### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON May 15, 2000 Session CASSANDRA D. MYLES v. PETER M. MYLES An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County No. 160706 R.D. George H. Brown, Jr., Judge

No. W1999-00495-COA-R3-CV - Filed April 26, 2001
This is a divorce case. The husband failed to appear for the rescheduled hearing on the w ife’s motion for default judgment. The trial court granted default judgment and, at a subsequent final divorce hearing from which the husband was also absent, granted the wife a divorce and awa rded her alimony in solido . The husband then filed motions to set aside the default judgment and for a new trial, asser

ting that he had not r

eceived notice o

f either the resc

heduled hearing

on default judgment or the final divorce hearing. The trial court denied both motions. The husband appeals. We affirm, finding that the husband’s neglect was not excusable. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgmen

t of the Circuit C

ourt is Affirmed.
H OLLY K IRBY L ILLARD , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in whichW. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S. and D AVID R. F ARMER , J., joined. John S. Richbourg, Me

mphis, Tennessee

, for the appella

nt, Peter M. Myles. Terry Allen Scott

II, Memphis, Tenn

essee, for the a

ppellee, Cassand

ra D. Myles. OPINION This is a divorce case. Defendant/A ppellant Peter M. Myles (“Husband”) and Plaintiff/Appellee Cassandra D. Myle s (“Wife”) wer

e married in

1995. On October 26, 1998, after slightly more than three years of marriage, Wife filed a complaint for divorce. Husband was served on November 2, 1998.

Husband did not hire

an attorney, nor

did he file an answ

er to Wife’s complaint for divorce. Husbandattempted to negotiate a marital dissolution agreement with Wife’s attorney, but Wife later told her attorneyto discontinue negotiations. On December 9, 1998, Wife filed a motion for default judgment. A hearing on themotion for default judgment was scheduled for December 18, 1998. When Husband arrived at the courtroom on the scheduled date, he learned that the hearing had

been postponed because the trial judge was ill. Husband did not ask when or whether the hearing was to be rescheduled. The rescheduled hearing was held on January 15, 1999. Husband was not present at this hearing.-2-

In February 1999, the trial court en tered an order g

ranting Wife’s mo

tion for default judgment. A final hearing on the divorce was held on March 3, 1999. Husband was not present at th e final divorce hearing. On March 11, 1999, the trial court entered the final divor ce decree , granting Wife a divorce and, inter alia , $15,000 in alimony in solido

. In April 1999, Husband retained counsel and filed motions to set aside the default judgment and for a new trial. Husband asserted that he had not received notice of either the r es cheduled hearing on the motion for default judgment or the final divorce hearing. He argued that the default judgment had resul

ted from excusab

le neglect. At the hearing on Husband’s motions, the trial court found that Husband was negligent for failing to take any steps to ascertain the status of the case or the date to w hich the postponed hearing was rescheduled. The trial court stated that Husband should have known that additional proceedings would follow after the

original h

ear ing on the default j udgment was postpon ed, and his failur

e to determine the status of the c ase was neglect

that was not excus

able. The trial c

ourt d enie d both motions and award

ed Wife attorne

y’s fees. Husban

d now appeals. On appeal, Husband argues the trial court abused its discretion in denyinghis motions to set aside th e default judgment and for a new trial. He asserts that he never received not ice of th e rescheduled

hearing and did not

receive notice

of the final divor

ce hearing until

the day before the hearing was scheduled. Husband concedes that he was negligent in failing to inquire about the status of his case or the date of the rescheduled hearing, but asse

rts that he was distracted from the divorce proceedings by his sister’s death in February 1999 . He argues that t his is the type of ex

cusable neglect contemplated by Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Wife asserts that Husband willfully allowed the default judgment to be entered aga

inst him. She notes that Husband had advance k nowledge of the final divorce hearing scheduled for March 3, 1999, but failed

to appear or take any action on the case until after the final divorce decree was entered. A motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Proce du re lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. On appeal, the scope of review is limited to whether the trial judge abused his discretion. Underwood v. Zuri ch Ins. Co. , 854 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tenn. 1993). Upon review of thetrial record, we find that no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Husband’s motion to set aside th e default judgmen

t. Although Rule

60.02 provides relief from a judgment or order due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, “mere negligence or [the] inattention of a party is no ground for vacating a judgment. . . . Carelessness is not synonymous with excusable neglect.” Food Lion, In c . v. Washington County Beer Bd. , 700 S.W.2d 893, 89 6 (Tenn. 1985) (quoting 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 718 (1969)). The stress or importance of a party’s priv atebusiness is not necessarily justification for neglecting his case; such neglect is usually not excusable. Id. A party remains respon sible for taking steps to protect his-3-

own interest. NCNB Nat’l Bank of North Carolina v. Thrail kill , 856 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Despite Husband’s knowledge that the original hearing had been postponed, he took no action on his case

unti l after the final divorce decree was entered. Rule 60.02 does not relieve a party from his deliberat e choices sim ply because he may disagree with the outcome of the judgment. Id. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Husband’s motions. The decision of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are taxed to the appellant, Peter M. Myles and his surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.

___________________________________ HOLLY K. LILLARD, JUDGE