T he H o no rable Jack Zo uhary , D i st ri ct Jud ge f o r t he U

. S. D i st ri ct C o urt * f o r t he N o rt hern D i st ri ct of O hi o , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

F OR P UB LIC AT ION
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE N IN TH C IR CU IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f - Appellee ,

v. C HAR L ES YI , A KAJangHo Yi ,

Defendant - Appellant

. No. 11-50234
D.C. No. 2:10-cr- 00793- PA-1

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntr a l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia Percy Ander son, District J udg e, Presiding Argued and Submitted No ve mbe r 6 , 2 01 2–Pa sa de na , Ca lif or nia Filed January

2, 2013
Be fore : Alfred T . Goodwin and Dia rmuid F. O’ Scannlain, Circuit J udg es, and Jack Z ouhary , District J udg e. *

Op ini on by Judg e Go od

wi nU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Crim inal L aw The p a n e l a f f ir me d a ju r y c o n v ic ti o n an d s e n te n c e for conspirac y t o v iolate the Clean A ir Act a rising f rom the d ef en d ant’s role as CEO of a rea l estate de velopment co mp an y t h at c o n t ra ct edt o h av e c o n d o m i n i u mce i l i n gs scr a p e d an d r e f

in is h e d w it

h o u t p r o p e r a s b e s to s d is p o s a l or notice. The pa nel held that the district cour t did not err in g iving or formulating a deliberate i g noranc e jury instruction, did not e rr in a pp lyinga

se nte nce e nh anc e me nt f or an o ff e ns e re su lti ngin s ub sta

nti a l li ke lih oo d of de a th o r s e ri ou s b od ily injury , and did not err

in applying a

n enhanc emen t fo r t he defe ndant’s role as an or g anizer or lea der.

CO UN SEL
Mari ly n B e dn ars ki, Kay e , M c L ane & B e dn ars ki L L P, Pa sa de na , Ca lif

or nia , f or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.
J ohn E. Arba

b, United States Department of Just ice, Environmental & Natura l Resource s Division , Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appe llee.U NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 3
OP IN ION
GOODWI

N, Circuit J udg e: Charles Yi a

ppeals his conviction and se ntence , assig ning err or to a jury instruction, a nd to his custodial sentenc e f or c on sp ir a c y

to v iol a te the Cl ean A ir Ac t. T he jud g me nt i s aff irmed.
I. F AC TS
Yi was the CEO of Millennium Pacific I con Group, a re al estate d ev elopment company . I n April 2004, Millennium p u r c h a s e d

F ores t G le n , a

2 0 4

- u n it c o n d o mi n ium c o mp le x, afte r Yi and some of

his Mill ennium associat es did a wa lkt h r o u g ho f

t h e p r o p e rt y. J oseph Yoon, Mil lennium’s For est Glen proje ct manag er, testified that Yi commented dur ing the walk-throug h that he wa s ce rt ai nt h e c ei l i n gs co n t ai n edas b es t o s b ec au s e o f t h e a ge of the building. Yi’s sister, Sheri Yi Hill, was a lso present at the walk- throug h. Hill testified that she discus sed the ce i l i n gs wi t h Yi an d t h e t wo d ec i d edn o tt o t o u ch t h e c ei l i n gs beca use they assumed the ceiling s contained a sbestos, which would be costly

to remove. Yi signe d a purc hase of

fer for F orest Glen that included a due diligenc e cla

use allowingtime to review e nvironmental materia ls and to conduct an environmenta l revie w. The seller provided a

due dilige nce binde r that included two P h ase I environmenta l report s and an “Oper ations and Maintena nce Plan for Asbe stos-Containing Mate rials” ( “The O& M Plan”). The re ports contained te s t results showing the prese nce of a sb e sto s in the c e ili ng s. Th e O& M Pla n in c or po rate d th e te stU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 4 results and stated that it wa s develope d to minimize ex posure to the r e le a s e o f a s b e s to s f ib e r s
. Y o o n te s ti f

ie d th a t he pr e se nte d th e du e dil ig e nc e binder to Yi and ide nti fi e d it s contents. Yoon a lso testified that Yi asked another employ ee to assess the diligenc e materia ls with respec t to the building’s phy sical condition, including the environmental aspec ts. The empl o y ee prepa

red a handwr itten summary . Yoon testified that he ty ped the summary

into a one-pa g e docume nt and ha nd e d it to Y i.
Ac c or din g to Y oo n, Yi su bs equ ent ly

ins tr uc te d h im t o secur e a bid f

or re moving the a sbestos from the F orest Glen ceiling s. Yoon contac ted Sky Blue Environmental in J une 2004, and u l t i mately

rec eived a

$437,000 proposal for asbestos abatement. Yoon te stified that Yi indicated he would not pursue the a bateme n t beca

use he f elt it was unnece ssary

for se lling the units. Yoon also testified that Yi reje cted a later bid to install dry wall over the ce ilings, which wo uld have c os t any

wh e re fr om $ 1, 80 0 to $ 2, 80 0 pe r u nit

. Mil le nn ium e mpl oy e e Ti mot hy Yu te sti fi e d th a t Y i sa id asbestos abatement would be too expensive.
After Millennium purchased F orest Glen, a n ag ent for Millennium’s insurance car rier visit ed the pr operty , observe d ceilingmater i al on the g round, and took a sample to test for asbestos. The ag ent later emailed Millenn i u m empl oy ee Andre w L avaux, stating that the test showed 1% a sbestos. Yi testified that he wa s told the sample came back “ neg ative,” but L avaux testified that he neve r told Yi the s ample wa s asbestos-f ree
. L avaux a lso te stified that he neve r heard anyone else tell Yi that the sample wa s asbestos-fr ee.
I n Se pte mbe r 2 00 5, unit sa le s at F or e st G le n b e g an to slow and evide nce show ed Yi bec ame c oncer ned about t heU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 5 slowdown in Novemb er 2 0 05. Yoon testified that Yi instructed him to dr aw up a contra ct to have the c ondominium ceiling s scra

ped and ref

i nished, and on January

16, 2006, Millennium contracted to ha ve the c eilings sc rape d

. The a g re e d- up on

pr ic e br ok e do wn

to $ 1, 50 0 p e r u

nit fo r t he fi rs t ten—less per

unit than ei ther the pr eviously reje cted bid for a sb e sto s a bate me nt o r fo r ins ta lli ngdr y wa ll o ve r t

he c e ili ng s. The c ontrac tor, Rudy s Palacios, t estified that no one informed him that the ceiling s contained asbestos. Palacios hired f our or five men t o do the s cra

ping. They

wore no specia l clothing to protect ag ainst asbestos ex posure and only “white masks.” He a lso s tate d th a t po wd e ry c e ili ngmate ri a l w a s si mpl y pla c e d into b a g s and wh e e lba rr ow s b e fo re be ingthr ow n into dumpsters.
A s tate ins pe c tor , L arr

y I sr a e l, t e sti fi e d th a t th e wo rk sit e was one of the wor st he had e ver s ee n and that ce iling mate ri a l w a s b low inge ve ry wh e re : pu

blic wa lkw ay s, sid e wa lks , d

ri ve wa y s, and aro un d th e dumps te rs
. Yi testified that he did not re member be ing shown the due dilige nce binde r; he ne ver r ead e ither enviro n mental re p o rt ; an d

h e d i d n o tb el i ev e F o re s t G l e n ’ s ce i l i n gs contained a sbestos beca

use one of

the Millennium manag ers ha d to ld h im that th e insu ranc e a g e nt’ s a sb e sto s te st “ c a me [back] negative” for as b es t o s . Acc ording to Yi, he was not shown the ac tual test results; he simply trusted the mana g er. As to the abatement work, Y i testified that he wa s not involved in ch o o s i ng the ce iling-sc rapingcre w, and did not know who made the choice or how it was made

. Yi a lso of

fe re d te sti mony

a bo ut the c los ingdo c ume nts , c la imi nghe did

no t r e a d th e du e dil igenc e pa ra g ra phand its ref ere nce to e nvironmental re view. According to Yi, he re adU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 6 and complied with the “Good Fa ith Deposit” provision of Ke y B ank ’s c on dit ion a l le tte r of int e re st, but sp e c if ic a lly did n o tr e a d t h e i m m e d i a t e l y

p r e c e d i n g “ E n v i r o n m e n ta l” pr ov isi on wh ic h c a lle d f

or an e nv ir on me nta l re po rt

. He a lso said he did not rea d any portion o f the ultimate loan a g r e e me n t w it

h K e y B an k d e s p it e s ign in g it

. Y i th e ndenied re a din g an e ma il s e nt t o h im c on ta ini ng ite ms n e e de d p ri or to closing the loan—spec ifically denying that he re ad the email’s re fer ence to the require ment of a Phase I environment al re p ort. He a lso denied re adingan ema il sent to him the day of closing in which Key Ba nk stated it needed the O& M Plan to be in place to c lose the loan.
II. THE D ELIB ER

AT E IG NO RA NC E IN STR UC TIO N Yi argues that the district cou rt er red in giving a jury instruction on deli b erate ig noranc e, asse rting that it was not wa rr ante d b e c a

us e the fa c ts s ho wn

a t tr ia l di d n ot suppor

t a finding of deliber ate ig noranc e. The dist rict cour t instructed the jury using the Ninth Circuit model inst ruction: You may find that the def endant a cted kn ow ing ly

if y ou fi nd be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e de fe nd ant:
1. was a war e of a high pr obability

that there was a sbestos in the ceiling s at For est Glen Condomini ums, and
2. deliberately

avoided lea

rning the truth. You may not find such knowledge , howeve r, if y ou fi nd that th e de fe nd ant a c tua lly believed that there w as no asbestos in theU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 7 ceiling s at the F orest Glen Condomi niums, or if y ou fi nd that the de fe nd ant was si mpl y c are le ss. A district court’s decision to g ive a pa rticular jur

y instruction is revie wed f

or abuse of discre tion. Un ite d S tates v . H e re dia , 483 F.3d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)

. An instruction’s substance is re viewed de n o v o
. Id. An ins tr uc tio n is a pp ro pr iate if

it i s “ su pp or te d b y law and ha s f

ound a tio n in the evidenc e.” Id. a t 92 2. As su c h, “ the dis tr ic t c ourt mus t vie w the e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to the p art

y reque sting it .” Id. I f a pa

rt y re qu e sts a lte rn a tiv e ins tr uc tio ns , the dis tr ic t c ourt

c on sid e rs the m sep arate ly to “ de te rm ine if the evidenc e could support a verdic t on either g round.” Id.
Wil lful blindness is inconsist en t with actual knowledg e, and thu s a de lib e rate ig no ra

nc e ins tr uc tio n is a pp ro pr iate on ly wher e “the jury could rationally find willful blindne s s even though it has r ejec ted the g overnme nt’s evidenc e of a ctual knowledg e.” Id. De lib e rate ig no ra nc e c on ta ins tw o p ro ng s: (1) a subjective be lief that there is a hig h probabili ty a fa ct exis ts; and (2) de liberate actions take n to avoid lear ning the truth. Global-Tech Applianc es, Inc . v. SEB S.A. , 1 31 S. Ct

. 2060, 2070 (2011).
Re g ard ingthe f

ir st Global-Tech prong , testimony from Hill, Yoon, and Yi himself supports an infe renc e that Yi wa s aw ar e o f ah i ghp ro b ab i l i t y t h at t h e F o re s tGl e n ce i l i n gs contained a sbestos. Both Hill and Yoon testified t h at Yi co m m en t ed o n t h e li k el i h o o d t h at t h e Fo re s t Gl en ce i l i n gs contained a sbestos during their initial walk-throug h. Yi’s 16- y ear experience in property manag ement bols ters the evidenc e that he suspected the ceiling s contained asbestos, as the age of the F orest Glen buildingand the c eiling’ s phy sicalU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 8

a p p e ar an c e w o u ld , a c c o r d in g to b o th H il l a n d Y i’ s own te sti mony , h ave put a

pe rs on e xpe ri e nc e d in

pr op e rt y manag ement on notice of the likelihood that it c o n t ained asbestos. While he argu es that the insura nce c ompany ’s supposedly

neg ative test allay ed his suspicions, that infere nce need not be drawn when viewing the evidence i n the g overnme nt’s favor

. T h us, there w as suffic ient evidentiar y su pp or t f or the fi rs t Global-Tech p ro n g. Turningto the s ec o n d Global-Tech prong , if the jury could infer

that Yi was a

war e o f a high proba

bility that the ceiling s contained a sbestos, it al s o could i nfer that Yi e ng a g e d in

a de libe rate patte rn

of fa ili ngto r e a d d oc ume nts that might clarify whether asbestos was in fac t present. The jury would not be re quired to believe Yi’s ar g ument that he was ve ry busy , that he truste d all of his subordinates to re ad ever y thing f or him, or eve n that he wa s told the insurance company ’s test had c ome back “ neg ative” f or asbe stos. The evidenc e reg arding Yi’s real estate ex perie nce and patter n of failing to rea d documents common to rea l estate tra nsactions supports a finding that Yi deliberatel y av o ided lear ning the truth about whe t h er the For est Glen c eilings c ontained a sb e sto s. Yi attempts to analog ize this case wi th some that have fo un d th e e vid e nc e c ould no t su pp or t f ind ingde lib e ra

te ignor ance
. See, e.g. , United States v. Baron , 94 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1996), ov e rru le d b yHe re dia , 483 F.3d 9 1 3 . But those c a s e s ar e f

a c tu a ll y d is ti n g u is h a

b le , w it hr e c o r d s very differ ent from the r ecor d here

. Yi a lso argue s th a t th e ins tr uct io n its e lf

wa s le g a lly flawed . H e pr ima

ri ly take s is su e wi th t

he te rm “ sim ply car eless.” Y i argues t hat i nstructing a jury that it may

not findU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 9 knowledg e wher e a defe ndant is “simply ” ca rele ss leaves the do or op e n f

or so me oth e r l e ve l of

c are le ssn e ss. B ut He re dia make s c le ar t

hat t he Ni nth

Cir c uit mod e l in str

uc tio n is appropr iate “ an d t here is lit tle rea son to suspect that juries will import [recklessness or neg lige nce] conc epts, as to which they are not instruc ted, into their deliberations.” 483 F.3d at 924. The distri ct court did not err in givingor for

mulating the deliber ate ig noranc e instruction.

III. THE GU IDELINE S ENTENCE
We reviewde novo the district cour t’s interpre tation of t h e S entenc ing Guidelines. Un ite d S tates v . H olt , 510 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9 t h Cir. 2007). Fa ctual dete rminations at sentenc ing are revie wed for c lear err or, and the application of the Guidelines to the fa cts is review ed for abuse of discretion. Id. “ Cle ar e rr or

is n ot d e mon str a te d b y po intin g to co n fl i cti ng evidenc e in the re cord.” United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 875 ( 9th Cir. 1991). I nstead, “ [ a] fi nding of fa c t is ‘c le arl y e rr on e ou s’ wh e n, a lth ou g h the re is ev ide nc e to support it, the review ing c ourt is left wi t h the def inite and firm conviction that a mist ake ha s been c ommitt ed.” Harries v. United States , 350 F.2d 231, 235 ( 9th Cir. 1965).
Her e, the district c ourt calc ulated Yi’s total offense level as 3 1 under the Guidelines. In rea chingthat level, the c ourt applied, and Y i now challeng es, two enha nceme n t s : a ninele ve l enh anc e me nt f

or c omm itt ing

an e nv ir on me nta l of

fe ns e that “re sulted in a substantial lik el i h o o d of death or serious bodily injury ,” § 2Q1.2(b)( 2); and a f our-leve l enhanc ement for be ing “ an org anizer or lea d er o f a criminal activity that involved fiv e or more pa rticipants,” § 3B 1.1(a) . The enhanc ements re sulted in a sentenc ing range of 108–135 months. However , th e co urt g rante d sever al downwa rdU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 10 departur e s , r e s u lt in g in

a f in a l s e n te n c in g r an g e o f

5 1

– 63 months . U lti mate ly , th e c ourt se nte nc e d Y i to 48 months

. A. Subst ant ial Like liho od of De at h or Se r iou s Bo dily Injury
We l o o k t o whether

the district court’s a

pplication of a nine-level increa se for

an off ense r esulting in a

substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury was supporte d by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. S ee United States v. Staten , 466 F.3d 708, 720 ( 9th Cir. 2006). Clear a nd convincing e vid e nc e c re a te s a

c on vic tio n th a t th e fa c tua l c on te nti on is “hig hly probable .” Colorado v. New Mexic o , 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
Evidence prese nted at trial showed that the work c rew removingthe For est Glen c eilings did not wear proper respirators, wer e exposed to dry ceiling materia l, a nd that ons i te dust far

exceede d industry -re commended le vels of asbestos. The e vidence at sentenc ing, a si d e fr o m the ac tual on-site conduc t, came primarily from an E PA letter dis c us sin g c hr

y so til e —th e fo rm of a sb e sto s pre se nt at F or e st Gl e n. Th e le tte r s up po rt s f ind ingthat c hr

y so til e is car cinog enic. Contrar

y to the defe nse expert’s re port, the EPA letter noted a

lack of evidenc e to support using differ ent t o x i ci t y fac tors for diff

ere nt ty pes of a sbestos. Even if the evidence d i d support this approac h, it would not dis turb the EPA’s baseline c onclusion that chry sotile is a car cinog en. Moreove r, studies cited in the letter support finding incre ased risk of lung canc er, me sothelioma, asbestosis, and cance r of the ple ur a fr om e xpos ur e to t

he c hr y so til e fo rm

of a sb e sto s.U NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 11
I n a dd iti on

to t he EPAle tte r, th e dis tr ic t c ourt a lso appea red to rely

on United States v. Pe arson , 274 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2001), wher e this court wr ote: The fe dera l go vernme nt has rec og nized a sb e sto s a s a

he a lth ha zar d and it is g e ne ra lly a c c e pted tha t e xpos ur e to a sb e sto s c an c a us e mesothelioma , asbestosis, lung c ance r; and canc ers of the esopha g us, stomach, colon, and rec tum. Pearson’s noncomplianc e with the work pra ctice s tandar ds cre ated a substantial lik e lih oo d th a t w or

ke rs wo uld be expose d to lif e -t hr e a te nin ga sb e sto s f

ibe rs
. Id. a t 12 35 (c itatio n o mi tte d) . Y i argue s th a t Pearson involved a diffe rent ty

pe o f asbestos and is ther efor e inapplicable. H oweve r, the opini on makes no such le g al distinction. I n sum, the combined eviden ce o f t he re moval cre w’s on-site c onduct and the potential harm fr om inhaling any form of asbestos pl ace s the di strict court’s finding outside the re alm of cle ar e rror
. Yi’s ar g uments to the contra ry are unpersua sive. First, he c on te nd s th e g ov e rnme nt f a iled to pr ov ide an e xpe rt to establish the foundation for the enhanc ement. But there is no such re quirement. Sec ond, Yi contends the dis t rict cour t improper l y rejected his own expert’s testimony . But the district court both consider ed and pe rmissibly g ave little or no we ig ht t o th e de fe ns e e xpe rt ’s op ini on
. Yi a tte mpt s to compar e thi s case to United States v. Altman , 901 F.2d 1161, 11 65 (9 th C ir . 1 99 0) , b ut t he re t he distri c t c ourt

re fu se d to he ar t he pr of fe re d e xpe rt te sti mony
. Th e re c or d h e re c le arl y re fl e c ts that th e dis tr ic t c ourt c on sid e re d th e e xpe rt

re po rt

.U NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 12 Yi’s more f

orce ful contention is that the district court sh ou ld have g ive n h is e xpe rt ’s op ini on mor e we ig ht. Ge ne ra ll y , the tr ie r o f f

a c t is e ntr

us te d w ithdis c re tio n in weig hing e vidence

. See I n re Rains , 42 8 F .3 d 89 3, 90 2 ( 9th Cir. 2005). Ther e is no rea so n t o b elieve the district court abused its discre tion, even assuming it larg ely discounted the expert opinion. T he expert re port ca n be summed up as stating: (1) chry sotile is differ ent in form fr om other ty pes of asb estos; (2) chr

y sotile is less “tox ic”; (3) the For est Glen work crew wetted down ceiling materials while wor king; ( 4) the wo rk c re w w or e re sp ir a tor s; ( 5) the c e ili ng s conta ine d le ss than 10% c hry sotile; and (6) the wo rk cre w’s low leve l of ex posure c ombined with the supposed lower tox icity of chry sotile resulted in an ins u ff i cient likelihood of death or serious bodily

inju ry . Howeve r, the c ontrary evidenc e de ta ile d a bo ve e nti tle d th e dis tr ic t c ourt to w e ig h a ll the fa c ts and re ject the e x pert’s opinion.
Yi a lso c ompl ains tha

t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

imp ro pe rl y discounted the re port based upon the expert’s lack of medical or molecula

r biolog y training

. But the district court’s inquiry into training me rely

cre ated a

basis for discounting the e xpe rt ’s me dic al opinions as to tox i ci t y and likelihood of harm. This wa s well wi t h i n the district court’s discr etion. The only seeming ly

uncontrove rted stateme nt i n the expert repor t, that c hry sotile is differ ent in f orm from other

ty pes of asbestos, did not require the district court to adopt the expert’s opinion a s to likelihood of harm. The district court’s failure to give the expert opinion more weig ht was not an abuse of discretion and the u l t i mate findingwas not cle ar err or.U NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 13

E ven i f t he j ur y onl y f

ound Y i gu i l t y un der a del i bera t e i gn o ran ce 1 the o ry, tha t f

ind ing is l e g a ll y e q u iv a le n t t o kn o w le d g e
. Uni t ed St at es v. J e w e ll , 53 2 F.2d 69 7 , 70 2

– 0 3 (9t h C i r. 19 7 6 ). B. Or ga niz e r orLe ade r Ro le
The district cour

t also found that Yi fit the ro l e o f an orga n i z er or leade r ca lling for a four -leve l increa se. That fi nd ingre qu ir e s e vid e nc e “ that th e de fe nd ant e xer c ise d s ome c on tr ol ov e r oth e rs inv olv e d in the c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e or wa s responsible f

o r org anizing other s for the pur pose of car rying out the cr i m e.” United States v. Ingham , 486 F.3d 1 0 6 8 , 1 0 7 4 (9 t hC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( em p h as i s o m i t t ed ) ( ci t i n g United Sta te s v . A v ila , 95 F.3d 887, 889 ( 9th Cir. 1996)). I t must be supported by a prepondera nce of the evidence. Av ila , 95 F.3d at 889. Thi s finding is also revie wed for clear e rror
. United States v. Ponce , 51 F.3d 820, 826 ( 9th Cir. 1995).
Numerous f

acts support the r o le enha nceme nt. Yi’s conviction plus substantial evidence at trial support the c on c lus ion

that he kn e w the c e ili ng s c on ta ine d asbes tos

. 1 Testimony

showed that Yi was heavily involved in decisionmaking with reg ard to F orest Glen, pa rt i cularly g iven the ine xpe ri e nc e of

Mil le nn ium

pr oje c t ma

na g e rs and Yo on

in pa rt ic ula r. Ev ide nc e sh ow e d: Y i e arlie r i ns tr uc te d Y oo n to se e k b ids fo r as be sto s aba te me nt; Yi re

je c te d ab a te me nt b ids ; Millennium employ ees a

waited Yi’ s ultim ate a

pproval prior to removal; and Y i instructed Yoon t o d raw up the contra ct for c e ili ngsc ra

pin g . T he se fa c ts s up po rt a pe rm iss ibl e infere nce that Yi directe d the ce ilings be sc rape d, approving bo th t he ex pen dit

ur e and the wo rk its e lf , r a the r t ha n s imp ly pl ac i n g his signatur e on a c heck ma de out to the contra ctor. T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtd i d

n o tc l e ar l y e r

r i nf i n d i n g b y aU NI TED S T A T ES V
. Y I 14 preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that Yi wa s an org anizer or leade r. Yi paints the district court’s f inding a s the result of

an improper “ but for” te st. I t would be im proper to find that Yi org anized or led a

criminal ac ti vity

mere ly beca use the ac t i v i t y co u l d n o th av e b ee nco mp l et edb u t fo r h i s kn o wl ed ge and par ticipation. United St ates v. Lopez-Sandov al , 146 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Harpe r , 33 F.3d 1 1 4 3 , 1 1 5 1 (9 t hC i r. 1 9 9 4 ). At t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, defe nse counse l expl ained that Yi was re quired to appr ove expenditures over a

fewthousand dollars, at which point the dis tr ic t ju dg e a sk e d, “ [m]y qu e sti on is if [Y i] do e sn ’t

ok ay it, we ’r e [n o t ] h e r e t o d ay
. T h e r e ’ s n o b o dy e l s e t h a tm a d e t his decision. He was the f

inal arbiter ; corre ct? ” De fense counsel ag ree d. This colloquy

shows the enha

nceme nt was not based on on the ne c e ssi ty

of Yi ’s involvem ent as the c heck sig ner, but ra the r o n Y i’ s direction or control. The district cour t did not a pp ly an in c or re c t le g a l te st, and

the a pp licati on of

the ro le enhanc ement wa s proper
. AF F IRMED.