Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

AFGHANISTAN 

Key Issues for 

Congressional 

Oversight 

April 2009 

GAO-09-473SP 
Page i GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

Letter 1 

Enclosure I: U.S. and International Commitments in Afghanistan 13 

Enclosure II: Afghanistan’s Security Environment 15 

Enclosure III: Deployment of U.S. Forces and Equipment to Afghanistan 17 

Enclosure IV: Building Capable Afghan National Security Forces 19 

Enclosure V: Combating Narcotics Trafficking in Afghanistan 21 

Enclosure VI: Economic Development of Afghanistan 23 

Enclosure VII: Afghan Government Capacity 25 

Enclosure VIII: Accountability for U.S.-Provided Weapons in Afghanistan 27 

Enclosure IX: Oversight of Contractor Performance in Afghanistan 29 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products 31

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments 33 

Tables 

Table 1: U.S. Government Funding Provided in Support of Afghan Security, 

Stabilization, and Development, Fiscal Years 2002-2009 4 

Table 2: DOD Assessment of ANSF Capabilities, as of December 2008 19 

Table 3: Overall Anticipated Funding and Projected Expenditures for 

the ANDS 2008-2013 25 

Figures 

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan 3 

Figure 2: Breakout of U.S.-Provided Support to Afghanistan 5 

Figure 3: Map of ISAF Forces in Afghanistan 14 

Figure 4: Average Daily Attacks by Type in Afghanistan, 2003-2009 15 

Figure 5: Average Daily Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2003-2009 16 

Figure 6: Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2008 22 

Figure 7: Status of Afghan Highways for Which Donors Have 

 Committed Funds Since 2002 23 

Figure 8: U.S.-Procured Weapons Shipped to Afghanistan for 

 ANSF, Dec. 2004-June 2008 27 

Contents 
Abbreviations 

ANA Afghan National Army 

ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy 

ANP Afghan National Police 

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces (includes army and police) 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice 

GWOT Global War on Terrorism 

ISAF International Security Assistance Force 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

State Department of State 

UN United Nations 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page ii GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

April 21, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

The United States has provided approximately $38.6 billion in reconstruction 

assistance to Afghanistan and has over 35,000 troops in the country as of 

February 2009. Some progress has occurred in areas such as economic growth, 

infrastructure development, and training of the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF), but the overall security situation in Afghanistan has not 

improved after more than 7 years of U.S. and international efforts. In response, 

the new administration plans to deploy approximately 21,000 additional troops1

to Afghanistan this year, and has completed a strategic review of U.S. efforts in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan.2

 Based on our past work and the significance of U.S. 

efforts in Afghanistan to the overall U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, we have 

highlighted Afghanistan as an urgent oversight issue facing this Congress. This 

report expands on issues discussed on GAO’s transition Web site, 

http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-294sp. 

The government of Afghanistan, with the assistance of the international 

community, developed the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 

(ANDS), which was finalized in June 20083

, as a guiding document for 

achieving Afghanistan’s reconstruction goals. The ANDS articulates the 

priorities of the government of Afghanistan as consisting of four major 

areas: (1) security; (2) governance, rule of law, and human rights; (3) 

economic and social development; and (4) counternarcotics. The United 

States adopted the ANDS as a guiding document for its efforts, and has 

also identified an end state for Afghanistan using four strategic goals: 

namely, that Afghanistan is: (1) never again a safe haven for terrorists and 

is a reliable, stable ally in the Global War on Terror (GWOT); (2) moderate 

and democratic, with a thriving private sector economy; (3) capable of 

governing its territory and borders; and (4) respectful of the rights of all its 

citizens. In discussing his new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in 

 

1

Seventeen-thousand of the 21,000 troops are expected to take part in combat operations 

and 4,000 are expected to support the training and mentoring of ANSF. 

2

The President announced his new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan on March 27, 

2009. GAO has not yet had an opportunity to assess the strategy. 

3

Prior to the finalization of the ANDS in 2008, Afghanistan and its international partners, 

including the United States, used the Bonn Agreement of 2001 and the Afghanistan 

Compact of 2006 as guiding documents for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. 

Page 1 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
 

March 2009, the President noted his goals were to disrupt, dismantle, and 

defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to 

either country in the future. In addition, according to Department of State 

(State) officials, the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan is assembling provincial 

plans for security and development. Department of Defense (DOD), State, 

and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials have 

suggested that securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan will 

take at least a decade and require continuing international assistance. 

Security in Afghanistan has worsened significantly in the last 3 years, 

impeding both U.S. and international partners’ efforts to stabilize and 

rebuild the country. The security situation, including the overall increase 

in insurgent attacks from 2005 to 2008, is the result of a variety of factors 

including a resurgence of the Taliban in the south, the limited capabilities 

of Afghan security forces, a continuing and thriving illicit drug trade in 

the south, and the threat emanating from insurgent safe havens in 

Pakistan. (See fig. 1 for a map of Afghanistan and 

http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-473sp for a video of Afghanistan’s 

rugged terrain.) 

Page 2 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
 

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan 

CHINA

UZBEKISTAN 

TAJIKISTAN 

TURKMENISTAN 

Jowzjan

Kunduz

Badakhshan

Ba Takhar lkh

Samangan Faryab Baghlan

Sar-e Pol Panjshir

Nurestan Badghis Bamyan Konar Kapisa

Parwan Laghman

Kabul

Herat Wardak Lowgar Ghor Nangarhar

AFGHANISTAN 

Khost Daikondi Ghazni Paktia

Uruzgan

Farah 

Paktika

Zabul

IRAN Nimruz

PAKISTAN 

Kandahar Helmand

INDIA

Regional highway

Provincial boundary

Country capital 

Provincial capital

0 110 220 kilometers

0 68 130 miles

Source: GAO analysis of data from the Consultative Group for the Transport Sector and USAID; map (Map Resources).

Between fiscal years 2002 and 2009, the United States provided 

approximately $38.6 billion to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction goals, 

which can often be characterized as construction (see table 1). Table 1 

does not include funding provided for U.S. military operations in 

Page 3 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
 

Afghanistan.4 According to DOD, $22 billion of the $38.6 billion has been 

disbursed. 

Table 1: U.S. Government Funding Provided in Support of Afghan Security, Stabilization, and Development, Fiscal Years 

2002-2009 

Fiscal Years 

Dollars in millions 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009a

Total

Security $147 $388 $949 $2,307 $1,989 $7,431 $2,763 $5,606 $21,580

 — Afghan National Army 86 361 719 1,633 736 4,872 1,778 4,043 14,228

 — Afghan National Police 24 0 160 624 1,217 2,523 964 1,512 7,024

 — Other security 37 27 70 50 36 36 21 51 328

Governance, rule of law, human rights 110 97 262 244 110 286 517 824 2,450

 — Democracy/Governance 103 89 233 223 80 221 391 614 1,954

 — Rule of law 7 8 29 21 30 65 126 210 496

Economic and social development 650 498 1,153 1,570 1,007 1,591 2,100 2,448 11,017

 — Reconstruction 124 295 855 1,240 706 1,191 1,494 1,871 7,776

 — Humanitarian/Other 526 203 298 330 301 400 606 577 3,241

Counternarcotics 40 3 126 775 420 737 617 802 3,520

 — Eradication 39 0 50 257 138 177 183 202 1,046

 — Interdiction 1 3 76 338 137 323 248 366 1,492

 — Alternative development 0 0 0 175 140 229 181 225 950

 — Other counternarcotics 0 0 0 5 5 8 5 9 32

Total $947 $986 $2,490 $4,896 $3,526 $10,045 $5,997 $9,680 $38,567

Source: Departments of Defense and State. 

Note: Funding provided includes assistance for Afghanistan from a variety of budget accounts, such 

as Afghan Security Forces Funding, Economic Support Funds, and Commander’s Emergency 

Response Funds, among others; State/USAID operations funding; and use of drawdown authority 

contained in legislation such as the Afghan Freedom Support Act. Relevant transfers and 

reprogramming also are included. 

a

According to State, fiscal year 2009 numbers include preliminary allocations of funding received in 

the fiscal year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, as well as preliminary funding allocations from the 

fiscal year 2009 supplemental request. 

 

4

Specific funding figures for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan do not exist because 

funding provided to DOD for military operations in support of the GWOT, which includes 

Afghanistan, is not appropriated by country or specific contingency operation. Funding for 

military operations covers expenses such as personnel costs of mobilized reservists; costs 

for housing, food, and fuel; and costs to repair and replace equipment. 

Page 4 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
 

As seen in figure 2, over half of the $38.6 billion was provided to support 

the development of the Afghan national army and police forces. Almost a 

third of the funding was provided to support economic and social 

development efforts, such as the construction of roads and schools, and 

the remainder was provided to governance, rule of law, and human rights 

and counternarcotics programs. 

Figure 2: Breakout of U.S.-Provided Support to Afghanistan 

$3.5

$2.5

$21.6 $11.0

Source: GAO analysis of Departments of Defense and State data.

6%

Governance, rule of law, human rights

9%

Counternarcotics

29%

Economic and social development

Dollar in millions

56%

Security

Since 2003, we have issued 21 reports and testimonies on U.S. efforts in 

Afghanistan (see app. I for a list of related GAO products). Over the course 

of this work we have identified improvements that were needed as well as 

many obstacles that affect success and should be considered in program 

planning and implementation. In most of the U.S. efforts in the past, we 

found the need for improved planning, including the development of 

coordinated interagency plans that include measurable goals, specific time 

frames, cost estimates, and identification of external factors that could 

significantly affect efforts in key areas such as building Afghanistan’s 

national security forces. We also concluded that several existing 

conditions, such as worsening security; the lack of a coordinated, detailed 

interagency plan; and the limited institutional capacity of the Afghanistan 

Page 5 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
 

Page 6 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

government continue to create challenges to the U.S. efforts to assist with 

securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Afghanistan. 

To assist the 111th Congress, enclosed is a series of papers highlighting key 

issues for consideration in developing oversight agendas and determining the 

way forward in securing and stabilizing Afghanistan.5

 Significant oversight will 

be needed to help ensure visibility over the cost and progress of these efforts. 

The enclosures suggest areas for additional oversight on the following topics: 

• U.S. and international commitments 

• Security environment 

• U.S. forces and equipment 

• Afghan national security forces 

• Counternarcotics efforts 

• Economic development 

• Government capacity 

• Accountability for U.S. provided weapons 

• Oversight of contractor performance 

These papers represent an update to our May 2007 report, Securing, 

Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for 

Congressional Oversight, and are based on our past and continuing work. 

These enclosures incorporate updated information from current budget 

and program documents. We also discussed these topics with Department 

of Defense, State, Justice (DOJ), and USAID officials involved in securing, 

stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan. We reviewed reports related to 

Afghanistan by cognizant Inspectors General and various research 

institutions, updated relevant data when possible, and performed 

additional data reliability assessments when necessary. Additional 

assessments were conducted only on data that had not been previously 

reported; all other data were assessed as part of our previous and ongoing 

work. We assessed the reliability of the U.S. government budget data for 

Afghanistan security, stabilization, and development by comparing data 

 

5

GAO recently released similar issue papers concerning Pakistan and Iraq. Securing, 

Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with Afghanistan: Key Issues for 

Congressional Oversight, GAO-09-263SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2009) and Iraq: Key 

Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-09-294SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2009). 
 

received from other agencies and asking knowledgeable officials to 

explain inconsistencies in the data that we found. We also assessed the 

reliability of DOD-supplied attack data through interviews and 

comparisons with similar data from other sources. The attack data 

reported for Afghanistan and Iraq use similar methodologies, which 

allowed for a comparison between both sets of data. In most cases, we 

determined that the data are reliable enough for our purposes, and have 

noted our concerns when data reliability issues have arisen. Information 

on our scope and methodologies, as well as data reliability assessments, 

can be found in the reports referenced in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 through April 

2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains a list 

of GAO products directly related to Afghanistan. 

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DOD, DOJ, 

State, and USAID. Each agency informed us that they were not providing 

formal comments. However, each provided technical comments, which we 

have incorporated into the report where appropriate. 

Page 7 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
 

We are sending copies of this report to the congressional committees 

listed below. In addition, we are sending copies of this report to the 

President and Vice President of the United States, and executive branch 

agencies. The report is also available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions, please contact, Jacquelyn 

L. Williams-Bridgers at (202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov, 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov, or 

the individual(s) listed at the end of each enclosure. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the 

last page of this report. For press inquiries, please contact Chuck Young at 

Gene L. Dodaro 

(202) 512-4800. Key contributors to this report are included in appendix II. 

Acting Comptroller General of the United States

Enclosures 

Page 8 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chair 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John F. Kerry 

Chair 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chair 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

 and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chair 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Vice Chairman 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Chair 

The Honorable Judd Gregg 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

 and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

Page 9 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chair 

The Honorable John M. McHugh 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Howard L. Berman 

Chair 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Edolphus Towns 

Chair 

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chair 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman 

Chair 

The Honorable Dan Burton 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

Page 10 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey 

Chair 

The Honorable Kay Granger 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

 and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John Tierney 

Chair 

The Honorable Jeff Flake 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Page 11 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
 

[This page left blank intentionally.]

Page 12 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
Page 13 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

April 2009 

Enclosure I: U.S. and International 

Commitments in Afghanistan 

Background Issue 

The United States Is Allied 

with Partner Nations to 

Secure and Stabilize 

Afghanistan 

In 2006, the government of Afghanistan, along with the international partners,

adopted the Afghanistan Compact, a political agreement outlining the 

international community’s commitment to provide resources and support to 

achieve Afghanistan’s security, governance, and reconstruction goals as set out 

in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Subsequently, more 

than 70 nations pledged over $57 billion in aid toward the achievement of these 

goals. The United States alone provided $32 billion. United States efforts to 

work with NATO partners and other contributing countries present unique 

opportunities in Afghanistan, but also pose some challenges. In March 2009, the 

President announced a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Since 2001, the United States has 

worked with international 

partners under a United Nations 

mandate to assist Afghanistan in 

creating a safe and secure 

environment, in part through the 

International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF). The United States 

and its allies also work through 

the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) to secure, 

stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan. Key Findings 

U.S. forces in Afghanistan are deployed either as part of the NATO-led ISAF or 

Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes the Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in efforts to secure and stabilize 

Afghanistan. In October 2008, to improve coordination of military efforts, the 

United States gave General David McKiernan, the commander of ISAF, 

command of all U.S. forces in Afghanistan. 

• As of February 2009, the ISAF mission consisted of over 56,000 troops 

from 41 countries located throughout Afghanistan. Over half of the allies 

in ISAF have some form of caveat regarding the geographical or functional 

deployment of their forces, which can limit ISAF’s ability to plan and 

execute operations effectively and efficiently. The most common caveats 

restrict certain troops from deploying to the more dangerous southern and 

eastern regions without approval from their nation’s government. For 

example, German troops cannot leave their regional command and deploy 

outside their region without such approval. According to State, such 

approvals can take up to several days, limiting commanders’ ability to act 

quickly. Another set of caveats relates to the type of ISAF operations. For 

example, some countries restrict forces from participating in 

counternarcotics or policing activities. 

• The U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom,1

 which started October 7, 2001, 

is credited with removing the Taliban from power. Operation Enduring 

Freedom continues to combat terrorism and secure Afghanistan. The 

United States has several coalition partners in Operation Enduring 

Freedom, including the United Kingdom and Canada. 

• DOD’s CSTC-A, in partnership with State Department, the government of 

Afghanistan, and international partners, trains and equips the Afghan 

National Security Forces. CSTC-A works with the international 

community to develop a capable Afghan National Army and Afghan 

National Police that are intended to enhance the security and stabilization 

 

1

Operation Enduring Freedom takes place principally in Afghanistan, but also covers the 

Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and elsewhere. 
of Afghanistan. CSTC-A also assists in developing the capacity of the 

Ministry of the Interior to strengthen the authority of the Afghan police. 

As part of a UN mandate, the United States established Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in 2002, which were transferred to ISAF 

authority in 2003. PRTs consist of military officers, diplomats, and 

reconstruction subject matter experts working to support reconstruction 

efforts. The PRTs’ mission is to assist the government of Afghanistan in 

extending its authority; facilitate the development of a stable and secure 

environment; and, through military presence, enable security-sector reform 

and reconstruction efforts. The United States leads 12 of 26 PRTs (see fig 3). 

As part of a UN mandate, the United States established Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in 2002, which were transferred to ISAF 

authority in 2003. PRTs consist of military officers, diplomats, and 

reconstruction subject matter experts working to support reconstruction 

efforts. The PRTs’ mission is to assist the government of Afghanistan in 

extending its authority; facilitate the development of a stable and secure 

environment; and, through military presence, enable security-sector reform 

and reconstruction efforts. The United States leads 12 of 26 PRTs (see fig 3). 

United States and 

International Partners 

Coordinate through 

Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams to Reconstruct 

Afghanistan 

Figure 3: Map of ISAF Forces in Afghanistan 

U.S. ISAF PRT

Lead nation: Italy

Regional Command (RC)

KABUL

RC(N)

RC(W)

RC(S)

RC(E)

Logar

Herat

Qala-e-Naw

MeS

Chaghcharan

TarinKowt

Meymana

Lashkar

Gah Qalat

Konduz Feyzabad 

Pol-e-Khomri

Khowst

Asadabad

MetherLam

Jalalabad

Ghazni

Sharana

Bagram

Gardez

Bamyan

Panjshir

Nuristan

Wardak

Farah

Kandahar

ISAF REGIONAL COMMANDS

& PRT LOCATIONS 

Source: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Lead nation: Germany

RC(C) Kabul

Lead nation: France

Lead nation: USA

Lead nations: Canada, 

Great Britain, and 

Netherlands (rotating)

ISAF PRT

The overall success of reconstruction efforts has varied widely among the 

donor countries due to differences in the needs and security situations of 

Afghanistan’s regions and the capabilities of the lead nations. In April 2008, 

NATO agreed to focus on providing greater transparency and coordination for 

NATO’s PRT efforts to ensure they are aligned with Afghan government 

priorities outlined in the ANDS. 

The overall success of reconstruction efforts has varied widely among the 

donor countries due to differences in the needs and security situations of 

Afghanistan’s regions and the capabilities of the lead nations. In April 2008, 

NATO agreed to focus on providing greater transparency and coordination for 

NATO’s PRT efforts to ensure they are aligned with Afghan government 

priorities outlined in the ANDS. 

Oversight Questions 

1. To what extent does the new U.S. strategy take into account the roles 

and commitments of international partners? 

2. How do the United States and its international partners coordinate and 

evaluate their efforts in Afghanistan? Has coordination among U.S. 

forces and with international forces improved since the creation of the 

unified U.S. command structure?

3. How do the national caveats placed on various ISAF forces affect 

ISAF’s ability to provide security for Afghanistan and the operations of 

the PRTs? 

Point of Contact 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov

4. How does the United States ensure accountability over its PRTs and 

coordinate with those run by other coalition partners?

5. What is the United States doing to assist Afghanistan in securing 

additional international donor commitments to secure, stabilize, and 

rebuild Afghanistan? 

Page 14 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
Page 15 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

Background 

April 2009 

Issue 

Key Findings 

The security situation in Afghanistan, though cyclical in nature, has 

deteriorated since 2005. Attacks on civilians as well as Afghan and 

coalition forces have increased year after year. Attacks increased from 

2,388 in 2005 to 5,087 in 2006, 7,058 in 2007, and 10,889 in 2008. The 

majority of the violence is concentrated in the eastern and southern parts 

of Afghanistan where the Taliban receives funding from the opium trade 

and where U.S. forces operate. In 2008, insurgent activity increased 

dramatically, including an increase in improvised explosive device attacks, 

as well as attacks focused on infrastructure, development, and 

construction projects. 

As figure 4 illustrates, the frequency of enemy-initiated attacks over the 

past 3 years has been seasonal with the number of attacks generally 

peaking during the months of June through September each year. 

Figure 4: Average Daily Attacks by Type in Afghanistan, 2003-2009 

Enclosure II: Afghanistan’s Security 

Environment 

Following the removal of the Taliban regime, the United States and its 

international partners began creating a safe, secure democracy in Afghanistan 

under the auspices of the United Nations. In the early years of U.S. and allied 

efforts to secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Afghanistan, U.S. soldiers 

experienced relatively few attacks. However, since 2005 there has been an 

overall escalation of violence in the country that affects all aspects of U.S. and 

allied security and support operations in Afghanistan. This has been attributed 

to a variety of factors including a resurgence of the Taliban in the south, the 

limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, a continuing and thriving illicit 

drug trade in the south, and the threat emanating from insurgent safe havens in 

Pakistan; thus highlighting the need to work with Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Conflict has ravaged Afghanistan 

for decades. The Soviet Union 

invaded in 1979 and withdrew in 

1989 after waging a prolonged war 

against Afghan resistance groups. 

By 1998, most of Afghanistan was 

under the control of the Taliban, 

under whom the country became a 

haven for terrorists. Following 

September 11, 2001, the United 

States and its allies forcibly 

removed the Taliban. 

Overall Rate of Attacks in 

Afghanistan Increased 

Significantly since 2005 

Number of average daily attacks per month

Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalitian forces

Average daily attacks-civilians

Average daily attacks-Afghanistan security

Total average daily attacks

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.

0

10

20

30

40

50

2003 2005 2008 2004 2009

Dec.

Feb.

Apr.

Dec

Feb.

.

Au

Oct.

Oct.

g.

Aug.

Jan.

Mar.

June

June

Apr.

Dec.

Au

Oct.

g.

June

2006

Feb.

Apr.

Dec.

Au

Oct.

g.

June

2007

Feb.

Apr.

Dec.

Au

Oct.

g.

June

Feb.

Apr.

Dec.

Au

Oct.

g.

June
Page 16 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

 

Point of Contact 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov

Although never reaching the highest level of attacks in Iraq, which has a 

population of about 29 million, the number of attacks in Afghanistan, which 

has a population of about 33 million, surpassed those in Iraq for the first time 

in July 2008 (see fig. 5).1

Figure 5: Average Daily Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2003-2009 

In early 2006, there were over 36,000 U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan. 

As of February 2009, there are over 65,000 troops with over 35,000 U.S. troops 

and over 30,000 other troops from more than 40 different countries in 

Afghanistan. The new administration has indicated that it intends to send up 

to approximately 21,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan in 2009. 

The increase in insurgent attacks, especially in the east and the south, has 

impeded security and reconstruction efforts in those regions. 

• State officials reported that the development of the Afghan National 

Security Forces has been impeded by the security situation. For example, 

despite the fact that the Afghan National Army is directly charged with 

defeating the insurgency and terrorism, the Afghan National Police are 

often reassigned from their training to provide immediate help with the 

counterinsurgency effort, thus delaying the completion of their training. 

• According to USAID, programs ranging from road reconstruction to power 

generation, face significant cost increases and were delayed or abandoned 

due to a lack of security. 

Oversight Questions 

1. What additional costs have resulted from security issues? 

2. How do administration plans for deploying additional troops take into 

account regional differences in violence levels? 

 

1

According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials, attack data in figures 4 and 5 do not 

include violent incidents that coalition or Afghan security forces initiated, but represent a 

reliable and consistent source of information that can be used to identify trends in enemy 

activity and the overall security situation. 

Security Situation 

Significantly Affects U.S. 

Efforts in Afghanistan 

Number of average daily attacks per month

Average daily attacks - Iraq

Average daily attacks - Afghanistan

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

2003 2004 2005 2008 2009

Au

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.

Apr.

Oct.

Dec.

Feb.

g.

Aug.

June

June

Apr.

Au

Oct.

Dec.

g.

June

2006

Feb.

Apr.

Au

Oct.

Dec.

g.

June

2007

Feb.

Apr.

Au

Oct.

Dec.

g.

June

Feb.

Apr.

Au

Oct.

Dec.

Jan.

Mar.

g.

June
April 2009 

Enclosure III: Deployment of U.S. Forces and 

Equipment to Afghanistan 

Background Issue 

Since 2001, DOD has been 

engaged in military operations in 

support of the Global War on 

Terrorism (GWOT). These 

include Operation Enduring 

Freedom, which takes place 

principally in Afghanistan, but 

also covers the Horn of Africa, 

the Philippines, and elsewhere. 

DOD is in the process of 

developing its plans for future 

military operations in 

Afghanistan. As of February 2009, 

DOD had over 35,000 troops 

deployed to Afghanistan, with 

plans to add approximately 

21,000 troops in 2009. 

As DOD continues to refine its plans for future military operations in 

Afghanistan, it will likely face an array of potential challenges related to 

personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. For example, the availability and 

training of U.S. personnel will be critical as U.S. forces are already stressed 

from ongoing operations and the current training capacity has been primarily 

focused on operations in Iraq. In addition, availability of equipment may be 

limited because the Army and Marine Corps have already deployed much of 

their equipment to Iraq, and prepositioned assets have been withdrawn to 

support ongoing operations. Further, the ability to transport personnel and 

equipment to and within Afghanistan will likely be constrained due to the 

limited infrastructure and difficult terrain. Given the plans to increase force 

levels and likely challenges posed by the lack of infrastructure and the 

difficulty in transporting personnel and equipment in country, future costs in 

Afghanistan are likely to be considerable and require billions of dollars in 

additional funds. 

Key Findings 

Given the range of likely forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD may face nearterm challenges in providing personnel for operations in both locations. 

Demands have been particularly high within certain ranks and occupational 

specialties. For example, officers and senior noncommissioned officers are in 

high demand due to increased requirements within deployed headquarters 

organizations and requirements for transition teams to train Iraqi and Afghan 

forces. The ongoing operations also have challenged DOD’s ability to provide 

sufficient numbers of forces with certain specialized capabilities including 

engineering, civil affairs, transportation, and military police. If emerging 

requirements for Afghanistan include many of these high-demand support 

skills, which tend to reside in the reserve component and require longer lead 

times to train and deploy, DOD will likely need to use alternate approaches to 

meet them. These challenges could be exacerbated by the need for these 

forces to support the drawdown of troops in Iraq. It also will take time to 

adjust DOD’s training capacity, focused on an urban style mission reflective of 

Iraq’s mission requirements, to the more austere operating environment of 

Afghanistan with its myriad mix of languages and cultures and lack of major 

infrastructure, such as paved roads. While DOD has some training 

infrastructure and combat-tested veterans to support training for the mission 

in Afghanistan, its training base is not yet configured to support a large 

increase of forces deploying to Afghanistan, and adjustments may be needed. 

Availability of Personnel 

and Equipment May Pose 

Challenges to U.S. Military 

Operations in Afghanistan 

Equipment availability may pose challenges for operations in Afghanistan. 

Army and Marine Corps officials stated they are in the process of determining 

equipment requirements for Afghanistan; however, final equipment needs will 

be based on several factors such as the type of operations, force structure, 

and capabilities needed. For example, Army and Marine Corps officials 

recently stated operations in Afghanistan may require lighter body armor and 

lighter Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. Geographic and 

environmental factors also play a role in determining equipment requirements 

Page 17 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
for Afghanistan. For example, heavy brigade combat teams, which include 

tanks, may not be well suited for Afghanistan’s difficult terrain. As a result, the 

Army is currently developing a lighter version of the Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected vehicle better suited for Afghanistan. DOD also will need to 

reassess its requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

capabilities to support increased force levels in Afghanistan, given its current 

allocation of assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq. 

for Afghanistan. For example, heavy brigade combat teams, which include 

tanks, may not be well suited for Afghanistan’s difficult terrain. As a result, the 

Army is currently developing a lighter version of the Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected vehicle better suited for Afghanistan. DOD also will need to 

reassess its requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

capabilities to support increased force levels in Afghanistan, given its current 

allocation of assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq. 

Page 18 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

Point of Contact 

Sharon Pickup, 202-512-9619, 

pickups@gao.gov

Operations in Afghanistan depend on difficult and uncertain overland supply 

routes from neighboring countries. Since Afghanistan is landlocked, items 

being shipped by sea to Afghanistan currently enter through the port of 

Karachi, Pakistan. According to DOD, about 75 percent of the supplies 

delivered to U.S. troops in Afghanistan pass through land routes in Pakistan, 

such as the Khyber Pass. DOD officials told us that in June 2008, 44 trucks and 

220,000 gallons of fuel were lost in attacks and threats on convoys. Given this 

context, airlift capabilities are very important; however, air operations in 

Afghanistan do not have a nearby location for staging and receiving (like 

Kuwait provides for operations in Iraq) and must depend on access to bases 

such as Manas, Kyrgyzstan, which is some distance away. Moreover, access to 

the base in Kyrgyzstan may not continue and any strategy developed for 

operations in Afghanistan may have to consider a regional approach for 

basing alternatives. Furthermore, future planning efforts are complicated by 

limited existing facilities, ramp space, and fuel availability, all of which may 

influence the rate at which forces can be received and moved forward into 

Afghanistan. 

Operations in Afghanistan depend on difficult and uncertain overland supply 

routes from neighboring countries. Since Afghanistan is landlocked, items 

being shipped by sea to Afghanistan currently enter through the port of 

Karachi, Pakistan. According to DOD, about 75 percent of the supplies 

delivered to U.S. troops in Afghanistan pass through land routes in Pakistan, 

such as the Khyber Pass. DOD officials told us that in June 2008, 44 trucks and 

220,000 gallons of fuel were lost in attacks and threats on convoys. Given this 

context, airlift capabilities are very important; however, air operations in 

Afghanistan do not have a nearby location for staging and receiving (like 

Kuwait provides for operations in Iraq) and must depend on access to bases 

such as Manas, Kyrgyzstan, which is some distance away. Moreover, access to 

the base in Kyrgyzstan may not continue and any strategy developed for 

operations in Afghanistan may have to consider a regional approach for 

basing alternatives. Furthermore, future planning efforts are complicated by 

limited existing facilities, ramp space, and fuel availability, all of which may 

influence the rate at which forces can be received and moved forward into 

Afghanistan. 

Limited Supply Routes May 

Impede Ability to Transport 

Supplies 

As additional forces and equipment are deployed to Afghanistan, future costs 

could be considerable. These future costs will be affected by a number of 

different factors, such as the pace and duration of operations, basing and 

infrastructure plans, transportation and fuel requirements, and the amount of 

equipment to be repaired and replaced. For example, as the force in 

Afghanistan increases, additional personnel will likely be required to provide 

housing, food, and services, thus increasing contractor costs. In addition, 

since Afghanistan is landlocked and infrastructure is limited, transportation 

costs are likely to be high. DOD has reported costs of about $124.2 billion as 

of December 2008 for Operation Enduring Freedom, which takes place 

principally in Afghanistan. However, our prior work has found numerous 

problems with DOD’s processes for recording and reporting its GWOT costs. 

As the department prepares additional GWOT funding requests for military 

operations in Afghanistan, reliable and transparent cost information will be of 

critical importance in determining future funding needs. 

As additional forces and equipment are deployed to Afghanistan, future costs 

could be considerable. These future costs will be affected by a number of 

different factors, such as the pace and duration of operations, basing and 

infrastructure plans, transportation and fuel requirements, and the amount of 

equipment to be repaired and replaced. For example, as the force in 

Afghanistan increases, additional personnel will likely be required to provide 

housing, food, and services, thus increasing contractor costs. In addition, 

since Afghanistan is landlocked and infrastructure is limited, transportation 

costs are likely to be high. DOD has reported costs of about $124.2 billion as 

of December 2008 for Operation Enduring Freedom, which takes place 

principally in Afghanistan. However, our prior work has found numerous 

problems with DOD’s processes for recording and reporting its GWOT costs. 

As the department prepares additional GWOT funding requests for military 

operations in Afghanistan, reliable and transparent cost information will be of 

critical importance in determining future funding needs. 

Future Costs in Afghanistan 

Could Be Considerable 

Oversight Questions 

1. What steps is DOD taking to address challenges posed by the availability 

of personnel and equipment, particularly in regards to high-demand units 

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities? 

2. What efforts is DOD undertaking to secure other air and land 

transportation routes into Afghanistan? 

Point of Contact 

Sharon Pickup, (2

3. What infrastructure requirements are needed to support and sustain 

02) 512-9619, additional forces and when can they be completed? 

pickups@gao.gov

4. To what extent has DOD estimated the future costs of continued 

operations? What steps is DOD taking to improve its capability to provide 

accurate and reliable estimates of future funding needs? 
April 2009 

Enclosure IV: Building Capable Afghan 

National Security Forces 

Background Issue 

The goal of the Afghan National Development Strategy is to establish a 

nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced ANSF that is 

accountable, organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the 

country by the end of 2010. The United States has provided over $21 billion to 

develop the ANSF since 2002. Despite some progress, U.S.-led efforts to build 

capable ANSF continue to face significant challenges. 

Since 2002, the United States has 

worked to develop the Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF). 

DOD is primarily responsible for 

directing U.S. efforts to develop 

the Afghan National Army (ANA) 

and, in conjunction with State, 

the Afghan National Police 

(ANP). Key Findings 

DOD, in conjunction with State, has taken steps to outline plans for 

completing and sustaining the ANSF. We recommended in 2005, and 

reaffirmed in 2007 and 2008, that such plans should include clearly defined 

objectives and performance measures, milestones for achieving these 

objectives, future funding requirements, and a strategy for sustaining results 

achieved. In 2008, Congress mandated that DOD and State provide a long-term 

strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF and a long-term plan for 

sustaining the ANSF. In response, DOD, in conjunction with State, reported on 

its strategy and efforts to complete and sustain the ANSF. These reports 

include most of the elements we called for and provide a baseline to assess 

progress of the ANSF. However, DOD did not include long-term funding 

requirements, which are particularly urgent given the recent decision to 

increase the ANA from 80,000 to 134,000 and the potential costs of sustaining 

the ANSF. 

DOD and State Have Taken 

Steps to Outline Plans for 

the ANSF 

Some progress has been made since our June 2008 report1

 on U.S. efforts to 

build capable Afghan security forces. In April 2008, only 2 ANA and 0 ANP 

units were assessed by DOD as fully capable of conducting primary missions. 

As Table 2 shows, in December 2008, there were 18 ANA and 18 ANP units 

assessed by DOD as fully capable. 

ANSF Capabilities 

Improved in 2008 

Table 2: DOD Assessment of ANSF Capabilities, as of December 2008 

ANSF Units

Fully 

capable 

Capable with 

support 

Partially 

capable Not capable 

Units not 

formed or not 

reportinga

ANA units 18 26 26 2 Not available 

ANP units 18 16 22 317 Not available 

Source: U.S. Department of Defense. 

a

A unit categorized as “not formed or not reporting” is either a planned unit or unit in basic 

training.

 

1

Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face 

Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability, GAO08-883T (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008). 

Page 19 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
U.S. efforts to build Afghan forces that can lead security operations have 

faced challenges in several key areas, including recruiting and retaining 

qualified personnel, training in critical functions, and reforming the ANP. As 

of November 2008, the ANA had over 79,000 and the ANP over 75,000 troops. 

U.S. efforts to build Afghan forces that can lead security operations have 

faced challenges in several key areas, including recruiting and retaining 

qualified personnel, training in critical functions, and reforming the ANP. As 

of November 2008, the ANA had over 79,000 and the ANP over 75,000 troops. 

Efforts to Train and Equip 

the ANSF Face Several 

Challenges • DOD cited a shortage of U.S. trainers and coalition mentors in 

Afghanistan as a major impediment to providing ANSF with training 

needed to establish capabilities such as advanced combat skills and 

logistics. As of November 2008, DOD reported it had only about half of 

the 2,225 military personnel it needed to train the ANA. This problem 

is likely to be exacerbated by the planned increase in the size of the 

ANA. Similarly, as of November 2008, DOD had only about one-third 

of the 2,375 personnel it estimated it needs to staff police mentor 

teams, which were taken from personnel intended for ANA training. In 

March 2009, GAO recommended that DOD and State support creation 

of additional mentor teams. The new Administration indicated that the 

United States plans to deploy approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train 

Afghan security forces in 2009. 

• DOD cited a shortage of U.S. trainers and coalition mentors in 

Afghanistan as a major impediment to providing ANSF with training 

needed to establish capabilities such as advanced combat skills and 

logistics. As of November 2008, DOD reported it had only about half of 

the 2,225 military personnel it needed to train the ANA. This problem 

is likely to be exacerbated by the planned increase in the size of the 

ANA. Similarly, as of November 2008, DOD had only about one-third 

of the 2,375 personnel it estimated it needs to staff police mentor 

teams, which were taken from personnel intended for ANA training. In 

March 2009, GAO recommended that DOD and State support creation 

of additional mentor teams. The new Administration indicated that the 

United States plans to deploy approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train 

Afghan security forces in 2009. 

• The ANA has had difficulty finding qualified Afghan candidates for 

leadership and specialty skill positions, such as logistics, medical 

support, and engineering, according to DOD. In addition, while DOD 

has reported that recruitment targets for infantry personnel have been 

met, both the ANA and ANP have had trouble retaining personnel. 

• The ANA has had difficulty finding qualified Afghan candidates for 

leadership and specialty skill positions, such as logistics, medical 

support, and engineering, according to DOD. In addition, while DOD 

has reported that recruitment targets for infantry personnel have been 

met, both the ANA and ANP have had trouble retaining personnel. 

• While some progress has been made, the ANP faces numerous 

challenges. Afghanistan’s weak judicial system hinders effective 

policing and rule of law. ANP personnel continue to experience 

problems with corruption and insurgent attacks. The Ministry of 

Interior, which is responsible for managing the national police force, 

faces a number of problems including corruption and a lack of 

professional standards and internal discipline. The United States has 

supported recent efforts to reform the ANP’s top-heavy rank structure, 

cutting the number of officer positions from about 17,800 to about 

9,000 and reducing the number of highest ranking officers (generals 

and colonels) by nearly 85 percent. However, its efforts to verify the 

names of active ANP personnel are being impeded by a lack of 

cooperation by some high-ranking ANP commanders. In March 2009, 

GAO recommended that DOD and State consider provisioning funding 

for salary contributions upon verification of ANP personnel. While 

there had been a disparity between ANA and ANP salaries, DOD has 

successfully raised ANP pay rates to be on a par with the ANA. 

• While some progress has been made, the ANP faces numerous 

challenges. Afghanistan’s weak judicial system hinders effective 

policing and rule of law. ANP personnel continue to experience 

problems with corruption and insurgent attacks. The Ministry of 

Interior, which is responsible for managing the national police force, 

faces a number of problems including corruption and a lack of 

professional standards and internal discipline. The United States has 

supported recent efforts to reform the ANP’s top-heavy rank structure, 

cutting the number of officer positions from about 17,800 to about 

9,000 and reducing the number of highest ranking officers (generals 

and colonels) by nearly 85 percent. However, its efforts to verify the 

names of active ANP personnel are being impeded by a lack of 

cooperation by some high-ranking ANP commanders. In March 2009, 

GAO recommended that DOD and State consider provisioning funding 

for salary contributions upon verification of ANP personnel. While 

there had been a disparity between ANA and ANP salaries, DOD has 

successfully raised ANP pay rates to be on a par with the ANA. 

Oversight questions 

1. Given the announcement of plans to deploy 4,000 additional military 

trainers, what are DOD’s and State’s plans for utilizing the additional 

troops? 

2. To what extent are current and proposed ANSF force levels based on 

analysis of Afghanistan’s needs and long-term ability to sustain its forces? Point of Contact 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

202-512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov

3. How will the cost of sustaining the ANSF change with the Afghan army’s 

authorized size increase beyond 80,000, and who is intended to pay for it? 

4. To what extent do DOD's and State's budgets provide for sufficient 

funding to sustain ANSF without use of supplemental appropriations? 

5. What are the plans for Afghanistan to take program and financial 

responsibility for its army and police? 

Page 20 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
Page 21 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

April 2009 

Enclosure V: Combating Narcotics Trafficking 

in Afghanistan 

Background Issue 

Key Findings 

The drug trade has undermined virtually every aspect of the Afghan government’s

effort to build political stability, economic growth, rule of law, and its capacity to 

address internal security problems. Moreover, the drug trade helps fund the 

insurgency of the Taliban and other antigovernment groups. Following the Taliban’s 

removal, the United Kingdom took the international lead in counternarcotics. Since 

2002, the United States has played an increasingly larger role, providing over $3.5 

billion for counternarcotics-related programs in Afghanistan, including $950 million 

on programs to help farmers and farm labor find ways other than poppy cultivation 

to earn a living—often referred to as alternative development programs—and 

developing capable Afghan counternarcotics police forces. 

Afghanistan has a largely 

agrarian economy. Afghanistan 

provides over 90 percent of the 

world’s opium, which is refined 

into heroin in Afghanistan and 

other countries. Opium poppy 

cultivation often is forced on 

farmers by insurgents and 

generally promises greater 

income. 

The United States became more involved in counternarcotics efforts after 

several years of increases in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The 

United States developed a five-pillar counternarcotics strategy in 2004 and 

retooled that strategy in 2007. The five pillars of the U.S. strategy include: 

The United States Retooled 

Its Counternarcotics 

Strategy in 2007 

• Poppy elimination/eradication. State has supported the Afghan 

government’s efforts to prevent poppy planting and eradicate poppy crops 

if prevention fails. State has supported both the central government’s 

Poppy Eradication Force and governor-led eradication efforts. 

• Interdiction/law enforcement. State and DOD have assisted Drug 

Enforcement Administration-led efforts to build Afghan capacity to destroy 

drug labs, seize precursor chemicals and opiates, and arrest major 

traffickers. The Drug Enforcement Administration trained a National 

Interdiction Unit, consisting of Afghan personnel, to interdict drugs and 

arrest traffickers. However, the United States does not have an extradition 

treaty with Afghanistan, and corruption and a lack of prison space hamper 

efforts to prosecute and incarcerate drug traffickers. 

• Justice reform/prosecution. State has supported the Afghan government’s 

efforts to increase its capacity to arrest, prosecute, and punish drug 

traffickers and corrupt officials. As part of its efforts, State provided funds 

for DOJ prosecutors, who helped develop and implement a new 

counternarcotics law and corrections reform, and train and mentor 

prosecutors and judges. State also has approved funding to equip and 

manage a new Counter Narcotics Justice Center, which was originally 

scheduled to be completed in late 2006, but is not yet fully operational 

• Public information. State led a public information campaign to convince 

the Afghan people to reject poppy cultivation and trade, with a focus on 

person-to-person community outreach initiatives to engage local leaders. 

• Alternative development. USAID implemented projects to provide ways 

other than poppy production for Afghan farmers to earn a living, and thus 

reduce the amount of Afghanistan’s economic activity attributable to drugs. 

The revised U.S. counternarcotics strategy approved in August 2007 prioritizes 

three areas: (1) increasing coordination between counternarcotics and 

counterinsurgency activities; (2) amplifying the effects of the “carrot and 

stick” approach to reducing poppy cultivation; and (3) fomenting the 

necessary political will to make lasting changes in the Afghan government. 
Page 22 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

GAO examined the 2004 strategy in its early stages of implementation and 

found State and USAID were making a significant effort to reduce illicit drug 

cultivation, production, and trafficking. However, GAO also noted that 

deteriorating security and difficulty fielding eradicators threatened the 

success of U.S. efforts. Likewise, in 2007, a joint assessment by DOD, DOJ, 

and State noted the strategy was reasonable and comprehensive, but security 

was a growing concern. 

GAO examined the 2004 strategy in its early stages of implementation and 

found State and USAID were making a significant effort to reduce illicit drug 

cultivation, production, and trafficking. However, GAO also noted that 

deteriorating security and difficulty fielding eradicators threatened the 

success of U.S. efforts. Likewise, in 2007, a joint assessment by DOD, DOJ, 

and State noted the strategy was reasonable and comprehensive, but security 

was a growing concern. 

In December 2008, DOD acknowledged that global and regional terrorists 

finance their activities with drug money. As a result, DOD changed its rules of 

engagement to permit increased targeting of drug traffickers suspected of 

funding such terrorists. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

also expanded its counternarcotics role. DOD continues to support State and 

the Drug Enforcement Administration with police training and transport. 

In December 2008, DOD acknowledged that global and regional terrorists 

finance their activities with drug money. As a result, DOD changed its rules of 

engagement to permit increased targeting of drug traffickers suspected of 

funding such terrorists. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

also expanded its counternarcotics role. DOD continues to support State and 

the Drug Enforcement Administration with police training and transport. 

Since 2005, opium poppy cultivation has been reduced dramatically in northern 

Afghanistan, but has increased greatly in the south. In 2008, 98 percent of 

Afghanistan’s opium was cultivated in 7 of its 34 provinces, all in the south, with 

one province, Helmand, accounting for 66 percent of the total (see fig. 6). The 

United States and the United Nations attribute the decrease in the north to strong 

leadership by some governors, weather, and an increase in wheat prices. 

Nevertheless, despite a drought-induced decrease last year, high levels of opium 

production continue to threaten the security and stabilization of Afghanistan. 

Since 2005, opium poppy cultivation has been reduced dramatically in northern 

Afghanistan, but has increased greatly in the south. In 2008, 98 percent of 

Afghanistan’s opium was cultivated in 7 of its 34 provinces, all in the south, with 

one province, Helmand, accounting for 66 percent of the total (see fig. 6). The 

United States and the United Nations attribute the decrease in the north to strong 

leadership by some governors, weather, and an increase in wheat prices. 

Nevertheless, despite a drought-induced decrease last year, high levels of opium 

production continue to threaten the security and stabilization of Afghanistan. 

Despite Progress in 

Northern Afghanistan, 

Opium Cultivation 

Continues to be a 

Significant Problem in the 

South 

Figure 6: Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2008 

Herat 

Farah

Helmand

Nimruz

Kandahar

Badakhshan

Zabol

Faryab

Badghis

Baghlan

Daykondi 

Oruzgan

Konar

Kabul

Laghman

Kapisa

TURKMENISTAN

IRAN

PAKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

0 100 200

Geographic projection: WGS 84

km

50

Legend

1-1,000

hectares

Provinces are

poppy free

1,000-20,000

hectares

Over 100,000 

hectares

Oversight Questions 

1. How has the U.S. strategy affected drug trafficking in Afghanistan? How 

have DOD’s and ISAF’s new counternarcotics policies affected efforts to 

secure and stabilize Afghanistan and curtail the drug trade? 

2. What lessons can be learned from the decrease in poppy cultivation in 

northern Afghanistan? 

Point of Contact 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov

3. To what extent is the absence of an extradition treaty between Afghanistan 

and the United States an impediment to counternarcotics efforts? What 

mechanisms exist for prosecuting and incarcerating drug traffickers? 

4. What challenges, including national caveats imposed by some NATO allies, 

affect counternarcotic efforts? 
April 2009 

Page 23 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

Background 

Enclosure VI: Economic Development of 

Afghanistan 

Background Issue 

Afghanistan is one of the world’s 

poorest countries and ranks near 

the bottom of virtually every 

development indicator category, 

including life expectancy; literacy; 

nutrition; and infant, child, and 

maternal mortality. Nearly three 

decades of war and extended 

drought have devastated many 

elements of Afghan society, 

including the economy. 

The United States and the international community have helped the 

government of Afghanistan stabilize and rebuild its country since the 

overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2009, the 

United States provided approximately $38.6 billion to support Afghanistan’s 

reconstruction, including over $11 billion for economic and social 

development. Although U.S. efforts have made some progress in the areas of 

transportation, education, and health care, efforts to rebuild Afghanistan face 

serious challenges—in particular, the immense scale of the reconstruction 

needs themselves and the deteriorating security situation. 

Key Findings 

The United States and its international partners have undertaken numerous 

development projects in Afghanistan, using the Afghanistan National 

Development Strategy (ANDS) as their guiding document. 

United States and 

International Partners Have 

ade Some Progress in 

Reconstruction and 

Development 

M

The United States and international donors have made some progress in 

improving the country’s roads which may help Afghanistan promote licit crops, 

improve security, and broaden access to health and education (See 

http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-473sp for a video of poor Afghan road 

conditions and GAO-09-626SP for maps of donor-funded roads). As of February 

2008, USAID has constructed or rebuilt over 2,700 kilometers of roads and 

highways. As figure 7 shows, the United States has completed or come close to 

completing its portion of commitments to build Afghanistan’s highway network. 

Figure 7: Status of Afghan Highways for Which Donors Have 

Committed Funds Since 2002 

In July 2008, GAO recommended that USAID and DOD better assess results 

and conduct impact evaluations of U.S.-funded roads, and that USAID work 

with the Afghan government to address maintenance funding of the roads. 

USAID has reported some notable successes in basic education and health 

care in Afghanistan. In 2008, according to USAID and the government of 

Afghanistan, more than 6 million children attended school in Afghanistan, 

including almost 2 million girls, compared with less than 1 million children 

and no girls under the Taliban. In September 2008, USAID reported 80 percent 

of the population had access to health care, up from 8 percent in 2001. 

Sustained improvements such as these have the potential to bolster 

Afghanistan’s long-term economic development. 
Page 24 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

A key aspect of USAID’s reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan includes the 

alternative development programs linked to U.S. counternarcotics efforts. 

Many of these programs were launched as short-term pay-for-work projects 

such as road rehabilitation, which were to transition into long-term 

development projects. However, according to USAID, though these short-term 

projects have achieved results, as of March 2008, many have not yet 

transitioned into long-term efforts. Despite some progress with these 

programs in some regions of Afghanistan, according to USAID, opium 

production in the southern provinces rose. 

on efforts in Afghanistan includes the 

alternative development programs linked to U.S. counternarcotics efforts. 

Many of these programs were launched as short-term pay-for-work projects 

such as road rehabilitation, which were to transition into long-term 

development projects. However, according to USAID, though these short-term 

projects have achieved results, as of March 2008, many have not yet 

transitioned into long-term efforts. Despite some progress with these 

programs in some regions of Afghanistan, according to USAID, opium 

production in the southern provinces rose. 

Alternative Development 

Programs Achieved Mixed 

Success 

Since 2004, DOD has reported obligations of over $1 billion on what U.S. 

commanders in Afghanistan described as a critical weapon in the fight against 

the Taliban—the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).1

CERP enables local commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction needs within their areas of responsibility by carrying out 

programs that will immediately assist the local population. Since the program 

began, DOD has steadily increased its funding request, and reported CERP 

obligations for Afghanistan have grown from almost $40 million in fiscal year 

2004 to more than $486 million in fiscal year 2008. Of the more than $1.4 

billion Congress appropriated for CERP thus far in fiscal year 2009, $683 

million has been allocated for the program in Afghanistan. According to DOD 

officials, given plans to increase force levels in Afghanistan, the size and 

funding of CERP also is likely to expand. 

Since 2004, DOD has reported obligations of over $1 billion on what U.S. 

commanders in Afghanistan described as a critical weapon in the fight against 

the Taliban—the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).

Use of Defense Funds for 

Development Projects Is 

Growing 

1

CERP enables local commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction needs within their areas of responsibility by carrying out 

programs that will immediately assist the local population. Since the program 

began, DOD has steadily increased its funding request, and reported CERP 

obligations for Afghanistan have grown from almost $40 million in fiscal year 

2004 to more than $486 million in fiscal year 2008. Of the more than $1.4 

billion Congress appropriated for CERP thus far in fiscal year 2009, $683 

million has been allocated for the program in Afghanistan. According to DOD 

officials, given plans to increase force levels in Afghanistan, the size and 

funding of CERP also is likely to expand. 

The security environment and lack of Afghan capacity has hindered U.S. 

reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. For example, the initial work to refurbish 

the Kajaki Dam power plant was stalled for almost 2 years between 2006 and 2008 

due to security concerns. This power plant is a vital component of Afghanistan’s 

power network. However, as of February 2009, repair work was again underway. 

Another example is road reconstruction, which, according to USAID officials, has 

experienced significant delays and higher costs associated with the deteriorating 

security situation. In an effort to address limited capacity issues, USAID provided 

a wide variety of training, including technical assistance and literacy training and, 

since 2005, has included capacity building in its contracts as part of program 

support. Additional information concerning Afghan government capacity is found 

in Enclosure VII. 

The security environment and lack of Afghan capacity has hindered U.S. 

reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. For example, the initial work to refurbish 

the Kajaki Dam power plant was stalled for almost 2 years between 2006 and 2008 

due to security concerns. This power plant is a vital component of Afghanistan’s 

power network. However, as of February 2009, repair work was again underway. 

Another example is road reconstruction, which, according to USAID officials, has 

experienced significant delays and higher costs associated with the deteriorating 

security situation. In an effort to address limited capacity issues, USAID provided 

a wide variety of training, including technical assistance and literacy training and, 

since 2005, has included capacity building in its contracts as part of program 

support. Additional information concerning Afghan government capacity is found 

in Enclosure VII. 

Reconstruction Efforts Are 

Constrained by 

Deteriorating Security and 

Lack of Capacity 

Oversight Questions 

1. How are reconstruction programs evaluated for effectiveness and impact? 

2. How effective are programs in insecure areas? What are the development 

priorities in the most insecure areas? What strategies does USAID have to 

maintain ongoing efforts in these areas? 

3. How have alternative development programs changed over time given 

USAID plans to transition from short-term pay-for-work projects to 

longer-term projects? 

4. How are CERP funds being used in Afghanistan? To what extent is DOD 

taking steps to ensure an adequate workforce with sufficient training and 

expertise to manage and oversee CERP? How does DOD track CERP 

projects? What is the impact of increased DOD funding on reconstruction? 

5. How do DOD and USAID coordinate their reconstruction projects with 

each other and other donors who provide assistance in the same area? Point of Contact 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov

 

1

In our previous work on CERP in Iraq, we identified the need for stronger 

management and oversight of CERP which is also applicable to Afghanistan.
Page 25 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

April 2009 

Enclosure VII: Afghan Government Capacity

Background Issue 

According to the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), capacity is the 

ability of individuals, institutions, and societies to perform functions, solve 

problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner. Capacity 

development is the process by which these abilities are gained, strengthened, 

adapted, and maintained over time. A lack of capacity in virtually all areas remains 

a major constraint to Afghanistan’s recovery and transformation, hindering the 

government’s ability to bring about peace and security, eliminate corruption, 

develop the economy, increase the participation of women, and ensure appropriate 

care of the environment. Since 2002, the United States has provided nearly $2.5 

billion on democracy, governance, and rule of law in Afghanistan. 

Afghanistan is struggling to 

recover from decades of warfare 

and economic neglect. It is one of 

the poorest countries in the 

world, has a high illiteracy rate 

resulting from limited access to 

basic education, much of its 

population lacks basic skills, and 

government ministries have 

difficulty executing their budgets.

Key Findings 

According to the ANDS, more than 70 percent of Afghanistan’s population is 

illiterate. The illiteracy level poses problems in recruiting police, prosecutors, 

investigators, and even trained administrative staff, according to U.S. and UN 

officials. U.S. officials also noted that a lack of basic computer skills makes it 

difficult to run modern management systems. Moreover, trained staff often 

leave the government for better paying jobs with donor countries or 

nongovernmental organizations, leaving Afghan ministries with fewer 

adequately trained staff. For example, the United Nations provided the Afghan 

government with a small lab for drug testing, but had to staff and fund the lab 

due to a shortage of capable local staff and resources. According to U.S. 

officials, most development programs now include a form of capacity 

building. For example, USAID is strengthening literacy training and training 

Afghan ministries how to tender and manage contracts. 

Afghanistan’s Population Is 

Largely Untrained 

Afghanistan continues to lack the ability to cover its government expenditure 

plans without foreign assistance. Table 3 details the ANDS’s overall funding 

and expenditures between 2008 and 2013 and estimated shortfalls that will 

require international funding and support. 

Afghanistan Will Remain 

Dependent on Foreign 

Assistance to Maintain 

Government Services 

Table 3: Overall Anticipated Funding and Projected Expenditures for 

the ANDS, 2008-2013 

U.S. Dollars in Millions 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 Total

Funding 

 Domestic revenue $887 $1,104 $1,351 $1,611 $1,911 $6,864

 Total assistance from donors 6,513 4,960 4,814 4,398 3,908 24,593

Total funding 7,400 6,064 6,165 6,009 5,819 31,457

Expenditures 

 Security 3,219 2,585 2,679 2,790 2,906 14,179

 Infrastructure 1,781 3,093 3,681 4,180 4,451 17,185

 Agriculture and rural 

 development 

829 921 916 909 912 4,486

 Education and culture 742 893 980 1,077 1,181 4,872

 Good governance and rule of law 374 558 640 685 728 2,985

 Health and nutrition 325 465 530 563 595 2,478

 Economic governance and 

 private sector development 

237 215 230 244 260 1,186

 Social protection 192 359 394 421 449 1,815

 Others 205 198 185 170 157 915

Total expenditures 7,903 9,286 10,236 11,038 11,637 50,100

Total shortfall $-503 $-3,222 $-4,071 $-5,029 $-5,818 $-18,643

Source: Afghanistan National Development Strategy. 
Donor assistance accounts for about 88 percent of Afghanistan’s total funding 

during the 2008-2009 budget year; however, this assistance is expected to 

decline to about 67 percent of total funding by the 2012-2013 budget year. 

Moreover, Afghanistan’s total expenditures exceed its total funding and these 

shortfalls are expected to increase. 

Donor assistance accounts for about 88 percent of Afghanistan’s total funding 

during the 2008-2009 budget year; however, this assistance is expected to 

decline to about 67 percent of total funding by the 2012-2013 budget year. 

Moreover, Afghanistan’s total expenditures exceed its total funding and these 

shortfalls are expected to increase. 

Afghanistan lacks the capacity to sustain and maintain many programs and 

projects put in place by donors. USAID rated the capability of 14 of 19 Afghan 

ministries and institutions it works with as 1 or 2 on a scale of 5, with 1 

representing the need for substantial assistance across all areas and 5 

representing the ability to perform without assistance. While USAID noted 

there has been overall improvement among the ministries and institutions in 

recent years, none were given a rating of 5. For example, in 2008 we reported 

that a sustainable road maintenance program was not established, although it 

is a goal of the Afghan government and international donors. The Afghan 

government’s support of this goal has been limited due to factors such as a 

lack of resources and a fragmented institutional organization. As a result, 

donors have agreed to fund road maintenance to protect their investments. 

The USAID Inspector General also found that an urban water and sanitation 

project did not ensure system operators were adequately trained or Afghan 

ministries with water and sanitation responsibilities had adequate plans in 

place to assure the financial and operational sustainability of the systems. 

Nevertheless, several ministries, such as the Ministries of Finance and Public 

Health, received ratings of 4 and have demonstrated improved capacity. 

Afghanistan lacks the capacity to sustain and maintain many programs and 

projects put in place by donors. USAID rated the capability of 14 of 19 Afghan 

ministries and institutions it works with as 1 or 2 on a scale of 5, with 1 

representing the need for substantial assistance across all areas and 5 

representing the ability to perform without assistance. While USAID noted 

there has been overall improvement among the ministries and institutions in 

recent years, none were given a rating of 5. For example, in 2008 we reported 

that a sustainable road maintenance program was not established, although it 

is a goal of the Afghan government and international donors. The Afghan 

government’s support of this goal has been limited due to factors such as a 

lack of resources and a fragmented institutional organization. As a result, 

donors have agreed to fund road maintenance to protect their investments. 

The USAID Inspector General also found that an urban water and sanitation 

project did not ensure system operators were adequately trained or Afghan 

ministries with water and sanitation responsibilities had adequate plans in 

place to assure the financial and operational sustainability of the systems. 

Nevertheless, several ministries, such as the Ministries of Finance and Public 

Health, received ratings of 4 and have demonstrated improved capacity. 

Afghan Ministries Are Not 

Sustaining and Maintaining 

Development Projects and 

Programs 

According to State and USAID officials, Afghanistan lacks the funds to pay for its 

2009 and 2010 elections and will have to rely on donor pledges from the United 

States and other nations to fund them. Although Afghanistan expects to receive 

funding for the 2009 presidential elections, it was not sufficiently organized to 

hold them this spring as required by the Afghan constitution and had to delay 

them to August. 

According to State and USAID officials, Afghanistan lacks the funds to pay for its 

2009 and 2010 elections and will have to rely on donor pledges from the United 

States and other nations to fund them. Although Afghanistan expects to receive 

funding for the 2009 presidential elections, it was not sufficiently organized to 

hold them this spring as required by the Afghan constitution and had to delay 

them to August. 

2009 and 2010 Afghanistan 

Elections Are Delayed Due 

to Limited Capacity 

According to the ANDS, Afghanistan’s capacity problems are exacerbated by 

government corruption, a significant and growing problem in the country. The 

country ranked 117 out of 159 on Transparency International’s 2005 

Corruption Perception Index. In 2008, Afghanistan’s corruption ranking fell to 

176 out of 180. Also according to the ANDS, the causes of corruption in 

Afghan public administration can be attributed to a series of factors such as: a 

lack of institutional capacity of public administration, weak legislative and 

regulatory frameworks, limited enforcement of laws and regulations, poor and 

non-merit-based qualifications of public officials, low salaries of public 

servants, a dysfunctional justice sector, and illegal profits through the opium 

trade. Furthermore, the sudden influx of donor money into a system already 

suffering from poorly regulated procurement practices increases the risk of 

corruption and waste of resources. 

According to the ANDS, Afghanistan’s capacity problems are exacerbated by 

government corruption, a significant and growing problem in the country. The 

country ranked 117 out of 159 on Transparency International’s 2005 

Corruption Perception Index. In 2008, Afghanistan’s corruption ranking fell to 

176 out of 180. Also according to the ANDS, the causes of corruption in 

Afghan public administration can be attributed to a series of factors such as: a 

lack of institutional capacity of public administration, weak legislative and 

regulatory frameworks, limited enforcement of laws and regulations, poor and 

non-merit-based qualifications of public officials, low salaries of public 

servants, a dysfunctional justice sector, and illegal profits through the opium 

trade. Furthermore, the sudden influx of donor money into a system already 

suffering from poorly regulated procurement practices increases the risk of 

corruption and waste of resources. 

Pervasive Corruption 

Exacerbates Afghanistan’s 

Capacity Problems 

Oversight Questions 

1. How is the United States working to develop Afghan government capacity 

at the appropriate central government and provincial levels? 

2. How will the Afghan government sustain programs and projects put in 

place by foreign donors? 

3. What impact will the delay in elections have on the U.S. ability to work 

effectively with the Afghan government? Point of Contact 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov

4. What efforts has the United States made to enhance Afghan accountability 

and reduce corruption? 

Page 26 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
Page 27 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

April 2009 

Enclosure VIII: Accountability for U.S.-

Provided Weapons in Afghanistan 

Background Issue 

DOD, through its Combined 

Security Transition CommandAfghanistan (CSTC-A) and with 

State support, directs 

international efforts to train and 

equip the Afghan National 

Security Forces (ANSF). The U.S. 

Army and Navy have procured 

small arms and light weapons for 

the ANSF. CSTC-A also has 

obtained weapons for the ANSF 

from international donors. 

From June 2002 through June 2008, DOD obtained about 380,000 small arms 

and light weapons for the ANSF, including machine guns; pistols; rifles; 

shotguns; mortars; and launchers for missiles, rockets, and grenades. DOD 

and 21 donor nations reported the value of these weapons at over $223 

million. Given the unstable security conditions in Afghanistan, the risk of loss 

and theft of these weapons is significant. We previously reported lapses in 

accountability for similar arms provided to Iraqi security forces, and in August 

2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence emphasized the 

importance of safeguarding weapons intended for the ANSF, stating that “the 

security of conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives is paramount, as 

the theft or misuse of this material would gravely jeopardize the safety and 

security of personnel and installations world-wide.” 

Key Findings 

DOD did not establish clear guidance for U.S. personnel to follow when 

obtaining, transporting, and storing weapons for the ANSF, resulting in 

significant lapses in accountability. While DOD has accountability 

requirements for its own weapons, including serial number tracking and 

routine inventories, it did not clearly specify whether they applied to ANSF 

weapons under U.S. control. GAO estimates the U.S. Army and CSTC-A did 

not maintain complete records for about 87,000, or 36 percent, of the 242,000 

U.S.-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan (see fig. 8). 

DOD Could Not Fully 

Account for ANSF Weapons 

Figure 8: U.S.-Procured Weapons Shipped to Afghanistan for the 

ANSF, Dec. 2004-June 2008 

Rifles

Pistols

Machine guns

Grenade launchers

Shotguns

Rocket-propelled grenade launchers 

 117,163

Weapon category Quantity shipped

 62,055

 35,778

 18,656

 6,704

 1,620

 227

Total 242,203

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.

Mortars and other weapon
For about 46,000 weapons, the Army could not provide serial numbers, and 

GAO estimates CSTC-A did not maintain records on the location or 

disposition of about 41,000 weapons with recorded serial numbers. CSTC-A 

also did not maintain reliable records for about 135,000 weapons it obtained 

for the ANSF from 21 other countries. Accountability lapses occurred 

throughout the supply chain and were primarily due to a lack of clear 

direction and staffing shortages. During our review, CSTC-A began correcting 

some shortcomings, but indicated its continuation of those efforts depends on 

its ability to address staffing shortages and other factors that have impeded its 

efforts. 

For about 46,000 weapons, the Army could not provide serial numbers, and 

GAO estimates CSTC-A did not maintain records on the location or 

disposition of about 41,000 weapons with recorded serial numbers. CSTC-A 

also did not maintain reliable records for about 135,000 weapons it obtained 

for the ANSF from 21 other countries. Accountability lapses occurred 

throughout the supply chain and were primarily due to a lack of clear 

direction and staffing shortages. During our review, CSTC-A began correcting 

some shortcomings, but indicated its continuation of those efforts depends on 

its ability to address staffing shortages and other factors that have impeded its 

efforts. 

Page 28 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

Despite CSTC-A’s training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and 

account for weapons and sensitive equipment. DOD and State have deployed 

hundreds of trainers and mentors to help the ANSF establish accountability 

practices. CSTC-A’s policy is not to issue equipment without verifying that 

appropriate supply and accountability procedures are in place. Although 

CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF units’ ability to account for 

weapons, mentors have reported major accountability weaknesses, which 

CSTC-A officials and mentors attribute to a variety of cultural and institutional 

problems, including illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance. Further, 

CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices 

until 15 months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units. 

Despite CSTC-A’s training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and 

account for weapons and sensitive equipment. DOD and State have deployed 

hundreds of trainers and mentors to help the ANSF establish accountability 

practices. CSTC-A’s policy is not to issue equipment without verifying that 

appropriate supply and accountability procedures are in place. Although 

CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF units’ ability to account for 

weapons, mentors have reported major accountability weaknesses, which 

CSTC-A officials and mentors attribute to a variety of cultural and institutional 

problems, including illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance. Further, 

CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices 

until 15 months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units. 

Despite Training Efforts, the 

ANSF Cannot Fully 

Safeguard and Account for 

Weapons 

We made several recommendations to help improve accountability for 

weapons and other sensitive equipment DOD provides to the ANSF, including 

that DOD (1) establish clear accountability procedures for weapons while 

they are in the control and custody of the United States and direct the Army, 

CSTC-A, and other military organizations involved in providing these weapons 

to track all weapons by serial number and conduct routine physical 

inventories; (2) direct CSTC-A to specifically assess and verify each ANSF 

unit’s capacity to safeguard and account for weapons and other sensitive 

equipment before providing such equipment, unless a specific waiver or 

exception is granted; and (3) devote adequate resources to CSTC-A’s effort to 

train, mentor, and assess the ANSF in equipment accountability matters. DOD 

concurred with these recommendations and has taken some initial corrective 

action but did not state when the shortcomings we identified would be fully 

addressed. In March 2009, the new administration indicated that it will send 

about 4,000 troops to help train and support the ANSF. 

We made several recommendations to help improve accountability for 

weapons and other sensitive equipment DOD provides to the ANSF, including 

that DOD (1) establish clear accountability procedures for weapons while 

they are in the control and custody of the United States and direct the Army, 

CSTC-A, and other military organizations involved in providing these weapons 

to track all weapons by serial number and conduct routine physical 

inventories; (2) direct CSTC-A to specifically assess and verify each ANSF 

unit’s capacity to safeguard and account for weapons and other sensitive 

equipment before providing such equipment, unless a specific waiver or 

exception is granted; and (3) devote adequate resources to CSTC-A’s effort to 

train, mentor, and assess the ANSF in equipment accountability matters. DOD 

concurred with these recommendations and has taken some initial corrective 

action but did not state when the shortcomings we identified would be fully 

addressed. In March 2009, the new administration indicated that it will send 

about 4,000 troops to help train and support the ANSF. 

Continued Oversight 

Needed to Ensure 

Corrective Actions Are 

Taken to Improve Weapons 

Accountability 

Oversight Questions 

1. What progress has DOD made in implementing serial number tracking and 

routine physical inventories of weapons intended for the ANSF? 

2. To what extent has CSTC-A begun to systematically assess the ability of 

all ANSF units to account for weapons and other equipment and monitor 

progress? 

3. To what extent have DOD and the ANSF accounted for weapons and other 

equipment provided to train and equip the ANSF? Point of Contact 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., 

(202) 512-7331, 

johnsoncm@gao.gov

4. What are DOD’s plans for utilizing the additional 4,000 troops to assist 

with weapons accountability? 
Page 29 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 

April 2009 

Enclosure IX: Oversight of Contractor 

Performance in Afghanistan 

Background Issue 

Key Findings 

Since the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban, contractors have played a key role in 

U.S. efforts to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Contractors have been hired to 

construct roads and buildings, increase agricultural capacity, develop Afghan 

government ministries’ management capacity, train Afghan police, maintain 

U.S. weapons systems, and provide security and logistical services to U.S. 

forces and other government personnel. As the administration plans to increase 

the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and develops an overarching 

reconstruction strategy, it will need to determine the types and extent of 

contractor support required. At the same time, DOD, State, and USAID need to 

overcome challenges associated with the procurement, management, and 

oversight of contractor performance. 

DOD, State, and USAID have relied 

on contractors to support troops 

and civilian personnel and conduct 

reconstruction efforts in 

Afghanistan. For fiscal year 2007, 

DOD obligated approximately $3.2 

billion on contracts performed in 

Afghanistan, with State and USAID 

reporting obligations of $562.5 

million and $427.5 million, 

respectively. 

DOD’s, State’s, and USAID’s ability to effectively manage contractors in 

Afghanistan has been undermined by several systemic challenges, including a 

failure to clearly define contract requirements and a lack of acquisition and 

oversight personnel with experience working in contingency operations. 

These challenges have contributed to higher costs, schedule delays, and 

operational impacts. For example: 

Agencies’ Ability to Manage 

Contractors in Afghanistan 

Undermined by Systemic 

Challenges 

• In September 2008, the DOD Inspector General reported that contracts for 

construction at a U.S. air field often did not clearly define acceptable 

standards for construction. This, combined with a lack of qualified 

oversight personnel, contributed to the U.S. government accepting poor 

quality buildings and projects from the contractor. The U.S. government 

then paid the contractor at least $3.4 million to bring these buildings and 

projects up to acceptable standards. Not only did costs increase, but U.S. 

military units also experienced delays in receiving fully useable facilities. 

• As we reported in July 2008, USAID had not completed project designs or 

conducted detailed assessments before awarding road construction 

contracts. As a result, work plans were modified during construction 

contributing to a $28 million cost increase on a 326-kilometer road project 

linking Kandahar to Herat. 

• In September 2007, the State Inspector General found that State had 

neither clearly defined authority and responsibility nor developed 

standard policies and procedures for its personnel to monitor contractorheld property. As a result, State could not determine the total quantity and 

costs of acquired property or whether that property, which included 

vehicles and weapons, was needed or received. Nevertheless, State 

accepted and approved $28.4 million for payment on questionable 

vouchers submitted by the contractors. 

The agencies’ reliance on contractors in Afghanistan requires that each have a 

sufficient number of acquisition and contractor oversight personnel to 

effectively manage and oversee contractors. Our work, as well as that of 

others, found that as the United States increased its planned level of 

reconstruction in Iraq, the increased workload strained the agencies’ 

acquisition and oversight capacity. DOD is developing new policies to improve 

contracting and the management of contractors in contingency operations 

such as Afghanistan and Iraq, but not all of these policies have been issued 

and the impact of those that have been issued remains to be seen. In addition, 

Agencies’ Capacity to 

Oversee Contractors Needs 

to Be Increased 
USAID acknowledged the need for and requested additional contracting 

personnel staff based on a recently developed strategic plan. 

Afghanistan’s poor security situation has contributed to U.S. funds being 

expended without achieving the desired program outcomes and with limited 

U.S. government oversight of contractors working on those projects. For 

example, because attacks prevented contractors from working on an Afghan 

road to the Kajaki dam, USAID terminated the road contract after it had spent 

about $5 million on it. State and USAID officials also have reported that poor 

security inhibited their oversight of opium eradication projects outside Kabul 

and that planned oversight trips may be cancelled at any time if sufficient 

military personnel are not available to provide security. As in Iraq, private 

security contractors are being used in Afghanistan to protect U.S. officials. We 

have previously reported on the importance of the management and oversight 

of contractors. 

Afghanistan’s poor security situation has contributed to U.S. funds being 

expended without achieving the desired program outcomes and with limited 

U.S. government oversight of contractors working on those projects. For 

example, because attacks prevented contractors from working on an Afghan 

road to the Kajaki dam, USAID terminated the road contract after it had spent 

about $5 million on it. State and USAID officials also have reported that poor 

security inhibited their oversight of opium eradication projects outside Kabul 

and that planned oversight trips may be cancelled at any time if sufficient 

military personnel are not available to provide security. As in Iraq, private 

security contractors are being used in Afghanistan to protect U.S. officials. We 

have previously reported on the importance of the management and oversight 

of contractors. 

Poor Security Environment 

Impacts Contract Outcomes 

and Oversight 

As the number of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan increases and 

reconstruction efforts continue, the three agencies will need to assess the 

roles and responsibilities of contractor personnel. We found, for example, that 

DOD’s increased use of contractors at deployed locations was the result of 

thousands of individual decisions, not a result of a strategic or deliberate 

planning process. Moreover, the agencies’ ability to do such an assessment is 

hindered by their limited insight into the extent to which they rely on 

contractor personnel. DOD, State, and USAID could not provide complete, 

reliable data on the number of contractor personnel in Afghanistan for our 

October 2008 report. The agencies have begun using a DOD database to track 

contractor personnel in Afghanistan; however, DOD has acknowledged that 

there are weaknesses in the system for tracking personnel and it does not 

routinely evaluate the completeness of the data. 

As the number of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan increases and 

reconstruction efforts continue, the three agencies will need to assess the 

roles and responsibilities of contractor personnel. We found, for example, that 

DOD’s increased use of contractors at deployed locations was the result of 

thousands of individual decisions, not a result of a strategic or deliberate 

planning process. Moreover, the agencies’ ability to do such an assessment is 

hindered by their limited insight into the extent to which they rely on 

contractor personnel. DOD, State, and USAID could not provide complete, 

reliable data on the number of contractor personnel in Afghanistan for our 

October 2008 report. The agencies have begun using a DOD database to track 

contractor personnel in Afghanistan; however, DOD has acknowledged that 

there are weaknesses in the system for tracking personnel and it does not 

routinely evaluate the completeness of the data. 

Level and Nature of 

Contractor Support Needs 

to Be Assessed 

Oversight Questions 

1. What are the desired mix, roles, and responsibilities of military, civilian, 

and contractor personnel in light of increased U.S. military and ongoing 

reconstruction efforts? What actions are needed to achieve this desired 

mix? 

2. Do DOD, State, and USAID have adequate staff resources in Afghanistan 

to ensure the appropriate level of contract management and contractor 

oversight? Do existing staff resources have adequate training and 

guidance? 

3. When does DOD expect it will issue and fully implement the remaining 

policies designed to improve contracting and the management of 

contractors in contingency operations? What mechanisms has DOD 

established to assess the effectiveness of these policies? What efforts do 

State and USAID have underway to improve contracting and the 

management of contractors in contingency operations? 

4. To what extent can contractor oversight, particularly with respect to 

reconstruction and counternarcotics efforts, be effectively carried out in 

the existing Afghan security environment? 

5. What framework has been established to govern and regulate the use of 

private security contractors in Afghanistan? 

Points of Contact 

John Hutton, (202) 512-4841, 

huttonj@gao.gov

William Solis, (202) 512-8365, 

solisw@gao.gov 

6. What actions are DOD, State, and USAID taking to improve their ability to 

track and identify contractor personnel in Afghanistan? To what extent do 

these agencies know what functions contractors are performing? 

Page 30 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
Appendix I: Related GAO Products Appendix I: Related GAO Products 

Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges 

to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies.

GAO-09-476T. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2009. 

Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to More Accurately Capture and 

Report the Costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 

Freedom. GAO-09-302. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009. 

Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of 

Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel 

and Afghan Cooperation. GAO-09-280. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2009. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with 

Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-263SP. 

Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2009. 

Afghanistan Security: Corrective Actions Are Needed to Address Serious 

Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National 

Security Forces. GAO-09-366T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2009. 

Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and 

Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and 

Plans. GAO-09-380T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2009.

Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant 

Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National 

Security Forces. GAO-09-267. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2009. 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq.

GAO-09-86R. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2008. 

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and 

Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO-09-19. Washington, 

D.C.: October 1, 2008. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but 

Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance 

Program Are Needed. GAO-08-689. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2008. 

Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police 

Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help 

Ensure Accountability. GAO-08-883T. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008. 

Page 31 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
Appendix I: Related GAO Products 

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to 

Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable 

Afghan National Security Forces. GAO-08-661. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 

2008. 

Questions for the Record Related to the Benefits and Medical Care for 

Federal Civilian Employees Deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq.

GAO-08-155R. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for 

Congressional Oversight. GAO-07-801SP. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 

2007. 

Military Operations: The Department of Defense’s Use of Solatia and 

Condolence Payments in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO-07-699. 

Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2007. 

Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating 

Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals. GAO-07-78. Washington, D.C.: 

November 15, 2006. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating 

Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. 

Goals. GAO-05-742. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 

Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made 

Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined. GAO-05-575. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited 

Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy 

Needed. GAO-04-403. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004. 

Foreign Assistance: Observations on Post-Conflict Assistance in Bosnia, 

Kosovo, and Afghanistan. GAO-03-980T. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003. 

Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to 

Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability. GAO-03-607. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Page 32 GAO-09-473SP Afghanistan 
Appendix II: 

A

GAO Contact and 

cknowledgments 

Page 33 GAO-09-473SP 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition, the following staff contributed to the results presented in this 

report: Hynek Kalkus, Johana Ayers, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Joseph Carney, 

Carole Coffey, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, Laura Czohara, Aniruddha 

Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Karen Deans, Lucia DeMaio, Mark Dowling, 

Mattias Fenton, Etana Finkler, Walker Fullerton, Richard Geiger, Cindy 

Gilbert, Elizabeth Guran, David Hancock, Albert Huntington, John Hutton, 

Julia Jebo, Bruce Kutnick, Armetha Liles, James Michels, Mary Moutsos, 

Alise Nacson, Marcus Oliver, Theresa Perkins, Sharon Pickup, Emily 

Rachman, Elizabeth Repko, Mona Seghal, Jena Sinkfield, William Solis, 

Pierre Toureille, and Sonja Ware. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320652) Afghanistan 
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