Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 21-0017

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Sarah Gregory and New Prime, Inc.,

Petitioners,

v.

Jaswinder Chohan, et al.

Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued January 31, 2023

JUSTICE BLACKLOCK announced the Court’s judgment and 

delivered an opinion, in which Chief Justice Hecht and Justice Busby

joined in full, and in which Justice Bland joined except as to Parts II.C.2 

and II.D.

JUSTICE DEVINE filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in 

which Justice Boyd joined.

JUSTICE BLAND filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring 

in the judgment.

Justice Lehrmann, Justice Huddle, and Justice Young did not 

participate in the decision.
2

This case arises from a fatal accident on an icy, unlit stretch of 

highway near Amarillo. An eighteen-wheeler driven by Sarah Gregory 

jackknifed across lanes of traffic, and the resulting pileup caused four 

deaths. Among those killed was Bhupinder Deol, a truck driver, but 

more importantly a husband, son, and father of three.

Deol’s wife and family brought a wrongful death action against 

Gregory and her employer, New Prime, Inc. The jury awarded 

approximately $16.8 million to Deol’s family. Noneconomic damages—

awarded to six family members for past and future mental anguish and 

loss of companionship—accounted for just over $15 million of the total. 

On appeal, the defendants challenged the size of the noneconomic 

damages award. The en banc court of appeals affirmed, concluding that 

the award was not “flagrantly outrageous, extravagant, and so excessive 

that it shocks the judicial conscience.” 615 S.W.3d 277, 314 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2020). The chief issue before this Court is the size of the 

noneconomic damages award.

Assigning a dollar value to non-financial, emotional injuries such 

as mental anguish or loss of companionship will never be a matter of 

mathematical precision. But when properly called upon, appellate 

courts have a duty to ensure that the damages awarded for a 

noneconomic injury are the result of a rational effort, grounded in the 

evidence, to compensate the plaintiff for the injury. As we held over 

twenty years ago in Bentley v. Bunton, courts do not fully discharge that 

duty merely by concluding that a verdict is not so “excessive or 

unreasonable” as to shock the judicial conscience. 94 S.W.3d 561, 606 

(Tex. 2002). We said almost 140 years ago that “[w]hat shocks the 
3

conscience or manifests passion or prejudice in the jury are tests too 

elastic for practical use in the great majority of cases.” Gulf, C. & S. F. 

Ry. Co. v. Dorsey, 18 S.W. 444, 445 (Tex. 1886). Our precedent requires 

courts reviewing the size of noneconomic damages awards to do more 

than consult their consciences.

As we have said before when reviewing mental anguish damages, 

“[t]here must be evidence that the amount found is fair and reasonable 

compensation, just as there must be evidence to support any other jury 

finding.” Saenz v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607, 

614 (Tex. 1996) (emphasis added). Rather than limit review of 

noneconomic damages to elastic, impractical standards like the “shocks 

the conscience” test, our precedent instead requires evidence of both the 

“existence of compensable mental anguish” and “evidence to justify the 

amount awarded.” Id.

Today’s case requires us to apply these principles from our prior 

holdings regarding mental anguish damages for the first time to a 

wrongful death claim. “While the impossibility of any exact evaluation 

of mental anguish requires that juries be given a measure of discretion 

in finding damages, that discretion is limited.” Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 

606 (quoting Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614). No matter the cause of action, 

the results of litigation should always be justifiable based on evidence 

and reason. “Juries cannot simply pick a number and put it in the 

blank.” Id. To guard against arbitrary outcomes and to ensure that 

damages awards are genuinely compensatory, the plaintiff in a wrongful 

death case should be required to demonstrate a rational connection, 
4

grounded in the evidence, between the injuries suffered and the dollar 

amount awarded.

Mental anguish and loss of companionship damages are neither 

punitive nor exemplary. They are compensatory. That label is illusory 

if courts do not require a rational connection between the amount 

awarded and the evidence of injury. While precision is not required—

and surely cannot be achieved when placing a dollar value on the 

emotional toll of losing a loved one—some rational basis for the size of 

the judgment is a minimal requirement on which the law must insist.

Here, the plaintiffs produced—and the court of appeals 

recounted—sufficient, even ample, evidence demonstrating the existence

of compensable mental anguish and loss of companionship suffered by 

Deol’s family. But nothing in the record or in the plaintiffs’ arguments 

demonstrates a rational connection between the injuries suffered and 

the amount awarded. The arguments made to the jury regarding the 

proper amount included references to the price of fighter jets, the value 

of artwork, and the number of miles driven by New Prime’s trucks. 

Rather than rationally connect the evidence to an amount of damages, 

these arguments did just the opposite by encouraging the jury to base 

an ostensibly compensatory award on improper considerations that have 

no connection to the rational compensation of Deol’s family.

We also agree with Gregory and New Prime that the trial court 

incorrectly excluded a responsible third party from the jury charge. 

Because a reasonable jury could have determined that another 

company’s truck was at least partly responsible for Deol’s death, the 
5

trial court should not have denied the defendants’ request to designate 

that company as a responsible third party.

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is 

remanded for a new trial.

I.

Around midnight on November 23, 2013, Sarah Gregory was 

driving a New Prime eighteen-wheeler eastbound on Interstate 40 

toward Amarillo. The road was icy, traffic was light, and Gregory was 

traveling at 58 miles per hour. The highway had two lanes in each 

direction, divided by a median. In response to brake lights indicating a 

traffic jam a half a mile or so ahead, Gregory applied the brakes. The 

truck began to slide on the ice, and she lost control of it. The truck 

“jackknifed,” which means that its trailer began to skid, pushed the cab 

out of alignment with the trailer, and eventually folded the cab back 

toward the trailer, rendering the truck immovable. When the truck 

came to rest, it was blocking the entire left lane and some of the right 

lane. Gregory did nothing to warn the drivers behind her of the 

obstruction. The highway was unlit, so approaching drivers had little 

notice of the hazard shrouded in the darkness ahead.

A tragic multi-vehicle pileup ensued. In addition to the New 

Prime truck, the accident involved two passenger vehicles and six other 

eighteen-wheelers. The first two vehicles to arrive on the scene were 

both trucks—a Maryland Trucking Company truck driven by Bhupinder 

Deol and a Danfreight Systems truck. Deol came first. Both trucks 

managed to steer around the New Prime truck on the right, but the 

Danfreight truck clipped Deol’s truck after both had passed by. Deol’s 
6

truck eventually stopped on the right shoulder of the road not too far 

past the disabled New Prime truck, and the Danfreight truck stopped

on the grass between the highway and the feeder road.

Next came a truck owned by ATG Transportation. Unlike the two 

trucks before it, the ATG truck did not make it around the New Prime 

truck. Instead, its driver veered right and lost control. The ATG truck 

turned onto its side on the right shoulder, blocking most of the 

remaining space between the New Prime truck and the right edge of the 

highway. Only a few feet of space separated Gregory’s truck, jackknifed 

on the left, from the ATG truck, overturned on the right.

Following behind the ATG truck was a van driven by Guillermo 

Vasquez.1 Vasquez saw the ATG truck fall over on the right side of the 

road and steered left in response, but he could not avoid the wall of 

trucks almost entirely blocking the road. The Vasquez van hit the New 

Prime truck at less than ten miles per hour. A Prius followed the 

Vasquez van, crashing at high speed into the ATG truck on the right.2 

At this point, neither Deol nor the Vasquez van’s passengers had been 

seriously injured. The next truck, however, struck the back of the 

Vasquez van at 56 miles per hour. This truck belonged to P&O 

Transport. After that collision, the final two trucks—belonging to DOD 

Reynolds and CDO Express Diversified—collided with the P&O truck.

Some time before the P&O truck arrived, Deol left his truck to 

assist victims of the accident. Adam Moseley, a DPS officer who 

1 Five of Vasquez’s family members were riding in the van with him. 

His wife Alma and his son-in-law Hector Perales were among the deceased.

2 Another decedent was Tracy Jones, a passenger in the Prius.
7

responded to the scene, testified that Deol’s injuries suggested he had 

been killed when the Vasquez van—pushed forward by the force of the

successive collisions with the P&O, DOD, and CDO trucks—rolled over 

and crushed him.

Deol’s estate and family sued Gregory and New Prime, among 

others, seeking compensatory damages for (1) economic losses caused by 

Deol’s death, (2) Deol’s conscious pain and suffering, and (3) the mental 

anguish and loss of companionship suffered by his wife, three children, 

and parents. The estates and families of the other decedents intervened 

in the litigation, but the Jones parties later settled, leaving the families 

of Deol, Vasquez, and Perales to go to trial. The jury’s verdict awarded 

almost $39 million to the plaintiffs, and Deol’s family’s share of the final 

judgment was $16,447,272.31. Deol’s family’s noneconomic damages 

accounted for $15,065,000 of the verdict.3

After the verdict, Gregory and New Prime settled with the 

Vasquez and Perales parties. Gregory and New Prime appealed, raising 

a host of issues. On appeal, the Deol parties were the only remaining

3 The jury verdict awarded Deol’s wife Jaswinder Chohan $7,437,500, 

including (1) $350,000 for loss of past companionship, (2) $2,625,000 for loss of 

future companionship, (3) $525,000 for past mental anguish, and 

(4) $3,937,500 for future mental anguish. It awarded each of his two sons

$2,445,000, including (1) $160,000 for loss of past companionship, 

(2) $1,200,000 for loss of future companionship, (3) $160,000 for past mental 

anguish, and (4) $925,000 for future mental anguish. His daughter was 

awarded $1,457,500, including (1) $160,000 for loss of past companionship, 

(2) $1,200,000 for loss of future companionship, (3) $5,000 for past mental 

anguish, and (4) $92,500 for future mental anguish. Finally, each of Deol’s 

parents were awarded $640,000. Both received $160,000 for each category of 

damages. Economic losses and Deol’s conscious pain and suffering accounted 

for the rest of the verdict.
8

plaintiffs. On its own motion, the court of appeals took the case en banc 

before a panel opinion was issued. A 10–4 majority affirmed the 

judgment on all issues. The defendants now raise three issues in this 

Court. They contend that (1) the court of appeals reviewed the amount 

of the noneconomic damages award under an overly deferential 

standard of review, (2) the amount of the award finds no support in the 

evidence, and (3) ATG should have been designated as a responsible 

third party. As explained below, we largely agree with Gregory and New 

Prime.

II.

A.

Noneconomic damages are the exception, not the norm, in tort 

law. The common law has long hesitated to recognize mental or 

emotional injuries absent an accompanying physical injury. E.g., Lynch 

v. Knight (1861) 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (“Mental pain or anxiety the law 

cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act 

complained of causes that alone.”).4 Consistent with the common law 

tradition, this Court first allowed recovery of mental anguish damages 

in personal injury cases only when there was an accompanying physical 

injury to the plaintiff. Hill v. Kimball, 13 S.W. 59, 59 (Tex. 1890). We 

4 See also Blake v. Midland Ry. Co. (1852) 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 42 (“[W]e 

are of opinion that the learned Judge at the trial ought more explicitly to have 

told the jury that, in assessing the damages, they could not take into their 

consideration the mental sufferings of the plaintiff for the loss of her 

husband . . . .”); Baker v. Bolton (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033, 1033 (“In a civil 

Court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury; and 

in this case the damages, as to the plaintiff’s wife, must stop with the period of 

her existence.”).
9

later expanded that rule to allow recovery when the mental anguish 

produces some physical manifestation. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. 

Hayter, 54 S.W. 944, 945 (Tex. 1900). The chief justifications for the 

common law’s skepticism of mental anguish damages were “[t]he 

inherently subjective nature of mental anguish,” “the concomitant 

potential for false claims,” and the resistance of non-pecuniary, 

emotional injuries to rational monetization. Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 

901 S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex. 1995).

In keeping with the common law, this Court in wrongful death 

cases long adhered to the pecuniary loss rule, a “well settled” principle 

that damages for wrongful death “are measured by the pecuniary injury 

to the respective parties entitled,” and not by reference to a surviving 

party’s pain or mental anguish. March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372, 375 

(1877). Not until comparatively recently did our precedent depart from 

this rule. In 1983, our decision in Sanchez v. Schindler departed from 

the common law’s traditional teaching about the difficulty of assigning 

a dollar value to non-physical injuries and charted a new course for 

wrongful death cases, reasoning that “present social realities” 

demanded that “the antiquated and inequitable pecuniary loss rule” be 

abandoned. 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983). We expressed optimism 

that injuries such as these “are not too speculative to be given a 

monetary value,” although we offered little advice on how that might be 

done. Id. at 253.

Three years after opening the door to mental anguish damages in 

wrongful death cases in Sanchez, we also abandoned—as to wrongful 

death cases at least—the venerable prohibition on recovery of mental 
10

anguish damages without a physical manifestation. Moore v. Lillebo,

722 S.W.2d 683, 685–86 (Tex. 1986). Moore held for the first time that 

family members could recover for both mental anguish and loss of 

companionship without a showing of physical manifestation. Id. Since 

Sanchez and Moore, this Court has not had occasion to elaborate on how 

the wrongful death damages authorized by these decisions should be 

reviewed on appeal.

We have, however, decided other cases involving mental anguish 

damages that shed light on the inquiry. For personal injury cases in 

general, we have in the years since Sanchez and Moore held that 

“evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of [] mental anguish” is 

required to establish the existence of mental anguish damages. 

Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 444; Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 

231 (Tex. 2011) (“Even when an occurrence is of the type for which 

mental anguish damages are recoverable, evidence of the nature, 

duration, and severity of the mental anguish is required.”).

A year later, building on Parkway, we concluded in a personal 

injury case that “[n]ot only must there be evidence of the existence of 

compensable mental anguish, there must also be some evidence to 

justify the amount awarded.” Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614 (emphasis 

added); Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 68 (Tex. 2013) (“There must 

be both evidence of the existence of compensable mental anguish and 

evidence to justify the amount awarded.”). Rejecting the notion that 

“[t]ranslating mental anguish into dollars is necessarily an arbitrary 

process,” we held that a jury’s discretion in crafting these verdicts is not 
11

unlimited. Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614. In short, “[j]uries cannot simply 

pick a number and put it in the blank.” Id.

In the years since Parkway and Saenz, we have applied these 

limitations on recovery in a line of defamation cases involving mental 

anguish damages. Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 606; Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 

68; Bennett v. Grant, 525 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex. 2017); Anderson v. 

Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 618–20 (Tex. 2018). In Bentley, we applied the 

requirement announced in Saenz for the first time, overturning a $7 

million mental anguish verdict in favor of Bentley even though “[t]he 

record le[ft] no doubt that Bentley suffered mental anguish.” 94 S.W.3d

at 606. That record indicated that (1) Bentley could not sleep, (2) he 

experienced embarrassment in public life, (3) his family life was 

disrupted, (4) his children were distressed at school, (5) he felt 

depressed, and (6) he felt that his honor and integrity had been 

irrevocably impugned. Id. at 606–07. But “all of this [wa]s no evidence 

that Bentley suffered mental anguish damages in the amount of $7 

million.” Id. at 607 (emphasis added).

The court of appeals disregarded Bentley and later cases, which 

require evidence justifying the amount of mental anguish damages, by 

distinguishing between defamation and wrongful death. We are not 

convinced that this distinction makes a difference. Bentley, a 

defamation case, quotes Saenz, a personal injury case, at great length. 

Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 606 (quoting Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614). Our 

precedent thus cannot support the notion that defamation cases are 

somehow unique. Nor do we see any valid basis on which to carve out 

special rules for appellate review of noneconomic damages in wrongful 
12

death cases, as opposed to non-death injury cases or defamation cases. 

Though the magnitude of mental anguish may often be heightened in 

wrongful death cases, the jury’s task is the same: “They must find an 

amount that, in the standard language of the jury charge, ‘would fairly 

and reasonably compensate’ for the loss.” Id. A wrongful death case is 

no different in this regard.

All acknowledge the inherent difficulty in assigning a dollar value 

to the anguish and loss suffered by the grieving family of an accident 

victim, but this is what we ask juries to do. The nature of this 

undertaking—compensating people with money for emotional injuries 

that are difficult to monetize—is not fundamentally different when the 

emotional injuries are caused by a death rather than by defamation as 

in Bentley or by a non-fatal personal injury as in Saenz. In any factual 

context, including wrongful death, the approach we stated in Saenz and 

repeated in Bentley applies to the legal-sufficiency review of damages 

awarded for noneconomic injury:

Not only must there be evidence of the existence of 

compensable mental anguish, there must also be some 

evidence to justify the amount awarded. We disagree with 

the court of appeals that “translating mental anguish into 

dollars is necessarily an arbitrary process for which the 

jury is given no guidelines.” Fidelity & Guaranty 

Insurance Underwriters v. Saenz, 865 S.W.2d 103, 114 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993). While the impossibility 

of any exact evaluation of mental anguish requires that 

juries be given a measure of discretion in finding damages, 

that discretion is limited. Juries cannot simply pick a 

number and put it in the blank. They must find an amount 

that, in the standard language of the jury charge, “would 

fairly and reasonably compensate” for the loss. 

Compensation can only be for mental anguish that causes 
13

“substantial disruption in . . . daily routine” or “a high 

degree of mental pain and distress.” Parkway v. Woodruff, 

901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995). There must be evidence 

that the amount found is fair and reasonable 

compensation, just as there must be evidence to support 

any other jury finding. Reasonable compensation is no 

easier to determine than reasonable behavior—often it 

may be harder—but the law requires factfinders to 

determine both. And the law requires appellate courts to 

conduct a meaningful evidentiary review of those 

determinations.

Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 606 (quoting Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614) (cleaned 

up).

B.

Holding that some evidence must justify the amount of 

noneconomic damages awarded does not fully answer the question, 

however. If we take seriously the notion that mental anguish and loss 

of companionship damages are meant to reasonably compensate

surviving family members for their injuries—as our cases undoubtedly 

do5—then we must grapple with the difficulties that inevitably arise 

when courts attempt to evaluate the size of these compensatory awards.

“Compensation is the chief purpose of damages awards in tort 

cases.” J&D Towing, LLC v. Am. Alt. Ins. Corp., 478 S.W.3d 649, 655 

(Tex. 2016); see also id. at 655 n.14 (quoting Fowler Harper et al.,

Harper, James and Gray on Torts § 25.1, at 574 (3d ed. 2007) (“The 

5 E.g., Moore, 722 S.W.2d at 688. Mental anguish is “the emotional pain, 

torment, and suffering that the named plaintiff would, in reasonable 

probability, experience from the death of the family member.” Id. Loss of 

companionship is the loss of “positive benefits flowing from the love, comfort, 

companionship, and society the named plaintiff would, in reasonable 

probability, experience if the decedent lived.” Id.
14

cardinal principle of damages in Anglo–American law is that of 

compensation for the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant’s 

breach of duty.”)). Compensatory damages awards are meant to 

compensate victims, not to punish or deter tortfeasors. This basic 

premise of our civil justice system is no less true in a wrongful death 

case than in any other context. No matter what the compensatory 

damages are compensating for, they are supposed to be “[r]easonable 

and proper compensation . . . sufficient to place the plaintiff in the 

position in which he would have been absent the defendant’s tortious 

act.” Id. at 655.

Applying this simple-sounding rule to noneconomic injuries is far 

from simple. The unavoidable truth is that money cannot genuinely 

compensate for emotional trauma, whether or not tort law claims 

otherwise. Money’s inability to truly compensate for mental anguish is 

most starkly demonstrated in a wrongful death case. How can money 

“place the plaintiff[s] in the position” they were in before Deol died?6 

Obviously it cannot. The economic loss in this case may be readily 

ascertainable, but the noneconomic harm transcends quantification 

entirely. At Deol’s death, Jaswinder Chohan lost far more than just a 

source of financial support. She lost her husband.7 Three children lost 

their father. Two parents were delivered the terrible news that they had 

outlived their son.

6 See Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 

S.W.3d 142, 152 (Tex. 2014) (“[M]oney does not equate to peace of mind.”).

7 For one man’s estimation of his own anguish upon the death of his 

wife, see C.S. Lewis, A Grief Observed (1961).
15

Any attempt to monetize the grief experienced by those whose 

loved ones die suddenly and prematurely will fail in its paltry attempt 

to compensate with money that which is priceless. The love we feel for 

those closest to us—and the pain we would feel at their passing—far 

exceeds any price that could ever be paid. Even as we establish legal 

standards in an attempt to promote rationality and non-arbitrariness in 

the damages awarded by courts, we are well aware of the 

insurmountable imperfection of any attempt to use money damages to 

compensate for the emotional injuries alleged in a wrongful death case. 

Imperfect justice is all that can be offered to grieving families who 

cannot truly be made whole, but it should be said that the entire 

enterprise of assigning dollar values to matters of the heart is 

exceedingly imperfect indeed.8 Nevertheless, existing Texas law 

authorizes such recoveries, and our justice system must proceed in this 

realm, as in all others, on the basis of evidence and reason.

We must insist that every aspect of our legal system—including 

the way we compensate grieving families for the wrongful death of a 

loved one—yields rational and non-arbitrary results based on evidence 

8 Similar considerations have led jurisdictions like the State of New 

York to ban recovery for noneconomic losses in wrongful death cases 

altogether. See Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622, 633–34 (N.Y. 1980) (noting 

that the New York wrongful death statute limits recovery to pecuniary 

injuries). Indeed, on the very day we heard oral arguments in this case, the 

Governor of New York vetoed a bill that would have authorized the recovery of 

noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions. Carolyn Gusoff, Gov. Kathy 

Hochul Vetoes Grieving Families Act, But Families of Victims of Fatal 

Tragedies Aren’t Giving Up, CBS NEW YORK (Feb. 1, 2023), 

https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/newyork/news/grieving-families-act-vetoedgovernor-hochul/.
16

and reason, to the extent possible. Any system that countenances the 

arbitrary “picking numbers out of a hat” approach to compensatory 

damages awards is not providing the rational process of law that we are 

obligated to provide, or at least to strive for.

As explained above, our precedents in Parkway, Saenz, Bentley, 

and later cases require legally sufficient “evidence of the nature, 

duration, and severity” of mental anguish to support both the existence

and the amount of compensable loss. Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 444; 

Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614; Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 606. These decisions 

acknowledge the inherent indeterminacy of noneconomic awards and 

the discretion that must be afforded to juries asked to assign a dollar 

value to emotional injury. But they also make clear that the jury’s 

discretion is by no means unlimited and that the amount awarded must 

be supported by evidence. The logic of these precedents applies with 

equal force to wrongful death cases.

The en banc majority did not look to these non-death cases for 

guidance because, in its view, “[d]eath is different.” 615 S.W.3d at 304. 

While that statement is accurate in almost every conceivable 

application, it is not accurate when it comes to assessing damages for 

noneconomic injuries. No matter the source of the mental anguish or 

loss of companionship suffered, our precedent is clear that “there must 

be . . . evidence to justify the amount awarded” in compensatory 

damages, just as there must be evidence to support any other relief 

afforded by our judicial system. Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 68.
17

C.

Having established that (1) our precedent requires that the 

amount of damages awarded must be based on evidence and 

(2) emotional injuries are in their nature resistant to monetary 

quantification, we turn to the question of how a wrongful death plaintiff 

could establish the required connection between an emotional injury and 

an amount of damages.

1.

We begin with a few examples of how not to do so. During closing 

argument, counsel for Vasquez and Perales (other decedents) attempted 

to support the large request for noneconomic damages using a tactic that 

some amici refer to as “unsubstantiated anchoring.”9 We understand 

unsubstantiated anchoring to be a tactic whereby attorneys suggest 

damages amounts by reference to objects or values with no rational 

connection to the facts of the case. Analogies employed by counsel in 

this case included a $71 million Boeing F-18 fighter jet and a $186 

million painting by Mark Rothko.

Of course, the cost of a fighter jet, the auction price of a coveted 

painting, or any other expensive comparator are all equally flawed 

analogies. After learning that a particular aircraft or painting sells for 

many millions of dollars, jurors are no closer to gaining a sense of how 

to compensate the family for their injuries. The self-evident purpose of 

these anchors, however, is to get jurors to think about the appropriate

damages award on a magnitude similar to the numbers offered, despite 

9 Brief for Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, Ins. Council of Tex., and Nat’l Ass’n 

of Mut. Ins. Cos. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at 26–27.
18

the lack of any rational connection between reasonable compensation 

and the anchors suggested. Unsubstantiated anchors like those 

employed here have nothing to do with the emotional injuries suffered 

by the plaintiff and cannot rationally connect the extent of the injuries 

to the amount awarded.

Decedents’ counsel offered these examples to the jury with the 

stated purpose of helping them “place a monetary value on human lives.” 

That statement misunderstands the task a jury faces when asked to 

award damages for mental anguish or loss of companionship. Such 

awards are not meant to place a value on human life, which would be an 

even more nebulous and speculative task than monetizing mental 

anguish and loss of companionship. Unsubstantiated anchors 

introduced as a way to assist a jury in “valuing a human life” are not the 

type of information a jury can rightfully rely on when crafting a verdict. 

And on appellate review, such suggestions are of no assistance in 

rationally explaining why the amount of noneconomic damages awarded 

reasonably compensates the decedent’s family.

Another unsubstantiated anchor offered in this case vividly 

exemplifies the potential for such numbers to improperly influence 

verdicts. After referencing expensive paintings and military aircraft, 

counsel for Vasquez and Perales urged the jury to give defendants their 

“two cents worth” for every one of the 650 million miles that New Prime’s 

trucks drove during the year of the accident. The exact request was 

“[t]wo cents worth for each [decedent]; six cents a mile for the six 

hundred and fifty [million] miles . . . they traveled in the year that they 

took these people’s lives.” Counsel argued that “for four years I’ve been 
19

trying to give this company and their lawyers my two cents 

worth[;] . . . [f]or four years I’ve been trying and they won’t listen to me.” 

He then asked the jury to give New Prime their “two cents worth” 

instead. The unmistakable purpose of this argument is to suggest that 

New Prime can afford a large award and that it should be punished for 

denying Chohan and her family justice for Deol’s death. But punitive 

damages are not at issue here; only compensatory damages are, and the 

“two cents a mile” argument has nothing to do with compensation. 

This improper argument may have influenced the jury. 

Accounting for three decedents, the “two cents a mile” calculation yields 

$39 million in damages. The combined final jury verdict was $38.8 

million, so it is not difficult to conclude that the improper argument 

influenced the result. This is especially the case when we are given no 

other explanation for the size of the award. The only discernible basis 

for the amount awarded in this case that appears from the evidence or 

the argument of counsel is the “two cents a mile” suggestion, which 

matches the amount awarded within one-half of one percent. 

Chohan urges that the Court should not consider these comments 

because they were made by counsel for Vasquez and Perales, not her 

own. We do not find that distinction convincing. The parties tried their 

wrongful death claims simultaneously to the same jury, which heard 

closing argument from both attorneys before deliberation. As a result, 

the improper argument might very well have affected the jury’s 

deliberations as to all three decedents. If the jury’s total award was 

influenced by the unsubstantiated “two cents a mile” suggestion, then 

improper considerations influenced the amount awarded to Deol’s 
20

family just as much as they influenced the amount awarded to the 

Vasquez and Perales plaintiffs.

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure speak clearly to this issue. 

“Counsel shall be required to confine the argument strictly to the 

evidence and to the arguments of opposing counsel.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 

269(e). It should go without saying that the cost of a painting, a military 

aircraft, or a percentage of a company’s revenue are not “evidence” to 

which “counsel shall be required to confine the argument.” Courts have 

an obligation to prevent improper jury argument and “will not be 

required to wait for objections to be made when the rules as to 

arguments are violated.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 269(g). The trial court should 

have done so in response to the unsubstantiated anchors suggested by 

counsel.

Chohan’s counsel asked the jury to use Deol’s economic damages 

as a reference for both mental anguish and loss of companionship. 

Petitioners and some amici embrace the use of economic damages as a 

benchmark for noneconomic damages, and the courts of appeals take a 

mixed approach to the issue.10 The usefulness of such ratios will vary 

10 Compare JNM Express, LLC v. Lozano, 627 S.W.3d 682, 701–02 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2021, pet. pending) (entertaining an 

argument that “the ratio of non-economic damages to economic damages” was 

“approximately 17:1,” but ultimately tossing it for inadequate briefing), FTS 

Int’l Servs., LLC v. Patterson, No. 12-19-00040-CV, 2020 WL 5047913, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 26, 2020), pet. granted, cause remanded, No. 20-0795, 

2023 WL 2358215 (Tex. Jan. 27, 2023), Lane v. Martinez, 494 S.W.3d 339, 351 

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.) (“This large ratio of non-pecuniary 

damages to pecuniary damages . . . lead[s] us to the conclusion that the jury’s

awards of non-pecuniary damages [are] not supported by factually sufficient 

evidence.”), and Hous. Livestock Show and Rodeo, Inc. v. Hamrick, 125 S.W.3d 
21

depending on the nature of the case. In wrongful death cases, however, 

we reject any requirement that the ratio between economic and 

noneconomic damages must be considered. The emotional trauma and 

loss experienced by the decedent’s loved ones is different in kind from 

any lost income the family suffers because of the death. To suggest that 

greater pecuniary loss necessarily justifies greater noneconomic 

damages is to suggest that the families of a well-paid decedent suffer 

more grief and pain than the families of those with less income. Our 

consciences should indeed be shocked by such a suggestion. The severity 

of mental anguish and loss of companionship felt by surviving family 

members does not correlate with economic status. If—as the law 

demands—noneconomic damages are calculated to compensate a 

decedent’s family members for their suffering, we cannot endorse a rule 

under which a wealthier family can recover more mental anguish 

555, 581 n.24 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.), with Alonzo v. John, 647 

S.W.3d 764, 778–79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. filed) 

(expressing skepticism about using the ratio of economic and noneconomic 

damages and upholding an award as supported by sufficient evidence despite 

a 24:1 disparity between the two), Emerson Elec. Co. v. Johnson, 601 S.W.3d 

813, 844 n.18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018), aff’d on other grounds by 627 

S.W.3d 197 (Tex. 2021) (concluding that the court need not consider the ratio 

of economic and noneconomic damages awards, but nevertheless concluding 

that the ratio was not excessive), and Simmons v. Bisland, No. 03-08-00141-

CV, 2009 WL 961522, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin April 9, 2009, pet. denied) (“The 

applicable standard of review requires us to uphold non-economic damage 

awards that are supported by the evidence, regardless of any ratio of noneconomic damages to economic damages.”).
22

damages than another family could simply because the wealthier 

decedent stood to earn more during his life.11

This is not to say that economic damages can never be considered 

when assessing noneconomic damages. There are certainly 

circumstances in which some types of economic damages might correlate 

with noneconomic damages. For example, the family of a decedent who 

suffers for an extended time in the hospital before passing away might 

suffer more mental anguish due to the strain of dealing with medical 

bills and insurance hassles while coping with the death of a loved one. 

In those circumstances, economic damages would also be higher because 

of the medical expenses associated with a long hospital stay. But the 

possibility that economic and noneconomic damages may correlate or 

inform one another in certain situations does not mean that they are 

necessarily connected in all cases or that the ratio between the two is 

always a useful tool. Like other unsubstantiated anchors, unexamined 

use of the ratio between economic and noneconomic damages—without 

case-specific reasons why such analysis is suitable—cannot provide the 

required rational connection between the injuries suffered and the 

amount awarded.

2.

If unsubstantiated anchors and unexamined ratios are not useful 

tools, then how can a party discharge its obligation to support an amount 

11 Additionally, we agree with the dissent below that ratios between 

economic and noneconomic damages are particularly ill-suited for a wrongful 

death claim “because it is brought by the surviving family members, not the 

decedent whose primary economic loss is captured in a separate claim.” 615 

S.W.3d at 319 (Schenck, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23

of noneconomic damages with evidence? To begin with, just as evidence 

of the existence of mental anguish damages generally must establish the 

“nature, duration, and severity” of the anguish suffered, Guerra, 348 

S.W.3d at 231, the same kind of evidence—of “nature, duration, and 

severity”—will naturally also be relevant to the amount awarded.

In some cases, there may be direct evidence supporting 

quantification of an amount of damages, such as evidence of the likely 

financial consequences of severe emotional disruption in the plaintiff’s 

life. Or there may be evidence that some amount of money would enable 

the plaintiff to better deal with grief or restore his emotional health. 

While money itself cannot alleviate grief or truly compensate for 

emotional trauma, it may be that money can provide access to all kinds 

of things that may help the person who has endured such an experience.

We do not offer these examples to suggest that in all cases there 

must be direct evidence of a quantifiable amount of damages. In other 

words, the requirement that some evidence support the amount of 

damages for emotional injury is not a requirement of precise 

quantification or a requirement that a particular type of evidence must 

always be proffered. It is instead merely a requirement that the amount 

of damages must have a rational basis grounded in the evidence. This 

requirement flows ineluctably from our prior holding that “[t]here must 

be evidence that the amount found is fair and reasonable compensation, 

just as there must be evidence to support any other jury finding.” 

Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 606 (quoting Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614). As with 

any evidentiary-sufficiency requirement, parties defending an award of 

damages cannot just assert that the amount justifies itself. Instead,
24

when the record lacks evidence directly supporting the amount found, 

parties and reviewing courts must explore whether there is any other 

rational explanation of how the evidence supports the finding. See Crim 

Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 592 

n.1 (Tex. 1992) (framing the sufficiency inquiry as including “whether 

the evidence offered has a tendency to prove the existence of a material 

fact”). As we held in Bentley and Saenz, the amount of a noneconomic 

damages award is subject to these conventional requirements of 

“meaningful evidentiary review,” just like “any other jury finding.” 

Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 606 (quoting Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614).

The required rational basis for the award may come from evidence 

suggesting a quantifiable amount of damages, such as testimony about 

the potential financial consequences of severe emotional trauma. Or the 

rational basis may be revealed by lawyer argument rationally 

connecting the amount sought—or on appeal, the amount awarded—to 

the evidence. Accord Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 

S.W.3d 660, 675 (Tex. 2004) (observing in the context of constitutional 

law that a “rational basis” for government action should be found “if one 

can be conceived,” whether or not government officials had that basis in 

mind when they acted). We will not speculate here about all the 

permissible ways in which parties may demonstrate that a rational 

connection between the evidence and the amount awarded exists or is 

lacking. But merely asserting, without rational explanation, that any 

amount picked by the jury is reasonable compensation simply because a 

properly instructed jury picked the number is to argue that a jury may 

“simply pick a number and put it in the blank.” Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 
25

614. That is exactly what we have said must not be done. Id. Such an 

arbitrary approach to damages is no more defensible in a wrongful death 

case than in any other case.

If awarding and reviewing noneconomic damages is to be a 

rational and non-arbitrary exercise, as we surely must insist that it be, 

then courts and jurors alike should be told why a given amount of 

damages, or a range of amounts, would be reasonable and just

compensation. Mathematical precision is by no means required, but it 

is not enough for the plaintiff or his attorney merely to assert, without 

rational explanation, that a given amount or a given range is reasonable 

and just. We do not doubt that those who argue for such damages to 

juries and who seek to uphold them on appeal genuinely believe the 

amounts they seek and obtain are reasonable and just compensation for 

the injuries suffered. But one party’s genuine belief is no rational basis 

for a judgment. There must be a reason given for why the belief is valid, 

a reason given for why the amount sought or obtained is reasonable and 

just. And it must be a rational reason grounded in the evidence.12

12 Although neither party advocates for a comparative method under 

which the size of damages awards can be justified based on the damages 

previously awarded in factually similar cases, several amici suggest such an 

approach. We do not foreclose the possibility that comparison to other cases 

may play some role in a plaintiff’s effort to establish that a given amount of 

noneconomic damages is reasonable and just compensation rationally 

grounded in the evidence. We have in the past invoked similar reasoning. See 

Anderson, 550 S.W.3d at 620 (“The jury’s $400,000 award appears to be 

excessive compared to awards in cases involving similar or more egregious 

behavior . . . .”). We will not endeavor here to define the permissible uses of 

verdict comparisons.
26

If the amount sought is genuinely thought to be reasonable and 

just compensation, then there should be an articulable reason why that 

is so. An attorney asking a jury to award that amount in damages 

should be expected to articulate the reason why the amount sought is 

reasonable and just, so the jury can rationally decide whether it agrees. 

And on appeal, if the reasons offered in justification of the amount 

awarded are rational and do not partake of prohibited motives, courts 

should defer to the jury’s verdict. Again, we do not place any limits, in 

this opinion, on the reasons by which a plaintiff might justify the 

amount he seeks or the amount he has been awarded. We hold only that 

a rational reason, grounded in the evidence, must be given by the 

plaintiff, whose burden it is to prove the damages. Only then can juries 

and judges rationally assess whether the amount is reasonable and just 

compensation for the injuries suffered.13

In sum, to survive a legal-sufficiency challenge to an award of 

noneconomic damages, a wrongful death plaintiff should bear the 

burden of demonstrating both (1) the existence of compensable mental 

13 Some amici support a standard that asks what “a reasonable person 

could possibly estimate as fair compensation.” Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc., 434 

S.W.3d at 153 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 cmt. i). The 

Fifth Circuit has characterized Texas law as employing a similar standard. 

Longoria v. Hunter Express, Ltd., 932 F.3d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 2019). Because 

a juror acting reasonably could only award a specific amount of money if there 

was a rational connection between that amount and the evidence adduced at 

trial, we understand both our approach and the Restatement’s as asking 

essentially the same question. The question is “what verdict is within the 

bounds of reasonable inference from the evidence.” Miller v. Md. Cas. Co., 40 

F.2d 463, 465 (2d Cir. 1930) (Learned Hand, J.). It is the plaintiff’s 

responsibility, as the party with the burden of proof, to articulate the 

“reasonable inference” connecting the size of the verdict and the evidence.
27

anguish or loss of companionship and (2) a rational connection, 

grounded in the evidence, between the injuries suffered and the amount 

awarded.

D.

With these standards in mind, we examine the proceedings below. 

To determine whether the award was excessive, the en banc court of 

appeals employed essentially a two-step framework.

First, it gave a detailed account of Chohan’s trial testimony 

indicating that she, her three children, and Deol’s parents all had a close 

relationship with Deol during his life and were deeply grieved by his 

passing. 615 S.W.3d at 309–14. The unenviable task of explaining how 

she and each of her family members had been affected by Deol’s death 

fell to Chohan alone. Her testimony is thorough, saddening, and as the 

en banc majority notes, accounts for nearly fifty pages of a lengthy 

reporter’s record. Id. at 310. As to her own relationship with Deol, she 

testified that they shared a “very, very close” relationship, and he was 

her “best friend.” The night of the accident was particularly traumatic 

for her, and she described the moment that she heard the news of his 

passing as “the saddest moment of her life.” She began taking 

antidepressants, and the loss of Deol’s support meant she had to relocate 

the family, which created additional disruption and discomfort in all of 

their lives, including hers. She finds herself particularly saddened by 

Deol’s passing at milestones in their children’s lives.

As to the children, both sons quite understandably reacted 

emotionally to their father’s death. Both were very attached to him. 

Since the time of the accident, the older son, who used to be happy and 
28

outgoing, is now quiet and keeps to himself. The younger son is less 

active than before and has gained weight. As for the daughter, who was 

only seven months old at Deol’s death, she sees pictures of her father 

around the house and asks when he is coming home.

Finally, Chohan testified that Deol was very close to his parents, 

who lived with them. They enjoyed spending time cooking and 

gardening together. Since his death, his mother cries several times a 

day. Though Deol’s father is more reserved in his grief, Chohan testified 

that the family’s entire home life has changed for the worse and that 

everyone is greatly saddened by Deol’s passing.

After surveying this evidence, the court of appeals turned to the 

second step of its review. Noting that the jury was properly instructed 

on the definitions of mental anguish and loss of companionship and the 

types of evidence relevant to each, id. at 311–12, the court concluded 

that the verdict displayed no indication that the award was motivated 

by “passion, prejudice, sympathy, or other circumstances not in 

evidence,” id. at 314. Nor was the award “flagrantly outrageous, 

extravagant, [or] so excessive that it shock[ed] the judicial conscience.” 

Id. With those observations, it began and ended its analysis, affirming 

the verdict as sufficiently supported by the evidence. Id.

That approach is not so much wrong as it is incomplete. While 

we agree with both the majority and Justice Schenck’s dissent that 

Chohan’s testimony is sufficient evidence that Deol’s family suffered 

compensable mental anguish and a loss of companionship,14 the 

14 Gregory and New Prime concede as much. Pet. Br. on the Merits, at 

38–39.
29

testimony is no evidence, standing on its own, of the amount of damages 

incurred on account of that suffering. Crucially, plaintiffs’ counsel at no 

point in these proceedings has attempted to proffer a rational argument 

justifying either the amount sought or the amount awarded. At trial, 

the only arguments provided to justify an amount of damages were 

impermissible appeals to irrelevant considerations, such as fighter jets 

and New Prime’s total miles driven. See supra at 17–20. On appeal, the 

plaintiffs’ suggested approach is that as long as the jury is properly 

instructed and no improper motive is evident, then the jury may 

essentially “pick a number and put it in the blank.” Saenz, 925 S.W.2d 

at 614. But that is precisely the kind of arbitrariness our precedent 

attempts to avoid by insisting on “evidence to justify the amount 

awarded.” Id.

Chohan’s testimony gave the jury much to work with when 

deliberating the first question related to damages: their existence. As 

we said in Moore, proof of a “family relationship constitutes some 

evidence” of mental anguish. 722 S.W.2d at 686. Chohan’s testimony, 

in addition to proving the family relationships, provides an explanation 

for how each member of the family grieved Deol’s loss. It gives examples 

of appreciable ways in which each of their lives was made worse by his 

passing. But it does not give any indication of what amount of damages 

would be enough “to indemnify the injured [plaintiffs] for the loss 

suffered.”15 After hearing her testimony, no reasonable jury, however 

attentive, properly instructed, and well-intentioned, would be any closer 

to rationally assigning a monetary value to the losses she described. 

15 Compensatory Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
30

While Chohan’s testimony satisfies Parkway’s requirement that a 

plaintiff introduce legally sufficient “nature, duration, and severity” 

evidence, 901 S.W.2d at 444, it does not satisfy Saenz’s requirement that 

“there must also be some evidence to justify the amount awarded.” 925 

S.W.2d at 614.

Nor does it suffice to simply conclude, as the en banc majority did, 

that the result neither shocks the conscience nor arises from bias or 

prejudice. We said almost 140 years ago that:

What shocks the conscience or manifests passion or 

prejudice in the jury are tests too elastic for practical use 

in the great majority of cases. They readily dispose of rare 

extremes. But the cases which need a rule are those which 

press the bounds of reason without transgressing; they 

disturb, but do not shock, the conscience; voice a severe, 

but not necessarily an enraged or prejudiced, jury.

Dorsey, 18 S.W. at 445. The “shocks the conscience” standard is 

inherently subjective because the consciences of appellate judges will 

surely differ in their assessment of damages awards. As we said in 

Bentley, a court of appeals’ factual-sufficiency review of the amount of 

damages for excessiveness—which is where the “shocks the conscience” 

standard has been employed—does not “displace[] [the court of appeals’] 

obligation, and ours, to determine whether there is any evidence at all 

of the amount of damages determined by the jury.” 94 S.W.3d at 606. 

Applying only the vague and subjective “shocks the conscience” standard 

is therefore not enough.16 Whether or not it is reversible error to “shock 

16 Whatever the limited value of the “shocks the conscience” inquiry, if 

a reviewing court concludes that a jury’s verdict was motivated by improper 

passion, prejudice, or a desire to punish a defendant, this remains a separate 
31

the conscience” of an appellate judge, it is error to allow a verdict to 

stand when no rational basis for the verdict’s amount is proffered, as is 

the case here.

The court of appeals detailed Chohan’s testimony and then stated 

that its conscience was not shocked. But it made no attempt to reason 

from the testimony to an explanation for why $15 million reasonably 

compensates Deol’s family for the many injuries Chohan described. Nor 

did the plaintiffs’ counsel assist in that regard. Indeed, the only 

argument offered at any point in this case that could explain the size of 

this award is the impermissible “two cents a mile” exhortation by 

counsel for Vasquez and Perales. No other explanation for the award’s 

size has been proffered. Because no rational connection has been 

proffered between the amount awarded and the evidence of the “nature, 

duration, and severity” of the noneconomic damages suffered by Deol’s 

family—and no such connection is apparent from the record—we must 

conclude that no evidence supports the amount awarded. The award of 

noneconomic damages must therefore be reversed.

When sufficient evidence exists to support the existence of 

damages but not the amount awarded, we reverse and remand. See ERI 

basis for reversal, even if there is otherwise evidence in the record that meets 

the legal standards articulated here. Texas courts often say that they “will set 

aside the verdict only where the record clearly indicates that the award was 

based on passion, prejudice, or improper motive, or is so excessive so as to shock 

the conscience.” E.g., Sanchez v. Balderrama, 546 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.). Though our decisions in Parkway, Saenz, and

Bentley augment that standard of review, they do not eliminate it. “Passion, 

prejudice, or improper motive” remains an independent basis for reversal.
32

Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 882 (Tex. 2010).17 

Typically, in such a case, we would remand to the court of appeals to 

consider a remittitur. Id. But because in this case we also remand for 

a new trial due to the responsible-third-party issue, we will remand the 

entire case to the trial court for a new trial.

III.

Finally, we consider the responsible-third-party issue. Before 

trial, Gregory and New Prime sought to designate several responsible 

third parties, including ATG, Danfreight, CDO, and each of their 

drivers. At the request of Deol’s family, the trial court struck the 

designations before trial and later reaffirmed its ruling after 

presentation of the evidence.18

In this Court, the defendants complain only about the exclusion 

of ATG as a responsible third party. Their theory as to ATG’s 

responsibility is as follows. Though the New Prime truck was blocking 

all of the left lane and most of the right lane of traffic, the two trucks 

17 See also Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d at 882 (“We also hold that while legally 

sufficient evidence does not exist to prove the lost profits awarded by the trial 

court, legally sufficient evidence does exist to prove some reasonably certain 

amount of lost profits. We therefore also reverse the portion of the court of 

appeals’ judgment that ERI take nothing on its claims for lost profit damages 

and punitive damages and remand the case to the court of appeals to consider 

a remittitur, as well as any other remaining issues, before remanding the case 

to the trial court.”).

18 In their briefing before this Court on the responsible-third-party 

issue, both petitioners and respondents engage with the full extent of the 

evidence presented at trial. Thus, they ask this Court to review the trial court’s 

second, post-trial ruling on the issue, rather than the initial pre-trial ruling. 

We decide the issue as presented, by applying the statutorily dictated 

responsible-third-party standard to the trial evidence.
33

that encountered the crash site before ATG were able to successfully 

navigate around the hazard to the right. It was not until the ATG truck 

arrived on the scene, tipped over, and blocked all remaining clearance 

on the right that the accident became unavoidable for the approaching 

vehicles. When the Vasquez van arrived soon after, it had no way to 

avoid the obstacles in front of it. The defendants contend that ATG’s 

driver bore much of the responsibility for the fact that the accident was 

unavoidable for approaching vehicles, including the Vasquez van and 

the ensuing vehicles that caused the Vasquez van to crush Deol. They 

reason that if Gregory was responsible for Deol’s death because her 

negligence created an obstructed road ultimately causing a later 

collision that killed Deol, then ATG’s driver must likewise be at least 

partly responsible because the later, deadly collision was not 

unavoidable until the ATG driver’s negligence resulted in a total 

obstruction of the road.19

For her part, Chohan contends that ATG was properly excluded 

as a responsible third party because the defendants produced no 

19 Chohan contends that Gregory and New Prime waived this objection 

because, at the charge conference, they objected to ATG’s exclusion from the 

jury questions pertaining to the Vasquez and Perales parties but made no 

objection about the questions directed at Deol. We disagree. Gregory and New 

Prime designated ATG as a responsible third party, opposed the plaintiffs’ 

motion to strike the designation on the record, moved for reconsideration 

multiple times after the first attempt was unsuccessful, and obtained a ruling 

on the record. There are six pages of the reporter’s record dedicated to 

back-and-forth argument on this point. The Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure require that the record reflect a timely objection stating the grounds 

for the ruling sought and a ruling on the request. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). 

Gregory and New Prime’s preservation efforts satisfy those procedural 

requirements. 
34

evidence as to (1) duty,20 (2) negligence, or (3) causation. As to 

negligence, Chohan contends that, at most, the defendants point to

evidence that the ATG driver “steered aggressively to the right” and 

spun out, which, given the circumstances created by Gregory’s prior 

jackknife of the New Prime truck, was eminently understandable. 

Chohan thus contends that the defendants did not introduce sufficient 

evidence of negligence on the part of ATG. As to causation, Chohan 

argues that ATG played no part in making the crashes that led to Deol’s 

death more likely because the New Prime truck was the but-for cause of 

the Vasquez van’s crash. Had the New Prime truck not been jackknifed 

in the left lane, Chohan contends, the Vasquez van could have safely 

avoided the overturned ATG truck by travelling in the left lane.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude 

ATG, reasoning that the Vasquez van’s involvement in the crash was 

solely attributable to Gregory’s negligence. 615 S.W.3d at 299.

“A defendant may seek to designate a person as a responsible 

third party.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(a). “After adequate 

time for discovery, a party may move to strike . . . on the ground that 

there is no evidence that the designated person is responsible for any 

portion of the claimant’s alleged injury or damage.” Id. § 33.004(l). 

Then, the burden shifts to the designating party to “produce[] sufficient 

20 We do not consider this objection in depth because the record contains 

a police report demonstrating that the driver of the truck was also the owner 

of ATG Transportation. That is some evidence implicating the entity. 

Chohan’s negligence and causation objections are more substantial, and we 

give them lengthier consideration.
35

evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the designated 

person’s responsibility for the claimant’s injury or damage.” Id.

“Consistent with the statute’s language, [the] courts of appeals 

have described the standard of review as mirroring a no-evidence 

summary judgment” under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i). In re 

Eagleridge Operating, LLC, 642 S.W.3d 518, 525–26 (Tex. 2022) 

(collecting cases).21 We agree. The similarity between the statutory 

responsible-third-party standard and the no-evidence summary 

judgment standard is obvious. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 

802, 825 (Tex. 2005) (“The standards for taking any case from the jury 

should be the same, no matter what motion is used.”). Regardless of the 

procedural context, to ask “[w]hether the proof establishes as a matter 

of law that there is no genuine issue of fact” is to ask a question of law, 

which means that review of the denial of a responsible-third-party 

designation is de novo. Ham v. Equity Residential Prop. Mgmt. Servs. 

Corp., 315 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied).

21 Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(l) (“After adequate 

time for discovery, a party may move to strike the designation of a responsible 

third party on the ground that there is no evidence that the designated person 

is responsible for any portion of the claimant’s alleged injury or damage. The 

court shall grant the motion to strike unless a defendant produces sufficient 

evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the designated person’s 

responsibility for the claimant’s injury or damage.”) (emphasis added), with 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) (“After adequate time for discovery, a party without 

presenting summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on 

the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim 

or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.

The motion must state the elements as to which there is no evidence. The court 

must grant the motion unless the respondent produces summary judgment 

evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.”) (emphasis added).
36

We cannot agree with the courts below that “there is no evidence 

that [ATG] is responsible for any portion of [Deol’s family’s] injury.” 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(l). Instead, the evidence of the 

ATG driver’s role in bringing about the dangerous conditions that 

caused the deadly collision would have permitted a reasonable jury to 

assign partial responsibility to ATG for Deol’s death.

To begin with, there was evidence that the ATG driver’s 

negligence—and not solely the negligence of Gregory—resulted in a total 

obstruction of the road. An expert witness for the plaintiffs testified that 

the ATG driver “steered aggressively to the right” with “well beyond the 

normal steering input that you would use,” which “led to the [ATG] 

tractor trailer spinning out and then ultimately rolling over onto its left 

side.” That same witness agreed that it would be “fair to say that any 

motor vehicle reacting to [the condition of the roadway] that lost 

traction, just like Ms. Gregory had done, was also failing to properly 

control their speed.” A surviving passenger from the Vasquez van 

testified that, right before the ATG truck crashed, it “went straight up 

in the air like it was [a] catapult. And you could actually see the bottom 

of the trailer and the axles underneath as it went up.” Other passengers 

from the van provided a similar version of events. Additionally, the ATG 

truck was the only truck to overturn during the entire course of events. 

Two other trucks had previously encountered the jackknifed New Prime 

truck, and unlike the ATG truck, both were able to steer clear of it on 

the right.

From this testimony, a reasonable jury could have concluded that 

the ATG driver negligently operated his vehicle, either by driving it too 
37

fast in inclement conditions such that he could not avoid the crash to the 

right, as other trucks did, or by overcorrecting his vehicle in an attempt 

to steer to the right.

Chohan’s argument in both the trial court and the court of appeals 

focused less on the ATG driver’s negligence and more on causation. The 

court of appeals affirmed solely on that basis, reasoning that Gregory’s 

truck, not the ATG truck, was solely responsible for causing the Vasquez 

van to crash because:

The evidence showed that, but for Gregory’s vehicle 

blocking the road with no hazard warning signal, Vasquez 

would have had ample space and time to stop his vehicle 

and get off the road, notwithstanding the location of the 

ATG Transportation truck. Because it was due to 

Gregory’s actions that the Vasquez van was placed in the 

position it was before being pushed over Deol, the evidence 

is insufficient to establish that any act or omission by ATG 

Transportation was a substantial factor in causing Deol’s 

death.

615 S.W.3d at 299.

There are two problems with this reasoning. First, while it is true 

that Gregory’s truck blocked the Vasquez van from travelling safely 

along the highway in the left lane (and in most of the right lane), it is 

just as true that the ATG truck blocked the Vasquez van from avoiding 

the accident on the right—as two earlier large trucks had done. Before 

the ATG truck arrived on the scene, two other trucks had safely passed 

the New Prime truck on the right, avoiding any serious accident. But 

after the ATG truck fell and blocked the right side of the road, any 

possibility that later drivers who approached the accident could safely 

navigate around the accident was eliminated. When the Vasquez van 
38

arrived shortly thereafter, its driver had no choice but to crash into 

either the New Prime truck on the left or the ATG truck on the right. 

Indeed, it was only because the ATG truck flipped over in front of the 

Vasquez van that its driver was compelled to move into the left lane to 

begin with. We cannot know whether the Vasquez van and the later 

vehicles would have crashed into the New Prime truck had the fallen 

ATG truck not blocked the rest of the road, but there can be little doubt 

on this record that the total obstruction of the road increased the 

likelihood of later collisions, including the one that killed Deol.

Second, even if it were true that the New Prime truck was the sole 

cause of the Vasquez van’s crash, the Vasquez van’s crash did not kill 

Deol. The evidence indicated that later collisions by subsequent vehicles 

pushed the van onto Deol. Thus, it is not enough to say, as the court of 

appeals did, that “it was due to Gregory’s actions that the Vasquez van 

was placed in the position it was before being pushed over Deol.” Id. at 

299. It was not the van’s presence that killed Deol; it was instead the 

van’s being “pushed over Deol” by later collisions. Regardless of what 

caused the Vasquez van’s presence at the scene, a reasonable juror could 

have concluded that the later, deadly collisions were made more likely 

by the total obstruction of the road and that the total obstruction was 

caused, in part, by the ATG driver’s negligence.

The court of appeals was correct to conclude that “but for 

Gregory’s vehicle blocking the road,” “Vasquez would have had ample 

space and time to . . . get off the road.” Id. But the mere fact that one

person’s behavior is a but-for cause of an injury does not mean that 

another’s behavior is not also a substantial factor in causing the same 
39

injury. Gregory’s negligent operation of her truck was the first cause in 

a series of events that led to a tragedy. Although the accident would not 

have occurred but for Gregory’s actions, a reasonable jury could have 

concluded that the ATG driver’s actions turned an already dangerous 

situation into a deadlier one by closing off the ability of drivers 

approaching the scene to avoid a crash.

For these reasons, there was “sufficient evidence to raise a 

genuine issue of fact regarding [ATG’s] responsibility” for Deol’s death. 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(l). Prohibiting the jury from 

considering ATG’s partial responsibility for Deol’s death was harmful 

error because litigants have a “significant and substantive right to allow 

the fact finder to determine the proportionate responsibility of all 

responsible parties.” In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tex. 2017). A 

new trial is therefore required. See id. (“Allowing a case to proceed to 

trial despite erroneous denial of a responsible-third-party designation 

would skew the proceedings and potentially affect the outcome of the 

litigation”) (cleaned up).

IV.

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case is 

remanded to the trial court for a new trial on all remaining issues 

between the remaining parties.

James D. Blacklock

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 16, 2023