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48–119 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 110-824 

CURRENT AND PROJECTED THREATS TO THE 

NATIONAL SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 5, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 

(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

ANDREW W. JOHNSON, Staff Director 

LOUIS B. TUCKER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

FEBRUARY 5, 2008 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Rockefeller, Hon. John D., IV, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from West Virginia .. 1 

Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Missouri ....... 4 

Feingold, Hon. Russ, a U.S. Senator from Wisconsin ........................................... 93 

WITNESSES 

McConnell, J. Michael, Director of National Intelligence .................................... 7 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14 

Hayden, Michael V., Director, Central Intelligence Agency ................................ 60 

Fort, Randall M., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research ................................................................................................................ 62 

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation ..................... 65 

Maples, Michael G., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency ................................. 66 

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD 

Turner, Kathleen, Director of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, letter transmitting responses to questions from Committee Members, May 2, 2008 ............................................................................. 104 

(1) 

CURRENT AND PROJECTED THREATS TO THE 

NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Jay Rockefeller, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Rockefeller, Feinstein, 

Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, Feingold, Nelson of Florida, Whitehouse, 

Bond, Warner, Hagel, Hatch and Snowe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. The hearing will come to order. 

I would severely hope that there would be a couple other members. I think it would be courteous and in their interest and in the 

national interest if several of our members showed up. If they’re 

a few minutes late, that’s OK. If they don’t show up, that’s not so 

OK, and we might have something more to say about that. 

In any event, we’re presented with the full array of our national 

intelligence structure, and the Intelligence Committee meets to 

hear from this ommunity, intelligence community, about security 

threats facing our Nation. 

It is appropriate that we begin this annual threat hearing and 

that we do it in public. We do it every year. Sometimes they’ve 

gone on for a long time. What we’ve done this time is to ask each 

of you, with the exception of the Director, to hold your comments 

to 5 minutes, and it will be very interesting, in the case of the CIA, 

to see if that can actually be done. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. But anyway, you’re the folks that keep 

us safe. We in Congress authorize and appropriate funds for what 

you do. The American people have a right to know where our resources are going, insofar as that’s appropriate, what intelligence 

officials consider to be the greatest threats, and what actions our 

Government is taking to prevent those threats. As we’ve learned 

many times, our intelligence programs will only be successful if the 

American people are informed. It’s a relative statement. But they 

have to feel that they’re a part of this equation, and that’s what 

2 

helps us get appropriations and gets bills passed, hopefully, and 

makes the process work. 

Today the Committee will want to hear how our intelligence community assesses the immediate threats from terrorist organizations. We do that each year, starting with the continued threat 

posed by al-Qa’ida. 

I believe this threat has actually grown substantially since last 

year’s threat review—I’ll be interested if you agree—particularly in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. I hope to focus closely on that threat in 

today’s hearings, and throughout the year it will be part of the Vice 

Chairman’s and my schedule throughout the year. 

As you know, al-Qa’ida’s war against the United States did not 

start on September 11th. It started before that and did not end on 

that tragic day. Since that time, our intelligence agencies have 

been successful in identifying and preventing new al-Qa’ida attacks 

in this country, most of which cannot be discussed publicly. 

But progress has been mixed. And unfortunately, many of our 

Government policies have, in fact, hindered our counterterrorism 

activities. After 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan by U.S. and coalition forces drove the Taliban from power, had Osama bin Ladin on 

the run and was on the verge of depriving al-Qa’ida of the very 

sanctuary that it needs in order to plot and carry out its murderous 

designs. 

Then the focus of America’s military forces and intelligence resources were mistakenly shifted from delivering the decisive blow 

against al-Qa’ida, which is the enemy. Instead, these resources 

were diverted to the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam 

Hussein, and one can have arguments about that. 

Now, 6.5 years later, after the 9/11 attack, bin Ladin remains at 

large. That is a source of embarrassment and concern to all of you. 

And al-Qa’ida operates in a terrorist safe haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border from which it trains and directs terrorist 

cells, perhaps with more confidence than ever. al-Qa’ida has used 

this border safe haven to reconstitute itself and launch offensive 

operations that threaten to undo the stability of Afghanistan and 

undermine, if not overthrow, the Pakistan Government. 

And tragically, like before 9/11, al-Qa’ida has once again secured 

a base of operations from which to plot and direct attacks against 

the United States. Unfortunately, our continued military occupation of Iraq compounds the counterterrorism challenge that we face 

as it is used for terrorist propaganda purposes to fuel the recruitment of Islamic jihadists. 

As evidenced by the Madrid and London bombings, violent extremism is spreading at an alarming rate and making inroads into 

disaffected populations in Europe and elsewhere. That seems to 

continue to grow. All of this leads to some tough necessary questions for our witnesses. 

Why has al-Qa’ida been allowed to reconstitute a terrorist sanctuary along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border from which to threaten the stability of the region and plot against the United States? 

How is the threat posed by this al-Qa’ida safe haven different from 

the one that al-Qa’ida benefited from prior to 9/11? 

How have the terrorist threats facing the governments in Kabul 

and Islamabad changed in the past year? And how willing and caVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
3 

pable are those governments to go after al-Qa’ida within their own 

borders? 

Are the United States and its allies losing the war of ideas to the 

virulent message of the terrorists? Does the continued existence 

and operation of a separate CIA system for terrorists employing secret interrogation techniques undermine our moral standing and 

the willingness of other countries to cooperate with us? 

Is our continued military presence in Iraq generating more terrorists and more Islamic radicals around the world than we are 

capturing or that we are killing? 

Since last year’s worldwide threat review, another 1,000 American service members have been killed in Iraq, not to speak of 

those who have been wounded externally and internally. Polls consistently show that a large number of Iraqis oppose the presence 

of coalition forces. That doesn’t seem to deter us. 

The Committee has ongoing scrutiny of intelligence on Iraq, and 

that will continue, mostly in classified session, but the public needs 

to know whether intelligence experts perceive that Iraq is moving 

toward the kind of political reconciliation that was the objective of 

the U.S. surge in the first place and of the whole effort in the first 

place. Is it happening? 

Going beyond the war and terrorist threats of today, the Committee is particularly concerned about the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons technology and the threat posed to our security by those 

who possess them and those who may possess them in the future. 

I’m particularly concerned about the security and safeguarding of 

weapons and fissile material in Russia and states of the former Soviet Union. This is something I have expressed concern about for 

several years, and many of us have, and something our Government must address but is not putting up the money to address. 

But potential threats to our homelands are not just about AlQa’ida and nuclear proliferation. Threats can come in unfamiliar 

ways. And because our society is very complex, we are vulnerable 

to threats that we may not fully appreciate. In this regard, I’m very 

concerned about the potential of cyberattacks—they have already 

been executed—and our ability to protect our critical infrastructure. This is something that we have discussed before. Cybersecurity is a growing subject of importance that will be addressed by 

the Committee in detail, intensely, in the coming weeks. 

Climate change also poses a long-term threat to us in ways that 

we are only beginning to understand. More attention needs to be 

paid to it. I’m extremely gratified that the intelligence community 

is grappling seriously with the issue. We eagerly await the National Intelligence Council’s assessment of the national security impact of climate change due out this spring. 

Before introducing the witnesses who are sitting in front of us, 

I want to pay tribute to a large number of anonymous heroes who 

are risking their lives abroad or working long hours in headquarters to collect the intelligence and provide the analysis on 

which your testimony today is based. 

We are privileged in this Committee of seeing what most of the 

public does not. We are constantly impressed with the dedication 

and the professionalism of the intelligence officials that we encounter. Americans can be proud of the men and women of the U.S. inVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
4 

telligence community. Indeed, our occasional and, I hope, constructive criticisms are a measure of the high standards that we routinely expect. 

Now, let me introduce the distinguished witnesses before us 

today, and then I will turn to the distinguished Vice Chairman. 

And they will speak in this order, please. 

Admiral Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence; 

General Mike Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; 

Mr. Randall Fort, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 

Research; Mr. Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation; and Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Director of 

the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

It’s worth nothing that Director McConnell’s remarks have been 

coordinated with his intelligence colleagues, who will nonetheless 

have a chance to offer their own comments after his statement. I 

believe that this procedure and format is not only symbolically important, it gives real meaning to the structural reforms that were 

instituted under the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act. We now have a 

DNI who authentically represents and oversees the 16 intelligence 

agencies but who does so without suppressing their individual perspectives or eliminating their necessary independence. 

I now turn to Vice Chairman Bond. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

appreciate your holding this hearing. As always, it’s a very sobering reminder to all of us in public of the kinds of threats our Nation faces and our men and women abroad, military and civilian, 

face. 

We need to know about this. Obviously, we discuss much of it in 

the classified hearings, but this gives us an opportunity to lay out 

what you see as the challenges. 

Lots has changed since last year’s worldwide threat hearing. Everybody was saying that the situation in Iraq was grave and we 

were looking at failure. Now, a year after the surge—and, most importantly, General Petraeus’s leadership in adopting a counterinsurgency strategy to clear, hold and build—we’re seeing marked 

changes. And American military men and women are coming home, 

returning on success, which is, I believe, the right way for them to 

return. We’re not out of the woods yet. We’re continuing to train 

and equip the military and security forces. 

Our goal must be to establish a reasonably secure and stable 

Iraq from which the Iraqis can develop their own system of government. That stability and security is necessary to prevent them from 

falling into chaos, genocide, potentially region-wide civil war, and 

giving a real safe haven to al-Qa’ida, which they do not have, in 

the mountain caves where they must reside now. 

I think it’s fitting to remember that David Kay and his Iraqi 

Study Group said, after they went in and examined some of the intelligence failures, that Iraq was a far more dangerous place even 

than we knew, because of the terrorists running wild, the chaos in 

that country, and the ability to provide weapons of mass destruction. 

5 

We do realize that we must maintain that commitment there, 

but we are concerned about the situation in Afghanistan. The security situation has deteriorated, and we are adding 3,000 additional 

Marines. It would be very helpful if our NATO allies lived up to 

their commitments. The failure of the NATO allies to do their jobs 

or to send over troops who can’t go in harm’s way, well, that’s nice. 

The business of sending troops is to send them into dangerous 

places to pacify them. 

Decades of civil war and other war have devastated Afghanistan, 

but it appears—and I’m looking forward to hearing your view—that 

Afghanistan has passed the tipping point, where the Taliban and 

their terrorist allies are not going to take the country back. They 

will continue to kill, maim and destroy. 

But we can’t afford to ignore situations in other parts of the 

world, and I will look forward to hearing about national threats— 

North Korea, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, the Chinese military power, 

instability in Africa. 

I want to emphasize one item that the Chairman said, that we 

need to look at how we’re winning the hearts and minds, something 

I believe is very important, something that should be done primarily by the State Department, by other agencies of Government. 

But I commend the U.S. Army, which has done an excellent job 

in showing how clear, hold and build works in the Mindanao, 

southern Philippines region. I’m proud to say that a Missouri National Guard unit is deploying to Afghanistan with agricultural 

specialists to bring modern agricultural techniques. These are the 

kinds of things that we must be doing to help those countries 

which are on the verge of either opting for democracy, human 

rights, and free markets, or going the terrorist route. 

Congressional oversight, obviously, is our part of the job. We 

have reviewed the failures before 9/11. And I would say that we 

have made tremendous progress. 

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that this distinguished group of leaders 

that we have before us today is the finest working team that the 

intelligence community or any intelligence community has had. 

Now we just need to make sure that everybody is playing on the 

team. 

I was not a supporter of the intelligence reform, because while 

I thought it was a good idea, I thought we gave the DNI all kinds 

of responsibility and too little authority. But the Director has 

shown positive leadership, management and oversight. And next 

week we look forward to receiving a report from him on a list of 

legislative recommendations for intelligence reform, particularly 

how we can ensure in statute that the working relationships that 

have been developed, because of the great cooperation among the 

people at this table and your top leaders in your agency, have been 

able to achieve. 

Another area of congressional oversight, obviously, is the FISA 

amendments, which are on the floor. And the Chairman and I are 

delighted to be able to take a few hours off and talk with you. We 

believe that the bipartisan bill that the Senate Intelligence Committee passed with the two changes, which we have worked out 

with your experts, is the best way to go. 

6 

Another important reform issue is something I’ve been very 

much concerned on, and that’s the leaking of intelligence. Our most 

sensitive means of collection appear in the papers. I believe General Hayden said in confirmation hearings in 2006, when I asked 

him about the collection of intelligence, I think he said, ‘‘It’s almost 

Darwinian. The more we put out there, the more we’re going to kill 

and capture only the dumb terrorists.’’ And that is a frightening 

thing. 

Obviously, a strong free press is an important safeguard. We 

must, however, deal with those Government officials who, for their 

own personal ends, either profit or notoriety, leak information. The 

irresponsible officials have provided far too much sensitive, classified information. And I think, as we see more and more of them 

in orange jumpsuits, there will be a much greater disincentive to 

share that information. 

Obviously, the journalists will have to make up their minds as 

what they want to cover. But I would just urge my friends and colleagues in the fourth estate, if an irresponsible bureaucrat somewhere in the operation tells you the intelligence community has detected an event in country X, and it tells you how the community 

detected the event, and you feel you must print the story, consider 

leaving the details of the ‘‘how’’ out. That’s really interesting only 

to a very select few, but primarily the terrorists and those who 

need to know how we get our information, not as much as ‘‘what.’’ 

Finally, on analysis, I believe we have to take a continued look 

at the analytical process. I think we have a long ways to go, as I’ve 

indicated. I thought the Iran NIE was very disappointing, not because of what it said, not because of the fact that significant new 

information had been discovered, but how it was said and how it 

was used for public release. I don’t believe that NIEs should be 

used as political footballs, which they’ve become. I think they 

should be confidential assessments for policymakers in the intelligence community, the military, the executive branch, and Congress. 

The main news in the NIE was the confirmation that Iran had 

a nuclear weapons program, not that it had halted it temporarily, 

for all we know, in 2003, and other sources say they question that, 

and some believe they’ve restarted it. But the NIE offered no confidence in any intelligence on that, besides stating with moderate 

confidence that it had not restarted last summer. The French defense minister said publicly that he believes the program has restarted. 

Now, if our Government comes to that assessment, then we have 

set ourselves up to release another NIE or leak intelligence, because this last one has given a false sense of security. Once we 

start announcing the NIEs, we may have to change them if the situation changes. I think that, to put it in summary, the NIE, as released, put the emphasis on the wrong syllable. It should have stated that this was a confirmation. We have information that one aspect—one aspect—the weaponization programs, were shut down, 

but the long pole in the tent, the nuclear enrichment, had not. 

So that’s my humble suggestion, that the next NIE be reviewed 

to see what is really important for the broader intelligence community efforts. 

7 

We will do everything we can in Congress to help the intelligence 

community get the information and the support you need, and the 

resources, and we look forward to being able to work in a nonpartisan manner. And we continue to expect that the community 

fulfill its responsibility when it provides us intelligence in a nonpolitical manner. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. They are, as I said, 

Mr. Chairman, some of the best minds in the business. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. They are, indeed. 

And they will start with Director McConnell for 20 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL J. MICHAEL McCONNELL, USN 

(RET.), DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Director MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman 

Bond, members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity 

to address threats to the national security. I have submitted 

longer, classified and unclassified statements for the record that 

will go into more detail than I can cover in the time allotted here. 

Before I address specific threats, I want to address an issue just 

raised by Senator Bond. It’s an issue of importance to the community in providing warning and protection to the Nation. In doing so, 

I want to thank you, Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member 

Bond, and the entire membership of the Committee, for the leadership and hard work over many months—and I would emphasize 

over many months—in drafting and passing draft legislation that 

governs and enables this community. 

Your bill, draft bill, provides the needed updates to the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act. We refer to it, of course, as FISA. 

The authorities granted by the amendments to FISA, the Protect 

America Act, which temporarily closed some gaps in our ability to 

conduct foreign intelligence, are critical to our intelligence efforts 

to protect the Nation from current threats. 

Briefly, some of the most important benefits from the bill that 

was signed last August include: better understanding of international al-Qa’ida networks; more extensive knowledge of individual networks, including personalities and planning for suicide 

bombers; and, most importantly, greater insight into terrorist planning that has allowed us to disrupt attacks that intended to target 

U.S. interests. 

Expiration of the Act would lead to the loss of important tools 

the intelligence community relies on to discover the plans of those 

who wish us harm, in fact, those that have sworn to inflict mass 

casualties, greater than 9/11, on the country. 

As reflected in your draft legislation in the conference report, 

merely extending the Protect America Act without addressing retroactive liability protection for the private sector will have farreaching consequences for our community. Lack of liability protection would make it much more difficult to obtain the future cooperation of the private-sector partners whose help is so vital to 

our success. 

Over the past several weeks, proposals to modify your draft bill 

have been discussed. At the request of Members, the Attorney General and I have submitted a detailed letter that addresses each of 

those issues, and it will be delivered to you this morning. I would 

8 

ask Members to consider the impacts of such proposals on our ability to warn of threats to the homeland security and on our interests 

abroad. 

As my testimony will describe, the threats we face are global, 

complex and dangerous. We must have the tools to enable the detection and disruption of not only terrorist plots, but other threats 

to the country. 

In turning to the threats facing the country today, let me say 

that the judgments that I will offer are based on the efforts of thousands of patriotic, highly skilled professionals, many of whom serve 

in harm’s way. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, I appreciate 

your comments about the personnel in our community and their 

professionalism. 

It is my sincere hope that all of the Congress and the American 

people will see these men and women as the skilled professionals 

that they are, with the highest respect for our laws and our values, 

and dedicated to serving the Nation with courage, to seek and 

speak the truth in the best interests of the Nation. 

Let me start by highlighting a few of the top counterterrorism 

successes in the past year. There were no major attacks against the 

United States, nor against most of our European, Latin American, 

and East Asian allies in all of 2007. And that was no accident. 

In concert with Federal, State and law enforcement officials, our 

community helped disrupt cells plotting violent acts. For example, 

last summer, we and our allies unraveled terrorist plots linked to 

al-Qa’ida and its associates in both Denmark and Germany. We 

were successful because we were able to identify the key personalities involved in the planning. We worked with our European partners to monitor the plotters and to disrupt their activities, one of 

which was to be an attack on a U.S. facility. 

Most recently, European authorities arrested terrorists planning 

suicide attacks in Spain. The attacks were planned for Spain, 

France, U.K., and other European nations. 

In addition, our partners throughout the Middle East and elsewhere continued to aggressively attack terrorist networks recruiting, training and planning to strike American interests. 

Al-Qa’ida in Iraq—or as we slip into in our acronyms, AQI—suffered major setbacks last year. Hundreds of AQI leadership, operational, media, financial, logistical, weapons, and foreign fighter 

facilitator cadre have been neutralized. In addition, the brutal attacks unleashed by AQI and other al-Qa’ida affiliates against Muslim civilians have tarnished al-Qa’ida’s self-styled image as the extremist vanguard. 

Nonetheless, al-Qa’ida remains the preeminent terror threat 

against the United States, both here at home and abroad. Despite 

our successes over the years, the group has retained or regenerated 

key elements of its capability, including its top leadership, operational lieutenants, and a de facto safe haven, as was mentioned 

by the Chairman, in the Pakistani border area with Afghanistan 

known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA. 

Pakistani authorities who are our partners in this fight—with 

the Pakistanis, we have been able to neutralize or capture more of 

the terrorists than with any other partner. They increasingly are 

determined to strengthen their counterterrorism performance, even 

9 

during a period of heightened domestic political tension exacerbated by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and other suicide 

bombings. 

At least 865 Pakistani security forces and officials were killed by 

suicide bombs and improvised explosive devices in 2007, over 865. 

In addition, almost 500 security forces and civilians were killed in 

armed clashes, for a total of over 1,300 killed in 2007 in Pakistan. 

Total Pakistani casualties in 2007, including the number of injured 

security forces and civilians, exceeded the cumulative total of all 

the years between 2001 and 2006. 

Al-Qa’ida’s affiliates also pose a significant threat. As noted, alQa’ida in Iraq remains al-Qa’ida’s central, most capable affiliate. 

We are increasingly concerned that, even as coalition forces inflict 

significant damage on al-Qa’ida inside Iraq, they may deploy resources to mount attacks outside that country. 

Al-Qa’ida’s North Africa affiliate, known as al-Qa’ida in the 

Lands of Islamic Maghreb, that group is active in North Africa and 

is extending its target set to include U.S. and Western interests. 

Other al-Qa’ida regional affiliates in the Levant, the Gulf, Africa 

and Southeast Asia maintained a lower profile in 2007, but remain 

capable of conducting strikes against American interests. 

Homegrown extremists, inspired by militant Islamic ideology, but 

without operational direction from al-Qa’ida, are on an evolving 

course for danger inside the United States. Disrupted plotting last 

year here at home illustrates the nature of the threat inside the 

country. In addition, our allies continue to uncover new extremist 

networks inside Europe for their version of the homegrown threat. 

The ongoing efforts of nation states and terrorists to develop and 

acquire dangerous weapons and the ability to deliver those weapons constitute the second major threat to our safety. After conducting missile tests and its first nuclear detonation in 2006, North 

Korea returned to the negotiating table last year. 

Pyongyang has reaffirmed its September 2000 commitment to 

full denuclearization. They’ve shut down their nuclear facilities in 

Yongbyon, and they are in the process of disabling those facilities. 

But North Korea missed the 31 December deadline for a full declaration of its nuclear programs. 

While Pyongyang denies a program for uranium enrichment, and 

they deny their proliferation activities, we believe North Korea continues to engage in both. We remain uncertain about Kim Jong Il’s 

commitment to full denuclearization, as he promised in the sixparty agreement. 

I want to be very clear in addressing Iran’s nuclear capability. 

First, there are three parts to an effective nuclear weapons capability. First is the production of fissile material. Second, effective 

means for weapons delivery, such as ballistic missile systems. And 

third is the design and weaponization of the warhead itself. 

We assess in our recent National Intelligence Estimate that warhead design and weaponization work was halted, along with a covert military effort to produce fissile material. However, Iran’s declared uranium enrichment efforts that will enable the production 

of fissile material continues. Production of fissile material is the 

most difficult challenge in the nuclear weapons production cycle. 

10 

Also, as in the past, Iran continues its effort to perfect ballistic 

missiles that can reach both North Africa and Europe. 

Therefore, we remain concerned about Iran as a potential nuclear 

weapons threat. The earliest possible date Iran could technically be 

capable of producing enough fissile material for a weapon is late 

2009, but we judge that to be unlikely. 

As our Estimate makes clear, Tehran halted their nuclear weapons design-related activities in response to international pressure, 

but is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. If Iran’s 

nuclear weapons design program has already been reactivated or 

will be reactivated, it will be a closely guarded secret, in an attempt to keep us from being aware of its true status. The Iranians 

until this point have never admitted the secret nuclear weapons design program which was halted in 2003. 

Iran also remains a threat to regional stability and to U.S. interests throughout the Middle East. This is because of its continued 

support for violent groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and its 

efforts to undercut pro-Western actors, such as those in Lebanon. 

Iran is pursuing a policy intending to raise the political, economic 

and human costs of any arrangement that would allow the United 

States to maintain presence and influence in that region. 

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the cyber threat. I would just like 

to make a few comments and then, as you noted, we’ll have a hearing on that specific subject later. 

The U.S. information technology infrastructure, which includes 

telecommunications, computer networks and systems, and the data 

that reside on those systems is critical to virtually every aspect of 

our modern life. Threats to our IT infrastructure are an important 

focus for this community. 

We assess that nations, including Russia and China, have long 

had the technical capabilities to target U.S. information systems 

for intelligence collection. Think of that as passive. The worrisome 

part is, today, they also could target information infrastructure systems for degradation or destruction. 

At the President’s direction in May of last year, an interagency 

group was convened to review the threat to the United States and 

identify options. This tasking was fulfilled with the issuance of a 

Presidential directive earlier this year. We will have more to say 

about that in a hearing later in the week or questions, if you ask 

later today. 

Turning to Iraq, the security situation in Iraq continues to show 

signs of improvement. Security incidents country-wide have declined significantly, in fact, to their lowest levels since February 

2006, which followed the Samarra Golden Mosque bombing. Monthly casualty fatalities nationwide have fallen by over half in the past 

year. 

Despite these gains, however, a number of internal factors continue to undermine Iraq’s security. Sectarian distrust is still strong 

throughout Iraqi society. AQI remains capable of conducting destabilizing operations and spectacular attacks, as we have seen recently, despite the disruptions to their network. 

Intracommunal violence in southern Iraq has spread beyond 

mere clashes between rival militia factions. And while improving 

significantly over the past year, the ability of the Iraqi security 

11 

force to conduct effective, independent operations, independent of 

coalition forces, remains limited in the present timeframe. 

Bridging differences between competing communities and providing effective governance are critical to achieving a successful 

state. While slow, progress is being made, and we have seen some 

economic gains and some quality of life improvements for Iraqis. 

But improvements in security, governance and the economy are not 

ends in themselves; rather, they are means for restoring Iraqi confidence in a central government that works and easing the sectarian distrust. 

Afghanistan. In 2007, the number of attacks in Afghanistan’s 

Taliban-dominated insurgency exceeded the previous year, in part 

because the coalition and Afghan forces undertook many more offensive operations, stimulating that contact. Efforts to improve governance and extend development were hampered by the lack of security in some areas and limitation of the Afghan Government’s capacity to do so. 

Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend upon the government’s ability to improve security, deliver effective governmental services, and expand development for economic opportunity. 

The drug trade is one of Afghanistan’s greatest long-term challenges. The insidious effects of drug-related criminality continue to 

undercut the government’s ability to assert its authority, develop 

a strong rule-of-law-based system, and to build the economy. The 

Taliban and other insurgent groups, which operate in the poppygrowing regions, gain at least in part some financial support for 

their ties to the local opium traffickers. 

Turning to the Levant around the Mediterranean, the regime in 

Damascus seeks to undermine Lebanon’s security by using proxies 

and harboring and supporting terrorists, to include Hezbollah. 

Syria also remains opposed to progress in the Middle East peace 

talks. Since the assassination in 2005 of Rafik Hariri, eight additional Lebanese leaders or officials have been killed in an effort to 

intimidate the 14 March coalition and alter the political balance in 

the Lebanese legislature. 

In the Palestinian Territories, the schism between Abbas and 

Hamas escalated after Hamas seized control of the Gaza last summer. Although feeling increased pressure over the weakening situation in the economy and an accelerating humanitarian crisis, 

Hamas remains in charge of the Gaza Strip. 

In the West Bank, we see signs of progress by Fatah, including 

renewed security and law enforcement cooperation with Israeli 

forces in taking more effective action against Hamas. 

Turning now to Russian and Chinese military modernization, increases in defense spending have enabled the Russian military to 

begin to reverse the deep deterioration in its capabilities that 

began before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The military still 

faces significant challenges, however, challenges such as demographic trends and health problems. In addition, conscription 

deferments erode available manpower. And Russia’s defense industry suffers from the loss of skilled personnel. 

China’s military modernization is shaped, in part, by the perception that a competent, modern military force is an essential element of great power status. Improving Chinese theater-range balVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
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listic missile capabilities and cruise missile capabilities will put 

U.S. forces at greater risk from conventional weapons. In addition, 

the regime seeks to modernize China’s strategic nuclear forces to 

address concerns about the survivability of those systems. 

If present trends continue, the global development of 

counterspace capabilities continues. Russia and China will have an 

increasing ability to target U.S. military and intelligence satellites 

and command and control systems in the future. 

Turning now to Venezuela and Cuba, the referendum on constitutional reform in Venezuela last December was a stunning setback for President Chavez and it may slow his movement toward 

authoritarian rule. The referendum’s outcome has given a psychological boost to Chavez’s opponents. 

However, high oil prices probably will enable Chavez to retain 

the support of his constituents, allow him to continue co-opting the 

economic elite, and stave off the consequences of his financial mismanagement. Without question, the policies being pursued by 

President Chavez have Venezuela on a path to ruin their economy. 

The determination of Cuban leadership to ignore outside pres- sure for reform is reinforced by the more than $1 billion net annual 

subsidy that Cuba receives from Venezuela. We assess the political 

situation in Cuba probably will remain stable during at least the 

initial months following Fidel Castro’s death. Policy missteps or the 

mishandling of a crisis by the leadership could lead to political instability, raising the risk of mass migration. 

Persistent insecurity in Nigeria’s oil-producing region, the Niger 

Delta, threatens U.S. strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The 

president of that country has pledged to resolve the crisis in the 

delta but faces many, many challenges that would make progress 

difficult. 

Ongoing instability and conflict in other parts of Africa are significant threats to U.S. interests because of their high humanitarian and peacekeeping costs, the drag on democratic and economic development, and their potential to get much, much worse. 

Violence in Kenya, after a close election marred by irregularities, 

represents a major setback in one of Africa’s most prosperous and 

democratic countries. 

The crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region shows few signs of resolution, 

even if the planned U.N. peacekeeping force of 26,000 is fully deployed. 

The Ethiopian-backed transitional Federal Government in Somalia is facing serious attacks by opposition groups and extremists. It 

probably would flee Mogadishu or it would collapse if the Ethiopians were to withdraw. 

Tensions between the longtime enemies Ethiopia and Eritrea 

have also increased over the past year. Both sides are now preparing for war. 

In conclusion, the issues that I’ve touched on, merely touched on, 

covered much—and in my statement for the record, they are covered in much more detail. They confront us on many, many fronts. 

The intelligence community is fully committed to arming policymakers, to include this body, our war fighters and our law enforcement officials with the best intelligence and analytic insight that 

we can provide. This is necessary to help you all make the deciVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
13 

sions and take the actions that will protect American lives and 

American interests both at home and abroad. 

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Director McConnell follows:] 

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Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Director Hayden? 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF, 

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General HAYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will accept your 5-minute challenge that you laid out earlier. 

Let me echo the words of Director McConnell in expressing our 

gratitude for your comments about the men and women of the 

American intelligence community. It’s a message of thanks and respect that we can’t say often enough. So thank you for mentioning 

that. 

Now, Admiral McConnell has laid out a fairly complete overview 

of the threats and opportunities facing the United States in the 

world in which we find ourselves. I know that my colleagues up 

here—Mike Maples and Director Mueller and Randy—will offer 

their views of these issues from the perspective of their departments. 

I, however, lead an analytical workforce that is nondepartmental, 

orchestrated and architected that way by the Congress in the Intelligence Reform Act, so much of the work that has gone into creating Admiral McConnell’s statement is the product of an intimate 

relationship between his National Intelligence Council and our 

analytic workforce. 

And so I guess my comment on the worldview that Director 

McConnell has laid out is ‘‘me, too,’’ because it has been, again, 

crafted by the same workforce. 

What I’d like to do, rather than repeat some of the highlights of 

the Admiral’s overview, is just take a few minutes to point out 

some of the ways we’re attempting to respond to the world as he 

has outlined it here. 

Our core missions remain the same. The means by which we 

have to achieve those missions have changed radically. For example, in the primary threat that the Director emphasized, the global 

terrorist movement, we face an enemy that is clearly ruthless. But 

it’s also one that’s very adaptive, one who shuns traditional hierarchical structures, who learns from mistakes and therefore demands that we be no less resilient and creative. And so we at this 

agency and across the intelligence community are trying to achieve 

just that. 

We’re promoting, for example, new methods of collecting intelligence. In addition to our unilateral capacities, we’re reshaping our 

relationships and deepening our partnerships with foreign liaison. 

Steve Kappes, our Deputy, and I have visited about 40 of our liaison partners over the last 15-month period to kind of underscore 

how important these relationships are. 

We’re also getting larger. The President has directed, and with 

your support, we are expanding the number of our core collectors 

and our analysts by 50 percent. And we’re also trying to develop 

technological innovations that will allow us to penetrate the hardest targets. 

Now, in addition to doing better that which we do, we’re also trying to get our components within CIA to reinvent the way they do 

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61 

tion and collaboration not just within the agency but between the 

agency and the other parts of the intelligence community. 

Now, some of the steps in this regard are fairly mundane. We’re 

just taking a little bit longer in a common agency acculturation experience before our officers move out into the DI or into the National Clandestine Service or the Directorate of Support or Science 

and Technology. 

We’re also trying to make more routine assignments of our officers outside normal agency boundaries, and we are strong supporters of the Admiral’s program for joint duty, wherein agency officers, if they want to be senior leaders in our community, have to 

have time in service outside the walls and the organizational structure of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Now, the Admiral emphasized the variety of threats that our Nation faces and pointed out that there is no threat more deadly than 

that of global terrorism. And I want to assure the Committee that 

CIA is using all the tools available to it by law to fight that threat. 

And, as the Admiral suggested, we have some successes to report 

during the year we just completed. In Southeast Asia, for example, 

working with liaisons, we’ve been able to act upon leads we’ve provided them to capture or kill multiple terrorist group leaders. 

Our intelligence actually led directly to the foiling of a planned 

bombing in a crowded market in Southeast Asia last summer that 

would have led to mass casualties. 

Director McConnell has already pointed out the success we’ve enjoyed in Europe in 2007—German authorities arresting three Islamic Jihad Union operatives trained in Pakistan. On the same 

day, Danish authorities detained individuals that were directly 

linked to al-Qa’ida and who were preparing explosives for use in 

a terrorist attack. 

Our agency works vigorously with the American military in Iraq 

and Afghanistan to protect the lives of our soldiers. And again, 

there are successes to report. Acting on our intelligence, U.S. forces 

killed a senior al-Qa’ida leader who was responsible for the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq. 

And I believe the Committee is well aware a windfall of that operation was the capturing of documentary evidence that has given 

us our best insight into the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq 

that we’ve ever had. 

More recently, in October, acting on CIA intelligence, U.S. military forces raided a home in Diyala Province north of Baghdad and 

captured the largest number of improvised explosive devices that 

the American military has captured in any one cache to date. 

That’s success on our immediate requirements. That’s winning 

what we refer to as the close battle. You’ve asked us—you’ve demanded of us—to be prepared for the future as well, to be able to 

operate against enemies in what I’ll describe as the deep battle, not 

the enemy coming in over the perimeter wall right now, but the 

one who’ll be there directly. And what are the capabilities that we 

will have to have in order to defeat them? 

We had a session in our bubble, which is our auditorium, out at 

the agency that I know many of you have visited. We had it in 

early January. And I used two words with our workforce, enhance 

our current capabilities, get better at what we’re doing, and then 

62 

sustain them, to have the legs to be able to do this for a long period 

of time. 

I used a racing metaphor. In essence, I’ve said our community, 

but CIA in particular, has, in essence, been running a 4:40. And 

one of the worst things you can be told running a 4:40 is to come 

out of that last turn and see a coach with a clipboard and a stopwatch saying, ‘‘Now it’s time for the 100-yard dash.’’ 

We have got to build some ability for longevity, for sustenance, 

for sustaining into our community. And from time to time, that 

may mean difficult decisions to pull back just a little bit in current 

activity in order to build the capacity you need to have for, literally, the long run. 

So in addition to strengthening core capabilities and integrating 

those capabilities better on campus and throughout the community, 

we want to expand those capabilities so that we can sustain those 

capabilities so that you and the American people have them to call 

on over the long term. 

One of the things we’re doing to boost capabilities—and I have 

to be a bit indirect here but will be happy to go into it in more detail in closed session—is a major initiative to extend our operational reach by supporting what I’ll call creative deployments that 

aren’t limited by traditional cover or operational constraints. 

We’re also setting up forward-deployed analytic cells in key regional centers abroad that will allow our analysts to seek ground 

truth not inside the Washington Beltway but out there in the field. 

And I know that many of you in your trips have had a chance to 

visit these forward-deployed analytic cells, and we view them to be 

an unmitigated success. 

We’re pursuing a range of initiatives across the community to be 

better integrated. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Director Hayden, I hope you’ll wind up. 

General HAYDEN. I understand. I’ve just got the hook, Mr. Chairman. 

We celebrated CIA’s 60th anniversary last year. We reflected on 

that which has gotten us to where we are today. We’ve got a large 

new population out there. I think the Committee knows 50 percent 

of our folks have been hired since 9/11. 

We used the occasion of our 60th anniversary to try to move the 

values that have motivated this agency over such a long period of 

time into this new cohort of agency officers. I think you’ll find us 

to be innovative and collaborative, and I think you’ll find us aggressively using all the lawful tools provided to us by you in the 

defense of the Republic. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Secretary Fort? 

STATEMENT OF RANDALL FORT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

STATE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH 

Mr. FORT. Chairman Rockefeller, Vice Chairman Bond, members 

of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to present the perspective of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research on the threats to U.S. national security. 

63 

Let me start by concurring with and fully endorsing the joint 

statement for the record submitted by Director McConnell which he 

summarized in his remarks and to which we had a chance to contribute. 

Today I will focus my remarks on INR’s efforts to provide intelligence support to the Secretary of State and other department 

principals as they pursue diplomatic solutions to key U.S. foreign 

policy challenges. 

At a recent speech to the World Economic Forum, Secretary Rice 

said that, ‘‘America has no permanent enemies because we harbor 

no permanent hatreds.’’ And she spoke of diplomacy as that which 

can, if properly conducted, ‘‘make possible a world in which old enemies become, if not friends, then no longer adversaries.’’ 

It is because of our firm belief in the potential of diplomacy that 

we strive to achieve peace in the Middle East, that we can imagine 

a better relationship with a nuclear-free North Korea, that we envision stable democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that we aid 

Pakistan in its struggles to root out extremism. 

A key intelligence community imperative, especially so for INR, 

is to provide intelligence analysis that enables diplomacy to achieve 

policy solutions. Indeed, intelligence without policy is energy without movement. More than any other intelligence community agency, INR is charged with directly supporting diplomats in the conduct of diplomacy. 

Because of that mission, our analytic focus is nearly always strategic and focused on the Secretary’s unique needs for situational 

awareness and support that shrinks policymaker uncertainties and 

expands understanding of opportunities. Successful diplomacy demands the best possible understanding of political attitudes, relationships and capacities in the countries where diplomacy is practiced. INR makes significant contributions to the U.S. Government’s collective understanding of complex and fast-changing political and security environments in our top diplomatic and intelligence priority areas. 

In Afghanistan, for example, our analytic efforts focused less on 

tactical battlefield considerations and more on the national, political, economic, social and demographic factors that influence the 

survivability of the Karzai government and on the influence of 

neighbors and other international actors. 

In Pakistan, we support the pursuit of stability and democracy 

while strengthening the U.S.-Pakistan partnership for combating 

terrorism. 

Our work has facilitated the policy decisions of our Secretary as 

she pursues our goals of democratization, reconciliation between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a combined determination to fight 

the cross-border terrorism that plagues both countries. 

The President has pledged to do everything possible to help the 

Israelis and Palestinians achieve a peace agreement that will define a Palestinian state by the end of 2008. INR has worked intensively, especially since this past fall’s run-up to the Annapolis conference, to provide the Secretary and her senior Middle East staff 

with information and analysis on a number of critical issues. 

INR’s Iraq team works closely with policymakers in the department to provide analytic support for our efforts to promote recVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
64 

onciliation among Iraqis and to negotiate a long-term security 

agreement with Iraq. At the local level, INR public survey data 

often provides unique insights into opinions across and within regions of Iraq, data which is keenly appreciated by provincial reconstruction teams working to build good governance from the ground 

up. 

On Iran, we have been an active contributor to intelligence community analysis on key Iranian issues and independently produce 

strategic analyses that offer the Secretary insights into key policy 

challenges. 

Our Korea team is an integrated group of all-source analysts who 

cooperate closely with our intelligence community colleagues to provide comprehensive support for the six-party talks. This is an area 

where both political and technical expertise play important roles, 

and we work with our negotiators to ensure they have the best possible intelligence information available, both from INR and the intelligence community as a whole, regarding a wide range of intelligence community activities. 

INR’s writ is particularly broad because it mirrors the Secretary’s global responsibilities. So we focus not only on headline 

topics, but also on nations and issues that may appear to lack urgency until a crisis or catastrophe places them front and center on 

the world stage. The U.S. has diplomatic relations with 189 countries and maintains 267 diplomatic missions globally. Therefore, we 

must maintain the capacity to respond with timely, informed and 

actionable intelligence to support that diplomatic footprint. 

In addition to our all-source analysis, INR provides tailored support to diplomacy through our outreach activities. The DNI has 

identified INR as its executive agent for outreach in the community, in part because of our extensive polling and conference capabilities. 

Our polling results offer policymakers especially precise understanding of popular views that help define both the policy limits 

and possibilities in overseas political environments. And our conferences annually convene thousands of academic, think-tank, and 

other nongovernmental experts to provide insights and alternative 

views for our policymakers. 

INR is in a unique position to represent both the community perspectives to policymakers and to help explain the requirements of 

policymakers to the intelligence community. This is a very busy 

two-way street. The community provides significant data to support 

policy. And in return, the State Department diplomatic reporting 

channel provides copious grist for IC analysis. 

In conclusion, let me say that I think INR, both as an integral 

and integrated member of the intelligence community, and the Department of State’s primary resource for intelligence analysis and 

coordination, remains critical to ensuring that policymakers understand both the enduring issues that affect our security, as well as 

the emergence of sudden threats to demand swift action. 

INR also celebrated its 60th anniversary last year. As the senior 

civilian intelligence service and as the only direct institutional descendent of the Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis 

Branch, we will continue to work with our intelligence and policy 

colleagues to anticipate, confront and respond to these challenges. 

65 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Secretary Fort. 

Director Mueller? 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. MUELLER III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Director MUELLER. Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman 

Bond and members of the Committee, today I want to give you my 

brief view of the threats facing us today and generally outline the 

FBI’s efforts to combat these threats. 

As you aware, the FBI’s top three priorities are counterterrorism, 

counterintelligence, and cyber security. These priorities are critical 

to our national security and the FBI’s vital work as a committed 

member of the intelligence community. These areas will be the 

focus of my statement. 

In the counterterrorism arena, I echo Director McConnell’s assessments that al-Qa’ida continues to present a critical threat to 

the homeland. So, too, are self-directed groups not part of alQa’ida’s formal structure, but which have ties to terrorist organizations through either money or training. 

And, finally, we face the challenges presented by a third group, 

and that is self-radicalized, homegrown extremists in the United 

States. While not formally affiliated with a foreign terrorist group, 

they are inspired by those groups’ messages of violence, often 

through the Internet. And because they lack formal ties, they are 

often particularly difficult to detect. 

Here at home, through our domestic Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces, and abroad, with our legal attaches and international partners, we endeavor to share real-time intelligence to fight these 

three levels of terrorist threats. 

With regard to the counterintelligence threat, protecting our Nation’s most sensitive secrets from hostile intelligence services or 

others who would do us harm is at the core of the FBI mission. We 

reach out to businesses and universities, and we join forces with 

our intelligence community partners, and we work closely with the 

military and others to help safeguard our country’s secrets to protect our economic wellbeing and national security. 

Cyber threats to our national security and the intersection between cyber crime, terrorism, and counterintelligence is becoming 

increasingly evident. Foreign adversaries and competitors can remotely observe, target, acquire, and exploit our information to their 

advantage. 

Terrorists recruit, train and plan. They plan their attacks using 

the Internet. Spies sell intellectual property and state secrets to 

the highest bidders. Hackers who used to shut down servers 

around the world for bragging rights may now be linked to criminal 

or terrorist organizations. 

Today, the FBI’s cyber investigators focus on these threats. And 

we partner with the Government and industry through our sponsorship of InfraGuard, an alliance of nearly 21,000 individual and 

corporate members, to help identify, investigate and ultimately prevent cyber attacks. 

I am, indeed, mindful of this Committee’s abiding interest in the 

FBI’s progress in building an intelligence program while combating 

66 

these threats. The FBI has made any number of changes since September 11 to enhance our capabilities and to build a national security organization on par with our law enforcement capabilities. 

Among them, today’s intelligence is woven throughout every FBI 

program and every operation, and we have successfully broken up 

terrorist plots across the country, whether it be in Portland, Lackawanna, Torrance, California, Chicago, to the more recent plots relating to Fort Dix and JFK. 

We have increased and enhanced our working relationships with 

international partners, sharing critical intelligence to identify terrorist networks and disrupt planned attacks. We have doubled the 

number of intelligence analysts on board and tripled the number 

of linguists. 

We have tripled the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces from 

33 to over 100, combining the resources and expertise of the FBI, 

the intelligence community, the military, and, most importantly, 

State, local and tribal law enforcement. 

In the cyber arena, the FBI will continue its work within the intelligence community to counter cyber intrusions by foreign actors. 

Additionally, the FBI’s recently formed cyber fusion center in Pittsburgh is an example of a collaborative public-private alliance linking software companies, Internet service providers, merchants and 

members of the financial sector to protect against security 

breaches. 

We recognize that for the past 100 years of the FBI’s history our 

greatest asset has been our people. We are building on that history 

with continued restructuring of our approach to intelligence training, for both our professional intelligence analyst cadre, as well as 

new FBI agents at Quantico. And we have and will continue to 

streamline our recruiting and hiring processes to attract persons 

having the critical skills needed for continued success. 

In closing, the FBI recognizes that it is a national security service, responsible not only for collecting, analyzing and disseminating 

intelligence, but for taking timely action to neutralize threats within the homeland to prevent another terrorist attack. But in doing 

so, we also recognize that we must properly balance civil liberties 

with public safety in our efforts and will continually strive to do 

so. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, members of the Committee, 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and look forward to 

answering your questions. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Director Mueller. 

Director Maples? 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL MAPLES, 

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General MAPLES. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Bond, 

members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

today and to represent the dedicated men and women of Defense 

Intelligence and thank you for your comments about their service. 

My short remarks will focus on changes in military operations 

and capabilities. There are several general global military trends 

that are of concern, including proliferation of the knowledge and 

technology required to produce weapons of mass destruction, 

67 

longer-range ballistic missiles that are more mobile and accurate, 

improvised devices in suicide weapons, as weapons of choice, and 

the continued development of counterspace and cyber capabilities. 

In Iraq, an improved security situation has resulted from coalition and Iraqi operations, tribal security initiatives, concerned local 

citizen groups, and the Jaish al-Mahdi freeze order. While encouraging, the trends are not yet irreversible. 

Al-Qa’ida in Iraq has been damaged, but it still attempts to reignite sectarian violence and remains able to conduct high profile 

attacks. We have seen a decline in the movement of foreign terrorists into Iraq. 

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force continues to 

provide training and support. And DIA has not yet seen evidence 

that Iran has ended lethal aid. 

Iraqi security forces, while reliant on coalition combat service 

support, have improved their overall capabilities and are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations. 

In Afghanistan, ISAF successes have inflicted losses on Taliban 

leadership and prevented the Taliban from conducting sustained 

conventional operations. Despite their losses, the Taliban maintains access to local Pashtun and some foreign fighters and is using 

suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, and small arms to 

increase attack levels. 

While the insurgency remains concentrated in the Pashtun-dominated south and east, it has expanded to some western areas. The 

Afghan Army has fielded 11 of 14 infantry brigades, and more than 

one-third of Afghanistan’s combat arms battalions are assessed as 

capable of leading operations with coalition support. 

We believe that al-Qa’ida has expanded its support to the Afghan 

insurgency and presents an increased threat to Pakistan, while it 

continues to plan, support and direct transnational attacks. AlQa’ida has extended its operational reach through partnerships 

with compatible regional terrorist groups, including a continued effort to expand into Africa. Al-Qa’ida maintains its desire to possess 

weapons of mass destruction. 

Pakistani military operations in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas have had limited effect on al-Qa’ida. However, Pakistan recognizes the threat and realizes the need to develop more 

effective counterinsurgency capabilities to complement their conventional military. At present, we have confidence in Pakistan’s 

ability to safeguard its nuclear weapons. 

Iran is acquiring advanced weapons systems and supporting terrorist proxies. New capabilities include missile patrol boats, antiship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missile systems, and an extended range variant of the Shahab–3 ballistic missile. Iran is close 

to acquiring long-range SA–20 SAMs and is developing a new 

Ashura medium-range ballistic missile. Lebanese Hezbollah continues to receive weapons, training and resources from Iran. 

North Korea maintains large forward-position land forces that 

are, however, lacking in training and equipment. Robust artillery 

and mobile ballistic missiles are being sustained. Development of 

the Taepo Dong–2 continues, as does work on an intermediaterange ballistic missile, a variant of which has reportedly been sold 

to Iran. 

68 

China is fielding sophisticated weapons systems and testing new 

doctrines that it believes will strengthen its ability to prevail in regional conflicts and counter traditional U.S. military advantages. 

Military modernization includes anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, submarines, a cruise missile-capable bomber, and modern 

surface-to-air missile systems. 

China’s missile development includes the road-mobile DF–31A 

ICBM. Future ICBMs could include the JL–2 submarine-launched 

ballistic missile and some ICBMs with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles. China successfully tested an anti-satellite 

missile in January 2007 and is developing counterspace jammers 

and directed-energy weapons. 

Russia is trying to reestablish a degree of military power that it 

believes is commensurate with its renewed economic strength and 

political confidence. Russia’s widely publicized strategic missile 

launches, long-range aviation flights, and carrier strike group deployment are designed to demonstrate global reach and relevance. 

Development, production and deployment of advanced strategic 

weapons continues, including the road-mobile SS–27 ICBM and the 

Bulava–30 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Russia is also 

making improvements in its high-readiness, permanently ready 

conventional forces. 

To our south, Colombia’s counterinsurgency operations are 

achieving success against the FARC. Venezuela’s neighbors express 

concern about its desire to buy submarines, transport aircraft, and 

an air defense system, in addition to the advanced fighters, attack 

helicopters, and assault rifles it has already purchased. 

This has been a brief summary highlighting the work of our defense intelligence professionals. They are honored to serve our Nation and thank you for your interest and support. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you very much, all of you. 

I apologize for the relatively shorter time allotted to you, but I 

think, all in all, the questions will elicit a lot of what you otherwise 

would have liked to have also said. 

I will start, Director McConnell, with you. What is the intelligence community’s assessment at this point about the ability to 

achieve the kind of political reconciliation in Iraq over the coming 

year that will make less necessary some of the sectarian and other 

violence which plagues that nation now? 

Director MCCONNELL. Mr. Chairman, I think, as I mentioned in 

my remarks, it’s slower than we would like, but progress is being 

made. 

One of the things that they wrestled with over the past year is 

a de-Ba’athification law, and if I could expand on it just for a second, for those that were in the regime before—security professionals, for example—when the new government was established, 

they were left out. 

And they made some very hard decisions to try to be inclusive 

to—while it’s a Shia majority and Shia-dominated, to be inclusive, 

to bring the Sunnis in the country back in. And that law was 

passed just recently. 

There are other laws that are working through the system. And 

as they get more experienced with government—remember, this is 

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69 

one in that current organization governmentally, and they’re actually learning the political process, how to negotiate, how to compromise and so on. 

So progress is slow, but I think we’re on a course to have success 

over the next year. I don’t think it will be done over the next year, 

but with perseverance it will be done in time. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. That doesn’t really answer the question—there will be success in the coming year and things will get 

better. But as we all know, there’s an amplitude of very serious 

problems that remain. You mentioned a few of them. 

The question is what about the next year. To what extent do you 

think in the next year—I understand the word ‘‘over time.’’ I understand better the word ‘‘over the next year.’’ 

Director MCCONNELL. The two issues they are focused on at the 

moment that I think will be significant progress, if they can work 

it through their legislative process and get approval are provincial 

elections and revenue sharing, hydrocarbon revenue sharing. 

Those are two very, very tough issues. It’s the form of government going forward. Is it inclusive of the provinces, and can it get 

agreement on that? So if they are successful in negotiating and 

closing on those two issues over the next number of months, then 

it would be significant progress. 

But I don’t want to lead you, Mr. Chairman. It is not going to 

be over in a year. It’s going to be a long time to bring it to closure. 

But progress is being made. The fact that security has been improved and established, we actually see things that return a quality of life to the Iraqi citizens. 

While there’s a bill pending for how to share oil revenue, oil production’s up another 500,000 barrels. It is being sold and that revenue is being shared. Electricity output is going up. The economy 

is growing. I think it’s in a 7 percent, 8 percent growth level. 

Inflation, which was very, very high this time a year ago, is down 

in the 4 percent, 5 percent range. So progress is being made, but 

I couldn’t tell you that it’s going to be over and done and completed 

in 12 months or 18 months. It’s going in the right direction. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I understand. 

Director Hayden, the House and Senate Conference Committee 

on Authorization agreed to a term which I think you may not be 

in favor of, and that is that all interrogation in CIA facilities, wherever, must follow the Army Field Manual. Now, that’s controversial, and many changes have been made, and I understand that, 

within your approach. 

But what I need you to do is to tell me how you turn to Director 

Mueller and Director Maples, who say that that will do the trick 

and that that kind of interrogation’s enough to elicit what you need 

to get, and tell them that it may be, if the authorization is passed, 

that we will be, in your view, perhaps shortchanging our ability to 

do intelligence. 

General HAYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. 

The way I usually describe it, is that there is a universe out there 

of lawful interrogation techniques, you know, that we should feel 

as a Nation that we have a right to use against our enemies. And 

obviously, there are a lot of subtexts and subplots to that against 

70 

our enemies. Are they lawful combatants, unlawful combatants? 

Are they terrorists? Are they uniformed soldiers? And so on. 

But again, there’s a universe out there of lawful techniques. The 

Army Field Manual describes a subset of that universe. I’ve heard 

no one claim that the Army Field Manual exhausts all the tools 

that could or should be legitimately available to our Republic to defend itself when it comes to questioning people who would intend 

our Republic harm. 

What I would say is, the Army Field Manual meets the needs of 

America’s Army—and, you know, give that to you in maybe three 

or four different senses. 

It meets the needs of America’s Army in terms of who’s going to 

do it, which, in the case of the Army Field Manual, would be a relatively large population of relatively young men and women who 

have received good training but not exhaustive training in all potential situations. So the population of who’s doing it is different 

than the population that would be working for me inside the CIA 

interrogation program. 

The population of who they do it to would also be different. In 

the life of the CIA detention program, we have held fewer than 100 

people. And actually, fewer than one-third of those people have had 

any techniques used against them, enhanced techniques, in the 

CIA program. 

America’s Army literally today is holding over 20,000 detainees 

in Iraq alone. And so again, there’s a difference in terms of who’s 

doing it, against whom you’re doing it, and then, finally, in the circumstances under which you’re doing the interrogation. 

And I know there can be circumstances in military custody that 

are as protected and isolated and controlled as in our detention facilities, but in many instances that is not the case. These are interrogations against enemy soldiers who almost always will be lawful 

combatants, in tactical situations, from whom you expect to get information of transient and tactical value. None of that applies to 

the detainees we hold, to the interrogators we have, or the information we are attempting to seek. 

And so I would subscribe and support—in fact, the CIA had a 

chance to comment on the Army Field Manual during its development—that the Army Field Manual does exactly what it does, exactly what it needs to do for the United States Army. 

But on the face of it, it would make no more sense to apply the 

Army Field Manual to CIA—the Army Field Manual on interrogations—than it would be to take the Army Field Manual on grooming and apply it to my agency, or the Army Field Manual on recruiting and apply it to my agency, or, for that matter, take the 

Army Field Manual on sexual orientation and apply it to my agency. 

This was built to meet the needs of America’s Army. We should 

not confine our universe of lawful interrogation to a subset of those 

techniques that were developed for one purpose. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I’m way over my time. I apologize to 

my colleagues. 

And I call on the Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

71 

Following up on that, I’d like to ask Director Hayden for his comments, because we’ve spoken about this issue and your belief that 

the CIA’s program was essential. Now the Attorney General has 

publicly said that the CIA is no longer using waterboarding as one 

of its techniques. 

I’d like your views, from your professional perspective, on why 

you think enhanced techniques are so critical in collecting intelligence and what you would say to those who think the Army Field 

Manual will be just as effective. Because that provision that was 

added in conferences out of—and when the conference comes— 

when the bill comes to the Senate, I intend to attempt to strike 

that. 

What arguments, Director Hayden? 

I’m sorry, General Hayden’s had the shot. Let me direct that to 

Director McConnell. My apologies. I want to get another view in 

the game. 

Director MCCONNELL. Senator Bond, I would associate myself 

with the comments just made by Director Hayden with regard to 

lawful techniques that could be used to protect the country under 

any appropriate circumstances. 

You mentioned waterboarding. That is not currently in the program that we use. The question that’s always asked—is that a lawful technique—and I think, as you saw the reports or participated 

in the hearing that the Attorney General participated in last week, 

if there was a reason to use such a technique, you would have to 

make a judgment on the circumstances and the situation regarding 

the specifics of the event. 

And if such a desire was generated in the interest of protecting 

the Nation, General Hayden would have to, first of all, have a discussion with me, and we would have a dialog about whether we 

should go forward and seek legal opinion. 

Once we agreed to that, assuming we did, we would go to the Attorney General, who’d make a ruling on the specifics of the situation. At that point, it would be taken to the President for a decision, and if a decision was taken, then the appropriate committees 

of the Congress would be so notified. 

So in managing the process, there is a universe of lawful techniques. They should be considered in defense of the Nation and appropriately administered, given that we would have to use such a 

technique. 

General HAYDEN. Can I add to that, Mr. Vice Chairman? 

Vice Chairman BOND. Please. 

General HAYDEN. Thank you. To put this into scale—and I know 

this is—look. This is a very difficult issue, not just for the Committee but for the Senate, for the Government, for my agency and 

for the people in my agency, and for the Nation at large. 

But let me just try to frame the discussion by pointing out a few 

facts. I mentioned just a minute or two ago that in the life of the 

CIA detention program, we’ve detained fewer than 100 people. Of 

the people detained, fewer than one-third have had any of what we 

call the enhanced interrogation techniques used against them. 

Let me make it very clear and to state so officially in front of this 

Committee that waterboarding has been used on only three detainVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
72 

ees. It was used on Khalid Shaykh Mohammed. It was used on Abu 

Zubaydah. And it was used on Nashiri. 

The CIA has not used waterboarding for almost 5 years. We used 

it against these three high-value detainees because of the circumstances of the time. Very critical to those circumstances was 

the belief that additional catastrophic attacks against the homeland were imminent. In addition to that, my agency and our community writ large had limited knowledge about al-Qa’ida and its 

workings. Those two realities have changed. 

None of us up here are going to make the claim—and I’m sure 

we’ll get this question before we’re done this morning—is America 

safe. And we’ll answer it is safer, but it is not yet safe. So this one 

never gets to zero. 

But the circumstances under which we are operating, we believe, 

are, frankly, different than they were in late 2001 and early 2002. 

We also have much more extensive knowledge of al-Qa’ida. And 

I’ve told this to the Committee in other sessions—our most powerful tool in questioning any detainee is our knowledge, that we are 

able to bring that knowledge to bear. 

Vice Chairman BOND. General, excuse me for interrupting. In the 

8 seconds I have left, I wanted to fire off a question to you and Director Mueller. 

We’re debating retroactive immunity. People keep telling me it’s 

wrong. I used to be a lawyer. I believe that the private parties did 

nothing wrong. The Committee approved 13–2 supporting civil liability reform. 

How important is the support of the private parties to your agencies in getting the operational successes? 

Director MUELLER. Well, I would say in protecting the homeland 

it’s absolutely essential. It’s absolutely essential we have the support, the willing support, of communication carriers. 

In this day and age, our ability to gain intelligence on the plans, 

the plots, of those who wish to attack us is dependent upon us obtaining information relating to cell phones, the Internet, e-mail, 

wire transfers, all of these areas. My concern is that if we do not 

have this immunity, we will not have that willing support of the 

communication carriers. 

I know there has been some discussion of having the Government 

substituted as a party, but I do think that that includes—if that 

were passed, it would be a disincentive still to the communication 

carriers to give us the support we need to do our jobs. 

It would entail depositions. It would entail public hearings. And 

there would be a substantial disadvantage to corporations, communication carriers to assist us willingly at a time when we need it 

more than ever. Consequently, I strongly support the provision for 

giving immunity to the communication carriers so that we do have 

the support of those carriers and remove the disincentives. 

General HAYDEN. Mr. Vice Chairman, I support it in two jobs, 

the current one and one job once removed at NSA. I strongly support what Director Mueller has just stated with regard to carriers, 

but there are other relationships that we have that enable American intelligence that I’m more familiar with in my current job at 

CIA. 

73 

And let me reinforce one thing that Director Mueller pointed out. 

These are very fragile relationships. We lost industrial cooperation 

at the CIA with partners on the mere revelation of the Swift program in public discourse, not because they were doing anything related to that program whatsoever, but just the fear that the vulnerability they would have to the smooth functioning of their business 

had caused people who were otherwise patriotic and committed to 

back away from their totally lawful cooperation with our agency. 

Vice Chairman BOND. My apologies, Mr. Chairman, but I 

thought that was important to get that in. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I appreciate it. 

And going on the early bird rule, as we always do, Senator Feinstein? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Hayden, I wasn’t going to discuss this, but since it was 

raised, it is true that you have briefed the Intelligence Committee 

on the interrogation techniques, which are called ‘‘enhanced,’’ 

which I called ‘‘coercive,’’ and they have changed. And they have 

been reduced in number. 

I’d like to ask this question. Who carries out these techniques? 

Are they Government employees or contractors? 

General HAYDEN. At our facilities during this, we have a mix of 

both Government employees and contractors. Everything is done 

under, as we’ve talked before, ma’am, under my authority and the 

authority of the agency. 

But the people at the locations are frequently a mix of both—we 

call them blue badgers and green badgers. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And where do you use only contractors? 

General HAYDEN. I’m not aware of any facility in which there 

were only contractors. And this came up—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Any facility anywhere in the world? 

General HAYDEN. I mean, I’m talking about our detention facilities. I want to make something very clear, because I don’t think it 

was quite crystal clear in the discussion you had with Attorney 

General Mukasey. 

We are not outsourcing this. This is not where we would turn to 

firm X, Y or Z, and say, ‘‘This is what we would like you to accomplish. Go achieve that for us and come back when you’re done.’’ 

That is not what this is. This is a governmental activity under governmental direction and control, in which the participants may be 

both Government employees and contractors, but it’s not 

outsourced. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I understand that. 

General HAYDEN. Good. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Is not the person that carries out the actual 

interrogation—not the doctor or the psychologist or supervisor or 

anybody else, but the person that carries out the actual interrogation—a contractor? 

General HAYDEN. Again, there are times when the individuals involved are contractors, and there are times when the individuals 

involved have been Government employees. It’s been a mix, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Why would that be? 

74 

General HAYDEN. The best individual available at that moment 

for the task. In many instances, the individual best suited for the 

task may be a contractor. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. OK. 

I’d like to ask Director Mueller this question. An FBI special 

agent, George Piro, was on ‘‘60 Minutes’’ recently talking about 

how he conducted a lengthy interrogation with Saddam Hussein 

and how Hussein came to divulge many, many things I think not 

clearly known to the world before, such as the fact that, yes, he did 

not have weapons of mass destruction. He let the world believe he 

had weapons of mass destruction, and the reason he did so was because he feared an attack not from the United States, but from 

Iran. 

What techniques did Mr. Piro use to get this information, Director Mueller? 

Director MUELLER. It was a technique that was utilized over a 

period of time, which was building a bond, a relationship, a structured relationship, where Saddam Hussein believed that George 

Piro was the individual who controlled his everyday movements, 

his ability to have access to pen and paper, for instance, and developing a relationship over a period of time, which included a number of discussions in which a particular subject could be introduced 

and information elicited. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And clearly it worked very well. 

Director MUELLER. We believe so. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Does the FBI use the same techniques that 

the CIA has authorized? 

Director MUELLER. It has been our policy not to use coercive 

techniques. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Do you follow any of the techniques or, I 

should say, protocols, the 18 that are put forward in the Army 

Field Manual? 

Director MUELLER. Well, our policy has been fairly clear, from as 

long as certainly I’ve been there, and that is we do not use coercive 

techniques of any sort in the course of our interrogations, which we 

find in the course of interrogations, given that they are conducted 

generally within the United States, often most times U.S. citizens, 

to be sufficient and appropriate to the mission that we have to accomplish. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. General, is it fair to say that all members of 

the military use the Army Field Manual? 

General MAPLES. Yes, ma’am, that’s true. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So then it’s safe to say that the only organization of the American Government that does not is the CIA? Is 

that correct? 

General MAPLES. I didn’t hear Director Mueller say that they actually used the Field Manual. But within the Armed Forces, we do 

use the Army Field Manual as our guide. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So, Admiral McConnell, then the only organization of Government that uses coercive interrogation techniques 

really is the CIA, is that not correct? 

Director MCCONNELL. The only one to my knowledge, yes, 

ma’am. 

75 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And I was reading a New Yorker article 

about your interview on the subject of waterboarding and coercive 

interrogation techniques, and I gather that you felt that, for yourself, if used, waterboarding would, in fact, constitute torture. Is 

that correct? 

Director MCCONNELL. No, ma’am, it’s not correct. The discussion 

was about something entirely different. It was a personal discussion about when I grew up and what I was doing as a youngster. 

And the discussion was framed around being a water safety instructor. Some people—I’m one of them—have difficulty putting my 

head underwater. If my head goes underwater, I ingest water in 

my nose. 

So what I was having the discussion with the journalist is about 

being a water safety instructor and teaching people to swim. He 

said, ‘‘Well, what about when water goes up your nose?’’ And I said, 

‘‘That would be torture.’’ I said, ‘‘It would be very painful for me.’’ 

Then it turned into a discussion of waterboarding. 

Ma’am, I made no statement or judgment regarding the legality 

of waterboarding. We’ve discussed it openly here what it is. 

Waterboarding taken to its extreme could be death. It could drown 

someone. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Then the quote that I’m reading directly 

from the article, ‘‘Whether it’s torture by anyone’s else definition, 

for me it would be torture,’’ is not correct? 

Director MCCONNELL. I said it—and what I was talking about 

was water going into my nose, given the context of swimming and 

teaching people to swim. So it’s out of context. 

Now, when the journalist was checking facts, he called me back 

and said, ‘‘Here’s what I’m going to say.’’ And I said, ‘‘That’s not 

the subject of our discussion, and I ask you not to put that in the 

article.’’ We argued for 90 minutes. I said, ‘‘That will be taken out 

of context. It is not what our discussion was all about.’’ And he 

said, ‘‘Well, you said it. It’s in my article. It’s out of my control.’’ 

So here we are. I said to him, ‘‘I will be sitting in front of a committee having this discussion, arguing about what I said that was 

totally out of context.’’ 

The question, is waterboarding a legal technique? And everything I know, based on the appropriate authority to make that 

judgment, it is a legal technique used in a specific set of circumstances. You have to know the circumstances to be able to 

make the judgment. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. One last question. 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Would you support having the Department of 

Justice opinions on this subject, which we have asked for numerous 

times, being made available to the Committee? 

Director MCCONNELL. The Committee has an oversight role that 

should entitle it to have access to the appropriate information. And 

I’ve said that to you and to the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, on 

any number of occasions. So you know my position. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Senator Whitehouse? 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

76 

Just to follow up a little bit on Senator Feinstein’s questions, 

General Hayden, I just want to give you a chance to review your 

testimony here that those who conduct the interrogations are not 

100 percent contract employees, that they are actually a mix of 

contract and CIA employees? 

General HAYDEN. Senator, if you’re looking for a specific example 

or a specific place, I’d have to check the facts. But in the history 

of the program, the interrogators that I’m aware of have been a 

mix of contract and Government. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. How about if you narrow the program to 

waterboarding? 

General HAYDEN. The real answer is I don’t know. I’d have to 

check, Senator. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. OK. I think that helps clarify. 

General Maples, doesn’t the Army often, or military in general, 

face life-or-death decisions depending on what information it can 

extract from prisoners? 

General MAPLES. Yes, sir, I’d say that’s true, yes. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. It could be whether battleships with crews 

of thousands get torpedoed. It could be locations of V–2 missile 

sites that land on London. It could be all sorts of things, correct? 

General MAPLES. All sorts of information that could be derived 

from an interrogation, yes, sir. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And could save thousands, tens of thousands, large numbers of lives? 

General MAPLES. It could, yes, sir. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And notwithstanding those stakes, the 

Army has adhered in its interrogation techniques always to the 

Army Field Manual? 

General MAPLES. Certainly since the recent Army Field Manual 

was published and it became law, that we would adhere to that, 

that is what the Armed Forces of the United States train to, and 

that’s what we practice. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you. 

Director McConnell, recently—in fact, today—a prominent acolyte of the Bush administration on foreign policy and intelligence 

matters has described your National Intelligence Estimates as politicized and policy-oriented. He describes them of sufficient demerit that they put the intelligence community’s credibility and impartiality on the line. 

He says that the NIE was distorted, that in order for it to be objective it would have to be rewritten, that it involved sleight-ofhand, and grossly mischaracterizes the subject at hand, and that 

is infected with policy bias as the result of the work of policy enthusiasts within the intelligence community. 

Obviously, the entire discussion we’ve had today is of very little 

value or significance if the underlying intelligence estimate process 

is corrupted either by policy bias, or distortion, or gross 

mischaracterization, or politicization. 

Would you care to comment? Because it sort of had been my impression that we were in recovery from that and not in that state, 

but I think it would be worth it to hear your views on where the 

integrity of the intelligence community stands at this point, and 

specifically with regard to this NIE. 

77 

Director MCCONNELL. Sir, I’d start by saying that the integrity 

and the professionalism in this NIE is probably the highest in our 

history, in terms of objectivity, and quality of the analysis, and 

challenging the assumptions, and conducting red teams on the 

process, conducting a counterintelligence assessment about were 

we being misled and so on. 

So I would start by saying that the article you referred to is a 

gross misrepresentation of the professionalism of this community. 

Now, from there I would say, depending on one’s political perspective, you can pick up what this NIE has to say from different 

points of view. And I can also report that both sides are angry with 

how we represented this NIE. Therefore, we probably got it about 

right. 

Here was the issue. In the history of NIEs, there have been very, 

very few—I think I could number on one hand—that have been 

made public, unclassified key judgments. We got into that mode because it was highly politicized and charged when we were doing 

NIEs on Iran, Iraq and the terrorism threat. There was an expectation. 

Now, I made every attempt to establish a policy consistent with 

some of the views that were acknowledged or stated earlier about 

having our work be done in a confidential way and made available 

to those in the administration and in the Congress who need to do 

their work, where we’re dealing with classified information. 

And I worked that policy. I coordinated. I notified the Committees this was going to be how we were going to go forward. And 

then we had a dilemma. 

I promulgated my policy in October. We were working through 

this analysis, had been working from the summer, coming to closure in November. And the issue for us was that my predecessor, 

Ambassador Negroponte, and me were on public record making 

statements about Iran that were different from our conclusion. 

So now my dilemma was: I could not not make this unclassified. 

Now, so we finished the debate and the dialog on the 27th of November. We briefed the President on the 28th of November. And 

the issue was the position had changed somewhat. 

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, there are three parts to 

a nuclear program. The only thing that they’ve halted was nuclear 

weapons design, which is probably the least significant part of the 

program. So then the question became: What goes in unclassified 

key judgments? Now, we had closed and I had signed on the 28th 

of November the classified key judgments. So my dilemma now is 

I can’t make them different when I do unclassified. 

So now we’re in a horse race. I’ve got to notify the Committee. 

I’ve got to notify allies. I’ve got to get unclassified out the door. So 

if I’d had until now to think about it, I probably would have 

changed a thing or two. 

But let me make a point. I’ve anticipated your question. I want 

to go to the first key judgment and to make reference to the article 

that you referenced in your remarks. 

First one, ‘‘We judge with high confidence that, in the fall of 

2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.’’ Footnote, put 

it right here on the front page so everybody would see. We don’t 

want to make any mistakes. We don’t want to mislead anybody. 

78 

‘‘For the purposes of this estimate, nuclear weapons program, we 

mean Iran’s nuclear weapons design and weaponization work and 

covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related 

work.’’ 

So now, to someone who’s familiar with weapons—and this is the 

effort—that’s part of a program. Now, the argument in our group 

was we can’t just say that. We’ve got to attach it so it’s colon—pardon me, semi-colon, same sentence, semi-colon. ‘‘We also assess 

with moderate to high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is 

keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.’’ 

We tried every way we could to put it all right in the beginning. 

It depends on your perspective of how you pick up the issue. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Gentlemen, I regret to say that we 

have an inconsequential, thoroughly unsubstantive, reflective difficulties on the floor between the two political parties vote, and we 

have 4 minutes left. So I’m going to recess this for about 6 minutes. 

Senator BAYH. Can I go ahead with my questions? 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Yes, go ahead. 

I’ll call on Senator Bayh, if you can run fast. 

Senator BAYH. I’m going to go ahead with my questions and then 

run over for the vote, if that’s OK, because I’d like to follow up on 

Senator Whitehouse’s questioning. 

Director, I don’t agree with the aspersions that were cast upon 

the quality of the work of your people in the article that Senator 

Whitehouse referred to, but I do think the work has been 

mischaracterized in the public domain, as you were pointing out. 

And it’s had some unfortunate consequences. 

As a matter of fact, it may very well have made it more difficult 

to achieve the result that our Nation was hoping for, which was to 

find a way to end the Iranian nuclear program without resorting 

to force. It’s made diplomacy much more difficult because of the 

way this was received around the world, including by the Iranians, 

the Russians, the Chinese, and others. 

You just mentioned that if you had to do it over again without 

the heat of the moment, some time to reflect, you would have 

changed a couple of things. What would you have changed? 

Director MCCONNELL. I think I would change the way that we 

described nuclear program. I may have put it up front with a little 

diagram, what are the component parts, so that the reader could 

quickly grasp that a portion of it—I would argue, maybe even the 

least significant portion—was halted and there are other parts that 

continue. 

Senator BAYH. Just to clarify the record—and I’m referring only 

to the public NIE, and I’ve read it—my synopsis of it—and I’d be 

interested if any of you would disagree with this—was that they 

had an active all three components, fissile material creation, 

weaponization, delivery systems, all those were going forward. 

They decided a few years ago to suspend one component, as you 

characterize it, the least consequential of the three, at least temporarily they decided to suspend it. They could recommence that at 

any point in time. 

Director MCCONNELL. They could. 

79 

Senator BAYH. It would be very difficult for us, as I think you 

pointed out, to know when they have recommenced that. And ultimately, given their industrial and technological capabilities, they 

are likely to be successful. We don’t know exactly when, but ultimately they’re likely to be successful. 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator BAYH. Is that a fair synopsis? 

Director MCCONNELL. That’s exactly right. And that’s what the 

unclassified—if you read them all the way through—the unclassified key judgments make that point, and then there’s the full body 

of the 140 pages of the National Intelligence Estimate. 

Senator BAYH. Well, so my question to you is, you know, it’s difficult when we just have one footnote that kind of clarifies the 

thing. How can you and your people go about presenting this in a 

way that is more likely to have a balanced presentation of your beliefs to avoid the kind of problem we’ve now got ourselves in going 

forward? 

And how can you think through the consequences of the report? 

Because it’s had unintended consequences that, in my own view, 

are damaging to the national security interests of our country. 

Director MCCONNELL. Sir, it’s a challenge. We tried in the time 

we had left to do just what you said. I thought at the moment, at 

that point in time, we had gotten good balance. In retrospect, as 

I mentioned, I would do some things differently. 

But let me make a couple of points. As you might imagine, I have 

focused very intently on Iran and the aftermath of this. And there’s 

a debate in Iran now. And some are debating that this is not a 

good news National Intelligence Estimate; it’s a bad news National 

Intelligence Estimate, because that means that international pressure and diplomacy efforts will be increased and sanctions will be 

enforced to hurt their economy. 

And, in fact, the permanent five-plus-one, Germany, they’ve just 

come to closure and agreement on new sanctions, and they’re going 

to take it to the United Nations. 

Senator BAYH. Are the Russians and the Chinese in accord with 

this? 

Director MCCONNELL. They are. 

Senator BAYH. They are? 

Director MCCONNELL. Perm–5. 

Senator BAYH. Well, I will be heartened and I will be pleasantly 

surprised if they do more than verbally express their support, but 

actually take the tough steps necessary. 

Director MCCONNELL. U.K., France, the United States. 

Senator BAYH. How do you interpret the Russians, almost immediately after the issuing of this NIE, their beginning to supply the 

nuclear material to the Iranians for their reactor? 

Director MCCONNELL. Sir, I think to help the background of that, 

I think they’re actually helping make the point. Here’s the issue. 

First of all, the Iranians are pursuing a fissile production capability. 

The Russians, in negotiating with them, said to them: We will 

provide you what you need to run a peaceful reactor, but everything is absolutely under our control. The material is provided, the 

plutonium that’s produced, it has to go back to Russia, and so on. 

80 

Russia’s also making the argument to the Iranians: The fact 

you’re running an independent uranium enrichment program 

makes you suspect. You have no need for it. 

Senator BAYH. I agree with all that, and I’ve got a little bit of 

time left here, so I guess, since I’m the last person standing, I’ll 

have to recess the hearing and run on over there. But I agree with 

all that. 

But they had held up the delivery beforehand, I assume to make 

the point to the Iranians, look, you know, you’ve got to get your act 

together on some of these other things, because this is the pathway 

forward. And then they immediately took that pressure off. 

Director MCCONNELL. But it’s because the Iranians, in fact, 

agreed to these very strict controls. So my view is they were, in 

this dialog, actually supporting the program that had been initiated on a diplomatic level to impose sanctions through the U.N. 

Senator BAYH. Well, good. Let’s hope that that proves to be the 

case going forward. 

My last question—and General Hayden—— 

Mr. FORT. Senator, excuse me, if I might add, just in terms of 

the Russian and Chinese attitudes, there are existing U.N. sanctions against Iran as a result of their failure to abide by the will 

of the international community, to which China and Russia have 

been compliant. 

And we are now negotiating another round of sanctions against 

Iran. So they have not withheld—or they have not, I should say— 

the Russians have not just totally opened up the floodgates in the 

one instance that you indicated, but the U.N. sanctions still stand 

against Iran. 

Senator BAYH. Well, that’s true. But the question is whether the 

sanctions will be effective. And some observers believe that a little 

more needs to be done there to try and finally get the Iranians in 

the place they need to be. 

Mr. FORT. That’s why the Secretary of State is continuing to pursue exactly that course of action to impose yet additional sanctions. 

Senator BAYH. My last question, and then I’ll turn this over to 

my colleague, General Hayden, it may be for you. It’s about Pakistan and the tribal areas. 

It’s unfortunate, but I was interested to hear about the fatalities 

that the Pakistanis have suffered, the other casualties they’ve suffered. Is it not possible that they may make a good-faith effort to 

try and stabilize that region, but it is just beyond their ability to 

accomplish, which will then present us with a real dilemma? 

We saw what happened in Afghanistan many years ago, when we 

allowed a lawless area to become essentially controlled by bad actors. We don’t want a repetition of that. At the same time, if we 

insert ourselves, there’s a real risk of destabilizing an already fairly tenuous regime. 

How do we strike that balance? And when do we conclude that, 

if the Pakistanis simply can’t do it by themselves, that we have to 

do more and essentially say, ‘‘Look, if you can’t do it, we’re going 

to have to do more, and we’re going to do what we need to do here, 

because we can’t afford to have a repetition of the Afghan situation’’? 

81 

How do we strike that balance? And when do we conclude that 

the balance of risks has tipped against us not acting, as opposed 

to acting? 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. And I can elaborate more in closed 

session, but there’s a lot that I think can be said in open. 

As the Admiral pointed out, these are good partners. We’ve 

worked very closely with the Pakistanis. 

To be fair, if you look at the history of our cooperation, we have 

been most successful in cooperating with our Pakistani partners in 

the settled areas of Pakistan, in which, number one, obviously, 

they have a more powerful presence, but, number two, I think 

there’s more commonality of view between us and our partners that 

this is a threat to both of us. 

In the tribal area, I think it’s fair to say, over a fairly long period 

of time and the Pakistanis were concerned about it, but the threat 

emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the 

FATA, they could say, with some justification, was more a threat 

outside of Pakistan than it was to Pakistan, per se. 

Senator BAYH. General, I apologize. 

General HAYDEN. That changed. 

Senator BAYH. Can you continue with your explanation for my 

colleague? I look forward to reading it, and I will return. Apparently, they’re holding the vote just for me. So far be it for me to 

bring the Senate to a standstill. 

But I appreciate your response. If you would please conclude it, 

I will return. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. I think the new piece analytically is 

now that our partners in Pakistan understand that this is a Pakistani problem. And the threat coming out of the tribal area is now 

as much a threat to the health and well-being and identity of Pakistan. 

Senator BAYH. I’m glad they have that understanding. My question went more to capabilities. They may just not have the ability, 

even if they’re well-intended, and then what do we do? 

General HAYDEN. And if you meet with them, you meet with the 

best of them and have candid discussions, that is absolutely the 

case. And, therefore, we are in a period of time in which I think 

there is commonality of interest, commonality of intent, that Pakistan’s capacity to do some of the things we both would like to see 

happen in the tribal area is limited. 

And now we come into this period of time, what is it both of us 

do in this period in which they must build capacity, and yet the 

threat currently exists? And we may be able to talk about that 

more in closed session. 

Senator BAYH. Look forward to it. 

Chairman Wyden? 

Senator WYDEN [presiding]. Gentlemen, I think I can apologize 

for all of us that this is a particularly chaotic morning, and we appreciate your patience. 

I’d like to start with a different tact for purposes of my questioning. As I look at where terrorists get their money, I increasingly find that the dial points to Saudi Arabia. There are press reports that 50 percent of Hamas’s budget comes from Saudi Arabia, 

Saudi citizens providing the majority of financing for al-Qa’ida in 

82 

Mesopotamia, and it all flows through the madrassas and the cultural centers and scores of charities led by Saudi nationals and organizations based in Saudi Arabia. 

So I think my first question would be for you, Director McConnell, and you, General Hayden. Is it correct to say that private donors within Saudi Arabia continue to be a major source of funding 

for terrorist groups? 

Director MCCONNELL. Senator, I’d have to agree that a major 

source of terrorist funding would originate with private donors in 

that region of the world. When you look broadly across the globe, 

the majority would come out of the Middle East. 

But now some, just to be complete, some of the contributions to 

these terrorist efforts actually originate here in the United States. 

I mean, it’s not out of the question that it would originate here. 

So if you look at the region, the Middle East is the majority, and 

the Saudis have recognized this, particularly since they were attacked internally some years ago. And they have been very forceful 

in attempting to turn the tide, to include engagement with the 

schools and the mosques and the religious establishment in Saudi 

Arabia to start to change this situation. 

It’s not completely turned around, but it is being addressed. 

Senator WYDEN. I like the first part of your answer, General, and 

have questions about the second part. 

Now, 4 years ago, the Saudi Government announced that it 

would form a charities commission to oversee charitable donations 

and keep them from being used to fund terrorism. So there was 

this big, much-ballyhooed announcement 4 years ago. 

But as of today, this commission still has not been established. 

So my sense is that this is concrete evidence that they still aren’t 

particularly serious about stopping money from flowing to terrorists who are outside their country. 

Isn’t that again a signal that while the rhetoric may sound like 

they want to be supportive, it’s just not happening when you look 

at the concrete signals like the foot-dragging on the charities commission? 

Director MCCONNELL. Sir, I’m not familiar with the specific charities commission that you’re referring to. Maybe General Hayden— 

I’ll turn that over to him. 

But let me be very clear about my point of view, having come 

back to Government just one year ago. I focused on this issue because it was a personal interest and because it’s important. And 

what I have observed are major steps on the part of the Saudis to 

be more serious and more engaged on this topic. And the one I’m 

familiar with is here in the United States. 

What I was concerned about as a private citizen is support coming from Saudi for schools here in the United States contained language that we should not tolerate. And that process has been addressed. It’s been cleaned up and so on. And so is it 100 percent 

complete and effective? No. But concrete steps are being taken. 

Senator WYDEN. I want to let the general answer, but, Admiral, 

take a look at the foot-dragging on the charities commission. I 

think it is a powerful signal that the follow-through still isn’t there. 

General, do you want to add to that? 

83 

General HAYDEN. Yes, very briefly, Senator. Thank you. I think 

you’re right. Last time I checked, that was my understanding of 

where the charities commission was, but I haven’t looked at it for 

a period of time, so I don’t challenge your conclusion there. 

That said, Saudi Mabahith head Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, 

has actually moved their game into this region for the first time. 

As the Admiral suggested, they got real serious about threats in 

the kingdom. They have done very, very well in taking care of alQa’ida there. 

The last piece and the one that we’ve urged greater energy on 

them has been with regard to funding. And as the Admiral points 

out, this is a difficult one for this good partner, because it’s 

wrapped in amongst alms giving and religious education and charity and so on. And so there are some cultural challenges for our 

partners to take this on as thoroughly as we might want. But I’ve 

talked to Mohammed bin Nayef, our counterpart there for the internal service. These have been very candid discussions. 

And I think—and we should probably get you a paper on this, 

Senator—there have been very concrete steps taken by the Saudis 

against donors, admittedly with this commission not yet up and 

running. 

Senator WYDEN. Let me see if I can get one other question in on 

the interrogation issue, because I know while I was out there was 

a fair amount of discussion about that. 

I think the concern has always been—certainly, the concern of an 

American in a dangerous time is—is it going to be possible to get 

information from these ticking time bombs, people who have information who represent a very serious and immediate threat to the 

wellbeing of the country. 

And my question on that point is for you, Director Mueller, and 

that is do the FBI—and perhaps we can bring the military folks 

in on this as well—use noncoercive techniques on individuals who 

have this time-sensitive threat information? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. As I indicated before, our policy states 

we will not use coercive techniques in the course of questioning 

suspects, subjects of our investigations. And there is no timeframe 

given. 

Senator WYDEN. And is it fair to say—this is an open session; 

I’ve touched on this in the past in open sessions as well with some 

of your people—that these noncoercive techniques that are being 

used by the department now can be effective in dealing with these 

time-sensitive ticking time bomb situations that the American people are so concerned about? 

Director MUELLER. The general answer is yes. But again, it depends on a circumstance. Yes. And as I have expressed before, our 

techniques, I believe, are appropriate to the success of our mission. 

Senator WYDEN. I’m going to ask you some more about this in 

closed session. 

But, Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I got a little bit of extra 

time, I gather, since everybody is running back and forth, and I appreciate it. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden. 

84 

Senator Warner is next, but he’s not back yet, so I’m going to 

take advantage of the regular order and ask you, Director Mueller, 

to discuss something which you brought up which has had almost 

no discussion in this country at all. 

There’s occasional discussion when it comes to, you know, is Baltimore safe as a port, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, but—rail 

lines—but there’s been no kind of comprehensive discussion of it. 

I would like to have you talk, if you can, for a full 5 minutes 

about what you said, and that is the threat of terrorism within the 

United States of America. 

Director MUELLER. I refer to it on three levels. The first is alQa’ida itself, bin Ladin the core, which has been described here 

previously, and the Fatah. 

And the second level is individuals who are not necessarily directed from the outset, and the planning is not accomplished by 

core al-Qa’ida, but have some ties to al-Qa’ida, whether it be financial or recruiting or otherwise. 

And the third level is self-radicalized without any ties whatsoever to al-Qa’ida. 

The threat here in the United States is principally, at this juncture, we believe, self-radicalized groups with no ties to al-Qa’ida. 

Two of those instances we rolled up last year. One related to the 

plot against JFK. The other related to the plot against soldiers at 

Fort Dix. 

However, there are individuals in the United States who are 

philosophically, ideologically, associated with al-Qa’ida who recruit, 

finance and would have the capability of providing a support mechanism to somebody should they come in the country, much in the 

way there was unwitting support for the 19 hijackers as they came 

into the United States before September 11th. 

And our great concern is that there will be operatives that come 

to the United States, whether it be from Europe or elsewhere, that 

will come in with the goal of undertaking a terrorist attack. 

If you look at what has happened—transpired recently in the 

U.K., in 2005, July 7th, July 21st attacks, if you look at the recent—one was a successful attack; the other was aborted—or not 

aborted; was not successful—if you look at the recent detentions in 

Barcelona, Spain, these were individuals who had association with 

al-Qa’ida, traveled to Pakistan, gained perhaps some financial 

backing but certainly the training that they brought back and had 

a cadre of individuals that were available to undertake attacks. 

Our concern, great concern, is that while it is happening in Europe—it is one plane ticket away from occurring in the United 

States. 

And consequently, it’s that middle level that may be selfradicalized at the outset but then, because of the close association, 

familial associations, with Pakistan gets training in Pakistan, gets 

support in Pakistan, and comes back, utilizes a network to undertake an attack, would be not satisfied with undertaking an attack 

in Europe but undertake an attack in the United States. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. And I understand that. What I’d like to 

get you to focus on for a minute or so is that which is carried on 

by people who have become disaffected either through unemployVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
85 

ment, which now presumably will grow, through the example of a 

cause, the attraction to a cause. 

And it may not be that they actually go to al-Qa’ida or get their 

training in Afghanistan, but they simply decide to create malevolent actions within the United States for purposes which can either 

be twisted or which reflect their fundamental unhappiness within 

the American society as it’s held before them in many ways. 

Director MUELLER. I think that is a possible explanation for certain actors who would take the dissatisfaction, the disenfranchisement, in the United States and couple it with the radical Islamic 

ideology and the two would reinforce each other. 

What you also see, in a number of these instances around the 

globe, well educated, relatively well off individuals who also have 

subscribed to this ideology who undertake such attacks. The most 

recent one that comes to mind is the doctors in the U.K. who—not 

last summer; I think it was the summer before—attempted to bomb 

a nightclub in London—that did not work—but then drove a car 

into the airport at Glasgow. 

These were doctors. These were not persons who were unemployed. They are not persons who lacked skills. 

And consequently, while you can look at some individuals who 

may have motivation, given their current financial circumstances, 

you cannot rule out others who would undertake attacks for other 

reasons but do not suffer from the same disadvantages. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. In 30 seconds, if you can, do you see 

the trend within the United States—or let me say this. Are we not 

paying enough attention to this—not referring to the FBI, but referring to the American people, to the American news media—to 

the discussion? 

The discussion is always attracted to, you know, firebombs, and 

destruction overseas, and loss of life, and yet the Richard Reid situation indicated that things can happen in other ways also, and that 

was very early; therefore, maybe not less relevant. 

But people become attracted to a cause. People have to have 

some meaning in their life. They’re disenfranchised economically or 

in their own minds, and they want a cause to give their life meaning, even though it’s malevolent meaning. It’s a very powerful factor. And I would think that America is no less immune to that 

than, let’s say, parts of Africa, although it may not be as developed. 

I just want to hear you talk about that, unless you find my question inappropriate. 

Director MUELLER. No, I would agree with the premise of the 

question in terms of persons who fall prey to that malevolent ideology as something that we are tremendously concerned about. 

There can be any number of causes. 

Do we pay enough attention to that? My concern is that we’re 

several years away from September 11, and inevitably there is a 

complacency that begins to take hold when there is nothing immediately happening. And I do worry about complacency. I do worry 

about early intervention, early identification of individuals who fall 

prey to the ideology. I can tell you we and our counterparts, DHS 

and State and local law enforcement, through our Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces, are alert to this. 

86 

But it also takes representatives of the communities in which 

this can occur to be alert to it, and not turn a blind eye toward it 

and to alert us when there are the signs that somebody is becoming 

radicalized and getting to the point where it is beyond the discussion stage and to the point where they take an overt act in pursuit 

of a particular plot or conspiracy. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. So to sum up, then, you do not have to 

be Russian, Chinese or somebody else in order to do 

cyberterrorism. You can do that as an individual, untrained in Afghanistan or Pakistan, from within the United States if you’re 

angry enough about something that you think that by doing that 

you will bring meaning to your life simply because you feel 

disenfranchised. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. Meaning to your life—you know, even if 

you are not disenfranchised, it brings additional meaning to your 

life. You can be a college student in Atlanta or elsewhere. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Or a doctor. You’re correct. 

Director MUELLER. And we’ve had instances along those lines. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. I thank you, sir. 

And I apologize to Senator Warner, whose turn it now is. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to say to Director McConnell and each of his associates here today that Americans have got to take great pride in 

what you and your respective organizations are doing to preserve 

freedom as we so cherish it here in this country. 

You represent now under the new law, having brought together 

and integrated our intelligence, the finest professional group of 

men and women to be found anywhere in the world who devote 

themselves solely to the preservation of the freedoms of this country. And I want to commend each of you. 

And I want to go back to our distinguished Chairman and Ranking Member and their comments about the current FISA debate in 

the Senate and once again look at your paragraph, Director McConnell, where you say, ‘‘Expiration of the Act would lead to the loss 

of important tools the intelligence community relies on to discover 

the plans of our enemies.’’ 

And you’ve particularly reemphasized this Committee having 

voted 13–2 to give retroactive liability protection to the private sector which have stepped up to work with this community. And I just 

wanted to emphasize that the motivation of private companies to 

come forward and participate in this program, they’re may be some 

reimbursement for cost, but it’s purely for patriotic reasons. Am I 

not correct in that? 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Senator WARNER. General Hayden? 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, absolutely correct. 

Senator WARNER. Director Mueller? 

Director MUELLER. Correct. 

Senator WARNER. You know, I, on the floor, working with my colleague here on a colloquy one day, I likened the activities of these 

corporations in America to the all-volunteer force. Each of the men 

and women in our Armed Forces today have raised their hand and 

have volunteered to step forward and proudly wear the uniforms 

87 

of our country and to assume the risk and their families to share 

in those burdens. 

So I look upon these companies as part of the all-volunteer force 

in the general matrix of people in this country trying to ensure our 

freedoms and safety. So I’m going to fight ever so strongly with my 

two colleagues on my right here to get this done. 

Let’s turn now to your comments on Iraq, Director McConnell. 

You say, ‘‘The security situation in Iraq continues to show signs of 

improvement.’’ And in response to questions from the Chairman 

and the Ranking Member, you amplified about the provincial elections coming up, how pivotal they are, and the hydrocarbon law. 

But I want to step back, and I look at this in the context of another responsibility that I have here in the Senate on the Armed 

Services Committee and our urgent need to reduce the time of 

tours of duty from 15 months down to a more realistic, and hopefully a lesser, 12 months, and then perhaps even a shorter tour. 

Because, I have to tell you, I visited with the Army officials here 

in the last day or two, and we’re going to have hearings in the 

Armed Services Committee. This conflict is taking its impact on 

our all-volunteer force. We’re asking an awful lot of these men and 

women who have repeated tours over there and the burden on their 

families and their ability, as Reserve and Guard, to reintegrate into 

civilian life. 

So I want to ask you this question. What is your level of confidence that there will be continued signs of improvement in the 

coming year? Hopefully that will translate in our ability to shorten 

the tours. Is it a high confidence that we’ll continue to see signs 

of improvement, medium confidence, or low confidence? 

Director MCCONNELL. Sir, I would say medium confidence on my 

part, and hopefully that would improve in time. As I mentioned, 

the leadership in Iraq, they’re learning how to govern and how to 

compromise and how to do this business, a few key pieces of legislation. 

But as this goes forward, having an Iraqi security force that’s 

professional—so that’s a training component for us. So I see a path 

that gets us to what you suggested, in addition to shortened tours, 

to also having a role more in overwatch, where we’re training and 

assisting and equipping, as opposed to actually engaging in the security applications. 

Senator WARNER. You list here very carefully all of the things 

that are taking place over there that are of concern. We still have 

just an extraordinary amount of Shia insurgency with various 

groups, and the fragility of the Sunnis, who have tried to cooperate 

and are now beginning to, certainly in Al Anbar, keep things quieter. 

But if you had to list the two greatest risks to reversing this 

trend of continued improvement, what would they be? 

Director MCCONNELL. First would be Iran and Iran’s role in how 

they play, equip, and support, and cause issues. 

And the second would be the Shia-on-Shia dialog. There’s one 

large group referred to as Jaysh al-Mahdi, which Muqtada al-Sadr 

is responsible for, and then there’s the group, ISCI, we refer to it 

as a shorthand, which is a political party. 

88 

And if those two can learn to work together and compromise, and 

the Kurds also have a role in having participation and compromise, 

and the Sunnis will come into that group for dialog and constructive engagement, then they’re going to be successful. But it’s going 

to—the single most thing in the short term would be Shia-on-Shia, 

in my view. 

Senator WARNER. Do you share, Director Hayden, with Director 

McConnell’s assertion that it’s a medium confidence? Is that the 

level that you have? 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, I do, Senator. I do. And I agree with 

how he racked up the different factors. 

I would add one additional thought. I know you’re aware of this, 

but I need to make it explicit. The enemy gets a vote, or the enemy 

gets the appearance of a vote. So there is the possibility that alQa’ida in Iraq, for example, which I think is the one most capable 

of doing this, could create the appearance of lack of progress by 

extra exertion, as we talked last year when we had this discussion, 

kind of visiting hell on the civilian population. 

And so I’d just caution for all of us to be careful about the underlying realities that are happening, because there can be these violent spikes that are engineered by the enemy. And that’s what I 

meant by his getting a vote in this. 

Senator WARNER. The key word is ‘‘spikes,’’ though. That indicates what goes up comes down in a short period of time. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, that’s correct. That’s right. 

Senator WARNER. But the general sort of plan, that it’s continuing to ratchet down, not as fast as we would hope, but it is in 

that direction, you have a medium confidence that will continue? 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, I think that’s right. 

Senator WARNER. General Maples? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I would agree with that, also, that assessment, moderate level. I think there are a lot of variables that are 

at play that have caused a reduction in violence that we have seen 

in Iraq. 

And I think that, clearly, the Shia restraint is one of the key 

variables here. The freeze that has been imposed by Jaish alMahdi, Shia-on-Shia cease-fire that has been agreed to I think is 

key to being able to maintain this. 

And on the other side, the local initiatives that have taken place, 

which al-Qa’ida in Iraq is doing its best right now to try to undo, 

they have to be sustained. 

Senator WARNER. I thank you. 

Let me proceed to Afghanistan, Director McConnell. Looking 

page 18—I’ll just read it to you—‘‘The Taliban and other insurgent 

groups operating in the poppy-growing regions gain at least some 

financial support as a result of their ties to the local opium traffickers.’’ 

This situation with regard to the drugs is just, in my judgment, 

almost out of control. And to date, neither NATO nor the United 

States working with our partners have been able to come up with 

what I believe is a strategy that’s going to begin to ratchet down 

the increasing levels of poppy and opium traffic. 

And as you say here, I think you’ve put it a little too mildly for 

me, that the Taliban may be getting financial support. I think a 

89 

lot of financial support is flowing to the Taliban, which enables 

them to buy weapons and then fire those weapons right at U.S. 

troops and to the NATO troops. 

And I think that’s just unacceptable. Do you have any views as 

to what could be done to strengthen—of course, this is a policy 

question—a cessation of this source of cash, ready cash to the 

Taliban? 

Director MCCONNELL. Sir, I would say there are two major 

issues. You touched on one. That is a serious program that not only 

eradicates, but provides an alternative to the Afghan farmers that 

need a way to make a living and so on. So that’s the challenge. 

How can you effectively do that? And so far, we haven’t come up 

with the right combination. 

The second part, it is also in Pakistan with regard to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where not only al-Qa’ida has some 

de facto level of sanctuary, but some Taliban members have de 

facto sanctuary for training, and equipping, and rest and recuperation, and so on. 

So if we find a way of addressing those two issues, and then we 

take offensive operations with regard to the Taliban insurgents, I 

think progress would be a little more forthcoming. 

Senator WARNER. But that drug trade is the cash-flow that’s 

keeping Taliban alive. 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. General Hayden? 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, Senator, I’d agree. If you look at the 

circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan, they’re very different. I 

would suggest to you the single biggest difference between the two 

countries, in trying for us to translate tactical success into strategic 

success, the single biggest difference are the drugs in Afghanistan. 

Senator WARNER. The drugs. 

General Maples? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I agree. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Warner. 

Senator Hatch? 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Followed by Senator Feingold. 

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

all of you for the service you’re giving to our country. It really 

means a lot to all of us up here, and certainly to me. 

But having mentioned Pakistan, two of our most important allies 

in the global war on terrorism are two of our most problematic 

ones, and that includes Pakistan and, of course, Saudi Arabia. 

Now, I think what I’m going to do is ask a couple questions about 

Pakistan. Last year, in the widely reported declassified key judgments of the NIE on the threat to homeland security, you recognized that al-Qa’ida is secure in Pakistan’s Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas, or FATA. 

From this part of the world, where Pakistan asserts sovereignty, 

al-Qa’ida plots against the West and its allies in the Taliban-supported area, and the counterinsurgency, also, that seeks to topple 

the government of our ally in neighboring Afghanistan. 

90 

Further, the militancy emanating from the tribal areas has 

grown so strong that it has spread to the settled areas of Pakistan, 

in the Northwest Frontier Province, but also reaching into the 

heart of Pakistan’s cities, including Islamabad. The most egregious 

example of this, of course, is Benazir Bhutto. 

But open press reporting last year gave too little coverage to the 

story of the escape of Rashid Rauf, whose escape from Pakistani 

custody seems too incredible to believe, as he seems to have been 

allowed to walk out of the door of a mosque that he was allowed 

to visit. Rauf, I will remind everyone here, was considered the mastermind of the 2006 airline plot out of Britain, which was to blow 

up as many as 10 airlines over the Atlantic. 

Yesterday’s Washington Post had a piece on Abu Laith al-Libi, 

whose demise last week none of us will bemoan, but who, according 

to the Post, freely traveled around Pakistan, not just in the tribal 

areas, met with foreign diplomats, and visited wounded Taliban 

warriors recuperating in Pakistani hospitals. And these Taliban, it 

must be noted, were wounded fighting Afghans and coalition forces, 

including the U.S. military, in Afghanistan. 

In short, under the current Pakistani Government, the terror 

threat to the West has grown, the insurgent threat to Afghanistan 

has grown, and—this was entirely predictable—the militant threat 

to the people of Pakistan has grown. 

Now, at what point do you believe it would be better to pronounce the current Pakistani Government a complete failure in advancing security for us or even their own people? And what Pakistani institutions could successfully stand against these threats? 

What could the United States do to support these institutions? 

And what is the significance of the creation last December of Tariki 

Taliban, the Taliban movement of Pakistan? 

Those are a lot of questions. I guess we’ll start with you, Admiral. 

Director MCCONNELL. Thank you, sir. 

I think the most significant thing in the recent situation is the 

threat has moved into Pakistan proper to threaten the very existence of the nation. 

Senator HATCH. Well, it’s been there for a quite a while. 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. But in the last year the number 

of terrorist attacks and deaths were greater than the past 6 years 

combined. 

So what’s happened is Pakistan has now recognized that this is 

an existential threat to their very survival. And the leadership 

there is taking steps, and conducting actions, and starting a process to be more aggressive in getting control of the situation, with 

regard to not only al-Qa’ida, but also the militants in the FATA 

area. 

The only institution that has the strength to do what you just 

described is the Pakistani Army. We need to think about the Pakistani Army and how it was constructed and how it’s been maintained for 60 years. It is designed as a force-on-force, primarily facing a threat from India, and is not a counterinsurgency force the 

way we have evolved with our special operations forces. So that 

discussion is taking place in Pakistan now. And there will be 

changes in time to be more aggressive in addressing this threat. 

91 

With regard to the government itself—very critical time. They’re 

in a transition to democracy, and it is a key point in Pakistani history. For the first time in their history, their legislature finished 

a term, and the elections are happening later this month on the 

18th. 

This is a critical time to get them through this process—they get 

themselves through this process—so they have democratic institutions that can start to address the issues you’ve outlined. 

Senator HATCH. General Hayden, do you have any comments 

about all that? 

General HAYDEN. Well, Senator, I’d agree with your macro description of what’s gone on there over the past several years, with 

very few exceptions. 

I’ve spoken to my counterparts in Pakistan and actually General 

Kayani, who’s Chief of the Army Staff. I think they would agree 

in broad outline with your analysis. But now the question is capacity. What is it they can do about this with the capacity they have 

as a government? 

General Kayani, as the Admiral suggests, as Chief of Army Staff, 

has inherited an incredibly artillery-heavy army, and how he’s 

faced with an insurgency between and among tribal groups in the 

tribal region. He’s got a plan using the resources he has available 

plus transitioning to the kind of army that he will need to meet 

this problem. I think it’s a realistic appreciation of the situation. 

But right now, it’s a question of capacity. 

Senator HATCH. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one other question? Thank you, 

sir. 

I wish to commend both you, Admiral McConnell—well, all five 

of you, but in particular, through listening to you, you, Admiral 

McConnell and General Hayden, for your candor and your precision 

of your remarks on the question of enhanced interrogation techniques. 

And I want to thank you, General Maples, for reiterating the 

Pentagon’s adherence to the Army Field Manual. These couple of 

questions that I’m going to direct to you, General Maples. 

In following up on Senator Whitehouse’s question earlier, let me 

ask you these two questions. Can the Army Field Manual be rewritten? 

General MAPLES. Certainly, it could. Yes, sir. 

Senator HATCH. How? 

General MAPLES. Well, one of the areas that we’ve looked at and 

we have talked about is what type of behavioral techniques are 

most beneficial to adduce information from others, and—— 

Senator HATCH. So it could be changed at any time. 

General MAPLES. Yes, sir. It could be. 

Senator HATCH. OK. Then let me ask you this. Would it be fair 

to say that the Army Field Manual was written for 18-year-olds to 

20-year-olds primarily to help them to know how to act and what 

to do? 

General MAPLES. I would go somewhat beyond that, but generally it is a younger population. Yes, sir. 

Senator HATCH. Let’s say up to 24-year-olds or 25-year-olds. I 

don’t care. 

92 

General MAPLES. Yes, sir. 

Senator HATCH. But written for younger people who may not be 

involved in the intelligence gathering that the CIA does or that 

others in the intelligence community have to do for us. 

General MAPLES. Certainly written for a different group with a 

different purpose. Yes, sir. 

Senator HATCH. That’s right. Now, one last question. If the application of an enhanced interrogation technique on an al-Qa’ida operative could have given us intelligence to have prevented the attack 

on the USS Cole, would that have been worthwhile? 

General MAPLES. Sir, it certainly would have been to the Armed 

Forces and to those young sailors. 

Senator HATCH. We lost how many young sailors at that time? 

It was about 17. 

General MAPLES. Seventeen, sir. 

Senator HATCH. Well, it seems to me that you guys have a really 

tough job to be so second-guessed up here by people who don’t have 

to be on the front lines on these things. 

One last thought on this line. Right now, we’re in a big battle 

up here on the FISA bill. 

And Admiral McConnell, you know, as an attorney, understanding how general counsels work, if we do not grant retroactive 

immunity to these companies that acted patriotically at the request 

of the United States, and no civil suits continue—based upon, by 

the way, Mr. Klein and a few other people who really haven’t— 

didn’t know anything about what was going on. 

With all the depositions, discoveries, interrogatories and so forth 

that would disclose all kinds of sensitive information, wouldn’t we 

be at a tremendous disadvantage because general counsels of those 

companies—if they’re going to be second-guessed and their people 

are going to be sued, and their employees subjected to terrorism all 

over the world, just to mention a few little aspects of this, what 

general counsel would allow that type of cooperation without litigation, which would then delay us getting the intelligence we need 

to protect America from even weapons of mass destruction, Admiral 

McConnell? 

Director MCCONNELL. You’ve described it exactly right, Senator. 

Without retroactive liability protection, those general counsels, as 

an obligation to those companies, would tell them not to cooperate 

with us and to litigate. 

Senator HATCH. And we would not get the intelligence we’d have 

to have on a short-time basis so that we could protect America, is 

that right? 

Director MCCONNELL. The tragedy is it would slow our efforts. It 

would make us less effective. And I would make one other point. 

American industry, particularly in this field, leads the world. 

And so not only is it what they’ve alleged to have been—to help 

us in the aftermath of 9/11, but since they lead the world, their insight and abilities and knowhow, understanding of technology, is 

what we depend on to be effective on a global scale. 

Senator HATCH. Some have said up here that we should substitute the United States as the defendant in these cases. Would 

that solve the problem? 

Director MCCONNELL. No, sir. 

93 

Senator HATCH. You’d still have discovery, depositions, interrogatories, all kinds of disclosures of the highest classified information 

that could just wreck what we’re trying to do to protect America, 

is that correct? 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Senator HATCH. Do you agree with that, General Hayden? 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator HATCH. How about you, Mr. Mueller? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. Yes. I agree with that. 

Senator HATCH. And the others? General Maples? 

General MAPLES. Yes, sir. 

Senator HATCH. Mr. Fort? 

Thank you letting me ask those questions. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Hatch. 

Senator Feingold? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me ask that my opening statement just be put in the 

record. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. It is so ordered. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSS FEINGOLD, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The National Intelligence Estimate 

on threats to the homeland released last year assessed that al 

Qaeda has protected and regenerated its capacity to attack the 

United States. Meanwhile, the situation in Afghanistan is backsliding. And recent bombings in Algeria underscore the serious 

threats posed by Al Qaeda’s affiliates around the world. Yet, tragically, the Administration maintains its overly narrow focus on the 

war in Iraq, draining attention and resources from these and other 

national security priorities. While only one year remains in this 

Administration, we cannot wait that long to refocus on the threats 

before us. We need strategies to combat Al Qaeda’s global reach. 

We need a better understanding of Al Qaeda’s affiliates, their links 

to Al Qaeda , and the unique role they play in the countries and 

regions in which they operate. We need a better grasp of terrorist 

safe havens and the political, economic and cultural factors that 

allow them to fester. And we need truly global intelligence capabilities directed at local and transnational issues that are far too often 

overlooked—until a crisis explodes. One need look no further than 

Kenya to understand how bad governance, corruption, repression, 

and ethnic tensions can end up posing serious strategic challenges 

for the United States and to appreciate how anticipating these 

kinds of crises is in our vital national security interests. 

Supporting the Intelligence Community’s ability to protect our 

nation means providing it with the strategies and capabilities to 

understand the world as it is. It means acknowledging that Iraq is 

not the central front in the fight against al Qaeda—not when the 

Intelligence Community tells us that al Qaeda has a ‘‘safehaven in 

the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas.’’ It means giving the Intelligence Community the tools it needs to go after al 

Qaeda and its affiliates without intruding unnecessarily on the 

94 

rights and freedoms of law-abiding Americans at home. Hard work 

lies ahead, but we cannot afford to wait. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Second, let me also thank each of you for 

your tremendous service to the country. 

And, Director McConnell and General Hayden, the New York 

Times reported in December that the CIA tapes that were destroyed ‘‘documented a program so closely guarded that President 

Bush himself had agreed with the advice of intelligence officials 

that he not be told the locations of the secret CIA prisons.’’ Is that 

true? 

General HAYDEN. I’m not at liberty to discuss any personal conversations I’ve had with the President, Senator. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Did the President know? 

General HAYDEN. I’m not at liberty to discuss that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s not asking about the conversation, but 

did he know? 

General HAYDEN. For me to comment on that would imply other 

activity, previous conversations, and, one, I won’t do it. And number two, I don’t know. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Director McConnell? 

Director MCCONNELL. I don’t know. 

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. Well, wouldn’t this raise serious concerns 

about whether the President is capable of or even interested in 

making fundamental decisions relating to fighting al-Qa’ida? 

I mean, shouldn’t the President have this knowledge if he’s going 

to make the kind of judgment and analysis that’s needed here? 

General HAYDEN. My judgment is that the President knew all 

that he felt sufficient for him to issue the guidance he felt he 

should issue us. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you think the President needs to know 

this information? 

General HAYDEN. Me? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you think the President ought to know 

that information in order to make his best judgment? 

General HAYDEN. If I thought the President needed to know 

something, I would tell the President something. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Has the Vice President known the locations 

of the facilities, General Hayden? 

General HAYDEN. I don’t know, and again, I wouldn’t venture to 

comment on any conversations I’ve had with the Vice President. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Director McConnell? 

Director MCCONNELL. I don’t know. 

Senator FEINGOLD. How about the Secretary of State or the Attorney General? Either of them know? 

General HAYDEN. I’m not aware that they do. 

Director MCCONNELL. I don’t know. 

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. 

Director McConnell, you were quoted in the New Yorker as saying that whether an interrogation technique is torture is ‘‘pretty 

simple. It is excruciating and painful to the point of forcing someone to say something because of the pain.’’ 

Well, pain is pain, right? It doesn’t depend on the circumstances 

under which it’s inflicted, right? 

Director MCCONNELL. Is that a question? 

95 

Senator FEINGOLD. Yeah. It’s a question. I mean, pain is pain. It 

doesn’t really depend on the circumstances under which it’s inflicted. 

Director MCCONNELL. My remarks that you’re referring to—I 

was talking about excruciating pain. 

Senator FEINGOLD. General Hayden, do you agree with the Director’s definition? Do you agree that torture is defined by the level 

of pain that is inflicted and not by the circumstances? 

General HAYDEN. The statute points out the requirement for 

something to be defined as torture, and I’ve forgotten the adjectives, Senator, but there are a series of adjectives in front of the 

word pain. That’s correct. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And does this have to do with the level of 

pain or the circumstances? 

General HAYDEN. I think it has to do with both the level and duration and the lasting effects of the pain, to the best of my memory 

of the statute. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me switch to Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

The State Department’s counterterrorism chief, Lieutenant General 

Dell Dailey, has expressed publicly his concerns that there are significant gaps in what we know about threats in the Afghan-Pakistan border tribal areas. 

He said, ‘‘We don’t have enough information about what’s going 

on there, not on al-Qa’ida, not on foreign fighters, not on the 

Taliban.’’ Director McConnell, do you agree? And if so, how serious 

is this problem? 

Director MCCONNELL. Our information is never complete enough, 

and if we had the locating information, particularly of the leadership, we would be able to carry out actions to neutralize the leadership. So that specific information we seek and we do not have. 

Senator FEINGOLD. So you would agree with his assessment? 

Director MCCONNELL. I would agree in broad terms with the 

need for better information. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Director McConnell, your testimony points 

out that al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb has expanded its targets to include the United States and the U.N. and 

has increased the lethality of its attacks. 

Director MCCONNELL. U.S. interests is what I said, yes, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. What’s that? 

Director MCCONNELL. U.S. interests is what I said. A U.S. company is what was attacked. 

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. Fair enough. I’m concerned, however, 

that your testimony seems to lump the group, which has a long history in Algeria, with AQI, which didn’t even exist prior to the war 

in Iraq. These are very different situations. 

Director MCCONNELL. No, I linked it with AQ, meaning alQa’ida, not specifically AQI, which means al-Qa’ida in Iraq. We use 

the terms just so we can have conversations to place geographically 

the group we’re talking about. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you agree that the terrorist threat in 

North Africa has become worse? And second, how do we confront 

this threat directly with strategies geared toward the unique history and political environment in that region? 

96 

Director MCCONNELL. I think it’s become worse in Algeria, in 

that area. I don’t think it’s gotten worse necessarily yet in Libya 

or in Egypt. 

Senator FEINGOLD. You don’t see a general trend in that region. 

Director MCCONNELL. A trend meaning that al-Qa’ida, who resides in the Federally Administered Tribal Area in Pakistan, having a reach with Internet and a method to communicate has been 

successful in establishing links and having a broad message that’s 

been embraced by radical elements—in that sense, I see a trend. 

Senator FEINGOLD. If the threat from the Pakistan-Afghanistan 

region is getting worse, and the threat in North Africa is getting 

worse, is it accurate to say that any tactical successes against alQa’ida in Iraq are, at best, unrelated to the global threat from alQa’ida and its affiliates? 

Director MCCONNELL. No, I wouldn’t agree with that at all. I 

would describe a trend. A trend is something that people are attracted to, an ideology, something they will follow. And if you look 

at throughout history, there have been a variety of things that people would follow. Communism is the one we dealt with in the last 

generation. 

So my view of what’s happened—there’s an ideology. It has a 

way of communicating. And these things are linked. It’s a broad, 

inspirational level. 

So there is a group in Iraq that’s associated with al-Qa’ida. They 

take direction and guidance from al-Qa’ida that’s still residing, the 

leadership, in Pakistan. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Bond? 

Vice Chairman BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director McConnell, there’s a little bit of lack of clarity in some 

of the discussions earlier on. 

I think General Hayden said that there is a group of lawful techniques which can be used in interrogation. Some of them are in the 

Army Field Manual and some of them are the techniques that 

would be used by the CIA. In response to a question, you said that 

we do use coercive techniques. But my understanding is you only 

use techniques if they are coercive to lead a detainee to give information. 

And I would imagine if the Army Field Manual techniques did 

not have some coercion, they wouldn’t be used. Can you clarify for 

me—you are not implying, are you, that the techniques the CIA 

uses are coercive, whereas the Army Field Manual techniques are 

not coercive? 

Director MCCONNELL. No, sir. That wasn’t what I implied. I did 

not use the word ‘‘coercive,’’ or at least I don’t recall using it. 

I was describing it as enhanced. Now, you may say I’m splitting 

hairs here. 

Vice Chairman BOND. No, I wrote it down that you said coercive, 

and I just wanted to make sure that we were clear. Is it your view 

that the techniques used by the CIA under its program are different from but no more painful or violative of the standards which 

are applied to the Army Field Manual, that they would comply, 

97 

should the Army Field Manual tomorrow pick up the CIA techniques? 

Of course, they’d be published, and then they wouldn’t be effective on high-value detainees, but they could be picked up by the 

Army Field Manual, is that correct? 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, I would say ‘‘enhanced.’’ 

Vice Chairman BOND. Enhanced. 

Director MCCONNELL. The techniques are enhanced. They are effective. They’re not coercive, and they’re lawful. And now the expert on this subject, of course, is General Hayden, so let me offer 

him a chance to follow up my remarks. 

Vice Chairman BOND. I’ll always be proud to hear from General 

Hayden. 

General HAYDEN. Thank you, Senator. 

Just to reinforce and, if you don’t mind, maybe draw together a 

couple of points that were kind of scattered about in some earlier 

conversations, we have a body of techniques that we believe to be 

lawful and the Attorney General has said are lawful and that we 

briefed to the Committee and staff. They are beyond those authorized by the Army Field Manual, but I think Senator Hatch pointed 

out that the Army Field Manual can be a transitory document. It 

can change. 

The current Army Field Manual, for example, I think most people would judge to be less robust than the Army Field Manual that 

it replaced. And so there are changes that can take place there. 

I’ve said that the techniques that I have briefed the Committee 

inside the CIA program are appropriate—lawful, certainly, otherwise we wouldn’t have the conversation—but appropriate and adequate to the needs of the CIA program, as are, I believe, the Army 

Field Manual to what DOD has to do and the processes contained 

in the various regulations of the FBI for what they have to do. 

But ours is different. It was brought up earlier, the interrogation 

of Saddam Hussein, which revealed some very interesting and very 

valuable information, but I’d only point out that was done over a 

period of months. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And before he was about to be hanged. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, in an environment that was. . . 

Vice Chairman BOND. Talk about an enhanced interrogation 

technique. I think Johnson said there’s nothing that clarifies the 

mind like the prospect of a hanging in a fortnight. 

General HAYDEN. And it was done as a retrospective. 

Vice Chairman BOND. From old English lit. 

General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. It was done as a retrospective. It was 

done as forensics on events past, again, very valuable, but different 

than what we need. 

Let me say something very clearly, Senator. I really need to put 

this on the record. We will play to the edges of the box that the 

American political process gives us. 

In the creation of that box, if we’re asked a view, we’ll give a 

view. But the lines drawn by that box are the product of the American political process. Once you’ve drawn the box, once that process 

creates a box, we have a duty to play to the edge of it; otherwise, 

we’re not protecting America, and we may be protecting ourselves. 

98 

If the American political process draws the box and makes it 

equal to the Army Field Manual, we will play inside the box labeled ‘‘Army Field Manual’’ or the Miranda process. 

One should not expect this Director or a subsequent Director— 

that’s not really very interesting—let’s talk about the officers of the 

Central Intelligence Agency—one should not expect them to play 

outside the box because we’ve entered a new period of threat or 

danger to the Nation. So there’s no wink and nod here. 

If you create the box, we will play inside the box without exception. If it is the judgment of the American political process that the 

Army Field Manual and the processes of the FBI are adequate to 

the defense of the Republic in all conditions of threat, in all periods 

in the future, that’s what we will do. 

My view is that would substantially increase the danger to 

America and that my agency should be allowed to continue the use 

of techniques which have been judged lawful by the Attorney General and briefed to this Committee. 

Vice Chairman BOND. And I believe you have said that the less 

than one third of the less than 100 who were subjected to enhanced 

techniques would not give information using less than the enhanced techniques that you used and, thus, the literally thousands 

of intelligence reports that you gained from that small subset 

would not be available. 

General HAYDEN. That’s correct, Senator. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, my thanks to all of you. My apologies to the Chairman. 

General MAPLES. Sir, could I make just one follow-on there? 

Vice Chairman BOND. Oh, please do, yes. 

General MAPLES. Since the Army Field Manual has been mentioned several times, and the fact that it could be rewritten, to my 

knowledge right now, within the Department of Defense and within 

the Army, there’s no intention to rewrite that field manual and 

that the manual does give us the kinds of techniques that we believe we need to have in order to be successful. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Well, when Mr. Piro questioned Saddam 

Hussein, he claimed he was an envoy of the President of the 

United States. Is that within the tactics in the Army Field Manual? 

General MAPLES. It is. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman BOND. You can say you’re an envoy. 

General MAPLES. And Mr. Piro was also all-knowing, and he 

used a number of techniques that could be considered as a part of 

the manual. 

General HAYDEN. I believe—and, Mike, correct me if I’m wrong— 

that’s called false flag, and it’s a limited technique, and I believe 

the field manual confines that to unlawful combatants. 

Director MCCONNELL. Yes. 

General HAYDEN. Not to the normal lawful combatants. 

Vice Chairman BOND. Most interesting. I will follow up at our 

subsequent open hearing on the powers that the intelligence reform 

bill should have given to the community and also ask you about 

budgeting problems. 

But I appreciate the forbearance of the Chairman and your willingness to join us for this lengthy session. And if we do not get 

99 

called on the floor to play in the FISA sandbox this afternoon, we 

will look forward to further discussions. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. Please 

don’t collect your papers yet. I have two more questions. We will 

be meeting in less than 2 hours, hopefully. No, actually, hopefully, 

we’ll be doing FISA on the floor before that, but I don’t think that’s 

going to happen. 

Two questions. One, I want to go back to the subject that you 

and I were discussing, Director Mueller, about the threat to America from within America. First, I want to go to China and Taiwan, 

a juxtaposition. The Chinese have basically made peace with all of 

the countries that they border, some 14, and others in Southeast 

Asia and have made a remarkable kind of effort to do that, providing aid, all kinds of things. 

They’ve made none whatsoever, of course, with Japan and Taiwan. And then there is always us. So those three stand out. 

There are many who think that communism, except for the party 

apparatus and the big meeting places, doesn’t really exist any 

longer in China, that it’s been changed irrevocably because of economic forces, and that the Chinese leaders who throughout history, 

including all imperial history, obviously have never been elected. 

And, therefore, the two present leaders, neither of whom have 

any sort of military connections, are then also lacking that, which 

has been a stronghold of other previous leaders. And that, therefore, when a Tiananmen Square comes along or there’s mercury in 

a stream or factories are closed down and tens of thousands of 

workers—and this becomes almost a daily routine somewhere in 

that very vast country—are demonstrating that Chinese leaders 

overreact because they are fundamentally afraid of their own people. 

They have authority over their own people, but throughout Chinese history, going back to the Boxer Rebellion, the May 4th Movement, way before that, the people have been free to revolt and to 

change their leadership. Those lessons are never lost on the Chinese, because they never forget in their 5,000 years. 

So that’s one scenario, that they’re afraid of their people and of 

disruption within their own country, and with good reason, with 

the hundreds of millions of people who have not yet landed anywhere, migrating from east to west, and not having found a place. 

And so what they do, then, is they turn to nationalism, because 

nationalism is a button that really works in China, and that they 

do that either toward Japan and the Yasukuni shrine visit by a 

prime minister and not to Taiwan, for obvious reasons, even 

though there is tens of billions of dollars of commerce—and I think 

air service, at least in one direction—between those two entities. 

And so one asks the question: Is the Taiwan-mainland China— 

is that for eternity? Deng Xiaoping used to say, ‘‘Wait 50 years, and 

things will solve themselves. Don’t always feel you have to take action. Problems work out.’’ He was a wise man. 

I’m putting the question to you. The probable next president of 

Taiwan is not in favor of stirring up independence in Taiwan. It 

would seem to me that the economic future and the personal interrelationship of Taiwan and the mainland could very well signal 

more peace and a growing willingness to deal with each other and 

100 

jaw at each other from time to time, but actually not doing anything about it, in spite of all the missiles that are aimed at Taiwan 

and in spite of all the energy as Taiwan prepares to prepare itself. 

So I’m interested in how long you think this is going to last, if 

you think that Deng Xiaoping—maybe you have to add on an extra 

25 or 30 years—will be proven right, number one. 

And, second, Director Mueller—and I would ask Director McConnell to also comment on this—this country has changed enormously 

in recent years. The whole problem of income disparity, the problem of joblessness, the problem of degradation of our culture, primarily through television and sexually explicit and violence, which 

is I think a shame upon our Nation and a shame upon Hollywood, 

this Nation has changed. 

And when I mention disaffected youth or people, whether they’re 

doctors or whether they’re young people, it strikes me that the climate for people doing things that they never would have considered doing before simply out of frustration and because new tools 

are available to them—and you, Director Mueller, discussed extensively the Internet, the whole question of cyber security and all the 

rest of it—that you don’t have to go to Pakistan to train. 

You can just go on the Internet to find out how to do a suitcase 

bomb. You don’t have to climb poles and jump over trenches. So I 

really worry that the American people don’t worry. I really worry 

that, because there’s been no attack since 9/11, that the American 

people have let down their guard. 

I really worry that the Department of Homeland Security is 

treated as a stepchild in Government and is funded often as a stepchild in Government and that all of this bodes for our not being 

able to protect ourselves and to have the sort of day-to-day vigilance which is required psychologically and actually to be on a 

strong state of alert as we are in other parts of the world. 

Now, those are two questions, and I’m already way over my time, 

but I’d like to have answers. 

Director MCCONNELL. Could I start, sir? Would that be all right? 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Please. 

Director MCCONNELL. Let me go to China-Taiwan. I would agree 

with Deng Xiaoping. In time, it will heal itself. The greatest risk 

now is miscalculation. 

As you said, the United States is a very different place than it 

was 50 years ago. China is a very different place than just a few 

years ago. Their biggest challenge is stability. The focus of the 

party in power is to, first of all, keep the party in power. 

And so the argument is how do you maintain a society of 1.3 billion people, half of which have not yet had the fruits of this economic prosperity and growth rained down on them, and move them 

in a way that it remains stable, they get access to raw materials 

and they have markets for which they can sell their goods. 

So my view is it will become more democratic over time, and the 

Taiwan-China situation will solve, but the greatest risk for us is 

miscalculation or an event that gets out of control. You mentioned 

that leadership could overreact, and that’s my worry. If it’s left to 

just its normal trend, I think it will evolve to be a different place. 

With regard to your question on extremists in this country, I 

would highlight we’ve always had extremists in this country, alVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
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ways. The difference, in my view, is the tools that they have access 

to can do disproportionate harm or damage in relation to one or 

two or three, because of things like the Internet, because of things 

like explosives or flying airplanes into buildings. 

All the things that one could dream up could have a broadly disproportionate impact on our society because of the tools and the 

technology available to them. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. And your reason for the fact that we 

don’t seem to be that worried about it because we keep saying 

there’s never been anything that’s hurt our country since 9/11? 

Director MCCONNELL. I think that is shaped by political debate 

and leadership. The country will respond to the right kind of leadership, I believe, and so it’s making the argument and having the 

debate, because it would be a very vigorous debate. 

Some of the things that you alluded to about Hollywood and the 

kinds of material they produce and so on—there are going to be 

many people that would disagree with you, in the interest of freedom of speech and not controlling anything and so on. 

So there’s going to be a tremendous debate. Either we’re going 

to have an event that causes us to be shocked and awakened, and 

then we’ll start to move down that path, or the leadership and the 

dialog will take us in a different direction. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Director Mueller? 

Director MUELLER. Yeah, I agree with the Admiral. We’ve always 

had extremists, disaffected, McVeigh being an example, responsible 

for the Oklahoma City bombing. 

But those who are disaffected now have greater access to information, greater access to instruction on how to manufacture devices, greater capabilities of intersection with others through the 

Internet or through other communications, and the damage is disproportionate given the capabilities that one has today. 

As to complacency, yes, I mentioned it before. We have become 

complacent over a period of time, and we have to resist that complacency, understand that there are people out there who wish to 

do us harm in our communities and continue to work with State 

and local law enforcement ourselves but also work with other members of the community to identify those who seek to do us harm 

before they can undertake such attacks. 

Chairman ROCKEFELLER. All right. We recess and we meet again 

not far from here at 2:30. 

And I thank you all very, very much. 

[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

(103) 

Submission for the Record 

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Question 1: (U) a) To what extent has the government of President Preval been 

able to tackle ongoing problems with government corruption? Is the Haitian National Police (HNP) force taking adequate steps, with the support of U.N. forces, to 

address drug trafficking and armed criminal gangs? How is the training of the HNP 

progressing? b) In recent months, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti 

(MINUSTAH) role has shifted toward helping Haitian authorities combat the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people. What steps are MINUSTAH and the Preval government taking to improve the security of Haiti’s border with the Dominican Republic and to increase patrols of the country’s maritime borders? What are the prospects 

of economic refugees from Haiti arriving on U.S. shores? 

Question 2: (U) During President Bush’s recent visit to Israel, the case of Jonathan Pollard—an American citizen who pleaded guilty in 1986 to conspiracy to deliver national defense information to Israel—was reportedly on the unofficial agenda. During the 1998 Wye River Summit, then Director of Central Intelligence 

George Tenet threatened to resign if Mr. Pollard’s life sentence was commuted. Are 

you opposed to the release of Mr. Pollard? How would the release of Mr. Pollard 

affect the Intelligence Community and our national security interests? 

Answer: (U) We are unequivocally opposed to leniency for Mr. Pollard. This is the 

unanimous view of the counterintelligence community. Our reasons are still best 

stated in the January 30, 1996 letter from then-FBI Director Louis Freeh to thenAttorney General Reno and the strong stance taken in 1998 by then-Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet. Additional classified information, previously submitted to the SSCI during the years of this matter, remains valid as to the grave 

national damage caused by this individual. Clemency for Pollard will undermine 

U.S. security practices and complicate U.S. counterintelligence programs. 

Question 3: (U) a) The Administration has stated that the surge in Iraq is producing the desired results. Defense Secretary Gates recently stated that if progress 

continues in Iraq, he will authorize the redeployment of five military combat brigades. What is the current Intelligence Community (IC) assessment regarding 

neighboring countries’ activities with respect to current conditions in Iraq? How 

does the IC assess potential actions that neighboring countries may taken should 

the U.S. initiate drawdown activities in the near future? 

Question 3: (U) b) To what extent are you concerned that armed Sunni Arab 

Iraqis now associated with the Anbar Awakening movement and Concerned Local 

Citizens committees could pose a threat to the Iraqi government or U.S. forces? 

What role are Shiite militia groups such as the Jaysh Al Mandi likely to play in 

Iraq’s security over the coming year? 

Answer: (U) We continue to monitor the effectiveness and durability of tribal and 

former insurgent local citizens groups—commonly referred to as Sons of Iraq 

(SOIs)—and their interaction with the Iraqi government. We judge that over the 

next 6 months these security initiatives probably will remain a viable mechanism 

for countering extremist threats, providing economic opportunities, and allowing for 

constructive Sunni participation in a unified Iraq over the next 6 months and beyond as long as the Coalition or the Iraqi Government funds SOI contracts or provides job opportunities. 

(U) We judge that if the Iraqi Government is unwilling or unable to meet Sunni 

expectations for economic opportunities and integration into government positions, 

the risk that SOIs will suspend support for local security initiatives and resume violence against Coalition forces and the Iraqi Government will increase. 

(U) We judge Shia militia groups will continue to have a destabilizing affect on 

Iraq’s security environment over the next year. The public rhetoric of Muqtada alSadr, the head of the Jaysh al-Mandi (JAM) militia, has become increasingly vocal 

about his long-held anti-Coalition and anti-Iraqi government stance over the last 

month and his militia has become increasingly active against Coalition forces in 

Baghdad and southern Iraq and is likely to remain so while being targeted by the— 

Iraqi government. 

a.(U) Increasing competition between the Sadrists and other Shia organizations 

such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and its militia wing, Badr 

Organization, for political power and economic resources has the potential to 

further erode security in southern Iraq. Many Sadrists probably view the recent 

targeting of senior Sadrist officials in Najaf and Basrah as an attempt by ISCl/ 

Badr to undermine the Sadrist movement in the run-up to provincial elections. 

b.(U) Shia organizations such as Jund al-Sama, the Shia messianic cult responsible for violence in early 2006 and 2007, retains a capability to conduct highprofile violence in the Shia holy cities of Najaf and Karbala as well as in provinVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
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cial capitals in southern Iraq. Jund al-Sawa historically conducts their violence 

around major Shia religious holidays such as Ashura and Arbaeen. 

Question 3: (U) c) Please describe the current state of Iranian intervention in Iraq 

in terms of the supply of weaponry, financing, or training to Iraqi groups. What 

level of threat do weapons and supplies of Iranian origin pose to U.S. and Coalition 

personnel? 

Answer: (U) Iran, primarily through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods 

Force (IRGCQF), continues to provide weapons, funding, training, and logistical support to certain Iraqi Shia militants. We have recovered weapons in Iraq that were 

clearly manufactured by Iran, and some with relatively recent factory markings. 

Tehran uses the provision of lethal aid to build ties to an array of influential actors, 

protect the Shia in the event of civil war, prepare for future contingencies such as, 

military action against Tehran, as well as ensure the US suffers setbacks in Iraq. 

(U) We assess Iran continues to provide Iraqi Shia militants explosive devices or 

components, including explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), rockets, mortars, C– 

4, small arms and munitions. Attacks from EFPs—the vast majority of the components of which we assess come from Iran—are of particular concern because of the 

number of casualties they inflict on Coalition forces. We assess Iran also has supplied Shia militants with 107mm and 204mm rockets that have been used to attack 

Coalition Forces and Iraqi Government targets. We judge Iranian-supplied rockets 

were used by Jaysh al-Mandi militants to attack the International Zone and other 

Coalition facilities and bases during the recent fighting in Baghdad, Al Basrah, and 

several southern cities. 

Question 3: (U) d) Do you agree with the recent comments by the Iraqi Defense 

Minister that it will take until 2018 to defend Iraq’s borders? Do you believe the 

current level of violence in Iraq will hold, get better, or get worse? Are the factors 

behind the drop in violence sustainable? 

Answer: (U) We are unable to confidently judge when Iraq will be fully capable 

of defending its borders. We judge the amount of time that is required before Iraq 

is able to defend its borders will depend on several factors, including how rapidly 

the ISF is able to address critical shortfalls in combat service support and combat 

enablers such as fire support and intelligence; the amount of time required for the 

ISF to acquire, integrate, and become proficient in modern combat equipment; the 

capacity of Iraq’s security ministries to absorb and train additional forces; and the 

level and type of Coalition support provided to the ISF in the coming years. 

(U) We assess with moderate confidence that overall security gains in Iraq will 

be maintained during the next 6 months because most of the factors underpinning 

security trends are likely to remain viable. Coalition and ISF population security 

operations will continue to inflict losses and constraints on AQI; the security contributions of the Sons of Iraq, assisted by the Coalition and grudgingly supported 

by the GOI, will continue to weaken the Sunni insurgency while bolstering the fight 

against AQI; and Iraqi Security Forces—supported by Coalition training, logistics 

and combat support elements—will continue to improve their operational capabilities. 

(U) Nevertheless, AQI is still capable of conducting spectacular attacks despite 

disruptions of its networks. Stability remains fragile in southern Iraq as Shia 

groups continue to compete for political power and economic resources and the Iraqi 

Government forcibly confronts the JAM. Security in northern Iraq also remains tenuous as Sunni resistance elements and AQI increasingly focus their activities in the 

area. 

Question 3: (U) e) Does the Intelligence Community assess al-Sadr and his militias will continue their cease-fire indefinitely? Do they retain the capacity to return 

to violence? Will the recently approved de-Bathification law promote reconciliation 

or discord between Shiite and Sunni factions? How big a role will Ahmed Chalabi 

play in the law’s implementation? 

Answer: (U) Prime Minister Maliki’s recent endorsement of operations against the 

Jaysh al-Mandi (JAM) militia and public warning that the Sadrists cannot participate in the political process unless the militia disbands could diminish the Sadrists’ 

stake in the provincial elections and decrease Muqtada al-Sadr’s incentives to use 

political, rather than violent, means to gain influence. 

(U) Sadr on 7 April 2008 publicly announced he would disband the JAM only if 

top Shia clerics in An Najaf or Qom, Iran, ordered him to do so. Sadr also has 

warned that he would lift the freeze on attacks by his group if government military 

actions against the group become too far-reaching. 

107 

(U) The JAM also may resume attacks to relieve supporters’ frustration about 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) operations and to press the Iraqi Government to address 

Sadrist demands, including an end to indiscriminate raids and a release of JAM 

prisoners. Although the efforts of the Iraqi government to limit the scope of their 

operations have so far prevented major JAM violence, recent ISF and Coalition operations in Sadr City and ongoing clashes in Al Basrah could trigger widespread fighting. 

(U) Muqtada al-Sadr on 3 April 2008 called for an end to ISF operations against 

JAM members and the Sadrist movement is reacting to stepped-up government 

pressure by keeping its JAM militia at high readiness to resume violence quickly 

if directed. 

(U) Recent passage of de-Bathification reform by the Council of Representatives 

(COR), along with several other laws, marks a step toward Iraqi political reconciliation. The impact of de-Bathification reform will depend on how effectively it is implemented, who is appointed to the new de-Ba’thification Commission, and what 

procedures and regulations govern its work. 

(U) Ahmad Chalabi is unlikely to have significant influence over the implementation of the Law on Accountability and Justice unless he can secure an appointment 

to the new Higher National Commission of Accountability and Justice (HNCAJ), 

which will replace Chalibi’s Higher National De-Ba’athification Commission. 

Question 3: (U) f) How likely are we to secure Iraq’s borders with Iran and Syria 

without these countries’ cooperation? 

Answer: (U) We judge increased efforts by the Iraqi government to garner legitimate cooperation from Tehran—in addition to implementing measures to filter out 

corrupt members of the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), increasing funding for additional border security personnel and new equipment, and engaging border area tribal leaders—will be necessary to improve security along the Iraq-Iran 

border. Iraqi police and DBE are constrained by corruption, militant infiltration, insufficient manpower, and outdated equipment and are at present incapable of stopping the flow of Iranian-made explosives, weapons, drugs, oil, and people across 

Iraq’s 900-mile border with Iran. 

(U) We judge the Iraqi government will have difficulty securing Iraq’s borders 

with Syria without additional measures taken by Damascus to secure the Syrian 

side of the border and prevent Sunni extremists from crossing into Iraq. Over the 

past year, Damascus has taken more aggressive action against some Sunni extremists in Syria and has continued to take steps to increase security along its border 

with Iraq, such as installing new border guard posts; improving earthen berms at 

the border; and engaging Iraq and other states in the region to increase border security. Despite these efforts, we estimate the majority of foreign terrorists continue to 

travel to Iraq via the Syria-Iraq border. 

Question 4: (U) a) Does Iran have the ability to mate a nuclear warhead to a longor medium-range ballistic missile? Can International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

safeguards provide confidence in the ability of the United States and/or the IAEA 

to detect a revived Iranian nuclear weapons program? 

Question 4: (U) b) The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) released this past December states that ‘‘the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of 

producing enough HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) for a weapon is late 2009, but 

that this is very unlikely.’’ The NIE adds that ‘‘Iran probably would be technically 

capable of producing enough LIEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010–2015 

timeframe.’’ It also notes that ‘‘INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability 

before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.’’ This estimate also states that ‘‘[all agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may 

not be attained until after 2015.’’ However, the NIE also states that ‘‘Iran probably 

would use covert facilities — rather than its declared nuclear sites — for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon.’’ Do the NIE’s timelines assume 

that Iran would use covert enrichment facilities, rather than its known enrichment 

facilities? Would Iran’s use of a covert facility alter the timelines significantly? 

Question 4: (U) c) To what extent, if at all, does the recently published National 

Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear program alter the perception of threat from 

Iran? How would you characterize the potential Iranian overall threat to broader 

U.S. interests in the Middle East? 

Question 5: (U) (a) Please provide an assessment of the strength, capabilities, and 

intentions of remaining al-Qa’ida operatives in Saudi Arabia. What steps have Saudi 

authorities taken to secure critical energy infrastructures such as the Abqaiq oil facility that was attacked in 2006? (b) To what extent are Saudi nationals and organiVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
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zations based in Saudi Arabia providing material or financial support to international terrorist organizations? To what extent are Saudi nationals and organizations supporting armed Sunni groups in Iraq? How do you assess current Saudi efforts to curtail the flow of fighters and money from the kingdom to combatants in 

Iraq and terrorist groups elsewhere? 

Question 6: (U) a) To what extent are you concerned that the Turkish military 

will launch another invasion of northern Iraq to combat the terrorist organization 

Kongra Gel (KGK), formerly known as the Kurdistan Workers Party — or PKK? 

How has U.S. assistance to the Government of Turkey mitigated this concern? How 

much of a threat does KGK pose directly to the U.S. and U.S. interests? b) In 2007, 

the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured a second term 

in office despite objections from the military command and secularist groups. Are 

you concerned about the possible loss of Turkey’s secular identity and, if so, why? 

Please assess the changes in Turkey’s relations with Arab and Muslim countries 

since the AKP came to power and any concerns you might have about these relations. In particular, how do Turkey’s relations with Iran and Syria and dependence 

on Russian gas affect, conflict or undermine U.S. policies? 

Question 7: (U) The threat posed by Islamist militancy in western Pakistan appears to be growing. a) What new steps might the Pakistan Government take to 

more effectively combat al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups in the tribal regions of Pakistan? b) How does the Intelligence Community assess Islamabad’s ability to curb 

support emanating from the FATA to the Afghan Taliban, whose insurgency is a 

threat to the government of President Karzai? 

Answer: (U) If the Pakistan Government took the following steps, it would more 

effectively combat al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups in the tribal regions of Pakistan: 

a. (U) Exert sustained effective military pressure on militants and their alQa’ida allies, reducing their de facto control of portions of the FATA. 

b. (U) Integrate sustained effective military pressure with administrative, economic, educational, legal and social reforms that reduce the leverage of militants and their al-Qa’ida allies. 

c. (U) Improve police and paramilitary forces’ ability to provide justice and border security. 

d. (U) Provide effective political leadership that effectively explains the reasons 

for military action and orchestrates the administrative, economic, educational, 

legal, and social reforms to reduce the leverage of militants and their al-Qa’ida 

allies. 

(U) Islamabad can curb support emanating from the FATA to the Afghan Taliban. 

Pakistan has substantial military and intelligence resources that it has not used in 

the FATA, and its leadership has not made reducing militancy there a top priority. 

(U) Three factors account for Pakistan’s lack of action. First, civilian and military 

leaders for the most part do not appreciate the threat that FATA-based militants 

pose to Pakistan. Second, military leaders have been more concerned about the 

threat from India. Third, Islamabad is not prepared to bear the very substantial 

costs of a larger military effort, such as counterattacks by tribal militants and their 

al-Qa’ida allies through the length and breadth of Pakistan, as occurred in the latter 

half of 2007 and early 2008, with heavy military casualties, and strong public criticism of the government. 

(U) The newly elected civilian leaders in Islamabad and at the provincial level in 

Peshawar are slowly beginning to come to terms with the threat of militancy in the 

tribal areas. They are beginning to examine the administrative and economic steps 

that would be necessary to counter militancy over the long term. Their public statements suggest they see some role for military action as well, but we expect that new 

civilian leaders will reduce the pace of military efforts against FATA militants in 

the near term. 

(U) Taliban based in Baluchistan also provide important support for the insurgency in Afghanistan. 

Question 8: (U) Two independent assessments on the situation in Afghanistan 

were recently released — one prepared by the Atlantic Council of the United States 

and the other by the Afghanistan Study Group. The reports state that (1) NATO 

forces in Afghanistan are in a ‘‘strategic stalemate’’ and that ‘‘NATO is not winning’’; (2) Afghanistan remains a failing state, and could become a failed state,’’ and 

(3) progress in Afghanistan ‘‘is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges, and a growing lack of 

confidence on the part of the Afghan people about the future of their country.’’ The 

109 

administration has recently announced that 3,200 Marines would be sent to Afghanistan to stem shortfalls in troop levels there. 

a. (U) Do you agree with these assessments? Why is violence up 27 percent last 

year? Is NATO winning or losing in Afghanistan? How large is the Taliban insurgency? How does this compare with recent years? 

b. (U) What is the role of al-Qa’ida in the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan? 

Does al-Qa’ida control any insurgent forces in Afghanistan? 

c. (U) Will the Government of Afghanistan ever be able to defend itself and provide security and services with outside assistance? How long will this take? 

d. (U) What is the role of Iran in Afghanistan? How has it changed in the last 

year? 

e. (U) What would be the consequences for NATO of a withdrawal from Afghanistan? Is NATO able to sustain its deployments to Afghanistan? 

Answer: (U) After almost thirty years of continuous warfare, Afghanistan and the 

international community face enormous challenges in building a self-reliant, sustainable government. Notable gains have been made but there is a long way to go. 

Increased violence last year was a result of a combination of operations by international forces and insurgent initiated activity. The insurgents cannot capture 

ground held by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops but Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF) are not yet able to hold ground cleared by ISAF. 

The Taliban-led insurgency includes hardcore militants and part-time fighters and 

overall numbers are hard to assess. We judge that despite losses among leaders and 

the rank and file last year that the Taliban can find replacements and will remain 

a formidable challenge in 2008. 

(U) We judge that al-Qa’ida fighters comprise a comparatively small percentage 

of the overall insurgent force, frequently working with Taliban commanders. AlQa’ida does, however, provide fmancial and personnel support as well as assistance 

in training and propaganda. 

(U) Improvements made in governance at the national level have not yet, for the 

most part, fully extended to the provincial and district level. The creation of the 

Independent Directorate for Local Governance in the Presidential palace is an attempt to close that gap. The Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to grow and 

improve. Some units are capable of limited independent activity but it will be at 

least several years before the ANA is ready to take a leading role against the insurgency. Development of the Afghan National Police lags behind the Army. 

(U) Iran is a major aid donor providing funding for development and reconstruction in Afghanistan—particularly in the western region of that country, and is engaged in counter-narcotics efforts along the Afghan border. Iran’s active pursuit of 

its own interests, however, undermines Afghan objectives to achieve peace and stability. Iran does not limit its support to a single political, religious, or ethnic group 

in Afghanistan. Tehran provides financial support to government-aligned tribes and 

former Northern Alliance contacts politically opposed to President Karzai, while also 

funding and arming the Taliban in Afghanistan. Since 2006, Iran’s IRGC Qods 

Force has provided weapons to the Taliban for use against Afghan government and 

international forces. The frequent weapons shipments Iran has arranged have included small arms and associated ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, mortar 

rounds, 107mm rockets, plastic explosives, explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), 

and probably man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to the Taliban. 

We believe Iranian lethal support is aimed more at attempting to raise the costs 

for the United States and our ISAF partners of our presence in Afghanistan — inflicting casualties on international forces in an attempt to negatively affect public 

opinion in ISAF troop-contributing nations — than at restoring a Taliban government. 

Question 9: (U) Is al-Qa’ida as strong today as it was on 11 September 2001? How 

serious is the Government of Pakistan about the threat from al-Qa’ida? How effectively have the Pakistanis dealt with the al-Qa’ida presence in the FATA? 

Question 10: (U) How aggressive is China in collecting against sensitive and protected U.S. systems, facilities, and development projects? Is the counterintelligence 

threat to the U.S. from China at the same level as it was during the cold war? What 

are the challenges of prosecuting suspected espionage cases involving China? What 

has been the evolution of threats of cyber-attacks and computer spying from China? 

Answer: (U) The Counterintelligence Community considers the People’s Republic 

of China (PRC) to be one of the most aggressive countries targeting U.S. military, 

political, and economic secrets as well as sensitive U.S. trade secrets and technologies. A broad spectrum of entities is involved in the collection effort. For examVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
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ple, the PRC Intelligence Services (PRCIS) such as the Ministry of State Security, 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff 2nd Department and 3rd Department, 

Liaison Office of the PLA General Political Department, and the PRC Ministry of 

Public Security—are major collectors. The PRCIS has the intent, the patience, and 

the capability to spot, target, assess, and recruit U.S. officials with high-level access 

to sensitive U.S. Government information. 

(U) Nonprofessional intelligence collectors—including government and commercial 

researchers, students, academics, scientists, business people, delegations, and visitors—also provide China with a significant amount of sensitive U.S. technologies 

and trade secrets. Some members of this group knowingly or unknowingly collect 

on behalf of PRCIS or Chinese defense industries, presenting a significant intelligence threat. But in many cases, the collection efforts of these private-sector players are driven entirely by the opportunity for commercial or professional gain and 

have no affiliation with PRCIS. Although, in such cases, the Chinese government 

is not involved in the collection effort, it has been a major beneficiary of the acquired technology. 

(U) For a number of reasons, we believe China poses a significantly greater foreign intelligence threat today than it did during most of the cold war era. 

a. (U) China’s economic boom has enabled the government to invest in a broad 

spectrum of advanced technical intelligence collection capabilities. That increase 

in basic capability poses a rising challenge to U.S. military, intelligence, and security operations. 

b. (U) The sizable increase in immigrants and visitors from China to the United 

States has created a large pool of potential targets for PRCIS. For example, in 

1989 about 32,000 immigrants entered the United States from China. By comparison, in 2006 and 2007 the figures were about 87,000 and 77,000. The overwhelming majority of these visitors are in the United States to pursue legitimate objectives, but Chinese intelligence services and other PRC Government 

institutions exploit the access these individuals afford. 

(U) We respectfully recommend you refer your question regarding the challenges 

of prosecuting suspected espionage cases involving China to the Department of Justice. 

(U) China has identified the U.S. critical infrastructure as a lucrative target for 

cyber as well as kinetic attacks; however, we have little direct information on specific plans to attack these systems. We assess that Beijing currently has the technical capabilities to target and disrupt elements of the U.S. information infrastructure and aggressively targets U.S. Government, military, and private sector information systems for intelligence collection. Over the past two years, a number of U.S. 

Government departments and agencies—including the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense—have been victims of computer network intrusions that appear to have originated in China. Determining the exact origins of these attacks, however, is a challenging technical problem. 

Question 11: (U) Between 2004 and 2005, Egypt experienced a series of bombings 

against tourist sites in the Sinai Peninsula. Since then, the situation has become 

relatively stable. In your opinion, were these bombings a result of local grievances, 

or were they influenced or carried out by international organizations such as alQa’ida? How secure is the Suez Canal, and are U.S. warships passing through the 

Canal a target for terrorist groups? 

Answer:(U) TWJ appears to be motivated by Cairo’s harsh treatment of the Bedouin community and difficult economic conditions in the Sinai Peninsula. Animosity 

between the Bedouin and the Egyptian government runs deep, although the Taba 

bombings marked the first Bedouin involvement in violence against the Egyptian 

state. 

a. (U) The Bedouin tribes have historically considered themselves a distinct ethnic group from other Egyptians, and some Egyptians consider them second-class 

citizens. 

b. (U) The Egyptian government has largely failed to deliver on promises to improve economic opportunities and infrastructure in the Sinai, and the aggressive tactics of the Egyptian security services in the northern Sinai following the 

attacks likely fueled further resentment of the central government. 

Question 12: (U) a) Do you believe that it is important for the Intelligence Community to examine issues such as water shortages, disease, and the environment as 

threats to U.S. national security? What unique resources, expertise, or information 

does the Intelligence Community have to add to this issue? To what extent have 

111 

Intelligence Community analysts examined the impact of climate change? Does the 

Intelligence Community have sufficient resources to adequately address the environmental change issue? What judgments, if any, have they made with regard to the 

potential impact of climate change on National Security? How much analytic disagreement, if any, has there been with regard to the potential impact of climate 

change on National Security, and how would you characterize the range of any such 

disagreement? b) To what degree do the intelligence services of the other countries 

view climate change as a national security issue? c) Which world’s regions have analysts assessed to be at greater risk of instability as a result of climate change? Of 

those regions, will any significantly affect U.S. national security, and over what period of time could such a threat expect to emerge? d) What is the assessment of the 

eventual likelihood of territorial conflict due to climate change? What conclusion, if 

any, have intelligence analysts reached with regard to climate change, its impact 

on regional and global instability, and the effect such instability may have on religious and political extremism and, ultimate, any increase in terrorism? 

Answer: (U) This question calls for a partial classified response. The Intelligence 

Community (IC) examines state stability as a critical part of determining potential 

threats to U.S. interests. In this analysis, water shortages, disease, and the environment are considered along with other factors. The IC also considers the effects that 

climate change negotiations and mitigation efforts will have on the U.S. economy, 

its trade goals, and its diplomatic relationships with the international community. 

Based upon a recent National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) review and 

Congressional interest, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) is preparing a National Intelligence Assessment (NIA) on the national security impacts of global climate change to 2030. The assessment will provide judgments of the IC on the broad 

potential impacts of climate change on National Security. This assessment has not 

yet been completed so we have no information on any analytical disagreement 

among the members of the IC. If there is disagreement, this will be documented in 

the NIA, using the same footnote procedure the NIC uses for National Intelligence 

Estimates (NIEs). For determining the physical impacts of environmental and climate changes, the IC relies heavily upon research work from other organizations 

(non-government and government). However, the general scientific literature and research is more concentrated at the global level, and often not targeted at areas that 

may be of interest to the IC. In addition, many climate-related impacts on state and 

regional stability are likely to be felt first in areas of the world where IC agencies— 

particularly collection agencies—have limited resources and expertise. Hence, there 

is a need for better research/information on state/regional level on physical, agricultural, economic, social, and political impacts from climate change. This research 

does not necessarily require classified sources or methods and may be performed in 

an open/unclassified environment. However, once the impacts are understood, the 

IC is equipped to make the determination if the impacts cross a national security 

threshold. A section of the NIA will be devoted to challenges to the IC in performing 

these kinds of assessments. The IC is evaluating its own ability to make contributions to the scientific study of environmental and climate change issues through a 

special study with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Results from this effort—which may also identify specific IC needs—are not expected until next year. 

As a result of previous research we had put in place a long-term collection program 

to observe critical sites using national classified systems, and these data are being 

routinely collected through the US Geological Survey (USGS) and the Civil Applications Committee (CAC). Working with NAS, we will add additional sites, globally, 

as appropriate. These data will be a valuable resource to evaluate future trends in 

climate and environmentally sensitive sites. In addition, the Department of Energy’s 

Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is expanding its climate change analytical capabilities, as well as prototyping an unclassified strategic intelligence network focused on these issues. 

(U) The regional impacts and likely significance to national security from climate 

change will be discussed in the forthcoming NIA. 

(U) The potential for climate change to cause territorial conflict, or regional instability will be discussed in the forthcoming NIA. 

Question 13: (U) Many health analysts are concerned about the threat of emerging (e.g. the H5N1 strain of avian influenza) or re-emerging (e.g. severe acute respiratory syndrome) infectious diseases. Is there a role for the Intelligence Community in the effort to protect the U.S. from diseases that might originate overseas but 

threaten U.S. territories? Does the Intelligence Community collect intelligence on 

the international efforts to improve state openness, global reporting, monitoring, 

and containment of infectious diseases, and to prepare for pandemics, coordinating 

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national and global responses to infectious disease outbreaks, and including resource and distribution challenges? 

Answer: (U) The Intelligence Community (IC) plays a crucial role in the protection 

of U.S. persons and national interests from emerging or re-emerging disease outbreaks. The IC provides earliest possible warning, and forecasts potential primary, 

secondary, and tertiary impacts from these events, using both clandestine collection 

and open source collection of foreign print and electronic media. 

(U) Not all countries are capable of detecting—or are forthcoming in reporting— 

disease outbreaks. In the absence of such data, there may be important gaps in the 

international disease surveillance conducted by national and international health 

agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The IC helps to close these gaps through the use of clandestine reporting and foreign language open source material that provide insights into foreign 

governments’ transparency, capabilities, intentions, and effectiveness in responding 

to disease outbreaks. Further, the IC is developing partnerships with non-IC agencies such as the CDC to enable data sharing and strengthen US government warning capabilities for emerging and re-emerging diseases. IC examination of foreign 

news websites through use of an Open Source Center capability called ARGUS provided the CDC with the first indications of an Ebola outbreak in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo last year. 

(U) While national and international health agencies assess information on the 

spread of emerging diseases and their impact on the health of populations, the IC 

is unique in providing policymakers with all-source analysis of potential primary, 

secondary, and tertiary impacts from these events (including the international political, economic, and security ripple effects). Further, the IC provides dynamic threat 

assessments and develops scenarios that clarify how a foreign government may respond should an outbreak occur. The 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory 

Syndrome (SARS)—which, in spite of a very low mortality rate resulted in an estimated $40 billion of economic losses in affected countries—demonstrated that the 

strategic impact of a disease can outweigh the public health one. Throughout the 

SARS period, IC analysts tracked not only the course of the disease, but the havoc 

it was wreaking on the global economy. 

Question 14: (U) What intelligence does the Intelligence Community have about 

how the U.S. position on the use of enhanced interrogation techniques impacts U.S. 

national security interests? What does that intelligence indicate? 

Answer: (U) The Central Intelligence Agency will respond to this question under 

separate correspondence. 

Question 15: (U) a) Please describe the recently announced Cyber Initiative (cyber 

security) program. Is the program focused only on cyber security related issues relevant to the Intelligence Community? 

Answer: (U) This question can be answered only at the classified level. The program is focused on the critical cyber infrastructure of the U.S., beginning with that 

of the entire Federal Government. The role of the Intelligence Community (IC) is 

only one small part of a holistic inter-agency effort to improve cyber security across 

the government. The U.S. information infrastructure, which is critical to our national security and prosperity, is under constant threat by a growing array of stateand non-state adversaries. An integrated and holistic national approach is needed 

to implement effective solutions, and will include an emphasis on defensive and offensive capabilities such as intelligence, law enforcement, counterintelligence, and 

information assurance capabilities. 

Question 15: (U) b) There has been much criticism over the years that the IC increasingly has focused on current or tactical intelligence rather than on strategic intelligence. The result, according to some observers, is that the government’s capacity 

to think broadly and strategically has been reduced. Do you agree with that general 

assessment? If so, what steps have you taken to address the problem and what evidence can you submit that would indicate progress? If not, why not? 

Answer: (U) In March 2005 the Commission tasked to investigate the IC’s approach to Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) issued their report. The report 

addressed the IC’s need to foster long-term research and strategic thinking, and recommended a dedicated research and analysis unit within the National Intelligence 

Council (NIC). 

(U) In 2006, the Office of the DNI took seriously the Commission’s diagnosis and 

recommendation, and established a new dedicated organization, the Long-Range 

Analysis Unit, within the NIC. The Unit is staffed by a combination of research diVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
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rectors and rotational analysts from across the IC and has been active in developing 

strategic intelligence for the National Security Council and the policy planning 

staffs of the Departments of State and Defense. 

(U) The Unit’s staff works closely with analysts from across IC agencies and a 

wide range of outside academics, researchers and practitioners on issues deemed important for strategic intelligence. The Unit has produced strategic intelligence on 

the implications of WMD proliferation, the prospects for global democratization, the 

implications of the rise of China, and the social and political consequences of climate 

change, among many other issues. Since mid-2006, the Unit has produced 14 strategic level studies. 

(U) The Unit is currently taking the IC lead on development of a large study on 

global trends looking out fifteen to twenty years. The study effort is undertaken 

every 4 years, and the results are widely used by policymakers, academics, and the 

media both in the US and abroad. A key purpose of the study is to orient top US 

policymakers toward the trends and likely contexts in which future policy will be 

developed and implemented. 

(U) Besides the LRAU’s work, the NIC continues to provide policymakers with ICcoordinated strategic analysis. As with LRAU papers, NIC products oftentimes 

serves to orient and prompt strategic-level analysis from the individual analytic 

agencies. In the past few years, individual agencies—such as the CIA/DI—also have 

developed extensive annual research programs, which emphasize strategic and longrange analysis. 

Question 15: (U) c) The 9/11 Commission and other groups have argued that in 

the past, intelligence agencies tended to rely on information from sensitive sources, 

neglecting important information available in newspapers, the Internet and other 

‘‘open sources.’’ Are you satisfied that open source information is currently being 

thoroughly and effectively used by intelligence agencies? What steps have been 

taken to ensure the integration of Open Source information into all source analysis? 

Answer: (U) The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection will respond to this question under separate correspondence. 

Question 16: (U) The CSIS Commission on Smart Power’s recent report noted that 

the United States influence abroad has waned dramatically, with majorities of the 

world’s population not trusting the U.S. to act responsibly, and viewing our role in 

the world negatively. These numbers have become even worse in the last years — 

especially in the Middle East. How significant is the United States standing in the 

world to the Intelligence Community? How do negative views of the U.S. impact our 

national security? 

Answer: (U) Department of State polling confirms the general observation that 

foreign publics, especially in the Middle East, have a much more negative view of 

the United States than they did a decade ago. That, however, is not the only facet 

of public opinion that has salience for foreign policy formulation. Polling also indicates, for example, that in a number of countries, including some in the Middle 

East, polled individuals value relations with the United States and frequently describe relations as generally good, even if their view of the United States is less 

than rosy. These findings point to a pragmatic sense among publics about bilateral 

relations that leaders draw upon as part of their policymaking calculus in deciding 

whether to cooperate with the United States on various issues. 

Question 17: (U) a) Do public threats against the government of Iran weaken or 

strengthen the opposition to the regime of the Ayatollahs? How strong is AhmadiNejad’s position? b) The American ambassador to the U.N. said on February 1, 2008, 

that the U.S. led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq ‘‘helped Iran’s relative position 

in the region.’’ Do you agree with his assessment? c) What is your assessment of 

the likelihood that Iran and Syria would be willing to engage in multilateral efforts 

to stabilize Iraq? d) Are sanctions against Iran having an effect on the country? 

Have they had an effect in changing decisions by Iran’s leaders? e) Was the January 

2008 Strait of Hormuz incident a deliberate attempt to force a confrontation between Iran and the United States? Is there a danger that a similar incident in the 

future could lead to an unintended conflict between the U.S. and Iran? 

Answer: (U) Public threats against the government of Iran—which presumably 

would target Iran’s objectionable foreign policies or nuclear program—probably do 

little to strengthen opposition to the regime, but may provoke policy debates among 

regime elites. 

a. (U) Internal opposition to the regime is fragmented and primarily is based 

on parochial domestic issues—such as ethnic, religious, and localized economic 

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or political grievances—that have little linkage to regime activities that might 

prompt foreign threats. 

b. (U) Iran’s leaders frequently attempt to use foreign threats to rally support 

for the regime. For example, Iranian elites in March 2008 tried to use the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803, which placed additional international sanctions on Iran, to encourage greater voter participation in Iran’s 

Majles (parliament) elections as a sign of popular support for the government 

and opposition to international pressure. 

c. (U) Nonetheless, we judge that foreign threats play a role in internal policy 

debates and political infighting between regime insiders. Iranian leaders who 

favor a more pragmatic approach to international affairs sometimes blame their 

hard-line rivals for engaging in provocative actions that may endanger or disadvantage Iran. 

(U) President Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad’s internal political standing and prospects 

for re-election are unclear. Ahmadi-Nejad’s policies and abrasive style appear to 

have alienated many regime elites, but he retains the public support of Supreme 

Leader Khamenei and, so far, seems to have escaped popular blame for his controversial actions and inflationary economic policies. 

a. (U) We judge that many senior regime figures have serious concerns about 

Ahmadi-Nejad’s policies—especially his populist economic programs and provocative approach to international affairs—or dislike his management practices 

and political style. In addition, we judge that Ahmadi-Nejad’s economic policies 

are fueling inflation and other economic problems, which are the biggest source 

of popular dissatisfaction with the regime. 

b. (U) Nonetheless, Ahmadi-Nejad retains the public backing of Supreme Leader 

Khamenei and we see little open indication that he is being broadly blamed by 

the Iranian public for Iran’s economic woes and increased international isolation. 

c. (U) The Majles (parliament) elections on 15 March should have provided the 

latest opportunity to judge Iranian public attitudes toward national political 

issues, but candidate vetting, restrictions on campaign techniques, the re-election of relatively few incumbents, and the murky nature of Iranian domestic political affiliations make it difficult to determine how Ahmadi-Nejad’s allies 

fared. 

d. (U) We note that Ahmadi-Nejad’s institutional authority—despite his elevated public profile—pales in comparison to Supreme Leader Khamenei, who 

remains the ultimate decisionmaker on Iranian domestic and foreign policy. 

(U) Iranian leaders probably perceive that regional developments—including the 

removal of Saddam and the Taliban, challenges facing the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the influence of HAMAS and Hizballah—have given Tehran more opportunities and freedom to pursue its objective of becoming a regional power. Despite 

Tehran’s ambitions, we judge regional geo-strategic rivalries, religious and ethnic 

animosities, and concerns of neighboring states regarding Iran’s foreign policy and 

military programs will limit the success of Iran’s efforts to expand its influence. 

(U) We assess that Iran likely would be willing to participate in multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq, but we note that any participation would primarily be intended to further Iran’s own interests in Iraq. Tehran would see participation in 

such efforts as an opportunity to legitimize its presence in Iraq, learn more about 

the activities of other foreign actors engaged in Iraqi stabilization efforts, and perhaps direct additional international resources to its allies. 

a. (U) Tehran’s ability to help stabilize Iraq may be limited. Although Iranian 

lethal aid to Shia militias in Iraq currently enables violence, we judge that 

Tehran has only a limited ability to encourage reconciliation. 

b. (U) Nonetheless, Iranian participation in such efforts might be useful in 

terms of aligning Iranian assistance with broader international efforts, reducing 

some of Iran’s concerns that Coalition activity in Iraq is targeting their interests, and giving the U.S. additional insight into the scope of Iranian involvement in Iraq. 

c. (U) Syria also most likely would be willing to participate in multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq to gain influence in any Iraqi government and to look cooperative to the international community. Damascus’s contribution to stability 

probably would be limited to increasing patrols of its border with Iraq and taking more consistent steps to stop the flow of foreign fighters transiting Syria. 

Syria, however, probably would continue reaching out to Iraqi Sunni and Shia 

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groups to increase its influence regardless of the implications for multilateral 

efforts. 

(U) We judge that U.S. and U.N. actions against Iran since the fall of 2006 have 

disrupted Iran’s international financial and commercial activity, raised its cost of 

business, and contributed to Tehran’s continuing engagement in discussions about 

its nuclear policy. Tehran, however, is seeking to minimize the effect of sanctions 

by developing options and we see little indication that sanctions yet have changed 

decisions by Iran’s leaders who, for example, remain publicly resolute about not suspending uranium enrichment. 

(U) We assess the January 2008 Strait of Hormuz incident likely was initiated 

unilaterally by local Iranian Navy commanders and that it was not an attempt by 

Tehran to provoke a confrontation between Iran and the United States. We see no 

indication, however, that Tehran has instructed naval units to alter their operational approach or to less aggressively defend Iran’s maritime boundaries. The assertive attitude of Iranian naval units and ongoing bilateral tensions between Iran 

and the United States make similar future incidents likely. There is a danger of escalation should a future incident turn violent. 

Question 18: Is Hizballah stronger or weaker than at the end of the conflict with 

Israel in the summer of 2006? Given that many believe that Hizballah is a more 

capable organization than al-Qa’ida, do you believe we are allocating enough intelligence resources against it? 

Question 19: (U) a) Which foreign intelligence service currently poses the most 

significant counterintelligence threat to the United States? What intelligence or sensitive information is that service generally targeting for collection? b) The Department of Energy oversees a complex of scientific laboratories that engage in some of 

this government’s most sensitive nuclear research. How significant a target do the 

laboratories remain for foreign intelligence services? Which foreign service do you 

view as the most aggressive at targeting the national laboratories, and what information and intelligence is being targeted for collection? c) As director of the government agency with principal responsibility for counterintelligence, what is your assessment of the quality of DOE’s counterintelligence program? d) How serious is the 

cyber threat confronting the DOE complex, including its weapons laboratories and 

what steps are being taken to address the problem? What evidence can you point 

to that indicated progress is being made in confronting this problem? 

Question 20: (U) In your testimony before the Committee, you stated that ‘‘we do 

not use coercive techniques of any sort in the course of our interrogations.’’ Have 

you been briefed on the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques? If so, do you consider the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques to be coercive? Please elaborate. 

Has the FBI’s Office of General Counsel examined the Army Field Manual? Has the 

FBI determined whether its interrogation and/or interview techniques would be affected if the FBI were limited to only those techniques authorized by the Army Field 

Manual? 

Answer: (U) Although I am aware generally (largely from press reports) of some 

of the enhanced interrogation techniques the CIA has used, I have not been briefed 

on their ‘‘enhanced interrogation techniques’’ and I can, therefore, not comment on 

whether they are coercive. In my opinion, though, waterboarding, which General 

Hayden has acknowledged was used on certain high value detainees, is coercive. 

(U) As for the FBI’s interrogation policy, the FBI has continued its time-tested 

interrogation technique of ‘‘rapport-based interviewing’’ in its criminal and intelligence interviews, both domestically and abroad. This technique comports with the 

U.S. Federal Court due process standard for voluntariness. Furthermore, ‘‘[i]t is the 

policy of the FBI that no attempt be made to obtain a statement by force, threats, 

or promises.’’ This interrogation policy was reaffirmed in a 5/19/04 Electronic Communication (EC), subject: ‘‘Treatment of Prisoners and Detainees,’’ from the FBI 

General Counsel to all FBI divisions. This EC stated: ‘‘It is the policy of the FBI 

that no interrogation of detainees, regardless of status, shall be conducted using 

methods which could be interpreted as inherently coercive, such as physical abuse 

or the threat of such abuse to the person being interrogated or to any third party, 

or imposing severe physical conditions. 

(U) The FBI’s Office of the General Counsel is familiar with the relevant portions 

of the applicable Army Field Manual, including its list of eighteen permitted interrogation approaches. We are not aware of any FBI technique that would be prohibited 

by the Field Manual. Likewise, we are not aware of any Field Manual technique 

the FBI would prohibit. Nevertheless, we do not believe that a manual designed for 

use by soldiers, who may have limited law enforcement experience and education, 

on a battlefield would be appropriately applied to the FBI, which has both a domesVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:26 May 28, 2009 Jkt 045038 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\48119.TXT PREBLE PsN: DPROCT
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tic law enforcement mission and a national security mission. The FBI has a long 

history of conducting interviews using techniques that have been accepted by Article 

III Courts for use in interviewing criminal defendants. These standards could be different from those acceptable for use in a battlefield setting. It would be counterproductive if the FBI were forced to return to the courts to demonstrate that its currently court-approved techniques remain legitimate under the Field Manual’s standards. 

Æ