J-S69017-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RASHAWN TAHI KNOX 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 498 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered February 20, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0000772-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 15, 2019

Rashawn Tahi Knox appeals from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Dauphin County, denying his motion to dismiss on double 

jeopardy grounds.1 Upon careful review, we affirm.

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1 An order denying a motion to dismiss charges on double jeopardy grounds 

is technically interlocutory. However, such an order is immediately appealable 

as a collateral order where the trial court does not make a finding that the 

motion was frivolous. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B)(6). Here, the court did not 

find that Knox’s motion was frivolous. Thus, the order denying his motion is 

immediately appealable as a collateral order. Pa.R.A.P. 313. See

Commonwealth v. Orie, 22 A.3d 1021 (Pa.2011) (reiterating that direct 

appeal from denial of motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is not 

permitted where hearing court has considered the motion and made written 

findings that motion is frivolous; however, absent such finding, appeal may 

be taken from denial of motion). See also Commonwealth v. Brady, 508 

A.2d 286, 289–91 (Pa. 1986) (allowing an immediate appeal from denial of 

double jeopardy claim under collateral order doctrine where trial court does 

not make a finding of frivolousness).
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On March 11, 2015, a jury convicted Knox of one count of attempted 

homicide, two counts of aggravated assault and related weapons charges 

arising from the following factual scenario:

On September 13, 2013, Office [Donald] Bender [of the 

Harrisburg Bureau of Police] was on patrol duty in the city of 

Harrisburg. He was dispatched to the intersection of Crescent and 

Kittatinny Streets for multiple reports of multiple gunshots. He 

arrived at the scene about 4:45 p.m. and began to look for any 

active shooting. Finding none, and finding no immediate danger, 

he began to interview witnesses. He instructed other officers who 

arrived nearly simultaneously to secure the crime scene, which 

they did. Witnesses indicated that the victims had left in a van 

and the officers did not observe anyone who might be a suspect.

[Jerrell Thompson], a victim, testified [at trial]. [ ] Thompson is 

currently incarcerated in Cumberland County Prison for both a 

parole violation and a theft. About three years prior to the 

incident, [ ] Thompson began using heroin. By August or 

September of 2013, he was using it on a daily basis. He purchased 

it in Harrisburg from someone named “Tip”, whom he identified 

as [Knox]. He would contact [Knox] by cell phone, both calls and 

texts. They would then meet up somewhere in Harrisburg, often 

in the Hall Manor area.

Two days prior [to the incident in question], [on] September 11, 

2013, [ ] Thompson had arranged to meet [Knox] to buy heroin.

They made the trade and as [ ] Thompson walked away, he saw 

a lot of policemen converge on the van that [Knox] was driving. 

He saw [Knox] jump out of the van and start running and then 

[ ] Thompson also ran. As far as [Thompson] could see, [Knox] 

was able to elude the police. [ ] Thompson denied having 

contacted police or having any connection to that raid. He agreed 

that it was suspicious that the police converged upon [Knox] just 

after their deal.

Usually [ ] Thompson would buy a bundle (about ten bags) for 

himself and other users. On [September 13, 2013], [ ] Thompson 

was planning on buying ten bundles for him and others. [Knox] 

instructed [ ] Thompson to meet him at the dead end of Crescent 

Street.
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Once [ ] Thompson and his compatriots arrived, they parked and 

waited for [Knox]. [Knox] arrived and [ ] Thompson got out of 

the van to walk with him. The two of them walked around a corner 

and [ ] Thompson saw another man standing there. [ ] Thompson 

and [Knox] were speaking about the incident on September 11 

when the other man pulled out a gun as did [Knox]. Neither 

[Knox] nor the other man with a gun seemed surprised to see 

each other or that they both had guns. [ ] Thompson ran off 

towards the van[.] [H]e ran first to the passenger’s side, but in 

an attempt to avoid getting shot in the back, he then ran to the 

driver’s side. [Knox] ran to the front of the car and started 

shooting. The driver [Starr Shopp] was hit and then [ ] Thompson 

was shot in the back.

. . . [Detective Richard] Iachini was dispatched to Harrisburg 

Hospital on September 13, 2013, related to a shooting. . . . 

Following [his] investigation, [Detective] Iachini developed a 

suspect and created a photo array. He met with [ ] Thompson on 

September 20, 2013, at the hospital and [ ] Thompson identified 

[Knox] from the photo array.

Commonwealth v. Knox, 142 A.3d 863, 864–65 (Pa. Super. 2016), quoting 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/15, at 1–3, 7–8 (footnotes, citations and some 

brackets omitted).

Following a two-day trial, Knox was convicted by a jury of the above 

charges. On May 12, 2015, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate 

term of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration. Knox appealed and, on June 21, 2016, 

this Court vacated his judgment of sentence and awarded him a new trial, 

concluding that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to 

determine whether a certified interpreter was available to assist a Spanishspeaking witness and, instead, allowed the witness’ sister – who was also a 

witness at trial – to translate for him.
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On October 30, 2017, Knox filed a motion to dismiss the charges against 

him, arguing that his retrial was barred by prosecutorial misconduct that 

allegedly occurred during the course of his first trial. The trial court held a 

hearing on February 20, 2018, and denied the motion that same day. Knox 

filed a timely notice of appeal followed by a court-ordered statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).2 On appeal, Knox 

raises the following issue for our review: 

Whether the trial court erred in denying Knox’s motion for 

dismissal following a mistrial where the Commonwealth engaged 

in prosecutorial misconduct by having one prosecution witness 

interpret and assist in the testimony of another prosecution 

witness and by presenting facts not in evidence including 

reference to a gun that was excluded by the [c]ourt’s pretrial 

rulings to the jury in closing?

Brief of Appellant, at 5. 

We begin by noting that “[a]n appeal grounded in double jeopardy 

raises a question of constitutional law. This court’s scope of review in making 

a determination on a question of law is, as always, plenary. As with all 

questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Vargas, 947 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal 

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2 On November 20, 2018, we issued a judgment order dismissing Knox’s 

appeal for failure to order the transcription of the notes of testimony from the 

February 20, 2018 hearing on his motion to dismiss. On December 4, 2018, 

Knox filed for reconsideration/reargument on the basis that the transcript had, 

in fact, been belatedly made part of the certified record on September 10, 

2018. By order dated January 10, 2019, we granted reconsideration and 

remanded the record to the trial court for the preparation of an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). The trial court has complied and the matter is 

now ripe for disposition. 
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citations omitted). To the extent that the trial court’s factual findings impact 

its double jeopardy ruling, we apply a more deferential standard of review to 

those findings:

Where issues of credibility and weight of the evidence are 

concerned, it is not the function of the appellate court to substitute 

its judgment based on a cold record for that of the trial court. The 

weight to be accorded conflicting evidence is exclusively for the 

fact finder, whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they 

are supported by the record.

Commonwealth v. Wood, 803 A.2d 217, 220 (Pa. Super. 2002), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Young, 692 A.2d 1112, 1114–15 (Pa. Super. 1997).

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits 

retrial of a defendant when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally 

undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of denying him a fair trial. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992). However, because of 

the compelling societal interest in prosecuting criminal defendants to 

conclusion, our Supreme Court has recognized that dismissal of charges is an 

extreme sanction that should be imposed sparingly and only in cases of blatant 

prosecutorial misconduct. Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136, 1144 

(Pa. 2001). An error by a prosecutor does not deprive a defendant of a fair 

trial. Commonwealth v. Kearns, 70 A.3d 881, 884 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 777 A.2d 459, 464 (Pa. Super. 2001)

(where prosecutor’s conduct changes from mere error to intentionally 

subverting court process, then fair trial is denied). Even a mere finding of 

willful prosecutorial misconduct will not necessarily warrant dismissal of 
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charges. Burke, 781 A.2d at 1145; Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 

1265 (Pa. 1992) (although prosecutor’s failure to inform defense counsel of 

witness statement containing incriminating admissions allegedly made by 

defendant amounted to willful discovery violation and raised significant ethical 

concerns, court did not dismiss charges, but rather remanded for new trial). 

[U]nder Pennsylvania jurisprudence, it is the intentionality behind 

the Commonwealth’s subversion of the court process, not the 

prejudice caused to the defendant, that is inadequately remedied 

by appellate review or retrial. By and large, most forms of undue 

prejudice caused by inadvertent prosecutorial error or misconduct 

can be remedied in individual cases by retrial. Intentional 

prosecutorial misconduct, on the other hand, raises systematic 

concerns beyond a specific individual’s right to a fair trial that are 

left unaddressed by retrial.

Kearns, 70 A.3d at 884–85.

Here, Knox bases his claim on two separate incidents that occurred 

during his first trial. The first involved the testimony of Commonwealth 

witness Dalvin Rosario, a native Spanish speaker. During his testimony, 

Rosario was asked to refresh his recollection by reading the statement he gave 

to police on the day of the incident. The following exchange then transpired: 

Q: Dalvin, just read from here to here by yourself. Okay? Just 

read that to yourself to see if it refreshes your recollection. Okay?

A: I don’t read English well.

Q: Okay. Would—having [your sister] in here to help translate, 

would that help?

A: Yeah.

MR. JASON: Your Honor, would she be permitted —

THE COURT: Yes.
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N.T. Trial, 3/11/15, at 153. The court then swore in Rosario’s sister as a 

translator and she proceeded to assist Rosario during his direct examination. 

Knox asserts that he was “denied a fair trial not only because of the lack of a 

certified interpreter in this case, but more significantly because Attorney Jason 

had one Commonwealth witness clandestinely assist another Commonwealth 

witness during [his] testimony.” Brief of Appellant, at 16. Knox claims that 

“it was the conscious object of [Attorney] Jason[] to call Ms. Marte to assist 

Mr. Rosari[o] . . . so that he would testify consistent with what was in the 

police report.” Id. at 16, 17. 

The second alleged incident of prosecutorial misconduct occurred during 

Attorney Jason’s closing argument. By way of background, prior to Knox’s 

2015 trial, the trial court issued an order granting a motion in limine filed by 

the Commonwealth, allowing evidence of prior drug dealing incidents involving 

Knox and the victims pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), as well as evidence of an 

event that occurred on September 11, 2013, two days prior to the incident 

forming the basis for the current prosecution, in which Knox had attempted to 

sell drugs to the victim, but fled the scene when police approached. During 

the September 11 incident, police raided and seized the vehicle in which Knox 

had been a passenger and recovered a gun. The Commonwealth sought to 

introduce evidence of the September 11 incident to establish an inference that

Knox shot Thompson as a retaliatory measure because he believed Thompson 
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had set him up on September 11.3 At trial, evidence of the September 11 

incident was admitted through the testimony of one of the victims, Jerrell 

Thompson. Later during the course of the trial, the court sustained a defense 

objection to the introduction of further testimony regarding the September 11 

incident by Detective Richard Iachini. The parties instead entered into a 

stipulation that was communicated to the jury as follows:

Ladies and gentlemen, the stipulation between the parties is that 

during Detective Iachini’s discussion with the defendant, he 

mentioned the September 11th incident that was testified [to] by 

victim Thompson, and that the defendant did acknowledge the 

sale on that September 11th day.

N.T. Trial, 3/11/15, at 266. 

Subsequently, during closing remarks, the Commonwealth used a 

PowerPoint presentation that made two references to the gun discovered in 

Knox’s van by police during the September 11 raid, in violation of the court’s 

ruling earlier that day that further evidence concerning the September 11 raid 

was inadmissible. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court 

denied. Knox now asserts that Attorney Jason’s inclusion in the PowerPoint 

presentation of references to the gun amounted to misconduct intended to 

mislead the jury.

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3 The Commonwealth argued that “the fact that [Knox] made a deal with the 

victim two days prior, that [Knox] was subsequently—or nearly arrested, he 

had to escape from his van and run from police at that point, does provide a 

motive to at least believe that the victim was the one who set up that 

transaction and set up for the police to come . . . arrest him.” N.T. Trial, 

8/10/15, at 12.
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At the hearing on Knox’s motion to dismiss, Attorney Jason testified 

that, although in retrospect it was a mistake to ask Rosario’s sister to translate 

for him, he “[d]idn’t intend anything by it.” N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/20/18, at 

22. In fact, Attorney Jason testified that, after interviewing Rosario and his 

sister prior to trial, he believed that neither of them would require a translator

during their testimony. See id. at 21. 

With regard to his PowerPoint presentation, Attorney Jason testified as 

follows:

Q: Okay. But you still had some stuff in your PowerPoint that 

referenced that evidence that was not in front of the jury, not on 

the record.

A: Well, let’s be perfectly clear. Just to back up a little bit, before 

we get to the PowerPoint, I had—and I’m sure you have a copy of 

my extensive motion in limine which outlined both—all of the prior 

drug dealing incidents, the prior drug dealing incidents involving 

the defendant and the victims in this case, and the prior occasion 

on September 11th in which guns and drugs were found in a van 

that was raided as a result of probation officers approaching the 

defendant and the victim in Hall Manor.

I’d outline that all extensively. And during a pretrial ruling, the 

judge at that point, I believe, allowed all of that in. Again, I don’t 

have the transcript right in front of me. But from what I 

remember, “It’s all coming in,” was approximately the language 

that was used at that time.

Throughout the course of the testimony of the last witness in this 

case, which is Detective Iachini, I believe the judge at that time 

revised that ruling. But this was after approximately two days[’] 

worth of testimony, and the last witness prior to the closings. So 

at that point I had not, I believe, the opportunity to review and 

make the necessary two-word change to the PowerPoint that I 

think resulted in the issue.

. . .
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Q: Okay. And so, if you didn’t have time to take it out, you knew 

it was in there, but you just didn’t—you didn’t have time to take 

it out.

A: I mean, I think that it’s an unfair distinction, because at the 

time in which all this change had been happening—there are a lot 

of things that go into being in the middle of a serious trial. Not 

having the time, quote/unquote, is that there’s a lot of things 

happening and that it was inadvertent.

It’s not that I intentionally said, That’s a mistake and I’m leaving 

it in there. Or that it was, I intentionally know that’s there, and I 

physically don’t have the opportunity.

It’s—there’s a lot going on. There’s a condensed lunch break. 

There’s a lot of—there’s still witness testimony. There’s potential 

defense witness testimony. And there’s a lot happening.

And so when I say that I may not have had the time or I didn’t 

have the time to take it out, that I didn’t have—there wasn’t, like, 

an evening break that I could have sat back and pored over my 

closing PowerPoint and realized that that subsequently changed 

ruling affected the nature of my PowerPoint. That’s what I mean 

by that.

Id. 25-26, 33-34.

In its opinion, the trial court concluded as follows:

In this case, Appellant availed himself of the appellate system 

which rectifies errors and which has granted him a new trial. 

Further, the Superior Court found that the issue related to 

translation was a trial court error and thus we believe it is not 

attributable to the prosecutor for a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct. The second claim of misconduct relates to the 

PowerPoint presentation during closing arguments.

. . .

We do not find that the prosecutor intentionally left the slides in 

the presentation. We did rule that there should be no mention of 

the gun or heroin about two hours prior to closing and we can 

accept that the prosecutor was unable to adjust his presentation 

in time. However, it does not appear to have prejudiced the jury 

in any way. The jury did come back with questions during 

deliberations, but the issue of the slides was never raised by the 
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jury. The record indicates that the jury took their duty seriously 

and considered their verdict carefully. The prosecutor did not 

barrage the jury with inadmissible information, he did not appeal 

to emotions rather than reason. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/19, at 4-6.

Upon review, we can discern no error of law or abuse of discretion on 

the part of the trial court in concluding that Attorney Jason did not act 

intentionally “to prejudice the defendant to the point of denying him a fair 

trial.” Smith, supra. With regard to the use of witness Rosario’s sister as a 

translator, there is no evidence to support Knox’s claims that “the 

Commonwealth failed to adequately prepare for trial and to request an 

interpreter” or that Attorney Jason’s intent was to have one Commonwealth 

witness “clandestinely assist another Commonwealth witness during their 

testimony.” Brief of Appellant, at 15-16. Rather, the evidence demonstrates 

that, based on his pre-trial conversations with Rosario, Attorney Jason did not 

believe that Rosario would require an interpreter at trial and it was only when 

Rosario became “somewhat uncooperative” that Attorney Jason concluded an 

interpreter might be of assistance. N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/20/18, at 22. 

Indeed, the majority of Rosario’s testimony was given in English, in response 

to English, without his sister’s translation assistance. The record is devoid of 

any evidence that Rosario was “clandestinely” assisted by his sister to benefit 

the Commonwealth’s case. 

As to the PowerPoint presentation, the court credited Attorney Jason’s 

testimony and concluded that, while he “made a mistake by not removing the 

slide,” there was no “overt, intentional conduct.” Id. at 49. This conclusion 
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is supported by the record. At trial, the court revised its earlier ruling 

approximately two hours before closing statements. Attorney Jason, in the 

midst of a felony trial and with only a very short break between the conclusion 

of testimony and the commencement of closing arguments, simply did not 

think to remove the offending slide, which contained information that would 

have been admissible only two hours before, and which he turned off as soon 

as defense counsel noted the objectionable content. There was no evidence 

that Attorney Jason’s use of the slides was anything but an unfortunate 

oversight. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Knox’s motion to 

dismiss. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/15/2019