19-3656

Carrasco-Canales v. Garland

BIA

Loprest, IJ

A077 406 820

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 20th 4 day of May, two thousand twenty-two.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,

8 REENA RAGGI,

9 JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 ORLIN ANTONIO CARRASCO-CANALES,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 19-3656

17 NAC

18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

20 Respondent.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: Craig Relles, Esq., White Plains, 

24 NY.

25

26 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant

27 Attorney General; Mary Jane 

28 Candaux, Assistant Director; 
2

1 Stephen Finn, Trial Attorney, 

2 Office of Immigration Litigation, 

3 United States Department of 

4 Justice, Washington, DC.

5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

8 is DENIED.

9 Petitioner Orlin Antonio Carrasco-Canales, a native and 

10 citizen of Honduras, seeks review of an October 16, 2019, 

11 decision of the BIA affirming an April 17, 2019, decision of 

12 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for 

13 withholding of removal and relief under the Convention 

14 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Orlin Antonio Carrasco15 Canales, No. A077 406 820 (B.I.A. Oct. 16, 2019), aff’g No. 

16 A077 406 820 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 17, 2019). We assume 

17 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 

18 procedural history.

19 Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the decisions 

20 of both the IJ and the BIA. See Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 

21 494 F.3d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 2007). The applicable standards 

22 of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 

23 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 
3

1 2014) (reviewing factual findings for substantial evidence 

2 and questions of law de novo). Carrasco-Canales applied for 

3 withholding of removal based on political opinion and 

4 membership in a particular social group, and for CAT relief, 

5 asserting that a Honduran crime family—the Acostas—threatened 

6 him because he refused to sell them his livestock and because 

7 they suspected him of having an affair with the wife of an 

8 Acosta family member.

9 I. Withholding of Removal

10 An applicant for withholding of removal must establish 

11 that his “life or freedom would be threatened in [the] country 

12 [of removal]” on the basis of “race, religion, nationality, 

13 membership in a particular social group, or political 

14 opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). An applicant must

15 “demonstrate a clear probability of future persecution on 

16 account of a protected characteristic,” Hong Fei Gao v. 

17 Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (quotation marks 

18 omitted). 

19 Even assuming Carrasco-Canales’s past harm rose to the 

20 level of persecution, the agency did not err in denying 

21 withholding of removal because the record supports the 
4

1 agency’s conclusion that Carrasco-Canales failed to show a 

2 nexus to a protected ground. An applicant must establish 

3 both that there is an applicable protected ground and that 

4 his alleged persecutors were motivated to harm him on that 

5 basis. See Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010).

6 Here, Carrasco-Canales’s claimed memberships in several 

7 social groups based on his status as a businessowner and 

8 landowner facing extortion were not cognizable. 1 “To 

9 constitute a particular social group, a group must be: 

10 “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable 

11 characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and 

12 (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”

13 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); 

14 see also Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195–97. The agency did not err 

15 in concluding that the proposed groups were not cognizable 

16 because the record reflected that broad swaths of the Honduran 

17 population are victims of crime and Carrasco-Canales’s 

1 Insofar as Carrasco-Canales challenges the IJ’s failure to 

address whether he expressed a political opinion when he 

refused to pay a bribe to a traffic officer, he did not raise 

this claim before the BIA and it is therefore unexhausted.

See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 107 

n.1, 118-22 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that our review is 

generally limited to issues raised before the agency).
5

1 proposed groups were based on access to money or property or 

2 defined by the harm suffered. See Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 

3 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that “a social group 

4 cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that its members 

5 have been subjected to harm”). “When the harm visited upon 

6 members of a group is attributable to the incentives presented 

7 to ordinary criminals rather than to persecution, the scales 

8 are tipped away from considering those people a ‘particular 

9 social group’ within the meaning of the INA.” Id.

10 Moreover, the record supports the agency’s conclusion 

11 that Carrasco-Canales also failed to show that his membership 

12 in any group was a reason for the harm he suffered. See

13 Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195 (“the applicant must establish both 

14 that the group itself was cognizable and that the alleged 

15 persecutors targeted the applicant on account of h[is]

16 membership in that group” (citations and quotation marks 

17 omitted)). Carrasco-Canales concurs with the agency findings 

18 that personal avarice played a role in the Acosta family’s 

19 actions, and his own testimony reflects that he was targeted 

20 for his assets and his suspected affair. Although he 

21 maintains that his status as a landowner facing extortion 
6

1 constitutes a distinct and particular social group, he does 

2 not show that the Acostas targeted him for that reason.

3 II. CAT Claim

4 The agency did not err in finding that Carrasco-Canales 

5 failed to meet his burden of proof for CAT relief. See 

6 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). A CAT applicant must prove that 

7 “it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured,”

8 id., “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 

9 acquiescence of a public official,” id. § 1208.18(a)(1). 

10 “Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment 

11 and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or 

12 degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to 

13 torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2); see also Kyaw Zwar Tun 

14 v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 567 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]orture requires 

15 proof of something more severe than the kind of treatment 

16 that would suffice to prove persecution.”). In assessing the 

17 likelihood of torture, the agency considers, among other 

18 factors, past torture, the possibility of relocation, “gross, 

19 flagrant, or mass violations of human rights within the 

20 country of removal,” and “[o]ther relevant information 

21 regarding conditions in the country of removal.” 
7

1 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i)–(v). “An alien will never be 

2 able to show that he faces a more likely than not chance of 

3 torture if one link in the chain cannot be shown to be more 

4 likely than not to occur. It is the likelihood of all 

5 necessary events coming together that must more likely than 

6 not lead to torture, and a chain of events cannot be more 

7 likely than its least likely link.” Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 

8 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Matter of J–F–F–, 23 I. 

9 & N. Dec. 912, 918 n. 4 (A.G. 2006)). 

10 Here, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial 

11 of CAT relief. In arguing otherwise, Carrasco-Canales 

12 references evidence “that the Acosta family seized [his]

13 land, slaughtered and poisoned his father-in-law’s cattle, 

14 looted his home, and attempted to covertly locate him through 

15 Facebook,” along with another gang’s extortion of his 

16 brother, as showing that he likely will face torture if 

17 returned to Honduras. While terribly unfortunate, these acts 

18 do not amount to torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2). 

19 Moreover, Carrasco-Canales did not present evidence that he 

20 was forced to pay the Acostas or anybody else while he lived 

21 in Honduras, and he did not allege that his brother who was 
8

1 extorted was tortured. Carrasco-Canales also testified that

2 the Honduran police were untrustworthy and did not act when 

3 he reported that a possible Acosta associate pointed a gun at 

4 him. However, his country conditions evidence reflects both 

5 severe crime and corruption and government efforts to 

6 ameliorate those problems. Given the absence of past torture 

7 (of him or his family members) and absence of clear evidence 

8 that the authorities would acquiesce to his torture, the 

9 agency did not err in concluding that he had not shown he 

10 would more likely than not be tortured with the acquiescence 

11 of Honduran authorities. See Savchuck, 518 F.3d at 123.

12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

13 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

14 stays VACATED.

15 FOR THE COURT: 

16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

17 Clerk of Court