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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
TERESA REED-JENNINGS and CLIFF JENNINGS, wife and husband and their marital community, Appellants,

THE BASEBALL CLUB OF SEATTLE, LP., a Washington corporation, d/b/a The Seattle Mariners, WASHINGTON STATE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM PUBLIC FACILITIES DISTRICT, a municipal corporation; Defendants John Doe l-X, Respondents. No. 71545-3-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: May 26, 2015 Verellen, A.C.J. — During batting practice before a Seattle Mariners baseball game, a batter hit a foul ball into the stands along the right field foul line, seriously injuring Teresa Reed-Jennings. The trial court properly dismissed the Jennings' negligence claim against the Mariners because the Mariners did not breach its limited duty of care, and, alternatively, assumption of risk bars any recovery. We affirm.
FACTS The material facts are undisputed. The Jennings attended a Mariners game at Safeco Field on May 4, 2009, and arrived more than an hour before the game to watchNo. 71545-3-1/2 

### batting practice.1 They sat along the rightfield foul line, two rows up from the field in
section 116. The Jennings' ticket included a warning that explained the dangers of balls and bats entering the stands. CliffJennings, Teresa's husband, read the warning, but Teresa did not. On the concourse above section 116, several support posts for the lower level warned spectators about bats and balls leaving the playing field. Nearthe Jennings' seats on the wall separating the seats from the field, additional warnings cautioned spectators about bats or balls leaving the field. The back ofeach seat in 

### section 116 warned spectators about "bats and balls leaving the field."2 Teresa maintains she did not see any ofthese warnings but "knew that balls could come into the stands" during batting practice.3 Safeco Field has a permanent 26-foot safety screen behind home plate. For batting practice, the Mariners place a batting cage above and around three sides of home plate and temporary safety screens at first base, second base, centerfield, and the pitcher's mound. Since 2002, the Mariners have placed 8- by 10-foottemporary safety screens along the left field and right field foul lines. Major League Baseball (MLB) did not require teams to have temporary safety screens along the foul lines until
2012. From 2005 to May 2009, over 10,000,000 spectators attended a Mariners baseball game. Ofthose 10,000,000, 300 spectators have been hit by eitherfair or foul balls. Ofthose 300, only 5 spectators were injured while sitting in section 116.

1We use the parties' first names for ease ofreference. 

### 2Clerk's Papers (CP) at 111. 3CP at 280, H6.No. 71545-3-1/3 Batting practice affords spectators more protection because the Mariners remove the batting cage and othertemporary safety screens once the game starts. Teresa was
aware that a safety screen did not extend all the way down the first base line to protect her from all foul balls. The visiting team performs batting practice after the Mariners. The pitcher "typically hold[s] three balls in his non-pitching hand and one ball in his pitching hand" to 

### reduce "delay between pitches."4 The pitcher "must throw in a rhythm during batting practice so that players and coaches can get the maximum work done and are not 

### unduly exposed to danger."5 Batting practice runs rapidly and consists of "many 

### activities occurring at the same time."6 Pitchers do not wait long between pitches, so batters can get the proper number of swings. Every other MLBteam conducts batting practice in a similarfashion. Before May 4, 2009, Teresa had never attended or seen batting practice. The Jennings previously attended several baseball games at Safeco Field and,
on those occasions, sat near or in section 116. The Jennings recalled seeing foul balls land in the stands on previous occasions. The Jennings knew foul balls could reach their area. But Teresa did not know "multiple balls could be batted into the air 

### simultaneously during batting practice."7 On May 4, 2009, Teresa saw a foul ball land near her seat during batting practice. Shortly after, a batter hit a ball into centerfield, and Teresa attempted to track

4CP at 135,1J6. 5CP at 135 H8. 6CP at 136, If9. 7CP at 280, H7.No. 71545-3-1/4 the ball's flight. Before that ball was caught, Teresa heard another ball being hit. When she turned her head, the second ball hit her in the face. Teresa sustained serious injuries to her lefteye. She twice tweeted several days after the game: "Afoul ball landed inthe seats in front of us and the young man next to Cliffscampered over the 

### seats and grabbed it,"8 and "I said, well, that really should have been my ball. Ijust 

### wasn't fast enough. Isaid Iwanted another one to land right there. It'[ll] be mine."9 The Jennings sued the Mariners, alleging negligence. The Mariners moved for summaryjudgment, arguing itsatisfied its limited duty to protect spectators from foul balls by placing several temporary safety screens on the field and a permanent 26-foot safety screen behind home plate. The Mariners also 

### argued Teresa assumed the risk of her injury because "she knew batting practice was 

### ongoing" and "afoul ball had landed in her seating area earlier."10 The Jennings argued the adoption ofcomparative fault statutes abrogated the limited duty rule. They also argued the implied primary assumption of risk doctrine does not bar their recovery because the Mariners breached its duty to exercise reasonable
care under Restatement (Second) ofTorts§ 343 (1965). The trial court granted the Mariners summaryjudgment. The trial court 

### determined the Mariners did not breach a duty owed to the Jennings, and, even ifthe Mariners did breach a duty, the Jennings assumed the risk of injury. The Jennings appeal.

8 CP at 113. 9 CP at 114. 10CP at 11.No. 71545-3-1/5
ANALYSIS The Jennings challenge the trial court's summaryjudgment dismissing their negligence claim. They specifically argue genuine issues of material fact exist as to whetherthe Mariners breached its duty of care and whether Teresa assumed the risk posed by multiple batted balls being simultaneously in play during batting practice. We review a summaryjudgment order de novo, viewing the facts and all 

### reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.11 Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issues of material fact exist and "reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion."12 "A material fact is one that affects the outcome of 

### the litigation."13 Limited Duty Rule 

### Contrary to the Jennings' contention, Washington follows the limited duty rule. 

### For many decades throughoutthe United States, the majority of jurisdictions have 

### applied the limited duty rule to define the duty a baseball stadium operator owes to its 

### patrons injured from foul balls before orduring a game.14 The limited duty rule requires

11 Fulton v. State. Dep't of Soc. &Health Servs.. 169 Wn. App. 137, 147, 279 P.3d 500 (2012). 12 Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. 154 Wn.2d 16, 26, 109 P.3d 805 (2005).13 Wm. Dickson Co. v. Pierce County. 128 Wn. App. 488, 492, 494, 116 P.3d 409 (2005).

### 14 A partial list ofotherjurisdictions that have applied the limited duty rule under similar circumstances includes: Turner v. Mandalav Sports Entm't, LLC. 124 Nev. 213, 

### 217-19, 180 P.3d 1172 (2008) (adopting the limited duty rulewhere an in-game foul ball 

### hitthe plaintiffas she sat in the stadium's beer garden); Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc., 901 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Utah 1995) (applying the limited duty rule 

### where an in-gamefoul ball struckplaintiffas he sat at his seat); Arnold v. Citv of Cedar Rapids, 443 N.W.2d 332, 333 (Iowa 1989) ("[A baseball stadium operator] fully 

### discharges any obligation to protectspectators from thrown orhit balls byproviding 

### seatingin afully protected area."); Akins v. Glen Falls Citv Sch. Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325,No. 71545-3-1/6 

### baseball stadium operators "to screen some seats ... to provide protection to 

### spectators who choose it."15 This rule imposes two requirements on baseball stadium 

### operators. First, baseball stadium operators must provide a sufficient number of protected seating forthose spectators "'whomay be reasonably anticipated to desire 

### protected seats on an ordinary occasion.'"16 Second, baseball stadium operators must "provide protection for allspectators located in the mostdangerous parts of the stadium, that is, those areas that pose an unduly high risk ofinjury from foul balls (such as 

### directly behind home plate)."17 Washington courts have long imposed a limited duty on baseball stadium 

### operators to screen some seats, generally those behind homeplate.18

329-30, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 424 N.E.2d 531 (1981); Erickson v. Lexington Baseball Club, 233 N.C. 627, 628-29, 65 S.E.2d 140 (1951); Anderson v. Kansas Citv Baseball 

### Club, 231 S.W.2d 170, 172-73 (Mo. 1950); Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball &Athletic Ass'n, 185 Minn. 507, 508-09, 240 N.W. 903 (1932); Wade-Keszev v. Town of Niskavuna, 4 A.D.3d 732, 733-35, 772 N.Y.S.2d 401 (2004); Beneiam v. Detroit Tigers. 

### Inc.. 246 Mich. App. 645, 635 N.W.2d 219, 225 (2001) ("[A baseball stadium operator] 

### that provides screening behind home plate sufficientto meet ordinary demand for 

### protected seating has fulfilled itsduty with respect to screening and cannot be subjected 

### to liabilityfor injuries resulting to a spectatorby an objectleaving the playing field."); Bellezzo v. State, 174 Ariz. 548, 554, 851 P.2d 847 (1992); Crane v. Kansas Citv 

### Baseball &Exhibition Co.. 168 Mo. App. 301, 153 S.W. 1076 (1913); see generally 

### James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, LiabilitytoSpectatoratBaseball Game Who isHit byBallorInjuredas ResultofOtherHazards ofGame, 91 A.LR.3d 24 (1979). 15 Taylor v. Baseball Club ofSeattle. LP., 132 Wn. App. 32, 37, 130 P.3d 835 (2006).

### 16 Turner, 124 Nev. at 217-18 (quoting Schneiderv. Am. Hockey. 342 N.J. Super. 527, 533-34, 777 A.2d 380 (2001). 17 Jd, at 218. 

### 18 Taylor, 132Wn. App. at 37; Leek v. Tacoma Baseball Club, Inc., 38 Wn.2d 362, 364, 229 P.2d 329 (1951) ("[A baseball stadium operator's] duty isfulfilled when 

### screened seats are provided for as many as may reasonably be expected to call for 

### them on anyordinary occasion."); Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass'n, 105Wash. 215, 181 P. 679(1919).

6No. 71545-3-1/7 The Mariners clearly satisfied its limited duty to screen a reasonable number of seats. Safeco Field has a permanent 26-foot safety screen behind home plate. The Mariners' head groundskeeper Bob Christofferson testified that he and his crew place temporary safety screens on the field during batting practice, including a batting cage above and around three sides of home plate and temporary safety screens at first base, second base, center field, and the pitcher's mound. As previously noted, since 2002, the Mariners have placed 8- by 10-foot temporary safety screens along the left field and right field foul lines. MLB did not require teams to have temporary safety screens along the foul lines until 2012. Christofferson placed the temporary safety screens along the 

### foul lines "toreduce the number of line drive foul balls reaching the spectator seats."19 No evidence inthe record suggests the Mariners' screening of certain sections ofthe stadium deviated from the screening customarily employed at other MLB stadiums. The record reveals a very low risk of injury in section 116 from foul balls. For example, the Mariners' Vice President of Ballpark Operations Scott Jenkins testified that from 2005 to May 2009, over 10,000,000 patrons attended a Mariners game at Safeco Field. During that period, for both games and batting practice, "300 people had some 

### form ofinjury orcontactwith a ball that leftthe playingfield."20 Ofthose 300 incidents, only 5 occurred in section 116 where Teresa was injured. Nothing inthe record indicates "foulballs of this kind cause serious injuries with sufficient frequency to be considered an unreasonable risk."21 Similar to throwing balls pregame ("long toss") in Taylor v. Baseball Club of Seattle. L.P.. batting practice is a normal part ofpregame
19 CP at 366, U8. 20 CP at 74. 21 Leek, 38 Wn.2d at 366; Taylor, 132 Wn. App. at 41 ("The fact that no one has 

### been injured simply shows that longtoss does not pose an unreasonable risk.").No. 71545-3-1/8 

### warm-ups.22 No evidence suggests the batting practice here did notconform to MLB

custom. 

### The Jennings cite Leek v. Tacoma Baseball Club for the proposition that 

### Washington applies Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 343 to define a baseball stadium 

### operator's duty ofcare.23 But Leekonly discussed the restatement in pronouncing its 

### holding that the limited duty rule applies. No Washington courts havecited § 343in the baseball context since Leek. And no Washington courts, including Leek, have applied § 343 inthe baseball context. 

### Additionally, the Jennings cite Rountreev. Boise BaseballLLC, a 2013 Idaho 

### Supreme Courtdecision rejecting thelimited duty standard.24 Rountree isnot compelling. Rountree involved adifferentfactual scenario, rejected thelimited duty rule, anddetermined "primary implied assumption ofthe risk is not a valid defense"in 

### Idaho.25 BecauseWashington applies the limited duty rule and accepts primary implied assumption ofthe risk as a valid defense,26 wedecline tofollow Roundtree. 

### TheJennings alsocontend that, to theextent Kavafian v. SeattleBaseball Club Association27 and Leekpreviously recognized the limited dutyrule, subsequent 

### comparative fault statutes haveimpliedly overruled it. Butthe Jenningscite no

22 132 Wn. App. 32, 37, 130 P.3d 835 (2006). 23 38 Wn.2d 362, 229 P.2d 329 (1951). 24 154 Idaho 167, 296 P.3d 373 (2013). 25 JU at 174. 

### 26 Scott ex rel. Scottv. Pac. W. Mountain Resort. 119 Wn.2d 484, 495, 834 P.2d 

### 6 (1992) ("Primary implied assumption ofriskcontinues as a complete bartorecovery [even] aftertheadoption ofcomparative negligence laws."). 27 105 Wash. 215, 181 P. 679 (1919).

8No. 71545-3-1/9 compelling authority for this proposition. The Jennings demonstrate nothing about comparative fault that precludes the continued viability ofthe limited duty rule. Therefore, because the Mariners satisfied its duty of screening a reasonable number of seats, the Jennings chose not to sit inthose screened seats, and the seats they chose did not pose an unduly high risk of injury from foul balls, they fail to demonstrate any breach of duty regarding injury from a foul ball in section 116 during 

### batting practice. The trial court properly applied the limited duty rule to grantthe Mariners summaryjudgment dismissing the Jennings' negligence claim. Implied PrimaryAssumption ofRisk Even ifthe limited duty rule did not apply here, the defense of implied primary 

### assumption of risk would preclude any recovery. The interplay between a landowner's 

### general duty ofcare and a plaintiff's assumption ofrisk is nuanced. The "'boundaries of the defendant's duty to act do not.. . coincide in allcases with those of the plaintiff's assumption ofrisk.'"28 The duty is determined upon the basis of what the defendant should expect, while assumption of risk is a matter of what the plaintiffknows, understands, and is willing to accept. Thus one who supplies a defective chattel for the use ofanother may be under a duty to make itsafe, to warn the other ofthe defect, or otherwise to protect him, because itmay be 

### expected that he will not discover the defect. When the otherdoes discover it, and nevertheless proceeds quite voluntarily to make use of the chattel, he assumes the risk.[29J 

### Even assuming that a general landowner's duty applies, the boundaries of the landowner's duty do not coincide in allcases with the defense ofimplied primary assumption ofthe risk.
28 Hvolboll v.WolffCo., No. 31836-2-111, 2015 WL 1573274, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. 

### Feb. 12, 2015) (quoting Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 496C cmt. e (1965)). 29 Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 496C cmt. e.No. 71545-3-1/10 

### Teresa argues she did notfully subjectively understand the specific risk that she could be hit and injured by a foul ball sitting in an unscreened seat during batting 

### practice when multiplebatted balls are simultaneously in play. She contends she did not voluntarily choose to encounterthat specific risk. We disagree. 

### Washington recognizes "'fourcategories ofassumption ofrisk: (1) express, (2) 

### implied primary, (3) implied reasonable, and (4) implied unreasonable.'"30 Implied primaryassumption of risk "occurs when the plaintiffhas impliedly consented to assume
a duty."31 "Since implied primary assumption of the risknegates duty," itbars recovery 

### "when the injury resultsfrom one of the risksassumed."32 Assumption of the risk limits recovery but onlyto the extent the plaintiffsdamages resulted from the specific risks 

### known to and appreciated bythe plaintiffand voluntarily encountered.33 To establish the implied primary assumption of riskdefense, the defendant must 

### show the plaintifffully subjectively understood the specific risk's nature and presence, 

### and he or she voluntarily chose to encounter the risk.34 In other words, the spectator 

### "knowinglyand voluntarilychose to encounter the risk."35 36 "Ifreasonable minds could
30 Hvolboll, 2015 WL 1573274, at *5 (quoting 16 David K. DeWolf&Keller, W. 

### Allen, Washington Practice: TortLawand Practice 9:11, at 398 (4th ed. 2013)); Scott. 119Wn.2dat496. 31 Scott, 119Wn.2dat497. 32 Id. at 498 (emphasis omitted). 

### 33 JU at 496; Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 109Wn.2d 448,454-55, 746 P.2d 285 (1987).

### 34 Taylor, 132 Wn. App. at 38; Kirk, 109 Wn.2d at 453. 35 Jessee v. Citv Council of Dayton, 173 Wn. App. 410, 414, 293 P.3d 1290 (2013) (emphasis added). 

### 36 The comments to the restatement provide an apt illustration: "A, the owner of 

### a baseball park, is undera duty to theentering public toprovide a reasonably sufficient number ofscreened seats to protect those who desire itagainst the risk of beinghit by batted balls. A fails to do so. B, a customerentering the park, is unable to find a
10No. 71545-3-1/11 

### not differ on the knowledge and voluntariness, there is implied primary assumption of the risk as a matter of law."37 

### Implied primary assumption ofrisk generally applies a subjectivestandard.38 In particular, the test for knowledge is subjective, but the facts that should be known are 

### objectivelydetermined. Aplaintiffhas knowledge if, "at the time of decision, [he or she] actuallyandsubjectivelyknew all facts that a reasonable person ... in the plaintiff's shoes would want to know and consider."39 A plaintiff"must be aware ofmore thanjust 

### the generalized risk of theiractivities; there must be proof [he or she] knew of and 

### appreciated the specific hazardwhich caused the injury."40 "Whether a plaintiffdecides voluntarilyto encounter a riskdepends on whether he or she elects to encounter itdespite knowing of a reasonable alternative course of 

### action."41 The plaintiff"'musthave had a reasonable opportunity to act differently or 

### proceed on analternate coursethatwould have avoided thedanger.'"42 Teresa claims she did not appreciate the specific riskposed bymultiple batted 

### balls simultaneously in play during batting practice. Butthe required knowledge is of a 

### particulartype ofrisk, not knowledge ofevery variable thatmight affectthelikelihood or exact mechanism of harm. Simpson v. May explains: 

### screened seat, and althoughfully aware of the risk, sits in an unscreened seat. B is 

### struck andinjured by a batted ball. Although A has violated his dutyto B, Bmay be barredfrom recovery by hisassumption ofthe risk." Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 496C cmt. g(4). 37 Jessee, 173 Wn. App. at 414. 38 Taylor, 132 Wn. App. at 38. 

### 39 Home v.N. Kitsap Sch. Dist., 92 Wn. App. 709, 720, 965 P.2d 1112(1998). 40 Shorter v. Drurv. 103 Wn.2d 645, 657, 695 P.2d 116(1985). 41 Home. 92 Wn. App. at 721. 

### 42 Id, (quoting Zookv. Baier, 9Wn. App. 708, 716, 514P.2d 923 (1973)).

11No. 71545-3-1/12 

### To illustrate, one who attends a baseball game may be precluded from recovering for damages suffered when hit by a ball or broken bat. This 

### preclusion may apply even if the circumstances leading to the injury were somewhatbizarre. He [orshe] would not be precluded from recovering for damages from a collapsing grandstand or from eating tainted concession 

### food unless he [or she] knew of this specific riskand voluntarily accepted these risks.[43] 

### The particular riskfaced inattending batting practice at a Mariners game at Safeco Field is the occasional risk ofan errantthrow or foul ball or bat entering the stands. The record here supports that Teresa had a full subjective understanding ofthe specific risk, both its nature and presence, that a foul ball could be hit into section 116 and injure her during batting practice:

• She has been to Safeco Field for a Mariners game between four to six times and sat in section 116 on several ofthose occasions.

• She choose to sit in section 116, an unscreened section, and arrived early at Safeco Field to specifically watch batting practice.

• When she arrived at her seat, she noticed players catching balls and a batter hitting balls.
• A foul ball landed near her seat before another foul ball hit her.

• She knew foul balls could reach the stands where she sat in section 116.

• She was familiar with baseball because she watched her child play it and attended many baseball games at both the Kingdome and Safeco Field.

• She was aware that neither a permanent nor temporary safety screen extended all the way down the first base line to protect herfrom foul balls.

• She tweeted several days after her injury that a foul ball landed inthe stands near her seat on May 4, 2009, and that she wanted anotherfoul ball to land near her.

43 5 Wn. App. 214, 218, 486 P.2d 336 (1971) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

12No. 71545-3-1/13 

### No reasonablejuror could findthatTeresa lacked knowledge ofthe specific risk of being hit by a foul ball while in section 116. Moreover, Teresa is "deemed to have known and understood the risk of such 

### injury where such risk would have been quite clear and obvious to a reasonably careful 

### person under the same or similar circumstances."44 The record reflects Teresa 

### subjectivelyappreciated the risk offoul balls and she voluntarily chose to encounterthat risk.45 

### The Jennings attemptto distinguish Taylor, but Taylor controls. There, a pitcher 

### during "long toss" warm-ups before a Mariners game at Safeco Field accidentally threw
a ball into the stands, injuring a patron. Tayloraffirmed the trial court's dismissal of the 

### patron'snegligence claim under the implied primary assumption ofrisk doctrine. Taylor firstdetermined "warm-ups are integral to the game ofbaseball and that a spectator 

### assumes the risk ofbeing struck by a baseballduring warm-ups."46 Second,Taylor determined "the circumstances leading to Taylor's injury" did not constitute "an unusual 

### danger."47 Third, Taylordetermined thespecific risk ofinjuryfrom an errantthrow 

### during warm-ups was "foreseeableto a reasonable person with Taylor's familiarity with baseball," eventhough "no one ... had ever seen someone hit by an overthrown ball 

### during [warm-ups]."48 Taylorconcluded that thepatron "assumed therisk ofaball

44 Ridge v. Kladnick, 42 Wn. App. 785, 787, 713 P.2d 1131(1986). 

### 45 She tweeted several days after her injury that she wanted afoul ball to land near her seat during batting practice. 46 Taylor, 132 Wn. App. at 39. 47 JdL at 40. 48 Id at 40-41.
13No. 71545-3-1/14 entering the stands," and because the injury resulted from a risk inherent inthe activity, 

### the patron was barred from recovery.49 Similarly, Teresa's injury occurred during batting practice, also part ofwarm-ups, 

### "an event necessarily incidentto the game."50 Noevidence suggests the batting practice was conducted in an irregular manner. The Mariners' third base coach Jeff Datz stated that every other MLBteam conducts batting practice in a similar manner as that conducted on the day ofTeresa's injury. No evidence suggests the circumstances 

### leading to Teresa's injury "constituted an unusual danger."51 The parties do not dispute that (1) batting practice is part of the sport, (2) MLB teams typically conduct batting practice inthe mannerthat can include more than one batted ball simultaneously in the air, (3) Teresa purposely attended batting practice, and (4) the Mariners permit spectators to view batting practice. As inTaylor, there were multiple balls 

### simultaneously in the air at the time ofTeresa's injury. The risk ofTeresa's injuries "are 

### within the normal comprehension of a spectatorwho isfamiliarwith the game."52 Teresa contends that because she was distracted by a previously hit ball, she 

### "could not be reasonably expected to avoid such an injury."53 Butthe specific mechanism of the foul ballentering the stands has no bearing on the outcome. Batting 

### practicetypically involves pitchersthrowing ballsin quick succession with the chance that multiple balls could be simultaneously in play. Areasonable person in Teresa's shoes would know and considerthat by choosing to sit in an unscreened area, there is
49 Id, at 41. 50 Id at 39. 51 Id, at 40. 52 JU at 40. 53 Appellants' Br. at 45.

14No. 71545-3-1/15 

### a possibilitythat a ball could enterthe stands and injure her. Especially when a foul ball had just landed inTeresa's section moments before her injury, no reasonablejuror could conclude that Teresa did not knowingly and voluntarily choose to encounterthis 

### specific risk. Even ifthis particularcircumstance ofmultiple batted balls simultaneously in play could be considered "somewhat bizarre," assumption ofthe risk precludes recovery here. Therefore, we conclude the Jennings' negligence claim is barred by the limited duty rule. Even ifthe limited duty rule did not apply, Teresa assumed the risk of a foul ball from batting practice entering the stands.
We affirm.

WE CONCUR:



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