In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-2427

NORMAN MEYERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHOWBOAT MARINA CASINO PARTNERSHIP, doing

business as Harrah’s East Chicago Casino,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:01 CV 163JM—James T. Moody, Judge.

____________

SUBMITTED NOVEMBER 20, 2002—DECIDED DECEMBER 5, 2002

____________

Before COFFEY, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM. Three years ago Harrah’s East Chicago

Casino (the trade name of Showboat Marina Casino Partnership) fired Norman Meyerson. He filed two suits in

response: one in federal court alleging defamation, and the

other in state court alleging wrongful discharge. Showboat

removed the second, invoking the diversity jurisdiction. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), 1441(a). The district court entered

judgment against Meyerson in each case, and he filed two

appeals.
2 No. 02-2427

Meyerson’s appeal in the defamation suit was decided last

July, and we did not reach the merits because the parties

had not established diversity of citizenship. See Meyerson

v. Harrah’s East Chicago Casino, 299 F.3d 616 (7th Cir.

2002) (Meyerson I). Meyerson’s papers, filed pro se, ignored

the issue. Showboat, despite the benefit of counsel, did little

better. Although Circuit Rule 28(a)(1) requires any unincorporated association to identify the citizenship of every

member, Showboat did nothing more than assert that

diversity existed, without supplying details. We not only

vacated the judgment but also required Showboat’s lawyers

to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for violating Circuit Rule 28(a). Our opinion reminded counsel

that

the citizenship of unincorporated associations must

be traced through however many layers of partners

or members there may be. E.g., Carden v. Arkoma

Associates, 494 U.S. 185 (1990); Wild v. Subscription Plus, Inc., [292 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2002)] at

528; Indiana Gas Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 141

F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1998), rehearing denied, 141 F.3d

314, 320 (1998). Failure to go through all the layers

can result in dismissal for want of jurisdiction. E.g.,

Guaranty National Title Co. v. J.E.G. Associates,

101 F.3d 57 (7th Cir. 1996).

299 F.3d at 617. The appeal of the discharge suit took

longer to reach us, because the district court had directed

the parties to supply jurisdictional information. Meyerson

claims to be a citizen of Indiana, which would spoil diversity

because Showboat concedes that it too is a citizen of that

state. The district court found that Meyerson is a citizen of

Michigan but did not determine Showboat’s citizenships; it

relied on Showboat’s assertion that none of its partners is

a citizen of Michigan.
No. 02-2427 3

In this court the parties have repeated their sorry performance of the first appeal. Meyerson’s brief, filed on July

24 (two weeks after our opinion in Meyerson I) once again

ignores subject-matter jurisdiction. We said in Meyerson I

that the court should not accept for filing any brief, even

one tendered by a pro se litigant, lacking the jurisdictional

statement required by Circuit Rule 28. That Meyerson

swiftly tendered another such brief, which the court again

accepted, is disappointing. But the performance of Showboat’s legal team was worse.

In response to the order issued in Meyerson I, the

lawyers—Nicholas Anaclerio and David E. Neumeister of

Querrey & Harrow, Ltd.—acknowledged their failure to

comply with Rule 28 and promised that it would never

happen again. They contended that sanctions beyond the

public rebuke they had received in our opinion “are not

necessary to further impress upon them the significance of

the error they committed or the importance that it never

recur.”

Anaclerio and Neumeister filed that response on July 19,

2002. Relying on their representations we discharged the

order to show cause on August 5, imposing no further

penalty. On September 11 Anaclerio and Neumeister, joined

by Jennifer Medenwald, filed Showboat’s brief in the discharge appeal. This brief describes Showboat’s citizenship

as follows (citations to the record omitted):

Showboat . . . is an Indiana general partnership

whose partners/members are two additional Indiana general partnerships, Showboat Marina Partnership and Showboat Marina Investment Partnership. Neither Showboat nor any of its aforementioned constituent members are citizens of the state

of Michigan. . . . Showboat’s citizenship is in no

other state but Indiana. Thus, diversity is complete.
4 No. 02-2427

Counsel seem not to have read the opinion in Meyerson I,

because although “the citizenship of unincorporated associations must be traced through however many layers of

partners or members there may be” (299 F.3d at 617), their

statement does not tell us the identity and citizenship of the

partners in the two entities that own Showboat. Far from

showing jurisdiction, this statement multiplies the questions by increasing from one to two the number of partnerships whose partners’ citizenship matters. What is more,

counsel seem not to have read Guaranty National Title,

which Meyerson I cited. The jurisdictional statement describes Showboat and each of its constituent partnerships

as “an Indiana general partnership”, while Guaranty

National Title observes: “There is no such thing as ‘a [state

name] limited partnership’ for purposes of the diversity

jurisdiction. There are only partners, each of which has one

or more citizenships. To determine the citizenship . . . we

need to know the name and citizenship(s) of its general and

limited partners.” 101 F.3d at 59.

Counsel’s representation that “[n]either Showboat nor any

of its aforementioned constituent members are citizens of

the state of Michigan” (emphasis added) treats the three

partnerships as having state citizenships, although Carden

and Guaranty National Title hold that partnerships are not

citizens of any state and that only the partners’ citizenship

matters. This legal error—unfathomable given the observations in Meyerson I addressed to these very lawyers—

coupled with the lack of any factual detail about the partners, makes it impossible for us to accept the brief’s statement that “Showboat’s citizenship is in no other state but

Indiana.” Indeed, the record shows that this statement is

false. An affidavit filed in the district court supplies a few

details about Showboat’s ownership structure. We learn, for

example, that one partner of Showboat Marina Investment

Partnership is Showboat Indiana Investment Limited

Partnership, and one partner of that partnership is Show-
No. 02-2427 5

boat Operating Co., which according to the affidavit is incorporated in Nevada and has its principal place of business there. So Showboat is a citizen of at least one state

other than Indiana. How many more partners there may be,

and of what state or states they may be citizens, the record

does not reveal.

Anaclerio and Neumeister made to this court a promise

that they broke at their very first opportunity, a few weeks

later. As we stressed in Meyerson I, all members of our bar

must assist the court in enforcing the limits of federal

subject-matter jurisdiction. Showboat’s lawyers have failed

miserably. We see no reason to remand this case for further

proceedings to establish all details of Showboat’s ownership

structure. Showboat removed the case; it bore the burden of

establishing diversity of citizenship, but despite multiple

opportunities in the district court, the benefit of Meyerson

I, and the vows in response to the order to show cause, that

has not been accomplished. We gather that Showboat wants

to keep its ownership secret. That is its owners’ right, but

one consequence is lack of access to federal courts under the

diversity jurisdiction.

The judgment in this case therefore is vacated, and the

case is remanded to the district court with instructions to

remand to the state court in which the suit began. As for

Anaclerio and Neumeister: we grant them 14 days to show

cause why sanctions (not only fines but also suspension

from practice) should not be imposed for their egregious

disregard of obligations to the court—obligations that stem

in part from Rule 28, in part from the statutes limiting the

subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, and in part

from the promises made last July. This time we will not be

so credulous.
6 No. 02-2427

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—12-5-02