THE HONORABLE HOWARD F. SACHS, United States District Judge 1

for the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

 The Honorable H. David Young, United States Magistrate Judge 2

for the Eastern District of Arkansas, presiding by consent of the

parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994). 

_____________

No. 96-1751

_____________

Joyce Gwathney, SS #432-06-1313,*

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Arkansas. 

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner,*

Social Security Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

____________

 Submitted: November 21, 1996

 Filed: January 14, 1997

____________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, MAGILL, Circuit Judge, and SACHS,1

District Judge.

_____________

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Joyce Gwathney appeals the district court's decision to grant

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summary judgment and thereby affirm the administrative law judge's (ALJ)

denial of social security disability benefits. Gwathney challenges the

ALJ's finding of no disability. Because the record as a whole supports the

ALJ's finding that Gwathney was not disabled, we affirm.
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I.

Gwathney filed for social security disability benefits on October 5,

1990. She claimed to be disabled since May 15, 1987, because of a poorly

healed arm fracture which gave her throbbing pain, particularly when she

attempted to lift heavy objects. Gwathney later claimed that she suffered

from a variety of conditions that caused severe impairment, including

obesity, hypertension, arthritis, gastritis, dermatitis, depression, and

mental retardation. Gwathney's initial application for benefits was

denied, as was her petition for reconsideration. Following proceedings

before an ALJ, a social security administrative appeals council, and the

district court, her case was remanded for further fact finding.

Upon remand, the ALJ considered evidence that Gwathney, who was born

in 1950 and who has an eleventh grade education, had a verbal IQ of 69, a

performance IQ of 68, and a full-scale IQ of 67. In addition, the ALJ

considered Gwathney's subjective accounts of pain and hypertension. 

The ALJ was also presented with evidence that Gwathney successfully

participated in a wide variety of activities, including housework, cooking,

shopping, attending GED classes, and preparing for and teaching Sunday

school classes. Gwathney testified that, for a time after she had applied

for social security disability benefits, she had had a part-time job

stocking groceries at a convenience store. 

Additional evidence indicated that Gwathney had never followed a

regular regime of medical treatment for her physical complaints. Gwathney

did not report taking any prescription medication for her pain, and

although her hypertension and gastritis could have been managed by the

conservative use of medication, she never pursued a regular course of

medication for these conditions. Finally, there
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was no evidence that Gwathney had ever sought treatment for her mental

health concerns, which included being prone to various behavioral tics and

having dependent personality disorder.

Upon considering this evidence, the ALJ found that Gwathney did not

suffer from a severe physical or mental impairment and accordingly was not

disabled under the Social Security Administration's regulations. Because

Gwathney did not meet the regulatory definition of disabled, the ALJ found

that she was not entitled to social security disability benefits. The

Social Security Administration Appeals Council and the district court

affirmed the ALJ's decision, and Gwathney now brings this appeal, arguing

that the ALJ's conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence.

II.

In considering whether a claimant has properly been denied social

security disability benefits, we must determine "whether there is

substantial evidence based on the entire record to support the ALJ's

factual findings, and whether his decision was based on legal error."

Clark v. Chater, 75 F.3d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence

is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion." Id. (quotation omitted). "We must consider both

evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Secretary's

decision, but we may not reverse merely because substantial evidence exists

for the opposite decision." Johnson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th

Cir. 1996). The ALJ may discount subjective complaints of physical and

mental health problems that are inconsistent with medical reports, daily

activities, and other such evidence. See Haynes v. Shalala, 26 F.3d 812,

814-15 (8th Cir. 1994).

A person is entitled to social security disability benefits only if

he or she meets the threshold requirement of having a
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disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1501 (1996). To be disabled, a claimant

must have a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (1996). To qualify

as severe, an impairment must "significantly limit [a claimant's] physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities," 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a)

(1996), which are "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs."

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b) (1996). 

In this case, there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ's

finding that Gwathney was not significantly limited by either her physical

or mental impairments. Gwathney was able to perform such physically

demanding tasks as housework and employment requiring shelf-stacking,

contradicting her claim that she was unable to perform basic work

activities. Cf. Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) ("More

telling than a chronicle of [the claimant's] various ailments are his

actual activities, which are incongruous with his contention that he cannot

work."). Furthermore, and despite her low IQ, Gwathney was able to engage

in such intellectually challenging tasks as studying for her GED and

conducting Sunday school classes. Cf. Loving v. Department of Health &

Human Servs., 16 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting psychologist's

conclusion that claimant was a functional illiterate where the conclusion

of functional illiteracy was contradicted by the claimant's own testimony

about his reading activities). 

Finally, Gwathney's failure to seek medical assistance for her

alleged physical and mental impairments contradicts her subjective

complaints of disabling conditions and supports the ALJ's decision to deny

benefits. Cf. Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir. 1996)

("[Claimant's] complaints of disabling pain and functional limitations are

inconsistent with her failure to take prescriptive pain medication or to

seek regular medical treatment for her symptoms."); Haynes, 26 F.3d at 814

("A lack of strong pain medication is inconsistent with subjective

complaints of disabling pain."). 
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III.

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the decision of the

district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.