Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

DEFENSE 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

DOD Needs to 

Periodically Review 

Support Standards 

and Costs at Joint 

Bases and Better 

Inform Congress of 

Facility Sustainment 

Funding Uses 

March 2009 

GAO-09-336 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2009

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE 

DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards

and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress

Highlights of GAO-09-336, a report to of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses

congressional committees 

DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure consistent delivery of 

installation support at the planned joint bases, but the cost of installation 

support is expected to increase rather than decrease as forecasted by the 2005 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. In January 2008, DOD 

began issuing joint base implementation guidance that for the first time 

established a set of common definitions and standards for installation 

support. The guidance defined 47 installation support areas (e.g., airfield 

operations, grounds maintenance, custodial services, and child and youth 

programs) and provided 267 standards to define the expected level of service

in each area. DOD officials stated that the standards represented the service 

levels needed to meet mission and personnel requirements in view of DOD 

policies and guidance, commercial standards, other federal agency guidance, 

or in some cases, military judgment. However, contrary to the expectations of 

the commission, for two primary reasons installation support costs at the joint 

bases are expected to increase above the cost of support provided by the 

separate installations before consolidation. First, DOD has required the joint 

bases to deliver installation support in accordance with the new standards 

even though the military services have not previously funded installation 

support in the amounts needed to meet each of the standards. GAO’s 

comparison of 40 selected standards to the service levels currently provided 

at the nine installations it visited showed that on average service levels would 

have to increase to meet the standards in about 27 percent of the areas 

compared. Second, in some instances the services’ approach to implementing 

joint basing will result in additional administrative costs and the loss of some

existing installation support efficiencies. Although DOD officials stated that 

the increased support costs at the joint bases might be at least partially offset 

over time as experience is gained and new efficiencies are identified and 

adopted, it is unclear whether joint basing will result in actual savings. 

The military services have not budgeted and spent sufficient funds to meet 

their facility sustainment requirements and goals and prevent facility

deterioration at the installation level. Citing other budget priorities as the 

reason, the military services did not budget funds to meet about $2.3 billion 

(9 percent) of their total facility sustainment requirements during fiscal years

2005 through 2008 and, according to DOD, needed sustainment work that is 

not performed may eventually result in damaged facilities, shortened facility 

service lives, and increased future costs for facility restoration. The services

have further exacerbated the sustainment funding issue by using some 

budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes. During fiscal years 2006 

through 2008, the military services used about $2.6 billion (14 percent) of the 

funds budgeted for sustainment for other purposes, primarily to pay for 

unfunded facility restoration and modernization projects. Although service 

officials stated that these projects were needed, the consequence was that 

sustainment requirements were not met. During visits to nine installations, 

GAO found backlogs of deferred sustainment needs and some facilities that 

were not in good condition because funds were not available to pay for all 

needed sustainment work. 

The 2005 Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission 

recommended that the Department

of Defense (DOD) establish 12 joint 

bases by consolidating the 

management and support of 26

separate installations, potentially 

saving $2.3 billion over 20 years. In 

response to a direction from the 

House Armed Services Committee 

report accompanying the National

Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2009, GAO evaluated 

DOD's (1) efforts and expected

costs to deliver installation support 

at joint bases and (2) funding for 

facility sustainment, which

includes the maintenance and

repair activities necessary to keep

facilities in good working order, at

all installations. GAO compared

new support standards with the 

current support levels, visited nine 

installations that will become four 

joint bases, and compared facility

sustainment funding levels with 

requirements and goals. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD 

(1) periodically review the newly 

established installation support 

standards and joint base

administrative costs to help ensure 

economies and efficiencies and

(2) report to Congress on the 

estimated installation support costs 

at the joint bases and on facility

sustainment funds used for other

purposes. DOD partially agreed 

with the recommendations but did

not indicate that it would take

steps to fully implement them. GAO 

believes that DOD needs to take

additional actions to fully 

implement the recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-09-336.

For more information, contact Brian J. Lepore 

at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 6

DOD Has Made a Comprehensive Effort to Ensure Consistent 

Delivery of Installation Support at Joint Bases, but Support 

Costs Are Expected to Increase 13 

Facility Sustainment Funding Has Not Been Sufficient to Meet 

Requirements and Prevent Facility Deterioration 23 

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 33 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 39 

Appendix II Methods Used by the Military Services to Allocate 

Facility Sustainment Funds to the Installation Level 41 

Appendix III List of Installation Support Functions and Number of 

Associated Standards for Joint Bases 43 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 45 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 48 

Related GAO Products 49 

Page i GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
Tables 

Table 1: DOD’s Planned 12 Joint Bases 8 

Table 2: Estimated Increase in Installation Support Costs before 

and after Joint Basing 18 

Table 3: Comparison of Current and Standard Service Levels for 

Selected Installation Support Areas 20 

Table 4: Facility Sustainment Requirements Not Budgeted in Fiscal 

Years 2005 through 2008 25 

Table 5: Installation Support Functions and Number of Associated 

Standards for Joint Bases 43 

Figures 

Figure 1: DOD’s Budgeted Fiscal Year 2009 Funding for Installation 

Support 9

Figure 2: Damaged Basement in the Command Headquarters 

Building at Fort Story 29 

Figure 3: Leaking Windows Allow Water to Flow into Electrical 

Control Panels at McChord Air Force Base 30 

Figure 4: Leaking Pipes Caused Mold and Mildew Damage at Naval 

Amphibious Base Little Creek 31 

Figure 5: Damage from a Leaking Roof at the Public Works 

Building at Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst 32 

Abbreviations 

BRAC base realignment and closure 

DOD Department of Defense 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

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Page ii GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

March 30, 2009 

Congressional Committees 

Estimating that $2.3 billion could be saved over a 20-year period,1

 the 2005

Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission 

recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) establish 12 joint 

bases by consolidating the management and support of 26 separate Army, 

Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps installations.2

 The commission noted 

that, because all installations perform common functions in support of 

installation personnel and facilities and because these installations shared 

a common boundary or were in close proximity, the joint bases could 

reduce duplication of efforts and achieve greater efficiencies through 

economies of scale, which could result in significant long-term savings in 

installation support costs.3

 For each of the joint bases, the commission 

designated which military service would become the lead component with 

responsibility for delivering installation support services for the 

consolidated base. This arrangement—with one military service assuming 

responsibility for supporting another military service’s installation—

created concerns about the delivery of installation support at the joint 

bases because DOD had not established common definitions and 

standards for installation support functions and services. Instead, each 

military service had its own long-standing policies and practices on how 

each installation support function was defined and the level of service 

typically provided in each area. In view of the differences, it was not clear 

that the joint bases, scheduled to be fully implemented by October 2010, 

 1

The 20-year savings estimate, also known as the 20-year net present value, reflects 

constant fiscal year 2005 dollars (i.e., excludes projected inflation). 

2

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005 Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission Report to the President (Arlington, Va.: Sept. 8, 2005). 

3

Installation support includes many diverse categories of services and support activities 

through which DOD manages and funds the life-cycle of its installations. For example, 

installation support includes installation airfield and port operations; base security; fire and 

emergency services; transportation; supply; communications; information management;

personnel management; administrative, legal, and financial services; unaccompanied 

personnel housing management; food services; family and quality-of-life programs; 

environmental compliance activities; utilities; real property management; refuse collection 

and disposal; custodial services; grounds maintenance; and facilities sustainment, 

restoration, and modernization. 

Page 1 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

would deliver installation support consistently and at a level considered 

acceptable by each of the installations combining into the joint bases. 

One installation support area that has been of particular concern, not only 

at the planned joint bases but at all military installations, is facility 

sustainment, which includes the maintenance and repair necessary to 

keep facilities in good working order. DOD is one of the world’s largest 

organizations in terms of physical plant, managing and operating about 

545,000 buildings and structures with a total replacement value of about 

$706 billion. DOD determined that the most cost-effective approach to 

managing its facilities is to fully fund sustainment requirements because 

this method provides the most performance over the longest period for the 

least investment. To implement this approach, DOD developed a facilities 

sustainment model that determines these requirements and established a 

goal that the military services budget for sustainment in accordance with 

the model. However, in an April 2008 report, we found that although 

DOD’s model provided reasonable and consistent requirements estimates, 

the military services were not budgeting for sustainment in the amounts 

estimated by the model.4

 As a result, some installation facilities were not 

being sustained at a level to keep them in good working order and will 

likely experience reduced service lives, which in turn will lead to more 

costly recapitalization requirements in the future.

The House Armed Services Committee cited our 2008 report in its report 

accompanying the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2009 and expressed concerns about the delivery of installation

support across the joint bases and the adequacy of facility sustainment 

funding at all installations.5

 The committee directed that we perform an 

assessment of these areas. In response, this report evaluates DOD’s 

(1) efforts and expected costs to deliver installation support at the planned 

joint bases and (2) funding for facility sustainment at all installations. 

To address these areas, we (1) reviewed DOD implementation plans, 

guidance, and cost estimates associated with the delivery of installation 

support at the planned joint bases and compared the levels of service in

selected support areas currently provided by the separate installations 

with the levels of service to be provided by the joint bases and 

 4

GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Continued Management Attention Is Needed to Support 

Installation Facilities and Operations, GAO-08-502 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 24, 2008). 

5

H.R. Rep. No. 110-652, at 524-525 (2008). 

Page 2 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

(2) examined and compared DOD’s requirements and goals for facility 

sustainment funding with the amounts actually budgeted and spent on 

sustainment. Also, to gain local-level insight into the planned delivery and 

expected costs of installation support at the joint bases as well as 

sustainment funding levels and facility conditions, we visited 3 Army, 3 

Navy, and 3 Air Force installations that are consolidating into 4 of the 12

planned joint bases. We selected bases for visits that had the highest 

potential reduction in jobs according to DOD’s 2005 BRAC report.6

 We 

conducted this performance audit from May 2008 through February 2009,

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more 

information on our scope and methodology. 

DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure consistent delivery of 

installation support at the planned joint bases, but the cost of installation

support at the joint bases is expected to increase rather than decrease as 

forecasted by the 2005 BRAC Commission. In January 2008, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) began issuing a series of joint basing 

implementation guidance that for the first time established a set of 

common definitions and standards for the installation support to be 

provided by each joint base. The guidance defined 47 installation support 

functions—such as installation security services, custodial services, and 

child care programs—and provided 267 standards to help define the level 

of service that each joint base is to provide in the support functions. OSD’s 

guidance also required that the installations forming joint bases complete 

a memorandum of agreement defining the installation support relationship 

between the components forming the joint base for fully implementing the 

BRAC 2005 joint basing decisions, and that the lead component deliver 

installation support in accordance with the new definitions and standards. 

However, contrary to the expectations of the BRAC Commission, DOD 

officials stated that installation support costs at the joint bases are 

expected to increase, at least in the short term, above the cost of 

Results in Brief 

 6

Department of Defense, Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group

Base Realignment and Closure Report, Volume VII Final BRAC 2005 Report (May 10, 

2005). 

Page 3 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

installation support provided by the separate installations before 

consolidation. For example, at the three joint bases that had completed 

their agreements by January 2009, annual installation support costs are 

expected to increase by about $24 million (7 percent) above current 

support costs. Increased support costs are expected for two primary 

reasons. First, OSD has required that the joint bases deliver installation 

support in accordance with the new support standards even though the 

military services have not previously funded installation support in the 

amounts needed to meet each of the standards. Our comparison of 40 

selected standards to the service levels currently provided at the 

installations we visited showed that on average service levels would have 

to increase to meet the standards in about 27 percent of the areas 

compared. In some support areas, judgment was used to decide the 

standard level of service and, because support costs normally increase as 

the level of service increases, such decisions also involve trade-offs 

between alternative levels of service and affordability. Second, in some 

instances the military services’ approach to implementing joint basing will 

result in additional administrative costs and the loss of some existing 

installation support efficiencies. In the long term, OSD and service 

headquarters officials stated that the increased cost of installation support 

at the joint bases might be at least partially offset as experience is gained 

and best practices and new operational efficiencies are identified and 

adopted over time. Nevertheless, the military services’ estimate of the 

potential 20-year savings from joint basing has already declined about 

88 percent from the amount estimated by the BRAC Commission in 

2005—specifically, from $2.3 billion estimated by the commission to about 

$273 million estimated by the military services in fiscal year 2009 (in 

constant fiscal year 2005 dollars). On the basis of the higher installation 

support cost estimates from the initial joint bases and as long as 

installation support is delivered in accordance with the new standards, the 

military services’ estimates of potential savings will likely continue to 

decline in the future and it is unclear whether joint basing will result in 

any actual savings. 

The military services have not budgeted and spent sufficient funds to meet 

their facility sustainment requirements and goals and prevent facility 

deterioration at the installation level. Citing other budget priorities as the 

reason, the military services have not budgeted funds in the amounts 

needed to fully fund their sustainment requirements since budgeting goals 

were established in 2005. With a goal to budget for 100 percent of their 

facility sustainment requirement in fiscal year 2008, the Army budgeted 89 

percent, the Navy budgeted 83 percent, the Air Force budgeted 90 percent,

and the Marine Corps budgeted 89 percent of their respective sustainment 

Page 4 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

requirements. In total for fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the military 

services did not budget funds to meet about $2.3 billion (9 percent) of 

their total facility sustainment requirements, and according to DOD, 

needed sustainment work that is not performed may eventually result in 

damaged facilities, shortened facility service lives, and increased future 

costs for facility restoration. The military services have further 

exacerbated the sustainment funding issue by spending some budgeted

sustainment funds for other purposes. During fiscal years 2006 through 

2008, the military services used about $2.6 billion (14 percent) of the funds

budgeted for sustainment for other purposes, primarily to pay for 

unfunded facility restoration and modernization projects.7

 Although 

service officials stated that these projects were urgently needed, the 

consequence was that additional sustainment requirements were not met. 

Considering the levels budgeted for sustainment and the use of some 

sustainment funds for other purposes, the amount actually spent on 

facility sustainment at six of the nine installations we visited was less than 

75 percent of the estimated requirement during fiscal years 2006 through 

2008, and at three installations, the amount spent was less than 60 percent

of the estimated requirement. As a result of less than full funding of 

sustainment requirements and the use of some sustainment funds for other 

purposes, the military services reported backlogs of deferred facility 

sustainment needs and some installation facilities had fallen into disrepair. 

As long as the military services do not budget sufficient funds to meet 

their facility sustainment requirements and use some budgeted 

sustainment funds for other purposes, some facilities will not be sustained 

at a level to keep them in good working order and will likely experience 

reduced service lives, which in turn will lead to more costly 

recapitalization requirements in the future. 

We are making several recommendations to address the expected 

increased installation support costs from joint basing implementation and

the use of facility sustainment funds for purposes other than sustainment. 

Specifically, we are recommending that DOD periodically review the 

installation support standards as experience is gained with delivering 

installation support at the joint bases and make adjustments, if needed, to

ensure that each standard reflects the level of service necessary to meet 

 7

Compared to facility sustainment work, restoration and modernization work typically 

involves larger, more extensive projects that restore facilities degraded from several 

causes, such as natural disaster and fire, or renovate or replace facilities to achieve new 

standards, accommodate new functions, or replace building components that typically last

more than 50 years. 

Page 5 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

installation requirements as economically as possible; periodically review 

administrative costs as joint basing is implemented to minimize any 

additional costs and prevent the loss of existing installation support 

efficiencies; and complete a detailed analysis of the estimated installation 

support costs from the initial joint bases and report the results of the 

analysis to the Congress in the department’s documents supporting the 

administration’s annual budget submission or another document deemed 

appropriate. Also, to increase the attention given to facility sustainment 

spending, we are recommending that DOD summarize and report to the 

Congress the amount of budgeted sustainment funds spent on other 

purposes in the department’s documents supporting the administration’s 

annual budget submission or another document deemed appropriate. In 

written comments to a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with our 

recommendations, but did not indicate that it would take additional steps 

to implement them. We continue to believe that DOD’s actions to date 

related to the expected increase in joint bases support costs and the use of 

sustainment funds will not fully address the intent of our 

recommendations and that DOD needs to take additional actions to 

implement them, such as directing periodic reviews of installation support 

standards and reporting additional information to Congress. We discuss 

DOD’s comments in detail later in this report. 

The 2005 BRAC Commission final report noted that all installations 

employ military, civilian, and contractor personnel to perform common 

functions in support of installation facilities and personnel and that all 

installations execute these functions using similar or near similar 

processes.8

 The report also noted that, in areas where the military services 

operated separate installations that share a common boundary or were in 

close proximity, there was significant opportunity to reduce duplication 

and costs by consolidating the installations. Specifically, the report stated 

that by consolidating nearby installations, savings in personnel and 

facilities costs could be realized by eliminating duplication of efforts, 

paring unnecessary management personnel, achieving greater efficiencies 

through economies of scale, consolidating and optimizing existing and 

future service contract requirements, establishing a single space 

management authority that could achieve greater utilization of facilities, 

Background 

 8

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005 Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission Report to the President (Arlington, Va.: Sept. 8, 2005). 

Page 6 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

and reducing the number of base support vehicles and equipment 

consistent with the size of the combined facilities. 

The report recommended that DOD establish 12 joint bases from 26 

existing installations and estimated that the net present value of the costs 

and savings from this effort over 20 years would be about $2.3 billion. For 

each of the joint bases, the report designated which military service would 

become the lead component with responsibility for delivering installation 

support services for the consolidated base. To implement the 

recommendation, DOD established a schedule that divided the 12 planned 

joint bases into two implementation phases. Five joint bases involving 

11 installations were placed into phase I with a September 30, 2008, 

milestone for signing a joint base memorandum of agreement, which 

would provide a detailed implementation plan including the personnel and 

financial arrangements for the combined base, and an October 1, 2009, 

milestone for full implementation, which included the transfer of 

personnel and funds to the joint base. The remaining 7 joint bases 

involving 15 installations were placed into phase II with a September 30, 

2009, milestone for signing the joint base memorandum of agreement and

an October 1, 2010, milestone for full implementation. Table 1 provides 

details on the planned joint bases. 

Page 7 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

Table 1: DOD’s Planned 12 Joint Bases 

Name of joint base Location

Implementation 

phase 

Installations

consolidating into the joint base 

Component 

delivering

installation

support 

Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst New Jersey I McGuire Air Force Base, Fort Dix, and 

Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst 

Air Force 

Joint Expeditionary Base Little 

Creek-Fort Story 

Virginia I Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek and 

Fort Story 

Navy 

Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air 

Facility Washington 

Maryland I Andrews Air Force Base and Naval Air 

Facility Washington 

Air Force 

Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall Virginia I Fort Myer and Henderson Hall Army 

Joint Region Marianas Guam I Navy Base Guam and Andersen Air Force 

Base 

Navy 

Joint Base Lewis-McChord Washington II Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base Army 

Joint Base Charleston South Carolina II Charleston Air Force Base and Naval 

Weapons Station Charleston 

Air Force 

Joint Base Langley-Eustis Virginia II Langley Air Force Base and Fort Eustis Air Force 

Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Hawaii II Naval Station Pearl Harbor and Hickam 

Air Force Base 

Navy 

Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson Alaska II Elmendorf Air Force Base and Fort 

Richardson

Air Force 

Joint Base Lackland-Sam HoustonRandolph Texas II Lackland Air Force Base, Fort Sam 

Houston, and Randolph Air Force Base 

Air Force 

Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling District of 

Columbia 

II Naval District Washington and Bolling Air 

Force Base 

Navy 

Source: DOD. 

DOD officials stated that, although none of the phase I joint bases met the 

September 30, 2008, milestone for signing their memorandums of 

agreement, joint bases Myer-Henderson Hall, Andrews-Naval Air Facility 

Washington, and Little Creek-Fort Story had signed agreements by January 

2009. The officials stated that Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and Joint 

Region Marianas are expected to sign agreements later in 2009 and all 

phase I joint bases are still expected to meet the October 1, 2009, 

milestone for full implementation. 

Installation 

Responsibilities and 

Support Funding 

The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 

Environment has overall responsibility for DOD’s installations and 

facilities and by delegation has authority to approve and issue guidance for 

joint basing. DOD’s facilities portfolio includes about 545,000 buildings 

and structures worldwide with a total replacement value of about 

Page 8 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

$706 billion. During fiscal year 2009, DOD plans to spend about $62 billion 

to support its facilities and installations. DOD refers to this funding as 

installation support, which includes broad categories of services, 

programs, and support activities, as shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: DOD’s Budgeted Fiscal Year 2009 Funding for Installation Support 

Installation

support

$62.08

Facilities

$29.40

Installation

services

$16.50

Base realignment 

and closure

$9.46

Family

housing

$3.20

Environment

$3.52

Disposal

$0.19

Facilities

operation services

$7.72

Sustainment

$8.06

Recapitalization

$6.56

New footprint

$6.87

Appropriation

Operation and maintenance

Military construction

Military personnel

Procurement

Working capital fund

Family housing

Base realignment and closure

Other

Total

Amount

$33.36

11.65

2.74

0.45

0.89

3.20

9.46

0.34

$62.08

Source: DOD.

Dollars in billions

Note: The Congress appropriates funds according to the categories listed under the appropriation 

heading, and DOD classifies funds for installation support according to the categories in the figure.

The appropriation amounts do not total correctly due to rounding. 

The largest categories of installation support are installation services and

facilities. Installation services, funded primarily with operation and 

maintenance appropriations, includes the personnel, support equipment, 

contracts, and associated costs to plan, manage, and deliver installation 

services and functions, such as installation airfield and port operations; 

security; transportation; supply; communications; information 

management; personnel management; food services; administrative, legal, 

Page 9 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

and financial services; unaccompanied personnel housing management; 

family and quality of life programs; and environmental compliance. 

The facilities category is composed of five subcategories—facilities 

operation services, sustainment, recapitalization, disposal, and new 

footprint, which includes facility construction related to new or expanded 

missions. 

• Facilities operation services, funded primarily with operation and 

maintenance appropriations, includes 10 facility-related services—fire 

and emergency services, utilities, pavement clearance, refuse

collection and disposal, real property leases, grounds maintenance, 

pest control, custodial services, real property management and 

engineering services, and engineering readiness. DOD previously 

referred to facility operations as real property services and, together 

with installation services, family housing, and environment, were 

referred to as base operations support. In general, the military 

services’ budgets continue to refer to funding for installation services 

and facility operation services as base operations support funding. 

• Sustainment, funded primarily with operation and maintenance 

appropriations, includes the maintenance and repair activities 

necessary to prevent deterioration, maintain safety, and keep facilities 

in good working order over their service lives. Sustainment includes 

routine and preventive maintenance tasks and emergency response 

and other service calls for minor repairs. Sustainment also includes 

major repairs or replacement of facility components that are expected 

to occur periodically throughout a facility’s life cycle, such as regular 

roof replacement; refinishing wall surfaces; repairing and replacing 

electrical, heating, and cooling systems; and replacing tile and carpets. 

Since fiscal year 2003, DOD has used a model—the facilities 

sustainment model—to estimate annual facility sustainment funding 

requirements in each military service. Although the Office of the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment 

has overall responsibility for DOD’s installations and facilities, the 

individual military services are responsible for budgeting and 

allocating facility sustainment funds to installations. Appendix II 

summarizes each service’s sustainment funding allocation process. 

• Recapitalization, funded primarily with operation and maintenance 

and military construction appropriations, provides for improving 

facilities through restoration and modernization. Restoration includes 

repair and replacement work needed to restore facilities degraded 

from several causes, such as natural disaster, fire, accident, excessive 

Page 10 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

age, or inadequate sustainment. Modernization includes both 

renovation and replacement of existing facilities to implement new or 

higher standards, accommodate new functions, or replace building 

components that typically last more than 50 years and are near the end 

of their economic lives. 

Prior GAO Reports Since 1997, we have identified management of DOD support infrastructure 

as a high-risk area because infrastructure costs have affected the 

department’s ability to devote funds to other more critical programs and 

needs. In a January 2009 update to our high-risk series, we noted that 

although DOD has made progress in managing its support infrastructure in 

recent years, a number of challenges remain in managing its portfolio of 

facilities and reducing unneeded infrastructure while providing facilities 

needed to support several simultaneous force structure initiatives.9

Further, we noted that because of these issues, DOD’s management of 

support infrastructure remains a high-risk area. 

We have issued several reports on DOD’s implementation of the 

recommendations from the 2005 BRAC round. The reports generally found 

that, compared with the original cost and savings estimates, 

implementation costs were expected to increase and savings were 

expected to decrease. For example, in a December 2007 report,10 we found 

that DOD planned to spend more, save less, and take longer to recoup upfront costs than expected to implement the 2005 BRAC recommendations 

due to increased construction cost estimates, the effects of inflation, 

environmental clean-up costs not accounted for in the original estimates, 

and other miscellaneous expenses including operation and maintenance 

expenses. We also found that DOD’s estimated costs and savings to 

implement the recommendations were likely to change further due to 

uncertainties surrounding certain implementation details, potential 

increases in military construction costs, and likely increases in the cost of

environmental cleanup for some BRAC properties. In a March 2008 report 

on two BRAC recommendations that were intended to improve DOD’s 

logistics systems, we found that DOD would spend more, save less, and 

take longer than expected to recoup up-front costs to implement those 

recommendations due to the use of inaccurate or outdated data, 

 9

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-09-271 (Washington, D.C.: January 2009). 

10GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased and

Are Likely to Continue to Evolve, GAO-08-159 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2007). 

Page 11 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

misinterpretation of terms, and changes in operational requirements.11 On 

January 30, 2009, we reported that while DOD has made progress in 

implementing the BRAC 2005 round, it faces challenges in its ability to 

meet the September 15, 2011, statutory completion deadline.12 Further, 

DOD’s fiscal year 2009 BRAC budget submission shows that DOD plans to 

spend more to implement recommendations and save slightly less 

compared to the 2008 BRAC budget and that the potential remains for 

BRAC cost estimates to continue to increase. DOD concurred with several 

recommendations from these reports on ways that DOD could improve its 

development of BRAC savings estimates. 

We have also issued several reports over the past few years highlighting 

the long-term challenges DOD faces in managing its portfolio of 

installations and halting the degradation of facilities. For example, in 

February 2003, we found that funds designated for facilities sustainment 

were held back at the service headquarters, major command, and 

installation levels to cover more pressing needs or emerging requirements 

and that, as a result, facility deterioration continued.13 DOD concurred 

with our recommendation that the military services reassess the funding 

priorities attached to sustaining and improving their facilities. In a June 

2005 report, we found that DOD did not have a common framework for 

identifying installation support functions and funding requirements to 

ensure adequate delivery of services, particularly in a joint environment.14

We also found that, because of a lack of a common terminology across the 

military services in defining installation support functions and the lack of a 

mature analytic process for developing credible and consistent 

requirements, the services moved hundreds of millions of operation and 

maintenance dollars designated for facilities sustainment and other 

purposes to pay for installation support services. While such funding 

 11GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower Savings 

Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC Recommendations, 

GAO-08-315 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2008).

12GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in 

Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently Updating Savings

Estimates, GAO-09-217 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2009). 

13GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic Planning 

Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities, GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 19, 2003). 

14GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and Funding 

Base Operations and Facilities Support, GAO-05-556 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005).

Page 12 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

movements are permissible, we found that they were disruptive to the

orderly provision of installation support and contributed to the overall

degradation of facilities. In an April 2008 report, we found that the military 

services had not met all of DOD’s goals for funding facility sustainment 

and recapitalization at levels to prevent deterioration and, because DOD 

continued to lack common definitions and performance standards for 

installation support functions, each military service had developed 

methods to determine its installation services requirements and funding 

needs subject to its own definition of the types and levels of services it 

deemed necessary.15 We also found that DOD’s facilities sustainment 

model provided a consistent and reasonable framework for preparing 

estimates of DOD’s annual facility sustainment funding requirements, even 

though the reliability of the model’s estimates could be improved through 

increased accuracy of the model’s inputs. The 2005 and 2008 reports made 

recommendations related to resolving the inconsistencies among the 

military services’ definitions of installation support functions and, with the 

joint basing guidance issued during 2008, DOD completed the 

development of common installation support definitions. DOD also 

concurred with recommendations from the 2008 report that it will take 

several actions to increase the facilities sustainment model’s reliability. 

DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure that the 12 planned joint 

bases deliver consistent installation support, but support costs are 

expected to increase, at least in the short term, rather than decrease as 

expected by the 2005 BRAC Commission. DOD’s efforts to ensure 

consistent support have included the issuance of detailed guidance, which 

for the first time provided common installation support definitions and 

standards, and the establishment of mechanisms to help ensure that the 

joint bases comply with guidance requiring that the bases deliver 

installation support in accordance with the new definitions and standards. 

However, instead of decreasing, support costs at the joint bases are 

expected to increase primarily because past funding for installation 

support has been insufficient to provide support at the levels called for by

either existing or the new common service standards, and in some 

instances the military services’ approach to implementing joint basing will 

result in additional administrative costs and the loss of some existing 

installation support efficiencies. In the long term, DOD officials stated that 

the increased installation support costs might be at least partially offset as

DOD Has Made a 

Comprehensive Effort 

to Ensure Consistent 

Delivery of 

Installation Support at 

Joint Bases, but 

Support Costs Are 

Expected to Increase 

 15See GAO-08-502. 

Page 13 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

best practices and new operational efficiencies are identified and adopted 

over time. However, on the basis of the higher installation support cost 

estimates from the initial joint bases and as long as installation support is 

delivered in accordance with the new support standards, it is unclear 

whether joint basing will result in any actual savings. 

DOD Established Common 

Definitions and Standards 

to Help Ensure Consistent 

Delivery of Installation 

Support 

Before January 2008, DOD had not established common definitions and 

standards for installation support functions and services. Instead, each 

military service had its own long-standing policies and practices on how 

tasks in each installation support function were defined, performed, and 

funded. The differences in the military services’ policies and practices for 

managing their installations had resulted in differences in the emphasis 

placed on the various support areas and the level of service typically 

provided in each area. In view of such differences, it was not clear that the 

joint bases, scheduled to be fully implemented by October 2010, would 

deliver installation support services consistently and at levels considered 

acceptable by each of the installations combining into the joint bases. 

To address this issue, OSD began issuing a series of joint basing 

implementation guidance in January 2008 that for the first time established 

a set of common definitions and standards for the installation support 

functions and services to be provided by each joint base.16 After working 

with the military services to develop and obtain concurrence with the new 

definitions and standards, OSD issued guidance that defined 47 installation 

support functions—such as installation security services, custodial 

services, and child care programs—and provided 267 standards to help 

define the level of service that each joint base is to provide in each area. 

The guidance also required that only the joint bases deliver installation 

support in accordance with the new definitions and standards.17 Thus, the 

vast majority of military installations that are not involved with joint 

basing are not required to deliver installation support in accordance with 

the new definitions and standards at this time. 

 16Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Transforming Through Base Realignment 

and Closure (BRAC) 2005 – Joint Basing (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 2008). 

17The guidance provides a template memorandum of agreement that among other things 

commits the lead component to deliver installation support in accordance with the support 

standards. Although installations can request that OSD approve deviations from delivering

support in accordance with each standard during development of the memorandums, OSD

officials stated that no deviations were requested by the installations consolidating into the 

phase I joint bases.

Page 14 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

According to DOD, the new standards represented the service levels 

needed to fully meet installation mission, facility, and personnel needs in 

view of existing OSD and military service policies, guidance, and practices; 

commercial industry standards; guidance from other federal agencies; or 

military judgment. The standards include the following. 

• About 62 percent of the standards, in areas such as fire protection and 

emergency services and airfield operations, were based on existing 

OSD and military service policies and requirements. 

• About 13 percent of the standards, in areas such as custodial services 

and grounds maintenance and landscaping, were based on commercial 

industry standards or guidance from other federal agencies. 

• About 25 percent of the standards, in areas such as installation 

chaplain services and legal support, were based on the judgment of 

military subject matter experts. According to DOD, the standards 

determined by military subject matter experts were in areas that were 

not covered by DOD policy or other requirements and did not have 

comparable commercial standards. To determine standards for these 

areas, the subject matter experts generally reviewed the practices of 

each military department and reached agreement on the service levels 

needed that in their judgment would best meet installation mission and 

personnel requirements. Judgment was used to decide the standard 

level of service in view of mission, facility, personnel, and quality of 

life factors. Also, because costs generally increase as the level of 

service increases, some of these decisions also involved the 

consideration of trade-offs between alternative levels of service and 

affordability. 

Officials at OSD and each of the military services stated that the new 

common standards called for service levels that were very close to each

military service’s existing installation support standards or practices. 

However, the officials also noted that because installation support had not 

been fully funded in the past, military installations normally did not 

provide support at the levels called for by all of their existing standards. 

The following examples illustrate a few of the installation support function 

definitions and standards that DOD established for joint basing, and 

appendix III provides a list of the 47 defined installation support functions 

and the number of standards developed for each area. 

• Information technology services management was defined to include 

the personnel, contracts, and equipment necessary to plan, manage, 

Page 15 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

coordinate, and execute the delivery of services including fixed and 

wireless voice, data, and video services. Twenty-six standards were 

established to define the expected level of service for this support 

function. For example, each joint base is to (1) maintain 99.99 percent 

telephone dial tone availability, (2) provide wireless local mobile radio 

service for 100 percent of the base’s populated area and 85 percent of 

the total base area, (3) respond within 90 minutes to critical circuit 

outages 99 percent of the time, and (4) resolve 95 percent of 

nonmission critical trouble calls within 4 days. 

• Installation law enforcement operations was defined to include the 

personnel, contracts, and support equipment necessary to enforce 

federal, state, and military law; investigate crimes; apprehend and 

detain suspects; manage traffic; and detect and prevent crime. Five 

standards were established to define the expected level of service for 

this support function. For example, within 15 minutes of a call the joint 

base is to provide the first law enforcement patrol response and within 

30 days the joint base is to complete 90 percent of investigations. 

• Grounds maintenance and landscaping was defined to include all 

associated landscaping and plant growth management activities for 

three defined land categories—improved, semi-improved, and 

unimproved. Three standards were established to define the expected 

level of service for this support function. For example, for improved 

land, which includes the grounds surrounding occupied buildings and 

permanent structures, the joint base is to maintain the grass height at 

2 to 4 inches and accomplish necessary trimming, edging, pruning, and

landscaping to maintain healthy vegetation and a professional 

appearance.

• Facilities sustainment, which DOD had previously defined, includes 

the maintenance and repair activities necessary to prevent 

deterioration, maintain safety, and keep facilities in good working 

order over their service lives. Seven standards were established to 

define the expected level of service for this support function. For 

example, the joint base is to (1) perform 90 percent of the preventive

maintenance called for by manufacturers’ recommendations, 

(2) replace 90 percent of facility components in accordance with each 

component’s useful service life, (3) resolve 100 percent of emergency 

service calls within 24 hours, and (4) resolve 90 percent of routine 

service calls within 30 calendar days.

Page 16 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

Officials at the nine installations we visited stated that in general the 

definitions and standards adequately described the installation support 

functions and provided reasonable metrics so that the expected level of 

service in most areas was clearly understood. Installation officials stated 

that in some cases the standards were not as detailed or as clear as 

possible. Nevertheless, the officials stated that they recognized that the 

standards provided the first common expectations for installation support 

and believed that missing details and needed clarifications would be 

provided as the standards are implemented at the joint bases.

DOD Has Taken Additional 

Steps to Help Ensure That 

Joint Bases Deliver 

Consistent Installation 

Support 

DOD has taken additional steps to help ensure that the joint bases will 

deliver installation support in accordance with the new installation 

support definitions and standards. First, OSD issued guidance that 

requires the installations forming each joint base to complete a 

memorandum of agreement that defines the installation support 

relationship between the components forming the joint base for fully 

implementing the BRAC 2005 joint base decisions. The guidance also 

provides a template memorandum of agreement that, among other things, 

commits the lead component to deliver installation support in accordance 

with the support definitions and standards. Although installations can 

request that OSD approve deviations from delivering support in 

accordance with each standard during development of the memorandums, 

OSD officials stated that no deviations were requested from the 

installations consolidating into the phase I joint bases. Second, to facilitate 

consistency in developing the memorandums, OSD officials stated that 

they held workshops and conducted visits to the installations involved in 

joint basing. Third, to ensure top management support for the terms 

included in each memorandum, OSD’s guidance requires that the Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Vice

Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Assistant Commandant of the 

Marine Corps approve and sign the memorandum at each joint base 

involving their military service. Because the memorandums include the 

expected joint base personnel and funding requirements, the signatures of 

the Vice Chiefs are considered to be a commitment that each involved 

military service will provide the necessary personnel and funding to fully 

support the joint base and the delivery of installation support services in 

accordance with the definitions and standards. Fourth, OSD has 

established a framework, termed the cost and performance visibility 

framework, which is designed to collect and report cost and performance 

data pertaining to installation support and also assess compliance with the 

terms of the joint base memorandums of agreement. According to DOD 

officials, this framework, as well as installation-level monitoring of joint 

Page 17 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

base implementation, will help ensure that any issues concerning the 

delivery of support are quickly identified so that corrective steps can be

taken. Officials at the nine installations we visited stated that, as long as

necessary funding is provided, the joint bases will deliver consistent 

installation support. 

Installation Support Costs 

at the Joint Bases Are 

Expected to Increase 

Contrary to the expectations from the 2005 BRAC Commission, OSD and 

service headquarters officials stated that installation support costs at the 

joint bases are expected to increase, at least in the short term, above the 

cost of installation support provided by the separate installations before 

consolidation. Included in each joint base’s memorandum of agreement 

are estimates of the current cost of installation support at the installations 

consolidating into joint bases and the expected cost of installation support 

after implementation of a joint base. As shown in table 2, at the three joint 

bases that had completed their memorandums as of January 2009, annual

installation support costs are expected to increase by about $24 million 

(7 percent) above current support costs. 

Table 2: Estimated Increase in Installation Support Costs before and after Joint Basing 

(Fiscal year 2009 dollars in millions) 

Estimated annual 

installation support costs

Estimated increase 

in support costs Joint bases with completed 

memorandums of agreement Before joint basing After joint basing Amount Percentage

Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story $87 $90 $3 3

Joint Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington 154 173 19 12

Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall 101 103 2 2

Total $342 $366 $24 7

Source: DOD. 

Officials at each of the nine installations we visited noted concerns about 

the cost of installation support under joint basing. For example, during our 

visit to McGuire Air Force Base, Fort Dix, and Naval Air Engineering 

Station Lakehurst, installation officials stated that installation support 

costs would increase after implementation of the joint base primarily 

because support levels in some areas would be increased to meet the new 

standards. An official estimate of the expected increase in costs was not 

available in January 2009 because these installations had not completed 

their memorandum of agreement. However, during our visit, McGuire Air 

Force Base officials estimated that an additional 194 personnel, along with 

the associated costs, would be needed for the joint base to provide 

Page 18 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

installation support in accordance with the support standards. Similarly, 

during our visit to Charleston Air Force Base and Naval Weapons Station 

Charleston, a phase II joint base, installation officials also stated that they

expected support costs to increase under joint basing. Preliminary 

estimates by Charleston Air Force Base officials showed that over 200 

additional personnel might be needed for the joint base to provide 

installation support in accordance with the support standards. 

Even before the initial three phase I joint bases had prepared their cost 

estimates showing increased support costs, the military services had 

already significantly reduced the estimate of the potential 20-year savings 

from joint basing as compared to the savings estimate made by the 2005

BRAC Commission. Specifically, in documents prepared to support the 

fiscal year 2009 budget, the military services estimated that the potential

20-year savings from joint basing was about $273 million in constant fiscal 

year 2005 dollars. This amount reflects a reduction of about 88 percent 

from the $2.3 billion savings in constant fiscal year 2005 dollars estimated

by the commission. In view of the increased cost estimates from the initial 

phase I joint bases, some DOD officials stated that the military services’ 

future estimates of the potential long-term savings would most likely 

continue to decline. 

Military Services Have Not 

Fully Funded Installation 

Support in the Past 

A key reason that installation support costs at the joint bases are expected 

to increase is that OSD has required that the joint bases deliver installation 

support in accordance with the 267 new support standards, even though

the military services have not previously funded installation support in the 

amounts needed to meet each of the standards. Thus, additional costs will 

be incurred to meet the standards. According to OSD officials, ideally all 

military installations should provide support services in accordance with 

the newly established definitions and standards. However, primarily 

because of the significant increase in installation support funding that 

would be needed for all installations to meet the service standards, OSD 

has required that only the joint bases meet the standards at this time. 

For many years, the adequacy of installation support funding has been a 

concern for the military services. Army, Navy, and Air Force officials 

stated that installation services funding for fiscal years 2005 through 2008

was less than the amounts needed to provide support at the levels desired. 

For example, according to Army officials, installation and facility 

operations support services—collectively classified as base operations 

support in the Army’s budget—were funded at about 80 percent, 

82 percent, 87 percent, and 85 percent of requirements in fiscal years 2005, 

Page 19 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively. Army officials stated that, because of 

these funding levels, some installation services were reduced and provided 

at lower than optimum levels at some installations, which reduced the

support provided to military personnel. 

To obtain some insight into how many areas might require increased 

service levels at the installations consolidating into the joint bases, we 

performed a comparison of current service levels to the joint base 

standard service levels at the installations we visited. Specifically, we 

judgmentally selected 40 of the 267 joint base service-level standards and,

at each installation we visited, compared the level of service that the 

installation was currently providing with the new standard. As shown in

table 3, in about 27 percent of areas we compared, the joint base will have 

to increase the level of service provided to meet the standards. 

Table 3: Comparison of Current and Standard Service Levels for Selected Installation Support Areas 

Current service level 

meets the standard

Current service level is 

below the standard

Installation 

Number of support 

areas compareda

Number

of areas Percentage

Number

of areas Percentage

Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek 38 23 61 15 39

Fort Story 37 27 73 10 27

Fort Lewis 40 26 65 14 35

McChord Air Force Base 39 32 82 7 18

McGuire Air Force Base 40 25 63 15 38

Fort Dix 38 31 82 7 18

Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst 36 22 61 14 39

Charleston Air Force Base 40 34 85 6 15

Naval Weapons Station Charleston 38 31 82 7 18

Total 346 251 73 95 27

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by each installation. 

a

At each installation, we compared the current service level with the standard for the same 40 

judgmentally selected support areas. However, at 6 of the 9 installations sufficient information was 

not available to make the comparison in all 40 areas. Thus, the number of comparisons actually made 

ranged from 36 to 40 among the installations visited. 

The following examples provide details on some of the support standards 

and current service levels that we compared at the installations visited. 

• One standard for an installation’s child care program calls for 100 

percent of children to be placed in the program within 3 months of a 

Page 20 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

request. Officials at five of the nine installations we visited stated that 

their installation was not currently meeting this standard and that 

additional funding for facility construction and personnel will be 

needed to meet the standard. According to OSD officials, this standard 

was determined by military subject matter experts and was based 

primarily on an existing Navy standard. 

• One standard for an installation’s youth program services calls for 

35 percent of eligible youth to participate in service youth programs. 

Officials at six of the nine installations we visited stated that their 

installation was not currently meeting this standard and that additional 

funding to increase facility capacity for youth programs will be needed 

to meet the standard. According to OSD officials, this standard 

originated in a DOD social compact, which was previously adopted by 

the military service components. 

• One standard for an installation’s basic custodial services calls for the 

restrooms to be cleaned three times per week, the floors to be swept 

and mopped once per week, the carpets to be vacuumed once per 

week, the floors to be buffed monthly, and the windows to be cleaned 

annually. Officials at seven of the nine installations we visited stated 

that their installation was not currently meeting this standard and that 

additional funding for personnel will be needed to meet the standard. 

According to OSD officials, this standard was based primarily on an 

existing Air Force standard. 

• One standard for an installation’s facility sustainment activities calls 

for 90 percent of facility components to be replaced in accordance 

with the component’s useful service life. Officials at seven of the nine 

installations we visited stated that their installation was not currently 

meeting this standard and that additional funding will be needed to 

meet the standard. According to OSD officials, this standard was based 

on recently issued DOD budgeting guidance. 

Military Services’ 

Approach to Joint Base 

Implementation Will Result 

in Some Additional 

Installation Support Costs 

Another key reason that joint basing is expected to increase installation 

support costs is that the military services’ approach to joint base 

implementation will result in some additional administrative costs and the 

loss of some existing installation support efficiencies. For example, 

additional costs for installation administration are expected at the six joint 

bases where the Air Force will be the lead component. DOD officials noted 

that the typical smaller Air Force installation has one base commander 

who is responsible for both installation support and the operational 

mission of the installation. This differs from larger Air Force bases and 

Page 21 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

typical Army and Navy installations, which have separate commanders 

responsible for installation support and for operational missions. Because 

of the increased administrative workload associated with providing 

installation support at a joint base, Air Force officials decided that it 

would be preferable to have a commander solely responsible for 

installation support at each joint base. To accomplish this, the Air Force 

intends to establish a new organization unit, consisting of a commander 

and supporting staff, which will be responsible for managing installation 

support at six joint bases where the Air Force will be the lead component. 

Although the Air Force did not have estimates of the added costs for the 

new units, officials at McGuire Air Force Base estimated that 19 additional

administrative personnel will be needed to establish the new unit that will 

manage installation support at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, which 

will result in increased costs. 

As another example, officials at some of the Army and Navy installations 

we visited stated that in a few instances existing installation support 

efficiencies will be lost at joint bases where the Air Force will be the lead 

component. The officials stated that currently their regional commands 

provided some support services to the installation, such as certain 

personnel- and travel-related services, which would become the 

responsibility of the Air Force under joint basing where the Air Force is 

the lead component. However, the officials stated that the efficiencies 

from these existing arrangements will be lost because the joint base will 

begin to provide these services and at the same time no reduction in 

personnel was expected at the Army and Navy regions since the regions 

will continue to provide services for the installations that are not involved 

with joint basing. 

Officials at McGuire Air Force Base and Fort Dix cited another example of 

increased support costs resulting from the way that Joint Base McGuireDix-Lakehurst is being implemented. As the lead component, McGuire Air 

Force Base will become responsible for installation support at this joint 

base and, in the area of delivering contract support, the Air Force has 

decided that McGuire’s existing contracting office will be expanded in 

order to provide contracting services for the joint base. However, 

according to McGuire Air Force Base and Fort Dix officials, this approach

will result in higher support costs compared to an alternative approach. 

Specifically, the officials stated that an existing contracting office at Fort 

Dix, which currently provides contracting services to Fort Dix as well as 

to other Army reserve units across the United States, could provide 

contracting services for the joint base with fewer personnel and at less 

cost than McGuire Air Force Base’s contracting office. Although 

Page 22 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

installation officials stated that this alternative was feasible and less 

costly, Air Force decided not to use the contracting office at Fort Dix 

primarily because the office is outside the Air Force’s direct chain of 

command and the Air Force will ultimately be responsible for all joint base 

contracting services. 

In the long term, OSD officials stated that the increased cost of installation

support at the joint bases might be at least partially offset as experience is 

gained and best practices and new operational efficiencies are identified 

and adopted over time. However, as long as support is provided at levels

that meet the new support standards, OSD officials stated that they did not 

expect that installation support costs at the joint bases would fall below 

the current cost of installation support provided by the separate 

installations before consolidation. Thus, even in the long term, the officials 

did not expect that joint basing would result in actual savings from 

installation support spending levels prior to joint basing. 

The military services have not budgeted and spent sufficient funds to meet 

their facility sustainment requirements and goals and prevent facility 

deterioration at installations throughout DOD. According to DOD, full 

funding of sustainment requirements is the most cost-effective approach

to managing facilities because it provides the most performance over the 

longest period for the least investment. For this reason, DOD established a 

goal that the military services budget for sustainment in accordance with 

requirements as determined by DOD’s facilities sustainment model. 

However, citing other budget priorities as the reason, the military services

have not budgeted funds in the amounts needed to fully fund their 

sustainment requirements. In addition, the services have often spent even

less on sustainment than they budgeted because they used some of the 

budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes, primarily to pay for 

unfunded facility restoration and modernization projects. As a result, the 

services have significant backlogs of needed facility sustainment work and 

some installation facilities have not been sustained at a level to keep them 

in good working order. According to DOD, when facilities are not fully 

sustained, the facilities will likely experience reduced service lives and 

more costly recapitalization requirements in the future. 

Officials Believe Increased 

Installation Support Costs 

Could Be Offset in the 

Long Term 

Facility Sustainment 

Funding Has Not 

Been Sufficient to 

Meet Requirements 

and Prevent Facility 

Deterioration 

Page 23 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

According to DOD, full funding of sustainment requirements is the most 

cost effective approach to managing facilities because it provides the most 

performance over the longest period for the least investment. However, as 

other important priorities, such as force modernization, have competed for 

funding, DOD has been challenged to provide adequate resources for 

sustaining and recapitalizing its facilities. In April 2007 testimony, DOD 

noted that full funding of facilities sustainment had been and continued to 

be the foundation of the department’s long-term facilities strategy and 

goals in order to optimize DOD’s facility investment and ensure facility 

readiness.18 When full sustainment funding is not provided, service officials

noted that facility deterioration accelerates, facility service lives shorten, 

mission capabilities and quality of life decrease, and expected future costs 

increase. 

In view of these positions and recognizing that funding of sustainment 

requirements had been a challenge because of competing budget 

priorities, DOD’s 2004 installations strategic plan established a goal for the 

military services to fund sustainment at 95 percent of the requirement 

determined by DOD’s facilities sustainment model beginning in fiscal year 

2005, and at 100 percent of the requirement beginning in fiscal year 2008. 

In April 2008, we reported on the reliability of the facilities sustainment 

model.19 The report noted that even though the reliability of the model’s 

estimates could be improved, the model provided a consistent and 

reasonable framework for estimating sustainment requirements. Thus, use 

of the model for setting annual funding goals at the military service level 

appears reasonable. 

Citing other budget priorities as the reason, the military services have not 

budgeted funds in the amounts needed to meet their sustainment 

requirements. Although DOD established a sustainment budgeting goal in 

fiscal year 2005, until fiscal year 2008 the goal called for the services to 

budget 95 percent of their requirements, rather than 100 percent of their 

requirements. Thus, even though the services met the goal in some years 

during fiscal years 2005 through 2007, they still did not budget sufficient 

funds to meet all requirements as determined by the facilities sustainment 

Full Funding of 

Sustainment Requirements 

Is Cost Effective 

Military Services Have Not 

Budgeted for Sustainment 

at Levels to Meet 

Requirements 

 18Statement of Mr. Philip W. Grone, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 

Environment), before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Senate 

Armed Services Committee (Apr. 10, 2007). 

19See GAO-08-502. 

Page 24 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

model. Further, none of the services met the 100 percent goal for fiscal 

year 2008. Specifically, in fiscal year 2008, the Army budgeted 89 percent,

the Navy budgeted 83 percent, the Air Force budgeted 90 percent, and the 

Marine Corps budgeted 89 percent of their respective facility sustainment 

requirements. In total during fiscal years 2005 through 2008, the military 

services did not budget funds to meet about $2.3 billion (9 percent) of 

their total facility sustainment requirements. Table 4 provides details by 

service on the amount of the facilities sustainment requirement that was 

not budgeted during fiscal years 2005 through 2008. 

Table 4: Facility Sustainment Requirements Not Budgeted in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2008

(Dollars in millions) 

Amount of sustainment requirements not budgeted by fiscal year 

Service 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total

Army $126 $290 $249 $302 $967

Navy 63 71 61 239 434

Air Force 108 112 291 241 752

Marine Corps 26 28 35 64 153

Total $323 $501 $636 $846 $2,306

Source: DOD. 

While maintaining the goal that the services budget 100 percent of their 

requirements as determined by the facilities sustainment model, OSD 

officials stated that they issued guidance in 2007 that the services budget 

at least 90 percent of their facilities sustainment requirements in fiscal 

years 2009 through 2013. The budgeting floor was set in order to provide a 

minimum funding level for sustainment across DOD and more consistency 

across the services in sustainment budgeting. According to OSD officials, 

affordability played a major role in choosing 90 percent as the floor, and 

the risk of not budgeting at 100 percent was considered acceptable in light

of other DOD priorities. 

Military Services Have 

Used Some Budgeted 

Sustainment Funds for 

Other Purposes 

The military services have further exacerbated the sustainment funding 

issue by using some of the budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes. 

OSD officials explained that even though the goal is for the services to 

budget 100 percent of their sustainment requirements and beginning in 

fiscal year 2009 the services are required to budget at least 90 percent of 

their sustainment requirements, the services have the flexibility to use 

budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes, if they determine that 

Page 25 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

such spending is necessary. OSD officials noted that some spending 

flexibility is needed and is inherent in all operations and maintenance 

funded programs, including facilities sustainment. 

According to information provided by the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, 

and the Marine Corps, the services used about $2.6 billion (14 percent) of 

the funds budgeted for sustainment for other purposes during fiscal years 

2006 through 2008.20 Specifically, of the funds budgeted for sustainment 

during fiscal years 2006 through 2008, the Army used about $1.5 billion 

(21 percent) for other purposes, the Navy used about $900 million 

(25 percent) for other purposes, the Air Force used about $200 million 

(4 percent) for other purposes, and the Marine Corps did not use any 

budgeted sustainment funds for other purposes. Service officials noted 

that nearly all of the sustainment funds used for other purposes was used

to pay for unfunded facility restoration and modernization projects that 

they determined to be more urgent than funding sustainment work.21

Restoration and modernization work typically involves larger, more 

extensive projects that restore facilities degraded from several causes, 

such as natural disaster or inadequate sustainment, or renovate or replace

facilities to implement new or higher standards, accommodate new 

functions, or replace building components that typically last more than 

50 years and are near the end of their economic lives. Thus, the funds were 

used for the benefit of installation facilities. However, even though the 

officials stated that these projects were needed and other funds to pay for

the projects were not available, the consequence was that additional 

sustainment requirements went unmet. According to DOD, needed 

sustainment work that is not performed may eventually result in damaged 

facilities, shortened facility service lives, and increased future costs for 

facility restoration. 

 20Service officials stated that in some years funds from other sources, such as supplemental 

funds provided for the Global War on Terrorism, were used to pay for some facility 

sustainment work. Thus, the amount of budgeted sustainment funds that the services used

for other purposes in some years was partially offset, which lessened the impact from using 

sustainment funds for other purposes. 

21DOD officials noted that the explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated 

Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, required DOD to

provide written notification to the congressional defense committees of cumulative 

transfers in excess of $15 million from specified operation and maintenance budget 

subactivities, including the facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization budget

subactivity. However, such notification is not required if funds budgeted for sustainment 

are used for restoration and modernization purposes because the funds would be used in 

the same budget subactivity. 

Page 26 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

Because the military services have not budgeted to meet all sustainment 

requirements and have used some of the funds budgeted for sustainment 

for other purposes, the services have backlogs of needed sustainment 

work and some facilities have fallen into disrepair. For example, the Navy 

and the Air Force reported that their sustainment backlog at the end of 

fiscal year 2008 was about $222 million and $362 million, respectively. The 

Army did not report the amount of its sustainment backlog. Instead, the 

Army stated that deferred sustainment work became a restoration 

requirement, and at the end of fiscal year 2008, the Army reported that its 

restoration and modernization backlog was $19.6 billion. For comparison, 

the Navy and the Air Force reported that their restoration and 

modernization backlog was $28.7 billion and $10.2 billion, respectively, at 

the end of fiscal year 2008. The Marine Corps also did not report a backlog 

of sustainment work but reported that its restoration and modernization 

backlog was about $1.1 billion at the end of fiscal year 2008. 

Underfunding of 

Sustainment Requirements 

Has Resulted in 

Sustainment Backlogs and 

Some Deteriorated 

Installation Facilities 

Although many facilities were in good condition, service officials stated 

that underfunding of sustainment requirements over many years had 

resulted in some deteriorated facilities, which according to DOD will likely 

result in reduced service lives and more costly recapitalization 

requirements in the future. Army officials noted that when sustainment 

funding is inadequate, planned projects are delayed, which sometimes 

causes further deterioration, such as damage to interior walls and floors 

from leaking roofs. Navy and Air Force officials also stated that inadequate

facility sustainment funding had resulted in deteriorated facilities, reduced 

mission capabilities, and lower quality of life for installation personnel. 

Navy officials stated that in some instances installation aircraft runways 

have been closed because sustainment funds were not available to 

perform needed repairs.

At the nine installations we visited, facility sustainment requirements were 

not fully funded every year during fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008. At 

some installations, facility sustainment had benefited from the use of some 

supplemental funding provided for the Global War on Terrorism to pay for 

some related facility repairs. Still, considering the levels budgeted for 

sustainment and the use of some sustainment funds for other purposes, 

the amount actually spent on facility sustainment at six of the nine 

installations we visited was less than 75 percent of the estimated 

requirement, as determined by DOD’s facilities sustainment model, during 

fiscal years 2006 through 2008, and at three of these installations, the 

Page 27 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

amount spent was less than 60 percent of the estimated requirement.22

Officials at the nine installations reported a total of $376 million in 

backlogged facility sustainment needs. 

Although many facilities at the installations we visited were in good 

condition, some facilities had fallen into disrepair because funds were not 

available to pay for all needed sustainment work. The following examples

illustrate the deteriorated conditions of some facilities we observed. 

Officials at Fort Story, Virginia, stated that repairs costing about $2 million 

for the installation’s command headquarters building had been deferred 

because sustainment funds were not available. One needed repair involved 

the building’s basement, which had been damaged from extreme moisture, 

mold, and termites (see fig. 2). Due to the severity of the damage, the 

basement was not being used and, because the building was occupied and 

in daily use, a support wall had to be constructed to prevent the floor 

above the basement, which is the floor of the building’s entrance, from 

collapsing. 

 22At the installation level, comparisons of the amounts spent on sustainment with 

sustainment requirements can be less precise than similar comparisons at higher levels, 

such as at the military service level. The reason is that the facilities sustainment model 

estimates the average annual sustainment needs—not the actual annual sustainment 

needs—for each facility in the real property inventory. Thus, a particular facility’s actual 

sustainment needs in a given year may vary from its average sustainment needs because in 

some years more sustainment work is needed than in other years. For example, in a year 

that a facility needs a roof replacement, the actual needed work would be more than the 

needed work in years when fewer repairs were needed. However, according to DOD 

officials, the model’s estimates become increasingly precise as the sustainment needs of

individual facilities are summed to higher levels because individual facility fluctuations 

from the average tend to offset each other. 

Page 28 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

Figure 2: Damaged Basement in the Command Headquarters Building at Fort Story 

Source: GAO.

Note: Description of photographs, clockwise beginning with top left photograph: exterior entrance to

the headquarters building, building’s basement showing moisture and mold, support wall constructed

in basement to prevent the floor above the basement from collapsing, and support beam to 

basement’s ceiling showing termite damage. 

Officials at McChord Air Force Base, Washington, stated that window 

repairs costing about $32,000 for the installation’s steam plant had been

deferred because sustainment funding was not available. The building’s 

windows leak and allow water to flow onto the electrical panels of some 

equipment in the plant. The leaks have occasionally caused the panels to 

short out, which resulted in temporary electricity outages to portions of 

the installation, potentially undermining operations (see fig. 3).

Page 29 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

Figure 3: Leaking Windows Allow Water to Flow into Electrical Control Panels at 

McChord Air Force Base

Source: GAO.

Note: Description of photographs, clockwise beginning with top left photograph: exterior of steam 

plant building, tarp to help prevent rain water from damaging equipment, and plastic sheet to help 

prevent rain water from shorting out electrical panels. 

Officials at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Virginia, stated that 

repairs costing about $650,000 at an administrative building had been

deferred because of inadequate sustainment funding. Extensive water 

leaks from interior pipes in the building had caused excessive mold and 

mildew throughout the building (see fig. 4). The officials stated that one 

employee received medical treatment as a result of exposure to the mold 

in the building and other employees had experienced breathing 

difficulties. 

Page 30 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

Figure 4: Leaking Pipes Caused Mold and Mildew Damage at Naval Amphibious

Base Little Creek 

Source: GAO.

Note: Description of photographs, clockwise beginning with top left photograph: piping above ceiling 

showing mold and mildew, ceiling air vent showing mold and mildew, and a bucket sitting on room air 

conditioner to collect water and help prevent damage from leaking pipes in ceiling. 

Officials at the Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, New Jersey, 

stated that the roof of the public works building leaked and needed to be 

replaced. However, work had been deferred because sustainment funds 

were not available to complete the work, which was estimated to cost 

about $200,000. The leaks had caused mold and damage in sections of the 

building and, in a recently refurbished conference room, a video display 

had to be covered with plastic sheeting to prevent damage from the leaks 

(see fig. 5). 

Page 31 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

Figure 5: Damage from a Leaking Roof at the Public Works Building at Naval Air 

Engineering Station Lakehurst 

Source: GAO.

Note: Description of photographs, beginning with photograph on the left: plastic sheet covering a 

conference room television monitor to help prevent damage from leaks and side view of same

television monitor showing trash can on floor to catch dripping water. 

While DOD has made a comprehensive effort to ensure consistent delivery 

of installation support at the planned joint bases, the estimates of potential 

savings will likely continue to decline and it is unclear whether joint 

basing will result in any actual savings. The levels of service called for by 

most standards were determined in view of DOD policies and practices, 

industry standards, or from other federal agencies, but judgment was also 

used to decide the standards in many areas. Because such decisions 

involve trade-offs between alternative levels of service and affordability, 

opportunities exist to review and, if needed, adjust these standards as 

experience is gained to ensure that the standards reflect the level of 

service necessary to meet installation requirements as economically as 

possible. Similarly, opportunities also exist to periodically review and 

address those instances where the military services’ approach to 

implementing joint basing results in additional administrative costs or loss 

of existing installation support efficiencies. Furthermore, in view of DOD’s 

newly established common support standards, the associated increase in 

the cost of installation support, and the significant decrease in expected 

long-term savings from joint basing, a detailed cost analysis of the results 

from the initial joint bases could assist the Congress in its oversight of this 

effort. 

Conclusions 

The military services have exacerbated the underfunding of facility 

sustainment requirements by using some budgeted sustainment funds for 

Page 32 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

other purposes. Although using budgeted sustainment funds for other 

purposes is permissible, the result is that additional sustainment 

requirements are not met, and according to DOD, when facilities are not 

fully sustained, the facilities will likely experience reduced service lives 

and more costly recapitalization requirements in the future. Until 

additional attention is focused on facility sustainment spending, the 

military services might continue spending some sustainment funds on 

other purposes, thus leaving more sustainment needs unmet, which leads 

to greater recapitalization costs in the future. Furthermore, without 

updates on the amount of budgeted sustainment funds spent on other 

purposes, OSD will not be well positioned to effectively manage the risk 

associated with the redirection of sustainment funds and the Congress will 

lack the information needed to make informed decisions and ensure 

proper congressional oversight of the administration’s annual budget 

submission for facility sustainment. 

To address the expected increased installation support costs from joint 

basing implementation and the use of budgeted facility sustainment funds 

for purposes other than sustainment, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 

Environment) to take the following four actions:

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Periodically review the installation support standards as experience is 

gained with delivering installation support at the joint bases and make 

adjustments, if needed, to ensure that each standard reflects the level 

of service necessary to meet installation requirements as economically 

as possible. 

• Periodically review administrative costs as joint basing is implemented 

to minimize any additional costs and prevent the loss of existing 

installation support efficiencies. 

• Complete a detailed analysis of the estimated installation support costs 

from the initial joint bases and report the results of the analysis to the 

Congress in the department’s documents supporting the 

administration’s annual budget submission or another document 

deemed appropriate. 

• Increase the attention given to facility sustainment spending by 

summarizing and reporting to the Congress the amount of budgeted 

sustainment funds spent on other purposes in the department’s 

Page 33 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

documents supporting the administration’s annual budget submission 

or another document deemed appropriate. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense (Installations and Environment) stated that our report provided 

a comprehensive look into joint basing and facility sustainment funding 

and that DOD partially agreed with the report’s four recommendations. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to periodically review the 

installation support standards and make adjustments, if needed, to ensure

that each standard reflects the level of service necessary to meet 

requirements as economically as possible. DOD agreed that the standards 

may require refinement as mission requirements evolve, organizational 

structures mature, and efficiencies improve installation support delivery.

However, because the joint base memorandum of agreement template 

already requires periodic reviews to ensure that installation support is 

delivered in accordance with appropriate, common, output level 

standards, DOD stated that further action to implement the 

recommendation was not necessary.

We agree that the memorandum of agreement template provides for the 

individual joint bases to periodically review their delivery of installation 

support and use of standards. However, while only the joint bases are 

currently required to deliver services in accordance with these standards, 

OSD officials told us that DOD developed the standards to define the level 

of service that all military bases should ideally provide in delivering 

installation support. Thus, because the standards are DOD-wide standards 

and not merely joint base standards, our recommendation calls for 

periodic reviews of these DOD-wide standards and not of the standards at 

individual bases. Also, because military judgment was used to decide 

many of the standards and support costs generally increase as the level of

service increases, we believe that the trade-offs between alternative levels 

of service and affordability should be reconsidered as experience is 

gained. For these reasons, we continue to believe that DOD needs to take 

additional steps to periodically review the standards from a DOD-wide 

perspective and make adjustments, if needed, to ensure that the standards 

are appropriate and economical. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to periodically review 

administrative costs as joint basing is implemented to minimize any 

additional costs and prevent the loss of existing installation support 

efficiencies. DOD stated that it had already established a process to 

Page 34 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

periodically review joint basing costs as part of DOD’s planning, program, 

budget and execution system and that the joint base memorandum of 

agreement template requires periodic reviews of mission and resource 

impacts. Thus, DOD stated that further action to implement the 

recommendation was not necessary.

DOD’s response to our recommendation describes the processes DOD 

intends to use to review costs after the joint bases have been 

implemented. However, our recommendation calls for reviewing costs 

during the joint base implementation process—not only after 

implementation has been completed. As illustrated by the examples cited 

in this report, the opportunity to reduce some joint base administrative 

costs and prevent the loss of existing installation support efficiencies 

exists during the time that the individual installations are working out the 

details on how to combine into a joint base. Thus, we continue to believe 

that DOD needs to take additional steps to perform periodic reviews to try 

to avoid losing existing efficiencies during the joint base implementation 

process and to help ensure that each joint base is established as 

economically and efficiently as possible. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to complete a detailed 

analysis of the estimated installation support costs from the initial joint 

bases and report the results of the analysis to the Congress. DOD stated 

that it is collecting estimated installation support cost information at the 

joint bases and that the information will be provided if the Congress 

requests it. As discussed in this report, installation support costs at the 

joint bases are expected to increase, at least in the short term, compared 

to support costs before consolidation. Because this outcome is the 

opposite of what was expected by the BRAC Commission, we believe that 

the issue is particularly noteworthy. As such, we believe that DOD should

not only collect joint base installation support costs, as DOD stated it is 

doing, but also complete an analysis that compares the costs to the 

original cost expectations for the initial joint bases. We believe that the 

information in the analysis will assist the Congress in its oversight of joint 

basing and, as such, we continue to believe that DOD needs to proactively 

report the results of the analysis to the Congress in the department’s 

documents supporting the administration’s annual budget submission or 

another document deemed appropriate. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to increase the attention 

given to facility sustainment spending by summarizing and reporting to the 

Congress the amount of budgeted sustainment funds spent on other 

purposes. DOD stated that it will collect and summarize the amount of 

Page 35 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

budgeted sustainment funds spent on other purposes and that the 

information will be provided if the Congress requests it. This action 

partially addresses the recommendation. However, because we believe 

that the information will assist the Congress in its oversight of sustainment 

spending, we also continue to believe that DOD should proactively report

the information in the department’s documents supporting the 

administration’s annual budget submission or another document deemed 

appropriate.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV. DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into this report 

as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. In

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions on the 

information discussed in this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4523 

or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in 

Brian J. Lepo

appendix V.

re, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 36 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

List of Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tim Johnson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

 Veterans’ Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable John M. McHugh 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 37 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
 

The Honorable Chet Edwards 

Chairman 

The Honorable Zach Wamp 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

 Veterans’ Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 38 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 39 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To evaluate the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts and expected 

costs to deliver installation support at the planned joint bases, we 

reviewed the justification supporting the 2005 Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment (BRAC) Commission’s recommendation that DOD establish 

12 joint bases and examined DOD’s implementation plans, guidance, and 

cost estimates associated with the delivery of installation support at the 

planned joint bases. In addition, we reviewed recently issued DOD 

guidance that provided common installation support definitions and 

267 support standards, and that required joint bases to deliver support in 

accordance with the definitions and standards. We discussed with the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service officials the 

status of joint base implementation, the basis for the new installation 

support standards, and mechanisms established to help ensure that the 

joint bases comply with DOD’s joint basing guidance. In assessing 

expected changes in installation support costs at the joint bases, we 

compared the military services’ fiscal year 2009 estimate of potential longterm savings from joint basing with the savings estimate made by the 2005

BRAC Commission, compared support cost estimates before and after 

joint basing at the three initial joint bases that had completed such 

estimates, discussed joint base support cost expectations and reasons for 

cost changes with OSD and military service officials, and reviewed 

information from the military services concerning past funding levels for 

installation support. To gain local level insight into the planned delivery 

and expected costs of installation support at the joint bases, we visited 

3 Army, 3 Navy, and 3 Air Force installations that are consolidating into 

4 of the 12 planned joint bases.1

 We selected bases for visits that had the

highest potential reduction in jobs according to a DOD 2005 BRAC report.2

At each installation visited, we discussed with local officials their views on 

the delivery of installation support by the joint bases and expectations 

regarding changes in support costs before and after implementation of the

joint bases. Also, to obtain some insight into how many support areas 

might require increased service levels at the joint bases, we compared 

current service levels to the joint base support standards at each 

installation we visited. Specifically, we judgmentally selected 40 of the 267 

 1

Specifically, we visited Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek and Fort Story in Virginia; 

Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base in Washington; McGuire Air Force Base, Fort Dix, 

and Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst in New Jersey; and Charleston Air Force Base 

and Naval Weapons Station Charleston in South Carolina. 

2

Department of Defense, Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group

Base Realignment and Closure Report, Volume VII Final BRAC 2005 Report (May 10, 

2005). 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

support standards and compared the level of service that the installation 

was currently providing to the level of service called for by the standard. 

To evaluate DOD’s funding for facility sustainment at all installations, we 

examined and compared DOD’s requirements and goals for facility 

sustainment funding with the amounts actually budgeted and spent on 

sustainment. Specifically, we reviewed DOD’s facility sustainment 

requirements for fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as determined by DOD’s 

facilities sustainment model; reviewed DOD’s installation strategic plans 

to identify DOD’s goals for facility sustainment budgeting; obtained OSD 

and military service information for fiscal years 2005 through 2008 that 

showed the amounts budgeted for sustainment, spent on sustainment, and 

budgeted for sustainment but spent for other purposes; and compared the 

amounts budgeted and spent to the corresponding requirements and goals. 

The amounts budgeted and spent represented official OSD and military 

service information and we did not independently verify the amounts. In 

cases where DOD goals were not met and where sustainment funds were 

used for other purposes, we interviewed OSD and service officials to 

discuss the reasons why and any associated consequences, including the

amounts of any deferred facility sustainment backlogs. We also reviewed 

other DOD guidance related to facility sustainment and interviewed OSD 

and service headquarters officials to further assess DOD’s goals, policies, 

and practices related to facility sustainment, including the allocation of 

sustainment funds to the installation level. We developed case studies on 

facility sustainment requirements, funding allocations, and spending at the 

installation level, and interviewed local officials about the consequences if 

spending was less than requirements. To coordinate with our joint basing 

work, we developed case studies at the nine installations visited in 

connection with our joint basing work. Thus, because the installations we 

visited were not randomly selected, information from the case studies 

might not be representative of all military installations. During the 

installation visits, we also observed and took photographs of installation 

facilities that were in a deteriorated condition because needed 

sustainment work had not been performed. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2008 through February 

2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 40 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
Appendix II: Methods Used by the Military 

Services to Allocate Facility Sustainment 

Funds to the Installation Level 

Page 41 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 

Appendix II: Methods Used by the Military 

Services to Allocate Facility Sustainment 

Funds to the Installation Level 

According to officials in each of the military services, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) facilities sustainment model is used as a tool to allocate

facility sustainment funds to the installation level. However, some 

differences exist among the services’ practices in allocating sustainment 

funds. For example, according to Army officials, the Army first considers 

each installation’s facility sustainment requirement, as determined by 

DOD’s model. Then, the Army allocates funding to its installations based 

on a set percentage of each installation’s requirements. The same 

percentage is used for all installations and, historically, each installation 

has been allocated about 70 to 75 percent of its sustainment requirement. 

These funds are expected to be used to pay for routine sustainment work, 

such as regular facility inspections, preventive maintenance, and service 

calls, as well as some larger sustainment projects, such as roof 

replacements. According to Army officials, in the past few years all 

budgeted sustainment funds were not allocated to the installations. Some 

funds were retained at Army headquarters and used to pay for unfunded

restoration and modernization projects related to specific Army 

investment strategies, such as barracks improvement and upgrades to 

transportation infrastructure. 

According to Navy officials, the Navy first considers the facility 

sustainment requirement of all installations, as determined by DOD’s 

model, under each of the Navy’s regional commands. Then, the Navy 

allocates funding based on a set percentage of each region’s total 

sustainment requirement. The regions then allocate sustainment funds to 

their installations. According to Navy officials, the percentage used to 

allocate funds to the regions is determined by the amount of sustainment 

funds that the Navy budgeted and the Navy’s practice of retaining a 

portion of the funds at headquarters to centrally pay for some larger 

sustainment projects, maintenance dredging, specialized inspections, 

demolition projects, and some unfunded restoration and modernization 

projects. With this practice in fiscal year 2008, the Navy allocated to each 

of its regional commands about 55 percent of each region’s total 

sustainment requirement. Some regional commands reallocate all of the 

funds they receive to their installations based on the same percentage of 

each installation’s sustainment requirement. Other regional commands 

retain a portion of the funds they receive to pay for regional projects—

such as design work on facility projects, larger sustainment projects, and 

some unfunded restoration and modernization projects. Installations use 

their sustainment funds to pay for routine sustainment work and can

submit to their regional commands or Navy headquarters a prioritized list 

of needed larger sustainment projects, which compete for funding based 

on Navy and regional priorities. 
Appendix II: Methods Used by the Military 

Services to Allocate Facility Sustainment 

Funds to the Installation Level 

According to an Air Force official, the Air Force first considers the facility 

sustainment requirement of all Air Force active, guard, and reserve 

installations, as determined by DOD’s model. Then, the Air Force allocates 

to each component about 90 percent of each component’s total 

sustainment requirement. The components, in turn, allocate funding to 

their major commands based on the commands’ specific mission needs 

and their model-determined sustainment requirements, and the commands 

allocate the funds to the installation level in accordance with execution 

plans, unique funding priorities, and advice from financial management 

and civil engineering experts. 

According to a Marine Corps official, the Marine Corps first considers the 

facility sustainment requirement of all installations, as determined by 

DOD’s facilities sustainment model, under each of the Marine Corps’ 

regions. Then, the Marine Corps allocates funding based on a set 

percentage of each region’s requirements. The same percentage is used for 

all regions and, historically, each region has been allocated about 60 

percent of its sustainment requirement. The regions then allocate 

sustainment funds to their installations based on their specific knowledge 

of each installation’s requirements. Installations are expected to use these 

funds to pay for routine sustainment work, such as regular facility 

inspections, preventive maintenance, and service calls. According to 

Marine Corps officials, all budgeted sustainment funds are not allocated to

the regions. Some funds are retained at Marine Corps headquarters and 

used to pay for larger sustainment projects. Specifically, each installation 

can submit a prioritized list of larger sustainment projects to Marine Corps 

headquarters. Headquarters decides which projects to fund based on 

Marine Corps priorities and the amount of funds available, which is the 

amount of budgeted funds that was not initially allocated to the regions.

Page 42 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
Appendix III: List of Installation Support 

Functions and Number of Associated

Standards for Joint Bases 

Page 43 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 

The Department of Defense (DOD) issued joint basing implementation 

guidance in January and April 2008 that for the first time established a set 

of common definitions and standards for installation support. As shown in 

table 5, the guidance defined 47 installation support functions and 

provided 267 standards to help define the level of service that each joint 

base is to provide for each of the support functions. 

Table 5: Installation Support Functions and Number of Associated Standards for Joint Bases 

Installation support functions Number of standards

1 Airfield operations 14

2 Child and youth programs 6

3 Command management 26

4 Installation public affairs 11

5 Legal support 7

6 Financial management 4

7 Management analysis 4

8 Procurement operations 6

9 Installation safety 4

10 Installation chaplain ministries 6

11 Installation history and museums nonea

12 Laundry and dry cleaning 2

13 Food services 4

14 Custodial services 3

15 Emergency management 9

16 Environmental compliance 5

17 Environmental conservation 7

18 Environmental pollution prevention 3

19 Environmental restoration nonea

20 Facilities demolition 1

21 Facilities new footprint nonea

22 Facilities restoration and modernization 1

23 Facilities sustainment 7

24 Family housing services 2

25 Fire protection and emergency services 1

26 Grounds maintenance and landscaping 3

27 Information technology services management 26

28 Lodging 6

29 Military personnel services nonea

Appendix III: List of Installation Support 

Functions and Number of Associated 

Standards for Joint Bases 
Appendix III: List of Installation Support 

Functions and Number of Associated

Standards for Joint Bases 

Installation support functions Number of standards

30 Morale, welfare, and recreation 6

31 Pavement clearance services 1

32 Pest control services 1

33 Port services 14

34 Readiness engineering services nonea

35 Real property management and engineering services 8

36 Real property leases nonea

37 Refuse collection and disposal 3

38 Installation law enforcement operations 5

39 Installation physical security protection and services 4

40 Small arms range management 8

41 Supply, storage, and distribution (munitions) 13

42 Supply, storage, and distribution (non-munitions) 8

43 Base support vehicles and equipment 9

44 Installation movement 5

45 Unaccompanied personnel housing services 2

46 Utilities 4

47 Warfighter and family services 8

Total 267

Source: DOD. 

a

DOD officials stated that the use of standards was not applicable for this installation support function. 

Page 44 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 45 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 46 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 47 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 48 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant Director; 

Kate Lenane; Jeanett Reid; Geoffrey Peck; Charles Perdue; and Gary 

Phillips made significant contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 49 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 

Related GAO Products 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in 

Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently 

Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 

2009. 

Base Realignment and 

Closure 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to 

Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R. 

Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower 

Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC 

Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations 

Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have 

Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. Washington, 

D.C.: December 11, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating, 

Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of 

Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, 

and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics 

Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor 

Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve 

Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 

Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 
Related GAO Products 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 

2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers

Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 

Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2007. 

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 

Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 

Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 

Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property. 

GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007. 

Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. 

Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005. 

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and 

Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 

Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005. 

Defense Infrastructure High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 

2009. 

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 

Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. 

GAO-08-665. Washington D.C.: June 17, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Continued Management Attention Is Needed to 

Support Installation Facilities and Operations. GAO-08-502. Washington, 

D.C.: April 24, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 

Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008. 

Page 50 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
Related GAO Products 

Defense Infrastructure: Army and Marine Corps Grow the Force 

Construction Projects Generally Support the Initiative. GAO-08-375. 

Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Issues Need to Be Addressed in Managing and 

Funding Base Operations and Facilities Support. GAO-05-556. 

Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2005. 

Military Training: Better Planning and Funding Priority Needed to 

Improve Conditions of Military Training Ranges. GAO-05-534. 

Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005. 

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic 

Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities. 

GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.

(351223) Page 51 GAO-09-336 Defense Infrastructure 
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