alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Hillsborough

No. 78-212

#### Joanne S. Mayo v. Kenneth S. Knapton, Jr.

December 29, 1978

*Rinden Professional Association,*of Concord *(Paul A. Rinden*orally), for the plaintiff.

*927*Perkins, Upshall & Robinson, Professional Association,*of Concord *(Barbara B. DeHart*orally), for the defendant.

Memorandum Opinion

This is an action wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover balances due under the terms of two promissory notes. The defendant entered a pro se appearance and at all times, before appeal, represented himself.

The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and, more than thirty days later, the defendant answered by an unsworn pleading entitled “Defendant’s Answer to Pending Plea of Assumpsit and Motion for Summary Judgment.” *See*RSA 491:8-a (Supp. 1977). The plaintiff then filed (and served on the defendant by certified mail return receipt requested) requests for admissions which were not answered by the defendant within thirty days. *See*Superior Court Rule 51; RSA 491:App. R. 51 (Supp. 1977).

After a hearing and based on defendant’s failure to properly and timely respond to the motion for summary judgment and requests for admissions, the Court *(Flynn,*J.) entered a verdict for the plaintiff.

Defendant, represented by counsel, then filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for other relief. The trial court, after a hearing, denied the motion and transferred defendant’s exception.

Mr. Knapton first argues that his pleading was sufficient in form and substance as a counter-affidavit to comply with RSA 491:8-a (Supp. 1977). However, the record reveals that the pleading was not in proper form and that it was not timely filed. Although it appears to have been acknowledged before a notary public, it does not show that the defendant swore that the allegations were true. We find no error in the granting of the motion for summary judgment. *Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Barton,*118 N.H. 195, 385 A.2d 118 (1978).

Defendant next argues that his failure to respond to the request for admissions, as required by the rules of the superior court, was insufficient grounds to justify entry of a judgment for the plaintiff. We have recently held that a “[T]rial court has broad discretion in determining whether to waive its rules. It is only an abuse of this discretion that will cause us to reverse the trial court’s decision, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” *R. J. Berke & Co. v. Griffin,*118 N.H. 449, 452, 388 A.2d 1260, 1262 (1978) (citations omitted).

*928We agree that a trial court has, in the exercise of its sound discretion, inherent power and authority to set aside a summary judgment. *Coburn v. First Equity Associates, Inc.,*116 N.H. 522, 363 A.2d 402 (1976). Upon review of the record, in the instant case, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion.

*Exceptions overruled.*

Douglas and Brock, J.J., did not sit.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Report of CECO Environmental Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Phillip DeZwirek, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                 
|-------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Phillip DeZwirek                             
|Phillip DeZwirek                                 
|Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer

August 11, 2008
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection
with this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of American Express Credit Corporation
(the Company) for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2010, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
Anderson Y. Lee, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| |     |                                                                                                                                                       
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) | The Report
 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
 Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| |     |                                                                                                                                                       
| | (2) | The
 information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
 respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                                  | 
|--------------------------------- | 
|/s/ Anderson
 Y. Lee              | 
|                                  | 
|Name:  Anderson Y. Lee            | 
|Title:    Chief Financial Officer | 
|Date:    November 10, 2010        | 

The foregoing
certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and is not
being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document for
purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
Exchange Act), or otherwise subject to liability under that section. This
certification shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any
filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act except
to the extent that this Exhibit 32.2 is expressly and specifically incorporated
by reference in any such filing.

A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

E-7

---
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 11

- 00133

- CV

IN RE JON EARL PHELA N RELATOR

------------

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

------------



### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

------------

The court has considered relator’s petition for writ of mand amus and is of

the opinion that relief should be denied. Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of

mandamus is denied.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: WALKER, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and MEIER, J.

DELIVERED: May 6 , 2011

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4, 52.8 (d).
[if !vml]>[endif]>

[if !vml]>[endif]>

You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title: USDAForest Service research & development ... highlights**
 
2005 | 2008-09 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012-13
 
SuDoc Number:A 13.2:R 31/37/
Item Number:0084 (online)
CGP systemNumber: 000824492
 
July 9, 2018
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report
of Alico, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2013, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on August 6, 2013, (the “Form 10-Q”), I, JD Alexander, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

(2) The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: August 8, 2013



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ JD ALEXANDER                     
|JD Alexander                         
|Chief Executive Officer and President

10
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports.

Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum

opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain

computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of

Appeals and does not include the filing date. 

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 

3 COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE OF THE 

4 HOME EQUITY MORTGAGE LOAN 

5 ASSET-BACKED TRUST SERIES 

6 INABS 2005-C, HOME EQUITY MORTGAGE

7 LOAN ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, 

8 SERIES INABS 2005-C UNDER THE 

9 POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT 

10 DATED SEPTEMBER 1, 2005,

11 Plaintiff-Appellee,

12 v. NO. 34,942

13 EARNEST M. LUCERO a/k/a ERNEST

14 M. LUCERO, CATHY I. LUCERO, and 

15 THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 

16 DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION 

17 AND REVENUE, 

18 Defendants-Appellants.

19 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY

20 Abigail Aragon, District Judge

21 Rose L. Brand & Associates, P.C.

22 Karla K. Poe

23 Albuquerque, NM

24 for Appellee
2

1 Ernest M. Lucero

2 Cathy I. Lucero

3 Las Vegas, NM

4 Pro Se Appellants

5 MEMORANDUM OPINION

6 KENNEDY, Judge.

7 {1} Defendants-Appellants (Homeowners) appeal in a self-represented capacity

8 from the district court’s ruling that Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust

9 Company (Bank) has standing to enforce the note and the mortgage. [RP Vol.II/274,

10 311] Our notice proposed to dismiss for lack of a final order. Homeowners did not file

11 a response to our notice, and Bank filed a response in support. For reasons provided

12 in our notice, we dismiss for lack of a final order. 

13 {3} IT IS SO ORDERED.

14 _______________________________

15 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge

16 WE CONCUR:

17 ___________________________________

18 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
3

1 _________________________________

2 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A0046. ARTHUR STARLING A/K/A RICKY STARLING v. THE STATE.

Arthur Starling a/k/a Ricky Starling was convicted of malice murder and

numerous other charges. The trial court denied his motion for new trial, and Starling

filed a direct appeal to this Court. 

Under our Constitution, however, the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction

over “[a]ll casesin which a sentence of death wasimposed or could be imposed.” See

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (8). Because a penalty of death can be

imposed for the crime of murder, jurisdiction is proper in the Supreme Court. See

OCGA § 17-10-30 (b); Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 572 (722 SE2d 765) (2012)

(Hunstein, J., concurring); see also State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524 (322 SE2d 711)

(1984) (directing this Court to transfer “all cases in which either a sentence of death

or of life imprisonment has been imposed upon conviction of murder”). Accordingly,

Starling’s appeal is hereby TRANSFERRED to the Supreme Court for disposition.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

09/10/2015

September 10, 2015
EXHIBIT 32.1

SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, Morteza Ejabat, Chief Executive Officer of
Zhone Technologies, Inc. (the Company), and Kirk Misaka, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certify that, to their knowledge:



|1. | The Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 6, 2008



|                                       |  |  |  |                                    
|-------------------------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------------
|/s/ MORTEZA EJABAT                     |  |  |  | /s/ KIRK MISAKA                    
|Morteza Ejabat Chief Executive Officer |  |  |  | Kirk Misaka Chief Financial Officer
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HARDIAL SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 18

- 71022

Agency No. A095

- 630

- 059

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 2, 2020 * *

Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges

.

Hardial Singh , a native and citizen of Indonesia , petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals ’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen and

terminate removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen and review de

novo questions of law. Bonilla v. Lynch , 84 0 F.3d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 2016). We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUN 8 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 18

- 71022

deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s third

, untimely

motion to reopen where he failed to show he qualified for an y exception to the time

and n umber limits for motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (A), (C)

.

We lack jurisdiction to consider Singh’s unexhausted contention that the

BIA erred in failing to apply equitable tolling

. See Barron v. Ashcroft , 358 F.3d

674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (no jurisdiction to r eview issues where petitioner failed to

exhaust the claim before the BIA )

.

We further lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise its

sua sponte authority to reopen where Singh has not shown a legal or consti tutional

error , and the BIA provided sufficient reasoning

. See Bonilla , 840 F.3d at 58 7

- 88

( this court’s review of denials of sua sponte reopening is limited to identifying

legal or constitutional error ) ; Najmabadi v. Holder , 597 F.3d 983, 9 90 (9th Cir.

2010 ) ( “What is required is merely that [the BIA] consider the issues raised, and

announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive

that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” ( internal quotation marks

and citation omitted) ) ; 8 C.F.R. § 1003. 2 (“ The Board has discretion to deny a

motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for

relief.”)

.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part

.
135	San	Lorenzo	Avenue,	Suite	770,	Coral	Gables,	Florida 33146

TEL 305.230.4884			FAX 305.230.4844

www.fairlawattorney.com

EXHIBIT

“G”

EXHIBIT “G”

Case 1:22-cv-23074-BB Document 127-7 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/21/2023 Page 1 of 2
MAIL, EMAIL, OR TEXT YOUR COMPLETED FORM (OR A PICTURE OF) TO: 

FairLaw	Firm	

135	San	Lorenzo	Avenue,	Suite	770,	Coral	Gables,	FL	33156 /	brian@fairlawattorney.com

TEL 305.230.4884 TEXT	786.386.0885 FAX 305.230.4844

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 1:22-CV-23074-BLOOM/OTAZO-REYES

OCTAVIO COLLADO,

Plaintiff,

COLLECTIVE ACTION

vs.

450 NORTH RIVER DRIVE, LLC,

D/B/A KIKI ON THE RIVER, 

RJ RIVER, LLC AND 

ROMAN JONES,

Defendants.

______________________________/

CONSENT TO JOIN PURSUANT TO 29 U.S.C. §216(b)

1. My name is __________________________________________.

2. I consent, agree, and opt to become a Plaintiff in this lawsuit brought under the FLSA, 29 

U.S.C. §201, et seq., against my current/former employers, 450 North River Drive, LLC, RJ River, LLC, 

and Roman Jones, and any of their officers, agents, parent corporations, successor corporations, 

subsidiaries, joint employers, and representatives (collectively “Defendants”).

3. I wish to assert a claim for unpaid/underpaid tips (overtips) from Defendants under the

FLSA to recover all tips/overtips, liquidated damages, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs available to me.

4. I agree to be bound by any adjudication of this action by the Court, whether it is favorable 

or unfavorable. I further agree to be bound by any collective action settlement herein that is both 

recommended by FairLaw Firm and approved by the Class Representative so that the Court can approve 

it as fair, adequate, and reasonable.

5. I designate the FairLaw Firm to represent me in this action.

6. This form may be utilized and/or re-filed in an individual action for me, as necessary.

Dated ________________, 202__. Signed: _____________________________

 Printed Name: ______________________________

Your Address, Email, and Telephone Are Needed, But Will Not Filed With The Court

Address:__________________________ Tel No.: __________________________

 __________________________ Email: __________________________

Case 1:22-cv-23074-BB Document 127-7 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/21/2023 Page 2 of 2
###### Editorial Note on Subpart 101-6.2 of Part 101-6

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 101-6 appear at 68 FR 51373, Aug. 26, 2003.

#### § 101-6.210-5 Intimidatory or retaliatory acts prohibited.

No recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section 601 of the Act or this subpart 101-6.2, or because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subpart. The identity of complainants shall be kept confidential except to the extent necessary to carry out the purposes of this subpart, including the conduct of any investigation, hearing, or judicial proceeding arising thereunder.
#### ROBERT MARTIN, as Executor, etc., Respondent *v.*CATHERINE NESTOR ENNISMON HICKS, Appellant.

*Order refusing to postpone trial*— appeal *from*— *remedy.*

No appeal lies directly to tlie General Term from an order made at the Circuit refusing- to postpone the trial of a case.

Tlie remedy is, in tlie first instance, by non-enumerated motion at Special Term.

Appeal from order made at the Circuit denying a motion to postpone the trial of the above entitled action.

*John A.*Wright. for the appellant.

*Joseph*Laroque, for the respondent.

Davis, P. J.:

We are of opinion that no appeal lies directly to the General Term from, an order made at Circuit refusing to postpone the trial of a case. The correct practice in such cases is laid down in volume 3 of Wait’s Practice (at page 77), as follows : “ Where a party defendant feels himself aggrieved by a refusal to postpone the trial, whether such refusal be made on a trial by jury or a trial by the court, he may withdraw from the trial; and, if the trial proceeds, and the cause is decided against him, he may, upon affidavit showing the application to postpone, the papers upon which it was founded, its denial, and that a decision has been made against him, make a non-enumerated motion, at Special Term, to set aside such decision. He may also remain and try the case on the merits, and, in case of a decision against him, either .pursue the same course to obtain a new trial, or may, if the trial was by jury, under section 265, move at Special Term, on a case, for a new trial, alleging, as one of the grounds, the refusal to postpone the trial; or, if the trial *75was by the court, he may then, under section 268, appeal directly to the General Term, alleging, as cause for reversal, the refusal to postpone. *(Howard*v. Freeman, 3 Abb. [N. S.], 292; *Ogden*v. Payne, 5 Cow., 15; *Hooker*v. Rogers, 6 id., 577; *People*v. Vermilyea, 7 id., 369 ; *Brooklyn Oil Works*v. Brown, 38 How., 451; S. C., 7 Abb. [N. S.], 382; *Miller*v. Porter, 17 How., 526.)

The appeal from the order of the Circuit Court should, therefore, be dismissed, with costs.

Daniels and Brady, JJ., concurred.

Appeal dismissed, with costs.
#### § 961.1 Authority for rules.

These rules are issued by the Judicial Officer pursuant to authority delegated by the Postmaster General.
EXHIBIT 32.2
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO     18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of American Express Credit Corporation (the Company) for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the Report), David L. Yowan, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|

/s/ David L. YowanName: David L. YowanTitle: Chief Financial OfficerDate: August 14, 2007

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or
as a separate disclosure document for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act), or otherwise subject to liability under that section. This certification shall not be deemed to be
incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act except to the extent that this Exhibit 32.2 is expressly and specifically incorporated by reference in any such filing.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.

---