NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.W.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0121 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. B8015JD201904074

The Honorable Rick Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Your AZ Lawyer, Phoenix

By Robert Ian Casey

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer L. Thorson

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 3-5-2025
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.W.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Erick W. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination 

of his parental rights as to R.W., his daughter, who was born in October 

2020.

1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On October 27, 2020, R.W. was born substance exposed to 

methamphetamine in California. California Child Protective Services had 

custody of R.W. until February 2021, after which she was placed in a foster 

home in Arizona so she could live with her half-siblings. When R.W. was 

born, Father was incarcerated in Nevada for possessing a stolen vehicle. In 

March 2021, after pleading guilty, Father received a sentence ranging from 

a minimum of 19 months to a maximum of 48 months, with credit for 153 

days of presentence incarceration. 

¶3 Father learned about R.W.’s birth from his sister, and once he 

was able to send letters from prison, he wrote a letter to the Arizona 

Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) in May 2021. In that letter, he said he 

did “not give up [his] parental rights” and asked that DCS establish his 

paternity. After confirming Father’s paternity in August the same year, a 

DCS case manager wrote to Father a month later encouraging him to send 

cards, letters, and pictures to R.W. Father sent DCS pictures, a couple of 

cards, and a letter for R.W. in early October, which DCS acknowledged 

receiving a few weeks later. 

¶4 The extent and nature of Father’s contact with DCS after this 

exchange is disputed. Father claimed that he sent approximately 13 or 14 

letters to DCS, and attempted to call DCS numerous times but was unable 

to get through. DCS, conversely, noted only three instances during these 

proceedings when it received mail from Father. Father also claimed he was 

1 The court also terminated R.W.’s mother’s parental rights, but she is 

not a party to this appeal.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.W.

Decision of the Court

3

contacting R.W. through his sister, who had visits with R.W., and that 

during such visits Father’s sister arranged calls between him and R.W.

Though Father testified that he informed DCS of such calls, DCS denied 

knowing of them. Father admitted he stopped having these calls when his 

sister stopped having visits with R.W. for at least 8 months, but he also 

claimed he sent letters to R.W. during that time.

¶5 In November 2021, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental 

rights based on the length of his sentence under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). A year 

later, DCS amended its motion to include abandonment under A.R.S. 

§ 8-531(1). In 2022, Father was moved to a prison in California for a separate 

series of charges. Between October 2022 and April 2023, Father was moved 

to at least four different jails or prisons. In January of 2023, a second case 

manager replaced the original. Though Father claimed that he wrote to 

DCS informing it of his whereabouts, the new case manager stated she had 

no idea where he was, and that it was difficult to find him. When the case 

manager was able to contact Father by mail in January 2023, he responded 

by sending three letters at the same time.

¶6 The juvenile court held a contested termination adjudication 

hearing in April 2023. Father testified about his incarceration, contact 

attempts with DCS, and the contact he had and attempted to have with 

R.W. The case manager described her understanding of Father’s 

communications with DCS and R.W., and testified that R.W. was doing well 

at her placement and would benefit from termination.

¶7 The court found that DCS established both grounds for 

termination by clear and convincing evidence. As to the length-of-sentence 

ground, the court explained that although “Father was provided 

opportunities to establish and build a parent-child relationship through 

DCS,” he failed to do so, and that he had been incarcerated throughout 

R.W.’s life. The court also took judicial notice that Father had a pending 

felony matter in Mohave County, for which there was “an active 

extraditable warrant.” For the abandonment ground, the court found that 

Father “failed to maintain regular contact with [R.W.] despite having an 

opportunity to do so,” and he “made only minimal efforts to support and 

communicate with her for more than six months.” The court also 

determined that termination was in R.W.’s best interests. Father timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235(A).
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.W.

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶8 To terminate parental rights, a court must find (1) by clear and 

convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) 

has been proven, and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. See Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 286, ¶ 15 (App. 2016). We will affirm the juvenile 

court’s factual findings “if reasonable evidence and inferences support 

them.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023). And 

we will affirm the court’s legal conclusions regarding the statutory grounds 

for termination “unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 478–79, ¶ 31. The 

“clearly erroneous” standard of review means that “this finding will be 

affirmed unless the appellate court determines ‘as a matter of law that no 

one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and convincing.’” Id. at

481, ¶ 46 (citation omitted). 

¶9 Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s legal conclusion

or related factual findings that DCS met its burden of proving the statutory 

grounds under § 8-533(B)(4) (length of sentence).

2 He has therefore 

abandoned and waived any issues relating to the court’s ruling on the 

length of sentence ground. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 

576, 577, ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (holding that mother’s failure to challenge one of 

the grounds for termination constituted waiver and abandonment of any 

contention that the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights

on that ground). Even if Father’s briefing can reasonably be construed as 

challenging the reunification services component of the length of sentence 

ground, Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574 (2021), he has not 

shown the court erred. 

¶10 Father argues DCS failed to make diligent reunification 

efforts by not “even attempt[ing] to find Father when he was incarcerated,” 

and by placing the burden on him to communicate with R.W. The record 

shows otherwise. 

¶11 DCS reached out to Father shortly after confirming his 

paternity, offering to forward any cards, letters, and pictures from Father 

to R.W. Father evidently understood how to contact DCS and to send such 

materials, as he did so three times while incarcerated. These contacts 

resemble those noted by our supreme court when it suggested what 

incarcerated parents could do to maintain a bond with their children in

2 Father has not challenged the juvenile court’s finding that 

termination was in R.W.’s best interests.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.W.

Decision of the Court

5

Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 581, ¶ 17 (noting that “an incarcerated parent can 

maintain a bond with a child” in several ways, including through “letters, 

pictures, and gifts”). 

¶12 Father suggests that DCS was not proactive enough in 

locating him as he moved between correctional facilities. Though Father 

contends that “DCS had the ability to locate [him] without him having to 

be a willing participant” in their searching, the record does not support his 

contention. The second DCS case manager testified that she had difficulty 

locating Father. When she did locate him, she verified his location and 

prepared a letter to send him, but by the time it was ready to send, Father 

had already relocated to a different facility. The case manager further

testified that when a parent moves multiple times through a case without 

providing updated contact information, it complicates DCS’s ability to 

provide services. Father does not explain how, on this record, DCS’s efforts 

to locate him were deficient under the unique circumstances of his 

incarceration. 

¶13 Because Father has not shown that DCS failed to meet its 

obligation to reasonably facilitate the type of contacts contemplated under 

Jessie D., we do not address Father’s argument, raised for the first time on 

appeal, that DCS had a constitutional obligation to provide services before 

terminating Father’s rights under the abandonment ground, § 8-533(B)(1). 

See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 177, 178–79, ¶¶ 10, 

16 (App. 2014) (holding that arguments not raised in the juvenile court are 

generally waived on appeal); Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 

373, 376–77, ¶ 14 (App. 2010) (“[W]e will affirm the termination if any one 

of the statutory grounds is proven and if the termination is in the best 

interest of the children . . . and accordingly do not address the other 

statutory grounds for termination.”). 

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.