United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 19-1406 

CRAIG LAMBERT, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES J. FIORENTINI, Mayor of Haverhill; 

ALAN R. DENARO, Chief of the Haverhill Police Department, 

Defendants, Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Lynch and Barron, Circuit Judges. 

David G. Gabor, with whom Katherine A. Brustowicz and 

The Wagner Law Group were on brief, for appellant. 

Janelle M. Austin, with whom KP Law, P.C. was on brief, 

for appellees. 

January 24, 2020 
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. After retiring as a City of 

Haverhill police officer in 2014, Craig Lambert in 2017 sought an 

identification card from Chief of Police Alan DeNaro that would 

allow Lambert to carry a concealed firearm across state lines under 

the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act ("LEOSA"), 18 U.S.C. 

§ 926C. Massachusetts has chosen to require the state's law 

enforcement agencies to provide identification cards to certain 

officers who retire in good standing, 501 Mass. Code Regs. 13.03, 

and each agency's policies define the criteria for the "in good 

standing" requirement in LEOSA. 

Chief DeNaro denied the request on the grounds that 

Lambert was not in good standing at the time of his 2014 

retirement. Lambert then brought this action against DeNaro and 

Haverhill Mayor James Fiorentini in state court, advancing four 

causes of action. DeNaro and Fiorentini removed the case to 

federal district court and moved for judgment on the pleadings, 

which the district court entered for defendants on all four claims. 

We hold, as a matter of first impression, that 

Massachusetts has, in its state certiorari procedure, Mass. Gen. 

Laws ch. 249, § 4, provided a constitutionally adequate remedy 

which precludes assertion of a federal procedural due process claim 

here. These LEOSA identification card denial cases in 

Massachusetts are fully redressable in state court. We also hold 

that Lambert has failed to plead facts sufficient to support his 
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federal substantive due process claim, as he has not demonstrated 

that the denial of a LEOSA identification card shocked the 

conscience. 

We affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 due process claim, 

the only federal claim set forth in Lambert's complaint and the 

only basis asserted for federal jurisdiction. We also affirm 

dismissal of the negligence claim and the purported equity claim 

as they plainly fail to assert a claim under state law. We vacate 

the judgment on the merits as to the state certiorari claim and 

direct its dismissal without prejudice. 

I. 

"Because this appeal follows the granting of a motion 

for judgment on the pleadings, we glean the facts from the 

operative pleading," accepting those facts as true. Grajales v. 

P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2012). We also 

"consider 'documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by 

the parties; . . . documents central to plaintiffs' claim; [and] 

documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint' . . . even 

when the documents are incorporated into the movant's pleadings." 

Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2007) (alterations in 

original) (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 

1993)). We describe the substantive legal standards for issuance 

of such identification cards before setting forth the facts. 
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A. Legal Standards 

LEOSA provides that a "qualified retired law enforcement 

officer" carrying certain identification issued by the officer's 

former law enforcement agency "may carry a concealed firearm that 

has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 

18 U.S.C. § 926C(a). The statute defines "qualified retired law 

enforcement officer" as, inter alia, a person that "separated from 

service in good standing from service with a public agency as a 

law enforcement officer," but it does not further define "in good 

standing." Id. § 926C(c)(1). The identification Lambert requested 

is "a photographic identification issued by the agency from which 

the individual separated from service as a law enforcement officer 

that identifies the person as having been employed as a police 

officer or law enforcement officer" and either includes or is 

accompanied by a certification of the retired officer's firearms 

qualification. Id. § 926C(d). LEOSA leaves to state and local 

agencies the issuance of identification cards to their retired 

officers. Burban v. City of Neptune Beach, 920 F.3d 1274, 1280 

(11th Cir. 2019). 

The Massachusetts regulations require that "[t]he chief 

law enforcement officer for a law enforcement agency shall issue 

an identification card to a qualified retired law enforcement 

officer who retired from that law enforcement agency." 501 Mass. 
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Code Regs. 13.03.1 The regulations define "qualified retired law 

enforcement officer" as, inter alia, a person who "separated from 

service in good standing with a law enforcement agency as a law 

enforcement officer." Id. 13.02. 

The state regulations leave the definition of good 

standing to local law enforcement agencies. See Frawley v. Police 

Comm'r of Cambridge, 46 N.E.3d 504, 507-08 (Mass. 2016) (observing 

that neither the federal statute nor state regulations establish 

good standing criteria). The Haverhill Police Department's 

relevant policy defines "[s]eparated in good standing" to mean 

"that such officer was not charged with or suspected of criminal 

activity at the time of retirement, nor was he or she under 

investigation or facing disciplinary action for an ethical 

violation of departmental rules, or for any act of dishonesty."

B. Facts 

Lambert began work as a police officer for the City of 

Haverhill in April 1994. Effective August 21, 2012, Lambert was 

placed on injured leave. 

After Lambert went on leave, Chief DeNaro sent Lambert 

a letter dated August 22, 2012. The letter stated that DeNaro had 

concluded that Lambert had violated orders from a deputy chief and 

 1 The Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety 

adopted these regulations in 2008 and amended them in 2013 in 

response to an amendment to the federal statute. 1095 Mass. Reg. 

85 (Jan. 11, 2008); 1241 Mass. Reg. 49 (Aug. 16, 2013). 
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a captain in June and July 2012. The letter informed Lambert that, 

because of that violation, he was suspended for five working days, 

from August 22, 2012, to August 28, 2012, and that DeNaro would 

recommend to Mayor Fiorentini that Lambert also receive an 

additional 55-day suspension.2

Lambert successfully challenged the loss of five days' 

injury pay in state Superior Court. The court held that the 

disciplinary matter could not be used as the basis for withholding 

Lambert's injury pay because the City imposed the suspension after 

Lambert went on leave.3 Lambert remained on leave until he retired 

on March 22, 2014, more than a year and a half after he went out 

on leave. In January 2017, Lambert requested a LEOSA 

identification card by telephone to a Haverhill police captain, 

who told him at some point that Chief DeNaro had decided Lambert 

did not qualify for the card. On July 28, 2017, Lambert sent a 

 2 Under Massachusetts law, only Mayor Fiorentini, as the 

"appointing authority," could issue a suspension of longer than 

five days, and only after providing written notice and a hearing. 

See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31, § 41.

3 We take notice of the contents of the state court 

judgment to which Lambert's complaint refers and which defendants 

filed in the district court as an exhibit to their motion for 

judgment on the pleadings. See Lambert v. DeNaro, No. 1377-CV00351 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2013); Boateng v. InterAmerican 

Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[A] court may look 

to matters of public record in deciding a Rule 12[] motion without 

converting the motion into one for summary judgment. . . . And a 

court ordinarily may treat documents from prior state court 

adjudications as public records."). 
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letter to Mayor Fiorentini asking why his request had been denied. 

On October 2, 2017, Haverhill Police Department Chief Alan DeNaro 

formally denied Lambert's request, stating in a letter that Lambert 

did "not qualify, as he left employment under a disability prior 

to the completion of an Internal Affairs Investigation, which could 

have potentially resulted in discipline up to and including 

termination." 

Lambert then filed a four-count complaint in Essex 

Superior Court against DeNaro and Haverhill Mayor James 

Fiorentini. Count I is a complaint in the nature of certiorari 

pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 249, section 4. 

See Frawley, 46 N.E.3d at 513 ("[T]he appropriate avenue of relief" 

for a LEOSA identification card denial is "a civil action in the 

nature of certiorari pursuant to G.L. c. 249, § 4."). Count II is 

an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging civil rights violations 

and invoking the Massachusetts Constitution. Count III asserts 

that defendants acted negligently in "discharg[ing] the legal 

duties" owed to Lambert as a retired police officer. Count IV, 

titled "Equity," alleges that DeNaro's October 2, 2017, letter 

contained inaccurate and unsupported factual assertions. Lambert 

alleged that no investigation was open when he retired and that 

DeNaro was acting "for personal reasons related to malice or 

spite." 
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C. Procedural History 

On November 22, 2017, the defendants removed the case to 

the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts based on 

federal question jurisdiction over the § 1983 due process claim. 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. Defendants moved for judgment on the 

pleadings, Lambert opposed, and the district court allowed the 

motion as to all counts. Lambert timely appealed. 

II. 

We review de novo the grant of a motion for judgment on 

the pleadings. Villeneuve v. Avon Prods., Inc., 919 F.3d 40, 49 

(1st Cir. 2019). "Dismissal is proper if -- after accepting all 

well-pleaded facts as true and viewing them in the light most 

favorable to [Lambert] -- the complaint fails to allege a plausible 

right to relief." Id. "In conducting this appraisal, we are not 

bound by the district court's reasoning but, rather, may affirm 

the entry of judgment on any ground made manifest by the record." 

Kando v. R.I. State Bd. of Elections, 880 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 

2018). 

We begin with the sole federal claim set forth in the 

complaint, Lambert's § 1983 due process claim.4 Count II is 

 4 Lambert's complaint clearly frames only the § 1983 due 

process claim as a federal cause of action. He does not argue 

that he has a LEOSA § 1983 cause of action. We note that the 

Eleventh Circuit has held that there is no such cause of action. 

Burban, 920 F.3d at 1280. 
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labelled as a § 1983 claim, and Lambert argued to the district 

court that this claim alleged violations of his procedural and 

substantive due process rights.5 "Procedural due process 

guarantees that a state proceeding which results in a deprivation 

of property is fair, while substantive due process ensures that 

such state action is not arbitrary and capricious." Licari v. 

Ferruzzi, 22 F.3d 344, 347 (1st Cir. 1994). We consider each 

separately. 

"A sufficient procedural due process claim must allege 

'that [the plaintiff] was deprived of constitutionally protected 

property because of defendants' actions, and that the deprivation 

occurred without due process of law.'" Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. 

City of E. Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 999 (1st Cir. 1992) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 

1517, 1522 (1st Cir. 1983)). A procedural due process claim that 

does not "allege the unavailability of constitutionally-adequate 

remedies under state law" fails. Id. 

 5 On appeal, Lambert further argues that he has a "stigmaplus" claim. See Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 63 

(1st Cir. 1998) ("[A] deprivation of a constitutionally protected 

liberty interest [occurs] when, in addition to mere reputational 

injury, words spoken by a government actor adversely impact a right 

or status previously enjoyed under state law." (citing Paul v. 

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708–09 (1976))). But "this argument was never 

raised to the district court and 'arguments not made initially to 

the district court cannot be raised on appeal.'" River Farm Realty 

Tr. v. Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co., 943 F.3d 27, 41 n.21 (1st Cir. 

2019) (quoting DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 34 (1st 

Cir. 2001)). 
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Even assuming LEOSA could give rise to a property right, 

Lambert's complaint makes no allegation that the state remedies 

available to him are constitutionally inadequate. To the contrary, 

Count I of the complaint invoked the state certiorari remedy for 

judicial review of DeNaro's denial of his LEOSA identification 

card. The procedural due process inquiry "examine[s] the 

procedural safeguards built into the statutory or administrative 

procedure of effecting the deprivation, and any remedies for 

erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law." Zinermon 

v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990). The Massachusetts Supreme 

Judicial Court has specifically held that judicial review of a 

denial of a LEOSA identification card is available through a civil 

action in the nature of certiorari pursuant to Massachusetts 

General Laws chapter 249, section 4. Frawley, 46 N.E.3d at 510-

11. "The constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is not 

complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless 

and until the State fails to provide due process." Zinermon, 494 

U.S. at 126. We hold that his procedural due process claim fails.6

Lambert's substantive due process claim fails on the 

pleadings for a different reason. "In order to assert a viable 

substantive due process claim, a plaintiff has 'to prove that [he] 

 6 Indeed, Lambert acknowledged at oral argument that the 

certiorari claim provides an adequate state remedy. He does not 

assert a pre-deprivation due process claim. 
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suffered the deprivation of an established life, liberty, or 

property interest, and that such deprivation occurred through 

governmental action that shocks the conscience.'" Najas Realty, 

LLC v. Seekonk Water Dist., 821 F.3d 134, 145 (1st Cir. 2016) 

(quoting Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2008)). 

On these pleadings, as to substantive due process, the 

denial of Lambert's LEOSA identification is not "egregiously 

unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking." Licari, 22 

F.3d at 347 (quoting Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 

1990)).7 Lambert's § 1983 claim fails to state a claim and was 

properly dismissed.8

III. 

The § 1983 due process claim provided the sole basis for 

federal jurisdiction, so we consider whether the district court 

appropriately exercised its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1367 over the state claim at the motion for judgment on 

 7 Because Lambert's substantive due process claim fails 

for this reason, we need not address whether LEOSA in fact creates 

a property interest in the LEOSA identification card that is 

cognizable for due process purposes. Compare Henrichs v. Ill. Law 

Enf't Training & Standards Bd., 306 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1058 (N.D. 

Ill. 2018) (LEOSA does not create a property interest cognizable 

under § 1983), with DuBerry v. District of Columbia, 824 F.3d 1046, 

1053-54 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (LEOSA does create a cognizable property 

interest). 

8 Lambert presents no argument that his reference to the 

Massachusetts Constitution in Count II would survive dismissal of 

his federal constitutional claim. 
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the pleadings stage. "As a general principle, the unfavorable 

disposition of a plaintiff's federal claims at the early stages of 

a suit . . . will trigger the dismissal without prejudice of any 

supplemental state-law claims." Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 

57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995). Federal courts may retain 

jurisdiction in appropriate cases but, before doing so, must 

consider "the interests of fairness, judicial economy, 

convenience, and comity," the last of which is "a particularly 

important concern in these cases." Camelio v. Am. Fed'n, 137 F.3d 

666, 672 (1st Cir. 1998). Courts may also consider whether the 

state law issues are "novel or sensitive." Sexual Minorities 

Uganda v. Lively, 899 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2018); see also 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) ("The district courts may decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the claim 

raises a novel or complex issue of State law."). "Needless 

decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity 

and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them 

a surer-footed reading of applicable law." United Mine Workers of 

Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). "[U]nder this standard, 

it can be an abuse of discretion -- if no federal claim 

remains -- for a district court to retain jurisdiction over a 

pendent state law claim when that state law claim presents a 

substantial question of state law that is better addressed by the 

state courts." Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2017). 
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Lambert makes no argument to us that the district court's 

conclusion as to his last two state law claims was error, and 

vacating that ruling would promote neither comity nor justice as 

both plainly fail to state a claim. Count III, which alleges that 

DeNaro and Fiorentini acted negligently in performing their 

duties, is barred by the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. See Mass. 

Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 2 ("[N]o . . . public employee . . . shall be 

liable for any injury or loss of property . . . caused by his 

negligent or wrongful act or omission while acting within the scope 

of his office or employment."). The "Equity" cause of action 

advanced in Count IV simply does not exist as a matter of law. 

The state certiorari claim stands on different footing, 

as we cannot say on the face of the pleadings that it failed to 

state a claim. Lambert has argued that his five-day suspension is 

no longer outstanding and was not outstanding at the time of the 

denial, which the defendants dispute. That dispute appears to 

raise questions of state law, which would be "best resolved in 

state court." Camelio, 137 F.3d at 672. There also appear to be 

disputed issues of material fact, such as the date, if any, on 

which the suspension became effective, which are inappropriate for 

resolution on the pleadings. Finally, the certiorari claim is not 

so "inextricably intertwined" with the procedural due process 

claim under § 1983 that exercising supplemental jurisdiction would 

be appropriate. See Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69, 81-82 
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(1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 

35, 51 (1995)); Penate v. Hanchett, 944 F.3d 358, 370 (1st Cir. 

2019) ("[T]he state courts . . . are often better suited than are 

federal courts to resolve questions of state law."). 

IV. 

We affirm dismissal of the § 1983, negligence, and 

"equity" claims with prejudice. We vacate the dismissal of the 

state certiorari claim on the merits and direct its dismissal 

without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. No costs are awarded.