Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 29A02-1709-DR-2150 | May 24, 2018 Page 1 of 24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Matthew T. Black

Adam Clay

Black Clay LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Ary Avnet

Metzger Rosta, LLP

Noblesville, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Marriage of:

Bobbie Sales (f/k/a

Bobbie Herron),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Richard Allen Moulder, Jr.,

Appellee-Petitioner.

May 24, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

29A02-1709-DR-2150

Appeal from the 

Hamilton Superior Court

The Honorable 

Steven R. Nation, Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

29D01-1112-DR-12869

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Bobbie Sales, formerly known as Bobbie Herron, (“Mother”) appeals the trial 

court’s order denying her petition for modification of custody and parenting 

time for her children, K.M. and R.M., raising the following restated issues:

I. Whether the trial court erred by denying Mother’s petition for 

modification of custody;

II. Whether the trial court erred by restricting Mother’s 

parenting time and access to K.M.’s and R.M.’s educational

records; and

III. Whether the trial court erred by modifying child support.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

1

 

Facts and Procedural History2

[3] Mother and Richard Allen Moulder, Jr. (“Father”) (together, “Parents”) were 

married in 2007 and had two children, K.M., born October 11, 2008, and R.M., 

born January 19, 2010 (together, “Children”). Parents’ marriage was dissolved 

by “Waiver of Final Hearing, Mediated Settlement Agreement, and Decree of 

Dissolution of Marriage,” which the trial court approved on September 5, 2012. 

Pursuant to that Decree, Parents agreed to share joint legal custody of Children, 

 

1 By separate order, we deny Father’s motion for oral argument. 

2 The facts are, in part, taken from the “Preliminary Findings and Conclusions” that the trial court made in 

its March 17, 2015 “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 64-85. 

Because Mother petitioned the trial court to modify that order’s terms of custody, and we focus on events 

that occurred after the March 2015 Order, we include facts that occurred between September 5, 2012 and 

March 17, 2015 only for historical context. 
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with Mother having primary physical custody subject to Father’s parenting time

and reasonable phone contact. Both Parents also agreed to refrain from 

discussing the other with Children except in a manner that was “supportive of 

or complementary to the other” and “refrain from any effort to alienate the 

children from the other party, the absolute aim of the parties to be a healthy, 

respectful relationship between the children and each party.” Appellee’s App. 

Vol. II at 3. 

[4] In early 2013, both Parents filed petitions regarding modification of custody, 

support, and parenting time, and Father filed a petition for rule to show cause. 

A hearing was held on those pending petitions on July 9, 2013 and, on July 30,

2013, the trial court issued its Order (“the 2013 Order”), finding that Mother 

had: (1) made “unilateral legal custody decisions”; (2) “intentionally acted to 

exclude Father from the children’s legal custody decisions”; and (3) “engaged in 

a pattern of conduct aimed at entirely excluding Father from the children’s 

lives.” Id. at 7. The 2013 Order designated that Father, upon his return to 

Indiana following his military service in California, would have sole legal 

custody of and be the primary physical custodian for Children. However, 

Mother was granted physical custody of Children until Father’s return. The 

2013 Order required Mother to “attend psychotherapy with Dr. Mac Greene or 

another psychotherapist at the recommendation of Dr. Greene” and “execute 

all necessary documentation so that her psychotherapy and counseling records 

[could] be obtained by Father.” Id. at 11. The trial court noted it would 
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consider restricting Mother’s parenting time if she continued to disparage 

Father and inappropriately involve Children in disputes. Id. at 9.

[5] Father returned to Indiana in July 2014 and discovered that Mother had moved 

Children to Kansas without filing a Notice of Intent to Relocate as required by 

Indiana law. On Father’s motion, the trial court held an emergency hearing 

and issued its order, requiring Mother to immediately return Children to Father 

in Hamilton County, Indiana. Thereafter, the trial court, with input from 

Father’s counsel and Mother’s then-counsel, ordered that Mother’s parenting 

time be supervised. 

[6] On July 25, 2014, Mother filed a Verified Petition for “Ph.D. Forensic Custody 

Evaluation,” and on September 5, 2014, she filed a “Verified, Renewed,

Petition for Ph.D. Forensic Custody Evaluation and Advance Hearing on the 

Matter.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 65. Pursuant to an agreed entry, Parents 

decided that therapist Janine Miller would perform the custody evaluation at 

Mother’s sole expense; however, around October 29, 2014, Mother withdrew 

her petition. Father had no objection to the withdrawal of Mother’s request for 

evaluation, but reserved the right to present evidence as to his attorney fees 

incurred for Mother’s request and later withdrawal.

[7] On March 10, 2015, the trial court held a hearing to address ten pending 

motions, including four of Father’s motions to show cause, Mother’s motion to 

enforce parenting time, and Mother’s petition for modification of physical and 

legal custody. On March 17, 2015, the trial court entered its order (“March 
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2015 Order”), reaffirming Father’s sole legal custody and primary physical 

custody of Children and voicing its concerns about Mother’s mental health and 

the fact that she had not complied with the trial court’s past orders to participate 

in psychotherapy. Id. at 78. The trial court found that Mother’s 2014 action of 

moving Children to Kansas, without filing a Notice of Intent to Relocate or 

notifying Father as to Children’s whereabouts, endangered Children’s physical 

health and impaired their emotional development. The trial court also found

that Mother remained a flight risk because she was planning to move to 

California on March 21, 2015, yet had failed to inform Father or the trial court 

until the March 10, 2015 hearing. Furthermore, the trial held that Mother’s 

disparagement of Father, her inability to display appropriate boundaries with 

Children, and her continued reports to the police and DCS, were damaging to 

Children’s physical health and impaired their emotional development.

Therefore, the trial court found that supervised parenting time for Mother was 

in Children’s best interests until she completed psychotherapy with a licensed 

professional. Additionally, the trial court ordered Mother to participate in joint 

therapy with Children and their therapist at a frequency determined by 

Children’s therapist, Jessi Wild (“therapist Wild”).

[8] About eight months later, Father filed a petition for modification of custody. 

The trial court held a hearing in December 2015, during which Father testified 

that Mother had made disparaging remarks about Father to Children during 

telephone calls. Therapist Wild corroborated Father’s testimony, as did a 

recording of a phone call between Mother and Children. Based on the evidence 
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presented, the trial court found that Mother’s “current telephonic contact” with 

Children was harmful to them and that it was in the best interests of Children 

that such contact be reduced. Id. at 89. Accordingly, the trial court reduced

Mother’s telephone contact to two days a week and gave Father the option to 

monitor the calls and to terminate any call he found was inappropriate. 

[9] In the spring of 2016, Mother participated in therapy with therapist Wild and 

Children. On May 26, 2016, the parties filed, and the trial court approved, an 

agreed entry, which provided: (1) “[Mother] has been in therapy with the 

parties’ children and [therapist Wild] since March 2016”; (2) “[therapist Wild] 

approves of [Mother] having parenting time with children over the summer; 

and Parents “agree that [Mother] shall have visitation with the children in 

California, beginning May 27, 2016 through July 25, 2016.” Id. at 90.

[10] On July 29, 2016, four days after the end of Children’s summer parenting time 

with Mother, Mother filed her petition for modification of custody, motion for 

change of judge, and motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem (“Petition 

for Custody Modification”). Id. at 92. Judge Steven R. Nation was selected as 

special judge on August 12, 2016, and the trial court approved the appointment 

of a guardian ad litem (“the GAL”) on January 19, 2017. Id. at 97, 100. In 

March 2017, the GAL requested a continuation of the scheduled May 2017 

custody modification hearing, citing the need to complete the GAL Report. 

Mother objected to a continuation and requested that the hearing proceed as 

scheduled or, in the alternative, that the hearing proceed only for the purpose of 

deciding summer parenting time. Id. at 102. The trial court agreed to proceed 
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with a hearing on summer parenting time and, following the May 18, 2017

hearing, took the matter under advisement until such time as the evidence on 

all pending motions was complete. The trial court ordered that Mother’s 

parenting time continue to be supervised. 

[11] Two months later, on July 21, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Mother’s 

Petition for Custody Modification. About forty-five days prior to that hearing,

the GAL completed and filed with the trial court the GAL Report, which 

contained facts and procedural history obtained through interviews and 

contacts with, among others, Parents, Children, school personnel, therapists, 

doctors and other medical personnel, childcare providers, and references 

supplied by Mother. During the 2017 hearing, the GAL Report was amended, 

“made part of the record[,] and admitted into evidence”;

3

the individuals who

testified at the hearing included, Mother, Father, Father’s fiancée, therapist 

Wild, and the GAL. Tr. Vol. 2 at 212. 

[12] On August 17, 2017, the trial court entered written findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon (“the instant Order”) pursuant to Mother’s written request. 

In the instant Order, the trial court denied Mother’s request to modify custody, 

denied her request to return to unsupervised parenting time and further 

restricted her supervised parenting time, restricted her access to Children’s 

 

3 The version of the GAL Report that was filed with the trial court was amended, on Father’s motion, 

without objection. Tr. Vol. 2 at 213. That amendment is not pertinent to this appeal. 
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educational records, and modified Mother’s child support order.

4

 Mother now 

appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Custody and Parenting Time

[13] Mother contends that the trial court erred when it denied her Petition for 

Custody Modification. In that Petition, Mother argued that because it was in 

Children’s best interest to spend more time with her, the trial court should 

change her parenting time to unsupervised and evaluate Parents’ custodial 

arrangement to determine if modification is in Children’s best interests. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 93.

[14] Here, Mother filed the Petition for Custody Modification and, therefore, bore 

“the burden of demonstrating the existing custody should be altered.” SteeleGiri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). Indeed, this “more stringent 

standard” is required to support a change in custody, as opposed to an initial 

custody determination where there is no presumption for either parent because 

“permanence and stability are considered best for the welfare and happiness of 

the child.” Id. (citation omitted). When evaluating whether a change of 

circumstances has occurred that is substantial enough to warrant a modification 

of custody, the context of the whole environment must be judged, “‘and the 

 

4 The trial court also denied as moot Mother’s request for summer parenting time. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 

59.
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effect on the child is what renders a change substantial or inconsequential.’” 

Montgomery v. Montgomery, 59 N.E.3d 343, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting In 

re Marriage of Sutton, 16 N.E.3d 481, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)), trans. denied. 

[15] The Indiana Supreme Court has expressed a preference for granting latitude 

and deference to our trial judges in family law matters. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at

124. “‘On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other 

conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by 

appellant before there is a basis for reversal.’” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 

N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess 

witness credibility. Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010). Rather, we consider only the evidence and inferences most favorable to 

the trial court’s judgment. Id. 

[16] By appealing the denial of her request to modify custody and parenting time, 

Mother appeals from a negative judgment. See Nunn v. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d 779, 

783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We will reverse a negative judgment only if it is 

contrary to law, meaning that the evidence points unerringly to a conclusion 

different from that reached by the trial court. Id. 

[17] Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21(a), a trial court may not modify a 

child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests of the 

child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one or more of the factors that the 

court may consider under section 8 of this chapter. The pertinent factors in

section 8 include: (1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents; (2) the 
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interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents, siblings,

and anyone else significant to the child’s best interest; (3) the child’s adjustment 

to his or her home, school, and community; and (4) the mental and physical 

health of all individuals involved. Ind. Code § 31-17-2-8. 

[18] Here, Mother’s actions have caused her custody and parenting time to become 

more restricted over time. In 2012, as part of the mediated dissolution, Parents 

agreed that they would share joint legal custody of Children and that Mother 

would have primary physical custody subject to Father’s parenting time. In its 

2013 Order, the trial court, citing Mother’s “unilateral legal custody decisions”

and intentional exclusion of Father in Children’s lives, modified Parents’ 

custody arrangement and granted Father sole legal custody and primary 

physical custody of Children. Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 7. By 2015, the trial 

court found it was in Children’s best interest that Mother’s parenting time be 

supervised until she completed psychotherapy with a licensed professional. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 79. The trial court found that Mother’s 2014 action of

relocating Children to Kansas without notifying Father or the State endangered 

Children’s physical health and impaired their emotional development. Id. 

Furthermore, the trial court held that Mother’s disparagement of Father in front 

of Children, her inability to display appropriate boundaries with Children, and 

her continued reports to the police and DCS, were damaging to Children’s 

physical health and impaired their emotional development. Id. 

[19] Four days after the end of Mother’s summer parenting time with Children, she 

filed her Petition for Custody Modification, citing in support thereof that: (1) 
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Mother sees a clinical psychologist on a regular basis; (2) she completed family 

therapy with Children and therapist Wild in May 2016; (3) Parents agreed in 

May 2016, with the approval of therapist Wild, that Mother would have two 

months of unsupervised parenting time with Children at Mother’s California 

home; (4) during the summer parenting time, Mother expressed to Father 

concerns for Children’s health and took Children for various medical checkups; and (5) it is in the best interests of Children for them to spend more time 

with her, that such time be unsupervised, and that the trial court evaluate 

Parents’ custodial arrangement to determine if modification is in Children’s best 

interests. Appellant’s App. at Vol. 2 at 92 (emphasis added). A hearing on the 

Petition for Custody Modification was held in July 2017, during which, the trial 

court, without Mother’s objection, admitted into evidence the 132-page GAL 

Report. Also during that hearing, Mother testified that she planned to live in 

California, where her husband is stationed, for at least six years. Mother 

further admitted that she and Father do not have “good communication.” Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 87, 91. 

[20] The trial court entered its written findings of fact and conclusions thereon 

pursuant to Mother’s written request under Trial Rule 52(A). Indiana Trial 

Rule 52(A) provides that a court on appeal “shall not set aside the findings or 

judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 

opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Indiana 

law requires a determination on “whether the evidence supports the findings 

and whether the findings support the judgment.” Pitcavage v. Pitcavage, 11 
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N.E.3d 547, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The trial court’s findings and 

conclusions will be found clearly erroneous “if they are unsupported by the 

facts and inferences contained in the record.” Id. at 553. “We will find the 

judgment to be clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the record, we are left with 

a firm conviction that there has been a mistake.” Id. 

[21] Citing to findings 29 through 43 in the instant Order, Mother argues that the 

trial court “issued findings that merely identify what Father (and in some cases 

Mother) testified to or contended.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. Mother asserts that 

the trial court neither referred to corroborating evidence, see e.g., Bowyer v. Ind. 

Dep’t of Nat. Res., 944 N.E.2d 972, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), nor indicated how 

the recounting of Father’s testimony led it to specific findings. Pitcavage, 11 

N.E.3d at 533. Our court has said, “Findings of fact are a mechanism by which 

a trial court completes its function of weighing the evidence and judging 

witnesses’ credibility,” and a trial court “does not find something to be a fact by 

merely reciting that a witness testified to X, Y, or Z.” Id. Instead, “the trier of 

fact must find that what the witness testified to is the fact.” Id. Thus, “where a 

trial court’s findings are merely recitations of a witness’s testimony, they cannot 

be construed as ‘true factual determinations.’” Id. (citing Garriott v. Peters, 878 

N.E.2d 431, 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied). We treat the trial court’s 

inclusion of these findings as “mere surplusage” rather than harmful error. Id. 

Here, we need not address whether the challenged findings are valid because, 

even if we treat some as surplusage, Mother’s testimony, her admissions in the 

GAL Report, and the remaining findings support the trial court’s determination 
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that Father should retain sole legal and primary physical custody of Children, 

and that Mother’s parenting time should continue as supervised.

[22] Regarding custody, this court recently held:

[W]hether the parents are willing and able to cooperate in 

advancing the child’s welfare, is of particular importance in 

making legal custody determinations. . . . Where the parties have 

made child-rearing a battleground, then joint custody is not 

appropriate. Indeed, to award joint legal custody to individually 

capable parents who cannot work together is tantamount to the 

proverbial folly of cutting the baby in half in order to effect a fair 

distribution of the child to competing parents.

Milcherska v. Hoerstman, 56 N.E.3d 634, 641-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal 

citations, quotation marks, and parentheticals omitted). Here, Mother does not 

dispute the trial court’s finding that she and Father do not have “good 

communication.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 87. In denying Mother’s Petition for Custody 

Modification, the trial court concluded that “a change of custody [was] not in 

the best interest of the children at this time.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 59. The 

evidence before us does not point unerringly to a conclusion different from that. 

The trial court did not err when it denied Mother’s request to modify legal 

custody.

[23] Mother’s claim that the trial court erred when it did not grant her unsupervised 

parenting time likewise fails. Mother and Children took part in therapy with 

therapist Wild for about three months in the spring of 2016. Thereafter, Parents 

and therapist Wild agreed, with the consent of the trial court, that Mother could 
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have two months of unsupervised parenting time in California during the 

summer of 2016. This agreed entry, however, did not change the underlying 

status that parenting time would be supervised upon Children’s return to 

Indiana. Mother had the burden to prove that parenting time should no longer 

be supervised. 

[24] In the spring of 2017, to gather information for the GAL Report, the GAL 

reviewed various videos of telephone conversations between Mother and 

Children, some of which she described in the GAL Report as follows. In an 

April 2017 call, Mother asked K.M. if she missed Mother anymore and asked if 

K.M. was saying that Mother was not her mom anymore. Appellee’s Conf. App.

at 91-92. K.M. began to cry and, twice, said she was sorry. Id. at 92. Mother 

told K.M., “[Y]ou don’t have to fake cry, okay.” Id. at 92. K.M. told Mother 

she was not fake crying, said she did not want to speak with Mother anymore, 

and hung up the phone. Id. In a call to R.M. that same day, R.M. asked

Mother why she made K.M. cry. Id. Mother told R.M. that she didn’t make 

K.M. do anything, “I asked her a question and she decided to act the way she 

did.” Id. Mother told R.M. she heard that Children are saying Mother is not 

their mom, which hurts Mother’s feelings. Id. R.M. explained that Father’s 

fiancée could be their mom too, saying, “[Y]ou don’t have to be our only 

mom.” Id. Mother responded, “[S]he’s a live-in girlfriend, and she has no legal 

rights to you.” Id. 

[25] The GAL Report also reflected statements made by Mother directly to the 

GAL—statements made through written and verbal communication. Mother, 
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describing a 2017 telephone conversation she had with K.M., admitted to 

calling K.M. “disrespectful” and “accusatory” when K.M. raised a topic that 

Mother did not want to discuss. Id. at 39. Mother confirmed with the GAL 

that she was being treated for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, yet believed that 

she had never been diagnosed with a mental health condition. Id. at 40. 

Mother also said that she had taken the Minnesota Multiphase Personality 

Inventory, and there were no findings. Id. The GAL requested a copy of that 

test, but through Mother’s counsel, the GAL was told that the evaluation was 

completed as part of a psychological evaluation to see if she could participate in 

a “TV show,” and the test could not be released because one of the television 

networks owned the rights. Id. 

[26] Although Mother filed a motion to exclude part of the GAL Report as being 

inaccurate, she made no such request about the rest of the GAL Report. 

Mother cannot contest findings that are based on her own words. Based on this 

evidence, the findings were supported by properly admitted evidence. Here, the 

trial court did not err in finding in favor of the continuation of supervised 

parenting time. 

II. Parenting Time and Educational Records

[27] Mother next argues that the trial court erred “[b]y failing to identify the basis of 

its conclusion or meet the statutory basis for restricting Mother’s parenting 

time.” Appellant’s App. at 26. “‘Indiana has long recognized that the rights of 

parents to visit their children is a precious privilege that should be enjoyed by 
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noncustodial parents.’” Patton v. Patton, 48 N.E.3d 17, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)

(quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 843 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. 

denied). “A parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable 

parenting time rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time 

by the noncustodial parent might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly 

impair the child’s emotional development.” Ind. Code § 31-17-4-1 (emphasis 

added). Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2 provides:

The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting 

time rights whenever modification would serve the best interests 

of the child. However, the court shall not restrict a parent’s 

parenting time rights unless the court finds that the parenting 

time might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly 

impair the child’s emotional development.

Despite the statute’s use of the word “might,” for over twenty-five years 

Indiana Courts have interpreted the statute to require evidence that parenting 

time “would,” not “might,” endanger or impair the physical or mental health of 

the child. Patton, 48 N.E.3d at 21 (citing Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 

763 (Ind. 2013)).

[28] Here, the March 2015 Order provided:

9. Mother’s actions[,] in leaving the State of Indiana without 

filing a Notice of Intent to Relocate in May 2014, and failure to 

provide any notification to Father as to where the Children 

were[,] endangers the Children’s physical health and impairs their 

emotional development. The Court also believes Mother continues 

to be a flight risk because she testified at the March 10, 2015, 

hearing that she was moving to California on March 21, 2015, 
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without any notification to the Court or to Father in advance of 

the March 10, 2015 hearing. Furthermore, Mother’s 

disparagement of Father, inability to display appropriate 

boundaries with the Children, continued reports to the police and 

DCS are damaging to the Children’s physical health and impairs their 

emotional development.

10. The Court finds that supervised parenting time for Mother is 

in the Children’s best interest until such time as she completes 

psychotherapy with a licensed professional recommended by Dr. 

Mac Greene.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 79. Based on the finding of endangerment, the trial 

court ordered that Mother have “supervised parenting time with the Children at 

the Family Access Center in Noblesville, Indiana.” Id. at 82. The trial court 

further ordered that “Mother shall arrange the times for supervised parenting 

time directly with the Family Access Center when she returns to Indiana for 

visits on at least seven (7) days’ notice to Father; Mother may enjoy up to four (4) 

hours of parenting time with the Children. Id. (emphasis added)

[29] In the summer of 2016, by agreement of Parents and approval of therapist Wild, 

Mother enjoyed two months of unsupervised parenting time. At the end of the 

parenting time, Mother returned Children to Father safely and promptly. Four 

days later, Mother filed a Petition for Custody Modification, requesting a 

modification of custody and parenting time. Here, evidence was before the trial 

court through the GAL Report and the testimony of various witnesses, and, in 

the instant Order, the trial court held:
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12. That prior to the commencement of Mother’s therapeutic 

parenting time, Mother shall participate in treatment with Ms. 

Wild and the children in a manner and for a duration that Ms. 

Wild recommends. Once Ms. Wild recommends that Mother and the 

children are ready for parenting time then parenting time shall proceed in 

that Mother shall have therapeutic supervised parenting time 

through Meridian Psychological Associates with Janine Miller, 

Psy.D. or another doctoral level therapist with experience in 

therapeutic supervised parenting time. Said supervised parenting 

time shall occur in Indiana and shall be no more than 4 hours per 

month unless determined by Dr. Miller or other doctoral level 

therapist that such frequency or duration should be increased or 

decreased.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 60-61 (emphasis added). Mother claims the trial court 

erred, first, by improperly suspending all of her parenting time (until therapist 

Wild determined that parenting time should proceed) without making a 

concurrent finding that her parenting time would “endanger the [C]hild[dren]’s 

physical health or significantly impair [their] emotional development,” and 

second, by restricting her parenting time, once commenced, to four hours per 

month. Appellant’s Br. at 23, 26. 

[30] Father argues that a finding of endangerment is inapplicable here because that 

language applies only where “no parenting time was granted to the noncustodial 

parent,” not where, as here, “parenting time was ordered to be supervised and 

within certain parameters designed to protect the best interests of” the child. 

Appellee’s Br. at 23 (quoting J.M. v. N.M, 844 N.E.2d 590, 599-600 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006) (emphasis original), trans. denied). Assuming without deciding that 

Father is correct, we agree with Mother that the trial court suspended all of 
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Mother’s parenting time, including supervised parenting time, until such time 

as therapist Wild recommended that Mother and the Children were ready for 

parenting time. Appellant’s Br. at 25. The trial court’s suspension of Mother’s 

parenting time is open-ended. Nothing precludes Mother from requesting that 

the trial court require therapist Wild to provide progress reports to the court or 

otherwise keep the court informed as to when therapeutic parenting time may 

begin. 

[31] The determination of whether Mother’s parenting time posed a danger to 

Children’s physical or mental health is a question of fact that requires the trial 

court to weigh the evidence and judge witness credibility. Here, we cannot say 

that the GAL Report and the testimony of witnesses at the modification hearing 

provided insufficient evidence to make such a finding; we can only say that 

those explicit findings were not made. Accordingly, we remand to the trial 

court the question of whether parenting time with Mother would endanger 

Children’s physical health or significantly impair their emotional development. 

[32] In addition to restricting Mother’s parenting time, the trial court ordered “[t]hat 

Mother shall cease all contact and be denied contact with the [C]hildren’s school, 

extracurricular activities, clubs, doctors, therapists, and other activities that the 

[C]hildren participate in until therapeutic therapy as previously outlined is 

completed and either Ms. Wild or Dr. Janine Miller recommends such 

contact.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 62. Mother interprets the italicized language 

to mean that the trial court has restricted her from having access to Children’s 
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“educational records,” and she argues that the evidence before the trial court 

does not support that conclusion. Appellant’s Br. at 30.

[33] Here, the language used by the trial court—Mother is “denied contact with the 

[C]hildren’s school”—does not specifically state that Mother is denied access to 

the educational records, but such a conclusion is implicit in the trial court’s 

order “[t]hat Mother shall cease all contact and be denied contact with the [C]hildren’s 

school.” 

[34] The Indiana General Assembly has shown a preference for each parent having 

access to a child’s educational records. Indiana Code section 20-33-7-2

provides:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a nonpublic or public 

school must allow a custodial parent and a noncustodial parent 

of a child the same access to their child’s education records.

(b) A nonpublic or public school may not allow a noncustodial 

parent access to the child’s education records if:

(1) a court has issued an order that limits the noncustodial 

parent’s access to the child’s education records; and

(2) the school has received a copy of the court order or has actual 

knowledge of the court order.

Nothing in the trial court’s order precludes Mother from asking the trial court to 

provide alternative access to the Children’s educational records.
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III. Modification of Child Support

[35] Finally, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

modified her weekly child support payments from $76.47, as of March 2015, to 

$133.00, beginning August 25, 2017. Appellant’s Br. at 30-31; Appellant’s App. 

Vol. 2 at 63, 86. We begin by noting that Father did not respond to that

argument in his brief. Father’s failure to respond to an issue raised in Mother’s 

brief is “akin to failing to file a brief as to that issue.” Gwinn v. Harry J. Kloeppel 

& Assocs., Inc., 9 N.E.3d 687, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “‘Although this failure 

does not relieve us of our obligation to correctly apply the law to the facts in the 

record in order to determine whether reversal is required, counsel for appellee 

remains responsible for controverting arguments raised by the appellant.’” Id.

(quoting Nance v. Miami Sand & Gravel, LLC, 825 N.E.2d 826, 837 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005), trans. denied). “To obtain reversal, the appellant need only establish 

that the trial court committed prima facie error.” Id. Prima facie error in this 

context means “‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face [of] it.’” Id. 

(quoting Ponziano Constr. Servs. Inc. v. Quadri Enters., LLC, 980 N.E.2d 867, 875 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). 

[36] “‘Decisions regarding child support rest within the sound discretion of the trial 

court.’” Taylor v. Taylor, 42 N.E.3d 981, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting 

Haley v. Haley, 771 N.E.2d 743, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)), trans. denied. “Thus, 

we reverse child support determinations only if the trial court abused its 

discretion or made a determination that is contrary to law.” Id. “‘An abuse of 

discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the 
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facts and circumstances before the court, including any reasonable inferences 

therefrom.’” Holtzleiter v. Holtzleiter, 944 N.E.2d 502, 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)

(quoting In re Paternity of E.M.P., 722 N.E.2d 349, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).

[37] Modification of child support may be made only under certain conditions. 

Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1 in pertinent part provides:

(b) Except as provided in section 2 of this chapter, modification 

may be made only:

(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and 

continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or

(2) upon a showing that:

(A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child support 

that differs by more than twenty percent (20%) from the amount 

that would be ordered by applying the child support guidelines; 

and

(B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was issued at 

least twelve (12) months before the petition requesting 

modification was filed. 

Ind. Code § 31-16-8-1. Our court has said, “[W]hen a change in the parent’s 

income would modify the child-support order by less than 20%, that change, by 

itself, is not enough to meet the statutory burden of subsection (b)(1), but 

‘[t]here may be situations where a variety of factors converge to make such a 

modification permissible under the terms of the statute.’” Maple v. Maple, 71 

N.E.3d 75, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 
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N.E.2d 938, 942 (Ind. 2005)). “In other words, in order to satisfy subsection 

(b)(1) a parent must prove that one or more factors, in addition to any change in 

income, have ‘converged’ to create a change in circumstances so substantial and 

continuing as to make the prior order unreasonable.” Id. While possible, “it 

will be uncommon for multiple factors to ‘converge’ to create a change in 

circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the prior order 

unreasonable.” Id. 

[38] This case is not one of those instances. Here, we find no evidence in the record 

before us to establish that one of the Parents was paying child support in an 

amount that was more than twenty percent of the child support guideline as 

required by Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1(b)(2)(A). Furthermore, because 

sole legal custody and primary physical custody remained with Father, there 

was no evidence of “changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to 

make the terms [of child support] unreasonable.” I.C. § 31-16-8-1(b)(1).

[39] Moreover, the evidence before the trial court did not support the trial court’s: 

(1) finding 45, which stated, “Father makes $64,500 annually [and] . . . . 

receives a vehicle allowance of $3,600 annually”; and (2) conclusion 19 that 

was based on finding 45 and stated in pertinent part, “That Mother shall pay 

child support to Father in the amount of $133 weekly[,] . . . [which] shall 

commence on August 25, 2017.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 57. During the 

custody hearing, Father testified that he earned $55,000 per year and received a 

fringe benefit of a $3,000 car allowance. Tr. Vol. 2 at 121. In the GAL Report,

which was filed with the trial court on June 1, 2017, the GAL noted, “[Father] 
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is currently employed . . . earning $55,000.00 working 40 hours per week.” 

Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 42. The trial court’s modification of child support, 

requiring Mother to pay Father $133 per week, was based on a Child Support 

Obligation Worksheet that neither party signed. Appellant’s App. at 63. We find 

no evidence to support the finding that Father made $64,500 per year or a 

conclusion that Mother should pay Father child support in the amount of $133 

per week. The trial court’s determination to the contrary is clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Accordingly, we 

reverse the trial court’s determination to modify Mother’s child support 

obligation and remand for the trial court to reinstate the child support order that 

was in place prior to the instant modification. 

[40] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Bailey J., and Pyle, J., concur.