1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

STATE OF FLORIDA,

DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO.:

SMARTBIZ TELECOM LLC, 

A Florida limited liability company,

Defendant.

/ 

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Office of the Attorney General, State of Florida, Department of 

Legal Affairs (“Attorney General”), by and through the undersigned Assistant 

Attorneys General, hereby brings this action pursuant to the Telemarketing and 

Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (“Telemarketing Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 

6101 et seq., the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310; the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., and Florida’s 

Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practice Act, Chapter 501, Part II, Florida Statutes 

(“FDUTPA”), against Defendant, Smartbiz Telecom LLC, a Florida limited liability 

company authorized to transact business in Florida, (“Defendant” or “Smartbiz”). 

Plaintiff seeks temporary and permanent injunctive relief, the imposition of civil 

penalties and statutory damages, an award of attorney’s fees and costs, and other 

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legal, statutory, or equitable relief this Honorable Court deems proper, and alleges 

the following:

INTRODUCTION

1. On any given day millions of American consumers are informed that 

their “social security number has been found to be involved in illegal activities and 

will be suspended in the next 24 hours.”1

 Others will be told a suspicious iPhone 

purchase has frozen their Amazon account but that they can press “1” to report it.

2

Sometimes the message can sound relatively benign, like an offer from “Discover” 

to reduce your credit card interest rate,

3 but regardless of whether the call tries to 

threaten or entice - it is a scam. At best these calls are annoying, but for many they 

lead to catastrophic financial losses. Fraudulent robocalls are the most common

contact method for scams, and consumers reported losing over $692 million to 

fraudulent robocalls in 2021 alone.4

1

Defendant transmitted a robocall with this message on February 2, 2021. 

https://media.youmail.com/mcs/glb/audio/s3diZGlyX2RsaGRmYTp0b21jYXQzMjEyOjE2MTI

yOTk3ODI1NThYWza3aJ.gen.mp3 2

 Defendant transmitted a robocall with this message on February 8, 2022. 

https://media.youmail.com/mcs/glb/audio/s6diZGlyX3J6cWRmYTp0b21jYXQ2Mzc0OjE2NDQ

zNTc3MTM5OTlSybBRRA.gen.mp3 3

 Defendant transmitted a robocall with this message on January 10, 2022. 

https://media.youmail.com/mcs/glb/audio/s6diZGlyX2g5amRmYTp0b21jYXQ0NDEyOjE2ND

E4MzAyODgzNzhLtRRDkK.gen.mp3 4

 FTC Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book 2021, at 12 (February 2022) 

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/CSN%20Annual%20Data%20Book%202021%20F

inal%20PDF.pdf 

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2. Smartbiz is a provider of Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) 

telephone service. 

3. The Industry Traceback Group (“ITG”), a neutral consortium appointed 

by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to manage private-led efforts 

to trace back the origin of suspected unlawful robocalls, has notified Smartbiz at 

least 255 times since April 7, 2020, about fraudulent or otherwise illegal calls that 

transited Smartbiz’s network. According to records produced by the ITG, Smartbiz

is one of the most prolific transmitters of illegal robocalls in the United States.

4. Of the approximately 1,225 companies that have received tracebacks,

5

only twenty-eight (28) have received more tracebacks than Smartbiz. That puts 

Smartbiz in the ninety-eighth percentile for transmitting illegal robocalls. It has been 

linked to more illegal robocalls than approximately ninety-eight percent (98%) of 

other companies in its industry.

6 The ITG estimates that each traced call is 

representative of a large volume of similar illegal calls, meaning Smartbiz has 

5 Registered pursuant to 47 C.F.R. 64.1203, the ITG traces back the most prolific or damaging 

ongoing illegal robocall campaigns in the United States. This “traceback” process starts when the 

ITG sends a notice to the “terminating provider,” the voice service provider who delivered an 

illegal robocall to the call recipient. The notice contains a recording or description of the illegal 

robocall and requests that the terminating provider respond and identify the company which sent 

it the illegal robocall. The ITG then sends a notification to the company that sent the terminating 

provider of the illegal robocall and the process repeats until the ITG determines the source of the 

illegal call or reaches a company that refuses to respond to the traceback notification. 

6 Because tracebacks always begin with the call recipient’s voice service provider, companies with 

large numbers of subscribers appear in more tracebacks than companies, like Smartbiz, that do not 

provide phone service to consumers directly. Several of the companies that have received more 

tracebacks than Smartbiz are large cellular carriers.

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caused vast numbers of scam robocalls to reach US consumers, despite being told 

about the problem over and over again. 

5. This deluge of scam robocalls invades consumers’ privacy and can 

result in enormous monetary loss to consumers. 

6. In turn, Defendant profits from these scam calls. Smartbiz courts 

robocaller customers by allowing them to place a high volume of calls in quick 

succession, billing only for the duration of completed calls – sometimes in as little 

as .6 second increments and ignoring clear indicia of fraudulent call traffic. 

7. Smartbiz knows that it carries fraudulent calls. Its contracts contain 

language that provides the parties shall not withhold any payment on the basis that 

fraudulent calls comprise a portion of the traffic volume. 

8. Despite over 250 tracebacks specifically informing Smartbiz that it is 

transmitting illegal calls, despite letters from the ITG about Defendant’s need to 

improve its traffic screening procedures, and despite discussions with the Attorney 

General about steps Smartbiz can take to reduce or eliminate fraudulent calls on its 

network, Defendant has chosen profit over people and refuses to implement 

meaningful procedures to prevent perpetration of serious fraud on its network. This 

lawsuit seeks to hold Smartbiz responsible for its role in flooding the United States 

with phone scams. 

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), 1355; the Telemarketing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6103(a); and 

the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(6) and (g)(2). This Court has pendent jurisdiction 

over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

10. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1), 1395(a), 

47 U.S.C. §§ 227(e)(6)(E), 227(g)(4), and 15 U.S.C. § 6103(e). Defendant resides 

within this District. 

11. Plaintiff has notified the FCC of this civil action as required by 47 

U.S.C. §§ 227(e)(6)(B) and (g)(3).

12. Plaintiff has notified the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) of this 

civil action as required by 15 U.S.C. § 6103(b). 

PLAINTIFF

13. The Attorney General is an enforcing authority of FDUTPA under § 

501.203(2), Florida Statutes, and is authorized to bring this action and to seek 

injunctive and other statutory relief pursuant to §§ 501.207 and 501.2075, Florida 

Statutes.

14. The Attorney General determined that this enforcement action serves 

the public interest.

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15. The Attorney General is authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 6103(a) of the 

Telemarketing Act to file actions in federal district court to enjoin violations of, and 

enforce compliance with, the Telemarketing Sales Rule on behalf of the residents of 

Florida, and to obtain damages, restitution, or other compensation on behalf of 

Florida residents. 

16. The Attorney General is authorized by 47 U.S.C § 227(e)(6)(A) to bring 

this action to impose civil penalties. 

17. The Attorney General is authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(1) to bring 

this action to enjoin Defendant’s illegal calls and for damages. 

DEFENDANT

18. Smartbiz is a Florida limited liability company with its principal place 

of business in Miami, Florida. Smartbiz was organized as a limited liability 

company effective September 25, 2016. 

19. Smartbiz identified itself as a VoIP telecommunications provider,

registered in the FCC’s Form 499 Filer Database as Filer ID No. 831853.

20. At all relevant times Smartbiz was engaged in trade or commerce within 

the scope of § 501.203(8), Florida Statutes. 

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BACKGROUND

Defendant’s Business

21. Smartbiz purports to be an intermediate VoIP provider, meaning it

accepts calls from upstream VoIP providers, whose call traffic often originates

outside the United States, and routes those calls through others, called downstream 

providers, for delivery to call recipients on the public switched telephone network.7

22. Smartbiz structures its contracts and billing to appeal to upstream 

providers who transmit robocalls. 

23. Robocalling technology allows for the transmission of high volumes of 

calls in a short duration. A robocaller can make multiple calls in a single second. 

These calls can deliver prerecorded or artificially voiced messages, or they can allow 

a computer to listen for the call to be answered and then connect the call to a live 

operator. The hallmark of robocalling is the ability to quickly place high volumes 

of phone calls in a very short period of time. 

24. Robocall technology is particularly attractive to scammers because it 

allows them to efficiently place millions or billions of calls as they troll for 

vulnerable consumers who may fall victim to their scams. 

7 The public switched telephone network refers to the aggregate of landline and mobile telephone 

infrastructure that can be accessed by the public at large. This does not include private 

communications networks which are only accessible by select individuals such as intercom 

systems. 

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25. Smartbiz appeals to upstream providers who transmit robocalls by, 

inter alia, accepting high volumes of very short duration call traffic, billing only for 

the calls that connect, and billing in extremely short billing increments –as little as 

.6 seconds. These practices allow robocallers to make huge numbers of call attempts 

for free and only pay a tiny amount if call recipients immediately hang up, which 

happens frequently. 

26. Smartbiz also appeals to robocallers by allowing calls with obviously 

false calling phone numbers to transit its network. Robocalls are often made with 

simulated, or “spoofed,” calling phone numbers which allows the caller to 

deliberately disguise the origin of the call and the caller’s actual identity. It is 

particularly easy to spoof a phone number when making VoIP calls, because the 

calling phone number is just another piece of data that is transmitted with the call 

and any string of numbers or letters can be input. Smartbiz does not block calls with 

invalid or otherwise improper calling phone numbers.

27. For instance, Smartbiz transmits high volume, short duration call traffic 

that originates in a country that does not use the same numbering format as the 

United States, but where the calls appear as United States’ phone numbers. 

28. Telephone numbers used in the United States conform to a numbering 

convention called the North American Numbering Plan (“NANP”). All NANP 

numbers allocated to phone service subscribers in the United States follow the

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format 1-NXX-NXX-XXXX, where the leading “1” is the country code, N can have 

a value of 2 through 9, inclusive, and X can have any value 0 through 9, inclusive. 

29. Many countries use alternative numbering plans to denote valid 

telephone numbers. At a minimum, calls from non-NANP numbers will need to 

display a country code that is different from the country code used by NANP 

numbers for a caller in the United States to have enough information to return the 

call. 

30. High volume, short duration traffic that originates in non-NANP 

countries but uses exclusively NANP phone numbers is likely to contain fraudulent

calls, as scammers know that potential victims are less likely to answer calls from 

phone numbers in unfamiliar formats. Moreover, scammers are often not interested 

in the recipients being able to return their calls, and if the caller’s identifying number 

is spoofed a recipient will not be able to use it as a call back number to reach the 

scammer. 

31. Smartbiz accepts traffic that originates from non-NANP countries but

where the calls purport to be from NANP phone numbers, Smartbiz does not require 

any information from upstream providers to demonstrate that such traffic is legal. 

32. Smartbiz accepts upstream VoIP providers’ traffic without ever 

checking whether the purported calling phone numbers appear facially legitimate. 

For instance, Smartbiz accepts VoIP call traffic where the calling number is invalid 

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under any country’s numbering plan, or where the calling phone number is not a 

number at all. For instance, Smartbiz connected calls where the caller ID was 

“USERNAME.” This is usually related to some misconfiguration of the caller’s 

robocalling software. 

33. More egregiously, Smartbiz also routinely transmits calls from foreign 

upstream carriers where the purported calling numbers match a US government 

agency such as the Social Security Administration, a US law enforcement agency

such as a local sheriff’s office, or a commonly impersonated company such as Bank 

of America, Apple, Microsoft, or a utility service provider. 

34. Smartbiz accepts and connects call traffic which contains calling 

numbers that purport to be 911. The emergency code 911 is never used for outbound 

calling. A legitimate call will never display 911 in the caller ID.

Calling Patterns Associated with Illegal Robocalls

35. Even if Smartbiz had not been specifically informed over 250 times that 

it was carrying fraudulent call traffic, it should have known that it was facilitating 

scam calls based on the records it maintains. 

36. Every attempted call that reaches a VoIP provider’s network 

automatically generates a record which generally includes at least the following 

information: 

a. The date and time of the call attempt;

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b. The duration of the call (calls that fail to connect are generally denoted 

by a zero second duration);

c. The destination or called number of the intended call recipient;

d. The originating or calling number from which the call was placed 

(which may be a real number or may be spoofed); 

e. An identifier such as a name or account number for the upstream 

provider that sent the call attempt to the VoIP provider’s network; and

f. An identifier for the downstream provider to which the VoIP provider 

attempts to route the call.

37. VoIP providers use these call detail records (“CDRs”) for billing 

purposes and thus have an interest in ensuring that they are complete and accurate.

38. Illegal robocalls create distinctive patterns in CDRs. For instance, these 

calls are universally unexpected and unwanted and call recipients frequently hang 

up the phone immediately, so the calls typically connect for a very short duration. 

CDRs for illegal robocalls will often feature a high percentage of calls that are only 

a few seconds long, and when examined in the aggregate show a very short average 

call duration.

39. Conversely, CDRs showing legitimate, consented to robocalls or 

routine conversational call traffic typically have a much lower percentage of short 

calls and have a much longer average call duration. 

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40. Also, Caller ID spoofing is often apparent in CDRs of illegal robocalls.

41. Robocallers use spoofing to both hide their identity and to make it more 

likely that consumers will answer their calls. 

42. One common technique used by illegal robocallers, called neighbor 

spoofing, is to spoof the calling phone number so it matches the area code and/or the 

exchange code of the called phone number.

8 This makes it appear to the call 

recipients that they are getting a local call which they’re more likely to answer. 

43. Illegal robocallers frequently use caller ID spoofing to impersonate 

trusted organizations, such as law enforcement, government agencies, and large 

corporations. 

44. Patterns of neighbor spoofing or impersonating trusted numbers are 

easy to detect when they are present in CDRs and indicate that the upstream provider 

is sending fraudulent calls across the intermediate provider’s network. 

45. Another recognizable characteristic of fraudulent robocalls captured by 

CDRs is the presence of high numbers of unique calling numbers.

46. Robocallers often use a calling number only once or twice to prevent 

consumers from reporting the phone numbers as associated with scam calls and

8 In a NANP telephone number the first three digits after the country code of “1,” which is often 

not necessary to dial, are called the area code and correspond to a geographic area. The next three 

digits are called the exchange code. Historically the exchange code also corresponded to a 

geographic area; however, this is no longer true. 

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because many legitimate companies try to block calls from phone numbers that are 

associated with scams.

47. Legitimate telemarketers and people who make calls for ordinary 

business or personal purposes use their same phone number for each call they place, 

and as a result CDRs for legitimate traffic usually show that the total number of calls 

is significantly greater than the total number of unique phone numbers used. 

However, CDRs for call traffic that contains fraudulent robocalls generally show 

that the total number of calls is close to the total number of unique phone numbers. 

Using a different phone number for each fraudulent robocall is often called 

“snowshoeing” or using “disposable” phone numbers. 

48. Finally, substantial numbers of illegal robocalls are placed to numbers 

on the National Do Not Call Registry (“DNC List”) because fraudulent robocallers 

are unlikely to respect legal restrictions on calling numbers on the DNC List. High 

rates of calls to DNC List numbers can distinguish between illegal robocalls and

legitimate telemarketing.

49. Defendant has access to CDRs for all of the call traffic that transits its 

network but does not analyze these CDRs to investigate whether its upstream 

providers are sending it potentially illegal robocalls.

50. Periodically checking CDRs to better understand and mitigate the 

problematic traffic it receives from upstream carriers would protect consumers from 

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scam calls and would ensure that Smartbiz follows the law. Smartbiz knows that it 

is trafficking in scam calls because, among other reasons, the ITG has informed 

Smartbiz over 170 times about specific scam calls Smartbiz transmitted. Rather than 

uncover and cut off illegal call traffic, Smartbiz instead chooses to profit from it. 

DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY TRANSMITS ILLEGAL CALLS

Smartbiz is on Notice That it Transmits Illegal Calls

51. Smartbiz receives a traceback notification from the ITG informing it 

that it is carrying fraudulent call traffic virtually every week. Smartbiz has received

at least 255 tracebacks between April 7, 2020, when it received its first traceback,

and November 10, 2022. During this 136-week period, Smartbiz received on average 

approximately 1.8 tracebacks per week. 

52. Smartbiz has not gone a month without receiving a traceback since May 

2020.

53. This volume and consistency of tracebacks shows that Smartbiz 

considers transmitting illegal robocalls an acceptable component of its business. The 

company knowingly continues to transmit these calls despite having the ability to 

cleanse its network of this traffic. 

54. Smartbiz’s responses to tracebacks frequently state: “In addition to 

notified (sic) immediately our customers, they are identified as the account sending 

us FRAUD calls into the US territory (as we are currently doing). We will require 

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them to take immediate action and stop these calls while giving information 

regarding the upstream carrier originating those calls. If we don’t receive a formal 

response and actions taken as requested within 24hrs, Their (sic) account will be 

blocked temporarily until they comply with our requirements.”9

55. Smartbiz’s traceback history shows that they do not temporarily block 

upstream providers who send fraudulent call traffic that gives rise to a traceback. For 

example, in 2022 alone Smartbiz was notified through tracebacks of scam calls they 

received from the upstream provider Whisl on 3/6, 3/8, 3/30, 4/1, 4/5, 4/26, 5/16, 

5/17, 5/19, 5/26, 6/20, 6/21, 6/29, 6/30, 7/14, 7/21, 7/26, 8/3, 8/8, 8/10, 8/11, 8/17, 

8/23, 8/24, 8/26, 8/29, 8/30, 9/12, 9/14, 9/21, 10/3, 10/11, 10/15, 10/27 and 10/28. 

This history indicates that Smartbiz did not block Whisl’s traffic at all despite 

receiving tracebacks repeatedly for calls they received from this customer. 

Upstream Provider Call Detail Records

56. On April 21, 2021, pursuant to Section 501.206, Florida Statutes, the 

Attorney General issued an investigative subpoena to Smartbiz requesting, inter alia, 

CDRs for all call attempts received from four upstream providers who had 

transmitted calls through Smartbiz that were the subject of tracebacks. 

57. SmartBiz provided CDRs for traffic it received from four carriers: 

OXNP Telecom Limited, AlkaIP Telecom LLC, KWK Communications Inc., and 

9 ITG records noted this response from Smartbiz, verbatim, on several occasions. 

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Family Communication Pte. Ltd. For each carrier, virtually all of the calls placed by 

the top twenty calling numbers were associated with scam calls.

58. OXNP’s top twenty ANIs10 accounted for 255,139 calls (15.51%) of 

the total number of attempted calls by that carrier. Nineteen of those ANIs are 

associated with scams according to publicly available information on unwanted calls 

compiled by the companies YouMail and Nomorobo. These ANIs attempted 

249,097 calls which were likely fraudulent, including 15,133 calls which used ANIs 

reported as making scam calls impersonating the Social Security Administration 

(“SSA”).

59. Similarly, publicly available information indicated that seventeen of 

KWK’s top twenty ANIs were associated with scams, fourteen of Family 

Communication’s top twenty ANIs were associated with scams, and all twenty of 

AlkaIP’s top twenty ANI’s were associated with scams.

60. The Attorney General’s analysis of the top twenty ANIs for each carrier 

showed that SmartBiz transmitted at least 1,176,889 attempted calls associated with 

reported scams. In most cases a surface level internet search would show that the 

ANIs had placed reported scam calls. However, SmartBiz does not perform any such 

10 Calling numbers in CDRs are frequently referred to as “Automatic Number Identifications” or 

“ANIs.” Calling numbers and ANIs are used synonymously unless otherwise stated. 

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analysis, even though it would likely identify the upstream carriers who are sending 

fraudulent calls to SmartBiz. 

61. Additionally, the Attorney General’s analysis of SmartBiz’s CDRs 

showed a high volume of suspicious call traffic featuring calls that spoofed into 

invalid numbers or numbers associated with the SSA, law enforcement agencies, 

major corporations such as Apple and Bank of America, and even 911.

62. Traffic transmitted from Family Communications contained at least 

6,221 calls using three of Apple’s phone numbers. 

63. Traffic received from AlkaIP contained calls spoofing Florida law 

enforcement offices such as the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office, as well as federal 

law enforcement such as the phone numbers for the FBI’s Dallas, El Paso, and San

Antonio offices.

64. Family and AlkaIP’s traffic showed that callers attempted to spoof into 

911 for several calls.

65. The Attorney General’s analysis of this portion of one day’s worth of 

Smartbiz’s call traffic showed at least 10,023 instances where callers attempted to 

impersonate government offices, corporations, or law enforcement. 

Analysis of Full Days of Smartbiz’s Call Traffic

66. In order to better understand the composition of SmartBiz’s call traffic, 

the Attorney General issued another investigative subpoena to Smartbiz for all 

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attempted calls it transmitted into the United States on two days, January 10, 2022 

and February 8, 2022, on which the company had transmitted fraudulent calls that 

were the subject of tracebacks. 

67. Smartbiz produced CDRs to the Attorney General which show that 

many of Smartbiz’s upstream provider clients routinely route call traffic to Smartbiz

with obvious indicia of fraud. 

68. For instance, on January 10, 2022, Smartbiz received 44,290 call 

attempts from Etelix, a VoIP provider based in Miami, FL that “provides 

International and Domestic Long-Distance voice termination” to “Long Distance 

Operators and Long Distance Wholesales (sic) Carriers” among other commercial 

customers.11 

69. Most of these calls, 61.7%, were consistent with neighbor spoofing. 

Both the area code and exchange code of the calling phone number matched the 

called phone number 43.9% of the time (19,431 calls), and the area code of the called 

and calling numbers matched 17.8% of the time (7,577 calls). Given that Etelix is a 

provider of wholesale long-distance phone service, rather than providing service to 

consumers for local calling, Smartbiz should have been suspicious of this traffic and 

required Etelix to demonstrate that the traffic is legal or be terminated as a customer. 

11 https://www.etelix.com/ (Last accessed 11-30-2022). 

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70. Furthermore, of the over 44,000 calls, only seventy-seven (77) had a 

duration over two (2) minutes and only eighteen (18) lasted longer than fifteen (15) 

minutes. Also, a different phone number was used for almost every single call – 97% 

of the phone numbers used appeared only once. Neither of these indications are

consistent with local conversational calling or legitimate telemarketing. 

71. Finally, the call blocking service YouMail captured a transcription of 

one of these calls. YouMail’s transcription indicates that the call consisted of a 

prerecorded message which impersonated law enforcement and threatened the 

recipient with legal action unless they press one to confirm some information.12

72. Similarly, Red Telecom, an Egyptian VoIP provider nominally 

headquartered in Miami, sent Defendant 3,220,367 call attempts over the two days 

for which the Attorney General subpoenaed records. Only 16,298 (0.51%) of these 

calls lasted longer than two minutes. 

73. Red Telecom’s calls featured obvious neighbor spoofing. 

Approximately 71% of the call attempts made by Red Telecom displayed a calling 

phone number that matched the area code or both the area code and the exchange 

code of the called phone number. This pattern is an indication that the calls are

12 The full transcription of the captured call reads: “There is your priority. So that we can discuss 

your case and take necessary action on this matter if we don't hear from you then we will be forced 

to take legal action against you kindly we would like to confirm some information with you before 

taking legal action. If you want to talk with the administrator please press one I repeat press one 

thank you.”

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fraudulent robocalls, particularly in light of the fact that the call traffic was coming 

from an Egyptian provider but consisted of NANP phone numbers. 

74. Again, call content captured by YouMail dispels any doubt that Red 

Telecom’s traffic contained illegal robocalls. Call recordings for these calls included 

calls fraudulently claiming the recipients’ Social Security Number was used 

improperly13 and Amazon imposter scam calls,14 among others. 

75. Smartbiz also received call traffic from upstream providers that 

contained high volumes of short duration calls to numbers on the DNC List. 

76. Despite these indicia of fraud, Red Telecom is still Smartbiz’s customer 

and as recently as September 26, 2022, Smartbiz received one of many tracebacks 

for calls transmitted by Red Telecom.

77. Records Smartbiz provided to the Attorney General for Whisl 

contained a total of 877,594 call attempts on one day. Of these call attempts, 391,889 

resulted in a call with a duration of at least one (1) second. The average duration of 

connected calls was 11.76 seconds, indicating that these calls were generally not 

expected or wanted by the recipients. 

13 YouMail transcribed several of these calls which read as follows: “Your social security number 

is being used for some kind of suspicious activity in the South border of Texas. To know more. 

Please press one I repeat please press one thank you have a nice day.” 14 YouMail transcriptions of these calls include: “Amount of $1537.35 will be debited from your 

bank account for the purchases. If you authorize this transaction. No action is required but if you 

have a dispute with the purchases. Please press one and your call will be connected with Amazon 

support. I repeat. If you have a dispute. Press one. Thank you.”

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78. YouMail captured several examples of the calls Whisl transmitted to 

Smarbiz. These callsincluded, among others, a call featuring a pre-recorded message 

that stated “Hello this is Sarah from Discover. I am calling in regards to the rate 

expiration. We’ve been trying to reach you as your eligibility for reduction is about 

to expire. Press one for more information or hang up this call.”15

79. The call traffic from Whisl included 356,374 call attempts to telephone 

numbers on the DNC List – 40.61% of the total number of call attempts. 

80. The short duration of the calls, the presence of prerecorded messages, 

and the high volume of calls to numbers on the DNC List, all indicate that most, if 

not all, of the call traffic from Whisl were fraudulent or otherwise illegal robocalls. 

81. Multiple other upstream provider customers of Smartbiz also sent 

traffic that consists of or includes illegal robocalls and shows obvious indicia of 

fraud. 

COUNT I 

Violations of the TCPA – 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)

82. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges the paragraphs preceding Count I as 

if fully set forth herein.

15 A recording of the call is available at: 

https://media.youmail.com/mcs/glb/audio/s6diZGlyX2g5amRmYTp0b21jYXQ0NDEyOjE2ND

E4MzAyODgzNzhLtRRDkK.gen.mp3 

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83. Section 227(b) of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., prohibits any 

person within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the 

recipient is within the United States, from making any call using an automatic 

telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice to any cellular 

telephone, with exceptions for certain emergency calls or calls placed with the prior 

express consent of the called party. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 

84. The Attorney General is authorized to bring an action for violations of 

the TCPA when the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person has 

engaged in a pattern or practice of telephone calls or other transmissions to residents 

of Florida in violation of the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(1). 

85. Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of making telephone calls 

featuring prerecorded or artificially voiced messages to cellular telephone numbers 

in Florida, and elsewhere, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 

86. CDRs provided by Smartbiz to the Attorney General contain 3,206,193 

calls terminated to Florida phone numbers, many of which are cellular telephones. 

Call recordings captured by YouMail, as well as patterns in the CDRs of these calls, 

show that many of these calls featured prerecorded or artificially voiced messages. 

87. Smartbiz made calls terminated to Florida because the calls would not 

have connected but for Smartbiz’s decision to allow them to transit its network 

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despite having actual knowledge that many of the calls were scam robocalls

featuring prerecorded or artificially voiced messages. 

88. Defendant knew or should have known that many of calls it made to 

Florida violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 

89. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(1) the Attorney General is entitled to actual 

monetary loss or $500 in damages for each violation of 47 U.S.C. 

§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Furthermore, because Defendant willfully violated 47 U.S.C. 

§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), the amount of such damages may be increased by not more than 

three (3) times.

COUNT II

Violations of the TCPA – 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B)

90. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges the paragraphs preceding Count I as 

if fully set forth herein. 

91. The TCPA prohibits any person within the United States, or any person 

outside the United States if the recipient is within the united States, from initiating 

any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded 

voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party, 

unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes, or is exempted by rule or order 

of the FCC under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). 

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92. The Attorney General is authorized to bring an action for violations of 

the TCPA when the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person has 

engaged in a pattern or practice of telephone calls or other transmissions to residents 

of Florida in violation of the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(1).

93. Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of initiating telephone calls 

to residential telephone lines, including telephone lines in Florida, using artificial or 

prerecorded voices to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the 

called party in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). 

94. CDRs provided by Smartbiz to the Attorney General contain 3,206,193 

calls terminated to Florida phone numbers, many of which are residential telephones. 

Call recordings captured by YouMail, as well as patterns in the CDRs of these calls, 

show that many of these calls featured prerecorded or artificially voiced messages.

95. Smartbiz initiated calls terminated to Florida because the calls would 

not have connected but for Smartbiz’s decision to allow them to transit its network 

despite having actual knowledge that many of the calls were scam robocalls

featuring prerecorded or artificially voiced messages.

96. Defendant knew or should have known that many of these calls violated 

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B).

97. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(g)(1) the Attorney General is entitled to enjoin 

violative calls and to actual monetary loss or $500 in damages for each violation of 

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47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). Furthermore, because Defendant willfully violated 47 

U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B), the amount of such damages may be increased by not more 

than three (3) times.

COUNT III

Violations of the Truth in Caller ID Act – 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)

98. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges the paragraphs preceding Count I as 

if fully set forth herein.

99. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1), it is unlawful for any person within the 

United States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is within the 

United States, in connection with any voice service or text messaging service, to 

cause any caller identification service to knowingly transmit misleading or 

inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, 

or wrongfully obtain anything of value, unless such transmission is exempted 

pursuant to FCC regulations. 

100. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(6), the Attorney General may bring a civil 

action to enforce 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1). 

101. Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) by knowingly causing the

caller identification services of the recipients of their call traffic to transmit 

misleading or inaccurate caller identification information including spoofed or 

otherwise misleading and inaccurate phone numbers. 

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102. Defendant knew or should have known that they transmit and profit 

from fraudulent robocalls with spoofed or otherwise misleading and inaccurate 

phone numbers which seek to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain things of 

value from the call recipients. 

103. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C §§ 227(e)(5)(A) and (e)(6)(A), the Attorney 

General is entitled to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 for each violation of 47 

U.S.C. § 227(e)(1), or 3 times that amount for each day of a continuing violation, 

except that the amount assessed for any continuing violation shall not exceed a total 

of $1,000,000 for any single act or failure to act. 

COUNT IV

Violations of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.3-310.4

104. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges the paragraphs preceding Count I as 

if fully set forth herein. 

105. Congress directed the FTC to enact rules prohibiting abusive and 

deceptive telemarketing acts or practices. 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1). 

106. The FTC adopted the Telemarketing Sales Rule (“TSR”), 16 C.F.R. §§ 

310.1-310.9, pursuant to Congress’s grant of rulemaking authority. 

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107. The TSR prohibits abusive and deceptive acts or practices by “sellers”16

or “telemarketers”17 and further prohibits other persons from providing substantial 

assistance or support to any seller or telemarketer when that person knows or 

consciously avoids knowing that the seller or telemarketer is engaged in any act or 

practice that violates the TSR. 

108. Many of the fraudulent robocalls that transited Smartbiz’s network 

constitute telemarketing and were initially placed by sellers and/or telemarketers 

within the scope of the TSR. 

109. Defendant, on numerous occasions, violated 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(b) by 

providing substantial assistance or support through its VoIP services to one or more 

sellers or telemarketers who Defendants knew, or consciously avoided knowing,

were engaged in abusive and deceptive telemarketing acts or practices that violated 

the TSR. 

110. Defendant routinely assisted and facilitated fraudulent robocalls which:

a. Violated 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(iii) by misrepresenting material 

aspects of goods or services;

16 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(dd) defines “seller” as “any person who, in connection with 

a telemarketing transaction, provides, offers to provide, or arranges for others to provide goods or 

services to the customer in exchange for consideration.” 17 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(gg) defines “telemarketing,” in relevant part, as “a plan, program, or campaign 

which is conducted to induce the purchase of goods or services or a charitable contribution, by use 

of one or more telephones and which involves more than one interstate telephone call.” 16 C.F.R. 

§ 310.2(ff) defines “telemarketer” as “any person who, in connection with telemarketing, initiates 

or receives telephone calls to or from a customer or donor.”

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b. Violated 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(vii) by misrepresenting the seller or 

telemarketer’s affiliation with corporations or government entities;

c. Violated 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(4) by making false or misleading 

statements to induce any person to pay for goods or services;

d. Violated 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(8) by failing to transmit or causing to be 

transmitted the telephone number and the name of the telemarketer to 

caller identification services used by call recipients;

e. Violated 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) by calling telephone numbers 

on the DNC List; and

f. Violated 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(d)(1) by failing to disclose the identity of 

the seller.

111. Under 15 U.S.C. § 6103(a), the Attorney General is entitled to enjoin 

Defendant’s violations of the TSR and obtain damages and restitution on behalf of 

those injured by the fraudulent robocalls Defendant transmitted. 

COUNT V

Violations of Chapter 501, Part II, Florida Statutes

112. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges the paragraphs preceding Count I as 

if fully set forth herein.

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113. FDUTPA states that “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable 

acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade 

or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” 

114. The provisions of FDUTPA are to be construed liberally to promote the 

protection of the consuming public and legitimate business enterprises from those 

who engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or 

unfair acts or practices. § 501.202, Florida Statutes. 

115. FDUTPA defines a “violation of this part” to include violations of the 

Act based on “[a]ny rules promulgated pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission 

Act” or “[a]ny law, statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance which proscribes unfair 

methods of competition, or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or practices.” 

§ 501.203(3), Florida Statutes. 

116. “A violation of the TSR constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or 

practice in violation of § 5(a) of the FTC Act.” United States v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 

75 F. Supp. 3d 942, 1004 (C.D. Ill. 2014).

117. The TSR’s enabling statute is the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud 

and Abuse Prevention Act (15 USC §§ 6101-08).

118. Under 15 U.S.C. § 6102(c)(1) violations of the TSR are treated as 

violations of rules passed under the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 

57a).

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119. Violations of rules passed under the FTC Act are unfair and deceptive 

within the scope of 15 U.S.C. § 45. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(3).

120. Defendant’s violations of the TSR are per se violations of FDUTPA. 

121. Defendant’s conduct also violates FDUTPA because knowingly 

transmitting fraudulent robocalls to consumers in Florida and elsewhere is a 

deceptive trade practice. 

122. Defendant routinely transmits calls to consumers which misrepresent 

the identity of the caller and the nature of goods and services offered through the 

calls. 

123. Particularly when the caller’s phone number has been spoofed, 

consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances would be deceived to their 

detriment when receiving many of the calls transmitted by Defendant. 

124. Furthermore, the call traffic Defendant transmits causes injury, or the 

risk of injury, to consumers which is substantial, one that consumers cannot 

reasonably avoid, and is without offsetting benefits to consumers or competition. 

125. Defendant’s practices complained of herein are unfair or deceptive or 

both and constitute violations of § 501.204, Florida Statutes; therefore, Defendant 

is liable for injunctive, and other equitable, legal, or statutory relief.

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126. Defendant is also liable for civil penalties, as prescribed 

by Sections 501.2075 and 501.2077, Florida Statutes for each unfair act or practice 

it willfully engaged in, as set forth above, found to be in violation of FDUTPA.

127. Finally, Defendant is also subject to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant 

to Section 501.2075, Florida Statutes.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Attorney General requests that this Honorable Court: 

A. Enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendant for the 

violations as alleged herein;

B. Temporarily and permanently enjoin Defendant from transmitting 

fraudulent robocalls to consumers in Florida and elsewhere in the United States; 

C. Award the Attorney General damages of not more than $1,500 per 

violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii); 

D. Award the Attorney General damages of not more than $1,500 per 

violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B); 

E. Award the Attorney General a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 for 

each violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1), or 3 times that amount for each day of a 

continuing violation; 

F. Temporarily and permanently enjoin Defendant from transmitting calls 

which violate the TCPA, TSR, or FDUTPA as complained of herein;

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G. Award restitution for consumers injured by the fraudulent robocalls 

Defendant transmitted;

H. Award civil penalties, attorney’s fees, and costs against Defendant 

pursuant to Sections 501.2075 and 501.2077, Florida Statutes, or as otherwise 

authorized by law;

I. Grant such other legal or equitable relief as this Honorable Court deems 

just and proper.

Dated: December 5, 2022. Respectfully Submitted,

ASHLEY MOODY

Attorney General of the State of Florida 

/s/ Patrick Crotty 

Patrick Crotty

Florida Bar # 108541

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

Consumer Protection Division

3507 E. Frontage Road, Suite 325

Tampa, FL 33607

Phone: 813-287-7950

Fax: 813-281-5515

Patrick.Crotty@myfloridalegal.com

Sarah Cortvriend

Florida Bar # 718947

West Palm Beach Bureau Chief

Office of the Attorney General

Consumer Protection Division

1515 North Flagler Drive, Suite 900

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

Tel: (561) 837-5007

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Fax: (561) 837-5109

sarah.cortvriend@myfloridalegal.com

Miles Vaughn

Florida Bar # 1032235

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Attorney General

Consumer Protection Division

3507 E. Frontage Road, Suite 325

Tampa, FL 33607

Phone: 813-287-7950

Fax: 813-281-5515

Miles.vaughn@myfloridalegal.com

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