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WHY TAIWAN MATTERS, PART II

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 4, 2011

Serial No. 112–70

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................... 9

Peter Lavoy, Ph.D., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian 

and Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense ............................... 20

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Kurt Campbell: Prepared statement ............................................ 11

Peter Lavoy, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................... 22

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 55

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 57

Written responses from the Honorable Kurt Campbell to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative 

in Congress from American Samoa .................................................................... 59

(1)

WHY TAIWAN MATTERS, PART II 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, my good friend, 

Mr. Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will 

recognize the chairman and the ranking member of our Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific for 3 minutes each for their 

statements. We will then hear from our witnesses and I would ask 

that you please summarize your prepared statements at 5 minutes 

each before we move to the question and answer period within the 

5-minute rule. 

So without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record and members may have 5 days to insert 

statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitations in the rules. The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. 

Today we continue our examination that we began in June of 

‘‘Why Taiwan Matters,’’ and why, despite the importance of the 

U.S.-Taiwan relationship, Taiwan has been so neglected in recent 

years. 

To counteract this growing inattention to Taiwan in certain 

Washington circles, including inside this administration, and to 

clarify congressional intent, I introduced last month, H.R. 2918, the 

‘‘Taiwan Policy Act of 2011.’’ This legislation seeks to further clarify and strengthen the Taiwan Relations Act, which has long 

served as the cornerstone for American policy in addressing crossStrait issues. But there are increasing challenges ahead of us. 

On December 29, 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt addressed 

the American people in one of his famous fireside chats. At that 

time, a small island democracy was being threatened by the overwhelming force of a menacing continental power. Roosevelt told the 

American people that ‘‘We must be the great arsenal of democracy’’ 

to provide the means for the small island country of Great Britain 

to preserve mutually-cherished democratic values. 

Yet, the Obama administration has beaten a steady retreat not 

only from its obligations mandated in the Taiwan Relations Act, 

but from the spirit of FDR’s words, by not providing sufficient 

means for Taiwan’s defense. 

2

The decision not to sell Taiwan the next generation of F–16 fighters is a decision with potentially grave repercussions. Why must we 

appear so timid before Beijing? And what message does such timidity in the face of Beijing’s growing belligerence send to our treaty 

allies in the Asia-Pacific region, specifically Japan, South Korea, 

the Philippines and Australia? 

Nor does allowing Taiwan to slip further and further behind in 

the cross-Strait arms race meet our own national security requirements. And any cozying up to Beijing with a wink and a nod on 

Taiwan arms sales is a clear violation of President Reagan’s Six 

Assurances. Is it customary to give the clearly potential adversary 

the game plan for the defense of a friend and strategic partner? 

Isn’t that like telling the fox the location of each chicken in the 

henhouse? 

Taiwan needs our help. China is on the march in Asia, and its 

primary target remains democratic Taiwan. In August, Beijing 

began sea trials of its first aircraft carrier, reportedly to be named 

after a Chinese admiral who led a successful invasion of Taiwan 

over 300 hundred years ago. 

The carrier will be used to further assert Beijing’s maritime 

claims, and will patrol the Taiwan Strait. 

Beijing has bullied our Philippine allies in the South China Sea, 

threatened our Japanese ally in the East China Sea, and intimidated our South Korean ally in the Yellow Sea. In June, for the 

first time since 1999, Beijing also sent up aircraft that crossed into 

Taiwan airspace above the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan responded by 

sending two of its outdated F–16 fighters to intercept the Chinese 

aircraft which, fortunately, turned back. 

But why must Taiwan depend on rickety old aircraft, provided 

almost 20 years ago by the George Herbert Walker Bush administration, to face state-of-the-art Chinese fighters? Taiwan has repeatedly asked this administration to provide it with the next generation of F–16 C/Ds. If the skies over the Taiwan Strait become 

contested, how is Taiwan to defend itself against Chinese state of 

the art fighter jets? 

The 2011 Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress on 

‘‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’’ noted that ‘‘The balance of cross-Strait military forces 

and capabilities continues to shift in the mainland’s favor.’’

Randall Schriver, who appeared as a witness at the committee’s 

last Taiwan hearing in June, wrote this summer in the Washington 

Times that ‘‘Out of our deference to China, and despite the rapid 

PLA buildup, the Obama administration to date has the worst 

record on Taiwan arms sales since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979.’’ A 2009 RAND study goes so far as to claim that 

the Chinese military ‘‘likely has, or will soon have, a credible ability to challenge the United States and Taiwan for air supremacy, 

perhaps opening a window for an invasion attempt.’’

Likewise, the administration’s most recent China Military Power 

Report clearly shows the threats that Taiwan faces from an increasingly muscular and aggressive China. It is obvious, therefore, 

that Taiwan needs the next generation of F–16 fighters to protect 

her skies and she needs them now. And Taiwan equally needs dieVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:50 Nov 30, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\100411\70584 HFA PsN: SHIRL
3

sel submarines to protect her territorial waters and she needs them 

now. 

The upgrade of older model F–16s is a modest step in the right 

direction, but insufficient to meet Taiwan’s increasingly urgent requirements for an effective air defense, including late model combat aircraft. This raises questions about the administration’s commitment to ensure that Taiwan has the means to defend herself 

against mainland China, as mandated in the Taiwan Relations Act. 

And more broadly, Taiwan needs an active American policy to 

promote deeper ties between our two nations. Such a reinvigorated 

policy should include high-level official visits, a free trade agreement and, as soon as all homeland security criteria are met, Taiwan’s early admission to the 

Visa Waiver Program once security requirements are finalized. 

These proposals are included in the legislation that I introduced 

and that I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks. And now I 

turn to my friend, the ranking member Mr. Berman for his opening 

remarks. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, my friend, Madam Chairman. At the 

first hearing we had in June, I made an extensive opening statement on the critical importance of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. 

Today, as we open part two of the hearing, I want to reiterate my 

strong support for Taiwan and for bolstering all aspects of our bilateral ties. 

With an upcoming Presidential election in Taiwan next year, the 

people of Taiwan will once again exercise their democratic right to 

directly choose a President. I strongly support Taiwan’s vibrant democracy. I want to assure the Taiwanese people that the United 

States will respect the choice they make in January and will continue to support them, no matter who is elected. 

Despite a marked improvement in the economic and social ties 

between Taipei and Beijing, China still has not renounced the use 

of military force against Taiwan. On the contrary, Beijing has increased the number of missiles targeted at Taiwan. During the earlier hearing on Taiwan, members on both sides of the aisle expressed a strong commitment to maintaining Taiwan security in 

the face of the growing Chinese military threat. 

To address this threat, the United States should continue to supply Taiwan with weapons so that it can defend itself. I welcome the 

Obama administration’s recent decision to upgrade Taiwan’s existing fleet of F–16 fighter jets and would note that this administration has sold more defense systems to Taiwan in a shorter time 

span than the previous administration. 

However, I view the upgrades only as a first step. Taiwan’s air 

force needs more advanced F–16s to adequately defend itself from 

China and it needs them soon. Projections of Taiwan’s air force 

stocks indicate a significant decline from its current fleet of 377 

fighter jets which includes F–16 A/Bs, Vietnam era F–5s, Taiwanese indigenous fighters and Mirage 2000s. A decrease from 

that number, 377 to fewer than 275 fighters by 2020. 

Not only will Taiwan have fewer planes, but also less capability 

while the Chinese air force and missile squadrons deploy across the 

Taiwan Straits are growing at an exponential rate. As a result of 

the administration’s decision, Taiwan will ultimately have 145 F–

4

16s that have been retrofitted to be equivalent to F–16 C/Ds 

through the sale of the upgrade kits. But if the administration had 

provided both the upgrade kits and the advanced fighters requested by Taipei, then Taiwan would have 211 F–16 C/D aircraft 

delivered in the same time period as the upgrade kits alone. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today to hear 

their views of how Congress and the administration can work together to support Taiwan’s democracy and security. And with that 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman. I 

now would like to recognize members for 1-minute opening statements beginning with Mr. Smith of New Jersey, the chairman of 

the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you for 

calling this very timely and important hearing. A welcome to Assistant Secretary Campbell and Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Schiffer. 

Taiwan is a special place, as we all know, with very special people. Through adversity, struggle, and courage, the Taiwanese people have created a vibrant, free, and democratic society that is a 

beacon of hope and light in that part of the world. This strategic 

ally and economic powerhouse also serves as an example of a society where human rights are highly valued, promoted, and upheld. 

In Taiwan, the values of freedom of religion, freedom of expression, 

worker rights, and the rule of law are not just given lip service, but 

are core principles taught to each new generation. 

But maintaining freedom comes with a price. Vigilance, preparedness, and a commitment to a strong national defense cannot 

be taken for granted, but must be pursued and maintained. 

As the United States fought the battle of ideas and values with 

the former Soviet Union, Taiwan by its very existence fights the 

battle of ideas and values with those nations that seek to limit and 

repress their citizens, especially the PRC through institutional injustice, lack of freedom in residence and movement, and the horrific corrosion tactics which destroy families and communities. With 

that, I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Thank you. 

Another gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires is recognized. 

Mr. SIRES. Madam Chairperson, I’ll be very brief. I’m just happy 

to be here to listen to what you have to say and I am a supporter 

of the sale of the fighters to Taiwan and I’m very happy to see that 

they moved forward on democracy where they actually had a transfer of power. So I’m just supportive and thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sires. Mr. Burton is 

recognized. He is the chairman on the Subcommittee on Europe 

and Eurasia. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Taiwan has been 

a great ally of ours for as far back as I can remember and I’ve always thought it was unseemly that we wouldn’t allow their chief 

executive to visit the United States or even get off the plane. I just 

think it’s terrible. And while China has 1600 missiles pointed at 

Taiwan, we continue to just piddle around and not give Taiwan the 

support that they need to defend itself. They have asked us personally, me personally, and others, for the upgraded F–16s and the 

5

kits that will keep them in a positive situation. They’ve also asked 

for a diesel-powered submarine so that they can defend themselves. 

And it just seems to me totally unacceptable that this administration and the Congress of the United States and the Government 

of the United States does not support Taiwan and sell them the 

needed equipment necessary to defend themselves. They’re not 

going to attack China. They want to be able to defend themselves. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. Royce is recognized. He’s the chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair. In two generations, Taiwan has moved from poverty to prosperity, from autocracy to democracy. And unlike China, Taiwan is truly a responsible stakeholder in Asia. However, Taiwan faces several challenges. China’s 

rapid military buildup, its continued aggressiveness in the South 

China Sea are big concerns and yes, I’m afraid we’re falling short, 

giving China too much sway in our relations with Taipei. We 

should be moving on the advanced F–16 fighters, not just the upgrade kits. 

Let me also say that we should move forward with our Trade and 

Investment Framework Agreement with Taiwan. And we should 

use this dialogue to increase the prospects of securing a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement in the future. Our trade relations with 

Taiwan have deteriorated over the last several years as American 

businesses continue to lose market share. The best way to bolster 

trade ties would be to initiate negotiations for a free trade agreement. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Royce. Mr. Connolly of 

Virginia is recognized for 1-minute opening statement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank 

you for having part two of this very important set of hearings. The 

U.S.-Taiwan relationship is a very important one. It’s our ninth 

largest trading partner. We’ve invested a lot in the security of the 

Taiwan Strait. The ultimate outcome in the Taiwan Strait must be 

settled between the Chinese, but it must be settled peacefully. We 

have a statutory obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act to protect and to provide for the defense capability of Taiwan. 

I certainly look forward to hearing why the administration decided to upgrade the F–16s that exist now in Taiwan rather than 

providing the order of new F–16 weapons requested and that I consider to be a reasonable request by the Government of Taiwan. 

I thank the chair and look forward to talking to our witnesses. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chabot is recognized. He’s the—okay. Ms. Schmidt is recognized from Ohio. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this 

very important hearing. I just want to say a few things. The best 

defense is a good offense. For the Taiwanese, that means the F–

16s, and we need to sell them to them and sell them to them immediately. China is rapidly building up its military, in addition to an 

almost 13 percent increase in their defense budget last year. They 

purchased their first aircraft carrier from Ukraine under the guise 

that it was going to be used as a floating casino. Taiwan needs to 

be able to protect itself and we have the ability to help them do 

that. 

6

We also need to work on trade issues, including free trade agreements, the Visa Waiver Program, and finally, we need to honor the 

Taiwan Relations Act. I yield back my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Another member 

from Ohio, Mr. Johnson is recognized. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman and I appreciate 

our important panel being here today to discuss the relevance of 

Taiwan to our national security and foreign affairs objectives. Over 

the past few months concerns abound surrounding China’s military 

buildup and its implication for the Asia Pacific region. China has 

significantly surpassed Taiwan in military capability and as the 

sale of new F–16s fails to move forward in replacing Taiwan’s F–

5 fleet that disparity continues to mount. 

Even with the sale of the new F–16s, Taiwan would still be far 

behind Chinese military capability. 

In dealing with Taiwan, we must work to emphasize the shared 

values that induced us to become a defender and advocate for Taiwan in the first place: Human rights, democracy, strong market 

economies, and freedom. I’m glad that that’s what this committee 

promotes and this Congress promotes and I look forward to hearing 

from the panel today. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Marino is recognized for 1 minute. Thank you, sir. Mr. Gallegly is recognized for 

1 minute for his opening statement. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I think it’s 

clear that my position on Taiwan is well documented and the support that I think we have from the entire Congress is one that we 

can be proud of. The sale of the F–16s is critical and vital to the 

national security. 

I have so many things that I’d like to say and time won’t allow 

me to do this, so I just ask unanimous consent that I may place 

a statement into the record. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Ms. Bass is recognized for 1 minute opening statement and Mr. Cicilline passes as 

well. So now Mr. Manzullo, he’ll have 3 minutes. He is the subcommittee chairman on Asia and the Pacific. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Madam Chairman, thank you for holding this 

important hearing on the relationship between Taiwan and the 

United States. We’re here today because Taiwan matters. Indeed, 

it is one of the few beacons of freedom and democracy in a very 

dangerous neighborhood and our support for Taiwan must remain 

strong and steadfast. And I welcome Dr. Kurt Campbell, my fellow 

earthquake survivor in New Zealand in February this past year, 

when we were down there for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It’s 

pretty good for both of us to be here in light of what happened 

down there. We welcome you today. 

The administration’s decision not to sell modern F–16s to Taiwan 

is in a sense truly disappointing. Instead, Taiwan was offered a 

glass that’s half full, an option of updating its aging F–16 fleet 

which defense experts agree is not sufficient to defend against China’s burgeoning arsenal. Denying Taiwan the critically needed 

weapons system only weakens that government’s ability to defend 

7

itself and may even embolden China and indeed sends the wrong 

message to Mainland China as to our relationship with Taiwan. 

Thus, I’m glad the administration witnesses are here today to 

discuss the rationale behind the decision not to sell the upgraded 

fighters to Taiwan. 

Maintaining a close relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan is 

beneficial for the American people. Just last week, the delegation 

of 17 people from Taiwan visited the 16th Congressional District of 

Illinois which I have the honor of representing to announce Taiwan’s intention of purchasing approximately $5 billion worth of 

corn and beans. This was a significant gesture and re-affirmation 

by Taiwan that the relationship between our two countries remains 

a high priority. The fact that Taiwan’s is America’s 9th largest 

trading partner and 13th largest export market for agricultural 

products should not be forgotten. 

Beyond defense cooperation and related matters, the U.S. must 

do more to grow the relationship with Taiwan. It is in America’s 

interest to resume negotiations with Taiwan to include a Trade and 

Investment Framework Agreement in the near future. Furthermore, it is time to end the ridiculous policy of prohibiting high level 

Taiwanese Government officials from visiting Washington. It’s astounding that the Foreign Minister of Burma is allowed to meet 

with senior State Department officials in Washington while high 

level visitors from Taiwan are turned away. This gives the awful 

impression that representatives of cruel and despotic regimes are 

given better treatment than representatives from the government 

committed to democracy and freedom. Surely, this is not what 

America is about. 

Madam Chairman, Taiwan matters and we must do more to support this relationship. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Manzullo. 

And now we’d like to hear from the ranking member of that subcommittee, Mr. Faleomavaega. He’s recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to 

personally welcome my good friend, Assistant Secretary Campbell 

to appear before this committee and to give us a little status report 

on the latest in terms of the administration’s efforts in dealing with 

Taiwan. 

Madam Chair, Taiwan does matter. From a historical perspective, I believe Taiwan was one of the most crucial issues that took 

place when Kissinger was sent as a special envoy by President 

Nixon during the ’70s, but even before that, Taiwan became a prize 

of war. When China was in the state of civil war, and we all know 

the history of what happened was that between Mao Zedong and 

Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek lost the war and he ended up 

in Taiwan. And with the fervent effort or hope that someday he 

will someday return to Mainland China to overcome Mao Zedong’s 

Communist forces, etcetera, etcetera. Well, that never happened. 

That never happened. In fact, even the Korean War, it’s my understanding that Mao Zedong was about to attack Taiwan. 

President Truman sent the 7th Fleet to give indication to China 

that we are not going to do something like this. Mao Zedong backed 

off and in fact, this incident also occurred when a very crucial question came into being before the United Nations, whether or not 

8

Chiang Kai-shek representing 23 million people was in a position 

to represent 1 billion people in Mainland China and it was such 

that President Carter made the decision that there had to be a 

change in terms of Taiwan no longer officially representing all of 

the Chinese people before the United Nations and as such this took 

place where the Peoples Republic of China then became the official 

representative, not only in the Security Council, but with the 

United Nations. 

Taiwan matters because we also came very close in terms of the 

situation that happened during President Clinton’s administration 

where he had to send two battle groups to the Taiwan Straits 

again to show strong indication to China that because of our commitment and because of the Taiwan Relations Act in terms of our 

commitment in making sure that the people of Taiwan are protected from what enemy forces that may be that will cause harm 

to them. I believe the terms and the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act is pivotal for us to better understand and appreciate how 

the United States policy toward Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait 

should continue. 

Taiwan matters because I think in terms of what we have, it’s 

been a very consistent policy with all our Presidents, with President Obama, and that is basically that the people of Taiwan, the 

leaders of Taiwan are to negotiate and engage the peaceful dialogue with the Peoples Republic of China and whatever future that 

comes about in doing this that is to be done peacefully. I think 

we’re very firm in that commitment. And then on the other hand, 

too, we are to make sure that Taiwan receives necessary military 

equipment that is needed to protect itself. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. And now the Chair is 

pleased to welcome our witnesses. First I want to introduce Kurt 

Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Mr. Campbell has had a distinguished career in Federal service including as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Asia and the Pacific during the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis and as 

Director on National Security Council staff also during the Clinton 

administration. Before assuming his current position in June 2009, 

Dr. Campbell was the CEO and co-founder of the Center for a New 

American Security, CNAS. He also served as the director of the 

Aspen Strategy Group and was the senior vice president at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies. He received his 

B.A. from the University of California, San Diego, and his doctorate 

in international relations from Oxford University. We are pleased 

to have you here, Dr. Campbell. 

And I’m also happy to welcome Mr. Peter Lavoy, the Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Mr. Lavoy also serves concurrently as Acting Assisting 

Secretary of Defense. Previously, he served from 2007 to 2011 in 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) where he 

was Director for Analysis from August 2010 through August 2011. 

Prior to joining ODNI, he directed the Center for Contemporary 

Conflict and taught in the National Security Affairs Department of 

9

the Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey, California. Welcome 

to both you. 

I kindly remind our witnesses to keep your oral testimony to no 

more than 5 minutes and without objection your written statements will be inserted into the record. 

Dr. Campbell, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KURT CAMPBELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much, Chairwoman. We both 

very much appreciate the opportunity to come up and discuss and 

testify before Congress on this critical issue and we share many of 

the concerns that have already been raised in terms of the importance of our relationship with Taiwan. Let me also thank my colleague and friend, Congressman Berman for his leadership on Asia; 

my friend, Congressman Faleomavaega for all his work in the Pacific; and Congressman Smith, for his extraordinary work on issues 

associated with separated families and left-behind parents in 

Japan. 

If you could also communicate to Mr. Manzullo, after the tragic 

earthquake in New Zealand, we worked with him and his staff. The 

United States is now the leading supporter of the rebuilding of the 

lovely town of Christchurch in New Zealand. We appreciate his 

leadership. 

I ask and thank the chairwoman, you have my testimony, my full 

testimony put on the record and I will just quickly go over a few 

points if I could. 

I want to just paint a general strategic picture of what I think 

our nation is involved in right now. A major pivot, a major rebalancing in terms of our foreign policy, national security priorities. 

We are in the process of responsibly moving from important consequential activities in the Middle East and South Asia to more 

focus on the Asia Pacific region. It is absolutely clear that we as 

a nation, the Executive Branch, the Congress, we need to step up 

our game in the Asian Pacific region across the board, trade, investment, security issues, institutions and political and strategic 

engagement across the board. Our allies, new friends and partners 

like India, Indonesia, building a strong partnership with China, all 

of the countries in the Asia Pacific region, look to the United States 

as the key player in terms of the provision of our security guarantees and the maintenance of peace and stability, not only across the 

Taiwan Strait, but across Asia as a whole. We are in the midst of 

this. This will take many years. It will be difficult. We have enduring, extraordinarily expensive difficult challenges in the Middle 

East, but Asia beckons. 

Much of the history of the 21st century will be written in Asia. 

The United States has to play a significant role in that. A critical 

part of that over-arching strategy is building a comprehensive, durable, and unofficial relationship between the United States and 

Taiwan. It’s essential. The bedrock of that relationship is our security relationship and that is founded on several principles and key 

understandings. 

10

The Taiwan Relations Act stipulates, it’s one of the most important acts of legislative leadership in foreign policy in our history. 

It stipulates that the United States must maintain the capabilities 

to resist coercion, to maintain peace and stability. We provide necessary defense articles to Taiwan and it also requires us to consult 

actively on Capitol Hill on all issues associated with Taiwan. 

Taiwan Relations Act, plus the so-called Six Assurances and 

Three Communique ́s, form the foundation of our overall approach, 

but our relationship is not simply a defense relationship. It is much 

broader. We seek to expand our economic and our trade relations. 

The trade relationship today between the United States and Taiwan is larger than the relationship between the United States and 

India. That’s how significant it is. And we actually share the goals 

of moving forward on the TIFA Agreement. 

One of the most important things that we hear from congressional friends is how critical issues like beef are in terms of how 

they are treated. And I must say in our discussions with Taiwan 

friends, we have been disappointed with their lack of progress on 

this matter, but we are committed to make progress on this and 

building a deeper relationship with Taiwan economically and commercially going forward. 

Chairwoman, I also agree with you that on the people-to-people 

level, it’s important to take critical steps, that the Visa Waiver Program is extraordinarily significant. We’ve made much progress in 

recent months and we are aiming toward the very goal that you 

are aspiring to as well. So we see a broad range, unofficial relationship as deeply in the interests of the United States going forward. 

Some have suggested that there is an inconsistency with building 

a strong comprehensive partnership with China and maintaining a 

strong relationship with Taiwan. I think that’s false. And I think 

if you look over the last several administrations, there have been 

an attempt to build a strong partnership with China and at the 

same time maintain a critical key relationship with Taiwan and I 

think that’s exactly what we have done in the Obama administration and I think in terms of the consequences, the positive outcome 

of this you see also a strong improvement in relations across the 

Taiwan Strait between China and Taiwan in recent years. That’s 

very much in U.S. interests. 

Now we have also stated very clearly that we, too, are concerned 

by military buildup across the Taiwan Strait. We have communicated that directly, not just to China, but all of our allies and 

friends in the regions who share these concerns. We think that 

these steps are antithetical to China’s own interest in building a 

better relationship with Taiwan. 

Ultimately, it is in American interest to see democracy flourish 

in Taiwan. One of the things that bind us most closely is this 

democratic experience. In January, Taiwan will be conducting a 

major election both at the executive and the legislative levels. The 

United States supports that election. We don’t play favorites. We 

don’t choose candidates. We will work closely with any leader or 

leadership that emerges there. Thank you for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Campbell. 

Dr. Lavoy. 

STATEMENT OF PETER LAVOY, PH.D., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. LAVOY. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Berman, and 

members of the committee. I thank you for the opportunity to appear today to offer testimony on our policy toward Taiwan. 

Stability in the Taiwan Strait is critically important to the 

Obama administration and has a strong bearing on our enduring 

interest in and commitments to peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. I commend the committee’s continued interest in this 

matter. 

The Obama administration is firmly committed to our one China 

policy which is based on three joint U.S.-China communique ́s and 

the Taiwan Relations Act. This policy has endured for over three 

decades and across eight administrations. 

Today the United States has a deep security relationship with 

Taiwan as indicated by the administration’s strong record on arms 

sales. Defense articles totaling over $12 billion have been approved 

for Taiwan in the last 2 years. We will continue to make available 

to Taiwan defense articles and services to enable it to maintain a 

sufficient self-defense capability. But our security relationship with 

Taiwan encompasses much more than arms transfers. The Department of Defense has the responsibility to monitor China’s military 

developments and to deter aggression and conflict. Under the Taiwan Relations Act which has helped guarantee peace and stability 

in northeast Asia for over 30 years, we are charged with maintaining the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force 

or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize security or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan. 

China’s economic rise has enabled it to transform its armed 

forces from a mass army designed for wars of attrition on its own 

territory to one capable of fighting short duration, high-intensity 

conflict along its periphery against high-tech adversaries. Although 

we assess China’s ability to sustain military power and the distance remains limited, its armed forces are developing and fielding 

advanced military technologies to support attacks in anti-access 

and aerial denial strategies. 

The majority of the PLA’s advanced equipment is deployed to the 

military regions opposite Taiwan. Beijing fields advanced surface 

combatants and submarines to increase its anti-surface and antiwarfare capabilities. Similarly, advanced fighter aircraft and integrated air defense systems deployed to bases and garrisons in the 

coastal regions increase Beijing’s ability to gain and maintain air 

superiority over the Taiwan Strait. 

These systems also enable Beijing to conduct offensive counter 

air and land attack missions against Taiwan forces and critical infrastructure. Beijing has deployed over 1,000 short-range missiles 

and land attack cruise missiles to garrisons opposite the island to 

enable highly accurate conventional strikes. China also has an expanded capability for asymmetric warfare including special operVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:50 Nov 30, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\100411\70584 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ations forces, space and counter space systems and computer network operations. 

In response to this growing threat, Taiwan authorities have undertaken a series of reports designed to improve the island’s capacity to deter and defend against an attack by the mainland. These 

include important investments to harden infrastructure, build up 

war reserve stocks and improve the industrial base, joint operation 

capabilities, crisis response mechanisms and the officer and noncommissioned officer corps. These improvements on the whole have 

reinforced the natural advantages of island defense. 

Taiwan’s defense reforms today are important and necessary and 

further efforts are needed. We are working closely with Taiwan on 

such steps related to both planning and procurement. A key conclusion of the report to Congress on Taiwan’s air defense force is that 

Taiwan’s approach to defense cannot match the mainland one for 

one. For example, Taiwan defense spending cannot match the 

mainland’s, nor can it develop the same type of military the mainland is developing. Taiwan needs to focus its planning and procurement efforts on nontraditional, innovative, and asymmetric approaches. There’s no single solution. 

Given this context, we believe the F–16 A/B upgrade made significant contributions to Taiwan’s air power. The Taiwan Relations 

Act is a good law that makes for good policy, one that has created 

the conditions for the two sides to engage in peaceful dialogue. Our 

strong security commitment to Taiwan has provided them the confidence to intensify dialogue with the mainland and has resulted in 

improved cross-trade relations. 

A Taiwan that is strong, confident, and free from threats or intimidation is best postured to discuss and adhere to whatever future arrangements the two sides of the Taiwan Strait may peacefully agree upon. 

Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Berman, and members of 

the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lavoy follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent testimony. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I’m going to ask about the Taiwan arms sales. There have been 

disturbing press reports indicating that the administration may 

have given Beijing pre-notification of our intent regarding Taiwan 

arms sales prior to informing Members of Congress. A Defense 

News reported that ‘‘the United States and China on July 29 held 

top-level talks on Taiwan with Washington working preemptively 

to avoid fallout as the decision nears on whether to sell fighter jets 

to Taiwan.’’ Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns held a closed-door 

session with his Chinese counterpart and during Vice President 

Biden’s August trip to China, according to the Taipei Times, the 

Chinese Vice President reportedly raised a ‘‘deeply sensitive’’ issue 

of arms sales to Taiwan during their first meeting as well. 

My question is can you unequivocally confirm that no administration official including Vice President Biden and Deputy Secretary of State Burns pre-consulted with their Chinese counterparts on the administration’s decision regarding the F–16s or any 

other Taiwan arms sales? And related to that, you had mentioned 

the Six Assurances of Ronald Reagan and I mentioned it in my 

opening remarks. 

Does this administration consider those assurances as an essential component of Taiwan policy, including Reagan’s pledge to Taipei that the United States will not hold ‘‘prior consultations with 

the Peoples Republic of China on arms sales to Taiwan.’’ And lastly, can you explain to the committee why a U.S. decision not to sell 

Taiwan new F–16 fighter jets shouldn’t be seen by many U.S. allies 

in Asia as a sign of China’s growing clout and America’s relative 

strategic decline in the region. Won’t other nations interpret that 

decision as a retreat and reduction of support for a long-time friend 

and key nation in the chain of islands bordering China in the western Pacific? 

Dr. Campbell and Dr. Lavoy. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Chairwoman. That’s a lot of questions there, but let me try to take them one by one. I probably have 

been in hundreds of meetings between American officials and Chinese officials over a series of administrations, Republican and 

Democratic. I was in the meetings with Vice President Biden and 

I was with Bill Burns when he met with the Chinese counterparts. 

I have never, ever heard an American official ever talk to China 

and give advance notice about any arm sales. I categorically reassure you on that fact. And that is one of the most important aspects of our over-arching approach to Taiwan and also to China. 

As I stated in my opening testimony, yes, we do abide by the socalled Six Assurances and among the most important is an assurance that we do not pre-brief China about what we will do with respect to Taiwan. But as importantly, Chairwoman, we also talk to 

Congress before we talk to our Taiwan friends. So we think that 

this over-arching understanding is one of the most important 

underpinnings of how this implementation of the Taiwan Relations 

Act has——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Actually, the last one was shouldn’t 

that decision about the fighter jets not be interpreted as a weakening of our resolve. 

31

Mr. CAMPBELL. Let me just say generally speaking, the larger 

context. First of all, overall, American arms sales to the Asian Pacific region and to our allies and friends is up substantially, Chairwoman. In addition, we are moving U.S. forces from Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and elsewhere to reinforce our overall positions in the Asian 

Pacific region. 

And lastly, I would simply point out if you look at the decisions 

taken, and that’s the issue, the decisions taken to provide defensive 

sales to Taiwan during the Obama administration, in 2010 and 

2011, those 2 years, Chairwoman, they are greater than any other 

2 comparable years in the history of the Taiwan Relations Act. So 

I would simply suggest to you and I work in the Asian Pacific region a lot, I think if you polled substantially, they would say that 

the United States over the last several years comprehensively has 

fundamentally stepped up our game in the Asian Pacific region. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Lavoy? 

Mr. LAVOY. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I certainly agree with Assistant Secretary Campbell. Under no circumstances do we consult with China or any other foreign power 

about potential arms transfers to Taiwan. It’s a decision the administration makes, based on the Taiwan Relations Act and we do consult Taiwanese defense authorities. We have very rigorous and effective defense consultations with them to determine the appropriate prioritized needs for their defense and we judged that this 

was useful. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Berman, the ranking member is recognized for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I just 

would observe at the beginning that one perceives from a number 

of the countries in East Asia and in South Asia and Southeast Asia 

a desire for a closer relationship with the United States which undermines this notion that we are thought of in that area as a weaker and receding power. I think there’s enough basis on the evidence 

in front of us that what has happened in the past couple of years 

and the significant closer, even military ties with these countries 

to indicate that they’re investing a lot in America’s continued presence in that region. 

I want to get to the F–16s. There’s a factual dispute here. The 

administration on two occasions has asserted that the upgraded F–

16s, the kits, providing the kits will get greater capabilities, more 

rapidly in a larger number of airplanes into the field in a more decisive way than were a decision made to provide the planes right 

now. The manufacturer of the F–16s says that 66 new F–16 C/Ds 

could be provided 2 years earlier than a like number of the upgraded A/Bs. Do you—would you like to arbitrate this discrepancy 

between yourself and the manufacturer regarding the time? 

Mr. LAVOY. Thank you very much. As I said earlier, the F–16 A 

and B decision makes the most sense for Taiwan at this time. It’s 

a decision that was based on consultations with Taiwan. 

Mr. BERMAN. My specific question is could they get the new F–

16s, 66 new F–16s faster than they will get the modified A/Bs with 

the upgrade kits? 

Mr. LAVOY. It’s our conviction, again, based on discussions with 

Taiwan authorities that upgrading their existing fleet of F–16s A 

32

and Bs is the immediate priority. And we will ensure that we work 

with the defense contractors to accelerate this upgrade so that they 

can maintain and upgrade capabilities for years and decades to 

come. And we will work with the defense contractors to ensure this 

happens. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, you’ve asserted your position, but you haven’t 

shed light on why the upgraded F–16s will be available more rapidly than the new F–16s. Is there something you could add that 

would provide us—I understand what you’ve said, but is this an 

issue you have no more to add to at this point? 

Mr. LAVOY. No, I don’t, sir. We will work with the defense contractor to ensure that these are upgraded very quickly. 

Mr. BERMAN. You’ve made a decision, at least at this time not 

to do both. Is it the administration’s feeling that Taiwan’s funds 

available for defense acquisition, there are better things they could 

do for their own security interests than both buy the upgrade kits 

and the new planes? 

Mr. LAVOY. Thank you for that question, sir. We do look at Taiwan’s defense needs from a holistic point of view. And of course, 

as I indicated, we have two major arms transfers that we’ve concluded in this administration and we’re continuing to talk to them 

about a range of capabilities that they need to ensure their self defense for years to come. We judge that as an immediate priority, 

the F–16 A and B upgrade to take 145 existing aircraft that were 

becoming outdated, and upgrading them to make them comparable 

to any fourth generation aircraft we sold to other countries is an 

immediate priority. And we have not ruled out any future aircraft 

decisions. We understand Taiwan’s interest in F–16 Cs and Ds and 

this is under consideration. 

Mr. BERMAN. All right. I’ll use my last 30 seconds, I won’t get 

an answer, but on the underlining dispute I am still intrigued by 

the proposal—the Professor Ken Lieberthal, to what extent China 

and Taiwan could reach an interim understanding for that a set 

period of time 25 years, China commits to a force where any reliance on military means to settle this issue and Taiwan commits to 

resist any actions to seek independence during that period of time. 

And is that a reasonable approach to dealing with the underlying 

issue that has plagued us? And is that a role that the U.S. could 

facilitate? You don’t have any time to answer that, but that’s my 

fault. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman. Mr. Smith is 

recognized for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Again, I want 

to thank our two distinguished witnesses for their service to our 

country and for being here and for their testimony. It does shed 

light and it helps us make more informed decisions. 

You know, as we all know there is only one potential aggressor 

and that is not Taipei, it is Beijing. Taipei’s desire to procure F–

16 C/D fighters is based on what I believe Taiwan’s growing alarm 

as to the PRC’s systematic deployment of more missiles, combat 

aircraft, and an order of battle that increasingly by the week, by 

the month, certainly by the year looks more ominous and more 

menacing to people across the Taiwan Strait. 

33

My question is about deterrence. Obviously, Taiwan is not going 

to invade mainland China. It is all about defense. It’s reminiscent 

of our strategy with regards to NATO, our war games with regards 

to NATO were always defensive. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 

Union always had offensive war games because we knew they 

would be the ones that would attack. Same is true, I believe, and 

I think we all agree with regards to Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. 

So my question is about deterrence. Whether or not the upgrades 

buy sufficient deterrence, whether or not the F–16 C/Ds would 

truly provide the capabilities that Taiwan believes that it needs. I 

mean they have very savvy and very effective military planners 

who know what their capabilities are or lack. 

And another question would be did Beijing object more, is it objecting more to F–16 C/D sales, rather than upgrades? Of course, 

they’re going to object to everything. That’s part of their game plan, 

object to everything. But in their heart of hearts and certainly our 

perception of what they are objecting to, is it more about the F–

16 C/Ds and did that play any role in our not providing those aircraft? 

Mr. LAVOY. Thank you very much for the question, Mr. Congressman. You’ve asked two or three very important questions actually. 

First on deterrence. Again, we work with Taiwan defense authorities to appreciate the threat. I’ve outlined what you’ve also described as a growing China military capability. As I’ve indicated in 

my oral and written testimony, much of this capability, in fact, the 

most advanced parts of the capability are located in and around 

Taiwan. So it is a threat that the Taiwan defense authorities take 

very seriously. We consult with them on this threat. 

We are committed under the Taiwan Relations Act which is a 

very good foundation for our policy to ensure that Taiwan can 

maintain a robust, self-defense capability in the face of any number 

of threatening scenarios. 

And we believe that a strong, secure Taiwan, based on survivable 

military capabilities provides the best deterrence. 

The second question you asked is about Beijing’s objections to 

this particular arms transfer and relative to any other potential 

arms transfer. Well, I can’t answer that hypothetically. We don’t 

know how they would respond to a different arms transfer. And 

they have expressed, PRC has expressed its concerns about this. 

We understand them. But we think that this still makes the best 

sense for our relations with Taiwan and Taiwan’s defense capability. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Let me add just one other point if I could, Congressman. The issue of the maintenance of peace and stability 

which is really enshrined at the outset of the Taiwan Relations Act, 

a critical component of that is not only the provision of necessary 

defense articles as my colleague and friend Dr. Lavoy has indicated, but it is also the maintenance of a robust American presence 

in the Asian Pacific region. And we intend as have a series of 

American Presidents and I believe we’ll continue this into the future to maintain a robust capability that provides the basis of reassurance, not just across the Taiwan Strait, but to Asia as a whole. 

34

Mr. SMITH. If I could, what do we perceive the game plan to be 

on Beijing’s part? I remember Wei Jingsheng and his father, as you 

know, was very high up in the military, the father of the Democracy Wall movement. When he got out of China and he actually sat 

where you sat and testified at a subcommittee hearing on human 

rights, he is a tremendous human rights advocate. But he said we 

don’t realize that they are building to the point where they hope 

not to even fire a shot, because their capability will be so superior 

to that of Taiwan, but if necessary, they would. And the intentions 

of Beijing are not benign. And I know we know that, but it seems 

to me that providing the best capability on the part of Taiwan, notwithstanding the objections of Beijing, to deterring war, is the best 

way we should proceed. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Do you want me to answer the question? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Maybe in a later format. Mr. Sires, the 

gentleman from New Jersey, another gentleman from New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I just need you to 

help me understand this relationship a little bit because on one end 

it seems to be very confrontational. And as I read, I understand 

that there are more economic and more cultural ties now than has 

been in a long time between Taiwan and China. You know, can you 

just help me understand a little bit of that? I know there are a 

number of flights that have been increased and there’s some sort 

of family reunification. Is that correct? 

Can you just—to me, that’s—on one end, they’ve got 1600 missiles aimed at Taiwan and on the other end, there seems to be a 

lot of economic growth between the two nations. So can you just 

speak to that a little bit? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. It’s an excellent question, Congressman, and it actually feeds in nicely to the previous question that 

was just asked. In truth, we generally don’t answer hypotheticals 

and it’s hard to predict, put your mind 

—put yourself in the mind of any of your interlocutors, but it 

would be fair to say that what we’ve seen in recent years are developments that we welcome, very substantial people-to-people exchanges, economic interaction between Taiwan and China. I think 

there has been an improvement in dialogue and the economic relationship is stunning. 

But at the same time, it is true we are concerned by a buildup 

of military capabilities that is aimed at Taiwan and we have communicated directly to Chinese interlocutors that increasingly it 

seems that in their desire to build these ties, these positive ties 

that the military component is inconsistent and actually might undermine the very efforts to try to build trust and confidence that 

they are involved with in terms of—between the people to people 

of Taiwan and China. We’d like to see more of those efforts continue and would like China to reconsider some of the steps that 

they have taken along the lines that Congressman Smith has laid 

out in terms of military buildups which frankly undermine the very 

peace and stability that all of Asia Pacific needs to thrive. 

Mr. LAVOY. If I could add to that to my colleague, Assistant Secretary Campbell. We firmly believe that a strong and confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that’s comfortable and engaging with the mainVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:50 Nov 30, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\100411\70584 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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land in improving the cross-trade relations. And we believe that 

our policy, the policy of the Obama administration, like the policy 

of seven previous administrations in enhancing Taiwan’s self-defense capability has given it that confidence to improve cross-trade 

relations. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sires. You still have 

time. 

Mr. SIRES. I was going to give the rest of my time to my colleague, Chris Smith, but he’s——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Sires. Mr. 

Burton is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURTON. First of all, thank you for being here. We appreciate 

it. You’ve indicated, I think, that there are 1,000 missiles pointed 

at Taiwan and the information we have up here is that there were 

1,000 about 2 years ago, but now it’s closer to 1600. So when we 

get to the answers I would like for you to respond to that. 

Taiwan, as my colleague has said, just purchased $5 billion in ag. 

products, so they’re pretty good friend and trade partner. Right 

now in the U.S. Senate, the Senate is moving, trying to move legislation against China because they manipulate their currency to the 

detriment of the United States and other countries and so they 

don’t have our best interest at heart all the time, just as a point 

of information. 

I think you’ve said that there’s more military sales than at any 

time in history and when we get to the answer part here which you 

can respond to, I’d like to know what they’re buying, what they’re 

getting because they want F–16s, new aircraft, as well as the upgrades. And it was just pointed out to me they have 145 F–16s, 20 

of which are in the United States. That means they have 125 there. 

They have air frames that are 20 years old. The Mirages are really 

going to be gone pretty quick because they don’t have the ability 

to upgrade those. The F–5s are going to have to be retired, and so 

they need 66 new aircraft. 

So I’d like to ask you, the aircraft that they have that have 20-

year-old frames that you’re going to upgrade in your opinion, I’d 

like to know if you think those are as good as new ones that are 

going in. 

Number two, don’t you think that Taiwan deserves to have the 

ability as a very good friend and ally the ability to defend themselves in the event that there would be an attack and we hope that 

through negotiations that that will never occur. Nevertheless, 

they’re our ally and our friend. China sometimes we think are our 

friends and sometimes as the Senate is talking about right now, 

they aren’t. So don’t you think that we ought to do everything in 

our power to make sure that Taiwan has all the technical and military equipment necessary to defend itself? And the new F–16s, 

which I’ve been led to believe would be of longer duration as far 

as their ability to be flown, would be the case. And the ones—you 

keep talking about upgrading, have a shorter lifespan and so at 

some point we’re going to have to sell the new ones or let their 

whole military capability deteriorate anyhow. 

So those are just a few of the comments that I’d like to make in 

questions. So if you could respond to those, I’d really appreciate it. 

36

Mr. LAVOY. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman. I think 

these are important questions and I’m happy to respond. First, you 

asked a question about the Chinese missile threat. It’s my understanding that China has between 1,000 and 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles, but there are cruise missiles as well, and I think 

maybe the number that you’re giving is the combined missile capability. But it’s a growing capability and we take it very seriously. 

Secondly, on the F–16s. Again, as I said, I want to emphasize 

that it’s our understanding, our belief, that the F–16 retrofit provides the best bang for the buck at this time. It’s been the higher 

immediate priority. 

Mr. BURTON. I just want to follow up to make sure you answer 

the question fully. Do you believe that the 66 F–16s, the new ones 

that they want, would be a better quality and longer duration than 

the upgrades that you’re going to give them? 

Mr. LAVOY. Well, sir, I can state explicitly and we’ve taken a 

very close look at this issue, that the F–16 retrofit will provide Taiwan an advanced fighter whose detection capabilities, in other 

words, radar capabilities, and weapons engagement capabilities, its 

envelope, is comparable to any fourth-generation fighter available 

to the United States Air Force and available to our other—to our 

allies. 

Mr. BURTON. I’ve been led to believe that they will not be as powerful as the new aircraft. 

Mr. LAVOY. Well, sir, a contractor will be upgrading the enhancing structure of the aircraft. And as we’ve indicated in our congressional notification that we provided 2 weeks ago, we do have an 

analysis for a new engine in that aircraft, so it will be fully comparable to the F–16 Cs and Ds. 

Mr. BURTON. I’m running out of time. Let me real quickly say 

you said there was more military equipment sold to Taiwan than 

at any time in history. Now that covers a whole bunch of things. 

They want the F–16s. They want the ability to defend themselves. 

What have we been selling them? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Congressman, I think the Department of Defense 

can provide you a very full list. It’s quite expansive and what I said 

specifically was that the decisions taken in 2010 and 2011 are comparable or greater than any other 2-year period since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I just want to underscore quite directly this has 

been a bipartisan commitment across administrations and we’ve 

had a consistent high-level commitment——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Connolly is 

recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Dr. Campbell, Dr. 

Lavoy, briefly, what is your understanding of the U.S. commitment 

by statute in the Taiwan Relations Act with respect to the defense 

of Taiwan? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think at the outset I could restate it if that 

would be helpful, but I went through and in my testimony I have 

gone through that carefully, Congressman. Would you like me to do 

that again here? 

37

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, Dr. Campbell, I just want a concise—I mean 

we are committed by statute to the defense of Taiwan, are we not? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. We are committed to the maintenance of peace 

and stability across the Taiwan Strait, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Does the act address the defense capability of 

Taiwan? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, the act states clearly that the interest of the 

United States is the maintenance of peace and stability across the 

Taiwan Strait, that the United States maintain the capabilities to 

be able to respond to any coercion or disruption of that peace and 

stability and that we provide defensive, necessary defensive articles 

to Taiwan. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So it’s not just peace and stability in the Straits, 

it is explicit in the statutory commitment to the defense capability 

of Taiwan? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. I’m sorry. I thought I had stated that earlier, Congressman. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I was just trying to make sure we get that on the 

record. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Does the Taiwan Relations Act in any way, 

shape, or form allow for, encourage, or even address consultation 

with third parties in that statutory commitment? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Third parties, the fourth aspect that we think is 

extremely important in the Taiwan Relations Act is the insistence 

on consultation between the Executive Branch and the Legislative 

bodies——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I’m referring to sovereign nations. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. No. In fact, there’s nothing in the Taiwan Relations Act about that, but as the chairwoman has underscored, that 

soon thereafter there were a series of assurance, the so-called Six 

Assurances. And part of that was that the United States would not 

consult with other nations——

Mr. CONNOLLY. And is it your testimony, Dr. Campbell, I’m interrupting not to be rude, but I’m worried about my time. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Fine. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And the chair is very strict about it. Is it your 

testimony here today that therefore no formal or informal consultations or signals were sent to any sovereign third party with respect 

to the decision of the administration to upgrade the F–16s? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Absolutely not. There were no consultations of 

any kind in terms of specific weapons. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Did the State Department receive, nonetheless, 

representations from any third party sovereign nation with respect 

to the F–16, the pending F–16 decision? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think as Dr. Lavoy has indicated, in a number 

of interactions with Chinese interlocutors, they regularly stress 

their unhappiness with American arms sales to Taiwan. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But that played no factor whatsoever in your decision? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. It did not. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You just said to Mr. Rohrabacher, I mean to Mr. 

Burton, that essentially the upgrades you’re looking at in the existVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:50 Nov 30, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\100411\70584 HFA PsN: SHIRL
38

ing F–16s, even though they’re aging, will actually make them comparable in capability to new F–16 C/Ds. That’s what you just said? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think that’s what——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Lavoy. 

Mr. LAVOY. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If that’s the case, why not just sell them F–16 

C/Ds? Why are we quibbling? 

Mr. LAVOY. Well, sir, again, we’re working with Taiwan defense 

authorities to prioritize the upgrade, the retrofit of their existing 

145 aircraft. Many more aircraft that might be contemplated in the 

C and D new replacement——

Mr. CONNOLLY. But Dr. Lavoy, why not just give them the 66 we 

were talking about and then you can upgrade the rest? I was just 

in Taiwan. I didn’t meet a single defense official, from the President on down, who said no, no, no. We’re happy with an upgrade 

as opposed to our original request of C/Ds. I mean they may live 

with the upgrade, but their clear preference is for F–16 Cs and Ds. 

Mr. LAVOY. Well, sir, these are two separate issues. They were 

very pleased with the upgrade of the As and Bs. It does make 

sense. We believe that it makes sense for the security and they believe so. And we are considering—we know their interests in the 

Cs and Ds and we are considering that request. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You are still considering the request for——

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think what he means, Congressman, is that we 

rule nothing out. We continuously evaluate the situation across the 

Taiwan Strait. We believe at the current stage that the decision on 

the upgrade was the appropriate step. It is part of a strong and 

consistent determination of the United States to maintain strong 

defensive capabilities of Taiwan. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And final point since my time is running out, Dr. 

Campbell, you said that the Taiwan Relations Act does require Executive and Legislative Branch consultation. This committee, I 

think, unanimously adopted the Connolly-Berman Amendment that 

called on the administration, in fact, to honor the request of Taiwan. Somehow that factored in your decision making? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Let me say that we believe that the consultative 

dimension of the Taiwan Relations Act between the Executive and 

Legislative——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Royce——

Mr. CONNOLLY. We’ll leave it a mystery, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Let me ask Secretary Campbell a question here. I’ve long been an enthusiast for increasing trade and investment, increasing that relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan is 

based on the rule of law and you see the consequences of it 

unlocking a lot of entrepreneurial talent in terms of the Taiwanese 

people. And for far too long, I think, we’ve drawn this process out. 

Now, the Obama administration sent the KORUS Agreement to 

Congress for a vote yesterday. My question is, now that KORUS 

has been submitted to Congress, what can we do to move forward 

with our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement agenda 

with Taiwan? What can we do to advance that and how can we use 

39

this dialogue to increase the prospect of securing a U.S.-Taiwan 

free trade agreement? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much and I very much appreciate the question. I will say that I am very grateful for the fact 

that we’ve been able to move ahead on the free trade agreements. 

It sends a powerful message to Asia that we are committed to an 

optimistic role in the burgeoning economies that is really the cockpit of the global trade and economic performance currently. 

I think that will help us subsequently, Congressman Royce, in 

terms of TPP and also our overall efforts in APEC. 

I would actually like to ask you to assist us in this matter. One 

of the things that you all have talked about is your conversation 

with Taiwan interlocutors. I would simple suggest the next time 

you meet with your Taiwan interlocutors as we do, underscore to 

them how important it is that they take the necessary steps on 

beef that will allow us to go forward. Remember that the primary 

considerations on beef-related issues and agriculture and ranch 

products are underscored for us in all of our communications with 

Capitol Hill. They provide the foundation for our engagement not 

just with Taiwan, but with a variety of other countries, South 

Korea, Japan, and others. 

We have, frankly, been disappointed with the lack of progress on 

these issues. We’ve had a series of consultations and we’ve made 

it very clear to Taiwan that we want to make progress on this, but 

we need to see them to take the necessary steps on beef moving 

forward. 

Mr. ROYCE. We can figure out beef, I think, but we’ve also got 

to have the political will to make it happen and part of your role 

is to initiate those negotiations. And I would just point out in the 

meantime, we had a witness at our last hearing who explained how 

U.S. businesses were losing market share in Taiwan, that that situation has deteriorated over the last few years in terms of the 

trade relationship. And he laid out an argument to us that the best 

way to bolster trade would be to initiate negotiations for a free 

trade agreement. That’s probably the best way to get to a solution 

in terms of the beef issue and other issues that are of concern. 

But here’s my concern. You have Asian countries that have cut 

all kinds of bilateral trade agreements, over 170 agreements and 

the United States is only a party to two of them, Singapore and 

Australia. We have a tremendous opportunity, I think. Taiwan has 

been in kind of a tough situation with pressure from China, but 

Taiwan and Japan signed the first investment accord recently. I 

think that paves the way possibly for other free trade agreements 

that they’re looking at. 

What else could we do to help push an agreement between Taiwan and the United States forward and make sure that the U.S. 

is not left out in terms of the trade agreements that are proliferating in Asia? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. I would say, Congressman Royce, I 

do believe that the effort that the United States has engaged in 

now, the so-called Trans-Pacific Partnership, has the potential to 

be the highest quality, most sophisticated trade deal of the 21st 

century. And we are in the process of moving toward a very consequential period in those interactions. And frankly, they’ve drawn 

40

attention and interest from a whole host of other countries in the 

Asian Pacific region. 

I think that step will help potentially encourage other countries 

like Taiwan, other places like Taiwan, to take the necessary steps 

to enable the United States to engage intensively. 

Mr. ROYCE. I agree, but that will take years. We need to push 

this agreement with Taiwan now in my opinion. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to switch gears 

a little bit. Gentlemen, Taiwan’s military schedule to shift from 

mandatory service to voluntary by the end of 2014, Dr. Lavoy, are 

you concerned about the effect that this might have on military cooperation and security issues? 

Mr. LAVOY. No, we think it’s a good measure, like a number of 

defense reforms that Taiwan is undertaking to modernize its capability and make it more robust and confident in its self defense. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, and Secretary Campbell, your testimony—in your testimony, you discuss the importance of Taiwan 

joining the Visa Waiver Program. How would you assess Taiwan’s 

progress with respect to meeting the eligibility of the Visa Waiver 

Program and what are the next steps that need to be taken? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you on that. The Congresswoman referred 

to this at the outset. Frankly, they’ve made enormous progress. 

We’ve worked very hard on this. I’ve been very impressed by the 

activities they’ve taken in terms of passport refusals. There’s a variety of technical steps that Taiwan has taken in terms of how you 

go about applying for passports and we’ve been very impressed 

with the determination that they have shown in this manner. 

There is a complex review process that has been established 

working in consultation with Capitol Hill since 9/11 in terms of 

countries needing to qualify on a whole range of issues. The next 

steps are a series of determinations that take place inside the U.S. 

Government, not just with the Department of State, but with other 

agencies, the Department of Homeland Security. But I will say 

very clearly that we have been very impressed by the progress 

taken and I think we shared the ultimate goals and ambitions that 

have been laid out in some of the statements we’ve heard thus far. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I understand that there are some technical steps. 

I understand that within our Government there needs to be some 

further evaluation. Can you tell us here whether there are specific 

significant steps that need to be taken that we would benefit from 

discussing here at this hearing? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. To be quite honest, Congressman Deutch, we’re 

actually quite close. We’ve made substantial progress. And we are 

now in a process of evaluation. It is not simply Taiwan. There are 

other countries that are involved in this. You have to look at a 

whole series of factors. But I think there has been a determination 

at the highest levels that this would be an extraordinarily important contribution to improving the people to people, the kind of 

business steps that Congressman Royce has indicated and the 

other kinds of exchanges between our two, between the United 

States and Taiwan in a way that will serve our interests. 

41

So I am—I am trying to be careful here, but we’ve made enormous progress and I think we’ll try to make sure we work toward 

the finish line. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I’m sure that you will, Secretary Campbell. I, like 

a lot of my colleagues here, share your view that this would be a 

very important step for a whole host of reasons. Can you give us 

some sense of at least if you’re not—if you choose not to talk about 

specific steps or specific items that need to be evaluated, can you 

at least give us a time line for completing that evaluation? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think we can realistically expect to see progress 

in the very near term. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Congressman Deutch, part of the reason I am 

being careful here is that this is not the exclusive purview of the 

Department of State. There are other key agencies that are involved. I would like not to be in a situation where I’m prejudging 

those outcomes, but I will simply say we have been charged at the 

highest level to make progress. We have made substantial 

progress. I do not believe we would have taken all of these steps 

if we were not determined to take this over the finish line and do 

it in the near term. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Madam Chair, I will accept moving us toward the 

finish line in the very near term and I will yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much to my colleague 

from Florida. Mr. Chabot is recognized, the chairman of the Middle 

East Subcommittee. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I want 

to thank you for holding this important hearing and I know that 

you’ve been trying to pull this together for some time. We appreciate your efforts on that and as one of the founders of the Congressional Taiwanese Caucus I can say with certainty that you are 

much admired in Taiwan for your friendship and your tireless support of democracy in the region and around the world and we 

thank you for that. And we thank our distinguished panel here. 

Over the years, I’ve often brought up the issues of high-level visits and how the restrictions on diplomatic visits by high-level Taiwanese officials to the United States are in my mind both counterproductive and in fact, insulting to the Taiwanese people. 

Some of us on this committee can remember flying up to New 

York City after votes one night to meet with then Taiwanese President Chen Shui-Bian, a very good friend to the United States. I 

would also note, I’d be remiss if I didn’t say still incarcerated, and 

as a long time friend of Taiwan, let me just say that this to me 

smacks of Third Worldism and it amounts to the criminalization of 

politics. I wish it would be dealt with sooner rather than later. 

Anyway, because of travel restrictions, he could not come, the 

President could not come here to Washington to meet with us. I remember hosting a Taiwanese legislator here in my Washington office and only a few weeks later I had to travel to Baltimore to meet 

with him. Why? Well, he had since become Foreign Minister and 

he was barred from traveling to our capital. That’s ridiculous. And 

as I said before, it’s insulting to the Taiwanese people and that 

ought to be changed. 

42

And on the issue of high-level visits, I also want to raise the 

issue of high-level U.S. Government official visits to Taiwan. Since 

the United States began its one China policy, few U.S. cabinet officials have visited Taiwan. Secretary Clinton, during her confirmation hearings, and she said at that time that she would promote 

visits to Taiwan by U.S. cabinet secretaries. Well, that was almost 

3 years ago and no such visits to our democratic ally have occurred. 

That needs to be dealt with. 

So I’m hoping our witnesses can respond to those concerns, especially in light of the fact that high-level visits between Washington 

and Beijing are commonplace. And when the latest Communist dictator from the PRC comes calling, the red carpet always goes out. 

I also want to add my hope that the Obama administration and 

this has been dealt with already, but I’m going to say it again, 

would reconsider its decision not to allow the sale of the F–16 C/D 

fighter jet to Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act, in my view, clearly states the commitment of the United States to ensuring that 

Taiwan is able to defend itself against its often-hostile neighbor, 

Communist China. An aging Taiwanese fighter fleet does not reflect that commitment, upgraded or not, in my view. This argument 

that our evaluation is on-going I don’t buy it. As far as I’m concerned this administration just doesn’t want to upset China. That’s 

the real issue here I’m afraid. 

I can remember going to Taiwan for the first time in the mid-

’90s. At that time, China had a number of missiles pointed at Taiwan. My recollection is it was about 600 at that time. Every year 

since then the number of offensive PRC missiles has increased. 

Now it’s estimated that more than 1600 Chinese short and medium-range missiles are pointed at Taiwan, our democratic friend 

and ally. 

And before I yield to either of our witnesses, who would care to 

comment on these issues, I want to make clear that this is not a 

partisan matter with me. I’ve been very critical of our Taiwan policy under both Republican and Democratic administrations, so it’s 

not politics. Bad policy is bad policy no matter who is in charge. 

And just one final point. This committee has consistently requested 

on-going substantive discussions with the administration regarding 

security issues impacting Taiwan. On all but one occasion those requests have been rebuffed. Indeed, the administration has violated 

reporting requirements relating to the Taiwan arms sales under 

the Taiwan Relations Act. How can you say that the administration 

takes seriously its obligation to consult Congress regarding the defense of Taiwan as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act? And 

you’ve got 36 second to answer all those questions. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Congressman. I’m not sure exactly 

where to begin. I would simply say that we have an unofficial relationship as you know, between the United States and Taiwan. Nevertheless, we have broad and deep consultations as we speak today. 

One of my deputies in the State Department responsible for APEC 

is in Taipei. Our deputy secretary of State met a few weeks ago in 

Auckland with his counterpart to discuss cooperation in the Asian 

Pacific region. 

In the larger context, my own sense is that Taiwan is a flourishing democracy, largely because of the support of the United 

43

States. It has a strong, enduring relationship with the United 

States that will continue and has been bipartisan. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Ms. Bass 

is recognized. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Madam Chair. Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State David Shear stated in March 2010 that the United States 

is a strong and consistent supporter of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international organizations. He also noted that Taiwan has been a full member of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. For the second time since initiating APEC’s summits in Seattle in 1993, the United States will host an APEC summit in Honolulu in November. 

I wanted to know from the witnesses, if you feel that Taiwan’s 

President should attend for the first time? And you also had said 

in your testimony that we do—that the Six Assurances is still a 

part of U.S. policy and I wanted to know if you could reiterate 

those Six Assurances. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. I think 

I stated a few times already now on the importance of the Six Assurances and I will do so again. As I indicated, our APEC Ambassador is currently in Taipei to assist in preparations. Taiwan will 

be represented by a vice minister that is the practice at APEC and 

we think that that is the appropriate way to participate. 

We are in close consultation with Taiwan on a range of the 

issues that we are involved with in terms of the APEC agenda and 

we look forward to their active support and engagement on many 

of the issues that will be discussed in Hawaii when the President 

convenes the group in less than a month. 

You had one other question, I’m sorry? 

Ms. BASS. I knew you had said several times that the Six Assurances were a part of U.S. policy. As a new member, I was just asking if you could reiterate what the Six Assurances are. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. They are primarily associated with no prior consultations about arms sales. 

Ms. BASS. Oh, I see. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. And there are some other variants of those and 

I would be more than pleased to make sure that in a private consultation come up and provide you greater clarity on those issues. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Okay, thank you. And one other question. As Taiwan seeks greater international participation, what are U.S. concerns that Taiwan has questioned the safety of U.S. beef, even 

though Taiwan is a member of the World Organization for Animal 

Health? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, and this gets back to the point that we were 

raising with Congressman Royce. We want these assessments to be 

signed space and evidentiary based, not on unfounded claims. We 

believe that the steps that Taiwan needs to take on beef have not 

yet been taken and that they are an impediment to the kind of 

broader economic engagement that I think the entire committee 

shares and believes is important going forward. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ms. Bass. Mr. 

Johnson of Ohio is recognized. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Dr. Campbell, in 

May, a Chinese Communist official urged Taiwan’s voters to choose 

44

the right person in the upcoming Presidential election. Then last 

month, according to an article in The Financial Times, a senior 

United States official, after meeting with the visiting opposition 

Presidential candidate from Taiwan, Ms. Tsai, said that she left us 

with the distinct doubts about whether she is both willing and able 

to continue the stability and cross-Strait relations the region has 

enjoyed in recent years. 

Since when does the United States Government choose sides in 

the internal elections of a democratic country? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thanks. And thank you very much, Congressman. I stated very clearly in my testimony at the outset and restated in my oral presentation as well, that one of the most important things that ties the United States with Taiwan is the vibrancy 

and the engagement of our two democracies. 

Taiwan is coming up on an extraordinarily important election in 

January. The United States will not interfere in any way with that 

electoral process. We do not pick candidates. We do not take sides. 

And we will be committed to work closely and cooperatively with 

whoever is elected out of that free and fair election going forward. 

I would simply say also that the visitor that you referred to, 

Madam Tsai, when she came to Washington was greeted and engaged with very respectfully, both up here in Capitol Hill and with 

key officials in the United States Government as well. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I don’t know how we can say we’re not picking sides when we make public statements like that. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would simply say, Congressman, with respect, 

that was an unsourced, blind quote in a newspaper. Immediately 

thereafter, the United States Government issued a very clear statement which has been reiterated again and again and I will say so 

again here now. The United States does not take sides. We support 

the strong democracy in Taiwan. We will work closely with whatever candidate emerges from this election and we believe that it 

this is an essential feature of Taiwan, more than anything else, 

that keeps the United States and Taiwan close together. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I certainly hope we stick to that because it appears that, you know, we’re leaning toward becoming so eager to 

please China that we’re now taking our talking points from Beijing 

in regards to Taiwan’s political future. 

Also, Mr. Campbell, China’s threats following arms sales to Taiwan are not new. The U.S. faced a similar situation in January 

when China suspended military exchanges following the announcement of a $6.4 billion arms package to Taiwan. In addition, China 

froze military cooperation for the remainder of the Bush administration after the White House notified Congress in October 2008 of 

its plan to sell Taiwan $6.5 billion in defense equipment. 

In your view, does China actually have more to gain from these 

military exchanges than we do? And if so, how serious are their interests and how long would a cutoff in military ties exist? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I’ll start with this and then I think my colleague, 

Dr. Lavoy, might have something to suggest as well. 

First of all, the military-to-military relationship, the communication between the United States and China is in the interest of both 

parties. It’s in the interest of China and the United States. We 

45

don’t do this as a favor to China and they don’t do it as a favor 

or should not see it as a favor toward the United States. 

China is a growing military power, as they expand their forces, 

as they deploy more abroad in the oceans and air offshore China. 

They will come and they have come in contact more with American 

forces. We are concerned, frankly, about the potential for miscalculation and accident. We think establishing rules of the road, 

understandings, predictability about how we operate is one of the 

most important contributions to the maintenance of peace and stability. 

You remember back in 2001 at the beginning, at the outset of the 

Bush administration, the accident that took place between the Chinese fighter and the EP–3 American aircraft. Such actions have the 

potential to disrupt and roil relations in a way that is not in our 

interest and not in China’s interest. So it is our strong determination to see these ties and communications go forward, but as a matter to try to improve understanding between our two sides. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think I’m out of time, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. 

Faleomavaega is recognized. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Madam Chair. There is a perception that has been given to the extent that it seems that we are 

not giving enough military assistance to Taiwan. And I am glad 

just to hear that your statement, Dr. Campbell, that in actuality 

during this administration that there has been more assistance 

given in this regard with Taiwan’s need for military equipment to 

defend itself. 

Can you provide that for the record and make that as a comparative analysis with other times of administration, because this is 

very, very important to me to know that in actuality this administration is very, very firm in its commitment to the defense of Taiwan. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I must say thank you, Congressman. I would 

simply that I do not believe that this is a partisan issue. In fact, 

I believe that, generally speaking, over a range of administrations 

you have seen close ties between the United States and Taiwan. In 

fact, the areas that we’ve had the greatest tension, frankly, were 

in the previous administration when there were some difficulties 

between the two sides. 

However, we have stood by our commitments——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I appreciate that, Dr. Campbell, but please 

provide that for the record, just to make sure. 

Dr. Lavoy, I think it’s been said that there are 1600 missiles 

pointed toward Taiwan and I assume it’s the latest state-of-the-art 

capability that the Peoples Republic of China, as far as militarily, 

with its capacity to shoot these missiles. How long will it take for 

these missiles to land in Taipei or any important cities in Taiwan, 

minutes, an hour? 

Mr. LAVOY. Certainly, less than an hour, certainly minutes, sir. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Will that give Taiwan with its current capability militarily to respond in terms of defending itself with 1600 

missiles coming from everywhere? 

Mr. LAVOY. Sir, we do look at Taiwan’s defense needs in a holistic way. There are a number of threats. There’s some missile 

46

threat, but I also talked about the air capability that China is developing. Its naval undersea capability. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Here’s my concern and I’m lacking time. I’m 

sorry, Dr. Lavoy. It seems that it’s more symbolic in terms of our 

real commitment in helping defend Taiwan rather than saying does 

it have the capability of withstanding any military attack or aggression coming from the Peoples Republic of China. That’s my concern. And I would appreciate a more clear definition in terms of 

what you think that we’re capable of doing. 

Dr. Campbell, it’s been known over years, despite all the rhetoric 

that Taiwan and Peoples Republic of China have always been 

confrontational, but in a public forum. And yet, they conduct over 

$100 billion unofficial trade. This is one of the ironies about dealing 

with Taiwan and its relationship with the Peoples Republic of 

China, unofficial trade of over $100 billion. Can we add that to the 

actual amount of investments that Taiwan currently makes in the 

Procurement Center Representative, just like Japan, just like Hong 

Kong and other major companies? Do we have an approximate estimate of the total amount of investments that Taiwan has made in 

China? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Congressman. I don’t want to misstate here, so I want to make sure I get that into the record, but 

I think your general point is absolutely clear. The level of economic 

and commercial interaction is increasing dramatically between Taiwan and China. There are places that you can visit in China that 

are just filled with huge numbers of Taiwan businessmen. They 

have little communities where they have invested and they are engaged. 

I think that that’s the complexity of this issue, that there are the 

enduring threats that this committee has focused on, but there is 

also a picture of growing economic engagement, commercial 

ties——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I’m sorry, Dr. Campbell, I don’t mean to interrupt because I know my time is up. The chairlady is very important to this. 

I make this observation. I’ve been to Taiwan several times, having the opportunity to have met with both President Chen and also 

President Ma and there is no question that the people and the voters of Taiwan are in this threshold in terms of making decision in 

their democracy in terms of what basic democracy—I mean what 

future they have in terms of dealing—and correct me if I’m wrong. 

President Chen advocated the idea, even going to the United Nations. They want Taiwan to be independent, which is a very major 

decision with the people in contrast voted in favor of President Ma 

who doesn’t want to be under China, but economically, culturally, 

educationally which is exactly what’s happening now and it seems 

that Beijing seems to be okay with it. And my time is up. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Faleomavaega. 

Mr. Ted Poe, the vice chair on the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations is recognized. 

Mr. POE. I thank the chair for the time and thank you, gentlemen, for being here and your expertise in this area. 

47

Here’s the way I see the situation. The Chinese dragon is snorting the fire of intimidation against our ally, Taiwan. And to defend 

itself from the Chinese dragon’s evil intentions, Taiwan defends 

itself with what I think are rusty swords, the old outdated F–16s. 

And it appears that by intimidation the U.S. has become somewhat 

timid under the Chinese dragon. The Beijing Government doesn’t 

want us to sell them new F–16 C/Ds which happen to be built in 

Fort Worth, Texas, by the way. 

It is in our national interest to help Taiwan and it’s not in our 

national interest to play Chamberlain and appease the Chinese 

dragon. That’s the way it comes across to me. Chinese intentions 

of mischief are not limited to Taiwan. In the South China Sea, the 

Beijing dragon has initiated confrontation with the Philippine nation, the Japanese, Korea, and even Vietnam. China is expanding 

its claims of the South China Sea in areas that are international 

waters or actually belong to some other nation. 

So with this occurring and the expansion of the Chinese dragon, 

what message are we sending not only to Taiwan, but to Japan, 

other nations in the China Sea by failure to send the best aircraft 

we have, the F–16 C/Ds to them? So I would just like to hear from 

you that message that we’re sending to all of the above. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Let me, if I can, Congressman, thank you very 

much for your question. In a larger context, U.S.-Japan relations 

have been extraordinarily important to this administration. The 

United States by orders of magnitude provided the most support to 

Japan after their tragic earthquake and nuclear crisis. Japan understands that our relationship is at the core of everything that we 

seek to do in the Asian Pacific region. 

If you look back to 2010, the important South China Sea initiative that Secretary Clinton took at the ASEAN Regional Forum. It 

made, no doubt, it made very clear that the United States had a 

strategic interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, the 

international use of sea lines of communications, I think a very important and well-regarded contribution to Asian Pacific security. 

We’ve taken steps to strengthen all of our alliances and as I suggested earlier, we’re in the process of rebalancing substantial commitments in the Middle East and South Asia, more toward the Asia 

Pacific region. I would simply say as you look at Taiwan, what you 

see is first of all, a flourishing democracy that has achieved that 

status with the long-standing support of the United States, a very 

strong relationship with the United States, trade and economic engagement greater than that of India. We’d like to do more, I think 

has been underscored, but also at its bedrock an extraordinarily robust military relationship. And we’ve underscored clearly the steps 

that we have taken, not just in the provision of hardware, but 

broad-based engagement that we call software. 

Mr. POE. Let me reclaim my time, Dr. Campbell. I only have a 

little bit of time. Let me center in on the expansion of the Chinese 

influence in the South China Sea with its confrontations recently 

with Vietnam and their oil exploration. Some of the folks that I’ve 

talked to when I was in the area said that China claims the whole 

area because it is named the South China Sea. Can you help us 

out a little bit about what you see the intentions of China in that 

area? 

48

Mr. CAMPBELL. I’m cognizant of the gavel of the chairwoman. I’ll 

never get this through this in 40 seconds. I will simply say that the 

United States has a strategic interest in all issues be handled 

peacefully. We believe that issues associated with sovereignty and 

boundaries should flow from the provisions laid out in the law of 

the sea. We support negotiations. We reject coercion and we have 

been in close consultation with all of our allies and friends in the 

region about the critical issue in the South China Sea. And I do 

agree with you that’s it’s an important issue that requires American leadership going forward. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. I’ll yield back the 2 seconds, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Now Judge Poe was a very 

tough Judge in Texas and I’m a tough chairman. So we have that 

in common. 

Mr. Rivera, my Florida colleague, is recognized. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much and we greatly appreciate 

that toughness. It’s important. I share the concerns expressed earlier by many of my colleagues with respect to the signals or messages that are being sent by this latest decision not to support our 

greatest ally in the region, Taiwan, with respect to the F–16s. We 

have no greater ally than Taiwan, certainly in Asia, just as we 

have no greater ally in the Middle East than Israel. And we should 

always do everything possible to avert sending any type of mixed 

message or disturbing message that perhaps we are turning our 

backs on our allies in an effort to appease our enemies. I know 

some folks like to sugar coat the terms in describing China as a 

rival or competitor. But the fact is Communist China is an enemy 

of democracy. Communist China is an enemy of freedom. Communist China is an enemy of human rights and civil liberties. So 

we can spend a lot of time talking about how Taiwan is a flourishing democracy and I certainly agree and our great ally in that 

region, but we also need to say it like it is with respect to Communist China. 

So with that as a background as to my perspective, I have just 

one question for Secretary Campbell, one question for Secretary 

Lavoy and I’ll start with Secretary Lavoy. Other than upgrading 

the old F–16s, what can this administration do to enhance Taiwan’s air defense capability considering the threat that Communist 

China poses? 

Mr. LAVOY. Thank you very much for that question. Let me just 

make three very quick points in light of the diminishing time. First 

of all, this administration is committed to the defense of Taiwan 

and we have the strongest possible commitment to Taiwan. Taiwan 

does matter. 

Secondly, this arms package that was just announced to Congress 2 weeks ago does make sense. The core of Taiwan’s air defense or air force is 145 F–16s. This extension, this retrofit——

Mr. RIVERA. Is there anything else we can do? 

Mr. LAVOY. We can do other things and we are doing other 

things. That was my third point. We are consulting with Taiwan 

on a full range of capabilities so that they’re aware of the threat 

and they can undertake the defensive preparations. This might involve future arms transfers by this administration——

49

Mr. RIVERA. Future arms transfers such as? 

Mr. LAVOY. Well, I don’t want to speculate on future ones. This 

is something that we’re consulting with Taiwan authorities on and 

we are considering it actively. 

Mr. RIVERA. For Secretary Campbell, in that same vein, what 

can this administration do to enhance Taiwan’s diplomatic standing in the world, in encouraging and developing multi-lateral efforts? What can we do to help our greatest friend in the region? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thanks. It’s a good question. I think it is the consistent policy of the United States to encourage Taiwan to play an 

appropriate role in a variety of international organizations. They’ve 

most recently been playing a role in the World Health Organization, given the potential for an outbreak of disease that could be 

devastating in Asia. We’ve seen certain flus in the past. Taiwan 

has some unique capabilities to bring to bear and I think that cooperation has been significant. 

The region has also been struck by a lot of very severe weather 

patterns and also earthquakes. Greater preparedness opportunities 

for Taiwan to participate in this regard I think is important. It is 

also the case that frankly simply the example of Taiwan, 25 years 

ago, Taiwan was a very brutal, authoritarian regime. It’s now one 

of the most flourishing, exciting democracies in Asia. I think that 

example, also the example of a country, a place that’s growing at 

nearly 8 percent a year, tremendous vitality, lots of interchanges 

between Taiwan and China and with the United States and other 

countries in the region. It’s actually flourishing and it’s flourishing 

largely because of a strong relationship that we have sustained 

with Taiwan over decades and that we will continue to sustain 

going forward. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Rivera, 

and another wonderful Florida colleague, Mr. Bilirakis, a/k/a Ray. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Madam Chair, I appreciate that. One 

of these days, we’ll explain that. 

There’s a consensus among military analysts that the Taiwan 

Strait remains one of the most dangerous geo-political flashpoints 

in the world today. I’m therefore baffled at the President’s appointee for the Director of American Institute in Taiwan who after 

all functions as a de facto U.S. Ambassador of Taipei need not pass 

through the Senate confirmation process as all other diplomatic appointees do. Why are the qualifications and perspectives of our Ambassadors to Grenada and Barbados subjected to more congressional scrutiny than our main representative to a key democratic 

ally with whom we share a broad, economic, and strategic interest? 

It is clearly in the U.S. interest, in my opinion, to have an AIT director confirmed by the Senate just like any other Ambassador. 

Wouldn’t it be prudent to start the process of putting into law 

that the AIT director in Taipei be confirmed by the Senate, for the 

panel, please? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Frankly, it’s not for me, Congressman, for me to 

comment on that. The practice is, as you know, we have an unofficial relationship with Taiwan. The representative is chosen very 

carefully. We have a long, distinguished record of people who have 

served in that capacity, often with extensive experience in Asia, 

50

deep language capabilities, and strong commitment to maintaining 

that relationship between the United States and Taiwan. 

Our current AIT chairman, Bill Stanton, one of the most effective 

American diplomats for decades, has done a great job building the 

relationship between the United States and Taiwan. There have 

been many who have preceded him and there will be many that follow him. The issues associated with Senate confirmations really resides in some other capacity, not mine. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Sir. 

Mr. LAVOY. I’m from the Department of Defense and I would certainly defer to the State Department on that issue. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. I yield back, Madam 

Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you to 

all of our members, thank you to the audience, and most especially 

to an excellent set of panelists this morning. We appreciate your 

willingness to appear before us and the conclusion is that Taiwan 

matters a great deal, I know to you and most especially here to the 

Members of Congress and our committee. And with that, our committee is adjourned. Thank you, gentlemen. 

[Whereupon at 11:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

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WRITTEN RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE KURT CAMPBELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA


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