U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

29–967PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

GRADING COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

WITH THE GCC STATES

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 26, 2018

Serial No. 115–128

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Katherine Bauer, Blumenstein-Katz Family Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ................................................................................. 8

David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D., Washington representative for international 

affairs, Anti-Defamation League ......................................................................... 27

Ms. Leanne Erdberg, director, Countering Violent Extremism, U.S. Institute 

of Peace ................................................................................................................. 63

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Katherine Bauer: Prepared statement ........................................................... 11

David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................... 29

Ms. Leanne Erdberg: Prepared statement ............................................................. 65

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 90

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 91

Written responses from Ms. Leanne Erdberg to questions submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Nevada ............................................................................................. 92

(1)

GRADING COUNTERTERRORISM 

COOPERATION WITH THE GCC STATES 

THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to 

the length limitations in the rules. 

Our historic relationship with the Arab Gulf states is crucial. 

The ties we maintain allow us to project power to certain threats 

like Iran and secure key shipping lanes for global commerce while 

providing stability in a chaotic region. Our Gulf partners have 

made clear that they value our strong alliance with the United 

States. And the United States values and wants to continue to be 

a partner with them. 

But our relationship has not always been perfect. The 9/11 attacks were a tragic wake-up call to a dangerous idea that we had 

long ignored. Sunni extremism established strong roots across the 

Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. The intolerant and violent strain of Islam was largely able to spread so widely because 

it was funded and supported by some of our Gulf allies. While GCC 

states were benefitting from security and stability provided by the 

U.S., they still fostered radical ideas that sought to target and kill 

Americans. It is no coincidence that among the 19 hijackers from 

the 9/11 attacks, 17 came from the United Arab Emirates and 

Saudi Arabia. 

In part, al-Qaeda, led by Saudi, Osama bin Laden did this deliberately to damage the GCC alliance with the United States. The 

Saudi monarchy embraced—the embracement of Wahhabi ideology 

produced generations of young Saudis who despised the West and 

held hateful views of other religions. In fact, ISIS uses Saudi textbooks. 

After 9/11, the Kingdom and the rest of the GCC states pledged 

cooperation with the U.S. to fight terrorism and, to Saudi Arabia’s 

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credit, is doing more to stop terrorism. However, wealthy financiers 

and hateful preachers continued to operate across the GCC. For 

years, many of our Gulf allies tried to play both sides of the War 

on Terror. They acted both as arsonists and firefighters. While the 

U.S. military launched airstrikes against terrorists in the region 

from the Gulf air bases, money and recruits flowed to terrorists 

from the same Gulf countries. 

Ultimately, not George Bush, nor Barack Obama, nor a Donald 

Trump can convince young Muslims that al-Qaeda or ISIS’s version 

of Islam is the wrong one. An American President, regardless of 

their party affiliation, will not ever be able to effectively argue that 

jihad against the West is not the answer to the problems in the 

Middle East. It is only the leaders of the Muslim world who can 

make that argument. 

In recent years, we have seen progress by the Gulf states toward 

tackling the sources of extremism within their borders. They have 

recognized this is not just the United States’ first, but their own 

security is at stake. The Saudis have infiltrated terrorist groups to 

thwart attacks on the West and detained radical clerics who once 

incited thousands to join ISIS or al-Qaeda. The UAE is leading the 

region in developing messaging to counter violent extremism and 

has prioritized targeting al-Qaeda in Yemen. Bahrain is host to the 

region’s Financial Action Task Force and amended its charity law 

to closely monitor terrorism and enact harsh penalties on violators. 

Kuwait has intensified its charity monitoring and outlawed fundraising for terrorist organizations online. Meanwhile, Oman remains a haven for tolerance and moderate Islam, effectively preventing terrorists from using its territory for fundraising or recruitment. Even Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding with 

the U.S. last year to cooperate on counterterrorism and has created 

terrorist designation lists. Trust is finally being restored. 

But there is a lot of work to be done. Qatar still harbors Hamas 

operatives and al-Qaeda fundraisers. The Saudis still publish intolerant material in their textbooks that glorify jihad and incite hatred and violence. Kuwait still has designated terrorists living freely in their borders. Oman remains suspiciously tied to the region’s 

number one state sponsor of terrorism; of course, that is Iran. And 

reports of arms smuggling through Oman to Yemen’s Houthi rebels 

persist. No GCC member is contributing enough to prevent ISIS 

from reemerging in Syria and Iraq. The Saudi-led coalition is overly focused, in my opinion, on Iran’s meddling in Yemen while alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula survives in the chaos. 

So, we need our Gulf partners to aggressively and proactively 

combat extremism across the region, and not wait for the U.S. to 

take the lead. The region belongs to our Gulf partners, and they 

should be taking the lead in defeating terrorism. All the drones and 

special forces in the world cannot destroy an idea that is deeply 

rooted. The fight against terrorism must start and end with the 

ideals and not on the battlefield. Treating the symptoms is not 

enough to stop the underlying disease. And this hearing is a candid 

look at terrorism in the Gulf states. And that is just the way it is. 

I will yield to the ranking member on the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, Mr. Keating from Massachusetts. 

3

Mr. KEATING. Chairs Poe and Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch, thank you for convening the hearing today and joining us. 

We recently had a hearing in the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Trade Subcommittee on countering violent extremism and the 

role of women. Much of that hearing focused on the numerous ways 

that we can change how we empower communities and governments to get to the heart of violent extremism by capitalizing on 

the people and resources we have but, frankly, are not taking full 

advantage of. 

We are presented with an exceedingly challenging environment 

for addressing terrorism threats in and emanating from the Gulf. 

However, I refuse to believe that we are helpless to do anything 

about it and that we are confined to the geopolitical maneuverings 

of foreign actors. We have far too long thought about terrorism in 

the traditional Whac-A-Mole sense. But as we learn more about the 

drivers of extremism I think we have actually come away with a 

better understanding of how many different ways we can positively 

impact this problem: By empowering women to be meaningful actors in identifying and addressing early signs of extremism and 

radicalization in their communities; by strengthening the rule of 

law and grievance mechanisms so that there are formal pathways 

for citizens to make their concerns heard; by improving information 

sharing at the local level through community policing, and at the 

regional and international levels so that the governments can work 

better together to eliminate terrorist financing, take down terrorist 

networks, stop foreign fighter travel. There are a lot of tools at our 

disposal. And it is sheer negligence not to use them. 

This reality came into relief in the Boston Marathon bombing 

which this month marked the fifth anniversary of that attack. Terrorists don’t emerge in these instances without external support, be 

it inspiration for an attack, training, financing, or involvement 

early on in the radicalization of vulnerable individuals. We need to 

do everything we can to stamp out all streams of support for terrorism because terrorist attacks do not happen in a vacuum. 

The tragic deaths in Boston during the marathon, which is an inspiring and proud day every year for the runners, their families, 

and all those cheering them on the sidelines and watching them at 

home, these attacks don’t happen in a vacuum. There were a lot 

of lessons learned that emerged from that attack and others that 

we need to be implementing fully today. 

Combating terrorism abroad does mean saving lives at home. 

And while it is my hope that we have learned from the past, I 

think we can do much better. And we can encourage our allies in 

the Gulf to do much better. The Gulf is a serious threat environment for terrorism. The terrorist threats from al-Qaeda and ISIS 

operating in the Gulf is compounded by destabilizing engagement 

in the region by Iran and the dire conflict that exists in Yemen. 

If we fail to work strategically with our allies and partners and 

with our own State Department, intelligence community, Treasury 

Department, and with all the relevant agencies and actors across 

our Government working in the region to mitigate these threats, 

the question of the next terrorist attack here at home will just be 

a question of when. And that is unacceptable because we can do 

4

this work. We can support and invest in a strong State Department 

to navigate and negotiate the tensions in the region. 

At the end of the day our counterterrorism efforts work best 

when everyone is focused and committed and not distracted by unproductive disputes. We can do more to mitigate the humanitarian 

crisis in Yemen and to do our part in welcoming refugees. With our 

robust State Department, and with our allies working around the 

world we can coordinate our response to the conflict in Yemen and 

act swiftly so we can finally move more aggressively toward stabilization efforts and eradicating the terrorist networks there. 

Terrorists benefit from the ongoing chaos and conflict, And we 

are all ill-served by falling into the trap of thinking that the civil 

war and the humanitarian crisis on the other side of the world cannot hit us back here at home. 

Across the region what can we do to shut down terrorist financing networks? How can we compel the best efforts by our partners 

in the region to once and for all track and eliminate these funding 

streams and hold all of those accountable for their crimes? 

Lastly, one of the greatest assets we have are the programs being 

carried out by our State Department and USAID on better community policing, strengthening the rule of law and civil society, and 

expanding opportunities for economic empowerment, improving access to education and job training, turning down the incubators 

where the seeds of radicalization are sown. This is what we are 

here to discuss today. 

I thank our witnesses for being here. And I look forward to hearing your recommendations going forward, how we can improve the 

situation, make the world safer, make our country safer. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

The Chair now recognizes the chairman emeritus, the professional Ileana Ros-Lehtinen in foreign affairs from Florida, the chair 

of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee. And she can 

speak as long as she wants to. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I won’t take up that much time. But now 

that you have given me that opportunity. 

But thank you, Chairman Poe. Thank you, Ranking Member 

Keating. Congressman Deutch and I want to thank both of you and 

your staff for working with us and our teams to hold this hearing 

jointly today. 

As we know, the rift between Qatar and the other Gulf states 

has in many ways shined a necessary light on Doha’s support for 

certain groups and ideologies in the region, many of which have 

ties to terrorist organizations. And to be sure, the criticism of 

Qatar is well deserved. As former Deputy CIA Director David 

Cohen said in 2014, Qatar has openly financed Hamas, is supporting extremist groups operating in Syria, is a permissive terrorist financing environment, and has actively undermined regional 

stability. 

From Syria, to Libya, to Sudan, Qatar’s support for the Muslim 

Brotherhood and other more extremist organizations is a driver of 

that instability, complicating and setting back much of what the 

United States and our partners are trying to achieve. To see how 

Qatar fuels extremist violence in the region one need only look at 

5

its state-funded Al-Jazeera and the religious incitement that Qatar 

is condoning and broadcasting all over the Arab world. Understandably, Qatar’s neighbors are upset with Doha’s foreign policy 

and are pushing for change, which we have begun to address 

through our strategic dialogue and our memorandum of understanding with Qatar. 

However, as much as the rest of the Gulf countries want to single out Qatar, it must be said that other GCC members, including 

some of our most trusted and important partners do not have the 

best record on these issues either. Our friends in Saudi Arabia, 

after years of cultivating the political favor of religious extremists 

within its borders, have now taken steps to moderate the brand of 

Islam that the Saudis are famous for. 

But exactly how much the crown prince can or will reverse the 

behavior of Saudi citizens, including those in the royal family, remains to be seen. Never mind improving the Kingdom’s still abhorrent human rights record and reforming an educational curriculum 

that still promotes intolerance of both Jews and Christians. 

On a more practical level, all the GCC countries still have room 

to improve on fighting terrorist financing and money laundering, 

from Qatar and Kuwait, to Bahrain and Oman, to Saudi Arabia 

and the UAE. In the State Department’s latest country report on 

terrorism not a single GCC country escapes criticism as terrorists’ 

financiers continue to operate, charitable donations still reach terrorist groups, and religious incitement goes unaddressed. 

The amount of work left to do on these issues highlights just how 

big the challenge is before us, no matter how much cooperation we 

are getting from GCC partners in other areas. Since 9/11 the 

United States has poured billions of dollars, billions into counterterrorism efforts. And for the most part, our national security agencies and their partners have been enormously successful shutting 

down operation after operation, many of which will never be reported. 

What we have been less successful with is putting a stop to the 

root cause of terrorism, the violent ideologies, and associated economic factors that drive so many men and women to commit acts 

of terror in the first place. And when our partners are not fully 

committed, whether by failing to close gaps in their terrorist financing laws, or end religious incitement or reverse repression, 

both inside and outside their borders, then countering terrorism is 

made that much harder. 

As we look to the future, I am encouraged by a lot of the 

progress, albeit slow, that we are seeing in our GCC partners. And 

I am hopeful that we are going to see even greater commitment by 

our partners in the years to come. Not just on a military level but 

by leading by example, by promoting the kind of human rights, the 

kind of tolerance, and economic well-being that are so desperately 

needed in the Middle East. 

So, thank you, Chairman Poe. I look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses and any recommendations that they may have for increasing counterterrorism cooperation in the Gulf, and specifically 

what we can do in Congress to help. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. 

6

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member on the Middle 

East, North Africa Subcommittee, Mr. Ted Deutch, also from Florida, for his opening statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks to Chairman Poe and to you and Chairman 

Ros-Lehtinen, and thanks for calling this hearing. This is an important issue and I look forward to the discussion. I also want to 

thank Ranking Member Keating for his leadership. And thanks to 

our panel of expert witnesses for your time and insight. 

The threat of terrorism emanating from the Gulf states is clearly 

a very real concern. The high number of ISIS recruits and supporters in GCC countries demonstrates the seriousness of the 

radicalization in the region. However, we must remember that ISIS 

is only the most recent in a long line of radical Islamic terror 

groups. 

ISIS’s conventional defeat in Iraq and Syria will not stop support 

of its ideology around the world, especially in the Gulf region. Our 

counterterrorism efforts cannot focus on security cooperation alone. 

They are incomplete without a comprehensive effort to counter violent extremism and address the root causes, the drivers of terrorism. And while it is perhaps more difficult to measure success 

with these programs than it is to quantify territory controlled or 

number of fighters killed, they are a critical part of a counterterrorism strategy. And we have got to press our allies to work together on these efforts with the same commitment that they have 

to our security cooperation. 

Terror groups are increasingly propagating their dangerous message to vulnerable individuals through social media and online 

platforms. Efforts in the realms of education, through religious institutions, and government outreach can be powerful in fighting 

dangerous ideologies and fighting back against terrorist recruitment. Populations in GCC countries are especially vulnerable to 

this online radicalization. 

Fundraising and operational plotting go hand-in-hand with these 

online mechanisms, presenting what is a complex and fluid obstacle for GCC states to tackle. The GCC countries must be diligent 

in facing these challenges. However, counterterrorism and security 

concerns cannot be used by states as a reason to silence the voices 

of political opposition and curtail freedom of speech. Human rights 

and combating corruption must not be overlooked when applying 

the strongest counterterrorism policies. 

Likewise, the Gulf states must ensure its official messaging is 

consistent with their stated commitment to countering violent 

ideologies. State-sponsored media, like Al-Jazeera, cannot be used 

to spread messages of violence. And speakers who endorse violent 

action wherever they speak, whether in the public square or the 

public mosque, any violent actions spoken against perceived enemies of Islam must not be tolerated by the GCC. 

I am deeply concerned that U.S.-GCC counterterrorism has also 

been weakened by the current rift among the GCC countries. Unity 

in this region is critical to our efforts to counter Iran’s destabilizing 

influence. And unity will be even more vital should the administration choose to walk away from the nuclear deal. The United States 

will need our partners to stand together to deter the Iranian aggression that threatens all of our interests. 

7

It does the United States no good to choose sides in this rift. We 

must work to solve the current crisis, and, in the process, strengthen the efforts of all GCC countries to fight terrorism. The GCC 

countries host U.S. troops and critical security infrastructure. We 

are all safer when we are working together. I believe it is in the 

region’s best interest to counter all brands of terrorism from 

Hamas to al-Qaeda, ISIS to Hezbollah. And I know that some of 

our allies view these groups differently. But we must be clear in 

our expectations of those who want to be partners with the United 

States. 

The GCC countries should be working together, should find 

strength in unity in combating these violent ideologies that threaten long-term state stability. It does nothing to strengthen regional 

security to only point fingers and claim the terrorism supported by 

one country is worse than the terrorism supported by another country. Let’s agree, terrorism is bad, period. And we expect our allies 

to fight it, not fund it. 

Combating terror financing in the Gulf region is a key component 

of our counterterrorism strategy. There is substantial room for improvement in all of the Gulf countries. The United States has made 

clear that we will work with our allies to help them get their terror 

finance laws in line with ours, we will share technical expertise 

and information, but we expect the governments will pursue terror 

financiers to the full extent of the law. 

I look forward to our witnesses addressing the terror finance 

piece in greater detail. 

Finally, I hope that today will help us understand where the current gaps in our own counterterrorism programming as well as 

that of our allies exist, and just how we might strengthen our joint 

efforts to combat it. 

I appreciate the time, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Florida. 

The Chair will recognize other members for 1 minute if they wish 

to make an opening statement. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady 

from Missouri, Ambassador Wagner, for 1 minute. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank you, Mr. Chairman and Chairwoman, for 

your courtesy and for this hearing today. 

I had the opportunity just last week to ask Ambassador 

Satterfield, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, how our 

diplomatic corps is strengthening our partnerships with Gulf states 

and working to resolve tensions between Qatar and its neighbors. 

I appreciate very much the chance to revisit this critical issue 

today. It behooves the United States to foster excellent working relationships with and among Arab states as we counter the threats 

from Iran, Syria, and terrorist groups. 

And to add on to our colleague Mr. Deutch and what you had to 

say, I spent the better part of 4 years in a tiny little country as 

U.S. Ambassador of Luxembourg fighting directly terrorist financing that was being moved and laundered through and into this region. So I very much look forward to your thoughts and discussions 

on this area. So I thank you for your indulging me, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. 

Cicilline. 

8

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Deutch, and Chairman Poe and Ranking Member 

Keating for convening this important joint hearing on the Middle 

East, North Africa, and Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Subcommittees. 

Particularly since the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, we 

have relied on cooperation from our allies and partners throughout 

the world to work with us on counterterrorism operations through 

military support, intelligence sharing, and increased action against 

terrorist financing. Our partners in the Persian Gulf have played 

a critical role in these efforts in many areas. And in many of these 

nations, cooperation and partnership with the United States has 

continued to improve. 

While I hope that this will be part of today’s discussion, I also 

hope that we will be able to address ways in which Gulf Cooperation Council states can continue to improve counterterrorism activities, in ways in which we can combat the roots of extremism in the 

region, ways in which we can work together to prevent terrorist organizations from carrying out horrific acts around the world. 

I look forward to today’s discussion and to hearing from our witnesses today. And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Boyle. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will just be brief. One of the things that I am most interested 

in this hearing today is the extent to which, if any, the intra-GCC 

rift that has emerged on the Arabian Peninsula affects our overall 

joint counterterrorism efforts. So if they weren’t already planning 

to do so, perhaps our panelists might be able to address that point 

when they are speaking. 

Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair will now introduce each of our witnesses and hear 

from them. And then the members will question them. 

Ms. Katherine Bauer is the Blumenstein-Katz Family Fellow at 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and former Treasury official who served as the Department’s Financial Attache in 

Jerusalem and in the Gulf. 

Dr. David Weinberg is the Anti-Defamation League’s Washington 

representative for international affairs. Previously he was a senior 

fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies studying the 

Gulf. 

Mrs. Leanne Erdberg is the director of Countering Violent Extremism at the U.S. Institute of Peace. She previously served on the 

National Security Council and the State Department. 

Ms. Bauer, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes. When 

the red light comes on you know the drill, stop. So you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF MS. KATHERINE BAUER, BLUMENSTEIN-KATZ 

FAMILY FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR 

EAST POLICY 

Ms. BAUER. Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Keating and Deutch, distinguished members of the 

9

subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on 

GCC States counterterrorism efforts. 

The Arab Gulf States are important U.S. counterterrorism partners. Since 9/11, the United States has made great, albeit often uneven strides, in working with our various partners in the GCC. And 

counterterrorist financing has been at the heart of such cooperation. It remains essential today. The central role of counterterrorist 

financing is reflected both in the fact that it is among the grievances that has fueled the rift between Qatar on the one hand, and 

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt on 

the other, and because of the increasing complexity of the terrorist 

threat. 

Years of conflict in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya have provided 

fertile ground for terrorist groups and extremist ideologies. Such 

groups have sought and achieved safe havens in weak and failed 

states from which to recruit, train, plot, and conduct attacks, as 

well as to extract resources and aggregate funds. Because of this 

evolution in terrorist financing methodologies, disrupting foreign 

sources alone will not bankrupt such groups. 

In order to achieve durable counterterrorism successes, 

counterterrorist financing must proceed alongside efforts to counter 

extremist ideologies and promote good governance, areas where the 

GCC states also have an important role to play. Even, and especially so, continuing to build partner capacity to address systemic 

vulnerabilities to illicit finance will make it harder for terrorist organizations to move and store funds. 

Some GCC states have taken greater ownership of such issues in 

recent years due to domestic and foreign threats, as well as changing dynamics in the global financial system. As they do, the United 

States should continue to press the GCC states to comply with 

international standards for anti-money laundering and 

counterterrorist financing, promulgated by the Financial Action 

Task Force, to include transparency and due process in the application of targeted financial sanctions. 

Since the Gulf rift began 10 months ago, terror finance concerns 

have figured prominently. But it is unlikely that resolving these 

concerns alone would end the crisis. Nonetheless, the U.S. should 

continue to work with Qatar under the terms of the MOU on Counterterrorism Cooperation signed in July, as well as to work to mitigate the impact of the rift on counterterrorism and other security 

cooperation. 

The rift has focused attention on Qatar’s counterterrorist financing deficiencies, with the result that others in the region have arguably been given a pass. In particular, Kuwait, where a number 

of U.N.-designated terrorist financiers continue to operate according to the State Department’s most recent country reports on terrorism. In reality, each Gulf state faces its own deficiencies, 

vulnerabilities, and barriers to action against terrorist financing. 

These are hard and politically sensitive issues. The scope of the 

challenge facing Saudi Arabia is perhaps greater than any other 

Gulf state. Both ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to call for attacks 

against the Kingdom. And despite serious efforts on the 

counterterrorist financing front, Saudi individuals likely continue 

to serve as a source of funding for terrorist groups. 

10

The UAE has inherent vulnerabilities to terrorist and other illicit 

financing due to its role as a regional commercial and financial 

hub. 

Bahrain has among the most technically competent anti-money 

laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes in the Gulf. 

However, Manama is sometimes overzealous in its application of 

such laws and regulations against its local Shia population, risking 

the credibility of Bahrain’s counterterrorism efforts overall. 

Qatar does deserve its share of the blame. But the number of 

deep pocket terrorist financiers and facilitators in Qatar is ultimately relatively small. Qatar has taken some limited action 

against individual terrorist financiers, freezing assets, imposing 

travel bans, shutting down accounts, and even shutting down a 

charity tied to al-Qaeda in Syria. 

But in all these instances the country acted only in response to 

considerable U.S. pressure and was remarkably reluctant to publicly take credit for successes. Other actions have mixed or unclear 

results, such as stalled prosecutions and the omission of U.N. designated Khalifa al-Subaiy from their first national terrorist list 

issued last month. 

Taken together, one has to wonder, as the Treasury official did 

last fall, whether Qatar has made the kind of ‘‘fundamental decisions on combating terror finance that would make the country a 

hostile environment for terrorist financiers.’’

Before I conclude, I just want to recognize Congresswoman Wagner’s intervention regarding the importance of diplomacy. I couldn’t 

agree more. And I look forward to discussing the role of sanctions 

diplomacy in the Gulf in particular. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. And I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bauer follows:]

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Grading Counterterrorism Cooperation with the 

GCC States 

Katherine Bauer 

Blumenstein-Katz Family Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

Testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

April 26, 2018 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you for the oppmtunity 

to testifY today on Gulf state counterterrorism efforts. This hearing comes at a critical time. 

Years of conflict in Syria, Iraq and Yemen have proven fertile ground for terrorist groups 

and extremist ideologies. Terrorist groups have sought and achieved safe havens in weak or 

failed states from which to recruit, train, plot and conduct attacks, as well as to extract resources and aggregate funds. 

The Gulf states have been important U.S. partners in countering these threats. Since 9/11, 

the United States has made great, albeit often unequal, strides in working with our various 

partners in the Gulf, and counterterrorist financing has been at the heart of such cooperation. Across the Gulf, alongside efforts to encourage the development of partner capacity, 

establish appropriate legal frameworks, and develop key agencies and personnel, the United 

States dramatically increased information sharing and sought to galvanize political will 

among Gulf partners to act both jointly with and independently of the United States to 

stymie terrorist financing. 

Such cooperation remains essential today. Its impo1tance is reflected in the fact that terrorist financing is among the grievances that has fueled the rift between Qatar on the one hand 

and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt on the other. It is also important because of the evolution and increasing complexity of terrorist financing to involve 

more diverse sources of funds, as we have seen with the so-called Islamic State, among others. 

My testimony today will focus on these counterterrorist financing issues. First, I will discuss 

the GCC rift. Next, I will look in detail at the records of Kuwait and Qatar on counterterrorist 

financing issues. Finally, I will look at the evolution of the terror finance threat, and offer a 

few recommendations on the way forward in working with all GCC states to strengthen 

their ability to respond to this complex threat. 
12


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THEGCCRIFT 

In the ten months since the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt (the Arab Quartet) imposed a diplomatic embargo on their neighboring Arab Gulf state, prominent among their 

complaints has been Qatar's support for lslamist extremist groups, whether through media 

outlets, hosting senior officials, or funding by Qatari individuals. However, it is unlikely that 

resolving the Arab Quartet's concerns about Qatari counterterrorism financing deficiencies 

would end the rift. Rival media smear campaigns have targeted both foreign and domestic 

audiences further entrenching public opinion. As the rift has dragged on, parties on both 

sides appear to be only increasingly (and literally) dug in: Saudi media recently reported 

that the kingdom will dig a canal near the Saudi-Qatari border and place its nuclear waste 

dump in the Saudi land between the canal and Qatar to geographically isolate its neighbor.' 

Nonetheless, the United States should continue to work to alleviate the impact of the rift 

on counterterrorism and other security cooperation. Travel and port restrictions create logistical headaches for the U.S. military operating from the largest U.S. base in the Middle 

East, al-Udeid, as well as for other U.S. official efforts: a recent meeting of the U.S.-GCC 

Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), established in Riyadh on the margins of President Trump's visit there just prior to the beginning of the rift, had to be held in Kuwait so 

that Qatar could attend.' The center's physical headquarters was inaugurated in Riyadh by 

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin in October 2017. 3 

The rift is a distraction from the many pressing issues that face all parties involved. It takes 

up precious time of Gulf State officials. Given the Gulf states' small native populations and 

the necessity that national security positions be filled by citizens, they generally lack a deep 

bench of such officials. For example, Kuwait's role as mediator in the rift risks crowding out 

U.S. efforts to push Kuwait to remedy its own counterterrorist financing deficiencies. The 

blockade has arguably had some modest impact of pushing Qatar closer to Iran4 , despite 

U.S. efforts to mount a joint U.S.-GCC effort to contain the Islamic Republic. 

The rift has focused attention on Qatar's counterterrorist financing deficiencies with the 

result that others in the region-in particular Kuwait-have arguably been given a pass. In 

reality, each Gulf state faces its own deficiencies, vulnerabilities, and barriers to actions 

against terror finance. While I focus in this testimony on Qatar and Kuwait, largely out of a 

' Brennan, David, "Saudi Arabia wants to dump nuclear waste on the Qatari border to make its arch 

enemy an island," Newsweek, 10 April 201-ft Web. http:/ /w--v..w.newsweekcom/saudi-arahia-vvantsdump-nudear-waste-qatari-horder-make-enemy-island-879072 

2 "Qatar takes part in TFTC meet in Kuv.rait,"The Peninsula, March g, 2018. https://thepeninsulaqatar.comiarticle/o<J/03i2m8/Qatar-takes-part-in-TITC-meet-in-Kuwait 

3 "Secretary Mnuchin Leads Middle East Trip Focused on Combatting Terrorist Financing," Press 

Center, U.S. Department of the TreasUiy, Oct. 20, 2017. Web. https:.Liv..'V\.'VV.treasur'l-gov/press-centc r i press-rc l e(1 scs/P ages/ S\1 o 18 5.as px 

4 While some reports have pointed out that goods from Iran have doubled as a share of Qatari imports, it remains at a ve1y low level. "Qatar's non-oil exports in first 9 months of 2.017 stand at 

QRI3.3bn," Gulf Times, Oct. 2.2., 2.017. Web. http:/ /ww\v.gulf-times.com/stOiy/s68272/Qatar-s-nonoil-expurt;;-in-first-9-months-of-2.D17-; i\refmanesh, Sepehr, "Iran Exports to Qatar Up 117%," Financial Tribune, Nov. 19, 2017. Web. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/7639H/irans-economic-ties-\•\rith-qatar-hooming-exports-up-!17 
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desire to provide a complete picture that is often missing in the PR-fueled Gulf rift, the Gulf 

countries of the Arab Quartet have their own problems as well. 

The scope of the challenge facing Saudi Arabia is perhaps greater than any other Gulf state, 

with more than two thousand Saudis fighting for terrorist organizations in foreign conflicts, 

largely in Syria.5 Both ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to call for attacks against the kingdom, 

and despite serious efforts on the counterterrorist financing front, Saudi individuals likely 

continue to serve as a source of funding for terrorist groups. 6 

The UAE has inherent vulnerabilities to terrorist and other illicit financing due to its role as 

a regional commercial and financial hub. The large number of exchange houses, general 

trading companies, and hawalas create "an environment susceptible to bulk cash smuggling, 

trade based money laundering, and the raising and transferring of funds for illicit activity." 7 

With more than 15 million travelers to Dubai alone in 20178, the UAE also faces challenges 

in identifying and acting against UN-designated terrorist financiers in its territory. According to the Washington Post, the United States and UAE missed an opportunity to detain 

UN-designated Taliban leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansour on a trip to Dubai in spring 

2016." TI1e UAE faces significant challenges in coordinating across a bifurcated regulato1y 

setting between onshore and offshore financial activity, as well as between the country's 

two security services, which respectively cover Dubai, the primary financial and commercial 

center, and Abu Dhabi, the capital. 

Bahrain has zealously applied anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing 

measures, notably against a Shia cleric for collecting khums, a smt of tax paid by Shia to be 

used by clergy to help the needy.'u Even before this specific instance, the State Department 

warned that Bahrain's "potential politicization of terrorist finance and money laundering 

issues threatens to conflate legitimate prosecutions of militants with politically motivated 

actions against the mainstream, nonviolent opposition and Shia community."u 

s "Count1y Reports on Terrorism 2016: Middle East and North Aii·ica," U.S. Department of State. 

https:i/www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2m6/2722J2.htm 

6 Ibid. 

7 Ibid. 

8 "15.8 million people visited Dubai in 2017," Gulf News, Feb. 7, 2018. Web. 

https:/ /gulfnev.'s.com/husiness/sectors/tourism/ts-8-miHion-people-visited-duhai-in-20I7-

i.2lh9flo7 

9 Jaffe, Greg & Ryan, Missy, "A Dubai shopping trip and a missed chance to capture the head of the 

Taliban," The Washington Post, Mar. 24, 2018. Web. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nati on <Jl-secu rity I a -cl u ba i-sh o p ping-trip-and -a-mi ssed-c han ce-to-ea p tu re-t he-h ea d-o f-t he-ta I ihan/2oiS/oJ/24/D137dd6()-zhao-I!eS-Kad6-fhcsmS4fce8_stmy.html 

10 Reuters Staff, "Bahrain's top Shi'ite cleric gets one year suspended jail sentence," Reuters, May 21, 

2017. Web. https://'i,-vv:vw.rcuters.com/artide/us-hahrain-security-trial/hallrains-top-shiite-rlericgcts-one-year-suspended-jail-sentenre-idUSKBNl8Ho7C 

""Count1y Reports on Terrorism 2016: Middle East and North Africa," U.S. Department of State. 

https://'-A'Ww.state.gov/j /ct/ rl s/crt/ 2016/272232.htm 
14


29967a-4.eps

The United States should continue to work both bilaterally and multilaterally to strengthen 

all Gulf states' capability and will to implement the appropriate legal, regulatory, and operational measures to counter these threats. 

KUWAIT AND QATAR 

In the past, Kuwait and Qatar were often lumped together when discussing terror finance 

in the Gulf. Kuwait was named alongside Qatar as a "permissive jurisdiction" for terrorist 

financing by a Treasury official in 2014." The focus on Qatar oflate has in effect given Kuwait 

a pass, and Kuwait's role as a mediator in the Gulf rift has likely crowded out U.S. efforts to 

pressure Kuwait to act. According to the most recent State Department Country Report on 

Terrorism, "a number of UN-designated terrorist financiers continued to operate in Kuwait."13 

Underpinning Kuwait's inaction, Kuwait scholar Lori Plotkin Boghardt observed in 2014, is 

that "tightening the noose around local fundraising for Syria-based extremist groups would 

invite the wrath of powerful Salafist politicians and clerics who have been at the forefront 

of Kuwait's private fundraising scene."'4 Indeed, in 2014, Kuwait's Minister of justice and 

Awqaf (endowments), Nayef al-Ajmi, was forced to resign after being called out by a U.S. 

official for his association with fundraising efforts for "a prominent al-Nusra Front financier." Following Ajmi's appointment, according to the United States, "the Ministry of Awqaf 

announced it would allow non-profit organizations to collect donations for the Syrian people at Kuwaiti mosques, a measure we believe can be easily exploited by Kuwait-based terrorist fundraisers."•s 

In the interim, Kuwait has taken efforts to intensifY charity supervision, including closing 

two domestic charities for "illegal fundraising for foreign beneficiaries."'6 Notably, in 2016, 

Kuwait's Ministry of Social Affairs prohibited cash donations to charitable causes during 

Ramadan, insisting on credit card or other electronic funds transfer to enable financial authorities to monitor such transfers and prevent misuse.'7 

The United States continues to publicly identifY Kuwait-based terrorist financiers. Most recently, in March 2017, the United States designated "prominent al-Nusra Front and al-Qaeda 

10 "Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the 

Center for a New American Security on 'Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing," Press 

Center, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 03 April2014. Web. https:/ /w"w.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jbJo8.aspx 

'3 "Count1y Reports on Terrorism 2016: Middle East and North Africa," U.S. Department of State. 

https://'Nww.state.gov/j /ct/rl s/crt/ 2016/272232.htm 

'4 Lori Plotkin-Boghardt. "Policywatch 2247: The Terrorist Funding Disconnect v>ith Qatar and Kuwait," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2, 2014. http:/ /WINw.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/vie\v/the-terrorist-funding-disconnect-with-qatar-and-kuwJit. 

''"Remarks of Under Secreta1y for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the 

Center for a New American Security on 'Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing," Press 

Center, U.S. Department of the Treasu1y, 03 J\pril2014. Web. https:/ /w,;w.trcaswy.gmr/press-center/ press-re l~ases/P ages/jh 308 .as px 

'

6 "Country Reports on Terrorism 2016: Middle East am! North Africa," U.S. Department of State. 

https:/ f\vww. state. gov I j I ct/ rl s/ crt/ 2016 I 2722 32. h tm 

'7Jbid. 
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financier" Mohammad Hadi al-Anizi, discussed below for his ties to Abd al-Rahman alNuaymi.'8 Anizi, according to Treasury, is based in Kuwait, from which he has "provided 

extensive material and financial support to ANF since at least 2014." The press statement, 

however, traces Anizi's ties to AQ back to 2007 and adds that, in mid-to-late 2014, Anizi was 

"appointed as AQ's representative in Syria by AQ senior leadership."'9 Taken together, one 

has to wonder if Anizi only recently returned to Kuwait from Syria. 

With regard to ISIS, which has been the primary terrorist threat to Kuwait, a number of 

cases have been prosecuted with mixed success under Kuwait's anti-money laundering and 

counterterrorist financing law, which was only adopted in 2014.'0 In 2016, Kuwait tried 

twelve citizens charged with providing support to ISIS. Of the twelve, Kuwait "abstained 

fi·om punishing" seven of them resident in Kuwait. The other five, tried in absentia, were 

sentenced to ten years' hard labor." 

Qatar's record leaves much to be desired as well. For a number of years, a Treasury official 

revealed in 2014, "several major Qatar-based fundraisers [have acted] as local representatives for larger terrorist fundraising networks that are based in Kuwait."" 

While Qatar took a number of limited actions against individual terrorist financiers during 

this period-fi·eezing assets, imposing travel bans, shutting down accounts, and pursuing a 

number of prosecutions23-implementation has been thoroughly mixed, as my colleague 

Matthew Levitt detailed in his July testimony in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and as we have written about jointly.24 Qatar has been reluctant to take credit publicly 

for the steps they have taken-which is not uncommon across the Gulf-and largely in response to considerable U.S. pressure. 

'

8 "Treasury Sanctions Prominent AI-Nusrah Front and AI-Qa'ida Facilitator," Press Center, U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 14, 2017. Web. https:/ /www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/smoo27.aspx 

'"Ibid. 

'""Country Reports on Terrorism 2016: Middle East and NorthMrica," U.S. Department of State. 

https://wwv,;.state.gov/j /ct/rl s/crt/2016/ 272232.htm 

"Al-Enezi, Meshaal, "Dozen sentenced of supporting IS," Kuwait Times, Jan. 10, 2016. Web. 

http://news.ku\vaittimes.net/website/dozen-sentenced-ol~supporting-is/ 

" "Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the 

Center for a New American Security on 'Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing," Press 

Center, U.S. Department of the Treasu1y, 03 April 2014. Web. https:/ /w"w.trcasUiy.gnv/press-cente r I press-re 1 ea ses/P ages/jh 308 .as px 

'3 "Readout ofSecreta1y Tillerson's Meeting with Qatari Foreign Minister Al Thani," News & Events, 

U.S. Embassy Doha, 09 May 2017. Web. https:/ /qa.usembassy.gov/secretaly-tillersons-meeting-qatari-foreign-minister-al-thani/ 

'4 United States. Cong. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East 

and North Africa. Hearing on Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship Jul. 26, 2017. 113th Con g. Washington: GPO, 2017 (statement of Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director and Fromer-Wexler Fellow, Stein 

Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for Near Easy Policy). 

https:/ I docs.house .gov /meetings/ F A/fl\J 3/ 20I]07Z6/Io6329/l-lHRG-I15-F 1\.13-Wst ate-LevittM20170726.pdf: Levitt, Matthew & Bauer, Katherine, "Qatar Due,n't Need a Blockade. It Neecb an Audit," Foreign Policy. June 15, 2017. Web. https:/ /foreignpolicy.com/20I7/o6/I5/qatar-Joesnt-need-ahlockade-it-needs-an-audit-al-qaeda/ 
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For example, although the 2014 State Department Country Report on Terrorism credited 

Qatar with shutting down Saad al-Kaabi's online fundraising platform, Madad Ahl al-Sham, 

which was "suspected of sending funds to violent extremist elements in Syria,"'' a 2017 

Treasury designation of Kuwait-based financier Muhammad Hadi al-Anizi noted that Kaabi 

was still actively involved in financing AQ in Syria at least a year later in 2015.'6 The U.S. 

Treasury designated Kaabi as a financial supporter of al-Qaeda and ANF in 2015.'7 Kaabi was 

found responsible for raising funds for ANF to purchase weapons and food, as well as facilitating the ransom payment for a hostage held by ANF in early 2014- Kaabi worked for ANF 

in Syria since at least late 2012.'" 

In another case, the U.S. Treasmy sanctioned 'Abd al-Malik 'Abd al-Salam (aka Umar alQatari), a Jordanian with Qatari residence.'" In 2011 and 2012, he worked with associates in 

Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Qatar, and Iran to raise and move funds, transfer weapons, and 

facilitate travel for fighters. For example, in 2012, he gave thousands of dollars and material 

support to an al-Qaeda associate in Syria, intended to assist ANF operatives. That same year, 

he also assisted with ANF recruitment in Turkey. He has used online sites to raise funds for 

al-Qaeda, and in 2011 he was part of an attack against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. 3" In 2014, 

the State Department's Country Reports said that the Qatari government had deported a 

Jordanian terrorist financier living in Doha and employed by a Qatari charity. 3' The report 

did not name the Jordanian deported, but it may have been referring to Umar al-Qatari. If 

it was in fact him, it is possible he continued to engage in terrorist financing for at least two 

years after he was designated by Treasury. 

Doha has been less than forthcoming on the issue of prosecuting terrorism financiers in 

Qatari courts. To be fair, the universe of deep pocket terrorist financiers in Qatar is a small 

one. According to the State Department's 2015 Country Reports, Doha had "made efforts to 

prosecute significant terrorist financiers." 3' As of 2016, Qatar had prosecuted five terrorist 

'' "Country Reports: Middle East and North Afi·ica Overview," U.S. Department of State, 2014, 

https://wwvc.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2m4/239407.htm. 

26 "Treasury Sanctions Prominent AI-Nusrah Front and AI-Qa'ida Facilitator," U.S. Department of 

the TreasUiy, March 14, 2017, https:i /wwv;.treasu<y.gov/press-center/press-rcleases/Pages/smom7_aspx 

' 7 "TreasUiy Designates Financial Supporters of Al-Qaida and Al-Nusrah Front," U.S. Department of 

the Treasmy, August 5, 2015, https:/ /\V\11W.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jloJ4J.aspx. 

28 Ibid. 2 9 "Treasu1y Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators," U.S. Department oft be 

Treasu 1y, https:/ /vvv .. '\v. trea su 1y .gov /press-center I press-releases/Pages /jl.z6 51.a spx. 

3" Ibid. 

3• "CoLmtty Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview," U.S. Department of State, 2014, 

https:/ I www .st·ate.gov ii /ctjrls/crt /2014/239407.htm. 

3' "Count1y Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview," U.S. Department of State, 2015, 

https://www.statc.gov/j /ct/rl s/crt/ 2015/257517. htm. 
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financiers: Ibrahim al-Bakr,33 Saad al-Kaabi,34 Abd al-Latif al-Kawari,35 Abd al-Rahman alNuaymi,36 and Khalifa al-Subaiy.37Jt is now clear that of these, two were acquitted, one was 

convicted but then acquitted on appeal, and one was convicted in absentia. As a result, none 

were in jail when the current intra-Gulf spat broke out, though the ones still resident in 

Qatar were reportedly under surveillance. 

Despite shutting down Kaabi's fundraising platform in 2014, Qatar acquitted him in 2016, 

along with Nuaymi.38 Both were designated by the Treasury for providing support to alQaeda.39 According to his Treasury designation, Nuaymi ordered the transfer of almost 

$6oo,ooo to ai-Qaeda through one of the organization's representatives in Syria. He also 

assisted with the financing of al-Qaeda in Iraq and was the middle man between Qataribased donors and the group. 4o 

The three other individuals that Qatar prosecuted include Bakr, Kawari, and Subaiy. Bakr 

and Kawari were convicted in 2016, and Subaiy was convicted in 2008. This was the second 

time that Bakr was convicted, following his 2000 arrest in which he was subsequently "released from prison after he promised not to conduct terrorist activity in Qatar."'' In his latest 

case, he was convicted in absentia and remains at large outside of Qatar. According to the 

2008 Treasury designation, in 2006 Bakr assisted a terrorist cell that was plotting attacks 

against U.S. military bases in Qatar. Additionally, beginning in 2012, Bakr worked for alQaeda, serving as the link between Gulf-based al-Qaeda financiers and Afghanistan. 4' 

Kawari, arrested in 2016 in Qatar and supposedly serving his sentence under house arrest, 

was designated in 2015 by the U.S. Treasmy for coordinating the funding between Qatari 

financiers and al-Qaeda. He also served as an al-Qaeda security official. 43 

33 "Treasury Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators," U.S. Department of the 

Treasury, September 24, 2014, https:/ /www.treasury.goY/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jb6')l.aspx. 

""Treasury Designates Financial Supporters of AI-Qaida and AI-Nusrah Front," U.S. Department of 

the Treasmy, August 5, 2015, https:/ /wvAv.treasmy.gov/press-center/press-re1eases/Pages/jlm4J-aspx. 

35 Ibid. 

36 'Treasmy Designates Al-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen," U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 18, 2013, https:/ /www.treaswy.gov/press-center /press-releases/Pages/jl2249·aspx. 

37 "Treasmy Designates Gulf-Based a! Qaida Financiers," U.S. Department of the Treasmy, June 5, 

2008, https:/ /ww\v.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hprorr.aspx. 

3

8 "Counter Terrorism Designations," U.S. Department oft he Treasury, August 5, 2015, 

https://'<'wvv.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/2orsoHos.a,;px. 

' 9 "Treasury Designates AI-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen," U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 18, 2013, https:/ /V."A'W.treasmy.gov/press-center /press-release,;/Pages/jh249·aspx. 

4o Ibid . 

.P "TreasUiy Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilitators," U.S. Department of the 

Treasu1y, September 24, 2014, https:/ /vvvv\¥.treasury.gov/press-center/press-re1cases/Pagps/jlz6si.aspx. 

42 Ibid. 

43 "Treasury Designates Financial Supporters of Al-Qaida and Al-Nusrah Front," U.S. Department of 

the TreasUiy, August 5, 2015, https://'A'W\V.treasUiy.gov/press-center/press-re1 eases/Pages I jl o '43-a spx. 
18


29967a-8.eps

Lastly, Subaiy was originally arrested in January of 2008 in Bahrain for "financing terrorism, 

undergoing terrorist training, facilitating the travel of others abroad to receive terrorist 

training, and for membership in a terrorist organization."44 He was arrested again in March 

2008 by Qatar and served a six-month term in prison. He is supposedly under surveillance; 

however, in 2015 the UN Committee on al-Qaeda sanctions updated his listing with new 

information-which is no small matter because it required a new vote of the full UNSCand reported that Subaiy had resumed terrorist activity. According to the committee, Subaiy 

reconnected with al-Qaeda financiers and facilitators in the Middle East after his release 

and resumed organizing funds in support of the organization. Moreover, "his involvement 

with Iran-based facilitators continued" in 2009, 2011, and 2012, with money flowing to alQaeda leaders in Pakistan.45 If he is in fact under Qatari surveillance, the Qatari authorities 

do not appear to be very vigilant. 

Systemic Reforms 

Kuwait came late to counterterrorist financing: it did not pass its first terror financing law 

until 2013, after a long battle in the country's majlis, which counts among its elected representatives members of Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood and hardline Salafi Islamist parties. 

The law allows for asset freezing and creation of a financial intelligence unit, which was 

stood up not long after. Since then, Kuwait has implemented bylaws that mandate reporting 

suspicions of terrorist financing; it has also stood up an intergovernmental counterterrorism 

committee headed by the Ministry ofForeignAffairs to implement UN-level obligations and 

domestic regulations.46 

Qatar took a number of systemic steps as well, including adopting new laws on charitable 

sector regulation and prohibitions on online fundraising in 2014.47 In 2017, Qatar updated a 

2004 counterterrorism law to allow the establishment of domestic terrorism designation 

capability. This deficiency had been among the concerns that kept Qatar on the Financial 

Action Task Force's ongoing monitoring list after its first mutual evaluation by the international standard setter in 2008.48 Qatar was removed from the list in 2010 after enacting a 

44 "Treasury Designates Gulf~ Based a! Qaida Financiers," U.S. Department of the Treaswy, June 5, 

2008, https:/ /wv<w. treasury. gov /press-center I press-releases/Pages /hpwn.aspx. 

45 "Nanative Smrunaries of Reasons for Listing," United Nations, Februaq19, 2015, 

https:/ /;vv.•w. un.org/ sc/ suborg/ en/ sanctions/ 1267 I aq_sanctions_list/ summaries/individ ual/khalifamuhammad-turki-al-sub<Jiy. 

4

6 "Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Country Database," United States Department of State 

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. June 2015. Web. 

https:/ lw>vw. state .gov I documents/ organization/ 239329. pdf 

47 United States. Cong. House. Conunittee on Foreign Mfairs, Subconm1ittee on the Middle East 

and North Africa. Hearing on Assessing the U.S.-Qatar Relationship Jul. 26, 2017. 113th Con g. Washington: GPO, 2017 (statement of Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director and Fromer-Wexler Fellow, Stein 

Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for Near Easy Policy). 

https:/ I docs. house.gov /meeti ngs/Fii/FAr3/2oi70726/ 100329IHHRG-1 15-F/1 13-Wstatc-LevittM201]0726, pdf 

-tll "Mutual Evaluation Report of Qatar," Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, 

April 9, 2ooR. PDF. http:/ /'"''w,latf-gafi.nrglmedia/fatf/documents/reportslmer/MER%zoQatar.pdf 
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new AML/CFT law, issuing revised regulations and providing guidance on suspicious transaction monitoring requirements to obligated entities.49 However, despite Qatar's efforts to 

implement the appropriate legal infrastructure, the State Department noted in its 2015 

INCSR report: "The exploitation of charities and private donations to finance terrorism continues to be a concern, as does the ability of individuals to bypass the formal financial sector 

for illicit financing."so 

Despite the above legislative efforts, according to former senior U.S. Treasury official Daniel 

Glaser, U.S.- and UN-designated terrorist financiers continue to operate "openly and notoriously" in Qatar.'' In February 2017, Glaser lamented that Qatar had not yet made the kind 

of"fundamental decisions" on combating terror finance that would make the country a hostile enviromnent for terror financiers, concluding that the positive steps Qatar had taken 

were "painfully slow."5' 

Since the beginning of the GCC rift, the United States has redoubled efforts to galvanize 

Qatari action on terror finance. In July 2017, the United States and Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding "outlining future efforts Qatar can take to fortify its fight against 

terrorism and actively address terrorism funding issues," according to a U.S. State Department officiaJ.53 Although the contents of the MOU have not been made public, it is reported 

to focus on increased information sharing and capacity building related to prosecutions. On 

the terror finance side, in a statement following his October 2017 visit to Doha, Treasury 

Secretary Mnuchin enumerated additional areas of cooperation, including: "placing a 

greater emphasis on charitable and money service business sectors in Qatar to prevent terrorists from continuing to use those sectors for illicit financing purposes, developing a Qatari domestic designations regime in line with international standards, and taking joint actions against terrorist financiers."" 

Mnuchin's visit came days after Qatar had joined the United States and other GCC states in 

their first joint designation under the TFTC. Among those targeted was one individual with 

significant ties to Qatar: Yemeni Abd al-Wahab al-Humayqani. He was previously designated by the United States in 2013. According to the Treasury, in 2012, Abd al-Rahman al-

<a "Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: update on-going process- June 2010," Financial Action 

Task Force, June 25, 2010. http:/ /wwv>.fatf~gafi.org/countlies/d-i/greece/documents/improvingglobalamlcf!:complianceupdateon-goingprocess-june2olo.html 

so "Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Count1y Database," United States Department of State 

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. June 2015. Web. p 363. 

https://vvww.state.gov/documents/organization/239329-Pdf 

''Daniel Glaser, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February7, 2017, 

https://w;vw.youtube.com/watch"!v·-OXSMKYr-SFl&feature~youtu.be&t-·J411118s. 

5' !hid. 

53 "U.S., Qatar sign MOT on combatting terrorism, financing/' Reuters, July 11, 2017. 

https://V'IilNV•l.reuters. com/ a rti de! us-gu lf-qa ta r-us.:J -m o u I u-s-qa tar-sign-mou -on-com hutting-terrorism-flnancing-idUSKBNJgWJJX. 

' 4 "Joint Statement Following U.S. Treasuty Secretary Steven Mnuchin's Meetings with His Highne"' Shiekh Tamin bin Hamad AI Thani, Emir of Qatar, and Qatari Officiab," Pre"' Center, U.S. Department oft he TreasUJy, Octo her 20, 2017. https://www.treasury.govjpress-center/press-re1eases/Pages/smm96.aspx. 
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Nuaymi provided financial support to a charity headed by Humayqani. 55 Humayqani was 

also named in the list promulgated by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt in May 

2017. According to the Emirati information, Humayqani had previously worked for Qatar's 

Ministry of Endowments.'" Considering that Qatar has previously rejected the Arab Quartet 

list "as baseless allegations that hold no foundation in fact," 57 just the recognition alongside 

its GCC neighbors ofHumayqani's role in terrorist financing and others represents a significant step. 

In March, Qatar released its first national terrorist list, based on capabilities it gained when 

it bolstered its terror finance law in summer 2017.'8 The list named twenty individuals and 

eight entities, including a number of Qatari nationals already designated by the UN, United 

States, and Arab Quartet.'" The list did not include many of those on the boycotting nations' 

list of eighty-one issued in June 2017. Nonetheless, it represents a significant step by Qatar 

in line with its commitments made to the United States as part of an MOU signed in July 

2017 and through its involvement in the TFTC, as Qatar claimed in its official announcement. The announcement also noted Qatar's commitment to implementing UN obligations 

since the establishment of its National Counter-Terrorism Committee in 2007.00 However, 

markedly absent from the list was UN-designated Khalifa al-Subaiy, who after being sanctioned in 2008 remained an active facilitator for al-Qaeda as of2015, according to the UN. 

Qatari officials continue to demonstrate a tone deafness on these issues: just two days after 

Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani met with President Trump in Washington and promised 

that Qatar "will not tolerate people who fund terrorism,"6' his prime minister attended the 

wedding of the son of UN-, U.S.-, and Qatari-designated terrorist financier Nuaymi. 62 (Another notable guest was former Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal.) It is worth noting that 

""Treasury Designates Al-Qa'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen," Press Center, U.S. Department 

of the Treasury, December 18, 2013. https:/ /www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jh249·aspx. 

' 6 "43 new designations specifically address trn·eats posed by Qatar linked and based AI Qaida Terrorism Support Networks," Emirates New Agency (WAM), June g, 2017. http:/ /wam.ae/en/details/1395302li18259· 

57 Associated Press, "Arab nations add names to terror list an1id Qatar dispute," YNet News, Jun. g, 

2017. Web. https:i /www.ynetnews.com/articles/o,7J4D,L-4973564,oo.html 

'

8

"Qatar publishes National List of Terrorist Classification," The Peninsula, March 24, 2018. 

https:i I thepeninsulaqata r. com/ article /24/03/2018 /Qatar-publishes-N a tiona 1-List -of-Terrorist -Classification 

59"Qatar puts 2R people and entities on new terrorism list," Reuters, March 22, 201R. 

https:/ jVv""V>.'W .reuters. com I a rti d c j us-gu lf-qa tar-security I qatar-puts-28-people-and -e nti ties-on- ne1-\rt~rrorism .. Jist-idUSKB:-i 1GY 222 

60 "Statement by the Qatar National Counter-Terrorism Conunittee on the Issuance of National 

Lists ofTen·orist Classifications," Qatar Tribune, March 23, 2018. http://w\\rw.qatar-tribunc.com/Latest-News/A rtMID I 423/A rti clelD/r788z 6' "Remarks by President Trump and Qatar Amir Tamim hin Hamad al Thani of the State of Qatar 

hefore bilateral meeting," V\Thite House, Aprilm, 2018. https://v..'l.-\'\V,wllitdlouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-amir-tamim-hin-hamad-al-thani-state-qatar-hilatcral-mecting/ 

62 "Al-Arabiya expose sheds light on Qatar regime's open ties with terror financiers," Al-A.rabiya, 

April 17, 2018. https:/ /english.alarahiya.nct/en/Ncws/gul f/2o<S/o4/•7/Al-Arabiya-expose-shedslight-on-Qatar-regime-s-open-ties-with-terror-financiers.html 
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Nuaymi was reportedly acquitted of terror finance charges in Qatari courts prior to his inclusion on the country's inaugural national terrorist list. Such a designation even by the UN, 

which includes an asset freeze and travel ban, would not prohibit Nuaymi from attending 

his son's wedding. However, Nuaymi had been subject to pretrial detention for several 

months, pending a government appeal in his case, which appears to be stalled. A statement 

released by the Qatari government said that Nuaymi was released in March. It also confirmed that the prime minster had attended the event at the invitation of the groom, who 

it described as "a government employee of the state of Qatar, and an upstanding young 

man," adding that the prime minister would not "avoid a family affair because a defendant 

standing trial may possibly be in attendance."6

3 

EVOLUTION OF THE TERROR FINANCE THREAT 

The nature of the terrorist threat is that it will continue to evolve and develop ways to finance and otherwise resource themselves, and our responses must also be geared to these 

evolving threats. Since 9/n, as a result of efforts to detect, disrupt, and dissuade donors from 

contributing to terrorist organizations, as well as improved oversight of charitable organizations that are often used as cover to move funds, terrorist organizations increasingly 

sought more diverse sources of funding. The proliferation of un- and under-governed spaces 

also made it easier for groups to raise funds locally through extortion and taxation, as well 

as kidnapping for ransom and other criminal activity. 

Al-Qaeda 

With the beginning of the conflict in Syria, there was a resurgence of traditional means of 

funding, especially from the Gulf. Fundraisers and facilitators in the Gulf have long supported AQ core as well as its affiliates in Iraq and more recently Syria, including by facilitating the movement of people and funds from Southeast Asia to the Levant. U.S.- and UNdesignated Qatari Ibrahim al-Bakr, for example, served as a link between Gulf-based AQ 

financiers and Afghanistan. Kuwaiti Muhsin al-Fadhli was sanctioned in 2005 for financing 

aspects of the Iraqi insurgency, including "the Zarqawi Network" and al-Qaeda. In 2012, as 

part of a Justice Department "Rewards for Justice" announcement, U.S. officials detailed 

Fadhli's role as AQ's senior facilitator in Iran, leading a network that the State Department 

described as "a core facilitation pipeline through Iran, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and to Syria."64 

63 Edward Malnick. "Qatar PM went to wedding hosted by 'one of the world's most prolific terrorist 

financiers," The Telegraph, March 21, 2018. https://w\vw.telegraph.co.uk/news(2m8/o4/21/qatarpm-went-wedding-hosted-one-"\vor1ds-prolific-terror-financicrs/ 

64 Muhsin al Fadhli was killed by a U.S. airstrike in Syria on July 8, 2015, where he was reportedly 

leading a group of seasoned al-Qaida operatives working withal Nusrah Front in hopes of recruiting Europeans and Americans to conduct attacks in the West. (Schmitt, Eric. 2015. "Leader of 

Qaeda Cell in Syria, Muhsin al-Fadhli, is Killed in!\irstrike, U.S. Says," The New York Times, July 21, 

https://vv>Nw.nytimes.com/20I5/o7/2z/world/middleeast/leader-of-qaeda-cell-in-syria-muhsin-alfadhli-is-ki11ed-in-airstrike-us-says.html'l_r=o.) 
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While most AQ affiliates have diversified their methods of fundraising65 away from foreign 

sources, al-Qaeda in Syria had been the major exception. As of 2014, AQ in Syria may have 

received as much as few million dollars a year from private donors in the Gulf. 06 According 

to a 2016 UN Security Council report, the group has continued to derive its income "mainly 

from external donations," along with criminal sources of funding such as kidnapping for 

ransom, extortion, and war spoils.67 

Some of this fundraising went on in plain sight on online platforms such as social media. 

Hajjaj al-Ajmi, a Kuwaiti who was sanctioned by the UN in 2014, used Twitter to solicit 

donations for AQ in Syria.68 Ajmi and others, such as Qatari national Saad ai-Kaabi, who 

posted solicitations on Face book and WhatsApp accounts for "arming, feeding, and treating" fighters in Syria, openly crowd-sourced donations for AQ and other jihadist groups in 

Syria.69 Fundraisers have also used social media to thank and confirm to donors the delivery 

offunds and material support to jihadist groups. In a video uploaded to YouTube in October 

2016, U.S.-designated AQ in Syria financier and Saudi national Abd Allah al-Muhaysini 

thanked Gulf donors for supporting jihadists in Syria: "As for the businessmen, and I will 

mention some of them, the ones who prepared these hundred rockets, may Allah reward 

them. One hundred Elephant rockets ... some from a group of brothers in Islam from al-Riyadh, some from our brother Abu Ahmed from Kuwait, some from our brother Abu al-Joud 

fi·om Qatar, and some from some brothers I have not mentioned .. .! tell all the businessmen 

of the Muslims, this is your money now, fighting in the path of Allah."7" According to the 

U.S. Treasury, between 2013 and 2015, Muhaysini raised millions of dollars for AQ in Syria, 

claiming himself that he had secured $5 million in donations to arm fighters. on 

6' Levitt, Matthew & Bauer, Katherine, "Qatar Doesn't Need a Blockade. It Needs an Audit," Foreign 

Policy. june 15, 2017. Web. https://foreignpolicy.com/2on/o6/lsiqatar-doesnt-need-a-blockade-itneeds-an-audit-al-qaeda/ 

66 "Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the 

Center for a New American Security on 'Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing," Press 

Center, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 03 April2014. Web. https:/ /wwlv.treasury.gov/press-center/press-re!eases/Pages/jh)o8.aspx 

67 "Nineteenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2253(2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities," United Nations Security Council, December 30, 2016. 

http:/ /w;v,v.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/Js 68 "Narrative Sununaries of Reasons for Listing: Hajjaj bin Fahd a! Ajmi," United Nations, August 15, 

2014 (updated December 11, 2017). https:jjv,lww.un.org/sc/suhorg/cn/sanctions/1267/ag_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/hajjaj--hin-fahd-al-ajmi 

66 Erin Burnett. "Are Tenorists Raising Money in Qatar''" CNN. 

https://www. un.org/ sc/ suborg/ en/ sanctions/ 1267/ aq_sanctions_list/ summaries/individ ual/hajjajbin-fahd-al-ajmi 

7' al-Muhaysini, Abdullah. "Sheikh al-Muhaysini Announces Beginning of Breaking Siege of Aleppo 

and Fires 100 Elephant Rockets". You Tube video, 12:02. Posted October 2016, since removed date 

unknown. See Zelin, Aaron Y, "Policy Focus 153:How Al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the 

Islamic State: The Nature of the Current Treat," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 

June 2017. PDF. http://wvvw.washingtoninstitttte.org/Ltploacls/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocustsJ· 

Zelin.pdf 

"''Treasu1y Designates Key al-Nusrah Front Leaders," Press Center, U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 10,2016. https://•wvvw.treasuiy.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j1o6os.aspx 
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As the conflict in Syria has continued, however, al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, al-Nusra Front 

(ANF), has become increasingly entrenched in Syria's Idlib Province, participating in governance, controlling territory and taking or sharing resources with other extremist groups 

present there. According to the UN monitoring team's most recent report, published in 

Februa1y 2018, ANF now appears to be "largely self-sufficient." That ANF is no longer reliant 

on foreign sources does not necessarily mean that the group no long receives such support. 

However, it does likely mean that even if we are able to disrupt financing from foreign 

sources such as those in the Gulf, that alone will not bankrupt the group. What is needed is 

a multi-faceted approach. Disrupting foreign donations to terrorist groups alone will not 

solve the problem. 

Islamic State 

Foreign donations consistently made up only a small share ofiSIS funding, especially after 

the group took over vast swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq in the spring and summer of 

2014.?' The same year, the organization's budget was estimated to be close to $2 billion, 

derived primarily from the resources and people in the territory it controlled. ISIS did not 

develop this expertise overnight. For more than a decade, its predecessors al-Qaeda in Iraq 

and the Islamic State in Iraq acted under the strategic decision to derive revenues locally to 

avoid foreign dependence and direction.73 

Alongside efforts to isolate ISIS from the global financial system and cut off its access to 

locally-derived revenue, the United States acted to expose ISIS funders in the Gulf and elsewhere, as well as to share information related to ISIS fundraising bilaterally and under the 

auspices of the Counter ISIL Finance Group (CIFG), a subgroup of the Global Coalition to 

Defeat ISIS, founded in March 2015 and co-chaired by the United States, Italy, and Saudi 

Arabia.'4 

7' "Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps," BBC News, last updated March 2R, 201i'l. 

Web. http:/ /www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-278J8D)4; "Assessment by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the impact of the measw-es imposed in Security Council 

resolution 2199 (2015), pursuant to paragraph 30 of the resolution: Chair's summa1y," United Nations Security Council, September 25,2015. PDF. 

https:/ jwww.u n.org/ en/ ga/sea rch/vipw _doc.asp'!sym bol =Sj2o 15/739 73 "Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010," Patrick B. 

Johnston, et al, Rand Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_rPports/RRugz.html 

74 "Establishment of the Counter ISIL Finance Group in Rome, Italy," Press Center, U.S. Department 

ofTreasu1y, March 20, 2015. https:/ /V\,"'.~'\v.treasu!y.gov/press-center/press-re1eases/Pages/jllooo4.aspx 
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Gulf states have universally responded to the threat of ISIS financing, as most have faced 

domestic threats from the group as well. Most have prosecuted ISIS supporters and financiers.7' All of the Gulf states also signed on to the first joint action of the TFTC, which targeted a number of ISIS financiers in Yemen.76 

KEY ISSUES TO ADDRESS GOING FORWARD 

Using the TFTC Effectively 

When the TFTC was announced during Trump's visit to Riyadh in May 2017, it was not the 

first time the idea of establishing a multilateral body in the Gulf to address terrorist financing had been considered.77 In both concept and implementation, the TFTC faces a number 

of challenges, such as the difficulty in sharing robust, actionable intelligence in a multilateral setting, and the differing interests of the member states across a wide scope of targets 

- Shia and Sunni - under consideration. However, given the events following the Riyadh 

Summit, the TFTC may have a second life as it offers the opportunity for joint action among 

arguing neighbors and dialogue to address some of the underlying grievances of the dispute. 

The TFTC has issued its inaugural set of designations in October 2017 and all members have 

attended at least one meeting.'" These are no small feats. However, officials should be careful to not let the desire to use the TFTC as a bridge for the GCC states' differences in the 

exclusion of bilateral or even unilateral action. 

Exchange Houses 

As it has become harder for illicit actors to exploit the financial sector, they have turned to 

informal methods such as money exchanges houses, hawalas and new payment methods. 

In a recent report on emerging terrorist financing typologies, the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force highlighted the vulnerability of exchange companies and other remitters to terrorist financing where they are not regulated.79 

7' Lori Plotldn Boghardt. "Policywatch 2773: Gulf Support to the Counter-ISIS Campaign," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 21,2017. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-anaiYli is/view I gu l f-su ppo rt -to-the-counter-is i s-eam pa i gn 76 "TreasUJy and Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Partners Issue First Joint Sanctions Against 

Key Terrorist and Supporters," Press Center, U.S. Department of the Treasmy, October 25, 2017. 

https://W'NW. treasmy.gov /press-center/ press-releases /Pages/ smo187 .aspx 77 Levitt, Matthew, "Policywatch 2Rill: How a New Initiative Could Pave the Way to Gulf Reconciliation," The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Oct 30, 2017. Web. http:/ /www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-anclysis/view;how-the-tftc-could-pave-the-way-to-gulf-reconciliatinn 

"Meeting of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Member States Convenes in Kuwait," U.S. 

Department of State, Mar. 6, 2018. Web. https:/ /translations.statc.gov/2oi8/o3/o6/mecting-of-thcterrorist--flnancing-targeting-renter-Inerntwr-sta!-es-cunvenes-in-kuwait/ 

79 "FATF Report: Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks," Financial Action Task Force, October, 2015. 

http://W'ww.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/rcports/Emcrging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf 
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This trend has posed a particular threat across the GCC given its large expatriate population 

and sizeable remittance flows. But nowhere more so than the UAE, with its large number 

of exchange houses, general trading companies and hawalas. 

Over the past few years, the UAE has taken a number of joint actions with the United States 

against exchange houses involved in illicit activity, including closing AI Zarooni Exchange, 

which the United States tied to a global money laundering organization8u and cutting off a 

Yemen-based exchange house that was providing financial services to AI Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). "' 

In late March 2018, the UAE also promulgated new exchange house regulations aiming to 

raise industry standards. The rules include requiring exchange houses to appoint a compliance officer and shore up customer identification requirements. They also put in place restrictions on trade-related and charitable transactions - two areas that have proven to be 

vulnerabilities to illicit finance in the past. In 204, the Central Bank of the UAE had increased capital requirements for exchange houses in their jurisdiction, hoping to spur consolidation in the sector and ease the regulatory burden."' There are signs that the CBUAE 

has also improved cooperation with company registrars, an important step in identifYing 

and acting against unregistered money service businesses.8

3 

Other GCC states have committed to shoring up exchange house regulation. In September 

2017, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), the kingdom's central bank, suspended the operations of three of the country's four exchange houses licensed to make 

cross-border payments due to regulatory breaches."4 Qatar has also committed to address 

vulnerabilities related to its exchange house sector as an area of cooperation announced by 

Secretary Mnuchin. 

Deploying Targeted Financial Measures 

Amid the Arab Spring, Gulf states began to see the value of having the sanctions tool in their 

national security tool kit more acutely. In 2011, the Arab League adopted sanctions against 

80 "Treasury Sanctions The Khanani Money Laundering Organization," Press Center, U.S. Departmeny of the Treasmy, November 12, 2015. Web. https://www.treasmy,gov /press-center/press-releascs/Pages/jl0265.aspx 

8' "TreasUiy Designated Financial Supporters of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula," Press Center, 

U.S. Department ofTreasuty, November 1, 2016. https:/ /v.'V"l'iiT.treasuly.gov/press-centprjpress-releases/Pages/jloGm.aspx 

8' Tom Arnold. "UAE money exchange houses ordered to raise standards by regulators," Reuters, 

Marcl1 29, 2018. https:/ /\vvv-.,v.reutersxom/artide/emirates-regulations/uae-money-exchangehouses-ordered-to-raise-standards-hy-regulator-idUSL8"-'JRA2EC 

83 "UAE Central Bank orders closure of money exchange," Gulf News, May 30, 2017. 

https:/ I gu lfnews. com/news/ ua e I crime/ ua e-cen tra 1-bank-orders-closure-of-mo ney-exc han ge1.2035736 

"-4 "Saudi Central Bank cracks down on exchange bureaus," Arabian Business, September 26, 2017. 

http://wV~~w"arahianbusiness.com/industries/hanking-finance/379524-SiJUdi-central-bank-cracksdnwn-on-exchange-bureaus 
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Syrian president Bashar al-Assad"S, and in 2016, the GCC designated Hezbollah as a terrorist 

organization. 5

6 Around the same time, the UAE adopted its own national lists of designated 

terrorist organizations and individual supporters. 57 

This shift reflected a number of dynamics in the region at the time. These included perceived domestic threats by Gulf states during the Arab Spring, increasing concern among 

the Sunni-ruled states about the expansion of Iranian influence, as well as U.S. pressure and 

designations targeting those in their jurisdictions. 

Dynamics in the financial system were also changing-both in the region and globally. That 

is, the trend of so-called "de-risking," in whidt global banks have pulled out of what they 

perceive as high-risk jurisdictions or lines of business, has been in part a reaction to large 

fines brought against global banks for violations of U.S. sanctions. As such, the onus was 

placed on financial institutions in the Gulf, among a number of other regions globally, to 

demonstrate that they took combatting financial crimes seriously. Upward pressure from 

banks on regulators met with downward pressure from security-minded leaders in the Gulf 

resulting in a number of Gulf states taking ownership of counter-illicit finance issues in a 

way they had not previously. 

As Gulf states increasingly develop and implement their own domestic targeted financial 

sanctions capability, it will be important to press them to meet relevant FATF standards, 

especially those that relate to transparency and due process. Designation lists should be 

public, include a statement of the case, be based on an evidentiary standard of proof of 

"reasonable grounds," and include delisting procedures. According to guidance issued by 

the FATF: "In determining the limits of, or fostering widespread support for, an effective 

counter-terrorist financing regime, countries must also respect human rights, respect the 

mle oflaw, and recognize the rights of innocent third parties.""' 

85 Bakri, Nada & MacFarquhar, Neil, "Isolating Syria, Arab League Imposes Broad Sanctions," The 

New York Times, Nov. 27, 2011. Web. https:/ /vv\V"\\.'.ny'times.comj2on/II/2H/world/middleeastiarahl eagu e-prepares-to-vote-on -syria n -sanctions. html 86 Ballout, Dana & Fitch, Asa, "Gulf Cooperation Council Labels Hezbollah a Terrorist Group," Wall 

Street Joumal, Mar. 2, 2016. Web. https:/ /www.wsj.com/articles/gulf-cooperation-council-labelshezhnllah-a-terrorist-group-14569266s4 

87 "UAE publishes list of terrorist organisations," Gulf News, Nov. 15,2014- Web. 

https://gulfnews.com/news/uaejgovernment/uae-puhlishes-list-of-terrorist-organisations-1.1412895 

llll "International Best Practices: Targeted Financial Sanctions Related to Terrorism and Terrorist Financing (Recommendation 6)," Financial fiction Task Force, June 2013, p. 4- PDF. http://www.fatfgafi.org/nwdia I fatf! dorurn<•nts I n•commendation s /B PP-fin -Sanctions-TF-R6. pdf 
27

Mr. POE. Thank you, Ms. Bauer. 

Dr. Weinberg, welcome back. You have 5 minutes for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID ANDREW WEINBERG, PH.D., WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE 

Mr. WEINBERG. Chairman Poe and Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Members Keating and Deutch, and distinguished members of the subcommittees, thank you on behalf of the ADL for this chance to testify here today. I will present an abridged version of my written remarks. 

Nearly all six monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council have 

been victims of terrorist attacks, and each one hosts U.S. bases. Because this region is of particular importance for terror finance, I 

will focus on that issue, along with how well the GCC states are 

doing at publicly designating terrorist groups for financial and 

other countermeasures. 

This area is home to roughly half the Middle East’s super rich, 

as well as Wahhabism, an austere brand of Islam with historically 

intolerant teachings about non-Muslims. Thus, the majority of the 

millions of dollars raised by al-Qaeda’s core leadership and deeppocket donors appears to have come from the Gulf. Likewise, 

Hamas operatives in the GCC have raised or laundered tens of millions. And South Asian terror groups such as the Taliban have also 

raised any millions in the Gulf. 

Early last year a just-retired U.S. Treasury official confirmed the 

presence of designated terror financiers operating openly in Qatar 

and Kuwait. Then, last June, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and 

Bahrain sanctioned Qatar for supporting Islamist extremists, including tolerating terror financiers. At that time, as Ms. Bauer 

here has written, Qatar had prosecuted just five terror funders, 

and not a single one was serving time on a conviction in Qatar as 

yet. 

Compare that with Saudi Arabia, which has convicted hundreds 

for funding terrorist groups, primarily al-Qaeda, and frozen over 30 

million Euros in suspect funds. Since then, Qatar says it re-arrested most of these men and is retrying them. Yet, one was spotted just this month at his son’s wedding, along with Qatar’s Prime 

Minister. 

Meanwhile, the Web site of Kuwait’s top public university appears to list three men as faculty members who are under U.S. 

sanctions on charges of funding al-Qaeda, one of whom even used 

students to courier funds to al-Qaeda according to the U.S. Treasury. 

There is much the U.S. can do to address these problems: First, 

the U.S. needs Ambassadors in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. 

The U.S. should also seek to resolve the Gulf standoff, but only on 

terms that verifiably help to end the impunity of terror financiers. 

In part, that means greater transparency about the U.S.-Qatar Terror Finance Agreement, including its shortcomings. 

Second, U.S. officials should work with our Gulf allies to publicly 

designate all terrorist groups. Oman and Kuwait have not even 

issued public lists of this sort. Qatar issued its closest thing to such 

28

a public list last month, but it omitted Hamas, al-Qaeda, most of 

the Islamic State, and a major local al-Qaeda financier. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain have all issued public lists but with a 

few shortcomings. Not a single GCC state has publicly designated 

Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad as terrorists. 

Just as the House unanimously passed Ranking Member 

Deutch’s bill urging the EU to sanction Hezbollah, Congress should 

do the same with the Gulf states and Hamas. Similarly, the U.S. 

must persuade more Gulf allies to publicly ban the main South 

Asian terrorist groups. 

Third, the U.S. should encourage and advise the GCC states on 

imposing sanctions to deter foreign countries from enriching Iran’s 

terror-sponsoring IRGC. 

Fourth, Congress can urge Foggy Bottom and the new Secretary 

of State to weigh naming Qatar under Section 6(j) of the Export 

Administration Act as tolerating terrorist operatives on its soil. 

This would require licenses for sensitive exports that must be kept 

from terrorists’ hands. 

Likewise, Congress should pass Congressman Mast’s Palestinian 

International Terrorism Support Prevention Act which ADL endorsed last year. 

Fifth, the U.S. should indict more terrorists and seek their extradition. Last year, the U.S. unsealed charges against an accomplice 

of the Sbarro Pizzeria bombing in Jerusalem that killed or injured 

nine Americans in 2001. Qatar is evidently hosting a mastermind 

of that attack, Hussam Badran, who could be targeted for singular 

U.S. legal action. You could write the Justice Department a letter 

on this tomorrow. 

Sixth, the U.S. should do more to discourage government ransoms to terrorists, including, time and again, reportedly by Qatar, 

and to a lesser extent, in the past by Oman. As Chairman Poe has 

written, a year has passed since the Executive Branch missed a 

legal deadline to report which governments are believed to have facilitated terrorist ransoms. Congress should keep pressing this 

point and pass legislation making this reporting regular. 

Lastly, the U.S. must work intensively with Gulf partners to end 

incitement in state-backed media outlets, by state-backed religious 

officials, and in state textbooks. Incitement of this sort is particularly problematic in broadcasts by the state-backed Qatari television network Al-Jazeera; in sermons at Qatar’s state-controlled 

Grand Mosque, carried on official Qatari media; and in current 

Saudi state textbooks. 

ADL is, therefore, endorsing judicious legislation by Chairman 

Poe and Ranking Member Keating on addressing Saudi textbooks. 

Additionally, I can provide detailed examples for any of these 

kinds of state-backed incitement during Q&A if that would be helpful. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberg follows:]

29


29967b-1.eps

Grading Counterterrorism 

Cooperation with the G.C.C. States 

David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D. 

Washington Representative for International Affairs 

Anti-Defamation League 

Hearing before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Washington, D.C. 

April 26, 2018 

2:00pm 

Working to stop the defamation of the 

jewish people and to secure justice and 

fair treatment for all since 1913 
30


29967b-2.eps

Chairmen Poe and Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Members Keating and Deutch, and 

distinguished Members of the Subcommittees: thank you on behalf of the AntiDefamation League for the opportunity to testify before you again on Gulf 

counterterrorism cooperation. As a former staffer for this Committee, I particularly 

appreciate the chance to discuss this important topic with you here today. 

The Anti-Defamation League was founded in 1913 "to stop the defamation of the 

jewish people and to secure fair treatment for all." Today, a major component of 

that mission involves monitoring extremism across the ideological spectrum, 

tracking incitement and terrorism trends both at home and abroad. As we have 

learned, where anti-Semitism flourishes, no society is safe from extremism. 

Part I. General Overview 

In many ways, the Arab Gulf monarchies are on the front lines in the fight against 

terrorism. Saudi Arabia previously faced down a sustained al-Qaeda insurgency 

within its borders, and the other four Sunni-ruled Gulf monarchies have similarly 

been the target of significant terrorist plots. Thousands of Saudi citizens have gone 

to fight for extremists in Syria, and hundreds have returned. 1 With Iraq to the north, 

Yemen to the south, and Iran just across the pond, the threats posed by terrorism to 

the six monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.) are all too real. 

Because this region is of especially paramount importance for the fight against 

terrorist finance, I will be focusing the bulk of my testimony on that issue. This 

includes the related question of how well the various G.C.C. states are doing at 

acknowledging the threat posed by specific terrorist groups and designating them 

as such, for the purposes of financial and other countermeasures. 

However, before exploring this topic, it is important to note the relevance of the 

G.C.C. states for several other dimensions of U.S. efforts against terrorism. First, all of 

the Gulf monarchies have opened up their territory to U.S. military bases that are 

central to our efforts against terrorism. Second, several the Gulf monarchies have 

had a significant impact through their foreign policies on terrorism trends in 

Mideast conflict zones, such as in Yemen and Syria. Third, the Gulf monarchies have 

had a problematic, mixed record regarding ideological incitement, which has fed 

radicalism and enabled recruiting by terrorist groups in the region and beyond. 

1. American Bases: 

1 
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As of 2014, the U.S. had 35,000 military personnel at over a dozen bases in the Gulf.2 

Kuwait served as a major stopping point for U.S. forces moving in and out of Iraq 

during the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom.3 Qatar hosts America's Combined Air 

and Space Operations Center that coordinates U.S. air operations throughout the 

broader Middle East. Bahrain hosts America's main naval base in the region, and the 

U.A.E.'s harbor at Jebel Ali is the U.S. Navy's busiest foreign port of call.1 

These bases serve an important function for U.S. counterterrorism operations, but 

the fact that the Combined Air and Space Operations Center was moved from Saudi 

Arabia to Qatar in 2003 is a reminder that sometimes other security priorities may 

override this benefitS Indeed, critics of Qatari or Bahraini policies have called for 

contingency planning to explore the possibility of moving those bases.6 

2. Foreign Policies toward Conflict Zones: 

After Iranian-backed Houthi extremists overthrew the legitimately elected 

government of Yemen, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition including all of the other 

G.C.C. states to intervene militarily in Yemen against the rebels. Many of these 

governments characterize the Houthis as a terrorist group, and the insurgents have 

launched repeated missile attacks against civilian areas in Saudi Arabia, including as 

deep into the kingdom as Riyadh. Saudi-led forces have been criticized for civilian 

casualties from poorly targeted airstrikes, as well as for exacerbating Yemen's 

humanitarian crisis by strictly stalling imports to inspect for smuggled Iranian arms. 

Al-Qaeda capitalized on the resulting chaos in Yemen, including by conquering and 

enriching itself off of the Yemeni port city of al-Mukalla.7 After a delay of roughly a 

year, Saudi Arabia did eventually launch airstrikes in Yemen against al-Qaeda,8 and 

2 William .1. Hums,· A Renewed Agenda for l!.S.-C;u1f l'm1nership," Fehmmy 19, 2014. (J.mrs:l/20119-

KtnvaU: Govenwnce, Security, and Folic)), Congression~l Rese::m;h Service, Febnwry 

6_ 2018, page 11. (~//fas.org/sgp/crsimidcast/RS2l513J2@ 

4 Rajiv Chandrasckaran. ''In the UAE. the United States has a Quiet. Potent Ally Nicknamed 'Little 

Sparta.· Washington Post, November 9. 2014. 

Ciaramone, Ops Center Moves to Qatar," 

2003. (http. //arc hi\ e.defen~~- £.ov/nt.~wshu;\;v s::-~r1Ick.a~~?J.d-- 20(14 7) 6 Cok Bockcnfdd. "Human Rights in Bahrain: Next Steps." Testimony before the Tom Lantos I!uman 

Commission, September 9. 2016. 

(J..!lU?~t'_\V\\ ~Yr.::i.isgw/;trticl~s/the-t \Vo-l'<-J0es-,_,f-uuiar-a -dul1i(rus-mideas(-allv -14 93C!7 565,-1-) 

' Yara Bayoumi. Noah Browning. and Mohammed Ghobari. "How Saudi Arabia s War in Yemen Has 

Made al Qacda Sirongcr- and Richer," Reuters. AprilS, 2016. 

2 
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29967b-4.eps

the United Arab Emirates led a Yemeni ground campaign in 2016 with limited U.S. 

support that retook al-Mukalla from terrorists.Y In 2017, all six G.C.C. states recently 

joined with the U.S. in a historic joint designation of terrorist finance targets in 

Yemen linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State.1° However, more sustainable and 

effective efforts to combat al-Qaeda's dangerous Yemeni branch depend upon the 

resolution of Yemen's war and the establishment of some central authority there. 

In Syria, several of the Gulf monarchies played a dangerous game, backing jihadist 

insurgents in hopes they would be the most effective fighting force against 

Damascus's Assad regime. However, that strategy backfired, alienating Western 

support for the increasingly radicalized rebel forces and contributing to the 

rebellion's apparent failure, as well as feeding the global terrorist threat. Several 

Gulf monarchies did participate in the U.S.-led airstrikes in Syria that started in 2014 

against I.S., but those contributions fell off after the G.C.C. shifted its focus to Yemen. 

In Iraq, the G.C.C. states are finally coming around to the importance of investing in a 

relationship with Baghdad. By opening new diplomatic facilities, engaging Iraqi 

officials, and supporting reconstruction in newly-liberated Sunni areas of Iraq, the 

Gulf monarchies hope to create a bulwark in Iraq against both Iranian hegemony 

and a resurgence of the Islamic State.11 

In Libya, division among the Gulf states has unfortunately contributed to that 

country's fragmentation. After an electoral outcome in 2014 that Islamists did not 

like, Qatar and Turkey backed an Islamist-oriented claimant government in Libya's 

west, while the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia supported the more 

secular, elected government in Libya's east. The resulting vacuum allowed the 

Islamic State to capture significant territory in Libya, which was only rolled back 

thanks to Western military intervention and an uneasy Gulf state detente. 

Although most of the Gulf monarchies have sought to bolster Mahmoud Abbas's 

Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, Qatar has instead supported the Hamas 

regime in Gaza. 12 As I argue below, there is much more the G.C.C. states can do to 

help the U.S. and Israel combat Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas. 

3. Gulflncitement: 

9 Kristina Wong, "Pentagon Reveals lJS c'orces in Yemen;· !he Hill, May(>, 201(>. 

(l!ttp:f/thehitl.com/pnlicy/dd'cn~e/270045-pcntagon-say:-.-us-forces-an·::-hdping-fight-nl-gaeda-in-ycmcn) 

10 U.S. Treasury Department, "Treasury and Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Partners Issue First Joint 

Scmdions <-~gainst K~y T~rrorists and Supporters," October 25. 2017. (llltps:f/w\vw.tn:asurv _gov/pn:s~­

ccntcr/prcss-rclcascs!P agcs/smO 187. 8spx) 11 See, for example, Ilussein Ibish, The rower of Positive Uli'IUI.'IU<:V. 

the Arab (iulf States Institute in Washington, April 19, 201 S. '"-"'~==~='-'-"-"'-"'-"" 

£o:>ntcn!f.m2lllilds/201 S/(!4/1 hish Saucli.:Ju:..g_\lNI.INI '-1.pdf) 12 Tangentially. the UAE. has recently supported efforts by Abbas's rival Mohammed Dahlan to boost 

his influence in Gaza. See Dov Lieber, '·UAE, Other Countries Pledge $15 Million Per Month in Gaza," 

'l'imes of Israel, August 17, 2017. (https:/1\vvv\v tlmesofisrael.com/uae-mher··CilUntrie_;;;-nlcdQe-15-mi11lnnl2~L:lJlOHth-tc~Q.D 

3 
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29967b-5.eps

A 2016 investigation of Wahhabism and terrorism by the New York Times called 

Saudi Arabia "both the arsonists and the firefighters," crediting the kingdom with 

fighting terrorist groups while criticizing it for feeding the ideological extremism 

that bolsters terrorism's appeal.13 On the other hand, the kingdom has recently 

adopted some notable reforms in this regard, including new restrictions on its 

austere religious police, a pledge to grant women the right to drive later this year, a 

superb statement on Holocaust remembrance, and jailing some hardline clerics.14 

Yet it is important to evaluate the extent to which some of the Gulf monarchies still 

contribute to the extremism that complicates our shared fight against terrorism. 

Some G.C.C. states continue to enable incitement through state-backed educational 

materials, by state-backed religious officials, or in state-backed media outlets. 

I testified before this Committee last year on incitement in Saudi Arabia's 

government-published school textbooks, but on these matters I unfortunately do 

not have good news to report to you today. I have since examined Saudi Arabia's 

new textbooks for the 2017-2018 school year and found that virtually all of the 

problematic material still remained.15 

These current books call for the execution of people who engage in anal sex, commit 

adultery, or convert away from Islam. They call Christianity "an invalid, perverted 

religion," call Christians and jews "who disbelieved ... the worst of creatures," and 

falsely claim the goal of Zionism is a "global Jewish government." 16 The AntiDefamation League is therefore endorsing the Saudi Educational Transparency and 

Reform Act (H.R. 4549), judicious and important legislation by Chairman Poe and 

Ranking Member Keating that gives this urgent problem the priority it deserves. 

Hateful incitement by Gulf media outlets is all too present a problem today. For 

example, anti-Semitic incitement in Qatar's press is unfortunately the norm rather 

than the exception to the ruleY This is also often the case with certain other media 

n Scott Shane. "Saudis and Extremism: "Both the Arsonists and the Firefighters"," New York Times, 

August 25, 2016. l.illJN:i.YlJ.Yl!:.J.l:illl~C92lliL~~!!lli'll!.'~lil£lJlLllli!!~~!llli!l:!J[!l['l'!::~'l!Lill'lll) 

H [)avid Ignatius, '·Are 

March L 20 18. UillJ§/h'i.~'".J:IJ!.®!W!lLU!i>c-;il£\!Til'!.lRl]lli!.!.tlL'",'l]:'ill::;mJJillQl'l2!.c=•:illl!illo:tr!l.!2lill':I"l'2l1ll~:!l'I::: 

17 Sec, for example. Anti-Defamation League. ·'Qatar Media Publish Conspiratorial Cartoons Suggesting 

hracl Behind GulfDiplomatit: Crisis,'' ADL Blo~, June 28. 2017. (1Jtlps:;'/\\ \V\v.adl.org:1;lug/qa!ari-mcdiapublish-conspiralorial-canoons-suQ!Z,;sti.ng-isracl-bchind-:zulf-diplomatic-cnsis)~ Anti-Defamation League, 

""Qatari Media Propagates Anti-Semitic Cat1oons in Criticizing Bahraini Delegation to Jerusalem," clDL 

[)ecember l S. 2017. Chtt.l2:'.!i3J'i:iYJJ<fu!J£!hk'£AJfl1Qui:!lli'!:!i:l::llli!ru!!!di£.icilll!.l:f;s:mib£:£U:ill£"1'.:in: 

4 
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29967b-6.eps

outlets in the Gulf as well. 18 The Qatari state-backed television network AI jazeera 

continues to be a particularly egregious source of such incitement. For example, AI 

Jazeera provides unfettered airtime to terrorists and terror financiers,lY and it 

regularly lionizes Palestinian terrorists as "martyrs".20 

Likewise, religious incitement in the Gulf states continues to be a problem today, 

including by state-backed religious officials. 

For example, this past December Qatar hosted a sermon at its state-controlled 

Grand Mosque broadcast on state television, in which the speaker sought to tell the 

world's Muslims that jews have "enmity and hatred to you in their blood and their 

veins." The preacher further described the Jewish people as "your deceitful, lying, 

treacherous, fornicating, intransigent enemy." He even claimed that Israel received 

its weapons from Satan in an apparent derogatory reference to the United States.21 

Another sermon delivered in July at the Qatari Grand Mosque and on Qatari state 

television described Christians and Jews as dangerous enemies to Muslims and 

falsely accused jews of defiling the Temple Mount/ Noble Sanctuary in jerusalem.22 

State media in Abu Dhabi broadcast remarks this past year by an imam of Abu 

Dhabi's state-controlled grand mosque in which he decried "the wickedness of the 

Jews" and their supposed "control of the media ... for the destruction of the Islamic 

nation." 23 He was reportedly reprimanded by Abu Dhabi's authorities for anti-Hindu 

18 See, for example, Anti-Defamation League, ·'Arabic Language MediH Propagate .Anti-Semilic Cartoons 

in Wake of President Trump's Recognition of Jcrusakm as Israel's Capital." ADL Blog, December 11, 

20 1 7. (https :/ h,vyv>.,v. ad l. orc:/b log/arabic-langua rrc-mcd ia-propagate-anti -scmitic-c artoons-in-\vakc-of -. 

prcsident-tmmps-recognition); Anti-Defamation League, "Anti-Semitic Cmtoons in Arabic-Lm1guage 

Media Allege Israeli/Jewish IJomination of l!.s.;· AIH Hlog, IJecemher 19, 2017. 

Q.!!!.I2.o.:..:i/\\'\Y\Y.a ... il.org/bh~~~Llt:b-scr;Qj1i.c-cartoons-i.n-I![abic-langwls:e-m~4!a-alle_ge-isl~!ile\Yis}l-doiHinatlryn: 

ul'-us) 

1

" Sec, for CXa!llplc. David Andrew Weinberg, Oren Adaki, and Grant Rumley, ·'The Problem with AI 

Jazcera:· National Interest, September 10, 2014. (http/inationalintcrcst.orgifcaturc/the-prohlcm-al-jazccrall2J9): Al Jazccra Arabic, "Episode Title: Abu Muhanm1cd al-Jola!li, Emir of Jabhat al-Nusra," Program 

Title: Without Borders, Mav 27,2015. ihttp://www.aljazcera.nctireportslibratv/pages/Off44r:;ld-72aa-4d5ebh7~-2c05ed15e5.59); Al .la?:eera Arahc, "Episode Title: Muthanna Al-Dhari,'- l'rogram: IYiihoul Horders, 

October 26,2016. Ch!~~f/goru::d/i\1_FXU4): Al.la?:eera Arabic, ''l~pisode Title: Saleh al-Aromi,'- 1-)rogrwn 

Title: Without Borders, January 3, 2018. (hltp"//gc><>.~l!YwtV2h) 

20 ,~(!_'DavidA \V~inbcrg, ··search: martyr and #AlJazccra," T1·vitter. (1lltp-;://gtJu.gllvB6DLh) 21 David Andrew Weinberg, "Qatari for Extremist Preachers and Anti-Semitic Incitement," .1DL 

Bl o g, April 1 0, 20 18. C!illPS'ill:.\Y!Id\!L.ill:_glj;>)QgillQ.lill!l::ll.J.lill!lg,jtill::Qi!ITl.lllil::!llcil£Jill:it:m:ill.::ll!lll:Z:Jll!l;L<,;:: 

incitemeJtt) 

"Ibid. 

23 Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) TV Monitor Project, '·U.AE. Cleric Wassim Yousd: 

The Media was the Jews' First Weapon against Islam.'' Middle East Media Research Institute (MEA!RI!. 

no. 6091, June 13,2017. (hllps:/1\·\ Vl'·\\.nH.::mri.org/h)uac-ckric-vvich.cJ-jcv/s-~ontrol-thc­

!lli'.\lli.!!.!!:!l!l'£!J2.l), Profile of Wascem Yousef, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, accessed 

5 
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29967b-7.eps

remarks in 2015,24 and my understanding is that he was privately reprimanded 

again for these anti-Semitic remarks but still retains his post at the Grand Mosque. 

Part II. Terror Finance Trends 

How Significant Is Gulf Terror Finance? 

The Persian Gulf region is the world's hotbed for terrorist finance. On one side of the 

Gulf is Iran, the world's biggest state sponsor of terror and the patron of radical 

Shi'ite Islamist groups worldwide. At the top of the Gulf is Iraq, which is still 

struggling to consolidate its authority over territory retaken from the Islamic State. 

And on the other side ofthe Gulf are the six Arab monarchies of the G.C.C. 

The G.C.C. states are home to roughly half of the Mideast's "ultra high net worth" 

individuals. 25 Nearly all ofthese countries also have religious environments shaped 

at least in part by Wahhabism, a brand of Islam so austere that its historically 

intolerant teachings about non-Muslims have become pivotal to the ideologies of alQaeda and the Islamic State. 26 Thus, it should come as little surprise that in 2014 the 

U.S. reported al-Qaeda's core leadership in Pakistan had raised millions of dollars 

from deep pocket donors, mostly from sympathizers in this part of the Gulf. 27 

As secretary of state, Hillary Clinton signed a 2009 memo outlining concerns about 

private terrorist financing in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and 

Qatar (in addition to Pakistan). The memo asserted that "donors in Saudi Arabia 

constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups 

worldwide." 2U By 2014, however, U.S. officials reportedly concluded that donors in 

tiny Qatar may have surpassed Saudi Arabia as the largest source of such funds. 29 

That year the top U.S. official for combating terrorist finance praised Saudi Arabia 

Shubhajit Roy, "·Tv Cleric Fired after he Slams Ui\E Grant for 

September 25, 2015. (lJ.llJLiiimhilll<2il2L"~ellil.!iill::!.i£kiilli!J!!il'lilil:2tlli:!:!'!IY::fk!:!f:i~i:1:tkr::b£: 

David Andrew Weinberg. "'Don't Let Wahhabism Off the Hook." The Weekly Standard. October 26. 

2016. (https:iiwww.wceklvstandard.com/dont-lct-wahhabism-off-thc-hook/article/20050()9) 27 U.S. Treasury Department, '·Remarks of lJnder Secretary for TetTotism and Jiinancial Intelligence David 

Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on 'Confronting New ThTeats in TerTorist 

Fin::mcing · ,'' March 4, 20 14.(]}11.JL-;://\V\\'W .1n~U~I.l..:EQ2:fJm:s~-c.;njeJWTes~-L~ll~;e:::;/Pa2:esiJ12~}!l8.c~ 

2

' Douglas C. Hengel. '"US embassy cables: Hillary Clinton says Saudi Arabia 'a critical source of terrorist 

funding." The Guardian_ Dec 5, 2010.(hltps:/h,\ \V\\ .!h..:;~uardian.t..:om/\\·or11Lfll:-h.:rnb~Jssv-Gabks6 
36


29967b-8.eps

and the U.A.E. for efforts to crack down on terror financiers but called out Kuwait 

and Qatar in comparison as "permissive jurisdictions" for terrorist finance.:'o 

The U.S. Policy Record: 

In September 2014, the Obama administration persuaded all six Gulf monarchies to 

join in an initiative called the jeddah Communique, which laid out the steps they 

committed to take in the fight against the Islamic State. They agreed to stop the flow 

of foreign fighters, repudiate the hateful ideology of J.S. and other violent extremists, 

to combat terrorist finance, and to end the impunity of its practitioners.31 As I 

testified before this Committee in 201532 and wrote in subsequent articles,33 the 

implementation of these commitments by the Gulf states has varied considerably. 

When President Trump visited Riyadh as the first stop on his first official foreign 

trip, he urged over fifty heads of state from the Arab and Muslim worlds to do more 

to tackle terrorism and the extremism that fuels it. In what was considered possibly 

the top achievement of that visit, 34 America and the G.C.C. states also signed a deal to 

establish a Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (T.F.T.C) in Riyadh, which the U.S. 

has used to coordinate joint terrorist designations with all six G.C.C. states.35 

However, terror finance in the region is still a serious concern. In February 2017, 

the Obama administration's Assistant Treasury Secretary for Terrorist Financing 

revealed immediately after stepping down that "there continue to be designated 

terrorist financiers operating openly and notoriously "in both Qatar and Kuwait.36 

The State Department's latest Country Reports on Terrorism, which were published 

'"Robert Mcndick. "Terror financiers arc living freely in Qatar. US discloses." The Telegraph. November 

1 G, 2014. (https://rYY\'\V. teleuraph.cQ.llk/neY\'shvorldne\Ys/islamic-st~te/ 11233407 IT ClTOr-financiers-areliving -freely -in-Oatar-l J S-disdose~. html) 31 U.S. State Department, "Jeddah Communique,'' September 11,2014. Q~:i/20Q2: 

20 1 ?..:_stclk~?~ILl2i!Lln:::jfu..?L~QJ ·1/09/2314 '.JG.l]JJII-.2 32 David Andrew Weinberg, "Terrorist Financing: Kidnapping, Antiquities Traft!cking. and Private 

Donations," Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade. November 17, 2015. 

(http:!/docs.house.gov/mectiugs:'FA:FA18/2015lll7/104202!IIIIRG-114-FA l8-Wstatc-WcinbergD2(l]51117.pdt) 

33 David Andrew Vv'einherg, ''Ohama is Right: The Ciulf Arabs Ride Jiree on TetTmism:' ,Valional fnleresi, 

April 26, 2016. ChUr2.ltlli..!!i2~linteresl. m_:gj_fuatun.;{gQpma-ri aht -!be-gttlf-urabs-Ii_l}.e-fr<.::ei_t:rr:.Q..Ti sncl 59·1S).: 

David Andre'"' Weinberg. "Qatar Is Worst In The Region On Counlcrlcrrorism, But Other Gulf Monarchies 

Arc Not Off The Hook," Buffington Post, August 3, 2017. (hl_tn§,~C.'l:.Uilll1[imlliJ.Qlli~2.Q!.lli.s~:illm!irr:i!t: 

U.S. Treasury Dcpartn1cnt, ··u.S. and Saudi Arabia to Co-Chair Nnv Terrorist Financing Targeting 

Center,'' May 21, 2017. (https://'i?.,'t\"""-~.trcasurv. 2:ov/prcss-ccntcr/prcss-rclcascs/PiJfl.CSism001)2.asp'-:) 30 David Andrew Weinberg, "Terror Financiers "·Operating Openly" in (.!atar and Kuwait," Foundation For 

!Jefense of!Jemocracies, Fehruary 14,2017. (http://y\-\nv.defenddemocracv.on=dmedia-hlr/david-lvcinherg-

)QTOT-financicrs-operating-onenJ\--in-ya.tar-au.~-kuwait/) 

7 
37


29967b-9.eps

in July 2017 and cover the year 2016, stated that "terrorist financiers within the 

country are still able to exploit Qatar's informal financial system." and that "a 

number ofU.N.-designated terrorist financiers continue to operate in Kuwait."37 

The Qatar Crisis: 

In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain imposed 

trade and travel sanctions on Qatar over its support for Islamist extremists 

throughout the region, including Qatar's record of turning a blind eye to local terror 

financiers. This Arab quartet also imposed sanctions on dozens of individuals and 

organizations it accused of funding terrorism with links to Qatar.38 

Under pressure, Qatar then signed a U.S. memorandum of understanding (M.o.U.) in 

July on combating terrorist financing. 39 The text of the memorandum has been 

withheld from the public by both governments, making it next to impossible for 

outside observers to evaluate how credible it is and whether or not Doha is 

honoring its terms.40 It is reported that Qatar agreed to place U.S. Justice 

Department officials inside its Office of Public Prosecution, which had historically 

failed to effectively prosecute and convict local terror financiers. 41 At least some of 

the al-Qaeda financiers who had previously enjoyed legal impunity in Doha were 

rearrested and are now being retried.42 

3": lJ.S. State Department, ·'Chapter 2: The Middle Hast and North Africa;' Country Neporis on Terrorism 

2016, July 2()17 Clltws://-,Y\Y\)'.stattlov/j/ct/r]s/crt/2()1 h/2722J2.htnl) 38 Emir"tes News Agency ''43 New Designations Specifically Address Threats Posed by Qat"r Linked and 

Based Al Qaida Terrorism Support Networks." Emirates News A7ency. September 6. 2017. 

(http://;yam ac/cn/dctails/ 139 5102618:Q22 

Al Arabiya English, "Arab Powers List 59 Individuals as Qatar-linked Terrorism Suppmiers," .11 "1rabiya 

Hnglish, June 9, 2017. ( ~.//eHglish.nJarohiv-a.net/c:n/Ne'<v:-./gulf/2017/06iD9/Arah-countrie~-reka'!c-listo f-te_rrori:~t -finnnci crs-:-.11pported -b1-· -Qill.m::Jlltl-ill 

Sm1di Press Agency. "Kingdom, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt Add 9 Entities, 9 Individuals to Lists of Terrorist 

Groups.'' Saudi Press "·1gency, July 25, 2017. 

(hHp Ji-..,-..,-\v\v. spa. goY. sa/Yiewfu ll stoiT. ghp?lmH?:=cn&ncY\'sid = 1 () 5083 0) 30 U.S. State Department, "Press Availability With ()atari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin 

Abdulrahman al-Thani," July 11, 20 17. 

(http~:.:.://i\'\Y\V.statc.gcry/sccrctan-/20 l '7201 Stillersnnlrcmarks/20 17/07/272522. htm) 10 .Josh R.ogin, ''Congress demands clarity on Ttump administration's dealings with Qatar,'- IYalihingLon 

Post, December 20, 2017. (]~/;\\ ~\v.wa-;hiw .. lnnposl.cmrt!n(~\';:;:{io:->h-rngirJ/v.p/2017/l2/~0/c.:_mgre~;sJi..1.11E.Ilds-dari1l.:on-trump-_gJmini~lratiun~-Q_;;dlings-v\i~.h-qatar:) 

41 Tom Finn, Sylvia Westall '·U.s. to Deploy Officials in Qatar in Counter-terrorism Accord: Sources.'' 

Reule rs, July 20, 20 1 7. (ill[D§.Ji:s.l'JI:!Yl-'!!1illill'!l1')!11!9!JlbU{llii:ililill!::1lli!lLJJ±[Q_j;i£r'.[Q:dl!lliill!!2::lll::.\l!llill':: 

Matthew Levitt, Katherine Gauer, ''Qatar Doesn't Need a I3lockade. It Needs an Audit," Foreign Polic:v, 

June 15, 2017. (hllp:/~-lQiri@l-}Q.li_s_,.29_TJlil0 l7/0C!L_l5/'1!.!!.~!T-doesnt-necd-a-b1')ckade-it -netx1s-un-awh1-alqacda/) 

42 Inter alia. Ded"n W "lsh, ·'Tiny, W e"lthy Q"tar Goes Its 0\Vn W "Y, and Pays for It." New Fork Times, 

January 22, 2018. (https:/h,vw\V nYtimcs.com/2018/0 l/22hvorld/middlccost/qa1ar-saudi-cmir-boYcott.html): 

Sigmd Neubauer, "The Rift between ()atar and the GCC Could Threaten Trump's Foreign Policy.'' 

.VaLional lnLeresL, AugustS, 2017. (hrtn://nmlonalinterest.org/feahm.:/thc-rift-hetween-·qatar-tbe-Qc.c-could-

!l.lreatcn-tnll!illS:f~.21 X2Si~~) 

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Days after the M.o.U., Qatar's emir issued a decree specifying the sanctions his 

government would impose on terrorist entities and finally authorizing the creation 

of public lists for those terrorist actors and organizations who would be subject to 

these penalties.43 Qatar's first such public designation happened jointly under the 

new U.S.-G.C.C. targeting center in Riyadh. 

That designation happened in October, and it was the largest multilateral 

designation of terrorist entities in the Middle East.44 It targeted eleven individuals 

and organizations linked to operations in Yemen by al-Qaeda or the Islamic State.15 

The fact these designations went ahead at all in spite of the ongoing Gulf crisis was a 

surprising but positive development. 

Qatar then issued its closest thing yet to a global list of banned terrorist entities 

immediately after a visit by the U.S. Treasury Department's Assistant Secretary for 

Terrorist Financing Marshall Billingslea last month.16 However, the list still has 

enormous- and inexcusable- gaps.47 

On the plus side, Qatar's list included some of its own citizens for the first time. 

However, at least one Qatari local under U.S. and U.N. sanctions on charges of 

funding to al-Qaeda, Khalifa al-Subaiy, was conspicuously left off of Qatar's list.48 

The new Qatari list targeted the Islamic State's branch in Egypt but left off I.S.'s 

central branch in Syria and Iraq, as well as the rest of its branches around the world. 

Al-Qaeda financiers were targeted on Qatar's list, but al-Qaeda itself was not. 

Part III. The Major Terrorist Groups 

Six major terrorist entities that seek to conduct financial operations in the Gulf or 

have financial vulnerabilities there are the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Hamas, 

Hezbollah, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Taliban. The following 

section proceeds group by group, noting recent efforts by G.C.C. governments to 

combat terrorist finance and related activities by these six organizations. 

l!. S. Treasmy Department. l!. S. Treasmy Secretary Steven 

Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia:· October 25, 2017. 

(htl.ps:/ iw\\ \'v. tn:d -;un . guv/pn..>;s-c~nkr/pn:ss-n.:kas~..:~JPagesh;rnCll88. a;jDX) 

l'uture 

4

' U.S. Trcasmy Department, "·Treasury and Tcnorist Financing Targeting Center Partners Issue First Joint 

Sanctions Against Kev Terrorists and Supporters," October 25, 2017. (https:i/www.treasury .gov/prcssccnter/pre~s-rdease~/Pa;e:)/:;,mCJ l ;)7 .aspx) 

'

16 Qatar Central I3ank, "Qatar Central I3ank Goven10r Meets US Assistant Secretary of Treasury for 

Cmmlerlerrorism Finan~ing," MHrch 20,2018. 

(ll!ill;/iwvnv.ocb. aov.ill!fJJZlish/Ncwsfucs/ncws 190320 lS.aspx): Qatar National Countcrtcnorism 

Committee, Qatar Ministry ofthe Interior, "·I crrorisl Designations List (3/21120 18)" March 21, 2018. 

accessed Apri123. 2018. (hrtps//nctc.moi.gov.qailist2.htm1) 47 David Andrew Weinberg, "'(!alar's Swiss Cheese Tenorism List," ,inti-Defamation League, April!!, 

2() 1 X. ( hrtps: //v,;vyy~-. ndl. o r2/ ne\vs/ op-ed/ q;Jtap·,;- S\Yi ss--c1Jecse-tennrisn1--l i ;';i) 18 My thanks to Katherine 13auer for this insight. 

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The Islamic State 

The G.C.C. states are generally doing an excellent job in the fight against Islamic 

State finance. All six Gulf monarchies are members of the Global Coalition against 

Daesh, and Saudi Arabia co-chairs the coalition's Counter ISIL Finance Group along 

with Italy and the United States. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. have each 

conducted airstrikes in Syria against the Islamic State49 and sanctioned the Islamic 

State on their public lists of banned terrorist organizations.5° Kuwait, Oman, and 

Qatar have not done either, except for Qatari sanctions on I.S.'s Egyptian affiliate. 51 

All five of the Sunni-ruied Gulf countries have done a relatively good job since 2014 

at cracking down on their foreign fighters going to or coming back from Syria and 

Iraq. They have also taken decisive legal action against a number of I.S. supporters. 

All of the G.C.C. states consider themselves threatened by the Islamic State, and at 

least two of them have been victims of successful attacks by the group. In june 2015, 

an I.S. suicide bomber who had transited from Saudi Arabia through Bahrain killed 

27 and injured over 200 at the Shi'ite Imam Sadeq Mosque in Kuwait City.52 Saudi 

Arabia reported in 2017 that it had suffered over 60 attacks on its soil by I.S. oralQaeda, 34 of which were carried out the previous year.53 Among the attempted 

targets of those I.S. attacks included the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, the Prophet's 

Mosque in Medina, Shi'ite mosques, and Saudi security forces. 

As of 2016 Saudi Arabia had already arrested and was pursuing legal action against 

over 500 individuals on suspicion of terrorist activity on behalf of the Islamic 

State. 54 That year Bahrain convicted 24 citizens, 16 of whom in absentia, for forming 

49 Michael Lipin, Laila ALimi, "Saudi Arabia Toul::; Closer US ~'""l""'"'uu IS as Pressure 

Mounts," TTQ,J News, April4. 2017. Chltl?lJ.i:;~~~ll£~22))lf_;l/21'lli!L:QJ:ill2Jit:'l®11::!J.'2"9::illt: 

cooperation -against-is-as-prcssurc-_mounts/3 79 5 23 ~ .html) 

"' Saudi Press Agency. "Ministry of Interior: Injunctions on Security and Ideology for Citizens and 

Residents," Saudi Press ..-lgency, March 7, 20 14.( http://\""<;\v•;v.spa.gov.sah:ie\\~stOl\'.php?neYvsid= l20G7G2) 

Emirates Ne\vs Agency, "lJAF Cabinet Approves Llst of Designated TetTotlst Organi?:ations, Groups," 

Hmiraies ,Vews Agency, November 16,2014. Q~l/\.yam_,l!~/en/Lk1Aj1s/13tJ52_7247HXJjJ 

I3ahrain News Agen(.)y, "Cabinet Approves Terrorist OrganiLations List," Bahrain_News ARency-, 

November 4, 2016. (hltp:i/w v;, \\· .bna.bh/ponali~11frlc\\- -;/7216-lS) 51 David Andrew Weinberg, "(.Jatar's Swiss Cheese Terrorism List," .inti-Defamation League, April II, 

20 18. (https :/h.,-...,.'\V\Y. odl. org/nc\1-s/ op-ed/qatars-sv;iss-cheese-tenorism -list) 

~ Schams I !lwazer, Hamdi Alkhshali and Don Melvin, "Kuwait govemment says mosque suicide hom her 

\Vas Saudi national," C'iV_!_V, Jm1e 29, 2015. ( http:s:/hvWIY.cnn . ..:-mn/201S/06/28/middll.'::ea-;V'kl!.~:s!jl:J-Jl0"'-'.9.1!£: 

suici .~!c- bom blllli/i_nd~_\..hluJl) 

" Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

Kingdom o,j'Saudi Arabia. 2017. IJlll.!L'~i!!IIU:?i'J'2l!QlJ:l!,;~J2::!,:<mL!.QU!l!llli!i!Q'!l.£'d.l.0l:~',JJJ~ 

(page 7). 5

<-+ I .ori Plotkin Hoghardt, ·'From ISIS to Activists,'· The Wushingwn !nsliiuie for Near Hasi }Joficy, May 

20 1 h. (hUp:! 1-"1-\'\Y\V \Yashi_u_gtonJl1.'ili!:ute._Dreiup lo<;tJsil )ot::l]J:I1 ent?Llll:!bs/t< cse arch N otc3]-l 3o g h an:h::.Q.J]_Q.f) 

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an Islamic State cell. 55 The U.A.E. convicted 34 individuals as part of an I.S. copycat 

cell,56 sentenced a self-proclaimed local I.S. chief to life in prison, and executed his 

wife for stabbing to death an American teacher in Abu Dhabi.57 According to Sigurd 

Neubauer, Qatar has convicted 25 Islamic State sympathizers, although public 

details on their cases have been scarce.58 Kuwait convicted 15 individuals on 

charges related to the Imam Sadeq Mosque bombing59 and sentenced another I.S.-

supporter to life in prison for ramming his truck into a vehicle carrying U.S. troops.60 

Al-Oaeda: 

Al-Qaeda capitalized on its prominent role in the fight against Syria's Assad regime, 

as well as on its differentiation from the Islamic State, to revitalize its appeal to Gulf 

private donors. In 2016, the Nusra Front tried to capitalize on this advantage by 

rebranding itself as distinct from al-Qaeda, but the U.S. government appropriately 

rejected this fiction, updating its terrorist designation of Nusra to reflect that 

"whether it calls itself jabhat Fath a! Sham or al-Nusrah Front, the group remains alQa'ida's affiliate in Syria."6t 

This shift on the part of al-Qaeda reportedly happened following input from more 

than one Gulf government. According to Reuters, Gulf intelligence officials, including 

from Qatar, met with Nusra's leader to urge him to make this name change in hopes 

of securing outside support.62 According to Western and Middle Eastern 

government officials cited in a number of news reports, Al-Qaeda in Syria allegedly 

has also benefitted from numerous ransom payments from the government of 

Qatar.63 Similarly, al-Qaeda in Yemen reportedly received roughly $20 million in 

ransom payments in 2012 and 2013 from the governments of Qatar and Oman.64 

55 U.S. State Depmiment, "'Chapter 2: The Middle East and North Africa,'' Country Reports on Terrorism 

20 76, July 2017 (h.!lQs:/h,v\Y\v.statc. Rov/i/ct/rls/crt/201 D/2722J2.htm) 56 Mustafa Al Zarooni, "34 found guilty of setting up Daesh-style group in UAE,"' Khalet>j Timt>s, March 

28, 2016. Q1t tps://~~JJJiile~jtimes.cqJp/nulionicrimt.~/34-ro!Jl~-g!:illlY_:_Q[:_~>j~lL.Csd -up-4ilr;1il_~-~tv h~-

Naser i\1 Rcmcithi. "Husband of Rccm Island Killer Sentenced to Life in Prison for Terror Charges:· The 

~vational, May 9, 2016. (_https://Yi'"'Y'.V. thcnational.ac/1J_?c/h1Ji_b_and:.of-rccm -island-killcr-scntcnccd-to-lif('-inprison-for-tcnor-charges-l ,211891) 58 Sigurd Neul)auer, "The Rift hetvveen Qatar and the GCC Could Threaten ·bump's ~\1reign Policy;' 

iVaLionaf lnLeresL, August H, 2017. (b!t_r:.J~'natiQlJ.Plint~~.!'itQJg/PtilltLfcaturc/the-rift-bet\•.-ccn-qrrtar-the-gcccould -ll~r<.::aL~n.-trurp..lli_-forei gq_-21820) 59 ··scvc'Il Sentenced to Death Over Kuwaiti Mo::oquc Bombing- Nc\vs 

2015.(Dn~~~,n~~~2~~~~~~~~~IL~~~~ffi~~~~~~~~~~~~n~~~ 

bombillu-neYvs-aaency -idi.TKKl NORFO.fN2U 150915) 60 AI'P, ·'Kuwait Chves .lihadist l.ife lr1r Attack on l!S Troops," '/'he /Jai~v Mail, June 11, 2017. 

Q1.!1Q:I/t\}.Y\Y .dailx_nwiJ co. ukl·rt'i~~-~nfi1/ artick-'-i-5l)) 3 86/K U\Yai!.:g_l ve~- j 1had ist -l ife-_ilttack-U_:S-troo p~ Mn~D 

61 U.S. State Department, ·'State Department An1endments to the Terrorist Designation of al-Nusrah Front,"' 

November 10.2016. (https://20092_Qj].stat~~~flLRI~l1~2/2016/ll!264230.htm) 62 David Andrcvv Vv'cinbcrg, "Analysis: Deterring Gulf Slates from bacling the nc\·V Al Nusrah Front,'. 

Long War Journal, July 29, 20 IG.(https:!lwww.l0112Warjoumalorg!archivc,,i201()/t'71analYsis-dctcrring-

£mlf-states-from-backing-tl1e-ncv.'-al-nusmh-.frant.Dhp) 

63 David Andrevv 'W'einherg, '''l'enorist ~'inancing: Kidnapping, Antiquities Traftlcking, and Private 

Donations,'· Testimony before the House l'oreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on TetTotism, 

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U.S. officials described Kuwait in 2014 as "the epicenter of fundraising for terrorist 

groups in Syria." 65 They noted that many Kuwait-based financiers hired local 

fundraising captains in Qatar and solicited online donations from individuals in 

Saudi Arabia.66 At the start of the 2017 Gulf crisis, there was no public proof of legal 

action having been taken against even a single al-Qaeda financier in Qatar,67 

although it later turned out limited and ineffective legal action had been pursued in 

private. Compare that with Saudi Arabia, for example, which has convicted hundreds 

of individuals on charges of supporting terrorist groups, primarily al-Qaeda.6u In so 

doing, Riyadh has frozen over €30 million in suspect funds. 69 

Impunitv in Qatar: 

Katherine Bauer and Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy discovered some worrisome information last year about Qatar's judicial 

efforts against terror finance.7° On the plus side, they did find that Doha had 

privately prosecuted five individuals who had previously been enjoying Qatari legal 

impunity despite being under U.S. and U.N. terror finance sanctions. However, they 

noted that by the start of the 2017 Gulf crisis not a single one of the five was actually 

serving time in Qatari prison as a result of those charges: two had been acquitted, 

one was convicted in absentia because he had been released and left the country, 

one had been freed in 2008 (only to resume funding al-Qaeda, according to the 

"Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror," New York Times, Julv 29, 

20 14. (https :i h,v\Y\V. nv times. com/20 1 4/l )7/J 0/\vorki/afri cs/rar}som in o -clt i7~tl s-europc -h.::: corn es-a 1-q aedas-

,blntrcmJJiuill~ Ellen Knickmeyer, "AI Qaeda-Linked Groups Increasingly funded by Ransom," Wall Street 

Journal. J ul v 2 9. 20 14. (l!l.iJ2sJJ.}~~o:il~l!!Lm:U~·~E'ill~~mtl!lk:k!:I!.'Il?!::.'!SI.IJ.>:.[t.!!15_12Ql.L'lt\! 

''' Karen DeYoung. 

Post, 25. 2014. 

U.S. Treasury Department, Secretary for TetTotism and Financial Intelligence David 

Cohen before the Center for a Ne\v Ametican Security on Confronting Ne\'' Threats in Tenorist 

Fintmcing:' Mt~rch 4, 2014. Chlli;1s://'~\\ \V .trens1.rr·\·. gov/1'.@2~~1l.Lrtinre%.:r_eleuse-.;/P~j])30~~) 

07 David Andrew Weinberg, "Qalar and Tenor Finance: Part II: Private Fundcrs of al-Qacda in Syria," 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies. January 2017. 

(http://\1.-YnY.defenddemocrscv.org/contentiuploads/documents/11717 \Vei11berg (Jatar Rcport.pdf) 68 l'A'I'l', '·Ten·mist l'inancing l'A'll R.epmt To U20 l.eaders," I•A'I'I', November 2015. (http://www.fmfgnfi .oJ:g[mcdl.~t~~tfidocume!l!.~epon~/T errnri~t -fi nnnciDg-act1.0ns-ts~J-bv -fA TF .pd.t) 

Lori PloLkin Boghardt, ·'From ISIS to Activists,'· The Washington Institutefor .Year East Policy, May 2016. 

(h.lli~.:_U'iY\'-~.washiggtoninstffinc.org/uploaJs/l)ocumcntsJilubs/RcscarchNNc33-]2Q_ghardt-i?.nJf) 

69 FATF, '"Tcrrorisl Financing FATF Rcporl To G20 Leaders," FATF November 2015. (hllp.!/www.i'ali'-

Qafi. onz/mcd i a/fat£ldocumcntslrq10rts/T crrori st-:financinP: -action:;;-1okcn -·bv-F /\.IF. pdf) 

'''Matthew Levitt, Katherine Bauer, "(.Jatar Doesn't Need a Blockade. It Needs an Audit," Foreign Policy, 

.June 15, 2017. (http://foreignpolicv.com/2()17/06/1 5/gmar-dne~nt-need-a-hlockade-it-nceJs.-nn-audit-alf!Q!;,(\Q::) 

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U.N.J71 and one was allowed to serve time under house arrest.72 Since the U.S.-Qatar 

M.o.U. was signed, all four of the five still in Qatar have apparently faced new trials_?:; 

However, the effectiveness of even these new measures by Qatar is now in question. 

Qatar told the New York Times earlier this year that it had rearrested 'Abd alRahman al-Nu'aymi pending a new trial.71 The U.S. government had sanctioned 

Nu'aymi in 2013, stating that he had given millions of dollars to al-Qaeda over a 

decade,75 and he was subsequently sanctioned by the United Nations, U.K., E.U., 

Turkey, and even by his own government last month.76 

Yet Nu'aymi was spotted in public again just two weeks ago, on the very same day 

the Emir of Qatar was telling President Trump that "we do not tolerate with [sic] 

people who support and fund terrorism."77 Nu'aymi was free to pose for pictures at 

his son's wedding standing next to the Hamas arch-terrorist Khaled Meshal.78 The 

wedding was blessed by a broadcaster for Qatari state media 7Y and attended by 

none other than Qatar's prime minister,00 a fact now confirmed by the Qatari state.01 

71 United Nations Security CounciL "Nanative Smnmaries of Reasons for Listing,'· March 9, 2009, 

accessed April24. 2018. 

~·or more on see David Andrevv \/Vein berg, ''Qatar and Terror Finance,'' J-.()[fndation for 

!Jefense of/Jemocracies, Decetnl)ef 2014. 

(http: I/\Y\Y\v.dcfendden1ocmcy. ora../contcnt/uplondslpubl icntion:-:/Oatar !'a1t l.pdt); I )avid Andre\v 

Vv'einberg, ''Qatar and TeTTnr l'inance: Part II: Private l'unders of al-Qaeda in Syria," ]/oundaiionfor 

D(!_jfnse C!f Dernocracies. January 2017. 

January 22, 2018. Cill!l2ili!Jlli~lll!llli±\&I!QllilL'll!lm!:illhlLilllihll~~!hll:JLilll!ill:s::mJI::Jl>m:£211J:!1illll; 

Sigurd Neubauer, 

~Valional lnlf'resl, August 8, 2017. (h!:l]}i{natic:fu1.li&~rest.QI.£!~illlJI!.:8lle-riD_:betiveen-qata.I:!he-2cc-couk!.: 

1bJs::att:rr-tnlilJJI:i:1~:2.J X29?page···.-J) 74 Declan Walsh. "Tiny. Wealthy Qatar Goes Its Own Way. and Pays for It," New York Times. January 22. 

20 18. (https://\\·Tv"\V.nYtimcs. eom/2018/0 l/22/n:orld/middlccast/qatar-saudi -cmir-hoYcotLhtml) 

"U.S. Treasury Department, "·Treasury Designates Al-()a'ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen:· December 

18, 2013. (https://-..71"'"~V\Y. treac:.l.W~'. gov/press-center/pre.-;:s-releases/Pa2:es/i 12249 .aspx) 76 David Andrevv Vv'einherg, ''Qatar and Tenor Finance: llart II: Ptivate Funders of al-Qaeda in Sytia,"' 

]/oundaLionfor JJefen.\'e of/Jemocracies, January 2017, page 6. 

(hltp:!t\vw\Ldeft~nJd3E~S:IJJ.9l..QL~-mlenl/uplom.ls/J.U!J)lic<:~tiQI1-:iLQillar ParLLJ2.ill_} 

Qalar National CounlcTLcTiori::;m Commiltec. Qatar Ministry of the Interior, ·'Terrorist De::;ignations List 

(3/2112018)"' March 21. 2018, accessed April23, 2018. ~s://nctc.moi.gov.ga/list2.html) 

"White Ilouse, ·'Remarks by President Tnunp and Amir Tamim Bin Ilamad Al Thani of the State of Qatar 

13efore 13ilateral Meeting,'" April 10, 201 H. (httrb:/l\V\V\V \Yhirehousc.gov/hrlefines-siatemcntslremark~­

pr.;;siQ~t-trumP--amir-tarJJ.i!n.:bin-ilil.:rJy'ld-al-thnni-stHte-ilJ.!lQ!.:bilatcrol-Tq_ccting,/J; "Qatar Government 

Communications Office Statement in Response to The Telegraph Article," The Peninsula, April 22, 2018, 

accessed April 24. 2018. ClllJQ:L~cninsul..Q!]!!tarcQm/articj_ci22/04/20 1 ~!Q!}_tm:-Gc•vcmmcntCommunicalHJrJ::>-OlJicc-sla!l:TI1l.TlL-in-n:snun::;~..~-tu-Thc-Tch.::grapb-drlick) 

""·Wedding .. Abdullah Abd al-Rahman Umavr al-Jabcr al-Nu· aymi,"' April 15. 2018, accessed April23, 

2018. (http://www.rava.com/news/pagcs/575edcbd-Ob8G-48fb-9bab-Gc574ahb2e32) 79 ~:{~:~DavidA \Veinherg, '·Jcs hard to knovv what's worse: that Nuaymi vvas free to attend his son"s wedding 

\Veeks after l)eing designated a tenm·ist hy his even O\'rn govt & months after #Qatar told NYT he \Vas in 

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As I have documented in two separate monographs about Qatar and terrorist 

finance, Doha has repeatedly assured the U.S. in past years that it would henceforth 

keep specific local terror financiers under control, only to have it later emerge that 

those individuals then reengaged in funding al-Qaeda.82 Doha has yet to 

demonstrate how this time is different. 

lmpunitv in Kuwait: 

Despite having a record at combating terror finance that in some ways is just as 

spotty as Qatar's, Kuwait has dodged similar scrutiny in the past year; it has even 

been thanked by the U.S. for mediating the Gulf dispute.u:; Since the start of last year, 

the Trump State Department and Obama administration's last Treasury Assistant 

Secretary for Terrorist Financing each confirmed that internationally-designated 

terror financiers have been operating with impunity in Kuwait. 111 

In 2014 Kuwait even went so far as to let the fox guard the henhouse in this regard, 

appointing a justice minister who appeared to have endorsed several fundraising 

campaigns for Syrian jihadists, one of which the U.S. said was funding al-Qaeda. 115 He 

resigned under U.S. pressure but appears to remain on faculty at Kuwait's flagship 

jail, or that it seems the 

Ap1il 13, 20 I X._UlCU.C'"-':':'-'-'-''-'-''~''"'-'"""=''-'"'-"-'=""-'":"'-"""'"'-'"'::="-"--'o""'"-"'"-'--''-""D 8o.AI 

2018. 

'·Qatar Government Office Statement in Response to The Telegraph iuticle," The 

l'eninsula, April 22, 201 X, accessed Ap1il 24, 201 X. 

(hj:tp~://tl~enin".~l~Lq_g0.tsr C(lmia]ti..:;le/22/01Lbf2_18/0atnr-Gs.!_\'5TJ:illlent-(~~lJ.2-DlUHication~-Office-statementirr:r.~.il22!Tie-1t~- Th~-Telt::iiUffib:drtigl~) 

'

2 David Andrew Weinberg, "Qatar and Terror Finance: Part 1: Negligence," Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies, December 2014. 

(http://ww\Y.defcnddcm.ocracv orgicontcnt/upload~licationq/Qatar P_~rt !.pdf): David Andrew 

Weinberg, "Qatar and Terror Finance: Pmt II: Private Funders of al-Qaeda in Syria," Foundation for 

!Jefense ofUemocracies, January 2017. 

(http:i/-...1'\\_'\\·.defendden]g_qmqv. or2/content/uploads/documents/l 1717 Vv'~inl:~\)ntar I:t~QQJ1J.?.ill.) 

83 White House, ''Remarks by President Trump and Emir Sabah al-Ahmed ai-Jaber ai-Sabah ofKu"ail in 

Joint Press Confcrcn~c," September 7 _ 2017. (hUil:':l/w\.\ w. \."l-hildwus~.uc,vAiricfings--:>tatcrncnt~/n.:marl.s1?.I.£.~dfnt-1mmp-cmir-sabah-ol-ahmcd-al-jaber-al-s<}_l::_ah-kuwnit-joint::m::..~::;s-confcrcr1_Q.~D 

84 U.S. State Depmtment, "Chapter 2: The Middle East and North Africa:· Country Reports on Terrorism 

2076, July 2017 (http~://w\Y\Y.state.r:ov/j/ct/r1E>/crt/201h/272232.btm); David Andrew Vv'einl)erg, ·''J'en·or 

Financiers "Operating Openly'' in Qatar and Kuwait,'' Foundation For Deji:n.se oj"Dnnocracif's, Febnwry 

14, 2017. ChLiJ.~: //\-\·1~- \V .dt~femldc'rnQg~.QIL':/medi..±Jl.iJ/d<c~viil:_~:t.~il!berg-tciTur-fiiwn{fieiS.:.QTI~Ta1 ing -.Q.n_o,.'Illvi!l::galar-anJ-kuwaitl) 

85 David Andrcvv Vilcinbcrg, "Ncvv Kuwaiti Justice Minislcr Has Dccv E.\.Lrcmist Tics,'' The National 

Interest, Janum-y lG, 2014. (http://nationalintcrcst onz/commcntarv/nc\v-kmvaiti-justicc-ministcr-bas-dccpextremist-ties-97 19); David iu1drew Weinberg, "Kuwait's Embattled Justice Minister Part of Deeper Terror 

Finance Problem,'' The .Vafiona/ lnLeresL, April10, 2014. (http://naiionalinierestorg/comrnemarv/k.ll.\Ynits-

~mhanl.cd-ju~tice-mini~ter-pmt-de9per-te1nT[-finallf.:HL~Q) 

14 
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public university, Kuwait University,86 as do several Kuwaiti preachers who are 

currently under international terror finance sanctions. 

As of this week, the website of Kuwait University's College of Sharia and Islamic 

Studies appears to list three separate individuals as faculty members who are 

currently under U.S. sanctions on charges of funding al-Qaeda.u7 Those individuals 

are Abd al-Muhsin al-Mutayri, Shafi al-Ajmi, and Hamid Hamad Hamid al-Ali.88 

In addition to being under sanctions by the U.S., the latter two preachers are also 

sanctioned by the United Nations, which means that they should be subject in 

Kuwait to a travel ban and asset freeze. 89 According to the U.S. Treasury 

Department, al-Ali has described himself as an "al-Qaeda commando" and "used 

students in Kuwait to courier funds" to al-Qaeda's Syrian branch.Y0 One year after 

being sanctioned by the U.S. in 2014, al-Ali was reportedly also given his old job 

back as a mosque preacher by order of the Kuwaiti government.Y1 

In private settings, some Gulf officials acknowledge the obvious truth that Hamas is 

a terrorist organization. However, not a single one of America's G.C.C. allies has yet 

shown the courage to formally designate Hamas as such. 

Saudi Arabia's Approach to Hamas: 

86 '·Fa~ulty Members- Department of Jurisprudence and its Origins,'' accessed April23, 2018. 

'·faculty Members- Depm1meut of Tafsir and 1Iadith,'· accessed April23, 2018. 

(http:t/vF\Y\Y . .'!hariakunlY.com/mcmbers1) Archived versions of this wel)page also llst t\vo middle names 

for both Shaf:i al-Ajmi and Abd al-Muhsin al-Mutayri, each of which matches the full names in their U.S. 

sanctions designations. See Inten1d Archive \Vay back Mar..:hine, "Faculty Members- Departlnent of Tafsir 

and Hadith.'' archived April 9, 2014. 

(http:f/"-cb arehivc.org/wcb/20 140409143113/htip//www.shariakuniv.com/mcmbcrs1) 

''U.S. Treasury Department, '·Treasury Designates Additional Supporters of the Al-Nusrah Front and AlQaida," August 22, 2014. (hltps:l/www.treasurv.gov/press-centcr/prcss-rdeases:Pagesijl2613.asnx); U.S. 

Treasmy Department, "lreasmy Designates Al-Qaida, Al-Nusrah Front, AQAI', and ISIL Fundraisers And 

l'acilitators,'' May 1 <J, 2()16. OJ1W:/,\y~,-,..-,y_treo.:;l!~~ss-cc.1Jl~Iess-rclcnses/l-)age~/jl()4A2.ill!JTI)~ lJ.S. 

Treasury Department, ''Tret~SUI)' Designales Three Key Supporters of Terrorists in Syria and Iraq," AugusL 

6_ 2014. (hHp~://v.· vvw. tr~.:asur\'. go\/prv~~-Gclltcrlvrcs':>-r-..~kasc~/Pag~.:'5/j12605 .aspA) 

'"united Nations Security Council, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Shafi Sultan Mohammed 

al-Ajmi. "April20, 2016, accessed April24, 2018. 

(htt ps ::'/1\""\Y\\·-.un .ilrg/~c/suhorgi en/sancti nns/1 26 7/ aq s::u1ctl ons 1 i st/ summ aricsh ndi-.,·i duaL' sh nfi -~nl tanmobamrr~cl_-al-airqj} United Nations Security Com1cil, "Nanative Sunm1aries of Reasons for Listing: 

Hamid Hamad Hamid Al-Ali," 15,2014, accessed Apri124, 2018. 

U.S. Treasmy Depm1ment, '·Treasury Designates Additional Supponers of the Al-Nusrah Front and AlQaida, ''August 22, 2014. (https://\V\V\V.treasun'.gov/press-center/press-!-eleuses/T)ages/jl2G l3.aspx) 91 'l'urki al-Mughames, '·J !amid al-Ali again ... as an Imam for al-Adsani "ai-Rai A!edia, Apli121, 

20 15. Ql\1!21{"-'."}J:Aill!!.=~£<2!JD11::!.'2!ll:!il.l~!!!~l:lllsb~ill!tbl:.I11Ji2::±Jf!o.illl!'!!;212_(jlilij~ 11 

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At the end of the reign of Saudi Arabia's late King Abdullah, the kingdom arrested 

several Hamas financiers and coerced Qatar into doing the same. However, with his 

passing in january 2015, the pressure to keep those terror financiers in custody 

dissipated, and in both countries they were set free. 92 

In Saudi Arabia, the most prominent of these Hamas operatives released from 

prison in 2015 was Mahir Salah. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, he "led 

the Hamas Finance Committee in Saudi Arabia, the largest center of Hamas's 

financial activity" and oversaw the transfer of tens of millions of dollars to Hamas's 

military wing in Gaza.93 

Mahir Salah has since reemerged for public appearances in Lebanon,~~ Turkey,YS 

Egypt,% and Malaysia, including with the Malaysian premier.~ 7 He enjoys the title of 

Hamas's "ra'ees" abroad, meaning president, boss, or chief.98 Although it is possible 

that Mahir Salah may have left the kingdom for good, another senior Hamas 

financial official designated by the U.S. at the same time as him, Abu Ubayda al-Agha, 

apparently remains a free man in the Saudi city of )eddah.99 Al-Agha is under U.S. 

sanctions on charges of transferring millions of dollars to Ham as in Gaza. 100 

Qatar's Approach to Hamas: 

~ [)avid Andrevv Vv'einherg, '''l'enorist l•'inancing: Kidnapping, Antiquities 'l'raftlcking, and Private 

Donations,·· Testimony before the I louse Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on !'etTotism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade, November 17, 2015. 

U.S. Trcasmy Department, '·Treasury Sanctions Major Hamas Leaders, Financial Facilitators and a Front 

Companv,·· September I 0, 2015. (https:l/wwvv.treasury.govlpress-ccnter!orcss-releascsiT'ages/ilO 159.aspx) 9

'

1 '·[lamas OtTicial Abroad: .Jerusalem is Indivisible United and \\/}wever Ignites \Var against it Must Hear 

the Consequences,'· ai-Afay·adeen, December 17, 2017~ 

(J:!J.lJ.J:/!'A_\V\\' J:!lm_<:tv adt:~n.11etll1~\\ s/pl)litics/8·+6285~~ktails); '·Leadership Delegation from Hm11as Headed 

by Abu Marzouq Meets Shalah," I!amas website, December 18, 2017. accessed April23, 2018. 

(http:i!llmms.ps/ar/pnst/8342/); '·Pictures: Hamas Official Abroad: United Jcmsalcm Cannot Be Divided," 

llamas website, December 17, 2017, accessed April23, 2018. (h!_tg,'Qjggo.gl/lt7_;)2_'Y): "Leadership 

Delegation from llamas Visits the President of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies," Hamas website, 

December 19, 2017, accessed Aptil 23, 201 X. (httpsilgoo.g1/0llll2gd) 95 '·Document: Speech hy Leader Mahlr Salah at al-Quds Pioneers h1tum (_) ln lstanlml,"' 1-)a/esiiniun Afedia 

Center, October 21,2017. (llitps://goo.gllnl'!IGn£) 96 '·Al-NLmu: New Dckgation ofHamas Leaders Arrives to Cairo,'' Palestinian jfedia Center, February 22, 

2018. (ffitpsf!goo.g!lkhAF_q) 97 '·Pictures: Leadership Delegation from llamas Meets the Malaysian Prime Minister," Palestinian Media 

Center, December 6, 2017. (https:i/goo.glil't6rN4) 98 "Text of Speech by Hmnas Movement President Abroad the Brother Mahir Salah at 30th Anniversary 

Festival in Lebanon,'· I!amas website, December 17, 2017, accessed April23, 2018. 

(ffiiQ.:i!'hamas pslar/post/8341/) 99 "Jcddah- Dinner Party for Pilgrims to the House of Allah, the Harm11." Date Tree- The al-A7ha Family 

website, August 22,2017, accessed April23. 2018. (http:f/clagha.nct/13731) 11111 U.S. Treasury Department, "'I reasu0· Sanctions Major llamas Leaders, Financial Facilitators and a 

,. Septemher 1 (), 2()15. (https:I/Y\T'\.,\'\Y.trcasurv.£.rn,c/lmc~s-centerlprcss16 
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29967b-18.eps

There is really no comparison between Saudi Arabia and Qatar's current policies 

toward Hamas. Saudi Arabia condemns the group for its extremism, seeks its 

marginalization, 101 and has generally eschewed meetings with the group since 

hosting Khalid Meshal for meetings in 2015 and hosting Meshal and Ismail Haniyeh 

at a reception by the Saudi Embassy in Doha in 2016.102 

Meanwhile, Qatar actively promotes Hamas and praises it as a "legitimate resistance 

movement." 103 Qatar funds Hamas development projects in the Gaza Strip so 

lavishly that the U.S. condemned it in 2014 for "openly financ[ing] Hamas." 101 

Although U.S. and Israeli officials are more precise in their terminology these days, 

crediting Doha with limiting those funds to relief and development initiatives, 105 the 

timing and allocation of these disbursements are clearly designed to bolster 

Hamas. 106 Qatar has also reportedly provided funding for the living expenses and 

organizational activities of Hamas operatives living in Doha. 107 At the height King 

Abdullah of Saudi Arabia's pressure on Qatar over Ham as in late 2014, for example, 

Hamas official Hussam Badran declared that "there is no suspension of the Qatari 

financial support for the movement, since their relationship is ongoing." 1011 

Qatar has hosted Hamas leaders on and off for decades. The United States allegedly 

granted its permission for Qatar to host Hamas leader Khaled Meshal when he left 

101 .John Irish, "Saudi minister says Qatar must end 

June 6, 20 1 7. \ill!L':OB~'-Ll~l<;_rl~2ll'!J:l.IJ.l£l'"L!fi::gilll:.ili!ill'::.c'illl"!1c:.ill~:!J!&l!:!:l~l!!l!il!:I:::l'&:!:g!lli•L:IJ!.l!i~llil:: 

Treasury Department, "'Remarks of Under Secretary Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David 

Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on ''Confronting New Threats in Terrorist 

Financing.'' 111

~ Am1in Rosen, March "·Bipartisan 24. 2014. (~:~~~~'G~~;~~~~~~~~f~~~~::~-;~~~~~:; C 

Magazine. 21.2017. 

Michael Buchanan, "freed Palestinian Prisoners Adapt to Qatar Exile;· BBC, febtuary 1, 2012. 

QiliJJ_//\\ 'vY\V .bbc.~.nlne\vs/\\orlJ-I.niddlc--easl:l.S-l6:1~_9m: "Qatar Asks Hamas Elements to Leave its 

Territory. which Israel Considers a Positive Step," al-J'vfayadeen. June 3. 2017, archived on June 9, 2017 by 

Internet Archive \Vayback M<:~chinc, 

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Syria in 2012.109 However, Hamas activities in Qatar since then have exceeded 

anything the U.S. might have authorized at the time or should tolerate now, going so 

far as to include money laundering, recruitment, directing West Bank terror cells,11° 

and apparently cyberterrorism as well.lll 

It is also true that some of the Hamas operatives in Qatar made their way there after 

being released and deported as part of a deal with Israel for the release of the 

hostage Gilad Shalit. However, several of those individuals have reengaged in 

plotting terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens from Qatari territory, clearly 

something that Israel and the U.S. do not and should not tolerate.112 

Hamas's Base in Qatar Remains: 

Hamas lists thirteen individuals on its website as members of the group's top 

decision-making body, the Hamas political bureau (also known as its politburo ). 1 n 

Of those thirteen, most have been spotted in Qatar during the last year, and a 

sizeable plurality of them are still appear to be based there today. 

Under heavy pressure at the start of the Gulf crisis last summer, Qatar is reported to 

have asked several Hamas commanders who were most heavily involved in military 

and financial operations to leave the country.114 Among those who left were Salah 

al-Arouri and Musa Dudin.us 

However, others Hamas operatives have remained, including even some who have 

themselves engaged in such problematic activities. 

"'"Dcxicr Filkins, "A Saudi Prince's Quest to Remake the Middle East,'. The New Yorka. April 9, 2018. 

(https ://-.,;.,--..,v,;v-.nev,-v orker. com/magiJzine/20 18/04/09/ J-Smldi-princes-guest-to-remake-the-middle-east) 

Qatar Tribune, "Qatar hosted I lamas, Tali ban delegations at the request of lJS," Qalar '/'rihune, .Julv 4, 

2017. (htt~}:0I_,_qatar-tnhlme.coJ.uJgc'",.s-Qetajls/id/73S1D 

110 David Andre\v Vvreinberg, ·'Terrorist Financing: Kidnapping, Antiquities TndTicking, and Private 

Donations,·· Testimony before the House F orcign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on I crrorism, 

on]JIOJ.ucrauon, and Trade, November 17, 2015. 

2015lll7.pdf) 

111 David Shamah, "Qatmi tech helps I lamas in Tunnels, Rockets: c>.:pe1i," The Times of!srael, .July 31, 

2()14. (http:/J-...,-vnY.tinlesofi:.>rael.corn/cm!Q:ci-tech-ll~].!:lli:b..flD1US-iD-tunlJ.f .. L~:rocke1~.:0.H~1D 

JJ::: David Andre\v 'loleinberg, ·'Terrorist financing: Kidnapping, Antiquities Tra1Tid..ing, tmd Private 

Dona lions,'· Testimony bcfon.: the House F orcign Affairs Commitlcc' s Subcommillcc on I crrorism, 

on]JIOJ.ucrauon, and Trade. November 17, 2015. 

of the Political Bureau,'' Hamas 1vebsile, accessed April23, 2018. 

~'/hamfls.p~/ar/pohticic~lolTicemo,.,'THhcrs) 

114 "Qatar Asks Hamas Elements to Leave its Territory, which Israel Considers a Positive Step," alMayadeen. Jtmc 3. 2017, archived on June 9, 2017 by lnlcrnd Archive Way back Machine, 

(http://rycb.archivc.org/y\"d•/20 170609092519/http://\Y\Yl,Y.almavadccn.net/ncYvs/politics/58225) 11 ' Jack Khoury, "Palestinians Confinn: Top llamas Officials Ilave Left Qatar at Request," 

H a are Lz, June 5, 20 17. ( Jill.i.'."GI/'E.~".J}!J.ill:tli:S'lill.LlllliMi'C:f!!hl::l.!S~!Jlilk.S1lli.!.illl.82fll!':.ill!.!lilll.'iot;Qiilii!.TI:: 

18 
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Most obviously, Khaled Meshal remains in Qatar, 116 where he has been described by 

the government as a "dear guest". 117 Meshal led Hamas as its longtime politburo 

chief until last year, but despite being succeeded in that role by Ismail Haniyeh, he 

remains a member of that senior body to this day. 118 According to his personal U.S. 

sanctions designation, Meshal has been responsible for Hamas terrorist attacks as 

well as the financing of terror.119 Qatar downplays his presence, claiming 

inaccurately that he is not personally under U.S. sanctions and that he is "retired."120 

Hussam Badran: 

The one name I most want for you to come away from this hearing remembering, 

however, is Hussam Badran. Badran is an infamous terrorist commander who 

appears to be enjoying safe haven in Qatar today despite allegedly engaging in a 

broad range of terrorist activity there. 

In 2002, Israel announced Hussam Badran's arrest, describing him as the head of 

Hamas's military wing in the northern half of the West Bank. As such, it identified 

him as a mastermind of many of the most horrible terrorist attacks of the Second 

Intifada, stating the following: 

"Badran was responsible for the following terror attacks: The attack in the 

Dolphinarium, the Sbarro restaurant in jerusalem, the Nahariya train station, 

Matza restaurant in Haifa, the bus in Haifa, the bus near Emmanuel, the 

village of Hamra and the Park Hotel in Netanya. In these terror attacks, 

directed by Badran, over 100 people were killed and hundreds were 

wounded."12t 

'"'··wedding .. Abdullah Abd al-Rahman Umayr al-Jabcr al-Nu 'aymi_., April 15. 2018, accessed April23, 

2018. (http://wvcw.rava.com/ne"·s/pagcsio75cdebd-Ob8G-48fb-9bab-Gc574abb2c32) 117 Peter Kovessy, ·'Qatar FM: I lamas leader to remain in Doha as 'dear guest','. /)ofw ,Ve1vs, .January 13, 

2015. ~://dohanc\Y~.cni_ggtar-tlrt:b.il!J.las-lead~.J.::Iemaill:g_l2_[1n-Jegr:g~D 118 ''Members of the Political Bureau,'' Ham as •vebsite, accessed April 23, 2018. 

Treasmy Department. "U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas and Six Senior Hamas 

Leaders as Terrorist Entities," August 22, 2003. (https://\VY\·'Vi.trcasun·.gov/press-cemcr/prcssrc1e::lse~/!-l il£es/j sO 7 2.asp-...;:) 

t.:o "Qatar Govennnent Conmnmications Office Statement in Response to The Telegraph Article,'· The 

Peninsula. 22,2018, Hccessed 24.2018. 

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Among the 600+ casualties of those attacks included three American citizens who 

were killed and seven who were physically injured. 122 Although Badran served some 

time in Israeli prison for these crimes, Israel prematurely released him under duress 

as part of an exchange for the release of the hostage Gilad Shalit. According to Israel 

he has resumed operational terrorist activities since moving to Qatar. 

In 2013, the Israel Defense Forces (I.D.F.) announced the capture of a Hamas cell in 

Hebron that it said was stockpiling assault weapons for a plot to kidnap Israeli 

soldiers; Israel revealed that "their primary contact person abroad was Husam 

Badran" in Qatar.123 Then, in 2015, the I.D.F. exposed that Hussam Badran "led the 

establishment" of a sprawling Hamas terror cell and command center in Nablus and 

that he "transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars" to it with gold and jewelry 

smuggled through jordan.t24 

Many do not realize that this Qatar-based individual has such direct blood on his 

hands because he also serves a more visible role as a spokesperson for Hamas. As 

far back as the 1990s, Badran melded his role as a terrorist commander with a day 

job directing Hamas's press office in Nablus.12s In more recent years, he has served 

as a senior spokesperson for Hamas and was elected to its politburo lastyear.126 

Other Ham as Ooeratives Still in Qatar: 

Additional Hamas operatives who serve in a variety of terrorist roles continue to be 

based in Qatar. 

Along with Khaled Meshal and Hussam Badran, other members of the Hamas 

politburo also appear to have remained behind in Qatar since Arouri's departure, 

including Sami Khater and Izzat al-Risheq. 127 Ismail Haniyeh and Mousa Abu 

12:::0sen Atlorne:ys al Law, LLC, "United States District Courl Easten1 Districl of New York:' Osen 

.~lttorneys at Lmv_ LLC. June 17,2016. (https://\:rYn\-.oscnhnv.com/siccs/dcfault/fiks/06-11-

l() Strauss Fifth ,\mended Complaint ECF.pdi\ Michael Goldblatt, Morton A. Klein, Susan B. 

Tuchman. "ZOA to Jordan's King: Honor Extradition Treaty- Send Jew Killer Tamimi to U.S.," Zionist 

0 rganizati on of.1me rica, 7, 20 I 7. Wl!W.?.iliili:L1!!.!~lli.!::l::!.i.L~!Q.;:::U:£!2:ii:l~illilllil.:JS,illJ!.:.lli!!.ill:L 

Defense Forces, "When Hamas Tries to Establish a Terror Network- We 

Defense Forces, March 7, 2015. (Jl!:lm:I!J.Ol[Ulli!Jk!lliJ!llll.l§l)qhill:!!Wlill'll&:!l:billll!ill:ID~CQ:.!~Lll.!J!s!l±: 

Ataf Ali I3adran- Head of the Hmnas military wing in Samaria-18-

18. 2002. 

7 "Memhers of the Political Hureau;' Hwnas 1rehsite, accessed Aptil 23, 201 X. 

(11ttl):/.1llilllih~illi!2Q}jticalotTi~u:enib~I:'::1) 

20 
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Marzouq, senior Hamas leaders who like Meshal are personally under U.S. sanctions 

for their role in terrorist attacks and/or terrorist finance, have been known to spend 

extensive time in Qatar as well, although Haniyeh is clearly based now in Gaza. 12u 

Other senior Hamas officials who reportedly may still be spending time in Qatar 

during this period include Maher Obeid and Mohammed Nasr.l29 Obeid served as a 

major Hamas money launderer130 and was identified by Israel as the new external 

head of Hamas military operations for the West Bank after Arouri's 2017 departure 

from Doha.131 Mohammed Nasr is responsible for managing the terrorist group's 

relationship with its Iranian sponsor and visited Tehran as recently as October.132 

There is also no specific indication that Doha has deported or constrained several 

other Hamas officials who have been named by Israel or in press reports as Qatarbased terrorist operatives or financiers aiding Hamas cells in the West Bank. Those 

individuals include Mohamed al-Qawasmi, Tala! Shareem, and Hisham Hejazi.n:J 

Even though Qatar accepted a terror finance M.o.U. with the United States last year, 

it clearly continues to provide a safe haven to Hamas terrorist operatives - far 

beyond any token political presence for the group that may have been intentionally 

tolerated in the past by the United States. Until Qatar expels all Hamas terrorist 

operatives, it should face consequences in its relationship with Washington. 

Hezbollah: 

America's Gulf allies have all done a relatively more consistent job combating 

Hezbollah, the terrorist group responsible for killing the most American citizens 

prior to 9/11. Their willingness to do so is largely attributable to events in Syria and 

1

.:

8

U.S. State Department, "State Department Ten·or·ist Designations of Ismail Haniyeh, Barakat alS"bireen, Lis" Hl-Ihawra, ami H"rHkat Sawa'J Misr (HASM):' July 31, 2018. 

(htcps:/h\\V\V.stntc.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/0l/277792.htm): U.S. Treasury Department,·' U.S. Designates 

Five Charities Funding Hamas and Six Senior Hamas Leaders as Ienorist Entities," August 22, 2003. 

(http.s://-..D··,;v,r.trca~~rcss-ccntcr/prC'ss-rckascs!PaQ-,.~s/jsG72.aspx) 

leo '·Palestinian Sources: Leaders from llamas Left Doha," .11-Ghad (Jordan;, Juue 8, 2017. 

(http://-....v\Y\v.algh ad. com/articles/ 16577 3 2) 130 ])a,rid Andre\v Vv'einherg, "'l'enorist l'inancing: Kidnapping, Antiquities Trafficking, and l_)tivate 

Donalions,'· Testimony before the House Foreign Alit~ irs Committee's Subcommiltee on Terrorism, 

UHfJIUJ.llcJauuu, md Trade. Novcmbc'J' 17, 2015. 

Levy, '·New Head of Ham as TetTor Operations in Vv'est I ~ank Revealed;' Ynel .Vn1's, January 10, 

2018. (httm;:Jh,yv;~nctncws.com/article~0.73~~L-SO~i.2Q09.0Cl.html) 

130 "HHmas Delegation Anives in I ehr"n to Meet Inmi"n O!Tici"ls,'. Asharq .41-Awsat, October 21, 20017. 

(h~:// a~nvsat. com/ cnglish111omc/ article /1 059 346/hJmas-d c 1c gation: arriYcs-tc hnm-meet-iranian -officials) 133 David Andre\·V ¥leinbcrg. ·'Terrorist Fincmcing: Kidnapping, Antiquities Tra1Tick.ing, and Priv(Jtc 

Donations," I estimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on I errorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade, November 17, 2015. 

21 
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more recently in Yemen, where the G.C.C. states find themselves on the opposite 

side of two civil wars from Hezbollah. 

Following Bahrain's lead, the Gulf Cooperation Council declared Hezbollah as a 

terrorist group in 2016, suggesting that its other member states intended to do the 

same. 131 Saudi Arabia has gone one step further, sanctioning a number of individual 

Hezbollah operatives already on the U.S. sanctions list135 and even issuing new joint 

designations with the U.S. on other Hezbollah operatives.136 

Hezbollah's Gulf branch was responsible for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in 

Saudi Arabia that killed 19 American service members and a Saudi national, as well 

as injuring nearly 500.B7 Saudi Arabia captured the mastermind of that attack in 

2015 with help from American intelligence.l30 Bahrain has identified Hezbollah 

backing for numerous terrorist plots inside its territory.139 Kuwait recently 

convicted over 20 individualsH0 on charges related to an enormous weapons cache 

hidden by a Hezbollah terrorist cell in its territory that included 40,000 pounds of 

ammunition and 300 pounds of explosives.141 Most G.C.C. states have expelled 

purported Hezbollah supporters in recent years,H2 and the U.A.E. sentenced seven 

individuals on charges related to forming a Hezbollah cell in the country in 2016. 143 

Arabia Sanctions I le7bnllah ()fficials,·· FoundaLionfor /Jefense of 

J)emocrucies. [)ecemher J. 2015. (http:/i\'0;:Y\Y.Jefe"[Lddemq_g_roc<v-.on;dmedirr-hit/david-\~iDh::ro-sauJ1-

cmtbi~'H.![!ShLm~Q.L1>ollah-l)1I~01!i) 

136 U.S. Treasury DcpartmL-'Ill, ''Treasury Sandions Hi.Lballah Financiers and Operatives,'' October 20, 

20 1 G. (https :1/\Y\Y\V. trca surv. gnv/prcss-ccntcrlprcss-n: k asc:oi/Jl agcs/j l 0 5 87. asp:-,;:) 

U.S. State Depmtment, ··state Department Terrorist Designations of Ilashem Safieddine and Muhammad 

al-Isawi,'' May 19, 2017. Cb.lm~:.'/Yv\YW.statc.2(J\c/r/[~~017/05/~701}~Q.htm) 

137 U.S. Justice Department, '"Atto1ney General Statement' regarding Khobar indict1nent,'. June 21,2001. 

(htlps:/j__w\v~~~..:.g<2v/t1[£ll!o.Y.@l}.0iPr/2QQl/J(ntd21;5J~_g.htm) 

"'Ali Hashem. "With Khobar bomber's arrest. Saudi Arabia deals blow to Iran," .11-Monitor, August 31, 

2015. 

Targeting its Security," .11 .lrabiya, 

.Janumy 22, 201 X. (https://en21ish.a1aral":,i,-a.nctien/Ne\vs/gulf/201 X/0 l/2.2/Hahrain-llczhollah-suppnrt~­

~ror.~lJ:---tnrgc:tln2-..Q}.lr-:-;e~l!Iity .htnlD 140 ''Kuwaiti court upholds death sentence for member of alleged Inm 

(https://www.khakejtimes.com/article/20 l30Ci20/ARTICLE/3%209877/ l n lG); '·Repmt: Lebanese 

Husinessrnan J)epmted from Saudi Arabia Over I [e,bollah Ties,·· Naharnel, .July 21l, 2013. 

(hltnlL~\>:\Y.naham.£:1s(".lm/stnri~s/cn/92_l_Ll); I ~arhara Surk, ''l,el)anon Shiites ousted from (/ulf as 

22 
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29967b-24.eps

According to the New York Times and FT, last year Qatar's government allegedly 

paid part of an enormous ransom to Hezbollah's Iraqi offshoot and potentially to its 

central leadership in Lebanon as well. The elaborate purported accord, which has 

been called one of the "world's largest" ransom deals,144 allegedly totaled up to a 

billion dollars in exchange for the release of a royal Qatari hunting party that had 

been taken hostage in southern Iraq.14S 

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: 

Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, and it perpetrates those 

actions by means of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (I.R.G.C). Many of the 

I.R.G.C.'s clients are designated as terrorist entities by the United States and several 

Gulf states. The I.R.G.C. itself was finally sanctioned by the United States as a 

Specially Designated Global Terrorist in October, H 6 although its Quds Force division 

has been sanctioned as such for over a decade. 147 The I.R.G.C. has also been 

responsible for major acts of subversion in nearly every Arabian country. 

Although several Gulf governments have imposed limited diplomatic or direct trade 

sanctions against Iran, they have done remarkably little to force third-country 

companies in places like Europe or Asia to avoid enriching businesses controlled by 

the I.R.G.C., which holds sway over a major share of Iran's economy. 14u 

Iranian sanctions-busting networks have also exploited lax financial oversight in 

some parts of the Gulf, an ongoing U.S. concern that these host governments should 

do more to address. 

lle7hollah fans," '/'he San /)iego linion-1'rihune, July 11, 2013. 

Q_,illp://I\T0Y·sag_9.jW2Jlmontrihl~pe c:Jm/~llt-leJlanon-shiit9,?-oustecl:.from-guJt'-ai_-hezbollnh_:fan~ 

.f2fu)_ll-slon h!m_ll 141 "UAE court sentences Hezhollah cell," 

Cockburn, "Iraq considers next move after intercepting 'world's largest' ransom for kidnapped 

Qataris,·· The !ndependeni, April 2h, 2017. (httn.-,:-'I\YW\-Y.indcpcnJer;_t.co.uk/neu.'~/yvor1d/mldd1c-east/qa1ori­

~'11~-kjdn~l-iraq-rllJ}sonl:lillJf:J11[lion-shia-m1li1ia-syria-sQll_Q.i-ill!Tttcrd_~-~1 i703046.htTI!l) 145 Roher! f. Worih, '·Kidnapped Royalty 13ecome P;mns in Iran's Deadly Plot," New York Times, March 

14_ 2018. (hi_t~W\V\\ nvtim~':>.com/2018/03/l4/mc.illi1Linc/hoi\ -a-rau-;c•m-for-rL)\ al-falcoucrs-r~~s± 

thc-middlc-casthtml); Erika Solomon, '·The $1 bn Hostage Deal that Emaged Qatar's Gulf Rivals," FT. 

June 5, 2017. (https:iiwww,ftcomicontcnt/dd033082-49c9-lle7-a3f4-c742b979ld43) 

H 6 lJ.S. Treasury Department,'· Treasury Designates the IRUC under Tenorism Authority and Targets 

IRGC and Military Suppo1ters under Counter-Proliferation Authority;' October 13, 2017. 

(hUps:/1"\.n\ \\ .ire<JstLn. gt.w/press-cenle~~:-;s-rrl~:>~siPage:-;/-:>rnO l77.usp:{) 

w U.S. Treasury Department, "Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation 

Adivitics cmd Support for Terrorism," Odobcr 25.2007. (1Jllp:-;://\v\H\·.1n.:asun .go\·/pn:s::o-ccnkr/pn;s::;-

rdcascs/P agcs/hp(i44. asnx) 14' David Andrew Weinberg & Mark Dubowitz, "Where Obama Fails on Iran Sanctions, the Gulf States 

Can Step In," Wall '"'freeL.lournul, ~'ehn1my 21, 2016. (http~://\Y\Y\V.\Ysj.cnm/a.rticlcsiwhere-obama-faibon-iran -sanctions-the-gulf-states-can-sten-i n-145h0960Y :.?_) 

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Although the U.A.E. has made some improvements, more must be done to boost 

oversight of economic free zones in the U.A.E.'s smaller emirates, whose lax 

regulatory environments have been a frequent target for Iranian sanctions busters. 

Oman was reported to have turned a blind eye to Iranian weapons smuggling to 

Yemen through its land and sea territory, 149 and it is unclear whether the Trump 

administration has been satisfied by Omani efforts since then.l50 Additionally, 

Kuwait and Dubai should permanently cease any and all business in their territories 

by Iran's Mahan Air,151 an airline that is under U.S. sanctions for deceptive financial 

practices and smuggling arms and fighters for the Quds Force and Hezbollah.l52 

On the positive side of the ledger, it is now being reported that Bahrain's 2015 

closure of Future Bank, a major local financial institution linked to Tehran, halted a 

sanctions-busting scheme involving billions of dollars of deceptive financial 

transactions enabling Iranian terror finance in the region. 153 

The Tali ban: 

Neither the United States nor any of its Gulf allies formally designate the Afghan 

Taliban as a terrorist group, despite the fact that the Taliban is responsible for the 

vast majority of attacks against civilians in Afghanistan154 and coordinates 

extensively on the battlefield and organizationally with al-Qaeda.m 

Although the United States has refrained from sanctioning the Afghan Taliban for 

utilitarian reasons in hopes of reaching a political accord with the group, such an 

accord remains elusive. Furthermore, doing so has arguably made it harder for the 

140 Yara Bayoumy. Phil Stewmi. "'Exclusive: 

officials;· Reuters, October 19, 20 !G. lilllm!.JiJDr.l'!:.J~~ill!lllilillJ£b<!l1U'.<mlffil!£!'-ill:!JI.::!J:~llLS:I&Llli= 

".Mahan Air 1vehsiLe, accessed April 24, 20U( 

Q@1::. :/1\\'"\Y\V. m (!han. n~rn/ en/#int R.oute.Mrul.) 15:::: U.S. Treasury Department, '· I reasury Designates Iranian Commercial Airline Linked to lran1

s Support 

for I ~.:rrorism," October 12. 2011. (}lltps)/"., \"-'\\' .ln;asurv .go\)prcs..::-ccnlt.:r/prcs::;-

rclcascs/Pr.o-~1gllfb~) 

"'Souad Mekhennet & Joby WmTick, "'Billion-dollar sanctions-busting scheme aided Iran, documents 

show," 3, 201 X. 

State Department, Consortium for the Study of 1 errorism and Responses to 1 errorism: 

Annex of Statistical Infon11ation," Country Reports on Terrohsm 2016. July 2017. 

(https:! t\V\VYV. sta tc. gnv /i /ct/rL;/crt/20 1 ()/2 7 22 41. htm) 1

" Bill Roggio, "Designations highlight 1aliban's longstanding ties to a! Qaeda," Long WarJoumal, 

Fel)nwry 26, 201 g_ (https:/fv.,-v•:w. kmg\Y<JrjoumJl . .->rg/Drch[,_Ts/201 S/0 1 /desi£nntlnns-high1ight-talibnnslongstanding -ties-to-a~_da.pl1p) 

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U.S. to take a hard line against the group's operations in the Gulf, which is home to 

an enormous South Asian expatriate community in addition to the region's 

significant terror finance trends. 

The Taliban has sought to exploit Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari territory over the years 

in order to help fund its operations.156 For years the Saudi government allegedly 

turned a blind eye to Taliban fundraising in its territory, 157 but the kingdom has 

laudably taken a more assertive approach in recent years, undertaking joint 

designations with the U.S. of South Asian terror finance targets associated with the 

Tali ban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and al-Qaeda.tss 

The Taliban's deceased leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour reportedly traveled to the 

U.A.E. eighteen times in the past decade or so on false papers, despite being on a U.N. 

watch list.159 However, the U.A.E. has shown a very tangible commitment to fighting 

the Taliban, deploying its own special forces to Afghanistan for over a decade as well 

as close air support.l60 A terrorist bombing attributed to the Taliban last year took 

the life ofthe U.A.E. ambassador to Kabul and five other Emirati officials.161 

Qatar hosts a Taliban political office in its territory as well as the Guantanamo Five, 

a group of senior Taliban commanders released by the U.S. in exchange for the 

hostage Bowe Bergdahl. Although Qatar was reportedly allowed to host the 

Taliban's embassy on its territory with U.S. permission, 162 its broader approach to 

the group would seem to exceed what the U.S. would have allowed or what it should 

still be tolerating. For example, last year the New York Times quoted an Afghan 

official who indicated that Qatar is "home to about 100 Taliban officials and their 

1

'

6 The Guardian, ··us embassv cables: Ilillary Clinton says Saudi Arabia 'a critical source of terrorist 

funding,-' l'he CTuurclian, J)ecember 3(), 20()9. (https://v,-\Y\Y.thcguardian.com/\vmlllhl~-emb:J58V-cahlesdocutHenh/~~-Q1.:-l) 

JYI Carlolta Gall, ''Saudis Bankroll Talibt~n, Even as King Government,'' ~ve·w 

rorlc Times, December 6, 

afghanistan.html) 

m U.S. Treasury Department. ··united States and Saudi Arabia Designate Terrorist Fundraising and 

Suppmi Networks," March 31, 2016. (https:i/www.treasmY.gov/prcss-centcr/pre"-

rdcases/~la£.cs/jl04(10_a:'>p'\); lJ.S. Treasury J)epmiment, "The lJ.S. and Saudi Arabia Take .Joint Action 

Against 'J'eJTorist l'lnancing J·:ntity Attempting to ]~vade lJ.S. and UN Sanctions and Violate Saudi Lav\rs,"' 

April 7, 2015. (h_~\\ \\\v.tre~Jsurv.go\lr.:re~s-c~Ilk:r/J2n .. ~:->:-~-reku:-:e,'->1Ta~~es/ill0...::~~) 

159 EllafNajafizada. "Taliban Ex-Leader Often Visited United Arab Emirates, Iran," Stars 

26, 20 !G. 

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "In the l!AI c, the United States Has a Quiet, 

Sparta,·· Washington Post, November 9. 2014. (lJ_!!.J,?2Jl::,·Y,',O:~Yill11l1JB!'Qill~!.Qlli!•'.oY.<;!Ll\!illi!tl\'!b1l.::. 

questioned after Afghm1istan bomb.'' FT. February 3. 

2017. (httns:/iw\V\Y.ft.com/contcnt/981c4c7C\-cd31-:iafd-9057 -05da79Ga7b!l1) 10c Catherine Philip, "Taliban office in Qatar approved by US," The Weekend.1ustralian, September 13, 

2()11. (htttJs://wvY\Y.Thcaustcalian.com.aulr!ews/wnr1d/talihan-office-iJ1-qntilr-appn"Y\'ed-hv-us/nevvs-

~n11lt~!Obc25~d21 e~±bf'JdX2e~:s: 1 07ffL~;_y-=-=-e315(l{) 763 l29bfdX21 c~600023ftC76e) 

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relatives, who live comfortably at Qatari state expense." 163 In addition, two senior 

Haqqani Group officials, including a top-tier fund raiser, were allegedly able to travel 

to Qatar, visit a member of the Tali ban Five, and depart Qatar before being captured 

in Bahrain.164 The Afghan government seeks the closure of the Taliban's Doha office 

based on its view the office has had "no positive consequence in terms of facilitating 

the peace talks" and has taken no meaningful steps toward peace negotiations. 165 

In the G.C.C., only the U.A.E. publicly designates the Taliban-linked Haqqani Group as 

a terrorist organization.166 Only the U.A.E., and Bahrain publicly designate the 

Taliban's Pakistani offshoot.167 These are also the only G.C.C. countries that publicly 

designate Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai 

attacks that killed 166 people, including six Americans. 16B 

Part IV. Policy Recommendations: 

1. Work with Gulf Allies to Publicly Designate All Terrorist Groups 

Two G.C.C. states - Oman and Kuwait- do not have public lists of banned terrorist 

organizations. One G.C.C. state, Qatar, has a public list that is astonishingly 

inadequate. And three G.C.C. states - Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Bahrain - are 

using public lists that still fall short in some key regards. 

Kmirn Amini, '·Afghan Govt To Close Tali han Qatar Oftlce,'· Yolo News, Fehrumy 23, 201 X. 

(h!!.p~:.:/h\"i.Y';v.tolottC\Ys . ..::omhnd~~-~php/rrrgl1an-i;l:..!..fl.W.ilt£,Jwn.:gQY~.lQ.~~-talJJ2Dn-qatQ..~.lli~~) 166 ''Ministry of Inlerior: In_iunctions on Se~urity ~nd Ideology for Citizens and Residenb," ,)'aud; Press 

.lgency, March 7, 2014. (http:/i\vww.spa gov.sa/,·i,cwstorY php?ncwsid=1206762 

htlp/iwam.ac.'cn/dctailsil3952724788i4); "Cabinet Approves Terrorist Organizations List," Bahrain News 

.·lgenc_y. November 4, 2016. (http://\Y\Y1Y.bna.bh/portallc!1lncv.-s/72 l Q45); Qatar National Counterterrorism 

Committee, Qatar Ministry of the Interior, '·Terrorist Designations List (10/25/20 17)" October 25, 2017, 

accessed Aprll 2::3, 201X. (hrtrs://nctc.moi.gcn:.gw1ist.htm1); Qatar National CounterteJTorism Committee, 

Qatar Ministry of the Interior, "TetTorist Designations List (3/2 I /201 gy· March 21, 201 g, accessed April 

23,2018. (hUp-.://nc1c.moi.~Wlf1ist2.hlr.Ql) 

16' ''Ministry of InLcTior: In.iundions on Sc~urity and Ideology for Citizens and Rcsidcnb," Saudi Press 

.·lgenCJ'- March 7, 2014. Ch!!rri{\V\V\V spa.guv sa/vic\vstoJ:I.J!J:ui?ncw8id=120()7(12} 

"UAE Cabinet Approves List of Designated Terrorist Organizations, Groups," Emirates News Agency, 

Novemher 16,2014. (http://wam.adenidetaiis/1.19527247XXH) 

"Cabinet Approves Ten·orist Organizations List," Bahrain _NeH'S Agenc,v, November 4, 2016. 

(lilln..J/\\ ww.bn:·Ltili£portul/c·n/ne\\ s/721645); Qalar National Counterterrorism Commitlee, Qatar Ministry 

of the Interior. "Terrorist Designations List (1 0/25/20 17)" October 25, 2017. accessed April 23, 2018. 

(hlLp-;://nctc.moi.wo\ .q<JJ1i<:>!.1tlTIIl)~ Qatm National CounlL-'TLL-Tiori::;m Committee, QJtar Mini::;try of the 

Interior, '·Terrorist Designations List (3/21/2018)" March 21.2018, accessed April23, 2018. 

(https://nctc.moi. gov. ga/list2.htrnl) 168 Ibid., lJ.S. State [)epm1ment, "Amendments to the '['enorist J)esignation of l,ashkar e-'J'ayyiba,·' April 2, 

201 K (httns://v:.:v·i\V.state.gov/rlpa/prs/ps/20 1 X/04/~JiQL25.htm) 

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The U.S. should work intensively to convince these governments to all issue such 

lists, to post and update them publicly, and to harmonize them with the American 

understanding of terrorist organizations, as represented by the U.S. government's 

lists of Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. 

Most notably, the continued absence of any Palestinian terrorist groups from all of 

these lists is inexcusable. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are Iraniansponsored terrorist groups that intentionally and admittedly target civilians. Our 

true allies against I.R.G.C. aggression must be persuaded to acknowledge the 

terrorist nature of these Palestinian terror groups in public and not just in private, 

and to act against these organizations accordingly. 

Additionally, we should work with our Gulf allies to ensure that they designate more 

South Asian terrorist groups in order to stem the flow of funding from private Gulf 

donors to these groups. Thus, the U.S. must persuade the majority of our Gulf allies 

to publicly ban as terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani Group, the 

Pakistani Taliban, and, yes, even the Afghan Taliban. That means the U.S. must 

seriously consider finally designating the Afghan Taliban as the terrorist group that 

we all know it is. Given Lashkar-e-Taiba's repeated efforts to rebrand itself,169 

members of the G.C.C. should also outlaw that group's aliases and affiliates. 

The U.S. could also garner appreciation by designating certain groups that our Gulf 

allies consider terrorists but that we have not yet designated as such. The U.S. has 

not designated Saraya al-Ashtar, an I.R.G.C.-sponsored terrorist group that seeks to 

overthrow the government of Bahrain. Since the U.S. has already designated 

individual leaders of Saraya al-Ashtar, this should not be too difficult a step.170 

The U.S. should also consider whether the Iranian-backed Houthi movement in 

Yemen meets the criteria for designation as a terrorist group. Not only does the 

group's motto include the phrase "death to America, death to Israel, damn the jews," 

but it has also been firing rockets at civilian areas deep into Saudi territory as well 

as at civilian ships in the Red Sea.171 

Z. Find Additional Ways to Combat Iran's Sponsorship of Terror 

The U.S. should also seek other ways to cooperate financially with our Gulf allies 

against Iranian terror sponsorship. 

169 U.S. State Departn1ent, "Punendments to the Ten·mist Designation of Lashkar e-Tayyiba;· April 2, 

2018. (lJ_itps://\VVV\V sl_ill_~uv/r/pa[Drl!LJ~s/20 l&0·-1/21l0 l2...:'2JH.I!J) 17" Tzvi Kahn & David Andrew Weinberg. "U.S. Sanctions Bahrainis Linked to Iran-Backed Group:· 

Foundation For Defimse ofDemocracies. MCirch 22, 2017. (http://\.\\\ \V .dcfcndJcmucnJc\ .orw/ntcdi::Jhit/tz\'i-kahn -us-sanctions-bahrainis-linkcd-to-iran-backed-g:roupf) 171 Bruce Riedel, ""What You Need to Know About the Latest Ilouthi Attack on Riyadh,'. Brookings, March 

27. 201X. 

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Most notably, the Chairman and Ranking Member of this full Committee have 

introduced legislation that should be a model for joint action against Iran's I.R.G.C. 

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Economic Exclusion Act (H.R. 5132) would 

broaden U.S. sanctions against economic entities controlled by Iran's I.R.G.C. and the 

foreign entities with whom they do business. 

The Anti-Defamation League endorses this legislation and will be lobbying for it 

when we bring volunteers to Capitol Hill next month. 

America's Gulf allies have economic leverage that they could use to dissuade 

companies in Europe and East Asia from enriching companies that are controlled by 

the I.R.G.C. 172 The U.S. can encourage Gulf governments to use this influence in such 

areas as the energy and petrochemical industries, construction contracting, and 

sovereign wealth fund investments to impose effective secondary sanctions of this 

sort. Further, the U.S. can help the G.C.C. states implement such sanctions by 

identifying those I.R.G.C.-controlled entities that international firms should avoid. 

The U.S. should also urge Dubai and Kuwait to stop granting access to Iran's 

terrorist-enabling Mahan Airlines, not least because failing to do so has already 

exposed service-providers in those locations to the possible risk of U.S. sanctions. 

The U.S. should also clear up existing uncertainty about whether or not Oman is 

permitting Iranian weapons smuggling across its land and sea borders. If so, then 

transparency would create added urgency to resolve the issue. And if not, then 

Muscat deserves a clean bill of health. 

Lastly, the U.S. should work with Abu Dhabi to limit opportunities for Iranian 

sanctions-busting via Emirati territory, subjecting economic free zones in the 

U.A.E.'s smaller emirates to stronger federal or international oversight. 

3. Dry Up Terrorist Safe Havens 

Terrorists continue to enjoy safe havens in several U.S. allied countries. America can 

and should do more to persuade these governments to turn over a new leaf. 

One natural tool U.S. officials have at their disposal is the bully pulpit. They can 

highlight and condemn terrorist safe havens in public remarks and to the press. 

They can do so through international forums, such as the Trump administration's 

recent efforts to place Pakistan on a watch list of the Financial Action Task Force for 

177 David Andrew Weinberg & Mark Dubowitz, "Where Obama Fails on Iran Sanctions, the Gulf States 

Can Step In," Wall '"'freeL.lournul, ~'ehn1ary 21, 2016. (http~:I/\YWVY.\vsj.c~,]JH!.::nticles/·whcre-obamtl-fails-­

on-l_ran -sanctions-the-2ulf-state:>.-con-step-fn-1·t5eSOW)().1 0) 

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terror finance negligence.173 The U.S. can also declassify intelligence to expose 

embarrassing details about the activity of terrorist operatives in these safe havens. 

The next secretary of state is unlikely to designate such countries as state sponsors 

of terrorism, but he or she can still do a more honest and accurate job in providing 

annual evaluations as to which foreign governments are in violation of Section 6(j) 

of the Export Administration Act. This statute requires the secretary to identify any 

foreign government that tolerates part of its territory being used by terrorist 

operatives to conduct training, recruitment, financing, or other terrorist activities. 

With regard to Hamas safe havens, there is clearly one G.C.C. state that should be 

listed by Foggy Bottom. Listing Qatar as the law requires under Section 6(j) of the 

E.A.A. would impose licensing for exporting certain dual use goods the U.S. wouldn't 

want falling into hands of terrorists anyway, such as advanced rocket equipment, 

cyberattack technology, and precursors for weapons of mass destruction. 

Finally, Congress should pass the Palestinian International Terrorism Support 

Prevention Act (H.R. 2712), which A.D.L. endorsed last year. With this bill, Congress 

would be authorizing additional penalties against those governments that provide 

material support to Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 

Members of Congress from both parties have written at least six separate letters to 

the executive branch or the Qatari embassy in Washington since 2013 raising 

concern about Hamas's operational presence in Qatar, including as recently as two 

such letters in November. 171 U.S. concern over this issue will not- and should notgo away, and action is needed now more than ever. 

173 Salman Masood, "AI [l.S'. Urging. Pakistan lo Bf' Placf:'d on Terrorism-Financing Lis/,., .iVelv York 

Tilnes, February 23, 2018. Q~!ln \\ w .nv lime'-'.CCH.l!/20 l8/Q2!.22_/world/_u:'ilJ.!.illu ki "tan-1 ~rror-rimmcelist.html) 

174 Letter led by Reps. Peter Roskam and John Barrow to Qatari Ambassador to Washington Mohamed alRumaihi. August 2. 2013. accessed April23. 2018. 

=~!Jill.!llij"-':!!.=!..illbSGZ~"Llliill==""!J!Jl.ill!C=wsw. Letter from Reps. Peter Roskam 

to Treasmy Secretmy 10,2014, accessed April23, 201X. 

(l~;/rosk_gm..J1QUSe.gi)v/sites/rosk1nl]mu~Q_y_ifi1es/B-..2§kml!!_'?_~nnau L:...~ter?/n~Oto~'U2.QSc~tw~:ilu20re?::!~ 

2illJ..ill.iJI.Jlill.}; Letter led by Reps. Josh Golthein1er ::md Ron DeSantis to Tre::Jsury· Secretary Sleven 

Mnuchin. November 20,2017. accessed April23. 2018. 

(hl!p~://gotlll\.:irncr.bol;::;~:.gov/uploud.:,U'ilcs/20l7l l 201638.pd1)~ Ldl~r led by Reps. Brad Schneider and 

Robert Pittenger to U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley. November 21, 2017, accessed 

23. 2018. 

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4. End the Impunity of Violators 

Related to the issue of drying up terrorist safe havens is the imperative of ending the 

impunity of terror financiers throughout the Gulf, something all six G.C.C. states 

already pledged under the 2014 jeddah Communique. In those instances in which 

Gulf governments provide no evidence they plan to bring local terror financiers to 

justice, it is up to the U.S. and the international community to act. 

just as the U.S. pursues legal action against other kinds of terrorist operatives, the 

U.S. should identify those cases in which it can indict senior terror financiers who 

enjoy legal impunity abroad and seek their extradition. Doing so may help punish 

violators, deter future crimes by them or by others, and can add pressure on 

permissive jurisdictions to fix their conduct, all while bolstering the rule of law. 

Members of this Committee have previously written that the U.S. uses this tool far 

too rarely with regard to the dozens of instances in which Palestinian terrorists 

have killed or wounded American citizens,175 albeit with some recent exceptions.176 

For example, last year the U.S. unsealed criminal charges filed in 2013 against an 

accomplice to the 2001 Hamas bombing of a Sbarro pizzeria in jerusalem that killed 

two U.S. citizens and injured seven U.S. citizens, among the many other victims. 177 

The U.S. added that woman to the F.B.I.'s list of Most Wanted Terrorists and filed a 

warrant for her arrest. Like Hussam Badran, she was freed as part of the Gil ad Shalit 

prisoner deal and reportedly resumed her support for Hamas from abroad. 178 

As one of the alleged masterminds of that Sbarro pizzeria attack, Hussam Bad ran 

could also be a natural target for such public U.S. legal action. According to the 

Israeli government, he also directed the 2002 Passover bombing at the Park Hotel in 

m United States House of Representatives: Committee on F orcign Affairs, ""Reps. Walsh and Bem1an Send 

Bipm1isan Letter;· United Stales House of Representatives: Committee on March 1, 2012. 

Office of Public A!Tairs, "Individual Charged in Connection With 2001 I errorist Attack in Jerusalem 

That Resulted in Death of Americans," The of Justice. March 14. 2017. 

Ot11ce of Public Affairs, "Two letrmists Charged in Connection With the 2010 Murder of a lJ.S. National 

in Israel," Tlw Unilt>d Stalt's Deparlrnt>nl oj'Juslice, April 13, 2017. (http::-.:/1\;F\"'ii\?iT.justicc. goY/r!.l~!!LrrltwoiciTorists-L:hargc(l-0onnesjimJ-20 1 O-m1 mier:!..!_s-nalit_m;tl-i srad) 

"'Office of Public Affairs. "'Individual in Connection With 2001 Terrorist Attack in Jcmsalcm 

L!eom"tment ofJustice. March 14. 2017. 

Khaled Ahu Toameh, "'Female Tenorist I Iosts Talk Shm:v on I lamas Tv,·· .JenLsalem fJos( March 1, 

2012. OJ.It~J..\.:"IL,~t. ,:;om/M iddlc-1 ~;1st/l,.ernaJe-terrorist-hosts-tn 1k-~hmv-on -1--l ama~-'l'V) 

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Netanya, which killed another American citizen.179 In addition, he may be vulnerable 

to civil suits by the families of these victims. 

Similarly, it could make sense for U.S. officials to file indictments and seek the 

extradition of some of those U.S.-designated al-Qaeda financiers who are enjoying 

legal impunity in the Gulf. 

However, the challenge in those cases would be to identify instances in which the 

crimes of these terrorist facilitators are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Yet even in the 

absence of U.S. legal standing, Washington can take other steps to build pressure for 

legal action against these individuals, not least by drawing public attention to such 

cases and by issuing forceful U.S. condemnations of their legal impunity more often. 

5. Stop State Ransoms to Terrorists 

The money that foreign terrorist organizations are making from ransoms payments 

has skyrocketed in the past decade, and state ransoms from some governments in 

the Gulf and in Europe have played a large part. Yet when the Obama administration 

updated its strategy for hostage recovery last year, it did not articulate a matching 

strategy for deterring these foreign government payments of terrorist ransoms. 180 

As such, there is more that can be done in this regard. Most notably, the U.S. should 

shine a bright light on those governments that engage in this understandable but 

destructive and illegal practice. 

For example, Section 709 of Public Law 114-323 (the Department of State 

Authorities Act Fiscal Year 2017, which was passed in December 2016) required the 

executive branch to submit a report within 90 days indicating "which foreign 

governments are believed to have facilitated, directly or indirectly, the payment of 

ransoms" in the last year as well as details about those suspected transactions.181 

Yet a year has elapsed without the administration fulfilling its obligation under this 

law. Chairman Poe, your letter last month to Treasury Secretary Mnuchin urging 

him to explain why this deadline was not met and to give a timeline for its 

submission was an important action that deserves more attention. 1u2 Congress 

should keep urging the administration to fulfill this obligation and should pass new 

legislation to make such reporting a regular requirement instead of a one-time duty. 

179 Olsen Attomeys At Law, LLC, "United States Disttict Coutt I castem District of New York," Olsen 

Allorney8 AI Law, J1me 17, 2016. Qlttps:/h,Y""\'\\'.osellla\v.com/_~_t...)s/dcfmllt/files/Oh-17-

16 SJpHsJiJn.Lj~ndcd Complaint ECT~.2® 1

''' David Andrew ·'What To Do About the "'"'u"l'l"·u'~ 

November 17.2015. (lilll'ii!l:l>J.ill19ml!l'k'l0:~M'!:!iilili,gii'DWl::L"'2lli~:iillil:L!'il!illc:1!!.::.ili:':'!l~l:lh£:: 

S.l635 -Department Authorities Act, F isca1 Year 2017, (https://www.congress. gov/bill/114thcongres:,/:,enate-bi l l/1 Ol5/tcxt) 182 Letter from Representative led Poe to Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin, March 1 J, 201 K 

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6. Boost Government Capacity 

The United States cannot effectively quarterback its policies in the Gulf without 

ambassadors on the ground. As such, the administration must finally nominate 

ambassadors to fill longstanding vacancies in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as the 

new vacancy that recently opened up in the United Arab Emirates. 

The U.S. should also continue technical assistance to boost the counter terror 

finance capacities of our Gulf allies. That includes bilateral and multilateral training 

programs, helping to boost the authorities of local counter terror finance 

institutions, and even embedding U.S. officials in relevant local institutions when 

permitted. But we should never confuse a lack of capacity in some instances in the 

Gulf with a lack of will, which is so obviously manifest in some others. 

7. While Addressing the Gulf Standoff. Prioritize U.S. interests 

Undoubtedly, the U.S. should exert some degree of effort to heal the rift that has 

emerged among our Gulf partners. But a diplomatic solution for its own sake is not 

in U.S. interests. Rather, the U.S. should make sure that any steps it takes in 

addressing the Gulf standoff also address key U.S. concerns about terrorist safe 

havens and terrorist finance. That was one of the main reasons this crisis erupted in 

the first place, and if these problems are not resolved now, they may never be. 

As such, the executive branch should give the public and the press a more 

transparent assessment of what Qatar has and has not pledged under its bilateral 

terror finance M.o.U., as well as the extent to which it is or is not implementing those 

commitments. None of the other participants in this dispute should get a free pass, 

either. Kuwait, the dispute's main mediator, should be held accountable for allowing 

U.S.- and U.N.-designated terror financiers to operate openly or to work in public 

sector positions of authority. Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Bahrain should be urged 

to further differentiate themselves from other countries in their neighborhood by 

improving their terrorist designation lists, including by outlawing Hamas. 

The U.S. should also review the designations of individual terror financiers issued by 

the anti-Qatar quartet over the last year to assess whether any of those individuals 

not under U.S. sanctions should also be designated by the United States. Although 

some of the more politicized entries on this list certainly do not meet U.S. legal 

standards for designation, some other entries might. Even Qatar itself has recently 

sanctioned several of its own citizens who had been designated by the Arab quartet 

but are not currently under U.S. sanctions. 

Lastly, the U.S. should take steps to insulate counter terror finance cooperation from 

the ongoing Gulf standoff, which could linger on for years to come. For example, the 

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U.S. should work toward ensuring that Qatari officials are finally permitted to take 

their seats at the joint Terror Finance Targeting Center in Riyadh. 1H:; 

8. Address The Ideological Underpinnings of Terror Finance 

The U.S. government's first terrorist finance czar Stuart Levey wrote in 2010 that 

stopping terrorist finance requires not just ending the impunity of violators but also 

preventing people from embracing such support for terrorism in the first place. He 

explained that "unless the next generation of children is taught to reject violent 

extremism, we will forever be faced with the challenge of disrupting the next group 

of terrorist facilitators and supporters."1B4 

As such, the U.S. government must work intensively with its Gulf partners to end 

incitement in state-backed media outlets, by state-backed religious officials, and in 

state-sponsored school textbooks. Doing so is a crucial part of achieving the goal 

President Trump identified during his speech to Arab and Islamic leaders last year 

in Riyadh: combating terrorism and the extremism that inspires it.185 

183 Ian Talley & Gordon Lubold, "The Real Danger in Qatar-Gulf feud is Iran, U.S. Officials Say," Wall 

S"treet Journal, April 10, 2018. Q-Hips://\'1"\V\\. \\ sj.Gomiartlcle~/u-s-\\ onie~JI-rift-JSjJushing-emiratcStuart A. Levy, "Loss of Moncymm1 a Big Blow for Al-Qacda,'' The Washinf'lon, Post, .Tunc 6, 20 l 0. 

(http !/mvw.washingtonpo3t comhYp-dvn/contcnt/aniclc/20 ll)il)(ii04/AR20 100604042 7 l.html) 1

'' White !louse "President Speech to the Arab Islamic American Smnmit," May 21, 2017. 

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Weinberg. 

Ms. Erdberg, the Chair recognizes you for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. LEANNE ERDBERG, DIRECTOR, COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

Ms. ERDBERG. Thank you, subcommittee Chairs Poe and RosLehtinen, Ranking Members Keating and Deutch, and members of 

the subcommittees. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

I will summarize my remarks, which cover two main themes: The 

first, GCC progress to date; and the second, future recommendations. 

Since the September 11 attack, GCC counterterrorism efforts, as 

my co-panelists have noted, have been varied. But that should not 

discount the sincere progress in several key areas that I hope will 

continue. 

The first is on rehabilitation and reintegrating former terrorists 

back into society. This has long been a focus notably of Saudi Arabia, but also Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE. Disengagement and 

deradicalization programs are only growing in importance as countries grapple with the return of foreign terrorist fighters. 

The second is on religious engagement. Religious clerics in Saudi 

Arabia and other GCC nations have issued numerous fatwas denouncing terrorism and condemning ISIS. Ministries of religion are 

actively reducing the reach of hardline clerics. And GCC countries 

sponsor several initiatives on religious topics, such as the UAE’s 

support for the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies. 

The third concerns counterterrorism finance, which has been well 

covered by my co-panelists. 

The fourth is on military operations. As part of the Coalition to 

Defeat ISIS, as well as independently, GCC militaries capture and 

kill terrorists on the battlefield, and they provide training to other 

nations. 

And lastly, GCC countries are participating in leading several 

international counterterrorism and CVE efforts. To name a few, the 

UAE helped to establish the Hedayah Center, a CVE Center of Excellence located in Abu Dhabi. 

Qatar has donated generously to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, which is a public-private partnership 

devoted to funding community-level initiatives that address violent 

extremism. 

And Saudi Arabia’s voluntary contribution has enabled the 

United Nations to launch its own counterterrorism center devoted 

to these topics. 

But these discrete areas of progress have been unable to stem 

the tide of terrorism. Every day terrorists take innocent lives, they 

spew a hateful, violent vision of this world, and yet they have new 

recruits that are willing to die for their cause. That is precisely 

why we of the United States and GCC countries must do more to 

prevent young people from turning to terror in the first place. I 

would like to focus on a couple concrete, practical areas that are 

in deep need of future progress. 

The first, how do we know what works? We have to turn to research. It can provide outsiders and locals alike with the data and 

information they need to make meaningful progress. 

64

The second area starts with recognizing that we cannot simply 

message away the attraction of belonging to a community, and the 

commitment to be on a moral mission to resist injustice. What we 

can do is give people an opportunity to be part of a larger cause, 

create meaningful social bonds in service of a mission, and give 

them the dignity of ownership through the proven power of nonviolent action and organizing. 

The third is to unleash the power of religious figures far beyond 

merely challenging religious discourse. Instead, we need to start 

seeing them as key contributors to addressing community needs 

that may not be—appear to be religious in nature. 

The fourth concerns the security sector. When security forces fail 

to protect their citizens from threats, perpetuate cycles of abuse 

and corruption, or act with impunity, terrorists take these injustices to sow distrust and radicalize new recruits. On the other 

hand, police can be incredibly valuable in preventing radicalization 

by strengthening the trust of the people they serve, and tangibly 

improving the security and circumstances of their communities. 

The last, and the subject of the subcommittee’s hearing last 

month, is to empower women and encourage their participation 

more fully as contributors to efforts that counter violent extremism. 

In sum, preventing the advent of the next ISIS must go beyond 

countering the propaganda-filled messages, killing terrorist leaders, 

and addressing financial flows. The United States should encourage GCC partners to empower the communities, civil society, municipal authorities, and local practitioners that are on the front 

lines of this challenge every day. And it is time to demonstrate to 

the generations of youth across the Middle East that they have a 

stake in their future and their human dignity matters. 

We can build our collective success through sustained U.S. leadership, close partnership with allies, and a shared commitment to 

end this scourge together. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. And I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Erdberg follows:]

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United States Institute of Peace 

"Grading Counterterrorism Cooperation with 

the GCC States" 

Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade and the Subcommittee on 

the Middle East and North Africa 

Leanne Erdberg 

Director, Countering Violent Extremism 

United States Institute of Peace 

April26, 2018 
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Introduction 

Subcommittee Chairs Poe and Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Members Keating and Deutch, and 

members of the Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to testify on "Grading 

Counterterrorism Cooperation with the GCC States.'' Your attention to the issues of terrorism 

and violent extremism in the Arabian Peninsula is appreciated. 

I am the Director for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) at the United States Institute of 

Peace, although the views expressed here are my own. USIP was established by Congress over 

30 years ago as an independent, national institute to prevent and resolve violent confEcts abroad, 

in accordance with US. national interests and values. The rise and expansion of violent 

extremism continue to pose a significant threat to global peace and stability. Understanding what 

drives violent extremism and how to address it is a USIP priority. 

I worked, earlier in my career, at the State Department and at the National Security Council stafl' 

at the White House where I focused on counterterrorism in the Middle East and Africa. My 

testimony is informed by these experiences as well as USIP' s work in contlict zones 

For this joint subcommittee hearing, I have been asked to comment on the progress America's 

GCC partners have made in combating violent extremism and where countries could continue to 

show progress to confront violent extremism and terrorists in the region. My testimony will 

cover the following questions (l) How have GCC countries addressed violent extremism and 

terrorism within their own national borders; (2) How have GCC countries addressed violent 

extremism and terrorism regionally and internationally; and, (3) What recommendations can 

enable future GCC efl'orts to go beyond eliminating today's terrorists and prevent terrorism from 

emerging in the first place? 

Overview 

The fragile and complicated geopolitical realities throughout the GCC countries cannot be easily 

separated- stances on Iran, Israel, Syria, andY emen- complicate the threat landscape, etTorts to 

assess counterterrorism success, and potential multilateral partnership opportunities. The 

dynamic and tluid political situations in the greater Middle East, including Qatar-GCC dynamics, 

varying support mechanisms in Iraq, and the ongoing war and ensuing humanitarian crisis in 

Yemen, will likely continue to take up much of the top-level attention of GCC leaders. 

Therefore, the US. should widen its outreach beyond governments and GCC countries should 

share responsibility and enable additional support to those best equipped to focus on countering 

the next generation of violent extremism- communities, civil-society, municipal authorities, and 

local practitioners. Radicalization and recruitment are often local, individually detailed, or 

contextually distinctive, so national-level efforts should include creating operating space for 

local action for combating extremism. 
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1. How have GCC countries addressed violent extremism and terrorism within their 

own national borders? 

There are three key areas where GCC countries have made some contributions within their own 

national contexts to address terrorism since the attacks of September 11, 2001: (A) rehabilitation 

and reintegration; (B) religious leader engagement; and, (C) countering the tinancing of 

terrorism. 

A. Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs 

GCC countries, most notably Saudi Arabia, realized early in the War on Terror that those 

incarcerated for terrorism-related crimes would eventually be released back to their home 

communities. Saudi Arabia's programs, the most well-known and documented in the 

international press, focus on providing incentives to otienders to give up previously held 

behaviors and beliefs- including education, counseling, financial incentives, monitoring, and 

reintegration. Other GCC countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE, have also 

invested in rehabilitation programs for terrorist offenders. That said, there is ongoing debate over 

whether such programs should focus on ''disengagement" - no longer undertaking violent 

activities- or on "deradicalization' -rejecting previously held radical ideological views- or 

which is more effective or even plausible. While improvements can be made, the use of 

rehabilitation and reintegration programs to reintroduce former terrorist otl'enders back into 

society is an important step forward for GCC states. Addressing rehabilitation and reintegration 

is likely to increase in importance as countries grapple with the return of foreign tighters where 

GCC countries have relevant experience to share. 

B. Religious Engagement 

Given the centrality of religion for the communities within the GCC countries, it is unsurprising 

that religious engagement has been a part of most, if not all, GCC countries' efforts to counter 

terrorism. This is against the backdrop of the consistent propaganda from terrorist groups that 

use religiosity to justify their barbaric and nihilistic objectives. Some of the highest religious 

clerics in Saudi Arabia and other GCC nations have issued numerous fatwas denouncing 

terrorism, contesting ISIS and al-Qaeda' s interpretation of Islam. Saudi Arabia has also recently 

modernized education curricula, including textbooks; though reversing the harms from past 

teachings containing intolerance and violence will take some time. The Kingdom has also 

established several institutions dedicated to countering violent extremism. The UAE provides 

support to the F arum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies, a group of prominent Sunni and 

Shia scholars from across the Muslim world led by the renowned Sheikh Abdallah bin Bayyah. 

The Forum seeks to address the root drivers of violent extremism, advance protection for 

religious minorities, and support Muslim peacebuilders in countries experiencing violent 

extremism. These etiorts, and others at the local level, that encourage (or at times monitor) local 

religious leaders to ensure they denounce terrorism and terrorist groups have been welcome 

additions to the counterterrorism arena. However, the religious landscape is far from simple. In 

some cases, research shows that state-led etl'orts that restrict religious spaces can actually fuel 

extremism. Additionally, state-endorsed messaging on religious matters that ignores state failures 

to meet citizens needs can come off as hollow and meaningless to at-risk audiences. 

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C. Countering the Financing of Terrorism 

Following the attacks of September II, 2001, the international community built up significant 

infrastructure, laws, and policies to deny terrorists the use of international financial systems. 

GCC countries responded by creating financial intelligence units (Fills), affirming international 

commitments [such as membership in the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task 

Force (MENAF ATF)], and disrupting terrorism tinance with criminal justice operations within 

the Gulf region. Ministries began providing specialized training programs- with assistance from 

the US. and other international partners -to ensure that for financial institutions, criminal justice 

officials, and even customs and border officials, had training and were able to curb terrorist 

financing within national borders and transnationally. While institutional vulnerabilities and 

weaknesses endure, increasing state capacity led to significant improvement in curbing some 

terrorist financing. That said, choices by certain GCC governments or individuals living in those 

countries (who may or may not be known to governments) often call into question GCC 

commitment and dedication to stemming the flow of funding to all terrorist groups. 

2. How have GCC countries addressed violent extremism and terrorism regionally and 

internationally? 

International political pressure and security realities have spurred action by the GCC and 

member governments to address violent extremism through a variety of international avenues of 

cooperation mainly focused outside their own borders. These regional and international efforts 

take on new significance to reassure partners that counterterrorism efforts can and will persist 

even as questions of GCC cohesion and bilateral uncertainties remain. 

A. Militarily 

A primary way in which GCC countries are countering terrorism are their military efforts to 

capture and kill terrorists, deny the groups safe haven, and liberate populations from terrorist 

rule. GCC countries participate in the Coalition to Defeat ISIS; they also train and equip other 

nation's militaries to gain new counterterrorism skills, understanding, and assistance. While the 

outputs of eliminating terrorists tram the battlefield are obvious, the lasting outcomes of these 

etiorts are t1eeting if the next pipeline of recruits are not stopped. 

B. International Cooperation 

Less apparent, but important have been the strides that GCC countries have made to cooperate 

and lead international efforts globally focused on counterterrorism and violent extremism. For 

instance, the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are all members of the Global Counterterrorism 

Forum (GCTF), an informal, multilateral counterterrorism platform that promotes sharing good 

practices, experiences, expertise, and tools to promote a long-term counterterrorism approach. 

Borne out of the GCTF, the UAE helped establish the Hedayah Center, which "aims to be the 

premier international center and operational platform for expertise and experience to counter 

violent extremism by promoting understanding and sharing of good practices." Hedayah's work 

spans tram training otlicials to producing research. Given that mandate, starting in 2013, USIP 

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helped build the capacity ofHedayah on community-oriented policing for CVE. USIP focused 

on helping Hedayah train institutional-levellaw enforcement and concentrated on enabling 

police academies to adopt content that enhanced the capacity of the police to develop 

partnerships with the community and respond professionally, in order to gain credibility and 

legitimacy as service providers, a key CVE imperative. 

In addition to contributing to Hedayah, the UAE also contributed to an international effort to 

counter ISIS's attacks in the digital sphere with the Sawab Center Digital Communications Hub 

to Counter Extremist Propaganda (Sawab Center) Sawab Center, co-established by the UAE and 

US, is used and sta±Ied by several nations participating in the Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and 

focuses on producing counter and alternative narratives to prevent youth from joining ISIS. Qatar 

has donated generously to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), a 

public-private partnership devoted to funding community-level initiatives to address violent 

extremism and resilience. This burden sharing effort continues to be of significant importance. 

GCC countries have also participated substantially in UN e±Iorts to counter terrorism and violent 

extremism, including, Saudi Arabia's voluntary contribution to enable the United Nations 

Secretariat to launch the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT). 

3. What recommendations can enable future GCC efforts to go beyond eliminating 

today's terrorists and prevent terrorism from emerging in the first place? 

The sudden rise of ISIS was perhaps the starkest example of how terrorism had metastasized in 

innumerable ways post-9/11 Tt clarified for many national security experts that decapitation of 

terrorist leaders and the networks that supported them did not preempt new permutations of 

terror groups from emerging. With the acute problem ofiSIS in focus, new policy 

recommendations emerged, and international consensus strengthened around the need to address 

the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. From the United States' Gulf allies to 

NATO allies, all agreed that today's terrorist networks had reached a level of pervasion and 

sophistication that required concerted, long-term action beyond security measures. Terrorist 

groups' violent acts, intolerance, and aggravation of existing conflicts must be met with helping 

vulnerable communities resist terrorist recruitment and insisting that governments do more to 

meaningfully address the underlying grievances violent extremists continually exploit. It also 

requires GCC partners avoiding counterproductive actions, such as using anti-terror legislation to 

silence critics and suppress dissent or engaging in military actions that result in unnecessary 

civilian causalities. 

To improve and expand upon their current activities, GCC countries can devote additional 

attention and resources to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) efforts to stem 

the emergence of tomorrow's terrorists. Governments can do much more to enable individuals in 

civil society- who are often better able to understand local vulnerabilities and perform the 

actions necessary to address such conditions- to support their full participation in the solution. 

Nations can take systematic steps that address the underlying social, political, economic, 

governance, cultural, and development-related conditions that contribute to individuals 

radicalizing and communities joining violent extremist groups. Many of the mechanisms needed 

to craft and implement these improved practices already exist. From examining the sources of 

radicalization to helping civil society leaders address violent extremism in their own 

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communities, progress can be made to reduce the highly dynamic and constantly evolving threat 

of violent extremism. 

A. Research 

Empirical research, locally driven and contextualized, provides a foundation for building 

etiective and targeted policies or programs to prevent and address violent extremism and 

terrorism. It can provide outsiders and local citizens alike with the data and information they 

need to make decisions. Research can help distinguish when to use a scalpel and when to use a 

hammer. For its part, starting in 2016, USIP partnered with the State Department to incubate the 

RESOLVE Network, which stands for "Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism." Today, 

RESOLVE is assisting researchers and policymakers to uncover and analyze which factors and 

trends contribute to the growth and spread of violent extremist groups. RESOLVE helps put 

locally-driven research and empirically sound insights into the hands of national and 

international policymakers to enable the development of actionable policy recommendations 

capable of improving counterterrorism and CVE practices. 

B. Enable Nonviolent Action 

Prevailing thinking on radicalization and recruitment is mostly deductive- the premise being, if 

experts know what the terrorists use in recruitment efforts, and then governments or others 

address those grievances, then individuals and communities will be less likely to join terrorist 

groups. An inductive lens leaves open the possibility that being part of a terrorist group is more 

complex than the reasons a member said he joined. If group identity and the perception of power 

are part of what makes terrorist groups attractive, alternatives should give young people vehicles 

to fill those needs positively. Engaging in nonviolent campaigns and movements gives people an 

opportunity to be part of a larger cause, create meaningful social bonds in service of a mission, 

and have the power to address concerns collectively. Nonviolent resistance using methods like 

strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and satire has been shown empirically to be twice as effective 

as armed struggle in achieving major political goals. 

Nonviolent movements empower their participants- including disenfranchised youth- and build 

bonds of trust between groups in society and between citizens and their governments. They help 

pull away extremist recruits by offering an effective alternative for communities to combat 

corruption, exclusion, and other injustices that fuel violent extremism. They give dignity of 

ownership- they are not premised on waiting for governments to help address grievances or 

outside actors to counter narratives. They give people the ability to act for themselves and see the 

results of their actions. Investing in the transfer of knowledge and skills in community 

organizing and strategic nonviolent action is an under-appreciated but potent way to stem violent 

extremism. 

C. Engage Religious Figures Beyond Ideology 

While religion is extremely significant in today's most virulent terrorist groups, it interacts with 

a wide range of other factors. The causality between religion and violent extremism is far from 

linear. What remains clear is that formal and informal religious leaders are integral members of 

civil society and key contributors to public and political discourse. They should be included in 

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efforts to address violent extremism. Partnering with religious leaders and faith communities to 

impact this challenge is critical. Religious leaders are already engaging on the religious topics 

distorted and tw·isted by terrorist ideologies, but room remains for them to engage on addressing 

the broader swath of conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Religious fi6'llres are well 

placed to- and often already are- connecting state policies to community needs and responding 

to the broader economic, social, and psychological drivers of violent extremism that may not 

appear to be "religious" in nature. In other words, their effectiveness as agents to prevent or 

counter violent extremism goes far beyond their ability to challenge violent religious discourse. 

Religious figures could play a leading role in promoting nonviolent alternatives to combatting 

the injustices that tile! violent extremism; however, support by national and foreign governments 

and international organizations to religious figures doing this work must advance with an 

understanding for their legitimacy, security, and concern about co-optation for it to be credible. 

D. Security Sector Improvements 

Security forces can help prevent and counter radicalization if they tangibly improve security for 

civilians they are charged with protecting. They can do so by responding to violent extremist 

threats and by working with communities based on transparent partnerships to solve concrete 

security problems in ways that respect human rights. But in many countries around the world, 

including some GCC countries, governments use people's fear of their security forces to 

maintain power. Where trust between police and the people they serve is weak, few mechanisms 

exist to bring security officials and civilians together to address security challenges. Working 

with the security sector to help build skills that allow them to know what to look for and earn the 

public's confidence and then bringing them together with communities to build cooperation 

enables communal progress on urgent security concerns. 

When security forces fail to protect citizens from security threats, including terrorist violence, or 

perpetuate cycles of abuse and corruption and act with impunity, violent extremists take these 

deficits to sow distrust and radicalize individuals and communities. Abuses and mistreatment by 

state sanctioned officials -from the humiliation of paying corrupt officials to victimization from 

sexual violence that scars for generations- generate fear, distress, and disable meaningful 

cooperation betw·een the citizens and the state. 

Moreover, during significant military operations, states must take care to respond etiectively and 

avoid responses that may end up being counterproductive. The responsibility to prevent civilian 

casualties during state-led operations undertaken by GCC countries must be a priority. All 

partners, including the U.S., should insist on this imperative. Beyond the reality that certain 

behaviors are outside of norms, laws, and moral standards, they also play into the hands of 

terrorists who exploit such abuses in their efforts to recruit and radicalize. 

E. Enable the Population to have a Stake in Their Future 

Cultural and political biases and past practices often constrain women from being fully engaged 

as positive contributors to etiorts that prevent and counter radicalization to violence and 

extremism. Failing to leverage the role of women and girls in peace and security is simp! y 

inadequate, especially given women's primary stake in countering the terrorist narratives that 

often target their rights. Meaningful women's participation in security approaches, deepens 

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understanding of the threat and leverages the unique roles and voices of women in the context of 

preventing violent extremism locally, and must be further embraced by GCC countries for them 

to achieve sustainable progress against terrorism. 

Conclusion 

The complexity associated with being able to uncover, understand and address the dozens of 

factors that contribute in differing ratios to every individual that joins a terrorist organization is 

astonishing. However, that does not mean that states cannot be motivated to make progress. 

In 2016, the Community of Democracies published an empirical study examining terrorism and 

liberal democracies and found that weak institutional capacity, weak political legitimacy, and 

breakdowns in the social contract between citizens and governments are all related to the 

underlying drivers of violent extremism. Indeed, preventing radicalization, recruitment, and the 

advent of the next ISIS must go beyond countering propaganda-filled messages and addressing 

flnancial flows. Nations can empower their civil society, take on governance reforms, make their 

politics more inclusive, and respect human rights- all ways that demonstrate to generations of 

youth that they have a stake in their own future and their human dignity matters. Despite 

important progress on aspects of counterterrorism such as military efforts, religious engagement, 

and international cooperation, GCC partners have room for improvement on overall scores. 

From the GCC to countries across the globe, there is much room for improvement in countering 

terrorism. Progress is possible, however. Through sustained U.S. leadership and concerted efforts 

to promote good governance and civil society partnerships, we can build our collective success. 

Thank you for your continued focus and attention to this critical issue. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

The view expressed in this testimony are those of the author and not the U.S. Institute of Peace. 

7 
73

Mr. POE. Thank you for your testimony. I thank all of the panelists for your excellent insight. 

Now we will allow members to ask questions. The Chair will 

yield its time, without objection, to the gentlelady from Florida and 

recognize her for her questions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I don’t know why you 

are buttering me up. I fear, I fear tomorrow. But thank you, Chairman Poe. 

In my opening statement I mentioned that despite a lot of success in stopping terrorist operations since 9/11 we still have a long 

way to go in getting at the root causes of terrorism. And I am hopeful that we are going to start seeing more of a commitment from 

the Gulf in that to this end. 

Two questions. Can you share some specific examples of our Gulf 

partners tackling the root causes of terrorism? 

And, secondly, how can Congress push the Gulf to take more of 

a leadership role in this area? Or is that something that we should 

not be involved in doing and let our partners do the pushing? 

Ms. ERDBERG. I would be happy to start with the first one particularly. 

So, I think that each and every one of the GCC partners has 

taken internal national efforts to try and address the root causes. 

Although we know that this phenomenon is very global, and so addressing only their own home communities is only part of the challenge. 

But, for instance, Kuwait has prepared a national plan to reinforce moderation, which is a collective interagency effort among 

many Kuwaiti parts of their executive branch, the Ministry of Education and Information, of Islamic Affairs and Youth. And they are 

initiating—I think it is dozens of initiatives at the local level that 

are designed to try and prevent youth from joining violent extremist networks. 

Oman, which doesn’t get a lot of air time in this place, but in 

2014 the Grand Mufti had published an essay calling for tolerance 

and rejecting extremism. And he has had in his weekly televised 

program, reference to those same themes pretty regularly. 

Qatar, as I mentioned, is a generous donor to the Global Community and Engagement and Resilience Fund, which is a really interesting way to get money into the hands of communities that are 

doing local level initiatives related to violent extremism. They also 

have instituted a number of CVE programs that are directed at its 

own citizens, particularly through the vector of education. 

I think that is a start on the horizon. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And I will ask the other panelists. Thank you, Doctor. 

Mr. WEINBERG. So there are a couple of interesting examples of 

Gulf states trying to tackle what we might consider root causes of 

terrorism. I think the UAE-backed Forum for Promoting Peace in 

Muslim Societies, and related Muslim Council of Elders is in part 

a sort of state rivalry thing with Qatar relative to Qatar’s International Union of Muslim Scholars. But, it is also a countering violent extremism, countering extremist ideology effort. 

I mean, if you look at the Qatari-backed IUMS, this is Yusuf alQaradawi, who has previously authorized in fatwas attacks against 

74

Americans in Iraq. He has wished—he has described the Holocaust 

as divine punishment, and wishing for more of that against the 

Jews, but truly horrible stuff. 

The Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies had a Jewish-Christian-Muslim religious leaders’ dialog in Washington a couple months ago on exactly sort of the opposite of that: How we can 

all work together in promoting more tolerant messaging within religious communities. 

The U.S.-UAE joint Sawab Center is specifically an initiative as 

part of the U.S.—as part of the Global Coalition Against ISIS. It 

is a center for countering the messages that ISIS has online. 

And if you look more broadly at Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 Modernization Program, I mean the general idea behind this is to give 

the youth a greater stake in their societies and greater opportunities to have a vibrant economic future. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And, Ms. Bauer? 

Ms. BAUER. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Should we do more or do we let others push? 

Ms. BAUER. So, countering violent extremism in the Gulf isn’t a 

specific area of my research. But I have spent time in the Gulf. 

Lived there for 21⁄2 years and also traveled there recently. And I 

would say that, that just in observation I have seen a difference in 

the recent efforts the Gulf states are taking compared to just a few 

years ago. 

In a recent trip to Saudi Arabia I had a chance to tour the 

ETIDAL Center with a delegation. And noticed, noted really, that 

their rhetoric had shifted to much more focus on the ideology as 

the underpinning of the issue. And really the violence is just a 

symptom of——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Moving in the right direction. 

Thank you. Excellent panelists, Mr. Poe. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. 

The Chair recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Keating, from 

Massachusetts for his questions. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, a person I am impressed with greatly in terms of his 

wisdom on these matters is Secretary Mattis. Recently in a group 

meeting that we had he really impressed upon all of us there his 

view of military. His view of the military is to be there as a foundation, a framework, and support for our diplomatic efforts. That it 

is diplomacy first, and the military’s place is just to provide incentive and support for that. And that is coming from our Secretary 

of Defense. 

We have work to do in that regard, I believe, in our own country. 

But can you comment on that philosophy with the GCC states, is 

there any progress with recognizing the diplomatic side first and 

the military side second? Jump in anyone. 

Ms. ERDBERG. I think the challenge is bigger than words. And I 

think with our defense sector, and as well as many of the other 

GCC defense sectors, the scalability of the amount of personnel and 

resources that they have devoted to the counterterrorism challenge 

is so far outweighing the amount of diplomats, development profesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:57 Jun 05, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\042618\29967 SHIRL
75

sionals, peace builders, and others who are also committed to this 

challenge. 

And so I absolutely agree with the Secretary on this premise that 

diplomacy first and defense second. But, when you look at the 

amount of people who are putting their brains toward solving this 

challenge, we need a little bit more of a right sizing in that approach as well. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. Anyone else want to jump in? 

I will, if you are not willing, I just had another question. We 

spoke, I did my remarks, Ms. Erdberg did too, I think Ms. RosLehtinen did too, about the role of women. Now, this presents a 

great challenge culturally in many of these countries, too. What 

progress has been made to advance that role, given the cultural 

challenges and limitations among those countries? 

Ms. ERDBERG. I think you hit the nail on the head in your assessment of the challenge. I think we have seen with the new 

crown prince and the Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia at least the right 

first steps in this direction to try and enable more of the population 

to have a stake in their own future. 

I think in other GCC partner countries, we have seen, again, I 

would characterize it as mixed progress for the role of women. But 

I think, as my co-panelist was saying in her most recent visit, that 

things are changing in terms of the discourse. And I think that we 

are hopeful to see more positive steps in the role of women in this 

discourse as well. 

I would also just add to that that, the role of women in national 

security positions in these countries would make a big difference 

into showcasing how there is a different gender role in the decision 

making apparatus as well. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes. I recall being in Afghanistan and being part 

of the training for women in security and witnessing that. 

One of the concerns, though, and it was mentioned in testimony, 

is government failings, you know, really being incubators for unrest 

and terrorist activities, becoming real incubators, and whether it is 

a security failure or the inability to police financing, private financing for terrorism. How are we doing against corruption practices in 

that regard? Because that would be simply one area where that 

would be a real roadblock to better enforcement on both of those 

counts. 

Ms. ERDBERG. On the illicit finance issue more broadly, one of 

the obstacles to acting sometimes for states is that greater transparency in the financial system inevitably uncovers corruption as 

well. And so, in certain countries if you are asking counterparts to 

take steps against terrorist financing, or money laundering, or anything else, that is one of the problems is that corruption can be underlying it. 

But positive steps on these issues as a whole help, you know, 

help all, raise all of the boats. So it is a worthwhile effort. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Weinberg. 

Mr. WEINBERG. One of the challenges with governments in this 

region is that these are all monarchies. Right? And so there is a 

tendency to make decisions from the top down without a lot of regard for institutions. So in Saudi Arabia we saw a massive campaign against corruption in the last year. But it was, you know, 

76

really in a way that raised concerns about the extent to which 

there is rule of law and concerns from investors. 

So this is, you know, an ongoing challenge in the Gulf, as is the 

broader human rights question and the extent to which the U.S. 

is talking even about human rights as opposed to, say, arms sales 

when the President goes to the Gulf. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you for that comment. Thank all the witnesses for their comments. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Perry, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Weinberg, I had signed a letter sometime back asking for the 

declassification of the MOU. And I am just wondering what your 

thoughts are regarding whether that is problematic, and why it is 

problematic, or if it should be done? 

Mr. WEINBERG. Ms. Bauer, did you have anything you wanted 

to——

Ms. BAUER. This is your, you are talking about the MOU 

with——

Mr. PERRY. Regarding Qatar. 

Ms. BAUER. Regarding Qatar. So, so I don’t—to my knowledge it 

is not necessarily classified. And, in fact, I had a meeting with 

Qatari officials. They invited a number of people working on these 

issues to sit down and talk with one of them. And there was a 

memorandum from that meeting that was by one of the Qatari 

consultancies that was working for them that was submitted as 

part of the FARA filing. And so there is actually details in there 

of a Qatari official describing the contents of the MOU. 

Mr. PERRY. Have you seen our MOU? 

Ms. BAUER. I have not seen it. But as it was described to me by 

a Qatari official, it focuses primarily on increasing intelligence. 

Mr. PERRY. Do you know anybody in Congress that has seen the 

MOU? 

Ms. BAUER. Not to my knowledge. But as I was going to say, my 

understanding is it is primarily intelligence information sharing 

and prosecutorial capacity building are the two primary focuses of 

that, and under which the idea is to forward deploy, you know, 

U.S. Government personnel who can work with Qatar to build their 

capacity to prosecute, you know, these——

Mr. PERRY. That sounds great. I just wonder if the United States 

Government, the State Department, the administration’s concerned 

about, about Members of Congress divulging classified information 

in that regard because I haven’t seen it and I don’t know anybody 

in this place that has. 

But that having been said, let me, let me ask you this. Why just, 

why just Qatar’s been singled out by its neighbors? In some testimony in the beginning here you talked about Kuwait and their harboring of terrorists. Why not Kuwait as well? 

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, as you noted, you know, Qatar and Kuwait 

are the two Gulf states that have been identified as having the 

most problematic records in this regard in recent years. The top 

U.S. official for combating terror finance in 2014 called them both 

out as relatively permissive jurisdictions for terror finance. 

77

In 2017, a top U.S. official, who had just retired, again said there 

were terror financiers operating openly and notoriously in both 

countries. 

And as Ms. Bauer noted in her testimony, the Kuwaitis have basically been able to sidestep some of this scrutiny because of the 

pressure on Qatar. The——

Mr. PERRY. Do you know how much the United States taxpayer 

spends in Kuwait? How many people, how many boots on the 

ground we have in Kuwait? 

Mr. WEINBERG. I believe we have over 10,000 troops in Kuwait 

currently. It is primarily an Army access point for Iraq, as well as 

a lot of other U.S. military operations in the region. But that is no 

excuse for Qatari failure to prosecute terror finance using their territory. 

I mean, if you wanted to write a letter to the Embassy of Kuwait 

on this issue I think you would be free to raise some of these concerns. 

Mr. PERRY. But why have the neighbors seemed to be reluctant? 

Mr. WEINBERG. So, a lot of this I think comes down to Qatari 

support for the Muslim Brotherhood and related Islamic extremists, something that Kuwait hasn’t done to such an extent. And 

something that Qatar’s neighbors understandably view as a threat 

to their own national security. 

Mr. PERRY. Let me ask you this, we talked at least in here a fair 

amount about countering violent extremism as it relates to the 

GCC partners or countries. Other than Islamist extremism what 

other violent extremism do they experience in their countries? 

Mr. WEINBERG. I mean, that is, that is the main one. 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. That is what my thought was. So I wonder why 

we call it violent extremism instead of Islamist extremism, because 

that is what it is. You know, they don’t, they don’t have the Ku 

Klux Klan there, they don’t have white supremacist organizations, 

they have Islamist extremism. And I think it is important that we 

call it what it is because it is important to recognize the problem 

if you are going to solve the problem. 

I would just beseech everybody in the room that that is what we 

are dealing with here, folks. That is what it is, unfortunately. Nobody likes it but it is the reality of the matter. 

Mr. Chair, I yield. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I said in my opening remarks, I don’t see how it is helpful 

to heal the rift in the GCC if the United States takes sides in this 

conflict to say that one form of terrorism is worse than another. 

But I do think it will be helpful in the midst of this ongoing dispute 

to understand some of the accusations that we hear, like the 

Qataris are funding al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. Or the Saudis are 

exporting Wahhabism around the world. 

What do each of those mean for our security interests? And are 

both accusations accurate? Ms. Bauer? 

Ms. BAUER. So, starting with the issue of Qatari individuals financing al-Qaeda, I think in the oft-cited speech that Chairman 

Ros-Lehtinen cited as well by David Cohen in 2014, where he 

78

called Kuwait and Qatar a permissive jurisdiction, that was an interesting point in time where someone like me who follows very 

closely the changes in terrorist financing methodologies, there was 

a real resurgence in traditional forms of financing and donations 

coming from the Gulf. And these were from individuals. And they 

were coming via online platforms. This was the next generation, of 

kind, of the abuse of charities that we saw before. 

Going forward, I think that there has been an evolution not necessarily in the Gulf, but if you look at the recent indicators of the 

financial strength and the way that they are funding themselves of 

the downstream groups, you see that al-Qaeda in Syria has become 

more self-reliant. It has embedded itself into the society there. And 

so I think that is an important, important point to emphasize, that 

even that the most recent U.N. report said that al-Qaeda in Syria, 

where a lot of this money was flowing, was self-sufficient. That 

doesn’t mean they are not getting the funds, it just means that it 

is a different picture perhaps than it was in 2014. 

Mr. WEINBERG. Okay. So, with regard to the Saudi question first, 

and the Qatari one second, so the Saudi religious tradition is an 

evangelical one. It is a proselytizing tradition that seeks to spread 

its view of a purer, more proper Islam. And, you know, as a country here that is founded on religious liberty, you know, it doesn’t 

seem like our place to say whether one should or should not share 

their religious beliefs. 

But where U.S. national interests are involved is when Saudi religious proselytization overseas involves spreading of religious incitement or ideas tolerating violent extremism. Saudi textbooks are 

where that ideological challenge is most explicitly articulated 

today. So if you look at this current year’s Saudi Government-published textbooks they teach that major Jewish organizations are 

trying to destroy—most major Jewish organizations are trying to 

destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque and trying to—that Jews are trying to 

destroy Islam; that Christianity and Jews who disbelieve are the 

worst of all creatures; and that gay people, people who commit 

adultery, or people who convert away from Islam should be executed. 

So these are areas where, you know, Saudi teachings should 

probably be challenged by the U.S. 

On the Qatari question there are two parts. One is private——

Mr. DEUTCH. By the way, it is not probably. No need to modify 

that. Go on. 

Mr. WEINBERG. By all means. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Yes. 

Mr. WEINBERG. So, you know, part of that is that legislation on 

this issue should be marked up by this committee. Right? On the 

Qatari question there are two parts really. One of them is private 

terror financing, whether the government is continuing to turn a 

blind eye to some of these terror financiers or finally cracking down 

on them and putting them in jail with convictions. 

The other part is reports of government-provided terror financing. 

So, case after case after case after case after case, government 

officials have been quoted in major news reports claiming that the 

Qatari Government has paid multi-million ransoms to al-Qaeda. 

79

Last year there was a reported case of an alleged Qatari Government ransom of nearly $1 billion between a Hezbollah offshoot, alQaeda, and other extremist groups. 

And so, you know, the biggest thing that the U.S. Government 

can do is to shine a light on this. And that means——

Mr. DEUTCH. Dr. Weinberg, I appreciate it. 

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I want to give Ms. Erdberg just one, one—just if 

you could answer this question. Shouldn’t we be equally concerned 

about anything happening in the Gulf, isn’t it, that threatens our 

security interests? Shouldn’t that be the approach no matter what 

country, instead of getting involved in the middle of this dispute, 

why not, why not work to protect our interests first? 

Ms. ERDBERG. I would align myself with that. I think we need 

to be working to protect our interests first. I also think that a lot 

of the international efforts that the GCC countries have, have generated independently really give us a little bit more latitude to not 

have to only look at things through a bilateral lens. 

So I think there are over half a dozen CVE and CT cooperation 

mechanisms that involve the GCC countries, and they allow us to 

be able to work with each of the countries beyond just our national 

borders. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from Florida. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 

being here today on these important issues. 

Look, American leadership in the Middle East is extremely important, especially when it comes to things like combating terrorism. And I believe, as I have said repeatedly, that we are in a 

generational fight against terrorists. It probably honestly could 

take as long as it took to win the Cold War because it is going to 

take new generations within Islam, frankly, rejecting that ideology. 

And I believe that is it. 

But also a part of that, though, is understanding of tyrannical regimes like Syria. When you have an oppressive dictator, he actually 

creates an environment for terrorism to thrive because people feel 

like they don’t have a voice and they turn to what they see as the 

alternative, which is, in many cases, radicalism. And while many 

of the GCC countries have taken steps to fight terrorism and its 

support at home, there remain a few countries who are hesitant to 

combat some of that deep-rooted terrorism. 

I do have a couple of questions if you all want to answer, whoever can take them, about Qatar. I spent a little time there as a 

military pilot in that base. It is an extremely important base for 

us in terms of the war. But it is well known that Qatar is willing 

to turn a blind eye to some of the nefarious activities in their country, in many places playing both sides, such as some of the fundraising networks that benefit Hamas and the Taliban. 

2017 some of the countries severed diplomatic ties with Qatar 

over their willingness to host Islamic scholars and embrace the 

Muslim Brotherhood movement. In response, the administration in 

Qatar signed a MOU to fight support of terrorism within the 

Qatari society. 

80

What should Congress and the administration be willing to do to 

ensure that the Qatari Government is upholding the MOU? Anybody can start. 

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, it has been reported that that MOU is not 

classified. So, you know, there is—there doesn’t seem to be a 

sources and methods question about whether that can be made 

public. So, instead, it is a political question. 

And, you know, if we are going to see this Gulf crisis resolved 

on terms that address some of the core concerns, if we are going 

to see terror finance effectively combated in the Gulf, a key part 

of that is having Congress and the public be able to debate and 

know whether the terms of that MOU are being implemented and 

whether the term—and what those terms cover and don’t cover. 

I have written two monographs on Qatar and its record on terror 

finance over the years, and I can tell you case after case after case 

after case the Qataris have said to the U.S. Government, we are 

going to do things better. We are really serious now. We are monitoring these people. We are going after them. We are doing serious 

things. 

And then those individuals have been free again and re-engaged 

in terror finance. 

So, public scrutiny and congressional accountability on this issue 

are crucial. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And so if they fail to meet the standards, you 

know, that we kind of set forth with them or in these agreements 

are we limited in our response due to the strategic importance of 

Al Udeid, or are there other options? 

Mr. WEINBERG. Well, it is an excellent question. It is very tempting to think in all or nothing terms, to think, oh, well, we don’t 

have leverage, they have leverage over us because this base is 

there and we need this base. It is an important base. But no base 

is permanent. And Al Udeid is actually a perfect example of that. 

Mr. KINZINGER. And it is not the only game in town now. 

Mr. WEINBERG. Right. The Combined Air and Space Operations 

Center that is based at Al Udeid, the most important part about 

that base was in Saudi Arabia until 2003. And then for strategic 

other reasons we moved it. 

For those same reasons, the U.S. can keep that there, or, it can 

look at alternatives. It can move some forces out, or keep some 

forces in. And so it doesn’t have to be all or nothing and it doesn’t 

have to be permanent. It should be as long as this base is serving 

U.S. interests. 

Mr. KINZINGER. So, earlier this week the Saudi Foreign Minister 

said that Qatar needed to pay for American presence in Syria and 

needed to contribute forces because ‘‘if the U.S. pulled out from its 

military base in Qatar the Doha regime will fall in less than a 

week.’’ What do you make of that statement? Anybody? 

Mr. WEINBERG. I mean that was clearly, you know, throwing a 

little bit of shade at his neighbor across the way. Right? 

Mr. KINZINGER. They like to do that sometimes. 

Mr. WEINBERG. Yeah. I mean, the U.S. spoke out for Qatari national sovereignty at the start of the Gulf dispute last year. And 

without it there might have been concern about the stability or 

about the safety of the Qatari regime. 

81

Look, as you know better than most Members of Congress, Syria 

is a really, really complicated, but really important military problem. And this is not something that should be treated as a political 

football by actors in the region, it is something where we should 

work with them to see what they can do, as well as, perhaps 

through the Saudi Islamic military lines to combat terrorism, to 

build a legitimate, multilateral military contribution to help the 

U.S. in combating terrorism in Syria and beyond. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Excellent. 

Well, given my time, I will yield back. And thank you all for 

being here. 

Mr. POE. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Donovan, for his questions. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to continue 

what Mr. Deutch was saying about protecting U.S. interests first. 

What is our leverage in these countries? And we are talking 

about very wealthy countries. And many times the United States 

uses things like sanctions as leverage to get other countries to act 

in a certain way. What is our leverage when you are talking about 

people or countries of such great wealth? And I would like to ask 

everyone just their opinion. 

Ms. BAUER. I would just say that we have used sanctions in this 

case to try to create leverage. And that is part of the popular—the 

public exposure of those individuals who are operating there who 

have also been—a number of whom have also been designated at 

the U.N. The idea is to build pressure on Qatar to act. 

And think, as the congressman was asking about the terms of 

the MOU and how to, how to hold them accountable to that, this 

list of entities or individuals that the Qataris themselves put out 

last month as part of fulfilling that MOU, it is imperfect, and they 

need to continue to work on that, and we need to continue to pressure them to do that. 

They also are supposed to be pursuing a number of prosecutions 

which may or may not result in convictions eventually. We need to 

help build that prosecutorial capacity. And we need to tell them if 

they are not going to result in convictions, that they have some 

other plan in order to be able to monitor and make sure that these 

individuals who have been identified and they no longer possibly—

I don’t know—be able to operate in, you know, in a clandestine 

way, that others don’t follow behind them. But they need to build 

their capacity to do that. 

So there are things that we can pressure them to do. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Right. Those are great goals but how do we pressure them to do those things? How do we pressure them to do those 

prosecutions? How do we pressure them after those prosecutions to 

impose some type of penalty for that conduct? 

Ms. BAUER. I think that they have responded to U.S. pressure. 

My primary critique would be that they, others in the region have 

taken these issues on themselves and taken ownership of them. 

Qatar has responded to U.S. pressures. Some of these prosecutions 

were being pursued before the rift started. This isn’t all in response 

to the rift. It is in response to being called out starting in 2014 

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when they were called a permissive jurisdiction for terrorist financing. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Doctor? 

Mr. WEINBERG. Yeah. I think the U.S. legitimacy to speak about 

good or bad conduct in the region shouldn’t be underestimated. The 

U.S. did a lot of this, especially in 2014, and you saw Qatar and 

Kuwait took notice and they started trying to take steps to at least 

make the situation look better. 

But, additionally, you see the importance, as Chairman RosLehtinen noted, of the State Department CT reports every year of 

country reports on what these countries are or are not doing. It is 

important information that shines light on good or bad practices. 

Members of Congress have also played an important role, in this 

regard, with letters. By my count, there are, I think, six letters 

from Congress to either the Executive Branch or to the Qatari Embassy on Hamas operations in Qatar, including signed by many of 

the members who are or have been in this room today. That is attention that can be helpful. 

The Export Administration Act, Section 6(j), does have legal requirements for dual licensing, for licensing of dual lease exports 

that these countries don’t want to see themselves listed under. And 

State is legally required to list countries every year that allow terrorists in their territory. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Wonderful. Ms. Erdberg? 

Ms. ERDBERG. I don’t know that I have that much to add. But 

I would say that there is also some encouragement that can be 

very, very powerful, both behind closed doors through the means 

of diplomacy, but also in the types of joint military exercises, joint 

police exercises. The ways in which we interact with officials at all 

levels of government can start to create more of a space for holistic 

conversation on some of these issues that sometimes is able to see 

behavioral change at the same level, if not more levels, than just 

the transactional leverage and sanctions that we have. 

So I hope that we are using all of, all of the tools at our disposal 

to try and change the bad behaviors that we seek to correct. 

Mr. DONOVAN. And for some of those we would like to see improvement in activity, any of our allies have influence on them, so 

if they are not heeding to our demands or our requests, or whatever we want to phrase them as, some of our allies have influence 

on those countries that can maybe encourage better behavior? 

Mr. WEINBERG. Absolutely. And, you know, the more the U.S. 

speaks in concert, for example, with our European allies on this 

issue it can be very effective. Additionally, international fora are 

important. 

So, if you look at U.S. designations with statements of the case 

about what terror financiers are doing in the Gulf, those are important, but so are U.N. terror finance designations. Those carry even 

greater authority. And the U.S. has been effective at getting joint 

designations in that regard, as well as joint designations with the 

Gulf governments. 

Additionally, the Financial Action Task Force is an important 

venue in this regard. The Trump administration is reportedly 

pressing for Pakistan to be put on a watch list for negligence on 

terror finance. That is something where U.S. partnership with 

83

other allies could create pressure on some Gulf governments as 

well. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Before my time has expired, and just for the 

record, I always take notice of what Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen 

says. 

Mr. POE. As you should. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank the members of the panel. 

Mr. Weinberg, is it Weinberg, pronounced correctly? You spoke 

in verbatim earlier saying that it might help moving forward with 

GCC states to give the youth, and I quote, ‘‘a greater say in their 

societies.’’ The curriculum under which these young people are educated, can you speak to the secular or non-secular nature of that 

and whether or not it is inherent in that curriculum that biases 

against non-prevalent denomination, states, et cetera might be 

common? 

Mr. WEINBERG. I will speak to Saudi Government-published textbooks in this regard because that is the one where I have actually 

read a fair number of the books. 

Mr. GARRETT. That is where I am going. 

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes. It is a serious, serious problem. 

The Islamic State in Syria actually was using Saudi Government-published textbooks until, I believe, it was 2014 or 2015 when 

they published some of their own. I mean, this is——

Mr. GARRETT. And who is—I know I am interrupting you, and 

not to be rude. 

Mr. WEINBERG. No, by all means. 

Mr. GARRETT. By the way, welcome back to the Foreign Affairs 

Committee. 

Who is the number one exporter of Arabic language textbooks on 

the planet Earth? 

Mr. WEINBERG. You know that, that is a particular figure I am 

not familiar with. Saudi textbooks have——

Mr. GARRETT. Well, how about would you believe that it might 

possibly be Saudi Arabia? 

Mr. WEINBERG. Yeah. 

Mr. GARRETT. And is the curriculum in these books driven by 

Wahhabiist sentiment in general speaking terms? 

Mr. WEINBERG. Yes. And the Saudi Government has also published I think it is something like 300 million copies of their particular commentary on the Quran, which has problematic language 

that is not necessarily in there about Christians and Jews. 

Mr. GARRETT. Sure. And we could do this all day long but I have 

a finite amount of time. 

I spent a little bit of time in the Balkans and had occasion to become good friends with some local national Muslims who had siblings who were in schools. And primarily when we saw a place of 

worship destroyed it was an Eastern Orthodox or Catholic church 

that lay in rubble. But if it was a mosque, very, very frequently 

there was a green and white sign in four languages that said, ‘‘This 

mosque rebuilt by the generous and benevolent peoples of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.’’

84

And one of my good friends, who is a local national, who is Muslim, said what they are teaching my little brothers and sisters is 

frightening. Right? And what terrible tragedy we witnessed in that 

civil war that arose in a society that was certainly secular enough 

wherein they used to hang out together, date, and, you know, 

spend time socially together. And this rift was created. 

My fear is that moving forward we can do all—and we need to 

do things like integrate young women into the opportunity network. Right? But where these things are taught professionally, 

what is the hope that in 30 years we aren’t still encountering violent extremism emanating from GCC countries? It is open-ended. 

Mr. WEINBERG. The first U.S. Undersecretary for Terrorism and 

Financial Intelligence wrote that capturing and going after terror 

financiers and terrorist operatives is great, but far more important 

is ending the stream of the ideology, ending the incitement, including in education of this sort. 

On the positive side there is a relatively new Secretary of the 

Saudi Muslim World League, which plays a big part in this propagation of Saudi Islamic teachings, who does seem to be more focused on stopping some of the radical incitement, hopefully. He has 

talked a good game on some issues. 

But on textbooks in particular, you are right, it needs to stop. 

And this is an area where, hopefully, the Saudi crown prince and 

king are moving to curtail this stuff. But until they do there is important legislation that——

Mr. GARRETT. Right. 

Mr. WEINBERG [continuing]. You and your colleagues can cosponsor. 

Mr. GARRETT. And I want to reiterate comments that I have 

made in this committee and other places publicly as it relates to 

arms deals between the United States and our allies, the Saudis, 

and that is that I think there is a time line that says 2030 is the 

magic year in which they will have hoped to have addressed these 

problems. 

And I don’t think, you know, candidly, that we need to be placing 

arms in the hands of individuals who are having an antithetical 

upbringing as it relates to the practices and beliefs of their neighbors. I understand that political consequences creates strange bedfellows, and that certainly there is a threat emanating from the nation of Iran, not the people thereof, but I would be clear on that. 

But that the Saudis need to put their proverbial money where their 

mouth is before we start sending advanced armaments to the tune 

of billions and billions of dollars. 

And that is just me editorializing. 

You spoke also to, Mr. Weinberg, ‘‘Kuwaiti support for the Muslim Brotherhood,’’ and this is a quote, ‘‘and other related extremist 

organizations.’’ There has obviously been some back and forth as it 

relates to the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign 

terrorist organization, and I can certainly see both sides of that. 

Brookings suggests that perhaps it might make sense to address 

Muslim Brotherhood elements locally as extremist foreign terrorist 

organizations. Thoughts on that in my last 10 seconds? 

Mr. WEINBERG. So Qatar is in support of the Muslim Brotherhood more than Kuwait. 

85

Mr. GARRETT. I am sorry, I may have gotten that wrong. 

Mr. WEINBERG. But there is no doubt that the Muslim Brotherhood is an extremist group, arguably in many institutes, a hate 

group. Some of its branches have been terrorist groups. 

So it may be a lot easier to go after some of these where we can 

meet U.S. legal criteria easily, rather than this global, variegated 

network. 

Mr. GARRETT. Right. There is a theory that we—and I understand that I am over. I will try to wrap up as quickly as I can.—

that we shouldn’t engage the Muslim Brother as a foreign terror 

organization for two reasons: Number one, they are so disparate in 

their chapters; number two, they are too big. 

It is exactly—that is crazy counter-logic; right? That there are 

too many adherents to the Muslim Brotherhood philosophy, so 

identifying them as an FTO would be bad. I just think it is interesting to flesh out with you all here today. And I don’t want to 

throw out proverbial babies with the bath water, but I don’t think 

we should be having this conversation either. 

Thank you. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes itself for 

5 minutes. 

Dr. Weinberg, you pointed out the big picture. We don’t have 

Ambassadors in three countries that we are talking about: The 

UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. We have got to have Ambassadors 

there. It is hard to deal with another country if you don’t have 

American Ambassadors. 

I have met with the Ambassadors from these three countries 

here and we have discussed many of the things that you are talking, or you all have been talking about. But we have got to have 

Ambassadors in these countries. 

And, of course, I am not in charge, but if I had my way we would 

have three Ambassadors in waiting right here and we could point 

you to the three countries that we have been talking about, and—

anyway, that is not my choice. But I am just, just suggesting that 

to those who decide. 

Anyway, the countries that we are talking about, and we are 

talking about several in the Gulf, I think because they are now experiencing terrorist activities in their own countries they may see 

the light to coming to the table about stopping terrorist groups. 

The gentleman from Virginia mentioned the phrase ‘‘hate 

groups.’’ The terrorist groups we are talking about are hate groups. 

I think that is just another name for them is terrorist hate groups. 

To me, it is all about the money. Let’s find the money. 

Now, do we know, does the United States have at its disposal the 

names, rank, and serial number of these people who are millionaires, bazillionaires that are sending their money all over the world 

to terrorist groups to promote hate? Do we know who these people 

are? Do we know who these people are? Do we know their names? 

Ms. BAUER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. has designated as terrorist financiers and facilitators a number of individuals in Qatar, 

Kuwait, a number of, you know, Saudi individuals. Saudi Arabia 

has many——

Mr. POE. So to answer the question, we do know their names? 

Ms. BAUER. Yes. 

86

Mr. POE. And we know the names that haven’t been designated, 

too. There are probably other people who we know are involved in 

terrorism, we just haven’t designated them yet. 

So, wouldn’t it be wise that we zero in on those people, no matter 

what country they are coming from or what country they are being 

harbored in, and stop the money train from them? I mean, is that 

an unrealistic thing that we can do, Dr. Weinberg? 

Mr. WEINBERG. You know, I think that is what the U.S. Treasury 

Department aims to do. 

Mr. POE. But is it doing it? 

Mr. WEINBERG. I think so. I will defer to the former Treasury official here to, you know, to give the insider outsider perspective 

though. 

Ms. BAUER. Thank you, David. 

There is a lot of challenges to doing it because there is a lot of 

different—it is a complex issue. You know, one of the false assumptions I think is that this money primarily flows through the financial system. And——

Mr. POE. A lot of it is cash. 

Ms. BAUER. A lot of it is cash. 

Mr. POE. It is just being taken across the border all over the 

world and it is just hard, hard cash. Isn’t that right? 

Ms. BAUER. It is either cash or some of it comes in through some 

money service businesses, kind of remittance shops, hawalas, exchange houses that may be——

Mr. POE. Fronts. 

Ms. BAUER [continuing]. Unregulated or——

Mr. POE. Fronts. 

Ms. BAUER [continuing]. Regulated, and it makes its way into the 

financial system that way. 

Mr. POE. But we know that that occurs and we know who these 

people are? 

Ms. BAUER. I think there are a lot of people in the U.S. intelligence community and the U.S. Treasury Department focused on 

this issue and engaging in information sharing with, with partners 

in the Gulf on these issues as well. 

Mr. POE. And let me just ask one of you, all three of you just 

one question. And, Dr. Weinberg, you have given us some ideas on 

legislation. And I think we will discuss this among the two committees. We may file the legislation calling these countries to designate certain groups like Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization. 

The question is, name one thing you would like to see Congress 

do about what you all have been talking about? Cut to the chase, 

Ms. Bauer. 

Ms. BAUER. So if there were one thing, okay, I will, I will take 

this opportunity to talk about the value, I think, of sanctions diplomacy. And I am not sure if you are aware of this. The Treasury 

Financial Attache corps is actually pretty small. It is usually about 

nine or ten people; very zero sum. Three of those positions right 

now are based in the Gulf, which is——

Mr. POE. Basically what? 

Ms. BAUER. Three of those positions, three out of the nine or ten 

Treasury attaches for the whole department are in the——

87

Mr. POE. The Gulf. Okay. 

Ms. BAUER [continuing]. Gulf states. One in Saudi Arabia, one in 

UAE, and one in Qatar. It is a reflection, I think, of the priority 

that is placed on this issue. But I think it is also an opportunity 

to highlight how important those relationships are. 

And I think that is something that Congress needs to know, that 

having people forward deployed who can engage in technical conversations with counterparts at central banks and ministries of finance is incredibly important. And I think there, there was addition—there were additional funds given to the Treasury Department this year to go toward the Terror Financing Targeting Center, which is the U.S.-GCC initiative. And some of that I think can 

be used to shore up the attache program as well. 

Mr. POE. Okay. More money. More money to fight money. 

Ms. BAUER. Yes. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. Dr. Weinberg, one thing? 

Mr. WEINBERG. The one thing is to legislate penalties that will 

motivate governments to not host terror financiers and terrorist 

operatives. There have been some U.S. books, laws on the books to 

this effect, such as the Export Administration Act provision that I 

cited. So in those regards, pressing the administration to enforce 

the law. But also legislating in ways that motivate these governments to realize that it is not okay to host terrorists. 

Mr. POE. Ms. Erdberg? 

Ms. ERDBERG. I would say a more cohesive interagency approach 

to research. We still don’t have enough empirical or locally based 

information that is getting from the hands of academics and research organizations into the hands of development practitioners, 

diplomats, and defense officials to understand how radicalization is 

happening and what prevents against it. 

Now, at USIP we host the Resolve Network, which is an incubated network to try and connect all these research pieces together. 

But there are huge amounts of information across the U.S. Government that are still not being widely shared. It is the completely 

non-classified realm. This is all about academic, social science, and 

other types of research getting into the hands of decision makers. 

Mr. POE. Thank you very much. I thank all three of you for being 

here. 

I think it is imperative that the United States work with the 

Gulf states in solving this problem because we are all in this together. 

And I also want to thank both committees and the members that 

were here to enlighten Congress, but also the American public, 

about what is going on in the Gulf states. So this, these two subcommittees are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(89)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT A TTVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee ou Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade 

Ted Poe (R-TX), Chairman 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, to be held jointly by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office 

Building (and available live on the Committee website at http://www.~oreignAffairs.house.uov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Thursday, April 26, 2018 

2:00p.m. 

Grading Counterterrorism Cooperation with the GCC States 

Ms. Katherine Bauer 

Blumenstein-Katz Family Fellow 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 

David Andrew Weinberg, Ph.D. 

Washington Representative for International Affairs 

Anti-Defamation League 

Ms. Leanne Erdberg 

Director 

Countering Violent Extremism 

U.S. Institute of Peace 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON l'errorlsm, Nonpollfmtlou, a1UI1'rrtde& Middle ltastmu!Nortlt Africa HE/\R!NG 

Day _ _:I::..:Z:..:Ill::_l's:..:·'l::.:r(,_l' __ nate __ _::_04::../'2::.6.::Z::.Z::c01:..:8:___~Uoom, ___ =c21:..:7c:2:__ __ 

StartingTime 2:10pm EndingTime 3:36pm 

Recesses I .I ( __ to __ )(__to __ )(__to __ )( __ to _ __)(__to __ )(__to __ ) 

Representatil•e Poe 

Open Session 0 Executive (!:losed) Session 0 Televised 0 

TITLR OF HEARING: 

Elccl!'onically Ueco!'d£!l(t•ped) 0 

Stenographic RcctH'd LtJ 

"Gmding Couuterterrol'ism Coopemtion with tile GCC States" 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBEUS PUESENT: 

Rep. Poe, J(mting, Ros-Lehtiueu, Deutch, Cook, Cicil/ilw, Peny, Boyle, D!!Smtlis, Schneider, Kiuziuger, 

Zeldin, Do1wvrmJ 1f..Tagner, Mrtsf_. G(urett 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark wirh an *(filley are not members ojji1ll commilleeJ 

HEARING WITNRSS~S: Sa mens meeting notice ~lttached? Yes 0 NoD 

(lj "no'', please list below and include fitle 1 ngem:y, depart men{! or OJf5Wlizatiun) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List i111J' swlemellfs sllbmittedfor tile record,) 

QFR mbmitted by Rep. Titus 

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or 

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May 14, 2018 

Questions for the Record of Representative Titus 

House Foreign Affairs Joint Subcommittee Hearing TNT and MENA 

"Grading Counterterrorism Cooperation with the GCC States" 

Question for the Record from Representative Titus to Ms. Erdberg 

You mention in your testimony that the U.S. should widen its outreach beyond governments, 

including to civil society, educational institutions, and cultural groups. This is indeed the goal 

of many USAID-funded programs, like IRI and NDI, which I strongly support. Would you 

further elaborate on how the U.S. can work with civil society groups in GCC countries to 

counter violent extremism, and how could widening outreach to women and youth help in 

addressing tbe root causes of extremism that lead to radicalization in the Gulf? 

Ms. Erdberg's Response: 

With the support of the Congress and many of the programs mentioned, civil society 

organizations (CSOs) and individuals- notably women, youth, religious figures and faith 

based organizations- are actively working with donor governments such as the U.S., UN 

entities, as well as with national and local governments, on topics related to preventing and 

countering violent extremism. In differing contexts around the world, local communities are 

demonstrating tbe courage and long-term commitment to change on-the-ground 

circumstances. They engage in many activities: conduct research and analysis, design and 

deliver programs, and they monitor and evaluate efforts. Tbe U.S. can further this work in 

several key ways: 

A. Promote the role of CSOs in government only discussions- Civil society organizations 

may not bave security clearances, but they do have a lot to add to tbe local understanding of a 

threat picture. Over the last several years, tbe U.S. and various UN actors have advocated for 

more room in policy conversations for civil society to help prevent and counter violent 

extremism. This cooperation is happening but can be expanded beyond conferences, formal 

diplomatic discussions, and site visits to projects. There is value to be gained by connecting 

civil society actors to a bost of other counterterrorism and countering violent extremism 

activities- from inviting civil society organizations to present during military exercises to 

including them in brainstorming and future planning sessions about terrorist threats between 

allies- they can bring additional understanding, awareness, and problems solving to this 

collective challenge if they are connected to more actors operating in the same ecosystem. 

B. Empowering civil society especially women and youth and advocating for human 

rights in the places where CSOs need additional safeguards for their civic spaceEnsuring that civil society- women, youth and religious figures - have the civic space to do 

their best work in their own communities, and be part of the decision making that impacts 

them disproportionately must be part of the equation. By using diplomatic capital to promote 
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civic space and participation (especially by marginalized groups), the U.S. can help groups and 

individuals not only carry out the good work that they want to be engaging in to keep their 

communities safe, and we can help imbue groups with a sense of ownership to address local 

level grievances through action. Additionally, our support for civil society and the inclusion of 

youth and women leaders is useful (and stronger) when we engage with them across a 

broader perspective than just violent extremism and terrorism. Given that both government 

corruption and human rights violations feature so prominently in the rhetoric that terrorists 

use to radicalize recruits, programs focused on civil society capacity building are key to 

enabling communities to engage meaningfully with their governments for preservation of 

their own rights. For example, programs like the Human Rights and Democracy Fund and 

Statej!NL's anticorruption efforts provide some avenues for the U.S. to engage broadly across 

subjects that matter to citizens. The U.S. can also continue to invest in the long-term security 

of CSOs by investing in digital security, data protection, and legal protection- particularly 

given the challenges of working in the CVE space. Additionally, beyond bilateral programs, the 

U.S. should continue to support and encourage GCC governments and civil society 

participation in networks, such as the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and the Global 

Anticorruption Consortium. Lastly, the U.S. could encourage more civil society participation in 

exchange programs -like the IVLP. These are all tools that we can leverage and could be 

expanded to support reforms in the region, particularly with new potential openings, such as 

in Saudi Arabia. 

C. Expand support and scale up initiatives with a focus on achieving goals and 

flexibility on activities and approaches -When it comes to violent extremism, there is 

no single play book on what works and what doesn't; several experiments are ongoing in 

contexts that are constantly changing, all with interconnected theories of change that intend 

to impact behavior, circumstances, and structural factors. Countering and preventing violent 

extremism is an ambitious objective- and even with large injections of resources, we cannot 

assume straightforward outcomes. Managing confusion and uncertainty in these contexts is 

critical and inevitable, but oftentimes overlooked in favor of the certain comfort of tactical 

level activities and outputs. Rule books, tool boxes, and step-by-step plans are only as useful 

as the outcomes they can achieve -when it comes to challenges as complex as violent 

extremism, we should build in more flexibility to shift away from international static plans 

and over to investing in local change agents that can develop innumerable means 

to improve local circumstances. This agility could also include enhanced U.S. assistance 

coordination efforts, including using interagency transfer authorities for joint programingfor example between the military and USAID -to enable security and development officials to 

do more together to support good governance and strong civil societies. 

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May 14, 2018 

Question for the Record from Representative Titus to Ms. Erdberg 

The President still has not presented Congress with a long-term strategy for U.S. engagement 

in Syria, and I have continued concerns about the complexity of this crisis and the fact that 

this Administration does not seem to have a coherent plan. How is the ongoing crisis in Syria 

affecting the security environment in the Gulf or counterterrorism cooperation among the 

GCC countries? 

Ms. Erdberg's Response: 

As you noted, the complexity of the conflict in Syria is one of today's most confounding. 

Adding to that, the geopolitical realities between GCC countries when it comes to how each 

national-level government views the crisis in Syria is not uniform. And political objectives are 

not separable from counterterrorism successes. Further, overall security and stability is not 

merely a function of counterterrorism successes. And counterterrorism cooperation between 

nations is not the sole determinative factor when it comes to the spread of violent extremism 

because throughout Syria, radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups is often hyper 

local, individually detailed, or contextually distinctive. 

Recognizing the localized nature of the post-ISIS challenge in Syria highlights the critical role 

played by local Syrian partners on ground in eastern and northeast Syria. Further, the U.S. can 

be catalytic in helping build the capacity of local actors in the short to medium term to help 

Syrians ensure against the return of extremism in their communities. Today, the stabilization 

and governance challenges that remain are daunting; nonetheless, the role that effective 

stabilization and good governance can play is a critical hedge against extremism. It is one of 

many important lessons learned from An bar and the rise of ISIS from the ashes of al-Qaeda in 

Iraq (AQI). 

While remarkable military gains have removed ISIS from controlling territory and liberated 

civilians, it is worth noting that just as AQI's transformation into ISIS was not linear, it is still 

unclear what the next permutation of ISIS will look like. Most experts agree that there will be 

some remnants of the terrorist group in the region for some time to come. That said, gains on 

the ground in Iraq and Syria have had an impact not just on ISIS's territorial control, but on 

ISIS recruitment throughout the world, including in the GCC; the absence of a consistent, 

territorial caliphate induces less foreign fighters to join. This is coupled with improvements to 

border security and information sharing that has prevented individuals from getting to Syria. 

While the pipeline of foreigners joining ISIS has not completely dried up, it has lessened. 

Question for the Record from Representative Titus to Ms. Erdberg 

Can you discuss U.S. engagement in rehabilitation and reintegration programs in GCC 

countries? Should the U.S. increase its attention to these efforts? 

3 
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May 14, 2018 

Ms, Erdberg's Response: 

Several U.S. agencies are involved in rehabilitation and reintegration efforts- and U.S. 

diplomacy, programmatic interventions, capacity building for foreign partners (government 

and non-government), and information sharing between governments are used to strengthen 

efforts to promote the rehabilitation and reintegration those charged with terrorist offenses. 

Specific U.S. engagement with individual GCC countries on rehabilitation and reintegration 

programs is not widely available, likely due to sensitivities and the niche nature of these 

efforts; thus, I would suggest asking the Departments of State, justice, and Defense, as well as 

the Intelligence Community, for more fulsome answers that include analysis of government 

sensitive engagements (and possibly classified information) in addition to what is available. 

Multilaterally, the information is much more readily available. For example, through the 

Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), GCC counties belonging to the GCTF (Qatar, Saudi 

Arabia, the United Arab Emirates) participate in a working group focused on "Detention and 

Reintegration" whereby the group publishes globally relevant good practices documents 

(such as the Rome Memorandum on Good practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of 

Violent Extremist Offenders1 and its addendum2) which are widely shared beyond GCTF 

members. Additionally, in 2015 and 2016, the GCTF released a "Lifecycle Initiative" co-led by 

Turkey and the United States, which provided six updated good practices documents for 

practitioners that they "can apply at various points of the life cycle of radicalization to 

violence: from prevention, to intervention, to rehabilitation, and reintegration."3 Those 

included: (1) the role of families in identifying and intervening with members at risk of 

radicalization; (2) identifying and countering terrorist recruiters and facilitators; (3) 

comprehensive reintegration programs for returning foreign terrorist fighters; ( 4) juvenile 

justice in a counterterrorism context; (5) appropriate alternative measures for terrorismrelated offences; (6) and guidelines for legal frameworks for rehabilitation and reintegration. 

The good practice documents 3-6 all have applicable, practical guidance to rehabilitation and 

reintegration activities. 

Question for the Record from Representative Titus to Ms. Erdberg 

You discuss in your testimony the importance of nonviolent resistance and action. What is the 

climate for nonviolent action in GCC countries? Do people feel this is an empowering 

alternative to violent extremism? 

Ms. Erdberg's Response: 

For a quick snapshot, there is a history of nonviolent protest and resistance in GCC countries, 

led by both Sunni and Shi'a populations. One of the most famous of these, the 2006 "Orange 

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May 14, 2018 

Movement" in Kuwait (also known as the Nabiha 5 or "We Want it Five" campaign), was a 

nonviolent campaign led by youth and backed by legislators and other societal groups, that 

put pressure on the Kuwaiti government to enact positive electoral reforms.1 In Saudi Arabia, 

women have actively protested the monarchy's ban on women drivers- including by taking to 

the streets while in defiance of the ban. Last summer the Saudi government announced that 

the ban would be lifted, and the new policy will take effect in June 2018. 

Some of the longest-standing nonviolent protests have occurred in Bahrain, led by the 

majority Shi'a population that has been marginalized economically, politically, and religiously 

by the minority Sunni government. Human rights groups widely condemned the government's 

repression of mass nonviolent protests in 2011 (known as the February 14th uprising). As 

recently as February 2018, Shi'a-led protests marking the seventh anniversary of the 

February 14th uprising were met with live bullets and tear gas.' 

While there have been protests across GCC countries targeting certain government policies, 

these protests often have not coalesced into coherent, disciplined nonviolent campaigns and 

movements that are able to achieve their stated outcomes. So while protests can be inherently 

empowering, their chances of leading to meaningful changes that address the drivers of 

violent extremism (corruption, exclusion, and marginalization) would be enhanced if activists 

in those countries had greater knowledge and skills in nonviolent organizing and movementbuilding. NED and Freedom House are organizations that provide such trainings and skillsbuilding opportunities, and USIP offers an online course on Civil Resistance and the Dynamics 

of Nonviolent Movements.6 

At the same time, the U.S. has leverage to press GCC governments and their security forces to 

respect their citizens' rights to freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly and 

association. This would support an enabling environment for nonviolent civic action and 

discourage recourse to arms and terrorist activities. Admiral Dennis Blair's handbook on 

Military Engagement provides tools that the U.S. military can use to encourage democratic 

behaviors in the armed forces of non-democratic countries, like the GCC.' 

Research and experience supports the notion that people, particularly alienated youth, when 

part of a grassroots resistance movement, have found an avenue to be a part of a moral cause, 

feel the validation of social bonds, and concretely redress the ills that energized them through 

collective action. And they work- more than a century's worth of struggles worldwide have 

shown that peaceful resistance movements are twice as likely as armed struggles to achieve 

their objectives. a 

4 IIamad Albloshi and l'aisal Althllad. ·The Orange Movement of Kuwait: Civic Pressure TnmstOnns a Political System,·· in Maria J. 

Stephm1 (ed). Cnalwn l1had: Notll'lolent Stmggle, DemocratJzatwn, and Gon!mana m the Af1ddle East, Palgrave Macmillm1. 2009. 

'i https://v•/W\Y.aljazeera.com!news/20 18/02/clashes-mark-anm versm:·-bahrain-20 11-uprising-1802140756 12644 .hunl 

n lltrn,.,·//vv''>'.-\'-- w.;inc]0h:J:::omp1J'-' 0t<'/'_ra.inl1'<>-nYerTi,:·wlcl\'il-rc:~J'ihltCd 

7 Dennis Blair (eJ.), Afililary Engagement: lnjluencmg Anned Forces WorldH·ide Jo Supporl TJemocralic Transilions, Brookings 

Tnstltutton Press_ 20 13 

H Why Civil Resistance Vlorks. t.tl;;.c;,!illJm>J,;ullli;L''JJhl')i'l;;'.ll.i.J;e\EctH:!lit&li;;c;y\'Il,_'i/!i.i:S'2W.u;;_:Q) 
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Many GCC countries have well documented systems where people are denied self-rule, justice, 

and fairness under the rule of law.9 The environments for alternative forms of non-violent 

mass struggle are not necessarily conducive in the GCC. But that may be precisely the reason 

that it is most needed. Governments have a security imperative to improve the conditions that 

terrorist prey upon for new recruits to deny terrorists the powerful rhetoric that they readily 

exploit. 

6