Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

DAVEL CHINN v. TIM SHOOP, WARDEN 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

No. 22–5058. Decided November 7, 2022 

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 

JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins,

dissenting from the denial of certiorari. 

This is a capital case involving a violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). There is no dispute that,

during the capital trial of petitioner Davel Chinn, the State 

suppressed exculpatory evidence indicating that the State’s

key witness, Marvin Washington, had an intellectual disability that may have affected Washington’s ability to remember, perceive fact from fiction, and testify accurately.

When affirming on direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court 

said “[i]f the jury accepted Washington’s testimony, the jury

was certain to convict [Chinn], but if the jury did not believe 

Washington, it was certain to acquit [Chinn] of all charges.” 

State v. Chinn, 85 Ohio St. 3d 548, 561, 709 N. E. 2d 1166, 

1178 (1999). Similarly, the Ohio Court of Appeals said that 

Washington was the “key” and “main” witness against

Chinn. State v. Chinn, 2001–Ohio–1550, 2001 WL 788402, 

*2, *8 (July 13, 2001). Yet, when confronted during state

postconviction proceedings with the State’s suppression of 

evidence that would have substantially impeached this key 

witness, the Ohio courts suddenly concluded that evidence 

was not “material” enough to have affected the trial. 

I write to emphasize the relatively low burden that is 

“materiality” for purposes of Brady and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). To prove prejudice under both 

Brady and Strickland, a defendant must show “a reasonable probability” of a different outcome. United States v. 
 

2 CHINN v. SHOOP 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

Dominguez Benitez, 542 U. S. 74, 82 (2004); United States 

v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, 

J.). We have repeatedly said that the “reasonable probability” standard is not the same as the “more likely than not” 

or “preponderance of the evidence” standard; it is a qualitatively lesser standard. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 434 

(1995) (collecting cases); see also Dominguez Benitez, 542 

U. S., at 83, n. 9; Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 298 

(1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part). In fact, it is “contrary to” our precedent to equate the 

“‘reasonable probability’” materiality standard with the 

more-likely-than-not standard. Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U. S. 362, 405–406 (2000).

The Sixth Circuit did not appropriately apply the materiality standard. Although the Sixth Circuit purported to recognize that the two standards were different, it simultaneously claimed that “‘reasonable probability’ for Brady’s 

purposes is effectively the same as a more-probable-than-not 

standard.” Chinn v. Warden, 24 F. 4th 1096, 1103 (2022) 

(emphasis added). It further said that “[t]he Brady question now” before the court was “whether it is more probable 

than not that the withheld evidence would have created a 

different result.” Ibid. That reasoning violated the spirit, 

if not the letter, of our many cases holding that the two 

standards are not the same and that “reasonable probability” is a lower standard. Indeed, it is unclear why Strickland would have spent the time it did considering but rejecting the “more likely than not” standard in favor of the 

“reasonable probability” standard for prejudice, 466 U. S., 

at 693–694, if courts could treat them as “effectively the

same,” 24 F. 4th, at 1103. 

Because Chinn’s life is on the line, and given the substantial likelihood that the suppressed records would have

changed the outcome at trial based on the Ohio courts’ own

representations, see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 

112 (2011), I would summarily reverse to ensure that the

Sixth Circuit conducts its materiality analysis under the 

proper standard.