United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 25, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_______________

m 05-60501

Summary Calendar

_______________

CHARLEAN MCDONALD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants,

ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.; UNUMPROVIDENT CORPORATION; HEATHER FRIANT,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

m 5:03-CV-241

____________________________________
2

Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, 

Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*

CharleanMcDonald, proceeding pro se, appeals the summary judgment dismissal of her

employment discrimination claims against

Entergy Operations, Inc. (“Entergy”), and her

ERISAclaims against UnumProvident Corporation (“UnumProvident”) and Heather Friant,

an employee of UnumProvident. Finding no

genuine issue of material fact, we affirm.

I.

Charlean McDonald, a black woman, was

hired by Entergy in 1981 and worked there

continuously, primarily in clerical positions,

untilJanuary 2002. In 2001, McDonald sued,

asserting that Entergy had discriminated

against her on account of race by failing to

promote her, by paying her a disparate wage,

and by generally creating adverse working

conditions. That suit was dismissed on summary judgment, which was affirmed in McDonald v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 75 Fed.

Appx. 279 (5th Cir. 2003) (“McDonald I”). 

In January 2002, McDonald was involved

in an automobile accident;she consultedmultiple doctors for the treatment of resulting back

and neck pain. In July 2002 she submitted a

claimfor long-termdisabilitybenefitsto Unum

Life Insurance Company of America

(“Unum”), a subsidiary of UnumProvident responsible for administering benefits under the

EntergyCorporationCompanies’ Benefits Plus

Long Term Disability Plan (“the Plan”).

AlthoughUnuminitiallyapproved McDonald’s claim in September 2002, it requested

that she have her physician complete forms, to

be submitted to Unum, describing the extent of

her injuries and her current functional abilities.

None of the physicians McDonald had consulted agreed to fill out the required forms,

because each thought McDonald was not disabled. Based on the medical opinions and the

informationitreceived fromEntergyregarding

the physical requirements of McDonald’s job,

Unum in April 2003 determined there was

insufficient evidence to support McDonald’s

claim of total disability and discontinued her

benefits.

In the meantime, in December 2002 McDonald had filed another claim of discrimination against Entergy with the Equal Employment OpportunityCommission (“EEOC”), asserting that Entergyhad subjected her to terms

and conditions of employment different from

those of her co-workers in retaliation for her

filing the discrimination suit in McDonald I.

1

In January 2003 the EEOC dismissed McDonald’s claim and issued her a right to sue letter.

In April 2003 McDonald sued Entergy2

alleging violations of title VII, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for re-

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has

determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 McDonald stated that the terms and conditions

of employment included the monitoring of her

telephone calls by the company attorney, charging

her absence fromwork as vacation time rather than

short-term disability leave, and failure to give her

an “outage incentive check” for 2002.

2 McDonald’s complaint also lists as defendants

various individual employees of Entergy, T. Roe

Price Retirement Plan Services, Inc., and the law

firm of Wise, Carter, Child & Carraway, P.A.

Each of those defendants was dismissed from this

case, and McDonald does not appeal that order.
3

taliation (in terms of the imposition of adverse

working conditions and, ultimately, termination). In addition, she asserted claims against

UnumProvident and Hearther Friant under

ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., for denial of

disability benefits.3 The court found no genuine issue of material fact with regard to any of

McDonald’s claims and granted summary

judgment, dismissing all claims with prejudice.

II.

Summary judgment “shall be rendered

forthwithifthe pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with affidavits, if any,show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

We review the grant ofsummary judgment de

novo, using the same criteria employed by the

district court. Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp.,

335 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2003).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry ofsummary judgment, after

adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case,

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation,

there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any

material fact,’ since a complete failure of

proof concerning an essential element of

the nonmoving party’s case necessarilyrenders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-

23 (1986). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination. To state a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff

must establish, inter alia, that there was a

causal link between the protected action taken

bythe plaintiff and the subsequent termination.

See Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci.

Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2001).

The district court found that Entergy was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the

title VII and § 1981 retaliatory discharge

claims because, even assuming that McDonald

had not voluntarily ended her employment

withEntergy,4 McDonald brought forth no evidence of a causal link between the filing of her

suit and her alleged termination. 

We agree with the district court. Not only

did McDonald fail to present any evidence,

other than pure speculation, of a causal link,

but she stated in deposition that her employment with Entergy ended because she was unable to performher job duties, not because she

had sued. McDonald’s claims of retaliatory

discharge under title VII and § 1981 therefore

fail as a matter of law.5

3 Although McDonald’s enumerated claims

mention § 1981, none of them refers specifically to

title VII or ERISA. We agree with the district

court, however, that becauseMcDonald is proceeding pro se, her complaint should be read liberally.

See Atchison v. Collins, 288 F.3d 177, 179 n.2

(5th Cir. 2002).

4 Whether McDonald was actually fired is an

issue in dispute.

5 McDonald also asserts that Entergy imposed

adverseworking conditions, in the formofmonitoring her phone calls and invading her privacy, in

retaliation for the filing of suit. This retaliation

claim is wholly without merit. It is based entirely

on the fact that an employee of Entergy listened to

a voicemail message relevant to McDonald’s longterm disability claim that McDonald had voluntarily left for him and then gave a transcript of that

message to Entergy’s attorney. McDonald does

(continued...)
4

III.

To determine whether UnumProvident and

its employee, Friant, are entitled to judgment

as a matter of law on McDonald’s ERISA

claims, we must first consider whatstandard of

review applies to the plan administrator’s decision to deny benefits in this case. Where, as

here, a policy gives an administrator discretionary authority over a claimant’s entitlement

to benefits, we review a denial of benefits for

abuse of discretion. Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins.

Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 295 (5thCir. 1999)

(en banc). Less deference is given under the

abuse of discretion standard where an administrator is self-interested. Id. at 296. 

The district court found that UnumProvident was not operating under a conflict of interest in administering the Entergy plan. We

have no reason to dispute that finding and

therefore apply a pure abuse of discretion standard to UnumProvident’s decision to deny

McDonald’s claim for long-term disability

benefits.

UnumProvident assertsthat it ultimately denied benefits because McDonald never submitted a physician’s certification of her physical limitations and presented no medical evidence indicating she was unable to performthe

material duties of her job. Because McDonald

has offered no coherent challenge to the merits

of UnumProvident’s decision, there is no basis

for finding abuse of discretion.

AFFIRMED.6

5

(...continued)

not point to any violation of law occasioned by this

action.

6Entergy’smotion to strike portions of McDonald’s reply brief is DENIED.