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82–394 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–731

U.S. MILITARY’S CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO

DOMESTIC TERRORIST ATTACKS INVOLVING

THE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND

CAPABILITIES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 1, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado

TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana

JACK REED, Rhode Island

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

BILL NELSON, Florida

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

LES BROWNLEE, Staff Director

DAVID S. LYLES, Staff Director for the Minority

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire

RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado

TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

BILL NELSON, Florida

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

(II)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

U.S. MILITARY’S CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO DOMESTIC TERRORIST ATTACKS

INVOLVING THE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

MAY 1, 2001

Page

Lieberman, Robert J., Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense ........ 6

Davis, Lt. Gen. Russell C., USAF, Chief, National Guard Bureau ..................... 10

Maples, Maj. Gen. Michael D., USA, Director of Military Support, Office

of the Chief of Staff of the Army ......................................................................... 19

Lawlor, Maj. Gen. Bruce M., USA, Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support, U.S. Joint Forces Command ....................................................................... 22

(III)

(1)

U.S. MILITARY’S CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND

TO DOMESTIC TERRORIST ATTACKS INVOLVING THE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION

TUESDAY, MAY 1, 2001

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS

AND CAPABILITIES,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in room

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Pat Roberts

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Roberts, Allard, Byrd,

Landrieu, Bill Nelson, and Dayton.

Professional staff members present: Edward H. Edens IV and

Carolyn M. Hanna.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, minority

counsel, and Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Suzanne K.L. Ross and Michele A.

Traficante.

Committee members’ assistants present: George M. Bernier III,

assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to

Senator Roberts; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins;

Christina Evans, Barry (B.G.) Wright, Erik Raven, and Craig Bury,

assistants to Senator Byrd; Jason Matthews, assistant to Senator

Landrieu; Peter A. Contostavlos and William K. Sutey, assistants

to Senator Bill Nelson; and Brady King, assistant to Senator Dayton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN

Senator ROBERTS. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and

Capabilities meets this afternoon to review the U.S. military’s capability to respond to domestic terrorist attacks, and those attacks

involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. Since its establishment in 1999, this subcommittee has worked to ensure that the

Department of Defense is adequately prepared, organized, and

funded for its critical combating terrorism mission, and today’s

hearing is a continuation of this process.

Now, this afternoon we are going to examine the structure, the

plans, the assets, and the capabilities of the Joint Task Force Civil

Support Teams—the CST teams. Some of you may recall we used

to call those RAID teams, and this will include a focus on the

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Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs),

and the recent Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General’s audit report on the management of those teams.

The Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTFCS), established in 1999,

under the Unified Command Plan 1999, is a standing joint task

force assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command. The JTFCS, if I can

use that acronym, does provide command and control over the DOD

forces in support of the lead Federal agency responsible for responding to a domestic incident involving a weapon of mass destruction.

Now, we look forward to the testimony of Maj. Gen. Bruce

Lawlor, the commander of the Joint Task Force Civil Support, on

the status of the JTFCS and the specific focus on its plans for trying to coordinate operations with the WMD–CSTs and the Reserve

components. Also, as the individual responsible for marshalling the

capabilities of our Armed Forces in support of the civilian agencies

involved in responding to domestic incidents involving any weapons

of mass destruction—General Lawlor’s views on the number and

adequacy of the assets available to him would be very useful to this

subcommittee.

In the course of its work in the area of combating terrorism, this

subcommittee has been very involved with and supportive of the

WMD–CSTs, as I indicated earlier, previously known as RAID

teams.

In fact, over the past 2 years, this subcommittee has authorized

22 WMD–CSTs, 17 more than was requested by the administration. Therefore, it was with great concern that we received the January 31, 2001 Department of Defense Inspector General audit report titled, ‘‘Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.’’ As everyone in this room is well

aware, this report, conducted over approximately a 1-year period,

is extremely critical of the management of this program. The following is a quote from the report’s executive summary. ‘‘The consequence management program and the Integration Office,’’ which is—the acronym for that is CoMPIO—‘‘did not manage

the WMD–CST program effectively. Specifically, CoMPIO failed to

provide adequate guidance or training and equipment for the 10

CSTs.’’

Now, what I find really particularly troubling is that less than

a year before this audit report was released, then Secretary of Defense Cohen, in a February 24, 2000 transmittal letter accompanying a congressionally-mandated report on the status of the WMD–

CST, stated the following:

‘‘I am very pleased to inform the Members of Congress that this

program’’—and I am talking again about the WMD and the CST

program—‘‘is progressing smoothly. We expect to certify the initial

10 teams is operationally capable by the third quarter of fiscal year

2000. The training received by these National Guard soldiers and

airmen and the equipment that are being provided the teams are

superior.’’

The Secretary of Defense went on to say, ‘‘these teams and capabilities they bring will greatly enhance the Federal, State, and local

response effort to a weapon of mass destruction incident.’’ That was

the feeling on this subcommittee. That is why, in a bipartisan efVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:35 Oct 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 82394.031 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
3

fort, this subcommittee decided to increase the number of these

teams available.

Then, a month later, during a March 24, 2000, hearing before

this subcommittee, Charles L. Cragin, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs at the time, stated the following:

‘‘The process of standing up these teams and getting them ready

to deploy has been truly remarkable, one that Congress, the Nation, and the Department of Defense can certainly be proud of.’’

The question I have now is, how, in a period of less than a year,

did the management of these WMD–CSTs and this program go

from being considered superior and remarkable to what is alleged

in the IG report as prepared by the Department of Defense, or were

those characterizations not quite accurate?

Who in the Department of Defense was providing the policy oversight and guidance for this program? If the IG report is accurate,

and I am well aware the U.S. Army does not concur. Let me repeat

that. I know that the U.S. Army does not concur with many of the

findings that are contained in the report. Why was CoMPIO allowed to operate for 3 years before it was disestablished?

To address these and other important questions, we have before

us this afternoon Robert J. Lieberman, who is the Deputy Inspector

General of the Department of Defense; Lt. Gen. Russell C. Davis

of the United States Air Force, Chief of the National Guard Bureau; Maj. Gen. Michael D. Maples of the U.S. Army, the Director

of Military Support, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army;

and Maj. Gen. Bruce M. Lawlor, who I referred to before, the USA

Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support and U.S. Joint Forces

Command.

In closing, I must say that although Congress has authorized 32

WMD–CSTs, none today are certified. None today are certified by

the Secretary of Defense. That was not the intent of this subcommittee. That was not the intent of the bipartisan support of

this subcommittee. I am terribly concerned about this and very

frustrated about it. We need to get answers.

I now turn to my friend and the subcommittee’s distinguished

Ranking Member, Senator Landrieu, for any opening remarks she

might have.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to

join with you today in calling for this hearing to explore many of

the points that you raised in your opening statement. I also want

to welcome our witnesses today, particularly General Davis. I was

just in Louisiana with our National Guard and spent a full, wonderful day with them observing a variety of different activities and

exercises, so I appreciate your hard work here.

As we all know, the congressionally-chartered Commission on

National Security in the 21st century, known as the Hart-Rudman

Commission, reported that America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland and that states, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass distribution, and some will use them. AmeriVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:35 Oct 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 82394.031 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
4

cans, it goes on to say, will likely die on American soil, possibly in

large numbers.

Finally, the commission stated that the most serious threat to

our security may consist of unannounced attacks on American cities by subnational groups using genetically engineered pathogens.

I accept this assessment, and that makes today’s hearing, Mr.

Chairman, a deadly serious one. In the event of a terrorist attack

using a weapon of mass destruction, the first officials to arrive on

the scene, and possibly among the first victims, will be police, paramedics, and fire fighters.

If that attack happened today, they would be ill-equipped to ascertain the nature of the attack, and would require expert assistance. The National Guard Civil Support Teams, among others,

would be called upon to provide that expert assistance. I realize

that there is some disagreement among our witnesses about the Inspector General’s audit report, but I believe they all agree that

those teams will play a critical role in our response to any attack

using such weapons.

In view of the existence of this threat, and the potentially devastating results of such attack, I believe our focus this afternoon

should be to identify the lessons learned from setting up initial

teams, assessing the progress made, addressing the existing deficiencies, and determining what else must be done to ensure that

these teams are certified and capable of performing their mission

effectively—a very important mission.

I would like to conclude by noting that the concluding paragraph

of the IG audit report begins with a very positive statement. It says

that the 10 commanders are ‘‘dedicated individuals, highly motivated about their positions, and committed to their mission, as well

as focused on doing the best possible job, regardless of the decisions

and conditions imposed on them.’’

That statement leads me to believe that the problem that exists

is systemic, and not a function of the team members or their leadership. In my home State of Louisiana, the Guard is actually working to prepare for that mission. As we sit here today, Mr. Chairman, guardsmen and women are training in Louisiana, and the

Guard recently refurbished a building to serve as their headquarters, provided by the State.

I have to believe that other states are making similar preparations. I only hope that this subcommittee will help to bring into

light some of the facts, that we can help strengthen the teams and

improve them so that they can meet the mission, as this subcommittee must certainly hope that we can do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Thank you Mr. Chairman:

I would like to thank you for calling this hearing to discuss one of the greatest

threats our country faces in the 21st century. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony on this issue.

The congressionally-chartered United States Commission on National Security/

21st century (also known as the Hart/Rudman Commission) reported that ‘‘America

will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland’’ and ‘‘States,

terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction

and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American

5

soil, possibly in large numbers.’’ Finally, the Commission stated that ‘‘the most serious threat to our security may consist of unannounced attacks on American cities

by sub-national groups using genetically engineered pathogens.’’ I agree with those words and that makes today’s hearing a deadly serious one.

In the event of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction, the first officials to arrive on the scene and possibly among the first victims, will be police, paramedics and firefighters. If that attack happened today, they would be ill-equipped

to ascertain the nature of the attack and would require expert assistance. The National Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction/Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs),

among others, would be called on to provide that expert assistance.

I realize that there is some disagreement among our witnesses about the Inspector General’s Audit Report on the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction— Civil Support Teams (WMD–CST), but believe all agree that those teams will play

a critical role in our response to any attack using weapons of mass destruction in

the United States.

In view of the existence of the threat and the devastating results of such an attack, I believe that our focus this afternoon should be to identify the lessons learned

from setting up the initial teams (including the comments made in the IG report),

assess the progress made in addressing existing deficiencies, and determine what

else must be done to ensure the teams are certified and capable of performing their

mission effectively.

I would like to conclude by noting that the concluding paragraph of the IG Audit

Report begins with ‘‘The 10 WMD–CST commanders are dedicated individuals, highly motivated about their positions, and committed to their mission as well as focused on doing the best possible job regardless of the decisions and conditions imposed on them.’’ That statement leads me to believe that the problems that exist

are systemic and not a function of the team’s members or leadership. In my home

state of Louisiana, the Guard is actively working to prepare for that mission. As

we sit here today, Guardsmen and women are training at Fort Leonard Wood and

the Guard recently refurbished a building to serve as their headquarters, built a Kspan hut to store their equipment and built a helicopter pad to facilitate their quick

response. I have to believe other states are making similar preparations. Given that

fact, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses not ‘‘what happened?’’ but ‘‘where

do we go from here?’’ Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator ROBERTS. I thank the distinguished Senator. I am delighted to welcome other members of this subcommittee, especially

Senator Byrd, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia; and

two new members of this subcommittee, Senator Nelson from Florida, Senator Dayton from Minnesota, and my good friend and colleague from Colorado, Senator Allard, and so we welcome you to

this subcommittee.

If any Member would like to make a very brief statement prior

to the testimony of the panel, I would certainly encourage that at

this time.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I would only underscore

what you said. This is one of the greatest, perhaps the greatest

threat that is facing the United States of America, and there just

simply cannot be any slack on us being able to meet this threat,

so I am anxious to hear what happens.

Senator ROBERTS. I was just writing down a response to the gentleman’s comments. We have the CSIS study—that is a think tank

here of noted prominence—the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Gilmore Commission, and the Bremer Commission, all four, and probably I am leaving something out, indicating that today there is

pretty much of a concerted opinion that the number 1 issue that

represents a threat to our National security is homeland defense.

Our efforts not only within the Department of Defense but

throughout all Federal agencies, and what we do about that, and

whether we can get our arms around it as best we can in a future

hearing with several committees of this Congress—I think that is

maybe eight, if I am not correct—but the DOD effort of having a

6

qualified, well-trained team within 4 hours of anywhere was the

idea that spawned this whole effort.

Again, I am very troubled, and I know there is a difference of

opinion with this report. We are right now 4 hours from nowhere,

and so consequently we have to get these teams up, running, and

certified. I was under the opinion that seven at least had been certified, then 10, then 17, and then we are up to 27, and then 32.

There are other problems—other challenges, not problems.

I did not mean to make another speech, but anyway, thank you

for your comment, Senator Nelson, and now Mr. Lieberman, please

proceed.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. LIEBERMAN, DEPUTY INSPECTOR

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the audit results to which you

just referred, and what the department is doing about them.

First, some additional background. The Presidential Decision Directive 39 in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act

of 1996 directed various measures to enhance national defense

against terrorists. A DOD Tiger Team subsequently recommended

establishing National Guard teams to assist the emergency first responders such as local fire departments and hazardous material response units in cases of known or suspected WMD incidents. The

focus of these teams is principally on helping to identify what material or agent was involved.

In January 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the

Army to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office, or CoMPIO, to implement the Tiger Team recommendations. CoMPIO planned to field the first 10 teams in January 2000.

Later in 1998, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 1999 mandated that ‘‘a Reserve component rapid assessment

element team and any Reserve assigned to such a team may not

be used to respond to an emergency unless the team or that Reserve possesses the requisite skills, training, and equipment to be

efficient in all mission requirements.’’ This is a tough, but not impossible, standard.

In addition, in a rather extraordinary provision that apparently

relates to the inherent danger of this mission, the act required that

the proficiency of each team be certified by the Secretary of Defense.

Now to the audit results. First, I would like to stress that we

were highly impressed by the professionalism and dedication of the

leaders and members of the initial 10 National Guard teams. The

program’s management problems are in no way attributable to

them.

In its initial stages, the WMD–CST program is basically a system acquisition program requiring intensive up-front planning, because it supports a new mission for the National Guard. Until recently, however, it was not managed within the Army acquisition

program structure or by trained acquisition corps personnel. Instead, CoMPIO operated as an essentially autonomous entity, with

little oversight or guidance.

7

Although CoMPIO communicated with numerous local, State,

and Federal officials, we heard lots of complaints that it regularly

bypassed or inadequately coordinated with DOD and Army centers

of expertise in acquisition, logistics, testing, doctrine, training,

medicine, communications, and chemical-biological defense. The result was flawed acquisition and sustainment planning, leading to

schedule slippage and cost growth of as yet undetermined severity.

Because no new technology was introduced, and various other

military and Federal organizations already have units with the

same general kind of mission that could serve as models, I personally do not see why this program became as complicated as it did.

Our report discusses the many deficiencies evident in the program last year. For illustrative purposes, I will mention just a few

of them. First, doctrine for employing the teams was incomplete.

The absence of approved doctrine obviously creates considerable

risk of premature or otherwise faulty decisions on training, equipment, manning, and mission-readiness certification.

Second, I feel that undue reliance was placed on external evaluations, EXEVALs, the unit-level training event to demonstrate the

mission readiness of the CSTs. What was actually needed was a

rigorous program of operational test and evaluation. Not only do

EXEVALs lack the discipline and reliability of formal testing, but

every team lacked key personnel, equipment, or both, when the

EXEVALs were staged.

For example, none of the teams undergoing the EXEVALs had

received the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System van, 9 of the 10

lacked the vital communications reach-back capability, and all of

them had personal protective equipment shortages. CST personnel

identified numerous issues to the auditors that normally would

have been surfaced in realistic testing and resolved.

Third, equipment chosen by CoMPIO for the teams was generally

different from standard items already in military inventories. We

saw no compelling reason to buy nonstandard equipment. It considerably complicates the logistics support requirements for the

teams, as well as posing testing and training issues.

Although the program was not managed using acquisition milestone criteria, the statutory certification requirement provided an

equivalent check-and-balance. Of course, certifications are only effective controls when the certification criteria are meaningful. We

reported, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed, that

the certification criteria initially developed by the Army were less

rigorous than Congress intended, and not prudent from the standpoint of soldier safety and DOD credibility.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed with our findings,

and took action to implement our recommendations, which are listed on page 4 of my written statement. We have been gratified by

the responsive actions taken over the past several months in response to the audit. I can report to you today that implementation

of all of our recommendations is either complete or ongoing.

My staff and I have been working closely with senior Office of

the Secretary of Defense, Army, and National Guard Bureau officials to move those agreed-upon actions forward. Those actions include a comprehensive program review to eliminate ambiguity

8

about the mission and certification criteria, as well as efforts to

achieve certification of several initial teams later this year.

In summary, I commend the department for taking the audit

findings seriously, and undertaking the thorough review that we

suggested to get this program back on track.

This concludes my verbal statement, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lieberman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ROBERT J. LIEBERMAN

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to

be here today to discuss the Department of Defense effort to bolster this Nation’s homeland defense by fielding Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support Teams

(WMD–CSTs). My testimony will focus primarily on the results of my office’s audit

last year of WMD–CST program management, which are presented in our report of

January 31, 2001.

AUDIT BACKGROUND AND TIMING

Chemical and biological defense has been an audit coverage emphasis area for us

throughout the past decade, as the threats posed by these and other so-called asymmetrical weapons received increased recognition and the Department of Defense reacted with numerous research, acquisition and organizational initiatives. Before the

WMD–CST audit, our reviews focused generally on the warfighters’ preparedness to

operate in contaminated environments on the battlefield.

Presidential Decision Directive 39, issued in June 1995, and the Defense Against

Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 directed various measures to enhance

homeland defense against terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. A

DOD Tiger Team subsequently recommended establishing National Guard teams to

assist the emergency first responders, such as local fire departments and hazardous

material response units, in case of known or suspected WMD incidents. The focus

of these teams, which were initially termed rapid assessment, identification and detection units, was to be on identifying what WMD material or agent was involved.

The Tiger Team estimated that an initial complement of 10 teams could be operational by fiscal year 2002. In January 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense

tasked the Army to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration

Office (CoMPIO) to implement the Tiger Team recommendations. CoMPIO adopted

a very aggressive schedule, planning to field 10 teams by January 2000.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 mandated that:

A Reserve component rapid assessment element team and any Reserve assigned to such a team, may not be used to respond to an emergency . . .

unless . . . the team, or that Reserve, possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements.

In addition, the act required that the proficiency of each team be certified by the

Secretary of Defense. Congress did not specify a schedule for WMD–CST certification and fielding, but authorized an additional 17 teams in fiscal year 2000 and

5 more in fiscal year 2001, for a total of 32.

Recognizing the growing DOD and congressional interest in homeland defense, we

decided in December 1999 to review the WMD–CST program. We briefed National

Guard, Department of the Army and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials on

the results of our review frequently during calendar year 2000. Most of the

fieldwork was completed by September 2000.

AUDIT RESULTS

It was apparent from the outset of the audit that the planned January 2000 initial operational capability date had been unrealistic; the WMD–CSTs were not operationally ready and the program lacked good management controls. On the other

hand, we were highly impressed by the professionalism and dedication of the leaders and members of the initial 10 WMD–CSTs. The program’s slippage and cost

growth are in no way attributable to the 10 teams. Those problems stem from what

we candidly characterized as ineffective management by CoMPIO and inadequate

oversight by the department before the audit brought numerous issues to their attention last summer.

In its initial stages, the WMD–CST program is basically a system acquisition program requiring intensive upfront planning because it supports a new mission. Until

recently, however, it was not managed within the Army acquisition program strucVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:35 Oct 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 82394.031 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
9

ture or by trained acquisition corps personnel. Instead, CoMPIO operated as an essentially autonomous entity with no effective oversight to ensure that sound acquisition practices were followed. CoMPIO regularly bypassed or inadequately coordinated with DOD and Army centers of expertise in acquisition, logistics, testing, doctrine, training, medicine, communications and chemical/biological defense. The result was flawed acquisition and sustainment planning. Our report discusses the

many deficiencies evident during the audit in the WMD–CST program. For illustrative purposes, I will mention just a few examples.

First, doctrine for employing WMD–CSTs was incomplete and coordination between CoMPIO and the Joint Forces Command and Army doctrine developers was

very poor. Absence of approved doctrine obviously creates considerable risk of premature or otherwise faulty decisions on training, equipment, manning and mission

readiness certification.

Second, coordination with the Federal law enforcement community, a vital player

in Consequence Management, needed improvement to ensure that WMD–CST mission definition and doctrine did not conflict with law enforcement agencies’ plans

and prerogatives.

Third, undue reliance was placed on external evaluations (EXEVALs), a unit level

training event, to demonstrate the mission readiness of WMD–CSTs. What was actually needed was a rigorous program of operational test and evaluation. Not only

do EXEVALs lack the discipline and reliability of formal testing, but every WMD– CST lacked key personnel, equipment, or both when the EXEVALs were staged. For

example, none of the teams had received the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System

(MALS) van, 9 of 10 teams lacked communications reachback capability, and all of

them had personal protective equipment shortages. WMD–CST personnel identified

numerous issues to us that normally would have been identified in realistic testing

and resolved.

Fourth, training programs and materials were inadequate. Again, lack of approved doctrine and vague mission definition were factors.

Fifth, WMD–CST equipment chosen by CoMPIO was generally different from

standard items already in military inventories. We saw no compelling reason for

CoMPIO to buy nonstandard equipment that considerably complicates the logistics

support requirements for WMD–CSTs, as well as posing testing and training issues.

Many of the problems identified by the audit could be considered symptoms of an

immature acquisition program that was not ready for a full-scale production or deployment decision. Although the WMD–CST program was not managed or controlled

using acquisition milestone criteria, the certification requirement in the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 provided equivalent ‘‘check and balance.’’ Of course, certifications are effective controls only when certification criteria

are meaningful. We reported, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed, that

the certification criteria developed by the Army for WMD–CSTs were considerably

less rigorous than Congress intended and simply not prudent from the standpoint

of soldier safety and DOD credibility.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CORRECTIVE ACTION

The Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed with our findings and took action

to implement our recommendations, which were:

• to disestablish CoMPIO;

• to reassign WMD–CST program management responsibilities to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support, the Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and the Deputy Assistant

to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs;

• to issue Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance prescribing certification standards and delineating the specific missions, duties and responsibilities of the WMD–CSTs;

• to ensure that WMD–CST certifications are based on that guidance;

• to coordinate at the Office of the Secretary of Defense level with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on WMD–CST roles and missions; and

• to conduct a thorough program review of the WMD–CST initiative, including operational concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel

assignments and rotations, funding and the certification process.

We have been gratified by the responsive actions taken over the past several

months in response to the issues raised by the audit. I can report to you today that

implementation of all of our recommendations is either complete or ongoing. My

staff and I have been working closely with senior Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Army and National Guard Bureau officials to move those agreed-upon actions forward. The increased involvement of the National Guard Bureau in this program is

10

particularly welcome. In summary, I commend the department for taking the audit

findings seriously and undertaking the thorough review that we suggested to get

this program back on track.

The full text of our Report No. D–2001–043, Management of National Guard

Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams, January 31, 2001, is available

on the web at www.dodig.osd.mil. Again, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing. This concludes my statement.

[Full text of the report can be found as appendix at the end of the hearing.]

Senator ROBERTS. The chair would like to have all members of

the panel testify, and then we can begin the questions at that time.

General Davis, welcome to the subcommittee.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RUSSELL C. DAVIS, USAF, CHIEF,

NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

General DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure for us to be

here to talk about these Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, with which the Guard has been charged with the responsibility for fielding.

These civil support teams have a very important mission, as you

indicated, sir, to respond in the event of a major catastrophic event

in the United States, and these teams were set up initially to do

just that, and they have been proceeding down with their training

and equipping in order to accomplish that very mission.

I would like to abbreviate my written statement. I have submitted it for the record, but there are a couple of topics I would like

to discuss with you, some six, program management, doctrine, certification, training, equipment and safety, and standardization of

equipment, and finally I would like to address some of the concerns

that were brought out in the report as they relate to the National

Guard teams.

I am confident that the first 10 teams have met all of the training standards as they were set out. They are competent, capable,

and have been supplied with appropriate equipment. However,

there remains some safety concerns and some other issues primarily relating to the Mobile Analytical Lab. Whenever safety concerns are raised, we have a duty to our airmen and to our soldiers

to assure that we have those corrected, and that a continuous improvement process is in place.

The safety of the Mobile Analytical Lab System was an issue

raised in the audit, and to address this, we have gone about working with the United States Army Test and Evaluation Command,

and they will be doing an assessment of these particular vehicles,

looking at integration of them with other systems within the required complement of equipment for the team. We are also working

very closely with the United States Army Soldier Biological Command as we make this assessment, and working other safety

issues.

These National Guard Civil Support Teams will have operational

authority, operational readiness and sustainability to conduct their

missions. The civil support team mission is, first: to assess a suspected weapons of mass destruction event, and second: to advise

the civil responders, those folks that Senator Landrieu talked

about who would be the first on the scene, regarding appropriate

11

actions, and next to facilitate the arrival of any additional local,

State, or Federal resources that show up at the incident site.

The issue of program management, which I will address first, in

support of these teams, must be viewed in the context of the dynamic process in the Department of Defense, the Army, and the

National Guard, who undertook a new, innovative, creative program that was mandated by Congress to field 10 teams and make

them operational, and the hope of doing that in less than 2 years—

that process normally takes from 3 to 5 years. This was fasttracked, and as a result of that some of the things that might have

been done and would have been done did not take place.

Operational management issues in the National Guard Civil

Support Teams is a very complex issue. To deal with our concept

of tiered response, employing first the local, then the State, and

then the Federal responses, these forces assist to deter, prepare, respond, and manage consequences at a mass casualty site caused by

an attack or any other situation.

These teams have a unique State-Federal relationship. While

they are federally funded, they are operated by the States, and are

detailed to the Governor for his use in that State or in any other

surrounding States, as context would dictate, a vital link between

the local civilian responses with whom they work, as well as the

Federal response force.

In the area of doctrine, in a fast-track program it is developed

simultaneously, and it evolves as the teams are being implemented.

As we execute those programs within the National Guard and the

Department of Defense, the guidance that we develop and all,

comes forth as we work our way through the process of fielding the

teams.

Early in this process, we sought and received assistance from

State and local agencies, and organizations representing first responder groups, to enhance interoperability as well as efficiency.

We are and continue to corroborate with the United States Army

Training and Doctrine Command, on all doctrine-related issues

through working drafts, and we have a second working draft of one

of those documents relating to doctrine at this point.

With respect to certification, that process and the criteria developed was approved by the Army for the civil support team commanders to have them equipped and trained in the units with established standards.

Preoperational criteria for civil support team certifications are

the overall readiness of C–1 as established by Congress, and this

is unique in the sense that most operational organizations, when

they stand up, reach their initial operational capability, they do

that at the C–3 level, a degraded level, typically because of the

time required for training and sometimes the delivery of equipment, but this was dictated to be at the C–1 level.

Second, an evaluation administered by the First or Fifth Army,

this was the external evaluation that will be used by the State Adjutants General in determining his or her intent to request unit

certification; and third, a commander’s subjective assessment that

indicates the unit’s ability to perform its mission, ergo, assess, advise, and facilitate.

12

All 10 teams have successfully completed their external evaluation. All the commanders have assessed their units and deemed

them to be operationally ready. At one point in time we have had

some personnel turnover, and as a result of that, we will go back

and evaluate each one of those units.

There are some unresolved safety concerns about the Mobile Analytical Lab System, and this is essentially a vehicle in which is

housed a series of equipment which will allow them to analyze a

chemical or biological agent.

These MALS, as we refer to them, were submitted to the teams,

and the teams as they worked their way through in training on

them, found that some additional enhancements were needed but

were unavailable. These tasks specifically related to the biological

access compartment of their mission.

The team’s ability to perform critical functions, planning, preparing, and coordinating, may be successfully performed outside of the

MALS unit, so we feel without the MALS unit they can, to a significant degree, perform most of their missions. Additional evaluation of this is being made out at Dugway Proving Grounds, and we

will have further comment on that later.

The training, a deliberate process, was used to identify and develop comprehensive training for the civil support teams. The

Army’s Director of Military Support provided individual and collective training guidance to the Commander, Forces Command, and

the civil support teams in a memorandum in 1988. It was designed

to allow the teams and their commanders flexibility in meeting

their unique training requirements for their teams while providing

a basis for the commitment of resources.

These teams, and each individual member, received in excess of

600 hours of individual training beyond what was required by their

military specialty in both the Army and the Air, and the teams are

comprised of both their soldiers from the Army Guard, and airmen

from the Air Guard. The program consists of three phases, institutional, collective, and sustained training.

Safety and equipment. Equipment and safety issues raised by

the audit have been resolved, with the exception of the comprehensive testing and evaluation of the MALS equipment. Further testing and evaluation, as I said, will be conducted by the United

States Army Training and Evaluation Command, and is expected

to resolve this matter.

Standardization of equipment. One of the comments related to

equipment variations was the result of lack of management oversight and lack of requirements definition testing, et cetera, as Mr.

Lieberman said. We have put together an equipment technical

working group, which is a body that consists of members of the

team, the National Guard Bureau, and acquisition officials, in

order to resolve some of these issues. We feel that we will get these

issues resolved of equipment standardization.

We also are looking at modernization ideas and opportunity to

continuously improve these teams with a centralized process,

where the States will be involved in modernization, as well as

working with acquisition officials. Equipment standardization and

interoperability is an ongoing and continuously worked issue by the

National Guard Bureau.

13

We have two other working teams, or working groups, within

this operation, the doctrine working group, where we are working

with a number of other agencies within the Army and throughout

the Department of Defense, as well as a plans and operations

working group. In summary, the management structure has been

established within the National Guard to execute Department of

Defense policy and guidance relative to the National Guard Civil

Support Teams, and this includes the fact that the teams will be

able to assess the effects of a mass destruction event and provide

situational awareness to the supported incident commander, then

facilitate additional local, Federal, and State response.

The National Guard Bureau has set up an office, a Civil Support

Office, to act as the permanent office for civil support teams and

manage the Title 10 responsibilities, the functions, and multiple

employment of civil support teams. The National Guard Bureau

will require funding for these teams, as well as for initial training

and sustainment.

We are also at the National Guard Bureau working with the

teams, and will continue to provide full support to the Adjutants

General in each State, who work closely within their States and

within their communities to coordinate National Guard support, or

civil authorities, as the National Guard fulfills its critical role.

Four important considerations must be addressed. The first of

these is to provide a lead in homeland security missions. We must

not be separated from the National Guard traditional mission of

war-fighting while we execute these homeland defense missions.

Second, from its inception, the National Guard has always been

a Federal and State asset.

Third, whenever the Guard is called out, it brings the will of the

American people with it. The close ties to State and community

allow the country to stay bound as one, and we must not fail in

that mandate to our country as we defend it from our enemies,

both foreign as well as domestic.

Fourth, the men and women serving on the civil support teams

are fully trained and capable individuals who are anxious to go and

perform their missions. They have proven themselves to a lot of us

as we work our way through it. We are working very extensively

with their training, comprehensive exercises, and evaluations.

I would like to comment further that we at the Department of

Defense, in the Army and Inspector General’s Office, as well as in

the National Guard Bureau, are working very closely as a team to

get these teams fielded as soon as possible.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with this subcommittee

on this critical area. We welcome the opportunity to return at some

point in the future to give you an additional update. Thanks again

for your interest and support for the National Guard Civil Support

Teams.

[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Davis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. RUSSELL C. DAVIS, USAF

INTRODUCTION

The National Guard routinely contributes to the National mission for civil support

by activating a state-level military response in 50 states, 3 territories and the District of Columbia. The National Guard is proud to provide a geographically disVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:35 Oct 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 82394.031 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
14

persed, community-based response to combat the varying types of asymmetric

threats which directly challenge the security of the homeland. In this role, the National Guard leverages the inherent capability within each state’s National Guard

for emergency management, response, and recovery operations for any emergency.

Emerging asymmetric threats, such as single or multiple weapons of mass destruction terrorism attacks within the United States, present the high-end of terrorism that clearly challenges the safety of this Nation, and warrants a unified response by the Department of Defense (DOD) in support of the civil authority.

In response to these emerging threats, the National Command Authority has directed the establishment of dedicated, mission-tasked organized forces within the

DOD to support the civil authority in preparing for and conducting consequence

management operations.

The National Guard welcomes the opportunity to continue its historical role in

homeland defense when we were given the mission to support civil authorities in

managing the consequences of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event. We appreciate the trust of Congress and the American people in asking us to form the

civil support teams (CSTs). Once again, when our Nation called, the National Guard

willingly stepped forward.

In light of a recent DOD Inspector General (DOD IG) Audit Report, my comments

will focus on the National Guard Civil Support Teams, and the National Guard’s

role in support of an incident commander during and after a domestic emergency

resulting from a Weapons of Mass Destruction event. With respect to the issues, we

are confident that our first 10 National Guard CSTs have met all established training requirements, are competent, capable, and have been supplied with the appropriate equipment. However, there remain concerns with the mobile analytical laboratory.

Whenever safety related concerns are raised, we have addressed these findings to

ensure a continuous process of improvement is followed. For example, the safety of

the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS) was an issue raised in the audit.

To address the viability and safety of the MALS we have asked the U.S. Army Test

and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to conduct an independent assessment of the system, and we are working with the U.S. Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command

to do just that.

Our overall perspective on the issues discussed within the DOD Audit Report is

that the audit helps us clarify and focus upon key issues that are critical to the successful fielding of the CSTs. For the past 2 years, the National Guard has embarked

upon an aggressive program to organize, man, train, equip, and exercise teams in

WMD consequence management operations. We have done so at an extremely rapid

pace and with substantial high-level oversight. This has been a collaborative effort.

We have successfully fulfilled our mandate by leveraging the experience, knowledge,

and lessons learned from hundreds of organizations, and from subject matter experts within the DOD and the civilian community.

We envision the National Guard CSTs mission to have operational authority,

operational readiness and sustainability. The CST mission is: to assess a suspected

WMD event in support of a local incident commander, to advise civilian responders

regarding appropriate actions, and to facilitate the arrival of additional State and

Federal military forces to support validated requests for assistance. Our task is to

help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage. Today we

are manned, trained, and equipped to perform this mission (with 10 initial teams,

each consisting of 22 highly skilled, full-time members of the Army and Air National

Guard).

With respect to our detailed analysis of the DOD IG Audit Report, we categorized

issues into six clear-cut areas concerning the National Guard’s CST initiatives: program management, doctrine, certification, training, equipment/safety, and standardization. All of the issues noted have received our full attention and have been satisfactorily addressed. A brief overview of each area will provide insight into particular

issues within each.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

The issue of program management of the CSTs must be viewed in the context of

the dynamic process that the Army and the National Guard undertook to establish

a new, congressionally mandated capability, and have it fully operational in less

than 2 years. The development and management of the program along with the subsequent capabilities of the CSTs, enables the National Guard to execute its stated

civil support mission. Many programmatic issues have been and are still being resolved with regard to the proper institutional placement of the CST management

15

requirements; however, the teams have been and continue to be managed in a manner that allows them to execute the mission for which they were designed.

With the design, implementation, and institutionalization of a DOD program as

unique and complex as the CSTs, a distinct historical record has evolved. In this

instance, the history indicates the dynamic nature of the establishment of the CSTs;

the high level of interest from the executive and legislative branches of government,

and the relatively recent desire to institutionalize the functions initially assigned to

the Army’s Consequence Management/Program Integration Office. As the CSTs are

further integrated into the DOD infrastructure, the National Guard will continue

to provide the program management functions that make the CSTs a mission capable consequence management asset to first responders.

Operational management issues mentioned in the audit are complex as they follow our concept of a tiered response in employing local, State, and Federal response

forces. These forces deter, prepare for, respond to, and manage the consequences of

a mass casualty event, attack, or situation. Our CSTs have a unique State-Federal

relationship. While all CSTs receive Federal funds and are trained and evaluated

to Federal standards, each remains, first and foremost, a state asset, under the command and control of the governor of the state in which they are located. It is this

very unique state-oriented capability of the CSTs that is often misunderstood, considered unnecessary, and perceived as a duplication of efforts to other U.S. military

rapid response units. We believe the dual relationship is a strength that enables the

CSTs to provide a vital link between the local civilian first responders, with whom

they know and train, and the Federal response force.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM DOCTRINE

A compressed method of doctrine development and concurrent CST fielding was

employed to meet the congressional intent of fielding the teams in a short period

of time.

Doctrinal issues will continue to evolve as we implement a management structure

within the National Guard to execute DOD policy relative to our civil support mission. The National Guard Civil Support Program does have doctrine relating to the

CSTs. Initially, an express method of doctrine development was employed concurrent with CST fielding. This was done to meet the congressional intent of fielding

the CSTs as quickly as possible.

Early in this process, we sought and received assistance from state and local

agencies and organizations representing first response groups. Experts from these

organizations provided assistance in developing operational concepts, refining requirements, writing doctrine, determining equipment sets, and developing and delivering training to the CSTs. We are collaborating with the U.S. Army Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on this issue. The final CST doctrine handbook was

developed following the Army’s DTLOMS model. It also complies with Chapter 5 of

How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 1997–1998.

The CST doctrine handbook has been approved by TRADOC and, in the near future will be placed in their digital library for public access. We have provided input

regarding CST doctrine for the revision of Joint Publication 3–07.7, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations, which has been submitted to the J–3 staff for approval. Both of these documents include guidance to

the proponents for both joint and service doctrine that will ensure the dual state

and Federal nature of the CST mission is adequately addressed.

The NGB will continue to be actively involved in the development of CST-related

doctrine in coordination with the appropriate joint agencies. We will work with the

Army’s Joint Task Force-Civil Support to identify operational concepts and plans as

a part of the development process.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM CERTIFICATION

Based on the certification process/criteria developed and approved by the Army,

the CST commanders have equipped and trained the units to the established standards. Certification standards were directed in a December 22, 1999 and subsequent

February 11, 2000, messages from the Army’s Director of Military Support (DOMS).

The three operational criteria for CST certification are:

• An overall readiness level of C–1 in all reportable areas (IAW AR 220–

1).

• An evaluation administered by the First or Fifth Army that will be used

by the state adjutant general in determining his or her intent to request

unit certification.

• A commander’s subjective assessment that indicates the unit’s ability to

perform its mission (assess, advise, and facilitate).

16

To accomplish this, the commanders have outfitted their units according to the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army approved table

of distribution and allowance and have outlined their training according to the mission training plan and the fiscal year 2001 training requirements list. Currently,

seven of the original 10 CSTs have a USR readiness rating of C–1 and the other

three have a USR readiness rating of C–2.

All 10 units have successfully completed their external evaluations, and all 10

commanders have assessed their units and deemed them operationally ready to

complete their mission. As I noted earlier, there are some unresolved concerns with

the Mobile Analytical Laboratory Systems (MALS). As a result, there is a degradation of the teams’ ability to accomplish a few mission tasks. These tasks, specifically

related to the biological assess component of their mission, do not hinder the teams’

ability to perform the critical functions of planning, preparing, and coordinating for

a weapon of mass destruction event.

Additionally, the external evaluations are the accepted method used to assist commanders in assessing the level of training and proficiency in their units. The NGB

believes that training is the responsibility of the unit commander. It is the commander who is responsible, and must attest to the unit’s readiness.

• Individual annual refresher training is required by the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) regulations in order to maintain and update training certificates.

• Individual annual refresher training is required in order to maintain and

update training certificates awarded in TRADOC programs.

These types of refresher training are in addition to external evaluations that will

be conducted as deemed necessary by the respective unit commander.

CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM TRAINING

Drawing upon the collective knowledge and expertise of organizations involved in

providing trained expertise in fields related to the CSTs mission, a deliberate process was used to identify and develop a comprehensive training program for the

CSTs. The training strategy (developed by the CoMPIO and approved by Director

of Military Support (DOMS)) was developed in consultation with subject matter experts in both the military and civilian communities. These subject matter experts

were drawn from the agencies listed in the Army’s response. All were key organizations involved in developing and presenting training to the CSTs.

The Director of Military Support provided individual and collective training guidance to the Commander, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the CSTs in a

memorandum dated September 14, 1998. It was designed to allow the CST commanders flexibility in meeting the unique training needs of their teams, while providing a basis for the commitment of resources. Selection of training curriculum involved evaluating the U.S. Army Soldiers and Biological Chemical Command’s

(SBCCOM) compendium of WMD courses and programs of instruction to leverage

existing courses to the greatest extent possible. Over 300 courses were examined.

As new equipment and additional capabilities are developed for the CSTs, additional

training will be developed.

The CST training program is very comprehensive, with each member receiving an

average 600 hours of initial individual instruction beyond basic MOS qualification.

The training program consists of three phases: institutional (which focuses on individual training such as branch qualification and specialty training and includes the

600 hours mentioned above), collective (which focuses on collective mission essential

tasks and the conduct of training exercises), and sustainment training (includes advanced courses, refresher training, and team training).

The first 10 CSTs have exercised with all of their equipment and have submitted

requests for certification, which at this time, have not been granted. The Army’s

Maneuver Support Center and FORSCOM conducted lanes training (at Fort Leonard Wood, MO) for all of the initial 10 CSTs. This training was conducted at the

request of the TRADOC Commanding General and at the direction of the DOMS.

The training course is the result of a formal training review of the initial 10 teams’

institutional training, which recommended combining three of the already completed

courses into one course, the WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course

(EADC). Five iterations of this course were conducted for the 17 Fiscal Year 2000

CSTs and newly hired members of the original 10 teams at Fort Leonard Wood, MO,

during the summer of 2000.

17

Military Occupational Specialty Qualification

Approximately 65 CST-assigned personnel received some of their training from

the USACMLS compressed 3-week Nuclear, Chemical and Biological (NBC) noncommissioned officer course instead of the standard 16-week NBC noncommissioned

officer course. The USACMLS does not award certification of MOS qualification because personnel did not attend the 16-week course.

Members of the CSTs receive structured individual and collective training. Each

member is assigned to a position as specified by a paragraph and line number in

the unit’s table of distribution and allowance. Required training courses relative to

each of these positions have been established. Each CST fields two survey teams

consisting of three members each. Survey team members must be MOS 54B or 3E9

(the Air Force qualification code equivalent) qualified and can obtain that qualification by attending the 54B 20/30–R course taught by the Army school system battalion or by attending the course taught by the USACMLS.

There are not enough 54B/3E9 MOS qualified personnel in the labor market to

meet the hiring needs of the CSTs. Approximately 35 otherwise qualified applicants

were hired for the survey team member positions that had to attend 54B/3E9 training. These individuals attended a specifically developed 54B 20/30-R (Reclassification Course) during November and December 1999. This particular program of instruction was taught at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, and consisted of courses taught

by an Army school system battalion. The main difference was that the instructors

used for this program of instruction were certified instructors from the USACMLS

and the CSTs, not from the Army school system battalion. The instructors used

were at least as well qualified as those habitually used for the standard and abbreviated courses taught by the Army school system battalion. This course had the

prior approval of the USACMLS, and the students were issued certificates of completion by the USACMLS Assistant Commandant, which indicates they received the

equivalent of the 54B 20/30 course taught by the Army school system battalion. No

team member is less qualified than if he or she had a MOS issued by the

USACMLS.

During December 2000 and January 2001, a series of three more courses were

taught at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, for approximately 70 personnel. However, these

courses only provided individual skill training (54B MOS, Phase 1) for new CST

members. These personnel will receive hands-on equipment training (54B MOS,

Phase 2) from the Army school systems battalions, from May to September 2001,

which will complete their MOS training.

Course Development

A new 3-week course, WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course

(EADC), required of all CST personnel, is a DOD and TRADOC approved course,

developed in cooperation with USACMLS because MOS qualification courses did not

cover CST specific equipment. The EADC combined new equipment training, the

NBC Recon/Survey course and the initial portion of lane training into one course.

Additionally, simulated training scenarios, guidance on specific tasks, and task sequencing were incorporated into the EADC course.

Training Equipment and Training Aids

The NGB is aware that insufficient cross training could degrade capability, therefore, cross training is accommodated at every opportunity. It is embedded in every

exercise a team conducts, both unilaterally and in conjunction with the first responder community. Additionally, team training occurs as part of CST day-to-day

operations. Team members learn their individual roles as they relate to the section

in which they are assigned and to the team’s overall mission. The CST members

are not traditional Guardsmen, because of their mission; they are in a full-time, Active Duty status and are on-call around the clock for 365 days a year. The CSTs

are the only units in the National Guard with this capability and commitment.

WMD specific training is obtained from a variety of sources including formal classroom training, distance learning technology, and practical application at Federal

and state proponent schools.

The training CSTs received complies with Army standards. Cross training of team

members occurs during lane training where individual and institutional training are

integrated for the entire team. Lane training is conducted at Fort Leonard Wood,

MO. The training regime has been finalized and approved; however, the regime continues to evolve as lessons learned are incorporated. As funding is programmed,

training will be handed off to the proponents and it will be fully institutionalized.

The institutionalization of training is dependent on adequate programmed funding.

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CIVIL SUPPORT TEAM EQUIPMENT AND SAFETY

Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS)

The NGB has been continuously working to ensure that the MALS performs successfully. The MALS, designed and developed by SBCCOM, has undergone test

plans, quality assurance procedures, and peer review and independent reviews. It

adequately accommodates the mission need for a functional laboratory by providing

the CSTs with an analytical platform for performing identification of chemical, biological, and radiological materials. The NGB is continuously working to ensure

MALS performance. An operational test of the complete system is being conducted

by the ATEC under the auspices of SBCCOM.

Information System Accreditation

The National Security Agency through the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security

Command (INSCOM) provides accreditation for the system in accordance with the

Defense Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process

and established Army policy. Interim accreditation has been in place since the UCS

was fielded. A message from the Commander of INSCOM, dated March 12, 2001,

gives all the CSTs interim approval to operate the UCS through June 11, 2001. Permanent accreditation is expected on June 1, 2001.

Reachback Infrastructure

The reachback system has been repeatedly demonstrated and works to specification. The CST reachback system was developed by DTRA. This system is fully capable. DTRA can provide both automated tools and a 24-hour, 7-day a week operations

center for support the CSTs. This system is accepted and regularly used by many

organizations throughout DOD.

The NGB continues to work with DTRA and Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft

Division to improve communication protocols and take full advantage of the

reachback capabilities of the CSTs. Currently, the CSTs are specifically trained in

communications protocol, to include reachback functions with DTRA.

Radio Frequency Assignment

It has been noted that the radio frequencies assigned to the CSTs has insufficient

range for conducting operations. This issue has been resolved. The CSTs currently

have three frequencies assigned in UHF. National wide frequencies were granted to

the CSTs on 28 March 2000. The teams work with their state chain-of-command to

establish standard procedures, as they do during normal disaster response operations. The frequencies are standardized among the teams with a permanent 5kHZ

TACSAT channel available for domestic consequence management response. There

are two national high frequency radio networks and a 24-hour, on-call frequency

manager in place to support the CSTs.

STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT

We are in the process of establishing a lessons-learned system to support the Civil

Support Team mission. The National Guard Civil Support Team has established a

number of working groups to address numerous issues. The Civil Support Team

mission support has an Equipment Technical Working Group, which is a technical

body consisting of civil support team members, National Guard Bureau, and acquisition specialists. The Equipment Technical Working Group is also involved with

equipment standardization issues. It provides management oversight and gives direction to equipment acquisition recommendations. Modifications and ideas must be

presented to the working group before they are reviewed or funded. This is a centralized process that the states are to follow before making any equipment modifications. Equipment standardization and interoperability are ongoing issues that are

continuously worked by the National Guard Bureau Civil Support Office.

SUMMARY

As the National Guard fulfills its homeland security role, four important considerations must be addressed. The first is that while the National Guard may lead on

certain homeland security mission areas, we must not separate the National Guard

from our traditional war-fighting missions.

Second, from its inception, the National Guard has always had a Federal and a

state mission. We have always accepted and executed our responsibilities for either

of these missions, but we must grant the same stature to the defense of the homeland, as the support we provide to combatant commanders.

Next, ‘‘calling out the National Guard’’ brings with it the will of the American people. Our ties with the states and communities across our country are binding, and

19

we must not fail in our mandate to defend this country from our enemies, both foreign and domestic.

Finally, the men and women serving on our CSTs are fully trained and capable

of performing their mission. They have proven themselves ready through extensive

training, and comprehensive exercises and evaluations. We all want to take the next

steps and move this program forward for the American people.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with the subcommittee on this most critical subject. We welcome the opportunity to return and report on our progress at the

earliest convenience of the subcommittee. Thank you for your interest.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, General Davis.

I failed to suggest to all members of the distinguished panel, we

want to welcome you. We certainly thank you for taking time out

of your valuable schedules to contribute. Please feel free to summarize your comments. Your full statements will be made a part of

the record, so if you would like to summarize, we can get to the

questions.

I am not trying to pressure you by any means. I just want to

make that clear. We have had two excellent statements, so please

proceed, and feel very free to summarize if you would like.

Welcome to the subcommittee, General Maples. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY SUPPORT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF

STAFF OF THE ARMY

General MAPLES. Thank you very much for both the welcome and

the opportunity to summarize. I do appreciate the opportunity to

appear before the subcommittee and to comment on the Weapons

of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. I have submitted a written statement, and I would just like to make short opening remarks.

The interest and support of the subcommittee for the WMD–CST

program is much appreciated. The teams that have been established in the National Guard will provide the Nation an important

capability in the event of a domestic weapons of mass destruction

event, and they are already being recognized by the local first responder communities for the expertise they bring.

The Secretary of the Army was given the mission in January

1998 to lead efforts within the Department of Defense to improve

military support for response to incidents involving weapons of

mass destruction. The Secretary of the Army was further directed

to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) to provide special management in this effort.

The program office was established subordinate to the Director

of Military Support. The Department of Defense, through the

CoMPIO, organized, trained, and equipped 10 WMD–CSTs while

simultaneously developing the doctrine training programs and the

specialized equipment required to support the mission requirements of these unique assets.

Consistent with congressional legislation and approved Department of Defense plans, special management and parallel processes

of development were employed in order to field the teams and provide for their availability as rapidly as possible. In a period of approximately 18 months, 10 WMD–CSTs were organized, trained,

and equipped.

20

At the same time that the WMD–CSTs were being fielded,

trained, equipped, and evaluated, the DOD Inspector General conducted an audit of the program. The Army provided a detailed response to the draft audit on 7 December, 2000. The Army did concur with several of the audit findings, particularly those related to

the program review and the institutionalization of the CoMPIO

functions for long-term within the Department of Defense.

The Army response offered substantive comments on each observation, finding, and recommendation, providing additional information and noting those observations that the Army believed had already been addressed by the program’s established processes during the period between the time the observations were made and

the date the draft report was received.

Also, on 7 December, based on recommendations received from

the commanders of the WMD–CSTs, and endorsed by the respective State Adjutants General and the Chief of the National Guard

Bureau, and having given additional detailed consideration to the

status of personnel, training, and equipment for each team, the

Under Secretary of the Army forwarded his recommendation that

seven teams be certified.

On February 22, 2001, consistent with approved Department of

Defense directives, the program office was formally disestablished,

and began the process of transitioning programs and activities

throughout the Department of Defense. The Army and the National

Guard are fully supportive of the comprehensive ongoing Department of Defense program review, including the certification working group, and the study of longer-term programmatic and systematic issues. The Army remains committed to ensuring that the

WMD–CSTs are properly manned, equipped, trained, and are proficient in all mission requirements in order to perform their vital

consequence management role in a safe and reliable manner.

Sir, this concludes my remarks. Thank you for the opportunity

to participate today.

[The prepared statement of Major General Maples follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators of the subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee and to comment on the Weapons of

Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs). The interest and support of

this subcommittee for the WMD–CST program is much appreciated. The WMD– CSTs that have been established in the National Guard will provide the Nation an

important capability in the event of a domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction event.

In January 1998, Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25 directed the Secretary

of the Army, as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Military Support

to Civil Authorities, to lead efforts within the Department of Defense to improve

military support for response to incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The Department of Defense Plan, ‘‘Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction,’’ was approved for Fiscal Year 1999 implementation as specified in Program Budget Decision (PBD) 712. The Secretary of the Army was further directed to establish the

Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO). The missions and

functions of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office and the

WMD–CSTs were broadly described in Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25. The

Secretary of the Army established the Consequence Management Program Integration Office in January 1998, subordinate to the Director of Military Support.

Congress authorized and funded the formation of ten WMD–CSTs in October

1998. Over the next 18 months, the Department of Defense, through the Consequence Management Program Integration Office, organized, trained, and equipped

ten WMD–CSTs, while simultaneously developing the doctrine, training programs,

21

and the specialized equipment required to support the mission requirements of

these unique assets. Consistent with congressional legislation and approved Department of Defense plans, special management and parallel processes of development

were employed in order to field the teams and provide for their availability as rapidly as possible. Throughout the developmental process, CoMPIO worked with experts from Federal, State and local agencies and conducted program status reviews

to maintain visibility of program decisions.

In January 1999, individuals assigned to the WMD–CSTs began an extensive

training program to prepare them both individually and collectively. At the same

time, acquisition of specialized equipment required by the teams was initiated.

Throughout 1999, the teams and team members improved their professional capabilities by participating in numerous established courses and programs, completing

institutional training in June 1999. In July 1999, the teams began to receive equipment and to conduct new equipment training. Collective training lanes for the

teams were completed in August 1999, and the teams began preparing for external

evaluations of their proficiency levels that were administered in February and

March 2000. Thus, in a period of approximately 18 months, 10 WMD–CSTs were

organized, trained and equipped.

Beginning in April 2000, the commanders of the WMD–CSTs began to request

certification. Their requests were endorsed by their respective State Adjutants General and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau before being forwarded to the Department of the Army. These commanders have reported that the teams and all assigned personnel possess the skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all

mission requirements.

At the same time that the WMD–CSTs were being fielded, trained, equipped, and

evaluated, the DOD Inspector General conducted an audit of the program. The

Army received a proposed draft audit report and met with members of the DOD Inspector General to understand the basis for the initial findings and to offer additional information if required. The requests for certification were held by the Army

in order to consider the initial observations of the audit.

The Army was provided a copy of the draft Inspector General audit on October

12, 2000. The Army provided a detailed response on December 7, 2000. The Army

concurred with several of the audit findings, particularly those related to program

review and the institutionalization of the CoMPIO functions within the Department

of Defense. The Army response offered substantive comments on each observation,

finding and recommendation, providing additional information and noting those observations that the Army believed had already been addressed by the program’s es- tablished processes during the period between the time the observations were made

and the date the draft report was received.

Also on December 7, 2000, based upon the recommendations previously received

from commanders, and having given additional detailed consideration to the status

of personnel, training and equipment for each team, the Under Secretary of the

Army forwarded his recommendation that seven WMD–CSTs be certified. Recommendations for the other three teams have been held pending resolution of readiness concerns and completion of the current program review.

In June 2000, the Department of Defense formed Process Action Teams to realign

the organizational placement of CoMPIO’s functions within the department. On November 9, 2000, the Deputy Secretary of Defense specified that the Special Assistant

to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support would serve as the Program Manager for the WMD–CSTs and directed the Secretary of the Army to prepare a detailed transition plan consistent with a proposed realignment that would institutionalize the functions of the CoMPIO. The Secretary of the Army submitted a transition plan on November 27, 2000.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved a Program Budget Decision on February 14, 2001, that superceded Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25 and directed the disestablishment of CoMPIO. On February 22, 2001, CoMPIO was formally disestablished. Personnel assigned to the former CoMPIO formed the Program

Transition Office to support the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for

Military Support in the process of transitioning CoMPIO programs and activities

throughout the Department of Defense. The Acting Secretary of the Army assigned

WMD–CST program functions to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

for Military Support, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has been assigned

to be the Army proponent for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support

Teams.

The Army and the National Guard are fully supportive of the comprehensive ongoing Department of Defense review of the WMD–CST program, and the review of

the status of the teams to resolve any remaining concerns to enable the certification

process to proceed. The Army remains committed to ensuring that the WMD–CSTs

22

are properly manned, equipped, trained, and are proficient in all mission areas in

order to perform their vital consequence management role in a safe and reliable

manner.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, General Maples.

General Lawlor.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. BRUCE M. LAWLOR, USA, COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE CIVIL SUPPORT, U.S. JOINT

FORCES COMMAND

General LAWLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you

today. I am Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support, which is

a standing joint task force headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia.

If I may, I would like to summarize very briefly the statement for

the record that I have prepared, and perhaps even depart a little

bit to answer your questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ROBERTS. Without objection, please proceed.

General LAWLOR. The mission of the Joint Task Force Civil Support was recently refined in interim policy guidance that was assigned by Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz on 28 March of

this year, and it specifically provides that the JTF principal focus

is to plan for and operationally integrate DOD support to the lead

Federal agency responsible for the U.S. Government’s consequence

management efforts during a domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive (CBRNE) incident.

Within the United States Joint Forces Command, a charter has

been written and was recently signed by the CINC, and it provides

that upon order of the Secretary of Defense, the JTF would deploy

to the vicinity of a CBRNE, or WMD incident site, and provide consequence management support to the lead Federal agency with the

specific purpose of saving lives, preventing injury, and providing

temporary critical life support.

So our function is really twofold. One, we plan, and two, we prepare to respond. I would like to emphasize, if I may, that the JTF

is an operational headquarters, and we are working on planning for

events that are catastrophic in nature. We are not designed, nor

programmed, to respond to incidents that are well within the capabilities of States to manage, or even States in conjunction with sister States through the interstate compact system to manage, or

even in conjunction with some assistance that can be provided from

civilian Federal agencies. My headquarters is specifically charged

with being a headquarters of last resort, if you will, to bring military assistance to bear when all other efforts have failed.

A meeting was recently held at the Joint Forces Command specifically to discuss the role of the CSTs as it relates to the Joint

Task Force in anticipation of certification. Until such time as the

teams are certified, they are not deployable, and of course that

means they are not available to the Joint Task Force for their utilization. However, I would like, with your permission, sir, to briefly

outline for you some of the thoughts that we are looking at with

respect to the integration of the CSTs and Joint Task Force Civil

Support for an operational response.

23

The CSTs, we believe, will be the first military organized units

that will arrive on scene, and they will serve, or can serve very effectively as the scouts for the JTF, and in that capacity provide

three very important components. The first is communications between the incident site and the command, the second is to provide

situational awareness of exactly what is transpiring on the ground,

and the third is to help us assess as quickly as we can the requirements that civil agencies might have for our assistance if we were

ordered to provide it.

It is very important that we understand as early as possible

what kind of assistance the lead Federal agency might be requesting, and the CSTs can provide an extremely valuable service in

providing us with that situational awareness and that understanding of those requirements.

Finally, in the event that the JTF deploys to an incident site to

provide military assistance to the lead Federal agency, we see the

CSTs augmenting the—let me go back a minute. We anticipate

that the CST that is resident in the State where the incident site

might have occurred would remain in a state status and subject to

the authority of the Adjutant General.

However, given the fact that our response role is only in the

event of a catastrophic incident, we would anticipate the need for

additional CSTs that might have to be brought into that location

from more remote states. Those CSTs would be used to, frankly, assist the in-state CST that will have been working very hard for a

number of days and the CSTs are only 22 persons strong, and they

will need relief.

We also see them playing a supplemental role in responding to

requests for assistance from the citizens who will have either suspected or confirmed the presence of a WMD agent in a different locality than what may be additionally identified. In order to facilitate this process, the Commander in Chief of the Joint Forces Command has recently signed a directive that will authorize us to have

direct liaison authority with CSTs so that we can begin to discuss

these missions more directly with them.

That concludes my remarks. I apologize for departing from the

prepared text, but I was trying to respond to your question, and

thank you very much for allowing me.

[The prepared statement of Major General Lawlor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. BRUCE M. LAWLOR, USA

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to address you today. Joint Task Force—Civil Support is a standing joint

task force headquarters under the command of the United States Joint Forces Command. It is located at Ft. Monroe, Virginia. It focuses exclusively on providing military support to the lead Federal agency during the aftermath of a domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or high yield Explosive (CBRNE) event. The

command came into being on 1 October 1999. The implementation plan called for

it to be organized and ready to assume its CBRNE consequence management (CoM)

mission on 1 April 2000. We met that target deadline. Today we are mission capable

and working hard to address the challenges associated with domestic CBRNE consequence management. I would like to take a few moments to update you on our

present status.

24

MISSION

Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz signed interim policy guidance on 28 March

2001 for ‘‘Department of Defense Consequence Management Support to Domestic Incidents Involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE–CM).’’ This policy guidance provided that DOD will maintain JTF–

CS as a standing headquarters and that its ‘‘principal focus shall be to plan for and

operationally integrate DOD support to the Lead Federal Agency responsible for the

U.S. Government’s consequence management efforts during a domestic CBRNE incident.’’ In addition, the JTF–CS Charter, approved by CINCUSJFCOM on 17 January 2001, provides that, when directed, JTF–CS will deploy to the vicinity of a

CBRNE incident site and provide command and control (C2) of designated responding DOD forces to provide military assistance in support of the lead Federal agency

(LFA) to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support. The

charter calls for us to deploy only upon order of the Secretary of Defense and only

in support of a civilian lead Federal agency. I would like to briefly review both parts

of the JTF–CS mission.

PLANNING

The Federal Response Plan (FRP) is the organizational construct under which

JTF–CS will respond to a domestic CBRNE emergency. It outlines how the Federal

Government implements the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to assist state and local governments when a major disaster or emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively. Under the Federal Response

Plan, Federal response operations are organized into 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Ten separate Federal agencies have been designated as primary agencies for the 12 ESFs. Designation as a primary agency means that the agency so

designated is responsible for managing the Federal response as it pertains to that

particular functional area. The Department of Transportation, for example, is the

primary agency for matters pertaining to Federal transportation assistance to state

and local authorities under the FRP. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for ESF #3, public works. In addition, the FRP tasks DOD with providing support to each of the other primary agencies responsible for directing the Federal effort within the other ESFs. This presents JTF–CS with a considerable challenge as

we are required to understand the procedures employed by each of the 10 Federal

agencies and the type of support each is likely to request so that we might support

them as they carry out their primary agency responsibilities.

To facilitate our planning processes and to ensure the primacy of the Federal

agencies we support, we have organized within JTF–CS a special liaison directorate

and assigned officers from that directorate liaison duties with each of the 10 Federal

agencies. These liaison officers are responsible for learning the processes and procedures unique to their agency and for working with the agency to identify potential

requirements for DOD assistance for CBRNE scenarios. We believe this liaison initiative is working very well.

The demand for domestic CBRNE consequence management planning has been

greater than was foreseen at the time of the JTF–CS stand up. In the 18 months

since our inception, we have quietly performed CBRNE consequence management

contingency planning for several domestic special events. Each of these plans has

been crafted to support a lead Federal agency—normally the Federal Emergency

Management Agency, but not always. Our most recent effort was in support of the

National Capitol Police in conjunction with the President’s State of the Union Address. Planning for these real world special events has provided JTF–CS with extremely valuable experience and has been more important than any other single factor in developing and improving our capabilities.

In addition to planning for real world events, JTF–CS conducts quarterly training

exercises that focus on planning and deployment for specific types of CBRNE incidents. To date we have conducted such exercises in each of the 5 areas with which

we are concerned: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive

events. We have learned to create a base plan for the most dangerous event and

prepare branches and sequels for other possible incidents. By doing so, we have reduced our response planning time considerably.

DEPLOYMENTS

In addition to domestic CBRNE CoM planning, JTF–CS, if ordered, will deploy

to the site of a CBRNE incident and assume command and control of designated

DOD responding assets. Once on site, our mission will be to respond to requests for

assistance from the LFA. It is important to note that while we are providing assistVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:35 Oct 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 82394.031 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
25

ance to state and local authorities, we remain a Federal military headquarters and

our taskings will come from a lead civilian Federal agency. In all cases, of course,

we remain under DOD control and our chain of command runs from the Secretary

of Defense to CINC, U.S. Joint Forces Command to JTF–CS.

The JTF–CS headquarters is ready to rapidly deploy anywhere within the United

States, its possessions and territories in response to a CBRNE incident. We have

developed this capability through regularly scheduled deployments that are part of

our quarterly training exercises and we have recently begun to conduct no notice

exercises. We are comfortable that we can meet our target deployment times and

through our exercise program we continue to improve our deployment procedures.

Not all civil support operations require deployment of the entire JTF–CS headquarters. Indeed, such a deployment is unlikely except in the event of a catastrophic

CBRNE incident. Because of this, we have also developed a minimum footprint concept that permits us to position ourselves to provide civil support to an LFA if needed but without pre-positioning a large DOD forward presence. This concept uses a

small number of liaison and communications personnel to maintain situational

awareness and establish communications at a potential incident site while keeping

the bulk of JTF–CS at home station ready to respond not only to that site but also

to any other site that we may be called upon to support. We are not unmindful that

a special event might be used to divert attention from a threat elsewhere and we

have planned for that eventuality.

WMD–CST

As the purpose of this hearing is to review the status of Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (CSTs), I would like to explain briefly the present relationship between JTF–CS and these teams.

JTF–CS has played virtually no role in CST development. CST assistance is not

currently a part of our mission and we neither conduct CST training nor perform

any oversight functions with regard to their operational capabilities or readiness.

There are several reasons for this. The most important is outlined in the fiscal year

2001 Forces For Unified Commands document. The assignment of Reserve component forces to a CINC in the Forces For Unified Commands document, in this case

the 27 CSTs, establishes the assigned CINC’s authority to exercise training readiness oversight (TRO) authority over them. This authority enables the CINC to exercise responsibility in five broad categories: 1) provision of guidance to component

commanders on operational requirements and priorities to be addressed in military

department training and readiness programs, 2) comment on service component program recommendations and budget requests, 3) coordinate and approve participation by assigned Reserve component (RC) forces in joint exercises and other joint

training, 4) obtain and review readiness and inspection reports of assigned RC

forces, and 5) coordinate and review mobilization plans. Traditional Title 10 responsibilities for manning, equipping, training, and sustaining RC forces remain with

the services.

It is important to recognize the CINC’s TRO authority extends only to those National Guard units that are assigned to his command. In the case of CSTs, this has

not happened because the CSTs are still in the process of certification and the

Forces For Unified Commands document stipulates they cannot be deployed or assigned until they are certified. In the absence of such assignment, the prevailing

legal opinion is that the CINC has no TRO authority. Once the Secretary of Defense

certifies CSTs as being mission capable as required by the law, they will be assigned

to USJFCOM and USPACOM at which time the assigned CINC’s TRO authority attaches. All that remains for that to occur is the Secretary’s certification which we

anticipate will be completed in the near future.

In the meantime, the CINC is taking measures to ensure standardization of CSTs

and their interoperability with JTF–CS. He directed that JTF–CS propose a CST

Mission Essential Task List that identifies the tasks, conditions, and standards that

will standardize the Federal CST mission and make them interoperable with JTF–

CS. We have forwarded this list and our associated recommendations through the

U.S. Joint Forces Command staff to be promulgated to its Army component and to

the NGB.

The CINC also tasked JTF–CS to prepare an outline of the tactics, techniques,

and procedures (TTPs) JTF–CS is using to support special events. Once completed

these will be made available to the CSTs for their use in supporting special events

within their respective states if called upon to do so. The initial draft of that document has been completed and we anticipate turning it over to the U.S. Joint Forces

Command staff shortly.

26

The CINC has also asked us to look at the training program for CSTs. The CST

training program is doctrinally sound. It was put together very quickly and as with

any such program refinements are required as the program matures. However, that

notwithstanding, CST members receive some of the best and most comprehensive

CBRNE consequence management response training available anywhere. Each soldier goes through approximately 800 hours of individual training conducted not only

at DOD schools but also at schools sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Fire Academy, the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Following completion of individual training, soldiers are taught to function as a team and to perform mission essential tasks in accordance with conditions

and standards published by the U.S. Army Chemical School. U.S. Army Forces Command, the Army component of U.S. Joint Forces Command, conducts external evaluations of each team at the end of its training cycle and assesses its level of proficiency in the tasks that are critical to the performance of its mission. In summary,

it is our belief that the CSTs are well-trained and valuable assets that contribute

materially to the accomplishment of the CBRNE consequence management mission.

In conclusion, JTF–CS has made great strides since its inception a year and a half

ago. We believe we have established good relations within the interagency and we

are confident we can deploy quickly if called upon to help in time of need. Thank

you for allowing me to speak with you today.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, General Lawlor. It would be the

intention of the chair to ask the distinguished Senator from West

Virginia if he had any questions or comments at this time.

Senator BYRD. I do have some comments. I will proceed in any

way you wish. I do have a statement and some questions, but I am

perfectly happy to have others go ahead of me.

Senator ROBERTS. No, sir. Please proceed.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this

hearing. Homeland security has emerged in recent years as one of

the Nation’s most pressing needs. The National Guard is at the

forefront of the effort to meet that need. Unfortunately, homeland

security also presents an incredibly complex and difficult set of

problems to address. The Department of Defense is but one of several Federal agencies assigned the central role in developing an effective homeland security strategy.

State and local governments are also key players. Leadership, coordination, oversight within and among all of these layers of Government are essential if we are to achieve an effective strategy because of the urgency involved in devising a framework for responding to potential acts of domestic terrorism. I think we have to expect such acts increasing as time passes.

The National Guard Civil Support Teams were developed and

fielded in a very compressed time frame. As Mr. Lieberman noted

in his prepared testimony, the personnel involved in standing up

the initial 10 teams demonstrated professionalism and dedication

in attempting to meet an unrealistic operational capability target.

It appears that management of the program is back on track,

that we are moving in the right direction. That is an important accomplishment. We cannot afford to lose ground in this endeavor.

While we must continue to make sure that this program is on

track, we also must be constantly scanning the horizon to make

sure that the track is going in the right direction.

For example, it appears that the Army is well on the way to developing a comprehensive program for training the civil support

teams and that is something we must keep on track, but it also appears that little progress has been made in standardizing crossVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:35 Oct 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82394.031 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
27

training between the CSTs and first responders, and that is a need

that we must anticipate and address.

First responders, police, fire and rescue squads, and emergency

medical personnel are at the tip of the spear. They will likely be

the first ones on the scene of almost any terrorist attack on U.S.

soil. They are the men and women who will have the initial responsibility to assess the situation, assist victims, and secure the scene.

They will provide the manpower to back up the civil support teams.

It is essential that these first responders be well-equipped and

well-trained so that they can work in concert with the National

Guard and other Federal agencies. Establishing a standardized

training program, including cross-training with the National

Guard, is a critical first step.

I have a particular interest in the training of first responders, as

well as the National Guard Civil Support Team, because of the excellent National Guard training programs and facilities in place

and under development in West Virginia. Although West Virginia

does not yet have a National Guard Civil Support Team, we do

have an outstanding National Guard operation under the direction

of an outstanding Adjutant General, Alan Tackett, whom I often

say is the best general since Hannibal. [Laughter.]

Senator LANDRIEU. That is saying something. [Laughter.]

Senator BYRD. He has a National Guard that is number 1 in the

Nation in four different categories, and has been for the last 3

years.

One of the crown jewels of West Virginia’s disaster response

training assets is the Memorial Tunnel near Charleston, a one-ofa-kind facility in which to train for subterranean terrorist attacks

such as the saran gas attack on Japan’s subway system. Real-life

training in an underground environment such as Memorial Tunnel

is not something that can be duplicated in many places.

The Memorial Tunnel is a tunnel that was part of the highway

that was built through there many years ago. I remember when I

first came to the House of Representatives, we dedicated the West

Virginia Turnpike. The Memorial Tunnel was a part of that turnpike, and subsequent thereto the roads have been changed and

they have cut through another mountain so we do not have to use

the Memorial Tunnel for that purpose. The Memorial Tunnel has

been converted to the very excellent use about which we are discussing here today.

The National Guard, in addition, is developing a comprehensive

training center at Camp Dawson in West Virginia, in addition to

classrooms and dormitories. Have you been up there, General

Davis?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. In addition to classrooms and dormitories, Camp

Dawson has the ability to support an array of training ranges to

simulate terrorist attack scenarios. In fact, the Department of Justice is very interested in locating its terrorism response training at

Camp Dawson.

Finally, West Virginia University, which is located near Camp

Dawson, houses the virtual medical campus that is being developed

in conjunction with Auburn University. This facility is capable of

28

delivering comprehensive training to first responders on how to

identify and deal with a toxic biological or chemical attack.

I traveled with President Bush recently to West Virginia when

he met with General Tackett and members of the National Guard.

I took that opportunity to brief the President on the unique facilities that are in place and under development in West Virginia. Due

to General Tackett’s vision and leadership, West Virginia National

Guard is poised to provide one-stop shopping, state-of-the art training for Federal, State, and local agencies, including civil support

teams and first responders.

The National Guard is only one piece of the homeland security

solution, but it is an essential piece, and I commend the National

Guard Civil Support Teams for the progress that they have been

making to date, and look forward to continuing to support and enhance the program.

Mr. Chairman, that is my opening statement. I will withhold my

questions.

Senator ROBERTS. I want to thank the Senator for his statement,

especially for highlighting the tip of the spear, the first responders.

It is absolutely essential that these teams are capable of working

with the first responders. That is a very important point.

Senator Nelson, I want to welcome you again to the subcommittee, and with all of the demands on our time, it is not often we

have members in attendance to the degree that we would like to

have, but you have been here on time and shown a very keen interest. You and I both served in the House of Representatives together, and it was a decision of mine that when I became chairman

of the once-powerful and sometimes-powerful House Agricultural

Committee, that I would recognize some of the newer Members and

wait until the end of the session to wrap up, so I am delighted to

welcome you to the subcommittee and to recognize you at this time.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, bless your heart, Mr. Chairman. Mr.

Chairman, I can get right to the heart of the matter because you

made a statement about the considerable importance to the country

on the subject matter of this hearing, and so has Senator Byrd. We

have in front of us an audit report, and the audit report says the

Consequence Management Program Integration Office did not manage the WMD–CST program effectively. My question is, why?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. In retrospect, and of course hindsight is golden,

I do not think the office had the requisite skills in its staff. It did

not have acquisition-trained people, it did not have a good financial

manager, and I think there was also probably some lack of appreciation of the capabilities that the Army had to support their effort.

I think they meant well. They certainly worked hard, but I think

in retrospect, as I said, the program would have had fewer problems had a different skill mix been present in the office.

Senator BILL NELSON. No doubt you understand the seriousness

of my question. In our form of Government, we are up here as overseers to see that the policy is made and the policy is carried out,

and for people to make excuses on a subject of this gravity, there

are no excuses, so let us go down the line.

Why, General Davis?

General DAVIS. I think in part I agree with what Mr. Lieberman

said in his assessment. We were trying to do something in a very

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compressed period of time, as I indicated earlier, and in the interest of doing that, many times, for example, in the acquisition process it can take 2 to 3 years to acquire a piece of equipment, and

certainly if there is any development involved in it.

I am sure, because I know some of the folks, they were all wellintentioned, good Americans, patriotic folks who were trying to do

the best to field it in a very short time period, as I said, trying to

do in 2 months and almost in 18 months what is typically about

a 5-year process, and so I think that they did not follow all of the

acquisition rules as we would know them.

They did not do anything illegal, sir, they were perfectly legal in

what they did, but they attempted to bypass the normal acquisition

system in order to get the job done in a short period of time, because the normal research and development that would be required, say, for some of the equipment we got—because the Mobile

Analytical Lab, as an example, is not a component of any of the

other services. It is unique to this particular team, and I think in

an attempt to compress the time to do that and get a quality piece

of equipment, I think we just did not get through all the steps that

we could have.

I agree absolutely with Mr. Lieberman, in hindsight, we certainly

would and could do it differently, but this is a unique challenge for

the country. It is a unique capability that we are providing to the

country and will provide to the country. We will go ahead and get

them certified, sir. I think in an attempt to do that and compress

the time we may have gotten just a little bit ahead of ourselves,

but I think they were well-meaning people who were working as

hard as they could to get the job done and getting it done we may

just have missed a few beats at the drum, sir.

Senator BILL NELSON. General Maples.

General MAPLES. Sir, if I could just distinguish between management process and management outcomes, because certainly the

CSTs that we believe we have trained, equipped, and fielded, and

that were very close to certification on, are an outcome of the program.

The program was set up as a special management program to integrate a number and a wide variety of functions, and the Army

agrees that within the program itself, that it did not have trained

acquisition personnel, but I also would state that the program tried

to use existing acquisition agencies to source and to acquire the

equipment for the teams.

The management program attempted to follow all of the guidance, all of the direction, all of the policies that they were given

with the intent of providing the best possible team, the best possible program in support of the Nation.

Senator BILL NELSON. General Lawlor.

General LAWLOR. Thank you, sir. The Joint Task Force Civil

Support really had no role in any of the standup of the CSTs. However, I personally was working in the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for the Army at the time, and was very much involved in

the standup, so if I may respond to your question from that perspective.

I think in line with what General Maples has just stated, and it

cannot be understated how the sense of urgency to move on with

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this mission affected us when we were standing these up. No one

has forgotten that on the day of the Oklahoma City bombing the

threat posture in this country was negligible, and so we were working very hard to stand up a program very quickly.

I think that in terms of the outcome, I recognize that some of the

comments in the IG’s report are valid. I would dispute others, but

I think, as I understand it, the comments that were made critical

of the program have by and large been addressed as the system

has worked its way through the issues that have been raised, and

that we are now in a position to move forward.

I would offer for you that in the context of urgency, there is no

structure, no doctrine, no paradigm to do what we are doing. There

is no prior experience. This is a first-of-its-kind organization, built

with first-of-its-kind doctrine, trying to understand problems that

have never confronted the country before, so we moved very quickly

within that system.

If I can use doctrine as an illustration, the standard normal time

it takes to process doctrine within the service is 24 to 33 months,

and that assumes that it goes very smoothly. In this field, where

there was no prior experience, that assumption is probably a little

bit problematic.

So rather than wait for 33 months before we began the program,

we brought together a group of the best people that we could find,

and we wrote a manual to guide the CSTs and to guide the training. That manual has now been staffed at least once through all

of the formal processes, and frankly there has been a few changes

but not many changes from what we initially wrote, so I think we

got most of it right. We did make some mistakes, but I think by

and large the program is on track.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, obviously where you are

trying to go is in your oversight capacity to see that this program

is working. You certainly have my pledge of support in whatever

capacity you want me to assist you.

Well-meaning and good intentions will not cut it on something of

this seriousness, and so whatever you want to pursue, just count

me in to help you.

Senator ROBERTS. I thank the Senator, and I thank him for his

comments.

Senator Byrd, I think I am going to ask a few questions if that

is all right with you, sir, and then we can come back to you. The

distinguished Ranking Member will be returning soon.

I am going to start with Mr. Lieberman and go down the panel.

Who in the Department of Defense now has the policy oversight in

regards to the management of this program? By the way, gentlemen, I have a lot of trouble saying WMD–CS teams. That is a

mouthful. We used to have a rule in this subcommittee, if you said

an acronym and you did not explain what it was before saying the

acronym, you had to put a dollar in a fish bowl. We could make

a substantial contribution to the Defense Department budget if I

would enforce that rule.

Now, we thought about renaming them. They were RAID teams.

I am not saying it is within my capability to change an acronym.

With Senator Byrd, he can do almost anything in an Appropriations bill. [Laughter.]

31

Senator ROBERTS. You might want to think about what kind of

an acronym would be more appropriate so that the American people would understand exactly who these people are. These are the

people that are 4 hours away from any incident, to provide help.

Civil Support Teams, that makes sense, but that is really a mouthful in terms of the acronym. You might want to have an acronym

that spells out BOB, or maybe TED and BOB. Maybe that would

work in terms of the funding, I do not know.

So, Mr. Lieberman, who in the Department of Defense now has

the policy oversight over the management of these teams?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. At the OSD level, the senior official is the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support. There are several OSD entities that are involved on a joint basis in overseeing

this program.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has a very central role, and also there is a Deputy Assistant

to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical-Biological Defense who

works the acquisition end of things, so there are multiple OSD offices involved right now. I do not know whether that structure is

going to be maintained by the new administration or not.

Senator ROBERTS. Well, that is part of the problem. If part of the

problem is on this side in terms of working with CoMPIO to try

to plus-up from 10 to 17 to see if it would work, asking CoMPIO

if, in fact, that number could be handled, we need to get our arms

around this.

We need to get that capability up and running, and perhaps—

I noted several of you have indicated, in terms of the direction of

the subcommittee and Congress and what happened in the authorization bill and in the appropriations bill, maybe we were a little

too hasty in this regard, but our idea was that we had this threat

out here. It is a very real threat.

General Lawlor is in charge of that whole arena, and we wanted

to make sure that since it was threat-driven and was becoming

more serious, we wanted to be 4 hours from anywhere. The staff

went to CoMPIO and asked, ‘‘can you handle it,’’ and they said, ‘‘yes, we are very eager to do it, very positive to do it.’’ I am not trying to put any recrimination or any blame on

CoMPIO. They have enough of that on their shoulders already, but

I am reminded about a year ago, when we had the administration

up, and we had four people within the Department of Defense, and

we said, in terms of counterterrorism, in terrorism, and also homeland defense, who is in charge? Then being a little mischievous, we

had them line up in order of seniority, and then I said, why don’t

you line up in order of your command structure? Nobody knew

where to sit.

Now, you just indicated that we are not quite sure as to who is

in charge of this, and I think that is one of the biggest challenges

that we have.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Senator, that is not what I intended to say exactly. I do believe the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for

Civil Support is clearly the tip of the pyramid, and all these other

offices are supposed to be supporting him or her, whoever that

turns out to be. There is another problem right now, because we

have lots of vacancies in the Department of Defense.

32

Senator ROBERTS. Amen to that. I wish we could speed up the

procedure not only in the Department of Defense, but every other

Federal agency. That was the point you were trying to make, that

there is the top of the pyramid, there is somebody—in terms of

management outcome, management process. How about management responsibility?

I do not know of any place in the legislation when we passed it

that said hurry up, but do it badly. That was not in the legislation,

so we do have somebody in charge in terms of the ‘‘TO’’ chart, and

I guess that was my question. In your view, was it a mistake for

the department to have established CoMPIO back in March 1998,

or should the department have used an existing entity within, say

DOD? That is hindsight, 20/20, I understand that. What do you

think?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. It could have worked, but I think special management structures in the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not

have a great history. Most of them do not work, so I think the

setup we have now is the optimum one. We were pleased with the

outcome of the deliberations over the last few months, on how to

realign responsibilities.

Senator ROBERTS. All right. The certification process. The IG report states that CoMPIO failed to assure that training provided ensure the proficiency required by Section 511. This is one of our requirements. We passed that in the Defense Authorization Act of

1999. Could you just tell us a little bit about the certification process, and why the IG audit concluded that CoMPIO was not complying with the requirements of Section 511?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Certainly. Section 511, and that was the quote

that I read earlier, basically says that every person in the team has

to be proficient in using whatever equipment they have in performing the mission. In the haste to get these teams fielded, the training started to occur before the equipment arrived, so you had a lot

of training activity going on with units doing the best they could,

but with only part of the equipment that they were going to use.

The external evaluations are the most glaring example of that,

where most of them were done without the teams having some of

the most fundamental equipment that they were supposed to operate with. Also, in some cases, not all of the team positions had been

filled yet, and these teams, being small, do not have a lot of redundancy. So if your chief science officer is not chosen yet, you have

a big gap there, and the training really cannot be realistic and cannot reasonably assure that the team is competent if it has to be

done under those handicaps.

Then, of course, the idea that the doctrine was evolving, what

they were supposed to do was evolving, and the different choices

were being made about what equipment would be there eventually,

means that whatever training was done may or may not have been

most efficiently focused on exactly what that team will end up having to do. So it was a very difficult task to try to keep all of these

balls in the air at the same time. One of the areas that suffered,

I would say, was the adequacy of training.

Senator ROBERTS. That testimony is extremely helpful. Where

did CoMPIO go astray on an implementation plan? Was there an

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implementation plan utilized to establish CoMPIO and a blueprint

that they could follow?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I think CoMPIO went astray because they were

given too long a leash and not enough advice. The program was

managed very much on an ad hoc basis because of the urgency, and

they tried to do a lot of things in certainly very different ways than

the department is used to doing them.

I do not accept the idea that if you use any of these standard

mechanisms it is necessarily slow as molasses. There are ways to

expedite things, particularly when you are dealing with a very high

profile program. I think senior leadership could have intervened if

they found that the bureaucracy was being unresponsive to their

requirements and moved things along quicker than normal. I do

not think that they were required to set up a good acquisition plan.

I do not think they had good program metrics so that people could

judge how well they were doing.

I wish personally we had done our audit a year and a half or 2

years before we did. If we had gotten in on the front-end, we could

probably have pointed out a lot of the weaknesses in the planning

up-front. It is a shame we had to be ‘‘Monday morning quarterbacks,’’ but that is the way it turned out.

Senator ROBERTS. Part of that might have been our responsibility. Maybe we should have had you in the ballgame on Saturday.

What role, if any, is your office playing now in the program review?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. We are an integral part of the team, and I think

there has been a lot of emphasis today on what people disagreed

about in the January report, but I think the good news is that

there has been a very cooperative attitude by all parties. My staff,

and the auditors who did the audit, are still working on this

project.

It is a rare occasion where we get to help fix the problem that

we found. Frankly, I think that is an excellent model for an IG,

and we have been very pleased that the Army, OSD, and the

Guard Bureau have let us continue to be players. I am personally

part of the senior management oversight team that is trying to

move this whole thing forward.

Senator ROBERTS. I want to talk about that attitude of cooperation. The Army response to your draft IG report was approximately

90 pages. Why did the final IG report devote only 5 pages to addressing the Army’s response? I have a feeling that it is probably

unsaid that the Army feels they were bypassed in this deal.

Maybe bypassed is not the best word, but that we have a lot of

people now who are new in regards to OSD, but we have a lot of

people in uniform who are taking the heat, and if they had 90

pages of commentary saying, ‘‘now wait a minute, let us take a look

at this,’’ and you only had 5 pages back—is this a little out of balance? I am just being the devil’s advocate here on behalf of the

Army. What do you think? You are working—and you have good— you like General Maples, don’t you? [Laughter.]

You all get along, and you are cooperating on this.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Many years ago I wore Army green myself.

Senator ROBERTS. You see where I am headed with this question.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Sure, and I think it is a fair question. Frankly,

the very volume of the Army response made it almost impossible

34

for us to follow our normal procedure, which is to publish the entire

response verbatim. In most of our reports we do that. In this case,

the response was far longer than the report itself, and also it went

to a level of detail that I do not think really we could have coped

with in the normal manner of responding ‘‘tit for tat,’’ and I think

the important items would have gotten lost.

I think my main problem with the response was, that we were

expecting more documentation of things that had actually happened, rather than just assertions that they had happened, which

in our view did not move the process forward very much. We tried

to capture the most important parts. Again, would 10 pages have

made people happier? I really do not know, but I think the important thing is that since January there has developed close to a consensus on where all of these particular points stand.

One can argue about when exactly it was they were fixed, but

the important question is, are there still unresolved items there

now or not?

Last winter, there was a bitter dispute about whether there were

safety issues with the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System van,

and now, as you just heard, there is an elaborate test being laid

on, because I think there is a consensus that yes, there are safety

issues. So I think everyone involved has come a ways since that report was written.

Senator ROBERTS. That is good news. I just want to ask you a

basic question here. Do you believe the fundamental mission of the

CSTs is a sound one?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yes, I do.

Senator ROBERTS. All right. I have another basic question. We

started out in this business thinking that a 4-hour response time

for the CSTs was a reasonable response, that it could be done. Was

that goal simply unrealistic, and if it is, what is a realistic response

time?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. That depends upon how many teams there are,

and how much geographical distance we are talking about.

Senator ROBERTS. Which is why the subcommittee decided to do

what we did.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. The idea was to make extensive use of air assets

to move the teams around. I would have to defer to the other panel

members on current doctrine. It seemed to us that as of last year

all the planning was for travel by road, which is not going to give

you a 4-hour response time in big states, but I would have to defer

to the others.

Senator ROBERTS. Let us go down the line. First, do you still believe the fundamental mission of the CSTs is a sound one? Second,

is the goal realistic in regards to the 4-hour response time?

General Davis.

General DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I think it is fundamentally sound.

We know we have to have some capability out there. The discipline

and vigor of the way the military trains in order to respond definitely works. We do know that, particularly in the Guard.

As we worked with the local responders when we have floods,

hurricanes, tornadoes and that type of a disruptive event to the civilian populace; we are fairly and routinely involved in those kinds

of activities, to include today. I think we have about 700 or 800

35

people I believe, something like that, up in Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, maybe a few less than that.

So yes, I believe it is fundamentally sound, and I believe we have

that duty and obligation to the American public to do everything

we can to assist them to ameliorate any major inconvenience like

you have in a flood or certainly in a weapons of mass destruction

incident.

The original feeling of stationing of the teams when there were

only 10 teams I will have to go into a little bit on this, sir, if you

do not mind, was based on the 10 FEMA regions that were assigned accordingly. Following further discussion here, I think the

subcommittee decided we were going to need more teams than

that, because just given the geography, you work within a FEMA

region, which could encompass three to five states or some seven

states in one particular instance, that we could not get there in the

allotted time, so additional teams were fielded and some 27 total

additional teams.

When these teams were fielded, instead of using a 150-mile radius, as they had done with the initial teams, these teams were

fielded with a 250-mile radius, and a part of that fielding process,

there are a number of factors that went into it. They looked at the

threat assessment, the Federal region that they were going to

cover, the coverage of major population densities, or major cities

within that, the existing facilities and stations that were out there,

as well as the technical analysis. The Army concept analysis was

brought into that, and they were dealing with data bases on census.

So I think these were done, and when the distance was raised

to 250 miles, they were trying to cover as much of the United

States population as was possible. With 250 miles you could not

traverse 250 miles in that 4-hour time period, so a reasonable time

came back as about 6 hours for the entire team to get there, and

with some attempt to get the teams there at an earlier point, say

an advanced part of the team at an earlier point, so I think that

is why the radius was extended to 250 miles.

This, by the way, would in part be justified, at least because it

will cover 92 percent of the population of the United States. If I

am part of that 8 percent, sir, I am not a happy camper, but we

would be able to move the teams with aviation assets. We have

done some amount of study on the use of aviation assets.

As a matter of fact, the fielding of a number of our teams are

in positions where they will have access to a C–130 so it can move

a significant part of the team to an incident site, sir. A lot of that

was factored in as a part of the fielding process, but in an attempt

to take the initial teams and put those out and then field additional teams, some of the teams might not have been fielded where

they were if we had known we were going to have 32 teams at the

time, or the 27 teams that are currently being fielded.

Senator ROBERTS. Senator Landrieu has a very tight time schedule. I am going to yield to her, but General Maples, do you have

any quick comment on whether or not you think that the plan is

a sound one?

General MAPLES. Sir, I will just make one comment, I think the

teams are absolutely essential, and they are doing what they were

36

designed for. I base that on my own experience in talking to first

responders, and the kind of expertise and the knowledge that they

can gain from the team members. I have had them report that to

me, that they have already seen benefit in the communities. Even

though the teams are not operational yet, they are training, and

their interaction with the first responder community is paying us

great dividends already.

Senator ROBERTS. That is absolutely key. That is going to be a

follow-up question to you to go into some detail. General Lawlor,

do you want to quickly respond?

General LAWLOR. I would agree with what General Maples said.

Senator ROBERTS. Senator Landrieu.

Senator LANDRIEU. I really appreciate this hearing, because I

think it is very important for us to focus on this issue. The more

I think about it, read about it, listen to the comments, and read

this report—the more it is highlighted. I would suggest, after reading this report, that one of the serious problems seems to be a lack

of clarity in the law, procedures, memorandums of understanding,

and other organizational constructs, which has given us what we

define as an unclear chain of command.

It is not that the people involved are not enthusiastic, motivated,

well-trained, and well-educated for the task before them. They have

performed similar functions very well, but this is quite complicated,

I think, to try and give an immediate response.

We might set our sights on 4 hours, but frankly, if I were a victim, I would like for somebody to arrive a little sooner, if possible,

than 4 hours. I would like to challenge our subcommittee to think

about that. We have a tremendous infrastructure of people out

there in the United States; well-trained, well-educated, highly motivated, and trustworthy people on the ground, whether they are

fire fighters, police officers, et cetera.

I know this is a system that we are trying to actually enhance,

strengthen, or focus for the purposes of responding when a specific

attack occurs. If we can facilitate and strengthen what is there so

the taxpayers’ money gets spent wisely, we become a facilitator.

Like the loaves and the fishes, we take what is there, create the

links, and perform miracles to expand so that if a crisis happens

we can respond anywhere, any time—in a small community, in a

big community, in a rural area, in an urban area—because we have

been smart by thinking in advance, and not limiting ourselves.

So I am going to be thinking—I do not have an answer—about

what we need to do to help to create, I think, the most effective

system possible.

Mr. Lieberman, I would just like to ask you one question. In light

of what I said, what are the one or two things this subcommittee

should focus on? Perhaps we need to readjust our sights. Based on

your report—I know there is no magic bullet to fix it—but a couple

of things that maybe we could do to get the program back on track?

Is there anything that you would like to offer for the purposes of

this hearing?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I think the department now has a handle on

what needs to be done to field these 32 teams, if everybody still

agrees we need 32. However, I think there still is a certain amount

of mission ambiguity, frankly. How do these teams fit in to that

37

picture you just described, where you have local, State, multiple

Federal entities with capabilities, and all need to find a way to

work together. I think some of these studies that you quoted earlier, Mr. Chairman, such as the 21st century study, have made the

point that on a Federal Government-wide basis, a lot more needs

to be done to bring some coherence to this picture.

There are so many cooks in the kitchen, and the mix and the

problem are going to be different at every single possible site of an

incident, because local capabilities are always going to vary dramatically.

Whatever can be done by Congress and the administration to

bring coherence to this whole picture is important. There are several bills that have been introduced in this session I believe already. There is one to establish a Homeland Defense Agency. I

frankly do not know whether that is a good idea or not, but there

has been some thinking going on and some innovative suggestions

made.

But I would suggest in terms of national priorities, national defense priorities, this is one where Congress itself is going to have

a problem because of the way your committee structure is set up.

Committees with different jurisdictions are going to have to find a

way to work together also on these problems; so it is a very interesting problem from the political scientist standpoint.

Senator LANDRIEU. Since our chairman here is so skilled with his

interpersonal relationships, we are counting on him and Senator

Byrd to lead us in this regard.

I think in all seriousness this is a very important issue for us to

stay focused on and to try to work it out, because if you do not address the top piece, no matter what direction you move, you are

going to end up with confusion and with reports like this, with us

not being able to accomplish the mission. This is complicated, but

I am sure we are not the first nation that has undertaken it, and

I think it is worth our time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling

this subcommittee hearing today.

Senator ROBERTS. Let me tell my colleagues that Mr. Lieberman

has really put his finger on it. Ever since the President came down

with PDD–62, which was the presidential directive indicating the

Justice Department was the lead agency, and assigning Mr. Dick

Clark to be in charge of that, and Dick is still on board and doing

a good job. It is a very difficult job—those of us that have the jurisdiction in the committees and the subcommittees took a hard look

at this, and we have determined that there are 46 Federal agencies

that have some jurisdiction.

I am an event-oriented person, and so I am trying to figure out,

all right, if there is an incident—and you can name your incident.

It all is pretty shocking in regards to what can happen, and General Lawlor can testify to that, and we have several operations. I

am familiar with the TOP OFF exercises, the one in Denver, was

right next to Kansas, so I took exceptional notice of that. But an

anthrax attack, what happens once this event actually takes place?

Who is in charge?

You are exactly right. The Senator has put her finger on it. It

is that first responder. They are there. Now, what do they do? How

do they get guidance from the Federal Government, and how on

38

earth do we get 46 Federal agencies to work in any kind of a cohesive fashion?

We are going to have a hearing May 8, 9, and 10, the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, with Chairman Shelby and Co-chairman Senator Bob Graham of Florida. We have the Senate Appropriations Committee, I would tell the distinguished Senator from

West Virginia, with Bob Byrd and Ted Stevens, and we have the

Subcommittee on Appropriations headed up by Senator Judd

Gregg. We have the Armed Services Committee with Senators Warner and Levin, and then we have some fellow named Roberts and

Senator Landrieu in regards to the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee with the DOD piece. We are going to have

a hearing May 8, 9, and 10, and we are going to ask all 46 agencies

to come in.

We are going to ask them three questions: What is your mission?

What is it that you do? Most importantly, who do you report to?

Now, you have indicated, Mr. Lieberman, one of the real problems we have. We have eight committees, probably more, but at

least eight, and seven subcommittees that have jurisdiction. We

have made a proposal in a bipartisan way to the leaders of the Senate to say we need, pardon the expression, a ‘‘belly button’’ task

force to coordinate at least once a month so we know what we are

doing up here.

It is enough for us to sit back and ask the questions that our

staff prepared that make us sound fairly intelligent about this. At

least we have the expertise and we get the acronyms right and all

of that, but it is another thing for us to get our act together.

Now, this is a tremendous undertaking, so it is a little bit disingenuous to point fingers at CoMPIO, or several people who happen to be in the audience today and say, ‘‘wait a minute, this has

all been your fault.’’ This is brand new, that if we do not get some

Federal response, and the order of things, as described by General

Davis, I think it was, that link of communications back to General

Lawlor—what are we dealing with here? How can we address this?

It may be the CDC. It may be first responders, and the fact that

we just do not have enough hospital beds to deal with people,

things of this nature.

It is a big problem, and I did not mean to get into a long-winded

speech there, but I think if you have any specific suggestions as to

how we can reorganize, or do something legislatively in your field

of expertise, we sure need to hear from you.

Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Senator Nelson also was interested in knowing,

and so am I, who is accountable? If we are going to conduct oversight, which is one of the great responsibilities of Congress, who is

accountable down there? If we are going to conduct oversight, we

should know who is accountable, so I am going to ask that question

for Senator Nelson. Who is accountable? To whom should we look

for accountability?

General DAVIS. I think the way we have established things in the

Department of Defense, it is the Assistant to the Secretary for Civil

Support, and that is the way we have identified at least in preliminary interim guidance, sort of—the new Deputy Secretary of Defense signed off on the interim guidance. There are a lot of parts

39

to that, I would suggest, though, as Mr. Lieberman said. There are

a number of other agencies within the department who have that

responsibility and would have to work part of the issue, but that

would appear to be where it would rest.

General MAPLES. Sir, if I could comment also that the decision

that the Deputy Secretary of Defense left program management of

these teams with the Army, and specifically identified a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support as the

program manager, and within the Army, the program management

of these teams will continue and that, in fact, the proponency for

that has been vested in the National Guard Bureau for further

management of the teams.

General DAVIS. Sir, related to that, and the question Senator

Landrieu got into, the number of teams, I think part of what the

DODIG report did was to talk to certification of the teams, and so

the action plan has again been broken out into two parts, one to

get the team certified, and two, a comprehensive program review.

As a part of that review they will be looking at a number of other

issues; looking at the mission of the teams; how many teams; they

should be looking at demographics; possibly using the new census

data, if that has been approved; looking at individual training; and

a lot of the issues that were raised in the IG report, so we do not

go back over that ground again in the future, what is the proper

mode for doing evaluations and assessments of the teams’ capabilities, funding profiles sustainment, those kinds of things.

There are a whole number of issues that we will be looking at

as part of that program review, and many of us in the Department

of Defense are involved in that program review of the civil support

teams, sir.

Senator ROBERTS. I hear a lot about missile defense shield. It

seems to me that here we are talking about something that is really important, and that can really be done. I do not know about a

missile defense shield that would guard against submarines out

there, but here is something that may happen to this country, and

probably will, but it seems to me that somebody ought to be in a

position to bump heads together and get the coordination, cooperation, and tie all the loose ends together. That is what I am sure

that Senator Nelson had in mind.

Have we gotten an answer to that question?

General DAVIS. I think that is part of the frustration of a number

of us who deal with the issue of dealing with parts and pieces of

the issue, and looking at the Gilmore Report. Governor Gilmore’s

second report talks about a czar, and the difficulty with that from

the standpoint of the Hart-Rudman. You would have somebody who

is in charge of policy, like we have for the counterdrug czar, but

that person does not have a funding line and does not have all the

other requirements and the resources to put anything in play other

than providing policy.

Senator BYRD. It should not be so difficult to get a funding line

if the President of the United States gets behind this. You ought

to be able to get a funding line.

General DAVIS. Sir, the way the Gilmore Report is done, it would

work with the existing agencies that are out there. The Hart-Rudman would construct a superagency, you are aware, I think perVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:35 Oct 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82394.031 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
40

haps, and which would have that funding line, and would be

charged. So you have—as you said, Senator Roberts, one ‘‘belly button’’ would be the super czar.

Senator ROBERTS. If I might, Senator, most of these reports, most

of these task forces do have super-qualified people, and people that

you and I both know and whose judgment we have relied on in the

past considered this threat so serious. You mentioned the missile

shield, which is obviously a very real threat, as we are considering

that, but all four them, and as I say, there may be five or six of

these reports, indicated it was so serious that they thought the

Vice President should be in charge of this.

Hart-Rudman, I think I am correct, and General Davis, you correct me if I am wrong—indicated that we need a czar, somebody

like Admiral Rickover in regards to his efforts, or somebody like

General McCaffrey in regards to the drug war. We declared war on

drugs 10 years ago. The results have not been what we have hoped

them to be, but we have a drug czar—and we need a terrorism

czar, if you will, or counterterrorism czar.

How do you define terrorism? Senator Bennett and I early on

asked Condoleezza Rice where is the administration really thinking

they are going. She said, give us 2 or 3 months. Now, it is my understanding that a proposal has been made to separate this out

into cyber threats and into a biological component, and then into

counterterrorism.

But you are exactly right, we need somebody with enough authority, with enough power, to make these decisions. Now, that is

overall. Within the Department of Defense I think we have the capability, within the Guard and within the management structure

that they have proposed to at least get this particular program, the

CSTs, or whatever we finally call them, to have that immediate response capability so that we know what we are dealing with immediately. The chances are the first responders would not know that.

That is a pretty good response, but the Senator’s request is the one

that is being asked.

By the way, Senator, Hart-Rudman said this was so serious we

ought to merge the authorizing committees with the appropriations

committees. I suggest they talk to you about that before they make

any more recommendations.

Senator BYRD. They will get a quick answer on that. [Laughter.]

Let me ask two or three other questions. There are five more

teams that have been authorized but not yet sited. Where is West

Virginia in the queue?

General DAVIS. Sir, as I said a little earlier, this program review

is going to look at it and see how many teams we really need, and

the five teams have been authorized, and those are on hold now

until we can complete this program review. It is anticipated it will

be culminated about 1 August, so sometime in about that time

frame.

Senator BYRD. I noticed in this map 27 teams within a 150-mile

radius, that nearly two-thirds of the State of West Virginia is not

within a 3-hour driving radius of any civil support team. We have

some pretty mountainous terrain down there, and I see also that

some of Kentucky and Ohio likewise is in the same situation. Do

41

you believe it would be prudent to have a civil support team in the

area there in West Virginia?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir, if you want one. [Laughter.]

I think we really do need to do this comprehensive review,

though, Senator, and when we started out with the 10 teams we

put them in places which, if we had started with 32, we might have

done that differently, sir, I would suggest to you.

I do not know for certain, but just looking at the chart, and I

have a similar chart to yours here, sir, there are a number of areas

in the country that are not covered by these teams, and it may be

that 32 is the right number, it may be more, it may be less. What

we would like to do is have some kind of a scientific assessment

of that and look at where we position the teams and see where we

need additional teams, or whether we need to perhaps move some

of the teams to a different location. It is very difficult to do, obviously, but we need to work our way through that, sir.

Senator BYRD. All right. Facilities are in place and continue to

be developed in West Virginia to complement the homeland security concept. West Virginia hosts facilities that would enable civilian-first responders, Federal, State, and local, an opportunity to

cross-train with military personnel and to respond to a variety of

scenarios.

I know you have been at Camp Dawson, General, and I invite

the others to go, and also I invite to the Memorial Tunnel facilities,

if they are down in that area, or if you have a convenient moment

to do so. Do you agree that a combined facility, remote from but

within reach of the Nation’s capital, could provide a university of

knowledge, a brain trust, a premier training facility for first responders and others involved in homeland security?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir. We have a number of facilities around

the country where we could do that, and certainly Camp Dawson

represents one of those.

Senator BYRD. On the subject of acronyms, Mr. Chairman, the

Romans had a great military establishment, probably one of the

greatest the world has ever seen, the Roman legions. I only recall

one acronym that they used. That was Senatus Populesqu

Romanus (SPQR), the Senate and the Roman people.

Speaking of acronyms in our day and time, there has been a proliferation of them. My staff has one suggestion for renaming the

WMD–CSTs. Back Yard Ready Defense Teams, BYRD Teams.

[Laughter.]

Senator ROBERTS. We will take that under very serious advisement, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

What was that?

Senator BYRD. Back Yard Ready Defense Teams.

Senator ROBERTS. That has some possibilities, very definite possibilities.

General Davis, in your effort to go out and personally visit with

the greatest general since Hannibal, have you had the opportunity

to view the training and interact with the personnel on these teams

not only in West Virginia but all around the country?

General DAVIS. Yes, sir. I was out in the St. Louis area, actually

at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, about 2 weeks ago, and had a

42

chance to meet with Team 7 and Team 5 from Illinois and Missouri

respectively.

Senator ROBERTS. When you do that, do you talk with the State

and local officials as well?

General DAVIS. On this particular one we did not have a chance

to do that. They brought in some of their equipment and set it up

at Scott Air Force Base and we had a number of Adjutants General

who were out there who had an opportunity to go in and observe

these.

It became very important, because most of the Adjutants General

who were there did not have CSTs, so a lot of them had the chance

to come out and talk to the individual members. They had set it

up in a mock environment, as they would be forward-deployed,

where they had a decontamination area, and then they had the

subject matter experts there, so it was a good opportunity for a lot

of us to get out there and talk to them first-hand.

Last Thursday, we had a video teleconference with six of the

other teams, and two of the teams, the team up in Massachusetts,

along with the team from Texas, had some of the first responder

folks there with them. We had the Highway Patrolmen, a major in

the Highway Patrol, a State Patrol in Massachusetts, who talked

to us about some of the things they did, along with another law enforcement official. We had two firemen and a law enforcement official down in Texas.

I have also had the opportunity to work with the National Sheriff’s Association and fire-fighting organization, the National Association of Chiefs—— Senator ROBERTS. That gets into the question I was going to ask

in regard to General Maples, in regard to all of you, in your efforts

to contact the first responders.

We just had a hearing this morning in the Armed Services Committee in reference to the V–22, the Osprey. I am not going to go

into all of the details, but I think in terms of technology, that is

an aircraft really for the future, and certainly despite the problems

we have experienced, and we talked about the 250-mile radius in

the C–130.

The technology is sound. If we can really produce that aircraft

in the way that it should have been produced, it seems to me there

is an exciting possibility in regards to the CSTs, and I just make

that as an observation, and certainly Senator Byrd, that would

mean that there would be less than 3 hours. It would not be an

hour and a half. It would not even be an hour in regards to having

the people on site, and since we had that hearing as of this morning, I thought I would mention it.

I am a little concerned in regards to this, General Davis. You

cannot respond unless you are certified, and the Governor must deploy the aircraft certification. According to the January IG report,

we have 10 that are in status that should be certified and operating, and 17 where they should be in training. We are wondering

if the certification is too high.

I went into that to some degree with Mr. Lieberman, and then

they have to be certified by the Secretary of Defense. We might as

well move it up to the President. I do not know of anybody in the

military that operates this way.

43

General DAVIS. Sir, that was a bit unique. That was one of the

challenges we had in 1999, when they passed the Defense Authorization Act and they put that in as a requirement, number 1, to

stand it up at C–1. We normally have initial operational capability

at C–3 for most of our operational organizations as we stand them

up, particularly when they are new capabilities and we bring them

on board, and normally that certification is done within the service

component.

Senator ROBERTS. I do not think you are at C–1 now. I think

there is another requirement. Is it not C–3? I have another question, but I am wondering—and we need to get on with this. Let me

just say that that is an area where we might want to take a look

at the legislation in regards to some flexibility in Section 511.

You mentioned decontamination. Are there any plans to expand

the function of the BYRD Teams? [Laughter.]

General DAVIS. At this point, no, sir, because one of the difficulties in doing that, they have a lot of capability to respond to incidents, and they work very closely with the HAZMAT teams in most

of the local areas. I have had a chance to talk to a couple of the

HAZMAT team members and leaders, and they have very high

opinion on our folks. They say they are some of the best folks that

they have ever seen, and in many cases far better trained than

local HAZMAT teams are.

The initial thrust was to make them available so if we had a catastrophic event they would be available. I think in something less

than a catastrophic event, once they are certified, the Governor

would have the authority to employ them, sir.

Senator ROBERTS. But you know what is going to happen. Senator Byrd knows what is going to happen. I know what is going to

happen. They are first on the scene. They are the scouts for the

joint task force, letting you know exactly what the situation is.

They establish the link in regards to communications. They let you

know the situation on the ground, and can give advice and counsel

to the first responders, and they detect whether or not a weapon

of mass destruction was used, obviously if it is nuclear you are

going to know that, but in regards to a plume or something like

that, with biological, say, contamination, and then the first responder is going to turn to them and say, in words that everybody

can understand, what do we do now.

I just think when we get to that training, sooner or later that

is going to have to be more robust, State-to-State compacts, National Guard mutual assistance compacts. Are you confident that

States are willing to allow their teams, the BYRD Teams across

State lines in regards to a WMD event, that one Governor will let

them go to another State?

General DAVIS. I am pretty comfortable with that. We went

through that exercise last year as we turned to Y2K year over. We

had a number of States which did not have aviation assets, and as

we set up a secondary communications network in two instances,

I believe, the Governors actually came on board and agreed to do

that, and sent the paperwork through the faxes electronically to

follow up.

I believe they will do it, sir. As we talked about team 1, which

is up in the northeast, in Massachusetts, as we talked to that

44

team, one of the things that came out the other day, and the Massachusetts State Patrolman was talking to it, they have gone

across all their State lines, and he says, I think you can look at

it as a borderless northeast, because wherever those teams are

needed, the States that have them are going to share them.

Senator ROBERTS. It is a frightening thought, but go ahead.

General DAVIS. But they have done that, and I think you are

aware of some of the compacts. The example your State is involved

in, in the Southwest Governors, the Southern Governors, which is

another major compact, and so we have compacts all over, and we

do move resources around.

Recently, two summers ago, I was down in North Carolina when

they had the flood of the Tar River, and we had assets there from

Texas, Kentucky, and I believe Georgia. They were heli-lifting and

rescuing people from the rooftops all over North Carolina. I think

the Governors do get together when one of them has a major crisis

and they see the need to support one another and they get out

there and make it happen, and they have arrangements to do the

compensation, moving of funding back and forth.

Senator ROBERTS. I am not going to try to delay this too much

longer, but I do have a couple of pertinent things. I am going to

move to General Maples now. General, give me your thoughts on

the department’s decision to assign the National Guard Bureau the

responsibility for all management functions of the CST program.

Any thoughts? Just in general, are you comfortable with that?

General MAPLES. I believe the program management does belong

to the Army as a whole, and that the Army as a whole has the responsibility associated with that. The National Guard Bureau will

have those management functions, but that does not divorce the remainder of the Army, the Army staff, our Forces Command, and

our Training and Doctrine Command, from their responsibilities

that are associated with those teams as well. We are going to coordinate that effort to make sure that we are supportive of the National Guard.

Senator ROBERTS. That is the management responsibility we

were referring to earlier, that is still on board?

General MAPLES. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBERTS. All right. Six pages, 90 pages, any comments?

General MAPLES. Sir, we respect the integrity of the Inspector

General system. Our belief was that many of the observations have

been corrected by the programs, their natural processes as we went

along. We did try to provide documentation in those areas where

we did not have concurrence. We had our opportunity to provide

our input to the Inspector General. Once the report became finalized our objective was to closely cooperate, provide whatever information that we could, and assist the Department of Defense and

the Inspector General in resolving any remaining issues.

Senator ROBERTS. Are we C–3 or C–1? I have a question here,

why was the decision to use the C–3, i.e. marginally combat readiness rating for the WMD–CST?

General MAPLES. Sir, at the time that was published the implementing memoranda stated the one consistent certification criteria

that exists, and that was the criteria that appears in the National

Defense Authorization Act. It was stated in there that to request

45

certification the team commander had to be in a state of C–3 or

higher. The C–3 was selected at the time by the Director of Military Support, which is consistent with the deployment criteria for

other units within the Army.

We fully realized that the C–3 criteria does not meet the same

criteria that is established by the National Defense Authorization

Act. We concurred with that portion of the IG report that C–3 is

not an applicable standard, and in fact the Secretary’s review of

the teams, the training of their personnel, the training of the teams

applied a C–1 standard before he forwarded those recommendations.

Senator ROBERTS. If we think we have problems with an IG report in a subcommittee hearing, if we have an incident and we

have C–3 readiness, and we are not ready, and they go out there,

and there takes place what could take place, we are all going to

be on the carpet in time, so I hope—which indicates the seriousness of this.

Thank you all for your patience. Let me move to General Lawlor.

General Lawlor, you are the individual responsible for marshalling

the capability of our Armed Forces in support of all of the civilian

agencies in response to something we call a domestic contingency

involving the weapons of mass destruction. Are you satisfied with

the number and the adequacy of the assets available to you?

General LAWLOR. I am.

Senator ROBERTS. It is a big-time responsibility.

General LAWLOR. One of the benefits of being stationed at the

United States Joint Forces Command is that the CINC of the

United States Joint Forces Command has effective operational control over about 80 percent of the Armed Forces in the United

States stationed within CONUS, and so through his components,

the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, he has

a vast array of units that he can bring to bear, if needed. So our

issue is really defining requirements. Once we have defined those

requirements, the CINC sources them through his staff. So that is,

we are satisfied that we have the capabilities.

Senator ROBERTS. General, you were the former Deputy Director

of Military Support during the establishment of CoMPIO, and we

know your current title and your current responsibilities. What are

your thoughts on the DODIG report, just your take on it?

General LAWLOR. I think that the report raises some valid points,

and I think the folks that were engaged in the discussion over the

course of the past 5 months concerning the results have learned on

both sides. I think there were some disagreements concerning how

the program was run. I think those were legitimate disagreements,

strongly held and strongly believed by both sides. I think there has

been a resolution of those points, and that the program is fundamentally sound and very important.

Senator ROBERTS. As I indicated, you were involved in the TOP

OFF exercises. I found that report fascinating and I wish they

could have received more publicity, and certainly wish that more

Members were aware of those exercises. My question is, are you

satisfied with how the JTF and the CS operated during the course

of the exercise, and then a follow-up question, what lessons were

learned, and how are you implementing those lessons?

46

Let me just say the TOP OFF exercise in Denver where we had

an anthrax outbreak and pretty much put up—well, we just isolated, eventually, Colorado. People who attended the event from

Kansas came back and were sick, and then obviously that started

to spread. We did not even really have any idea that it was anthrax until much later, and in some cases the people in charge basically said, I think I will go to the mountains, thank you very

much.

Self-preservation seemed to be a key there. I am not saying that

it all fell apart, but it was a hell of a thing, and if you really read

through that, and you see that could be almost a verbatim script

for one of the very popular movies that we seem to have around

lately about such events, it will scare the socks off you.

I think the exercises were very well-taken. There was some

thought that that was not a wise use of funds. I think just the opposite. At least to my way of thinking they really showed how far

that we have to come.

Now, I am making a speech and not letting you answer the question. Go ahead.

General LAWLOR. As I understand your question, sir, there are

two areas. The first was the interaction of the JTF and the CSTs

during TOP OFF. We had CST number 1 from Massachusetts with

us throughout that process. They were very effective. We utilized

them in conjunction with—in fact, we tag-teamed them with the

Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force of the Marine Corps,

and those two elements worked together very well as a team. I

thought they were very valuable and of great assistance to us.

Second, with respect to TOP OFF, I would agree with you that

that was an extremely effective exercise. It was very well done. My

only comment, in two respects, perhaps, is that I think we may

have paid a little bit too much emphasis on the no-notice aspect of

it. We probably could have done a little better, had we known that

we were going to have an exercise at a certain time—now, let us

train for it, let us practice what we train, and then evaluate what

we did and see where we went wrong. That is my Army upbringing.

However, I think one of the lessons learned out of TOP OFF that

we have looked at strongly within the Joint Forces Command, and

it was driven somewhat by the artificiality of the exercise, is that

we may have deployed to the wrong place. We are one of a kind,

JTF–CS. We deployed to Portsmouth by virtue of the script, when

in reality as we stepped back and looked at the TOP OFF exercise

the real threat appeared to emerge in Denver. So that has given

everyone pause to think about what is the trigger point for us to

actually launch.

Senator ROBERTS. What was the threat in Portsmouth? I cannot

remember.

General LAWLOR. The threat in Portsmouth was a chemical attack. It was relatively small in terms of numbers, compared to

Denver. We looked at probably 50 to 60 casualties in Portsmouth,

whereas Denver, of course, was exponentially larger.

Senator ROBERTS. Most of the experts who have come before this

subcommittee, when we ask what keeps you up at night, and they

indicate cyber threats, and then the possibility of the biological atVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:35 Oct 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 82394.031 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
47

tack, and anthrax would be so easy, and we see the hoof and mouth

disease publicity and BSE agriterrorism. Anybody, it is a little

frightening in regards to how easy it would be, and you are talking

about real consequences, so I really appreciate that.

You said there was no notice, a no-notice exercise, but you indicated because of your military background maybe we should have

provided notice. Maybe that training could have been a little bit

better in terms of experience. I know I went out to Urban Warrior

when the Marine Corps did that about—what was it, a year and

a half, 2 years ago, and the local community knew what was going

to happen but still did not know about how the chain of events

would evolve, but at least they were there and semi-prepared. Is

that what you are saying?

General LAWLOR. Yes, sir. I think from a training perspective

you want to have an objective that you are training for, and then

you can prepare yourself and use that exercise as a way to evaluate

how well your training was, and what were your deficiencies you

need to correct. That probably would have been a little bit more effective.

Senator ROBERTS. Do you have any comments on how we are either adequately or not adequately organized, as Senator Landrieu

has indicated, from Congress, what, on-down or on-up, and the

military?

General LAWLOR. I think in response to your question, within the

military, once there is an order issued by the Joint Staff to execute

military support, at least from my perspective the chain of command is very clear. I work for the CINC. The CINC reports to the

Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense,

of course, is his staff, working this particular issue.

With regard to the JTF itself, our challenge has been and will

be for some time, manpower. We are organized. Like everything

else in this field, we were set up very quickly. We are still working

on manpower issues through the process to be underwritten by the

services.

Senator ROBERTS. We are trying to get enough money in the appropriations process so that you can have these joint exercises, not

only in terms of your war-fighting capability, in regard to those

threats, but precisely the kind of contingencies that you are involved in. You have spent a lot of time with State and local officials

from around the Nation. The same question I asked in regards to

General Davis, any impression on what those officials are saying,

their views on the WMD–CSTs and your outfit?

General LAWLOR. I think there was initially some concern about

the presence of the Federal Government, particularly the Federal

military, intervening in local affairs and State affairs. I think, however, as the process has evolved, particularly as the CSTs have

been involved, those views are changing.

We find now that when we go to places to conduct exercises or

plan for special events, that we are very well-received. We are more

and more getting inquiries from State and local officials who would

like us to work with them. In some respects, that presents us with

a problem, because we have not staffed to have a great deal of

interaction with State and local officials, because in the final analysis we always follow a lead Federal agency. We are always working

48

for the Federal lead agency on-site, and not necessarily the State

and locals.

Senator ROBERTS. We had quite a debate several years ago

whether the DOD made a mistake as to whether or not they are

the lead agency in this whole endeavor, and obviously, that went

to the Department of Justice, and obviously, that was one of the

concerns in regard to DOD being the lead agency. I think that was

probably a wise decision on the part of President Clinton and others, and also Dick Clark, and so that decision has been made, and

so I hope we can work that out.

General LAWLOR. I did not mean to suggest that we should be

the lead, Senator. We clearly should not be, and we are not designed to be.

Senator ROBERTS. It sounded like you said that. As a matter of

fact, I said that about 2 years ago, but that is beside the point. I

have changed my mind.

I met with the Kansas first responders when they had their second annual meeting, and county officials, local community officials,

fire fighters, health care first responders, mayors, so on and so

forth. It is quite a meeting, and it is getting bigger and bigger, and

quite frankly they look to us to say, please give us the guidance,

give us the blueprint, we need: (a) money, which is always the case,

funding; (b) expertise; and (c) a blueprint, and let us run some exercises, let us see if it works.

So in that regard, why DOD—and you know as well as I do, if

we have an incident, who is going to be there. We are going to be

asked. We are about the only ones with the discipline and the numbers and the expertise to get there fast and to do something.

John Hamre has indicated that it should not be our responsibility in the ‘‘TO’’ chart, but you know darned well that we are going

to be there, and we are going to have to be ready in that respect.

That is the last of the questions. I am starting to lecture instead

of giving speeches, and so I will cease and desist. Do any of you

have any concluding comments or suggestions for the good of the

order on this whole topic that you would like to offer at this time?

I want to thank you for the job you are doing and the dedication

you are showing to this very difficult challenge that we have that,

as you have indicated, or you know by this subcommittee and all

the press attention to this, number 1 in terms of the threat that

we face in our country today, so I really think you are on the front

lines doing a great job. I thank you for coming to the subcommittee, and I thank you for your contribution. Mr. Lieberman, any concluding remarks?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. No, sir.

Senator ROBERTS. General Davis?

General DAVIS. Just one thing, sir. As you indicated, we are

going to be there, and we know in the Guard we are going to be

there probably as the first military folks on site, because when it

gets out of control for the mayor or the village——

Senator ROBERTS. But General, we did that on purpose because

local officials are familiar with the National Guard, and the National Guard is familiar with the local officials. We thought that

was a good fit.

49

General DAVIS. Yes, sir, so we would like to see this capability

expanded in the sense, particularly with respect to the training of

local first responders. They come to us all the time for that kind

of training, and that is one of the things—I think, number 1, training is a competency of the military, and I think we could really assist them a great deal more perhaps in that arena, sir.

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you.

General Maples?

General MAPLES. Sir, the only comment I would make is, as I

mentioned before, that the specialized training, skills, and equipment that the CSTs do possess truly do support and facilitate the

development of increased local and State capabilities, and we are

absolutely dedicated as a team to ensuring that we resolve whatever issues remain with the CSTs in order to get them certified in

the nearest possible time.

Senator ROBERTS. General Lawlor?

General LAWLOR. I have nothing. Thank you.

Senator ROBERTS. The subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank

you, gentlemen.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

WMD–CST INITIATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW

1. Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Lieberman, in your opening statement you note that

a thorough program review of the WMD–CST initiative is underway. This review

is to cover the operational concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations, funding and the certification process—all of which arguably have problems today. Please describe the participants in the WMD–CST program review, its elements, and what they have determined to date.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Since the Office of the Inspector General, DOD, is not a program

review member, this response was derived from information provided by the Office

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs). In January 2001, in response to one of the recommendations in our audit report, the Deputy Secretary of

Defense directed a formal OSD-led program review with a completion date by August 1, 2001. The current effort is on track to meet the completion date.

The program review is under the lead of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict); with full participation of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics); the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); OSD General Counsel; Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation; the Joint Staff; the U.S.

Joint Forces Command; the Army; and the National Guard Bureau.

Nine subgroups were formed to address current program deficiencies, propose any

program adjustments, and identify recommendations to integrate the WMD–CST

Program into existing DOD institutional practices. These subgroups are: (1) Missions and Operational Capabilities; (2) Regional and State Coverage Parameters; (3)

Sustainment Factors; (4) Individual and Collective Skills Requirements; (5) Organizational Structure; (6) Modernization, Fielding and Logistical Support; (7) Legislative Requirements; (8) Certification Standards and Procedures; and (9) Funding Profile Development. To date, the subgroups have not finalized or published the results

of their efforts, but indicate that the August 1, 2001, suspense will be met.

2. Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Lieberman, in your opinion, what remains to be done

before the WMD–CSTs can be certified?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. As a result of our audit report, a senior level working group with

representatives from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs); the Inspector General, DOD; the National Guard Bureau; and the Army was established

to oversee the correction of known deficiencies and to work toward WMD–CST certification. Significant progress has been made to date. The following actions are

planned so that the 10 initial CSTs may be certified by August 2001.

An operational test and evaluation is planned to be conducted for the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS). The MALS will undergo the same types of autoVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:35 Oct 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 82394.031 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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motive and mission-related tests new programs normally undergo. This is currently

scheduled to be completed by August 25, 2001. In addition, the teams are scheduled

to undergo training on revised tactics, techniques, and procedures on the missionrelated equipment contained in the MALS. The teams will then undergo a certification evaluation on that training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. That effort is

currently scheduled to be completed by July 15, 2001. Pending successful completion

of these efforts, the initial 10 CSTs would be candidates for certification.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

3. Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Lieberman, General Davis, General Maples, and General Lawlor, after reviewing the IG Audit Report and discussing this issue with

some knowledgeable people, I’ve come to the conclusion that one systemic problem

is the relationships between various Federal, state, and local organizations. The lack

of clarity in law, procedures, memorandums of understanding and other organizational constructs has resulted in what the military calls ‘‘an unclear chain of command.’’ Every expert I’ve talked to and every report I’ve read stresses the same

thing—the need for a quick, coordinated response between the various agencies. I’m

afraid that this is probably the biggest weakness in our present program. Can you

tell me if the governor of a State in which a WMD–CST is based could order a CST

to perform its mission even before it has been certified by the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. As stated in the National Security Authorization Act of 1999, ‘‘a

Reserve component rapid assessment element team and any Reserve assigned to

such a team may not be used to respond to an emergency unless the team or that

Reserve possesses the requisite skills, training, and equipment to be efficient in all

mission requirements.’’ This is the certification standard. As a result, the teams are

not allowed to respond to an incident until the teams are certified to Congress by

the Secretary of Defense.

General DAVIS and General MAPLES. While the laws of the 54 National Guard jurisdictions vary, in general the governor is the commander in chief of the militia,

which includes the National Guard. The Adjutant General is the governor’s principal advisor on military matters and manages the state’s military establishment.

Members of the National Guard serving in Title 32 status (federally-funded but remaining in militia status under state control) and members of the National Guard

ordered to state active duty under state law, typically to respond to emergencies,

disasters, or civil disturbances, are under the command and control of the governor.

Because members of the CSTs serve in a Title 32 Active Guard/Reserve status,

they are under the command and control of the governor at all times until mobilized

for active duty. In the event of a WMD emergency or disaster, it is reasonable to

assume that a governor will use personnel and assets under his command and control as needed to most effectively respond to that situation.

CSTs, like all other military units, would also respond to emergencies under the

‘‘Immediate Response’’ doctrine. That doctrine allows local military commanders to

act without prior approval of higher headquarters when necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering or mitigate great property damage. See Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, paragraph 4.5 (attached).

51

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General LAWLOR. A governor of a State could order a WMD–CST to perform a

mission before it is certified by the Secretary of Defense. He/she would do so in his/

her capacity as the senior State official and the unit would perform its mission

under State orders.

4. Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Lieberman, General Davis, General Maples, and General Lawlor, can you tell me the status of the effort to reach State-to-State compacts

so that CSTs in one State can travel to a neighboring State to provide assistance

in the case of a WMD incident?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Department of Defense only maintains visibility of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) oversees the EMAC. The EMAC establishes a legal foundation

for requests between States for emergency assistance. Requests made under the

EMAC are contractually binding. The State receiving assistance is responsible for

reimbursement of costs incurred by the State supplying assistance. However, not all

States where WMD–CSTs are located are signatories of the EMAC. Of the first 10

WMD–CSTs, only three are located in EMAC States. Of the 17 WMD–CSTs now in

training, 11 are located in EMAC States. With 13 WMD–CSTs located in States that

are not signatories to the EMAC, continued emphasis by FEMA is needed to ensure

that compacts are in place between those States and the surrounding States.

General DAVIS and General MAPLES. Forty states are members of the Emergency

Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). That compact provides for most forms of

interstate cooperation but is not applicable to the use of Civil Support Teams. Individual States can quickly reach agreements to rapidly share or lend resources in an

emergency situation. Therefore, the lack of a compact between two States does not

preclude requests for assistance.

Currently there are three general humanitarian compacts in place. The Mutual

Aide Compact enacted in 1952 by Pennsylvania (PA), New York (NY), and New Jersey (NJ); The Southwestern Governors Compact (amended to include the National

Guard) between the states of Arizona (AZ), California (CA), Colorado (CO), New

Mexico (NM), Nevada (NV), and Utah (UT); and the Southern Regional Emergency

Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC).

In August 1993 the 19-member Southern Governors’ Association (SGA) signed the

SREMAC. The signatories were the Governors of Alabama (AL), Arkansas (AR),

Delaware (DE), Florida (FL), Georgia (GA), Kentucky (KY), Louisiana (LA), Maryland (MD), Mississippi (MS), Missouri (MO), North Carolina (NC), Oklahoma (OK),

Puerto Rico (PR), South Carolina (SC), Tennessee (TN), Texas (TX), Virgin Islands

(VI), Virginia (VA), and West Virginia (WV). Though signed by the Southern Governors Association (SGA) governors, SREMAC requires enactment by some states’

legislatures.

In January 1995, the SGA passed a resolution to open SREMAC membership to

all other states/territories and seek state and Federal ratification, thereby providing

a core for expansion into a single national compact. The amended version of

SREMAC is called the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).

To date, the following 40 states/territories have enacted EMAC: AR, AZ, Connecticut (CT), DE, FL, GA, Indiana (IN), Iowa (IA), KY, Kansas (KS), LA, Massachusetts

(MA), Maine (ME), MD, Minnesota (MN), MS, MO, MT, Nebraska (NE), New Mexico

(NM), Nevada (NV), New Mexico (NM), NC, North Dakota (ND), New Hampshire

(NH), OK, Pennsylvania (PA), PR, Rhode Island (RI), SC, South Dakota (SD), TN,

TX, VA, VI, Vermont (VT), Wisconsin (WI), and WV.

General LAWLOR. Many States are members of interstate compacts that promote

cooperation among the jurisdictions. The largest such compact is the Emergency

Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). National Guard units have been traveling freely to neighboring States to render needed assistance for years without regard to whether the sending and/or receiving States are members of any particular

compact. Movement between States is not considered to be a problem.

5. Senator LANDRIEU. General Lawlor, you are assigned as the Commander, Joint

Task Force Civil Support. The JTF focuses exclusively on providing military support. Some of the CSTs, once certified, are scheduled to be assigned to the Commander in Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC). What will be your relationship to

those teams? Will it change if they are federalized?

General LAWLOR. These teams will report to the Adjutants General of the respective States to which they are assigned. In the event of an incident involving weapons of mass destruction, CSTs would respond as directed by the Adjutant General

of the affected State. If they are federalized and if JTF–CS is deployed to the

CINCPAC’s AOR to oversee DOD’s response, the CINC might place such teams

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under the JTF’s operational control. Otherwise, they would respond as directed by

CINCPAC.

6. Senator LANDRIEU. General Lawlor, will the Joint Task Force have any relationship with the CSTs or other National Guard units that a governor calls upon

in response to a crisis if they have not yet been federalized?

General LAWLOR. If National Guard forces are not federalized, they remain under

the control of the governor of the State in which they are located and will take their

direction from him or her. In such event, the JTF will conduct liaison operations

with such units to ensure effective coordination of ongoing operations.

WMD–CST INITIATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW

7. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis, in the opening statement of Mr. Lieberman,

he noted that a thorough program review of the WMD–CST initiative is underway.

This review is to cover the operational concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment,

personnel assignments and rotations, funding and the certification process—all of

which arguably have problems today. Do you have anything to add to Mr.

Lieberman’s comments on the program review?

General DAVIS. A program review was initiated by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA) concerning the WMD–CST operational

concept, doctrine, equipment, sustainment, personnel assignments and rotations,

finding and the certification process. The program review has been completed and

was forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for final approval.

The program review recommendations resulted from the full participation and

support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Department of the Army and National Guard Bureau staffs.

The original focus of the review was to address current program deficiencies, propose needed program adjustments and identify recommendations for optimum integration of the segment being examined into Department of Defense business practices. During the program review, it became apparent that the institutional processes of the Army, rather than the program review, would best address many longrange issues. The Army agreed to conduct a Force Management Analysis Review

(FMAR) to provide a comprehensive high-level examination of these and other

WMD–CST management issues, and to ensure that the program was fully integrated into the Army’s institutional processes. With this commitment from the

Army, the focus of the program review shifted to addressing issues necessary to develop a comprehensive program baseline and to propose adjustments necessary to

effectively implement the program, pending the results of the Army’s FMAR.

Although many areas of concern were raised by the recent DOD Inspector General

Report regarding overall management of the WMD–CST program, I am confident

that we are headed in the right direction toward their resolution.

8. Senator LANDRIEU. General Maples, do you have anything to add to Mr.

Lieberman’s comments on the program review?

General MAPLES. The Army is very supportive of the ongoing Department of Defense program review. We are cooperating fully in providing personnel with appropriate expertise and documentation of the program’s established processes that we

believe will assist in resolving any remaining concerns in the program areas mentioned. Our intent is to ensure that the Civil Support Teams are properly manned,

trained, and equipped and that longer-term programmatic and systemic issues are

resolved.

9. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis, General Maples, and General Lawlor, what

do you envision to be your respective organization’s role relative to the WMD–CSTs

and each other once the WMD–CSTs have been certified and are performing their

mission?

General DAVIS. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is the channel of communication on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, Army National Guard of the

United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States between (1) the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force, and (2) the several States

(U.S. Code: Title 10, Section 10501). The Chief of the National Guard Bureau has

responsibility for: allocating unit structure, strength authorizations, and other resources; prescribing the training discipline and training requirements; the allocation

of Federal funds; ensuring that units and members of the Army National Guard and

the Air National Guard are trained by the States in accordance with approved programs and policies of, and guidance from, the Chief, the Secretary of the Army, and

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the Secretary of the Air Force; monitoring and assisting the States in the organization, maintenance, and operation of National Guard units so as to provide welltrained and well-equipped units capable of augmenting the state emergency responders in time of national emergency involving weapons of mass destruction incidents; planning and administering the budget for the Army National Guard of the

United States and the Air National Guard of the United States; supervising the acquisition and supply of, and accountability of the States for, Federal property issued

to the National Guard through the property and fiscal officers designated, detailed,

or appointed under Section 708 of Title 32; supervising and administering the active

Guard and Reserve program as it pertains to the National Guard; issuing directives,

regulations, and publications consistent with approved policies of the Army and Air

Force, as appropriate; and facilitating and supporting the training of members and

units of the National Guard to meet State requirements.

These roles and responsibilities are further reinforced by the Acting Secretary of

the Army memorandum dated 2 March 01, establishing the Chief, National Guard

Bureau (CNGB) proponent for the National Guard WMD–CSTs. This responsibility

covers all management functions including training, organizing, acquisition,

sustainment, and operational support and force development. In addition, all programming, budgeting, and execution of funds for the CSTs will be executed as directed by the CNGB. The NGB will continue to coordinate Training Readiness Oversight functions with U.S. Army Forces Command and liaison with Joint Task Force

Civil Support in support of Federal activation of the CSTs.

General MAPLES. Overall program management of the WMD–CSTs will remain

with the Army. The Army will support the National Guard Bureau through Forces

Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and its other institutions to provide

training readiness and oversight, as well as support in the development of doctrine,

organizations, and materiel in order to ensure that these teams are trained,

manned, and equipped to perform their vital mission. The Army will maintain established relationships with JTF–CS to facilitate employment of the CSTs in a Federal role if required.

General LAWLOR. Once the WMD–CSTs are certified, a key objective for JTF–CS

will be to promote standardization and interoperability. While the WMD–CSTs are

operating in a State status as part of the State National Guard, JTF–CS will offer

joint training opportunities to the teams and provide them with assistance in such

areas as doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, response planning and expertise reach back. The goal is to incorporate the capabilities of the WMD–CSTs into

JTF–CS response planning.

If a WMD–CST is federalized and operational control (OPCON) is given to JTF–

CS, we envision that the WMD–CST will provide us with situational awareness, a

preliminary assessment of what support might be needed, guidance concerning local

laws and customs, and help in integrating Federal forces into state and local response operations.

INTERIM PROCESS PRIOR TO CERTIFICATION

10. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis and General Maples, during the period

prior to certification by the Secretary of Defense, I assume that the CSTs are continuing to train with first responders and others who will have a role in the event

of a terrorist incident involving a weapon of mass destruction. Can you tell me if

that training is actually taking place today?

General DAVIS and General MAPLES. Yes, in addition to the ongoing training of

the team members, the WMD–CSTs are continuously training civilian first responders and others who will have a role in the event of a terrorist incident involving

a WMD. In fact, the bonds between the WMD–CSTs and state and local officials

who are responsible for responding to emergencies are growing stronger with each

passing day. For example, in Texas, the 6th WMD–CST enjoys a strong and frequent training relationship with local officials such as the Houston Fire Chief in

charge of Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) response and the state Emergency Management Office.

In Massachusetts, the first WMD–CST has recently been training in exercises

with the State Police to coordinate sending video of an incident site back to Federal

authorities using the CSTs Unified Command Suite (UCS). Last year WMD–CSTs

participated in TOP OFFicials (TOPOFF), a nationwide exercise that involved local

first responders, the Justice Department, and other elements of the Department of

Defense in Denver, New Hampshire, and Washington, DC, where simulated WMD

events were used in concurrent exercises simulating WMD events. All of the WMD–

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CSTs train with local first responders on a continual basis, and this is providing

an awareness of the WMD–CST capabilities among civilian first responders.

The close association of the CSTs with State and local first responders is not surprising. In many states, the Adjutant General is also designated as the State Emergency Management Director. In such cases, both the CSTs and the state emergency

response assets are under the supervision of the Adjutant General.

In addition, all of the WMD–CSTs participate in a formal training program to

maintain and improve their proficiency once they are established. The Emergency

Assessment and Detection Course (EADC) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is the

kickoff for the entire training program for the WMD–CSTs. Once the teams complete EADC, the WMD–CSTs return home where members continue individual and

institutional training. WMD–CST training is unique because it combines military

and civilian training prior to certification. On average, a WMD–CST member will

complete approximately 600 hours of training, which consists of about 95 days of

temporary duty (TDY). Commanders and medical officers usually complete more

training. Courses are taught by the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and state fire academies.

The Incident Command System taught by FEMA, the Combat Lifesaver Course

taught by the U.S. Army Medical Department, and the Hazardous Materials

(HAZMAT) courses taught by state fire academies are basic courses required for

WMD–CST personnel to participate in a response to a WMD event. However, the

22-member team consists of 14 military occupational specialties, which require an

array of additional specialized training and courses.

Upon completion of the prerequisite individual training, the CSTs conduct collective training at Fort Leonard Wood. Upon completion of the collective training and

an external evaluation, the teams are normally recommended for certification. The

initial 10 teams have completed this process and have been recommended for certification. The remaining 17 teams have completed their collective training. Their external evaluations, however, have been delayed until they receive the UCS.

TOPOFF 2000 EXERCISE

11. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis, General Maples, and General Lawlor,

TOPOFF (TOP OFFicials) 2000 was a national combating terrorism field exercise

of Federal, state, and local organizations that simulated a biological weapons incident in Denver, Colorado, and a chemical incident in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Additionally, there was a separate but concurrent exercise in the National Capitol

Region that involved the use of radiological devices. I would like each of the military

witnesses to describe what role, if any, their organization played in TOPOFF or the

National Capital Region exercise and comment briefly on any lessons learned from

that participation.

General DAVIS. National Guard personnel organized themselves into liaison teams

to help assist and integrate the Federal response. Liaison teams escorted Federal

units to and from sites in and around Portsmouth, NH, where help was requested

and provided tactical communications between such units and the combined headquarters. Their knowledge of the local terrain significantly decreased response

times, as they were able to guide Federal forces unfamiliar with local street patterns quickly to sites where assistance was needed. JTF–CS found itself relying

heavily on their tactical communications capabilities to keep itself informed of the

location and progress of Federal units performing requests for assistance (RFAs).

The NH Guard did not have sufficient exercise funding to provide a robust response. The exercise would have benefited from greater funding that would have enabled the state to test and stress its mobilization and response plans. This is an

area JTF–CS is working for future exercises.

The following addresses additional issues and lessons learned from the TOPOFF

exercise:

ISSUE: Multiple Department of Defense agencies requesting status reports, no

‘‘single entry point’’ for status reporting to DOD.

DISCUSSION: Reporting points for the National Guard Bureau grew significantly

for this exercise when compared to other disasters under the Federal Response Plan

(FRP). NGB Operations Center provided Situation Reports (SITREPS) to the following Pentagon offices:

Director of Military Support (DOMS, Normal single entry point under FRP); Joint

Chiefs of Staff Manpower (JCS–J1); Army Operations Center (AOC) (Normal single

entry point for Federal Mobilization); Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations (JCS–J3); OfVerDate 11-SEP-98 13:35 Oct 18, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 82394.031 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
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fice of the Secretary of Defense Command, Control and Communications (OSD– CCC); Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Plans (JCS–J5);

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Civil Support; (ATSD–CS); Joint Chiefs of

Staff Operational Plans (JCS–J7); National Military Command Center (NMCC). Additional SITREPS were given to Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Joint Task Force

Civil Support (JTF–CS), Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM),

Forces Command (FORSCOM), and 1st Army, and 5th Army.

RECOMMENDATION: Have DOMS distribute NG support and activities for military support during WMD events as they do for other disasters under the FRP.

ISSUE: JTF–CS authority over NG personnel.

DISCUSSION: JTF–CS indicated that they wanted Tactical Control (TACON)/

Operational Control (OPCON)/Command and Control (C2) over all uniformed service

personnel at the disaster site. Only those service personnel under Title 10 support

may go under the control of JTF–CS. The Adjutant General (TAG) maintains control

of those personnel in Title 32 and State Active Duty (SAD). Normally the NG forces

are in support of state/local agencies (incident commander) while DOD assets are

in support of the lead Federal agency (LFA).

RECOMMENDATION: Clarify the authority of the JTF as it pertains to NG

forces in SAD or Title 32. Clarify coordination of support activities so all agencies

work toward a common goal. The TAG may provide assistance to JTF–CS if requested through the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) to FEMA to the state with

normal request for assistance (RFA) procedures already established.

ISSUE: Standardized reporting information.

DISCUSSION: There is a need to determine a standardized report(s) format for

WMD–CSTs in order to facilitate the transfer of information between the first responders, CSTs, JTF–CS, SBCCOM and NGB.

RECOMMENDATION: Establish a working group to facilitate and coordinate

standardized message formats and reporting formats between these agencies. Establish lead agency for publication of reports.

ISSUE: Process and procedure for handling of WMD disaster support was not

timely or responsive when compared to other disaster response support.

DISCUSSION: A disaster as a result of a WMD incident at the local or state level

is not significantly different from other disaster. Requests for Federal support from

the states should not be different. All requests should still come from FEMA to

DOMS for DOD support. Due to the probability of significantly more support from

DOD additional assets may require additional coordination within DOD but the coordination center for these assets should remain with DOMS due to their experience

and use during other disasters. This lack of experience added significant time to the

decision making process. The number of WMD incidents should remain small when

compared to the number of other military support to civil authorities operations conducted annually by DOMS.

RECOMMENDATION: External procedures to request/receive support from DOD

should remain constant. Internal changes for DOD support should be transparent

allowing more responsive and timely decisions.

ISSUE: A request for support from a civilian agency was not acted on in a timely

manner and was later denied because it did not come through proper channels.

DISCUSSION: Civilian agencies do not always know what proper channels are to

get support from DOD. DOMS has vast experience in working military support to

civil authorities and understands how to effectively get requests back into proper

channels and facilitate the request for DOD support. This well-established channel

is used for all other requests for support for disasters, is understood by other Federal agencies, and works extremely well.

RECOMMENDATION: Do not stop or sit on an action because it comes through

an improper channel. Facilitate the process to ensure each action is processed in a

timely manner. Established channels of communications to receive DOD support

during a disaster must accommodate the requestor and placed back into proper

channels at whatever level this action is received and identified as being improperly

received.

General MAPLES. The Director of Military Supports (DOMS), provided full time

manning support to the TOPOFF Crisis Response Cell throughout the course of the

exercise, processing Consequence Management (Military Support to Civil Authority)

actions and requests for Department of Defense assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. DOMS serves as the action agent for the Secretary of

the Army in his DOD Executive Agent role for military support to civil authorities.

The lesson learned for DOMS is consistent with the ongoing requirements to

maintain liaison, communicate, and train with the inter-agency and civilian authorities. Since DOMS is the Department of Defense’s entry point for support requests

from FEMA, we must sustain our ongoing relationships with multiple organizations

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to ensure that we provide the best support possible to FEMA while we coordinate

the DOD response with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Executive Secretary.

General LAWLOR. During TOPOFF, United States Joint Forces Command deployed JTF–CS to Portsmouth, New Hampshire in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s consequence management efforts at that location. Once

in Portsmouth, JTF–CS established a combined military headquarters with the New

Hampshire National Guard and provided military assistance in responses to those

state and local requests for assistance that were approved by FEMA.

In my judgment, the biggest lesson learned is that, as the size and scope of the

biological attack in Denver unfolded, the decision to deploy JTF–CS may have been

incorrect because the unit’s expertise and capabilities may have been better utilized

at the Denver incident site. In fairness, however, the decision to deploy JTF–CS to

New Hampshire was driven more by the script than by the exercise as it actually

unfolded. Based on the potential for future multiple incident sites and this lesson

learned, United States Commander in Chief, Joint Forces Command has looked at

its ability to respond to multiple sites and JTF–CS has worked on procedures to

rapidly disengage from one incident site if called upon to respond to a more serious

incident at another location.

NATIONAL GUARD WARFIGHTING MISSION

12. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis, in your prepared statement, you note that

‘‘while the National Guard may lead on certain homeland security areas, we must

not separate the National Guard team from our traditional warfighting missions. I

have two questions: one, is that statement addressed to the National Guard as a

whole, and two, if so, are you concerned that there is a risk that the homeland security mission may lead to a diminution of the participation of the National Guard

in its traditional warfighting missions?

General DAVIS. Yes, this statement is addressed to the National Guard as a

whole. The Hart-Rudman Commission released a report in January that recommended the National Guard have a lead role in homeland security, which is not

a new idea. However, leaders within the National Guard have consistently cautioned against making homeland defense the primary role of the National Guard.

Homeland defense has been a mission for the National Guard since its inception

more than 360 years ago. We will continue to provide homeland defense as well as

contribute our combat assets toward our primary role of providing the Nation with

a first line of defense against foreign threats. In essence, we help fight the Nation’s

wars, and we do this by contributing a significant share of combat assets to the regular forces, both Army and Air.

When it comes to homeland security, our role—as with the entire military—is

evolving. Currently there is a strong belief that our Nation is threatened by the possibility of a WMD attack inside our borders. This has raised an interesting issue

regarding the use of military assets inside the continental United States. One of the

main reasons that the WMD–CSTs were placed in the National Guard is because

of our constitutional role of protecting the homeland from potential harm.

13. Senator LANDRIEU. General Davis, does that statement apply in any way to

the WMD–CSTs?

General DAVIS. The WMD–CSTs represent just one of the many initiatives the

country has taken to protect its citizens and respond to the current WMD threat

against the United States. However, the National Guard has always defended the

Nation from similar threats against its citizenry and infrastructure, whether it is

the Air National Guard flying air-to-air defense of our borders or providing emergency relief for the myriad natural disasters and catastrophes that have occurred

throughout our history. The National Guard is our Nation’s forward deployed force

with a presence in more than 3,000 communities in every state, territory, and the

District of Columbia. As such we are the first line of defense inside the Nation as

well as against threats outside of United States. We are the first on the scene of

any catastrophic event, assisting the victims, providing authorities with crowd control assets, and doing what it takes to restore order and peace to the community.

We will continue to do this, and to answer the call no matter what it might be, or

from where it might come.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT REPORT NO. D–2001–043,

MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL GUARD WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION—CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS, DATED JANUARY 31, 2001.

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[Whereupon, at 4:46 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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