appellant's original lender did not agree with anyone to separate 

appellant's note from appellant's deed of trust. See Edelstein, 128 Nev. at 

286 P.3d at 258-59. Thus, under either the Restatement rule adopted 

by this court in Edelstein or the traditional rule mentioned in Carpenter v. 

Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 275 (1872), a negotiation of appellant's promissory 

note automatically transferred with it appellant's deed of trust. See 

Edelstein, 128 Nev. at , 286 P.3d at 257-58 (explaining the similarities 

between the Restatement rule and the traditional rule). Here, respondent 

produced appellant's original promissory note, which contained an 

endorsement (on an allonge) by appellant's original lender to the order of 

ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, and which also contained a blank 

endorsement by ABN AMR() Mortgage Group. Because respondent 

possessed appellant's original, properly negotiated note, it was the note 

holder and was entitled to enforce the note. See Leyva, 127 Nev. at , 

255 P.3d at 1280-81 (recognizing that a party in possession of a 

promissory note that has been properly negotiated is the note holder and 

that one way to attain holder status is to possess a note that has been 

endorsed in blank). And because each negotiation automatically 

transferred appellant's deed of trust, Edelstein, 128 Nev. at , 286 P.3d 

at 257-58, respondent also established that it held the beneficial interest 

in appellant's deed of trust.' Thus, the district court correctly determined 

'In this regard, we note that the 2012 deed of trust assignment with 

which appellant takes issue was unnecessary to complete respondent's 

chain of title. We further note that, at the time when respondent acquired 

beneficial interest in appellant's deed of trust in 2007, an interest in real 

property was capable of being validly transferred without the transfer 

being recorded. See Edelstein, 128 Nev. at n.5, 286 P.3d at 254 n.5 

continued on next page... 

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that respondent produced the documents necessary to establish that it was 

the proper entity to attend the mediation. Edelstein, 128 Nev. at , 286 

13 .3d at 260 (reviewing a district court's legal conclusions de novo); cf. 

Washoe Cnty. v. Otto, 128 Nev. , 282 P.3d 719, 727 (2012) 

(recognizing that this court may affirm the district court if it reached the 

proper result, albeit on alternative grounds). 

Appellant next contends that respondent's representative who 

participated in the mediation via telephone failed to demonstrate that he 

had authority to modify appellant's loan. Relying on FMR 11(7) (2013), 

appellant suggests that this representative should have produced a copy of 

his employment agreement with respondent showing that his job 

description entailed modifying loans. We disagree, as FMR 11(7) (2013) 

pertains to situations in which a loan servicer attends a mediation on 

behalf of the deed of trust beneficiary. 2Here, the record on appeal 

demonstrates that appellant was offered a loan modification at the 

mediation, and the district court did not clearly err in finding that 

...continued 

(recognizing that, before the Legislature's 2011 amendment to NRS 

106.210, recording a transfer of an interest in real property was optional). 

2Appellant contends that such a situation existed here, evidenced by 

a letter he received from Freddie Mac stating that Freddie Mac owns his 

mortgage and that respondent is the servicer. While this letter may 

suggest as much, respondent nevertheless appeared at the mediation with 

the documents needed to establish that it was the note holder and deed of 

trust beneficiary. See Edelstein, 128 Nev. at , 286 P.3d at 255 ("[T]o 

have standing to foreclose, the current beneficiary of the deed of trust and 

the current holder of the promissory note must be the same."). As this is 

what the FMP requires, id., the district court was within its discretion to 

deny appellant's petition for judicial review and to order the issuance of an 

FMP certificate. 

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J. 

respondent's representative had authority to modify appellant's loan. 

Edelstein, 128 Nev. at , 286 P.3d at 260 (indicating that, absent clear 

error, a district court's factual determinations will not be disturbed). 

Appellant lastly contends that the district court cited to an 

outdated version of the FMP rules in its order. While we agree with this 

broader contention, we are unable to discern a specific argument that 

appellant made in his petition for judicial review that might have had a 

different outcome if the district court had applied the 2013 FMP rules. 

Although appellant suggests that respondent's document certifications 

would have been deficient under FMR 11(8) (2013), appellant did not raise 

this argument in his petition for judicial review. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. 

Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). In any event, having 

independently reviewed these certifications, we conclude that they comply 

with FMR 11(8) (2013). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 3 

/at, xe_oz, 

Hardesty 

ca-.? 

Douglas 

3 In light of this disposition, we vacate the temporary stay imposed 

by our January 24, 2014, order. 

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cc: Hon. Lidia Stiglich, District Judge 

Robert C. Townsend, Jr. 

RCO Legal, P.S. 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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