NUMBER 13-10-00479-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI—EDINBURG

____________________________________________________

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Appellant,

v.

BELINDA DIAZ, Appellee.

On appeal from the 93rd District Court

of Hidalgo County, Texas

____________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Garza, Vela, and Perkes 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes 

Pursuant to the Anti-Retaliation Law, Appellee Belinda Diaz filed this lawsuit against 

her former employer, the Office of the Attorney General (the ―OAG‖), alleging the OAG 

wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for having filed a workers’ 

compensation claim. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001(1) (West 2006) (―Anti-
2

Retaliation Law‖). The trial court denied the OAG’s plea to the jurisdiction.1 By a single 

issue, the OAG contends the trial court erred by denying the OAG’s plea to the jurisdiction 

because sovereign immunity for Diaz’s claim has not been clearly and unambiguously 

waived by the Legislature. See TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West 2005). 

Specifically, the OAG argues that certain changes to the Code Construction Act in 2001 

and 2005 render any prior statutory language waiving sovereign immunity for antiretaliation claims ambiguous at best. See id. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because,

notwithstanding the changes to the Code Construction Act the OAG cites, we are bound by 

the Supreme Court of Texas’s holding in Kerrville State Hospital v. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d 

1, 8 (Tex. 2000).

I. BACKGROUND

Diaz was employed in the OAG’s child-support division for approximately ten years. 

The OAG states Diaz’s employment was terminated because of her failure to meet 

performance standards. Diaz, however, had previously filed a workers’ compensation

claim after she was allegedly exposed to chemicals which were sprayed in her office. Diaz 

asserted the chemical exposure made her ill, causing her to experience headaches, 

respiratory problems, disorientation, nausea, and fatigue. Diaz claims the true reason she 

was discharged was in retaliation for making a workers’ compensation claim. 

 

1

 In its answer, the OAG asserted a plea to the jurisdiction. Later, the OAG filed a pleading titled, 

―Defendant, Office of the Attorney General’s, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Brief in Support 

of Plea to the Jurisdiction in Original Answer.‖ In substance, the pleading is briefing in support of the OAG’s 

plea to the jurisdiction and a prayer for dismissal of Diaz’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. The OAG appeals 

the trial court’s ―Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Brief in Support of 

Plea to the Jurisdiction.‖ Despite the ambiguous title, in substance, the trial court’s order is a denial of the 

OAG’s plea to the jurisdiction and as such, this Court has appellate jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West 2005); Benson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bexar Appraisal Dist., 242 S.W.3d 54, 59 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.).
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Diaz filed a retaliatory-discharge claim against the OAG, seeking recovery under the 

Anti-Retaliation Law. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 451.001(1). The OAG answered and 

asserted a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing sovereign immunity had not been waived for 

retaliatory-discharge claims. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the OAG’s plea to 

the jurisdiction, and the OAG brought this interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West 2005) (permitting interlocutory appeal from an order 

that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit). 

II. ANALYSIS

We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep’t of 

Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). In Fernandez, the 

Supreme Court of Texas addressed the question presented by this case—whether the 

State’s sovereign immunity is waived for an anti-retaliation claim brought by a state 

employee against a state agency under the State Applications Act (―SAA‖), alleging 

wrongful termination in retaliation for bringing a workers’ compensation claim. 28 S.W.3d 

at 2–3. The Court concluded that the language of the SAA provided a clear and 

unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity for such a claim because the SAA identified 

the state agency as the employer for purposes of the Anti-Retaliation Law. Id. at 7–8; see 

also TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 501.002(b) (West 2006) (current codification of waiver 

language analyzed in Fernandez). According to the Fernandez majority, a waiver of 

sovereign immunity is the only ―sensible construction‖ of the use of the word ―employer‖ in 

the SAA. Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d at 8.

As the OAG points out, in 2001, the Legislature added section 311.034 of the Texas 

Government Code, and thereafter amended it in 2005 to provide:
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In order to preserve the Legislature’s interest in managing state fiscal matters 

through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a 

waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and 

unambiguous language. In a statute, the use of ―person,‖ as defined by 

Section 311.005 to include governmental entities, does not indicate

legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity unless the context of the 

statute indicates no other reasonable construction. Statutory prerequisites to 

a suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all 

suits against a governmental entity.

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West 2005). However, section 311.034 is part of the 

Code Construction Act and as such, it does not apply to the Anti-Retaliation Law. See Id.

§ 311.001 (West 2005); Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman, 342 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 

2011) (discussing the inapplicability of the Code Construction Act to the Anti-Retaliation 

Law).

Assuming without deciding that the Code Construction Act applies to the SAA, 

Fernandez controls the outcome of this case because it applied the ―clear and 

unambiguous language‖ standard contained in Government Code section 311.034, and 

the decision in Fernandez did not hinge on the definition of ―person.‖ See Fernandez, 28 

S.W.3d at 8–9 (discussing insignificance of the absence of the term ―person‖ in then 

section 15(b) of the SAA in apparent response to Justice Hecht’s remark in dissent that 

―person‖ ―has always been the operative word in the Anti-Retaliation Law‖). Recently, in

Norman, the Supreme Court of Texas treated the ―clear and unambiguous language‖ 

standard in section 311.034 as a codification of the clear-and-unambiguous-language 

standard it has long applied in determining whether immunity is waived. 342 S.W.3d at 58. 

This is the standard that was applied in Fernandez. See Fernandez, 28 S.W.3d at 3; see 

also Tex. Dep’t of Aging and Disability Servs. v. Beltran, —S.W.3d—, No. 08-10-00085-

CV, 2011 WL 3841297, at *2–5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 31, 2011, no pet.) (concluding 
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Fernandez still controls on the question of whether the Legislature clearly and 

unambiguously waived immunity for alleged violations of the Anti-Retaliation Law as 

applied through the SAA); Tex. Workforce Comm’n v. Olivas, —S.W.3d—, No. 08-10-

00070-CV, 2011 WL 3612207, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 17, 2011, pet. filed) 

(explaining the SAA has not been amended since Fernandez was issued and concluding,

under Norman, codification did not change application of the clear-and-unambiguous 

language standard); Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs. v. Parra, —S.W.3d—, No. 

08-10-00067-CV, 2011 WL 3240541, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 29, 2011) (same); 

Dep’t of Aging and Disability Servs. v. Powell, No. 13-10-00126-CV, 2011 WL 2090247, at 

*3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2011, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (concluding section 311.034 

does not supersede Fernandez). 

As an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by Fernandez. See Dallas Area 

Rapid Transit v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local No. 1338, 273 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Tex. 

2008) (discussing the binding nature of the Texas Supreme Court’s precedents on 

intermediate appellate courts); Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 

565 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (explaining intermediate appellate court is not free 

to mold Texas law as it sees fit but must follow the Supreme Court’s precedents). We 

overrule the OAG’s sole issue on appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying the OAG’s plea to the jurisdiction.

_______________________________

GREGORY T. PERKES

Justice

Delivered and filed the 

20th day of October, 2011.