1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No: 

RALPH CUAN,

Plaintiff,

v. 

FLORIDA TRANSPORTATION 

SYSTEMS, INC., a Florida 

Profit Corporation, DOUG REVELLE, 

an individual, CHRIS RUSTMAN, 

an individual, 

Defendants. 

_______________________________/ 

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN (“Plaintiff”), by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby 

sues Defendants, FLORIDA TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, INC. (“FTS”), DOUG REVELLE

(“Revelle”), and CHRIS RUSTMAN (“Rustman”) (collectively, the “Defendants”), and alleges as 

follows: 

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND PARTIES

1. This is an action alleging claims against Defendant for unlawful employment practices, 

including race discrimination, national origin discrimination, and retaliation, in violation of Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Civil Rights Act”), 

42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Florida Civil Rights Act (“the FRCA”).

2. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1343(a)(3). This 

Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

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3. Venue is proper in this judicial district under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 

1391(b) because it is where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the cause of 

action herein occurred.

4. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was and is a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida 

and is otherwise sui juris.

5. At all times material hereto, Defendant, FTS, is a foreign for-profit corporation, 

incorporated in Missouri and doing business in the State of Florida, with its principal place of 

business in Hillsborough County, Florida.

6. At all times material hereto, Defendant, DOUG REVELLE, was and is a resident of 

Hillsborough County, Florida, and the Vice President of FTS, and is otherwise sui juris.

7. At all times material hereto, Defendant, CHRIS RUSTMAN, was and is a resident of 

Hillsborough County, Florida, and the President of FTS, and is otherwise sui juris.

8. At all times material hereto, FTS has operated in the State of Florida, with offices in Tampa, 

Florida and Pompano Beach, Florida.

9. At all times material hereto, FTS has employed 15 or more employees.

10. Plaintiff was employed by FTS at its offices in Pompano Beach, Florida, and the unlawful 

employment practices alleged herein were committed at said Pompano Beach location, within the 

jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. 

11. Defendant is a “person” within 42 U.S.C. §2000e(a), and an “employer” within the 

meaning of 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b).

12. On or about June 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination against Defendant 

with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Florida 

Commission on Human Relations, claiming discrimination based on race, national origin, and 

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retaliation. The Charge was assigned number 510-2020-04472. See Charge of Discrimination filed 

herewith as Exhibit A. 

13. On or about August 12, 2022, after more than twenty-four months had passed from the 

initial filing of his Charge of Discrimination, Plaintiff requested a Notice of Right to Sue from the 

EEOC.

14. On August 12, 2022, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue to Plaintiff, providing 

Plaintiff with ninety (90) days to file a lawsuit under federal law. See Notice of Right to Sue filed 

herewith as Exhibit B. Therefore, this Complaint is timely, and Plaintiff has complied with all 

conditions precedent to filing this action.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

15. FTS is a for-profit transportation company that operates as a bus dealer and purveyor of of 

bus maintenance and technician services. 

16. Plaintiff is a Cuban-born citizen of the United States, who is a member of an ethnic 

Hispanic (Cuban) minority. 

17. Plaintiff was employed by FTS from March 30, 2015, until November 5, 2019, when FTS 

unlawfully terminated his employment.

18. Plaintiff was first hired by FTS as a service technician in March 2015. 

19. In or about August 2017, Plaintiff was promoted to Service Manager at FTS’s Pompano 

Beach location. 

20. Thereafter, Plaintiff became a target and victim of pervasive and incessant discrimination 

and harassment based on his race and national origin, as well as unlawful retaliation based on his 

complaints about same, resulting in multiple demotions and ultimately, the termination of his 

employment by FTS. 

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21. As a Service Manager, Plaintiff was responsible for the managing of technicians, assigning 

tasks to technicians, and managing the Pompano Beach shop at FTS. Plaintiff also played a role in 

interviewing and hiring technicians, subject to the approval of FTS company executives.

22. In the year that followed his promotion to Service Manager, Plaintiff became the target of 

discrimination and harassment by David Burns (“Burns”) and Lenworth Forbes (“Forbes”) –

Caucasian employees at FTS – as well as by the President of FTS, Chris Rustman (“Rustman”).

23. In May of 2018, Plaintiff hired Misdel Molina (“Molina”), a Hispanic employee, to work 

at the Pompano location of FTS. The decision to hire Molina was approved by Vice President of 

FTS, Doug Revelle (“Revelle”).

24. Almost immediately after Molina was hired, Burns began to repeatedly complain about the 

fact that a Hispanic employee was hired, sending a complaint to Revelle and Rustman, questioning 

why FTS was hiring Hispanic employees “who barely speak English.”

25. Molina was subsequently terminated by Rustman.

26. On the same week that Burns issued his racially motivated complaint about Molina, 

Plaintiff received a call from Rustman, wherein Rustman asked whether Plaintiff had been

harassing Burns, which Plaintiff vehemently – and truthfully – denied. 

27. Rustman called Burns and Plaintiff into an office and read them the FTS company 

harassment policy. 

28. Plaintiff was confounded by the situation as he had not harassed Burns in any way, and 

hence, Plaintiff asked Burns to specify how Plaintiff had harassed him. 

29. Shockingly, and in the presence of Rustman, Burns replied and admitted that Plaintiff had 

not harassed him. Rather, he claimed that he was “harassed” because he had not been promoted at 

FTS like Plaintiff.

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30. It was evident from Burns’ comments that Burns was upset at the fact that a Cuban Hispanic 

was promoted, while he, a white American employee, was not.

31. Thereafter, Burns’ evident resentment towards Cuban and Hispanic employees continued, 

which included Burns sending of discriminatory emails regarding the hiring of another Hispanic

employee. 

32. However, Burns was never reprimanded by any higher-ups at FTS, including Rustman 

and/or Revelle. 

33. By contrast, when Burns, a white employee, complained of harassment, Plaintiff was 

summoned and required to defend himself against baseless allegations.

34. Nevertheless, the racial discrimination and harassment continued against Plaintiff. 

35. In October 2018, a few months after hiring Molina, Plaintiff hired Oscar Cardenas

(“Cardenas”), a Cuban-born Hispanic employee. Revelle approved the decision to hire Cardenas. 

36. However, as with Molina, Burns complained about the hiring of yet another Cuban 

Hispanic employee “who did not speak English.” 

37. FTS again took no action against Burns regarding the discriminatory, racially motivated

complaint, and continued to ignore Burns’ racist statements and actions, while a hostile work 

environment continued to exist and progressively worsen. 

38. Two weeks after Burns complained about Plaintiff hiring Cardenas, Burns took it upon 

himself to post a derogatory sign in the FTS Pompano Beach location that read “Caution: hearing 

protection required for the Cubans.” 

39. The implication of this sign was that Cuban people are intolerably loud. Rather than 

removing the sign and disciplining the employee responsible for posting it, Defendant ignored the 

posting of the racist sign. 

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40. Revelle and Rustman visited the office and never mentioned or said a word to Burns 

regarding the sign. 

41. Plaintiff mentioned the sign to Don Ross, the Sales Manager at FTS, however, nothing was 

done, and no investigation or discipline was ever commenced. 

42. Later, the sign was changed to “Caution: hearing protection required for the loud mouths,”

which everyone knew still referred to the Cuban Hispanics in the workplace.

43. Thus, FTS, Revelle, and Rustman allowed Burns to put up two separate racist and 

derogatory signs within its shop. 

44. FTS, Revelle, and Rustman condoned this behavior by Burns, further allowing the hostile 

work environment to prosper.

45. In November 2018, Plaintiff sent Hispanic employees on the road for service assignments 

and projects. Thereafter, Burns began targeted harassment of several Hispanic employees without 

any justifiable basis by taking pictures of their work vehicles and anything inside their vehicles 

during their work assignment. 

46. Essentially, Burns was insinuating that Hispanic employees could not be trusted with 

company equipment and vehicles. 

47. Plaintiff complained to Revelle and Rustman about Burns’ racially motivated and hostile 

conduct and harassment in the workplace, explaining that Burns was constantly harassing the 

Hispanic workers and taking photographs of their vehicles without any legitimate reason each time 

they departed for an assignment.

48. However, after allegedly “asking” Burns to cease taking photographs, the conduct

continued, and nothing further was done to stop the harassment that was being committed by 

Burns. 

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49. FTS, Revelle, and Rustman were fully advised and aware of all previous complaints of 

harassment perpetrated by Burns at the Pompano Beach location yet did absolutely nothing within 

their power to alleviate the circumstances, nor did they reprimand or discipline Burns. 

50. This allowed for the unimpeded growth of a hostile work environment. 

51. In December 2018, Burns sent another email to FTS executives, including Revelle and 

Rustman, stating that, “the Cubans are going to run [their] business down.” 

52. Rather than reprimanding and disciplining Burns, in January 2019, Revelle arrived at 

FTS’s Pompano Beach office and informed Plaintiff that FTS was demoting him from Service 

Manager to Shop Foreman, and that FTS was hiring a new employee to be the Service Manager. 

53. Unsurprisingly, the new Service Manager happened to be a white American employee by 

the name of Ron Bean (“Bean”).

54. Meanwhile, Burns continued to harass Plaintiff by submitting more complaints containing 

fabricated allegations against Plaintiff.

55. In or about February 2019, Burns sent an email to Rustman regarding the company vehicle 

that was assigned to Plaintiff for use in work assignments. In the email, Burns alleged that 

Plaintiff’s vehicle was occupying space in the shop and should be cleared to make more room.

56. Without making any effort to determine the legitimacy of Burns’ complaint, Rustman 

blindly accepted Burns’ complaint and informed Plaintiff that he needed to take the vehicle home 

by the end of the week.

57. If Burns made any complaint to FTS, it was entertained. Meanwhile, Plaintiff’s complaints 

regarding derogatory and racist conduct were routinely dismissed and ignored.

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58. Sometime between March and April 2019, FTS’ Pompano shop was holding salary 

reviews. While conducting Burns’ salary review, Revelle asked Burns if he had anything to say to

Plaintiff. 

59. When Burns replied in the negative, Revelle stated that this was Burn’s time to say how he 

felt about Plaintiff, since Revelle frequently received emails from Burns about Plaintiff, including 

how “this Cuban fat piece of shit [referring to Plaintiff], is going to take down the company.”

60. In June 2019, Plaintiff was approached by Bean who advised Plaintiff that Rustman did 

not want Plaintiff in the office anymore, and that he was being demoted again. 

61. Plaintiff was informed that he would be put back on the floor to work as a mechanic, 

without reason or explanation from FTS, in what was a pattern of progressive discrimination.

62. On November 1, 2019, Bean did not report to work at the shop in the morning because he 

had been at a Halloween party the previous evening. Around noon, Bean finally showed up to the 

shop, still appearing intoxicated, and with red blood shot eyes. 

63. However, Bean quickly left the shop and did not return until approximately 3:00 PM.

64. White American employees at FTS, such as Bean, who should be arriving on time and 

making sure the shop is running smoothly, were never reprimanded nor demoted like Plaintiff, an 

employee who consistently showed up to work on time and made sure his duties and 

responsibilities were completed. 

65. However, because Plaintiff was a Cuban Hispanic employee, and because he complained 

about discrimination in the workplace, it was Plaintiff that was demoted without reason or 

explanation and ultimately terminated. 

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66. White employees like Bean, the Service Manager, who held the same position as Plaintiff 

and reported to the same Officers at FTS, were not subjected to harassment, reprimanded, 

disciplined, nor terminated as was Plaintiff. 

67. On November 5, 2019, Plaintiff arrived at the shop, departing shortly thereafter to complete 

his work assignment for the day. 

68. Upon returning to the shop, Plaintiff was called into the office at FTS and informed he was 

terminated. 

69. The only information provided to Plaintiff involved Rustman instructing an employee to 

terminate Plaintiff.

70. Upon Plaintiff’s termination, Burns once again posted derogatory written language and 

pictures in the shop. A derogatory picture of an obese Latino caricature was posted on the fridge 

with written remarks that read, “You’re fired!” Right underneath the derogatory picture with the 

fat cartoon was a written message that read, “Ralph,” Plaintiff’s first name.

71. This hateful, despicable, and racist display was not addressed by FTS or Revelle and 

Rustman, once again demonstrating that this behavior was accepted and condoned at FTS. 

72. Around January 2020, one of Plaintiff’s former co-workers informed Plaintiff that FTS 

relied upon a baseless complaint made about Plaintiff by Forbes, a white employee who constantly 

harassed Plaintiff and other Hispanic workers, as a pretext for terminating Plaintiff’s employment.

73. Forbes regularly called the owners and officers of FTS, including Revelle and Rustman, to 

make complaints with false allegations about Plaintiff and other Hispanic employees, including 

complaints about how he did not have a work vehicle while other Hispanic mechanics did. 

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74. In this specific instance, Forbes took a photograph of Plaintiff putting items into his work 

vehicle. The items were two batteries which Plaintiff paid for and five gallons of oil that a member 

of upper management had given Plaintiff permission to take home. 

75. Forbes submitted the picture to Rustman; however, Rustman once again failed to take or 

follow any investigatory steps or procedures regarding the complaint. 

76. Defendants accepted the racially motivated false allegations without question and 

unlawfully terminated Plaintiff. 

77. At the time of Plaintiff’s termination, Defendants were aware that multiple false allegations 

and complaints had been submitted regarding Plaintiff. 

78. Nevertheless, Defendants did not bother to speak with or question Plaintiff regarding the 

baseless complaint and used it as a pretext to terminate Plaintiff. 

79. Plaintiff received no explanation as to the reason for his termination from Defendants and

was given no opportunity to contest the termination. 

COUNT I: VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1981 – RACE DISCRIMINATION

(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

80. Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

81. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) makes it unlawful to discriminate against an employee 

because of race:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every 

State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and 

to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 

property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 

penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 

82. At all times relevant to this action, the relationship between Plaintiff and FTS was a 

relationship of “employee” to “employer,” such that a cause of action exists where discrimination 

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based on race and national origin is alleged to be the cause of an adverse action directed to the 

employee by the employer.

83. As a Hispanic-Cuban male born in Cuba and of Cuban descent, Plaintiff is a member of a 

protected class under Section 1981.

84. Plaintiff possessed the skills, background, and qualifications necessary to perform the 

duties of his position.

85. Plaintiff performed his work for Defendants satisfactorily, and he was in all respects a good 

employee of Defendants.

86. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff by failing to treat him the same or similar to its 

non-Hispanic employees as a result of his race.

87. Defendants based their decisions to demote, twice, and subsequently terminate Plaintiff 

based on his race. 

88. The discriminatory actions of Defendants against Plaintiff, when considered individually 

or collectively, constitutes an adverse employment action because of his race for purposes of 

Section 1981.

89. These actions constitute an ultimate employment decision, altered the compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of the employment of Plaintiff, his employment, and/or adversely 

affected his status as an employee.

90. But for Plaintiff’s race, he would not have been terminated by Defendants, and Plaintiff’s 

termination constitutes an adverse employment action for which Section 1981 provides legal 

recourse.

91. Defendants’ actions were malicious and demonstrated a reckless indifference to the rights 

of Plaintiff.

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92. The aforementioned acts by Defendants were done willfully, wantonly, and with reckless 

disregard for the consequences of such actions. 

93. Plaintiff suffered damages in the form of lost income in the past, lost income in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries. 

94. Pursuant to Section 1981, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs from 

Defendants, in addition to damages and punitive damages. 

WHEREFORE Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendants, FTS, DOUG REVELLE, and CHRIS RUSTMAN after a trial by jury, 

declaring that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §1981, awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages 

including the loss of income in the past and in the future, lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of 

dignity, other intangible injuries, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs as a result of 

Defendants discriminatory conduct and any and all other relief this court deems just. 

COUNT II: VIOLATION(S) OF TITLE VII 

(DISPARATE TREATMENT – RACE)

(AGAINST DEFENDANT FTS)

95. Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

96. Defendant was at all times material the “employer” of Plaintiff, as the term is defined by 

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

97. Plaintiff was at all times material an “employee” of Defendant, as the term is defined by 

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 

98. Pursuant to § 2000e–2(a)(1), (2) of the Civil Rights Act: 

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

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conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin; or 

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 

any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 

opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 

such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 

99. Plaintiff possessed the skills, background, and qualifications necessary to perform the 

duties of his position. 

100. Plaintiff performed his work for Defendant satisfactorily, and he was in all respects 

a good employee of Defendant.

101. Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff by failing to treat him the same or similar 

to their non-Hispanic employees as a result of his race.

102. Defendant based its decisions to demote, twice, and subsequently terminate 

Plaintiff based on his race. 

103. The discriminatory actions of Defendant against Plaintiff, when considered 

individually or collectively, constitutes an adverse employment action because of his race for 

purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

104. These actions constitute an ultimate employment decision, altered the 

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of the employment of Plaintiff, his employment, 

and/or adversely affected his status as an employee.

105.As such, the disparate treatment Plaintiff suffered constitutes an adverse employment 

action because of his race for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

106.Defendant’s actions were malicious and demonstrated a reckless indifference to the rights 

of Plaintiff.

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107.The aforementioned acts by Defendant were done willfully, wantonly, and with reckless 

disregard for the consequences of such actions. 

108.Plaintiff suffered damages in the form of lost income in the past, lost income in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries. 

109.Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney’s 

fees and costs from Defendant, in addition to damages and punitive damages. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendant, FTS, after a trial by jury, declaring that Defendant violated Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act, awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages including the loss of income in the 

past and in the future, lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, other intangible injuries, 

punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs as a result of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct 

and any and all other relief this court deems just. 

COUNT III: VIOLATION(S) OF TITLE VII 

(DISPARATE TREATMENT – NATIONAL ORIGIN)

(AGAINST DEFENDANT FTS) 

110.Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

111.Defendant was at all times material the “employer” of Plaintiff, as the term is defined by 

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 

112.Plaintiff was at all times material an “employee” of Defendant, as the term is defined by 

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 

113.Pursuant to § 2000e–2(a)(1), (2) of the Civil Rights Act: 

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 

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terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment 

in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 

employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 

employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 

national origin. 

114. Plaintiff possessed the skills, background, and qualifications necessary to perform the 

duties of his position. 

115. Plaintiff performed his work for Defendant satisfactorily, and he was in all respects a 

good employee of Defendant.

116. Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff by failing to treat him the same or similar to 

their non-Hispanic employees as a result of his national origin.

117. Defendant based its decisions to demote, twice, and subsequently terminate Plaintiff 

based on his national origin. 

118. The discriminatory actions of Defendant against Plaintiff, when considered individually 

or collectively, constitutes an adverse employment action because of his national origin for 

purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

119. These actions constitute an ultimate employment decision, altered the compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of the employment of Plaintiff, his employment, and/or adversely 

affected his status as an employee.

120. As such, the disparate treatment Plaintiff suffered constitutes an adverse employment 

action because of his national origin for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

121. Defendant’s actions were malicious and demonstrated a reckless indifference to the rights 

of Plaintiff.

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122. The aforementioned acts by Defendant were done willfully, wantonly, and with reckless 

disregard for the consequences of such actions. 

123. Plaintiff suffered damages in the form of lost income in the past, lost income in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries. 

124. Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney’s 

fees and costs from Defendant, in addition to damages and punitive damages. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendant, FTS, after a trial by jury, declaring that Defendant violated Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act, awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages including the loss of income in the 

past and in the future, lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, other intangible injuries, 

punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs as a result of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct 

and any and all other relief this court deems just. 

COUNT IV: VIOLATION OF FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 

(DISPARATE TREATMENT – RACE) 

(AGAINST DEFENDANT FTS) 

125.Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

126.The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”) makes it unlawful for an employer such 

as Defendant to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment because of that individual’s race. 

127.Defendant was, at all times material to this action, a “person” and/or an “employer” that 

was and remains subject to the FCRA by employing more than fifteen people for each working 

day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

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128.The FCRA prohibits Defendant from making employment decisions or from taking 

personnel actions affecting the terms, conditions, and/or privileges of employment based upon 

race considerations.

129.The FCRA allows a prevailing employee to obtain an order prohibiting Defendant from 

engaging in its discriminatory practice(s) and providing affirmative relief from the effects of the 

practice(s), to recover back pay, compensatory damages, damages for mental anguish, loss of 

dignity, and any other intangible injuries, and punitive damages. See Fla. Stat. §760.11(5).

130.Plaintiff possessed the skills, background, and qualifications necessary to perform the 

duties of his position. 

131.Plaintiff performed his work for Defendant satisfactorily, and he was in all respects a good 

employee of Defendant.

132.Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff by failing to treat him the same or similar to 

their non-Hispanic employees as a result of his race.

133.Defendant based its decision to demote, twice, and subsequently terminate Plaintiff based 

on his race. 

134.Defendant engaged in one or more prohibited “discriminatory practice”, as the term is 

defined by Fla. Stat. §760.02(4) and by §760.10(1) by engaging in the aforesaid actions, which 

is prohibited by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

135.These actions constitute an ultimate employment decision, altered the compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of the employment of Plaintiff, his employment, and/or adversely 

affected his status as an employee.

136.As such, the disparate treatment Plaintiff suffered constitutes an adverse employment 

action because of his race for purposes of the FCRA.

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137.Defendant’s actions were malicious and demonstrated a reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s 

rights pursuant to FCRA. 

138.The aforementioned acts of commission and omission by Defendant were done willfully, 

wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the consequences of such actions. 

139.Plaintiff suffered damages in the form of lost income in the past, lost income in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries. 

140.Pursuant to the FCRA, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs from 

Defendant, in addition to compensatory damages and punitive damages. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendant, FTS, after a trial by jury, declaring that Defendant violated the FCRA, 

awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages including the loss of income in the past and in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, other intangible injuries, punitive damages, and 

attorney’s fees and costs as a result of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct and any and all other 

relief this court deems just.

COUNT V – VIOLATION OF FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

(DISPARATE TREATMENT – NATIONAL ORIGIN)

(AGAINST DEFENDANT FTS) 

141.Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

142.The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”) makes it unlawful for an employer such 

as Defendant to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment because of that individual’s national origin. 

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143.Defendant was, at all times material to this action, a “person” and/or an “employer” that 

was and remains subject to the FCRA by employing more than fifteen people for each working 

day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

144.The FCRA prohibits Defendant from making employment decisions or from taking 

personnel actions affecting the terms, conditions, and/or privileges of employment based upon 

national origin considerations.

145.The FCRA allows a prevailing employee to obtain an order prohibiting Defendant from 

engaging in its discriminatory practice(s) and providing affirmative relief from the effects of the 

practice(s), to recover back pay, compensatory damages, damages for mental anguish, loss of 

dignity, and any other intangible injuries, and punitive damages. See Fla. Stat. §760.11(5).

146.Plaintiff possessed the skills, background, and qualifications necessary to perform the 

duties of his position. 

147.Plaintiff performed his work for Defendant satisfactorily, and he was in all respects a good 

employee of Defendant.

148.Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff by failing to treat him the same or similar to 

their non-Hispanic employees as a result of his national origin.

149.Defendant based its decisionsto demote, twice, and subsequently terminate Plaintiff based 

on his national origin. 

150.Defendant engaged in one or more prohibited “discriminatory practice”, as the term is 

defined by Fla. Stat. §760.02(4) and by §760.10(1) by engaging in the aforesaid actions, which is 

prohibited by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

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151.These actions constitute an ultimate employment decision, altered the compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of the employment of Plaintiff, his employment, and/or adversely 

affected his status as an employee.

152.As such, the disparate treatment Plaintiff suffered constitutes an adverse employment 

action because of his national origin for purposes of the FCRA. 

153.Defendant’s actions were malicious and demonstrated a reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s 

rights pursuant to FCRA. 

154.The aforementioned acts of commission and omission by Defendant were done willfully, 

wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the consequences of such actions. 

155.Plaintiff suffered damages in the form of lost income in the past, lost income in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries. 

156.Pursuant to the FCRA, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs from 

Defendant, in addition to compensatory damages and punitive damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendant, FTS, after a trial by jury, declaring that Defendant violated the FCRA, 

awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages including the loss of income in the past and in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, other intangible injuries, punitive damages, and 

attorney’s fees and costs as a result of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct and any and all other 

relief this court deems just.

COUNT VI: VIOLATION(S) OF TITLE VII

(HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT)

(AGAINST DEFENDANT FTS) 

157.Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

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158.Defendant violated the Civil Rights Act by subjecting Plaintiff to relentless humiliation, 

intimidation, and ridicule, because of his race and national origin, creating an abusive and/or 

hostile work environment.

159.Plaintiff is a Hispanic United States citizen, and therefore is a protected class member.

160.Plaintiff suffered unwelcome harassment because of his race and national origin, that was 

both subjectively and objectively hostile.

161.The abusive nature of Plaintiff’s work environment was pervasive, ongoing, and 

humiliating. 

162.Plaintiff’s white counterparts were not subjected to any hostility or racism, because they 

were non-Hispanic. 

163.Plaintiff was relentlessly subjected to derogatory remarks and pervasive accusatory 

conduct, as detailed supra, because he was Cuban. 

164.Plaintiff perceived the above-described conduct as hostile.

165.Likewise, any reasonable person would perceive such conduct as hostile.

166.Indeed, the above-described conduct was frequent, severe, and extremely humiliating and 

was made because of Plaintiff’s race and national origin.

167.This environment caused Plaintiff extreme emotional distress.

168.Defendant is liable for the above-described conduct because Plaintiff complained about 

the racism he experienced multiple times to Defendant’s company executives, thus, Defendant had 

notice of such conduct.

169.Defendant made clear through their action/inaction that they had no interest in rectifying 

the overt and covert racist acts Plaintiff was subjected to in Defendant’s workplace. 

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170.Consequently, as a result of Defendant’s inaction, the abusive and/or hostile work 

environment intensified.

171.Defendant’s failure to investigate and/or correct the racial discrimination in the workplace 

upon actual notice of such conduct altered the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment.

172.Defendant further altered the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment, demoting 

him twice, because of his race and national origin, and holding Plaintiff to a different standard than 

white employees.

173.Defendant is liable for the environment because they had actual notice of Plaintiff’s 

discrimination complaints, yet took no corrective action whatsoever. 

174.Defendant’s executives, Revelle and Rustman, repeatedly demonstrated that they did not 

concern themselves with the fact that FTS’s white employees relentlessly discriminated against 

Plaintiff on a continual basis, and furthermore, facilitated Plaintiff’s discrimination and abuse. 

175.Defendant’s actions were malicious and demonstrated a reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s 

rights.

176.Defendant’s violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) by subjecting Plaintiff to an 

abusive hostile work environment because of his race and national origin.

177.As an actual and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful employment practices in 

violation of the Civil Rights Act, Plaintiff has suffered damages.

178.Plaintiff suffered damages in the form of lost income in the past, lost income in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries.

179.Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and 

costs from Defendant, in addition to compensatory damages and punitive damages.

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WHEREFORE Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendants, FTS, after a trial by jury, declaring that Defendant violated Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages including 

the loss of income in the past and in the future, lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, other 

intangible injuries, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs as a result of Defendant’s

discriminatory conduct and any and all other relief this court deems just.

COUNT VII: VIOLATION(S) OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981 

(HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT)

(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

180.Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

181.Defendants violated Section 1981 by subjecting Plaintiff to relentless humiliation, 

intimidation, and ridicule, because of his race and national origin, creating an abusive and/or 

hostile work environment. 

182.Plaintiff is a Hispanic United States citizen, and therefore is a protected class member.

183.Plaintiff suffered unwelcome harassment because of his race and national origin, that was 

both subjectively and objectively hostile. 

184.The abusive nature of Plaintiff’s work environment was pervasive, ongoing, and 

humiliating. 

185.Plaintiff’s white counterparts were not subjected to any hostility or racism, because they 

were non-Hispanic. 

186.Plaintiff was relentlessly subjected to derogatory remarks and pervasive accusatory 

conduct, as detailed supra, because he was Cuban. 

187.Plaintiff perceived the above-described conduct as hostile. 

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188.Likewise, any reasonable person would perceive such conduct as hostile.

189.Indeed, the above-described conduct was frequent, severe, and extremely humiliating and 

was made because of Plaintiff’s race and national origin.

190.This environment caused Plaintiff extreme emotional distress.

191.Defendants are liable for the above-described conduct because Plaintiff complained about 

the racism he experienced multiple times, thus, Defendants had notice of such conduct.

192.However, Defendants made clear through their action/inaction that they had no interest in 

rectifying the overt and covert racist acts Plaintiff was subjected to incessantly. 

193.Consequently, as a result of Defendants’ inaction, the abusive and/or hostile work 

environment intensified.

194.Defendants’ failure to investigate and/or correct the racial discrimination in the workplace 

upon actual notice of such conduct altered the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment.

195.Defendants further altered the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment, demoting 

him twice, because of his race and national origin, and holding Plaintiff to a different standard than 

white employees.

196.Defendants are liable for the environment because they had actual notice of Plaintiff’s 

discrimination complaints, yet took no corrective action whatsoever. 

197.Defendants, Revelle and Rustman, repeatedly demonstrated that they did not concern 

themselves with the fact that FTS’ white employees relentlessly discriminated against Plaintiff on 

a continual basis, and furthermore, facilitated Plaintiff’s discrimination and abuse. 

198.Defendants’ actions were malicious and demonstrated a reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s 

rights.

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199.Defendants violated Section 1981 by subjecting Plaintiff to an abusive hostile work 

environment because of his race and national origin. 

200.But for Plaintiff’s race and national origin, he would not have been subjected to an abusive 

hostile work environment. 

201.As an actual and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful employment practices in 

violation of Section 1981, Plaintiff has suffered damages. 

202.Plaintiff suffered damages in the form of lost income in the past, lost income in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries. 

203.Pursuant to Section 1981, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees and costs from 

Defendants, in addition to compensatory damages and punitive damages. 

WHEREFORE Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendants, FTS, DOUG REVELLE, and CHRIS RUSTMAN after a trial by jury, 

declaring that Defendants violated Section 1981, awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages 

including the loss of income in the past and in the future, lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of 

dignity, other intangible injuries, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs as a result of 

Defendants discriminatory conduct and any and all other relief this court deems just.

COUNT VIII: VIOLATION OF FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

(HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT)

(AGAINST DEFENDANT FTS) 

204.Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

205.Defendant violated the FCRA, § 760.10(1)(a), by subjecting Plaintiff to relentless 

humiliation, intimidation, and ridicule, because of his race and national origin, creating an abusive 

and/or hostile work environment. 

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206.Plaintiff is a Hispanic United States citizen, and therefore is a protected class member.

207.Plaintiff suffered unwelcome harassment because of his race and national origin, that was 

both subjectively and objectively hostile.

208.The abusive nature of Plaintiff’s work environment was pervasive, ongoing, and 

humiliating. 

209.Plaintiff’s white counterparts were not subjected to any hostility or racism, because they 

were non-Hispanic. 

210.Plaintiff was relentlessly subjected to derogatory remarks and pervasive accusatory 

conduct, as detailed supra, because he was Cuban. 

211.Plaintiff perceived the above-described conduct as hostile.

212.Likewise, any reasonable person would perceive such conduct as hostile.

213.Indeed, the above-described conduct was frequent, severe, and extremely humiliating and 

was made because of Plaintiff’s race and national origin.

214.This environment caused Plaintiff extreme emotional distress.

215.Defendant is liable for the above-described conduct because Plaintiff complained about 

the racism he experienced multiple times, thus, Defendant had notice of such conduct.

216.However, Defendant made clear through its action/inaction that it had no interest in 

rectifying the overt and covert racist acts Plaintiff was subjected to incessantly. 

217.Consequently, as a result of Defendant’s inaction, the abusive and/or hostile work 

environment intensified.

218.Defendant’s failure to investigate and/or correct the racial discrimination in the workplace 

upon actual notice of such conduct altered the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment.

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219.Defendant further altered the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment, demoting 

him twice, because of his race and national origin, and holding Plaintiff to a different standard 

than white employees.

220.Defendant is liable for the environment because it had actual notice of Plaintiff’s 

discrimination complaints, yet took no corrective action whatsoever. 

221.Defendant’s executives, Revelle and Rustman, repeatedly demonstrated that they did not 

concern themselves with the fact that FTS’s white employees relentlessly discriminated against 

Plaintiff on a continual basis, and furthermore, facilitated Plaintiff’s discrimination and abuse. 

222.Defendant’s actions were malicious and demonstrated a reckless indifference to Plaintiff’s 

rights.

223.Defendant violated the FCRA, § 760.10(1)(a), by subjecting Plaintiff to an abusive hostile 

work environment because of his race and national origin.

224.As an actual and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful employment practices in 

violation of the FCRA, § 760.10(1)(a), Plaintiff has suffered damages.

225.Plaintiff suffered damages in the form of lost income in the past, lost income in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, and other intangible injuries.

226.Pursuant to the FCRA, § 760.10(1)(a), Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney’s fees 

and costs from Defendants, in addition to compensatory damages and punitive damages.

WHEREFORE Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendant, FTS, after a trial by jury, declaring that Defendant violated the FCRA, § 

760.10(1)(a), awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages including the loss of income in the past 

and in the future, lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, other intangible injuries, punitive 

Case 1:22-cv-23648-JEM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/07/2022 Page 27 of 44
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damages, and attorney’s fees and costs as a result of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct and any 

and all other relief this court deems just.

COUNT IX: VIOLATION(S) OF TITLE VII

(RETALIATION)

(AGAINST DEFENDANT FTS) 

227.Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

228.Defendant violated Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision by taking materially adverse 

actions against Plaintiff because he engaged in protected activity.

229.Plaintiff engaged in protect activity by complaining about FTS’s discriminatory 

employment practices, which he reasonably believed were motivated by discriminatory animus 

because of Plaintiff’s race and national origin. 

230.Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when throughout the course of his employment, on 

numerous occasions, he complained about the discriminatory pictures and conduct by Burns and 

Forbes. 

231. Rustman and Revelle are officers of FTS, and regularly visit the Pompano Beach location 

where Plaintiff worked. 

232. Rustman and Revelle were aware of situations occurring at the Pompano Beach location

and spoke with Plaintiff about Burns’ harassment, yet no action was taken to address or fix the 

issues. 

233.From the constant, derogatory complaints by Burns, to the harassing photographing of his 

vehicle, and to his unfounded demotions at FTS, this series of events highlights that Plaintiff’s 

termination was pretextual all because he was Hispanic/Cuban.

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234.Plaintiff suffered materially adverse actions because of his protected activity described 

above. Defendant took no corrective action after Plaintiff complained. 

235.Any reasonable employee well might be dissuaded about opposing discrimination if the 

employee knew his supervisor would not take any corrective action after the employee repeatedly 

complained. 

236.The above-described materially adverse actions are causally connected to his protected 

activity because Plaintiff’s discrimination complaints to Defendant and the subsequent adverse 

actions are not wholly unrelated. Indeed, Revelle and Rustman had actual knowledge. 

237.Further, Revelle and Rustman took the adverse actions against Plaintiff because of 

Plaintiff’s protected activity.

238.As a result of the Company’s employment practices in violation of Title VII’s 

antiretaliation provision, Plaintiff has suffered damages. 

239.Defendant’s conduct was malicious, willful, and/or with deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff’s civil rights, to warrant punitive damages against Defendant. 

WHEREFORE Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendant, FTS, after a trial by jury, declaring that Defendant violated Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act, awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages including the loss of income in the 

past and in the future, lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, other intangible injuries, 

punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs as a result of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct 

and any and all other relief this court deems just. 

COUNT X: VIOLATION(S) OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981 

(RETALIATION)

(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

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240.Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

241.Defendants violated Section 1981 by taking materially adverse actions against Plaintiff 

because he engaged in protected activity.

242.Plaintiff engaged in protect activity by complaining about FTS’ discriminatory 

employment practices, which he reasonably believed were motivated by discriminatory animus 

because of Plaintiff’s race and national origin.

243.Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when throughout the course of his employment, on 

numerous occasions, he complained about the discriminatory pictures and conduct by Burns and 

Forbes.

244. Rustman and Revelle are officers of FTS, and regularly visited FTS’s Pompano Beach 

offices. 

245. Rustman and Revelle were well-aware of situations occurring at the Pompano Beach 

location and spoke with Plaintiff about issues between him and Burns, yet no action was taken to 

address or fix the issues. 

246.From the constant, derogatory complaints by Burns, to the harassing photographing of his 

vehicle, and to his unfounded demotions at FTS, this series of events highlights that Plaintiff’s 

termination was pretextual all because he was Hispanic/Cuban.

247.Plaintiff suffered materially adverse actions because of his protected activity described 

above. Defendants took no corrective action after Plaintiff complained.

248.Any reasonable employee well might be dissuaded about opposing discrimination if the 

employee knew his supervisor would not take any corrective action after the employee repeatedly 

complained.

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249.The above-described materially adverse actions are causally connected to his protected 

activity because Plaintiff’s discrimination complaints to Defendants and the subsequent adverse 

actions are not wholly unrelated. Indeed, Revelle and Rustman had actual knowledge. 

250.Further, Revelle and Rustman took the adverse actions against Plaintiff because of 

Plaintiff’s protected activity.

251.But for Plaintiff’s protected activity, he would not have been terminated by Defendants, 

and Plaintiff’s termination constitutes an adverse employment action for which Section 1981 

provides legal recourse. 

252.As a result of the Company’s employment practices in violation of Section 1981, Plaintiff 

has suffered damages. 

253.Defendants’ conduct was malicious, willful, and/or with deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff’s civil rights, to warrant punitive damages against Defendants. 

WHEREFORE Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendants, FTS, DOUG REVELLE, and CHRIS RUSTMAN after a trial by jury, 

declaring that Defendants violated Section 1981, awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages 

including the loss of income in the past and in the future, lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of 

dignity, other intangible injuries, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs as a result of 

Defendants discriminatory conduct and any and all other relief this court deems just.

COUNT XI: VIOLATION OF FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

(RETALIATION)

(AGAINST DEFENDANT FTS) 

254.Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-79 above as if fully 

stated herein.

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255.Defendant violated the FCRA’s anti-retaliation provision by taking materially adverse 

actions against Plaintiff because he engaged in protected activity.

256.Plaintiff engaged in protect activity by complaining about FTS’s discriminatory 

employment practices, which he reasonably believed were motivated by discriminatory animus 

because of Plaintiff’s race and national origin.

257.Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when throughout the course of his employment, on 

numerous occasions, he complained about the discriminatory pictures and conduct by Burns and 

Forbes.

258.Rustman and Revelle are officers of FTS, and regularly visited the Pompano Beach 

location where Plaintiff worked. 

259.Rustman and Revelle were well-aware of situations occurring at the Pompano Beach 

location and spoke with Plaintiff about Burns’ harassment, yet no action was taken to address or 

fix the issues. 

260.From the constant, derogatory complaints by Burns, to the harassing photographing of his 

vehicle, and to his unfounded demotions at FTS, this series of events highlights that Plaintiff’s 

termination was pretextual all because he was Hispanic/Cuban.

261.Plaintiff suffered materially adverse actions because of his protected activity described 

above. Defendant took no corrective action after Plaintiff complained.

262.Any reasonable employee well might be dissuaded about opposing discrimination if the 

employee knew his supervisor would not take any corrective action after the employee repeatedly 

complained.

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263.The above-described materially adverse actions are causally connected to his protected 

activity because Plaintiff’s discrimination complaints to Defendant and the subsequent adverse 

actions are not wholly unrelated. Indeed, Revelle and Rustman had actual knowledge. 

264.Further, Revelle and Rustman took the adverse actions against Plaintiff because of 

Plaintiff’s protected activity.

265.As a result of the Company’s employment practices in violation of the FCRA’s 

antiretaliation provision, Plaintiff has suffered damages. 

266.Defendant’s conduct was malicious, willful, and/or with deliberate indifference to 

Plaintiff’s civil rights, to warrant punitive damages against Defendant. 

WHEREFORE Plaintiff, RALPH CUAN, demands the entry of a judgment in his favor 

and against Defendant, FTS, after a trial by jury, declaring that Defendant violated the FCRA, 

awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages including the loss of income in the past and in the future, 

lost benefits, mental anguish, loss of dignity, other intangible injuries, punitive damages, and 

attorney’s fees and costs as a result of Defendant’s discriminatory conduct and any and all other 

relief this court deems just.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable. 

 

Dated this 4th day of November, 2022. 

Respectfully submitted, 

s/Robert L. Switkes 

Robert L. Switkes, Esq. 

Florida Bar No.: 241059 

rswitkes@switkeslaw.com

s/Bradley F. Zappala 

Bradley F. Zappala, Esq. 

Case 1:22-cv-23648-JEM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/07/2022 Page 33 of 44
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Florida Bar No.: 111829 

bzappala@switkeslaw.com

s/Alejandra D. Gonzalez 

Alejandra D. Gonzalez, Esq.

Florida Bar No.:1035938 

agonzalez@switkeslaw.com

SWITKES & ZAPPALA, P.A.

407 Lincoln Road, PH SE 

Miami Beach, Florida 33139 

Tel: (305) 534-4757 

Fax: (305) 538-5504 

Attorneys for Plaintiff, Ralph Cuan 

Case 1:22-cv-23648-JEM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/07/2022 Page 34 of 44
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of November, 2022, I electronically filed the 

foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. 

s/Robert L. Switkes 

Robert L. Switkes, Esq.

Case 1:22-cv-23648-JEM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/07/2022 Page 35 of 44
Exhibit “A”

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Exhibit “B”

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