UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-22691-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes

RONALD INGRAHAM, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAPITAL LINK MANAGEMENT LLC, 

Defendant. 

__________________________________/ 

ORDER ON MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Ronald Ingraham’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion 

for Final Default Judgment, ECF No. [11] (the “Motion”). A Clerk’s Default, ECF No. [8], was 

entered against Defendant Capital Link Management LLC (“Defendant”) on October 7, 2022, as 

Defendant failed to appear, answer, or otherwise plead to the Complaint, ECF No. [1], despite 

having been served. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, the record in this case, the 

applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is

granted in part an denied in part. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff obtained an interest-based payday loan at an interest rate of $651% from an 

internet-based company called Green Gate Services, LLC (“GGS”). ECF No. [1] at ¶ ¶ 11-12, 16. 

On or before May of 2022, Defendant purchased the debt Plaintiff owed on the loan from GGS. 

Id. at ¶ 25. Defendant knew that the debt was unenforceable and illegal because it originated from 

an unlicensed online lender which originated loans at interest rates in excess of 600% which were 

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not enforceable against Florida residents. Id. at ¶ ¶ 27-28. Defendant contacted Plaintiff on at least 

five occasions seeking payment of the debt. Id. at ¶ 32. 

Plaintiff initiated this case on August 24, 2022, asserting claims against Defendant under 

the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”), the Florida 

Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.55, et seq. (“FCCPA”), and the Telephone 

Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (“TCPA”) (“Complaint”), ECF No. [1]. On 

September 2, 2022, Plaintiff effectuated service of process on Defendant at the address of its 

registered agent. ECF No. [5]. Defendant failed to respond or otherwise plead to the Complaint. 

After the Clerk entered a default against Defendant, ECF No. [8], Plaintiff filed the present 

Motion, seeking statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A), Section 559.77(2), Florida 

Statutes, and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), and attorneys’ fees and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) 

and Section 559.77(2), Florida Statutes.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) authorizes a court to enter default judgment 

against a defendant who fails to plead or otherwise defend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). “[B]efore 

entering a default judgment for damages, the district court must ensure that the well-pleaded 

allegations in the complaint, which are taken as true due to the default, actually state a substantive 

cause of action and that there is a substantive, sufficient basis in the pleadings for the particular 

relief sought.” Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007). “[A] 

default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.” Chudasama v. Mazda 

Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

“Even though well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed admitted, ‘plaintiffs’ 

allegations relating to the amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default; rather, the court 

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must determine both the amount and character of damages.’” Cain v. Consumers Sols. Grp., LLC, 

No. 2:16-CV-2031-VEH, 2017 WL 3131053, at *3 (N.D. Ala. July 24, 2017) (quoting Atl. 

Recording Corp. v. Carter, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1024 n.4 (S.D. Ala. 2007); see also Anheuser 

Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003) (federal law requires judicial 

determination of damages absent factual basis in record). “Following the entry of a default 

judgment, damages may be awarded ‘without a hearing [if the] amount claimed is a liquidated sum 

or one capable of mathematical calculation,’ so long as all essential evidence is a matter of record.” 

Evans v. Commercial Recovery Sys., Inc., No. 13-61031-CIV, 2013 WL 12138555, at *1 (S.D. 

Fla. Aug. 26, 2013) (quoting S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1231, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. FDCPA and FCCPA Violations

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant engaged in conduct in violation of provisions 

of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and of 

the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”), Fla. Stat. § 559.72(5). See generally

ECF No. [1]. The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading 

representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C § 1692(e). With 

particularity, a debt collector may not give or create a “false impression of...the character, amount, 

or legal status of any debt.” 15 U.S.C § 1692e(2)(A). Additionally, a debt collector may not make 

“use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 

U.S.C § 1692e(10). Moreover, a debt collector may not “threat[en] to take any action that cannot 

legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C § 1692e(5). To establish a violation 

of the FDCPA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) []he has been the object of collection activity arising out 

of consumer debt; (2) Defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA; and (3) Defendant 

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engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA. Ambroise v. Am. Credit Adjusters, LLC, 

No. 15-22444-CIV, 2016 WL 6080454, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2016) (citations omitted). The 

FCCPA is modeled after the FDCPA, and it prohibits similar conduct by debt collectors. Among 

other things, the FCCPA prohibits debt collectors from attempting to enforce a debt that they know 

is illegitimate or asserting the existence of a legal right that they know does not exist. Alvarado v. 

Featured Mediation, LLC, No. 8:16-CV-3259-T-30JSS, 2017 WL 1552248, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 

1, 2017) (awarding $500 per TCPA violation, dismissing the FDCPA claim as time barred, and 

declining to award statutory damages under the FCCPA (citing Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9))). 

Upon review of allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds a sufficient basis to enter 

default judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff’s unopposed allegations state that Plaintiff is a 

consumer, Defendant is a debt collector, and Defendant attempted to collect upon a debt it knew 

to be unenforceable by representing that the debt was valid and legally enforceable against Plaintiff 

despite knowing that the debt was illegitimate and unenforceable in violation of multiple 

subsections of 15 U.S.C § 1692e. ECF No. [1] ¶ ¶ 37 – 39, 42.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) when it asserted 

legal rights it knew did not exist; specifically, the right to collect a debt Plaintiff when they knew 

that the subject debt was illegitimate and unenforceable due to: (a) the application of an illegally 

high interest rate on the principal amount of the debt; (b) the fact that GGS was never licensed as 

a deferred presentment provider in the State of Florida; and, (c) their attempt to collect a debt prior 

to complying with the FCCPA’s requirement of notice of assignment of debt. Id. at ¶ 43. Moreover, 

in accordance with the Complaint’s allegations, Defendant persisted in its violation of Fla. Stat. § 

559.72(9) by indicating to Plaintiff that the debt was transferred to its “Pre Legal Collection 

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Team,” as if implying that legitimate legal action could or would be taken against Plaintiff 

regarding the alleged debt. Id. at ¶ 44.

Because Defendant failed to appear in this case, it has admitted the truth of these allegations 

by default. Moreover, after reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations to be 

well pled and sufficient to establish Defendant’s liability for violations of the FDCPA and the 

FCCPA.

Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages in the amount of $1,000.00 for Defendant’s 

violations of the FDCPA and $1,000.00 for its violations of the FCCPA. A consumer who brings 

a successful claim under the FDCPA or the FCCPA is entitled to an award of statutory damages 

in such an amount as the Court may allow, up to $1,000.00. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k; Fla. Stat. 

§ 559.77(2). Under both statutes, “[t]he decision whether to award statutory damages . . . and the 

size of the award are matters committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” Proescher v. 

Sec. Collection Agency, No. 3:17-CV-1052-J-32PDB, 2018 WL 3432737, at *9 (M.D. Fla. June 

8, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-1052-J-32PDB, 2018 WL 3428157 

(M.D. Fla. July 16, 2018) (quoting authority omitted).

“In the instant case, the nature and extent of Defendant’s actions warrant the maximum 

award of statutory damages.” Smith v. Royal Oak Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-543-J-34JRK, 

2012 WL 3290153, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 

3:11-CV-543-J-34JRK, 2012 WL 3290151 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2012); see also Sandler v. Michael 

Maxwell Grp., LLC, No. 6:19-CV-1688-Orl-41GJK, 2019 WL 7461690, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 

2019) (recommending maximum statutory damages where “Plaintiff has established multiple 

violations of the FDCPA and the FCCPA”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:19-CV1688-Orl-41GJK, 2020 WL 42867 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2020); Beltran v. First US Capital, LLC, No. 

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8:17-CV-1722-T-33AAS, 2017 WL 5889755, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2017) (concluding that 

the numerous violations of the FDCPA warranted an award for the maximum amount of statutory 

damages); Selby v. Christian Nicholas & Assocs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-121-J-34JRK, 2010 WL 

745748, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2010) (awarding $1000.00 in statutory damages based on that

defendant’s repeated improper actions in violation of the FDCPA).

Further, “by failing to respond to the instant Motion, Defendant declined the opportunity 

to challenge both the grant and the amount of the statutory award.” Figueroa v. Maximum Recovery 

Sols., Inc., No. 12-60098-CIV, 2012 WL 13134301, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2012); see also 

Frazier v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (noting 

that “Defendant through its default and non-appearance has not provided any basis for concluding 

that an amount less than the statutory maximum is appropriate”). Here, the Court concludes that 

Plaintiff should be awarded $2,000.00 in statutory damages requested under the FDCPA and 

FCCPA. See Smith, 2012 WL 3290153, at *5. 

B. TCPA Violations

The TCPA makes it “unlawful for any person within the United States...to make any call 

(other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the 

called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice...to 

any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile 

radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is 

charged for the call, unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the 

United States.” TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

Upon review of the Complaint, the Court does not find sufficient basis to enter default 

judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff’s unopposed allegations state that Defendant, in the course 

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of attempting to collect upon a debt in violation of both federal and state law, violated the TCPA, 

47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) when it willfully and/or knowingly contacted Mr. Ingraham on his 

cellular telephone on at least five (5) occasions without having first obtained Mr. Ingraham’s prior 

consent. ECF No. [1] at ¶ 47. Specifically, the Complaint sets forth that:

a. On May 25, 2022, CLM sent Mr. Ingraham a text message stating, 

“Ronald Ingraham, your Green Gate Services LLC account was transferred 

to our Pre Legal Collections Team. Balance is $1,680.00. Close your 

account for $588.00, or set up a hardship payment plan. Please call: 1-833-

524-3202. Disclosure This may begin to negatively impact your credit. This 

communication from a debt collector and any information obtained may be 

used for such purposes.” 

b. On June 21, 2022, CLM sent Mr. Ingraham a text message stating, 

“Ronald Ingraham, your greengateloan.com account has a balance of 

$1,680.00. We can close the loan for a one time payment of $840.00. To 

make a payment please call: 1-833-524-3202. Disclosure: This 

communication from a debt collector and any information obtained may be 

used for such purposes.” 

c. On June 27, 2022, CLM contacted Mr. Ingraham via phone on 2 

separate occasions using different phone numbers: (716) 270-1827 and 

(585) 565-8310. 

d. On June 29, 2022 CLM contacted Mr. Ingraham via phone using the 

phone number: (855) 714-2852. 

Id. at ¶ 32. The Complaint fails to set out any facts to support a claim that the calls were 

made using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. As such, 

the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege a violation of the cited section of the TCPA, and default 

judgment is not appropriate for Plaintiff’s claims arising under the TCPA.

C. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

i. Attorneys’ Fees

Finally, Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees and costs. “The FDCPA authorizes an award to any 

successful plaintiff of the costs of the action and a ‘reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the 

court.’” Moton v. Nathan & Nathan, P.C., 297 Fed. Appx. 930, 931 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing 15 

U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3)). This Court uses the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorneys’ fees, 

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considering the hourly rate and the hours billed. “Courts are considered experts on the 

reasonableness of the number of hours expended and the hourly rates requested. Caplan v. All Am. 

Auto Collision, Inc., 36 F.4th 1083, 1090 (11th Cir. 2022). “A reasonable hourly rate is the 

prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of 

reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 

836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). The relevant legal community is “the place where the case 

is filed.” ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citation omitted). 

While the particular expertise, experience, and prestige of the attorneys may be considered, the 

fees are constrained by the prevailing market rates. The fee applicant bears the burden of 

demonstrating that the rates charged are reasonable in the relevant legal community. Norman, 836 

F.2d at 1299.

Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a Declaration of Attorneys’ Fees in Support of Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Final Judgment (“Declaration”) ECF No. [11-2], in which he provided a justification 

of his rate of $300.00 per hour and a detailed summary of his hours expended on this matter. The 

Court notes that Plaintiff’s counsel also included the hours expended by his staff and time entries 

for Amarie Gonzalez and Gloria Herrera, each at a rate of $100.00 per hour. The hours expended 

by Amarie Gonzalez appear to be reasonably expended on compensable tasks. See Jean v. Nelson, 

863 F.2d 759, 778 (11th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Comm'r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990)

(“paralegal time is recoverable . . . to the extent that the paralegal performs work traditionally done 

by an attorney.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court notes that the time 

billed by Gloria Herrera was primarily of a clerical nature and is not recoverable. See Scelta v. 

Delicatessen Support Services, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“work that is 

clerical or secretarial in nature is not separately recoverable.”) The Court finds that the hours 

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expended by Plaintiff’s counsel and his staff are reasonable and that the rates charged correspond 

to the market rates in South Florida. The Court subtracts the time entries by Gloria Herrera totaling 

$110.00 from the requested total of $7,880.00 and awards Plaintiff $7,770.00 in attorneys’ fees.

ii. Costs

Plaintiff requests $509.50 in costs. Under the FDCPA, where a party is successful in 

bringing an action pursuant to the statute, Defendant is liable for the costs of the action. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692K(a)(3). “Although the statute does not identify the specific costs to which a plaintiff may 

be entitled, courts have determined that the cost award under § 1692k(a)(3) is limited to the costs 

allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” Figueroa, 12-60098-CIV, 2012 WL 13134301 at *9. The costs 

requested include: the $402.00 filing fee, $75.00 for service of process, and $32.50 for postage on 

the Motion for Default and the Order on Default both of which were mailed to Defendant. The 

Plaintiff is entitled to recover the filing fee and the cost of service of process. See U.S. E.E.O.C. v. 

W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 624 (11th Cir. 2000) (“a district court does not abuse its discretion in 

taxing private process server fees that do not exceed the statutory fees authorized in § 1921”); 

Frazier v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1368 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (courts 

have concluded that § 1920(1) permits the recovery of the filing fee). Section 1920 does not 

provide for the taxation of postage, so Plaintiff will not be compensated for the requested postage 

costs. Plaintiff can recover $477.00 in costs.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages under, 

and attorneys’ fees and costs under. Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that 

Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. [11], is GRANTED in part and denied in part. The Court will enter 

final judgment by separate order.

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DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on October 25, 2022.

_________________________________

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Capital Link Management LLC

c/o Corporation Service Company

1201 Hays Street

Tallahassee, FL 32301

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