COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

GUADALUPE FLORES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0660-97-2 PER CURIAM 

 SEPTEMBER 16, 1997 

RICHMOND DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 

 

 (Debora Cress Embrey, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 (Sandra L. Karison, Assistant City Attorney; 

Robert D. Jacobs, Guardian ad litem; City 

Attorney's Office, on brief), for appellee. 

 Guadalupe Flores appeals the decision of the circuit court 

terminating her residual parental rights to her four children. 

Flores contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding that 

the Richmond Department of Social Services (DSS) met its burden 

to prove Flores was unable or unwilling to substantially remedy 

the conditions which led to the children's foster care placement; 

(2) terminating her parental rights to her fourteen-year-old 

daughter without the daughter's express consent; (3) terminating 

her parental rights without considering the wishes of her 

children, who are above the age of reason; and (4) finding that 

DSS met its duty to help Flores substantially remedy the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

conditions that led to the children's placement and that Flores' 

failure to meet that goal was without good cause. Upon reviewing 

the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this 

appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the 

decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

 Code § 16.1-283 embodies "the statutory 

scheme for the . . . termination of residual 

parental rights in this Commonwealth." This 

"scheme provides detailed procedures designed 

to protect the rights of the parents and 

their child," balancing their interests while 

seeking to preserve the family. However, we 

have consistently held that "the child's best 

interest is the paramount concern." 

Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) 

(citations omitted). Under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), a party's 

parental rights may be terminated if the court finds, based upon 

clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's 

best interests and that 

 [t]he parent . . . , without good cause, 

[has] been unwilling or unable within a 

reasonable period not to exceed twelve months 

to remedy substantially the conditions which 

led to the child's foster care placement, 

notwithstanding the reasonable and 

appropriate efforts of social, medical, 

mental health or other rehabilitative 

agencies to such end. 

Proof that a parent "failed, without good cause, to communicate 

on a continuing or planned basis with the child for a period of 

twelve months" or "without good cause . . . [has] been unable to 

make reasonable progress towards the elimination of the 
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conditions which led to the child's foster care placement" in 

accordance with the foster care plan is prima facie evidence of 

the conditions set out in Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). See Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(3). 

 The trial court found that DSS had presented sufficient 

evidence to prove that Flores was "either [] unable or unwilling 

to substantially remedy the conditions which led to the 

children's placement in foster care." The children were placed 

in foster care in September 1991 when Flores left them with their 

father, who claimed to be unable to care for them. The children 

were demonstrably in need of services when they came into foster 

care. DSS was familiar with the family, having provided services 

to them since 1989, and DSS received custody pursuant to 

emergency removal orders after filing petitions alleging neglect. 

 At the time of the hearing, the children were doing well in two 

foster homes. 

 Flores was provided with referrals for alcohol abuse 

programs and housing assistance. She received transportation 

assistance, clothing, and money to help her apply for jobs. 

Flores did not maintain a stable address, and she completed 

alcohol rehabilitation treatment only after she was incarcerated. 

 Flores did not maintain consistent contact with the children, 

repeatedly missed visits, and was uncooperative with DSS workers. 

 After Flores relocated to Texas, she attempted on one occasion 

only to visit the children. 
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 No evidence in the record indicates that Flores had obtained 

a stable address or a job or was prepared to provide a home for 

the children. Her problem with alcohol abuse continued. DSS 

established that it had provided Flores with a variety of 

services without success. Therefore, there was clear and 

convincing evidence that Flores was unable or unwilling to 

substantially remedy the conditions which led to the children's 

placement in foster care and that the termination of her parental 

rights was in the children's best interests. 

Consideration of Children's Wishes

 Flores contends the trial court made its decision to 

terminate her parental rights without the oldest child's express 

consent and without considering the wishes of her other children. 

 Code § 16.1-283(E) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other 

provisions of this section, residual parental rights shall not be 

terminated if it is established that the child, if he is fourteen 

years of age or older or otherwise of an age of discretion as 

determined by the court, objects to such termination." The 

failure of a trial court to receive evidence concerning the 

wishes of a child who has reached the age of discretion can be 

grounds for reversal. See Hawks v. Dinwiddie Dep't of Soc. 

Servs., 24 Va. App. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1997). 

 In this case, however, the record does not indicate that 

Flores preserved for appeal any objection related to the court's 

consideration of her children's wishes. We are limited to the 
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record presented to us. The written statement of facts noted 

that the guardian ad litem "spoke to all four children and all 

but the oldest wanted to continue seeing their mother." Flores 

did not specify an objection under Code § 16.1-283(E) on the 

order. No such objection was incorporated into the court's 

letter opinion or the written statement of facts. Therefore, we 

do not address these issues. Rule 5A:18. 

DSS Assistance

 Flores contends that there was insufficient evidence to 

prove that DSS provided her with the necessary assistance to help 

her meet the goals set out in the foster care plan. On the 

contrary, the evidence indicated that DSS provided numerous 

services to Flores. The evidence does not establish that Flores' 

lack of success in meeting the goals set in the initial foster 

care plans, including obtaining treatment for alcohol abuse and 

maintaining consistent contact with the children, was 

attributable to a failure on the part of DSS to offer relevant 

assistance. As noted by the trial court, "it is not evident that 

[Flores] has ever done enough herself for herself to stabilize 

her situation for the sake of the children." The evidence 

supports the trial court's conclusion. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.