1The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-1346

___________

In the Matter of the Complaint of *

Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., *

as owner or owner pro hac vice of *

the M/V Karen Michelle for *

Exoneration from or Limitation of *

Liability, *

* Appeal from the United States

Appellant, * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri

v. *

*

James F. Lewis, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 16, 1999

Filed: November 5, 1999

___________

Before McMILLIAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM,1 District Judge.

___________

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
-2-

This is a federal admiralty case involving an underlying Jones Act personal injury

action brought in Illinois state court by James F. Lewis (Claimant) against Lewis &

Clark Marine, Inc. (Lewis & Clark). Lewis & Clark presently appeals from an

interlocutory order entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Missouri dissolving a restraining order that the district court had previously entered

to enjoin Claimant's state court action from further proceedings; upon dissolution of its

restraining order, the district court also stayed the present federal action brought by

Lewis & Clark seeking its exoneration from or limitation of liability. See In re

Complaint of Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., Case No. 4:98CV0503 (MLM), (E.D. Mo.

Dec. 22, 1998) (hereinafter "Memorandum and Order"). For reversal, Lewis & Clark

argues that the district court abused its discretion in dissolving its restraining order and

staying the federal admiralty action because (1) the federal district court has exclusive

jurisdiction to adjudicate Lewis & Clark's right to exoneration from or limitation of

liability and (2) Claimant's Illinois state court action was properly enjoined under the

circumstances of the present case. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the

order of the district court and remand the case to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1333;

46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196. Jurisdiction in the court of appeals is proper based upon

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a). 

Background

Lewis & Clark is a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business in

Granite City, Illinois. At all times relevant hereto, Lewis & Clark was the owner or,

alternatively, owner pro hac vice of the M/V KAREN MICHELLE. On March 17,
-3-

1998, Claimant was purportedly injured while working for Lewis & Clark as a

deckhand aboard the M/V KAREN MICHELLE. See Memorandum and Order at 1.

One week later, on March 24, 1998, Lewis & Clark filed a "Complaint for Exoneration

from or Limitation of Liability" (hereinafter "Complaint") in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Missouri pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act,

codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196. See Joint Appendix at A1-A5

(hereinafter "App.").

On April 2, 1998, Claimant sued Lewis & Clark in state court in Madison

County, Illinois, seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in the March

17, 1998, incident. See James F. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., No. 98-L-233

(Apr. 2, 1998) (hereinafter "the state court action") (located in App. at A30-A37).

Claimant asserted three counts: (1) negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §

688; (2) unseaworthiness; and (3) maintenance and cure. See id. Claimant did not

demand a jury trial in the state court action and does not dispute that it would not be

tried to a jury. See Memorandum and Order at 2.

On May 8, 1998, the federal district court entered an "Order Approving

Stipulation for Costs and Security for Value and Directing the Issuance of Notice, and

Restraining Suits." See App. at A19-A21. In this order, the district court approved the

surety bond in the amount of $450,000 as security for Lewis & Clark's interest in the

M/V KAREN MICHELLE. See id. at A20. The district court further directed that any

person with a claim related to the March 17, 1998, incident file said claim with the

court on or before June 12, 1998. See id. at A20-A21. Finally, the district court

enjoined the institution or prosecution of any other suits against Lewis & Clark relating

to the incident involving the M/V KAREN MICHELLE on March 17, 1998. See id.

at A21.

On June 9, 1998, Claimant filed his Answer to Lewis & Clark's Complaint, as

well as a Claim for Damages for Injury and a Motion to Dissolve Restraining Order
-4-

(hereinafter "Motion"). See id. at A45-A53. Claimant initially contested Lewis &

Clark's right to exoneration from or limitation of liability, see id. at A45, and claimed

an amount in excess of the limitation fund. See id. at A49. In his Motion, Claimant

sought to dissolve the May 8, 1998, injunction so that he might pursue his state court

action. To this end, Claimant asserted that he was the sole claimant seeking damages

with respect to the March 17, 1998, incident. See id. at A52. He also stated that he

"waive[d] any claim of res judicata relevant to the issue of limited liability based on any

judgment obtained in state court" and "stipulate[d] to [Lewis & Clark's] right to litigate

issues relating to the limitation in this limitation proceeding." Id. On July 24, 1998,

Claimant filed a Second Stipulation in the district court, stating that the value of his

claim in the federal action was less than $400,000 and thus less than the value of the

limitation fund deposited with the district court by Lewis & Clark. See id. at A79.

On December 22, 1998, the district court granted Claimant's Motion and entered

an order both dissolving the prior restraining order enjoining related litigation and

staying the federal court action pending final resolution of Claimant's Illinois state court

action. See Memorandum and Order at 11-12. This appeal followed.

Discussion

Statutory Background

The Limitation of Liability Act (hereinafter "Limitation Act"), was "adopted

primarily to encourage the development of American merchant shipping." Lake

Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 150 (1957) (Lake Tankers). To this end, the

Limitation Act "exempt[s] innocent shipowners from liability, beyond the amount of

their interest." Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 121

(1871). Specifically, the Limitation Act permits a shipowner to limit its liability to

damage claimants to the value of its interest in the vessel and the vessel's pending

freight, so long as the loss is incurred without the shipowner's "privity or knowledge."
-5-

46 U.S.C. app. § 183. See also In re Complaint of Universal Towing Co. v. Barrale,

595 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1979) (Universal Towing).

Thus, when faced with potential liability for a maritime accident, a shipowner

may demand a federal district court judgment for exoneration from or limitation of

liability. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supplemental Admiralty & Maritime Claims Rule F(2)

(hereinafter "Supp. AMC Rule"). In addition to filing a complaint, the shipowner must

deposit with the court an amount representing the value of the vessel and its freight, to

serve as the "limitation fund" from which damage claims are satisfied. See 46 U.S.C.

app. § 185; Supp. AMC Rule F(1). Upon the shipowner's compliance with these

requirements, the district court must enjoin all related claims against the shipowner

pending in any other forum and issue a notice to all potential claimants directing them

to file their claims against the shipowner in the district court within a specified time.

See 46 U.S.C. app. § 185; Supp. AMC Rules F(3), F(4); see also In re Petition of

Beiswenger Enter. Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032, 1036 (11th Cir. 1996)

(Beiswenger), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1275 (1997); Universal Towing, 595 F.2d at 417.

Claimants may then file damage claims in the district court within the specified period

as well as answers contesting the right to exoneration from or limitation of liability.

See Supp. AMC Rule F(5). After all damage claims have been timely filed, the district

court determines "if a loss occurred; whether there was negligence; if there was

negligence, whether it was without the privity and knowledge of the owner; and if

limitation is granted, how the fund should be distributed." Universal Towing, 595 F.2d

at 417.

The federal district courts have exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over suits

brought pursuant to the Limitation Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1998); In re Muer, 146

F.3d 410, 417 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Ex Parte Green, 286 U.S. 437, 439-40 (1932)),

cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 867 (1999); Beiswenger, 86 F.3d at 1036 (citing same). The

district court also sits without a jury in such admiralty actions. See Waring v. Clarke,

46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 459 (1847) (holding that the Seventh Amendment applies only
-6-

to cases brought at common law, not those brought in admiralty); Newton v. Shipman,

718 F.2d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (explaining that limitation actions

involve no jury trial right). Moreover, as stated above, the federal district court

typically enjoins claimants from pursuing common law actions in other fora. See In re

Complaint of Dammers & Vanderheide & Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V. v.

Corona, 836 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1988) (Dammers). However, the same statute

that grants this exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district courts also "sav[es] to

suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333.

This "saving to suitors" clause embodies a "presumption in favor of jury trials and

common law remedies." Dammers, 836 F.2d at 754. 

Given the competing interests of claimants (seeking "other remedies" such as

jury trials) and shipowners (desiring resolution of liability issues in a federal forum but

without a jury), a critical tension emerged between the "saving to suitors" clause and

the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction over limitation actions. See, e.g., Jefferson

Barracks Marine Serv., Inc. v. Casey, 763 F.2d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1985) (Jefferson

Barracks) ("The conflict between the Limitation of Liability Act . . . and the 'saving to

suitors' clause . . . has been troublesome for the courts."). Courts have attempted to

resolve this conflict between the Limitation Act and the "saving to suitors" clause by

carving out two exceptions in which a claimant "must be allowed to pursue an action

in another forum and have the claim tried before a jury." Valley Line Co. v. Ryan, 771

F.2d 366, 372 (8th Cir. 1985) (Valley Line). The "adequate fund" exception occurs

when the value of the limitation fund exceeds the total value of all the claims asserted

against the shipowner. See id. (citing Lake Tankers, 354 U.S. at 152). The "sole

claimant" exception arises when only one claim is asserted against the shipowner. See

id. at 373. If either exception applies, "it is an abuse of the court's discretion to fail to

dissolve the injunction against other legal proceedings," so long as the shipowner's
2Prior to dissolution of the injunction, claimant must file stipulations that

include: (1) claimant's concession that "the value of the fund is the value of the

vessel and its freight"; (2) claimant's waiver of "any right to a claim of res judicata

based on the state court judgment"; and (3) claimant's concession that "the district

court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all issues affecting the shipowner's right

to limit its liability." Valley Line Co. v. Ryan, 771 F.2d 366, 373 (8th Cir. 1985).

-7-

limitation proceeding rights are adequately protected via certain stipulations filed by

the claimant with the district court.2 Id.

Before the applicability of these exceptions can be considered, there must be a

finding of actual statutory conflict between the Limitation Act and the "saving to

suitors" clause in the case at bar. Cf. Valley Line, 771 F.2d at 372 (stating that "insofar

as limitation proceedings deprive claimants of their right to jury trial, they are in direct

conflict with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1333" and then analyzing the applicability

of the two exceptions); Universal Towing, 595 F.2d at 417 (similarly inquiring into

conflict issue first and then examining exceptions). But cf. Kreta Shipping, S.A. v.

Preussag Int'l Steel Corp., No. 98-7899, 1999 WL 710117, at *6-8 (2d Cir. Sept. 13,

1999) (staying "adequate fund" case in federal admiralty court and allowing action in

foreign forum to proceed, irrespective of whether conflict between the Limitation Act

and the "saving to suitors" clause exists). The threshold "conflict" inquiry most often

involves analysis of both the shipowner's right to limitation and the claimant's attempt

to preserve a jury trial remedy. See Valley Line, 771 F.2d at 369-70; Jefferson

Barracks, 763 F.2d at 1008; Universal Towing, 595 F.2d at 415; see also In re

Complaint of Eagle Marine Indus., Inc. v. Macke, Case No. 4:97CV0357 ERW, slip

op. at 6 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 1997) (Eagle Marine) (stating that, where plaintiff waived

her jury trial right in an Illinois state court action, "there is not a conflict between the

shipowner's right to limitation and the claimant's right to a jury trial, and so this Court

should not consider dissolving the injunction."). More generally, in considering this

potential tension between the Limitation Act and the "saving to suitors" clause, a court

must look to whether (1) the shipowner has the right to remain in federal court and (2)
-8-

the claimant is seeking "saved" remedies in a forum other than the federal admiralty

court. See Eagle Marine, slip op. at 4-6; In re Complaint of S & E Shipping Corp. v.

Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 1982 A.M.C. 2940, 2942-43 (N.D. Ohio 1982).

In the present case, the district court held that Claimant met the "adequate fund"

exception to the federal court's exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over limitation

proceedings because the $450,000 limitation fund exceeded the total value of all claims

asserted against the vessel owner, which amounted to $400,000. See Memorandum

and Order at 8. The district court found that Claimant might qualify for relief under the

"sole claimant" exception as well. See id. at 9 n.3. The district court rejected the

arguments that Lewis & Clark had the right to exoneration from liability (in addition

to limitation of liability in federal court), see id. at 9, and that Claimant's waiver of his

right to a jury trial precluded application of the two exceptions to the federal court's

exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over these types of claims. See id. at 9-10 n.9.

We review the district court's order dissolving the injunction and lifting the stay

under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re Helena Marine Serv., Inc., 564 F.2d

15, 18 (8th Cir. 1977) ("In administering equitable relief under [the Limitation of

Liability Act], and particularly in deciding whether to dissolve the stay of proceedings

to allow claimants to proceed against the shipowner in other courts, the District Court

exercises broad equitable discretion."), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978). "Abuse of

discretion occurs if the district court reaches its conclusion by applying erroneous legal

principles or relying on clearly erroneous factual findings." Randolph v. Rodgers, 170

F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Fogie v. THORN Americas, Inc., 95 F.3d 645,

649 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1166 (1997)). 

Jurisdiction in Federal Court

Claimant initially questions whether the federal court retains exclusive

jurisdiction over the limitation proceeding, given that Claimant has already stipulated

to the adequacy of Lewis & Clark's limitation fund. Claimant argues that, when the
-9-

limitation fund sufficiently covers all claims, a shipowner's right to limited liability is

no longer affected. Like the district court below, Claimant reads the Limitation Act as

granting the shipowner a right to limitation only and nothing more. See Memorandum

and Order at 9; see also Beiswenger, 86 F.3d 1032, 1037 (stating that, in an adequate

fund case, "the vessel owner is not exposed to liability in excess of the limitation fund,

and thus the vessel owner's rights under the Limitation Act are not implicated.");

Petition of Moran Transp. Corp. v. Mellino's Adm'x., 185 F.2d 386, 388-89 (2d Cir.

1950) ("The statutory purpose is to exempt the investor from loss in excess of the value

of the investment in the vessel and freight. Where that value is obviously greater than

all claims, no matter how many, the statute does not permit limitation."), cert. denied,

340 U.S. 953 (1951). Claimant further contends that, because the Limitation Act's

statutory goal of affording the shipowner limited liability has been achieved in the

"adequate fund" instance, the court should not impair Claimant's ability to proceed in

state court. See In re Complaint of Port Arthur Towing Co. v. John W. Towing, Inc.,

42 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir.) (Port Arthur Towing) ("But when a shipowner is not

exposed to potential liability in excess of [the value of the vessel and its freight], the

shipowner's absolute right to limit its liability is not implicated and 'the saving-to-suitors

clause dictates that the admiralty court must allow suits pending against the shipowner

in a common law forum, in this case the state court, to proceed.'") (quoting Magnolia

Marine Transp. Co. v. Laplace Towing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992)),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 823 (1995). We disagree.

Before a federal admiralty court can even address the limitation question in a

Limitation Act proceeding, the court must first determine whether the shipowner is

entitled to complete exoneration based on the shipowner's lack of negligence. See

Universal Towing, 595 F.2d at 417 (noting that, after all claims are filed, the district

court must determine "if a loss occurred; whether there was negligence; if there was

negligence, whether it was without the privity and knowledge of the owner; and if

limitation is granted, how the fund should be distributed"); see also Port Arthur

Towing, 42 F.3d at 317 ("A limitation proceeding generally comprises a two-step
3Claimant also cites Fecht v. Makowski, 406 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1969)

(Fecht), for the proposition that there is no right to exoneration separate from a right

to limitation. Specifically, "[w]here no grant of limitation is possible, the basis for

granting exoneration vanishes. In such a case, a boat owner should not be treated

any more favorably than an automobile driver." Id. at 723. Fecht is the rare case

where limitation was not possible because the shipowner was also the boat operator

and, therefore, any negligence had to have been within the shipowner's privity and

knowledge. See id. at 722-23. Here, the privity and knowledge of Lewis & Clark

(as well as the commission of any negligence) has not yet been determined. 

Accordingly, Fecht is distinguishable.

4The Supplemental Rules cannot in any way "abridge, enlarge, or modify any

substantive right" conferred on shipowners by the Limitation Act. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2072(b) (prohibiting abrogation of substantive rights by federal procedural rules). 

However, the Rules can enhance our understanding of the substantive rights

involved in limitation proceedings, including the right to exoneration and its

relationship to the right to limitation.

-10-

process, the first being 'the establishment of liability of the shipowner to the claimant,

as to which the claimant (or libellant) bears the burden.'") (citation omitted). In other

words, the liability of the shipowner is by no means assumed by the Limitation Act.

Instead, the determination of liability itself is part and parcel of the limitation

proceeding.3 This idea of exoneration as more than just a procedural adjunct to

limitation is reinforced by the dictates of Supplemental Admiralty & Maritime Claims

Rule F, which states that "[t]he complaint may demand exoneration from as well as

limitation of liability" and that a claimant must file an answer to the complaint if the

claimant "desires to contest either the right to exoneration from or the right to limitation

of liability . . . " Supp. AMC Rules F(2), F(5).4 In this case, Lewis & Clark's

Complaint explicitly sought exoneration from or, in the alternative, limitation of

liability. Thus, even though Claimant stipulated as to the adequacy of Lewis & Clark's
5We do not decide whether, as a condition of dissolving the injunction against

the state court proceedings, the district court may insist that a claimant waive the res

judicata effect of the state court finding on the liability issue. In other words, we

leave open the question of whether a shipowner may still litigate the issue of

exoneration in federal court without regard to the liability findings of a state court. 

Compare In re Complaint of McCarthy Bros. Co. / Clark Bridge, 83 F.3d 821, 828

(7th Cir.) (requiring federal court to accept state court's determination of liability

and to decide limitation issues only if judgment exceeds limitation fund), cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 950 (1996), with Texaco, Inc. v. Williams, 47 F.3d 765, 769 (5th

Cir.) (noting that claimant stipulations can protect both "the shipowner's right to

limit liability and [to] litigate the issue of exoneration in federal court"), cert. denied,

516 U.S. 907 (1995). 

-11-

limitation fund, adjudication of Lewis & Clark's right to exoneration is properly within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal admiralty court at this time.5 

"Saving to Suitors" Clause

Claimant contends that, even if Lewis & Clark is entitled to remain in federal

court, Claimant has other "saved" remedies which trump the shipowner's rights, such

that Claimant should be allowed to proceed in state court under one of the limitation

exceptions. Although he admittedly waived his jury trial right in state court, Claimant

cites Curtis Bay Towing Co. v. Tug Kevin Moran, Inc., 159 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1947)

(Curtis Bay), for the proposition that a state court jury trial is not a prerequisite to

dissolution of an injunction in this type of limitation case. Instead, Claimant maintains

that two other "saved" remedies apply in this case: (1) choice of forum and (2) in

personam judgments. As to the former, Claimant argues that the "saving to suitors"

clause grants him the right to have his claim tried in the "forum of his choice."

Specifically, in an "adequate fund" case, "every claimant has a legally protected interest

in choosing his [or her] forum, even though the method of trial be not changed if he [or

she] is moved elsewhere." Curtis Bay, 159 F.2d at 276. Claimant asserts that this

concept of forum choice as a "saved" remedy is further supported by language from

more recent limitation cases, including this circuit's decision in Universal Towing. See
-12-

595 F.2d at 418 (noting that federal courts permit "claimants to pursue their remedies

in a forum of their own choosing. . . . [including when] the limitation fund exceeds the

total of all claims."); accord Suzuki of Orange Park, Inc. v. Shubert, 86 F.3d 1060,

1063 (11th Cir. 1996) (Suzuki) ("[T]he 'saving to suitors' clause of § 1333(1) embodies

a presumption in favor of jury trials and other common law remedies in the forum of

the damage claimant's choice"); Odeco Oil & Gas Co., Drilling Div. v. Bonnette, 74

F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir.) ("Although the claimants' interest in litigating in the forum of

their choice is substantial, we will accede to that choice only 'if it is accompanied by

stipulations fully protecting Odeco's right to limit liability . . . .'") (citation omitted),

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 822 (1996).

Claimant's reliance on this "choice of forum" language is misplaced. We

interpret the "saving to suitors" clause as granting claimants a choice of remedies, not

a choice of fora. Accord Poirrier v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th

Cir. 1981) (Poirrier) ("The 'saving to suitors' clause does no more than preserve the

right of maritime suitors to pursue nonmaritime remedies. It does not guarantee them

a nonfederal forum . . . ."); see also 14A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &

Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3674 (3d ed. 1998) ("The 'savingto-suitors' clause has long been construed to afford litigants a choice of remedies, not

of forums.") (quoting Crispin Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 704, 707

(S.D. Tex. 1955). Moreover, any right to choose between fora appears to arise only

after a claimant has asserted a remedy "saved" by the clause itself. Accord In re

Chimenti, 79 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that the goal of the 'saving to

suitors' clause "was to give claimants pursuing a common-law remedy the ability to

choose their forum") (emphasis added); Suzuki, 86 F.3d at 1063 (discussing forum

choice only after noting the "tension between the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over

Limitation Act claims and the presumption favoring jury trials under the saving to

suitors clause"); Universal Towing, 595 F.2d at 417 (similarly alluding to forum choice

only after stating that "[i]nsofar as limitation proceedings deprive claimants of the right

to trial by jury, they conflict with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1333"). Finally, a
6

It is undisputed that Claimant's Jones Act claim is subject to transfer via

forum non conveniens. Interestingly, the Curtis Bay court only used its forum

choice language in the context of a forum non conveniens evaluation. Counter to

Claimant's contention, the Second Circuit did not find that the saving clause

protected a claimant's choice of a nonfederal forum. Instead, the court reasoned

that, if a shipowner has no independent basis for its presence in federal court (as

opposed to Lewis & Clark's basis, namely the right to exoneration), a shipowner's

need for a convenient forum will not trump a claimant's choice. See Curtis Bay

Towing Co. v. Tug Kevin Moran, Inc., 159 F.2d 273, 276 (2d Cir. 1947). For these

reasons, we find Curtis Bay inapposite.

-13-

claimant's right to forum choice is severely diminished both by a shipowner's right to

remove to federal court if an independent basis for jurisdiction exists as well as by a

court's ability to transfer the case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

6

 See

Poirrier, 648 F.2d at 1066 ("[The 'saving to suitors' clause] does not guarantee

[claimants] a nonfederal forum, or limit the right of defendants to remove such actions

to federal court where there exists some basis for federal jurisdiction other than

admiralty.").

Claimant alternatively argues that he is entitled to an in personam state court

judgment, purportedly falling within the meaning of the "saving to suitors" clause even

though it would result from a non-jury trial. Claimant notes that the Supreme Court has

already found the "saving to suitors" clause to include "remedies in equity, as well as

those enforceable in a court of law." See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264

U.S. 109, 124 (1924) (Red Cross Line). Because there was typically no right to jury

trial in equitable matters, Claimant argues, non-jury cases such as his state court action

must fall within the ambit of the "saving to suitors" clause. Claimant supports his

contention by citing to language within Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964

F.2d 1480, 1487 (5th Cir. 1992) (Linton), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 975 (1992), stating

that because "the Supreme Court cases do not require a jury trial as an element of a

'saving to suitors' remedy[,] . . . a maritime non-jury action is not necessarily outside
-14-

the scope of the 'saving to suitors' clause and within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction

of the federal courts."

We are not convinced that non-jury in personam judgments constitute a "saved"

remedy within the "saving to suitors" clause. First, although certain equitable remedies

may be within the scope of the "saving to suitors" clause based on Red Cross Line, this

does not mean that all non-jury cases are necessarily within its ambit. If all in

personam judgments were deemed "saved" by this Court, claimants could easily avoid

the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal admiralty court over such limitation matters and

thus effectively subvert Congressional intent. Second, there is no substantive

difference between the remedies afforded Claimant in the state forum and those

afforded in the federal court. Finally, besides Linton, Claimant can cite no other nonjury state action which has been allowed to proceed while the federal admiralty

limitation case was stayed. Linton is distinguishable from the present case because it

neither involved a limitation action nor an independent jurisdictional basis on which the

federal court could hear the matter (unlike Lewis & Clark's right to exoneration in this

case). Moreover, the plaintiff in Linton elected to proceed with a non-jury matter

pursuant to a Louisiana statute. That statutory election fell within Red Cross Line's

special category of "judicial remedies conferred by statute," which are "saved"

remedies under the "saving to suitors" clause. See Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 124.

Conclusion

In sum, we hold that there is no conflict between the Limitation Act and the

"saving to suitors" clause and thus no grounds for dissolution of the injunction imposed

upon the state court action. Accordingly, we find that the district court abused its

discretion when it ignored this lack of an actual statutory conflict and prematurely

applied the "adequate fund" exception instead. Thus, we reverse the order of the

district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
-15-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.