U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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INNOVATION AT TSA: EXAMINING THREAT MITIGATION THROUGH TECHNOLOGY ACQUISTIONS 

REFORM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

PROTECTIVE SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 18, 2018 

Serial No. 115–46 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

RON ESTES, Kansas 

DON BACON, Nebraska 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

STEVEN S. GIAIER, Deputy General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY 

JOHN KATKO, New York, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

RON ESTES, Kansas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KRISTA P. HARVEY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Protective Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation and Protective Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESS

Mr. David P. Pekoske, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman John Katko for David P. Pekoske ............................ 31 

Question From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for David P. Pekoske .................. 40 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for David P. 

Pekoske ................................................................................................................. 40 

(1) 

INNOVATION AT TSA: EXAMINING THREAT 

MITIGATION THROUGH TECHNOLOGY 

ACQUISTIONS REFORM 

Thursday, January 18, 2018 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND

PROTECTIVE SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. John Katko (Chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Katko, Rogers, Higgins, Fitzpatrick, 

Estes, Watson Coleman, and Payne. 

Also present: Representative McCaul. 

Mr. KATKO. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation and Protective Security will come to 

order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to discuss how TSA is working to mitigate threats to transportation security through reforming the agency’s broken acquisitions system. In particular, the subcommittee will examine TSA’s statutorily required 5-year investment plan that was recently submitted to Congress, as well as the 

agency’s Innovation Task Force and overall procurement practices. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. During my tenure as Chairman of the subcommittee, I have watched the threat 

environment grow ever more startling. I, along with my colleagues 

on the committee on both sides of the aisle, have been continuously 

briefed on changing security threats and TSA’s threat mitigation 

efforts. 

Unfortunately, TSA continues to be plagued by a reactive rather 

than proactive posture when it comes to technology development 

and deployment. While terrorists continue to develop better ways 

to try and defeat our security screening, TSA struggles to quickly 

and effectively deploy cutting-edge technology to the front lines. 

This has been a constant oversight issue for this subcommittee 

due to a lack of serious change within the agency. My predecessor 

on this subcommittee, Richard Hudson, passed legislation in the 

113th Congress requiring TSA to submit the 5-year investment 

plan, a legacy we have sought to build upon by introducing legislation to make the plan annual rather than biannual. 

Recently, while reviewing the history of this subcommittee’s oversight on this topic, I came across a question stemming from a hearVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:01 Jun 11, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18TP0118\18TP0118.TXT HEATH
2 

ing in June 2012 asking why credential authentication technology 

had been delayed for a third time. 

As we sit here today, in 2018, this technology still has yet to be 

deployed at airports. That is truly amazing. Bureaucratic bottlenecks and understaffing at the TSA Systems Integration Facility, 

or TSIF, have led to years of delays for technologies that other 

countries have been using in their airports for quite some time. 

Mrs. Watson Coleman, myself and others saw that for ourselves 

with our own eyes in a recent Congressional Delegation we took to 

the Middle East and Europe. On a recent bipartisan Congressional 

Delegation we saw that, as I mentioned to you. Excuse me, got 

ahead of myself. 

Specifically at Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, screening checkpoints utilize advanced Computer Tomography Systems or CT, 

which offer screeners better picture quality and more advanced 

threat detection capabilities. 

While Schiphol was able to deploy this American technology in 

a matter of months, TSA continues to be bogged down in a lengthy 

process for testing systems and developing algorithms. In TSA’s 

own 5-year investment plan, which was submitted to Congress 

nearly 6 months after the statutory deadline, let me say that again, 

6 months after the statutorily-imposed deadline, we finally got this 

watered-down plan. 

The agency states it only plans to procure two CT systems a year 

for the next 3 fiscal years. That is a total of 6. There are 12 at 

Schiphol airport alone and there are 450 airports in the United 

States. 

However, the same plan estimates it would need well over 2,000 

CT machines and $224 million for full deployment. While TSA has 

indicated to the committee that it intends to procure and deploy 

more of these machines, all estimates still fall woefully short of 

what is needed. 

With all the airports in the United States, goals and requests for 

CT machines should be measured in the hundreds or thousands 

rather than single digits. The good news is this, Mr. Pekoske: You, 

in your new role as administrator of TSA, have the opportunity to 

use the $7.4 billion budget Congress has provided you to fix this 

broken system and give the American people the type of security 

they demand and deserve for their tax dollars. 

Additionally, this subcommittee stands ready to work in a bipartisan manner to help you accomplish this monumental task 

through oversight and legislation. In order to be successful, however, we need TSA to come to the table with honest and timely answers and real solutions with a sense of genuine partnership. 

I look forward to hearing your vision for reforming the TSA acquisitions process and how Congress can help. 

[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN KATKO

JANUARY 18, 2018 

The subcommittee is meeting today to discuss how TSA is working to mitigate 

threats to transportation security through reforming the agency’s broken acquisitions system. 

3 

In particular, the subcommittee will examine TSA’s statutorily-required 5-year investment plan which was recently submitted to Congress, as well as the agency’s 

Innovation Task Force and overall procurement practices. 

During my tenure as Chairman of this subcommittee, I have watched the threat 

environment grow ever more startling. I, along with my colleagues on the committee, have been continuously briefed on changing security threats and TSA’s 

threat mitigation efforts. 

Unfortunately, TSA continues to be plagued by a reactive—rather than 

proactive—posture when it comes to technology development and deployment. 

While terrorists continue to develop better ways to try and defeat our security 

screening, TSA struggles to quickly and effectively deploy cutting-edge technology 

to the front lines. This has been a constant oversight issue for this subcommittee, 

due to a lack of serious change within the agency. 

My predecessor on this subcommittee, Congressman Hudson, passed the legislation in the 113th Congress requiring TSA to submit the 5-year investment plan— 

a legacy we have sought to build upon by introducing legislation to make the plan 

annual rather than biannual. 

Recently, while reviewing the history of this subcommittee’s oversight on this 

topic, I came across a question stemming from a hearing in June 2012 asking why 

Credential Authentication Technology had been delayed for a third time. As we sit 

here today, this technology still has yet to be deployed at airports. 

Bureaucratic bottlenecks and understaffing at the Transportation Systems Integration Facility, or TSIF, have led to years of delays for technologies that other 

countries have been using in their airports for quite some time. 

On a recent bipartisan Congressional Delegation to airports in the Middle East 

and Europe, my colleagues and I were amazed at the level of advanced security 

equipment utilized by several nations to screen both aviation passengers and employees. 

Specifically at Schiphol airport in Amsterdam, screening checkpoints utilize advanced Computed Tomography Systems—or CT—which offer screeners better picture quality and more advanced threat detection capabilities. 

While Schiphol was able to deploy these technologies in a matter of months, TSA 

continues to be bogged down in a lengthy process for testing systems and developing 

algorithms. 

In TSA’s own 5-year investment plan, which was submitted to Congress nearly 

6 months after the statutory deadline, the agency states it only plans to procure two 

CT systems a year for the next 3 fiscal years. However, the same plan estimates 

it would need well over 2,000 CT machines and $224 million for full deployment. 

While TSA has indicated to the committee it intends to procure and deploy more 

CT machines, all estimates still fall woefully short of what is needed. With 435 airports in the United States, goals and requests for CT machines should be measured 

in the hundreds or thousands rather than single digits. 

The good news is this, Mr. Pekoske: You, in your new role as administrator of 

TSA, have the opportunity to use the $7.4 billion budget Congress has provided you 

to fix this broken system and give the American people the type of security they 

demand and deserve for their tax dollars. 

Additionally, this subcommittee stands ready to work in a bipartisan manner to 

help you accomplish this monumental task through oversight and legislation. In 

order to be successful, however, we need TSA to come to the table with honest answers, real solutions, and with a sense of genuine partnership. 

I look forward to hearing your vision for reforming the TSA acquisitions process 

and how Congress can help. 

Mr. KATKO. I am pleased to recognize the Ranking Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson 

Coleman for her opening statement. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank 

you for convening this hearing. 

Mr. Administrator, thank you for appearing before our subcommittee. Today it seems like I haven’t seen you in a very long 

time. Funny, we saw each other earlier today. The Transportation 

Security Administration is essential to our Nation’s security. 

Americans rely on the work of TSA employees to keep us safe 

from a long and growing list of terrorist threats. Over the last year, 

4 

we have seen the threat landscape changed and watched TSA work 

to adapt. 

In March, we watched TSA grapple with the question of whether 

to ban electronic devices larger than the smart phone from all U.S.- 

bound passenger planes in response to the threat landscape. 

Since last summer, TSA has had to reevaluate the level of transportation security on a number of occasions. In August, a serious 

ISIS-connected cargo-based explosive plot came to light which was 

to be carried out on an international flight. 

Then in December, a would-be terrorist attempted an attack on 

the New York City subway system. Even though the terrorist 

threat picture evolves at an uncomfortably quick pace, the number 

of travelers who rely on TSA security operations has increased. 

During the holiday season, TSA screened a record of 42 million 

passengers and 31 million checked bags at airports across the country. TSA’s plate is close to full. Still, we need the agency to do 

more. 

We need TSA to continue to be a leader in aviation security and 

invest in leading technologies that would keep our transportation 

system safe. For me, today is an opportunity to look beyond the 5- 

year technology investment plan that appears to be the impetus for 

the hearing and to focus on the bigger picture. When is TSA going 

to fully realize its mission of effectively securing all modes of transportation against terrorism? 

As such today, I want to hear from you, Mr. Administrator, about 

your plans to address the growing threat to soft targets in surface 

transportation, on-going work force challenges, air cargo security, 

and behavior detection screening. 

Additionally, we need to discuss the passenger security fee diversion. It is unconscionable that at a time when the treats to aviation 

and surface transportation systems are so sophisticated and diverse, that TSA is forced on an annual basis to hand over $1.28 billion in aviation security fees it collects to the Treasury for the deficit reduction. 

The truth of the matter is that we cannot continue to have conversations on how TSA should do better or move faster to deploy 

innovative security screening equipment without having an honest 

conversation about TSA’s resource needs. 

As Members of this subcommittee, we are best positioned to 

know what TSA needs, and without question TSA needs us to enact 

H.R. 2514, Funding for Aviation Screeners and Threat Elimination 

Restoration Act, so that it can receive the funds necessary to procure security screening technology. 

We know the President’s budget will be released soon. Mr. Administrator, I would ask that you would work really hard to ensure 

that this time around, in contrast to last year’s submission, what 

we receive actually reflects your operational needs. 

Given everything that we are going to discuss today, following 

this hearing with a tone-deaf budget proposal would be unacceptable. Thank you, again, Mr. Administrator, for your time today. I 

hope today’s hearing will be productive and look forward to hearing 

your answers to the myriad of transportation security issues facing 

our Nation. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

5 

[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN

JANUARY 18, 2018 

The Transportation Security Administration is essential to our Nation’s security. 

Americans rely on the work of TSA employees to keep us safe from a long and growing list of terrorist threats. Over the last year, we have seen the threat landscape 

change and watched TSA work to adapt. 

In March, we watched TSA grapple with the question of whether to ban electronic 

devices larger than a smart phone from all U.S.-bound passenger planes in response 

to the threat landscape. And since last summer, TSA has had to reevaluate the level 

of transportation security on a number of occasions. In August, a serious ISIS-connected cargo-based explosives plot came to light, which was to be carried out on an 

international flight. Then in December, a would-be terrorist attempted an attack on 

the New York City subway system. 

Even though the terrorist threat picture evolves at an uncomfortably quick pace, 

the number of travelers who rely on TSA security operations has increased. During 

the holiday season, TSA screened a record 42 million passengers and 31 million 

checked bags at airports across the country. 

TSA’s plate is close to full. Still, we need the agency to do more. We need TSA 

to continue to be a leader in aviation security and invest in leading technologies 

that will keep our transportations systems safe. 

For me, today’s is an opportunity to look beyond the 5-year technology investment 

plan that appears to be the impetus for the hearing and to focus on the bigger picture—when is TSA going to fully realize its mission of effectively securing all modes 

of transportation against terrorism? 

As such, today, I want to hear from Administrator Pekoske about his plans to address the growing threat to soft targets in surface transportation, on-going workforce challenges, air cargo security, and behavior detection screening. 

Additionally, we need to discuss the passenger security fee diversion. It is unconscionable that at a time when the threats to aviation and surface transportation systems are so sophisticated and diverse, TSA is forced, on an annual basis, to hand 

over $1.28 billion in aviation security fees it collects to the U.S. Treasury for deficit 

reduction. 

The truth of the matter is that we cannot continue to have conversations on how 

TSA should do better or move faster to deploy innovative security screening equipment without having an honest conversation about TSA’s resource needs. 

As Members of this subcommittee, we are best positioned to know what TSA 

needs and, without question, TSA needs us to enact H.R. 2514, ‘‘Funding for Aviation Screeners and Threat Elimination Restoration (FASTER) Act’’ so that it can receive the funds necessary to procure security screening technology. 

We know the President’s budget will be released soon. Mr. Administrator, I would 

ask that you work really hard to ensure that this time around, in contrast to last 

year’s submission, what we receive actually reflects your operational needs. Given 

everything that we are going to discuss today, following this hearing with a tonedeaf budget proposal would be unacceptable. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman. Other Members 

are reminded that statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JANUARY 18, 2018 

A little more than 2 months ago, Administrator Pekoske testified before the full 

committee that ‘‘the threat to international aviation is high and multiple terrorist 

groups remain intent on attacking our surface transportation systems.’’ 

Members of the committee on both sides of the aisle agree that countering such 

threats demands enhancements to current security systems, including the deployment of innovative technologies such as computed tomography, or ‘‘CT’’ machines. 

Unfortunately, deploying advanced technologies to the Nation’s TSA checkpoints is 

easier said than done. 

While TSA has taken some positive steps such as establishing the Innovation 

Task Force, piloting CT machines, and publishing a refresh of its Strategic FiveVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:01 Jun 11, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18TP0118\18TP0118.TXT HEATH
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Year Technology Plan, TSA can and should do more to reduce the time line for deploying new technologies to the field. 

Congress must do its part as well. We can start by passing H.R. 2514, the ‘‘FAST- ER Act’’—a bill every Democrat on this committee supports—to return $1.28 billion 

in fees collected by TSA from the flying public for security that is currently being 

diverted away from TSA. 

It defies logic to call out TSA for failing to invest in new technologies while refusing to support the FASTER Act, which could provide TSA with the funding needed 

to realize the promise of integrating new technology in our aviation security system. 

Further, I am not sure it is fair to demand that TSA set out in great detail its 

plans for technology investments for the next 5 years at a time when the agency 

is funded on a stop-gap basis. 

Nevertheless, enhancing our transportation security efforts remains imperative. 

In addition to securing aviation systems, TSA must work with transit agencies and 

stakeholders across the country to secure subways, railroads, buses, and other surface transportation systems. I look forward to hearing about the TSA’s efforts to develop and deploy technologies to secure surface transportation systems used daily 

by millions of Americans. 

Finally, I want to emphasize that technology alone will not provide security. Such 

solutions must be staffed and operated by well-trained, capable officers. We must 

do more to support TSA officers and work to improve their morale—starting by providing them with workplace protections in place for other Federal workers. Democrats remain committed to doing just that. 

Administrator Pekoske, you have a difficult job and I thank you again for joining 

us today. 

Mr. KATKO. The Chairman of the full committee, Mr. McCaul, is 

going to make an opening statement. But he is on his way over, 

so in the interest of keeping in time here, we will go with Mr. 

Pekoske first and then come back to Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. Pekoske, welcome. You are the seventh administrator of the 

TSA, here to testify before us today in this critical topic. I believe 

you are the sixth either acting or actual administrator that I have 

seen at TSA in 3 years, which is unacceptable and that is why we 

had a bill passed that is sitting in the Senate, hopefully to give you 

a 5-year term to have some stability with TSA. 

In your role as administrator, Mr. Pekoske is responsible for securing the Nation’s civil aviation system and surface transportation 

modes. He leads a work force for approximately 60,000 employees 

who work to protect the Nation’s transportation systems while ensuring freedom of movement for people and commerce. 

Prior to joining TSA, Mr. Pekoske served as the 26th vice commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and we thank you for your service. 

Let me remind the witness that their entire written statement 

will appear in the record. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Pekoske 

for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID P. PEKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Katko, 

Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of 

the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you this afternoon. 

Innovation is a key priority of mine and I am looking forward to 

obtaining your perspective as we work together to mitigate threats 

to transportation security. 

First, I want to acknowledge the outstanding men and women of 

TSA. It is my privilege to serve as administrator to the over 60,000 

7 

dedicated professionals that provide security for millions of Americans who use our transportation systems each and every day. 

I am proud to highlight that we have made measurable improvements to our aviation security effectiveness over the past few 

months through training and procedural changes. This was accomplished as passenger volumes continued to increase. I am pleased 

to report passenger wait times remain on average well within TSA 

standards. 

Transportation security is an all-hands effort. Our aviation security checkpoint personnel are clearly the most visible part of TSA. 

But there are thousands of other TSA employees working behind 

the scenes or in the air or with the owners and operators of our 

Nation’s surface transportation systems. They are also key elements of TSA’s success. 

On behalf of this team, I thank you for your support, enabling 

TSA to accomplish a mission so critical for the safety, security, and 

economic well-being of the American people. 

Mr. Chairman, I have tremendous respect for the oversight role 

that this subcommittee performs with respect to TSA. I highly 

value your perspectives and opinions. You have made us stronger 

and America safer. I know that TSA needs to be much more responsive to requests for information required by statute or otherwise requested by any Member of this subcommittee. 

I have looked into our responsiveness over calendar year 2017. 

Simply put, we need to do better, much better. I give you my personal pledge to address this issue head-on and provide timely and 

complete delivery of information you seek going forward. 

Since becoming administrator, I have spent the majority of my 

time intentionally at the front lines of TSA. I have engaged with 

TSA employees at all levels of the organization and I have met 

with many of our partners to include the airlines, airports, law enforcement, and public safety professionals at the State and local 

level, owners and operators of surface transportation systems and 

international partners as well as industry groups and union leaders. 

Everywhere I visited, I found a deep commitment to the mission. 

It has also become very clear to me that we need to focus on three 

major lines of effort. The first is leading transportation security by 

strengthening the effectiveness of our operations. 

Second, is to accelerate action by deploying technology faster and 

third, committing to our people because they are the most valuable 

resource in our key line of defense against the threat. 

As I testified before the full committee in early November, the 

area that will yield the greatest impact on mitigating threats to 

aviation is improvement to the technology employed at the checkpoint. 

To this end, I am developing a TSA strategy, administrator’s intent, and a capital investment plan. These will guide TSA’s implementation of future technology development as part of a larger systems approach. 

I will ask for time in your calendars to obtain the subcommittee’s 

input on these important documents. We are moving very rapidly 

to deploy CT X-ray technology at the checkpoints. This is my top 

priority. 

8 

During this current fiscal year, we will field almost 40 units for 

developmental and operational testing, 28 of those at airports. We 

are planning a much larger deployment in fiscal year 2019. Details 

of this will be provided in the President’s budget when it is released in a few weeks. 

We are employing a flexible approach to test, procure, deploy CT 

systems while concurrently working to improve automation and 

achieve substantially enhanced levels of threat detection. 

We are enhancing our canine program. We will be at our budget 

allocation level in September. To ensure we maintain this level and 

position the program for continued growth, we have increased the 

capacity of our canine training center to maintain a robust pipeline 

of trained canines. 

I fully support the Domestic Canine Capability Building Act recently passed by this committee and the full House. We are deploying Credential Authentication Technology or CAT to be used at the 

first position on our security checkpoints. 

It will provide improved passenger identification, real-time 

verification of ticketing status, real-time verification of secure flight 

vetting status, that will reduce fraudulent ID vulnerabilities and 

provide real-time vetting information at the checkpoint. That is a 

significant enhancement. 

Currently, there are 33 CAT systems deployed for testing in TSA 

PreCheck lines at 10 airports. Both DHS and TSA are evaluating 

existing rapid acquisition processes across the Government to leverage known experience and best practices. 

This will be very valuable for future acquisition projects so that 

our technology stays ahead of the threats posed by our adversary. 

Our relatively new innovation task force provides industry with a 

better way to interface with TSA. 

Our partnerships with industry, both small and large businesses, 

are very important to successful deployment of technology. I have 

strived to engage personally with industry on a regular basis and 

fully engage the Aviation Security Advisory Committee for their 

advice and perspective as well. 

In closing, I am deeply committed to strengthening our security 

posture and will do everything in my power to put the proper technology tools in the hands of the dedicated men and women of TSA. 

Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

before you today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Thank you, Sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pekoske follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID P. PEKOSKE

JANUARY 18, 2018 

Good afternoon Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before 

you to discuss the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) technology initiatives. 

First and foremost, I would like to recognize the Transportation Security Officers 

(TSOs) on their success in providing security to over 44 million airline passengers 

during the December holiday travel period. They did so professionally and adapted 

to accommodate daily screening challenges. Over the past 6 months, we have seen 

5 of the top 15 total passenger volume days in TSA’s history. On average, TSA 

9 

screens 2.2 million passengers each day. During this past holiday season, the daily 

rate grew as high as 2.4 million. Keeping up with this challenge would not be possible without our outstanding workforce. 

Additionally, I would like to thank Chairman Katko and Ranking Member Watson 

Coleman for taking the time to visit TSA headquarters last month for a discussion 

on transportation security. I look forward to continuing to work with you and your 

staff to advance TSA’s critical mission. 

Today’s hearing is timely, as technology deployment will be critical to TSA’s success in 2018 and beyond. Terrorists continue to target commercial aviation, including cargo, and we must strive each and every day to stay ahead of the myriad 

threats. In the 5 months since I have been on board at TSA, we have seen scores 

of threats against aviation. I am committed to ensuring TSA remains as successful 

as it has been in the 16 years since the agency’s founding to protect our transportation systems, especially aviation. Since I have been TSA administrator, we have 

improved training, deployed enhanced screening procedures, and have aggressively 

pursued new technologies. We are continually increasing our ability to detect threat 

items throughout the aviation security system, and improving technology at the 

checkpoint will be the focus of my remarks today. 

CHECKPOINT SYSTEM

One of the most significant initiatives at the checkpoint is the introduction of 

Computed Tomography technology, or ‘‘CT,’’ as it is commonly referred. I know some 

of you have seen CT being tested overseas at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport and domestically at Boston Logan International Airport and Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport. CT is not new technology. The idea for CT was conceived in the 

1960’s and first employed for medical applications in the early 1970’s; however, it 

has evolved and is now used in other arenas, such as in aviation security. In fact, 

TSA has been using CT scanners to screen checked baggage since the agency’s inception in 2001. Over the past few years, industry has been aggressively working 

to reduce the technology equipment’s size and adjust its configuration to make it 

a viable option for deployment at most airport checkpoints. TSA continues to work 

closely and expeditiously with CT equipment manufacturers to improve detection algorithms, optimize throughput, and automate the detection of prohibited items so 

that CT technology can deliver the full host of capabilities needed to address checkpoint vulnerabilities into the future. 

Once fully developed for the aviation environment, checkpoint CT technology will 

deliver a significant advancement over today’s two-dimensional X-ray technology 

platforms. Checkpoint CT screening technology provides a three-dimensional view of 

the bag and enables the TSA officer to rotate the bag 360 degrees to show the contents at every angle. CT features allow officers to virtually remove unwanted clutter, and greatly enhances their ability to visually inspect the contents of carry-on 

bags for explosives and prohibited items. In these ways, CT offers substantially improved detection capability by more effectively detecting smaller and artfully concealed threats, thereby increasing our overall security effectiveness while enabling 

passengers to leave electronics in their carry-on bags. Ultimately, we hope to refine 

checkpoint CT technology to the point where, similar to the checked baggage process, we have automated the carry-on baggage screening process and reduced the 

need for officers to review all images. 

In order to further our efforts and capabilities, TSA is working closely with industry partners, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology 

Directorate, and international counterparts. Together, we are exchanging information and best practices related to operational and laboratory testing, explosives characterization, CT platform enhancements, and image library development. TSA is 

working closely with the European Commission, European Civil Aviation Conference, and bilaterally with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands to share test results with the goal of aligning detection requirements and 

testing methodologies. The Netherlands, Turkey, Japan, Singapore, and South Africa are currently testing CT technology at their checkpoints, which allows for robust 

information sharing and ultimately guides the successful deployment of this technology. 

We are also leveraging academia to develop innovative software algorithms to 

more accurately identify prohibited items. Through our own Innovation Task Force, 

TSA is providing CT vendors with end-user feedback and real-world operational 

data to further operational development, effectiveness, and efficiencies. In short, 

checkpoint CT development is a world-wide effort to achieve the best screening solution that is technologically possible today. Deployment of this technology, both here 

10 

at home and abroad, is a critical component of raising the global aviation security 

baseline. 

My team has developed an aggressive plan to deploy checkpoint CT technology. 

We are currently pursuing a flexible approach to test, procure, and deploy CT systems, while concurrently developing CT system algorithms to significantly improve 

automated threat detection capabilities. This approach employs the concepts of 

modularity and iterative design to support deployment of specific capabilities as 

part of a larger solution, while progressively expanding functionality until the full 

CT capability is realized. 

Deployment of CT technology at checkpoints is one of my top priorities, and a priority for DHS leadership as well. In fiscal year 2018, we will field almost 40 units 

for developmental and operational testing, with the goal of pursuing broader deployment and continued algorithm development in the first half of fiscal year 2019, dependent on funding availability. Such efforts for the acquisition of this technology 

and others will be reflected in the Capital Investment Plan and TSA Strategy and 

Intent that I am currently developing to guide our investment approach moving forward. 

Concurrent with our CT efforts, we are also pursuing other technologies to increase security at checkpoints. Two such technologies are enhanced Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and Credential Authentication Technology (CAT). TSA continues to improve our current AIT capabilities. As you may know, AIT uses imaging 

technology to scan individuals and analyze the images for the presence of anomalies 

beneath clothes, and in obscured areas. There are currently 945 AIT units deployed 

at 340 airports system-wide. Upgrades to this technology include greater detection 

capabilities in response to some of the vulnerabilities identified by the DHS Office 

of the Inspector General (OIG) in 2015 and in 2017. Other changes include software 

that will allow TSOs to process passengers through the AIT more expeditiously, 

thereby improving passenger flow through the checkpoint. In addition to these upgrades to currently fielded AIT units, TSA is working with other vendors to ensure 

we are testing every passenger screening technology available to provide our TSOs 

with better tools to assist them in performing their duties. TSA will be demonstrating an enhanced AIT capability in the field later this quarter, gaining critical 

insights into potential technology improvements that will move us closer to the future checkpoint vision. 

Another key technology under development for our checkpoints is CAT; which will 

greatly enhance the vital role that the Travel Document Checker (TDC) plays in ID 

verification, boarding pass validation, and screening status determination. Specifically, CAT will improve the TDC’s ability to accurately authenticate passenger identification documents, passenger ticketing status, and Secure Flight passenger vetting status, thereby addressing vulnerabilities associated with ID fraud and providing real-time vetting information at the checkpoint on passengers. There are 33 

CAT systems currently deployed for technical testing in TSA PreCheck® lanes at 

10 airports, including both Reagan National and Dulles airports, to optimize system 

functionality and associated Concept of Operations (CONOPS.) 

TSA is currently assessing another technology known as Automated Screening 

Lanes (ASLs). ASLs are already proving their worth and currently 111 ASLs are 

deployed at 12 airports including Newark, JFK, LaGuardia, Boston, and Atlanta. 

These lanes are not only designed to increase throughput, they also provide better 

security by offering capabilities such as automated pulls of bags needing further inspection, automated tracking of bins linking to the X-ray and picture images, and 

automated bin return allowing officers to focus on security, instead of moving bins 

from the end of the lane to the beginning. I envision that integrating CTs with ASLs 

will provide significant technological and screening process improvements at our 

checkpoints, and we plan on testing this integration in the near future. I appreciate 

the great partnerships with airlines and airports for their role in the procurement 

and deployment of ASLs. 

ACQUISITION PROCESS

Critical to the success of TSA’s technology strategy and our ability to stay ahead 

of the threat is the capability to acquire, procure, develop, test, and field new technologies in a timely manner. As the Chairman has noted, this is an area that needs 

improvement and I want to assure you we are evaluating ways to accelerate the acquisition process. In an effort to further identify ways to improve efficiencies in the 

process, DHS and TSA are evaluating existing rapid acquisition processes across the 

U.S. Government to leverage known experience and best practices as we develop a 

model to accelerate acquisition efforts and the ultimate deployment of effective solutions within a dynamic operational environment. With your support, we are conVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:01 Jun 11, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18TP0118\18TP0118.TXT HEATH
11 

fident that we will be able to create an acquisition paradigm that ensures accelerated deployment and preserves the integrity needed to deploy effective and cost-efficient capabilities. 

CONCLUSION

TSA is committed to securing the Nation’s transportation systems from terrorist 

activities and attacks. This year, we are focused on maturing and deploying additional CT-based systems and working closely with our domestic and international 

partners to raise the global baseline for aviation security. In addition, I’m developing a Capital Investment Plan, coupled with the TSA Strategy and Intent, which 

will chart the future course for improvements in checkpoints and checked baggage 

systems. I look forward to working with you on these efforts to secure our robust 

transportation sector. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these important 

issues. I look forward to the subcommittee’s questions. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Pekoske. 

Perfect timing, the Chairman of the full committee, Mr. McCaul, 

is here and he is recognized for an opening statement. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you Chairman Katko. 

Administrator, thank you so much for being here and I appreciate your openness and our conversations, both publicly and privately. 

When you appeared before our committee in early November, 

we—briefed by yourself and the DHS inspector general in a Classified setting about specific vulnerabilities at our airports. In the 

hearing that followed, I said that I found the briefing to be disturbing. I think you would probably agree with that. I know my 

colleagues on both sides of the aisle feel the same way. 

As we have seen across Europe and in New York, many of the 

most recent terror attacks have been carried out with vehicles and 

other low-tech means. However, with millions of Americans traveling annually by airplane, our aviation sector still remains in my 

judgment the crown jewel of the terrorist. 

Even though there are 60,000 TSA employees working hard and 

we are very proud of them, to protect nearly 450 airports across the 

country, I believe we still need the most innovative and cuttingedge technology to keep our planes and passengers safe. 

As I stated at our full committee hearing in November, ‘‘America’s enemies only have to be right once, but we have to be right 

100 percent.’’ They are just one airplane flight away. That is why 

I remain concerned by the agency’s inability to deploy Computed 

Tomography or CT and Credential Authentication, which would 

greatly enhance detection of threatening objects. 

You and I talked very productively about this. This concern was 

also made clear in a November 9 letter to Acting Secretary Duke 

from myself and Chairman Katko, urging TSA to reform the acquisition and procurement process for screening technologies. 

Our letter also contained nine questions about what actions DHS 

and TSA are taking to improve the overall screening system. We 

appreciate your efforts to get a response to our committee. I must 

say we were a bit underwhelmed by the lack of details. 

In particular, one of the responses stated that CT systems beyond the prototype phase would not be deployed until early to mid2019. There is an airport in Amsterdam that already uses American-made CT to screen bags. Not having this kind of enhanced security at our own airports I believe is unacceptable. 

12 

It is also important that TSA work with our international partners to install CT scanners at airports overseas, particularly those 

in the high-threat areas from last point of departure which serve 

for in-bound flights. 

This is something I have expressed to you in our most recent 

conversations as recent as today, and I am hopeful that you and 

I can work together to come through a resolution to protect the 

American people. 

To keep our homeland safe, we must have the best technology efficiently and effectively deployed without further delay. 

Today, I am hoping we can have a detailed discussion on how to 

get that done so that the American people are better protected. 

With that, sir, I want to thank you for your service and thank you 

for being here today. I yield back. 

[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL

JANUARY 18, 2018 

Before we begin I would like to welcome and thank Administrator Pekoske for 

joining us this morning to once again discuss how we can strengthen our aviation 

security. 

Administrator, when you appeared before our full committee in early November, 

we had just been briefed by yourself and the DHS inspector general in a Classified 

setting about specific vulnerabilities at our airports. In the hearing that followed, 

I said that I found the briefing to be ‘‘disturbing.’’ And I know my colleagues felt 

the same way. 

As we have seen across Europe and in New York City, many of the most recent 

terror attacks have been carried out with vehicles and other low-tech means. However, with millions of Americans traveling annually by airplane, our aviation sector 

still remains the ‘‘crown jewel’’ of targets. 

Even though there are 60,000 TSA employees working hard to protect nearly 450 

airports across the country, we still need the most innovative and cutting-edge technology to keep our planes and passengers safe. 

As I stated at our full committee hearing in November, ‘‘America’s enemies only 

have to be right once, but we have to be right 100 percent of the time.’’ That is why 

I remain concerned by the agency’s inability to deploy Computed Tomography (CT) 

and Credential Authentication, which would greatly enhance detection of threatening objects. 

This concern was made clear in a November 9 letter to Acting Secretary Duke 

from myself and Chairman Katko, urging TSA to reform the acquisition and procurement processes for screening technologies. Our letter also contained 9 questions 

about what actions DHS and TSA are taking to improve the overall screening system. We appreciate TSA’s efforts to get a response to our committee, however, we 

were underwhelmed by the lack of details. 

In particular, one of the responses stated that CT systems beyond the prototype 

phase, would not be deployed until early to mid-2019. 

There is an airport in Amsterdam (Schiphol) that already uses American-made CT 

to screen bags. Not having this kind of enhanced security at our own airports is just 

unacceptable. 

It is also important that TSA work with our international partners to install CT 

scanners at airports overseas which serve as the last point of departure for in-bound 

flights. This is something I have expressed to you in our most recent conversation 

and I am hopeful we can begin to make progress on that very soon. 

To keep our homeland safe, we must have the best technology efficiently and effectively deployed without further delay. 

Today, I am hoping we can have a detailed discussion on how we can get that 

done so that the American people are better protected. 

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chair now recognizes myself for 5 minutes of questions. I 

want to say at the outset that we have to begin the line of question 

13 

here that I gave you a heads-up on and that was the really terrible 

delinquencies that this agency has routinely engaged in responding 

to requests from Congress. 

You know, I know, the agency knows, that our request are not 

optional, particularly when they are in statute and when there is 

a deadline set. We don’t set those deadlines arbitrarily or to make 

your lives miserable. But, in fact, we set them because we need the 

information. If you look back on the information we have requested, it has to do as keeping America safe, keeping our airlines 

safe, having a better procurement system and what-have-you at 

TSA. 

So, it is deeply disturbing that we have to talk about this stuff 

again and again. But and you and your predecessors have a pretty 

dismal track record of responding to us in a timely manner to 

things. 

I want to put a graphic up. You see it up on the screens here 

and you turn on your monitors in front of you as well. If I was a 

prosecutor, cross-examining someone, I love these types of graphics, 

but I am not a prosecutor and you are not my adversary. 

That is why I don’t like this graphic. This graphic shows that of 

the—in the 115th Congress, 82 percent of the time you have had 

delinquent or very delinquent responses to inquiries from us, either 

oral or writing or from statutorily-missed deadlines, the 5-year 

plan of which was probably the worst. 

The content of what was in the 5-year plan to me was at best 

watered down and not very helpful. That 5-year plan is there and 

was designed years ago to try and get TSA to look forward and look 

ahead and it seems like we are beating our heads against the wall 

with that. 

There is just, for the record, so it is clear that out of the 17 requests you had from Congress this year, 14 of them were late or 

very, very late. We are not talking by a couple of hours. We are 

talking by days, weeks, and months. That is something that is absolutely unacceptable. 

We can provide to you after the hearing today or at any time a 

copy of each individual request, when it was done, when the deadline was and when the date of response was. It is routine like I 

said for it to be multiple months late and that is very difficult. 

Now, I want to talk about the biannual 5-year technology investment plan, which was submitted to the committee nearly 2 months 

late. First of all, I guess I would ask why that was? Any reason 

for that, any justification for that? I understand part of this before 

you answer that question is that you came in the middle of this. 

That I understand. 

But you also have a professional staff who does a very good job 

and works very hard. I am just at a loss as to why it would be so 

late and you would just ignore a statutorily-mandated deadline. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. We don’t intentionally ignore deadlines 

whatsoever and as I said in my opening statement, this is a key 

priority of mine. I pride myself on being responsive to others’ requests for information. 

I will take a personal interest in this to make sure that going 

forward we meet the deadlines that we have established to respond 

to this committee’s—every Member of this committee. 

14 

The reason that report was delayed and this is just a reason, it 

is not—the report should have been on time is the bottom line. The 

reason it was delayed is I got into office. I looked at the report. It 

already has been through staff clearance. It is not just staff clearance within TSA, it is staff clearance within the administration as 

well. 

There were some significant things that weren’t in that report, 

for example, CT. You commented that even the report that you 

have today shows two CT systems being acquired. 

That is because we can only report what is in the budget request. 

That doesn’t reflect our current thinking on CT as I just mentioned 

in my opening statement. So that report needed to be revised to at 

least bring it up to the more current information that was subsequently provided to the committee. 

But bottom line is that it shouldn’t be late. I will take a personal 

interest in making sure that we are responsive to the committee’s 

concerns. Like I said we very much appreciate your oversight. We 

want this to be a strong partnership. 

I think it already is a strong partnership but it can be even 

stronger. Every time I have talked to any Member of this committee, the first question they ask me after I brief them on whatever information I brief is: How can we help? I really appreciate 

that and I want to make sure that I do everything I can to provide 

you the information that you need going forward. 

The second thing I would mention, sir, is that I firmly believe in 

a long view. One of the things that TSA does not have is a longterm capital investment plan. So that is why we do fits-and-starts 

if you will on some of these projects. What I want to do is to be 

able to take a little bit longer view, a 5-year look at what our capital requirements are and actually plan that out so that we see it 

and we can plan to it early enough on so that things go much 

smoother than what they have in the past. 

Mr. KATKO. That is part of the reason why you have the 5-year 

plans. We can help you looking forward. I mean, we have tried to 

force you—the agency to look forward. That is something you 

shouldn’t have to start anew. It is something that is already there 

for you. 

I will note just for record that with respect to the letter we sent 

out on November 9, 2017 with Mr. Chairman to my right, it was 

a very pressing matter, a very serious matter. We got it Tuesday 

of just last week, which is almost a couple of months late. 

We are trying to help keep the country safe too and we have a 

job to make sure that oversight is done appropriately. We can’t 

help you, which we want to do, if you don’t give us information to 

help you with. 

If you haven’t noticed, this is one of the most legislatively active 

committees probably in the history of Congress, under Mr. 

McCaul’s leadership, and we churn out so many bills that are so 

important to keeping our country safe. 

We can’t do the legislation unless we know what the problem is. 

For example, I am contemplating something to expand the resources for TSIF, which I know is a bottleneck for technology and 

we want to help with that. But we can’t if we don’t get the informaVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:01 Jun 11, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18TP0118\18TP0118.TXT HEATH
15 

tion, especially if we don’t get the information in a timely manner, 

so I am confident you got the message. 

So with that I will recognize Mrs. Watson Coleman for 5 minutes 

of questioning. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Administrator. I wanted 

to get some clarity. You said that you were—you mentioned that 

you are going to be deploying 40 CTs through 20 airports and 20 

of them are going to go to airports. Is that right? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, Ma’am. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So where are the other 20 going? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. The other 12 are going to our labs, our testing facilities. So we are using three testing facilities and there will be 

four in each one of the testing facilities. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Now, how far away do you think you are 

of actually deploying these to the 440 airports Nation-wide? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. The testing articles that we deployed to 28 airports in fiscal year 2018, we are very close to starting that deployment, so I would say in the next 3 or 4 months we will start to 

deploying those and testing those in a real environment. 

With respect to the full deployment, starting to spread out to the 

450 airports, that begins in fiscal year 2019. The President’s budget when that gets released, I will be able to discuss more fully what 

our plan is for fiscal 2019. But I can assure that there is a deployment plan in fiscal 2019. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. I want to talk to you a little bit about 

surface transportation issues because I am always very concerned 

about that. Since the last time we talked in November there was 

an attempted terrorist attack in New York City’s subway. What is 

the security technology plan for surface transportation security? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. We work with the owners and operators of surface 

transportation systems and TSA’s role is to test technologies that 

might enable or enhanced surface transportation security. A good 

example is with that IED, person-borne IED up in New York, we 

are testing a technology that can detect at a distance if a person 

has something that is anomalous on their body. 

Essentially the technology reads millimeter waves that your body 

emits. It doesn’t send any energy toward the person. It just reads 

what the person’s body is emitting. It can tell at a pretty good distance like from, almost from me to you, Ma’am, whether or not 

there is an anomaly on your body that we might want to look at 

further. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So where would we be? Where are we 

in that process? How far away are we actually into being able to 

use this? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, ma’am. The TSIF, Transportation Security Integration Facility has been testing this. They should complete their 

testing this summer. That will be tested by TSA, the owners and 

operators of surface transportation systems will know it meets the 

testing regimen. They will have access to the data and they are 

able to purchase it knowing that, hey, this has already been tested. 

They don’t have to make the investment in that testing technology. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So they actually have to purchase the 

whatever it is that is going to be able to detect this. 

16 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes. We estimate the cost is about $100,000 per 

machine. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Oh my. OK. I also wanted to know 

about whether or not in any way, shape, or form there are regulations that you are waiting to, sort-of, bring up that will enhance 

the surface transportation security issues and if you are in any way 

hampered by this administration’s policies with regard to having to 

eliminate two in order to bring one up. That concerns me particularly in surface transportation because I just don’t think we are up 

to snuff anyway on any level as it relates to surface transportation 

issues. 

So where are we? Do you have any problems with getting out the 

regulations that you need to get out? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. We have three such regulations that required by 

the 9/11 Act. Two of those three regulations are in the—we are all 

in the process of being put forward. The other one is still being developed. But we hope to have the first. 

The topics they cover are training for surface transportation, vetting for surface transportation employees, and then security plans 

for surface transportation systems. We expect the first regulation 

to come out some time this year and the next one the year following that. Then the third one is still in development. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So are you compelled to have to eliminate two in order to bring one forward? So—— 

Mr. PEKOSKE. We are still working. Yes, ma’am. We are still 

working the implementation of that Executive Order inside the administration, so that process is still going on back and forth between the agencies. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. OK. OK. I want to talk to you a little 

bit more about the TSOs because I think that whole issue with regard to their salary, the conditions under which they are employed. 

Their ability to make complaints and have those complaints dealt 

with by independent third parties, that kind of thing, I wanted to 

know what you have done personally to sort-of advance, not only 

this career path, but to ensure that they are more fairly compensated and more a part of a predictable system? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, ma’am. That is a key focus of mine. I spend 

a lot of time at the front line of TSA, meeting with our transportation security officers and understanding the work that they perform and the conditions under which they work. 

We have put together a career progression plan for our TSOs 

that we are still putting the final touches on, but we should have 

that done very, very shortly. Essentially what that does is it lays 

out for an employee when you come into TSA, here is your pay 

level. Here is the training that you are going to be provided at each 

step along the way of your career. This is provided by TSA. The 

training would be both resident training, in other words, we will 

send you to a school, most likely the TSA Academy at Glynco, 

Georgia for training or training is provided on-site for you. 

Then once you meet those training requirements, we have established pay increases for those employees. So you can really, as a 

new employee look at that map and say, ‘‘If I get this training, and 

if I perform well, in X number of years, I can be at this level in 

the organization.’’ Assuming there are vacancies there, of course. 

17 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. It was anticipated that there would be 

a coming together of the union and the TSA and discuss, sort of, 

more formally, routinely what TSOs need and should have. OK. I 

will shut up in a second. 

Mr. KATKO. Yes, it’s all right. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So I know that the legislation hasn’t 

passed but I do wonder whether or not those kinds of meetings are 

taking place. With that, actually, after you answer that I will yield 

back the balance of my time. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Whenever I travel to an airport or a Federal air 

marshal service office in the field, I always do an all-hands session 

with our employees. I use that opportunity to share with them my 

vision for the organization, some of the observations that I have 

made about TSA, where I want to take it, but the vast majority of 

the time is answering their questions and getting their feedback. 

Oftentimes what I will do is, for example, with this career progression, I will test drive it in some of those meetings and say, 

‘‘Hey, we are thinking about this. Give me some feedback.’’ In almost every case, the union representatives have been part of that 

discussion. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mrs. Watson Coleman. The Chair now 

recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul for 5 minutes of 

questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know votes have been called and I know you know I will be visiting after. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. So, I will keep my questions very brief for the 

other Members, but I think this threat is getting worse, not better, 

without getting into a different room and space. I have been a big 

advocate for full deployment of the CT machines. 

Mr. Rogers has been a huge advocate for deployment of canines. 

Mr. Katko has been a real leader in terms of aviation security. I 

just want to ask you a very simply. As I understand it, you requested 300 CT machines to be deployed, is that correct? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. In our hearing, the full committee hearing 

on November 8 that was the number we have been using was 300. 

And I—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think at a minimum. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Right. 

Mr. MCCAUL. As I understand it, is it correct that OMB, did they 

deny that request or just lower it to a 150 which would be half that 

amount? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Whenever an agency requests a budget item from 

the Department of OMB, it goes through a review process and 

OMB and the Department have topline constraints. So they only 

have a certain amount of money they need to—they can allocate 

and they need to stick to that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I understand that, but I mean this is dollars and 

cents, we are talking about American-wise. One hundred-fifty million dollars, when we are talking about billions of dollars for a lot 

of other things, $150 million doesn’t sound like a whole lot to ensure the safety of the traveling public. 

18 

To cut that in half, when I think, quite frankly, we need more 

than 300 of these machines fully deployed, particularly in these 

dangerous countries that are last-point-of-departure airports. I flew 

back from Africa and Paris and Istanbul is—Cairo is frightening 

when we inspected those airports. 

I will just close in saying this and I think speak for all Members 

on both sides of the aisle, I want to work with you to do two things, 

to reprogram monies for the request that you made for 300 machines. 

If we need an additional appropriation and I understand the confines here within the OMB and the White House, but I think we 

in Congress can make the case for you because I know what you 

want and we want to give you want you need to protect the traveling public. 

So, let me just end with that I think we all want to work with 

you to get to that number and I think anything less than that is 

unacceptable for the American people. So, I yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. Mr. Chairman, I couldn’t agree with you more and 

I don’t think anyone on the committee disagrees with you at all on 

that. So, with that, we do have votes. We will stand adjourned 

until 5 minutes after votes conclude and we will resume at that 

time. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. KATKO. The subcommittee is now back in session. 

I will turn to the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for 5 

minutes of questioning. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

OK, one sec. Let us see, last year, Newark Airport became one 

of the first airports in the New York City region to have high-tech 

security checkpoints with the automated screening lanes. However, 

the strategic plan Refresh mentions that procurements are not anticipated until fiscal year 2020. 

To address these concerns and thus the Nation about screening 

checkpoint delays, does TSA intend to work with industry to accommodate non-Federal investment in ASLs potentially from the 

airlines or airports? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, Mr. Payne. We have 111 automated screening 

lanes deployed throughout the system. Every single one of those 

are automatic screening lanes was funded either by an airline or 

an airport, so they have provided the funding for those to let us 

do some developmental and some operational testing. 

There are no resources in the budget as it currently stands in fiscal 2018 for automated screening lanes, but we are standing up an 

acquisition project. This is one of the issues with how we proceed 

without a capital investment plan: Ideally, you would already have 

an automated screening lane project on the Government side so 

that when the industry-funded prototypes ran their course, that 

you had a project to come in behind that. We may see a little bit 

of a delay because that project wasn’t stood up. 

Mr. PAYNE. OK. Now, we expect the President’s budget to be out 

next month. Can you tell us in general terms about some of the 

TSA priorities in the budget? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, I can’t go into any specifics, but in general, the 

President’s budget reflects a resource-constrained approach because 

19 

we just do not have unlimited resources to apply to any particular 

agency. I can share with you that—— 

Mr. PAYNE. You don’t sound too sure. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Well, I know, I just cannot reveal what is in there 

at this point until the President releases the budget. Then I would 

be happy to sit down with you one on one to go over the particulars 

in that budget. But that should be the first or second week of February. 

Mr. PAYNE. So, there is something in it, though? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Oh, there is. 

Mr. PAYNE. Oh, OK. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes. 

Mr. PAYNE. All right, very good. 

As I am sure you are aware, TSA has consistently struggled with 

low morale across the work force. In 2016, TSA ranked 303rd out 

of 305 Government agencies for morale, there is also an immediate 

need for improvements to the TSO pay and performance system as 

well as other work force priorities so we can improve the morale 

and reduce turnover. 

I understand that AFGE which represents front-line transportation security officers has reached out to you on issues of importance to the work force. Are you planning to work with those labor 

representatives to try to rectify some of these issues? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. We are working with labor representatives. In fact, I met with the AFGE president already as one of my 

initial visits as the new administrator. Additionally, when I travel 

to airports around the country, the union representatives are always in those meetings, so I think we have a good dialog back and 

forth. 

Mr. PAYNE. How do you see addressing some of these issues from 

your standpoint? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, in my opening statement, I mentioned three 

key areas of priority for TSA. A key area, one of those three was 

a commitment to people. There are a number of subtasks underneath that that go to the very issue of increasing job satisfaction, 

by increasing retention within our work force. 

In my travels around TSA, actually my personal interactions 

with TSA, men and women at the checkpoints or the folks that are 

in checked baggage or behind the scenes doing inspections and 

things like that, I found very high morale and very strong mission 

focus. So, I am trying to reconcile the survey results with what I 

see personally. 

But, knowing that we do have some work to do there, we have 

seen some improvement in results from 2016 to 2017. I am open 

to see continued improvement in 2018, 2019, and 2020 for sure. 

From my perspective, sir, security effectiveness is directly related 

to worker satisfaction and job morale, so that is a very high priority one. 

Mr. PAYNE. OK. Well, I hope you are successful in that because, 

you know, being 303rd out of 305 indicates that there are obviously 

some issues. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PAYNE. I will yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you. 

20 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. 

Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for being here. We appreciate your service to our 

country. We have a lot of threats that originate overseas at lastpoint-of-departure airports. I am really curious to know what steps, 

if any, you all have been taking to work with our international 

partners to help them deal with deficiencies that the AT X-ray machines have in terms of screening passengers. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. We have a number of people deployed 

overseas that are industry representatives or TSA representatives 

in countries, roughly 100 people overall. They have direct interaction with both the carriers, the airports, and the nations involved 

in the last-point-of-departure airports. 

As we have worked to raise the global bar in aviation security, 

those steps that we put in place in July and the additional measures that came into force in October, all of those inspectors and 

those TSA representatives are visiting all of, every single one of the 

last-point-of-departure airports just to see how they are doing with 

implementing those measures and importantly, to see where we 

can help them out. 

Mr. ROGERS. OK. Do they seem receptive to that help? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. They do, certainly. 

Mr. ROGERS. According to the Refresh plan, TSA plan to procure 

two CT machines a year until you found the technology worked. I 

talked with the Chairman about now that you feel comfortable with 

it, that you would like to have at least 300. Down the road, what 

is the total number you think that you would be able to need for 

across the transportation world spectrum? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. Just for planning, it would be very, very 

simple and that is one for one replacement of the Advanced Technology of the AT machines with the CAT technology. That is roughly 2,400 machines overall. What we will find as we deploy the CAT 

machines that a one for one replacement may not be necessary. Additionally, a number of airports around the country are doing a lot 

of investment in their airport infrastructure and the way they invest may require more lanes for us or fewer. So, it is a very exact 

process to go through airport by airport and see where we can deploy the CT technology. 

Finally, there are some restrictions because the CT machines 

weigh more and they are a little bit bigger and so in some airports, 

we felt those infrastructure investments, they may not be able to 

handle a CT machine. 

Mr. ROGERS. We understand if you are constrained by the President’s budget in your advocacy, but the good news is the President 

proposes and we decide. So, we are going to do our best, as the 

Chairman said, to try and help you get what you need. I am curious, if you get to 300, what percentage of your capacity will that 

accommodate? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. If we get 300, I do not have the exact—basically, 

it would be 300 over roughly 2,400. So, whatever that math turns 

out to be. What is also important is to have some level of predictability in the future funding stream. That is important for the 

manufacturers to understand that too. 

21 

As we go through the testing process that we are in right now, 

we have a number of manufacturers’ machines that we are testing. 

We do not know at this point how many manufacturers of this set 

that we are testing are actually going to succeed in that test and 

be listed on our product list. So, that will also determine how much 

capacity we can put out there. Basically it is going to be the capacity of the number of manufacturers. 

Mr. ROGERS. OK. I want to shift over and I appreciate the fact 

that you have been full-throated in your support of the legislation 

we passed last week together with the establishing a working 

group for canine production and training. I hope that it is your expectation to give the same commitment to carrying out the report 

recommendations that they are going to yield as to how we implement those, that production in training. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, absolutely. In fact, I would like to get a 

start on the requirements in the legislation before the legislation 

is even passed. I agree with it so much that I think we should not 

waste any time. We should just get about the business and get it 

done. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. I know you now talked about the fact that 

TSA is struggling with American vendors to get green dogs or dogs 

that have the capability but haven’t been trained yet. What is the 

status? Is there any activity going on within TSA to kind-of modify 

their procurement processes to reflect more what DOD does? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. We are constantly looking at that because 

our procurement processes, as many of the other Members have 

noted, they are lengthy. So my approach is to look at it and say 

how can we stream—even within the existing requirements that we 

have, how can we streamline that process to get to an end solution 

faster? 

My central effort in my strategy is going to be accelerate action, 

because as I look across TSA, many things just take a lot longer 

than I think they should take no matter what it is. It takes longer 

than I think what it should take. So, our key focus and certainly 

a focus on getting technology deployed out to our front-line work 

force which would include canines, because I firmly believe that we 

need to do everything we can to get the right tools in the hands 

of the men and women we have out there. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. My time has expired. 

I do have a couple of additional questions that I will submit for 

the record and I hope you will reply to those. I yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you. I just want to note, we may do a quick 

second round if warranted. 

With that, I will recognize the gentleman from Louisiana. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pekoske, thank you for appearing before us today. 

I would like to touch on a couple of subjects very quickly. My colleague mentioned morale in TSA. Would you have not contributed, 

the morale status, generally speaking at TSA be due to consistent 

failures and high turnover, would you contribute that as? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Sir, I think there are a lot of factors that feed into 

the morale of our employees. Those would be two of the factors. I 

think other factors are the nature of the work, the competitive nature of the work, the stress that they are under, certainly some of 

22 

the feedback they get from customers that might not be fair feedback and things like that. 

Mr. HIGGINS. But we touched upon an interesting aspect of this 

in mentioning a 5-year term rather than frequent turnover at the 

upper administrative levels. Morale is reflective of consistency in 

my experience. In 2017, just a couple of months ago, we passed, the 

Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act and it now 

languishes in the Senate. If our colleagues in the Senate will act 

and pass that full authorization which is for the first time, the Department of Homeland Security was authorized since its inception 

which consolidates it under the oversight of one committee and associated subcommittees. 

Would you not see that as a statement of consistency and therefore would contribute to an improvement of morale? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, I would. I think that is very important. 

To your point on consistency of leadership, the Chairman mentioned the number of leaders he has seen just since he has been 

a member of this subcommittee and having some stability at the 

top of the organization I think is very important. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you. I think it is very important and I hope 

my Senate colleagues are listening. 

I would like to jump to CT. Can you tell us why the great disparity between the 2017 Refresh Plan that stated 2 units for fiscal 

years 2018, 2019, and 2020 with a total of 6 and now we are talking about 40 in 2018 which is great, we would like to see you get 

them in every airport, everywhere at whatever level you need 

them. 

But why the great disparity between that report and you are advising us now? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. So the difference is that when that report was 

written, we didn’t have budget numbers for our fiscal 2019 and forward. So what it reflects is the budget numbers that were existent 

at that time. 

Mr. HIGGINS. So, again, the consistency and full authorization of 

the Department of Homeland Security would assist us as a Nation 

to deploying this technology. Would you agree? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I would in consistency of funding, I support it. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I hope my colleagues in the Senate are listening. 

I would like to jump to what you stated. You had stated, sir, in 

your testimony that, pardon me, you have a plan to aggressively 

deploy checkpoint CT technology and you are currently pursuing a 

flexible approach to test, procure, and deploy CT systems. Then you 

stated that you are focused on maturing and deploying. Maturing, 

by that, do you mean testing algorithms? 

Why can these units not be deployed and put in use protecting 

American citizens as the algorithms are tested and tweaked and 

matured? Why can’t we go ahead and put the systems in place before we test them for a year or two? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. So, again, in fact the plan is to qualify the machines. It is just machines that work that meet a current standard 

and then the additional testing and the additional software development is for a new accessible property screening standard which 

gets to a wider range of explosives detection and—— 

Mr. HIGGINS. So, you concur that that is—is that a goal? 

23 

Mr. PEKOSKE. It is a goal, yes, sir. But, there are—— 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you. Thank you, for that answer. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes. But, we will have constraints in how fast we 

can deploy it just based on airport ability. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Oh, I see. Well, thank you for that clarification. 

My final 30 seconds, please touch on ground transportation and 

old technology of deployment of canines which this body has authorized the funding for many additional canine teams, do you not 

see that as an answer for our ground transportation system? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. It is part of a solution set. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Are you aggressively pursuing that? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. We have 675 canine teams that we provide to State and law enforcement for both airport and surface 

transportation. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you for that. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Fitzpatrick. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Pekoske, for being here. 

My questions, I want to narrow it on cockpit safety specifically, 

the flight deck officer program. How is it working? What is working 

about it? What is not working? What are the areas of improvement 

with regard to efficiency? It is obviously run and overseen by the 

Air Marshal program. 

As a former Federal agent myself, we had a lot of interaction 

with that program or with those folks. I just want an update on 

what is working about it and what is not? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I think it is working very well, sir. I have personally observed the training that the Federal flight deck officers go 

through. I think it is very rigorous, that they volunteer for this assignment, the airlines support their assignment. It provides an 

extra layer of security in aircraft which we very much value. So, 

I see no downside whatsoever to the FFDO program and see only 

upsides to it. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Is there anything that can be improved? Is it 

a purely voluntary program? Are their targeted percentages of the 

certain percentage of cockpits you want on in pilots or are pilots 

actually sought out after to participate in the program? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir, it is voluntary. Really, the more the better. I mean the more cockpit security we have, I think the better 

off we are. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. OK, thank you, sir. 

My second question also pertaining to the cockpit is the idea of 

double barriers, something that has come up a lot. I would like it, 

sir, if can opine on the necessity of them, whether you think that 

they would make aircraft and airliners and therefore the passengers therein safer and more secure. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I have looked at the overall cockpit security issues 

and as you know on flights where we deploy Federal air marshals, 

we generally put them in the forward part of the aircraft to provide 

that additional layer of security. Then when you consider the reinforced cockpit doors and then the potential of Federal flight deck 

24 

officers being on an aircraft, there are several layers of security 

that are built in there. 

The additional barrier piece, I can get back to you as a question 

for the record on that. I don’t have any specifics on that at this 

time, but I will look into it. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. OK, because certainly the flight deck officer 

program helps. Certainly the air marshals help, fortified barriers 

on the doors themselves help. The concern, and the reason why myself and many people think the double barrier was necessary is 

during the change, when is the change in personnel in and out of 

the cockpit. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Right. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Currently, what is being used to protect that 

are carts and attendants protecting the cockpit. Do you think it is 

safe to say that a double barrier to protect that change in the cockpit personnel would make the aircraft safer? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Well certainly, it is vulnerable when the change is 

occurring. So something that could close that vulnerability would 

be useful for sure. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. OK. Thank you, sir. 

I yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick. 

We will do just a brief second round and no one is compelled to 

ask questions if they are not inclined to do so. I just have a couple 

of follow-ups I wanted to touch upon. 

First of all, with respect to the 5-year plan and some of the responses in there, at one point, you stated that with respect to the 

CT machines that TSA, quote, expects actual deployment of CT 

systems to occur in early to mid–2019. What does that mean? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. That means that the deployment will probably 

occur about this time in 2019. Because part of the survey that we 

need to look at is when do we have surge periods at airports? Basically it is from the week before Thanksgiving all the way through 

the first week of January. You probably don’t want to be deploying 

these systems during that week just for throughput reasons and for 

training reasons. 

Additionally, whenever we go through a surge period, the transportation security officers are always on duty and they are often 

working overtime. We do look for periods that are immediately 

after the surge periods so give them a little bit of time off and to 

conduct some training that we might not have been able to cover 

when they were going through a surge. 

Mr. KATKO. We touched on this at the last hearing, but I wanted 

to just follow up just to make sure I am clear with this. You know 

that the actual machine you are contemplating is available now 

and you also know that it has been deployed now at least in other 

airports around the world, so the technology is there. 

There is some discussion about doing basically on-the-job tweaking if you will of that technology. Has there been any consideration 

given to just simply deploying them now as quickly as you can and 

tweaking, doing some of the tweaking that you need to do as you 

go, kind-of like learning as you go with this issue? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. When we do the operational and developmental testing that’s going to occur in fiscal year 2018, so it is this 

25 

fiscal year, we will pick those airports and we do have some flexibility in terms of throughput and do some actual real, live testing 

of those machines. 

Mr. KATKO. That is not going to be something that is widespread. You are basically going to wait until 2019 after the TCIF 

testing is done? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Two-thousand nineteen is when the first large 

chunk of money will come into the program. 

Mr. KATKO. I see. That is when you will be able to deploy. You 

are kind of waiting for the money as well, right? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Right. 

Mr. KATKO. OK, all right. Also I just want to mention, you mentioned at some point in your testimony earlier this afternoon that 

the importance of consistent funding streams with respect to Congress, and I couldn’t agree more. But one of the complaints we have 

received from industry routinely is that TSA often moves the goal 

posts on what the agency plans to buy and when they plan to buy 

it with their funding request. 

I want you to comment on that if you are aware of that issue in 

your short time there and what are you planning to do as you try 

to address that? Because one of the concerns I have and we have 

discussed these many times, there is an awful lot of great technologies out there that never find a way to the battlefield if you 

will, because of these moving of the goal posts that has occurred 

in the past. 

It discourages entrepreneurs and upstart companies and it also 

discourages a lot of companies to invest the amount of money they 

have to, to try and get these contracts. So I wonder if you could 

address that issue for me. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. 

One of the purposes for the innovation task force was to address 

that very issue, is how do we have a good, robust dialog back and 

forth with the industry, both large businesses and small businesses 

and really have an on-going dialog when we are doing developmental testing, so that the industry partners know how the developmental testing is going on? They can make some adjustments to 

their equipment as it is proceeding. 

Once you get into operational testing, that gets to be a little bit 

of a different animal. But I do think that a predictable funding 

stream is very, very valuable to the industry. I mean they are 

going to know that we are planning to invest X amount of dollars 

in 3 years hence. If they want to put R&D effort to be able to compete for those projects, they can do it early enough on, which actually at the end of the day benefits us as well in the process. 

So my goal is to have good, robust dialog with the industry and 

to see if we can get to a point where in the capital budget, we have 

a predictable funding stream. Right now, in checked bags, we have 

a very predictable funding stream. It is $250,000 per year and that 

allows us to look out. We know, in 3 years, we are going to have 

$250,000 adjusted for inflation. 

So, airports and TSA can make plans for deploying those systems 

in an orderly fashion. The rest of the capital budget is not like 

that, so I really think it is very important to get to that capital investment plan. 

26 

Mr. KATKO. OK, great. I just want one last question since I have 

a minute here. This is something that is just a personal bugaboo 

of mine, I go to airports all over the world and mostly international 

airports have automated exit lanes and in fact Syracuse, New York 

of all places which is not exactly the busiest airport in the world 

has automated exit lanes. 

Every time I walk out an exit lane in National Airport or elsewhere, I see they have two to four people in the exit lane just 

checking IDs when they come through. No bags are being checked 

or nothing like that. I just wonder, first of all about have you 

looked into automated exit lane technology and whether that could 

save any money for TSA and the Government, No. 1? 

No. 2, given the current threat climate and I think there was a 

case last year where one of the flight attendants was trying to 

smuggle on a significant amount of cocaine through the exit lane 

check-in procedure. Is there any concern about the exit lanes as 

being a security gap that might want to be addressed? Because I 

know the exit lane technology out there now is pretty much 100 

percent certainty that people aren’t going to sneak through that 

way. I just want to ask you about that. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. 

We look at those technologies and one of my biggest concerns in 

terms of resourcing overall is the number of people TSA has at the 

checkpoints, because I don’t think that is enough people. It is evidenced by the fact that we are having to use a lot of overtime to 

get through surge periods that we are not able to conduct training 

during those surge periods and things like that. I think it affects 

morale too if you are in a job and you are tasked to work extraordinary hours on a regular basis, I think that affects your overall 

perspective of that particular position. 

So my goal is to look at the resource base of TSA and see where 

we can put additional resources currently existing in the agency at 

the front line, because, again, my focus is on that front line. 

Mr. KATKO. OK, and I would like to hear more when we get a 

chance to just think about the exit lane technology, something we 

addressed in some hearings a couple of years ago. I think it is 

something we have to take another look at just from a manpower 

standpoint, but also from a cost standpoint. 

With that, the Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from New 

Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Pekoske, you have given us a lot of good information today 

and you certainly have expressed a commitment and understanding of the challenges and the commitment to resolve a lot of 

these issues. So, I just hope you have long enough to do that. 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Thank you. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Try not going anywhere for a while. 

Mr. KATKO. I will second that. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Last week, there was this report about 

a potential conflict of interest between staff at the Department of 

Homeland Security and a computed tomography contract that was 

awarded. I think we should all agree that contracts should be 

awarded fairly. 

27 

One article mentioned that the staff was recused from all matters involving the contractor. I am concerned about other potential 

conflicts at TSA. Would you be able to speak to the sort-of regularity of how this has been happening and would you also be able 

to provide our staff with the list of the individuals and the reasons 

for their recusals? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, ma’am. I will definitely take a look into that. 

I am not familiar with the particulars of that particular case, but 

I know in my own example, I have recusals from a number of items 

based on my business relationships before I came into this position, 

and we are very, very, very careful about making sure that every 

aspect of that is complied with. 

I think that the competition needs to be fair, open, and transparent and if there is any break in that particular model, I want 

to take a look at it. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Just to follow up on that, do you find 

the rate of recusal more now than, let us say, in sort-of the last 

terms? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I would not have a good basis to make that comparison. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Can you? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. I can get the data. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Would you share that with us? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thanks. I yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for questioning. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pekoske, I would just like to state that I echo the sentiments 

of my colleagues that we certainly hope you stay on the job, extremely squared away and your testimony today has been uplifting. 

I would like to jump back into canines for a moment regarding 

cargo and airport employee areas, restricted areas. We expend a 

great deal of energy and technology to screen our passengers to the 

extent that the deterrent factor is largely in place. I personally believe that if an airplane is to be hijacked by firearm, it is going to 

come from the cargo area or the airport employee restricted access 

area. 

So, regarding the use of canines and more specifically Americanbred canine teams, what is your vision on using old technology, 

given what you stated as, I think you used a term called budgetrestrained environment, old technology being certainly less expensive than new and canine team technology and capabilities being 

very, very adequate regarding detection of explosives, how do you 

envision the cargo areas and restricted access areas of airports and 

using canine teams? 

Mr. PEKOSKE. Yes, sir. Canine teams are effective in that environment. Not only to detect potential issues of concern, but also to 

provide that deterrent effect as you mentioned. The Aviation Security Advisory Council has a subcommittee on insider threat and I 

have asked that subcommittee to take another look at that overall 

issue because I think it is something that we just need to keep a 

constant stare on and we should not look at it two or 3 years ago 

28 

and say, OK, we have got adequate procedures in place, I think we 

need to constantly review that. 

I would also add, sir, that in our global efforts to raise the bar 

in aviation security, that second phase that began to be implemented on October 26 contains security around aircraft that are 

destined for the United States in foreign airports. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, sir. Thank you for that answer. Thank you for 

your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 

Payne, if he has any questions. 

Mr. PAYNE. No questions at this time. Thank you for your service 

to this country. 

Mr. KATKO. OK, thank you very much, Mr. Payne. 

Before we close, I do want to note that, listen, we had to get into 

some tough stuff here. That is part of our job at oversight. We 

would not be dispatching our duties if we did not do so. But that 

doesn’t take away from the fact that we view what TSA is doing 

in the front line everyday keeping America safe and keeping the 

skies guys safe and terror-free is really—they are doing a great job 

and we appreciate everything. 

So yes, our job is to bark at you. Our job is to point out where 

you are falling down. But, it is also incumbent upon us to point out 

what you are doing well. The agency is making progress. It has a 

long way to go, but I am confident that your leadership and your 

team that is there and even the young lady that would be going 

there next week with you, that you are going to be all right. 

I just hope that you understand that this is an interactive relationship and that when you need things, you have to let this committee know and we will respond. We will respond legislatively. We 

will respond in any way we can to help you, because I think it is 

in all of our interests to keep this country safe and we know from 

our briefings that the bad guys are still trying to get us in any way 

they can and their technologies are getting more advanced. We 

have to advance with them. That is why we spend so much time 

on the acquisitions process and trying to help streamline that process. We have to get the best tools available to the front lines. 

I think the same way about my son who has just graduated Fort 

Benning, Georgia, officer training and could be put in harms’ way 

tomorrow and it is incumbent upon us to make sure that he has 

every weapon at his disposal to both protect himself and to get the 

enemy. I view it the same way here. 

So, while we point out the tough stuff, we also want to say thank 

you to each and everybody, each and every person that works at 

TSA. You can obviously do a lot of other things elsewhere and a 

lot of you could be making a lot more money elsewhere, but you 

do that because you want to keep your country safe and that is a 

very commendable thing. 

Before I close, I do want to note that after several years with us, 

Krista Harvey would be going over to your shop. While we are sad 

to see her go, we are glad to see her going to your place. I encourage you to use her experience here because she is going to be very 

29 

helpful for you. Don’t figure out how to get me over, Krista, OK, 

all right? 

So, thank you all very much. With that, let me see if I can find 

my closing notes here, here we go. I want to thank everybody for 

their questions today. It was great as usual. I want to thank 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, my colleague and friend for her usual 

great work. 

The Members of the committee have 5 additional days to submit 

questions and for the witness to respond in writing. Pursuant to 

committee Rule VII(D), the hearing record will be held open for 10 

days. Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(31) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JOHN KATKO FOR DAVID P. PEKOSKE

Question 1a. Last spring, we saw the emergence of a serious new threat to the 

aviation system relating to personal electronic devices (PEDs). The threat had a significant, rippling effect on the international aviation system, with last-point-of-departure airports required to take drastic steps to increase security and passengers 

in the United States are now required to take PEDs out of their carry-on bags. The 

latest intelligence indicates that we are in a very dynamic and evolving threat landscape that could have significant implications on aviation security and the international economy. 

Will the investments outlined in the Refresh Plan for transportation security 

equipment keep pace with the evolving threats to aviation? 

Answer. TSA operates within a complex and evolving threat environment, and 

technology acquisition programs must proactively respond to emerging threats to 

protect transportation security. To address threats and increase security effectiveness, TSA is focused on deploying an effective, adaptive, and flexible system of security capabilities. TSA pursues enhanced capability development to address capability gaps, optimize existing technologies, and develop future technologies. It is our 

intent that the investment detailed in the Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan Biennial Refresh Plan will meet current and future threats to aviation. 

Question 1b. Can you describe in detail how the TSA’s Refresh Plan will accelerate significant advancements in security technology capabilities and deployment 

of these systems at the Nation’s checkpoints and checked baggage systems? 

Answer. TSA’s acquisition strategies will continue to transform to address threats 

within the transportation security environment, and reflect the goals outlined in the 

Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan Biennial Refresh, which provides 

industry and other stakeholders with the Agency’s strategic direction in order to 

align investments accordingly. The Refresh provides information regarding planned 

purchases within established acquisition programs as well as focusing on emerging 

capability areas. For example, TSA provides its detailed acquisition plan to rapidly 

test, procure, and deploy available Computed Tomography systems, which TSA believes will significantly increase security effectiveness at the checkpoint. In addition, 

the on-going technology initiatives and innovative concepts outlined in the Refresh 

Plan detail TSA’s continued progress in its pursuit to address capability gaps, optimize existing technologies, and develop future technologies. Last, the Refresh Plan 

details how the Innovation Task Force is demonstrating innovative and emerging 

capabilities. These demonstrations provide stakeholders within the security technology industry real-life operational experience and data, which in turn may reduce 

technology transition time and cost, and better inform TSA requirements. The Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan Biennial Refresh is one of many avenues that TSA uses to foster dialog and collaboration with its stakeholders and to 

provide transparency. TSA will continue to work with industry to develop capabilities that meet requirements and will work internally to shorten acquisition time 

lines to accelerate the deployment of capabilities to checkpoints and checked baggage across the Nation. 

Question 1c. Can you describe how the Refresh Plan fosters a robust domestic security manufacturing base and enhances competition to drive innovation in aviation 

security? 

Answer. Within the Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan Biennial Refresh, TSA provides industry and other stakeholders an understanding of where it 

intends to invest to elevate checkpoint screening capabilities. The Refresh provides 

information regarding planned purchases within established acquisition programs, 

as well as focusing on emerging technologies. TSA will continue to collaborate with 

and inform the domestic security manufacturing base to ensure it has an understanding of TSA’s direction, which should foster both competition and innovation. 

32 

Question 2a. Last year the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) undertook a comprehensive effort to assess the effectiveness of checkpoints at U.S. airports, and presented to TSA 35 specific recommendations in a report titled Improving Checkpoints at U.S. Airports. This report sets the vision for checkpoints of the 

future, which includes the fielding of next-generation technologies that will significantly increase security and improve the passenger experience. 

Will the TSA’s Refresh Plan meet the vision outlined in the ASAC report? 

Answer. TSA continues to work with the ASAC to implement the recommendations within the ASAC report. 

TSA concurred with all recommendations within the ASAC report and responded 

to the subcommittee with detailed implementation plans for each one, including 

milestones to full implementation. The status of these recommendations are discussed at ASAC subcommittee meetings. In addition, TSA will ensure that future 

reports to refresh TSA’s Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan consider 

these recommendations, as applicable to security technology. 

The Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan Biennial Refresh was considered in the development of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Report. TSA believes that the efforts detailed within the Refresh Plan show TSA’s continued progress to address threats and increase security effectiveness at checkpoints 

at U.S. Airports. 

Question 2b. Does TSA have the funding necessary to accelerate the development 

and deployment of increased capabilities and next-generation technologies as soon 

as possible to meet the evolving threats? 

Answer. Yes, TSA has been able to work with its allocated funding to best support 

the development of capabilities to address evolving threats and to develop strategies 

to test and deploy technologies faster. TSA will continue to use the established processes to request any additional funding if necessary to further accelerate increased 

capabilities. 

Question 2c. Notwithstanding current or anticipated budgets, has the TSA identified the funding requirements needed to accomplish the mission and meet the evolving threats, as the ASAC has recommended? 

Answer. Yes, TSA has identified the requirements and will continue to fund those 

requirements within existing resources. Within a budget-constrained environment, 

TSA prioritizes and makes difficult decisions of what to resource and what not to 

resource. TSA will continue to look for funding opportunities to best accomplish its 

mission to include addressing known and evolving threats and will continue to follow the established acquisition life-cycle process and the established processes to request additional funding if necessary to accelerate increased capabilities. 

Question 2d. TSA’s Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) has a $250 million capital fund each year, which provides multi-year funding for screening equipment upgrades and replacement. This provides some consistency and certainty in 

making future investment decisions for checked baggage system projects. Would the 

establishment of a capital fund for the Passenger Screening Program (PSP) help the 

TSA improve the checkpoint equipment? 

Answer. The administration has proposed that the traveling public pay a greater 

share of aviation security costs through higher fees. While the establishment of a 

capital fund to resource capabilities within the checkpoint would provide a more stable planning, programming, and budgeting process, any additional funds should not 

increase deficit spending. 

Question 3a. The ASAC Checkpoint Report also contains a number of specific recommendations for the TSA to vastly improve the long and expensive security equipment development and acquisitions process. In particular, the TSA test and evaluation process takes many years with high costs to Government and industry. The Refresh Plan provides additional details on the recent TSA reorganization and how it 

will enhance the process. 

Does TSA have examples of any efficiencies or time saved in the development and 

acquisitions process since the reorganization? 

Answer. The TSA reorganization addressed a need to create an organizational 

structure that centralizes acquisition programs in a single chain of command, establishes a dedicated requirements organization to enhance acquisition life-cycle processes, and separates contracting functions from broader acquisition management. 

One of the significant efforts that TSA is driving under the new organization is the 

rapid development, qualification, procurement, and deployment of Computed Tomography (CT) technology for checkpoints. The development of the acquisition strategy 

to aggressively deploy CT demonstrates how we are working to assess, develop, and 

deploy technologies faster and marshaling the focus of the entire agency. We are 

currently using existing processes such as field demonstrations, operational assessVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:01 Jun 11, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18TP0118\18TP0118.TXT HEATH
33 

ments, and developmental testing to develop screening capabilities in a time-constrained manner. 

Question 3b. Has the TSA set specific metrics or goals to measure reduced times 

for equipment development and qualification? Has the TSA established any specific 

metrics or goals to reduce the T&E time frame, as a means to measure progress? 

Answer. TSA monitors the time it takes for equipment to move through the qualification process (also referred to as the test and evaluation process), but much of 

that time line is dependent on the maturity and readiness of the technology to meet 

TSA requirements. Some Transportation Security Equipment failures during Qualification and Operational Tests have unfortunately created an iterative cycle of test, 

fix, and re-test that extends acquisition time lines and drives up test and evaluation 

costs. 

One of the goals of the Innovation Task Force (ITF) is to provide more immediate 

feedback to vendors on the performance of their technologies in the transportation 

security environment. One metric that ITF uses to assess the success of its Broad 

Agency Announcement (BAA) is looking at the number of small technology companies, international companies, and/or first-time TSA companies that apply and are 

accepted for a capability demonstration and comparing it to historical industry demographics. The goal is to increase TSA’s industry footprint to help identify innovative and effective security solutions. 

Also, TSA is working on opportunities to enhance test and evaluation practices 

such as expediting and supplementing testing by accepting vendor and/or thirdparty agent test data; avoiding duplication by leveraging existing test data through 

the creation of data-sharing agreements with international government entities; 

looking into using accredited Modeling & Simulation to augment live testing and 

support evaluations that cannot be assessed in a live environment; and looking into 

flexible testing processes that allow for a better understanding of system capabilities 

prior to entering formal Operational Tests. While the goal is to reduce the burden 

of excessive, timely, and costly testing, TSA is still in the planning process of this 

shift and has not established specific metrics for success to date. 

Question 3c. TSA is exploring third-party testing to gain efficiencies in the testing 

process. Will the third-party testing policy ensure that determinations made by the 

third party will be accepted by the TSA, so the testing process does not have to be 

replicated? 

Answer. The acceptance of data will be based on a thorough data source assessment of risk and a review of the test plans and data provided. Vendor-provided documentation demonstrating a robust test organization, sound test plan, and successful results executed will be accepted on a case-by-case basis specific to the technology and extent of third-party testing. TSA testing will be reduced when vendorprovided third-party testing demonstrates the necessary rigor to replace Government-conducted testing. 

The TSA Acquisition Qualification Policy and TSA Test and Evaluation (T&E) 

Guidebook established a consistent acquisition approach that is compliant with the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Instruction 102–01–001 Acquisition Management Instruction (series). Application of these published documents, allows TSA 

to ensure vendor-provided information (e.g., third-party test data) is sufficient to 

demonstrate system readiness to enter the TSA T&E process. As TSA considers 

third-party data, it may reduce test and evaluation time lines by increasing the maturity of systems thereby decreasing the probability of retests and possible reduction 

of TSA Qualification Testing and help validate and/or supplement TSA T&E results. 

Question 3d. TSA has indicated to the vendor community it will open up a notional, ‘‘checkpoint of the future’’ in Las Vegas McCarran International Airport to 

test and evaluate multiple types of technology including biometrics, Advanced Imaging Technologies, and CT systems. TSA has also indicated they may test different 

configurations of AT/CT and ASL configurations due to the lack of space at the TSA 

Integration Facility located adjacent to Washington Reagan National Airport. Given 

a shortage of engineering and testing personnel, the existing backlog at the TSIF, 

and geographic challenges, what new assets and resources will be deployed for the 

effort at Las Vegas McCarran? Do you anticipate reducing the workforce at the 

TSIF to accommodate this effort? Were alternative locations closer to TSA testing 

personnel or manufacturers’ facilities considered? Will TSA be funding procurement 

and installation of various ASL configurations as part of this demonstration? 

Answer. TSA does not have a shortage of engineering or testing personnel or a 

backlog at the TSA System Integration Facility (TSIF). TSA does have a need for 

additional opportunities to collect live operational data. Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (LAS) has offered to provide TSA with checkpoint space that is not 

currently being utilized by the airport for standard operations. The use of this space 

will allow TSA the flexibility to run parallel tracks at TSIF and in the field. It will 

34 

also enable TSA to assess new designs, technologies, and procedures in an operational environment and inform requirements as the agency continues to drive a future security screening strategy. The focus will be reducing the time it will take to 

assess and deploy systems in specific configurations for demonstration. 

TSA has an application process for airports interested in participating as Innovation Sites. Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (LAS) submitted an application and was selected for this opportunity. None of the National Capital Region airports (DCA, IAD, or BWI) have applied to be an Innovation Airport. 

TSA is currently identifying requirements surrounding staff availability, local 

operational impact, benefits to our public-private partnerships and benefits for industry. At this time, TSA is planning to use current resources to conduct its testing 

and assessment requirements both at its facilities and alternate locations. 

In order to fully demonstrate the Computed Tomography (CT) operational capability, TSA intends to demonstrate CT integration with Automated Screening Lanes 

(ASL) and/or an automated ingress/egress belt system to understand impacts in effectiveness and efficiency. LAS provides an opportunity to rapidly obtain data in a 

live operational environment, while the TSIF maintains its focus on laboratory functional and developmental testing. Additionally, the number of hardware configurations, between CT and ASL equipment, require significant space. 

Question 3e. Figure 2 is an Overview of the Acquisition Lifecycle for Security 

Technology. The ability to meet evolving threats in the future will be heavily reliant 

on algorithm development. Will new algorithm acquisition/deployment also proceed 

under a similar acquisition framework? If not, has that process been defined? Can 

it be provided to the committee? 

Answer. In general, the development and deployment of new algorithms to meet 

new threats are required to comply with the acquisition framework depicted in Figure 2 of the Refresh Plan and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Instruction 102–01–001 Acquisition Management Instruction. When algorithm enhancements are already associated with a technology that has approved requirements, 

TSA, in coordination with DHS, performs an analysis to determine where, within 

the framework, TSA can initiate the process to support the development and deployment of new algorithms. In addition, TSA is able to tailor the existing acquisition 

processes and look to delegate authorities as necessary and appropriate. 

Question 3f. Does TSA possess rapid procurement authorities to purchase and install significant quantities of TSE post-Innovation Task Force, bypassing the process 

outlined in Appendix F? For example, has TSA considered the use of innovative contracting methods to greatly accelerate the prototyping and procurements of new 

equipment, including executing Urgent Operational Needs (UONs) or Other Transaction Authority (OTAs)? If not, can you please recommend a rapid acquisition authority that would be feasible with TSA’s acquisition framework? 

Answer. TSA has used rapid acquisition authorities in the past. In September 

2016, DHS approved an Urgent Operational Need (UON) justification authorizing 

the deployment of Automated Screening Lanes at specified airports. This deployment was dependent upon TSA’s partnerships with stakeholders. Two of our largest 

ASL deployments include 22 lanes at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and 17 lanes at Newark Liberty International Airport. 

TSA is working closely with the Department to help draft policy which would help 

DHS components achieve a more rapid acquisition life cycle when needed. Additionally, TSA is exploring whether it could adopt an emergent acquisition process similar to DOD’s Joint Improvised-threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) Joint Emergent 

Operational Need (JEON) to gain flexibility in responding to non-urgent, but pressing threats. TSA would be glad to brief the committee on its findings from this assessment. 

Question 4a. Around 50 percent of all passenger airline travel has cargo in the 

bay of the aircraft, yet TSA’s Refresh Plan makes no reference to cargo security. 

This omission greatly concerns the committee. We understand that, while TSA delegates responsibility for cargo screening to freight forwarders and therefore does not 

itself purchase cargo screening equipment, the cargo security threat is recognized 

and there is work being done within DHS S&T to advance screening technology in 

this area. 

Does TSA accept the findings of such organizations as the GAO and CRS and 

view air cargo as a serious security concern and, if so, what are TSA’s specific plans 

for incorporating advanced, non-intrusive cargo screening technologies into TSA’s 

R&D and materiel acquisition planning? 

Question 4b. Is it possible to tie in the Air Cargo requirements with the requirements of other agencies, such as the CBP Non-Intrusive Inspection organization? 

Answer. TSA agrees with GAO and CRS’s view of air cargo as a serious security 

concern, and has had programs addressing air cargo threats since at least 2004. In 

35 

response to the increased threat of a bomb being smuggled on-board an aircraft 

bound for the United States, and working in close coordination with CBP, TSA recently issued emergency directives requiring stricter scrutiny of air cargo being loaded onto flights at last-point-of-departure airports in 6 countries—Egypt, Jordan, 

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. These new requirements include required electronic submission of additional data elements for the 

cargo before any cargo is laden onto an aircraft bound for the United States. TSA 

is also required by public law and regulation to assess and qualify technologies for 

screening air cargo. The agency’s goal is to stimulate and support a robust air cargo 

security technology marketplace. TSA has the ability to continuously receive vendor 

requests for qualification of prospective technologies, and works collaboratively with 

vendors to refine the technologies they propose. 

TSA is also partnering with the Air Cargo Associations and canine companies to 

initiate a Third-Party Canine Cargo program. This new program will provide the 

capability for private industry to screen cargo utilizing private canine companies 

certified to TSA standards. 

TSA actively collaborates with CBP and other Government agencies (for example, 

DOD and DOT) to harmonize requirements. The DHS Joint Requirements Council 

architecture is also very helpful in this regard. The threat characteristics associated 

with air cargo on both passenger and all-cargo aircraft are significantly different 

than those generally associated with cargo transported on other means. Accordingly, 

not all technologies used by other agencies are effective for air cargo transported 

in flight. 

Question 5a. TSA’s Refresh Plan contains an update on the state of hardening the 

aviation security system against cybersecurity threats and attacks. 

Can you describe specifically the status of the cybersecurity elements of the Security Technology Integrated Program (STIP) and any on-going challenges? 

Answer. The Security Technology Integrated Program (STIP) comprises a platform of technology that provides secure connectivity to Transportation Security 

Equipment (TSE) endpoints that are deployed in the field. Currently, and because 

of DHS internal policies 4300A, DHS 4300B, and NIST cyber controls, most of the 

TSEs are not connected to the network. In support of generating connectivity for 

TSE endpoints, DHS/TSA mandated 9 cybersecurity requirements, (OS Currency/Security Patching; OS hardening; AV Updates; PIV Compatibility; Security Scanning 

Support; Technical Obsolescence; SOC Monitoring; POAM Support and Vendor ISSO 

Designation) which were established following the OPM breaches in 2015, and are 

subsequently required to be implemented on TSE devices. Facilitating this secure 

connectivity establishes a centralized enterprise-wide data management system, 

which facilitates the exchange of information between the TSE and data center. 

STIP is active in multiple activities to further enhance cybersecurity elements. 

Specifically, STIP is engaging with the security technology acquisition programs to 

inform them of implementing the 9 DHS/TSA mandated cybersecurity requirements, 

as well as additional security requirements (e.g., mandated by DHS 4300A policy, 

NIST standards, etc.) so that programs can achieve an Authority to Operate (ATO), 

and maintain cybersecurity compliance. The technology acquisition programs are in 

the initial stages of evaluating its technology for cybersecurity compliance and determining implementation time lines. The Credential Authentication Technology 

(CAT) program is an exception, as the system has met the 9 DHS/TSA mandated 

cybersecurity requirements. TSA is working toward deployment of CAT systems in 

fiscal year 2019. Starting in fiscal year 2018, TSA intends to begin development of 

technical solutions for security at the endpoints and for the STIP application, which 

will facilitate all other security technology meeting cybersecurity requirements and 

enabling the TSA to connect TSE to the network in a phased approach over the next 

6 years. 

Question 5b. How does TSA ensure the cybersecurity of security technology deployed in the field? 

Answer. As part of TSA’s plan for continuous monitoring of the field equipment, 

TSA will be creating multiple systems associated with each type of transportation 

security equipment (TSE) to meet the requirements of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). Each identified FISMA system will be required to 

go through the Security Authorization process which will allow TSA to continuously 

assess the risks associated with the field TSEs on an on-going basis as well as identify security controls that can be put in place to secure the TSE. 

Currently, no additional deployed TSE equipment, with the exceptions of Credential Authentication Technology and Walk-Through Metal Detectors, are connected to 

the TSA network. TSA has made a determination that for TSE to connect to the 

TSA Network, the system must meet 9 minimum cybersecurity requirements. Any 

potential connectivity solution must meet 2 specific security needs. No. 1, it must 

36 

be able to protect the TSA network and STIP backend infrastructure. In other 

words, it must be able to secure the larger TSANet from malware and cyber attacks 

originating from the TSE. No. 2, it must be able to protect the TSE itself from compromise or attack. 

Question 5c. To what extent has TSA conducted penetration tests of this security 

technology to understand how an adversary might gain unauthorized access to the 

technology? 

Answer. TSA recently conducted a penetration test against STIP in the Test and 

Production environments and on the Credential Authentication Technology. TSA 

conducted the test based on known exploits that have been previously identified and 

approved. The testing, done in concert with other compliance and vulnerability testing, identified several opportunities to increase the security posture of these systems. The testing results have been added to the current system-level patching and 

deployment schedule. 

Question 5d. Could you describe the level of coordination between TSA and the 

DHS Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) on cybersecurity matters? 

Has TSA ever requested an independent cybersecurity assessment from DHS 

CS&C? 

Answer. TSA has been actively coordinating with CS&C on multiple occasions to 

include participation in the High-Value Asset Security Assessment Review (SAR) 

and Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) which includes penetration testing 

for TSA’s Mission Essential and High-Value Asset Systems. In 2017, CS&C conducted these assessments against the Secure Flight system. The Technology Information Modernization (TIM) will be assessed in April 2018 and the Transportation 

Vetting System (TVS) is scheduled to be assessed in August 2018. 

Question 5e. Does TSA have specific resource constraints associated with delivering on its cybersecurity objectives? 

Answer. Once a solution has been approved to implement on TSE equipment, this 

is an additional 15,000 endpoints that will be on the TSA network. Each endpoint 

requires incident monitoring, log reviews, as well as forensics investigation support 

if an incident does occur. On-going Security Authorization and continuous monitoring to ensure each TSE is adhering to DHS policies and guidelines, is required 

for the FISMA systems that will be defined through the separations of the TSEs 

boundary. Considering these additional monitoring requirements, TSA will need to 

assess the requirement for additional financial and human capital resources, to include possible re-prioritization and/or realignment of current resources to address 

any resource shortfall. 

Question 5f. What assistance from industry does TSA need in meeting its cybersecurity objectives? 

Answer. As industry continues to design and develop new aviation and screening 

technologies to meet an evolving threat landscape and TSA requirements, companies need to embrace the idea that new systems and capabilities must be cyberready when presented to TSA for consideration. 

Question 6a. TSA’s Refresh Plan incorporates outdated data and lacks a Classified 

appendix. 

Can you please update Figure 3 to reflect actual TSA TSE procured between August 2015 and August 2017? Please include an update of equipment procured August 2017–January 2018. 

Answer. 

FIGURE 3.—TSA TRANSPORTATION SECURITY EQUIPMENT AWARDS 

TSE 

Aug 2015– 

Aug 2017 

(includes 

options) 

Aug 2015– 

Aug 2017 

(actual/no 

options) 

Sept 

2017–Feb 

2018 

Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) .................... 161 162 0 

Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray .......................... 70 69 66 

Boarding Pass Scanner (BPS) ................................ 250 250 500 

Explosives Detection System (EDS) ...................... 115 118 59 

Explosives Trace Detector (ETD) ........................... 3,426 1,353 0 

Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) ...... 30 30 0 

Computed Tomography (CT) .................................. 0 0 8 

Question 6b. Figure 4 depicts projected useful life for deployed TSE. For AT systems, can you please provide the initial deployment year and number of systems 

constituting 2170 as of 5/30/2017? 

37 

Answer. Figure 4 provides the initial deployment of Advanced Technology (AT) 

systems from 2008 through May 30, 2017. The total number does not represent the 

exact number of AT systems deployed to airports as this list includes 46 systems 

that were decommissioned, four systems in temporary storage, and the remaining 

in transit or with the original equipment manufacturer for repairs/upgrades. 

FIGURE 4.—DEPLOYMENT OF AT BY YEAR 

Initial AT Deployment by Year 

2008 ................................................................................................................. 504 

2009 ................................................................................................................. 407 

2010 ................................................................................................................. 14 

2011 ................................................................................................................. 205 

2012 ................................................................................................................. 434 

2013 ................................................................................................................. 36 

2014 ................................................................................................................. 499 

2015 ................................................................................................................. 53 

2016 ................................................................................................................. 68 

2017 ................................................................................................................. 5 

Total ...................................................................................................... 2,225 

Question 6c. Figure 5 is current as of August 2017. Can you please update as of 

January 2018? 

Answer. 

FIGURE 5.—APPROVED PSP AND EBSP PLANNED PROCUREMENTS AS OF 

FEBRUARY 2018 

Transportation Security Equipment FOC 1 FY17 2 FY18 FY19 FY20 

Explosives Detection System (EDS) ................ 106 190 83 73 

Explosives Trace Detector (ETD) 3 5,860 0 1,898 159 10 

Advanced Imaging Technology 

(AIT) .............................................. 962 1 ............ ............ ............

Advanced Technology (AT) ............. 2,213 66 ............ ............ ............

Bottled Liquid Scanner (BLS) ........ 1,530 ............ ............ ............ ............

Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) ................................ 1,520 30 ............ 294 295 

Computed Tomography (CT) .......... ................ 8 4 30 3 145 5 120 

Enhanced Metal Detector (EMD) ... 960 ............ ............ ............ ............

Boarding Pass Scanner (BPS) ........ ................ 500 ............ ............ ............

1Full Operational Capability (FOC). 

2Quantities provided for fiscal year 2017 are now considered actual TSA TSE procured. 

Quantities provided for fiscal year 2018 and beyond are considered planned procurements. 3 Includes both Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) and Passenger Screening Program (PSP). 4TSA reprogrammed funding for initial CT development activities and the procurement, testing, and deployment of 42 checkpoint CT prototypes. 5These are for the Passenger Screening Program. 

Question 6d. What is the anticipated average cost of an Automated Security Lane? 

Figure 6 projects 125 ASLs in fiscal year 2020. Can you please inform the committee 

the basis for this number and the assigned security value of ASLs as compared to 

other TSE? What are the plans for deploying ASLs, and of the 2,170 Checkpoints, 

how many ASLs are planned to be deployed? Will TSA or airports be the purchasers 

and what is the site criteria for these deployments? 

Answer. 

• The anticipated average cost of an Automated Security Lane (ASL) is $280,000 

which includes estimated procurement and deployment costs. ASL systems will 

be procured with a 2-year warranty. Therefore, annual maintenance costs of approximately $25,000 per system will be incurred beginning in fiscal year 2020, 

upon conclusion of initial system warranty. 

38 

• Below provides TSA’s deployment plan through fiscal year 2019. Quantities for 

future years will be determined by the budget process. 

Quantities 

Fiscal Year 2016.—2 

Fiscal Year 2017.—84 

Fiscal Year 2018.—114 

Fiscal Year 2019.—0 

Fiscal Year 2020.—200 

Fiscal Year 2021.—200 

Fiscal Year 2022.—200 

Fiscal Year 2023.—200 

Fiscal Year 2024.—200 

• Security value of ASLs will be determined as requirements are defined, performance data is collected, and an ASL Program of Record (POR) is established. • The ASL systems deployed in fiscal year 2016, fiscal year 2017, and fiscal year 

2018 represent systems purchased by private entities and deployed under the 

2016 Urgent Operational Need by the TSA Innovation Task Force. Those systems to be deployed during fiscal year 2020 and beyond will be systems purchased and deployed under an ASL POR. During fiscal year 2018 and fiscal 

year 2019, TSA will be finalizing ASL requirements, completing documentation 

to establish the POR, testing systems against established requirements, and 

holding a Department of Homeland Security Acquisition Decision Event for approval to purchase and deploy qualified systems. • Based on space constraints at checkpoints, up to half of all deployed CT systems 

could be integrated with an ASL system, which would result in a total of 1,376 

ASL systems being deployed to the field. Funding for systems integration work 

to validate this assumption was provided in the 2018 Appropriations Act. • TSA will continue to work with our industry partners to determine whether 

there is an opportunity to procure ASL systems under the public-private partnerships strategy under the POR. Under the POR it will be incumbent that any 

partnership includes the procurement of qualified technologies to ensure screening operations are not negatively impacted, coordination with TSA on logistics, 

and prioritization of technology placement. • Site criteria will not be finalized until requirements are established and ASL 

performance data is collected. 

Question 6e. Pg. 25 TSA identifies non-prioritized capability gaps. Can you please 

provide for the committee a Classified prioritization and fiscal year 2017 and projected fiscal year 2018 funding toward achievement/fulfillment? 

Answer. We are in the process of scheduling a Classified briefing with the committee to discuss TSA’s screening equipment detection requirements and capabilities, which are written at the SECRET level. 

Question 7a. One of your key responsibilities as administrator is ensuring TSA 

has the information technology tools it needs to accomplish its zero-fail mission. To 

that end, the IMPACT procurement, which will select a contractor to run all of 

TSA’s IT infrastructure, is essential to the security of the traveling public. How does 

the IMPACT procurement reflect the latest cybersecurity best practices, including 

requirements of President Trump’s recent cybersecurity Executive Order? 

Answer. IT Management, Performance and Analysis, and Collaborative Technologies (IMPACT) procurement of IT support services for the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) IT environment reflects cybersecurity best practices as 

outlined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) in their cybersecurity and information assurance requirements and mandate. For example: • the IMPACT Task Order Request for Proposal (TORP) specifies the overarching 

information assurance/cybersecurity requirements of the solicitation; and • the IMPACT statement of objectives specifies the objectives for the information 

assurance and cybersecurity support services required of the IMPACT contractor. 

Following the issuance of President Trump’s recent cybersecurity Executive Order 

(EO), DHS and TSA seamlessly mapped the requirements of the EO and other relevant sources to the IMPACT TORP. TSA determined that the existing structure 

and cybersecurity provisions of the IMPACT TORP and its attachments already satisfied these requirements. 

Question 7b. How does this take into account priorities surrounding cloud deployment and shared services? 

Answer. IMPACT prioritized cloud deployment and shared services throughout its 

TORP. The IMPACT TORP released in May 2016 identified cloud deployment in ObVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:01 Jun 11, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\18TP0118\18TP0118.TXT HEATH
39 

jective No. 2: ‘‘Manage and maintain on-going relationships with TSA’s technology 

providers for services such as, data center, network, anything as a Service (XaaS), 

application development, and cloud services to ensure service availability and continuity across the TSA IT enterprise, without a break in service.’’ 

Cloud deployment was further identified as Priority No. 4: ‘‘Utilize the cloud to 

provide on-demand scalability, increased access, and higher security for all TSA 

users thereby delivering information more rapidly and enabling more informed decisions and actions. In an effort to reduce future recapitalization expenses, TSA’s strategic plans include migration of infrastructure of some or all services covered under 

IMPACT to a cloud environment.’’ 

TSA identified it would need support with the following with respect to cloud deployment: 

1. Provide enterprise systems management services for all TSA environments 

(e.g., Production, Development and Test, etc.,) to meet TSA and DHS policies 

and guidelines, in close coordination with the data center, XaaS, and cloud services providers. 

2. Provide migration-related operations and maintenance support for the movement of systems to other platforms, data centers, and cloud services. 

The IMPACT TORP also provided notice that TSA’s strategic plans included the 

migration of e-mail services infrastructure to a commercial cloud. 

TSA already utilizes several shared services, including Time and Attendance from 

U.S. Department of Agriculture; Financials from the U.S. Coast Guard; and Workplace as a Service (WPaaS) from DHS. When replacing an old capability or obtaining a new one, TSA determines the feasibility of adopting an existing shared service/ 

system. The IMPACT contractor’s only responsibility for access to these systems is 

the TSA infrastructure specified for support under the IMPACT solicitation, thus 

shared services are not mentioned under IMPACT. 

Below are some of the policies, directives, SOPs, and standards TSA included in 

the Virtual Reading Room (VRR), to which all IMPACT Offerors were provided access. 

• Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 

• DHS Policy Directive 034–03—Continuous Improvement of DHS Cyber Defenses 

• DHS USM Memo—Strengthening DHS Cyber Defenses 

• DHS Policy Directive 4300A—DHS Sensitive Systems 

• TSA Management Directive (MD) 1400.3—Information Technology Security 

• TSA MD 1400.3 Attachment 1—TSA Information Assurance Handbook 

• TSA Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 1444—Information Security Vulnerability Management 

• TSA SOP 1426—Security Event Testing 

• TSA SOP 1410—On-going Authorization (On-going assessments of systems) 

• TSA SOP 1402—Security Authorization (Tailoring security authorization process outlined in NIST SP 800–37) 

• TSA SOP 1444—Information Security Vulnerability Management 

• TSA SOP 1404—Incident Response for Computer Security Incidents 

• TSA SOP 1431—Automated IT Security Scanning 

• TSA Technical Standard (TS) TS–003—Wi-Fi (802.11) 

• TSA TS–006—Network Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 

• TSA TS–007—Host Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 

• TSA TS–012—Port Security 

• TSA TS–018—Wide Area Network (WAN) Security 

• TSA TS–010—Network Interconnections 

• TSA TS–072—Cloud Computing and Virtualization 

• TSA TS–016—Remote Access 

• TSA TS–028—Web Applications 

• TSA TS–037—Server Security 

• TSA TS–041—Switch Security 

• TSA TS–015—Network Logical Access Control 

• TSA TS–025—Virtual Private Networks 

• TSA TS–022—Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 

• NIST Special Publication (SP) 800–137—Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations 

• NIST SP 800–39—Managing Information Security Risk 

• NIST SP 800–37—Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems 

• NIST SP 800–53—Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations 

40 

• NIST SP 800–18—Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information 

Systems 

• OMB Memorandum M–14–03—Enhancing the Security of Federal Information 

Systems 

• Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication (PUB) 199— 

Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information 

Systems 

• FIPS PUB 200—Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and 

Information Systems 

QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL FOR DAVID P. PEKOSKE

Question. Why did TSA’s Technology Investment Plan Biannual Refresh pay little 

attention to the security of Air Cargo, given the current threat landscape and recent 

plots against aviation security? 

Answer. The Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan Biennial Refresh intends to provide an update to the original Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan and discusses TSA’s acquisition programs and technology initiatives. 

TSA’s regulatory role in the air cargo environment is supplemented by outreach and 

industry/association engagement to ensure carriers have the capability to properly 

screen air cargo before it is loaded onto an aircraft. TSA does not currently procure 

or invest in supplying equipment to carriers under an air cargo program and, at this 

time, there is no plan to establish a program. The carriers themselves own the technology systems or contract with third parties to ensure the strict security requirements for air cargo are implemented. 

However, the agency’s goal is to stimulate and support the air cargo security technology marketplace. TSA has the ability to continuously receive vendor requests for 

qualification of prospective technologies, works collaboratively with vendors to refine 

the technologies they propose, and publishes the TSA Air Cargo Screening Technology List (ACSTL) on our website. TSA also works with industry annually to develop needs and capability gaps that are submitted to DHS S&T, which form the 

basis for S&T’s air cargo R&D programs. 

TSA is also partnering with the Air Cargo Associations and canine companies to 

initiate a Third-Party Canine Cargo program. This new program will provide the 

capability for private industry to screen cargo utilizing private canine companies 

certified to TSA standards. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR DAVID P. PEKOSKE

Question 1a. Last spring, we saw the emergence of a serious new threat to the 

aviation system relating to personal electronic devices (PEDs). The threat had a 

signifcant, rippling effect on the international aviation sytem, with last-point-of-departure airports required to take drastic steps to increase security and passengers 

here in the United States now required to take PEDs out of their carry-on bags. 

The latest intelligence indicates that we are in a very dynamic and evolving threat 

landscape that could have significant implications on aviation and the international 

economy. Will the investments outlined in the Refresh Plan for transportation security equipment keep pace with the evolving threats to aviation? 

Cen you describe in detail how the TSA’s Refresh Plan will accelerate significant 

advancements in security technology capabilities and deployment of these systems 

at the Nation’s checkpoints and checked baggage sytems? 

Question 1b. Can you describe how the Refresh Plan fosters a robust domestic security manufacturing base and enhances competition to drive innovation in aviation 

security? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. Around 50% of all passenger airline flights carry cargo in the bay of 

the aircraft, yet the Refresh Plan makes no reference to cargo security. This omission is of great concern. We understand that while TSA delegates responsibility for 

cargo screening to freight forwarders and therefore does not itself purchase cargo 

screening equipment, the cargo security threat is recognized and there is work being 

done within DHS S&T to advance screening technology in this area. Does TSA accept the findings of such organizations as the GAO and CRS and view air cargo as 

a serious security concern and, if so, what are TSA’s specific plans on incorporating 

advanced, non-intrusive cargo screening technologies into TSA’s R&D and materiel 

acquisition planning? 

Are there opportunities to consolidate Air Cargo requirements with the requirements of other agencies, such as the CBP Non-Intrusive Inspection system? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

41 

Question 3. The Refresh plan is nearly 50 pages long. Throughout the entire Refresh Plan, there is only one paragraph dedicated to small businesses. That is not 

good enough. In greater detail than the portion in the Refresh Plan, will you describe how TSA is planning to better integrate small businesses into the security 

technology development pipeline? 

Answer. TSA has an excellent record of working with small businesses, and in fiscal year 2017 exceeded its overall small business goal, awarding 24.8 percent of its 

contracts to small businesses. 

Goal Achievement 

(Percent) 

Small Business—24 percent ...................................................................... 24.8 

Small Disadvantaged—5 percent .............................................................. 12.3 

Woman-Owned SB—5 percent .................................................................. 9.0 

Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned SB—3 percent ..................................... 3.5 

Hub Zone—3 percent .................................................................................. 2.92 

In addition, in fiscal year 2017, TSA awarded contracts to four Computed Tomography (CT) contractors for CT prototype units. This contracting opportunity was 

open to all of industry. One of the four contractors that was awarded a CT prototype 

contract is a small business, Integrated Defense and Security Solutions (IDSS) Holdings, Inc. In fiscal year 2018, TSA has conducted several industry engagements related to CT. These industry engagements include an informational conference that 

was held on November 8, 2017, an industry day that was held on November 17, 

2017, and a notice that was posted on the Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) 

website inviting vendors to submit their Advanced Technology (AT)/CT system for 

potential qualification. 

Further, the Office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis (ORCA) is working 

in partnership with the S&T Silicon Valley Innovation Program (SVIP) on technical 

calls to start-up companies with solutions to transportation security issues. DHS established the SVIP to keep pace with the innovation community and tackle the 

hardest problems faced by DHS’s operational missions. The SVIP is expanding 

DHS’s reach to find new technologies that strengthen National security with the 

goal of reshaping how Government, entrepreneurs, and industry work together to 

find cutting-edge solutions. DHS is reaching out to Silicon Valley and all of the innovation communities across the Nation to harness the commercial R&D ecosystem 

for Government applications, co-invest in ideas, and accelerate transition-to-market. 

Recognizing the value that collaboration, of various perspectives, and early/often 

engagement brings, TSA does a mix of large and small engagement events across 

the enterprise. TSA regularly posts Requests for Proposals, Requests for Information, Industry Day Announcements, Pre-Proposal Conferences, as well as Broad 

Agency Announcements (BAAs) on the Federal Business Opportunities website for 

known and future requirements. There is currently an open BAA for Transportation 

Security Innovative Concepts (TSIC) that all vendors, small and large, are available 

to submit ideas to. TSA seeks research across broad strategic areas which offer potential for advancement and improvement of TSA security operations, technologies, 

processes, human-factors, and capabilities. TSA is specifically interested in research 

that will provide for near-term improvement of current security operations and capabilities. TSA reviews all submittals against this BAA, and may or may not fund 

depending on various factors. 

Small businesses may have concerns that, due to the cost burdens of sending employees to the demonstration site or developing interim training, they may not be 

able to participate in demonstrations. ITF BAAs provide the option for small businesses to receive incidental funding to support demonstration activities on a caseby-case basis. Of the 96 vendors who submitted to the most recent ITF BAA, IDEA, 

40 self-identified as a small business. Additionally, 61 percent of respondents had 

never contracted with TSA before, and 33 percent had never contracted with the 

Federal Government. ITF is also working to reduce the level of background information on specific TSA processes and activities necessary for a vendor to successfully 

respond to solution solicitations. 

The unsolicited proposal is a valuable means by which unique or novel ideas, concepts, methods, or approaches, which have been developed outside the Government, 

can be made available to the TSA for use in the accomplishment of its mission. The 

unsolicited proposal when received would be considered against Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) criteria and evaluated accordingly. TSA has created an Unsolicited Proposal Manual available at www.tsa.gov that can help small businesses submit ideas to TSA. 

42 

Last, TSA has a robust industry engagement program. An experienced, senior 

management official in the Office of Contracting and Procurement is the TSA Industry Liaison and is an excellent source of information for small businesses and other 

entities looking to engage TSA. As part of the DHS-wide industry liaison program 

to establish strategic relationships with suppliers and stakeholders, serves as an information provider for firms seeking to do business with TSA and connects firms 

with program offices in support of our mission. There is also a Director, Small Business Programs that helps acquisition officials understand various small business 

programs, conduct market research, and make decisions that affect small business. 

Both the Industry Liaison and Small Business Advocate work directly with numerous Industry Councils, individual firms, TSA program offices, and DHS to increase 

transparency and knowledge of business opportunities and processes. 

Question 4a. With regard to Automated Screening Lanes (ASLs), the strategic 

plan refresh indicates that planned procurements are not anticipated until fiscal 

year 2020. Does TSA intend to work with industry to accommodate possible future 

non-Federal investment in ASL, potentially from airlines and airports, in the interim, as was done a few years ago to address concerns over screening checkpoint 

delays? 

Question 4b. Are there any particular challenges or concerns regarding the use 

of non-Federal investments to fund screening checkpoint technologies and infrastructure? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues to work 

with our industry partners to demonstrate emerging technology and explore publicprivate partnerships. At this time TSA has completed the final deployments authorized by DHS under the approved Urgent Operational Need and is transitioning to 

the Office of Acquisition Program Management to ensure the sustainment of current 

capabilities and initiate a formal program. 

TSA has not experienced any particular challenges with the use of non-Federal 

funding, but long-term it will be incumbent that any partnership includes the procurement of qualified technologies to ensure screening operations are not negatively 

impacted, as well as on-going coordination with TSA on logistics and prioritization 

of technology placement. There is also the question of maintenance and future upgrades; if the non-Federal investment only covers the initial capital expenditure, 

then TSA will need to receive Federal funding for equipment maintenance, upon 

warranty expiration, and any required upgrades of these systems. 

Question 5a. On January 15, the DHS Office of Inspector General issued a report 

(OIG–18–35) which found that ‘‘TSA’s handling of the Transportation Security Executive Service Employee’s disciplinary matter uncovered significant deviations from 

policy and standard practice indicating that the TSES employee received unusually 

favorable treatment.’’ The Office of Inspector General recommended that TSA ‘‘address the irregularities... advise TSA employees to comply with existing policies.’’ Have you had a chance to review the report? 

Question 5b. Have you or do you have plans to advise employees to comply with 

existing policies? 

Answer. I have read the report. I am committed to ensuring TSA’s core values, 

of which integrity is part, and all TSA policies are adhered to throughout all levels 

of the organization. 

TSA policy is reviewed and updated on an on-going basis. Upon review of the OIG 

reports, our processes for disciplinary matters involving members of the Transportation Security Executive Service (TSES) have been revised with great emphasis on 

oversight and collaboration for decision making. Specifically, effective March 13, 

2018, any proposed settlement agreement involving any member of the TSES or Executive-level positions must be coordinated with the TSA Deputy Administrator 

(DA), the Chiefs of Operations and Mission Support, and the Assistant Administrators of Security Operations, and Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service, before being finalized. 

In addition, as mentioned in the OIG report, during the time of the OIG investigation, TSA was considering modifying the structure of the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). TSA has since done so, ensuring that an employee’s supervisory 

chain is involved in the disciplinary decision-making process regarding that employee. To facilitate and ensure compliance with these policy changes, training is 

being planned for deciding officials regarding their roles and responsibilities. Additionally, an Executive Discipline Review Board administered by OPR will serve as 

the proposing official for employees in the Transportation Security Executive Service 

(TSES). 

Other policy changes regarding the disciplinary process are also being considered 

that will provide clarity for managers. For example, a project team consisting of senior executives and subject-matter experts, recently completed a lengthy and in-depth 

43 

review of our Table of Offenses and Penalties for Appropriate Discipline for Common 

Offenses, which is the document that provides guidelines to managers and human 

resources staff on penalties for employee misconduct. The document has been revised and, once it is formally approved, we will plan a targeted communications 

campaign to supervisors and non-supervisors, notifying them of the changes, the intended use of the document, and the necessity for all employees to read TSA’s policies on Employee Responsibilities and Code of Conduct. All employees are required 

to review the conduct policy on an annual basis. Additionally, TSA’s Office of 

Human Capital (OHC) has been conducting Employee Relations ‘‘boot camps’’ at airports around the country to provide local staff with the knowledge and skills necessary to address and resolve employee disciplinary issues at the lowest level possible. OHC has also been conducting similar training for offices at TSA Headquarters. 

Question 6a. I understand that the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), which represents front-line TSOs, has reached out to you on issues of 

importance to the workforce. Are you planning to work with labor representatives? 

Question 6b. I understand that you have not yet met face-to-face with AFGE’s national representation. Are you going to meet with AFGE? 

Answer. As TSA is an excepted service agency with delegated authority to establish the employment conditions of the screening workforce, collective bargaining was 

established under the first Determination issued in 2011. The Determination created the foundation of collective bargaining within TSA and limited the scope of 

issues that could be negotiated. Although the Determination has been revised over 

the years (last modified in 2016), the provisions relating to negotiable items has not 

changed. 

TSA continues to engage AFGE on all matters covered by the collective bargaining 

agreement, and works to resolve any disputes associated with the Determination 

and the collective bargaining agreement. I held an introductory call with J. David 

Cox on August 21, 2017, and also met with Mr. Cox on February 23, 2018. 

Question 7a. The August 2016 Determination on Collective Bargaining signed by 

former TSA Administrator Peter Neffenger included section (D), requiring an independent review of the Unitary Dispute Resolution System (UDRS), which is a grievance procedure. Section (D) states as follows: ‘‘Within 12 months of the date of this 

Determination, TSA will identify an expert, independent, third party to evaluate the 

entire UDRS. The expert, independent third party will evaluate the UDRS processes 

consistent with this Determination. The exclusive representative will participate in 

this evaluation. This third party will produce a report for TSA that will be shared 

with the AFGE and the workforce.’’ 

It is my understanding that instead of following an open, competitive process allowing human resource specialists to bid on the contract, TSA awarded the Chickasaw Nation a $500,000 no-bid contract to evaluate the UDRS in September 27, 2017. 

Did TSA use a non-competitive process to contract for the UDRS evaluation? If so, 

why? 

Answer. Yes. TSA sole sourced to Chickasaw as a means of developing them within the 8(a) program and to meet TSA’s small business goals within the 8(a) small 

business subset category. 

This method of procurement was determined by the Contracting Officer as part 

of a larger Agency procurement strategy to meet the requirements of Federal Acquisitions Regulation, part 19.800 as follows: 

‘‘19.800 General. 

‘‘(a) Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)) established a program 

that authorizes the Small Business Administration (SBA) to enter into all types of 

contracts with other agencies and award subcontracts for performing those contracts 

to firms eligible for program participation. This program is the ‘8(a) Business Development Program,’ commonly referred to as the ‘8(a) program.’ A small business that 

is accepted into the 8(a) program is known as a ‘participant.’ SBA’s subcontractors 

are referred to as ‘8(a) contractors.’ As used in this subpart, an 8(a) contractor is 

an 8(a) participant that is currently performing on a Federal contract or order that 

was set aside for 8(a) participants. 

‘‘(b) Contracts may be awarded to the SBA for performance by eligible 8(a) participants on either a sole source or competitive basis. 

‘‘(c) Acting under the authority of the program, the SBA certifies to an agency that 

SBA is competent and responsible to perform a specific contract. The contracting officer has the discretion to award the contract to the SBA based upon mutually 

agreeable terms and conditions. 

‘‘(d) The contracting officer shall comply with 19.203 before deciding to offer an acquisition to a small business concern under the 8(a) program. For acquisitions 

44 

above the simplified acquisition threshold, the contracting officer shall 

consider 8(a) set-asides or sole source awards before considering small 

business set-asides. (Emphasis added.) 

‘‘(e) When SBA has delegated its 8(a) program contract execution authority to an 

agency, the contracting officer must refer to its agency supplement or other policy 

directives for appropriate guidance.’’ 

Pursuant to this requirement, TSA sole sourced to Chickasaw as a means of developing them within the 8(a) program and to meet our TSA small business goals 

within the 8(a) small business subset category. 

Question 7b. Has TSA previously contracted with the Chickasaw Nation to evaluate a grievance procedure? 

Answer. No. TSA’s National Resolution Center has not previously contracted with 

the Chickasaw Nation to evaluate a grievance procedure. 

Question 7c. Did TSA work with AFGE or acknowledge their efforts to engage in 

the selection of ‘‘an expert, independent, third party’’ to evaluation the UDRS? 

Answer. No, TSA did not work with AFGE regarding this selection process. There 

is no requirement in the 2016 Administrator’s Determination to work with AFGE 

in the selection of ‘‘an expert, independent, third party.’’ The Determination requires 

that ‘‘TSA will identify an expert independent third party to evaluate the entire 

UDRS.’’ The Determination further states that ‘‘The exclusive representative will 

participate in this evaluation.’’ Participation in the evaluation is a separate activity 

from the ‘‘identification’’ of the third party reviewer. 

The selection of ‘‘an expert, independent, third party’’ is a procurement effort. The 

Contracting Officer determined the procurement strategy for this solicitation and 

deemed this would meet the requirements of a small business set-aside, meeting 

TSA’s Small Business Administration (SBA) goals. TSA did not work with AFGE 

during the procurement process, which requires the government to control information that is procurement sensitive. 

On November 13, 2017, AFGE engaged with TSA by email to inquire about the 

status of the independent review of the UDRS. The TSA acknowledged AFGE’s inquiry on the same day and referred the question to the National Resolution Center 

(NRC). The NRC responded on November 15, 2017 to AFGE’s email, advising AFGE 

that the NRC anticipated scheduling a meeting with AFGE in early 2018, upon commencement of the UDRS evaluation by Chickasaw Nation Industries. 

Question 7d. Could negotiations with the union on a grievance procedure eliminate the need for an expert, third-party evaluation and save the taxpayers hundreds 

of thousands of dollars? 

Answer. It is unlikely that a negotiated grievance procedure would save money 

as there would be significant costs stemming from: (1) The negotiations, (2) the resolution process for any terms not agreed upon in the negotiations, and (3) the resulting grievance processes. These costs would include increased official time, travel expenses, and litigation costs. Many of the potential costs would be on-going and related to payroll, rather than a one-time contract expenditure. Moreover, an independent evaluation may lead to long-term cost savings because the findings may 

highlight opportunities to increase efficiency and effectiveness of the UDRS. 

TSA’s labor framework, including the grievance process, is intended to preserve 

TSA’s flexibility needed to achieve its critical security mission in the midst of emerging threats. Consistent with the Determination, the current grievance process incorporated input from the union. The process also includes expedited arbitration of disciplinary actions and other covered workplace disputes, as agreed upon between 

TSA and AFGE in a 2012 Memorandum of Agreement. 

Question 8a. Please provide the following information: 

The number of full-time Equivalent Transportation Security Officers (Transportation Security Officers, Lead Transportation Security Officers, Behavioral Detection 

Officers, Equipment Maintenance Technicians Officers, and Training Instructors), 

employed by TSA during each calendar year from 2005–2017. 

Answer. See Table 1. 

Question 8b. The number of part-time employees (Transportation Security Officers, Lead Transportation Security Officers, Behavioral Detection Officers, Equipment Maintenance Technicians Officers, and Training Instructors) employed by TSA 

during each calendar from 2005–2017. 

Answer. See Table 2. 

Question 8c. The number of full-time workers and part-time workers employed by 

TSA to perform screening, behavioral detection, bomb appraisal, equipment maintenance technician, and training instructor duties during each calendar year from 

2005–2017. 

Answer. See Table 3. 

45 

Question 8d. The number of employees as set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) hired 

by TSA during each calendar year from 2005–2017. 

Answer. See Table 4. 

Question 8e. The number of employees as set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) separated from TSA during each calendar year from 2005–2017. 

Answer. See Table 5. 

Question 8f. The annual attrition rates from 2012–2017 for MCO (Orlando International), TPA (Tampa) and MIA (Miami) airports. 

Answer. See Table 6. 

46 

TABLE 1.—FT HEADCOUNT 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

BDO ........................ ............ 137 756 2,388 3,005 2,832 2,902 2,986 2,889 2,464 2,174 1,936 EMT ........................ ............ ............ ............ ............ 4 5 5 5 7 7 6 6 5 LTSO ...................... 5,482 5,560 5,622 5,547 5,689 5,811 5,910 5,829 5,426 5,158 5,045 5,108 6,274 STI .......................... ............ ............ ............ 465 492 577 562 570 628 601 562 548 663 TSO ......................... 29,451 26,720 26,672 25,318 22,844 22,979 22,711 23,195 22,635 22,429 22,765 25,155 25,426 

Grand Total 34,933 32,417 33,050 33,718 32,034 32,204 32,090 32,585 31,585 30,659 30,552 32,753 32,368 

TABLE 2.—PT HEADCOUNT 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

BDO ........................ ............ 2 8 16 35 8 14 34 16 22 12 12 ............LTSO ...................... 135 133 179 172 205 186 209 200 137 132 154 176 145 STI .......................... ............ ............ ............ 6 9 7 5 3 5 7 3 4 3 TSO ......................... 5,973 9,740 10,851 12,036 10,743 11,652 14,262 13,180 11,467 9,888 9,569 9,513 8,917 

Grand Total 6,108 9,875 11,038 12,230 10,992 11,853 14,490 13,417 11,625 10,049 9,738 9,705 9,065 

47 

TABLE 3.—BAO COUNT 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

BAO ........................ ............ 17 100 263 288 379 407 427 392 398 398 396 399 

FT ................. ............ 17 100 263 288 379 407 427 392 398 398 396 399 

BDO ........................ ............ 139 764 2,404 3,040 2,840 2,916 3,020 2,905 2,486 2,186 1,948 ............

FT ................. ............ 137 756 2,388 3,005 2,832 2,902 2,986 2,889 2,464 2,174 1,936 ............PT ................. ............ 2 8 16 35 8 14 34 16 22 12 12 ............

EMT ........................ ............ ............ ............ ............ 4 5 5 5 7 7 6 6 5 

FT ................. ............ ............ ............ ............ 4 5 5 5 7 7 6 6 5 

LTSO ...................... 5,617 5,693 5,801 5,719 5,894 5,997 6,119 6,029 5,563 5,290 5,199 5,284 6,419 

FT ................. 5,482 5,560 5,622 5,547 5,689 5,811 5,910 5,829 5,426 5,158 5,045 5,108 6,274 PT ................. 135 133 179 172 205 186 209 200 137 132 154 176 145 

STI .......................... ............ ............ ............ 471 501 584 567 573 633 608 565 552 666 

FT ................. ............ ............ ............ 465 492 577 562 570 628 601 562 548 663 PT ................. ............ ............ ............ 6 9 7 5 3 5 7 3 4 3 

TSO ......................... 35,424 36,460 37,523 37,354 33,587 34,631 36,973 36,375 34,102 32,317 32,334 34,668 34,343 

FT ................. 29,451 26,720 26,672 25,318 22,844 22,979 22,711 23,195 22,635 22,429 22,765 25,155 25,426 PT ................. 5,973 9,740 10,851 12,036 10,743 11,652 14,262 13,180 11,467 9,888 9,569 9,513 8,917 Grand Total 41,041 42,309 44,188 46,211 43,314 44,436 46,987 46,429 43,602 41,106 40,688 42,854 41,832 

Note: Duties based on position title. 

TABLE 4.—Q4—HIRES 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

BDO ........................ ............ ............ ............ 1 ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 1 2 2 ............LTSO ...................... ............ 5 4 7 2 3 ............ 2 4 2 4 5 1 STI .......................... ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 1 ............ ............ 1 ............TSO ......................... 1,406 10,771 12,775 11,278 2,608 5,679 8,069 6,357 4,847 4,854 7,276 10,761 7,938 

Grand Total 1,406 10,776 12,779 11,286 2,610 5,682 8,069 6,359 4,852 4,857 7,282 10,769 7,939 

48 

TABLE 5.—Q5—SEPARATIONS 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

BDO ........................ ............ 1 17 48 69 126 132 141 190 287 238 217 185 EMT ........................ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ 1 LTSO ...................... 213 425 429 306 198 257 286 441 420 471 436 427 456 STI .......................... ............ ............ ............ 6 9 9 21 23 28 41 43 31 34 TSO ......................... 3,612 8,044 8,834 7,126 3,708 3,376 4,003 5,509 5,779 5,775 5,565 6,455 6,416 

Grand Total 3,825 8,470 9,280 7,486 3,984 3,768 4,442 6,114 6,417 6,574 6,282 7,130 7,092 

Note.—In fiscal year 2017, TSA moved away from a ‘‘stand-alone’’ Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) position. TSA has since integrated the skillset into the 

screening workforce. 

TABLE 6 

Airport Code Airport Name 

2012 

TOTAL 

Attrition 

Rate 

2013 

TOTAL 

Attrition 

Rate 

2014 

TOTAL 

Attrition 

Rate 

2015 

TOTAL 

Attrition 

Rate 

2016 

TOTAL 

Attrition 

Rate 

2017 

TOTAL 

Attrition 

Rate 

MCO .................... Orlando International Airport ........................ 6.7% 9.1% 11.6% 13.5% 13.7% 11.7% MIA ...................... Miami International Airport .......................... 7.3% 7.4% 11.2% 9.5% 8.3% 8.1% TPA ...................... Tampa International Airport ......................... 9.0% 11.6% 8.3% 12.6% 11.6% 13.0% 

49 

Question 8g. The current distribution by pay band for all employees described in 

paragraphs (1) and (2) working at the airports listed in paragraph (9). 

Answer. 

Q6—COUNTS FOR MCO, MIA, TPA 

Airport 

MCO MIA TPA Grand 

Total 

EMT .................................................................... ............ ............ ............ ............

F Band ...................................................... ............ 5 ............ 5 

LTSO ................................................................... 144 199 85 428 

F Band ...................................................... 144 199 85 428 

STI ....................................................................... 13 13 9 35 

F Band ...................................................... 10 9 7 26 

G Band ..................................................... 3 4 2 9 

TSO ..................................................................... 782 1,041 460 2,283 

D Band ..................................................... 106 126 50 282 

E Band ..................................................... 666 900 403 1,969 

Question 8h. The number of full-time workers and part-time workers employed by 

screening companies for each airport under the Screening Partnership Program during each calendar year from 2005–2017. 

Question 8i. The attrition rates during each calendar year from 2005–2017 by airports that participate in the Screening Partnership Program by full-time and parttime workers. 

Answer. The following table provides the attrition rate and average annual 

headcount for calendar years 2016 and 2017 at Screening Partnership Program 

(SPP) airports. TSA did not track vendor attrition prior to this time frame. Additionally, TSA does not collect the contractor full-time/part-time ratio data on performance-based contracts, so that requested data is not available. 

SPP AIRPORT CONTRACTOR ATTRITION RATES 

CAT Region Airport 

CY ’16 Attrition 

(Percent) 

CY ’16 

Ave 

Monthly 

Headcount 

CY ’17 Attrition 

(Percent) 

CY ’17 

Ave 

Monthly 

Headcount 

X .................... 6 SFO 16 1,208 21 1,192 

I ..................... 3 MCI 32 368 32 383 

II ................... 2 EYW 58 33 43 30 

II ................... 5 JAC 35 41 18 51 

II ................... 3 FSD 63 45 70 51 

IV .................. 4 ROW 0 7 13 8 

IV .................. 5 HVR 0 5 97 6 

IV .................. 5 OLF 0 5 50 4 

IV .................. 5 GGW 78 6 76 7 

IV .................. 5 GDV 0 percent 5 14 

percent 

7 

IV .................. 5 SDY 0 4 11 9 

I ..................... 1 ROC 33 131 31 137 

IV .................. 4 TUP 0 8 26 8 

III .................. 6 STS 66 15 16 19 

II ................... 5 BZN 39 82 54 63 

III .................. 5 FCA 46 39 40 40 

IV .................. 5 WYS 0 0 0 0 

II ................... 2 SFB 42 120 45 113 

II ................... 2 SRQ 58 85 54 80 

III .................. 1 PSM 39 23 26 23 

II ................... 2 PGD* 24 54 55 52 

* Data for PGD in 2016 starts on June 1, 2016. 

Æ