Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-651 | September 17, 2019 Page 1 of 23

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joel C. Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of K.M. (Minor Child);

C.T. (Mother), 

Appellant-Respondent, 

v. 

Indiana Department of Child 

Services, 

Appellee-Petitioner.

September 17, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-651 

Appeal from the Miami Superior 

Court

The Honorable Daniel C. Banina, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

52D02-1808-JT-7 

Najam, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-651 | September 17, 2019 Page 2 of 23

Statement of the Case

[1] C.T. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights over 

her minor child, K.M. (“Child”).1

 Mother raises two issues for our review, 

which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court violated her due process rights

when it suspended her visitation with Child during the 

CHINS proceedings.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support 

the termination of her parental rights. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother gave birth to Child on October 17, 2014. On March 30, 2017, the 

Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Child’s 

scalp was missing a two-inch by two-inch section of hair. In response, DCS 

Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Nicole Krohn visited Mother and asked 

Mother about Child. Mother was “unable to give an explanation for the child’s 

injury[.]” Ex. Vol. III at 16. The next day, FCM Krohn showed pictures of 

Child’s wound to a doctor at Riley Children’s Hospital. The doctor informed 

FCM Krohn that Child’s injury was “inflicted” and that it would have been 

“very painful.” Id. Thereafter, on April 28, DCS filed a petition alleging that 

1 Child’s father does not participate in this appeal. 
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Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). DCS did not remove Child 

at that time. 

[4] On May 4, there was “an incident” at Mother’s home. Id. at 47. A man with a 

knife “got very upset,” and someone called 9-1-1. Id. Officers responded to the 

call and went to Mother’s house. Officers then transported the man to a 

counseling center for a 72-hour mental health hold. The next day, the trial

court held an initial hearing on the CHINS petition. Due to the incident at 

Mother’s house the previous day, the court ordered Mother to notify DCS 

“immediately of any change in the household composition, including providing 

the identity of any individual sleeping over in the home[.]” Id. at 45. 

[5] One week later, on May 12, FCM Krohn went to Mother’s home to conduct an 

announced visit. When she arrived, FCM Krohn discovered that an 

unidentified male had spent the night at Mother’s home with Mother and 

Child. When FCM Krohn asked Mother about the man, Mother could not 

provide FCM Krohn with the man’s first or last name but could only provide a 

nickname. DCS removed Child from Mother’s home at that time. The court 

ratified DCS’s removal of Child from Mother’s home and granted Mother 

visitation with Child. The man was later identified as a convicted child 

molester. 

[6] On June 28, following a hearing, the trial court adjudicated Child to be a 

CHINS. Specifically, the court found that Child was a CHINS because 

Mother: was unable to provide an explanation for Child’s head wound, was on 
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probation following a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, had a 

pending probation violation, and had a new criminal charge for battery. That 

same day, the trial court entered its dispositional decree and ordered Mother to 

participate in services, including home-based case management, supervised 

visitation, a mental health assessment, a parenting assessment, and to follow all 

recommendations of the service providers. 

[7] Between the date of the court’s dispositional order and the end of November, 

Mother “partially complied” with services. Id. at 59. Mother completed her

clinical intake and parenting assessments, but she did not enroll in the services 

recommended by the providers. However, at the end of November, Mother 

“went downhill . . . in her use of drugs[.]” Tr. Vol. II at 46. On November 30, 

the State charged Mother with several drug related crimes, and Mother pleaded 

guilty to one count of dealing in methamphetamine, as a Level 5 felony, and 

one count of possession of a syringe, as a Level 6 felony. As a result, Mother 

was incarcerated from December 2 through December 15. Shortly thereafter, 

Mother was again arrested, and, on January 15, 2018, the State charged Mother 

with one count of possession of a controlled substance, as a Class A 

misdemeanor. Mother pleaded guilty to that charge. 

[8] Mother’s arrests became a “hindrance” to her ability to participate in services. 

Id. at 35. On February 14, the trial court entered an order in which it changed 

the permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental rights. 

Specifically, the court found that Mother had not complied with services and 

that she had been arrested on two new drug charges. That same day, the court 
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ordered Mother to submit to random drug screens due to “concerns about 

[Mother’s] substance abuse” and “her arrests for substance related crimes.” Id. 

[9] Mother was “noncompliant” with services following that date. Ex. Vol. III at 

65. In March, Mother missed four out of four possible visits with Child. 

Further, Mother tested positive for illegal substances at the only random drug 

test she took. Accordingly, on March 14, the trial court modified its 

dispositional order. The court ordered Mother’s visitation to be suspended until 

she was “100% compliant with all services for three weeks[.]” Id. Thereafter, 

on May 7, the State revoked Mother’s bond in a prior case and arrested her. 

Prior to that arrest, Mother was “not in compliance with any service.” Id. at 

67. Mother was released from incarceration on June 12. The next day, the trial

court held a permanency hearing. Following that hearing, Mother tested 

positive for methamphetamine metabolites. Mother was again arrested on June 

18 and charged with one count of unlawful possession of a syringe, as a Level 6 

felony, to which Mother pleaded guilty. And, on July 1, Mother was charged 

with one count of unlawful possession of a syringe in a separate cause. 

[10] On August 21, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights over 

Child. Mother was released from jail on October 16 and, as a condition of her

probation in two prior cases, entered a rehabilitation center on October 19. 

However, Mother used methamphetamine “right before” she entered the 

program. Tr. Vol. II at 111. Less than one month later, on November 13, 

Mother left the program without having completed “even the most minimum of 

the programming[.]” Id. at 90. Mother knew that leaving “would be a 
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violation of [her] probation” and that DCS had filed a petition to terminate her 

parental rights. Id. at 122. After Mother left the program, she missed two drug 

screens. As a result of Mother’s failure to complete the program, the State filed 

two petitions to revoke her probation. 

[11] The court held a fact-finding hearing on the petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights on December 4. Thereafter, on February 19, 2019, the court 

entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the [C]hild’s removal or the reasons for the placement outside 

of the parent’s home will not be remedied in that:

* * *

3. On April 28, 2017, the Verified Petition Alleging [Child] a 

Child in Need of Services was filed as an In-Home CHINS due 

to the [C]hild having a two inch by two inch section of hair 

missing from the top of her head; Dr. Stalker confirmed the 

injury was inflicted and Mother could not explain how the [C]ild 

received the injury while in her care.

4. A condition of the [C]hild remaining in home with Mother 

was that she would, “notify the DCS immediately of any change 

in the household composition, including providing the identify of 

any individuals sleeping over in the home, and inform the DCS 

of the identify of any individuals providing care for or 

‘babysitting’ the child,” as ordered by the Court at the Initial 

Hearing on May 5, 2017.

5. On May 12, 2017, the [C]hild was removed from the [M]other 

and placed in foster care after FCM [Miranda] Sipe and FCM 
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Krohn conducted an announced home visit at [Mother’s] 

residence and an unidentified male, later identified as a convicted 

child molester who is on the sex offender registry, was asleep on 

the couch.

6. The [C]hild was adjudicated a Child in need of service[s] on 

June 28, 2017.

7. The CHINS court entered a Dispositional Decree on June 28, 

2017, ordering [Mother] to participate in services which would 

enhance [her] abilities to fulfill [her] parental obligations.

8. [Mother] was ordered to actively and consistently participate 

in the following services:

a. Home Based Services

i. While Mother had a brief period of compliance 

between detention and approximately November 

2017, all referrals were closed due to noncompliance 

without meeting an[y] service goals.

b. Supervised visitation

i. From the time of detention to approximately 

November 2017, Mother was adequately consistent 

with visitation; though she cancelled some visits, 

her referral was able to remain open.

ii. Mother’s attendance with visits became sporadic 

at best through November 2017 and after. In early 

March 2018, Mother failed to attend four of four 

possible visits and they were Ordered suspended 
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until she was 100% compliant with other services. 

Mother has not had any visits since that time.

c. Mental Health Intake

i. Mother did not follow through in completing the 

appointments for her intake to receive mental health 

services. 

d. Parenting assessment

i. Mother completed the parenting assessment early 

in the case; she was recommended to participate in 

individual therapy, a psychological evaluation to 

confirm [a] suspected mental health diagnosis, a 

psychiatric evaluation for medication management, 

and home based case management. Mother did not 

enroll, schedule, or participate in any of the 

recommended services, beyond the homebased case 

management she was already receiving. 

e. Random Drug Screens

i. Following arrests for drug related charges, 

Mother was Ordered to participate in the random 

drug screen calendar on February 14, 2018. Mother 

never participated [by] consistently calling in and 

screening when requested; she continued to test 

positive for methamphetamine metabolites when 

screened and had additional drug related arrests. 

ii. Mother was released from the Howard County 

Jail June 12, 2018; she attended a hearing in the 

underlying CHINS cause on June 13, 2018, and was 
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given a drug screen after which [she tested] positive 

for methamphetamine metabolites. 

* * *

10. At the time of the Fact Finding Hearing in the CHINS, 

Mother was on probation in cause 52D02-1604-CM-119 (pled 

guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance), and had a 

pending probation violation, as well as new criminal charges for 

battery under cause 52D02-1706-CM-178.

11. Mother was arrested on new cause 52D02-1807-F6-166 for 

Illegal Possession of a Syringe, a Level 6 felony, which was 

pending at the time of the Fact-Finding Hearing on 12/4/2018. 

(This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Mother 

subsequently pleaded guilty to this charge on February 14, 

2019[,] before the same Judge in the same Court.)

12. Mother was charged in cause 34D01-1806-F6-553 and 

plead[ed] guilty to Illegal Possession of a Syringe; there is a 

pending petition to revoke probation and warrant for her arrest 

due to her leaving her Court Ordered substance abuse 

rehabilitation probation without completing the program.

13. Mother was charged in cause 52D02-1801-CM-16 and 

plead[ed] guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance.

14. Mother was charged in cause 34D01-1712-F4-1375 and 

plead[ed] guilty to Dealing Methamphetamine and Illegal 

Possession of a Syringe; there is a pending petition to revoke 

probation and warrant for her arrest to her leaving her Court 

Ordered substance abuse rehabilitation program without 

completing the program.
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* * *

There is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parentchild relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the [C]hild in 

that:

* * *

3. Mother has never taken responsibility for the injury that led to 

the filing of the underlying CHINS cause; even today she gives 

no explanation for her child’s injury.

4. Mother has refused to engage in offered services to address 

her own mental health diagnoses and improve her ability to 

parent.

5. Not only has Mother not taken advantage of services offered 

to remedy the concerns that led to the child’s removal, Mother’s 

circumstances have grossly deteriorated with her 

methamphetamine use and repeated arrests for drug related 

charges.

6. Additionally, Mother has demonstrated no desire to change 

her behavior; she tested positive for methamphetamine the day 

after being released from incarceration, when she was in Court 

for a hearing in her daughter’s CHINS cause, knowing the 

Department had filed a petition for the termination of her 

parent[-]child relationship.

7. By her own testimony here today, Mother admits she left her 

substance abuse rehabilitation program without completing it, 

knowing this termination of parental rights case was pending, 

and that leaving would violate the terms of her probation, which 
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could lead to her suspended sentence in the Department of 

Correction being reinstated.

8. Mother also was reluctant to agree that she would participate 

in the substance abuse rehabilitation if she was given further 

opportunity, if that was the only way her child could be returned 

to her care.

* * *

Termination is in the [C]hild’s best interests in that:

1. [Child] is entitled to permanency and her needs are 

paramount . . . .

The Department of Child Services has a satisfactory plan for the 

care and treatment of the [C]hild, which is: adoption.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 21-25. In light of its findings and conclusions, the 

court terminated Mother’s parental rights over Child. This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[12] Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights over Child. 

We begin our review of this appeal by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional 

right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe 

Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. 

denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to 
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those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a 

termination. Schultz v. Porter Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 

832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is 

proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. 

Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely 

because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be 

terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental 

responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[13] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the 

reasons for placement outside the home of the 

parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.

* * *

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.
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Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2018). DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of 

parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. 

Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting 

I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[14] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cty. Off. of 

Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. 

denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial 

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s 

judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. 

Judy S. v. Noble Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[15] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court entered specific 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment 

contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of 

review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). 

First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we 

determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly 

erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either 

directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If 

the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. 

In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.
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Issue One: Due Process

[16] Mother first contends that the trial court violated her due process rights when it 

terminated her parental rights. “When a State seeks to terminate the parentchild relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of the 

due process clause. Although due process has never been precisely defined, the 

phrase embodies a requirement of fundamental fairness.” Tavorn v. Marion Cty. 

Off. of Fam. and Child. (In re J.T.), 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Baker v. 

Marion Cty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 810 N.E.2d 1035 (Ind. 2004). In addition,

because of the interlocking CHINS and termination of parental rights statutes, 

“‘procedural irregularities in a CHINS proceeding may be of such import that 

they deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to the termination 

of his or her parental rights.” Phelps v. Porter Cty. Off. of Fam. and Child. (In re 

A.P.), 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 

[17] In In re A.P., this Court considered “a record replete with procedural 

irregularities throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings that [were] 

plain, numerous, and substantial.” Id. at 1118. Specifically, this Court 

analyzed seven errors, which included the following: (1) the Porter County 

Office of Family and Children failed to provide the parents with copies of some, 

if not all, of the child’s case plans; (2) the termination petition did not include 

any of the statutorily required allegations; (3) the original CHINS petition was 

unsigned and unverified; (4) the trial court never held a permanency hearing; 

(5) none of the court orders, including the CHINS dispositional order, 
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contained written findings or conclusions; (6) the trial court entered a nocontact order against the father without following the statutory prerequisites; 

and (7) the father was deprived of his right to be present at hearings on at least 

two occasions. Id. at 1117. This court held that, taken together, those errors 

amounted to a violation of the parents’ due process rights such that the Court 

was “compelled” to reverse the court’s termination order. Id. at 1118.

[18] Here, Mother contends that she was denied her procedural due process rights 

with respect to the termination of her parental rights because of a procedural 

irregularity in the CHINS proceedings. Specifically, Mother asserts:

Here[,] the procedural irregularity is the cessation of Mother’s 

supervised visitation with her daughter long before the close of 

the CHINS proceedings. The juvenile court may have had 

benevolent motivations when ordering Mother’s visitation 

stopped until Mother complied 100% for three consecutive weeks 

with DCS services. But the reality is, when Mother’s largest 

hurdle with compliance is substance abuse, and the DCS has not 

referred Mother for substance abuse treatment, making visitation 

contingent upon consecutive clean drug tests likely exacerbates 

the problem that needs to be addressed.

For [a] drug addict, hopelessness and emotional turmoil will lead 

to caving to their addiction. This reality should be acceptable 

without citation. And, denying a parent access to their child for 

weeks at a time will cause hopelessness and emotional turmoil. 

Therefore, it’s possible, indeed likely, that the court order 

terminating Mother[’s] visitation with her child until she was 

100% compliant contributed to her substance abuse and related 

legal problems, which in turn made it more difficult for her to 

comply with the disposition order.
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Appellant’s Br. at 19-20. In essence, Mother contends that the court’s order 

suspending her visitation contributed to her noncompliance such that 

termination of her parental rights amounted to a violation of her due process

rights.

[19] We first note that Mother failed to raise this issue to the trial court during the 

termination hearing. It is well settled that a parent can waive a due process 

claim in a CHINS or termination proceeding by raising that claim for the first 

time on appeal. See McBride v. Monroe Cty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 798 N.E.2d 

185, 194-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Because Mother did not raise this issue to the 

trial court, the issue is waived. 

[20] Waiver notwithstanding, Mother’s claim must fail. Mother contends that the 

trial court’s order suspending her visitation with Child was a “procedural 

irregularity” because DCS had not provided her with substance abuse treatment

and because the order caused her to use drugs. But Mother’s argument is not a 

procedural attack. Indeed, DCS provided Mother with mental health services, 

which would have likely helped her address her drug addiction, but Mother did 

not follow through with the recommended services. There was nothing about 

the CHINS order suspending visitation that amounted to a violation of due 

process. Rather, the trial court gave Mother notice of the order; gave her an 

opportunity to respond to it; and outlined exactly what Mother needed to 

accomplish to resume visitation. Instead, Mother continued to use drugs and 

not comply with services. Mother has not demonstrated that there was any 

procedural irregularity in the CHINS proceedings, much less a procedural 
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irregularity that amounted to a violation of her due process rights during the 

termination proceedings.2

 

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[21] Mother next contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that: the 

conditions that resulted in Child’s removal will not be remedied; the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child’s wellbeing; and termination is in Child’s best interest. However, as Indiana Code 

Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we need not address 

Mother’s contention that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses 

a threat to Child’s well-being. 

Reasons for Child’s Placement Outside of Mother’s Home

[22] Mother asserts that the trial court erred when it concluded that the reasons for 

Child’s placement outside of Mother’s home were unlikely to be remedied. 

Specifically, Mother contends that the conditions that resulted in Child’s 

removal included “Mother allowing a man to sleep at her home on one 

occasion, without incident, shortly after a CHINS proceeding had been initiated 

due to an unexplained injury to [Child] from someone apparently pulling the 

2

 To the extent Mother argues that her due process rights were violated when DCS failed to refer Mother to 

substance abuse treatment, the “failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly 

attack a termination order as contrary to law.” A.Z. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re H.L.), 915 N.E.2d 145, 

148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
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child’s hair out,” but that there was “no evidence that either of these issues 

would persist[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 13.

[23] Mother’s argument on this issue misses the mark. This Court has clarified that, 

given the wording of the statute, it is not just the basis for the initial removal of 

the child that may be considered for purposes of determining whether a parent’s 

rights should be terminated, but also any basis resulting in the continued 

placement outside of a parent’s home. Inkenhaus v. Vanderburgh Cty. Off. of Fam. 

& Child. (In re A.I.), 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. 

Here, in addition to considering the reasons for Child’s initial removal from 

Mother’s home, the court also properly considered the conditions that resulted 

in the continued placement of Child outside of Mother’s home, which included

Mother’s failure to comply with services, her drug use, and her repeated arrests 

for drug-related crimes. 

[24] And the evidence supports the trial court’s findings and conclusions on this 

issue. To determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the reasons 

for Child’s continued placement outside of Mother’s home will not be 

remedied, the trial court should judge Mother’s fitness to care for Child at the 

time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed 

conditions. See E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 

(Ind. 2014). However, the court must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual 

patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation 

of the child.” Moore v. Jasper Cty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to this rule, courts 
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have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and 

alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of 

adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not required to rule 

out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a 

reasonable probability the parent’s behavior will not change. Id.

[25] The trial court found, and the evidence supports, that Child was removed from 

Mother’s care on May 12, 2017, after Mother had violated a court order and 

allowed an unidentified male, who Mother later learned had been convicted of 

two counts of child molestation, to stay at Mother’s house while Child was 

present. The court then ordered Mother to participate in services. Mother 

partially complied with services until the end of November. But Mother “went 

downhill” in December because of her drug use. Tr. Vol. II at 46. Mother’s 

drug use resulted in repeated arrests and periods of incarceration. Following 

one arrest in June 2018, Mother used methamphetamine the day after she was 

released from jail, which resulted in Mother being under the influence at a 

CHINS hearing. Mother was incarcerated again only a few days later. And on 

October 16, two months after DCS had filed its petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights, Mother was released from incarceration and again used 

methamphetamine. Indeed, Mother used methamphetamine right before she 

entered a rehabilitation program that was a condition of her probation. Then, 

in mid-November, less than one month before the fact-finding hearing on the 

petition to terminate her parental rights, Mother left the rehabilitation program 

without having completed it, even though she knew it was a violation of her 
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probation in two cases. And after she left the rehabilitation program, Mother 

missed two drug tests. 

[26] Still, Mother contends that her drug use and related legal problems cannot 

support the trial court’s judgment on this issue “because those did not arise 

until” after DCS had removed Child. Appellant’s Br. at 13. But, as discussed 

above, the trial court can properly consider the circumstances that led to Child’s 

continued placement outside of Mother’s home in addition to the reasons for 

Child’s initial removal. See In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d at 806.

[27] Mother’s arguments on appeal seek to have this court disregard the evidence 

most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and instead reweigh the evidence in 

her favor, which we cannot do so. The trial court did not clearly err when it 

concluded that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal will not be 

remedied.3

 

Best Interests

[28] Mother also asserts that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that 

termination of her parental rights is in Child’s best interests. In determining 

3

 Mother contends that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the unidentified male she 

had allowed to sleep at her house “was on the sex offender registry.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. The State agrees 

and concedes that “the record does not appear to support the portion of the finding that the man ‘is on the 

sex offender registry.’” Appellee’s Br. at 21. While both parties are correct that the record does not contain 

any evidence that the unidentified male was on the sex offender registry, the evidence does support the 

finding that the male was a convicted sex offender and that Mother had allowed him to stay at her residence 

despite the court order requiring Mother to notify DCS when other people were staying at her home. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the portion of the trial court’s finding that the man was on the sex offender 

registry is immaterial to the trial court’s judgment. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-651 | September 17, 2019 Page 21 of 23

whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial 

court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “A parent’s 

historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision 

coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that 

termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best interests.” 

Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), 

trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an important 

consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re A.K., 924 

N.E.2d at 224. 

[29] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the 

parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 

906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a 

child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” 

Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the 

family case manager and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, 

coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be 

remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. Id.

[30] Here, Mother contends that termination was not in Child’s best interests 

because she had made “recent remarkable progress with her sobriety.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 17. Specifically, Mother asserts that the termination of her 

parental rights was not in Child’s best interests because, with additional time 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-651 | September 17, 2019 Page 22 of 23

and “more substance abuse treatment that is referred from and paid for by the 

DCS,” there is “a strong possibility that [Child] will not need long-term foster 

care, and can reunify with Mother instead.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. 

[31] Mother’s contentions on appeal again amount to a request that we reweigh the 

evidence, which we cannot do. Child’s court appointed special advocate

testified that adoption was in Child’s best interests because Mother is not 

“stable enough to guarantee that [C]hild’s going to be in a safe home.” Tr. Vol. 

III at 78. Further, the evidence demonstrates that Mother received referrals for 

several services but that she did not complete any one service. 

[32] Additionally, Mother has continued to abuse drugs. As a result, Mother has 

been arrested and incarcerated several times through the proceedings. As a 

condition of her probation in two of her drug cases, Mother was required to 

complete a rehabilitation program. However, Mother used methamphetamine 

the day she checked into the program, and she left the program early without 

having completed it. That resulted in the State filing two petitions to revoke her 

probation. Further, by her own admission, Mother missed two drug screens 

between leaving her rehabilitation program in mid-November and the factfinding hearing in early December. 

[33] Child needs consistent and reliable care, and she needs permanency. The 

totality of the evidence, including Mother’s substance abuse issues and related 

criminal history and Mother’s failure to complete any service, supports the trial 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-651 | September 17, 2019 Page 23 of 23

court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best 

interests. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Conclusion

[34] In sum, the trial court did not violate Mother’s due process rights when it 

suspended her visitation with Child. And DCS presented sufficient evidence to 

support the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights over Child. We

therefore affirm the trial court. 

[35] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.