IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

QUENTIN JONES , Defendant Below, Appellant,

v. STATE OF DELAWARE , A ppellee. § § § § § § § § § § No. 241, 2021 Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware
Cr. ID

. No. 1502002252

Submitted: March 2, 2022 Decided: April 18 , 20 22
Before SEITZ , Chief Justice; VALIHURA , and VAUGHN , Justices. O R D E R
On this 18 th day of April 20 22 , upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: (1) The Appellant, Quentin Jones, appeals the Superior Court’s denial of his Motion to Withdraw a No Contest Plea to two counts of Rape in the Fourth Degree. Jon es claims that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for three reasons: 1) his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; 2) he had a valid
claim of legal innocence; and 3) his counsel was inadequate when he entered the plea. For the reasons that follow, we have concluded that the Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed.2

( 2 ) The victim in this case, A. R.

- S., 1 was approximately seven years old when Jones allegedly abused her . At that time, A. R

. - S

. resided with her father, Antoine Ross, along with Ross’s wife and daughter. Jones resided in an RV on the property of Ross’s home. A. R.

- S. confided to relatives that Jones had touched her inappropriately and raped her. A. R.

- S.’s mother called a Divis ion of Family Services hotline and reported Jones’s alleged actions. Jones was initially indicted on two counts of Rape in the First Degree and one count of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree. A trial on those charges was held in Superior Court

. ( 3 ) At trial, there was some conflicting testimony as to who abused the
victim. In an interview with a representative of the Child Advocacy Center of Delaware, A. R.

- S. first accused her brother of inappropriately touching her , then
clarif ied that Jones committed the acts alleged. At trial, A. R.

- S. testified that it was
Jones who abused her. T he jury found Jones guilty, and he received life imprisonment sentences for both Rape First Degree charges. ( 4 ) This, however, was not the end of Jon es’s case. The Superior Court vacated Jones’s conviction because the State failed to disclose the nature of a witness’s bargain for a reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony against Jones. ( 5 ) After his conviction was vacated, Jones decided to con sider accepting a plea offer made by the State

. The State offered Jones the opportunity to plead

1 Initials are being used to protect the victim ’ s identity.3

no lo contendere to two charges of Rape in the Fourth Degree, with the understanding that his probation (on another case) would be violated and a nolle prosequ i would
be entered on the Unlawful Sexual Contact charge. The State agreed to recommend

a sentence of 15 years at Level V, suspended after five years, followed by periods of
Level IV and Level III probation as to one of the Rape Fourth Degree charges, and 15 years at Level V suspended for Level III as to the other. It also recommended that Jones be discharged unimproved on the VOP. Imposition of these recommended sentences by the court would result in Jones’s release for time served. Jones’s attorney u rged him to take the State’s offer . In a letter dated July 1, 2020, defense counsel relayed the State’s plea offer to Jones, explaining: “That means as soon as you enter the plea, you would be released from jail and only have probation to do.” 2 Defense counsel further urged Jones: “I want you to strongly consider the plea offer because it puts this chapter behind you and allows you to
have a life on the outside

— away from prison” and additionally articulated that while
Jones would have to contend with the sex offender registry and other conditions , he would be “out and can have a good life.” 3 Jones decided to accept the State’s offer. ( 6 ) The plea agreement was presented to a S uperior Court J udge and Jones’s plea of nolo contendere to the two R ape Fourth Degree charges was

2 App. t o Opening Br. at A721. 3 Id.4

accepted. After accept ing Jones’ s plea, however, the judge indicated a hesitancy to impose the recommended sentence. The judge stated: “ I have to tell all counsel, this proposal gives me a great deal of trouble. ” 4 He conti nued: “Counsel, if we are going to immediate sentencing here today, I am not doing what is being proposed to me here. I am going to do something that is substantially different from that.” 5 After further discussion, defense counsel requested that senten cing be continued so that counsel could submit some additional information for the court’s consideration.
The court granted that request and sentencing was continued to a later date. ( 7 ) Following the hearing, defense counsel wrote to Jones and expressed disappointment and surprise at what had occurred after the acceptance of Jones’s

no lo contendere plea. Defense counsel then filed a motion to withdraw Jones’s plea , which was denied. ( 8 ) Jones’s relationship with defense coun sel deteriorated. Defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as Jones’ s counsel, and Jones filed a motion to disqualify his counsel. 6 Both motions were granted. Jones was assigned new counsel . His new counsel filed a second motion to withdraw his plea , which was
also denied. Sentencing was then schedule d , and the c ourt imposed sentence s

4 Id

. at A589. 5 Id. at A597. 6 It should be noted that attorney Tasha Stevens informed the trial court that she was only involved in Jones’s case for the purpose of trial preparation but was included in the granting of the motions to withdraw and disqualify

.5

requiring Jones to serve ten years of unsuspended L evel V time followed by probation

. ( 9 ) Jones challenges the Superior Court’s denial of his second motion to
withdraw the plea. We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for abuse
of discretion. 7 (1 0 ) Superior Court Rule 32(d) provides that when a motion to withdraw a plea of nol o conten dere is made before sentence is imposed , the Superior Court may permit the plea to be withdrawn for any fair and just reason. We have developed a
test of f ive factors to be considered in deciding whether the withdrawal of such a plea should be permitted :

(1) the procedure of the colloquy; (2) whether the plea was intelligent, knowing, and voluntary; (3) whether the defendant had a basis to assert legal innocence; (4) whether the defendant had adequate legal counsel throughout the proceedings; and (5) wheth er the State would be prejudiced or the court would be unduly inconvenienced if the defendant were permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. 8
T he se “are not factors to be balanced; indeed, some of the factors of themselves may justify relief.” 9 Jones rest s his case on the second, third, and fourth factors. (1 1 ) Jones first argues that the statements made by his counsel in the above

7 Lane v. State , 918 A.2d 3 38, 2006 WL 3703683, at *1 (Del. Dec. 18, 2006) (ORDER). 8 McNeill v. State , 2002 WL 31477132, at *1 (Del. Nov. 4, 2002) ( ORDER ). 9 Scarborough v. State , 938 A.2d 644, 649 (Del. 2007).6

discussed letter before h e accepted the State’s plea offer are a promise by counsel
that he would receive the sentence s recommended in the plea agreement. He argues
that the court’s imposition of ten years of unsuspended Level V time rather than the recommended five years renders his plea not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

. When considering whether a plea was knowin gly, intelligently, and voluntaril y made , this Court has concluded that “[i]n the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, [the defendant] is bound by his answers on the Truth

- in

Sentencing Guilty Plea Forms and by his testimony prior to t he acceptance of the guilty plea .” 10 A defendant’s statements to the Superior Court during a guilty plea colloquy are presumed to be truthful. 11 (1 2 ) We do not find that the statements in defense counsel’s letter render Jones’s plea not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. During the plea colloquy, the
trial court carefully explained to Jones that no matter what the terms of his plea agreement might be , the trial court could give him a greater sentence. Jo nes asserted to the trial court that he knew he could receive a greater sentence. He also acknowledged that he had reviewed the Truth

- in

- Sentencing form with counsel and approved its contents. Jones unconvincingly argues that his belief about what his

se ntence would be and could be existed simultaneously

. Jones’s discussion with

10 Savage v. State , 2003 WL 214963, at *2 (Del. Jan. 31, 2003) (ORDER) (citing Somerville v. State , 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997)). 11 Somerville , 703 A.2d at 632.7

the trial court should have alerted him to the inaccuracy of his belief that his sentence would definitely be time served. Jones has not provided clear and convincing
evidence t o rebut his testimony during the plea colloquy or his acceptance of the
Truth

- in

- Sentencing form. (1 3 ) Jones next argues that he has a basis on which to assert legal innocence. When considering an assertion of legal innocence, this Court has held that
“co nclusory allegations of innocence are not sufficient to require withdrawal of a guilty plea, especially when the defendant has admitted his guilty [sic] in the plea colloquy.” 12 Furthermore, denial of a motion to withdraw in the face of “reference
to inco nsistencies in the prosecution’s case” is not an abuse of discretion

. 13 (1 4 ) By pleading no lo contendere , Jones did not admit that he committed
the offenses he was accused of , and there was some conflicting evidence presented at trial as to Jones’s guilt . However, the State presented strong evidence of Jones’s guilt, namely the victim ’ s testimony. As this Court has stated before, “a victim’s testimony alone, concerning alleged sexual contact, is sufficient to support a guilty
verdict if it establis hes every element of the offense charged.” 14 In making its decision, the Superior Court concluded that Jones’s innocence claim was just “his

12 Savage , 2003 WL 214963, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 Barksdale v. State , 2016 WL 2585892, at *2 (Del. Apr. 6, 2016) (ORDER)

. 14 Hoyle v. S tate , 2008 WL 361139, at *2 (Del. Feb. 11, 2008) (ORDER) (quoting Farmer v. State , 844 A.2d 297, 300 (Del. 2004)).8

take on the facts of the case” and noted that while “charges of rape with little
extrinsic evidence can be difficul t . . . the victims [sic] evidence was clear and convincing.” 15 We do not find this conclusion to be an abuse of discretion. (1 5 ) Jones also argues that he lacked adequate legal counsel at the time of the plea process. When considering the adequacy of le gal counsel, th is Court ’ s review is “subject to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable.” 16 This Court has established two elements for finding that an attorney
was ineffective in this c ontext

. 17 First, a defendant must demonstrate that “counsel’s actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 18 Second, a defendant must demonstrate that “there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, [the defen dant] would have chosen to proceed to trial.” 19 Furthermore, this Court has explained that when a judge is acting in the
role of a factfinder , the judge “is the sole judge of credibility and therefore, this Court
will not disturb conclusions of fact made by the Trial Judge when supported by competent evidence.” 20 (1 6 ) In order to demonstrate that his counsel was inadequate, Jones must

15 Opening Br. Ex. B at 2. 16 Barnett v. State , 2007 WL 1314664, at *2 (Del. May 7, 2007) ( ORDER ) (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. ( internal quotation marks omitted ).9

rebut a presumption that defense counsel’s actions were reasonable. 21 Jones argues
that defense counsel’s “written pr omise” 22 to him meant that he was not provided with effective counsel during the plea ding stage. This claim is undermined , however, by Jones’s acknowledgement during the plea colloquy that he could be sentenced to up to 15 years of Level V time on each Ra pe Fourth Degree charge. He also told the court that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation.
Therefore , it was not an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court to decide that defense counsel’s conduct was adequate and not unreasonable. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT: /s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr. Justice

21 Id. 22 Opening Br. at 28.