UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 22-cv-23759-BLOOM

VICTOR ARIZA, 

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASABLANCO MATTRESS & 

FURNITURE GALLERY, LLC., a Florida 

limited liability company,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT FINAL JUDGMENT 

AGAINST DEFENDANT WITH SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Plaintiff, through undersigned counsel, moves this Court for entry of a Default Final 

Judgment against Defendant CASABLANCO MATTRESS & FURNITURE GALLERY, LLC,

on the following grounds and uncontested facts:

1. Plaintiff brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, costs, and 

attorney’s fees against Defendant for violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12181-12189 (“ADA”), as amended, in connection with the operation of 

Defendant’s associated website, https://casablancofurnituregallery.com.

2. Defendant was properly and timely served with a copy of the Complaint and 

Summons on November 28, 2022, as evidenced by the filed Return of Service [ECF No. 5]. 

Defendant failed to serve any response or answer to the Complaint and as a result a Clerk’s 

Default was entered on December 30, 2022 [ECF No. 9]. 

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3. Because of the Default, Plaintiff is entitled to the declaratory and injunctive relief

requested in the Complaint, as well as an award of his costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and 

expert expenses necessarily incurred through the preparation of this Motion, on the following 

uncontested facts and the application of law to those facts:

a) Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Florida, resides within the Southern District

of Florida, is sui juris, and is disabled as defined by the ADA and ADA Amendments Act of 

2008, 42 U.S.C. §12101 (“ADAAA”). (Complaint ¶4). 

b) Plaintiff is and at all relevant times has been blind and visually disabled in that he 

suffers from optical nerve atrophy, a permanent eye disease and medical condition that 

substantially and significantly impairs his vision and limits his ability to see. (Complaint ¶5).

Plaintiff thus is substantially limited in performing one or more major life activities, including, 

but not limited to, seeing, accurately visualizing his world, and adequately traversing obstacles.

(Id.). As such, he is a member of a protected class under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)-(2), the 

regulations implementing the ADA set forth at 28 CFR §§36.101, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 

§3602(h). (Id.). Plaintiff further is an advocate of the rights of similarly situated disabled persons 

and is a “tester” for the purposes of asserting his civil rights and monitoring, ensuring, and 

determining whether places of public accommodation and/or their respective and associated 

websites are in compliance with the ADA and any other applicable disability laws, regulations, 

and ordinances. (Id.). 

c) Because he is blind, Plaintiff cannot use his computer without the assistance of 

appropriate and available screen reader software. (Complaint ¶6). At a rapid pace, the software 

reads the content of a webpage to the user. (Id.) “The screen reading software uses auditory cues 

to allow a visually impaired user to effectively use websites. For example, when using the visual

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internet, a seeing user learns that a link may be ‘clicked,’ which will bring her to another 

webpage, through visual cues, such as a change in the color of the text (often text is turned from 

black to blue). When the sighted user's cursor hovers over the link, it changes from an arrow 

symbol to a hand. The screen reading software uses auditory – rather than visual – cues to relay 

this same information. When a sight impaired individual reaches a link that may be ‘clicked on,’ 

the software reads the link to the user, and after reading the text of the link says the word 

‘clickable.’...Through a series of auditory cues read aloud by the screen reader, the visually 

impaired user can navigate a website by listening and responding with her keyboard.” (Id., citing 

Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 17-CV-767, 2017 WL 6542466, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 

21, 2017).

d) Defendant is a Florida limited liability company authorized to do business and doing 

business in the State of Florida. (Complaint ¶7). Defendant owns and operates a retail store 

selling mattresses and furniture located at 9195 Southwest 40th Street, Miami, Florida, which

Plaintiff had patronized and intended to patronize in the near future. (Id.). 

e) Plaintiff frequently accesses the internet. (Complaint ¶9). Because he is 

significantly and permanently blind, to effectively communicate and comprehend information 

available on the internet and thereby access and comprehend websites, Plaintiff uses 

commercially available screen reader software to interface with the various websites. (Id.).

Screen reader software translates the visual internet into an auditory equivalent, and.at a rapid 

pace, the software reads the content of a webpage to the user. (Complaint ¶6).

f) At all times material hereto, Defendant was and still is an organization that owns,

operates, and controls a retail store selling mattresses and furniture under the name “Casablanco 

Mattress Furniture Gallery.” (Complaint ¶10). The Casablanco Mattress Furniture Gallery store 

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is open to the public. (Id.). As the owner and operator of this retail store, Defendant is defined as 

a place of “public accommodation" within meaning of the ADA because Defendant is a private 

entity which owns and/or operates “a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, 

shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment,” per 42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(E) and 28 

C.F.R. §36.104(2). (Id.).

g) Because Defendant is a store open to the public, Defendant’s physical store is a 

place of public accommodation subject to the requirements of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12182, 

§12181(7)(E), and its implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 36. (Complaint ¶11).

h) Defendant also owns, controls, maintains, and operates an adjunct website, 

https://casablancofurnituregallery.com (the “Website”). (Complaint ¶12). One of the functions 

of the Website is to provide the public information on the location of Defendant’s store that sells

Defendant’s merchandise within the State of Florida. (Id.). Defendant also sells to the public its 

merchandise through the Website, which acts as a point of sale for Defendant’s merchandise 

available in, from, and through Defendant’s physical store. (Id.). In addition, the Website allows 

the public to apply online for credit to make purchases of merchandise available in the physical 

store and allows users to arrange in-store pickups of merchandise purchased online. (Id.). The 

Website also services Defendant’s physical store by providing information on available products, 

services, tips and advice, editorials, sales campaigns, events, and other information that 

Defendant is interested in communicating to its customers. (Complaint ¶13).

i) Because the Website allows the public the ability to secure information about the 

location of Defendant’s physical store, purchase merchandise also available for purchase in and 

from the physical store, apply online for credit to purchase merchandise available online and in 

the physical store, arrange in-store pickups of merchandise purchased online, and sign up for an 

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emailer to receive exclusive online offers, benefits, invitations, and discounts for use online and 

in the physical store, the Website has a nexus to, and is an extension of and gateway to, the 

goods, services, privileges, and advantages of Defendant’s physical store, which is a place of 

public accommodation under the ADA. (Complaint ¶14). As an extension of and service, 

privilege, and advantage provided by a place of public accommodation as defined under the 

ADA, the Website is an extension of the services, privileges, and advantages made available to 

the general public by Defendant at and through its brick-and-mortar location and business. (Id.).

Furthermore, the Website is a necessary service and privilege of Defendant’s physical store in 

that, as a point of sale for the store, it enables users of the Website to make online purchases of 

Defendant’s merchandise that is available from and in its physical store. (Id.).

j) Because the public can view and purchase Defendant’s goods through the 

Website that are also offered for sale in the physical store, thus having the Website act as a point 

of sale for Defendant’s products also sold in the physical store, apply online for credit to 

purchase merchandise available online and in the physical store, arrange in-store pickups of 

merchandise purchased online, and sign up for an emailer to receive exclusive online offers, 

benefits, invitations, and discounts for use online and in the physical store, the Website is an 

extension of, and gateway to the physical store, which is a place of public accommodation 

pursuant to the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12181(7)(E). (Complaint ¶15). As such, the Website is a 

necessary service, privilege, and advantage of Defendant’s brick-and-mortar store that must 

comply with all requirements of the ADA, must not discriminate against individuals with visual 

disabilities, and must not deny those individuals the same full and equal access to and enjoyment 

of the goods, services, privileges, and advantages afforded the non-visually disabled public both 

online and in the physical store. (Id.).

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k) At all times material hereto, Defendant was and still is an organization owning,

operating, and controlling the Website. (Complaint ¶16). Since the Website is open to the public 

through the internet, by this nexus the Website is an intangible service, privilege, and advantage 

of Defendant’s brick-and-mortar store that must comply with all requirements of the ADA, must 

not discriminate against individuals with visual disabilities, and must not deny those individuals 

the same full and equal access to and enjoyment of the goods, services, privileges, and 

advantages as are afforded the non-visually disabled public both online and in the physical store.

(Id.). As such, Defendant has subjected itself and the Website to the requirements of the ADA.

(Id.).

l) Plaintiff is and/or has been a customer who is interested in patronizing, and 

intends to patronize in the near future once the Website’s access barriers are removed or 

remedied, Defendant’s physical store and to check store hours and merchandise pricing, purchase 

merchandise, apply for store credit, arrange in-store pickups of merchandise purchased online, 

and sign up for an emailer to receive exclusive offers, benefits, invitations, and discounts for use 

at the Website or in Defendant’s physical store. (Complaint ¶17). Plaintiff also intends to 

monitor the Website in the near future as a tester to ascertain whether it has been updated to 

interact properly with the screen reader software. (Id.).

m) The opportunity to shop and pre-shop Defendant’s merchandise, apply online for 

store credit, arrange in-store pickups and returns, and sign up for an emailer to receive exclusive 

online offers, benefits, invitations, and discounts for use both online and in the physical store

from his home are important and necessary accommodations for Plaintiff because traveling 

outside of his home as a visually disabled individual is often a difficult, hazardous, frightening, 

frustrating, and confusing experience. (Complaint ¶18). Defendant has not provided its business 

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information in any alternative digital format that is accessible for use by blind and visually 

disabled individuals using screen reader software while using the internet. (Id.).

n) Like many consumers, Plaintiff accesses numerous websites at a time to compare 

merchandise, prices, services, sales, discounts, and promotions. (Complaint ¶19). Plaintiff may 

look at several dozens of sites to compare features, discounts, promotions, and prices. (Id.).

o) During the month of October 2022, Plaintiff attempted on a number of occasions 

to utilize the Website to browse through the merchandise and online offers to educate himself as 

to the merchandise, services, sales, discounts, and promotions being offered, learn about the 

brick-and-mortar store, check store hours, and check merchandise pricing with the intent to make

a purchase through the Website or in the physical store. (Complaint ¶20). Plaintiff also 

attempted to access and utilize the Website in his capacity as a tester to determine whether it was 

accessible to blind and visually disabled persons such as himself who use screen reader software 

to access and navigate company websites. (Id.). However, Defendant’s Website contains access 

barriers that prevent free and full use by blind and visually disabled individuals using keyboards 

and available screen reader software. (Complaint ¶21). These barriers are pervasive and include, 

but are not limited to, the following: (a) the company logo, which is the home page button/link, 

is designed to take the user from wherever they may be within the Website and return to the 

home page; (b) the telephone number provided on the Website is not labeled to integrate with the 

screen reader; it reads the numbers as numbers and does not state it is a telephone phone; (c) 

icons like search button are not labeled properly; this bars one from searching for a specific item; 

(d) product name and price are inaccessible; when choosing an item such as the Allegro 4 piece

Bedroom Set, the cursor skips over the name and price of the furniture and jumps to the size 

option; and (e) the shopping cart the images are labeled as link and size, color, and price are 

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inaccessible. (Id.). The Website also lacks prompting information and accommodations 

necessary to allow visually disabled individuals who use screen reader software to locate and 

accurately fill out online forms to purchase Defendant’s merchandise from the Website.

(Complaint ¶22). These access barriers were independently confirmed by Plaintiff’s expert, 

Robert Moody, in October 2022. (Complaint ¶56).

p) Plaintiff attempted to locate an “accessibility” notice, statement, or policy on the 

Website that would direct him to a webpage with contact information for disabled individuals 

who have questions or concerns about, or who are having difficulties communicating with, the 

Website. (Complaint ¶23). However, Plaintiff was unable to do so because no such link or 

notice, statement, or policy existed on the Website. (Id.).

q) The fact that Plaintiff could not communicate with or within the Website left him 

feeling excluded, frustrated, and humiliated, and gave him a sense of isolation and segregation, 

as he is unable to participate in the same shopping experience, with the same access to the 

merchandise, sales, services, discounts, and promotions, as provided at the Website and in the 

physical store as the non-visually disabled public. (Complaint ¶24).

r) Plaintiff desires and intends, in the near future once the Website’s access barriers 

are removed or remedied, to patronize Defendant’s physical store and to use the Website, but he 

is presently unable to do so as he is unable to effectively communicate with Defendant due to his 

blindness and the Website’s access barriers. (Complaint ¶25). Also, as a tester using screen

reader software, Plaintiff is unable to effectively access, navigate, and communicate with 

Defendant through the Website due to his blindness and the Website’s access barriers. (Id.). 

Thus, Plaintiff and others who are blind and with visual disabilities will suffer continuous and 

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ongoing harm from Defendant’s intentional acts, omissions, policies, and practices as set forth 

herein unless properly enjoined by this Court. (Id.).

s) Because the Website clearly provides support for and is connected to Defendant’s 

retail store for its goods, services, operation, and use, and is a necessary service, privilege, 

advantage, and accommodation of Defendant’s brick-and-mortar store for the purchase of 

Defendant’s merchandise, the Website must comply with all requirements of the ADA, must not 

discriminate against individuals with disabilities, and must not deny those individuals the same 

full and equal access to and enjoyment of the goods, services, privileges, and advantages 

afforded the non-visually disabled public both online and in the physical store, which is a place 

of public accommodation subject to the requirements of the ADA. (Complaint ¶26).

t) Defendant thus has not provided full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the 

goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations provided by and through 

the Website and the physical store in contravention of the ADA. (Complaint ¶38).

u) The Website further does not meet the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 

(“WCAG”) 2.0 Level AA or higher versions of web accessibility. (Complaint ¶36).

v) Defendant is, and at all relevant times has been, aware of the barriers to effective 

communication within the Website which prevent individuals who are blind and visually 

disabled from the means to access and comprehend information presented therein. (Complaint 

¶41). Defendant also is, and at all relevant times has been, aware of the need to provide full 

access to all visitors to the Website. (Complaint ¶42).

w) The barriers that exist on the Website result in discriminatory and unequal 

treatment of individuals with visual disabilities such as Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶43).

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x) Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs

against Plaintiff as detailed above, and declaratory judgment and injunctive relief is his only 

means to secure adequate and complete redress from Defendant’s unlawful and discriminatory 

practices in connection with the Website’s access and operation. (Complaint ¶44).

y) Notice to Defendant is not required because of Defendant’s failure to cure the 

violations. (Complaint ¶45).

z) Enforcement of Plaintiff’s rights under the ADA is right and just pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202. (Complaint ¶46).

aa) Plaintiff retained his attorneys, Roderick V. Hannah, Esq. and Pelayo M. Duran, 

Esq., to represent him in this case, and has agreed to pay them a reasonable fee for their services.

(Complaint ¶47).

4. Based on these uncontested facts, the supporting arguments below, and the 

affidavits and supporting materials provided, Plaintiff is entitled to entry of a final default

judgment in his favor granting the declaratory and injunctive relief sought in the Complaint and 

awarding Plaintiff his reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expert expenses incurred in 

connection with the case. A proposed Order granting this Motion and a proposed Final Default

Judgment are attached as Exhibits “A” and “B”, respectively.

SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW

I. The ADA Claim

The ADA covers both tangible and “intangible barriers”, which would include company 

websites, that restrict a disabled person’s ability to access and enjoy the defendant entity’s goods, 

services, and privileges. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) – (ii); Rendon v. Valleycrest 

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Productions, Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). See also Ariza v. Walters & Mason 

Retail, Inc., 561 F.upp.3d 1350, 1354-55 (S,D, Fla. 2021) (denying motion to dismiss website

ADA claim where website acted as “intangible barrier” to purchase of the defendant’s 

merchandise sold through the website); Fernandez v. Bruno Northfleet, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 3d 

1294, 1298-99 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (same); Fernandez v. Mattress Xperts Broward, Inc., No. 21-

80573-CIV-MARRA, 2021 WL 3931243 at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 2, 2021) (same). In this regard, a 

company’s website violates the ADA in situations where its serves as an “intangible barrier” to 

disabled persons to communicate with the company’s physical stores and to thereby access the 

goods, services, and privileges that are otherwise available in the company’s physical stores, 

which are places of public accommodation under the ADA. Walters & Mason, 561 F.Supp.3d at 

1355; Bruno Northflleet, 568 F. Supp. 3d at 1298-99; Mattress Xperts, 2021 WL 3931243 at *2. 

In addition, judges within the Southern District have concluded that where a company’s website

acts as a point of sale for the company’s merchandise that is also available in and from the

company’s physical stores, then the website is covered under the ADA to the extent it acts as an 

intangible barrier to access the company’s goods and services. Bruno Northflleet, 568 F. Supp.

3d at 1298-99; Mattress Xperts, 2021 WL 3931243 at *2. 

Similar to the websites that were at issue in Walters & Mason, Bruno Northfleet and 

Mattress Xperts, Defendant’s website, as established by the uncontested facts in the Complaint,

acts as a point of sale for Defendant’s merchandise available in and from its physical store. 

(Complaint ¶¶12, 14, 15, 16, 26, and 50). The uncontested facts further demonstrate that 

Defendant's Website is inaccessible to blind and visually disabled individuals such as Plaintiff

who must use screen reader software to successfully access and navigate the website. (Id. at

¶¶19-23, 25, 27-34, 36-38). Accordingly, Defendant has violated the ADA because the 

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undisputed inaccessibility of the Website has created an “intangible barrier” to Plaintiff, as a 

visually disabled person, to full and equal access to and enjoyment of the goods, services, 

facilities, privileges, and advantages that Defendant offers its sighted customers in and through

its physical store.

III. Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expert Expense

A. Entitlement

Pursuant to the ADA, prevailing parties may be entitled to attorney’s fees, litigation 

expenses, and costs. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 states in pertinent part:

In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, 

the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 

the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and 

costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private 

individual.

42 U.S.C. § 12205 (emphasis supplied); Ass’n of Disabled Ams. v. Neptune Designs, Inc., 469 

F.3d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12205). For purposes of the ADA, a

“prevailing party” is one that “[r]eceive[s] at least some relief on the merits of his claim . . . .” 

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-04 

(2001) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

While the award of fees and costs are within the sound discretion of the trial court, the 

standards established for determining when a court should exercise this discretion to a prevailing 

party apply to ADA cases are those set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Christiansburg 

Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). Bruce v. City of Gainesville, 177 F.3d 949, 951-52

(11th Cir. 1999) (applying Christiansburg standard for prevailing plaintiffs in ADA suits). 

Under Christiansburg, a prevailing plaintiff “should ordinarily be awarded attorney's fees in all

but special circumstances.” Id. at 951.

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There are no “special circumstances” present here under which this Court should not 

award Plaintiff his fees and costs in light of his entitlement to the full requested injunctive relief 

for his ADA claim against Defendant. Plaintiff thus should be awarded his litigation costs and 

reasonable attorney’s fees as the prevailing party under his ADA claim. To this end, Plaintiff

requests that the Court find that he is entitled to an award of his reasonable attorney’s fees and

taxable costs.

In addition, Plaintiff should be awarded his expert expense incurred in connection with 

bringing this case. While expert witness fees are ordinarily not taxable costs, pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. §12205 such fees may be taxed as a litigation expense in ADA cases. Fox v. The Marquis 

Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25831, 2010 WL 1010871 at *7 (S.D. Fla. March 15, 2010) 

(citing Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2002)); Hansen v. Deercreek Plaza,

LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (“A prevailing ADA plaintiff may recover 

expert fees as a litigation expense.”) (internal citation omitted).

B. Amount of Attorney’s Fees Sought is Reasonable

1. The lodestar method.

The Eleventh Circuit follows the “lodestar” method described in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), which held that “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the 

amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate,” since this computation “[p]rovides an objective basis on 

which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.” Id. at 433; Norman v.

Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988). Once the Court calculates 

this amount — the “lodestar” — it must consider whether any adjustments are warranted based 

on the results obtained by counsel. Id. at 1302.

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The party seeking an award of fees bears the burden of documenting and substantiating 

both the number of hours and the hourly rate. ACLU of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d. 423, 427

(11th Cir. 1999). In determining reasonable hourly rates in South Florida, the Court may also 

consider certain factors, including “the attorney’s customary fee, the skill required to perform the

legal services, the attorney’s experience, reputation and ability, the time constraints involved,

preclusion of other employment, contingency, the undesirability of the case, the attorney’s

relationship to the client, and awards in similar cases.” Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546,

1555 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing factors articulated in Johnson v. Ga. High. Express, Inc., 488 F.2d

14, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)). Each of these factors will be discussed below.

a) Results Obtained.

Civil rights laws in general depend heavily upon private enforcement. Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 445(1983). Where the ADA is concerned, “private enforcement suits 

are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act,” D’Lil v. Best Western Encina

Lodge & Suites, 538 F. 3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir 2008); Doran, v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d at 

1041(same). Because of the importance of the federal rights private enforcement actions 

vindicate, such actions are, as the Supreme Court noted, “private in form only.” Guardian Ass’n 

v. Civil Service Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). In Villano v. Boynton Beach, 254 F.3d 1302, 

1306 (11th Cir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit held that “successful civil rights actions vindicate a 

public interest ...[and] [p]ublic benefit is a distinct measure of success in civil rights actions and 

... a court must account for that distinct measure of success when calculating an award of fees 

and costs.” 

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As the result of this lawsuit, the Plaintiff shall obtain significant beneficial results which 

substantially increase the accessibility of Defendant’s website not only to him but also to all 

blind and visually disabled consumers. 

b) Experience, Reputation, and Ability of the Attorneys. 

Plaintiff’s attorneys have significant litigation experience in both Federal and state court

and have significant experience in civil rights cases, including ADA Title III litigation. 

Roderick Hannah has over 38 years of litigation and trial experience in South Florida, including 

handling a wide array of cases in the Southern District of Florida. As lead or sole counsel, he has 

handled many federal cases involving discrimination matters, including cases arising under the 

ADA in both the employment and public accommodation contexts. He currently devotes a large

portion of his practice to ADA Title III accessibility issues, particularly to issues involving 

company website accessibility. See Affidavit of Roderick V. Hannah, Esq., attached as Exhibit 

“C”.

Pelayo Duran, Mr. Hannah’s co-counsel, has over 24 years of litigation experience in 

South Florida and has handled and been involved in numerous cases in the Southern District of 

Florida, including cases arising under the ADA involving public accommodation discrimination. 

He, like Mr. Hannah, also devotes a substantial portion of his practice to ADA Title III website 

accessibility issues. See Affidavit of Pelayo M. Duran, Esq., attached as Exhibit “D”.

c) Time and Labor Required. 

Appended to Messrs. Hannah and Duran’s respective supporting Affidavits as Exhibits

“1” are copies of their respective time records documenting the time and effort which was 

required to obtain the resolution of this case. The time expended by Plaintiff’s counsel in drafting

this motion is also included. In general, time incurred by Plaintiff’s counsel in filing, preparing,

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and litigating this fee application and any fee hearings thereon is and/or would be compensable. 

See Martin v. University of South Alabama, 911 F.2d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1990); Guerrero v. 

Commings, 70 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1995); Davis v. City and County Of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 

1536, 1544 (9th Cir. 1992); Valley Disposal, Inc. v. Central Vermont Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 

71 F.3d 1053 (2nd Cir. 1995); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1978); Johnson v. State of 

Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1979); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979).

As set forth in Messrs. Hannah and Duran’s attached affidavits with their respective time 

records, Plaintiff’s counsel spent a total of 13.1 combined hours working on this case. In 

addition, the time amounts in the proffered time records do not account for any attorney time and 

costs which shall be expended on post-judgment efforts such as continuing to check on 

Defendant’s website compliance. The time spent was reasonably necessary to vet, prepare, and

file the case and secure the final default judgment obtaining the complete injunctive relief 

requested in the Complaint and to making Defendant’s website fully accessible to visually 

disabled persons, including Plaintiff, nationwide. 

d) Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions Presented and the Skill Requisite

to Perform the Legal Services Properly.

It is estimated that there are very few firms nationwide that litigate ADA Title III claims,

especially in the burgeoning and yet developing area of company website accessibility to blind 

and visually disabled persons. Effective representation of plaintiffs in ADA actions requires not 

only sophisticated general litigation skills, such as familiarity with the rules of evidence and

procedure, but, in addition, presents numerous issues regarding entitlement to injunctive relief, 

including Article III Constitutional standing, the nature of barriers to access, the concept of 

undue burden, the applicability of exemptions, issues of new construction and alterations versus

pre-ADA construction, and extensive knowledge of the ADA, the applicable Web Content

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Accessibility Guidelines (also known as the “WCAG”, the “gold standard” in ADA website 

accessibility guidelines followed by the U.S. government’s agencies), the Technical Assistance 

Manual, a multitude of other guides issued by the Department of Justice, the developing body of 

case law issued by the courts nationwide, and, finally, whether remedial measures are “readily

achievable” and “technically feasible”. In addition, it is not unusual for Plaintiff’s attorneys to 

find themselves opposed by the substantial financial and legal resources of corporate defendants. 

For those reasons, Plaintiff submits that the novelty and difficulty of the issues presented 

in ADA Title III actions and the skill requisite to properly address such issues justify a higher

rate than many other areas of practice.

e) Preclusion of Other Employment due to Acceptance of the Case and the 

Undesirability of the Case.

 

As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that civil rights 

advocates act as “private attorney generals.” See e.g., Hensley, 461 U.S. at 445. The primary, 

and perhaps singular, reason public places are beginning to comply with the more than twenty 

year-old obligations of the ADA is because of private enforcement suits. See Antoninetti v. 

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 613 F. 3d 971, 980 (9th Cir 2010), cert. denied, Chipotle Mexican

Grill, Inc., v. Antoninetti, 2011 WL 645276 (79 USLW 3514, April 18, 2011). That 

notwithstanding, the efforts of individuals such as the Plaintiff and the attorneys who represent 

the disabled are “not pleasantly received,” Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714,

719 (5th Cir. 1974). Indeed, another court in this District was far blunter in describing the 

reaction against such lawsuits as one of “vitriolic hostility.” Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 

1546, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 

Because of the negative publicity and attitude that many have toward Title III ADA 

actions, Plaintiffs’ counsel have predictably been precluded from other employment based on 

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acceptance of the case. For instance, it is highly unlikely that a Plaintiffs’ lawyers would attract 

business clientele who would pay hourly rates. It has been recognized that civil rights plaintiffs’

work is oftentimes undesirable, and that plaintiffs’ attorneys are economically impacted by their

decision to help the civil rights litigant. As explained in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., 

Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974): 

“Civil rights attorneys face hardships in their communities because of their desire 

to help the civil rights litigant.... Oftentimes his decision to help eradicate 

discrimination is not pleasantly received by the community or his contemporaries. 

This can have an economic impact on his practice which can be considered by the 

Court.” 

488 F.2d at 719.

 Additionally, in the instant case, the Plaintiff’s rights, and those of all blind and visually 

disabled individuals, were vindicated by counsel working on this case, the time which could have 

been spent on other matters. 

f) Reasonable Hourly Rate, Customary Fee, and Fees Awarded in Similar 

Cases.

A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for 

similar services by lawyers of reasonable, comparable skills, experience, and reputation. See, 

Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 111 F. Supp.2d 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The relevant community to which 

the Court should look is the District in which the case was brought. Patrolmen’s Benevolent 

Assn. of the City of New York, Inc. v. The City of New York, 2003 WL 21782675 (S.D.N.Y. 

2003); AR v. New York City Department of Education, 407 F.3d 65 (2d Cir 2005); Access 4 All,

Inc. v. Park Lane Hotel, Inc., 2005 WL 3338555 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Here, that is the Southern 

District of Florida. 

In determining the reasonableness of the fees and hourly rates, it is appropriate to 

consider rates awarded in other cases. Because the attorney compensation is based on 

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contingency, and payment has not been made, courts award the current prevailing market rate. 

The current market rate is the rate at the time of the fee petition, not the rate at the time the 

services were performed. This takes into account the delay in payment. Lanni v. State of New 

Jersey, 259 F.3d 146, 149-50 (3d Cir. 2001). Additionally, in considering the rates awarded in

prior cases, courts adjust rates upward to account for inflation. It is especially important in this 

case, which has been in litigation for months, without the Plaintiff’s counsel having received any 

payment to date. 

In numerous ADA website cases, including two prior case before this same Court, judges 

within this District have ruled that the $425.00 hourly rate being charged by Plaintiff’s counsel,

Messrs. Hannah and Duran, was not excessive and was fair and reasonable. Ariza v. Wolf 

Fashion LLC, No. 22-cv-21944-BLOOM, 2022 WL 3591294, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2022); 

Ariza v. Untuckit, LLC, Case No. 19-cv-24291-BLOOM, 2020 WL 408241 (S.D. Fla. Jan 24, 

2020); Fernandez v. Sunday State LLC, No. 9:22-cv-80653-RS, 2022 WL 12256263, at *8 (S.D. 

Fla. Oct. 19, 2022); Ariza v. South Moon Sales, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-23604-

WILLIAMS/MCALILEY, 2022 WL 4345136, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2022), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4310972 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2022); Ariza v. Diatrde LLC, 

Case No. 21-cv-21137-GAYLES, ECF No. 20 at pp. 3-4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2022); Fuller v. 

Things Remembered, Inc., Case No. 19-62034-CIV-GAYLES/STRAUSS, 2020 WL 1316509 

(S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2020); and Moncada v. Intrigue Couture, Inc., Case No. 19-cv-61496-RUIZ, 

ECF No. 22 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2019). 

The reasonableness of the hourly rates Plaintiff’s counsel seek here is further supported 

by other Southern District of Florida decisions. In the 2013 case of Houston v. Arshak Corp., 

Case No. 13-cv-60752 (S.D. Fla. 2013) – a case resolved five years ago -- plaintiff’s counsel was 

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awarded $420.00 per hour [see ECF Nos. 15 & 17]. In Access 4 All, Inc. v. The TJX Companies, 

Inc., Case No: 11-cv-80109 (S.D. Fla.) – a case decided over nine years ago -- counsel for the 

defendant represented to the Court that $450.00 per hour was the rate for “senior” attorneys. [see 

ECF No. 30, at 11-12]. In Houston v. South Bay Investors, Case No. 13-CV-80193 (S.D. Fla. 

July 25, 2013) – a case decided seven years ago -- the Court found that the Plaintiff’s requested 

hourly rate of $420.00 was “reasonable in light of counsels’ experience and citation to other 

cases in this district wherein the courts approved an identical rate.” In Kennedy v. 5096 Forest 

Hill Investments, LLC, Case No. 15-cv-81001, at ECF No. 21 (S.D. Fla. October 21, 2015) the 

Court found an hourly rate of $420.00 to be reasonable. 

Similarly, although not controlling, courts in other jurisdictions have also approved rates

ranging up to $430 per hour in similar types of litigation. For example, in Rodriguez v.

McLoughlin, 84 F.Supp.2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) – a case now nine years old -- the court awarded 

the supervising attorney in a civil rights action $425 per hour. Indeed, hourly rates in the $400 to 

$430 range are not limited to large firms. See, e.g., New York State NOW v. Pataki, 2003 WL 

2006608, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 30, 2003) (approving a rate of $430 an hour for a small civil rights 

litigator). 

Furthermore, the $425.00 hourly rate for Plaintiff’s counsel’s work in this case was 

agreed to between Plaintiff and his counsel per the terms of their retainer agreement, a copy of 

which is attached as Exhibit “E”.

Plaintiff in the instant action is seeking $425.00 per hour for his attorneys’ time. Based 

on precedent and all relevant factors that this Court must consider, this amount is reasonable 

considering counsel’s experience in this field, the contingent nature of the case, the terms of the 

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retainer agreement between the parties, and the rate being in line with the prevailing market rate

in this District. 

g) Whether the Fee is Fixed or Contingent.

The fee in the instant action was and is contingent. In fact, Plaintiff’s counsel has 

incurred significant expenses in brining and pursuing this case, including the filing and service of 

process fees, copying charges, and an expert witness fee totaling $4,275.00. See Robert D. 

Moody invoice for services attached as Exhibit “F”, Mr. Moody’s C.V. as to his expert 

qualifications attached as Exhibit “G”, and Bill of Costs attached as Exhibit “H”. Moreover, there 

is no certainty that Plaintiff’s counsel will receive any compensation at all. Therefore, in setting 

a reasonable hourly rate, Plaintiff submits that this Court should award the higher range of rates 

to account for the length of time and uncertainty that counsel will be paid at all. 

h) Time Limitations Imposed by the Client or Circumstances.

Because the barriers to access complained of by Plaintiff restricted and/or limited 

Plaintiff’s access to the subject website, time was of the essence. Every day that passed while 

the undersigned did not work on the case and make every effort to expedite its resolution, by

pursuing litigation, was another day that the website would remain inaccessible. 

i) Nature and Length of the Professional Relationship with the Client 

Messrs. Hannah and Duran have represented similarly disabled plaintiffs in many other 

actions, and have a continuing relationship with their clients, including Plaintiff in this particular 

action. This has led to increased efficiency in the prosecution of this litigation. 

Based on these relevant factors, Plaintiff and his counsel submit that the total amount of 

$5,567.50 in attorney’s fees incurred to date and through the preparation of this Motion, based on 

13.1 combined hours of attorney time, are reasonable and should be awarded.

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C. Costs and litigation expenses.

1. Taxable costs.

Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of his statutory costs from Defendant, pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the Court shall award costs to the prevailing party in a 

lawsuit. Rule 54(d) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs, which the opposing party 

must overcome. Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo, 929 F.3d 633, 639 (11th Cir. 1991).

The award of costs in favor of the prevailing party in federal court is governed by 28 

U.S.C. § 1920 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 specifies the following 

as costs that a court may tax: (1) fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) fees of the court reporter for 

all of any part of the stenographic transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees 

and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) fees for exemplification and copies of papers

necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6)

compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,

expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1920; Barberi v. PDVSOL, Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 16-23243-CV-GAYLES/TUR, 2017

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81267, at *27-28 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2017).

The decision to award costs is discretionary with the Court, but the Court may tax items

specifically enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, absent alternative contractual or statutory authority.

Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987). In the instant case, 

Plaintiff’s Counsel incurred taxable costs in the amount of $496.40, consisting of the case filing 

fee ($402.00), the cost for service of process of the Complaint on Defendant ($58.40), and the 

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costs for copies of papers that were necessarily obtained for use in this case ($36.00). The 

allowable taxable costs per 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1) and (4) are thus $496.40.

2. Expert witness expenses (non-taxable costs).

As mentioned above, expert witness fees are ordinarily not taxable costs; however, 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §12205 such fees may be taxed as litigation expenses in ADA cases. Fox 

v. The Marquis Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25831, 2010 WL 1010871 at *7 (S.D. Fla. March 

15, 2010) (citing Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2002)); Hansen v. 

Deercreek Plaza, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (“A prevailing ADA 

plaintiff may recover expert fees as a litigation expense.”) (internal citation omitted).

As set forth on the detailed invoice for services of Plaintiff’s expert, Robert D. Moody, 

attached as Exhibit “F”, Mr. Moody spent considerable time and effort, totaling 9.50 hours, to

analyze Defendant’s website on two separate occasions prior to the filing of the lawsuit, and then 

continued to provide expert input as the case progressed. Thus, Plaintiff’s expert performed 

valuable services at the rate of $450.00 per hour for the progress and outcome of the case, and 

Plaintiff is entitled to expert witness fees as non-taxable costs in the total amount of $4,275.00. 

This amount is consistent with similar amounts Mr. Moody has been awarded for his expert 

witness services in prior ADA website cases in this District, including decision by this same 

Court. See, e.g., Ariza v. Wolf Fashion LLC, 2022 WL 3591294, at *2-3 (awarding Mr. Moody 

expert fees of $4,275.00 as “reasonable and recoverable” expert witness litigation expense); 

Fernandez v. Sunday State LLC, 2022 WL 12256263, at *9 (same); Ariza v. South Moon Sales, 

Inc., 2022 WL 4345136, at *9 (same) ; Ariza v. Diatrde LLC, Case No. 21-cv-21137-GAYLES, 

ECF No. 20 at pp. 3-4 (same).

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III. Conclusion.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks and believes that he is entitled to an Order 

granting this Motion as attached as Exhibit “A” and to entry of the Final Default Judgment 

attached as Exhibit “B”, including an award to Plaintiff of $10,338.90, comprised of his 

attorney’s fees in the total amount of $5,567.50, taxable costs in the amount of $496.40, and

litigation expenses – i.e., expert witness fees – in the amount of $4,275.00.

Respectfully submitted, 

RODERICK V. HANNAH, ESQ., P.A. LAW OFFICE OF PELAYO

Counsel for Plaintiff DURAN, P.A.

4800 North Hiatus Road Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

Sunrise, FL 33351-7919 4640 N.W. 7th Street

T. 954/362-3800 Miami, FL 33126-2309

954/362-3779 (Facsimile) T. 305/266-9780 

Email: rhannah@rhannahlaw.com 305/269-8311 (Facsimile)

Email: pduran@pelayoduran.com 

By____s/ Roderick V. Hannah __ By ___s/ Pelayo M. Duran ______

RODERICK V. HANNAH PELAYO M. DURAN

Fla. Bar No. 435384 Fla. Bar No. 0146595

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of January, 2023, a true and correct of the 

foregoing was electronically filed and was served via regular U.S. Mail on the Defendant as 

follows:

Jose M. Blanco III

as Member and Registered Agent

Casablanco Mattress & Furniture Gallery, LLC

9195 SW 40th Street

Miami, FL 33165

/s/ Roderick V. Hannah

Roderick V. Hannah

Case 1:22-cv-23759-BB Document 11 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/11/2023 Page 24 of 24