Filed 2/11/19; Certified for Publication 2/27/19 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

DAVID MOORER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

NOBLE L.A. EVENTS, INC.,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B282631

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC578016)

APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Samantha P. Jessner, Judge. Affirmed.

Pedersen Law, Neil Pedersen and Jamie Gottschalk-Hall 

for Plaintiff and Appellant.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

______________
2

David Moorer appeals from the March 23, 2017 order 

denying his request for entry of a default judgment against Noble 

L.A. Events, Inc. (Noble), and dismissing the case. The trial 

court denied Moorer’s request because Moorer refused to comply 

with the court’s order to distribute 25 percent of the penalties to 

be allocated under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act 

of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq. (PAGA))

1 to the 23 aggrieved 

employees in a pro rata amount. Instead, Moorer allocated the 

entire 25 percent to himself. On appeal, Moorer contends a 

PAGA action is a qui tam action, and therefore, 25 percent of the 

civil penalties should be distributed to the aggrieved employee 

who brought the claim. Moorer’s position is contrary to the 

California Supreme Court’s rulings interpreting PAGA. We 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

From August 18, 2013 to late December 2014, Moorer was 

employed as a full-time security guard and “lobby ambassador” 

by Noble, which provides security services to other companies. 

He and other employees provided security services to Apex, The 

Theatre at Ace Hotel (Ace), and Black Entertainment Television, 

LLC (BET). On January 14, 2015 Moorer sent notices under 

PAGA to Noble, Apex, Ace, BET, and the Labor and Workforce 

Development Agency (LWDA), alleging violations of the Labor 

Code and Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) wage order 

No. 4-2001 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11040.).

 

1 Unless otherwise noted, further statutory references are to 

the Labor Code.
3

On April 7, 2015 Moorer filed a complaint, as an individual 

and on behalf of all aggrieved employees, against Noble, Apex, 

Ace, and BET, alleging individual wage and hour and 

representative PAGA claims for violations of the Labor Code and 

IWC wage order No. 4. Noble filed an answer on June 24, 2015. 

On August 5, 2015 Moorer voluntarily dismissed Apex, Ace, and 

BET without prejudice.

Noble failed to respond to discovery that Moorer had served 

in February 2016. On March 24, 2016 Noble’s counsel filed an ex 

parte application to be relieved as counsel. The trial court 

granted the motion on March 25, and set an April 5 hearing on 

an order to show cause to strike Noble’s answer “if new counsel 

has not been retained.” (Capitalization omitted.)

At the hearing on April 5, 2016, the trial court struck 

Noble’s answer and deemed Noble to be in default because it had 

not retained new counsel and, as a corporation, Noble was unable 

to represent itself. The trial court directed Moorer to file a first 

amended complaint because the complaint did not allege specific 

damage amounts owed by Noble to support entry of a judgment 

on Moorer’s wage and hour claims, as required by Code of Civil 

Procedure section 425.10, subdivision (a)(2). The court ordered 

Moorer to submit a default judgment package no later than 

June 10. The court set a June 21 hearing for an order to show 

cause regarding entry of a default judgment against Noble.

On April 22, 2016 Moorer filed a first amended complaint 

against Noble, alleging individual and representative PAGA 

claims for failure to provide and maintain accurate itemized wage 

statements and records (§§ 226, subd. (a), 1174 & 1198), failure to 

provide meal breaks and rest periods (§ 226.7), and failure to pay 

Moorer his wages upon termination (§ 203). Moorer also alleged 
4

Noble engaged in unlawful business practices in violation of 

Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.

On July 25, 2016 the court clerk entered a default against 

Noble on the first amended complaint. On the same day Moorer 

submitted a request for entry of a default judgment in the 

amount of $679,374.52, including $594,550.00 in PAGA penalties, 

$9,513.59 in penalties for Moorer’s individual claims, $8,675.34 in 

costs, and $66,635.59 in attorneys’ fees. The civil penalties under 

PAGA in the proposed judgment were calculated based on wage 

violations for 23 aggrieved employees during the period from 

April 7, 2014 to April 7, 2015.

The trial court rejected Moorer’s first three requests for 

entry of default judgment because of clerical errors in the 

proposed judgments. At the January 31, 2017 hearing the court 

denied a later request by Moorer because the proposed judgment 

“fail[ed] to account for the distribution requirements for PAGA 

penalties.” Specifically, as the court explained, “[Moorer’s] 

proposed judgment seeks to give all penalties to [Moorer] making 

no reference to the 75% of PAGA penalties owed to LWDA. [¶]

Furthermore, the judgment must also distribute the remaining 

25% of the PAGA penalties to each of the 23 aggrieved employees, 

not just [Moorer].” According to Moorer’s counsel, at the 

January 31, 2017 hearing, the trial court continued the hearing 

to March 7, 2017, and stated Moorer “had ‘one last time’ to 

submit a correct default judgment package,” but “did not indicate 

what measures it would take should it deny” the request.2

 

2 Moorer did not include the reporter’s transcript of the 

January 31, 2017 hearing or a settled statement as part of the 

appellate record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.120(b), 

8.121(b)(1)(C), 8.130, 8.137.) Similarly, the record does not

include any information about whether a hearing took place on 
5

On March 23, 2017 the trial court held another hearing on 

Moorer’s request for entry of a default judgment. On that date 

Moorer filed a brief in support of his request. Moorer admitted in 

his brief the revised proposed judgment was only “in partial 

compliance” with the trial court’s January 31, 2017 ruling in that 

the judgment allocated penalties to the LWDA, but not other 

aggrieved employees. He acknowledged the trial court was 

correct “the LWDA is entitled to 75% of all PAGA penalties 

awarded.” But Moorer contended the remaining 25 percent of the 

PAGA penalties should be distributed only to the named plaintiff 

bringing the PAGA action, not all aggrieved employees.

At the March 23 hearing, the trial court denied Moorer’s 

request for entry of a default judgment against Noble. The trial 

court explained in its written order: “[Moorer] seeks PAGA 

penalties in the amount of $594,550.00. [Moorer] has now made 

about eight attempts to obtain a default judgment against Noble 

LA. Each time the court denied the relief requested, the court 

provided plaintiff with specific reasons for the denial. Yet again, 

[Moorer] has failed to heed the court’s direction and follow the 

law. [This] time around, [Moorer’s] proposed judgment allocates 

the amount of PAGA penalties pursuant to the percentage 

mandated by Labor Code § 2699(i), but the judgment continues to 

improperly provide the entire 25% of the PAGA penalties sought 

to [Moorer] individually, rather than each of the 23 aggrieved 

employees in a pro-rata amount. [¶] Rather than amend the 

judgment to comply with the court’s order, [Moorer] now argues 

that the entire PAGA award should be allocated to [Moorer] only, 

despite clear and unambiguous language from the California 

 

March 7, 2017 and, if a hearing occurred, what transpired at the 

hearing.
6

Supreme Court: ‘The PAGA conforms to these traditional 

criteria, except that a portion of the penalty goes not only to the 

citizen bringing the suit but all employees affected by the Labor 

Code violation.’ (Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC 

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 382 . . .)” (Italics and boldface omitted.)

The trial court added, “Additionally, allowing [Moorer], 

whose individual claim amounts to only $9,513.59, to individually 

and personally recover $148,912.50 in PAGA penalties would run 

afoul of the purpose of PAGA and makes no sense under the 

PAGA scheme. . . . [Citation.] To award [Moorer] roughly 14 

times the amount to which he would be entitled clearly flies in 

the face of the intent not to benefit private parties.” At the 

hearing, Moorer’s counsel stated Moorer did “not want another 

opportunity to submit an amended judgment package that 

compl[ied] with the court’s order,” and the court dismissed the 

case.

Moorer timely appealed.3

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The interpretation of PAGA is an issue of law, which we 

review de novo. (United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron & 

Steel Co. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1082, 1089; Weatherford v. City of San 

Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247.) “Our role in interpreting 

statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intended legislative 

purpose. [Citations.] We begin with the text, construing words 

 

3 The order of dismissal, signed by the trial court and 

entered by the court clerk, constitutes a judgment under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 581d.
7

in their broader statutory context and, where possible, 

harmonizing provisions concerning the same subject. [Citations.] 

If this contextual reading of the statute’s language reveals no 

ambiguity, we need not refer to extrinsic sources.” (United 

Riggers, at p. 1089; accord, 926 North Ardmore Ave., LLC v. 

County of Los Angeles (2017) 3 Cal.5th 319, 328.) 

B. PAGA Civil Penalties Must Be Distributed to All Aggrieved 

Employees

In 2003 the Legislature enacted PAGA “to allow aggrieved 

employees, acting as private attorneys general, to recover civil 

penalties for Labor Code violations, with the understanding that 

labor law enforcement agencies were to retain primacy over 

private enforcement efforts.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 

46 Cal.4th 969, 980 (Arias); accord, Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc. 

(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1074, 1079, fn. 5 [“PAGA authorizes an 

aggrieved employee to bring suit for specified Labor Code 

violations in a representative capacity and obtain civil penalties, 

which are then shared between the affected employees and the 

state.”].) An “‘aggrieved employee’” is “any person who was 

employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more 

of the alleged violations was committed.” (§ 2699, subd. (c); see 

Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1068,

1099.) Section 2699, subdivision (i), provides that “civil penalties 

recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distributed as follows: 

75 percent to the [LWDA] . . . and 25 percent to the aggrieved 

employees.”

Moorer contends that because a PAGA action is a type of 

qui tam action, under which the private citizen enforces a statute 

on behalf of the government, the 25 percent of the civil penalties 

not allocated to the government should be distributed to the 
8

aggrieved employee who brings the PAGA action. Although 

Moorer asserts policy arguments for why this approach would 

serve the goals of PAGA, the Supreme Court in Iskanian v. CLS 

Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 

(Iskanian) held otherwise. As the Supreme Court explained, a 

PAGA representative action “conforms to the traditional criteria” 

for bringing a qui tam action, “except that a portion of the 

penalty goes not only to the citizen bringing the suit but to all 

employees affected by the Labor Code violation.” (Iskanian, at

p. 382; see Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 

(Williams) [PAGA “deputiz[es] employees harmed by labor 

violations to sue on behalf of the state and collect penalties, to be 

shared with the state and other affected employees”].)4

Allocation of 25 percent to all aggrieved employees is 

consistent with the statutory scheme under which the judgment 

binds all aggrieved employees, including nonparties. (Iskanian, 

supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 381 [“‘Because an aggrieved employee’s 

 

4 Moorer relies on Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 

163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1195, Cunningham v. Leslie’s Poolmart, 

Inc. (C.D.Cal., June 25, 2013, No. CV 13-2122 CAS (CWx)) 2013 

U.S.Dist. Lexis 90256 *1, *17, and Admona v. University of 

Phoenix, Inc. (2012) 913 F.Supp.2d 964, 978, footnote 5, to 

support his contention 25 percent of the penalties recovered in a 

PAGA action are paid to the named plaintiff. (See Amaral, at

p. 1195 [“If an employee successfully recovers an award of civil 

penalties, PAGA requires that 75 percent of the recovery be paid 

to the [LWDA], with the remaining 25 percent going to the 

employee.”].) But these cases predated the Supreme Court’s 

Iskanian and Williams decisions and cite only to the language in 

section 2699, subdivision (i). (See, e.g., Cunningham, supra, at

p. *17, fn. 1 [“the [c]ourt has not been presented with any case 

law or other authority directly addressing how penalties 

recovered by an employee are to be distributed . . . .”].)
9

action under the [PAGA] functions as a substitute for an action 

brought by the government itself, a judgment in that action binds 

all those, including nonparty aggrieved employees, who would be 

bound by a judgment in an action brought by the government.’”]; 

accord, Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.)

Moreover, “‘an action to recover civil penalties “is 

fundamentally a law enforcement action designed to protect the 

public and not benefit private parties.”’” (Iskanian, supra, 

59 Cal.4th at p. 381; accord, Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) 

As the trial court observed, allowing Moorer to recover 

$148,912.50 in civil penalties, although his individual claims only 

amounted to $9,513.59, would be contrary to PAGA’s intent to 

protect the public, not to benefit private parties.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the Case

Moorer contends the trial court erred in dismissing the case 

because he was unable to distribute 25 percent of the penalties to 

the other aggrieved employees given that Noble never provided 

him with a contact list for the other employees. However, 

Moorer’s right to discovery would not end with the entry of a 

default judgment. Rather, Moorer could have complied with the 

trial court’s order, then obtained discovery from Noble as a 

judgment creditor. “A judgment creditor may conduct discovery 

directly against the judgment debtor by means of a judgment 

debtor examination ([Code of Civ. Proc.,] § 708.110), written 

interrogatories (§ 708.020), and requests for production of 

documents (§ 708.030).” (SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior 

Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 751-752 (SCC Acquisitions, 

Inc.); accord, Li v. Yan (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 56, 65 [“a 

judgment creditor may obtain documents from a judgment debtor 
10

either by subpoena duces tecum or by a discovery request for 

production”].)

Code of Civil Procedure section 708.030, subdivision (a), 

allows a judgment creditor to obtain information about a third 

party, provided the document “is in the possession, custody, or 

control” of the judgment debtor and “the demand requests 

information to aid in enforcement of the money judgment.” (See 

SCC Acquisitions, Inc., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 752-753.) 

Moreover, Moorer can obtain the other aggrieved employees’ 

contact information pursuant to a protective order, which would 

safeguard their privacy rights.5 (Id. at p. 755.)

Moorer also argues allowing the dismissal to stand would 

permit an employer to defeat an employee’s ability to obtain a 

judgment by simply not defending the action. But this is not 

such a case. The trial court dismissed the case after allowing 

Moorer approximately eight attempts to obtain a default 

judgment against Noble. At the January 31 hearing, the court 

informed Moorer that he had “one last time” to submit a correct 

default judgment package. Moorer refused to follow the court’s 

order, acknowledging the revised proposed judgment was only “in 

partial compliance” with the January 31 order. At the March 23, 

2017 hearing, the trial court dismissed the case only after 

Moorer’s counsel stated he did not want “another opportunity to 

submit an amended judgment package that compl[ied] with the 

court’s order.” Thus, the order of dismissal was the result of 

Moorer’s decision not to submit a default judgment in compliance 

 

5 The superior court could also follow the notice procedure we 

set forth in Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 

149 Cal.App.4th 554, 562, under which the employer would 

provide notice to nonparty employees and an opportunity for 

them to opt out from disclosure of their contact information.
11

with the trial court’s order, not Noble’s failure to defend the 

action.6

DISPOSITION

The dismissal order is affirmed.

FEUER, J.

WE CONCUR:

PERLUSS, P. J. ZELON, J.

 

6 Counsel for Moorer at oral argument stated that Moorer 

made the purposeful decision not to submit a judgment allocating 

25 percent of the PAGA penalties to all aggrieved employees in 

order to preserve the issue for appeal, not out of intransigence. 

Although dismissal of the action will mean the LWDA and 

aggrieved employees will not recover any PAGA penalties in this 

lawsuit, they would not be barred by issue preclusion from 

bringing a future PAGA claim because the dismissal does not 

“conclusively resolve[] an issue actually litigated and determined 

in the first action.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 

61 Cal.4th 813, 824; accord, Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 

322, 327 [issue preclusion prevents “‘relitigation of previously 

decided issues’”].) Neither would claim preclusion apply because 

the LWDA and other aggrieved employees were not parties or in 

privity with parties to this lawsuit. (Samara, at p. 327; DKN 

Holdings LLC, at p. 824.) As discussed, the LWDA and aggrieved 

employees would have been bound had a judgment been entered 

on Moorer’s PAGA claims. (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at

p. 381.)
1

Filed 2/27/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

DAVID MOORER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

NOBLE LA EVENTS INC.,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B282631

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC578016)

 ORDER CERTIFYING

 OPINION FOR

 PUBLICATION

 NO CHANGE IN

 JUDGMENT

THE COURT:*

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on 

February 11, 2019 was not certified for publication in the Official 

Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion should 

be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

 

* PERLUSS, P. J. ZELON, J. FEUER, J.