UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

ex rel. WADE RINER, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

HUNTERS RUN PROPERTY 

OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., 

et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No.: 1:22-cv-23342-MD 

DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT [DE 1]1

“The purpose of the FCA is to encourage private citizens who are aware of fraud against 

the government to expose the fraud, while preventing opportunistic suits by individuals who hear 

of fraud publicly but play no part in exposing it.” U.S. ex rel. Matheny v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 

671 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2012). 

Wade Riner (Riner) is the prototypical “opportunistic” relator bringing a suit based on 

allegations that are derived exclusively from information contained in the public record. Graham 

Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 294 (2010). He has 

filed at least three substantially identical FCA complaints alleging that seventy-nine defendants— 

country clubs, condominium associations and homeowners associations located throughout 

Florida and Colorado—were ineligible for benefits under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), 

enacted by Congress in response to the COVID-19 crisis.2

 

1

 Pursuant to this Court’s direction [DE 132, 135], the defendants listed on Exhibit A jointly submit 

this motion. 

2

 In addition to this action, in which Riner named 43 defendants, Riner has at least two related, 

pending lawsuits making the same FCA claims of PPP ineligibility: U.S. ex rel. Riner v. Watercolor 

Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., et al., Case No. 3:22-cv-11072-TKW-ZCB (N.D. Fla. 2022) (11 defendants), 

and U.S. ex rel. Riner v. Beaver Run Homeowners Ass’n, Case No. 1:22-cv-02071 (D. Co 2022.) 

(25 defendants). Upon information and belief, Riner has filed similar complaints in other federal 

courts that have not yet been unsealed. See Jeff McDonald, Rancho Santa Fe homeowners group 

illegally collected $1.5M in COVID-19 relief, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Dec. 1, 2023, 

11:36 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/watchdog/story/2023-12-01/ranchoCase 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 1 of 32
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Riner’s complaints do not allege the hallmarks of a typical PPP fraud claim—e.g., specific 

misrepresentations concerning the number of people the applicant employs, the amount of the 

applicant’s regular payroll, or the applicant’s actual use of the loan funds that were received for 

permissible purposes. Instead, Riner’s FCA claims are based exclusively on his conclusory 

assertion that the defendants were ineligible to receive PPP benefits as “various not-for-profit 

entities” with sufficient financial resources at their disposal such that they could not certify that 

economic uncertainty made their respective PPP loan applications necessary. As explained below, 

there are several fatal issues with the legal theories and allegations supporting Riner’s FCA claims 

that warrant dismissal of the Complaint. 

First, the Complaint is barred by the FCA’s public disclosure bar (31 U.S.C. § 

3730(e)(4)(A)–(B)) because the claims are based exclusively on publicly available information 

concerning the PPP loans that each defendant received. The Complaint makes clear that Riner has 

no connection to nearly all of the defendants that he named in this action and has no specific 

“insider” knowledge concerning their organizational structures and finances. Riner is not an 

“original source” of the fact that the defendants applied for and received PPP loans, the amounts 

of the loans that they received, or the fact that those loans were forgiven. All of that information 

was maintained by the Small Business Administration (SBA) and made available to the public by 

official government resources before being republished by various news outlets. Moreover, local 

news media in South Florida publicly raised questions concerning the eligibility of condominium 

associations and homeowners associations such as the defendants—including the one association 

to which Riner alleges he belongs and several other defendants that Riner named in this action—

more than two years before Riner sought to cash in by filing his own qui tam Complaint. 

Second, Riner’s conclusory allegations fail to state a plausible claim with the requisite 

particularity against any of the defendants. At the outset, Riner fails to identify a single individual 

from any of the defendants’ organizations who made the allegedly false statements that form the 

basis of the FCA claims. Without alleging the “who,” Riner necessarily also fails to allege the 

“what, “where,” when,” and “how” of the alleged false statements that each defendant allegedly 

submitted to the government, all of which are required to satisfy the heightened pleading standard 

that applies to FCA claims under Rule 9(b). Riner instead opts for a universal applicability 

santa-fe-homeowners-group-wrongly-collected-1-5m-in-covid-19-relief-now-agrees-to-repayfunds. 

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approach, contending that all 43 defendants are identically situated and submitted identical forms 

containing identical certifications. However, the official SBA forms on which Riner relies, per the 

SBA’s own instructions, did not apply to a vast majority of the defendants. 

Third, and indicative of Riner’s shotgun pleading, with respect to the 38 defendants in this 

action who received PPP loans under $2 million, Riner’s allegations that they falsely certified their 

economic uncertainty when they applied for their loans are barred as a matter of law by SBA 

guidance providing that the required certification is automatically deemed to have been made in 

good faith for loans of that size. As to the remaining defendants, Riner fails to allege the individual 

economic situations that prevented those defendants from making the economic uncertainty 

certification. 

At bottom, the number of defendants that Riner sued, and the dearth of specific allegations 

relating to each defendant that he named, underscore two insurmountable obstacles for purposes 

of this Motion to Dismiss: (1) his allegations are based entirely on information published on 

government and news media websites, which supply all of the detail concerning each defendant’s 

(and every other PPP borrower’s) PPP loan that form the basis of the FCA claims alleged in the 

Complaint and raised the specter of ineligibility more than two years before Riner filed his qui tam 

Complaint in this action; and, (2) as a stranger to nearly all named defendants, Riner has not 

pleaded, and indeed cannot, plead the elements of an FCA claim with the required particularity. 

THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM 

In March 2020, Congress enacted the ‘‘Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 

Act’’ (CARES Act).3

 The CARES Act was a response to the COVID-19-related economic 

shutdown. Additional legislation followed. Congress enacted the “Economic Aid to Hard-Hit 

Small Businesses, Nonprofits and Venues Act” on December 27, 2020, and the “American Rescue 

Plan Act” on March 11, 2021.4

 One district court explained the intent of the Paycheck Protection 

Program as follows: 

[T]he policy choices made by Congress when it enacted both the first and second 

round PPPs are entirely rational...The first draw program was enacted as part of an 

urgent legislative attempt to cope with the devastating, unprecedented, and rapid 

3

 Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020); 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36). 

4

 Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1993 (the Economic Aid Act); Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 

(American Rescue Plan).

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economic decline that occurred when states around the nation slammed the brakes 

on normal economic output by drastically curtailing in-person work and personal 

movement for non-essential purposes... It was both consistent and entirely 

economically and politically rational for Congress to believe, first, that the broadest 

possible allowance of credit was called for in the opening weeks and months of the 

pandemic crisis, in order to keep as many citizens gainfully employed as possible. 

Nat'l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 20-11780, 2021 WL 4458660, at *11 

(E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2021) (holding CARES Act preempted SBA ineligibility rules), rev’d on 

grounds of mootness, 2023 WL 192239 (6th Cir. 2023); see also DV Diamond Club of Flint, LLC 

v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 459 F. Supp. 3d 943, 957—58 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2020), aff’d 960 

F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 2020) (same).5

Congress intended to help businesses maintain employment by funding payrolls. To that 

end, the CARES Act expanded the eligibility for SBA loans by the “broadest possible allowance.” 

Id. Title I of the CARES Act is titled the Keeping American Workers Paid and Employed Act and 

the substantive provision speaks directly to “increased eligibility” as follows: 

(D) INCREASED ELIGIBILITY FOR CERTAIN SMALL BUSINESSES AND 

ORGANIZATIONS.— ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—During the covered period, in 

addition to small business concerns, any business concern, nonprofit 

organization, veterans organization, or Tribal business concern described in 

section 31(b)(2)(C) shall be eligible to receive a covered loan if the business 

concern, nonprofit organization, veterans organization, or Tribal business concern 

employs not more than the greater of . . . (I) 500 employees . . . . 

Pub. L. No. 116-136; 134 Stat. 281, 288; 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36) (emphasis added). The CARES 

Act does not define the phrase “any business concern” to which the act extends eligibility. 

Examining the CARES Act, one court explained that the word “any” carries “an expansive 

meaning . . . and implies every member of the class or group.”6

5

 “In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, Congress authorized historic levels of emergency 

funding for federal agencies to provide relief to individuals, businesses, state and local 

governments, and public services.” Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, Semiannual 

Report To Congress (April 1, 2020 – September 30, 2020). 

6 National Ass’n of Home Builders, 2021 WL 4458660, at *10 (emphasis in original).

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The relevant facts are drawn from the well-pleaded factual allegations of the Complaint, 

taken as true, and from publicly available government documents and news reports, the 

authenticity of which is not in dispute.7

A. Government Reports & News Media 

Through the CARES Act, Congress established the Pandemic Response Accountability 

Committee (PRAC) and tasked it with creating a public-facing website.8 In its first report to 

Congress, PRAC explained its first goal was to foster greater transparency on PPP funds usage by 

providing a “robust, publicly-accessible website” that makes available “to the public details on the 

$2.6 trillion coronavirus relief funds, providing details on who received the funding, how much 

they received, and how programs and industries are spending the money.”9

The website (<pandemicoversight.gov>), which is regularly updated, provides detailed 

information on each recipient of PPP funds, including the “loan amount,” the “amount forgiven,” 

and the “lender name.” In fact, this data has been available since at least December 1, 2020, when 

the SBA “publicly produced the full dataset containing the names, addresses, and precise loan 

amounts for millions of recipients of PPP...loans totaling hundreds of billions of dollars” in 

response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests from various news organizations. WP 

Co. LLC v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 514 F. Supp. 3d 267, 270 (D.D.C. 2021). 

Many news organizations re-published the same government data on their own websites, 

for example: Gannett -- The Ledger (Lakeland Florida),10 the Northwest Florida Daily News,11

NBC Miami,12 CNN,13 and ProPublica.14

7

 Concurrently with this motion, Defendants are filing a motion requesting judicial notice of 

government and news reports relevant to the public disclosure bar and the official SBA forms 

referenced in this motion. 

8

 134 Stat. 496,533-334, 539-540 (formation of PRAC). 

9

 Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, Semiannual Report To Congress, pg. 5 (April 1, 

2020 – September 30, 2020).

10 <https://data.theledger.com/paycheck-protection-program-loans/> 

11 <https://www.nwfdailynews.com/story/news/2020/07/08/florida-ppp-loan-recipients-see-fullsearchable-list-of-who-received-them/112604846/> 

12 <https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/south-florida-small-businesses-pandemicrelief/2336990/> 

13 <https://www.cnn.com/projects/ppp-business-loans/states/fl> 

14 <https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/> 

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For example, a search for Defendant “Anchorage Resort and Yacht Club Condominium 

Association, Inc.” (Anchorage) on ProPublica’s public database returns results for Anchorage’s 

two PPP loans. The screenshot below depicts the publicly available information for Anchorage’s 

First Round PPP loan: 

ProPublica’s disclosure indicates that, amongst other information, Anchorage is a nonprofit organization that obtained a First Round PPP loan of $104,120, the date of approval, the 

loan’s forgiveness status, and the lender of the loan. The same information is available for 

Anchorage’s Second Round PPP loan. 

Even before the government made the PPP loan database information widely available, 

news media showed interest in the recipients of PPP loans. As relevant to this action, The Palm 

Beach Post published an article on July 9, 2020, entitled Are the million-dollar PPP loans some 

Palm Beach County golf communities collected justified?,

15 which noted that the SBA had released 

certain PPP borrower information in response to lawsuits “by a number of newspaper organizations 

over the identity of the loan recipients.” The article then went on to explain “[t]he issue of whether 

it is appropriate for golf course communities to receive PPP loans has been debated,” in part 

because “[s]ome golf course communities that accepted PPP loans in Palm Beach County have 

recently spent upward of $10 million on massive improvements to their clubhouses and golf 

courses.” Id.

Noting that “[f]ifty-seven country clubs in Florida accepted the PPP funds” and “more than 

400 country clubs and golf courses received loans throughout the country,” the article highlighted 

15 Mike Diamond, Are the million-dollar PPP loans some Palm Beach County golf communities 

collected justified?, THE PALM BEACH POST (July 9, 2020, 7:30 AM), 

https://www.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/2020/07/09/are-million-dollar-ppp-loans-somepalm-beach-county-golf-communities-collected-justified/112287808/, attached herein as Exhibit 

B.

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six organizations in particular as having received loans: (1) Hunter’s Run, (2) Quail Ridge, (3) 

Wycliffe, (4) Old Palm, (5) Banyan Cay Resort Club, and (6) The Loxahatchee Club Homeowners 

Association. Id. Except for Banyan Cay Resort Club, Riner named all of the organizations 

identified in the Palm Beach Post article as defendants in this action. 

B. The Complaint 

Riner commenced this action by filing the Complaint [DE 1] on October 14, 2022—more 

than two years after The Palm Beach Post article was published and long after the PRAC database 

containing a trove of PPP borrower and loan data was made publicly available by the government 

and various news media outlets. 

Riner alleges that he “is a regular homeowner and investor,” that “[a] corporation with 

which Riner is the officer and principle [sic] in turn owns multiple homes in Florida,” and that 

“[t]hrough ownership of these homes” he was an alleged association member of two (of the 43) 

defendants. Compl. ¶ 9. Riner does not allege that he has ever owned a home or been a member of 

any of the remaining 41 defendants’ communities. Nevertheless, Riner alleges that he “is 

intimately familiar with the finances and organization of these particular homeowners associations 

as well as homeowners associations and country clubs in general, including details of how such 

community associations and country clubs are governed and how they raise funds through their 

membership and other sources of liquidity.” Id.

Riner does not allege how he became “intimately familiar” with the internal organization 

and financial operations of homeowners associations generally or any of the defendants in 

particular. He does not, for example, allege that he served on the board or held any position of 

authority with the two clubs of which he allegedly is/was a member. Nor does he allege that has 

access to any of the defendants’ non-public, internal records concerning their organizational 

structures or finances. Riner avoids addressing the issue entirely, failing to reveal exactly when, 

where, and how he learned the details concerning defendants’ PPP loans that he alleges in the 

Complaint. 

Aside from alleging his limited connections to two defendants, the remaining factual (i.e., 

non-conclusory) allegations in the Complaint merely repackage the following publicly available 

information concerning each defendant: (1) the type of organization (e.g., homeowners 

association, condominium association, or country club) (Compl. ¶¶ 11–53); and (2) with respect 

to the PPP loans that the defendants received, (a) the loan amount, (b) the date the loan was 

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approved, (c) whether the loan was forgiven, and (d) the amount forgiven (Compl. ¶¶ 89–132). 

The Complaint does not contain any specific allegations concerning, among other things, the dates 

that each defendant applied to receive its loan, the date that each defendant applied for forgiveness 

of its loan, or any information concerning the individual(s) who signed and submitted the loan and 

forgiveness applications on behalf of each defendant. 

 Anticipating that defendants would raise the FCA’s public disclosure bar in response to the 

Complaint, Riner included a wholly conclusory and inadequate allegation seeking to take 

advantage of the “original source” exception under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (Compl. ¶ 57): 

 

But Riner fails to plead what “independent” knowledge he has, or how that knowledge 

“materially adds” to the publicly disclosed allegations. Indeed, the remainder of the Complaint 

consists of bare conclusory allegations of FCA liability. 

C. Riner’s Two FCA Counts 

Riner alleges two FCA claims against all defendants. Both claims are based on the PPP 

loan and forgiveness applications that the defendants submitted to the government and Riner’s 

contention that each defendant falsely certified their eligibility to receive PPP loans in those 

applications. Compl. ¶¶ 149–66. 

As an initial matter, Riner fails to clearly delineate the statutory basis for his two FCA 

claims. The heading titles for Count I and Count II are identical: “PRESENTATION OF FALSE OR 

FRAUDULENT CLAIMS (31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)).” Further, the allegations for Count I and Count 

II closely mirror each other and fail to provide the Defendants sufficient notice as to Riner’s 

distinct theory in support of Count II, if any. This defect, standing alone, warrants dismissal of 

Riner’s Complaint. See Truesdale v. Venice Arms, Inc., No. 23-CV-23251, 2024 WL 307586, *2 

(S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2024) (dismissing complaint where the complaint failed to “draw any distinction 

between the two counts and identify the specific regulatory provisions applicable to each 

respective theory.”). 

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Further, both of Riner’s claims fail under the FCA’s public disclosure bar and because he 

failed to allege the required elements in accordance with the applicable pleading standards under 

Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b). 

ARGUMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW 

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[A] 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels 

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. 

(cleaned up). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” because “the tenet that a court must 

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 

Id. at 678. 

I. Dismissal Is Warranted Under the FCA’s Public Disclosure Bar 

Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), “[t]he court shall dismiss an action or claim under 

this section. . . if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim 

were publicly disclosed . . . (ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other 

Federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, unless . . . the person 

bringing the action is an original source of the information.” The public disclosure bar “strike[s] a 

balance between encouraging private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits” 

brought by purported relaters having no material independent information to add to that which is 

already contained in the public record. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 559 U.S. 

at 295; see Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 671 F.3d at 1222.

Courts in the Eleventh Circuit apply a three-prong test to determine whether the public 

disclosure bar applies: (1) whether the relator’s allegations have been publicly disclosed; (2) if so, 

whether the allegations in the complaint are substantially the same as allegations or transactions 

contained in the public disclosures; and (3) if yes, whether the relator is an original source of that 

information. U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 812 (11th Cir. 2015); see also 

Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 565 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994). 

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Riner, as the relator in this action, “bears the burden of proving that the public disclosure 

bar does not preclude his FCA action.” See U.S. ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 811 F.3d 636, 

640 (4th Cir. 2016). To avoid the public disclosure bar, Riner “must allege specific facts—as 

opposed to mere conclusions—showing exactly how and when [he] obtained direct and 

independent knowledge of the fraudulent acts alleged in the complaint and support those 

allegations with competent proof.” U.S. ex rel. Sedona Partners LLC v. Able Moving & Storage, 

Inc., No. 20-23242-CIV, 2021 WL 6932167, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2021), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 20-CV-23242, 2022 WL 178225 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2022). 

A. The Complaint Is Based On Publicly Disclosed Information 

The first prong of the test looks at whether information has been disclosed in “a 

congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other federal report, hearing, audit, or 

investigation”; or “the news media.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (emphasis added); Osheroff, 776 

F.3d at 812. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, the “sources of public disclosure in § 

3730(e)(4)(A) . . . suggest that the public disclosure bar provides a broa[d] sweep.” Schindler 

Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 408 (2011). Lower courts, including the Eleventh 

Circuit, have determined that such sources of public disclosure include information found on 

publicly available websites. See Osheroff, 776 F.3d at 813; see also U.S. ex rel. Brown v. Walt 

Disney World Co., No. 6:06-cv-1943, 2008 WL 2561975, at *13 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 2008) (finding 

Wikipedia pages constitute “news media”); U.S. ex rel. Jacobs v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 

20-20543-CIV, 2022 WL 573663, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2022) (holding “publicly available 

online blogs” constitute “news media”). The Eleventh Circuit has also held that a federal agency's 

response to a FOIA request constitutes a “report” within the meaning of the FCA’s public 

disclosure bar. U.S. ex rel. Lewis v. Walker, 438 F. App’x 885, 888 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Here, all of the information alleged in the Complaint concerning the defendants’ PPP loans 

is publicly available through websites maintained by the government and various news media 

organizations. PRAC’s publicly available website provides a host of information regarding PPP 

loan recipients, including PPP loan amounts, the date PPP loans were approved, and the PPP loan 

amounts forgiven. The SBA also produced this information in response to FOIA requests and made 

it publicly available on its website.16 Various news media organizations then repackaged and 

16 <https://data.sba.gov/dataset/ppp-foia.>

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republished the information that the government provided, amplifying the scope and reach of these 

public disclosures. Given the widespread public disclosure of the PPP loan information alleged in 

the Complaint, the first prong of the public disclosure bar test is easily satisfied. 

B. Riner’s Allegations Are Substantially The Same As The Public Disclosures 

The second prong of the test considers whether the relator’s allegations are “substantially 

the same” as the public disclosures. Osheroff, 776 F.3d at 814. This consideration is a “quick 

trigger” to get to the more exacting original source inquiry and is satisfied if the relator’s claims 

are based “in any part on publicly disclosed information.” Id. (cleaned up); see also U.S. ex rel. 

Saldivar v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., 841 F.3d 927, 934 (11th Cir 2016); U.S. ex rel. 

Zafirov v. Fla. Med. Assocs. LLC, No. 8:19-CV-1236-KKM-SPF, 2021 WL 4443119, at *7 (M.D. 

Fla. Sept. 28, 2021). This prong does not require a “complete identity” of allegations; rather, “[t]he 

key inquiry is whether the disclosures could have put the government on notice of the fraud alleged 

in the qui tam complaint.” Zafirov, 2021 WL 4443119, at *7. 

Here, again, there is no doubt that this prong is satisfied. The Complaint contains no 

specific allegations as to each individual defendant other than the loan amount, the date the loan 

was approved, whether the loan was forgiven, and the amount forgiven. The information contained 

in the Complaint is not merely “substantially the same” as the public disclosures. All of this 

information was made publicly available through government and news media resources well 

before Riner filed his qui tam Complaint. 

Even before the government made the full PPP dataset publicly available, The Palm Beach 

Post published an article specifically raising the issue of eligibility and questioning whether it was 

appropriate for golf course communities located in South Florida (and elsewhere) to receive PPP 

loans. See Exhibit B. That article was published in July 2020, more than two years before Riner 

filed his complaint in October 2022, and it specifically named five of the defendants that Riner 

included in his Complaint in this action. Id.

To these public disclosures, Riner adds only bare allegations of wrongdoing—i.e., his 

threadbare legal conclusions that defendants were ineligible for PPP benefits and “knowingly” 

submitted false claims. This Court is not obliged to accept those conclusions. Nor are they relevant 

to the public disclosure bar. The Eleventh Circuit has clarified that this prong is triggered by the 

public disclosure of the “transactions” irrespective of whether the disclosure indicates wrongdoing. 

See Osheroff, 776 F.3d at 814; U.S. ex rel. Lorona v. Infilaw Corp., No. 3:15-CV-959-J-34PDB, 

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2019 WL 3778389, at *13 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2019) (rejecting relators’ argument “that their 

allegations are sufficiently distinct from the matters discussed in these articles because the Public 

Disclosures do not specifically accuse the Infilaw Defendants of fraud on the federal government” 

based on Osheroff). Accordingly, even if the public disclosures contained in The Palm Beach Post 

article had not raised the specific allegations of wrongdoing that Riner repeats in the complaint, 

the public availability of the PPP data from the government and various news media sources 

sufficiently disclosed the “transactions” on which Riner’s FCA claims are based to satisfy the 

second prong of the test. 

C. Riner Is Not An “Original Source” Of This Information 

Under the third prong of the test, Riner must plead and prove that he is an “original source” 

of the information alleged in the Complaint. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). An “original source” is an 

individual who: (1) prior to the relevant public disclosure, voluntarily disclosed to the government 

the information on which his allegations are based, or (2) has independent knowledge of and 

“materially adds” to the publicly disclosed allegations and voluntarily provided that information 

to the government before filing his FCA Complaint. Id. 

The “original source” inquiry has been described as “exacting,” and for good reason. “To 

establish original source status knowledge, a qui tam plaintiff must allege specific facts—as 

opposed to mere conclusions—showing exactly how and when he or she obtained direct and 

independent knowledge of the fraudulent acts alleged in the complaint and support those 

allegations with competent proof.” U.S. ex rel. Brown v. BankUnited Tr. 2005-1, 235 F. Supp. 3d 

1343, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Hafter D.O. v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 

190 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1999)). “Secondhand information, speculation, background 

information, or collateral research do not satisfy a relator’s burden of establishing the requisite 

knowledge.” Id. Similarly, “[b]ackground information that helps one understand or contextualize 

a public disclosure is insufficient to grant original source status.” Osheroff, 776 F.3d at 815; see 

also Fresenius, 841 F.3d at 936 (“The phrase ‘direct and independent’ is most naturally read as 

creating an extreme limit on secondhand knowledge that is sufficient to qualify as an ‘original 

source.’”). Compilations of publicly disclosed information are likewise inadequate. U.S. ex rel. 

Lewis v. Walker, 438 F. App’x 885, 888 (11th Cir. 2011). 

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in U.S. ex rel. Saldivar v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, 

841 F.3d 927 (11th Cir. 2016), is instructive. The Fresenius relator was employed by the defendant, 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 12 of 32
13 

a provider of outpatient services that billed the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS). 

The district court determined that, although the relator’s complaint was informed by prior public 

disclosures, he was nonetheless an original source based on his knowledge of his employer’s 

practices and his “discussions with supervisors and coworkers about overfill use and billing” Id.

at 930. 

Reversing, the Eleventh Circuit noted the relator “was not himself directly involved in 

billing.” Id. at 931. The court held that secondhand information learned from fellow employees is 

not enough to qualify as an original source, explaining: 

The phrase “direct and independent” is most naturally read as creating an extreme 

limit on secondhand knowledge that is sufficient to qualify as an “original source.” 

Being told what another department is doing is almost necessarily not direct 

knowledge of that department’s behavior. In this case, Saldivar was told that 

inventory spreadsheets were used for billing purposes. This is not direct knowledge 

of the alleged improper billing. Indeed, it is on its face indirect; he was told by 

another that his work product was used, and it appears he had no direct knowledge 

of how billing occurred or even how his inventory was factored into the billing. 

**** 

While Saldivar had independent knowledge of the administration of overfill, his 

knowledge of the critical component—the alleged billing for drugs Fresenius 

received at no cost—was derived from secondhand sources. To the extent Saldivar’s 

information is not secondhand, it appears to be more akin to Osheroff’s background 

information. . . Saldivar thus fails to meet an essential element of the original source 

requirement, that he have “direct and independent knowledge of the information on 

which the allegations are based.” 

Id. at 936–37. On this basis, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the lawsuit for dismissal. 

In comparison to the failed relator in Fresenius, Riner is even further removed from the 

information alleged in his Complaint. He is a complete stranger to all but 2 of the 43 defendants 

named in this action. There is no indication he has ever been to any of the properties or knows 

anyone living in, or employed by, those defendants. Riner does not even have secondhand 

knowledge of the defendants (which would be insufficient under Fresenius); instead, Riner restates 

publicly available information and then proffers legal conclusions from a distance. Riner cannot 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 13 of 32
14 

possibly be an “original source” for his allegation that Defendants “knowingly” submitted a false 

claim for PPP benefits. Indeed, Riner’s claim that he is “original source” for all of the 79 

defendants that he named in his three unsealed qui tam complaints is a glaring indication that he 

lacks the requisite connection to any defendant. 

Aside from the wholly conclusory allegation that he has knowledge that is independent of 

and materially adds to any publicly disclosed allegations or transactions (Compl. ¶ 57), Riner 

alleges none of the details necessary to meet his burden to prove that the “original source” 

exception applies. Where, as here, “the ‘knowledge’ upon which Plaintiff’s qui tam Complaint is 

based is ‘derivative of the information of others’ and/or ‘dependent on a public disclosure’” it is 

“not ‘direct and independent’” and the “Plaintiff is therefore not an ‘original source.’” U.S. v. 

Molina Healthcare of Fla., Inc., No. 12-24298-CIV, 2015 WL 5562313, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 

2015), aff’d sub nom. Wilhelm v. Molina Healthcare of Fla., Inc., 674 F. App’x 960 (11th Cir. 

2017) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Hafter D.O. v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160, 

1162 (10th Cir. 1999)). Courts do not hesitate to dismiss FCA complaints based on the public 

disclosure bar. See, e.g., Osheroff (11th Cir. 2015); Fresenius (11th Cir 2016); Odom (N.D. Fla. 

2023); and Zafirov (M.D. Fla. 2021). The same result should obtain here. 

Moreover, a dismissal with prejudice is warranted because further pleading and discovery 

cannot avoid hard facts: Congress created a public website containing all of the relevant PPP loan 

data, various news media outlets republished that information to amplify the public disclosure of 

that data, and Riner has no connection to the defendants other than that he pulled the publicly 

available information together to assert the claims alleged in his Complaint. 

II. The Complaint Fails to Allege Each Defendant’s Alleged Fraud With Sufficient 

Particularity 

An FCA claim has four essential elements: “(1) a false statement or fraudulent course of 

conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3) that was material, causing (4) the government to pay out 

money or forfeit moneys due.” U.S. ex rel. v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., 987 F.3d 1340, 1346–47 (11th 

Cir. 2021). 

“In addition to the ordinary pleading rules, an FCA claim is based on fraud and therefore 

is subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), which requires a party to ‘state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.’” U.S. v. Odom, No. 3:20CV3678-

MCR-ZCB, 2023 WL 5203000, at *5 (N.D. Fla. June 22, 2023). To satisfy Rule 9(b), the complaint 

must allege: “(1) precisely what statements were made in what documents or oral representations 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 14 of 32
15 

or what omissions were made, and (2) the time and place of each such statement and the person 

responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not making) same, and (3) the content of 

such statements and the manner in which they misled the plaintiff, and (4) what the defendants 

obtained as a consequence of the fraud.” U.S. ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 

1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); see also Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 

Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1994) (requiring FCA pleading to include facts as to time, 

place, and substance of the alleged fraud). Failing to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard 

is grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 

1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002). 

In short, a relator must “allege the ‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘where,’ ‘when,’ and ‘how’ of fraudulent 

submissions to the government.” U.S. v. Landmark Hosp. of Athens, LLC, 3:21-CV-00036-CAR, 

2023 WL 3097948, at *9 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2023) (“The Amended Complaint contains no 

information concerning who at PARMC or any other medical facility submitted any requests for 

payment to the Government...”). Riner, however, fails to allege any of the necessary details for 

any of the 43 defendants he named in his qui tam Complaint. Indeed, Riner does not even attempt 

to identify which authorized representative for each defendant submitted their loan and forgiveness 

applications and when those applications were submitted—presumably because that information 

was not included in the publicly disclosed PPP databases on which all of Riner’s allegations are 

based. 

Riner’s failure to allege with particularity the details of the alleged fraud as to each 

defendant destroys his ability to establish the FCA’s scienter requirement. The Supreme Court 

recently explained that “[t]he FCA’s scienter element refers to respondents’ knowledge and 

subjective beliefs—not to what an objectively reasonable person may have known or believed.” 

U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 598 U.S. 739, 749 (2023). Thus, establishing scienter under 

the FCA requires proof that a person (1) “has actual knowledge of the information”; (2) “acts in 

deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information”; or (3) “acts in reckless disregard of 

the truth or falsity of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A). Here, Riner presents only 

conclusory allegations that the defendants “knowingly” submitted a false claim. There is no 

elaboration or facts alleged in support; Riner relies exclusively on a “threadbare recital[]” and 

“formulaic recitation” of the elements that is insufficient under Twombly and Iqbal. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 15 of 32
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Congress enacted the PPP in haste in response to an economic emergency. SBA-approved 

financial intermediaries encouraged employers to take PPP loans. While expeditiously 

administering the CARES Act, the SBA undertook to publish a series of “FAQs” designed to guide 

the public understanding of the PPP loan process.17 In total, the SBA published 72 questions and 

answers between April 3, 2020 and June 13, 2023. Id. Riner’s failure to identify when the 

defendants applied for their individual PPP loans fatally undermines his reliance on the FAQs to 

establish defendants’ scienter.18 See Compl. ¶¶ 69, 81. 

To be sure, Riner does not allege that any defendant used its PPP loan proceeds for a 

purpose other than what Congress intended. Instead, Riner merely alleges technical ineligibility 

and asserts that in April 2020—when the regulatory landscape surrounding PPP was changing by 

the day—the defendants should have interpreted the CARES Act as he does now. That is not 

plausible and does not establish scienter. 

Consider a comparison. The defendants here are not health care providers submitting false 

claims to CMS notwithstanding decades of regulatory guidance. The PPP has no equivalent. The 

COVID-19 crisis and Congress’s response are sui generis. The notion that seventy-nine 

defendants, most of whom are governed by volunteer boards, “knowingly” decided to defraud the 

government is not plausible. A one-word recitation of the element “knowingly” does not satisfy 

Twombly and its progeny. 

Riner’s reliance in the Complaint on the PPP loan and forgiveness application forms further 

undermines his ability to allege the required FCA elements—including scienter—with the requisite 

specificity under Rule 9(b). Compl. ¶¶ 67–71. It is also indicative of the carelessness of Riner’s 

“one size fits all” approach to pleading the FCA claims against all defendants. 

Addressing each individual defendant’s eligibility at the time it applied for a PPP loan, 

Riner includes snippets from SBA Form 2483 and then goes on to allege, in a conclusory fashion, 

that each defendant “falsely certified that it was ‘eligible to receive a loan under the rules in effect 

at the time th[e] application is submitted.’” Compl. ¶¶ 89–132. By selectively highlighting only 

portions of SBA Form 2483 in the Complaint, Riner strips the referenced certifications of their 

17 U.S. Small Business Administration, FAQ for PPP Borrowers and Lenders, available at 

https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/FAQPPPBrrwrsLndrsQstns1_72.pdf, (last 

updated June 13, 2023). 

18 Additionally, the SBA specifically notes the FAQs do not “carry the force and effect of law 

independent of the statutes and regulations on which it is based.” Id. at n.1

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 16 of 32
17 

necessary context. Indeed, none of the excerpted sections on which Riner relies contain any 

detailed representations concerning the applicant’s organization type, which is the lynchpin of 

Riner’s FCA theory against the defendants in this action (as well as his other, nearly identical 

actions pending in other courts). 

The original version of SBA Form 2483, which was the operative form for PPP loan 

applications submitted between the start of the PPP program in April 2020 through June 12, 2020, 

included a catchall “Other” checkbox that allowed applicants to indicate to the SBA and lenders 

that their organizations were not one of the types of organizations listed in the more specific 

checkboxes that preceded it. 

SBA Form 2483 (red box added for emphasis). 

On its face, the application form signaled to applicants that organizations other than those 

specifically listed could apply for PPP loans. If that were not so, then there would not have been 

any reason to include an “Other” option as part of the form. Notably, the application form did not 

require “Other” applicants to specify their organization type, necessarily preventing such 

applicants from intentionally misrepresenting in their applications that their type of organization 

was not eligible to receive a PPP loan under then-applicable SBA rules and guidance. Moreover, 

aside from this checkbox, SBA Form 2483 contained no other questions, required no other 

certifications, and offered no other instructions concerning the specific types of organizations that 

were and were not eligible to receive PPP loans at that time. Accordingly, there was nothing in the 

two-page application or two pages of instructions that accompanied it that would highlight for the 

individual representatives of defendants tasked with reviewing, completing, and signing the 

applications (none of whom Riner identifies in the Complaint) that their organizations might not 

be eligible to receive a PPP loan based solely on their organization type. 

Riner’s allegations concerning each defendant’s alleged false certifications in their 

respective loan forgiveness applications are equally problematic. Riner relies exclusively on a 

snippet from the certifications section of SBA Form 3508S, claiming that “when PPP loan 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 17 of 32
18 

recipients apply for forgiveness of their loan, they must further certify, through their authorized 

representative, that they have ‘complied with all requirements in the Paycheck Protection Program 

Rules,’ including the statute passed in the CARES Act and the subsequent amendments.” Compl. 

¶ 71. However, Riner again omits a key portion of the cited form—namely, the boldfaced legend 

at the top of the form stating that “A BORROWER MAY USE THIS FORM ONLY IF THE 

BORROWER RECEIVED A PPP LOAN OF $150,000 OR LESS.” 

 SBA Form 3508S (red box added for emphasis) 

The instructions accompanying SBA Form 3508S reiterated that it could be used “only if 

the loan amount you received from your Lender was $150,000 or less for an individual First or 

Second Draw PPP Loan” and that if the loan received exceeded $150,000 “you must apply for 

forgiveness of your PPP loan using SBA Form 3508 or 3508EZ (or lender’s equivalent form).” 

Neither of those forms contained the same certification that Riner references from SBA Form 

3508S. Instead, SBA Forms 3508 and 3508EZ contained a certification suggesting to the applicant 

that the SBA was not relying on the applicant’s representations and that it would conduct its own 

inquiry specifically into the applicant’s eligibility before making a forgiveness determination. 

Another important distinction is that for the smaller loans subject to SBA Form 3508S the 

borrowers were not required to submit supporting documentation with their forgiveness 

applications. In contrast, the borrowers who received larger loans were required to submit with 

their SBA Form 3508 or 3508EZ a detailed calculation worksheet along with “documentation 

verifying payroll costs, the existence of obligations and service (as applicable) prior to February 

15, 2020, and eligible business mortgage interest payments, business rent or lease payments, 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 18 of 32
19 

business utility payments, covered operations expenditures, covered property damage costs, 

covered supplier costs, and covered worker protection expenditures.”19

Accordingly, the compliance certification in SBA Form 3508S only applied to 7 of the 43 

defendants that Riner named in this action and is irrelevant to the 36 other defendants. Compl. ¶ 

89. The inapplicability of the forgiveness application form that Riner falsely asserts uniformly 

applied to all of the defendants exemplifies the deficiencies with the unspecific, broad stroke 

allegations that permeate the Complaint. 

III. Riner’s Allegations Regarding Economic Uncertainty Are Barred as a Matter of Law 

By The SBA Safe Harbor 

Riner contends that all of the defendants falsely certified their “economic uncertainty” to 

obtain PPP loans because all had access to alternative sources of funding. Compl. ¶¶ 69, 82, 89. 

15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)(G). Again, the complaint makes clear that Riner has no inside information 

concerning each individual defendant, as he fails to allege any details concerning any of the 

defendants’ financial situations or how their financial situations prevented their “economic 

uncertainty” certifications. In any event, the “economic uncertainty” certification is irrelevant to 

the vast majority of the defendants in this action. 

Although a certification of “economic uncertainty” is part of the PPP program, the SBA 

created a safe harbor for loans under $2 million. See 86 Fed. Reg. 3692-01, 3706 & n.87 (“any 

PPP borrower, together with its affiliates, that received PPP loans with an original principal amount 

of less than $2 million will be deemed to have made the required certification concerning the 

necessity of the loan request in good faith”). Faced with a similar claim premised on a supposedly 

false economic uncertainty certification, at least one court has ruled as a matter of law that SBA’s 

safe harbor for loans under $2 million is “conclusive on [a d]efendant’s potential liability for its 

economic uncertainty certifications.” U.S. v. ManPow, LLC, No. 2:21-CV-05418-VAP-ADSx, 

2024 WL 305699, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2024). 

In the ManPow case, the relators alleged claims against the defendant under the FCA 

stemming from the defendant’s PPP loan applications. Id. at *1. The relators alleged, in pertinent 

19 The instructions accompanying SBA Form 3508S make this clear: “SBA Form 3508S requires 

fewer calculations and less documentation for eligible borrowers. SBA Form 3508S does not 

require borrowers to show the calculations used to determine their loan forgiveness amount. 

However, SBA may request information and documents to review those calculations as part of its 

loan review or audit processes.”

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 19 of 32
20 

part, that the defendant “falsely certified that . . . economic uncertainty made the two loans it 

requested necessary to support its ongoing operations.” Id. In granting summary judgment in the 

defendant’s favor, the ManPow court held “[t]he SBA effectively absolved borrowers with 

principal loan amounts of less than $2 million of this requirement via its rulemaking process by 

later ‘deem[ing] [them] to have made the required certification . . . in good faith.’” Id. at 9. 

All but 5 of the 43 defendants that Riner named in this action received PPP loans under $2 

million and therefore have the benefit of this bright-line safe harbor. Compl. ¶ 89. Thus, in addition 

to the public disclosure bar and Riner’s failure to satisfy the applicable pleading standards, the safe 

harbor bars his FCA claims alleged against the overwhelming majority of the defendants to the 

extent they are based on those defendants’ economic uncertainty certifications. 

IV. The Shotgun Complaint Warrants Dismissal 

Shotgun pleadings are routinely condemned in the Eleventh Circuit because they are a 

waste of judicial resources. See Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F. 3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 

2018). Courts recognize four types of shotgun pleadings. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s 

Off., 792 F. 3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th Cir. 2015). Riner’s Complaint falls into the third recognized 

category: “pleadings that do not separate into a different count each cause of action or claim for 

relief.” Id. at 1322-23. Count I and Count II purport to assert separate violations of the False Claims 

Act under the same statutory basis. See Compl. at ¶¶ 149-166. The allegations, however, closely 

mirror each other, failing to substantiate Riner’s separate claims under the False Claims Act and 

failing to provide Defendants sufficient notice as to Riner’s distinct theories, if any. Riner’s failure 

to distinguish between the claims asserted, standing alone, warrants dismissal. See Sledge v. 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am. Ltd., 275 F. 3d 1014, 1018 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The failure of 

the plaintiff to identify his claims with sufficient clarity to enable the defendant to frame a 

[responsive] pleading constitutes shotgun pleading.”). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants joining in this motion respectfully request that 

this Court dismiss, with prejudice, the FCA claims against them, and grant such other relief this 

Court deems appropriate. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 20 of 32
21 

Respectfully submitted, 

By:/s/ Tama Beth Kudman 

Tama Beth Kudman 

Florida Bar No. 637432 

KUDMAN TRACHTEN ALOE 

POSNER LLP 

7108 Fairway Drive, Suite 130 

Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33418 

Telephone: (561) 472-0811 

tkudman@kudmanlaw.com 

 

David N. Saponara (admitted PHV) 

488 Madison Avenue, 23rd Floor 

New York, New York 10022 

Telephone: (212) 868-1010 

dsaponara@kudmanlaw.com 

Counsel for Frenchmans Reserve 

Country Club and Mizner Country 

Club, Inc. 

By: /s/ William N. Shepherd 

William N. Shepherd (Fla. Bar No. 88668) 

Jeffrey M. Schacknow (Fla. Bar No. 1004628) 

Henry A. Moreno (Fla. Bar No. 1031432) 

HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 

777 South Flagler Drive 

Suite 1900, West Tower 

West Palm Beach, FL 33401 

Telephone: (561)650-8338 

Facsimile: (561) 650-8399 

William.Shepherd@hklaw.com 

Jeffrey.schacknow@hklaw.com 

henry.moreno@hklaw.com 

Counsel for Mirasol Club & Association, 

Inc.

By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com 

One Financial Plaza 

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500 

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for the Aragon 

Condominium Association of Boca 

Raton, Inc. 

By: /s/ William Xanttopoulos 

JOHN CODY GERMAN 

Florida Bar No.: 58654 

WILLIAM XANTTOPOULOS 

Florida Bar No. 997668 

COLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A. 

Cole, Scott & Kissane Building 

9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 

P.O. Box 569015 

Miami, Florida 33156 

Telephone (786) 300-3941 

Facsimile (305) 373-2294 

william.xanttopoulos@csklegal.com

paola.valdes@csklegal.com

Counsel for The Grand Condominium 

Association, Inc 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 21 of 32
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By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

One Financial Plaza 

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for the Crossings 

Homeowners Association, Inc. 

By: /s/ Marcos D. Jiménez 

Marcos D. Jiménez 

Florida Bar No. 441503 

Brittany L. Finnegan 

Florida Bar No. 1032047 

LEÓN COSGROVE JIMÉNEZ, LLP 

255 Alhambra Circle, 8th Floor 

Miami, Florida 33134 

Tel: (305) 740-1975 

Email: bfinnegan@leoncosgrove.com 

Email: anoonan@leoncosgrove.com 

Email: vcerra@leoncosgrove.com 

Counsel for Deering Bay Yacht and 

Country Club, Inc. 

By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com 

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

One Financial Plaza

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500 

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for Fortune House 

Condominium Association, Inc. 

By: /s/ Christopher R. Parkinson

CHRISTOPHER R. PARKINSON 

Florida Bar No. 112114 

cparkinson@morankidd.com 

JASON P. DEL ROSSO 

Florida Bar No. 125379 

jdelrosso@morankidd.com 

BRIAN P. MORAN 

Florida Bar No. 1044082 

bpmoran@morankidd.com 

Moran Kidd Lyons Johnson Garcia, P.A 

111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 900 

Orlando, Florida 32801 

Telephone: (407) 841-4141 

Facsimile: (407) 841-4148 

Attorneys for Frenchman’s Creek, Inc. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 22 of 32
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By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com 

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

One Financial Plaza 

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for Leverett House 

Condominium Association, Inc. 

By: /s/ Stevan J. Pardo 

Stevan J. Pardo, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 438626 

Linsey M. Lovell, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 121581

PARDO JACKSON GAINSBURG & 

SHELOWITZ, PL

100 Southeast Second Street, Suite 2050 

Miami, FL 33131 

Phone: 305-358-1001 

Fax: 305-358-2001 

Email: SPardo@pardojackson.com

 LLovell@pardojackson.com

CFernandez@pardojackson.com 

Counsel for Ocean Club Community 

Association, Inc.

By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com 

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

One Financial Plaza

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for Palm Beach Towers 

Condominium Association, Inc. 

By: /s/ Jonathan Etra 

Jonathan Etra 

Florida Bar No. 686905 

Samuel Ludington 

Florida Bar No. 1031284 

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

One Biscayne Towner, 21st Floor

2 South Biscayne Blvd. 

Miami, FL 33131 

Telephone: 305.373.9447 

Facsimile: 305.995.6449 

Jonathan.Etra@nelsonmullins.com 

Sam.Ludington@nelsonmullins.com 

Counsel for Wycliffe Golf and Country 

Club Homeowners Association, Inc. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 23 of 32
24 

By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com 

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

One Financial Plaza 

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

 Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for the Township 

Community Master Association, Inc. 

By:/s/ Jonathan Etra 

Jonathan Etra 

Florida Bar No. 686905 

Samuel Ludington 

Florida Bar No. 1031284 

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

One Biscayne Towner, 21st Floor

2 South Biscayne Blvd. 

Miami, FL 33131 

Telephone: 305.373.9447 

Facsimile: 305.995.6449 

Jonathan.Etra@nelsonmullins.com 

Sam.Ludington@nelsonmullins.com 

Counsel for Old Palm Golf Club, Inc. 

By: /s/ Raymond A. James 

Raymond A. James 

Florida Bar No. 1026218 

Charles W. Prueter 

Admitted Pro Hac Vice

FORTIF LAW PARTNERS, LLC 

2021 Morris Avenue, Suite 300 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

raymond@fortif.com | 205.832.9106 

charles@fortif.com | 205.832.9109 

Counsel for Turnberry Towers 

Condominium Association, Inc. 

By:/s/ Samantha M. Gerencir 

Samantha M. Gerencir (FBN 1019553)

Jason P. Mehta (FBN 106110) 

Foley & Lardner LLP 

100 N. Tampa Street, Suite 2700 

Tampa, FL 33602 

Telephone: (813) 229-2300 

Facsimile: (813) 221-4210 jmehta@foley.com 

samantha.gerencir@foley.com 

Counsel for Willoughby Golf Club, Inc. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 24 of 32
25 

By: /s/Andrew B. Zelmanowitz 

Andrew B. Zelmanowitz, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 74202 

Nikki Frances Branch, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 1039430 

BERGER SINGERMAN LLP

201 East Las Olas Blvd., 

Suite 1500 

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 

Telephone: 954-525-9900 

Facsimile: 954-523-2872 

azelman@bergersingerman.com 

nbranch@bergersingerman.com 

DRT@bergersingerman.com 

ltorres@bergersingerman.com 

mavin@bergersingerman.com 

Counsel for Williams Island 

Property Owners’ Association, Inc. 

By: /s/ David C. Borucke 

BARRY A. POSTMAN 

Florida Bar No.: 991856 

DAVID C. BORUCKE 

Florida Bar No.: 039195 

JUSTIN C. SOREL 

COLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A. 

Esperante Building 

222 Lakeview Avenue, Suite 120 

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 

Telephone (561) 383-9234 

Facsimile (561) 683-8977 

E-mail: barry.postman@csklegal.com 

E-mail: david.borucke@csklegal.com 

E-mail: justin.sorel@csklegal.com

Counsel for Anchorage Resort And Yacht Club 

Condominium Association; Bal Harbour 101 

Condominium Association, Inc.; Bocaire 

Country Club, Inc.; Doral Park Country Club 

Association; Lake Clarke Gardens 

Condominium, Inc.; Meadowood Golf & Tennis 

Club Inc.; Pine Island Ridge Country Club 

Inc.; Quail Ridge Property Owners Association 

Inc.; and Yacht & Country Club, Inc. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 25 of 32
26 

By: /s/Adam M. Schachter 

ADAM M. SCHACHTER 

Florida Bar No. 647101 

aschachter@gsgpa.com 

DAN S. GELBER 

Florida Bar No. 512877 

dan@gsgpa.com 

Christopher S. Sundby 

Florida Bar No. 1026060 

csundby@gsgpa.com 

GELBER SCHACHTER & 

GREENBERG, P.A. 

One Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 

2600 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Telephone. (305) 728-0950 

Counsel for Royal Palm 

Improvement Association, Inc.

By: /s/ Carly Kligler 

Carly A. Kligler, Esq. 

Fla. Bar. No. 83980 

HILGERS GRABEN PLLC 

1221 Brickell Avenue, Suite 900 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Tel. 305.630.8304 

ckligler@hilgersgraben.com 

Paralegals@hilgersgraben.com 

Counsel for Turnberry Ocean Colony 

Master Association, Inc. 

 AND 

By: s/ James K. Parker 

James K. Parker, Esq. 

Fla Bar No. 157526 

Dominique G. Brown 

Fla Bar No. 1010187 

BOYD RICHARDS PARKER 

& COLONNELLI, P.L. 

100 S.E. 2nd Street., Suite 2600 

Miami, Florida 33131 

(786) 425-1045 

jparker@boydlawgroup.com 

dbrown@boydlawgroup.com 

 Co-counsel for Turnberry Ocean 

Colony Master Association, Inc. 

REQUEST FOR HEARING 

In accordance with Local Rule 7.1(b)(2), the Defendants request a hearing on the above 

motion and concurrently filed Defendants’ Joint Motion For Judicial Notice and estimate that 90 

minutes would be sufficient. A hearing will allow for full consideration of a threshold obstacle 

applicable to each of the defendants and, thus, potentially conserve substantial private and judicial 

resources. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 26 of 32
27 

By:/s/ Tama Beth Kudman 

Tama Beth Kudman 

Florida Bar No. 637432 

KUDMAN TRACHTEN ALOE 

POSNER LLP 

7108 Fairway Drive, Suite 130 

Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33418 

Telephone: (561) 472-0811 

tkudman@kudmanlaw.com 

 

David N. Saponara (admitted PHV) 

488 Madison Avenue, 23rd Floor 

New York, New York 10022 

Telephone: (212) 868-1010 

dsaponara@kudmanlaw.com 

Counsel for Frenchmans Reserve 

Country Club and Mizner Country 

Club, Inc. 

By: /s/ William N. Shepherd 

William N. Shepherd (Fla. Bar No. 88668) 

Jeffrey M. Schacknow (Fla. Bar No. 1004628) 

Henry A. Moreno (Fla. Bar No. 1031432) 

HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 

777 South Flagler Drive 

Suite 1900, West Tower 

West Palm Beach, FL 33401 

Telephone: (561)650-8338 

Facsimile: (561) 650-8399 

William.Shepherd@hklaw.com 

Jeffrey.schacknow@hklaw.com 

henry.moreno@hklaw.com 

Counsel for Mirasol Club & Association, 

Inc.

By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com 

One Financial Plaza 

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500 

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for the Aragon 

Condominium Association of Boca 

Raton, Inc. 

By: /s/ William Xanttopoulos 

JOHN CODY GERMAN 

Florida Bar No.: 58654 

WILLIAM XANTTOPOULOS 

Florida Bar No. 997668 

COLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A. 

Cole, Scott & Kissane Building 

9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 

P.O. Box 569015 

Miami, Florida 33156 

Telephone (786) 300-3941 

Facsimile (305) 373-2294 

william.xanttopoulos@csklegal.com

paola.valdes@csklegal.com

Counsel for The Grand Condominium 

Association, Inc 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 27 of 32
28 

By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

One Financial Plaza 

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for the Crossings 

Homeowners Association, Inc. 

By: /s/ Marcos D. Jiménez 

Marcos D. Jiménez 

Florida Bar No. 441503 

Brittany L. Finnegan 

Florida Bar No. 1032047 

LEÓN COSGROVE JIMÉNEZ, LLP 

255 Alhambra Circle, 8th Floor 

Miami, Florida 33134 

Tel: (305) 740-1975 

Email: bfinnegan@leoncosgrove.com 

Email: anoonan@leoncosgrove.com 

Email: vcerra@leoncosgrove.com 

Counsel for Deering Bay Yacht and 

Country Club, Inc. 

By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com 

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

One Financial Plaza

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500 

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for Fortune House 

Condominium Association, Inc. 

By: /s/ Christopher R. Parkinson

CHRISTOPHER R. PARKINSON 

Florida Bar No. 112114 

cparkinson@morankidd.com 

JASON P. DEL ROSSO 

Florida Bar No. 125379 

jdelrosso@morankidd.com 

BRIAN P. MORAN 

Florida Bar No. 1044082 

bpmoran@morankidd.com 

Moran Kidd Lyons Johnson Garcia, P.A 

111 North Orange Avenue, Suite 900 

Orlando, Florida 32801 

Telephone: (407) 841-4141 

Facsimile: (407) 841-4148 

Attorneys for Frenchman’s Creek, Inc. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 28 of 32
29 

By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com 

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

One Financial Plaza 

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for Leverett House 

Condominium Association, Inc. 

By: /s/ Stevan J. Pardo 

Stevan J. Pardo, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 438626 

Linsey M. Lovell, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 121581

PARDO JACKSON GAINSBURG & 

SHELOWITZ, PL

100 Southeast Second Street, Suite 2050 

Miami, FL 33131 

Phone: 305-358-1001 

Fax: 305-358-2001 

Email: SPardo@pardojackson.com

 LLovell@pardojackson.com

CFernandez@pardojackson.com 

Counsel for Ocean Club Community 

Association, Inc.

By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com 

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

One Financial Plaza

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for Palm Beach Towers 

Condominium Association, Inc. 

By: /s/ Jonathan Etra 

Jonathan Etra 

Florida Bar No. 686905 

Samuel Ludington 

Florida Bar No. 1031284 

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

One Biscayne Towner, 21st Floor

2 South Biscayne Blvd. 

Miami, FL 33131 

Telephone: 305.373.9447 

Facsimile: 305.995.6449 

Jonathan.Etra@nelsonmullins.com 

Sam.Ludington@nelsonmullins.com 

Counsel for Wycliffe Golf and Country 

Club Homeowners Association, Inc. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 29 of 32
30 

By: /s/Joseph M. Cobo 

Joseph M. Cobo, Esq. 

FBN: 114204 

Email: jcobo@kdvlaw.com 

KAUFMAN DOLOWICH, LLP

One Financial Plaza 

100 S.E. 3rd Ave., Suite 1500

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394 

Tel. (954) 302-2360 

 Fax: (888) 464-7982 

Counsel for the Township 

Community Master Association, Inc. 

By:/s/ Jonathan Etra 

Jonathan Etra 

Florida Bar No. 686905 

Samuel Ludington 

Florida Bar No. 1031284 

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

One Biscayne Towner, 21st Floor

2 South Biscayne Blvd. 

Miami, FL 33131 

Telephone: 305.373.9447 

Facsimile: 305.995.6449 

Jonathan.Etra@nelsonmullins.com 

Sam.Ludington@nelsonmullins.com 

Counsel for Old Palm Golf Club, Inc. 

By: /s/ Raymond A. James 

Raymond A. James 

Florida Bar No. 1026218 

Charles W. Prueter 

Admitted Pro Hac Vice

FORTIF LAW PARTNERS, LLC 

2021 Morris Avenue, Suite 300 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

raymond@fortif.com | 205.832.9106 

charles@fortif.com | 205.832.9109 

Counsel for Turnberry Towers 

Condominium Association, Inc. 

By:/s/ Samantha M. Gerencir 

Samantha M. Gerencir (FBN 1019553)

Jason P. Mehta (FBN 106110) 

Foley & Lardner LLP 

100 N. Tampa Street, Suite 2700 

Tampa, FL 33602 

Telephone: (813) 229-2300 

Facsimile: (813) 221-4210 jmehta@foley.com 

samantha.gerencir@foley.com 

Counsel for Willoughby Golf Club, Inc. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 30 of 32
31 

By: /s/Andrew B. Zelmanowitz 

Andrew B. Zelmanowitz, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 74202 

Nikki Frances Branch, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 1039430 

BERGER SINGERMAN LLP

201 East Las Olas Blvd., 

Suite 1500 

Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 

Telephone: 954-525-9900 

Facsimile: 954-523-2872 

azelman@bergersingerman.com 

nbranch@bergersingerman.com 

DRT@bergersingerman.com 

ltorres@bergersingerman.com 

mavin@bergersingerman.com 

Counsel for Williams Island 

Property Owners’ Association, Inc. 

By: /s/ David C. Borucke 

BARRY A. POSTMAN 

Florida Bar No.: 991856 

DAVID C. BORUCKE 

Florida Bar No.: 039195 

JUSTIN C. SOREL 

COLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A. 

Esperante Building 

222 Lakeview Avenue, Suite 120 

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 

Telephone (561) 383-9234 

Facsimile (561) 683-8977 

E-mail: barry.postman@csklegal.com 

E-mail: david.borucke@csklegal.com 

E-mail: justin.sorel@csklegal.com

Counsel for Anchorage Resort And Yacht Club 

Condominium Association; Bal Harbour 101 

Condominium Association, Inc.; Bocaire 

Country Club, Inc.; Doral Park Country Club 

Association; Lake Clarke Gardens 

Condominium, Inc.; Meadowood Golf & Tennis 

Club Inc.; Pine Island Ridge Country Club 

Inc.; Quail Ridge Property Owners Association 

Inc.; and Yacht & Country Club, Inc. 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 31 of 32
32 

By: /s/Adam M. Schachter 

ADAM M. SCHACHTER 

Florida Bar No. 647101 

aschachter@gsgpa.com 

DAN S. GELBER 

Florida Bar No. 512877 

dan@gsgpa.com 

Christopher S. Sundby 

Florida Bar No. 1026060 

csundby@gsgpa.com 

GELBER SCHACHTER & 

GREENBERG, P.A. 

One Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 

2600 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Telephone. (305) 728-0950 

Counsel for Royal Palm 

Improvement Association, Inc.

By: /s/ Carly Kligler 

Carly A. Kligler, Esq. 

Fla. Bar. No. 83980 

HILGERS GRABEN PLLC 

1221 Brickell Avenue, Suite 900 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Tel. 305.630.8304 

ckligler@hilgersgraben.com 

Paralegals@hilgersgraben.com 

Counsel for Turnberry Ocean Colony 

Master Association, Inc. 

 AND 

By: s/ James K. Parker 

James K. Parker, Esq. 

Fla Bar No. 157526 

Dominique G. Brown 

Fla Bar No. 1010187 

BOYD RICHARDS PARKER 

& COLONNELLI, P.L. 

100 S.E. 2nd Street., Suite 2600 

Miami, Florida 33131 

(786) 425-1045 

jparker@boydlawgroup.com 

dbrown@boydlawgroup.com 

 Co-counsel for Turnberry Ocean 

Colony Master Association, Inc. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of April, 2024, the undersigned electronically 

filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a 

Notice of Electronic Filing to all counsel of record. 

/s/ William N. Shepherd 

William N. Shepherd (Fla. Bar No. 88668) 

Case 1:22-cv-23342-MD Document 215 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/01/2024 Page 32 of 32