RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0239-16T4

A-0242-16T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.M. and C.G.,

Defendants-Appellants.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF

Ca.G., Ti.G., and Ta.G., minors.

_____________________________________________________

Argued October 3, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher and Sumners.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex 

County, Docket No. FG-12-0082-16.

Deric Wu, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant E.M. (Joseph 

E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; 

Kourtney J.A. Knop, Designated Counsel, on the 

briefs).

Bruce P. Lee, Designated Counsel, argued the 

cause for appellant C.G. (Joseph E. Krakora, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 12, 2017
2 A-0239-16T4

Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Lee, on the 

briefs).

Lisa D. Cerasia, Deputy Attorney General,

argued the cause for respondent (Christopher 

S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; 

Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, 

of counsel; Ms. Cerasia, on the brief).

Lisa M. Black, Designated Counsel, argued the 

cause for minors (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Ms. Black, 

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants E.M. (Elena) and C.G. (Carl) are the parents of 

C.G. (Carl, Jr.), Ti.G. (Teresa), and Ta.G. (Tanya), who were born 

in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. On June 29, 2013, the 

Division of Child Protection and Permanency removed these children1

from their home on an emergent basis because both Elena and Carl

had been incarcerated. Carl was charged (and later convicted) of 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and Elena was charged 

with evidence tampering. The family judge, after a three-day trial, 

terminated Elena and Carl's parental rights to the three children.

2

 

1 Elena has four other children, none of whom are now or were then 

in her care. Those four other children reside with their maternal 

grandparents; their relationship to Elena is not at issue here.

2 In July 2014 in an earlier action, both Elena and Carl executed 

identified surrenders of the children in favor of the children's 

maternal grandparents, who, however, eventually expressed an 

inability or unwillingness to adopt. Consequently, the Division 
3 A-0239-16T4

Elena and Carl separately appeal the judgment terminating 

their parental rights,

3 arguing the judge's findings were based on 

less than substantial evidence. Carl also argues that the 

Division's expert, Dr. Barry A. Katz, who performed psychological 

evaluations of both defendants and who evaluated defendants' 

relationships with the children, provided only a net opinion and, 

therefore, Carl claims the judge erred in relying upon Dr. Katz's 

opinions in terminating his parental rights.

Parents have a constitutionally protected right to the care, 

custody and control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 

U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 

(1982); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). 

"The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been 

deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights . . .,' and 'rights far 

more precious . . . than property rights.'" Stanley v. Illinois, 

405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558 

(1972) (internal citations omitted). "[T]he preservation and 

strengthening of family life is a matter of public concern as 

 

commenced this action, again seeking the termination of 

defendants' parental rights.

3 The appeals were consolidated and are both decided by way of 

this opinion.
4 A-0239-16T4

being in the interests of the general welfare." N.J.S.A. 30:4C1(a); see also K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347.

The constitutional right to the parental relationship, 

however, is not absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 553 (2014); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986). At times, a parent's interest 

must yield to the State's obligation to protect children from 

harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 

397 (2009); In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). To 

effectuate these concerns, the Legislature created a test for 

determining when a parent's rights must be terminated in a child's 

best interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires that the Division 

prove by clear and convincing evidence the following four prongs:

(1) The child's safety, health or development 

has been or will continue to be endangered by 

the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to 

eliminate the harm facing the child or is 

unable or unwilling to provide a safe and 

stable home for the child and the delay of 

permanent placement will add to the harm 

. . .;

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts 

to provide services to help the parent correct 

the circumstances which led to the child's 

placement outside the home and the court has 

considered alternatives to termination of 

parental rights; and
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(4) Termination of parental rights will not 

do more harm than good.

See also A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 604-11.

The experienced judge applied these legal standards when 

examining the proofs and weighing the evidence. Because we are 

required to defer to a trial judge's findings when based on 

substantial credible evidence, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012), we find insufficient merit in 

Elena and Carl's arguments to warrant further discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We provide only these brief 

comments.

As to Elena's arguments on the first prong, the judge found 

she placed the children at risk of both physical and emotional 

harm "due to her alcoholism and mental health problems," her 

"violent tendencies," and "[h]er lack of judgment." The judge also 

found Carl failed to live up to his parental obligations, as 

demonstrated by, among other things, his drug use and criminal 

involvement.

On the second prong, the judge found that both Elena and Carl 

have been unable or unwilling to correct the harm facing the 

children since removal. The judge found Elena

has acknowledge[d] [] mental health problems 

since at least age thirteen. She concedes that 

medicine and therapy has not helped her with 

her anger outbursts. In this case[,] two of 
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her children were involved in her outbursts 

and in the initiating [June 29, 2013] incident 

[Elena] states she either stabbed someone or 

him them with a hammer. . . . She [] suffer[s]

from black outs. The alcohol dependency has 

not abated since 2012. She has engaged in 

numerous detoxification and outpatient 

treatment programs but continues engaging in 

addictive behavior while in the programs.

The judge also found insufficient Elena's excuses for failing to 

engage in a recommended inpatient program.

The judge found that Carl had committed "multiple drug 

offenses" before the children were born and has been incarcerated 

at times since their birth because of drinking and the stabbing 

of someone in the marital home. Carl violated the terms of 

probation after the children's removal and failed to fulfill the 

conditions imposed by treatment programs as the Division attempted 

to reunite him with his children. Indeed, the judge recognized 

that even when the plan of reunification was "going well" in 2014, 

Carl chose to move back in with Elena and "joined her in 

addict[ive] behaviors," demonstrating to the judge that Carl "does 

not appreciate the danger and risk" of his choices.

While incarcerated, Carl was diagnosed with schizophrenia and 

post-traumatic stress disorders, and the judge found his "short[-

]termed compliance with programs" "does not foreshadow future 

success." The judge, therefore, rejected the idea that Carl "can 
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be relied upon to change his ways and provide stability for his 

children within a reasonable period of time."

We need not discuss the judge's findings on the third prong; 

that prong was undoubtedly met. And, as to the fourth, we defer 

to the judge's determination that the children have done "very 

well with [their] foster mother." They are, according to the judge, 

"smart and socially adept" as demonstrated by their ability to 

endure the circumstances and the ebbing of any expectation their 

parents will provide for their needs.

Because all the findings were supported by substantial 

evidence deserving of credit, we affirm substantially for the 

reasons provided by Judge Jane B. Cantor in her well-reasoned 

thirty-five-page opinion.

Affirmed.