

1942 might have been slightly over estimated in view of the fact that 

the early part of the year had previously proved to be that part in 

which the most serious losses were experienced. 

ADMIRAL KING said that some alleviation might be afforded by 

the new plan whereby convoys would use the Great Circle Route rather 

than going farther northward near Greenland where heavy winter gales 

were experienced. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was planning to ship a further 

23,000 men to the ABDA Area, and it was hoped to find sufficient shipping to permit them to sail in the first week in March. He was, however, 

seriously worried on the limitations imposed on the war effort of the 

United Nations by the shipping position, and he read extracts from a 

note from himself to Admiral Land pointing out that though 14 million 

U.S. troops would be ready for service overseas by the end of 1942and 

%million by the end of 1943, it appeared that less than half of these 

troops could, in fact, be shipped and maintained in an overseas theater 

of war. He felt that the whole subject should, in the first instance, be 

examined by the Combined Military Transportation Committee in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners in order that the Chiefs of 

Staff should have before them a picture of the implications of the shipping position on strategical possibilities, including the undertaking of 

such Operations as "GYMNAST. 

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THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Combined Military Transportation Committee, in 

collaboration with the Combined Staff Planners to examine the 

memorandum (C.C.S. 39), and to furnish a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on its implications in respect to:­

(a) The reinforcement and maintenance of the European, 

Middle East and Far East theaters. 

@) The possibility of undertaking Operation "GMWAST." 

3. PRIORITIES DIRECTIVE. 

GENERAL MARSHALL drew the attention of the Committee to the 

rhortage of certain essential raw materials which was holding up the 

mfacture of weapons. Certain alleviation was being obtained through 

the cessation of commercial production, but this was relatively small, 

ud it was essential that some simple guide, based on our strategic policy, should be given to the authorities responsible for production. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to consult with the 

Munitions Assignments Board as to the best method of arriving 

at a broad directive on a strategical basis for the general 

priorities in the production of the critical weapons of war, 

such as aircraft, tanks, combat and other ships, A.A., artillery etc. The purpose of this directive would be to obtain 

from the hlunitions Assignments Board a "trial balance sheet" 

for materiel on which the priorities to be accorded to critical items could be more precisely determined by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

4. NAVAL, ARMY AND AIR FORCES IN THE ABDA AND ANZAC AREAS. 

(C.C.S. 41) 

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SIR JOHN DILL said that he thought the Japanese claim of 

60,000 prisoners in Singapore was suostantially correct. This would include 10,000 Australians and at least 15,000 British troops. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Took note of this paper. 

5. NAVAL REINFORCEMENTS FDR THE ABDA AREA. 

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 3rd lIeeting, Minute 3, C.C.S. 2/2) 

ADMIRAL KING said that this suggestion, that further reinforcements should be sent to the ABDA Area, would be covered in the appreciation being produced by the Combined Staff Planners. He had been 

distressed to learn that the U.S. cruiser "PHOENIX," which had been sent 

to the AEIDA Area to relieve the "BOISE," had been delayed for some two 

weeks in Melbourne in spite of his instructions allocating her to the 

ABDA Area. She was, however, now on her way to Freemantle. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the paper. 

6. TORRES STRAITS. 

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 4th Meeting, Minute 11) 

ADMIRAL KING said that as yet no reply to D.B.A. 14 had been 

received from General Wavell. COMANSAC had, however, given his views. 

ADMIRAL KING then read out a telegram from Admiral Leary which 

suggested that in view of the navigational difficulties in the Torres 

Straits, and the possibility that the enemy could sweep a channel should 

mines be laid, he did not recomnd for the present laying mines in this 

area. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE said that the Admiralty had given him their 

views which were in general similar to those of Admiral Leary. Owing to 

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the strength of the tidal streams in various channels, it was not practicable to use either moored or magnetic mines in the channels themselves. To cover the approaches of the various channels would require 

more mines than were available from British sources; should the enemy 

sweep a channel, we should be at a disadvantage as the enemy would know 

the swept channel and we should not; should the Japanese gain control 

of either the southern shore of New Guinea or of the York Peninsula, the 

minefield would be of no value. 

ADMIRAL KING reminded the Committee that the proposal had in 

the first instance been made in Cecember by the Australians. He was prepared to accept the views of the local commanders, and to drop the proposal for the present. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Agreed that unless General Wave11 advocated the blocking of 

the channel, the proposal Shoiild, for the present, be dropped. 

7. DEFENSE OF NEST AFRICAN AIR ROUTE. 

(C.C.S. 28) 

SIR JOHN DILL said that the British Chiefs of Staff agreed 

with the recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of this paper, and 

asked if there were any way in which the British could be of assistance. 

TJIE COMMITTEE: -

Agreed to accept the recommendations contained in paragraph 6 

of C.C.S. 28. 

8. TANK PRODUCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE REQUIREhlENTS OF 

VARIOUS THEATERS OF WAR. 

(C.C.S. 35) 

Both GENERAL MARSHALL and SIR JOHN DILL felt that it was unwise to deal with certain weapons individually, and that the directive 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

being prepared for the Munitions Assignments Board (vide Item 3) would 

cover the production and allocation of tanks. 

THE COKtYITTEErAgreed with the views expressed above and instructedthe Secretaries to so inform the hiunitions Assignments Board. 

9. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MOVF&EhT OF TW KEAW BObIBARDMENT GROUPS 

OF THE U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. 

(C.C.S. 40) 

GENERAL ARNOLD explained that it would be necessary to study 

further the proposal to send two U.S. Army pursuit groups to the United 

Kingdom. 

AIR MAFSHAL EVILL undertook to obtain the views of the British 

Alp Staff on this point. 

ADMIRAL KING stressed the difficulty of allocating the necessary shipping for the movement of the heavy bombardment groups so far 

ahead. 

GENERAL ARNOLD explained that such a decision at the present 

stage was desirable in view of the necessary arrangements which would 

have to be made for the reception of the two groups in the United Kingdom. 

AIR MARSHAL WILL said that the arrangements for the reception 

of the two Heavy Bombardment Groups in the United Kingdom would, in any 

case, be made. 

THE COMMITTEE agreed:­

(a) That arrangements should proceed on the basis that 

the necessary shipping would be available to transport the two heavy bombardment groups to the United 

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Kingdom in May. 

(b) That it might at a later date be necessary to reconsider their destination. 

10. PROPOSAL TO BOLSTER CHINESE MORALE. 

(G.C.S. 38) 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of this paper. 

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C.C.S. 6th Meeting. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Room 340, 

Public Health Building, on Wednesday, February 

18, 1942, at 12:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss 

Lt. General H.H. Arnold, USA Air Marshal D. C. S. Evil1 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN Captain J. A. Grindle, RN 

Fear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN Lt. Colonel G. K. Bourne 

Captain F.C.. Denebrink, USN For Part of the Meeting: 

Colonel T. T. Handy, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Lt. Col. E. L. Sibert, USA 

Major J. C. Holmes, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, 

R. Adm. J.E.M. Ranneft, R" 

Dutch Naval Attache 

Comdr. C.W.M. Vereker, RNZN 

New Zealand Naval Attache 

Col. F.G.L. Weijennan, RNIA 

Dutch Military Attache 

USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. SITUATION IN THE ABDA AREA. 

(C.O.S. No. (W) 58) 

THE COMMITTEE had before them C.O.S. No. (W) 58, a telegram 

from the British Chiefs of Staff in London to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff containing the resolutions agreed at a meeting of the Pacific War 

Council in London. In the course of discussion the following points were 

bade: ­

(a) The telegram under consideration had been repeated 

to ABDACOM. Sir John Dill had sent a most immediate 

telegram to London suggesting that this should be 

cancelled. 

(b) Some concern was expressed that the Pacific War 

Council appeared to be usurping the functions of the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff in that they were exercising control over military strategy. 

(c) U.S. naval and air forces, including aircraft carriers,together with Australian vessels and aircraft, 

were already committed to operations immediately to 

the eastward of New Guinea which had as part of 

their object a diversionary effect on Japanese operations. Ten additional U.S. small submarines were 

being diverted to the southwest Pacific in April. 

(d) GENERAL MARSHALL had received a despatch from General Brett announcing his intention to divert to the 

Burma area equipment and ground personnel required 

for two heavy bomber squadrons now on the way to the 

ABDA Area from the westward, some of which were already at Rangoon and others en route. He also proposed that the personnel and equipment of three pursuit squadrons should be similarly diverted to the 

Burma area though it was not clear if this Included 

the aircraft themselves. 

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(e) In connection with (d) above, AIR MARSHAL EVILL 

pointed out that this appeared to be in pursuance of 

a previous suggestion from General Brett to transfer 

air forces from Australia to Burma. While Burma remained within his command such a small diversion was 

within the rights of ABDACOM but as a matter of policy it appeared sounder that in general air forces 

operating from Burma should be supplied and maintained from the United Kingdom orhliddle East, whereas those in Australia should be supplied and maintained from the United States. He would, however, 

refer the matter to the Air Staff in London for 

their views . 

(f) The Committee was reminded of the United States' obligation to assist the Chinese and of the strategic 

concept of finally bombing Japan from bases in Free 

China. 

THE COMMITTEE then considered a draft telegram from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to ABDACOM based on C.O.S. No. (W) 58, and certain 

amendments were made to this draft. 

(At this point R. Mn. Ranneft, Dutch Naval Attache, Colonel 

Weijerman, Dutch Military Attache, and Commander Vereker, New Zealand 

Naval Attache, entered the meeting.) 

After considering the draft telegram as amended, COLONEL 

WEIJERMAN explained that the forces now in Java were insufficient to 

hold the island against a determined attack. They consisted only of four 

combat teams, each of one regiment, together with some artillery. The 

total forces of all kinds in the island amounted to 60,000 but of these 

less than 40,000 were combat troops. The Dutch Commander in Chief had 

some three weeks ago asked for furthpr reinforcements but he realized 

that due to the time factor and the shipping difficulties it had not 

been possible to make these available. 

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R. Adm. Ranneft, Colonel Weijerman and Commander Vereker then 

gave their concurrence to the telegram to ABDACOM. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Agreed that the draft telegram as amended should be submitted 

simultaneously to the President and the Prime Minister for 

their concurrence prior to its despatch as from the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

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C.C.S. 7th Meeting. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINWES of a Meeting held in Room 240, 

Public Health Building, on Saturday, February 

21, 1942, at 3:OO p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN Field Marsha Si r ohn Dill 

General 0. C. Marshall, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss 

Lt. General H.H. Arnold, USA Air Marshal D. C. S. Evil1 

THE FOLLLMING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, USN 

Colonel T. T. Handy, USA 

Comander R. E. Libby, USN 

Lt. Col. H. B. Hansell, USA 

It. Col. E. L. Sibert, USA 

Major J. C. Holmes, USA 

The Rt. Hon. 

(for part 

Captain J. A. 

For Items 1&2: 

R. Adm. J. E.M. 

R. G. Casey 

of the time) 

Grindle, RN 

Ranneft, RNN, 

Dutch Naval Attache 

Maj. Gen. A.Q.H. Dyxhoorn, RNA 

Representative C.O.S.C. 

Col. F.G.L. Weijerman, RNIA 

Dutch Military Attache 

Commander D. H. Harries, RAN 

Australian Naval Attache 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. SITUATION IN TEE ABDA AREA. 

(ABDACOM Signal C.C.O.S. 16 and C.O.S. (W)69) 

THE COMMITTEE had before them BDACOK Telegram C.C.O.S. 16 to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and a Telegram from the Chiefs of Staff, 

London, to the Joint Staff Mission F!o. (W) 69. 

A draft telegram prepared by the Combined Secretariat was presented for consideration. 

(At this point, MR. CASEY entered the meeting.) 

With regard to the suggestion contained in paragraph 3 of the 

telegram from the Chiefs of Staff, London, No. (W)60, that the headquerters of ABDACOM should be set up at Freemantle, hlR. CASEY said that 

he could see no point in the selection of Freemantle as General Wavell's 

future headquarters. The Australian Chiefs of Staff, together with Admiral Leary, the U.S. Attaches, and the U.S. officers responsible for 

the organization of American supplies in Australia, were all situated at 

Melbourne, at which point also excellent communications existed. 

Both ADMIRAL STARK and SIR JOHN DILL felt that there was no 

particular reason for suggesting Freemantle to General havell, and that 

the establishment of headquarters at Darwin would not be practicable. 

(At this point, MR. CASEY left the meeting.) 

THE COMMITTEE were informed that the Pacific War Council were 

to meet in London at 2030 hrs. E.S.T. that evening. 

The Dutch and Australian Representatives signified their coneurrence to the draft telegram as amended in discussion. 

It was agreed that the paragraph in the draft telegram dealing 

with policy with regard to evacuation of air forces, air personnel for 

whom there were no aircraft, and such troops as could not contribute to 

the defense of Java, would have to be referred to the President and the 

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Prime Minister prior to its despatch. 

THE C0MlYITTEE:­

(a) Agreed to despatch that part of the draft telegram* 

not dealing with the points mentioned immediately 

above, to General Wavell. 

(b) Agreed to refer the remainder of the telegram to the 

President and the Prime Minister prior to its despatch. 

Q Subsequently despatched as D.B.A. 20. 

(Subsequent to the meeting, itwas learned that the President's 

approval had been obtained. 

2. EXCLUSION OF BURMA FROM THE ABDA AREA. 

(D.B.A. 17 and ABDACOM Signal C.C.O.S. 14) 

THE COMMITTEE had before them D.B.A. 17 from the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff to ABDACOM, and C.C.O.S. 14 from ABDACOM to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff. 

THE COMMITTEE considered a draft telegram to General Wavell, 

instructing him that Burma would revert to the operational command of 

India forthwith, and outlining the new provisional western boundary of 

the ABDA Area. 

THE COMKITTEE: -

Instructed the Secretaries to despatch this telegram*., as 

amended in the course of discussion, to General WaVell. 

* Subsequently despatched as D.B.A. 21. 

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3. COMMAND IN NEW CALEWNIA. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that one of the Free French representatives 

had visited him to discuss the question of command in New Caledonia. 

ADMIRAL D’ARGENLIEU had heard from the U.S. Liaison Officer 

there, of the intention to send an American force to the island and 

wished to be assured that he would be in command. The Free French representative had been told that this would not be a practicable proposition, 

but that the Admiral would have to be treated on the same basis vis-avls the United States forces as were the British Governors in the islands 

containing leased bases. 

SIR JOHN DILL said he would circulate the terms of the message 

which the Free French representative had been instructed to give him. 

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C. C. S. 8th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MlNUTES of a Meeting held in Room 240, 

Public Health Building, on Monday, February 

23, 1942, at 3:OO p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

Lth General H.h. Arnold, USA 

THE FOLLOWING 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, USN 

Colonel T. T. Handy, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Lt. Col. E. L. Sibert, USA 

Major J. C. Holmes, USA 

Major R. L. Vittrup, USA 

Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss 

Air Marshal D. C. S. Evil1 

WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Captain G. D. Belben, RN 

Air Commodore S. C. Strafford 

For Part of Meeting: 

Maj. Gen. A.Q.H. Dyxhoorn, RNA 

Representative C. 0. S.C. 

R. Adm. J.E.M. Ranneft, RNN 

Dutch Naval Attache 

Commander D. H. Harries, RAN 

Australian Naval Attache 

Commander C.W.M. Vereker, RNZN 

New Zealand Naval Attache 

Col. F. G. L. Weijerman, RNIA 

Dutch Military Attache 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander R. D. Coleridge,RN 

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1. SITUATION IN THE ABDA AREA. 

THE COMMITTEE had before them ABDACOM Signals Nos. C.C.O.S. 19 

and 20, and a telegram from the British Chiefs of Staff to the Joint 

Staff Mission No. (W) 76. 

With regard to the suggestion contained in General Wavell's 

signal, and in the signal from the British Chiefs of Staff referred to 

above, that the ABDA Area as such should disappear, and that a line 

should be drawn, to the east of which the United States would exercise 

strategic control, and to the west of which the United Kingdom would exercise such control, GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was loath at this 

stage to see the ABDA organization, which had been so laboriously set 

up, being completely abolished. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE explained that as he saw it the proposed line 

of demarkation was so designed that Naval forces could watch the passages of the Malay Barrier through which the Japanese forces could approach the Indian Ocean. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then read out a personal despatch he had received from Lt. Governor Van Mook. 

This despatch strongly deprecated the abandonment of the ABDA 

Command. Van Hook suggested that with adequate air support the position 

in Java could be held for at least several weeks. It was essential to 

get in fighters from the LANGLEY and the INDOMITABLE, and action by 

heavy bombers based outside Java was also necessary. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that his despatch differed very 

considerably from the views expressed by the tiovernor of the Netherlds East Indies as reported by General Wavell. 

THE COMMIYTEE then considered a draft communique on the subject of the withdrawal of General Wavell, and a draft telegram to GeneralWavel1 in reply to his telegrams Nos. C.C.O.S. 19 and 20. 

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(At this point, GENERAL DYXHOORN, ADMIRAL RANNEFT, COLONEL 

WEIJEIUIAN, COMMANDER HARRIES and COMMANDER VEREI(ER entered the 

meetiy .) 

After a preliminary discussion on these drafts, GENERAL DYXAOORN asked whether a complete decision had been reached on the abolition of the ABDA Area, and if so, whether the reallocation of spheres of 

responsibility would be made before or after the fall of Java. 

ADhlIRAL STARK explained that no decision as to the splitting 

up of the ABDA Area was being taken at this time. The question was 

whether the Dutch were prepared to take over the command of the ABDA 

Area on the departure of General Wavell. 

It was explained that certain British and Australian naval, 

land and air commanders would remain in Java, and that the flow of supplies already allocated to the ABDA Command would most certainly continue. 

GENERAL DYXHCORN said that the Dutch would be prepared to accept command of the Area on General Wavell's departure. He had been informed from Java that the flow of supplies was being stopped, and had 

received an urgent request that fighters should be shipped from Australia. 

GENERAL ARNOLD explained that the LANGLEY was not taking pursuit planes to Java. 

ADMIRAL STARK then asked the Dutch and Dominion representatives to consider the possibility of the removal of northwest Australia 

from the ABDA Command. This step, if decided upon, would in no way stop 

the flow of supplies from Australia to the ABDA Area, or deprive that 

area of the air forces in northwest Australia now assigned to it. 

After considering the draft communique and the draft telegram 

to General Wavell, the Dutch and Dominion representatives gave their assent to these two documents. 

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It was pointed out that these two documents had not yet received the approval of higher authority, more particularly as the British Government had not yet given its approval to the proposal that General Wave11 should assume the post of Commander in Chief, India. 

(At this point, GENERAL DEXHOORN, ADMIRAL RANNEFl', and COMNn 

WIJERMAN left the meeting.) 

Further discussion then took place on the question of the removal of northern Australia from the ABDA Area, which would then be a 

Eutch Comand. 

It was pointed out that northwest Australia provided a valuable base from which long range bombers might operate over the ABDA 

Area, and the decision with regard to the responsibility of the defense 

of Darwin would be left in considerable doubt. 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out the fact that the removal of 

northwest Australia from the ABDA Area simultaneously with its being turned over to the Dutch command, might haveavery adverse effect on 

public opinion, as it might be construed as abandoning the Dutch in 

difficult circumstances . 

THE COMMITTEE:­

(a) Agreed that consideration of the subdivision of the 

ABDA Area should for the present be deferred. 

@) Agreed that at present northwest Australia should 

remain within the ABDA Area. 

(c) Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to recommend 

a line of demarkation between the Pacific and Indian 

Ocean predicated on the assumption that Java fell to 

the Japanese. 

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(d) Agreed to despatch the two draft telegrams^ to Gen 

era1 Wavell, as amended in the course of discussion, 

on the receipt of the approval of the President, and 

of the Prime Xinister on the passage relating to the 

resumption of command in India by General Wavell. 

“Subsequently despatched as D.B.A. Nos. 23 and 25. 

2. PROPOSED TRANSFER OF Two BRITISH SUBMARINES FROM THE ABDA AFSA 

TO THE EASTERN FLEFP. 

(C.C.S. 48) 

ADMIRAL STAR!! and ADMIFiAL KING expressed agreement with the 

proposal contained in the above memorandum. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE then presented a draft telegram instructing 

General Wavell to release the two British submarines to the Eastern 

Fleet. 

THE C0,WITTEE: 

(a) Expressed their approval of the draft telegram. 

(b) Instructed the Secretaries to despatch it.’: 

::Subsequently despatched as D.B.A. 24. 

3. POLICY FOR DISPOSITION OF U.S. AND BRITISH AIR FORCES. 

(C.C.S. 47) 

SIR JOHN DILL pointed out that this paper contained only the 

bare outline of the situation and would require further study by the 

Combined Staff Planners. 

It was agreed that the two papers dealing with the Air Defense 

of Fiji and New Zealand (C.C.S. 45) and the Movement of two U.S. Pursuit Squadrons to Egypt (C.C.S. 46) should be included in the survey to 

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be made by the Combined Staff Planners. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the proposals contained in 

C.C.S. 47 visualized United States air forces operating in scattered 

units over the entire world, a policy to which he was opposed. 

AIR MARSHAL EVILL explained that a telegram had been received 

from the British Chiefs of Staff in London elaborating the proposals. 

The building up of a bomber striking force in the U.K. will remain the 

fundamental policy, but the pressure of events in the Middle East and 

Far East had necessitated the suggestions for certain diversions. The 

main diversions were: 

(a) The building up of a heavy bomber force in India. 

@) Additional heavy bomber forces in the Middle East. 

From the shipping aspect this commitment could 

more economically be undertaken by the United States 

rather than that the U.S. heavy bombers should be 

operated from the U.K., while the U.K. heavy bomber 

squadrons should move to the Middle East. 

The whole proposal to send U.S. heavy bomber groups to the 

Middle East and Far East was limited to a total diversion of4groups. 

With regard to pursuit planes, the two proposals by the British Chiefs of Staff were: 

(a) That the U.S. should be asked to provide two pursuit 

groups for the Middle East, to make good the shortage resulting from the move of 9 Eritish fighter 

squadrons frov the Middle East to the Far East. 

(b) That the 1J.S. should provide pursuit squadrons for 

Australia and New Zealand to secure the essential 

air and naval bases in these countries. 

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ADMIRAL TURNER pointed out that the present directive to the 

Combined Staff Planners to prepare a review of strategic requirements 

for aircraft covered only the employment of forces against Japan, and 

suggested the terms of reference should be broadened to cover the requirements of all theaters. 

TfIE COMMITTEE: -

Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to consider C.C.S. 45, 

46 and 47, together with C.C.S. 30 and 30/1, and to prepare, 

in collaboration with the Munitions Assignments Board, a review of the aircraft production of the United Natjons, and the 

strategic requirements of the various theaters of war. 

4. COMMAND IN NEW CACEDONIA. 

(C.C.S. 44) 

SIR JOHN DILL said that he felt that there were two alternatives which might be adopted with regard to the suggestions contained in 

this document, either: 

(a) ADMIRAL D'ARGENLIEU should continue in his capacity 

as Civil Governor in cooperation with the United 

States Commander of all the forces, as does the 

British Governor of a territory in which a U.S. 

leased base is situated. 

(b) He could assume the command of the Free French 

forces in New Caledonia, subordinate to the United 

States Commander in the Islands. 

ADMIRAL KING pointed cmt that New Caledonia was only one of 

many Free French islands in the Pacific which could only be protected by 

United States forces. It was, therefore, essential to get the principle 

of command clearly defined. 

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THE COMMITTEE: -

Invited Sir John Dill to reply to hi. Tixier on the lines he 

had suggested. 

5. COMBINED MITIWROLOGICAL COMMITTEE. 

(C.C.S. 37) 

GENERAL ARNOLD explained the importance of the adequate organization of a world-wide Meteorological Service properly coordinated and 

making better use of the information at our disposal, particularly long 

range weather prognostication. 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Accepted C.C.S. 37. 

(b) Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would arrange for the participation of the Governments of 

the U.S.S.R., China and Netherlands, and that the 

Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff would 

similarly arrange for the participation of the Dominions. 

8. MADAGASCAR. 

(C.C.S. 42 and 43) 

SIR JOHN DILL explained that a plan for the occupation of 

Dlego Suarez had been prepared, but that shortage of forces andmore 

particularly of shipping made it doubtful as to how soon it couldbeput 

into effect. 

ADMIRAL STARK felt that it was militarily most desirable to 

occupy Diego Suarez in order todeny this valuable base to the enemy, but 

that the decision to undertake such an operation could only be taken on 

political level, and after due consideration of the effects on our relations with Vichy. 

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THE COM#ITTEE:-

Agreed that while militarily the occupation of Uiego Suarez 

was important, forces were not at present available; and the 

decision to undertake such an operation would be dependent on 

political considerations. 

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C.G.S. 9th Meeting. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of meeting held in Room 240, 

Public Health Building, on Tuesday, March 

3, 1942, at 2:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Lt. General Sir Colville Wemyss 

It. General H.H. Arnold, USA Air Marshal D. C. S. Evil1 

THE FOLLOYYING WEM ALSO PRESENT 

Bear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN Brigadier G. K. Bourne 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN Commander i). H. Harries, RAN 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN Australian Naval Attache 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, USN Commander C.W.M. Vereker, RNZN 

Colonel T. T. Handy, USA New Zealand Naval Attache 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN Captain J. A. Grindle, RN 

Major J. C. Holmes, USA For Items 1 & 2: 

Maj. Gen. A.Q.H. Dyxhoorn, RNA 

Representative C.0.8 .C. 

K. Ah. J. E. M. Ranneft, RNN 

Dutch Naval Attache 

Col. F. G. L. Weijerman, RNIA 

Dutch Military Attache 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Conmander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. SITUATION IN THE ABDA AREA. 

GENERAL DYXHOORN gave an outline of the operations on and subsequent to February 27, 1942 in the ABDA Area. In reply to a question he 

said that the total number of Dutch troops in Java was 68,000 though not 

more than 40,000 of these were actually fighting troops. These were divided into four combat teams with certain other troops for the defense 

of beaches and strong points. Eighty percent of the troops in the Island 

were native troops, hut their equipment, training and morale were of a 

high standard. It was estimat,ed that 5 or 6 Japanese divisions had been 

landed. 

GENERAL DYXHOOFW then said that the Dutch forces were still in 

e position at least to deal heavy blows to the ,Japanese forces which 

were landing. All the Dutch troops were acting offensively in an attempt 

to drive the Japanese out and only as a last resort would they fall back 

on the final defensive position around Bandoeng, which town was situated 

in a plain surrounded by hills some 2,000 feet high. 

In reply to a question from General Arnold, GENERAL DYXHOORN 

said that to the best of his knowledge the Dutch High Command in Java 

were in touch with General Brett in Australia on the subject of the air 

reinforcements. 

GENERAL AANOLD pointed out that if the 36 pursuit aircraft 

landed from the SEAWITCH could be assembled, they should be able to defend at least one aerodrome from which heavy bombers could operate. 

2. DEhlARKATION OF NEW STRATEGIC AREAS IN THE JAPANESE WAR ZONE. 

(C.C.S. 53) 

It was agreed that consideration should be given only to the 

line dividing the Indian Ocean Area, a British sphere of responsibility, 

from the Pacific Ocean Area, a U.S. sphere of responsibility. 

After a full discussion, 

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THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Agreed that the dividing line between the Indian 

Ocean and Pacific Ocean Areas should run from Singapore south to the north coast of Sumatra, thence 

round the east coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda 

Strait to the eastward of the line) to a point on 

the coast of Sumatra longitude 104O east, thence 

south to latitude 8O south, thence to Onslow in Australia, thence south along the coast of Australia to 

longitude 117' east, thence due south. 

(b) To defer consideration of the other boundaries of 

the ABDA Area and of the system of command in the 

ABDA and adjacent areas. 

3. BEINFORCICEMENT OF AUSTRALIA BY 12 HEAVY BOMBERS. 

(C.C.S. 49) 

AIR MARSHAL WILL pointed out that in view of the dependence 

of this unit on the R.A.A.F. for ground personnel, the question of their 

command should be settled locally between General Brett, Admiral Leary, 

and the R.A.A.F. 

AIR MARSHAL m1LL reminded the Committee of the serious shortage of aircraft available to Coastal Command and expressed the hope that 

the replacement of the 12 aircraft diverted from the Coastal Command 

would be made at the earliest possible date. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that General Brett had authority to 

arrange for the employment of these aircraft and reassured Air Marshal 

Evil1 as to the replacement at an early date of the 12 heavy bombers 

taken from British allocations. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Accepted the recommendations contained in C.C.S. 49. 

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4. AIR TRANSPORTATION FOR MAINTENANCE OF FORCES IN BURMA. 

(C.C.S. 52) 

GENERAL ARNOLD explained that at present 38 transport aircraft 

were operating between Takoradi and Calcutta. It was intended that this 

number should shortly be increased to 104 and these aircraft would be 

used mainly for building up the U.S. forces operating in India andBurma. 

The cutting of the Burma Road had, however, necessitated planning for 

the employment of an additional 100 transport planes which could be used 

for taking vital supplies to China. He had already taken 25 transport 

aircraft from commercial air lines in the U.S. and an officer was now 

in China studying the facilities available for the operation of aircraft 

between India and Chungking. Rather than divert transport aircraft to 

the British, he would prefer that the British should use the existing 

U.S. facilities thus avoiding duplication of services where possible. 

AIR lllARSHAL JWILL mentioned the purely British problem of the 

maintenance of British forces operating in Burma. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he would welcome the appointment of a 

British officer to the Air Transport Staff in Washington. 

AIR MARSHAL WILL explained that he was already making arrange 

ments to obtain the services of an officer from the Middle East well 

versed in local air transport problems. The Air Officer Commanding in 

Cairo had also asked for a United States officer to be appointed to his 

staff to 6eal with coordination of air transport services through the 

Middle East. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he had already apuointed such an officer. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the measures being taken by the U.S. to increase 

air transport facilities in India and Burma which would be 

available both for British and U.S. use. 

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5. ASSIGNMENT OF MUNITIONS, GROUM) FORCES. 

(C.C.S. 50) 

ADMIRAL KING said that he felt that the ideas expressed in the 

paper under consideration would be ofgreat use to the Combined Munitions 

Assignments Board in assisting them to apply the basic strategic guidance which should be given them. This guidance, however, had not yet 

been produced. 

GENERAL MAFSHALL outlined the serious situation with regard to 

equipment of U.S. troops which had been disclosed by a study which the 

Staff had recently made. The requirements of defense aid, more particularly that necessitated by the Russian Protocol, had caused a very 

serious situation. There were in existence 30 U.S. divisions which had 

been formed for over a year. The majority of these had only 50 per cent 

equipment, and the study he referred to had disclosed the fact that 

there would be no chance of equipping these 30 divisions fully by March, 

which was the tentative date originally proposed. He had then ordered a 

calculation to be made as to the number of divisions which available 

tonnage would enable to operate overseas in 1942. Fourteen divisions, it 

was found, could be maintained overseas, but even if only these divisions were equipped and the date of equipment delayed from March until 

June, there would still be many critical items which could not be made 

available for them. 

GENEFUL bMSIiAL,L then presented a memorandum:: which General 

Aurand had prepared as a guide showing the strategic background required 

by the Combined Munitions Assignments Doard, from the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff, to enable them to allocate production on a strategic basis. 

A brief study of this document showed that the proposals contained in it closely resembled those in paragraph 5 of C.C.S, 50. 

:%Subsequentlycirculated as M.B.W. 3. 

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GENHlAL WEhlYSS pointed out that the necessary strategic policy 

had not been provided for the Combined hlunitions Assignments Board. The 

two papers concerned were designed to provide an adequate mechanism to 

enable the Combined Munitions Assignments Board to implement strategic 

policy and tosuggest in what form strategic guidance could most usefully 

be given. 

THE COMXITl’EE: 

Agreed to refer both memoranda to the hlunitions Assignments 

Board for consideration, and to instruct the Board to report 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the precise nature and form of 

the strategic guidance requiredbythem from the Combined Staff 

Planners. 

6. DEFENSE OF THE CAUCASUS. 

(C.C.S. 51 and C.C.S. 54) 

SIR JOHN DILL outlined the British forces available in the 

Middle East area prior to the entry of Japan into the war, the present 

forces available, and the proposed reinforcements. 

THE CO~YIMITTEb: 

(a) Agreed that a German attempt to gain the Caucasus 

this year was probable. 

(b) Instructed the Secretaries to prepare, in consultation with the liritish Joint Planning Staff, a memorandum for the President stating the above information and giving a broad outline of what may happen 

and the measures now inprospect to meet this threat. 

7. SUPER GYMNAST 

(C.C.S. 5/2) 

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BRITISH MOST SECRET 

THE COMUITTEErAgreed in principle with the recommendations contained in this 

paper, but decided to defer its presentation to the President 

and Prime Minister for one week, pending further consideration 

of the best method of so doing. 

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C.C.S. 10th Meeting. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 240, 

Public Health Building, on Saturday, March 

7, l9+Z, at 3:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Lt. General Sir Colvllle Wemyss 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA Air hflarshal.0. C. S. Evil1 

THE FOLIOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN Lt. Colonel G. K. Bourne 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, USN 

Colonel T. T. Handy, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

Major C. M. Berkeley 

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1. MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE CURRENT SITUATION. 

(C.C.S. 56 and C.C.S. SS/l) 

The Committee had before them a draft reply to the Prime Minister prepared by the Combined Staff Planners for submission from the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President. 

In the course of discussion certain amendments were made to 

the draft contained in C.C.S.56/1. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to submit the draft reply as amended in discussion* to 

the President. 

*Annex to these Minutes. 

2. BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE stressed the importance of the bases needed to 

implement the strategic policy outlined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

in their draft reply to the Prime Minister's telegram to the President. 

Be proposed to produce a short paper for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the present position with regard to bases in 

the Indian Ocean. 

ADMIRAL KING stressed the point that the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff should not be overburdened with detail but that they should deal 

only with the broad distribution of forces and priority with regard to 

the allocation of material. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the Representatives of the British Chiefs of 

Staff would prepare a short paper on the subject of bases in 

the Indian Ocean. 

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3. GOVERNMENTAL AND STRATEGICAL CONTROL AND COMMANLIS IN THE ANZAC 

AREA. 

(C.C.S. 57) 

GENERAL WlRSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

had already given considerable thought to the problem of command in the 

southwest Pacific. It was fully realized that the Australians were fearful of a quick attack on their territory and that they felt that the 

present command was unorganized. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that the problem was primarily one for the 

United States to decide on as the areas concerned were all within the 

United States strategic sphere of responsibility. As, however, the proposals contained in C.C.S. 57 had been put by the Australian and New 

Zealand Governments to the Prime Minister and these proposals were, he 

understood, to be discussed at a meeting of the Pacific War Council on 

Tuesday, March 10, 1942, the British Chiefs of Staff were most anxious 

to have the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff in order that 

they could better advise the Prime Minister on the line he should adopt. 

Be personally felt that the whole Pacific Area was one naval command and 

that it might be unwise to impose a Supreme Commander between the Comlander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the naval commands. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he was not inclined to favor the proposals which, if put into effect, would cut across the whole system of 

command and operations of the United States Pacific Fleet. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that if possible the United States Chiefs of Staff 

would advise the Representatives of the British Chiefs of 

Staff of their views on these oroposals on or before Monday, 

March 8, 1042. 

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ANNEX to iKnutes C.C.S. 10th Meeting, 

Public Health Building, on 

Saturday, hiarch 7, 1942, at 3:3O p.m. 

TO FOHh5R NAVAL PERSON: 

1. We have been in constant conference since receipt of your message of March 4, 1942 to insure that nothing is left unexplored which 

can in any way improve our present prospects. We recognize fully the 

magnitude of the problems confronting you in the Indian Ocean and are 

equally concerned over those which confront us in the Pacific, particularly since the United States assumes a heavy responsibility regarding 

measures for the defense of Australia, New Zealand, and the guarding of 

their sea approaches. You, on the other hand, will recognize the difficulties under which we labor in deploying and maintaining, in unprepared 

and distant positions, the considerable forces which will be required to 

meet this critical situation. I know that you will also appreciate that 

success in holding this region depends largely upon the adequacy of 

shipping, and the availability of munitions and aircraft for arming Cominion forces. The magnitude of the etfort which may be put forth by the 

United States in the southwest Pacific has a direct relation to the magnitude of the air offensive which the United States will be able to 

undertake from United Kingdom bases. 

2. The United States is now operating a large part of the Pacific 

Fleet in the ANZAC region, for the defense of Australia and New Zealand, 

for preserving abase area for a future decisive offensive against. .lapan, 

and for containing Japanese naval and air forces in the Pacific. Provided their bases in the west of Australia can be kept secure, U.S. submarines will continue to operate in the ABDA Area against Japanese supply lines and against naval forces that exit to the Indian Ocean. 

3. While Japan is indeed extending herself over a large area, it 

must be admitted that the deployment has been slcilfully executed and 

continues to be effective. The energy of the Japanese attack is still 

very powerful. It is only through a greater energy, skill, and deter­

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mlnation, that Japan can be halted before she attains a dominating 

position from which it would prove most difficult to eject her. The 

United States agrees that the Pacific situation is now very grave, and, 

if it is to be stabilized, requires an immediate, concerted, and vigorous effort by the United States, Australia, and Yew Zealand. To establish the many defended bases now planned and to transport to them their 

garrisons, together with enough amphibious troops for even minor offensives, requires the movement there of some of our amphibious forces, and 

the use ofall our combat loaded transports which are not urgently needed 

at home for elementary training of additional amphibious formations. The 

loan to the British of transports for further troop movements to India 

requires the use of combat transports for carrying U.5. garrisons to 

positions in the Pacific, and thus seriously reduces present possibilities of offensive action in other regions. 

4. he concur in your estimate of the importance of the Indian and 

Uiddle East Areas and agree that reinforcements are required. We also 

agree that the Australian and New Zealand divisions now in that region 

should remain. The 41st Division is leaving the United States by the 

18th of this month, reaching Australia about April 10, 1942. As a replacement for Australian and New Zealand divisions allotted to the Middle East and India, the United States is prepared to dispatch two additional divisions; one to Australia and one to New Zealand. A convoy of 

one half a division could leave about April 15, 1942 and the remainder 

of this division about f!ay 15, 1942. Another U.S. division can also 

leave for the southwest Pacific about ilay 15, 1942. It should be understood that our willingness to dispatch these two divisions, over and 

above the 41st, which is already set up to go, is based on the necessity 

for economizing in ShipDing and the continuing security of the Middle 

East, India and Ceylon. It is, therefore, dependent upon the retention 

of a similar number of Australian and New Zealand divisions in those 

theaters. The above movements in the southwest Pacific can be accomplished provided that some twenty-five cargo ships are withdrawn for one 

voyage from those engaged in transport of Lend-Lease material to the Red 

Sea and to China, and scheduled to sail in April and h:ay. 

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5. The United States can furnish shipping to move two divisions 

(40,000 men) with their equipment from the U.K. to the Middle East and 

India. The first convoy consisting of all the U.S. shipping and the 

AQUITANIA can depart for U.K. about April 26, 1942 and the remainder 

about May 6, 1942. The supplying of these ships is contingent upon acceptance of the following during the period they are so used: 

GYMNAST cannot be undertaken. 

Movements of U.S. troops to the Rritish Isles will be 

limited to those which these ships can take from the 

United States. 

Direct movements to Iceland (C) cannot be made. 

Eleven cargo ships must be withdrawn from sailings for 

Burma and Red Sea during April and May. These ships are 

engaged in transportation of Lend-Lease material to China 

and the Middle East. 

American contribution to an air offensive against Germany 

in 1942 would be somewhat curtailed and any American contribution to land operations on the continent of Europe 

in 1942 will be materially reduced. 

It is considered essential that the U.S. ships used for the 

movement of the two British divisions be returned to the United States 

upon completion of the movement. 

6. In addition to considerable U. S. air,antiaircraft and auxiliary troops, there isnow in Australia one division, intended for defense 

of New Caledonia, which contributes directly to Australian security. As 

stated above, the 41st Division is scheduled to sail to Australia on 

March 18, 1942. With the arrival of this division, U.S. ground and air 

forces in Australia and New Caledonia will total some 90,000 men. 

Samoa has been garrisoned and a U.S. pursuit squadron has been 

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sent to Suva. With the line from Samoa to Australia held, New Zealand 

in its retired position south thereof, is not thought to be in danger of 

serious attack. 

7. PERSONNEL SHIPPING. 

The present shipbuilding program seems to be about the maxim that can be attained, and any increases would not be available until 

after June, 1944. Included in the program are thirty C-4 ships, each 

having a lift of 3,675 men, and twenty P-2 ships, each having a lift of 

5,750 men. Thus, under construction we now have troopships that will 

carry 225,250 men. It is understood that the British do not plan to 

increase their total of troop-carrying ships. 

Shipping now available, under the U.S. flag, will lift a total 

of about 130,000 men. Increases from conversions during 1942 are estiniated at at least 35,000 men. Ry June, 1943, new construction will give 

an additional 40,000, by December, 1943, an additional 1130,000, and by 

June, 1944, an additional 95,000. Thus, neglecting losses, the total 

troop carrying capacity of U.S. vessels by June, 1944, will be 400,000 

men. 

8. AIR. 

The deployment of the American air forces, which, at this 

stage, must be regarded as wholly tentative, including Army and shore 

based Naval aviation, will be in accordance with the following strategic 

concept: offense against Germany using maximum forces; defense of the 

general area, Alaska, Hawaii, Australia, using necessary forces in support of the United States Navy in that area and in maintaining essential 

sea communications in all U.S. areas; defense of North and South America 

using essential forces. Tentative distribution by the end of 1942 of 

dirst line strength is as follows: 

(a) ALASKA, Army one group heavy bombers (35) and one group 

pursuit (80); Navy 48 VPB 

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HAWAII AND NORTH PACIFIC ISLANDS, Army two groups heavy 

bombers (70), three groups plus two squadrons pursuit 

(290), one squadron light bombers (13); Navy 1.26 VPB, 48 

VSO, 90 VF, 90 VSB. 

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AND AUSTRALIA, Army two groups heavy 

bombers (70), two groups medium bombers (114), one group 

light bombers (57),five groups and one squadron pursuit 

(425), Navy 90 Vrm, 24 VSO, 81 VSB, 81 VF. 

CARIBBEAN AREA, Army two grouus heavy bombers (70),one 

group medium bombers (57), one group light bombers (57), 

four groups pursuit (3u)); Navy 108 VPB, 60 VSO. 

CHINA-INDIA-BURMA AREA, Army one group plus two squadrons 

heavy bombers (CO), one group pursuit (80) exclusive of 

AVG . 

OUTPOSTS ON LINES OF COMblUNICATIONS, Army one squadron of 

heavy bombers (8), two squadrons medium bombers (26), 

seven squadrons pursuit (175); Kavy 48 VPB, 12 VSO. 

ARMY AIR FORCES AVAILABLE FOR OFFEYSIVE AGAINST GERMANY: 

(1) JULY 1942, three groups heavy bombers (105), one 

group medium bombers (5’1),three groups light bombers 

(171), five groups pursuit” (400). 

(2) OCTOBER 1942, eleven groups heavy bombers (385), 

three groups medium bombers (171), five groups light 

bombers (285), seven groups pursuit“ (560). 

(3) JANUARY 1943, fifteen :roups heavy bombers (525), 

seven groups medium bombers (399), seven groups 

light bombers (399),thirteen groups pursuit’: (1040). 

* Pursuit to be used as fighter escort for daylight bombing and for offensive sweeps. 

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9. This does not include airplanes in depot reserve and those essential for operational training. As much as possible of this force is 

essential in the United Kingdom if a concerted offensive against German 

military strength and resources is to be made in 1942. The above dispositions include forces previously set up for GYMNAST and MAGNET. 

10. In confiding thus fully and personally to you the details of 

our military arrangements I do not mean that they should be withheld 

from your close military advisors. I request, however, that further circulation be drastically reduced. 

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C.C.S. 11th Meeting. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 240, 

Public Health Building, on Tuesday, March 

10, 1942, at 2:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA Lt. Gen. Sir Colville Wemyss 

Air Marshal D. C. S. Evil1 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Admiral R. Willson, USN 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN 

Rear Admiral R.IL Turner, USN 

Brig. Gen. D. Eisenhower, USA 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain F. C. Denebrink, USN 

Colonel T. T. Handy, USA 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Major J. C. Holmes, USA 

General G. 

Captain J. A. Grindle, RN 

For First Part of Meeting: 

Maj. Gen. A.Q.H. Dyxhoorn, RNA 

Representative COSC 

Admiral J.E.hl. Ranneft, RNN 

Dutch Naval Attache 

Col. F.G.L. Weijerman, RNIA 

Dutch Military Attache 

ABSENT 

C. Marshall, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. SITUATION IN THE N.E.I. 

GENERAL DYXHOORN outlined the operations in Java from the 3rd 

to the 7th of March. Since this latter date no communications had been 

received from Java. There was no truth in the statement that 98,000 

Dutch troops had surrendered. Total forces in .Java had only amounted to 

60,000 men, including non-combatants, and Dutch forces had dissolved 

into small guerrilla warties who were continuing to harry the Japanese. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE said that it was now presumed that the EXETER, 

PERTH, ENCOUNTER, STRONGHOLD and two sloops had been lost. 

ADMIRAL KING said that no news had been heard of the HOUSTON 

since the night action in the Sunda Straits. 

ADMIRAL RANNEFT then gave details of Dutch naval losses and of 

the Dutch surface craft and submarines which are at or en route to 

Colombo. 

2. THE SITUATION IN BURMA. 

SIR JOHN DILL gave details of the present situation in Burma, 

including the fact that British forces were withdrawing from Rangoon and 

demolitions were being carried out in that city. General Alexander had 

MW taken over command of the British forces in Burma. 

(At this point, GENERAL DYXHOORN, ADMIRAL FIANNEFT and COIQNEL 

WEIJERMAN left the meeting). 

3. U.S. AIRCRAFT ALLOCATED TO THE N.E.I. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that some 500 United States aircraft were 

scheduled for delivery to the N.E.I. This included medium and light 

bombers, P-40 fighters and transport planes. A few were already en route 

to the N.E.I. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he felt that the movement of these air­

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craft towards Australia should be maintained as they could be used in 

Australia in lieu of aircraft which the British had undertaken to provide for the Australians. 

AIR hlARSHAL WILL agreed with this view and pointed out that 

the Australians had asked for 250 fighters and that they had many squadrons with good crews but obsolescent aircraft. 

THE COMMITTEE;-

Agreed that the United States aircraft scheduled for delivery 

to the N.E.I. should continue to be moved into Australia and 

that the manning of these aircraft could be decided on later 

when it became known what pilots, Australian, htch and American, were available to man them. 

4. GOVERNMENTAL AND STRATEGICAL CONTROL Ah' COMMANDS IN THE ANZAC 

AREA. 

(C.C.S. 57) and 

DEMARKATION OF NEW STRATEGIC AREAS IN THE JAPANESE WAR ZONE. 

(C.C.S. 53) 

It was agreed that no further consideration should be given to 

these two papers pending the answer to the President's telegram of March 

9, 1942, to the Prime Minister on the subject of the coordination of the 

strategic direction of the war by the United Kingdom and the United 

States. 

5. SUPER GYllINAST. 

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 9th Meeting, Minute 7, C.C.S. 5/2) 

It was agreed that in view of the Prime Minister's telegram to 

the President it was unnecessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to 

present any paper to the President or Prime Minister on the subject of 

Super Gynmast . 

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6. BRITISH TROOPS IN JAVA. 

ADMIRAL STARK read out a message to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff which he had received from General Dyxhoorn stating that the 

Dutch Coimnander in Chief of the N.E.I. had informed him that the report 

stating that British troops had unnecessarily withdrawn from certain 

positions was entirely unfoundedandexpressing his deepest apologies for 

this slight on brave men. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Took note of the above. 

7. SITUATION IN NEW GUINEA. 

SIR JOHN DILL reminded the Committee of recent reports on Japanese action in New Guinea and New Britain. The Australian Chiefs of 

Staff felt that an attack on Port Moresby might be expected any time 

after the middle of March by Japanese aircraft carriers and transports 

supported by shore based aircraft from New Guinea and New Britain. Such 

an attack if successful would give them a jumping off ground for a further attack on the east coast of Australia or New Caledonia in April. 

ADhlIW KING then outlined certain operations by United States 

cruiser carrier groups now taking place in that Area. 

8. JAPANESE INTENTIONS. 

A discussion took place on the next action likely to be undertaken by the Japanese. It was generally felt that the Japanese would be 

unable to make major attacks both against India and Australia simultaneously. Both Sir John Dill and Admiral Little stressed the dangers attendant on a Japanese attack on Ceylon which if successful would give 

them a base from which they could dominate the Indian Ocean. 

ADMIRAL TOWERS suggested the possibility of a raid on the 

fleet base at Colombo similar to that undertaken against Pearl Harbor. 

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SIR JOHN DILL then handed to the United States Chiefs of Staff 

a memorandum which he had prepared on the lines of attack from Burma into India and on the British forces, both land and air, now in India, together with planned reinforcements. 

9. SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 

ADMIRAL STARK initiated a discussion of the importance of the 

Middle East by asking Sir John Dill what his opinion was as to the relative importance of the Middle East and the Far East. 

SIR JOHN DILL reminded the Committee of our present weaknesses 

in that theater. Forces, both land and air, had been withdrawn for the 

Far East and India and the British would now be unable to afford Turkey 

all the support which, in the event of a German drive through Anatolia, 

we had hoped to be able to provide her. General Romel's presentinactivity in Libya might be due to the fact that he was waiting for reinforcements or he might be waiting to strike as one half of a pincer movement 

which the Germans might develop on the Canal. 

ADMIRAL STARK stated that in his opinion the loss of the Middle East would be much more serious to the United Nations than the loss 

of the Far East. Be said the Middle East was the one place where Germany 

could be fought. The loss of the Mediterranean and Middle East positions 

could have tremendous consequences due toits effect on the Moslem world. 

He had held these views for over two years and had expressed them frequently to the Committee. 

ADMIRAL ICING also stressed the importance of the Middle East 

position. 

SIR JOHN DILL agreed with these views. 

ADMIRAL STARK asked how people in the United Kingdom felt on 

this subject, as there were people in the United States who held the 

opinion that the Far East was of greater importance. 

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SIR JOHN DILL said that there had been some inthe United Kingdom who felt that the Far East was of greater importance. In the earlier 

part of the war he had himself looked upon the United Kingdom, the Middle East and the Far East as three points upon which British security 

rested. The loss of the middle point meant that the bridge sagged but 

the loss of either the United Kingdom or the Far East, more particularly 

Singapore, meant a much more serious collapse. Now, with Singapore lost, 

the importance of the Middle East had enormously increased, and he hoped 

that when Admiral Stark arrived in London, he would not hesitate to express his opinions freely on this matter. 

THE CO.WITTEE: 

Took note of the above statements. 

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C.C.S. 12th Meeting 

COblRINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 240, 

Public Health Building, on Tuesday, March 

17, 1942, at 2:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

General G.C. Marshall, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral E.J. King, USN Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, USA Lt.Gen. Sir Colville Wemyss 

Air Afarshal D.C.S. Evil1 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Rear Admiral F. J. Horne, USN Major Gen. R.H. Dewing 

Rear Admiral R. Willson, USN Lt. Col. G. K. Bourne 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Colonel T. T. Handy, USA 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain B. 13. Bieri, USN 

Commander R.E. Libby, USN 

Lt. Col. J. C. Holmes, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. AIcDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RM 

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1. STRATEGIC DIRECTIVE TO GOVERN ASSIGNMENT OF MUNITIONS. 

(C.C.S. 50/1) 

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that it was suggested that as a 

first step the Combined Staff Planners should produce an interim report 

covering Items (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of the paper. 

Both Admiral Turner and Colonel Handy felt that to produce the 

strategic guidance required by the ifunitions Assignments Board in the 

form in which it had been asked would present a difficult problem which 

would take too long to accomplish, and suggested that it should be discussed between the Combined Staff Planners and members of the hfunitions 

Assignments Doard in order that a simpler and quicker method of producing the strategic guidance might be found. 

GENERAL WEbfiSS suggested that the problem might be simplified, 

firstly if the Army, Navy and Air could be considered separately and 

secondly, if the problem could be considered under two heads: 

(a) The normal theaters over which the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff had direct control, and 

@) Special cases,such asRussia,where diplomaticagreements, 

or political considerations, were the predominant factor. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to discuss with members 

of the Munitions Assignments Board the problem of providing 

the necessary strategic guidance in a form which, while satisfactory to the Munitions Assignments Board, could be more easily produced by the Combined Staff Planners. 

2. POSSIBLE JAPANESE ACTION AGAINST AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. 

(C.C.S. 18/1) 

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THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of this paper. 

3. ARRIVAL OF GENERAL MacARTHUR IN AUSTWIA. 

GENERAL MARSHALL gave a brief account of the methods which had 

been emp >yed in transporting General MacArthur from the Philippines to 

Australia. The United States Chiefs of Staff had felt great concern as 

to the adverse effect on the morale of the troops defending the Philippines, and also on possible Axis propaganda based on General MacArthur's 

move from the Philippines. General Marshall emphasized the difficulties 

of the task now confronting General Wainwright who had assumed command 

in the Philippines, particularly in view of the fact that the Japanese 

were obviously building up strong forces for an offensive. 

SIR JOHN DILL, on behalf of the representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff congratulated the IJnited States Chiefs of Staff on the 

successful evacuation of General MacArthur and his staff and warmly welcomed his appointment as Supreme Commander in Australia. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Took note of the above statements. 

4. RELATION OF b5RCHANT SHIPPING LOSSES TO THE' PROSECUTION OF THE 

WAR. 

(C.C.S. 39/1) 

SIR JOHN DILL pointed out that In paragraph 1 (a) (2) and 1 

@) (2) of the above paper, the losses included British, allied, and 

neutral shipping. He had that morning been informed that the figures of 

losses for the first ten weeks of the year were now available and that 

they were at the rate of approximately 7 million gross tons. He felt, 

however, that this high rate of loss was due in some measure to the marine risks to be expected at this time of the year, and to the losses in 

the operations around Java. 

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ADMIRAL KING agreed that the rate of loss might be expected to 

decrease, particularly when more resources were available to combat the 

menace, and the longer hours of daylight in summer would also assist the 

position. 

GENEFLAL MARSHALL mentioned the use now being made of civilian 

aircraft for coastal patrols, which it was hoped would be of assistance 

in reducing shipping losses on the eastern seaboard of America. He suggested that C.C.S. 39/1 should be referred back to the Combined Military 

Transportation Committee for continuous study with a view to finding, 

whenever possible, further tonnage for troop movements. 

THE COIY~VJTTEE 

Instructed the Combined Military Transportation Committee to 

keep the shipping position under constant review with the object of finding, whenever possible, additional tonnage for the 

transportation of troops and combat material. 

5. MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT AND AIR FORMATIONS. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that he had been informed that considerable 

economy in shipping space would be achieved if, instead of shipping complete air units to an overseas theater, aircraft and spares, together 

with the necessary pilots, were sent to augment the existing squadrons. 

The shipping of such aircraft might be achieved at, for instance, the 

expense of steel required for the U.K. Whereas the steel would not be 

fabricated into weapons for use before 1943, the shipment of the aircraft in lieu of the steel might assist to hold the position in the difficult days of 1942. 

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that there was much to recommend shipping of aircraft to augment existing formations. In Australia, the U.S. 

were arranging for "overage", both in pilots and aircraft, to keep existing squadrons up to 100 per cent, in spite of heavy wastage. Iie asked 

to what extent Australian pilots could be provided to man U.S. aircraft 

in Australia, and if these pilots were available he felt that they 

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should be used both in Australia and New Zealand to man U.S. aircraft 

already there. 

GENERAL. ARNOLD said that5Oplanes had already been turned over 

by General Erett to Australian pilots. 

AIR MARSHAL EVILL said that his impression was that there was 

a surplus of pilots in Australia over and above those required to man 

the modern aircraft available, and therefore considerable local expansion 

would be possible. He was not very certain to what extent the U.K. were 

relying on trained pilots from Australia. Two officers were shortly arriving from the U.K. who had full knowledge of this problem, and he 

would consult further with General Arnold a5 soon as they had arrived. 

Discussion then turned on the importance of reinforcing the 

air forces in the Middle East. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff presented a 

memorandum* containing a proposal that U.S. personnel for certain formations should be shipped to the Middle East where they would man certain 

British aircraft on order in the United States, the necessary war equipment for which should be fitted either before leaving America or on arrival in the Middle East. 

AIR MARSHAL EVILJ., said that it appeared that the limiting factor, both for the U.K. and for the U.S., was shortage of aircraft. The 

Chief of the Air Staff was most anxious that the first two of the four 

U.S. pursuit groups scheduled to go to the U.K. should be diverted to 

the Middle East. 

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that acceptance of this proposal 

was dependent on a decision on major strategy as to where our mainofPensive was to take place. Air Marshal Portal had also asked for three 

light or medium bombardment groups for the Middle East. 

AIR MARSHAL EVILL explained that a strong offensive in the 

Middle East was feared within a month or so, and that, while nothing 

which was sent now could arrive in time to deal with the initial attack, 

it would help as a reinforcement to hold the offensive and make good the 

*Annex to these minutes. 

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heavy wastage which must be expected. 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Took note that General Arnold and Air Marshal Evil1 

would consider, in the light of discussion, the 

questionofhow best air assistance might be rendered 

to the Middle East. 

@) Took note that the Representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff would refer the proposals contained 

in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff memorandum to London. 

6. COMMAND IN ICELAND. 

(C.C.S. 58) 

SIR JOHN DILL said that the War Office was most anxious that 

the remaining 9,000 men of the 49th Division should, if possible,betaken 

out of Iceland. rhey had gone there from Norway and had already spent 

two winters in the Island. Would it not be possible for them to be relieved by [J.S. troops carried there in the shipping which had been offered to convey the 40,000 British troops to the Middle East? 

COLONEL HANDY explained that General Chaney was particularly 

anxious to get the U.S. armored division into Northern Ireland, and that 

the possibility of relieving the 9,000 British troops in Iceland was 

dependent on the type of formations to be taken to Northern Ireland, as 

well as on the port facilities available in Iceland. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if it were found to be possible he 

was in favor of the British troops in Iceland being relieved. 

ADMIRAL KING reminded the Committee of the acute shortage of 

U.S. escort vessels in the Atlantic. 

ADVJRAL LITTLE offered to communicate with the Admiralty with 

a view to British vessels providing some relief. 

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With regard to the naval position in Iceland, he was endeavoring to expedite a reply from the Admiralty on the points which he had 

previously discussed with Admiral King. 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked that the question of command in Iceland 

could be deferred until the U.S. Chiefs of Staff hadhadtime to consider 

it. 

T~45COHUTTEE: ­

(a) Instructed the Combined Military Transportation Committee to examine the possibility of arranging for 

the relief of the British troops in Iceland andfor 

their transportation to the U.K. 

(b) Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would inform 

the representatives of the Eritish Chiefs of Staff 

on the question of command in Iceland. 

7. PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS ON THE DIVISION OF STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY. 

It was explained that in general the proposals which the President had transmitted to the Prime Minister, and to which a reply was 

expected in the next 24 hours, were that there should be three main 

theaters of operations: The Pacific as far west as Singapore, a U.S. 

responsibility; the Indian Ocean and Middle East, a Eritish responsibility; and the Atlantic, including Europe, which would be a joint responsibility. Within the Pacific Ocean the U.S. Chiefs of Staff proposed 

that there should be a Southwest Pacific Area to include the old ABDA 

Area east of Sumatra and Singapore, the Philippines, the Commonwealth of 

Australia, New Guinea and the Solomons and a strip of ocean to the eastward of Australia. In addition, there would be a South Pacific Area 

which would include New Caledonia, New Zealand, Fiji and Samoa, and 

would be an areacovering the strategic line of communications to Australia. The Southwest Pacific Area would be under the supreme command of 

General MacArthur and the naval forces would probably be under Admiral 

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Leary, and would include the Australian Squadron and what was left of 

the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. The South Pacific Area would be a naval command 

and would include the New Zealand Squadron. 

ADMIRBL KING stressed the difficulties and delays which would 

undoubtedly arise if the Pacific War Council remained in London rather 

than in Washington. The area for which they were responsible would be a 

U.S. area and the Military decisions could be taken only in Washington. 

With regard to the formalization of General hlacArthur's position, it was 

generally agreed that this must await the receipt of the Prime Minister's 

reply to the President's proposals. In the meantime, General Marshall 

and Admiral King had jointly informed General Brett, Admiral Leary, and 

Admiral Glassford of the tentative arrangements which the U.S. Chiefs of 

Staff proposed for the Southwest Pacific Area. 

THE COHKITTEE--

Took note of the above statements. 

8. NAVAI, BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE said that he had prepared a paper on the subject of the naval bases in the Indian Ocean, which, in view of the fact 

that it contained a certain amount of detail, he did not propose to lay 

before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but would arrange for it tobegiven 

to the Combined Staff Planners for their information. 

Took note of the above statement. 

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ANNEX 1 

PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. AIR UNITS IN CAIRO 

1. The Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, appreciating the urgency of 

the British request for air reinforcements to the Cairo area, have explored every means of complying with that request. Our analysis indicates that there is insufficient U.S. aircraft available to meet these 

requirements, although personnel for the units can be made available. It 

is proposed that the U.S. undertake to provide the air units, and that 

the British make available the necessary aircraft from their production 

in the United States, provide the equipment necessary to make those aircraft operational, and undertake to move the units. 

2. The plan proposed is as follows: 

(a) The force will consist of: 

(1) An Air Force Headquarters 

(2) 1 Medium Bombardment Group 

(3) 2 Light Bombardment Groups 

(4) 2 Pursuit Groups 

(5) Essential Services 

(b) The United States will furnish all personnel and 

all equipment except aircraft and aircraft accessories. 

(c) The British to furnish: 

(1) 60 B-34 (Ventura)(mediumbombers) at the earliest 

possible date, in the United States. 

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(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

These aircraft to be operationally equipped, 

either here on in Cairo. 

(2) 160 P-40 airplanes (pursuit) to be delivered 

from stocks in Cairo, set up, and operationally 

equipped. 

(3) 60 llB-7 airplanes (light bombers) delivered in 

the United States as soon as possible and operationally equipped, either in the United States 

or in Cairo. 

(4) 60 Martin 187 airplanes (light bombers) delivered in the United States as soon as possible, 

and operationally equipped either in the United 

States or in Cairo 

The United States will have units ready for overseas 

movement as follows: 

(1) Personnel for 2 pursuit groups--April 20, 1942 

(2) Personnel for 2 light bomb groups--six weeks 

after receipt of total complement of aircraft. 

(3) Personnel for 1 medium bomb group--six weeks 

after receipt of total complement of aircraft. 

Aircraft of the medium bomb group will be flown to 

Egypt. Other aircraft will be shipped. 

Maintenance, supplies, and attrition replacements to 

be provided from British production. 

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C.C.S. 13th Meeting. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of meeting held in Room 240, 

Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, on Tuesday, March 

24, 194.2, at 2:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Lt. Gen. A. H. Arnold, USA Air Marshal D.C.S. Evil1 

Major General R.H. Dewlng 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO mESENT 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN Air Commodore S.C. Strafford 

Vice Admiral R. Willson, USN 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Colonel T. T. Handy, USA 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain B. H. Rieri, USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Lt. Col. J. C. Holmes, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. DENARKATION OF XEW STRATEGIC AREAS IN THE JAPANESE WAR. 

(C.C.S. 53) 

TIiE C@.Y8,YiTTEE:-

Took note that this paper had been superseded. 

2. GOVERNMENTAL AND STRATEGICAL CONTROL AND COhNANDS IN THE ANZAC 

AREA. 

(C.C.S. 57) 

THE COMITTEETook note that this paper had been superseded. 

AUSTRALIAN VIEWS Oh' STRATEGIC CONTROL IN THE PACIFIC AREA. 

(C.C.S. 57/1) 

ADMIRAL LITTLE explained that he had discussed paragraph (i) 

of the above paper with Admiral King. The First Sea Lord's proposal for 

the line of demarkation between the Pacific and Indian Ocean Areas, 

which was in contradiction to the Australian views, was due to a misunderstanding which he had now cleared up by signal with theFirst Sea 

Lord. The First Sea Lord had thought that the naval responsibility for 

repelling invasion on the northwesterly coast of Australia lay with the 

British Far Eastern Fleet, but Admiral King had agreed toaccept this re 

sponsibility and on that understanding Admiral TLttle felt sure that 

the British Chiefs of Staff would be prepared to accept the Australian 

proposal as outlined in paragraph (i) of C.C.S. 57/1, which proposal was 

also scceptable to Admiral King. The Supreme Commander of the Southwest 

Pacific Area would therefore cooperate with the British and United States 

naval forces in the two adjoining areas. 

With regard to the directive to the Supreme Commander in the 

Southwest Pacific Area it was agreed that this would be issued to General MacArthur by the United States Government in direct consultation as 

necessary with the Australian Government 

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With regard to paragraph (ij) of C.C.S. 57/1, SIR JOHN DILL 

said that while the Australian argirments in favor of including China in 

the Indian Ocean Theater rather than the Pacific Theater were logical, 

it was obvious that for political reasons China must fall within the 

United States sphere of strategical control. In this connection it was 

generally agreed that General Stilwell was competing most successfully 

with his very difficult task. 

SIR JOHN DILL mentioned a telegram from General Wave11 asking 

for information on the functions of the Council in Chungking. 

GENERAL MAFISHALL undertook to ask the President to give his 

views on the way in which this body would work. 

ADMIRAL KING expressed grave concern at the suggestion that 

there should be two Pacific War Councils, one in London and one in Washington. 

SIR JOHN DILL agreed that obvious djfficulties would arise and 

said he realized, as did the British Chiefs of Staff in London, that the 

control of military operations in the Pacific Area was the responsibility 

of the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

GENERAL kLARSHALL said he appreciated that the present difficulties with regard to the proposal that there should be two Pacific War 

Councils arose largely from the constitutional differences between the 

British system, whereby the Chiefs of Staff were the military advisers 

to a small Ministerial body, whereas in the United States the Chiefs of 

Staff dealt directly with the President as Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then read out the text of a draft message on 

the subject of strategic control in the Pacific theater prepared by the 

United States Chiefs of Staff for the President to send to the Prime 

Minister. The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff expressed 

general agreement with the terms of this draft. 

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THE COUMITTEE: 

(a) Agreed that since naval responsibility for dealing 

with sea-borne raids on the northwest coast of Australia would lie with the United States, the western 

boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area should be as 

follows: from Singapore south to the north coast of 

Sumatra, thence round the east coast of Sumatra 

(leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward of the 

line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 1040 east, thence south to latitude 0Eo south, 

thence easterly towards Onslow, and on reaching 

longitude 110' east, due south along that meridian. 

(b) Invited the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to consider the 

question of the relations between the Chungking 

Joint Military Council and the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff, and to inform the representatives of the 

British Chiefs of Staff of their proposals. 

(c) Took note of the concurrence of the representatives 

of the British Chiefs of Staff to the terms of the 

U.S. Chiefs of Staff memorandum to the President on 

the subject of strategic control in the Pacific 

theater . 

4. STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITD 

STATES. 

The Committee was informed that it was understood that the 

proposals contained in the enclosure to C.C.S. 57/2 had been comrcunicated by the President to the Prime Minister, though the exact terms in 

which this telegram had been couched were not known. The United States 

Chiefs of Staff desired to have the comments of the British Chiefs of 

Staff on these ?roposals. 

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THE COM#ITTEE:-

Took note that the proposals of the United States Chiefs of 

Staff for defining the strategic responsibility of the United 

Kingdom and the United States for the prosecution of the war 

as a whole, as contained in C.C.S. 57/2, would be referred to 

London by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff. 

5. COMMANL IN ICELAND. 

(C.C.S. 58) 

GENERAL hIARSHALL stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

agreed that command of the island base should pass to the command of the 

United States Commander wher. two thirds of the forces in Iceland were 

American, the actual date of the passing of command to be determined by 

Generals Bonesteel and Curtis. 

GENERAL MARSHALL added that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

hoped that the British air units now stationed in Iceland ,would not be 

withdrawn as there were no United States air units available to relieve 

them. 

AIR MARSKAZ, WILL said that there was no intention to withdraw 

the Z& Eritish squadrons now operating in Iceland but that he thought 

that no further air reinforcements would be available from British 

sources. 

THE C OXXIT TEE: 

(a) Agreed that the command in Iceland would pass to 

General Eonesteel when two thirds of the forces in 

the island were American, the actual date to be decided between Generals Bonesteel and Curtis. 

(b) Agreed that the British air units now operating in 

Iceland would not be withdrawn. 

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6. RELIEF OF BRITISH TROOPS IN ICELAND. 

GENERAL hlARSHAJL said that the report contained in C.C.S. 58/1 

had now been revised by the Combined Military Transportation Committee 

and that the new proposal would necessitate approximately 5,000 of the 

British troops in Iceland leaving their equipment behind for the use of 

the United States forces until replaced from the United States. 

GENERAL MARSHALL then read out an extract from a telegram from 

the Prime Minister to the President asking that 9,000 British troops in 

Iceland should be relieved by United States forces. He was in some doubt 

as to whether this referred to the 9,000 combat troops for which arrangements were being made, or for the relief of a further 9,000 who 

would consist of coast defense and service troops. It was generally felt 

that the Prime Minister was probably referring only to the 9,000 combat 

troops. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he hoped that the necessary escorts 

would be forthcoming but that it would be necessary for him to study the 

new plan before giving a final answer. 

THE COIYMITTEE: 

(a) Agreed to consider, and if possible, approve prior to 

the next meeting, the new plan being forwarded by 

the Combined Military Transportation Cornmiltee". 

@) Took note that the representatives of the British 

Chiefs of Staff would clear up with London the question of whether the Prime Minister was referring to 

the 9,000 British combat troops in Iceland or to an 

additional 9,000 troops. 

"Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 58/2. 

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7. ASSIGNMENT OF MUNITIONS, APRIL, 1942 

(C.C.S. 55) and 

DIRECTIVE FOR ASSIGNMENT OF MUNITIONS. 

(C.G.S. 50/2) 

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that of the 16 divisions mentioned 

in paragraph 3 (a) of C.C.S. 55, 12 of these would be equipped up to 100 

per cent by March 31, 1942, leaving only 4 divisions to be so equipped 

by June 30, 1942. At present the United States had 5 divisions overseas 

and one additional division due to sail in April. Three divisions were 

earmarked for overseas service and were awaiting shipment. A further 2 

divisions were training in amphibious operations. 

With regard to the necessity for providing weapons for training, GENERAL MARSHALL stressed the bad effect on morale of the removal 

of weapons from semi-trained units which had been necessary in order to 

equip other units for overseas service. This policy, which had proved to 

be the only practical one, had caused considerable adverse comment both 

in Congress and the Press. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that he felt that the strategic directive 

(C.C.S. 50/2) produced by the Combined Staff Planners was a very real 

step forward in relating the assignment of munitions to the strategic 

concept. He suggested that this report should be used for April allocations and that the Munitions Assignments Foard should be asked, in the 

light of the experience gained in April allocations, to report on any 

points on which they considered a more detailed direction was necessary. 

As the views of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on future strategy developed 

it would be possible to redraft the directive so that it should be more 

closely related to an agreed strategy. 

ADMIRAL KING agreed that the directive constituted an excellent basis for allocations and would serve as a modus vivendi pending 

future possible revision. 

ALIMIRAL TURNER pointed out that the United States Planners did 

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not feel that the Munitions Assignments Board was a body to whom all our 

future plans should be revealed. The directive issued to the Board would 

of course be based on the plans but the plans themselves would not be 

handed over. 

ADMIRAL TURNER added that the appendices which would shortly 

be added to C.C.S. 50/2 ought, he felt, to be referred to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff for their approval as they indicated the scale of effort 

which it was proposed to devote to each theater. 

THE C0MKITTEE:-

Agreed to accept C.C.S. 50/2 as a guide directive 

for the assignment of munitions, to include April 

assignments, subject to study and revision as the 

strategic situation changes andpolicy is developed. 

Took note that the directive would be referred to 

London and that anymodifications proposed by the 

British Chiefs of Staff would be submitted later for 

consideration. 

Agreed to withdraw C.C.S. 56 in consideration of the 

above. 

Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to submit the 

appendices to C.C.S. 50/2 to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff as soon as they were completed. 

8. ASCENSION ISLAND. 

(C.C.S. 28/1) 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Accepted the proposals contained in the Annex to C.C.S. 28/1 

as a working agreement to be used pending formal agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United 

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States as to the terms and conditions under which the United States will 

become responsible for the military defense of Ascension Island. 

9. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN EUROPE. 

After a brief discussion, 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to consider the British 

and United States studies for an offensive in Europe andto report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the following lines: 

(a) Is it possible to put the ground forces on the Continent during 1942 with sufficient support to give 

reasonable assurance that they can be maintained 

there? 

@) Is an invasion of the Continent early in 1943 a possibility? If so, the estimates of the British and 

American Planning Staffs as to material required 

should be reconciled. 

(c) If the answer to (a) above is in the negative, how 

does this affect United States participation in or 

assistance to the 6ritish defense of the Middle East 

in 19427 

10. BRITISH COMBINED OPERATIONS STAFF. 

SIR JOHN DILL informed the Committee that certain British officers of the three services were shortly arriving in the United States 

with the object of studying U.S. practice with regard to combined operations and to pass on all the information they had with regard to British 

experiences in combined operations. These officers would deal mainly 

with the tactical and technical problems of combined operations rather 

than with planning. 

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ADMIRAL KING undertook to arrange, through Admiral Willson, 

that the British officers should be put in t,ouch with the United States 

navalandmarine officers dealing with this problem, and General Marshall 

said that arrangements couldbemade for them to visit the new amphibious 

training center through which army divisions were being passed. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above statements. 

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C.C.S. 14th Meeting. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of meeting held in Room 240, 

Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, on Tuesday, March 

31, 1942, at 2:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, USA Air Marshal D.C.S. Evil1 

Major General R.H. Dewing 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN For Item 3: 

Vice Admiral R. Willson, USN Wing Comdr. C.hicK. Henry, RAAF 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Brig. Cen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain E. H. Bieri, USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Lt. Col. J. C. Holmes, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. STRATEGIC FESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED 

STATES. 

(C.C.S. 57/2) 

GENERAL F,L4FiSHALL explained that some confusion had been caused 

by the fact that the President had not telegraphed the contents of this 

paper to the Prime Minister and in the telegram which had been sent had 

referred to a Sunreme Commander in the whole Pacific Area which had not 

been visualized by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. In order to clarify the 

position, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had, however, drafted proposed directives for the two Supreme Commanders in the Pacific Theater (General 

MacArthur for the Southwest Pacific Area and Admiral Nimitz for the remainder of the Pacific). If the President approved of these directives 

then the position would become clearer. 

With regard to the political machinery for the higher control 

of the Pacific Area, GENERAL MARSHALL reminded the Committee that the 

Pacific War Council in Washington was meeting on the following day but 

he did not lmow what subjects would be discussed. 

In the course of a discussion on the views of the Australian 

and New Zealand Governments with regard to the incorporation of both 

Dominions within the same area, AOMIRAL KING said that he had discussed 

the question with Dr. Evatt and hlr. Nash, and both appeared to agree 

with the U.S. proposals whereby they would be in different areas. The 

views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments appeared to be influenced by an agreement which they had reached whereby each had undertaken to cooperate with the other in the defense of the two Dominions. 

SIR JOAN DILL said that the defense of New Zealand rested primarily on sea and air power and that it would in his opinion be an unwise diversion of force to build up strong land forces in New Zealand. 

He personally felt that New Zealand would be in a stronger position if 

under the direct command of the Naval Supreme Commander of the Pacific 

Area. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he had pointed out to ?Ir. Nash the 

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relative security enjoyed by New Zealand as long as the fortified line 

of communication from Hawaii to Australia remained intact. 

ADMIRAL ICING added that a despatch had been sent to Admiral 

Leary instructing him to assume command of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet previously under Admiral Glassford in addition to retaining his present 

command, and place himself at the disposal of General MacArthur to cooperate with him pending formal establishment of unity of command in the 

area. 

THE COKXITTEE: 

Agreed that no further action could be taken on C.C.S. 57/2 

until a final decision had been reached on a political level. 

2. RELIEF OF BRITISH TROOPS IN ICELAND. 

(C.C.S. 58/2) 

THE COMMITTEE were informed that agreement had been received 

from London that the British troops should leave their equipment to be 

taken over by certain of the U.S. forces going to Iceland. 

ADMIRAL KING outlined the escort position whereby the British 

had agreed to furnish the necessary escort for the second convoy from 

Iceland to the United Kingdom and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet had been asked to arrange to escort the second convoy as 

far as Iceland. Though Admiral King hadnot received specific information 

of his ability to undertake this, he felt no doubt that it could be accompl ished. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE saidthat he had that morning learned that the 

QUEEN MARY had been ordered back to New York and would be available for 

this movement. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that he presumed this move meant that the 

9th Australian Division would remain in the Middle East. He considered 

this particularly important in view of the difficulties which would 

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arise if all Australian troops in the Middle East were withdrawn while 

New Zealand forces remained. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in this connection he had suggested 

to the President that the condition whereby a second United States division was provided for Australia only if the 9th Australian Division remained in the Middle East, should be withdrawn. However, the importance 

of the 9th Australian Division remaining in the Middle East should be 

emphasized to the Australian authorities since the removal of these 

troops would entail a diminution of British strength to the extent of 

60,000 men because of the transport involved. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to accept C.C.S. 58/2. 

3. U.S. AIRCRAFT ALLOCATED TO THE N.E.I. 

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 11th Meeting, Item 3) 

GENERAL ARNOLD raised the question of the allocation to the 

Australian area of 611 aircraft previously scheduled for delivery to the 

Netherlands East Indies. He had discussed this matter with Dr. Evatt and 

Mr. Casey. The Netherlands authorities had informed him that they required only 18 of these aircraft (for which they had paid cash) in ALEtralia for the present. They wished that the remaining planes should be 

turned over to the U.S. authorities on the condition that they should be 

used in the United States for a Dutch training scheme and that the combat types would be replaced late in 1942 or early in 1943 when Dutch 

pilots would be available to man them. The present position was that 

only 54 of these aircraft were completed: 18 were already in Australia, 

24 were en route, 5 were on their way via India (and as they would be 

unable to proceed from there to Australia they were being diverted to 

General Brereton’s command), 3 had crashed, and 4 were not yet ready. 

SIR JOHN DILL reminded the Committee of the reasons which had 

led the Combined Chiefs of Staff to decide that the flow of these aircraft to Australia must continue. The defense of Australia was an urgent 

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need and crews were available to use them operationally at once. 

AIR MARSHAL EVILL said that the Australian authorities were 

anxious that the flow should continue as trained crews were available in 

Australia and 8 fully trained operational squadrons were at present 

equipped with obsolete Wirraways. The value of getting these aircraft 

into Australia where they could at once be absorbed into formed units 

was obvious in view of the importance of the time factor. No shipping 

would be required as the aircraft could be flown out. 

ADMIRAL TOWERS suggested that the Dutch contracts for any but 

completed aircraft should be cancelled and that the ‘J.S. Army and Navy 

should then take over the contracts and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

should decide in the light of the strategic situation at the time to 

what theater the remaining planes were to be allocated. 

With regard to the training of Australian or Dutch pilots and 

crews in Australia, GENERAZ, MARSHALL said that General Brett had informed 

him that training in Australia could not be increased in view of limited 

maintenance facilities which were now being largely employed for operational squadrons. 

ADMIRAL KING said that he lmew of no change of view on the 

part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with regard to the necessity for 

the continued flow of these aircraft to the Australian area. 

(At this point, WING COMMANDER HENRY entered the meeting.) 

WING COMMANDER HENRY explained that the Dutch had offered 

these aircraft to the Australians with the proviso that immediate financial arrangements must be made or the contract would be cancelled. He 

understood that the day after this offer was made a somewhat similar offer was made to the U.S. air forces. 

With regard to the availability of Australian pilots, WING 

COMMANDER HENRY confirmed that 8 complete operational trained squadrons 

were ready with only obsolete aircraft. 

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With regard to arrangements for ferrying the aircraft to Australia he explained that Australian crews trained in England or North 

America were available to undertake this task though in certain cases 

the captains of tbe aircraft wouldhave to beprovided Worn other sources. 

In reply to a question as to training facilities in Australia, 

WING COMMANDER HENRY said that though considerable training facilities 

existed, having been built, up in connection with the Empire air scheme, 

he felt that the largely increased size of the operational air force in 

Australia would be placing a heavy load on the maintenance facilities. 

(At this point WING COWANDW HENRY left the meeting) 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would reconsider the question of the flow of Dutch aircraft 

to the Australian Theater and would submit their 

proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

(b) Agreed that pending consideration of the proposals 

referred to in (a) above, the movement of completed 

aircraft to Australia should continue. 

4. CONSIDERATION OF U.S.--BRITISHREQUIREnlENTS FOR ESCORT VESSELS. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE referred to the suggestion that the U.S. Navy 

might wish to take over certain of the corvettes now building in Canada. 

He had ascertained that none of these corvettes would be completed until 

the end of 1942 and that most of them would not be finished until 1943 

or even 1944. In this connection he suggested that it might be wise if 

the Combined U.S.--Eritish Naval Staffs in Washington reviewed the whole 

problem of the future requirements of the two Navies fnr corvettes and 

perhaps destroyers. Such aspects as strategic responsibilities and the 

manning problem could be reviewed. 

ADMIRAL KING welcomed the proposal that the Combined Naval 

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BRITISH NOST SECRET 

Staffs should review the position with regard to corvettes but felt that 

consideration of the destroyer position should for the present be deferred. 

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that the question of both the United 

States and British building programs for landing craft should also be 

examined as it appeared that they might prove the limiting factor for 

any offensive operations. 

THE CO8XITTEE: 

Agreed that the 7J.S.--British b!aval Staffs in Washington 

should review and report on the adequacy, in the light of 

strategic requirements, of the combined building program for 

corvettes and landing craft. 

5. ALLOCATION OF AIR FORCES. 

ADMIRAL KING read to the Committee a telegram:: from the Prime 

Minister to the President containing a request for the earliest possible 

employment from Great Britain of a U.S. bomber force of at least 100 

aircraft. The Prime Minister had pointed out the diversion of bombers to 

anti-submarine work in the Bay of Biscay aimed at lessening the scale of 

attack on shipping off the east coast of America, and had also informed 

the President of the unserviceability of certain Dritish heavy bombers. 

The Prime hiinister had stressed the success of recent bomber attacks on 

Germany but feared that the weight of attack throughout the summer 

months would fall off instead of increasing. 

GENERAZ. MARSHALL said that he was encouraged by the Prime hfinister‘s telegram in that it reinforced his own views ofthe importance of 

a heavy bomber offensive from the United Kingdom. General biarshall reviewed the many demands made for U.S. aircraft which though important in 

themselves tended to cause adisaersion of effort which he was sure ought 

to be avoided. In order that the very important decisions as to the allocation of aircraft could be taken in the light of the fullest possible 

knowledge, he hoped that the Representatives of the British Chiefs of 

“No. Go. 

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Staff wouldprovide the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with the fullest information as to British aircraft material resources in each theater of war. 

GENERAL ARNOLD also stressed the importance of operating U.S. 

heavy bombers from Great Britain and said that he hoped that if no further calls were made on his limited training and operational resources 

one heavy bomber group would be ready in Nay, a further two in June. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that every effort would be made to provide 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with the most up-to-date and realistic picture 

of the British aircraft position. 

AIR MARSHAL EVILL said that he realized the difficulties which 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had found ininterpreting certain of the figures 

which were available and he had asked London to produce at the earliest 

possible date realistic and practical information which would help the 

Chiefs of Staff to decide on the future allocation of the available aircraft. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Took note that the Representatives of the British Chiefs of 

Staff would provide the information needed by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff to enable them to allocate available aircraft 

to the various theaters of war. 

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C.C.S. 16th Meeting. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

blINUTES of meeting held in Room 240, 

Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, on Tuesday, April 

7, 1942, at 2:3O p.m. 

PRESENT 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. H.H. Arnold, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

hj. Cen. C.T. McNarney, USA Air Marshal D.C.S. Evil1 

(Representing General Major General R.H. Dewing 

Marshal 1) 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN 

Vice Admiral R. Willson, USN 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Brig. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain B. H. Bieri, USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, TEN 

Lt. Col. H. S. Hansell, USA 

Lt. Col. J. C. Holmes, USA 

Air Commodore S.C. Strafford 

AFISENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. GERMAN CAPABILITIES IN TURKEY, SYRIA AND IRAQ. 

(C.C.S. 59) 

ADMIRAI, KING said that in considering C.C.S. 59 at their meeting on the previous day, the United States Chiefs of Staff had felt that 

certain information essential to considering the world situation was 

still lacking. The situation with respect to aircraft, for example, was 

not sufficiently clear to permit a decision to be made as to whether or 

not five additional U.S. groups should be sent to the Middle East at the 

expense of reducing aircraft strength in other areas. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that the paper under consideration could be 

considerably improved and brought up to date by the insertion of figures 

recently received of strengths of forces now available. 

THE C0,YKlTTEE:-

Took note of C.C.S. 59 and directed the Secretaries to refer 

this paper back to the Combined Intelligence Committee to be 

brought up to date in the light of the latest information 

which has become available since the paper was prepared, and 

to include the German strengths available. 

2. UNITED STATES--BRITISH STRATEGY. 

Referring to ADMIRAL ICING'S request for additional information 

on which to base strategic allocation of forces, SIR JOHN DILL said that 

he felt that it was necessary that the Combined Staff Planners should, 

as a matter of urgency, produce an agreed strategic policy for the United 

Nations. Such an appreciation would serve as a much needed guide for the 

allocation of forces, for production of munitions and ships, and the expansion of armed forces necessary for the final offensive. 

In the course of discussion it was pointed out that the Combined Staff Planners had already received a directive* instructing them 

: C.C.S. Qth Meeting Item 6 

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to prepare an appreciation covering the employment of forces in the war 

against Japan. It was generally agreed that this directive should be 

widened to include the whole world situation. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that an appreciation had been prepared by 

the British which would be available as a basis for discussion. He hoped 

that the United States would have a corresponding paper which could be 

similarly used. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an over-all 

general appreciation leading up to an agreed strategic policy 

for the United Nations, which will cover major deployment of 

forces and courses of action for 1942, andintentions for 1943. 

3. AIRCRAFT SITUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 

With regard to the appreciation referred to in Item 2 above, 

ADMIRAL KING said that he felt that the difficulties with regard to the 

allocation of aircraft necessitated an immediate review of the present 

aircraft resources of the United Nations, together with the proposed expansion programs. 

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed with this view. The points whiohrequired 

clarification were the present strength of air forces, the proposed expansions, the present and proposed production programs and the missions 

to be performed by the aircraft of the United Nations in the various 

theaters of war. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he was appreciative of the amount of 

information which Air Marshal Evil1 had already provided him with, but 

the necessity for a combined review of the aircraft situation was emphasized by the continual requests he was receiving to allocate aircraft to 

individual theaters which, without the full picture, was an impossible 

task. 

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SIR JOHN DILL welcomed the investigation on the lines suggested 

by General Arnold. The British aircraft figures would be completely at 

the disposal of the United States Chiefs of Staff. 

ADMIRAL KING suggested that in order tospeed up the procedure, 

the review of the aircraft situation should be undertaken by General 

Arnold, Admiral Towers and Air hfarshal Evill and when completed this appreciation would fit in to the wider appreciation being undertaken by 

the Combined Staff Planners. 

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed that sufficient information regarding 

British aircraft resources was available to enable the study suggested 

by Admiral King to be undertaken. 

T8E COMMITTEE: -

Invited General Arnold, Air Marshal Evill and Admiral Towers 

to draw up over-all data which will present a complete agreed 

picture of all U.S. and British air resources to include: 

(a) Operating strengths 

@) Reserves of all types 

(c) Production 

(d) Proposed expansion 

(e) Present distribution by theaters including movements already in progress or arranged. 

4. U.S. AIRCRAFT ALU)CATED TO THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. 

(C.C.S. 60) 

SIR JOHN DILL said that he realized that the Dutch aircraft in 

question presented a special case and that it therefore might be necessary to depart from the agreed principle that all aircraft should be 

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within a common pool from which they would be allocated by the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff in accordance with strategical needs. 

ADMIRAL KING said that as he saw it in this case the U.S. 

Chiefs of Staff would be acting as the agents of the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff and the allocation of the Dutch aircraft to the Pacific Theater 

would be taken into account when considering the needs for aircraft in 

that theater against the needs of the other theaters. 

GENERAL ARNOLD explained that the Netherlands Government had 

explicitly requested that the United States should take over these aircraft and that they should replace them for use by Dutch pilots at such 

time as sufficient numbers of these were trainedtooperate the aircraft. 

If all these 500 aircraft were put into Australia, theUnitedStateswould 

find themselves expected to allocate some 135 aircraft a month in the 

form of replacements. Certain of these Dutch aircraft were, in fact, 

scheduled to be sent to India. 

THE C0KMITTEE:­

(a) Agreed that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, as agents of 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will make arrangements 

to take over the Dutch planes as they are produced, 

including arrangements with the Netherlands Government for their eventual replacement. 

(b) Agreed that allocation of these planes should be 

considered along with the general allocation of aircraft materiel. 

(c) Invited General Arnold to draft a note of information on the above to the Australian representatives 

in Washington, to include particulars of the Dutch 

aircraft which were being despatched to the Southwest Pacific Area. 

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6. PROVISION OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FOR AUSTRALIA. 

(C.C.S. 30/2) 

SIR JOHN DILL explained that the position in the Middle East 

was such that the British Chiefs of Staff felt it essential that 80 

Kittyhawks promised to Australia should be retained in the Middle East 

but they were anxious not to take unilateral action without the approval 

of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. 

AIR MARSHAL WILL pointed out that these 80 aircraft were over 

and above 125 which had already been specially diverted from the Middle 

East. This addition was made at a time when the Japanese threat towards 

Australia seemed more imminent than against India. 

In the course of a discussion on the strength of the airforces 

required in Australia, GENERAL ARNOLD explained that the United States 

had originally allocated 4 groups (320 operational fighters) to the 

Southwest Pacific Area. One group had been turned over to the R.A.A.F., 

and one group diverted to India. He asked whether the Australians would 

now ask for an additional 80 aircraft from U.S. sources or whether the 

pursuit group turned over by General Brett to the R.A.A.F. would meet 

this demand. 

AIR MARSHAL WILL said that it was difficult to assess the 

number of additional fighters required in Australia pending a decision 

as to how many of the Dutch fighters would be allocated to the area. 

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed to inform Air Harshal Evil1 of the numbers when a decision had been reached. 

ADMIRAL ICING pointed out that this problem emphasized the necessity for a very early appreciation of the aircraft resources of the 

United Nations. 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff support the 

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British Chiefs of Staff in the retention in the Middle East of eighty fighter aircraft provisionally 

earmarked for diversion from that theater to Australia. 

@) Took note that General Arnold would let Air Marshal 

Evil1 have a copy of his note to the Australianrepresentative in Washington (vide conclusion item 4 

(c) for the information of the British Chiefs of 

Staff. 

6. REQUEST FOR AIRCFWT FROM INDIA. 

ADMIRAL KING read out to the Committee a despatch from Colonel 

Louis Johnson to the President containingaletter from General Wave11 to 

himself on the subject of India's need for aircraft. General Wavell's 

specific requests were for 40 transport aircraft, 80 reconnaissance aircraft, 120 medium bombers and 120 fighters. With these, in addition to 

British andU.S. aircraft already allocated tothe area, he felt confident of holding India. 

With regard to transport aircraft, 

within the next 16 to 2 months there would be 

between Suez and Calcutta. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that the request 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that 

100U.S.transport aircraft 

should more properly have 

been put to the British Chiefs of Staff and asked that he might have a 

copy of the despatch to send to London. 

ADMIRAL KING agreed to furnish Sir John Dill with a copy of 

Colonel Louis Johnson's despatch to the President. 

7. PRODUCTI'ON OF LANDING CRAFT. 

ADMIRAL KING said that in the course of discussion at the 

White House ithad been felt that there might be an opportunity to launch 

an offensive in the autumn of 1942 but that the limiting factor for such 

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an offensive might be the availability of landing craft. He had therefore examined the possibilities of increasing the production of landing 

craft. Improvement in the production of certain types was impossible but 

the production of tank lighters and landing boats could be improved. He 

had already given orders that the greatest possible numbers of these 

craft should be built ready for use by September, 1942. Delays in the 

completion of certain combatant ships might be incurred but it was 

thought that only small mine sweepers and some of the larger long-dated 

combat vessels would be affected. 

ADMIRAL KING said that the problem of the transportation of 

these craft across the Atlantic had not yet been fully investigated but 

that they would of course be available in the common pool for use by 

troops of any of the United Nations. If they were not required on the 

continent in the autumn of 1942 there would be many other uses to which 

they might be put. 

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C.C.S. 16th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINLPIES of meeting held in Room 240, 

Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, on Tuesday, April 

21, 1942, at 2:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Sir Dudley Pound, 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral of the Fleet 

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Air Marshal D.C.S. Evil1 

Major General R. H. Dewing 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN 

Vice Admiral F.J. Horne, USN 

Vice Admiral R. Willson, USN 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Maj. Gen. J.T. hlcNarney, USA 

Brig. Gen. H.J. Malony, USA 

Brig. Gen. T.T. Handy, USA 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Commander C. F. Espe, USN 

Lt. Col. J. C. Holmes, USA 

Admiral Sir Charles Little 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. NAVAL BASES AND REPAIR FACILITIES. 

(C.C.S. 63) 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Approved the recommendations of the Combined Staff 

Planners contained in paragraphs 9 to 11 and the 

priority list proposed in paragraph 12 of C.C.S. 63. 

(b) Cirected the Combined Munitions Assignments Board to 

consider allocations of materiel for LION and CUB 

bases in the light of current requirements for active projects. 

2. IUID MILITARY CCMIIIL'NICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 

(C.C.S. 64) 

GENERAL MAIARSHALL said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggested 

that the Washington Communications Board should be instructed to review 

the adequacy of combined communications system foruniversal application. 

THE COMMITTEE:-­

(a) Approved the draft directive to the Washington Communications Board and the London Communications Committee submitted by the Combined Staff Planners (C. 

C.S. 64) 

(b) Took note that the U.3. Chiefs of Staff had directed 

the Washington Communications Board to submit a report by May 15, 1942, of the adequacy of the combined communications system for universal application. 

3. ALLOCATION OF TRANSPORT AIRPLANES FOR U.S.S.R. 

(C.C.S. 65) 

THE COKMITTEE had before them a memorandum by the Joint U.S. 

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Chiefs of Staff suggesting that the allocation of 29 heavytransportaircraft to Russia made by the Combined Munitions Assignments Board should 

be disapproved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

GENERAL ARNOLD explained that at present only 50 heavy transport aircraft were available inthe United States, of which only 10 could 

be spared for the training of parachute troops. It was therefore necessary to weigh up the relative importance of this diversion to Russia 

against the irnpossihility of meeting U.S. commitments for a continental 

offensive in EuroDe if this demand were met. 

GENERAL MALCNY said that in Kovember the Russians had asked 

for 600 transport aircraft. This demand had been reduced to 400. Later 

the Russians had asked for 100 transport aircraft at once plus an allocation of 25 a month. 

The Munitions Assignments Board (Air) Committee in considering 

this request felt that on military grounds no transport aircraft should 

be allocated to Russia but if necessary for political reasons the maximum allocated should be 162. The figure of 29 would be the Kay and June 

allocations, further allocations being considered in the light of the 

new Russian Protocol. 

GENERAL ARNOLD stressed the importance of retaining heavy 

transport aircraft in the United States if the necessary airborne troops 

for continental operations in the autumn were to be trained. The figures 

of 200 transport aircraft in August and 400 transport aircraPt in November, given in paragraph (c) of C.C.S, 66, would all be available for use 

from Great Britain. If it were decided tosend any of these aircraft to 

Russia, they could be flown across Africa and in through Basra. 

ADMIRAL TOWERS stressed the importance of making at least a 

small allocation to Russia in view of the political considerations. If 

this course were decided on, the Navy would be prepared to release a 

proportion of the aircraft required. Ae estimated the total production 

of heavy transport aircraft for the next two months to be 150. 

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Both SIR JOHN DILL and AIR MARSHAL WILL stressed the urgent 

need of India for transport planes. The Air E'inistry had asked for the 

release of 40 in view of the fact that troops operating in Burma could 

be supplied only by air. This request was similar to that put forward by 

Colonel Louis Johnson. 

SIR JOHN DILL said that if it were agreed that notransport aircraft could be allocated to Russia then it would be necessary to give a 

very well reasoned explanation of the present shortage of transport aircraft, including the urgent needs for such types in India and Burma. 

SIR JOHN DILL further suggested the possibility of using certain of the older civil airlines' aircraft for the training of airborne 

troops. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that 80 civil airliners were already in 

use by the Army, although still run and operated by the civil airlines, 

and he felt that no further aircraft could be taken from this source. 

The total number of civil airliners operating in the United States was 

approximately 330, of which the 80 he had referred to were no longer 

available for civilian passengers. 

GENERAL hZARSHALL explained the proposed expansion program for 

the U.S. airborne troops. The next three months were the critical ones, 

and it was essential not to cut down training facilities. iluring his 

visit to England he had seen exercises carried out by Rritish airborne 

formations and the number of aircraft available for this important form 

of training (17) was hopelessly inadequate. 

In discussion on continental operations in London, the British 

Chiefs of Staff had suggested that U.S. parachute troops, together with 

their aircraft, should be sent over to take part in some of the Commando 

raids and further that a month before any major operation on the continent it would be necessary to requisition all civil airliners in the 

United States for use in the operation. He had undertaken to look into 

this suggestion. 

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He agreed with Sir John Dill that in replying totheRussians 

a very carefully phrased reply would have to be made. He felt that the 

operational effect of such a small number of aircraft in Russia would 

be small although the political effect might be considerable, and he 

realized that Russians in this country resented the large civil air 

services still running. 

GENERAI, ARNOLD said that his figures for production of heavy 

air transport planes were 89 for April and 84 for hlay. He suggested 

that the lighter types of air transport planes might be sent to Russia. 

AIR MARSHAL WILL pointedout that this woirld seriously handlcap the British who at present were receiving no allocations of the 

heavier types but could be using the lighter types very considerably 

for air transport in the Middle East, !le suggested that a balance sheet 

of transport aircraft should be drawn up showing present and future 

commitments on the one hand and available aircraft including airliners 

and production on the other. 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Agreed that on strategical grounds the allocationof 

29 C-47 and C-53 transport aircraft to Russia during 

Nay and June, 1942, should be countermanded. 

(b) Instructed the Secretaries to draft, for their approval, a memorandum setting out the strategical 

considerations which prompted the above decisim. 

4. USE OF U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. 

SIR JOHN DILLonbehalf of the British Chiefs of Staff thanked 

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff for theuseof certain U.S. aircraft carriers. 

5. SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND outlined the difficulties which were being 

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experienced in the supply of weapons to Russia by the northern route. 

To date this problem had been treated on the basis of availability of 

supplies and shipping. The basing of Fokke Wulfs, long range bombers, 

and submarines in Norway, together with surface craft in Trondheini, had 

seriously increased the difficulties of achieving the safe and timely 

arrival of convoys from the United Kingdom and the United Statcs. In 

addition, the ice conditions this year were the worst for some 25 years 

and some 65 merchant ships were expected Co be waiting in Iceland for 

the next convoy to be put through. Heavy losses must be expected in 

these convoys. 

6. SITUATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. 

SIR DUDLEY POUND outlined the recent naval and air operations 

in the Indian Ocean and pointed out the inadequate A.A. defenses of Colombo, Trincomalee and Addu Attol. 

Ire stressed the importance ofthecontrol of the Western Indian 

Ocean which, if lost, would result in the Japanese not only cutting our 

lines of communications to India and the Middle East, but also stopping 

oil supplies from the Persian Gulf. If this source of supply were cut, 

the tanker tonnage available would not be sufficient to supply the area 

from America. 

7. GENERAL MAARSHALL'YS VISIT TO LONDON. 

GENERAL MARSHALL outlined the discussions which took place 

during his visit to London. He had found the views of the British Chiefs 

of Staff were almost in complete accord with his own, regarding operations proposed for 1943. One of the points which had been considered was 

the availability of landing craft for continental operations and he was 

now investigating the possibility of requisitioning marine engines and 

outboard motors in the United States. In discussion with the Prime Minister on the degree of publicity already afforded to possible operations 

on the continent, it had been felt that it might be desirable to issue 

some carefully phrased communique on the subject. 

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8. REVIEW OF THE SITUATION BY ADMIRAL STARK. 

In reply to a request, ADMIRAL STARK outlined his views on the 

present situation. He regarded the Russian army as our most valuable immediate asset and felt we must make every effort to guard against its 

defeat, which would be a catastrophe of the first magnitude. 

With regard to the Middle East, ADMIRAL STARK said that hehad 

always stressed the importance of this theater. Jf it fell, the blockade 

of Germany would be broken and it was, in addition, the one place, other 

than Russia, where a German army was being actively engaged. All operations by the United rations were dependent on shipping. In a recent conversation with Admiral Land, he had understood that the building of shipping in the United States might be increased from 15 to 35 per cent, if 

certain labor troubles could be overcome. 

With regard to the Pacific our policy should be to stand on the 

defensive in that area. Ile deplored the excessive publicity given to 

this theater in the newspapers. 

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G.C.S. 17th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of meeting held in Room 240, 

Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, on Tuesday, April 

28, 1942, at 2:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Fi f d Marsh 1 Sir John Dill 

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN Air Marshal D.C.S. Evil1 

(Representing Admiral King) Major General R. �1. Dewing 

THE FOLLOWING WERE AISO PRESENT 

Vice Admiral R. Willson, USN 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Maj. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA 

Brig. Gen. H. J. Alalony, USA 

Brig. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Commander C. F. Espe, USN 

Lt. Col. J. C. Holmes, USA 

ABSENT 

Admiral E.J. King, 

SECRETARIAT 

Captain G. D. Belben, RN 

Captain J. A. Grindle,RN 

Erigadier G. K. Bourne 

Air Cdr. S. C.Strafford 

USN 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

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1. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT FOR BURMA AND INDIA. 

(C.C.S. 52/1 - G.G.S. 52/2) 

SIR JOHN DILL stressed the urgent necessity for increase of 

transport aircraft in India and Burma. He considered the general situation in that area to be deteriorating and stated that there were only 

four transport aircraft in Burma and twenty-four in India. The forty additional requested from the United States would not be used on a steady 

run, but as a mobile force available wherever their services would be of 

greatest assistance. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that consideration was now being given as 

to the best use of all available transport aircraft and cited figures on 

the current situation regarding these planes. First priority of allocation was given those planes assigned to England for use of airborne and 

parachute troops and glider operations, for which purpose he expected 

there would be sent 200 by August and a further 200 by October. The second priority was given to the Air Ferry Command which now had 57 planes 

and which, it was contemplated, would be built up to a total of 284 by 

December. Thirty-four planes were now en route to the Burma-China theater as part of a total of 75 which were committed there. The next priority was given tothe planes for the Karachi-Calcutta area, which he hoped 

soon to build up to a total of 40 planes. He further hoped to build up 

the trans-African Ferry Service to a total of 40 about the same time. 

When all present commitments were made and a small number retained in 

the United States, the estimated U.S. requirements would lack about 369 

planes. In view of the above, he considered that reductions must be made 

somewhere, and that the best use which could be made of available planes 

would be to operate them in such a way that they could be sent to any 

area where their services were most needed. 

SIR JOHN DILL considered that a better or greater mobility of 

air transport would be possible if certain of the planes in India were 

under the control of the Rritish Commander in Chief. 

GENERAL MARSHALL appreciated the desire of the Commander in 

Chief to have some aircraft on the use of which he could rely. It was to 

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help in this respect that General Brereton had been ordered to operate 

under the orders of the British. 

GENERAL ARNOLD mentioned the three types of transport service 

now in being in India: 

(a) A speciai service from the U.S. to India and China, returning to the U.S.viaIndia, which used very few planes. 

All of these were controlled directly from the United 

States. 

@) Transport planes destined for China, of which there were 

now 44, with expectation of an increase to a total of 75 

by this summer. These were under the direction of General 

Stilwell. 

(c) The trans-India service, where he expected to have 20 in 

May and 40 in the late summer, under direct control of 

General Brereton. 

In replying to a question by General Marshall, AIR MARSHAL 

WILL said that there were 431 transport planes allocated for delivery 

to England this year. Seventy small transport planes (C-61) had been allocated, but no large transports (C-47 and C-53) would be delivered until after mid-summer. These latter, he feared, would arrive too late for 

service in India. He considered that at the present time suitable air 

transport service in India would be invaluable to the Army and would 

double the value of the air units, while planes delivered two months 

hence would arrive too late to do much good. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Took note that General Marshall would examine the situation 

further to determine if any action can be taken, either by 

specific directive to General Brereton or otherwise, to ameliorate the acute situation with respect to air transport in 

Burma and India. 

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2. AUXILIARY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. 

(C.C.S. 62/1) 

ADMIRAL HORNE mentioned that arrangements had been made for 

the production of 24 C-3 type hulls to be converted into auxiliary aircraft carriers each year as long as they were required. 

THE COMMITTEE:­

(a) Agreed to approve the recommendations contained in 

the basic paper. 

(b) Directed the Secretaries to inform the Munitions 

Assignments Board of this decision. 

3. TRANSPORT OF SMALL NUMBERS OF TROOPS ON CARGO VESSELS TO 

BRITAIN FROM NORTH AMERICA. 

(C.C.S. 66) 

In the brief discussion of this subject, SIR JOHN DILL mentioned that the British policy was not to transport additional personnel 

on cargo vessels which had a speed of less than 12 knots, inasmuch as it 

was considered too dangerous for ships carrying men if for any reason 

they fell behind the convoy and were unable to rejoin. 

THE COMMITTEE: -

Took note of the report and approved the recommendations of 

the Combined Military Transportation Committee. 

4. PREPARATION OF WAR PLAN BOLERO. 

(C -5’. S. 26/2/D) 

SIR JOHN DILL inquired as to when the U.S. would send a planning team to the I1.K. 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in addition to an officer from the 

Operations andplans Division for the London Committee, two officers, one 

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logistics expert and one planning expert, were leaving to join the staff 

of General Paget, while three officers from the Army and some from the 

Navy were soon to join Combined Operations Headquarters. He also had in 

mind sending to England a corps commander with his staff. 

Some discussion followed on the procedure to be adopted by the 

two committees in Washington and London. It was generally agreed that 

the London Committee would deal primarily with questions ofport capacity 

and accommodation, while the Washington Committee would he principally 

concerned with production questions. A troop movement program would have 

to be drawn up by the two Committees working in the closest cooperation. 

SIR JOHN DILL considered that the provision of landing craft 

was the governing factor in the proposed operations and inquired whether 

production of these craft could in any way he speeded up, particularly 

the large tank landing ships. 

ADMIRAL HORNE, in reply, said that a new program of landing 

craft productiorAwould shortly be ready. In August, some 250 landing 

craft would be available for use in England. Of these, 23 had already 

been shipped, 53 were in New York awaiting shipment, while an additional 

40 would be ready in less than a week. He added that every effort was 

being made to speed up production of the 2,300 landing craft of various 

types now proposed for the operation. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE suggested the advisability of broadening the 

terms of the directive to the Combined Staff Planners to include an account of all landing craft which would be available in the U.K. by April 

1943. 

ADMIRAL TURNER stated that this was envisaged, in that the 

Combined Staff Planners would be able to state how many craft would 

be available by August 15, 1942, and by April 1, 1943. 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Took note of the arrangements madetosend U.S. staff 

personnel to London. 

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(b) Took note that the Landing Craft Committee would 

include in their report a forecast of all landing 

craft of T!.K. and U.S. production [which would he 

available for operations from the Ynited Kingdom by 

(1) August 15, 1942 

(2) April 1, 1943 

(c) Took note that the 1J.S. planes scheduled to go to 

the hited Kingdom in May would all he ready prior 

to June 1. ?he Senior iieadquarters have already left 

1i.S. Transportation of manpower, bombs and organizational equipment depends on available water transport. 

5. DIRECTIVE RIL? ASSIGP!MEENT OF hlUPJITIONS. 

(C.C.S. 50/2 (appendices) ) 

SIR JOHN DIJL, considering that allocations of aircraft under 

the Arnold-Portal agreement were well understood, suggested that this 

agreement he continued as a basis for allocations until such time as the 

report of the Arnold-Lvill-lowers Comniittee had been approved. Confusion 

was likely to he caused by adopting a new basis for a short time which 

would probably he subjert to considerable change upon completion of the 

Conunittee's repnrt. 

ADMIRAL TURNER spoke in favor of the system of priorities for 

the al!ocation of aircraft contained in the appendices under discussion, 

on the ground that this allocation was based on strategic considerations 

and the allocations were by theaters, whereas the Arnold-Portal agrPPrent merely assigned planes without regard to strategic priority. iie 

added that the blunitions Assignments Board was most desirous of having 

their directive completed by receipt of these appendices. Vhile it was 

fully realized that the figures therein were tentative and would 2hange 

somewhat upon comnletion of a study now being made along broad strategical lines, the Munitions Assignments Board could use the figures for 

at least the next few months while taking into consideration the lilcelihood of future changes. 

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U. S. SECRET 

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AIR MARSHAL EVILL, agreeing with Sir John Dill, stressed the 

desirability of continuing assignments on the present basis rather than 

to introduce a policy of assignments admittedly temporary. 

GENERAL h1AU)K:Y considered that the subject was one of greater 

scope than mere assignment, in that strategic dispositions adopted would 

lnfluence the production schedules. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

Accepted the appendices and directed the Secretaries to transmit them to the \innitions Assignments Board for use inconjunction with the assignments directive (C.C.S. 50/?) subject to 

the proviso that the Arnold Portal Agreement should remain the 

basis for aircraft assignments pending the adoption by the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff of a new basis resulting from the report of the Arnold-mill-Towers Committee. 

6. REQUISITION OF KATERIEL FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA. 

(C.C.S. 68) 

GENERAL MAWW described two proposals for dealing with allocations to Australia which had been discussed by the London Xunitions 

Assignments Board. These were, in brief, as follows: 

(a) (1) Australian army and air requirements should be dealt 

with in Washington. 

(2) Australian naval requirements, with certain exceptions, shoulfi be dealt with in London. 

If the above conclusions were accepted, it was nroposed 

that Australian requirements for small arms ammuniiion also be 

dealt with in Washington, since the Army and Air Force are the 

major users. 

(b) (1) Australian air requirements to be dealt with in 

Washington. 

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(2) Australian naval and army requirements, with certain 

exceptions, to be dealt with in London. 

If accepted, small arms ammunition would also be dealt 

with in London as at present. 

The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff stated that 

they were not prepared to discuss this matter and requested a deferment 

until the next meeting. 

GENERAL SMITH informed the Committee that Dr. matt had given 

his approval to the methods of requisitioning set forth in C.C.S. 68. 

THE COMMITTEE: ~-

Agreed to defer consideration, pending further study by the 

representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff. 

7. VICHY FRANCE POSSESSIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN. 

ADMIRAL HORNE, in reply to a question by Sir John Dill, described certain proposals regarding the Vichy France possessions in the 

Caribbean. 

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C.C.S. lath Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of meeting held in Room 240, 

Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, on Tuesday, May 

5, 1942, at 2:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral E. J. King, USN Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, USA Air Marshal D.C.S. Evil1 

Major General R.H. Dewing 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN 

Vice Admiral R. Willson, USN 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, USW 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, WSN 

Maj. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA 

Maj. Gen. D.D. Eisenhower, USA 

Brig. Gen. H. J. Malony, USA 

Brig. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Captain Oscar Smith, USK 

Captain C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Commander C. F. Espe, USN 

Lt. Col. J. C. Holmes, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, 

Lt. General E. K. Smart 

(For Item 1) 

Air Cdr. S. C. Strafford 

USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. REQUISITION OF MATERIAL FOR SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA. 

(C.C.S. 68) 

SIR JOHN DILL said that while the principle of General MacArthur approving all requisitions from the theater would be acceptable 

to the British Chiefs of Staff, it would be necessary to obtain the Australian Government's consent. He hoped that the full details of the proposal would be explained to them. Discussions were now in progress with 

Australia as to whether Australian ground requirements as well as air 

requirements should be dealt with in Washington. Their naval requirement 

would presumably continue to be sent to London. 

GENEBAL SMART said that as the Southwest Pacific was an area 

of United States responsibility it seemed right that all demands from 

that area should be initiated by General MacArthur. Dr. matt was now in 

London where he was presumably discussing the matter and he felt it wise 

to await the views of the Australian Government. 

ADMIRAL KING said that it seemed logical that all demands PrCm 

the Southwest Pacific Area should be correlated in Washington to avoid 

duplication. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer further consideration of this matter pending 

the receipt of the Australian Government's views. 

2. TRANSFQRT AIRCRAFT FOR INDIA. 

(C.C.S. 52/2, Previous References: C.C.S. 9th Meeting, Minute 

4, C.C.S 15th Meeting. Minute 6) 

GENERAL ARNOLD outlined the present position with regard to 

transport aircraft in India, Burma and China. General Stilwell had a 

total of 16 aircraft, 6 operating under C.N.A.C. and 10 under his own 

control. Nineteen aircraft were en route to him and 23 more were about 

to leave the United States. The Japanese northern advance, including the 

capture of the aerodromes at Lashio and Mandalay, had put the Japanese 

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within 200 miles of the main airport on the alternate route to China 

which they could now interrupt. This would entail the use of the direct 

route which led over 13,000 foot mountains and therefore severely limited the load which could be carried from India into China. General 

Brereton had at present 4 transport aircraft with one further aircraft 

at Khartoum and 5 en route. He would in addition shortly have 8 which 

had been loaned to General Stilwell. The total transport aircraft in the 

area which it was hoped would be achieved by the middle or the latter 

part of June would be 25 under General Brereton and 40 under General 

Stilwell. If the route to China were cut, the aircraft under General 

Stilwell would remain under his control but might be used in India, 

though it was more likely that they would be used within China. 

GEKERAL ARNOLD added that he had suggested to Air Marshal 

Evil1 that the British might convert certain Loclcheed Ventura aircraft 

now in the United States for use as transports. He had ascertained that 

the Lockheed firm could complete this alteration in 10 days, making each 

aircraft capable of transporting 25 men. 

AIR hlARSHAL WILL agreed that this solution was a possibility. 

There were at present approximately 120 Venturas in the United States. 

This number had accumulated owing partly to lack of certain items of 

equipment and partly to a holdup in ferrying. However, the aircraft were 

badly needed by Bomber Command to relieve Bostons of which the British 

were already short due to diversions to Russia. 

SIR JOHN DILL reiterated the urgent need for transport air 

craft in India and expressed his disappointment that no more could be 

made available at present. 

3. AIR OFFENSIVE OVER WESTERN EUROPE -REQUIREllENTS OF PURSUIT 

AIRCRAFT. 

(C.C.S. 69) 

GENERAL MARSHALL asked that consideration of this paperbedeferred. 

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AIR MARSHAL WILL furnished a more detailed statement of the 

British fighter position in the United Kingdom and agreed to elaborate 

this statement to General Arnold. 

4. SITUATION IN TKE PHILIPPINES. 

GENERAL MARSHALL read to the Committee two despatches from 

General Wainwright, the latest of which originated at about midnight, 

4/5 May, 1942, reporting that a Japanese landing on the northern part 

of the island had just begun. 

5. ENEMY INTENTIONS. 

In reply to a question by General ?Harshall, SIR JOHN DILL said 

that he considered the use of gas by the Germans would indicate that 

they had embarked on a desperate venture. The British population were 

well protected against this menace but its use by the Japanese in India 

mould have serious consequences. The British would not use gas prior to 

the initiation of this type of warfare by the enemy but were ready to 

do so. As a defensive measure the beaches could be soaked in a persistent gas. There were no indications that the Germans had any new type of 

gas. 

GENERAL EISENHOWER outlined a report by Colonel Ratay,recently 

U.S. Military Attache in Bucharest and Lisbon, who had a very thorOUKh 

howledge of European military affairs and had predicted the GermanKttack on Russia with extreme accuracy. Colonel Ratay estimated that the 

strength of the German forces in the spring of 1942 was greater than 

ever before and that they would have available a total of 40 thousand 

aircraft of all types. He was convinced that the Germans would attack 

England this spring. They would not attack either in Russia or the Middle East and would use only from one hundred to one hundred and twentyfive divisions to hold the Russian front. The Germans had trained vast 

numbers of airborne troops and he estimated that in a maximum of three 

to five days between two hundred and two hundred and fifty thousand 

German airborne troops could be landed in England who would concentrate 

in cells of resistance all over the country. This would he followed by 

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a strong air attack and a sea borne landing, the spearhead of which would 

consist of mechanized troops. The large number of torpedo carrying aircraft now being built in Germany would be used against British shipping 

and warships. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that while it was estimated that theGerman 

aircraft industry could maintain their original front line strength, 

this strength had in fact appeared, from reports available, to have 

dwindled and it seemed reasonable therefore to presume that an air force, 

not now in use, was being built up. 

AIR MARSHAL EVILL said that there were clear indications ofthe 

training of a large number of glider troops and this form of operation 

was not easy to deal with. 

GENERAL McNARNEY emphasized the danger of German paratroop attacks on British R.D.F. stations, some of which had seemed to him to be 

insufficiently protected. The loss of R.D.F. stations wouldveryseriously reduce the value of the British fighter command. 

GENERAL DEYYING outlined the conclusions of the Committee, of 

which he had been a member, which had considered the possibility of invasion of England from the German point of view. They had no knowledge 

of the German training in night glider operations, which was a most difficult feat even on a bright moonlight night and was impracticable on a 

dark night. It had been considered that the most effective attack would 

be initiated by heavy bombing, the dropping of paratroops for attacking 

R.D.F. stations and communications, particularly signal communications, 

and followed up by a seaborne attack. It was estimated at that t,ime that 

the number of sortjes required for all these purposes was larger than 

could be provided from the resources available to the Germans. The warning of a seaborne attack would be at least one month. It was therefore 

probable that all preparations would be made and the actual moment of 

launching then deferred in order that some measure of surprise would be 

achieved. With regard to gas, it had been felt that, though the Germans 

would probably make use of it, theywould not gain muchadvantaqe thereby. 

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C.C.S. 19th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINbTES of meeting held in Room 240, 

Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, on Tuesday, May 

12, 1942, at 2:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Admiral E. J. Xing, USN Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, USA Air Marshal D.C.S. Evil1 

Major General R. H. Dewing 

TWE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN Captain J.A. Grindle, RN 

Vice Admiral R. Willson, USN Air Cdr. S. C. Strafford

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, USN 

Rear Admiral R. I<. Turner, USN 

Maj. Gen. J. T. McNarney, USA 

Maj. Gen. D.D. Eisenhower, IJSA 

Brig. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Commander C. F. Espe, USN 

Lt, Col. J. C. Holmes, USA 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. AIR OFFENSIVE OVER WESTERN EUROPE-REQUIREMENTS OF PURSUIT AIRCRAFT. 

(C.C.S. 69, Previous Reference: C.C.S. 18th Meeting, Item 9) 

At the suggestion of GENERAL MARSHALL, 

THE COMMITTEErAgreed that the problem contained in C.C.S. 69 should be studied by the Arnold-Will-Towers Committee as part of the overall consideration of the allocation of the aircraft of the 

United Nations, now being undertaken by this body. 

2. NAVAL BASES- PLANNING, OPERATION AND PROVISION OF PERSONNEL 

AND MATERIALS. 

(C.C.S. 67) 

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that where reference was made to 

the Governments concerned this should be altered to read "The Chiefs of 

Staff of the Power concerned," thus bringing the subject, which was essentially military in nature, on to the Chiefs of Staff and not the political level. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE stated that London had agreed with the terms of 

the document but had suggested that the concurrence of Australia and New 

Zealand should be sought. This was being done. 

THE COMMITTEE: 

(a) Approved the re-draft of C.C.S. 67 as presented by 

General Uarshall; and 

@) Instructed the Secretaries to issue this re-draft as 

a Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive on receipt of 

the formal concurrence of the Australian and New 

Zealand Chiefs of Staff. 

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3. REQUISITIONOF MATERIAL FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA. 

(C.C.S. 68) 

The Committee was informed that a Supply Council had been set 

up in Australia of which either General MacArthur or a member of his 

staff would be a member, and that Australia had agreed that all requisitions from the Southwest Pacific Area should be approved by General BlacArthur before forwarding to either London or Washington. 

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the object was to expedite the 

flow of supplies to Australia and suggested that General IMacArthur, in 

consultation with the Australian Supply Council, should be asked to put 

forward proposals for the necessary machinery forrequisitioning material 

for the area. On receipt of these proposals, the hiunitions Assignments 

Board could complete the planz and prepare the Supply Directive for the 

approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Took note that the Australian Government had taken 

action which appeared to be in conformity with the 

principle that all requisitions from the Southwest 

Pacific Area should have the approval of the Supreme 

Commander. 

@) Agreed that on receipt of the proposals of the Ailstralian Government and General FlacArthur as to the 

machinery for presenting these requisitions, the 

Combined Munitions Assignments Eoard should prepare 

the necessary directive for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 

4. MOVFAENT OF TROOPS FOR BOLERO. 

SIR JOHN DILL asked if any decision by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff was required to insure the implementation of the plan for themovement of U.S. troops to the United Kingdom. 

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ADMIRAL TURNER reported that the Combined Bolero Committee had 

put forward to the Combined Staff Planners aproposed plan of troop movements. London had been asked at what rate they could accommodate these 

troops and in what order the ground units should arrive. The problem of 

escorts for this large troop movement was being studied. It was hoped 

that 105,000 troops would be in the United Kingdom by September, 1942, 

and 800,000 by April, 1943. These movements would entail delay in the 

relief of the 11,000 British troops remaining in Iceland until after 

September 1, 1942. 

GENERAI, HANDY said that no decision by the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff was required at this stage to implement the moves planned to take 

place in May and June. When the plans mentioned by Admiral Turner had 

been completed, a report would be put forward to the Combined Chiefs of 

Staff showing the program of movements. 

GENERAL ARNOLD said that it was hoped that there would be 8 

U.S. transport groups in the United Kingdom by October, 1942, in addi~ 

tion to 2 heavy bombardment, 2 medium bombardment, and 2 pursuit groups. 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Agreed that troop movements for BOLERO should proceed with all dispatch. 

@) Took note that the sailings for May and June had already been arranged, and that the preparation of 

tentative programs for later movements for which 

convoy arrangements were still under consideration 

was being expedited. 

5. ALLOCATION OF AIRCRAFT OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 

GENERAL ARNOLD stated that General Spaatz with his staff would 

be going to London at the end of this month. The Arnold- Evill-Towers 

Committee were very conscious of the necessity of arriving at agreed 

decisions at the earliest possible moment but with regard totheproposed 

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visit of the Committee toLondon there were certain basic decisions which 

would first have to be reached. 

SIR JOHN DILL reminded the Committee of the importance of a 

speedy decision on the allocation of aircraft, more particularly as the 

possibility of undertaking operations on the continent in 1942 would depend an these decisions. 

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C.C.S. 20th Meeting 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

MINUTES of meeting held in Room 240, 

Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, on Tuesday, May 

19, 1942, at 2:30 p.m. 

PRESENT 

General G. C. Marshall, USA Field Marshal Sir John Dill 

Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, USA Admiral Sir Charles Little 

Vice Admiral R. Willson, USN Air Marshal D.C.S. Evil1 

(Representing Adm. King) Major General R. �I.Dewing 

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT 

Vice Admiral F. J. Horne, USN 

Rear Admiral J.H. Towers, USN 

Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, USN 

Maj. Gen. J.T. NcNarney, USA 

Brig. Gen. �1. J. Malony, USA 

Brig. Gen. T. T. Handy, USA 

Captain Oscar Smith, USN 

Captain C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN 

Commander R. E. Libby, USN 

Commander C. F. Espe, USN 

Lt. Col. J. C. Holmes, USA 

Brigadier G. K. Bourne 

ABSENT 

Admiral E. J. King, USN 

SECRETARIAT 

Brigadier V. Dykes 

Brig. Gen. W.B. Smith, USA 

Commander L.R. McDowell, USN 

Commander R.D. Coleridge, RN 

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1. UNITED STATES AIR ATTACK ON JAPAN. 

GENERAL MARSHALL gave a brief resume of the very successful 

air attack carried out on targets in Japan in mid-April. 

2. BOLERO. 

(C.C.S. 72) 

SIR JOHN DILL said that the British Chiefs of Staff were anxious to get the remaining British troops out of Iceland before September 

when the weather became had, and in order to complete the divisional 

formation in England. It was hoped that additional shipping could be 

found. It would be useful if the Bolero Committee could report to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff at regular intervals on the progress of this 

plan. 

THE COMMITTEE:­

(a) Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff wished to 

have the relief of the British troops in Iceland 

completed before September, and instructed the Corn 

bined hlilitary Transportation Committee, in consultation with the Bolero Combined Committee, to investigate and report on the best method of so doing. 

@) Subject to the above qualification, approved the 

tentative shipping program for troop movements during 

July and August and cargo shipments during June, 

July and August, 1942, as set out in paragraphs 3 

and 5 of the Annex to C.C.S. 72. 

(c) Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to report 

progress and future planned movements to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at frequent intervals. 

3. ADEQUACY OF COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS. 

(C.C.S. 71) 

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GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff 

felt that the Washington Communications Board should be instructed to 

submit recommendations for the amendment of its Directive (C.C.S. 64) in 

order to provide the Board with sufficient executive authority to issue 

directives onthe broad aspects of the technical phases of comniunications. 

The Committee were informed that arrangements had been made 

for Communication Officers to be available for consultation by the Combined Staff Planners as necessary, though these would not serve as members of the Combined Staff Planners. 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Accepted C.C.S. 71 subject to the deletion of paragraph 5. 

(b) Instructed the Washington Communications Board to 

submit, for their approval, a revised Directive 

designed to provide them with sufficient executive 

authority to implement agreed technical policy without further reference to higher authority. 

(c) Took note that Communications Officers would be 

available to the Combined Staff Planners for consultation as might be necessary. 

4. GERMAN CAPABILITIES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ. 

previous Reference: C.C.S. 15th Keeting, Item 1, G.C.S. 59/1) 

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the opinion of the War Department, German capabilities might have been under-estimated. The length of 

time before the Germans could advance towards the Persian Gulf from secure Syrian bases was likely to be five months instead of from seven and 

one-half to nine months as envisaged in the report. 

SIR JOHN DILL agreed that the paper under-estimated German 

capabilities, particularly, he thought, with regard to the time factor 

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involved in the capture of Cyprus, and the subsequent attack on Syria. 

THE COMMITTEE:-

Accepted the Combined Intelligence Report (C.C.S. 59/1) subject to the provisos mentioned above by General Marshall and 

Sir John Dill. 

5. AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINE BASES, BUILDING YARDS 

AND HEAVY SHIPS. 

(Memorandum by CinC, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, 

C.C.S. 73) 

SIR JOHN DILL said that the problem outlined by Admiral King 

was one which had been receiving the constant consideration of the British Chiefs of Staff since the beginning of the war. The importance of 

naval targets and particularly submarines had frequently been stressed 

by the First Sea Lord and the weight of attack on this form of target 

had been increased from time to time, particularly in the last few 

months. The submaririe menace was very serious and was threatening the 

maintenance of our vital sea communications. The coastal command of the 

Royal Air Force had recently been increased to assist in combatting this 

menace, and raids on such places as Augsburg, where Diesel engines for 

submarines were being made, had been planned to slow up German submarine 

production. 

SIR JOHN DILL presented a note on the subject of the selection 

of targets together with tables showing the weight of attack during February, 1942, on various types of targets. 

ADMIRAL LITTLE said that it had been hoped to build up the 

number of escort vessels available to the United Nations to a number 

whereby as many as 12 to 16 escorts could be provided for each convoy. 

This would make submarine at.tacks very difficult and take such a heavy 

toll that they would not become worthwhile. The losses of boats and 

trained crews might break the morale of the German submarine personnel. 

The rate of German building, however, had enabled them to increase the 

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area in which attacks could be made and therefore, while more escort 

vessels were available, the areas over which convoying was essential had 

increased, thus preventing more escort vessels being available for each 

convoy, 

SIR JOHN DILL said that upon arrival of United States bomber 

forces in the United Kingdom, it would be necessary to consider the most 

useful targets for both them and the Royal Air Force to attack. Heundertook to refer Admiral King's memorandum to the British Chiefs of Staff. 

THE COMMITTEE: ­

(a) Invited the Representatives of the British Chiefs of 

Staff t,o forward C.C.S. 73 to London requesting an 

expression of views by the British Chiefs of Staff. 

@) Agreed to defer consideration of the paper pending 

receipt of these views. 

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May 20, 1042. 

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF 

CORRIGENDUM 

to 

MINUTES of meeting held on 

Tuesday, May 19, 1942. 

(24Jth Meeting) 

All holders are requested to add the following new item: 

6. NEW TYPE OF GERMAN GAS. 

(Previous reference: C.C.S. 18th Meeting, Item 5) 

SIR JOHN DILL said that since discussing the question of new 

gases at a previous meeting, he had been informed by London that the 

Germans were now known to possess a new odorless gas, suitable for surprise attack by inclusion in bombardments from the ground or from the 

air. This gas was known as "Green Ring One" and its effect on the eyes 

was serious, though its effect, on the skin was less than that of mustard 

gas. Fb11 details of this gas has been given to the U.S. War Department. 

V. DYKES 

W. B. SMITH 

Combined Secretariat. 

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SUBJ ECT PAGE NO. ........ .............................................. -...-......... ..__ .................... .. 

ABDA AREA: Additional U.S. Troops For 

British Naval Forces In 

Dissolution Of 

Dutch Take Over Command 

General Situation In 

General Wavell's Appreciation 

Of Situation In 

Heavy Bomber Squadrons to 

Burma 

Inclusion of Darwin In 

Naval Command In 

Naval Reinforcements For 

New Western Boundary 

Pacific War Council In London 

Relation Between Naval And 

Air Operations 

Supplies For The Dutch In 

Supplies From Australia 

Transfer Of British Submarines From 

ABDACOM: Location Of Headquarters In 

Melbourne 

AIR: Offensive Against Enemy Bases, 

Yards, And Ships 

Possibility Of German Offensive 

Against Emgland 

AIRCRAFT: Arnold-*ill-Towers Committee 

Arnold-Portal Agreement As 

Basis For Allocation 

Bombardment Groups: 

Allocation to U.K. 

For Australia (Heavy) 

Force For India 

Force For Middle East 

Burma To Australia, Diversion 

From 

I 

46 

C.C.S. 10 

61-62 

a2 

43,53,57,70 

2 

53 

16 

38 

3,13,23,48 

58,61 

53 

44 

10,16 

62 

64 

57 

155 

145 

122 

139 

20,50,65 

71 

65 

65 

87 
SUBJECT PAGE NO. ..__ ................................................... ..... ... .. ...... .......................-

AIRCRAFT: Cairo, Proposals For U.S. 

(Continued) Units In 99 

Carriers, Auxilliary 137 

Civilian Aircraft For Coastal 

Patrols 94 

Fighter: Additional for N.E.I. 37 

For Australia 124 

For India 124-125 

Movement Of Planes Instead Of 

Complete Units 94 

N.E.I., Allocated To 114,122 

N.E.I., U.S. Schedule For 

Delivery To 86 

Pursuit: For Australia and 

New Zealand 65 

For Middle East 65 

Requirements For 

European Air Offensive 144,148 

To Accompany Heavy Bombardment Groups to U.K. 50 

U.S. Squadrons to Egypt 64 

Requirements Of All Theaters 66 

Resources, Total British 118 

Resources, United Nations 321 

Shortage Of, Versus Shortage 

Of Pilots 95 

Transport: Allocation Of For USSR 128 

For Burma And India 72,135,14 3 

For China 

For India, Request For 

General Allocations 

United Nations, Allocations Of 

United Nations, Production Of 

U.S. Training 

Variety Of Requests For 

AIR FORCES: British Request 100 Antisubmarine 

Bombers 

Economical Elnployment Of Against 

Japan 

Policy For Disposition Of U.S. 

And British 

Reinforcement Of For Middle East 

I1 

143 

130 

130 

150 

37 

129 

117 

117 

37 

64 

95 
SUBJECT ...................................................................... ... 

AIR LINERS, CIVIL: Use by Army 

AIR ROUTE: West African 

ALEXANDER, General: Takes Command Of British Forces 

ANZAC AREA General Situation In 

Governmental And Strategical 

Control And Commands In 

Institution Of 

Naval Forces In 

U.S. Commander In 

U.S. Sphere 

AREAS : ABDA: Additional U.S. Troops For 

British Naval Forces In 

Dissolution Of 

Dutch Take Over Command 

General Situation In 

General Wavell's Appreciation 

Of Situation In 

Heavy Bomber Squadrons to Burma 

Inclusion Of Darwin In 

Naval Command In 

Naval Reinforcements For 

New Western Boundary 

Pacific War Council in London 

Relation Between Naval And Air 

Operations 

Supplies For The Dutch In 

Supplies From Australia 

Transfer Of British Submarines 

From 

ANZAC: Control and Commands In 

General Situation In 

Governmental And Strategical Control And Commands In 78 

Institution Of 31 

Naval Forces In 13 

U.S. Commander In 4 

U.S. Sphere 44 

PHILIPPINE: Supplies For 275 

PAGE NO. ...................... 

130 

49 

86 

43 

78 

31 

13 

4 

44 

46 

C.C.S. 10 

61-62 

62 

13y53y57,70 

2 

53 

16 

38 

3,13,23y48 

58,61 

53 

44 

10,16 

62 

64 

87 

43 

STRATEGIC: 

WESTERN ATLANTIC: 

In Japanese War Zone 87 

Change In, As Defined in ABC-1 8940 

111 
SUBJECT PAGE NO. ....................................................... ....................... 

ARNOLD, General: 

ASCENSION ISLAND: 

AUSTRALIA: 

A.V.G.: 

BASES: 

Arnold-Evill-Towers Committee 122 

Arnold-Portal Agreement As Basis 

For Allocations of Aircraft 139 

Terms Of Occupancy 108 

Air Requirements For 36 

Allocation Of Aircraft Purchased 

By Dutch 114 

Bases Between Hawaii And 44 

British Allocation Of Pursuit 

Planes 26 

Defense of N.E. Approaches 26 

Fighter Aircraft For 124 

Heavy Bombers For 71 

Japanese Intentions Against 88,92 

Naval Reinforcements For 2 

Possible Japanese Action Against 25 

Proposals Re Sphere of 

Responsibility 78 

Pursuit Squadrons For 65 

Supplies to ABDA Area 62 

Surplus Of Pilots 95 

Troops For Burma 43 

Troops In Middle East 113 

Views Regarding Strategic

Responsibility 112 

Employment Of In Burma And China 6:18,31 

Between Hawaii And Australia 44 

LION and CUB 128 

Naval, And Repair Facilities 128 

Naval, In Indian Ocean 77,9a 

Naval, Supervision Of 148 

Pacific: Air Forces 35 

Land Forces 36 

Submarine, Proposed Air 

Offensive 155 

IV 
SUBJECT , ............................_.. ..............., ............. 

BOLERO: 

BOMBARDMENT GROUPS: 

BRITISH DOMINIONS: 

BURMA: 

CASEY, Rt.fi0n.R.G.: 

CAUCASUS: 

CEYLON: 

CHIANG-KAI-SHEK: 

Movement of Troops 

Preparation Of War Plan 

Program For Troop And Cargo 

Movement 

U.S. Planning Personnel To 

England 

Allocation to U.K. 

For Australia (Heavy) 

Force For India 

Force For Middle East 

Representation Of 

Air Transports For Forces 

Australian Troops For 

British Sphere Of Activity 

Employment Of A.V.G. 

PAGE NO. ............................ 

149 

137 

153 

138 

20,50,65 

71 

65 

65 

23 

72 

43 

44 

6,18,31 

General Alexander Takes Cmand 

Of British Forces 86 

Heavy Bombardment Squadrons 

From ABDA Area 53 

List of British Forces In India ti9 

Reverts to India Command 43,58 

Supply And Maintenance of Air 

Forces 54 

Transpol't Aircraft For 135,143 

Transport Planes For 72 

Withdrawal Of British Forces 86 

Present At Meeting 57 

Defense Of 74 

Possibility Of Japanese Attack 88 

Support Of 14 
SUBJECT PAGE NO. ..............................................._...................... __ ..__ ............__ ...... 

CHINA : Air Routes Into 

British Sphere Of Activity 

Employment Of A.V.G. 

Included In U.S. Sphere Of Strategic Control 

Proposal To Bolster Chinese Morale 

Transport Aircraft For 

U.S. Forces 

U.S. Obligation To Assist 

COASTAL PATROLS: Use Of Civilian Aircraft For 

COLLAI3ORATION: Between United Nations 

Post Arcadia 

COMBINED: Intelligence 

Meteorological Committee, 

Charter For 

Military Transportation Committee, 

Charter For 

COMMITTEES: Arnold-Dill-Towers 

Combined Military Transportation 

Committee, Charter For 

Communications Board, Washington - Amendment of Directive 

Meteorological Committee, 

Charter For 

Munitions Assignments Board, 

Establishment Of 

COMhfUNICATIONS: Adequacy for Universal Application 

Board, Washington - Amendment 

of Directive 

Rapid Military 

CONVOYS: Use of Great Circle Route 

DIEGO SUAREZ: Plan for Occupation 

VI 

144 

44 

6,18,31 

103 

40,5l 

143 

6 

54 

94 

34 

9 

34 

67 

35 

122 

35 

154 

67 

29 

128,153 

154 

128 

46 

67 
SUBJECT PAGE NO. .................... .. ..__ __ ..__ ........... .. ..__ -.............__ __ ...... ..........__ ....__ __ .. 

DUTCH : 

EASTERN FLEET: 

am: 

EQUIPMENT: 

ESCORT VESSELS: 

EUHOPE: 

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT: 

FIJI: 

FRENCH: 

GAS : 

GYMNAST : 

Additional Fighter Type Air-­

craft for N.E.I. 

Aircraft Allocated To Australia 

Forces In Java 

Forces Lost 

Representation Of 

Supplies For In The ABDA Area 

Take Over Comnand Of ABDA Area 

U.S. Aircraft Scheduled For Delivery 

Transfer Of Rritish Submarines 

From ARDA Area 

Proposals For U.S. Air Units 

In Caii'o 

U.S. Pursuit Squadrons To 

For U.S. Divisions 

From Semi-Trained Units For 

Overseas Units 

Lack Of For U.S. Troops 

IJ.S. -British Requirements 

Offensive Operations In 

Additional For N.E.I. 

For Australia 

For India 

Air Defense Of 

Free French Desire Command In 

New Caledonia 

German New Type 

Possibility of Use 

Delay Due To Movement To 

North Ireland 

VII 

37 

114 

54 

86 

23 

10,16 

62 

86 

64 

99 

64 

107 

107 

73 

116 

109 

37 

124 

124-192 

64 

59 

157 

145 

30 
SUBJECT PAGE NO. .... . ....................... .........~.....~ .. .~... ....__ .......... .... ............ . .. .. 

GYMNAST: 

(Continued) 

HAWAII : 

HELFRICH, Admiral: 

ICELAND: 

INDIA: 

INDIAN OCEAN: 

INTELLIGENCE: 

IRAQ: 

IRELAND: 

JAPAN: 

Modified Super 

Possibility Of 

Super 

Super, Shipping For 

Bases Between Australia And 

Commanding Combined Naval Forces 

in ABDA Area 

British Air Units Remain 

Command In 

Relief Of British Troops In 

Air Transport Facilities 

British Sphere Of Activity 

Control Of Burma 

Fighter Type Aircraft For 

Japanese Intentions Against 

14 

47 

87 

7 

44 

39 

105 

96,105 

96,106,113,153 

72 

44 

43,58 

124,125 

88 

List Of British Forces To Withstand 

Attack From Burma 89 

Request For Transport Planes For 130 

Transport Aircraft For 135,143 

Naval Bases In 77,98 

Situation In 132 

Combined 34 

German Capabilities In T20,154 

(See North Ireland) 

Economical Employment Of Air 

Forces Against 35 

Expectancy Of Attack On Port 

Moresby 88 

Intentions Against India And 

Australia 88 

VIII 
SUBJECT PAGE NO. ...................... .......__ ....__ .... ....................__ ..__ JAPAN: 

(Continued) 

JAPANESE THEATW 

OF WAR: 

JAVA: 

LANDING CRAFT: 

Possible Action Against Australia And New Zealand 

Russian Attitude To 

U.S. Air Attack On 

Distribution Of Naval Bases 

Distribution of Naval Forces 

Distribution Of Dutch Forces 

Dutch Forces In 

Dutch Forces Lost 

Evacuation Of Forces 

Unsound To Reinforce 

Availability Of In August, 1942, 

and April, 1943 

Production Of Increased 

Transportation In Atlantic 

U.S.-British Building Programs 

25 

10 

153 

35 

35 

70 

54 

86 

67 

45 

138 

125,138 

126 

117 

93 

93 

102 

67 

16 

61 

132 

46 

46,93 

67 

MacAFiTHUR, General: Appointment As Supreme Commander 

In Southwest Pacific Area 

Departure From Philippines 

Directive As Supreme Commander In 

Southwest Pacific Area 

hlADAGASCAR: Plan For Occupation 

MALAYA: And New Guinea 

MALAY BARRIER: Disposition Of Naval Forces 

MARSHALL, General: Visit To London 

MERCHANT SHIPPING: Lack Of To Transport U.S. Troops 

Losses Of In Relation To War 

METEOROIDGICAL Charter For 

COMMITTEE: 

IX 
.--I- __ -..._.. 

MIDDLE EAST: 

MUNITIONS: 

NETHERLANDS EAST 

INDIES: 

NEW CALEDONIA: 

NEW GUINEA: 

NEW ZEALAND: 

Admiral Stark's Views On 

Forces Withdrawn For Far East 

And India 

Importance Of In Relation To U.K. 

And Far East 

Reinforcement Of Air Forces 

Situation In 

Assignments 

Assignments Board, Establishment Of 

Assignments, Directive For 

Assignments, Strategic Guidance For 

Grmund Forces, Assignment Of 

Strategic Policy Regarding 

Assignment Of 

Additional Fighter Type Aircraft 

For 

U.S. Aircraft Allocated To 

U.S. Aircraft Scheduled For 

Delivery To 

Command In 

Relief of U.S. Garrison By 

Australia 

And Malaya 

Situation In 

Air Defense Of 

Air Requirements For 

British Allocation Of Pursuit 

Planes 

Possible Japanese Action Against 

Proposals Re Sphere Of Responsibility 

Pursuit Squadrons For 

Troops In Middle East 

Views Regarding Strategic Responsibility 

89 

89 

90 

95 

89 

107 

29 

107,139 

92 

73 

73-74 

37 

114,122 

86 

59,66 

2 

16 

88 

64 

36 

26 

25,92 

78 

65 

113 

112 

X 
SUBJECT PAGE NO. -- .................... ..........._.......... ........ .................. .......................'... 

NORTH IRELAND: 

OFFENSIVE : 

OPERATIONS: 

PACIFIC: 

PHILIPPINE AREA: 

POLICY: 

PORT MORESBY: 

POST ARCADlA : 

PRESIDENT: 

PRIME MINISTER: 

PRIORITIES 

DIRECTIVE: 

Move Of U.S. Troops To 

U.S. Troops For 

Air, Against Enemy Bases, 

Yards, And Ships 

Air, Possibility Of Against 

England 

Operations In Europe 

Amphibious, Inspection by 

British Officers 

Continental, General Marshall's 

Visit To London 

Offensive, In Europe 

War Council - London And 

Washington 

War Council - Relation To 

Southwest Pacific Area 

Japanese Landing In 

Supplies For 

Strategic, Re Assignment Of 

Munitions 

Expectancy Of Japanese Attack 

Collaboration 

Proposals On Division Of Strategic Responsibility 

Message From On Current Situation, 

Proposed Presidential Reply To 

Study Of Production Of Critical 

Weapons 

XI 

29 

96 

155 

145 

109 

109 

132 

109 

103 

98 

145 

2,5 

73-74 

88 

9 

97 

77 

79 

47 
................__ ........__ .~ 

PURSUIT AIRCRAFT: 

RATAY, Colonel: 

RUSSIA: 

SHIPPING: 

SINGAPORE: 

SOUTRWEST PACIFIC 

AREA: 

SPAATZ. General : 

SPHERE OF RESPONSIBILITY: 

ST. PlEKRE AND 

MlQUFLON : 

STRATEGIC AREAS: 

STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY: 

SUBJECT ..............__ ................__ ... 

Accompany Heavy Bombardment 

Groups To U.K. 

For Australia And New Zealand 

Planes For Middle East 

Requirements Of For European 

Air Offensive 

U.S. Squadrons To Egypt 

Predicts German Air Offensive 

Allocation of Transports For 

Attitude to Japan 

Supplies To, Difficulty 

Merchant Losses 

Prisoners Taken 

Directive For Supreme Commander 

Final Line of Demarkation with 

Indian Ocean Area 

Requisition of Material 

Tentative Arrangements For 

Commanders In 

In London 

British--Indian Ocean 

U.S. --PacificOcean 

Coup d'etat 

Demarkation Of 

Australian Views on For Pacific 

Area 

Draft Reply of President To 

Prime Minister 

XI1 

PAGE NC. .. .. ..........~... 

50 

65 

65 

144,148 

64 

145 

128 

19 

131 

93 

48 

102 

104 

140,143,149 

98 

150 

70 

70 

24 

70,71 

102 

103 
SUBJECT PAGE NO. ............................................................. .......................... 

STRATEGIC RESPC" 

SIBILITY (Cont'd): 

STRATEGY: 

SYRIA: 

TAHITI: 

TANKS : 

TIMOR 

T0KRT:S STRAJT: 

TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT: 

TRANSWRTATION : 

TROOPS: 

TURKEX: 

Iixrfrm NATIONS: 

Of U.K. and U.S.--Directives 

To Supreme Commander 

President's proposals on 

Division Of 

Concept as Guide for Allocation, Production, and Expansion 

U .S... -Brit ish Pol ic y 

German Capabilj ties In 

Defense Of 

Production And Requirements 

Garrison For 

Proposal FOP Mining 

For Burma And India 

For China 

For India, Request For 

General A1 locat ions 

Combined Military Transportation 

Committee, Charter For 

Of Troops On Cargo Vessels 

Air Borne .- Expansion And 

Training 

Air Borne . Participation 

In Commando Raids 

Transportation Of On Cargo 

Vessels 

German Capabilities In 

Aircraft Allocation Of 

Aircraft Production Of 

XI11 

112 

97 

120 

120 

120,154 

8,9,15 

49 

2,31 

39,48 

135,143 

143 

130 

130 

35 

137 

130 

130 

137 

120 

150 

37 
SUBJECT .. ~.~..... . . ~ . .......... ~ ...................... 

UNITED NATIONS Aircraft Resources Of 

(Continued) : War Collaboration Between 

VAN MOOK, Dr. H.E.: Present at Meeting 

VICHY FRANCE: Possessions in Caribbean 

Relations With 

WEST AFRICAN AIR Defense Of 

RWTE: 

WESTERN ATLANTIC Change In As Defined 

AREA: In ABC-1 

x IV 

PAGE NO. ..- .. 

121 

34 

27 

141 

24 

49