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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

 CASE NO. 22-CR-20423-RNS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.

NEPMAR JESUS ESCALONA,

 Defendant.

_____________________________________

GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS

The United States of America, by and through its undersigned attorneys, opposes the 

defendant’s motion to suppress filed on March 20, 2023. Dkt. 38. The motion should be denied 

because the defendant has failed to meet the Eleventh Circuit’s clear standard for suppression.

The defendant’s statements to law enforcement all took place prior to his arrest, were voluntary,

and were not made during a custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent. Moreover, the 

defendant has failed to provide any evidence to the contrary. The defendant’s motion to suppress 

his statements to law enforcement should be denied.

Procedural Background

On August 26, 2022, the defendant was charged by criminal complaint with a single 

count of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, in violation of Title 18, United States 

Code, Section 1956(h). Dkt. 3. The defendant was arrested on August 26, 2023. Dkt. 6. On 

September 7, 2022, the defendant was indicted by the grand jury with a single count of 

conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 

1956(h). Dkt. 10. The defendant was arraigned on the indictment before United States Magistrate 

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Judge Lisette M. Reid on September 19, 2022. Dkt. 14. Trial is scheduled for May 8, 2023. 1

Summary of Defendant’s Statements and Admissions

The defendant made admissions to law enforcement in the form of oral and written 

statements to federal agents prior to his arrest. The admissions occurred during voluntary 

interviews on January 31, February 1, February 2, February 16, and March 19, 2018.2 The 

government holds that all relevant statements made by the defendant prior to his arrest, including 

these five interviews, are admissible at trial because the interviews were voluntary, and the 

defendant was not in custody at the time the statements were made. United States v. LunaEncinas, 603 F.3d 876, 886 (11th Cir. 2010) (Defendant is entitled to Miranda warnings only if 

he was in custody at the time he made the statements in question); United States v. Acosta, 363

F.3d 1141, 1148 (11th Cir.2004) (Miranda protection attaches only “when custodial interrogation 

begins.”)

As summarized in the law enforcement reports, a Drug Enforcement Administration 

(“DEA”) Special Agent and a DEA Task Force Officer (“the agents”) approached the defendant 

in the driveway of his home in Aventura, Florida, at approximately 10:30 a.m. on January 31, 

2018. The agents identified themselves as federal law enforcement agents and showed the 

defendant their badges and credentials; they did not brandish weapons or touch the defendant.

While the defendant stood between the agents and the front door to his home, the agents asked to 

speak with him about his business. The defendant agreed and invited the agents into his backyard

to sit on patio furniture for a conversation. The defendant’s wife appeared at a back door and 

offered the agents something to drink, which they did not accept. The defendant’s wife remained 

1 For recitation of the full procedural history, see Dkt. 45. 

2 The Government produced official law enforcement reports of the interviews on September 16, 

2022. See Dkt. 23

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inside the house and did not participate in the meeting between the agents and the defendant. The 

agents began the conversation by advising the defendant that their conversation was voluntary,

and the defendant could end it at any time for any reason. The agents explained they were 

investigating an illegal scheme in which exporters to Venezuela were fraudulently being paid for 

imports to Venezuela that did not actually take place. The defendant told the agents that he 

conducted business dealings in Venezuela from South Florida, including the fraudulent 

importation of goods. The defendant explained thatsome of the goods were chemicals used for 

processing food and were secretly diluted. The invoices said the chemicals were 90 percent pure,

but they were actually five percent pure. After approximately twenty minutes of discussion, the 

agents and defendant agreed to pause and meet again at the DEA Miami Field Division 

headquarters on the following day to discuss the defendant’s illegal business practices in further 

detail.

As agreed by the defendant, the defendant voluntarily appeared at the headquarters of the 

DEA Miami Field Division on February 1, 2018. The interview took place in a brightly lit 

conference roomwith floor to ceiling windows. The agents began the interview by again 

advising the defendant that their meeting was voluntary and that the defendant could leave at any 

time. Over the course of approximately two hours, the defendant told the agents, among other 

things, of his career with the Venezuelan National Guard. The defendant recounted meeting 

members of the charged criminal conspiracy and going into illegal business with them. The 

defendant told the agents that he placed proceeds of his business dealings in Venezuela in a 

Swiss bank account held in the name of his wife. The defendant told the agents that during the 

charged conspiracy period, he and his associates profited fromimporting machinery and food 

products to Venezuela that were diluted or entirely fake. The defendant agreed to speak with the 

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agents again the following day to further discuss details of his corrupt business practices, as well 

as the possibility of cooperating with the government’s investigation.

The next day, February 2, 2018, the defendant voluntarily appeared at the United States 

Attorney’s Office in Miami for an interview. Federal prosecutors attended, and the interview was 

conducted in a conference room. The AUSA told the defendant at the outset that the interview 

was voluntary, and the defendant could leave at any time. They also advised that he was free to 

consult or bring an attorney to the interview, but the defendant stated he preferred not to consult 

an attorney or have an attorney present. Over the course of approximately ninety minutes, the 

defendant further explained his fraudulent Venezuelan import business revolved around 

acquiring Venezuelan permits to release U.S. dollars outside of Venezuela. He named his coconspirators and confirmed the receipt of proceeds into the United States through bank accounts 

held in the name of several businesses involved in the conspiracy. At the conclusion of the 

interview, the defendant agreed to meet with the agents again at a mutually agreed upon later 

date to continue assisting in the government’s investigation by discussing his fraudulent import 

scheme in further detail.

After agreeing by telephone on a mutually convenient time and date, the defendant 

voluntarily returned to DEA Miami Field Division headquarters on February 16, 2018, and met 

with the agents in the same conference room. For approximately two hours, the defendant 

explained in greater detail that bribery of public officials in Venezuela was a key component of 

his import business. He stated that through associates in the customs directorate and the National 

Guard, bribes were distributed to facilitate the acquisition of documentation needed for his 

business. He explained that the rate of the bribe payments depended on the amount of goods 

being invoiced. He stated the products imported under this scheme were diluted or entirely fake 

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and that the bribe payments were higher for the entirely fake imports. The defendant explained 

that the customs workers had an extra inventory and would move product from warehouse to 

warehouse to simulate goods entering Venezuela. The defendant stated he would provide DEA 

the precise names of bribed public officials at a later date. The parties agreed to meet again to 

discuss the bribery in greater detail.

After agreeing by telephone on a mutually convenient time and date, the defendant 

voluntarily appeared at the DEA Miami Field Division headquarters on March 19, 2018, and met 

with the agents in the same conference room as prior interviews. During the meeting, the 

defendant gave the agents the name, rank, and location of twelve public officials in Venezuela 

that he had bribed with the help of co-conspirators. To assist the agents with understanding his 

illegal scheme, the defendant also handed the agents two thumb drives with documents regarding 

his conspiracy in Venezuela and the United States. The agents asked if was willing to proactively 

gather information on more illegal activity and he agreed. The agents stated to the defendant that 

he would still face charges for his past illegal conduct even if gathered information on others. 

The defendant agreed and continued to meet with the agents at least once every three months for 

approximately the next two years to discuss evidence of crime he had gathered or was attempting 

to gather. 

Legal Standard For Suppression Of Defendant Statements

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[n]o person... shall be 

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Applying the Fifth Amendment 

to police interactions with criminal suspects, the Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona that 

the government “may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from 

custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 

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effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).It then 

defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a 

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 

significant way.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed that Miranda protections only apply to custodial 

interrogations. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 886 (Defendant “entitled to Miranda warnings only if 

he was in custody at the time he made the statements in question); Acosta, 363 F.3d at1148

(Miranda protection attaches only “when custodial interrogation begins”). To determine whether 

someone is in police custody, the Court must ask “whether under the totality of the 

circumstances, a reasonable man in his position would feel a restraint on his freedom of 

movement to such extent that he would not feel free to leave. The test is objective: the actual, 

subjective beliefs of the defendant and the interviewing officer on whether the defendant was 

free to leave are irrelevant.” United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Factors to be considered, “include the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made 

during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and 

the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509

(2012). Although not dispositive, “courts are much less likely to find the circumstances custodial 

when the interrogation occurs in familiar or at least neutral surroundings, such as the suspect's 

home.” United States v. Matcovich, 522 F. App’x 850, 851 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in 

original), citing United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006). Other relevant 

factors include “whether the officers brandished weapons, touched the suspect, or used language 

or a tone that indicated that compliance with the officers could be compelled.” United States v.

Barry, 479 F. App’x 297, 299 (11th Cir. 2012).

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The Eleventh Circuit has also been deliberate in distinguishing a custodial interrogation 

from the “traditional investigatory functions” of police which lack the compulsive atmosphere 

that would trigger Miranda. Sullivan v. State of Alabama, 666 F.2d 478, 482 (11th Cir.1982). 

Police questioning someone after seizing that person with an “unusual degree of force” could be 

considered the functional equivalent of interrogation and an infringement of Miranda

protections. United States v. Glen–Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 815 (11th Cir.1982). However, without 

other factors, “‘on-the-scene questioning’ concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding a

crime or other general questioning of citizens during the fact-finding process do not

trigger Miranda warnings.” Garcia v. Singletary, 13 F.3d 1487, 1489 (11th Cir.1994).

Legal Argument

In his motion to suppress, the defendant denies that he, “made statements to government 

agents and prosecutors allegedly admitting wrongdoing.” Dkt. 38, p 2. In particular, he denies 

making a statement to DEA agents “on March 19, 2018, during which the defendant detailed 

bribe payments to twelve specific public officials in Venezuela in furtherance of the illegal 

conspiracy.” Id. Such denials are facts for the jury to consider at trial and not appropriately 

credited or discredited in a motion to suppress.

The defendant’s motion also states, “[t]he alleged actions by government agents and 

prosecutors in this case violated due process rights under the Fifth Amendment,” but fails to

specify what “actions” are being referred to in the motion. Id. at 3. Presumably the defendant is 

attacking the viability of using his admissions as evidence at trial due to a lack of Miranda

warning. In support, the defendant asserts that he, “did not knowingly, willingly, or voluntarily 

waive any constitutionally protected rights.” Id.

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However, no rights of the defendant were violated by the agents during their series of five 

voluntary interviews with him. The defendant was never in custody for questioning and was 

therefore never entitled to Miranda warnings. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 886; Acosta, 363 F.3d at

1148. None of the factors recognized by the SupremeCourt or Eleventh Circuit caselaw as indicia

of a custodial interrogation, or its functional equivalent, were met by the five interactions between

DEA agents and the defendant.The agentsshowed zero force or coercionwith the defendant.They

never brandished weapons, used restraints, or even touched the defendant. They repeatedly told

him he did not have to speak with them and that he was free to change his mind and leave even

after the interviews had started.3 In fact, the defendant did leave after each interview. The first

interview was held in the comfort and familiarity of the defendant’s backyard at his private home.

The next four interviews were conducted at government buildings at mutually agreed upon

appointment times, with the defendant traveling on his own accord and expense to and from the

interviews. The frequency of the interviews, along with the professional manner in which they 

were conducted, are a strong indication that the interviews were voluntary and non-custodial in 

nature. Nothing in the defendant’s motion suggests otherwise. Moreover, the Government supplied 

law enforcement reports that detailed all statements made by the defendant to law enforcement, 

therefore, there is no ambiguity as to the admissions. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, suppression of the defendant’s statements to law enforcement 

is inappropriate and the defendant’s motion should be denied.

3 “[A]bundantadvice of freedom to terminate the encounter should not be treated merely as one equal factor in a 

multi-factor balancing test... That a person is told repeatedly that he is free to terminate an interview is

powerfulevidence that a reasonable person would have understood that he was free to terminate the interview.” 

United States v.Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 826(8th Cir.2004).

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 Respectfully submitted,

MARKENZY LAPOINTE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

By: /s/ Andrea Goldbarg .

ANDREA GOLDBARG

Assistant United States Attorney 

Court ID No. A5502556

99 Northeast 4th Street 

Miami, Florida 33132-2111

Tel: (305) 961-9421

Email: agoldbarg@usdoj.gov

 And BRENT S. WIBLE

CHIEF

MONEY LAUNDERING AND ASSET 

RECOVERY SECTION

By: /s/ Joseph Palazzo .

JOSEPH PALAZZO

Trial Attorney

Court ID No. A5502141 

Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section

U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division 

1400 New York Avenue, N.W. – 10th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20005

Tel: (202) 514-1263

Email: joseph.palazzo@usdoj.gov

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY this third day of April, 2023, that I am filing this document 

electronically via CM/ECF, which will cause a true and correct copy to be delivered via email 

to all defense counsel of record.

/s/ Joseph Palazzo 

JOSEPH PALAZZO

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