J-S12003-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

KAITLYN JOANNE MANGONE

Appellant No. 2474 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 26, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0002546-2014

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2016

Appellant, Kaitlyn Joanne Mangone, appeals from the June 26, 2015 

aggregate judgment of sentence of one to two years’ imprisonment, followed 

by three years’ probation, imposed following the revocation of her prior 

probation sentence. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the facts and procedural history of his case as 

follows.

[Appellant] was originally arrested for offenses 

committed on June 3, 2014. [Appellant] was 

charged with Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2702(a)(2), Simple Assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ [2701](a)(1), Harassment—Subject Other to 

Physical Contact, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1), Public 

Drunkenness and Similar Misconduct, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5505, and Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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§ 2702(a)(3). On August 29, 2014, [Appellant] ... 

pled guilty to Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2702(a)(3). In return, the Commonwealth 

withdrew the other four charges.

[That same day], [Appellant] was sentenced to 

a period of incarceration for a minimum of three 

months to a maximum of six months and a period of 

supervision for a maximum of twelve months. 

[Appellant] was also given credit for her time served 

and ordered to pay court costs and fines totaling 

$1,475.69.

[Appellant’s] Petition for Parole was approved 

on October 8, 2014 and became effective on October 

9, 2014. [Appellant] was released on parole. 

Northampton County Probation Department filed a 

Petition for Review of [Appellant’s] parole on 

December 26, 2014 after [Appellant] received a new 

charge. A Gagnon II[1] hearing was held on 

February 13, 2015 as a result of the new charge and 

technical violations. As a result, [Appellant] was 

found a willful violator of her supervision and a strict 

compliance order was entered. [Appellant] was 

released from Northampton County Prison following 

the Gagnon II hearing.

Another Gagnon II hearing was held on June 

26, 2015 in regard to [Appellant’s] technical 

violations of supervision since being released after 

the first Gagnon II hearing. [Appellant’s] Probation 

Officer, Christiana Buniak [], testified at the June 26, 

2015 Gagnon II hearing. Buniak stated that 

[Appellant’s] technical violations included: failing to 

report as directed, failing to enroll in treatment,

failing to submit to random urine screens, failing to 

comply with mental health treatment, failing to 

provide a verifiable address, and failing to make 

payments, as [Appellant] still owes $1,435.69.

____________________________________________

1 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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Specifically, after [Appellant] was released on 

February 13, 2015, [Appellant] failed to report to 

Buniak’s office until April 9, 2015. When [Appellant] 

finally reported to Buniak on April 9, 2015, [she] 

tested positive for heroin, methamphetamine, and 

marijuana and admitted to drinking alcohol. 

[Appellant] was advised to immediately get a Drug 

and Alcohol Evaluation, and she did so on April 16, 

2015. The Drug and Alcohol Evaluation 

recommended intensive outpatient treatment, but 

[Appellant] never enrolled in treatment and missed 

three appointments in connection with the 

evaluation’s recommendation for intensive outpatient 

treatment. Moreover, on April 23, 2015, [Appellant] 

was given notice of a Gagnon I hearing to be held 

on May 7, 2015. [Appellant] missed her 

appointment with Buniak on May 6, 2015 and did not 

appear for the Gagnon I hearing on May 7, 2015. 

As a result of her failure to appear, a bench warrant 

was issued and [Appellant] was subsequently picked 

up on the bench warrant.

Buniak also recommended that [Appellant] be 

sentenced to a state correctional facility. Buniak 

reasoned that due to [Appellant’s] “mental health 

and drug issues ... the State system would be able to 

help her out a little bit more.” Further, Buniak 

stated that [Appellant’s] maximum date of 

supervision remained December 4, 2015.

At the June 26, 2015 Gagnon II hearing, 

[Appellant] stated that she was approximately 

sixteen weeks pregnant and was interested in 

pursuing intensive outpatient or inpatient treatment. 

When asked why she did not go to treatment 

following her April 2015 Drug and Alcohol Evaluation 

or prior to the evaluation, [Appellant] responded that 

she had just discovered her pregnancy and 

consequently, she stated, “I wasn’t in my right state 

of mind. I didn’t know how to ... handle the 

situation. I was very upset, and I just kind of 

blocked out the whole world.” [Appellant] also 

indicated that she is currently treated for posttraumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder. 
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Additionally, [Appellant] testified that she has not 

used drugs since finding out she was pregnant.

Following the June 26, 2015 Gagnon II

hearing testimony, the [trial court] revoked 

[Appellant’s] probation and resentenced [Appellant] 

to a period of incarceration in a state correctional 

facility for a minimum of twelve months to a 

maximum of twenty-four months, followed by a 

period of State supervision of thirty-six months.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/1/15, at 1-4 (citations omitted). On July 1, 2015, 

Appellant timely filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which the 

trial court did not act on. See generally Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E). Thereafter, 

on July 24, 2015, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.2

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review.

Did the trial court commit a clear abuse of discretion, 

a fundamental error in applying the correct law, or a 

violation of Constitutional rights and impose a 

sentence which is manifestly excessive; or the result 

of actions by the sentencing court was inconsistent 

with the Sentencing Code or contrary to the 

fundamental norms underlying the sentencing 

process; or the judgment is so manifestly 

unreasonable or the result of partial[it]y, prejudice, 

bias or ill will as shown by the evidence of record 

that it cannot stand by virtue of failing to consider 

the mitigating evidence presented by [Appellant?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

We review a trial court’s sentence imposed following the revocation of 

probation for an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.
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Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 109 A.3d 

678 (Pa. 2015). “[Our] scope of review in an appeal from a revocation of 

sentencing includes discretionary sentencing challenges.” Commonwealth 

v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). “An abuse 

of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a 

conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, 

as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.” 

Commonwealth v. Burns, 988 A.2d 684, 689 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 8 A.3d 341 (Pa. 2010).

Appellant does not dispute that she violated her probation. Instead, 

she claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked her 

probation and sentenced her to one to two years’ imprisonment, followed by 

three years’ probation. Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. This challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence is not appealable as of right. Colon, 

supra at 1042. Instead, an appellant must petition for permission to 

appeal. Id. We evaluate the following factors to determine whether to 

grant permission to appeal a discretionary aspect of sentencing.

Before we reach the merits of this issue, we must 

engage in a four part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant 

preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief 

includes a concise statement of the reasons relied 

upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of sentence [as required by 

Rule 2119(f) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure]; and (4) whether the concise statement 

raises a substantial question that the sentence is 

appropriate under the sentencing code. The third 

and fourth of these requirements arise because 

Appellant’s attack on his sentence is not an appeal 

as of right. Rather, he must petition this Court, in 

his [Rule 2119(f)] concise statement of reasons, to 

grant consideration of his appeal on the grounds that 

there is a substantial question. [I]f the appeal 

satisfies each of these four requirements, we will 

then proceed to decide the substantive merits of the 

case.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329-330 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013). Further, “[i]f a 

defendant fails to include an issue in his [or her] Rule 2119(f) statement, 

and the Commonwealth objects, then the issue is waived and this Court may 

not review the claim.” Commonwealth v. Karns, 50 A.3d 158, 166 (Pa. 

Super. 2012), appeal denied, 65 A.3d 413 (Pa. 2013).

Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved her 

discretionary sentencing challenges in her timely post-sentence motion and 

Rule 1925(b) concise statement. However, Appellant’s brief did not include 

a separate Rule 2119(f) concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal. Moreover, the Commonwealth, in its brief, objected to 

Appellant’s failure to include a Rule 2119(f) statement in her brief. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 6. Consequently, we are precluded from 

addressing the discretionary aspects claim. See Edwards, supra; Karns, 

supra.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant did not preserve her 

sole issue on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s June 26, 2015 

judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/4/2016