UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 22-23684-CIV-LENARD/LOUIS

ADISLEN PAZ DEL SOL,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOMESTEAD HOSPITAL, INC.,

BAPTIST HEALTH SOUTH 

FLORIDA, INC., HEALTHCARE 

REVENUE RECOVERY GROUP,

INC., doing business as HRRG, ARS

Account Resolution Services, and

PARAGON CONTRACTING SERVICES,

LLC, doing business as TeamHealth Florida,

Defendants.

__________________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT (D.E. 8)

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants Homestead Hospital, Inc. 

(“Homestead Hospital”) and Baptist Health South Florida, Inc.’s (“Baptist Health”) Motion 

to Dismiss Complaint, (“Motion,” D.E. 8), filed December 5, 2022. Plaintiff Adislen Paz 

del Sol filed a Response on December 18, 2022, (“Response,” D.E. 18), to which 

Homestead Hospital and Baptist Health filed a Reply on December 23, 2022, (“Reply,” 

D.E. 21). Upon review of the Motion, Response, Reply, and the record, the Court finds a 

follows.

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I. Background

On or about June 8, 2021, Plaintiff received emergency medical services from 

Defendant Homestead Hospital for injuries suffered in the course and scope of her 

employment. (Compl. (D.E. 1) ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiff informed Homestead Hospital that her 

injuries stemmed from a work-related accident. (Id. ¶ 20.) 

On or about June 20, 2021, July 4, 2021, and July 23, 2021, Homestead Hospital 

and Baptist Health (“Defendants”) jointly sent collection letters to Plaintiff, attempting to 

collect a consumer debt in the amount of $2,915.00 for treatment received at Homestead 

Hospital’s Emergency Department on June 8, 2021. (Id. ¶ 21.) 

On November 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint asserting seven claims, 

(D.E. 1); only Counts 5 and 6 remain.1 Count 5 alleges that Defendants violated the Florida 

Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”), “including Florida Statute § 559.72.” (Id.

¶¶ 50-52.) Count 6 alleges that Defendants violated the FCCPA, Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9), by 

attempting to collect a debt from Plaintiff with knowledge that they had no right or 

authority to collect the debt from Plaintiff under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation law.

(Id. ¶¶ 53-63.)

On December 5, 2022, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss arguing that 

(1) Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to assert Counts 5 and 6, and (2) in any event, Counts 

1 Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 were asserted against Defendants Healthcare Revenue 

Recovery Group, LLC d/b/a ARS Account Resolution Services ("ARS") and Paragon Contracting 

Services, LLC, d/b/a Teamhealth Florida ("Teamhealth"). On February 2, 2023, the Court entered 

an Order dismissing this case as to ARS and Teamhealth, following a Joint Notice of Settlement 

as to those Defendants. (D.E. 37, 38.)

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5 and 6 fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted. (D.E. 8.) Plaintiff filed a 

Response, (D.E. 18), to which Defendants filed a Reply, (D.E. 21). 

Because the Court finds that Counts 5 and 6 must be dismissed for lack of standing, 

the Court will confine its analysis to that issue.

II. Legal Standard

“Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the judicial power of the federal courts 

so that they may only exercise jurisdiction over ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” L.M.P. ex 

rel. E.P. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 879 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, and citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992)). 

“Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction requires a justiciable case or controversy within 

the meaning of Article III.” Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51) (1984)). 

“Standing constitutes one component of justiciability.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-

61). “Whether a plaintiff has standing presents a ‘threshold question in every federal case, 

determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.’” Id. at 1280-81 (quoting Warth 

v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). “‘Because standing is jurisdictional, a dismissal for 

lack of standing has the same effect as a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).’” Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 

Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 

921 F.2d 1190, 1203 n.42 (11th Cir. 1991)). “If the court determines at any time that it 

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P 

12(h)(3); see also Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 896 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990) 

(“[A] district court or appellate court may dismiss a case at any time for lack of subject 

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matter jurisdiction[.]”) (citing Ins. Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 704 

(1982)). 

At the motion to dismiss stage, “a plaintiff must allege facts that, taken as true, 

‘plausibly’ state that the elements of standing are met.” Hunstein v. Preferred Collection 

& Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 48 F.4th 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Thole v. U.S. Bank 

N.A., __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1621 (2020); Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 

F.3d 917, 924 (11th Cir. 2020)). “For a party to have standing to bring a lawsuit, it must 

have ‘(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of 

the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” 

Muransky, 979 F.3d at 924 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)).

III. Discussion

Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing because she has failed to allege that 

she suffered a concrete injury in fact. (Id. at 2-6.) They argue that the Complaint alleges 

only that Defendants sent Plaintiff collection letters in violation of the FCCPA, (id. at 2), 

and a bare statutory violation, divorced from any concrete harm, does not satisfy the injuryin-fact requirement of Article III, (id. at 3 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 

341 (2016); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, __ U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021); 

Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 48 F.4th 1236, 1248 (11th Cir. 

2022))). They argue that the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff made any payments 

in response to the Collection Letters or suffered any other concrete injury. (Id. at 5.) As 

such, they argue that the Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. (Id. at 5-6.)

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In her Response, Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court in Spokeo “recognized that 

‘the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some 

circumstances to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘a plaintiff in such a case need not allege 

any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’” (D.E. 18 at 4-5 (quoting 

Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 342); see also id. at 5 (quoting Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 8 

F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 342)).) She argues that 

“post-Spokeo decisions trend in favor of finding concrete injury under FDCPA where the 

amount of the validity of the debt is misstated.” (Id. at 5 (citing Church v. Accretive Health, 

Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 994-95 (11th Cir. 2016)).) She argues that violations of the FDCPA 

based on untruthful representations of the character and amount of debt, and unfair or 

unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt, should be sufficient to confer 

standing without the need to show additional harm. (Id. at 5-6.) She further argues that 

the FCCPA “allows statutory damages, and as such, a plaintiff ‘is not required to prove 

actual damages, but only a violation of one of the prohibited practices in the FCCPA.’” 

(Id. (quoting Laughlin v. Household Bank, Ltd., 969 So. 2d 509, 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 

2007), and citing Harris v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Jacksonville, 338 So. 2d 196, 200 (Fla. 

1976)).) She argues that her “allegation that she was deprived of her statutory right to 

receive correct information regarding the legitimacy of the debt as a result of Defendants’ 

unlawful actions is sufficient to demonstrate a concrete injury under FCCPA, thereby 

establishing FCCPA standing.” (Id. (discussing Bacardi v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 

Civil Action No. 16-23381-Civ-Scola, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160951, at *11-12 (S.D. Fla. 

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Apr. 4, 2017), and citing Belcher v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Case No: 8:16–cv–690–

T–23AEP, 2018 WL 1701963, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2018)).)

In their Reply, Defendants argue: “Perhaps before Spokeo and its progeny there was 

an argument that Plaintiff’s claim could have survived as pleaded, but her allegation now 

- - consisting of nothing more than a ‘bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete 

harm’ - - is too attenuated to survive.” (D.E. 21 at 1.) They argue that all of the federal 

court cases Plaintiff relies on directly conflict with subsequent decisions of the Eleventh 

Circuit and the Supreme Court. (Id. (citing Hunstein, 48 F.4th at 1248; Muransky v. 

Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 936 (11th Cir. 2020); TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 

2214; Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 1004 (11th Cir. 2020)); see 

also id. at 2-3 (citing Hunstein, 48 F.4th at 1248; Muransky, 979 F.3d at 936; TransUnion, 

141 S. Ct. at 2214; Trichell, 964 F.3d at 1004).) They further argue that Laughlin and 

Harris “are state court decisions and cannot govern standing in this Court. Even if they 

could, they directly conflict with the controlling decisions in Transunion, Hunstein, 

Muransky and Trichell.” (Id. at 2.) They further argue that to the extent Count 6 is 

predicated upon Florida’s Workers’ Compensation law—which provides, in relevant part, 

that “[a] health care provider may not collect or receive a fee from an injured employee 

within this state, except as otherwise provided by this chapter[,]” Fla Stat. § 

440.13(13)(a)—“Plaintiff did not, and cannot, plead that Defendants collected or received 

a fee in response to their correspondence, because she never made a payment.” (Id. at 3.) 

Thus, they argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a concrete injury with respect to a FCCPA 

violation predicated on Florida’s Workers’ Compensation law. (Id.)

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“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion 

of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, 

not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

560). Only concreteness is at issue here. 

“An injury is concrete if it actually exists—that is, if it is ‘real, and not abstract.’” 

Hunstein, 48 F.4th at 1242 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340). Concrete harms can be 

tangible (e.g., physical injury or financial loss) or intangible. Muransky, 979 F.3d at 926. 

However, not all intangible harms are concrete. See id. “In particular, a plaintiff does not 

‘automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a 

statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Trichell, 

964 F.3d at 997 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341). A plaintiff cannot satisfy the demands 

of Article III by alleging “a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm[.]” 

Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341. “Rather, ‘Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in 

the context of a statutory violation.’” Trichell, 964 F.3d at 997 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. 

at 341). “To determine whether an intangible injury is sufficiently concrete, we must look 

to both history and the judgment of Congress.” Id. (citing Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341). 

As for history, “we consider whether the alleged intangible injury bears a ‘close 

relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit 

in English or American courts.’” Id. (citing Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341). “Those include . . 

. reputational harms, disclosure of private information, and intrusion upon seclusion.” 

TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204 (citations omitted). For example, in Perry, the Eleventh 

Circuit “held that CNN’s dissemination of a plaintiff’s news-viewing history to a thirdCase 1:22-cv-23684-JAL Document 40 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/03/2023 Page 7 of 13
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party, in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act, could constitute a concrete injury 

because it was analogous to torts that were well-established in American courts—namely, 

invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion.” Muransky, 979 F.3d at 926 (citing 

Perry, 854 F.3d at 1340-41). And in Pedro v. Equifax, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit “held that 

an agency’s violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act—offering an allegedly inaccurate 

statement in a plaintiff’s credit report—was analogous to the longstanding tort for 

publication of defamatory material.” Id. (citing Pedro, 868 F.3d at 1279-80).

The judgment of Congress “can matter for two reasons. First, Congress may 

‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were 

previously inadequate in law.’” Trichell, 964 F.3d at 998 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578). 

“Second, Congress is ‘well positioned’ to make its own judgment about which harms are 

sufficiently concrete, particularized, and imminent to constitute injuries in fact.” Id. (citing 

Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 331). However, “Congress’s creation of a statutory prohibition or 

obligation and a cause of action does not relieve courts of their responsibility to 

independently decide whether a plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm under Article III . . 

. .” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2205.

Here, Counts 5 and 6 allege what can be characterized, at best, as an intangible harm 

resulting from a violation of the FCCPA. (See Compl. ¶¶ 21, 50-63.) Plaintiff wholly fails 

to argue that her alleged intangible injury has a common-law analogue. See Stalley, 524 

F.3d at 1232 (recognizing that the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of 

establishing an injury in fact). 

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Regardless, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s alleged intangible injury does not bear “a 

‘close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a 

lawsuit in English or American courts.’” Trichell, 964 F.3d at 997 (quoting Spokeo, 578 

U.S. at 341). In Trichell, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for sending deceptive debt 

collection letters in violation of the FDCPA (which is the FCCPA’s federal counterpart).2 

964 F.3d at 995. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the collection letters misleadingly

suggested that the plaintiffs could be sued when, in fact, the statute of limitations had 

expired on any legal right to collect the debt. 964 F.3d at 995. The district court dismissed 

the complaint for failure to state a claim. Id. On appeal, neither party raised Article III 

standing, but the Eleventh Circuit ordered them to address it at oral argument. Id. The 

Eleventh Circuit ultimately found that a bare violation of the FDCPA of the kind alleged 

in the complaint did not result in a de facto concrete injury to the plaintiffs. Id. at 997-

1005. As to history, the court found that “the common law furnishes no analog to the 

FDCPA claims asserted” by the plaintiffs. Id. at 998. “The closest historical comparison 

is to causes of action for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, but these torts differ 

from the plaintiffs’ claims in fundamental ways. For centuries, misrepresentation torts 

2 The FCCPA instructs: “In applying and construing [the FCCPA], due consideration 

and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the 

federal courts relating to the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.” Fla. Stat. § 559.77(5). 

See also Byrd v. Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co., Case No: 6:18-cv-1809-Orl-22GJK, 2019 WL 

13246785, at *9 (M.D Fla. Sept. 19, 2019) (“[T]he FDCPA and FCCPA are largely similar and 

‘the FCCPA is construed in accordance with the FDCPA.’”) (quoting Lilly v. Bayview Loan 

Servicing, LLC, Case No: 2:17-cv-345-FtM-99MRM, 2017 WL 4410040, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 

2017)).

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have required a showing of justifiable reliance and actual damages[,]” which the plaintiffs 

had not alleged. Id. (citations omitted).

Similarly, here, the Complaint alleges that Defendants sent collection letters which 

misrepresented that Plaintiff owed Defendants a debt—specifically, it alleges that 

Defendants cannot recover the debt from Plaintiff under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation 

law. (See Compl. ¶¶ 21, 50-63.) However, it does not allege justifiable reliance or actual 

damages. “By jettisoning the bedrock elements of reliance and damages, the plaintiff[]

assert[s] claims with no relationship to harms traditionally remediable in American or 

English courts.” Trichell, 964 F.3d at 998. “This cuts against Article III standing, for the 

purpose of that doctrine is to confine courts to their ‘traditional role.’” Trichell, 964 F.3d 

at 998.

The Eleventh Circuit in Trichell further found that “the judgment of Congress 

disfavor[ed]” the plaintiffs. Id. at 999. It reasoned:

The FDCPA’s statutory findings contain one sentence identifying the harms 

against which the statute is directed: “Abusive debt collection practices 

contribute to [a] number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to 

the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a). 

These serious harms are a far cry from whatever injury one may suffer from 

receiving in the mail a misleading communication that fails to mislead. In 

terms of “privacy and nuisance concerns,” Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169, an 

unwanted mailing is more like an unwanted text message than an unwanted 

phone call. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 

530, 542, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 65 L. Ed.2d 319 (1980) (recipient “may escape 

exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring the 

[communication] from envelope to wastebasket”). And while a recipient 

may take offense that a private party has violated the FDCPA, that is akin to 

taking offense that the government has violated other statutes—an injury that 

is canonically abstract as opposed to concrete. See, e.g., Defs. of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. at 575–76, 112 S. Ct. 2130; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754, 

104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984).

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The FDCPA’s private cause of action reinforces this analysis. It provides 

that a person may recover “any actual damage sustained by such person as a 

result of” an FDCPA violation and “such additional damages as the court 

may allow.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). This formulation suggests that Congress 

viewed statutory damages not as an independent font of standing for 

plaintiffs without traditional injuries, but as an “additional” remedy for 

plaintiffs suffering “actual damage” caused by a statutory violation

Id. at 999-1000. As such, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “the FDCPA’s narrow 

findings and cause of action affirmatively cut against [the plaintiffs] and, in any event, 

suggest no congressional judgment firm enough to break with centuries of tradition 

indicating that misrepresentations are not actionable absent reliance and ensuing damages.” 

Id.

This Court agrees that the harms Congress identified in the FDCPA, including 

personal bankruptcy, marital instability, job loss, and invasion of privacy, “are a far cry 

from whatever injury one may suffer from receiving in the mail a misleading 

communication that fails to mislead.” Id. at 999. Furthermore, like the FDCPA, the 

FCCPA’s private cause of action provides that a person may recover “actual damages and 

. . . additional statutory damages as the court may allow . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 559.77(2). “This 

formulation suggests that [the Florida legislature] viewed statutory damages not as an 

independent font of standing for plaintiffs without traditional injuries, but as an ‘additional’

remedy for plaintiffs suffering ‘actual damage’ caused by a statutory violation.” Id. at 

1000. Thus, the Florida legislature’s judgment disfavors Plaintiff. Id.

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s reliance on Church, in which the Eleventh Circuit held 

that a mere deprivation of the right to disclosures required by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 

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1692e(11), 1692g(a)(1)-(5), is a concrete injury in fact even absent a tangible injury. 654 

F. App’x at 995. Church is an “unpublished opinion [that] directly conflicts with 

subsequent binding decisions of the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit.” Klein v. 

Receivable Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1194 (M.D. Fla. 2022) (citing 

TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2214 (concluding the plaintiffs lacked standing because asserted 

“informational injury that causes no adverse effects cannot satisfy Article III”); Trichell, 

964 F.3d at 1004). “The Court is not permitted to follow an unpublished Eleventh Circuit 

decision when it conflicts with precedent.” Id. (citing 11th Cir. Rule 36-2).

The Court further rejects Plaintiff’s argument “she was deprived of her statutory 

right to receive correct information regarding the legitimacy of the debt . . . .” (Resp. at 6 

(citing Bacardi, 2017 U.S. Dist. Ct. LEXIS 160951, at *11-12; Belcher, 2018 WL 1701963, 

at *4).) To begin with, Plaintiff cites no provision of the FCCPA that provides a statutory 

right to receive correct information regarding the legitimacy of the debt. Even assuming 

that the FCCPA does confer such a right, the Complaint does not allege that Defendants 

violated that right—it merely alleges that Defendants attempted to collect a debt they knew 

they had no right to collect in violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). (Compl. ¶¶ 60-61.) And 

even assuming that the FCCPA provides a statutory right to receive correct information 

regarding the legitimacy of a debt and that the Defendants violated that right, a bare 

statutory violation is not enough where, as here, neither history nor the judgment of 

Congress (or the Florida legislature) support a finding that the intangible injury is 

sufficiently concrete to establish Article III standing. See Trichell, 964 F.3d at 1003 

(rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that “the FDCPA gives them a right to receive truthful 

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communications from debt collectors, which makes any violation of that right qualify as a 

concrete injury”). 

In light of the above, the Court finds that Counts 5 and 6 fail to allege a concrete 

injury in fact. Consequently, Counts 5 and 6 must be dismissed without prejudice for lack 

of standing. See Stalley, 524 F.3d at 1232 (“A dismissal for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice.”) (citing

Crotwell v. Hockman–Lewis Ltd., 734 F.2d 767, 769 (11th Cir. 1984)).

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint (D.E. 8) is GRANTED;

2. Counts 5 and 6 of the Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE for lack of standing; 

3. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT; and

4. This case is now CLOSED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 3rd day of February, 

2023.

____________________________________

JOAN A. LENARD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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