IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 19–1862

Filed May 15, 2020

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

JENNIFER L. MEYER,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance 

Commission.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a 

complaint against attorney alleging she violated three rules of professional 

conduct. LICENSE SUSPENDED. 

Tara van Brederode and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

Leon Spies of Spies & Pavelich, Iowa City, for respondent.
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

Attorney Jennifer Meyer entered an Alford plea to third-degree theft 

and was ordered to pay $102,989.95 in restitution after a special 

investigation by the state auditor found she billed the state public defender 

(SPD) for services she did not provide and collected reimbursement for 

expenses she did not incur. The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board brought a complaint against Meyer, alleging she 

violated three rules of professional conduct in connection with her Alford 

plea: Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a) (unreasonable fees or 

expenses), 32:8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act), and 32:8.4(c) (conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). A division of 

the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission found Meyer violated 

those rules and recommended a sixty-day suspension. On our de novo 

review, we find Meyer violated all three rules and suspend her from the 

practice of law for one year. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

We make the following findings based upon our de novo review of 

the record. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moran, 919 N.W.2d 

754, 756 (Iowa 2018). 

A. The SPD Contract and Audit. Meyer was hired as a contract 

attorney with the SPD in October 2002. The SPD periodically renewed her 

contract. The scope of Meyer’s representation expanded to include courtappointed practice in seven Iowa counties and consisted primarily of 

indigent criminal defense. She described her practice as “busy,” 

estimating that she opened approximately 2100 files during 2010–2012. 

The SPD contract required that Meyer claim fees only for “actual 

time and expenses reasonably necessary to properly represent” her clients. 
3

She was also required to follow SPD rules for mileage reimbursement. The 

contract required that Meyer maintain records. 

Contractor shall maintain books, records, documents, and 

other evidence of accounting procedures and practices which 

sufficiently and properly reflect the services performed and for 

which payment was requested or which relate to the work 

performed pursuant to this contract. . . . Contractor shall 

retain all books, records, documents and other relevant 

materials for five years after payment has been made under 

this contract. 

For each claim Meyer submitted to the SPD, she certified she was entitled 

to the requested payment. 

I, the undersigned attorney, certify that I have 

completed my services under the appointment; that I have not 

received nor have I entered into any agreement to receive 

compensation for these services, direct or indirect, from any 

source other than the State Public Defender; and that the 

above information summarizes the services and expenses for 

which I am entitled to payment. I further state that an 

itemized statement of services and expenses is attached 

hereto and a copy has been provided to my client. 

SPD initially approved or disapproved Meyer’s submitted billings on a 

case-by-case basis. During the autumn of 2013, however, the SPD 

reviewed Meyer’s previously approved billings on a per-day basis rather 

than a per-case basis. 

In a letter to Meyer dated September 24, 2013, the state public 

defender, Samuel Langholz, raised concerns about her billing practices 

and mileage expenses. Langholz noted Meyer billed SPD more than 2591 

hours in fiscal year 2010 and at least 2089 hours in fiscal year 2011.

When Langholz added up Meyer’s hours charged per day in multiple cases, 

he noticed that Meyer had billed the SPD twenty-four hours or more in a 

single day on nineteen different dates. Langholz and Meyer met on October 

9 to discuss his concerns. 
4

Six days later, Meyer wrote Langholz to report she was unable to 

reconstruct her total billings by day. Meyer stated she dictated her billings 

prepared by her secretary and then would often make handwritten edits 

to the invoices, usually to correct time entries. Those changes were not 

reentered in the billing software.

As we discussed at our [October 9] meeting, I reviewed 

my billing on a case-by-case basis prior to submitting bills to 

your office . . . . Following our meeting, I continued to review 

the days in question, however, unfortunately because I 

dictated almost all entries, reconstructing each day is not a 

viable option. I take full responsibility for not tracking my 

billable time in a way that allow[s] me to review the amount of 

time billed for each day, not just the work done itself. . . . The 

dictation was deleted by my secretary upon entry of the time 

into the billing system. 

Meyer stated that billing errors could occur when her secretary 

billed on the days “the letter or document was actually mailed out to the 

client,” rather than the actual days Meyer worked on the case. “Time may 

have been entered from days or weeks prior, depending on when the 

information was entered. . . .” According to Meyer, this explained how the 

hours worked on one day could be entered on another, creating the 

artificially high number of hours for a particular day. Meyer insisted all of 

the time billed was for work she actually performed, even if the dates were 

billed incorrectly. 

The SPD renewed Meyer’s contract on November 2013, which was 

set to expire on January 3, 2014. However, on December 30, 2013,

Langholz notified Meyer that the SPD would not renew the contract. 

Langholz rejected Meyer’s explanation for the high billing days. 

Your time records do not always reflect that the days 

surrounding these highest-billing days were unusually low as 

would be expected if these high billing days were merely the 

result of secretarial date entry errors. And you did 

occasionally bill time on the weekends further undermining 

this explanation. Moreover, your total hours claimed during 
5

these time periods casts further doubt on the accuracy of the 

submissions. From July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010 – the 

period for which we have the highest volume of claims data 

analyzed – you billed nearly 2,600 hours, which is a high 

number of billable hours for any attorney, particularly within 

Iowa. And in July 2009, you billed 353.8 hours – an amount 

that is highly improbable for an individual to bill in a single 

month, considering that it would require billing more than 

eleven hours a day for thirty-one days straight, and keeping 

in mind that such a monthly rate would result in annual 

billable hours totaling 4,245.6. 

The SPD review also revealed discrepancies with Meyer’s claims for 

mileage reimbursement. Specifically, Meyer at times billed multiple clients 

for the full mileage to the same location on the same day. Langholz 

determined at least 2853 miles of reimbursement were improperly claimed. 

Meyer paid the SPD $998.60 in an effort to resolve the contention that she 

overbilled mileage. 

It became apparent that improprieties with the SPD billing fees and 

mileage expenses were not limited to Meyer. As a result, the state auditor 

conducted a special investigation of the SPD. Meyer and thirteen other 

attorneys were audited, leading to disciplinary charges. See Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Noel, 923 N.W.2d 575, 580, 591 (Iowa 2019)

(suspending an attorney’s license for one year in a disciplinary case that 

arose from this SPD audit); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Mathahs, 918 N.W.2d 487, 491, 500 (Iowa 2018) (suspending an attorney’s

license for sixty days in a disciplinary case that arose from this SPD audit).

The audit included an examination of Meyer’s fees and expenses from 

August 2009 through August 2013. The auditor found thirty days on 

which Meyer billed SPD twenty-four hours or more. And on 317 days, 

Meyer billed SPD 12.1 hours or more for combined billings totaling

$101,220. For the same period, the auditor identified 147 trips in which
6

Meyer duplicated her mileage reimbursement, totaling $2768.55 for 7910 

miles traveled. 

B. The Criminal Proceedings. In June 2016, the Iowa attorney 

general filed a two-count trial information against Meyer. Count I charged 

Meyer with first-degree fraudulent practice, a class “C” felony, in violation 

of Iowa Code sections 714.8(3), 714.9, and 714.14 (2016). Count II 

charged Meyer with first-degree theft, a class “C” felony, in violation of 

Iowa Code sections 714.1(1), 714.1(3), 714.2(1), and 714.3. The state 

alleged Meyer “did knowingly tender false certificates given in support of 

claims for compensation, where the total amount of money exceeds 

$10,000” and “did take possession of property of the State of Iowa with the 

intent to deprive thereof, or did obtain a transfer of possession of the 

property . . . by deception, where the amount of money involved exceeds 

$10,000” from 2009 to June 30, 2013. 

Meyer entered a written Alford1 plea to the lesser included offense of 

third-degree theft, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code 

sections 714.1(3) and 714.2(3). The statutory value of third-degree theft 

is capped at property not exceeding $1000. Iowa Code § 714.2(3). Meyer’s 

Alford plea stated, 

I have read the Minutes of Testimony filed with the Trial 

Information, and do not contest the accuracy of those minutes 

except for: I am pleading guilty because I understand that a 

reasonable jury could find me guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt, and enter this plea with the advice of counsel and to 

take advantage of the plea agreement. 

The parties jointly recommended probation for two years and that Meyer 

pay restitution. The district court accepted the plea, finding there was 

“strong evidence of [Meyer]’s guilt which substantially negate[d] [her] claim 

 1North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970). 
7

of innocence.” On April 26, 2018, the district court sentenced Meyer to 

two-year’s probation, a deferred judgment, and a $625 civil penalty. Meyer 

was ordered to pay restitution payments in an amount to be determined 

at a later date. 

The attorney general requested $102,989.95 in restitution, 

comprised of $101,220 in excess billing fees and $2768.55 in improper 

mileage expenses, less the $998.60 that Meyer previously paid the SPD. 

Meyer agreed to the attorney general’s requested restitution provided that

the SPD filed a partial satisfaction for $53,808.82—the approved amount 

of her pending, postaudit services that she provided under her contract 

“other than for the events giving rise to this criminal prosecution.” In 

accordance with this agreement, the district court ordered Meyer to pay 

the full restitution amount of $102,989.95, and the SPD filed a partial 

satisfaction in the amount of $53,808.82. Meyer then entered into a 

payment plan requiring $250 each month until she paid the remaining 

$49,181.13 in full. 

C. The Disciplinary Proceedings. Meyer informed the Board of 

her third-degree theft Alford plea. On May 31, 2019, the Board filed an 

amended three-count complaint against Meyer, alleging she violated Iowa 

Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a) (unreasonable fees or expenses), 

32:8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act), and 32:8.4(c) (conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). The Board alleged Meyer 

(1) collected an unreasonable fee for billing the SPD for services she did 

not provide; (2) collected an unreasonable amount for expenses billed to 

SPD for miles she did not travel; (3) committed a criminal act, theft by 

deception, that reflected adversely on her honesty, trustworthiness, or 

fitness as a lawyer; and (4) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit, or misrepresentation by billing SPD for fees she did not earn and 
8

expenses she did not incur. According to the Board, the conduct at issue 

was established by Meyer’s Alford plea to third-degree theft. Meyer 

answered, admitting most of the allegations in the complaint, including 

the preclusive effects of her Alford plea. Pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 

36.17(4)(c), the Board provided Meyer with notice of its intent to invoke 

issue preclusion “with regard to all matters resolved in a criminal 

proceeding in the Iowa District Court for Polk County . . ., which resulted 

in a finding of guilt.” 

D. The Commission Hearing and Recommendation. The 

commission held a multiday hearing beginning May 30. The Board’s case

focused on three events: the SPD’s internal investigation of Meyer’s 

billings, the state auditor’s special investigation that included Meyer’s 

billings, and the criminal case against Meyer that resulted in her Alford

plea to third-degree theft. Meyer consistently argued that “[s]he did the 

work, she billed for the work, [and] she was entitled to be paid for the 

work.” She acknowledged there were billing irregularities, which she 

attributed to the way she and her staff billed the SPD. Meyer never denied 

her responsibility for the billing irregularities. 

On November 7, the commission determined Meyer’s Alford plea

demonstrated she violated rules 32:1.5(a), 32:8.4(b), and 32:8.4(c), finding 

she “engaged in a criminal act that reflects adversely on her honesty or 

trustworthiness[] and also engaged in conduct that involves dishonesty or 

deceit.” The commission found the Board failed to prove that Meyer billed 

for time not actually worked beyond the $1000 established by her Alford

plea. Accordingly, the commission determined a sixty-day suspension was 

appropriate. 
9

II. Standard of Review. 

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Iowa 2013). 

The Board must prove the rule violation by a convincing preponderance of 

the evidence. Mathahs, 918 N.W.2d at 489. A convincing preponderance 

of the evidence is more demanding than the civil preponderance-of-theevidence standard but less demanding than the criminal beyond-areasonable-doubt standard. See Moran, 919 N.W.2d at 758. We 

respectfully consider the commission’s findings, but we are not bound by 

them. Noel, 923 N.W.2d at 582. “Upon proof of misconduct, we may 

impose a greater or lesser sanction than the sanction recommended by the

commission.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Bauermeister, 927 

N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Iowa 2010)). 

III. Ethical Violations. 

A. Prohibition Against Unreasonable Fees—Rule 32:1.5(a). This 

rule provides, “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect 

an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses, or violate 

any restrictions imposed by law.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(a). We 

have said that the fees under rule 32:1.5(a) “must be ‘reasonable under 

the circumstances.’ ” Noel, 923 N.W.2d at 585 (quoting Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:1.5(a) cmt. [1]). 

We give preclusive effect to Meyer’s Alford plea to third-degree theft 

by deception in the amount of $1000. See Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. 

Van Haaften, 815 N.W.2d 17, 28 (Iowa 2012) (holding the preclusive effect 

of an Alford plea is limited to the elements of the offense, including the 

upper limit on the dollar value). Based on issue preclusion, the 

commission found Meyer violated rule 32:1.5(a) by charging an excessive 
10

$1000. The commission, however, found the Board otherwise failed to 

prove Meyer billed for work she did not perform and declined to consider 

the six-figure criminal restitution judgment in calculating the amount 

Meyer overcharged the SPD. We do not give the restitution award 

preclusive effect here. Yet the fact that Meyer agreed to reimburse the SPD 

$102,989.95 in the criminal proceeding undermines her claim in this 

disciplinary proceeding that she overcharged the SPD by much less. We 

need not determine the exact amount Meyer overcharged the SPD, but we

agree with the Board that the amount far exceeds the $1000 ceiling for 

third-degree theft. 

The state auditor discovered Meyer billed more than twenty-four 

hours in a day on thirty different days. On thirty-eight different days, the 

state auditor found Meyer billed between twenty and 23.9 hours per day. 

In one month, July 2009, Meyer billed the SPD for 353.8 hours. That 

would require Meyer to bill an average of eleven hours daily for thirty-one 

straight days, an accomplishment Langholz aptly described as “highly 

improbabl[e] for an individual to bill in a single month.” We agree. 

Meyer testified she often worked beyond customary hours and 

during weekends and blamed her office’s billing practices for inaccurately 

entering the dates of work actually performed, thereby artificially inflating 

the number of hours in multiple cases piled onto the same day. “[S]loppy 

billing practices” do not excuse violations of rule 32:1.5(a). Noel, 923 

N.W.2d at 586. And Langholz credibly noted Meyer’s pattern of billing did 

not justify the high billing days. He determined the days surrounding the 

high billing days were not as low as he expected, and when viewed in 

weekly, monthly, or yearly blocks of time, he did not believe the billable 

hours were legitimate. For example, in fiscal year 2010, Meyer claimed 

more than $160,000 in fees, or more than 2660 billable hours. 
11

In addition, Meyer acknowledged that she overbilled the SPD for 

mileage expenses and indeed reimbursed the SPD $998.60 for excessive 

expenses billed. The state auditor’s report identified 147 trips in which

Meyer duplicated her mileage reimbursement, totaling $2768.55 for 7910 

miles traveled. Her excessive mileage reimbursement alone violates rule 

32:1.5(a)’s prohibition against charging unreasonable expenses. See id. 

We determine that the Board proved by a convincing preponderance 

of the evidence that Meyer violated rule 32:1.5(a). 

B. Conduct Reflecting Adversely on the Attorney’s Fitness to 

Practice Law—Rule 32:8.4(b). Rule 32:8.4(b) states, “It is professional 

misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that reflects adversely 

on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other 

respects.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(b). Again applying issue 

preclusion, we find Meyer’s Alford plea establishes she committed a 

criminal act. Not every criminal act reflects adversely on the attorney’s 

fitness to practice law. See Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 767. “There must 

be some rational connection other than the criminality of the act between 

the conduct and the actor’s fitness to practice law.” Noel, 923 N.W.2d at 

587 (quoting Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 767). We consider the attorney’s 

mental state, the disrespect the act demonstrates for the law or law 

enforcement, the presence or absence of a victim and the actual or 

potential injury, and the existence of a pattern of criminal conduct. See 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Sears, 933 N.W.2d 214, 220 

(Iowa 2019). 

In Noel, we found that the misconduct of an SPD-contracted 

attorney, who repeatedly billed for services he did not provide while 

representing indigent clients, was “directly connected to his fitness to 

practice law.” 923 N.W.2d at 587. We reiterated “an attorney’s conduct 
12

‘that diminishes “public confidence in the legal profession” ’ is ‘conduct 

that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law.’ ” Id. (quoting 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wheeler, 824 N.W.2d 505, 510–

11 (Iowa 2012)). We reach the same conclusion as to Meyer’s criminal act.

We find Meyer’s conduct diminishes public confidence in the legal 

system. Meyer disregarded her responsibility to avoid submitting billing 

errors to the SPD for indigent defense work. See id. We agree with the 

commission’s finding that Meyer violated rule 32:8.4(b). 

C. Conduct Involving Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or 

Misrepresentation—Rule 32:8.4(c). Rule 32:8.4(c) provides, “It is 

professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:8.4(c). To show a violation of rule 32:8.4(c), the Board must 

prove “the attorney acted with ‘some level of scienter’ rather than mere 

negligence.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Green, 888 N.W.2d 

398, 403–04 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Haskovec, 869 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2015)); see Rhinehart, 827 N.W.2d 

at 182 (holding the Board did not prove a violation of rule 3:8.4(c) because 

“there [was] no evidence that [the attorney] was dishonest, deceitful, or 

that he committed fraud or made any misrepresentation”). “The 

dispositive question ‘is whether the effect of the lawyer’s conduct is to 

mislead rather than to inform.’ ” Noel, 923 N.W.2d at 588 (quoting Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Suarez-Quilty, 912 N.W.2d 150, 158

(Iowa 2018)). 

The record must show Meyer “acted knowingly, intentionally, or with 

the aim to mislead.” Id. (quoting Suarez-Quilty, 912 N.W.2d at 158). In 

Wheeler, we found an attorney engaged in conduct involving 

misrepresentation because he pled guilty to knowingly making a false 
13

statement to a financial institution. 824 N.W.2d at 511. Here, Meyer 

entered an Alford plea to third-degree theft. Meyer’s “guilty plea, 

notwithstanding its Alford character, precludes [her] from contending that 

[she is] not guilty of that offense.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Engelhardt, 630 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 2001). “A person 

commits theft when the person . . . [o]btains the labor or services of 

another, or a transfer of possession, control, or ownership of property of 

another, or the beneficial use of property of another, by deception.” Iowa 

Code § 714.1(3). The relevant definition of “[d]eception” means knowingly 

“[c]reating or confirming another’s belief or impression as to the existence 

or nonexistence of a fact or condition which is false and which the actor 

does not believe to be true.” Id. § 702.9(1). By pleading guilty to theft by 

deception, Meyer acknowledged that when she submitted her billings and 

reimbursements, she “acted knowingly, intentionally, or with the aim to 

mislead.” Suarez-Quilty, 912 N.W.2d at 158 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Guthrie, 901 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Iowa 2017)). 

We agree with the commission that Meyer violated rule 32:8.4(c). 

IV. Sanction. 

Meyer argues a thirty-day suspension of her license is sufficient, 

while the Board seeks a one-year suspension. The commission 

recommended a sixty-day suspension. To calibrate the appropriate

sanction, we consider 

the nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to continue 

in the practice of law, the protection of society from those unfit 

to practice law, the need to uphold public confidence in the 

justice system, deterrence, maintenance of the reputation of 

the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating 

circumstances. 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 441

(Iowa 2012) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 
14

N.W.2d 53, 61 (Iowa 2009) (per curiam)). Prior cases are instructive, see 

Mathahs, 918 N.W.2d at 494, but we “rarely encounter cases [with] the 

exact same conduct,” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Iowa 2014). 

Last term, we suspended two lawyers who overcharged the SPD. We 

imposed a sixty-day suspension in Mathahs, 918 N.W.2d at 500, and a 

one-year suspension in Noel, 923 N.W.2d at 591. “Generally, our 

sanctions for attorneys who charge and collect unreasonable fees range 

from sixty days to two years.” Id. at 588–89 (collecting cases). In our view, 

Meyer’s misconduct is comparable to Noel’s and worse than Mathahs’s. 

In Mathahs, the attorney billed the SPD for excessive hours and 

mileage, violating rules 32:1.5(a) (unreasonable fees) and 32:5.3(b) (failure 

to supervise staff). 918 N.W.2d at 489–91. But the Board stipulated 

Mathahs did not violate rules 32:8.4(b) and (c), and we found no 

misrepresentation or deception. Id. at 497. We noted the attorney 

general’s investigation closed without any criminal charges. Id. The 

attorney general found Mathahs’s hours “were high but believable” and 

“could not locate any billings for events or work that did not actually 

occur,” while also concluding “the billing errors appeared much more like 

accidental and less like intentional theft.” Id. Unlike Mathahs, Meyer was 

convicted of theft by deception and violated rules 32:8.4(b) (criminal act) 

and (c) (deceit). Meyer’s hours were high and unbelievable. That Meyer 

“received a deferred judgment does not excuse [her] violation of [the]

disciplinary rule[s].” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carroll, 721 

N.W.2d 788, 792 (Iowa 2006). A sixty-day suspension is insufficient for 

Meyer. 

In Noel, the auditor’s investigation “resulted in two criminal 

convictions for fourth-degree theft, and Noel both admitted to and was 
15

convicted of billing for events that he did not actually attend.” 923 N.W.2d 

at 589. Noel was sentenced to probation for two years, fully suspended 

jail sentences of thirty days and one year, mandatory minimum fines of 

$315 each count, and ordered to pay $14,697.45 in restitution. Id. at 581. 

We found “Noel engaged in repeated deception over a period of years.” Id.

at 590. Noel persisted in arguing his misconduct resulted from honest 

mistakes, which we concluded “evidenc[ed] a lack of an actual appreciation 

of [his] wrongful conduct.” Id. at 589 (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83, 93 

(Iowa 2004)). Noel admittedly discovered he was overbilling the SPD for 

mileage yet made no effort to remedy the problem before Langholz informed 

him his contract was in jeopardy. Id. at 590. Noel was a magistrate, such 

that his misconduct further undermined public confidence in our 

profession. Id. Noel’s partial reimbursement and previously unblemished 

disciplinary record were insufficient to avoid our imposition of a one-year 

suspension, the sanction recommended by the commission. Id. at 590–

91. 

The commission recommended a sixty-day suspension for Meyer. In 

our view, the commission underestimated the dollar amount Meyer 

overcharged the SPD. Her court-ordered restitution, $102,989.95, is 

larger than Noel’s $14,697.45, and she pled guilty to a more serious theft 

offense. But mitigating factors cut against imposing a longer suspension 

on Meyer than Noel. The SPD never questioned the quality of Meyer’s 

representation of her clients or claimed any of her clients were harmed. 

To the contrary, a retired district court judge stated in an affidavit that 

Meyer was “always extremely well-prepared, on time[,] and a superior

professional, caring advocate for the children she represented.” He noted 

foster care support groups had urged him to continue appointing Meyer 
16

as guardian ad litem for children because of her diligence, responsiveness,

and “that she always went above and beyond what other 

guardians ad litem did to help the children she served.” A district 

associate judge also submitted an affidavit stating that Meyer was her 

“first choice when appointing counsel” in juvenile court matters and 

described her as a “superb advocate.” We consider their testimony in 

mitigation. See Noel, 923 N.W.2d at 590. 

Another mitigating factor is that aside from a private admonition, 

Meyer has never previously been subject to professional discipline. Id. at 

591 (considering an unblemished disciplinary record in mitigation). Yet 

another mitigating factor is that Meyer has volunteered for pro bono cases 

at the Iowa Veterans Home in Marshalltown and through the Polk County 

and Iowa Legal Aid Volunteer Lawyer Projects. See Mathahs, 918 N.W.2d 

at 498–99 (considering pro bono work in mitigation). Finally, we consider 

Meyer’s partial payments and stipulation to pay the full remaining amount 

of restitution ordered to make the SPD whole through monthly payments. 

See id. at 499 (considering voluntary restitution and repayments in 

mitigation). Meyer has already reimbursed the SPD over $53,000 and is 

making monthly payments on the net amount due. 

On balance, we determine that a one-year suspension is appropriate 

in this case. 

V. Disposition. 

We suspend Meyer’s license to practice law in this state with no 

possibility of reinstatement for one year. The suspension applies to all 

facets of the practice of law, as provided in Iowa Court Rule 34.23(3), and 

requires notification to clients, as provided by Iowa Court Rule 34.24. The 

costs of this proceeding are assessed against Meyer pursuant to Iowa 

Court Rule 36.24(1). To establish her eligibility for reinstatement, Meyer 
17

must file an application pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 34.25 and must show 

she has continued making the stipulated monthly payments in restitution. 

See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Taylor, 887 N.W.2d 369, 383 

(Iowa 2016) (requiring the attorney to “demonstrate she has made every 

payment to federal and state tax authorities required of her under the 

terms of any payment plans in effect” to establish eligibility for 

reinstatement). 

LICENSE SUSPENDED.