DHS' Controls Over 

Firearms and Other 

Sensitive Assets 

October 25, 2017 

OIG-18-05 
 

 

 

 

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
 

DHS’ Controls Over Firearms and 

Other Sensitive Assets
 

October 25, 2017 

Why We Did 

This Audit 

Since issuing the 2010 

Office of Inspector General 

report, DHS’ Controls over 

Firearms, lost or stolen 

Federal firearms continue 

to be used to commit 

serious crimes. We 

conducted this follow-up 

audit to determine 

whether DHS 

implemented effective 

controls to ensure 

component personnel 

properly safeguard 

firearms and other 

sensitive assets to prevent 

loss, theft, or 

unauthorized use. 

What We 

Recommend 

We made six 

recommendations to 

improve the tracking and 

safeguarding of sensitive 

assets. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 254-4100, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

Component personnel do not always safeguard 

sensitive assets that, if lost, would result in critical 

mission impact or loss of life. Between fiscal years 

2014 and 2016, the Department of Homeland 

Security personnel lost a total of 2,142 highly 

sensitive assets — 228 firearms; 1,889 badges; and 

25 secure immigration stamps. Although this 

represents a slight improvement from our last 

audit, more than half of the lost items we reviewed 

(65 of 115) revealed that component personnel did 

not follow policy or used poor judgment when 

safeguarding these assets. In these cases, 

components did not always hold personnel 

accountable nor did they receive remedial training 

for failing to safeguard these sensitive assets. 

Furthermore, components are not effectively 

tracking sensitive assets, and practices 

surrounding non-law enforcement badges may be 

resulting in unnecessary risk. These issues are 

caused in part by insufficient guidance, but also 

because DHS lacks reliable data and oversight to 

effectively manage the program. Without oversight 

and policy improvements, highly sensitive assets 

will continue to be subject to loss or theft and the 

safety of the general public will be at risk. 

DHS Response 

DHS concurred with all six of our 

recommendations and has already implemented 

corrective actions, resulting in the resolution and 

closure of recommendation 3. The remaining 

recommendations are considered open and 

resolved. 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-18-05 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

October 25, 2017 

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Claire M. Grady 

Senior Official Performing the Duties of 

the Deputy Secretary 

Department of Homeland Security 

FROM: John Roth \,.,.,~\(_o~ ...... 

Inspector General 

SUBJECT: DHS' Controls Over Firearms and 

Other Sensitive Assets 

Attached for your action is our final report, DHS' Controls Over Firearms and 

Other Sensitive Assets. We incorporated the formal comments from the 

Department in the final report. 

The report contains six recommendations aimed at improving the program's 

overall effectiveness. DHS concurred with all six of our recommendations and 

has already implemented corrective actions, resulting in the resolution and 

closure of recommendation #3. The remaining recommendations are considered 

open and resolved. Once your office has fully implemented the 

recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days 

so that we may close the recommendations. The memorandum should be 

accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed upon corrective actions and 

of the disposition of any monetary amounts. Please send your response or 

closure request to OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will 

provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will 

post the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact 

John E. McCoy II, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audits, or 

Donald Bumgardner, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at 

(202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

Background .................................................................................................... 1 

Results of Audit ............................................................................................. 3 

Components Do Not Properly Safeguard Sensitive Assets ....................... 4 

Components Do Not Effectively Track Sensitive Assets ........................... 6 

Insufficient Guidance over Badges May Be Contributing to Significant 

Losses and Resulting in Unnecessary Risk............................................. 8 

Department Needs to Improve Oversight and Enforce Policy ................ 10 

Conclusion ......................................................................................... 11 

Recommendations......................................................................................... 11 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................. 15 

Appendix B: Department’s Comments to the Draft Report .................... 17 

Appendix C: FY 2014–2016 Components’ Lost Firearms, Badges, and 

Stamps ..... ...................................................................... 20 

Appendix D: Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report ........... 21 

Appendix E:Report Distribution .......................................................... 22 

Abbreviations 

CAPSIS Consolidated Asset Portfolio and Sustainability Information 

System 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

ECD Estimated Completion Date 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
 

OCRSO Office of Chief Readiness Support Officer 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-18-05 
 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background
 

As the Nation’s largest law enforcement agency, the Department of Homeland 

Security maintains an inventory of sensitive law enforcement equipment that, if 

lost, could pose a danger to the public or significantly impact the Department’s 

mission. Sensitive assets are defined as all items, regardless of value, that 

require special control due to unusual rates of loss, theft, or misuse. Such 

assets include weapons, ammunition, explosives, law enforcement equipment, 

and secure immigration stamps.1 

The Department faced challenges in the past 

safeguarding sensitive assets. In 2010, the Office 

of Inspector General published the audit, DHS’ 

Controls over Firearms (OIG-10-41), which 

determined that Department personnel did not 

adequately safeguard its firearms; losing 289 

handguns, rifles, and shotguns over a 3-year 

period. We recommended that DHS implement 

department-wide policies and procedures for 

safeguarding and controlling firearms. DHS 

satisfied the recommendations in 2013, 

implementing new policy, additional monitoring 

controls, and an enhanced data system for accountable assets.2 

Figure 1: DHS Sensitive Assets 

Source: DHS OIG 

Department’s Role in Managing Sensitive Assets 

The Office of Chief Readiness Support Officer (OCRSO) is responsible for 

managing the Personal Property Asset Program across the Department. OCRSO 

is charged with providing oversight by setting policy, conducting program 

reviews, and recommending corrective action to components. At the end of 

2016, the Department reported approximately 2.6 million accountable assets in 

its inventory costing more than $27 billion, of which approximately $2 billion 

represent the Department’s most highly sensitive assets. 

The Department determines an asset’s level of sensitivity by evaluating the 

potential impact a loss could have on the safety, security, and operation of the 

Department’s mission. DHS classifies assets as level one through five. Level 

one assets are the most sensitive and, if lost, would result in a critical mission 

impact or loss of life. Our review focused on the following level one assets: 

1 Secure immigration stamps are used to document admission or denial to the United States and other 

immigration services. The stamps are issued with security ink to prevent counterfeiting false impressions.

2 Accountable property is either: (1) an asset with an expected useful life of 2 years or longer and an asset 

value of $5,000 or more; (2) that is classified as sensitive; (3) for which accountability or property control 

records are maintained; (4) or otherwise warrants tracking in the property system of record. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-18-05 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Customs and Border Protection 99,920 140,879 24,436 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement 82,262 17,715 -

United States Coast Guard 46,140 80 -

United States Secret Service 15,999 14,033 -

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers 10,674 18 -

National Protection and Programs Directorate 2,966 1,161 -

Federal Emergency Management Agency 713 317 -

Science and Technology Directorate 417 0 -

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services - - 43,027 

Total 259,091 174,203 67,463 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

firearms; badges;3 and secure immigration stamps. Table 1 shows the total 

number of these assets across the Department. 

Table 1: Total Firearms, Law Enforcement Badges, and Stamps 

Component Firearms Badges Stamps 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of component-generated property management data as of June 2017. We did not test the 

reliability of this data and are presenting the information as provided. We did not include the number of firearms and 

law enforcement badges for Transportation Security Administration because the information is protected Sensitive 

Security Information under 49 CFR 1520.5(b)(8(ii)). 

Policy and Procedures for Personal Property Management 

In 2013, OCRSO issued the Personal Property Asset Management Program 

Manual to provide components with uniform standards, policies, and 

procedures to manage personal property. The policy established specific 

requirements to ensure proper accountability, tracking, and reporting of all 

sensitive assets. Appendix F of the manual contains the DHS Firearms Policy, 

which provides additional safeguarding instruction and clarification for 

firearms. Specifically, it requires components to establish procedures for safe 

storage of issued firearms. The component’s procedures must account for 

safeguarding firearms both on and off duty, as well as the use of a safety 

locking device. In addition, components must ensure that all law enforcement 

officers receive annual training in accountability and safeguarding of firearms. 

Personal Property Data System 

The Department created the Consolidated Asset Portfolio and Sustainability 

Information System (CAPSIS) as DHS’ system of record and to provide visibility 

over its assets. CAPSIS is a centralized data warehouse populated from each 

component’s personal property system. It is not used for inventory purposes, 

but rather as a tool that enables DHS to monitor compliance with policy and 

procedures through monthly reporting requirements. 

3 Badges for purposes of our review include badges and credentials because not all components track the 

items individually. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-18-05 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Crimes Committed with Sensitive Assets Figure 2: CBS Local News San Francisco 

Even with new controls designed to 

strengthen the security of sensitive 

assets, lost or stolen Federal firearms 

continue to be used to commit serious 

crimes. For instance, a media article 

reported a September 2015 robbery in 

which an attacker killed a man with an 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) firearm that was stolen from an unattended vehicle. The ICE agent failed 

to properly secure the weapon inside the vehicle in a high crime area (figure 2). 

Source: http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com 

We conducted this follow-up audit to determine whether the Department 

implemented effective controls to ensure components properly safeguard 

firearms and other sensitive assets to prevent loss, theft, or unauthorized use. 

Results of Audit 

Component personnel do not always safeguard sensitive assets to prevent loss, 

theft, or unauthorized use. DHS maintains an inventory of law enforcement 

equipment and other sensitive assets that, if lost, would result in critical 

mission impact or loss of life. Between fiscal years 2014 and 2016, Department 

personnel lost a total of 2,142 highly sensitive assets — 228 firearms; 1,889 

badges; and 25 secure immigration stamps. Although this amount is a slight 

improvement from our last audit, more than half of the 115 lost cases that 

were reviewed revealed that component personnel lost firearms, badges, and 

secure immigration stamps due to poor safeguarding practices. In these cases, 

components did not always hold officers4 accountable nor did officers receive 

remedial training for failing to safeguard these sensitive assets. 

Furthermore, components are not effectively tracking sensitive assets, and 

practices surrounding non-law enforcement badges may be resulting in 

unnecessary risk. These issues are caused in part by insufficient guidance, but 

also because DHS lacks reliable data and oversight to effectively manage the 

program. Without oversight and policy improvements, highly sensitive assets 

will continue to be subject to loss or theft and the safety of the general public 

will be at risk. 

4 This term includes both law enforcement and non-law enforcement officers. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 3 OIG-18-05 
 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Components Do Not Properly Safeguard Sensitive Assets 

Components are not always safeguarding sensitive assets. The Department lost 

a total of 228 firearms; 1,889 badges;5 and 25 immigration stamps between 

fiscal years 2014 and 2016 (see appendix C for a breakdown by component). 

Specifically, of the 115 lost case files reviewed, 65 officers (57 percent) did not 

properly safeguard their sensitive asset, 27 did not include sufficient detail to 

determine whether the officer properly safeguarded the asset, and 23 occurred 

due to circumstances beyond the officer’s control or despite reasonable 

precautions taken. Additionally, officers were not always held accountable or 

did not receive remedial training for failing to safeguard these sensitive assets. 

As a result, DHS assets have fallen into the hands of criminals and been used 

to commit crimes, putting the public at risk. 

Component Personnel Used Poor Judgment Safeguarding Sensitive Assets 

In the 65 cases, officers either disregarded policy or used poor judgment. 

According to the Department’s policy, sensitive assets must receive a higher 

level of safety and security. Each employee is obligated to properly care for, 

handle, and protect governmentissued assets at or away from the 

office. Firearms and other sensitive 

assets must be properly secured to 

prevent loss, damage, theft, and 

unauthorized use at all times. Figure 

3 shows the breakdown of the types 

of assets reviewed that were not 

properly safeguarded. 

Figure 3: Results from 115 Case Files 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of component lost case 

files. 

Assets were typically lost or stolen 

from vehicles, residences, or public locations. Component policy requires 

firearms to be secured using a safety locking device or any reasonable 

measures when left unattended. The following are descriptions of the most 

egregious circumstances surrounding some of the losses in which officers did 

not follow policy or take reasonable measures to safeguard assets: 

x	 Two off duty ICE officers left their firearms unsecured and unattended in 

backpacks while on a beach in Puerto Rico. When the officers returned 

the bags were gone. 

x	 An ICE officer left his firearm, badge, and credential unsecured in his 

hotel room while on vacation. As he slept, his overnight guest stole his 

belongings. 

5 Lost badge totals included both law enforcement and non-law enforcement badges since components do 

not make the distinction on the lost reports. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIG-18-05 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

x A Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer left his backpack 

containing his wallet and government badge in an unlocked public gym 

locker. When he returned, his belongings were gone. 

x A CBP officer left his firearm in a bag at a friend’s house. When he 

returned 2 days later, the gun could not be located. 

x A Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officer left his firearm in 

a bag in the backseat of his vehicle while having dinner with his family. 

The rear passenger side window was shattered and the bag was taken. 

x A CBP officer left his firearm and other law enforcement equipment in an 

unlocked vehicle overnight. The following day he realized his firearm and 

two magazines were no longer in the vehicle. 

x A U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officer did not 

secure her immigration stamp in the provided lockbox and did not know 

the asset was missing until the time of the annual physical inventory. 

In 27 cases, the file did not include sufficient detail to determine whether the 

officer properly safeguarded the asset. The Department requires a Report of 

Survey be submitted to record the circumstances surrounding the loss. Officers 

are also required to file a police report upon discovery of a lost or stolen 

firearm; however, the policy does not require police reports to be included with 

the file. Case files with police reports attached provided greater detail than the 

Report of Survey alone. Without the appropriate level of detail, reviewing 

officials cannot make an informed decision whether the officers followed policy 

when securing their assets. 

Officers Not Always Held Accountable for 

Poor Safeguarding 

Components do not always hold officers 

accountable for failing to safeguard 

sensitive assets. Of the 65 cases in which 

officers did not safeguard their sensitive 

assets, 22 officers (34 percent) did not 

receive any disciplinary action, and 9 

officers (14 percent) only received oral 

counseling. Figure 4 provides a breakdown 

of the disciplinary action taken in the 65 

cases reviewed. 

Additionally, none of the officers received 

any type of remedial training for failing to safeguard sensitive assets. Although, 

Figure 4: Disciplinary Action in 65 

Assets Not Safeguarded 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of component disciplinary 

action data. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-18-05 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

the Department’s policy does not require officers to attend remedial training, at 

a minimum, training reinforces component’s policy on proper behavior and 

conduct. Each component is responsible for setting its own table of penalties 

and disciplinary action is left to the supervisor’s discretion. Without proper 

disciplinary action and training, officers may misinterpret poor safeguarding as 

acceptable behavior and these practices will go uncorrected. The Department 

has a responsibility to oversee the program and take corrective action to ensure 

compliance with safeguarding requirements. 

DHS Sensitive Assets Found in the Hands of Criminals 

DHS cannot ensure its sensitive assets do not fall into the hands of criminals 

or pose additional risk to national security and public safety. In fact, of the 

cases we reviewed, police recovered three firearms and one badge from 

convicted felons. Police recovered one firearm from an individual in possession 

of heroin; another from a suspect charged with attempted armed robbery; and 

the last from a convicted felon at a pawn shop. Police recovered a badge during 

a raid nearly 2 years after it was reported missing. 

Components Do Not Effectively Track Sensitive Assets 

Components do not effectively track and record sensitive assets. Specifically, 

components did not update property records or track secure immigration 

stamps and security ink in a system of record as required by policy. Without 

accurate inventory records, components may not be able to locate an asset. 

Components Did Not Have Accurate Property Records 

Components did not have accurate property records at the 21 locations tested. 

We conducted physical inventory verifications of 3,961 randomly selected 

firearms, badges, and secure immigration stamps; and found 454 assets (11 

percent) did not match the name or physical location of the information 

recorded in the component’s inventory system. 

According to DHS policy, property records must be updated no later than 7 

business days from when the asset changes users, the property is moved from 

one area to another, or when the asset has been disposed. The policy also 

requires components to include a physical location for firearms. Without 

accurate property records, components may not be able to locate an asset, 

which may cause it to appear lost. The following are instances of sensitive 

assets that could not be immediately located or were found in the wrong 

location during physical inventory verifications: 

At a CBP regional armory, 208 firearms could not be physically located. 

The property custodian researched the situation, and approximately 2 

www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-18-05 

x
 

Secure Stamp Lockers 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

weeks later provided documentation of the actual physical locations for 

each firearm, which included various lockers and storage vaults across 

CBP’s field offices. 

x	 At a USCIS office, officials could not locate a secure immigration stamp 

recorded as unassigned in the component’s inventory. Further review of 

property receipts indicated the asset was assigned to an immigration 

officer nearly 5 months earlier, but the property custodian never updated 

the inventory. 

x	 At a TSA office, 11 firearms stored in the storage vaults were not 

included on the inventory. The property custodian had possession of 

some of the firearms for more than a year without updating the property 

records. 

x	 At a CBP office, the property 

custodian was unable to 

immediately locate firearms 

from the inventory. After 

searching the facility, the 

property custodian discovered 

the firearms in a random file 

cabinet, stored haphazardly in 

boxes (see figure 5). 

Figure 5: Unassigned Firearms in File Cabinet 

However, not all locations visited were disorganized (figure 6 illustrates some 

best practices observed during physical inventory verifications). 

Figure 6: General Observations during Physical Inventory Verifications 

Source: DHS OIG photo taken during site visit. 

Source: DHS OIG photos taken during site visit. 

Unassigned Firearms Vault Vehicle Lockbox 

www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-18-05 
e

 

 7: CBP Secure Immigration St 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

CBP Did Not Track Secure Immigration Stamps in an Official System 

Source: CBP Guidebook P Guidebook 

CBP does not track secure immigration Figure 7: CBP Secure Immigration Stamp stamps in an official inventory system as 

required by the Department’s policy, and 

instead uses informal Excel spreadsheets. 

In addition, CBP does not record any 

information regarding security ink. 

Officers assigned to Ports of Entry are 

issued secure stamps and security ink to 

document admission into the United 

States and prevent counterfeit impressions (see figure 7). The Department’s 

policy requires all sensitive assets to be tracked in an official system of record. 

However, CBP is not following the Department guidance. During the review, 

CBP issued an email to all local property officers requiring secure immigration 

stamps and security ink to be uploaded into CBP’s system of record, the 

Firearms, Armor, and Credentials Tracking System. 

Since these assets are categorized as highly sensitive and can be a threat to 

public safety or national security if lost or stolen, proper tracking is critical to 

ensure they are controlled and accounted for to prevent unauthorized use. 

Without using an official tracking system, DHS cannot ensure CBP is 

complying with physical inventory requirements or reporting these assets when 

lost or stolen. 

Insufficient Guidance over Badges May Be Contributing to 

Significant Losses and Resulting in Unnecessary Risk 

Components lost 8 times as many badges as firearms — 1,889 and 228, 

respectively. Although the size and nature makes it more susceptible to loss, 

the Department’s lack of guidance may also be a contributing factor. The 

Department’s policy requires components to account for safeguarding firearms 

both on and off duty; however, the same detailed requirements are not provided 

for badges. More than 50 percent (38 of 75) of the badges in our sample were 

lost off duty. These losses occurred at a variety of public venues including 

sporting events, grocery stores, and amusement parks. Lost and stolen badges 

potentially allow criminals or terrorists unauthorized access to secure areas 

and sensitive information, and provide the means to impersonate law 

enforcement officials. 

Components issue badges to both law enforcement and non-law-enforcement 

personnel. However, not all components classify non-law enforcement badges 

as a level one sensitive asset. The Department’s policy does not specify how 

non-law enforcement badges should be classified. ICE and USCIS consider 

these badges to be a level three asset, but CBP assigns a level one to all 

www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIG-18-05 
 

TSA ICE CBP USCIS & 

LOCAL 

Non-Law 

Enforcement 

Law 

Enforcement 

x CBP Agriculture Specialists, Import Specialists, and Attorneys; 

x ICE Attorneys and Intelligence Officers; 

x TSA Transportation Security Officers, Managers, and Inspectors; and 

x USCIS Immigration Officers. 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

badges. Level three assets are not inventoried, tracked, or reported with the 

same rigor as level one law enforcement badges. TSA classifies the badges as 

security sensitive property and does not use the Department’s classification 

system. As illustrated in figure 8, badges issued to non-law enforcement 

personnel look similar to law enforcement badges and, if lost, pose the same 

risk. 

Figure 8: Non-Law Enforcement vs. Law Enforcement Badge 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of component provided photos. Since USCIS does not have law enforcement badges, we used 

the City of Bakersfield’s police badge for comparative purposes (www.bakersfieldcity.us/gov/depts/police). 

Each badge, regardless of who it is issued to, poses a risk of loss, theft, or 

unauthorized use if not properly safeguarded. Components have approximately 

137,942 non-law enforcement badges, ranging in cost from $40 to $75 per 

badge, as listed in table 2. Components issue non-law enforcement badges to a 

variety of positions that do not have arrest authority, for example: 

The Department has not assessed the need, nor has it required components to 

submit justifications for non-law enforcement badges, although some officers 

may not use them. For example, during a site visit to a USCIS service center, a 

senior immigration official said that Immigration Officers in positions that 

approve or deny applications without meeting with the public do not use their 

badge. 

As of July 2017, the Department spent approximately $6 million on non-law 

enforcement badges. Components plan to hire a significant number of new 

employees in the upcoming years. If DHS discontinues the use of these badges, 

it could potentially save millions while also reducing unnecessary risk. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-18-05 
 

 

CBP 6,040 $56 $338,240 

ICE 1,800 $58 $104,400 

TSA 120,000 $40 $4,800,000 

USCIS 10,102 $75 $757,650 

Total 137,942 $6,000,290 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Components may also save an unmeasurable amount of time and resources 

spent inventorying, tracking, and recording non-law enforcement badges. 

Table 2: Component Non-Law Enforcement Badge Cost as of July 2017 

Component Badge Count Badge Cost Total Cost 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of component inventory data and badge cost information. Badge cost includes the cost of the 

badge and other associated costs such as, credential shell, credential case, and laminate. 

Department Needs to Improve Oversight and Enforce Policy 

The Department lacks effective oversight to ensure components are complying 

with all critical property management policies. Specifically, DHS did not have 

reliable data, did not enforce policy, or conduct adequate reviews. As a result, 

DHS cannot make strategic property management decisions or ensure 

components are properly tracking and safeguarding all sensitive assets. 

Incomplete and Unreliable Property Management Data 

The Department does not have complete and accurate property management 

data to provide effective oversight and make informed decisions. As the 

responsible official for managing the Department’s sensitive assets, OCRSO 

must have a complete picture of the total number of sensitive assets across all 

components. OCRSO uses CAPSIS as a tool to manage its assets; however, the 

system did not contain complete and accurate information. For instance, 

CAPSIS data was missing the following: 

x firearms, badges, and credentials inventory information for TSA and 

United States Coast Guard; 

x secure immigration stamp inventory information for CBP; 

x serial numbers for some reported lost or stolen assets; and 

x submission and adjudication dates for some Reports of Surveys. 

DHS Did Not Enforce Policy 

DHS also did not ensure components submit required reports, such as annual 

inventory certifications and asset accountability control plans. DHS requires 

components to submit these reports to outline additional internal controls over 

sensitive assets and to certify an annual inventory was completed. Although 

DHS established these requirements as a way to provide oversight, it did not 

hold components accountable when information was not submitted. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-18-05 
 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In addition, when OCRSO did receive the reports, it did not always conduct a 

thorough review. Reports had obvious math errors and inconsistencies that 

warranted additional follow up. Even though OCRSO officials stated that they 

do not have resources to thoroughly review or correct issues with CAPSIS data, 

the information in these reports is critical to effectively manage sensitive 

property and prevent losses. 

Conclusion 

The highly sensitive nature and potential for public harm intensifies the 

significance of each lost firearm, badge, and secure immigration stamp. It is 

crucial for DHS officers entrusted to protect the public to set the standard by 

adhering to policy and properly safeguarding high-risk assets. The Department 

needs to strengthen its policy and improve oversight to better ensure it can 

make well-informed and cost-efficient property management decisions. 

Additionally, all levels must work together to successfully reduce the number of 

losses and protect the public’s safety. 

Recommendations 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Under Secretary for 

Management strengthen the Personal Property Asset Management Program 

Manual. At a minimum, the policy should: 

x	 require that each component establish procedures for (a) the 

safeguarding of all level one assets including procedures for safeguarding 

during on and off duty time, and (b) issuance of safety locking devices 

and policies on their use, as applicable; 

x require additional safeguarding training for individuals who do not 

properly safeguard sensitive assets; 

x provide examples of level of detail that should be recorded on the Report 

of Survey and require supervisors to adhere to the standards set; and 

x as applicable, require police reports to be submitted along with the 

Report of Survey and be included in the lost case file. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Under Secretary for 

Management require components to re-train property custodians and 

employees on timeframes for updates to the property inventory records. 

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the Under Secretary for 

Management ensure that CBP complies with the Department’s policy to track, 

inventory, and record secure immigration stamps and security ink in an official 

system of record. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 11	 OIG-18-05 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation 4: We recommend that the Under Secretary for 

Management standardize law enforcement and non-law enforcement badges as 

a level one asset and require components to safeguard these assets 

accordingly. 

Recommendation 5: We recommend that the Under Secretary for 

Management require that components assess the need and submit 

justifications to the Department for badges issued to non-law enforcement 

personnel and recommend components discontinue the use of non-law 

enforcement badges without adequate justification. 

Recommendation 6: We recommend that the Under Secretary for 

Management improve the oversight activities by specifically requiring the Office 

of Chief Readiness Support Officer to: 

x leverage component internal inspection units as a force multiplier to 

ensure inventory and property reporting requirements are followed; and 

x summarize all component Lost Damaged Destroyed data semiannually 

and disseminate results throughout the Department to increase 

awareness and remind officers to properly safeguard all sensitive assets. 

DHS Comments and OIG Analysis 

In its response to our draft report, DHS concurred with all six of our report 

recommendations. We incorporated the Department’s comments, responses to 

our recommendations, and our analysis with the applicable recommendations 

in the report. We also included a copy of the management comments in their 

entirety in Appendix B. DHS also provided technical comments to our draft 

report, which we considered in our analysis. 

DHS reported that it remains committed to exploring ways to further the 

progress made in strengthening their policy and oversight of the Department’s 

personal property assets. For example, the Department continues to work 

closely with each component through the Personal Property Committee, led by 

OCRSO, which meets on a bi-monthly basis in a collaborative forum to provide 

guidance, discuss policy, and coordinate current and planned initiatives. 

DHS Response to Recommendation 1: Concur. The DHS OCRSO will work 

with components to develop updated policy, require procedures to implement 

that policy, and implement training for components that are non-compliant. 

Estimated Completion Date (ECD): June 30, 2018. 

OIG Analysis: The Department’s corrective action is responsive to the 

recommendation. The recommendation will remain open and resolved until the 

Department provides evidence to support that corrective actions are completed. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

DHS Response to Recommendation 2: Concur. OCRSO will provide direction 

and guidance to components to re-train property officials and employees, as 

applicable, on DHS policy regarding updates to personal property records. 

ECD: June 30, 2018. 

OIG Analysis: The Department’s corrective action is responsive to the 

recommendation. The recommendation will remain open and resolved until the 

Department provides evidence to support that corrective actions are completed. 

DHS Response to Recommendation 3: Concur. The U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection’s Office of Facilities and Asset Management recently provided 

evidence to support that it is now compliant with this requirement. 

OIG Analysis: The OIG reviewed the documentation provided and confirmed 

that CBP is compliant with the Department’s policy to track, inventory, and 

record secure immigration stamps and security ink in an official system of 

record. As a result, we consider this recommendation closed and resolved. 

DHS Response to Recommendation 4: Concur. OCRSO will update the DHS 

Personal Property Asset Management Program Manual to identify law 

enforcement and non-law enforcement badges as an Equipment Control Class 

1 level asset to be safeguarded accordingly. ECD: June 30, 2018. 

OIG Analysis: The Department’s corrective action is responsive to the 

recommendation. The recommendation will remain open and resolved until the 

Department provides evidence to support that corrective actions are completed. 

DHS Response to Recommendation 5: Concur. DHS leadership agrees that a 

review is necessary to determine the need for non-law enforcement badges. 

OCRSO will work with the DHS Headquarters offices and components to 

determine the appropriate office to lead the review and develop a process for 

obtaining and reviewing justifications, as appropriate. ECD: September 30, 

2018. 

OIG Analysis: The Department’s corrective action is responsive to the 

recommendation. The recommendation will remain open and resolved until the 

Department provides evidence to support that corrective actions are completed. 

DHS Response to Recommendation 6: Concur. OCRSO will work with each 

component to identify their respective internal inspection units and review the 

assessments conducted by these units for compliance with inventory and 

property reporting requirements. For example, USCIS plans to create an Office 

of Professional Responsibility, which will include an Inspection Division 

responsible for ensuring that, among other things, inventory and reporting 

requirements are satisfied. OCRSO will also consolidate lost, damaged, and 

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Department of Homeland Security 

destroyed data on a semi-annual basis and report these results throughout the 

Department. ECD: June 30, 2018. 

OIG Analysis: The Department’s corrective action is responsive to the 

recommendation. The recommendation will remain open and resolved until the 

Department provides evidence to support that corrective actions are completed. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107ï296) by 

amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This discretionary audit was 

included in our FY 2017 annual performance plan and is a follow-up review to 

the OIG report, DHS’ Controls over Firearms (OIG-10-41). 

We conducted this audit to determine whether the Department has 

implemented effective controls to ensure components properly safeguard 

firearms and other sensitive assets to prevent loss, theft, or unauthorized 

use. We limited our review to high-risk assets that, if lost, have the potential 

impact of loss of life and critical mission impairment. We selected firearms, 

badges, credentials, and secure immigration stamps. 

To achieve our objective, we reviewed Federal, departmental, and component 

guidance on personal property management, including the DHS Personal 

Property Asset Management Program Manual. We interviewed Headquarters 

officials from DHS Office Chief Readiness and Support Office; U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 

Transportation Security Administration; United States Secret Service; Federal 

Emergency Management Agency; National Protection and Programs 

Directorate; Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers; United States Coast 

Guard; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; and Science and Technology 

Directorate. 

We reviewed the CAPSIS database and component inventory data to determine 

the Department’s inventory of sensitive assets. We identified incomplete and 

inaccurate CAPSIS data; therefore, we determined that the CAPSIS data was 

unreliable and instead used component data to determine the total inventory of 

selected sensitive assets. We tested the reliability of component-generated data 

during fieldwork and found some inaccurate property records as discussed in 

the report. Nevertheless, we determined the information was sufficiently 

reliable to support the audit’s conclusions. We reported law-enforcement 

badges and credentials as a combined total because some components do not 

track these assets separately in the inventory system. 

Using risk assessment we selected four components, CBP, ICE, TSA, and 

USCIS for additional testing. We evaluated risk factors such as total inventory, 

total lost and stolen assets, and policies and procedures. To perform the 

physical inventory tests, we conducted a total of 21 site visits to the selected 

component field offices in Dallas, TX; Los Angeles, CA; and San Diego, CA. We 

also visited component firearm armories in Atlantic City, NJ; Altoona, PA; and 

Harpers Ferry, WV. At each location we conducted a physical inventory of 

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Component Badges Firearms Stamps Total 

CBP 53 12 0 65 

ICE 12 14 0 26 

TSA 10 12 0 22 

USCIS 0 0 2 2 

Total 75 38 2 115 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

assigned and unassigned assets using component inventory data. We 

compared randomly selected assets with the component’s official inventory 

system of record and noted any discrepancies. Additionally, we observed 

safeguarding practices, when possible. 

We reviewed the CAPSIS data to identify the reported cases of lost firearms, 

badges, and secure immigration stamps. We performed limited testing to verify 

the accuracy of the CAPSIS information for lost assets. Specifically, we 

compared the serial number field in CAPSIS to the serial numbers from 

component’s source data and determined the data sufficiently reliable. From 

the CAPSIS data, we selected 115 case files and obtained component source 

documentation to conduct a more in-depth review. Table 3 provides a 

breakdown of case files reviewed. 

Table 3: Total Number of Case Files Reviewed for Each Component 

Source: DHS OIG case file sample. 

Specifically, we reviewed each case file to determine circumstances 

surrounding the loss and to verify compliance with reporting requirements. We 

based our safeguarding conclusions using component source data and not 

from CAPSIS-generated information. Additionally, we requested the disciplinary 

action of our cases from each component. We did not conduct an in-depth 

analysis of components’ discipline policy or process. 

We conducted this performance audit between October 2016 and August 2017, 

pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Department’s Comments to the Draft Report 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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Department of Homeland Security 

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CBP ICE TSA USCIS Total Universe Percent 

Firearm 103 47 28 N/A 178 228 78% 

Badge 956 250 538 61 1,805 1,889 96% 

Stamp 0 N/A N/A 25 25 25 100% 

Totals 1,059 297 566 86 2,008 2,142 94% 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

FY 2014–2016 Components’ Lost Firearms, Badges, and Stamps 

Source: DHS OIG analysis of CAPSIS data. 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

Office of Audits Major Contributors to This Report 

Yesenia Starinsky, Director 

Lindsey Koch, Audit Manager 

Barry Bruner, Auditor 

Audrey Van, Auditor 

Michael Scoffone, Auditor 

Felipe Rodriguez, Auditor 

Amber Carlson, Program Analyst 

Kevin Dolloson, Communications Analyst 

Thomas Hamlin, Communications Analyst 

Ebenezer Jackson, Independent Referencer 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

DHS Component Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

www.oig.dhs.gov 22 OIG-18-05 
Additional Information and Copies 

To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: 

www.oig.dhs.gov. 

For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click 

on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at 

(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at: 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 

Attention: Hotline 

245 Murray Drive, SW 

Washington, DC 20528-0305