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OPEN HEARING ON WORLDWIDE THREATS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

THURSDAY, MAY 11, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

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(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

KAMALA HARRIS, California 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio 

CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD BAILEY, Chief Clerk 

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CONTENTS 

MAY 11, 2017 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 

Warner, Hon. Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia .............. 3 

WITNESS 

Dan Coats, Director of National Intelligence; Accompanied by: Mike Pompeo, 

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Andrew McCabe, Acting Director 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Admiral Michael Rogers, Director 

of the National Security Agency; and Robert Cardillo, Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency ................................................................ 6 

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 12 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

1983 CIA Report, ‘‘Soviet Strategy To Derail U.S. INF Deployment,’’ declassified in 1999 submitted by Senator Cotton ...................................................... 68 

Responses of Andrew McCabe to Questions for the Record ................................. 96 

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OPEN HEARING ON WORLDWIDE THREATS 

THURSDAY, MAY 11, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Risch, 

Rubio, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Cornyn, Feinstein, Wyden, 

Heinrich, King, Manchin, and Harris. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Chairman BURR. I’d like to call the hearing to order. I’d like to 

welcome our witnesses today: Director of National Intelligence Dan 

Coats—Dan, it’s good to see our former colleague here—Director of 

the Central Intelligence Agency Mike Pompeo—good to see you, 

Mike—Director of Defense Intelligence General Vince Stewart; Director of National Security Agency, Admiral Mike Rogers; Director 

of Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Robert Cardillo; and Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Andrew McCabe. I 

thank all of you for being here this morning, especially to you, Director McCabe, for filling in on such short notice. 

Since 1995, this committee has met in an open forum to hear 

about and discuss the security threats facing the United States of 

America. I understand that many people tuned in today are hopeful 

we’ll focus solely on the Russian investigation of their involvement 

in our elections. Let me disappoint everybody up front: While the 

committee certainly views Russian intervention in our elections as 

a significant threat, the purpose of today’s hearing is to review and 

highlight to the extent possible the range of threats that we face 

as a Nation. 

The national security threat picture has evolved significantly 

since 1995. What used to be a collection of mostly physical and 

state-based national security concerns has been replaced by something altogether different. Today our traditional focus on countries 

like North Korea, Russia, and Iran is complicated by new challenges like strategic threats posed by non-state actors in the cyber 

arena and the danger of transnational terrorists who can use the 

internet to inspire violence and fear in the homeland, all without 

leaving their safe havens in the Middle East. 

What has not changed, however, is the tireless dedication and 

patriotism of the women and men who make up the United States 

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intelligence community, the very people represented by our witnesses this morning. 

One of the many reasons I find so much value in this hearing 

is that it provides the American public with some insight into the 

threats facing our country. But it also lets people know what’s 

being done in their behalf to reduce those threats. I encourage all 

the witnesses today to not only address the threats to our Nation, 

but to talk about what their organizations are doing to help secure 

this country, to the degree they can in an unclassified setting. 

Director Coats, your written statement for the record represents 

the collective insight of the entire intelligence community. It is a 

lengthy and detailed account of what this country is facing. It is 

also evidence of why the substantial resources and investments 

this committee authorizes are in fact necessary. 

From the human tragedy of the refugee crisis in the Middle East 

to the risk that territorial ambitions will set off a regional conflict 

in the South China Sea, it’s a complicated and challenging world. 

Director Pompeo, the Korean Peninsula is a point of particular concern to me and to many on this committee. I’d like your insights 

into what is behind North Korea’s unprecedented level of nuclear 

and missile testing and how close they are to holding the U.S. 

mainland at risk of a nuclear attack. I’d also value your sense of 

how Tuesday’s election of a new President in South Korea is going 

to impact things for us on that peninsula. 

General Stewart, I’m sure you’re aware of the reinvigorated policy discussions on Afghanistan. While we all respect that you can’t 

offer your own recommendations on what that policy should be, I 

would very much value your assessments of the situation in Afghanistan today, including the state of governance in Kabul, the 

sustainability and proficiency of the Afghan National Security 

Forces, and whether Taliban reconciliation is a realistic objective. 

If the U.S. is ramping up in Afghanistan, we need to know the IC’s 

views on what we’re getting into. 

I also hope you’ll share your assessments of the battlefield in 

Iraq and in Syria with us this morning. Your insights into conditions on the ground, including ongoing operations to dislodge ISIS 

from Mosul, and sustainability of the Mosul Dam would be of great 

value to the members of this committee and to the public. 

Admiral Rogers, I’ve made a couple references to cyber already 

and that’s for good reason. Of the many difficult challenges we’re 

going to discuss this morning, nothing worries me more than the 

threat of a well-planned, well-executed widescale attack on the 

computer networks and systems that make America work. From 

banking and health care to military and critical infrastructure, the 

functionality of our modern society is dependent on computers. 

When the first line of the DNI’s statement reads, and I quote, 

‘‘Nearly all information, communications networks, and systems 

will be at risk for years,’’ unquote, that alarms me. Admiral Rogers, 

I look forward to hearing from you on this line of assessments. 

Director Cardillo, as head of the NGA you sit at the nexus of innovation and data collection and analysis. Given the complexity of 

the intelligence questions the IC is being confronted with and the 

global nature of our national security threats that this country 

faces, expectations of the NGA are high. We know the IC can’t be 

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everywhere at once, but that’s still kind of what we look to the 

NGA to do. I’d appreciate your sense of what NGA analytic 

strengths are today and what the role of commercial imagery is in 

NGA’s future. 

Director McCabe, welcome to the table and into the fray. To the 

extent possible, I hope you’ll discuss the Bureau’s assessments of 

the terrorist threat within our borders. Your agents are often our 

last line of defense here at home and I will say continue to do outstanding work. 

We’re fortunate to have six people with the experience and the 

dedication that we have today. I’ll close there, but I’d like to highlight for my colleagues: the committee will be holding a classified 

hearing on worldwide threats this afternoon at 1:30. I will do everything I can to make sure that the questions that you ask in this 

open session are appropriate to the venue that we’re in. I would 

ask you to think about that long and hard, and if there’s a question 

to move to a staffer to ask them whether this is the appropriate 

area; and if you as our witnesses feel that there’s something that 

you can’t sufficiently answer in an open setting, that you will pause 

long enough to get my attention and I will try to make sure that 

we move to the appropriate setting. 

With that, I turn to the Vice Chairman for any comments he 

might make. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you for your leadership on this Committee. I also want to join in 

welcome the witnesses. It’s good to see you all. 

But it is impossible to ignore that one of the leaders of the intelligence community is not here with us today. The President’s firing 

of FBI Director Comey Tuesday night was a shocking development. 

The timing of Director Comey’s dismissal to me and to many members on this committee on both sides of the aisle is especially troubling. He was leading an active counterintelligence investigation 

into any links between the Trump campaign and the Russian government or its representatives and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia’s efforts to interfere in 

our election. 

For many people, including myself, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that the President’s decision to remove Director Comey was related to this investigation. And that is truly unacceptable. 

We were scheduled to hear directly from Director Comey today 

in open session. We and the American people were supposed to 

hear straight from the individual responsible for the FBI investigation. We anticipated asking Director Comey a series of questions 

about his actions and the actions of the FBI in terms of looking 

into which Trump associates, if any, and some of their actions during the campaign as it relates to the Russians. However, President’s Trump’s actions this week cost us an opportunity to get at 

the truth, at least for today. 

You may wonder a little bit how seriously I know the White 

House continues to dismiss this investigation. I point out simply for 

the record the front page of the ‘‘New York Times,’’ which shows 

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a picture of clearly an Administration that doesn’t take this investigation too seriously. 

It is important to restate the critical importance of protecting the 

independence and integrity of Federal law enforcement. This is 

central to maintaining the confidence of the American people in the 

principle that all Americans, no matter how powerful, are accountable before the law. The President’s actions have the potential to 

undermine that confidence, and that should be deeply concerning 

no matter which political party you belong to. 

This week’s remarkable developments make our Committee’s investigation into Russia’s influence on the 2016 U.S. presidential 

election even more important. And while it is clear to me now more 

than ever that an independent special counsel must be appointed, 

make no mistake, our Committee will get to the bottom of what 

happened during the 2016 presidential election. Again, I want to 

compliment the Chairman on his work in this effort. 

We will not be deterred from getting to the truth. These actions 

will do nothing to undermine our resolve to follow the evidence 

wherever it leads. We hope to speak to Mr. Comey. We will speak 

to anyone and everyone who has something to offer in this investigation. 

Mr. McCabe, while I didn’t necessarily expect to see you here 

today, we don’t know how long you’ll be Acting FBI Director. But 

while I will adhere to what the Chairman has indicated in terms 

of the line of questioning, I will want to make sure my first question for you, even in this public setting, will be for you to assure 

the Committee that if you come under any political influence from 

the White House or others to squash this investigation or impede 

it in any way, that you’ll let the Committee know. 

This investigation has had its ups and downs and again some, 

including myself, sometimes have been frustrated with the pace. 

We will no doubt face other challenges in the future. But ups and 

downs and bumps sometimes is how bipartisanship works. It’s a 

constant struggle, but one worth making, and I’m proud of the way 

Members of this Committee from both sides of the aisle have conducted themselves in one of the most challenging political environments we’ve ever seen. 

At the same time, Chairman Burr and I have put this investigation on what we believe to be a solid bipartisan footing, with the 

shared goal of getting the truth. In spite of the events of the last 

24 hours, I intend to maintain our Committee’s focus on the investigation. Indeed, the recent actions only increase the burden of responsibility on all of us to ensure that we live up to this challenge 

and to uncover the truth, wherever that leads. 

There is, obviously, consensus agreement among the U.S. intelligence community that Russia massively intervened with active 

measures in the 2016 presidential elections. Nor do I imagine that 

any member of this Committee was surprised to see the exact same 

Russian playbook just being run during the French elections that 

just took place last weekend. And no one should forget back in mid2015—Director Coats, we had some of the folks in from the German services recently—that there was a hacking into the German 

Bundestag. It’s fair to say the Germans should anticipate seeing 

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more cyber attacks directed against their elected officials with their 

upcoming national elections in September. 

In short, Russia’s direct interference in democratic processes 

around the globe is a direct assault that we must work on together 

and it’s clearly one of the top worldwide threats. 

That being said, gentlemen, I want to start again by thanking 

you for your service to the Nation. I want to particularly note that 

Director Coats is testifying before this Committee in the first time 

since his confirmation. Dan, I know that you and Marsha were 

ready for retirement and I thank you both for being willing to serve 

your country one more time. 

I also want to recognize the men and women who you represent 

here today. These thousands of dedicated intelligence professionals 

toil in the shadows, put their lives on the line, and make sacrifices 

most of us will never know in order to keep our country safe. I also 

want to make sure they know that I appreciate their efforts and 

am proud to represent them, not only as the Vice Chair of the Intelligence Committee, but as a Senator from Virginia, where so 

many of those intelligence professionals live. 

This Committee’s annual Worldwide Threat hearing is an important opportunity to review the threats and challenges we face as 

a Nation. Obviously, these threats continue to multiply. As the 

world becomes more complex and challenging, good intelligence 

gives our policymakers and national leaders a heads-up on the 

challenges they need to address. 

The intelligence community in many ways is our Nation’s early 

warning system. However, a fire alarm only works if you pay attention to it. You cannot ignore it simply because you do not like what 

it’s telling you. Similarly, we need to make sure that all our policymakers pay attention to the warnings provided by you, the independent, nonpartisan intelligence professionals. 

Since the Second World War, America has relied, as we all know, 

on a global system of alliances, institutions, and norms to ensure 

our stability and prosperity. Today many challenges threaten that 

system, that system that has been built up over the last 70 years. 

As the Chairman mentioned, countries like China and Russia are 

challenging many of the global institutions. They are in many cases 

seeking to undercut and delegitimize them. We must work together 

to stand vigilant against that threat. 

Similarly, rogue states such as North Korea have sought to undercut the global nonproliferation regime. Obviously, North Korea 

is one of the most pressing issues our country faces. And, Admiral 

Rogers, as the Chairman mentioned, we all share enormous concern about both the up side and down side of new technologies and 

the asymmetrical threats that are posed by cyber and other technology actors. I would add as well—Director Cardillo, I think we’ve 

discussed this as well—our dominance in terms of overhead in 

many ways is at threat as well from emerging nations. 

Terrorist groups and extremists are also able to access a lot of 

these new technologies. And while ISIS in particular continues to 

suffer losses in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, unfortunately it continues 

to spread its hateful ideology through social media and encrypted 

communications. 

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Gentlemen, I have only lightly touched on a few of the challenges 

we face. I look forward to the discussion we’re about to have. But 

again, I thank you for being here and look forward to this hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. I thank the Vice Chairman. 

For members’ purposes, we have a vote scheduled on the floor at 

11:00 o’clock. It’s the intent of the Chair and Vice Chair that we 

will rotate the gavel so that the hearing continues through. Members will be recognized by seniority for five minutes. When we conclude the open session, hopefully with enough gap for our witnesses 

to have some lunch, we will reconvene at 1:30. The afternoon vote 

to my knowledge is not set yet, but we will work around that, so 

plan to be back at the SCIF by 1:30 for that hearing to start. 

With that, Director Coats, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN COATS, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. VINCENT STEWART, DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 

MIKE POMPEO, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY; ANDREW MCCABE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ADMIRAL MICHAEL ROGERS, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; AND 

ROBERT CARDILLO, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL 

GEOSPATIAL–INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Director COATS. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I’m here with my colleagues from across the IC 

community and I’m sure I speak for my colleague Mike Pompeo, 

the new Director of the CIA, that the two of us, new to the job, 

have inherited an intelligence community with leadership and professionals, with expertise, that is exceptional. It is a great privilege 

to hold these positions and know that we have the support from 

across 17 agencies relative to gathering intelligence, analyzing and 

synthesizing that intelligence, and several of those leaders are sitting here today and we’re most appreciative of their contributions 

to their country and to this issue. 

The complexity of the threat environment is ever expanding and 

has challenged the IC to stay ahead of the adversary, and it has 

not been an easy task. Given the tasks we face around the world, 

the IC continues its work to collect, to analyze, and integrate these 

and other issues. 

We appreciate very much the support from your committee to address these threats in a way that will give the President, the Congress, and other policymakers the best and most integrated intelligence we can assemble. 

In the interest of time and on behalf of my colleagues at the 

table, I’ll discuss just some of the many challenging threats that we 

currently face. The intelligence community’s written statement for 

the record that was submitted earlier discusses these and many 

other threats in greater detail. 

Let me start with North Korea. North Korea is an increasingly 

grave national security threat to the United States because of its 

growing missile and nuclear capabilities combined with the aggressive approach of its leader, Kim Jong Un. Kim is attempting to 

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prove he has the capability to strike the U.S. mainland with a nuclear weapon. He has taken initial steps toward fielding a mobile 

intercontinental ballistic missile, but it has not yet been flight tested. 

North Korea updated its constitution in 2012 to declare itself a 

nuclear power and its officials consistently state nuclear weapons 

are the basis for regime survival, suggesting Kim does not intend— 

not intend—to negotiate them away. 

Although intelligence collection on North Korea poses difficulties 

given North Korea’s Isolation, the IC will continue to dedicate resources to this key challenge. It requires some of our most talented 

professionals to warn our leaders of the pending North Korean actions and of the long-term implications of their strategic weapons 

programs. 

In Syria, we assess that the regime will maintain its momentum 

on the battlefield provided, as is likely, that it maintains support 

from Iran and Russia. The continuation of the Syrian conflict will 

worsen already disastrous conditions for Syrians in regional states. 

Furthermore, on April 4th the Syrian regime used the nerve agent 

sarin against the opposition in Khan Sheikhoun in what is probably the largest chemical attack by the regime since August 2013. 

The Syrian regime probably used chemical weapons in response to 

battlefield losses along the Hama battle front in late March that 

threatened key infrastructure. 

We assess that Syria is probably both willing and able to use 

CW, chemical warfare, in future attacks, but we do not know if 

they plan to do so. We are still acquiring and continuing to analyze 

all intelligence related to the question of whether Russian officials 

had foreknowledge of the Syrian CW attack on 4 April, and as we 

learn this information we will certainly share it with this committee. 

Cyber threats continue to represent a critical national security 

issue for the United States for two key reasons. First, our adversaries are becoming bolder, more capable, and more adept at using 

cyber space to threaten our interests and shape real-world outcomes. And the number of adversaries grows as nation-states, terrorist groups, criminal organizations, and others continue to develop cyber capabilities. 

Secondly, the potential impact of these cyber threats is amplified 

by the ongoing integration of technology into our critical infrastructure and into our daily lives. 

Our relationships and businesses already rely on social media 

and communication technologies and on critical infrastructure. It is 

becoming increasingly reliant on the internet. As such, this raises 

the potential for physical, economic, and psychological consequences when a cyber attack or exploitation event occurs. 

The worldwide threat of terrorism is geographically diverse and 

multifaceted, and it poses a continuing challenge for the United 

States, for our allies and partners who seek to counter it. ISIS is 

experiencing territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, with persistent 

counterterrorism operations degrading its strength. However, ISIS 

will continue to be an active terrorist threat to the United States 

due to its proven ability to direct and inspire attacks against a 

wide range of targets around the world. 

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Outside Iraq and Syria, ISIS is seeking to foster interconnectedness among its global branches and networks, align their efforts to 

its strategy, and withstand counter-ISIS efforts. We assess that 

ISIS maintains the intent and capability to direct, enable, assist, 

and inspire transnational attacks. 

Al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to pose a significant terrorist 

threat overseas as they remain primarily focused on local and regional conflicts. Homegrown violent extremists remain the most 

frequent and unpredictable terrorist threat to the United States 

homeland. This threat will persist, with many attacks happening 

with little or no warning. 

In Turkey, tensions in Turkey might escalate rapidly and unpredictably in 2017 as the government’s consolidation of power, crackdowns on dissent, and restrictions on free media continue. 

Let me now take just a quick run through some key areas of the 

Middle East. In Iraq, Baghdad’s primary focus through 2017 will 

be recapturing and stabilizing Mosul and other territory controlled 

by ISIS. ISIS in Iraq is preparing to regroup, however, and continue an insurgency and terrorist campaign even as it loses territory. We assess that Iraq will still face serious challenges to its stability, political viability, and territorial integrity even as the threat 

from ISIS is reduced. Reconstruction will cost billions of dollars 

and ethnosectarian and political reconciliation will be an enduring 

challenge. 

In Iran, Teheran’s public statements suggest that it wants to 

preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action because it views 

the deal as a means to remove sanctions while preserving some nuclear capabilities. Iran’s implementation of the deal has extended 

the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about a year. 

Teheran’s malignant activities, however, continue. For example, 

Iran provides arms, financing, and training and manages as many 

as 10,000 Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani Shia fighters in Syria to 

support the Assad regime. Iran has sent hundreds of its own forces, 

to include members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and 

the IRGC Quds Force, to Syria as advisers. 

In Yemen, fighting—we assess fighting will almost certainly persist in 2017 between Houthi-aligned forces trained by Iran and the 

Yemeni government, backed by a Saudi-led coalition. Neither side 

has been able to achieve decisive results through military force to 

this point. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, an ISIS branch in 

Yemen, have exploited the conflict and the collapse of government 

authority to gain new recruits and allies and expand their influence. 

In South Asia, the intelligence community assesses that the political and security situation in Afghanistan will almost certainly 

deteriorate through 2018, even with a modest increase in military 

assistance by the United States and its partners. This deterioration 

is undermined by its dire economic situation. Afghanistan will 

struggle to curb its dependence on external support until it contains the insurgency or reaches a peace agreement with the 

Taliban. 

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formance will probably worsen due to a combination of Taliban operations, combat casualties, desertions, poor logistics support, and 

weak leadership. 

Pakistan is concerned about international isolation and sees its 

position through the prism of India’s rising international status, including India’s expanded foreign outreach and deepening ties to the 

United States. Pakistan will likely turn to China to offset its isolation, empowering a relationship that will help Beijing to project influence into the Indian Ocean. 

In addition, Islamabad has failed to curb militants and terrorists 

and Pakistan. These groups will present a sustained threat to the 

United States’ interests in the region and continue to plan and conduct attacks in India and Afghanistan. Pakistan is also expanding 

its nuclear arsenal and pursuing tactical nuclear weapons, potentially lowering the threshold for their use. 

Let me now turn to Russia. We assess that Russia is likely to 

be more aggressive in foreign and global affairs, more unpredictable in its approach to the United States, and more authoritarian 

in its approach to domestic policies and politics. We assess that 

Russia will continue to look to leverage its military support to the 

Assad regime to drive a political settlement process in Syria on 

their terms. Moscow is also likely to use Russia’s military intervention in Syria in conjunction with efforts to capitalize on fears of a 

growing ISIS and extremist threat to expand its role in the Middle 

East. 

We assess that Moscow’s strategic objectives in Ukraine—maintaining long-term influence over Kiev and frustrating Ukraine’s attempts to integrate into Western institutions—will remain unchanged in 2017. Russia’s military intervention in eastern Ukraine 

contains more than two years—continues, excuse me—more than 

two years after the Minsk 2 Agreement. Russia continues to exert 

military and diplomatic pressure to coerce Ukraine into implementing Moscow’s interpretation of the political provisions of the 

Minsk agreement, among them constitutional amendments that 

would effectively give Moscow a veto over Kiev’s strategic decisions. 

In China, China will continue, we assess, to pursue an active foreign policy, especially within the Asia Pacific region, highlighted by 

a firm stance on competing territorial claims in the East China Sea 

and South China Sea, relations with Taiwan, and its pursuit of economic engagement across East Asia. China views a strong military 

as a critical element in advancing its interests. It will also pursue 

efforts aimed at fulfilling its ambitious ‘‘One Belt, One Road’’ initiative to expand their strategic influence and economic role across 

Asia through infrastructure projects. 

Just a quick look at sub-Saharan Africa, home to more than a 

billion people and expected to double in size by mid-century. African governments face the threat of coups, popular uprisings, widespread violence, and terrorist attacks, including from Al-Qaeda and 

its ISIS affiliates. 

In the Western Hemisphere, Venezuela’s unpopular autocratic 

government will turn to increasingly repressive means to contain 

political opponents and street unrest. Oil has long been the regime’s cash cow, but mismanagement has led to declining output 

and revenue. We assess the Venezuelan government will struggle 

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to contain inflation, make debt payments, and pay for imports of 

scarce basic goods and medicines. 

Mexico’s government will focus on domestic priorities to prepare 

for the 2018 presidential election while seeking to limit fallout from 

strained relations with the United States. Public demand for government action against crime and corruption will add to political 

pressure. 

As Cuba heads into the final year of preparations for a historic 

transition to a next generation leader in early 2018, the government’s focus will be on preserving control while managing recession. Cuba, which continues to use repressive measures to stifle 

human rights and constrain democracy activists, blames its slowing 

economy on lower global commodity prices, the U.S. embargo, and 

the economic crisis in Venezuela, a key benefactor. 

Let me just make a statement on the threat from illegal drugs. 

The threat to the United States from foreign-produced drugs, especially heroin, synthetic opioids, meth, and cocaine, has grown significantly in the past few years. This is contributing to previously 

unseen levels of U.S. drug-related mortality, which now exceeds all 

other U.S. causes of injurious death. 

Finally, I’d like to make a few points here that are important to 

the IC going forward. As you are all very aware, Section 702 of the 

FISA Amendments Act is due to expire at the end of the year. I 

cannot stress enough the importance of this authority in how the 

IC does its work to keep Americans safe, and I know that is shared 

by everyone at this table. 

Section 702 is an extremely effective tool to protect our Nation 

from terrorists and other threats. As I described in my confirmation hearing, 702 is instrumental to so much of the IC’s critical 

work in protecting the American people from threats from abroad. 

The intelligence community is committed to working with all of 

you, in both classified and unclassified sessions, to ensure that you 

understand not only how we use our authorities, but also how we 

protect privacy and civil liberties in the process. 

Additionally, many of you have asked me as part of my confirmation process about the status of the IC, its effectiveness and efficiency, and how it can be improved. As part of the Administration’s 

goal of an effective and efficient government, the ODNI has already 

begun a review of the entire intelligence community, to include the 

Office of the DNI, and to answer the very questions about how we 

can make our process even more streamlined, more efficient, and 

more effective. 

My office is proud to lead this review and I look forward to the 

confirmation of my principal deputy in order to shepherd this process to completion, and I have total confidence in her that she has 

the capacity and capability to effectively lead this effort. 

The recently passed intelligence authorization bill also includes 

the requirement for a review of the IC focused on structures and 

authorities ten years beyond the intelligence reforms of the mid2000s. Between these two reviews, I am confident that I will be 

able to report back to the committee with constructive recommendations on the best ways forward for the whole of the IC. 

In the short time I’ve been on this job, I have learned that the 

IC is full of dedicated, talented, creative, and patriotic men and 

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women who are committed to keeping America safe. We must retain this posture while looking for ways to improve. 

In conclusion, the intelligence community will continue its tireless work against these and all threats, but we will never be omniscient. Although we have extensive insight into many threats and 

places around the world, we have gaps in others. Therefore, we 

very much appreciate the support provided by this committee and 

will continue to work with you to ensure that the intelligence community has the capabilities it needs to meet its many mission 

needs. 

With that, we are ready to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Director Coats follows:] 

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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT 

of the 

US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 

May 11,2017 

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Burr, VIce Chairman Warner, Members of the Committee, thank you for the Invitation to offer 

the United States Intelligence CommunitY's 2017 assessment of threats to US national security. My 

statement reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community's extraordinary men and women, 

whom I am privileged and honored to lead. We in the Intelligence Community are committed every day to 

provide the nuanced, multtdlsciplinary intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law 

enforcement personnel need to protect Americen lives and America's interests anywhere in the world. 

The order of the topics presented in this statement does not necessarily Indicate the relative importance 

or magnitude of the threat In the view of the Intelligence Community. 

Information available as of Aprll24, 2017 was used in the preparation of this assessment. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

GLOBAL THREATS 

Cyber Threat 

Emerging and Disruptive Technologies 

Terrorism 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation 

Space and Counterspace 

Counterintelligence 

Transnational Organized Crime 

Economics and Natural Resources 

Human Security 

.East Asia 

China 

North Korea 

Southeast Asia 

Russia and Eurasia 

Russia 

REGIONAL THREATS 

Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus 

The Caucasus and Central Asia 

Europe 

Key Partners 

Turkey 

Middle East and North Africa 

Syria 

Iraq 

Iran 

Yemen 

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South Asia 24 

Afghanistan 24 

Pakistan 24 

India-Pakistan 25 

Sub..Saharan Africa 25 

South Sudan 25 

Sudan 25 

Nigeria 26 

Sahel 26 

Somalia 26 

Ethiopia 26 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 26 

Western Hemisphere 27 

Mexico 27 

Central America 27 

Colombia 27 

Cuba 27 

Venezuela 28 

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GLOBAL THREATS 

CYBER THREAT 

Our adversaries are becoming more adept at using cyberspace to threaten our interests and advance 

their own, and despite Improving cyber defenses, nearly all Information, communication networks, and 

systems will be at risk for years. 

Cyber threats are already challenging public trust and confidence in global Institutions, governance, and 

norms, while imposing costs on the US and global economies. Cyber threats also pose an increasing risk 

to public health, safety, and prosperity as cyber technologies are integrated with critical infrastructure in 

key sectors. These threats are amplified by our ongoing delegation of decisionmaking, sensing, and 

authentication roles to potentially vulnerable automated syalems. This delegation incnsa!;Bs the likely 

physical, economic, and psychological consequences of cyber attack and exploitation events when they 

do occur. Many countries view cyber capabilities as a viable tool for projecting their Influence and will 

continue developing cyber capabilities. Some adversaries also remain undeterred from conducting 

reconnaissance, espionage, influence, and even attacks In cyberspace. 

Cyber Threat Actors 

Russia. Russia Is a full-scope cyber actor that will remain a major threat to US Government, military, 

diplomatic, commercial, and critical infrastructure. Moscow has a highly advanced offensive cyber 

program, and In recent years, the Kremlin has assumed a more aggressive cyber posture. This 

aggressiveness was evident In Russia's efforts to Influence the 2016 US election, and wa assess that 

only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized the 2016 US election-focused data thefts and 

disclosures, based on the scope and sensitivity of the tSrgets. Outside the United States, Russian actors· 

have conducted damaging and disruptive cyber attacks, including on critical Infrastructure networks. In 

some cases, Russian inteUigence actors have masquereded as third parties, hiding behlrid false online 

personas designed to cause the victim to misattributa the source .of the attack. Russia has also 

leveraged cyberspace to seek to Influence public opinion across Europe and Eurasia. We assess that 

Russian cyber operations will continue to target the United States and Its allies to gather Intelligence, 

support Russian decisionmaking, conduct Influence operations to support Russian military and political 

objectives, and prepare the cyber environment for future contingencies. 

China. We assess that Beijing will continue actively t!i!rgetlng the US Government, Its allies, and US 

companies for cyber espionage. Private-sector security experts continue to identify ongoing cyber activity 

from China, although at volumes significantly lower than before the bilatarat Chinese-US cyber 

commitments of September 2015. Beijing has also selectively used offensive cyber operations against 

foreign targets that it probably believes threstan Chinese domestic stability or regime legitimacy. 

Iran. Tehran continues to leverage cyber espionage, propaganda, and attacks to support Its security 

priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats-including against US allies in 

the reg'ion. Iran has also used Its cyber capabilities directly against the United Statel1. For example, in 
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2013, an Iranian hacker conducted an Intrusion into the Industrial control system of a US dam, and In 

2014, Iranian actors conducted a data deletion attaCk against the network of a US-based casino. 

North Korea. Pyongyang has previously conducted cyber-attaeks against US commercial entitlesspecifically, $any Pictures Entertainment in 201~nd remains capable of launching disruptive or 

destructive cyber attaCks to support its political objectives. Pyongyang also poses a cyber threat to US 

allies. South Korean officials have suggested that North Korea was probably responsible for the 

compromise and disclosure of data in 2014 from a South Korean nuclear plant. 

Terrorists. Terrorists-to include the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham {ISIS}-will also continue to 

use the Internet to organize, recruit, spread propaganda, raise funds, collect Intelligence, Inspire action by 

followers, and coordinate operations. Hlzballah and HAMAS will continue to build on their cyber 

accomplishments inside and outside the Middle East. ISIS will continue to seek opportunities to target 

and release sensitive Information about US citizens, similar to their oper'ations In 20.15 disclosing 

Information about US military personnel, in an effort to inspire attacks. 

Criminals. Criminals are also developing and using sophisticated cyber tools for a variety of purposes 

Including theft, extortion, and facilitation of other criminal activities. 'Ransomware," malware that employs 

deception and encryption to bloCk users from acoasslng their own data, has become a particularly popular 

tool of extortion. In 2016, cr1mlnals e'inploytng ransomware turned their focus to the medical sector, 

disrupting patient care and undermining public confidence In some medical institutions. 

Physical Consequences 

Our adversaries are likely to seek capabilities to hold at r1sk US cr1tlcal infrastructure as waH as the 

broader ecosystem of connected consumer and industrial devices known· as the *Internet of Things• (loT). 

Security researchers continue to .discover vulnerabilities In consumer products including automobiles and 

medical devicas. If adversaries gain the ability to create significant physical effects in the United States 

via cyber means, they will have gained new avenues for coercion and deterrence. For example, a cyber 

attaCk on a Ukrainian power network in ~015 caused power outages for several hours. 

Economic and Security Consequences 

Adversaries will continue to use cyber operations to undermine US military and commercial advantage by 

haCking Into US defense industry and commercial enterpr1ses In pursuit of scientific, technical, and 

business information. Examples include _theft of data on the F-35 Joint Strike Aghter, the F-22 Raptor 

fighter jet, and the MV-22 Osprey. In addition, adversaries often target personal accounts of government 

officials and their privata-sector counterparts. This espionage reduces cost and accelerates the 

development of foreign.weapon systems, enables foreign reverse-engineering and countermeasures 

development, and undermines US military, technological, and commercial advantage. 

Psychological Consequences 

The impact of cyber threats extends beyond the physical and commercial realms. Online threats-from 

both states and non-state actors-distort the perceptions and decisionmaking processes of the target, 

whether they are countries or individuals, in ways that are both obvious and Insidious. Information from 

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cyber espionage can be leaked indiscriminately or selectively to shape perceptions. Furthen:nore, even a 

technically secure Internet can serve as a platform for the delivery of manipulative content crafted by foes 

seeking to gain influence or foment distrust. 

Global Security, Diplomacy, and Norms 

We assess that as foreign countries seek to balance security, economic growth, and interoperability 

objectives, many will implement new laws and technical changes to monitor and control acoess to 

Information within and across their borders. Some states will continue to seek to control user access 

through means such as restrictions on encryption and steps to reduce anonymity online. However, these 

states will probably not significantly erode the overall global connectivity of the Internet. Furthermore, 

some state information control efforts will ahpost certainly be challenged by a broad coalition of states 

and non-state cyber stakeholders, including innovative technologists, Industry leaders, privacy advocates, 

"hackers,• .and others with an interest In opposing censorship or government control of cyberspace. 

Although recognition is widespread that existing lntematlonallaw applies to states' conduct In 

cyberspace, how that law applies to states' use of information and communication technologies (ICT) 

remains a subject of significant international discussion. In additibn, although efforts are ongoing to gain 

adherence to certaln voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behavior In cyberspace, they haw 

not gained universal ecceptance, and efforts to promQta them are increasingly polarized. Despite the 

existence and widespread ratification of the Budapest Convention-the treaty on cybercrime of the 

Council of Europe-some states !:lave called for the drafting of new international treaties to regulate 

cybercrime and other cyber-related issues. Moreover, although some countries might be willing tci 

explore limits on cyber operations against certain targets, few would likely support a ban on offe11sive 

capabilities. 

EMERGING AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 

strategic Outlook 

Continued rapid technological progress remains central to economic prosperity and social well-being, but 

it is also introducing potential new threats. Artificial intelligence (AI) is advancing .computational 

capabilities that benefit the economy, yet those advances also enable new military capabilities for our 

adversaries. Genome editing has the potential to cure diseases and modify human performance, which 

presents new ethical and security issues. The Internet of Things (loT) is connecting billions of new 

devices to the Internet, but it also broadens the attack potential of cyber actors against networks and 

information. Semiconductors remain core to the economy and the military, yet new national security risks 

might arise from next-generation chips because of technology plateaus and investments by other states. 

Artificial Intelligence 

A surge of COI'l'!merclal and government research is improving AI capabilities while raising national 

security Issues. Semi-autonomous cars, the victory of anAl-based system over the worid champion in 

the game Go, and devices with At-enabled personal assistants have drawn global attention to the field. 

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Corporations around the globe are Investing in a range of AI applications including marketing, crime 

detection, health, and autonomous vehicles. Although the United States leads AI research globally, 

foreign state research in AI is growing. Foreign governments cite AI in their science and technology 

strategies or have planned specific efforts to enhance their AI capabilities. The Implications of our 

adversaries' abilities to use AI are potentiaDy profound and broad. They include an increased 

vulnerability to cyber attack, difficulty in ascertaining attribution, facilitation of advances In foreign weapon 

and intelligence systems, the risk of accidents and related liability issues, and unemployment. 

Genome Editing 

The development of genome-editing teclmologies is accelerating the rate at which we can develop new 

approaches to address medical, health, industrial, environmental, and agricultural challenges and 

revolutionize blotoQical research. However, the fest pace of development and broad range of applications 

are likely to challenge governments and scientific communities alike to develop regulatory and ethical 

frameworks or norms to govern the responsible application of the technology: 

Internet of Things 

The widespread Incorporation of •smart" devices into everyday objects Is changing how people and 

machines intef!!cl with each other and tlie world around them. often improving efficiency, convenience, 

and quality of life. Their deployment has also Introduced vulnerabilities into both the infrastructure that 

they support and on which they rely, as Well as the processes they guide: Cyber actors have already 

used loT devices for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and we asseas they will continue. In 

the future, state and non-state actors will likely use loT devices to support Intelligence operations or 

domestic security or to access or attack targeted computer networks. 

Next-Generation Semiconductors 

Continual advancement of semiconductor technologies during the past 50 years in accordance with 

Moore's Law-which posits that the overall processing power of computers will double every two yearshas be6n a key driVer of the information technology revolution that underpins many US economic and 

security advantages. Industry experts, however, are concerned that Moore's Law might no longer apply 

by the mld-2020s as the fundamentelllmits of physics to further miniaturize transistors are reached, 

potentially eroding US national security lidvanteges. Meanwhile, China is increasing its efforts to Improve 

its domestic technological and production capabilities through mergers and acquisitions to reduce its 

dependence on foreign semiconductor technology, according to Western experts and business analysts. 

TERRORISM 

The worldwide threat from terrorism will remain geographically diverse and multifaceted-a continuing 

challenge for the United States, our allies, and partners who seek to counter it. Sunni violent extremists 

will remain the primary terrorist threat. These extremists will continue to embroil. conflict zones In the 

Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. Some will also seek to attempt attacks outside their operating areas. 

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• Iran continues to be the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and, with its primary terrorism partner, 

Lebanese Hizballah, will pose a continuing threat to US Interests and partners worldwide. The 

Syrian, Iraqi, and Yemeni conflicts will continue to aggravate the rising Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict, 

threatening regional stability. 

Terrorist Threat to the United States 

US-based homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) will remain the most frequent and unpredictable Sunnl 

violent extremist threat to the US homeland. They will be spurred on by terrorist groups' public calls to 

carry out attacks in the West. The threat of HVE attacks will persist, and some attacks will probably occur 

with little or no warning. In 2016, 16 HVEs were arrested, and three died in attacks against civilian soft 

targets. Th~ detained were arrested for a variety of reasons, including attempting travel overseas for 

jihad and plotting attacks in the United States. In addition to the HVE threat, a small number of foreignbased Sunnl violent extremist groups will also pose a threat to the US homeland and continue publishing 

multilingual propaganda that calls for attacks against US and Western interests in the US homeland and 

abroad. 

Dynamic Overseas Threat Envl~nment 

The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-sham (ISIS) continues to pose an active terrorist threat to the United 

States and its allies because of Its ideological appeal, media presence, control of territory in Iraq and 

Syria, its branches and networks In other countries, and its proven ability to direct and Inspire attacks 

against a wide range of targets around the world. However, territorial losses in Iraq and Syria and 

persistent counterterrorism operations against parts of its global network are degrading its strength and 

ability to exploit instabliity and societal discontent. ISIS is unlikely to announce that it Is ending its selfdeclared caliphate even if it loses overt control of its de facto capitals In Mosul, Iraq and Ar Raqqah, Syria 

and the majority of the populated areas it once controlled In Iraq and Syria. 

Outside Iraq and Syria. ISIS is seeking to foster Interconnectedness among its global.brancties and 

networks, align their efforts to ISIS's strategy, and withstand counter-ISIS efforts. We assess that ISIS . 

maintains the intent and capability to direct. enable, assist, and inspire transnational attacks. The number 

of foreign fighters traveling to join ISIS In Iraq and Syria will probably continue to decline as potential 

recruits face increasing difficulties attempting to travel there. The number of ISIS foreign fighters leaving 

Iraq and Syria might increase. increasing departures would very ·likely prompt additional would-be 

fighters to look for new battlefields or return to their home countries to conduct or support extemal 

operations. 

During the past 16 years, US and global counterterrorism (en partners have significantly reduced aiQa'lda's ability to carry out large-scale, mass casuaity attacks, particularly against the US homeland. 

However, a!-Qa'ida and its affiliates remain a significant CT threat overseas as they remain focused on 

exploiting local and regional conflicts. In 2016, ai-Nusrah Front and a!-Qa'lda In the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP) faced CT pressure in Syria and Yemen, respectively, but have preserved the 

resources, manpower, safe haven, local influence, and operational capabilities to continue to pose a 

threat. In Somalia, aJ-shabaab sustained a high pace of attacks in Somalia and continued to threaten 

the northeast and coastal areas of Kenya. Its operations elsewhere in East Africa have diminished after 

the deaths of many external plotters since 2015, but ai-Shabaab retains the resources, manpower, 

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influence, and operational capabilities to polie a raal thraa! to the region, especially ~nya. In North and 

West Afiica, ai-Qa'lda In the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) escalated its attacks on Westerners 

In 2016 with two high-profile attacks in Burkina Faso and Cote d'lvolre. It merged with allies In 2017 to 

form a new group Intended to promote unity among Mall-based jihadists, extend the jihad beyoQd the 

Sahara and Sahel region, Increase military action, and speed up recruitment of fighters. In Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, remaining members of ai-Qa'ida and its regional affiliate, ai..Qa'lda In the Indian 

Subcontinent (AQIS), continued to suffer personnel losses and disruptions to safe havens in 2016 due 

to CT operations. However, both groups maintain the intent to conduct attacks against the United States 

and the West. 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND PROLIFERATION 

State efforts to modernize, develop, or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery 

systems, or their underlying technologies constitute a major threat to the security of the United States, its 

deployed troops, and allies. Both state and non-state actors have already demonstrated the use of 

chemical weapons in the Levant. Biological and chemlcal materials and technologies-almost alwaYs 

dual use-move easily In the globalized economy, as do personnel with the scientific expertise to design 

and use them for legitimate and illegitimate purposes. Information ·about the latest discoveries In the life 

sciences also diffuses rapidly around the globe, widening the accessibility of knowledge and tools for 

beneficial purposes and for potentially nefarious applications .. 

Russia Pressing Forward With Cruise Missile That VIolates the INF Treaty 

Russia has developed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that the United States' has declared Is in 

violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Despite Russia's ongoing development 

of other Treaty-compliant missiles with in.termediate ranges, Moscow probably believes that the new 

GLCM provides sufficient military advantages that make it worth risking the political repercussions of. 

violating the INF Treaty. In 2013, a senior Russian administration ·official stated publicly that the world 

had ·changed since the INF Treaty was signed In 1987. Other Russian officials have made statements in 

the past complaining that the Treaty prohibits Russia, but not some ·of Its neighbors, from developing and 

possessing ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 to 5,500 kilometers. 

China Modernizing Its Nuclear Forces 

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has established a Rocket Force-replacing the 

longstanding Second Artillery Corps-and continues to modernize Its nuclear missile force by adding 

more survivabi!l road-mobile systems and enhancing Its silo-based systems. This new generation of 

missiles Is intended to ensure the viability of China's strategic deterrent by providing a second-strike 

capability. In addition, the PLA Navy continues to develop the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile 

(SLBM) and might produce additional JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The JINclass submarines-armed with JL-2 SLBMs-will give the PLA Navy its first long-range, sea-based 

nuclear capability. 

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Iran and JCPOA 

Tehran's public statements suggest that it wants to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

(JCPOA)-because it views the JCPOA as a means to remove sanctions while preserving some nuclear 

capabilities. It expects the P5+1 members to adhere to their obligations, although Iran clearly recognizes 

the new US Administration is concerned with the deal. Iran's implementation of the JCPOA has extended 

the ar:nount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few 

months to about a year. The JCPOA has aiso enhanced the transparency of Iran's nuclear activities, 

mainly through Improved access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Investigative 

authorities underthe Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 

Iran is pursuing capabilities to meet its nuclear energy and technology goals and to give It the capability to 

build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, If it chooses to do so. Its pursuit of these goals will influence 

its level of adherence to the JCPOA. We do not know whether I rim will eventually decide to build nuclear 

weapons. 

We judge that Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferrad method of delivering nuclear 

weapons, if it builds them. Iran's ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering WMD, and Tehran 

already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Tehran's desire to deter the 

United States might drive it to field an intercontinental ballistic miSsile (ICBM). Progress on Iran's space 

program could shorlen a pathway to an ICBM because space launch vehicles use similar technologies. 

North Korea Continues To Expand WMD-Appllcable Cepablllties 

North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs will continue to pose a serious threat to US 

Interests and to the security environment in East Asia In 2017. North Korea's export of ballistic missiles 

and associated materials to several countries, Including Iran and Syria, and Its assistance to Syria's 

construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate its willingness to proliferate dangerous 

tachnologies. 

North Korea has also expanded the size and sophistication of its ballistic missile fOrces-from closerange ballistic missiles (CRBMs) to ICBMs--and continues to conduct test launches. In 2016, North 

Korea conducted an unprecedented number of ballistic missile tests. Pyongyang is committed to 

developing a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that Is capable of posing a direct threat to the United 

States; It has publicly displayed its road-mobile ICBMs on multiple occasions. We assess that North 

Korea has taken steps toward fielding an ICBM but has not flight-tested it. 

We have long assessed that Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities are intended fur deterrance, international 

prestige, and coercive diplomacy. 

Chemical Weapons In Iraq and Syria 

We assess the Syrian regime used the nerve agent sarin In an attack against the opposition In Khan 

Shaykhun on 4 April2017 in what is probably the _largest chemical weapons attack since August 2013. 

We continue to assess that Syria has not declared all the elements of its chemical weapons program to 

the Chemical Weaiwns Convention (CWC) and has the capability to conduct further attacks. Despite the 

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creation of a specialized team and years of work by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 

Weapons (OPCW) to address gaps and inconsistencies In Syria's declaration, numerous Issues remain 

unresolved. The OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism {JIM} attributed threa chlorine attacks in 2014 

and 2015 to the Syrian regime. 

We assess that non-state actors in the region are also using chemicals as a means of warfare. The 

OPCW-UN JIM concluded that ISIS used sulfur mustard In an attack In 2015. ISIS has allegedly used 

chemicals in attacks in Iraq and Syria, suggesting that attacks might be widespread. 

SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE 

Space 

Global Trends. Continued global space Industry expansion will further extend space-enabled 

capabilities and space situational awareness to nation-state, non-state, and commercial space actors In 

the coming years, enabled by Increased availability of technology, private-sector investment, falling 

launch service costs, and growing International partnerships for shared production and operation. 

Government and commercial organizations will increasingly have access to space-derived Information 

services such es Imagery, weather, Internet, communications, and positioning, navigation, and timing 

(PNT) for intelligence, military, scientific, or business purposes. For Instance, China aims to becon'le a 

world leader in PNT as it completes its dual-use global satellite navigation system by 2020. 

Military and Intelligence. Russia aims to Improve intelllgenpe collection, missile warning; and military 

communications systems to better suppdrt situational awareness and tactical weapons targeting. 

Russian plans to expand its Imagery constellation and double or possibly triple the number of satellites by 

2025. China Intends to continue increasing Its space-based military and Intelligence capabilities to 

Improve global situational awareness and support complex military operations. Many countries In the 

Middle East, Southeast Asia. and South America are purchasing' dual-use Imaging satellites to support 

stretegic military activities, some as joint development projects. 

Counters pace 

Space Warfare. We assess .that Russia and China perceive a need to offset any US military advantage 

derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems and are Increasingly considering attacks against 

satellite systems as part of their Mure warfare doctrine. Both will continue to pursue a full range of antisatellite {ASAT) weapons as a means to·reduce US military effectiveness. In late 2015, China 

established a new 'service-the PLA Streteglc Support Force-probably to Improve oversight and 

command of Beijing's growing mlrrtary interests in space and cyberspace. Russia and China remain 

committed to developing capabilities to challenge perceived adversaries in space, especially the United 

States, while publicly and diplomatically promoting nonweaponizatfon of space and "no first placemenr of 

weapons in space. Such commitment continues despite ongoing US and allied diplomatic efforts to 

dissuade expansion of threats to the peaceful use of space, including international engagements through· 

the UN. 

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CounteiS#)aCe Weapons. The global threat of electronic warfare (EW) attacks against space systems 

will expand In the coming years in both number and types of weapons. Development will very likely focus 

on jamming capabilities against dedicated military satellite communications (SATCOM), Synthetic 

Aperture Radar (SAR) imaging satellites, and enhanced capabilities against Global Navigation Satellite 

Systems (GNSS), such as the US Global Positioning System (GPS). Blending of EW and cyber-attack 

capabilities will likely expand In pursuit of sophlsticeted means to· deny and degrade Information networks. 

Chinese researchers have discussed methods to enhance robust jamming capabilities with new systems 

to jam commonly used frequencies. Russia Intends to modernize its EW forces arid field a new 

generation of EW weapons by 2020. Iran and North Korea are also enhancing their abilities to disrupt 

military communicattons and navigation. 

Some new Russian and Chinese ASAT weapons, including destrUctive systems, will probably complete 

development In the next several years. Russian military strategists likely view counterspace weapons as 

an integral part of broader aerospace defense rearmament and are very likely pursuing a diverse suite of 

capabilities to affect satellites in all orbital regimes. Russian lawmakers have promoted military pursuit of 

ASA T missiles to strike low-Earth orbiting satellites, and Russia is testing such a weapon for eventual 

deployment. A Russian ofliclal also acknowledged development of an aircraft-launched missile capable 

of destroying satellites in tow-Earth orbit. Ten years after China intercepted one of its own satellites in 

low-Earth orbit, its ground-launched ASA T missiles might be nearing operational service within the PLA. 

Both countrles.are advancing directed energy weapons technologies for the purpose of fielding ASA T 

systems that could blind or damage sensitive space-based opttcal sensors. Russia is developing an 

airborne laser weapon for usa against US satellites. Russia and Chin!! continue to conduct sophisticated 

on-orbit satellite activities, such es rendezvous and proximity operations, at iesst some of which are likely 

intended to test dual-use technologies with Inherent counterspace functionality. For instance, space 

robotic technology research for satellite servicing and debris-removal might be used to damage satellites. 

Such missions will pose a particular challenge In the future, complicating the US ability to characterize the 

space environment, decipher intent of space activity, and provide advance threat viaming. 

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 

The United States will face a complex global foreign intelligence threat environment in 2017. We assess 

that the leading state Intelligence threats to US interests will continue to be Russia and China, based ·on 

their services' capabilities. Intent, and broad operational scope. Other states In SoUth Asia, the Near 

East, Eest Asia, and latin America will pose local and regional intelligence threats to US interests. For 

example, Iranian and Cuban intelligence and security services continl!S to view the United States as a 

primary threat. 

Penetrating the US national decisionmaking apparatus and the Intelligence Community will remain 

primary objecttves for numerous foreign Intelligence entities. Additionally, the targeting of national 

security information and proprietary Information from US companies and research institutions involved 

with defense, energy, finance, dual-use technology, and other areas will remain a persistent threat to US 

interests. 

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Non-state entitles, including international terrorists and transnational organized crime groups, are likely to 

continue to employ and-Improve their int~lligence capabilities Including by human, technical, and cyber 

means. As with state intelligence services, mesa non-state entities recruit sources and perform physical 

and technical surveillance to facilitate their illic~ actMtles and avoid detection and capture. 

Trusted insiders who disclose sensitive or classified US Government information without authorization wiil 

remain a significant threat In 2017 and beyond. The sophistication and availability of information 

technology that increases the SCOP!l and impact of unauthorized disclosures exacerbate this threat. 

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 

Rising US Drug Threat 

The illicit drug threat the United States is intensifying, as indicated by soaring US drug deaths, foreign 

drug production, lind drug seizures. 

Deaths from synthetic opioids-includlng fentanyl and its analogues-Increased 73 percent in 2015 

compared to 2014, and mortality from all other Illicit drugs Increased 36 percent for the same period, 

according to the us Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Preliminary data for 2016 

from some states suggest that deaths have continued to increase. 

• Seizures of cocaine and methamphetamine increased along the US southwest border in 2016 over 

2015. 

Rising foreign drug production, the staying power of Mexican trafficking networks, and strong demand are 

driving the US drug threat 

• In Mexico, the dominaot source of US heroin, potential heroin production doubled from 2014 to 2016, 

according to the US Government estimates. 

• Production of cocaine reached the highest levels on record for Colombia in 2016 and for Peru and 

Bolivia in 2015-the last years for which estimates are available-driven in Pl!rt by a decline in coca 

eradication efforts. 

Synthetic drugs from Asia-including synthetic oploids, eannabinolds, and cathlnones-pose a strong 

and probably growing threat and have the potential to displace some traditional drugs produced fi'om 

plants. Such drugs are often traded via the Internet or-ln the case of cannablnoids and cathlnonessold over the counter in products marked ·not Intended for human consumption. • Counterfeit and 

substandard pharmaceutical trafficking is also on the rise, with the Internet being the primary means by 

which transnational criminal organizations target US citizens. 

• Approximately 16-20 new illegal online pham1acy domain names are registered every day, according 

to estimates of the Food and Drug Administration, adding to the tens of thousands of existing Illegal 

online pharmacies in operation. 

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Crime Enables Other Nefarious Actors 

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) will pose a continuing threat to the United States and its allies 

through close relationships with foreign states and non-state actors. Some states use TOC networks as 

proxies to engage in activities from which the states wish to distance themselves. TOC networks also 

have the ability to capture territory In states or portfons.of states and control it with violence and 

corruption of public officials. They often receive sanctuary as a result of providing social services, 

incorporating corruptive methods, and- creating dependencies. TOC networks facilitate terrorism by 

providing money and services, such as selling weapons. They also engage in cyber-based theft and 

extortion and offer their capabilities to other cyber actors. 

Hong Kong police arrested six individuals with suspected Chinese organized crime links in connection 

with death thrests to a lawmaker elected in September 2016 who advocated for greater autonomy 

from China. 

• In 2015, MS-13 gang members in San Pedro Sula, Honduras provided meals to children and the 

elderly, shielded residents from rival criminals, meted out justice for unauthorized crimes, and halted 

criminals from unofficially taxing residents and small businesses. Such support to local communities 

undermines government legitimacy and engenders public support for the criminal groups. 

Global Human Trafficking Risks Rising 

The number of individuals at risk of human trafficking will almost certainly rise in 2017 11ecause internal 

conflict, societal violence, and environmental crises are increasing the populations of refugees and 

Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). Risks of human trafficking vulnerability intensify during crisis 

situations when Individuals often lose their support networks and sources of livelihood. In addition to 

crisis-induced displacement, entrenched structural factors-including political instability, government 

corruption, weak rule of law, soft economies, low levels of democracy, and discrimination toward women, 

children, and minorities-will very likely continue to increase potential victims' vulnerability to human 

trafficking worldwide. 

Wildlife Trafficking and Illegal Fishing 

Wildlife trafficking and poaching are widespread In many countries, especially those grappling with 

comuption, weak judiciaries, and scarce state resources. Some wildlife traffickers also move other 

contraband, such as drugs and weapons, at times relying on the same comupt protectors. Awareness of 

wildlife crime and its impact is growing among source and demand countries, and regional leaders in 

Africa Increasingly acknowledge the links among poaching, wildlife trafficking, instability, comuptlon, 

crime, and challenges to the rule of law. 

Global fisheries face an existential threat In the decades ahead from surging worldwide demand, 

declining ocean health, and contlnued.illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. IUU fishing also 

harms legitimate fishing activities and livelihoods, jeopardizes food and economic security, benefits 

transnational crime, distorts markets, contributes to human trafficking, and undermines ongoing effortS to 

Implement sustainable fiSheries policies. It can also heighten tensions within and between countries and 

encourage piracy and frequently Involves forced labor, a form of human trafficking. 

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ECONOMICS AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

Global growth Is likely to remain subdued In 2017 amid growing headwinds In China's economy and tepid 

growth in advanced economies. Worldwide gross domestic product (GOP) growth was virtually , 

unchanged in 2016 from the previous year at 3.1 percent and Is forecast to grow 3.5 percent in 2017, 

according the International Monetary_ Fund (IMF). Improving· growth in commodity-dependent economies 

Is likely to boost global economic activity beyond 2017. Adverse shocks, however, such as a greater 

slowdown In China than the IMF projects or capital outflows from emerging markets stan'lmlng from rising 

US Interest rates, would put the modest global economic recovery at risk. 

Macroeconomic Stability 

The outlook for emerging markets and developing countries Is improving, primarily because ol stabilizing 

commodity prices and increased capital inflows. The IMF forecasts that growth in emerging economies 

will accelerate to 4.5 percent In 2017 as recoveries start to take hold In several countries. However, rising 

non-performing loans In China could reinforce the deceleratiori In Chinese economic growth, weighing on 

global economic and financial condltions·and dampening global demand, particularly for commodities. 

Moreover, the prospect of higher interest rates In the United States and a strengthening dollar might lead 

to sustained capital outflows again from emerging markets. 

Continued solid p_erformance by the United States and lncreeslngly stable conditions in many European 

states will probably help to support grOwth In developed economies. Many European countries and 

Japan, however, continue to rely on low Interest rates and accommodative monetary policies to counter 

weak demand. Policy uncertainty also poses risks to the global economy. 

Energy and Commodities 

Subdued growth, particularly In the industrialized acqnomles, had a negative impact on commodity prices 

in recant years, which have been particularly harmful for emerging market economies, with the exception 

of net commodity importers, such as China and India. A collapsing economy In Venezuela-the result of 

the oil-price decline and years of flawed economic policy and profligate govemmertt·spendin~llleave 

Caracas struggling to avoid default in 2017. Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf oil exporters, who 

generally have more substantial financial reserves, have nonetheless seen a sharp Increase In budget 

deficits that have forced politically unpopular fiscal ~orms such as cuts to subsidies, government 

spending, and government jobs. In Africa, declining oil revenues, past mismanagement, lind Inadequate 

policy responses to oil price shock have contributed to Angolan and Nigerian fiscal problems, currency 

strains, and deteriorating foreign exchange reserves. The World Bank forecasts that priceS for most 

commodities, however, will increase slightly In 2017 as markets continue to rebalance, albeit at lower 

levels than earlier in the decade. 

Sluggish growth ofglobal demand for oiFand low prices continue to discourage plans to develop new 

resouroas and expand existing projects-particularly in high-cost areas such as the Arctic, Brazilian presalt region, or West Africa's deepwater. Projects already under development will probably be completed 

during the next five years, but longer-term prospects have been slashed, potentially setting the stage for 

shortfalls and higher prices when demand recovers. 

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The Arctic 

Arctlc countries face an array of challenges and opportunities as diminishing sea ice increases 

commercial shipping prospects and possible competition over undersea resources in coming decades. In 

August 2016, the first large-capacity cruise ship traversed the Northwest Passage, and more such trips 

are planned. In Septem~r 2016, NASA measured.the Arctic~ lee minimum extent at roughly 900,000 

square miles less than the 1981-2010 average. Relatively loW economic stakes In the past and fairly well 

established exclusive economic zones (EEZs) among the Arctic states have facilitated cooperation In 

pursuit of shared interests in the region, even as polar ice has receded and Arctic-capable technology has 

improved. However, es the-Arctic becomes more open to shipping and commercial exploitation, we 

assess that risk of competition over access to sea routes and resources, including fish, will Include 

countries traditionally active in the Arctic as well as other countries_ that do not border on the region but 

increasingly look to advance their economic interests there. 

HUMAN SECURITY 

Environmental Risks and Climate Change 

The trend toward a warming climate is forecast to continue In 2017. The UN World Meteorological 

Organization (WMO) is warning that 20171s likely to be among the hottest years on record-although 

slightly less warm than 2016 as the strong El Nino conditions that influenced that year have abated. The 

US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) reported that 2016 was the hottest year since modem measurements began in 

1660. This warming Is projected to fuel more Intense and frequent extreme weather evenls that will be 

distributed unequally in time and geography. Countries with large populations in coastal areas are 

particularly vulnerable to tropical weather events and storm surges, especially in Asia and Africa.· 

Global air ppllution is worsening as more countries experience rapid industrialization, urbanization, forest 

burning, and agricultuial waste Incineration, according to the Wo~d Health Organization (WHO). An 

estimated 92 percent of the world's population live In areas where WHO air quality standards are not met, 

according to 2014 Information complied by the WHO. People in low-income cities are most affected, with 

the most polluted cities located in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Public dissatisfaction with air quality 

might drive protests against authorities, such as those seen in recent years in China, India, and Iran. 

Heightened tensions over shared water resources are likely In some regions. The dispute between Egypt 

and Ethiopia over the construction of the massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERO) on the Nile 

is likely to Intensify because Ethiopia plans to begin filling the reservoir in 2017. 

Global biodiversity will likely continue to decline due to habitat loss, overexploltation, pollution, and 

Invasive species, according to a study by a nongovernmental conservation organization, disrupting 

ecosystems that support life, including humans. Since 1970, vertebrate populations have declined an 

estimated 60 percent, according to the same study, whereas populations In freshwater systems declined 

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more than 80 percent. The rate of species foss wort~ is estimated at 100 to 1,000 times higher than 

the natural background extinction rate, according to peer-reviewed sclentlffc literature. 

We assess national security implications of climate change out do not adjudicate the science of climate 

change. in assessing these Implications, we rely on US government-coordinated scientific reports, peerreviewed literature, and reports prod!Jced by the fntergovemnientaf Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 

which is the leading international body responsible for assessing the science related to climate change. 

Health 

The Zlka virus is likely to continue to affect the Western Hemisphere through 2017. Although it Is causing 

minor or no Illness for most infected people, it Is producing severe birth defects in about 10 percent of 

babies born to mothers who were infected while pregnant and is likely causing neurological symptoms for 

a small number of infected adults. A separate strain of the virus will likely continue to affect Southeast 

Asia, where scientists believe it has circulated since the.1960s. However, scientists do not know whether 

the virus will cause a spike in birth defects there. Previous outbreaks in Asia and Africa might provide at 

leest partial immunity and hinder the virus's spread in those regions. 

The continued rise of antimicrobial resistance-the ability of pathogens, including viruses, fungi, and 

bacteria, to resist drug treatment-Is likely to outpace development of new antimicrobial drugs. This 

resistance will result in increasingly diffiCUlt or Impossible-to-cure infections of previously curable 

diseases. Drug-resistant fonns of malaria and tuberculosis are on the rise, threatening progress in 

controlling these diseases. Meanwhile, some strains of gonorrhea are showing resistance to nearly all 

classes of anUblotics, leaving only treatments of last resort, greaUy increasing the risk of incurable Strains. 

HIV/AiDS, malaria, and tuberculosis continue to kill millions of people annually and hinder development in 

many resource-constrained countries despite signifiCant progress to alleviate the global burden of 

infectious diseases. Stagnating or declining funding for global health initiatives and lack of domestic 

resources threaten the continued progress against health threats despite the availability of more costeffective treatments. Rapidly expanding populations, particularly in Sub-5aharan Africa, put additional 

stress on scarce resources. Malnutrition; weak healthcare systems, conflict, migration, poor governance, 

and urbanization wiD worsen the emergence, spread, and severity of disease outbreaks. 

The emergence of a severe global pubiic health emergency Is possible in any given year and can have 

negative impacts on the security and stability of a nation or region. A novel or reemerging microbe that is 

easily transmissible between humans and Is highly pathogenic remains a major threat because such an 

organism has the potential to spread rapidly lind kill miiHons. Threats such es avian influenza and Middle 

East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) have pandemic potential. The World Bank has 

estimated that a severe global influenza pandemic could cost the equivalent of 4.8 percent of global GOP, 

or more than $3 trillion, during the course of an outbreak. 

Atrocities and Instability 

Risk of large-scale, violent or regime-threatening histability and atrocities will remain elevated In 2011: 

Poor governance, weak national political institutions, economic inequality, and the rise of violent non-state 

actors all undennine states' abilities to project authority. 

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• Weak state capacity can heighten the risk for atrocities, Including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial 

killings, rape, and torture. 

Groups that promote civil society and democratization are likely to continue to face restrictions in 2017. 

Freedom House reported the eleventh consecutive year of decline In "global freedom" in 2017. Middle 

East and North Africa had ratings as one of the worst regions In the world in 2015. 

Global Displacement 

In 2015, the number of people forcibly displaced reached the highest levels ever recorded by the UN. In 

many casas, US partners and allies were either the source of refugees and other migrants-such as 

Afghanistan and South Sudan-or hosted them-such as Ethiopia, Europe, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, 

Turkey, and Uganda. These countries and others will look to the United States, the. UN, and other 

international donors to help meet unprecedented aSsistance demands in 2017. Ongoing conflicts will 

continue to displace people, keeping displacement at record highs because few people can safely retum 

home and family members seek to join those who left. Europe and other host countries Will face 

acoommodation and integration challenges in 2017, and refugees and economic migrants will probably 

continue to seek to transit to Europe. 

• Primary drivers of global displacement include: conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, Somalia, 

South Sudan, and Syria; weak border controls, such as in Libya, which broadened a route from Africa 

to Europe; relatively easy and affordable access to routes an!l infonnat!on; endemic violence, such as 

In parts of Burundi, Central America, Nigeria, and Pakistan; and persecution, such as in Bunna and 

Eritrea. 

• The UN estimated that 65.3 million persons had been forcibly displaced worldwide at the end of 

2015, including approximately 21.3 million refugees, 40.8 million lOPs, and 3.2 million asylum 

seekers. Refugees displaced for five or more years are .mo~ likely to remain In their host 

communities than to return home, according to academic research. 

• In 2016, thousands of Syrian, Somali, Sudanese, and Afghan refugees who had fled their countries in 

preceding years were returned to their countries of origin, which are still undergoing intense conflict. 

These returnees are now Internally displaced in areas still in conflict. 

The scale of human displacement In 2017 will continue to strain the response capacity of the International 

community and drive record requests for humanitarian funding. Host and transit countries wiU struggle to 

develop effective policies and manage domestic concerns of terrorists eXploiting migrant flows, particularly 

after attacks in 2016 by foreigners in Belgium, France, Germany, and Turkey. 

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REGIONAL THREATS 

EAST ASIA 

China 

China will continue to pursue an active fQrelgn policy-especially within the Asia PacifiC regionhighlighted by a finn stance on competing territorial claims In the East China Sea (ECS) and South China 

Sea (SCS), relations with Taiwan, and its pursuit of !!COnomic engagement across East Asia. Regional 

tension will persist as China completes construction at its expanded outposts in the SCS despite an . 

overwhelmingly strong ruling against It by a UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) arbitral 

tribunal in July 2016. China will also pursue efforts aimed at fulfilling Its ambitious "'ne Belt, One Road" 

Initiative to expand China's economic role and outreach across Asia through infrastructure projects. 

China will seek to build on its hosting of the G20 Summit In Hangzhou in September 2016, its "9ne-Belt, 

One-Road" initiative, and progress on launching the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank to Increase its 

global presence on international economic issues. China will increasingly be a factor In global responses 

to emerging problems, as illustrated by China's participation in UN peacekeaplng operations, its 

expanding counterterrorism cooperation, and Infrastructure construction In Africa and Pakistan as part of 

·the Chine-Pakistan Economic Corridor. · 

Domestically, Chinese leaders will move cautiously on their ambitious refonn agenda, maintain their anticorruption campaign, and try to manage China's slowing economy. China's economic growth continues 

to be driven by unsustainable debt accumulation, but Beijing has. made limited progress on refonns 

needed to boost economic efficiencies. Debates among Chinese leaders over policy and personnel 

choices will intensify before th~ leadership transition at the 19'h Party Con9,ress in fall 2017 when Chinese 

President XI Jinping will begin his second tenn as the head of the Chinese Communist Party. 

North Korea 

North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program, public threats, defiance of the lnterriatlonal 

community, confrontational military posturing, cyber activities, and potential for Internal Instability pose a 

complex and increasingly grave national security threat to the United States and Its interests. 

North Korea's unprecedented level of testing and displays of strategic weapons in 2016 indicate that Kim 

Is Intent on proving he has the capability to strike the US mainland wiih nuclear weapons. In 2016, the 

regime conducted two nuclear tests-including one that was claimed to be of a standardized warhead 

design-end an unprecedented number of missile launches, including a space launch that put a satellite 

into orbit These ballistic missile tests probably shortened North Korea's pathway toward a reliable ICBM, 

which largely uses the same technology. Kim wes also photographed beside a nuclear warhead design 

and missile airframes to show that North Korea has warheads small enough to fit on a missile, examining 

a reentry-vehicle nosecone after a simulated reentry, and overseeing launches from a submarine and 

from mobile launchers In the field, purportedly simulating nuclear use in warllghting scenarios. North 

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Korea is poised to conduct its first ICBM flight test in 2017 based on public comments that preparations to 

do so are almost c;ompiete and would serve as a milestone toward a more reliable threat to the US 

mainland. Pyongyang's enshrinement of the possession of nuclear weapons in its constitution, While 

repeatedly stating that nuclear weapons are the basis for its survival, suggests thet Kim does not intend . 

to negotiate them away at any price. 

North Korea has long posed a credible and evolving military threat to South Korea and, to a ~erextent, 

Japan. North Korea possesses a substantial number of proven mobile baHistic missiles, capable of 

striking a variety of targets In both countries, as demonstrated in successful launches in 2016. Kim has 

further expanded the regime's conventional strike options in recent years, with more realistic' training, 

artillery upgrades, and new close-range ballistic missiles thet enable precision fire at ranges that can 

reach more US and allied targets In South Korea. 

After fiVe years In power, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un continues to defy lntamatlonal sanctions for 

his country's behavior and reinforce his authority through j)Urges,.executions, and leadership shuffles, 

restricting fundamental freedoms, and enforcing controls on Information. He notably unveiled new ruling 

structures In conjunction with the first Korean Workers Party COngress in a generation, held In May 2016. 

Southeast Asia 

Democracy In many Southeast Asian countries will remain fragile. in 2017. Elites..:....rather than the 

populace-retain a significant level of control and often shape governance reforms to benefit their 

individual interests rather than to promote democratic values. COrruption and cronyism continue to be 

rampant in the region, and the threat of ISIS and domestic terrorist groups might provide some 

governments with a new rationale to address not only the terrorist threat but also to curb political 

opposition movements, as some regional leaders did In the post-9/11 environment. 

In the Philippines, aggressive campaigns against corruption, crime, and drugs will probably continue 

despite charges by Filipino critics and international organizations that It Is fostering a permissive 

environment for extrajudicial killings. Philippine efforts to diversify Manila's foreign relations away from 

the United States have increased uncertainty about the future of Philippine-US security lies. Thailand is 

undergoing its most signifiCSnt transition in 70 years followllig the death of the king. In Burma, the 

government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) seeks to continue the country's democratic 

transition process, but the military, which has retained significant 'poUtlcal and economic power and 

exclusive control over the security forces, sometimes undermines the civilian govemmenrs objectives. In 

addition, the NLD will be challenged by Its lack of governing experience and provisions of the 2006 

Constitution that do not align with democratic norms. Burma's Government will continued to be 

challenged in dealing With the status of the Muslim minority Rohingya in western Burma. 

Cohesion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on economic and security issues will 

continue to be challenged by differing development levels among ASEAN members, their varying 

economic dependencies on China, and their views of the threat of Beijing's regional ambitions and 

assertiveness in the SCS. Southeast Asian SCS claimants will continue to seek various ways to 

strengthen cooperation in the region and, In some cases, With the United States on maritime security 

issues. 

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RUSSIA AND EURASIA 

Russia 

In 2017, Russia is likely to be more assertive in global affairs, more unpredictable in its approach to the 

United States, and more authoritarian in its approach to domestic politics. Emboldened by Moscow's 

ability to affect battlefield dynamiCs in Syria and by the emergence of populist and more pro-Russian 

governments in Europe, President Vladimir Putin is likely to take proactive actions that advance Russia's 

great power status. 

Putin will seek to prevent any challenges to his rule In the·runup to presidential elections scheduled for 

2018. Putin remains popular at home, but low turnout in the Duma elections in 2016 and sustained 

economic hardship will probably enhance Putln's concerns about his ability to maintain control. Putin is 

likely to continue to rely on repression, state control over media outlets, and harsh tactics to control the 

political elite and stifle public dissent. 

Russia is likely to emerge from its two-year recession in 2017, but the prospects for a strong recovery are 

slim. Russia Is likely to achieve 1.3 percent GOP growth in 2017 and 1.7 percent in 2018. according to 

commercial forecasts. Putin has long sought to avoid structural reforms that would weaken his control of 

the country and is unlikely to Implement substantial reforms l:iefore the presidential elections. 

We assess that Russia will continue to look to leverage its military support to the Asad regime to drive a 

political settlement process in Syria on its terms. Moscow has demonstrated that it can sustain a modest 

force at a high-operations tempo in a permissive, expeditionary setting while minimizing Russian 

casualties and economic costs. Moscow is also likely to use Russia's military Intervention In Syria, In 

conjunction with efforts to capitalize on fears of a growing ISIS and extramlst threat, to expand its role In 

the Mid~le East. 

We assess that Moscow's strategic objectives In Ukraine-maintaining long-term influence over Kyiv and 

frustrating Ukraine's attempts to integrate into Western institutions-will remain unchangea in 2017. 

Putin is likely to maintain pressure on Kyiv through multiple channels, including through Russia's actions 

in eastern Ukraine, where Russia arms so-called "separatists. Moscow also seeks to undermine 

Ukraine's fragile economic system and divided political sitUation to create opportunities to rebuild and 

consolidate Russian Influence in Ukrainian declsionmaking. 

Moscow will also seek to exploit Europe's fissures and growing populist sentiment in an effort to thwart 

EU sanctions renewal, justify or at laast obfuscate Russian actions In Ukraine and Syria, and waaken the 

attraction of Western integration for countries on Russia's periphery. In perticular, Russia Is likely to · 

sustain or Increase its propaganda campaigns. Russia Is likely to continue to finandally and politically 

support populist and extremist parties to sow discord within European states and reduce popular support 

for the European Union. 

The Kremlin Is also likely to continue to see defense modernization as a top national priority even as the 

cumulative affect on the economy of low oil prices, sanctions, and systemic problems serves as a drag on 

key military. goals. Moscow Is pursuing a wide range of nuclear, conventional, and asymmetric 

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capabilities designed to achieve qualitative parity with the United 'States. These capabilities will give 

Moscow more options to counter US forcas and weapons systems. 

Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova 

Russia's military intervention in eastern Ukraine continueS more than two years after the "Minsk II" 

agreement concluded in February 2015. Russia continues to exert military and diplomatic pressure to 

coerca Ukraine into Implementing Moscow's InterpretatiOn of the political provisions of the agreementamong them, constitullonal amendments that would effectively give Moscow a veto over Kylv's strategic 

decisions. Domestic Ukrainian opposition to making political concessions to Russia-especially while 

fighting continues In eastern Ukralne-wlll limit Kylv's willingness and ability to compromise, complicating 

prospects for Implementing the Minsk agreement Russia largely controls the level of violence, which it 

uses to exert pressure on Kyiv and the negotiating process, and fluctuating levels of violence will probably 

continue along the front line. The struggle of Ukraine to reform its corrupt Institutions will determine 

whether it can remain on a European path or fall victim again to elite Infighting and Russian influence. 

Rising popular discontent in Belarus will probably complicate the government's efforts to maintain its 

improved relations with the United States and the EU, which are aimed at bolstering its flagging economy 

and preserving some diplomatic maneuvering room with Russia. ·Minsk will continue close security 

cooperation with Mriscow but will probably continue to oppose the establishment of Russian military 

bases in Belarus. 

Moldova will probably also seek to balance its relations with Russia and the West rather than pursue a 

major shift in either direction. The Moldovan Government will almost certainly seek to move forward on 

implementing Moldova's EU Association Agreement despite the election of a more pro-Russian president. 

Settlement talks over the breakaway region of Transnlstria will continue, but any progress Is likely to be 

limited to smaller issues. 

The Caucasus and Central Asia 

In Georgia, the ruling Georgian Dream (GO) coalition's decisive electoral victory In 2016 is likely to 

facilitate GO's efforts to target the former ruling United National Movement and expand political control. 

GO will continue to pursue greater Euro-Atlantic integration by attempting to cement ties with NATO and 

the EU. 

Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the separatist region of Nagomo-Karabakh flared in 

Aprll2016, and both sides' unwillingness to compromise and mol,lnting domestic pressures suggest that 

the potential for large-scale hostilities will remain In 2017. In Azerbaijan, ongoing economic difficulties 

are likely to challenge the regime and increase its tendency to repress dissent to maintain power while it 

continues to try to balance relations with Russia, Iran, and tha Wesl 

Central Asian states will continue to balance their relations among Russia, China, and the West to 

pursue economic and security assistance and protect their reglm!!S' hold on power. They remain 

concerned about the threat of extremism to their stability, particularly in light of a reduced Coalition 

presence in Afghanistan. Russia and China share these concerns and are likely to use the threat of 

instability in Afghanistan to try to increase their Involvement In central Asian securtty affairs. Economic 

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challenges stemming from official mismanagement, low commodity prices, declining trade and 

remittances aSSOCiated with weakening economies of Russia and China, ethnic tensions, and political 

repression are.llkely to present the most significant threats to stability In these countries. 

EUROPE 

Key Partners 

The seventy of multiple crises facing Europe-irregular migration, security threats, slow economic growth, 

and protracted debt issues-will challenge European policy cohesion and common action. Additionally, 

the form and substance of the UK's exit (Brexlt) from the European Union will distract European 

policymakers. 

Migration 

The EU-Turkey Statement addressing migration issues concluded in March 2016 and that tightened 

border controls In the Balkans will continue to limit migration to Europe. Preserving the EU-Turkey 

agreement, completing trade deals and making Investments offered to five African countries, and 

ensuring the success of a repatriation deal with Afghanistan will likely remain a focus for Europe: 

Security 

T errortsts have taken advantage of the Influx of migrants and a potential rise In retumlng foreign fighters 

from the conflicts In Iraq and syn. might compound the problem. Europe will remain vulnerable to 

terrortst attacks, and elements of both ISiS and ai-Qa'lda are likely to continue to direct and enable plots 

against targets in Europe 

Some European states see Russia. as less of a threat to Europe than others do, even as the BaHic states 

and Poland begin to host multinational battalions as part of NATO's enhllf1ced Forward Presence. 

Economic/Financial Issues 

The European Commission projects that euro-zone growth will be about ·1.6 percent in 2017. Its 

projections are based on weak investment growth, uncertainty stemming from Brexlt, potential disruptions 

to trade, and. porrtical and practical limits to expanding monetary and fiscal efforts to support growth. 

Turkey 

President Recap Tayyip ErdQSan's narrow win In the mid-April popular referendum on expanding his 

powers and the ruling Justice and Oevelopment Party's (AKP's) post-coup crackdowns are increasing 

societal and poiHical tension In Turkey. 

Turkey's relations with the United States· are strained because Ankara calculates that the United States 

has empowered Turkey's primary security threat-the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)-by partnering 

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with the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey alleges is aligned with the PKK. 

European admonition of Turkey's Conduct during the referendum-Including limitations European 

countries placed on Turkish csmpaigning on their soil-Is further straining Turkish ties to the EU. 

• Two major T:urkish complaints are Washington's unwillingness to meet Turkish demands to extradite 

US-person Fethullah Gulen-accused by the Turkish Government of orchestrating !he failed coup in 

July 2016-and US support to the YPG in Syria. 

• In November 2016, the Turkish preSident indicated !hat he would be willing to consider joining the 

Russian-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an alternative to the EU. 

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

Syria 

We assess that the Syrian regime, backed by Russia and Iran, will maintain Its momentum on the 

battlefield but that the regime and the opposition are not likely to agree on a pplitica! settlement in 2017. 

Damascus has commHted to participate .in peace talks but is unlikely to offer more than cosmetic. 

concessions to the opposition. The. opposition, although on the defensive, Is able to counte(atl!ick; which 

will probably prevent the regime from asserting territorial control over western and southern Syria, and 

remains committed to President Basher ai-Asad's departure. 

The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-8ham (ISIS) has lost about 45 percent of the territory It held in Syria in 

August 2014, but it still controls much of the !!astern section of the country, including the city of Ar 

Raqqah. ISIS will likely have enough resources and fighters to sustain Insurgency operations and plan 

tenrorists attacks in the region and internationally. 

Asad's foreign supporters-Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hizballah-want to keep an allied regime in . 

power and maintain !heir influence in Syria. Moscow's deployment of combat assets to Syria in late 2015 

helped change the momentum of the conflict; Russia has provided combat aircraft, warships, artillery, 

arms, and ammunition. Iran provides military advice, fighters, weaponry, fuel, and Shia militants. 

Lebanese Hizballah provides fighters and helps control the Lebanon-syria border. 

Most opposition backers maintain their support, in part by linking Asad's· regime to Iran's malign influence 

in the region, but their lack of unity will hamper their effectiveness. 

Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) control much of northern Syria and have worked closely 

with coalition forces to seize temsln from ISIS. The YPG's goal to unite its •csntons• across nor!hein 

Syria is opposed by most Syrian Arabs and by Turkey, which vie\'18 these Kurdish aspirations as a threat 

to Its security. To weaken ISIS and check the Kurds, Ankara has used Syrian opposition groups, backed 

by Turkish artillery, aircraft, and armored vehicles, to establish a border security zone in Syria. 

The continuation of the Syrian conflict will worsen already-disastrous conditions for Syrians and regional 

states and maintain migration pressure on Europe. As of late March 2017, more than 4.9 million Syrians 

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have left the country from a pre-conflict population of approximately 23 million, and an additional 6.3 

million were internally displaced .. ISIS's presence in Syria and ability to stage cross-border attacks will 

continue to jeopardize Iraq's stability. 

Iraq 

The Iraqi Government's primary focus through 2017 will be recapturing and stabilizing Mosul, the largest 

urban ISIS stronghold in Iraq, and other ISIS-held territory. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Kurdish 

Peshmerga with coalition support and forces of the Shla-domlnated Popular Mobilization Committee 

(PMC) are ail Involved in the Mosul campaign. Faced with the eventual loss of Mosul, lSIS is preparing to 

regroup and continue an insurgency and terrorist campaign. 

• As the Mosul campaign progresses, Baghdad· faces potential tensions between the Kurds and the 

Iranian-backed PMC members over disputed territory while also managing the Turkish pra&~;mce in 

northern Iraq. Baghdad has rebuked Ankara for Its presence at Bashfqa and warned of potenttal 

conflict If Turkey intervenes any farther in northern Iraq. Tensions might persist wen after major 

counter-ISIS combat operations cease as external actors continue to pursue their political and 

strategic goals in Iraq. 

Meanwhile, the Iraqi prime minister is trying to fend off political challenges and cope with an economy 

weakened by the ftght with ISIS and depressed oil prices. A loose "reform" coalition In the Council of 

Representatives (COR) exploited political divisions in fall2016 to remove the defense and finance 

ministers. Political factionalism has prevented the passage of needed political refonn,_ heightened distrust 

among sectarian groups, and undennined governance. 

• Iraq will probably ne~ international financial supPort throughout 2017, but Iraq's finances could 

stabilize If oil priCes continue to slowly rise and Baghdad makes progress on its reform program. In 

2016, Iraq's revenue from crude oil sales· averaged $3.3 billion per month, leSs than half the monthly 

revenue in 2014, despite a rise in the number of barrels of oil exported. Oil sales account for about 

90 percent of goVernment revenues and make up almost 50 percent of Iraq's GOP.· The United 

States and Iraq concluded a sovereign loan agreement in late January 2017 that could help Baghdad 

access international funds that It sorely needs to reconstruct areas liberated from ISIS. 

Iraq will face serious challenges to its stability, political viability, and territorial integrity after control of 

Mosul is wrested from ISIS. Mora than 200,000 individuals have been displaced from Mosul due to the 

fighting. However, about a third have since returned to their homes, and as many as 1 million civilia'ns 

might be eventually displaced, adding to the 3 million displaced persons in Iraq as of February 2016. 

• Reconstruction of infrastructure and tens of thousands of civilian structures destroyed by fighting in 

Sunnl areas once occupied by ISIS Win cost billions of dollars and take years. 

• Ethnosectarian reconciliation· will also be an enduring challenge. Iraqi Shia, Sunnis~ and Kurds 

increasingly view themselves as having diverging futures. ISIS will seek to exploit any Sunni 

discontent wHh Baghdad and try to regain Iraqi territory, whereas the Kurds will probably continue 

efforts to establish an independent state. 

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Iran 

The Islamic Republic of Iran remains an enduring threat to US national Interests because of Iranian 

support to antt,US terrorist groups and militants, the Asad regime, Huthi rebels in Yemen, and because of 

Iran's development of advanced military capabilities. Despite Supreme Leader Khamenei'~ conditional 

support for the JCPOA nuclear deal implemented In January 2016, he Is highly distrustful of US 

intentions. Iran's leaders remain focused on thwarting US and Israeli influence and countering what they 

perceive as a Saudi-led effort to fuel Sunni extremism and terrorism against Iran and Shla communitias 

throughout the region. 

Iran is immersed In ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Iranian officials believe that engaging 

adversaries away from Iran's borders will help prevent instability from spilling Into Iran and reduce ISIS's 

threat to Iran and its regional partners. Iran's involvement in these conflicts, including sending hundreds 

Of its QWl1 foroes plus arming, financing, and training thousands of Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani Shia 

fighters to support the Asad regime, has aggravated sectarianism and increased tensions with other 

regional states. Tehran's provision of aid to the Huthis, Including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 

explosive boat technology, and missile support. risks expanding and intensifying th~ conflict In Yemen 

and the broader Iranian-saudi dispute. We assess that Iran's leaders intend to leverage their ties to local 

actors in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen to build long-term Iranian Influence in the region. Iran will also utilize its 

relationship with Moscow to try to expand Iranian Influence and counter US pressure. 

Hardliners, who believe that the West is attempting to infiltrate Iran to undermine the regime, have driven 

the increase of arrests of citizens since 2014 who are dual nationals. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps (IRGC) will likely continue to scrutinize, arrest, and detain lndMduals with ties to the West, 

particularly dual US-Iranian and UK-Iranian cilizens. This practice will weaken prospects of attracting 

foreign investment into Iran's economy. 

Iran continues to develop a range of new mllitary.capabllltles to monitor and target US and allied military 

assets In the region, including arm~ UAVs, ballistic missiles, advanced naval mines, unmanned 

explosive boats; submarines and advanced torpedoes, and anti-ship and lend-attack cruise missiles. Iran 

has the largest ballistic missile force in the Middle East and can strike targets up to 2,000 kilometers from 

Iran's borders. Russia's delivery of the SA-20c surface-to-air missile system in 2016 provides Iran with its 

most advanced long-range air defense system. 

IRGC Navy forces operating aggressively in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz pose a risk to the US 

Navy. Most IRGC Interactions with US ships are professional, although US Navy operators consider 

approximately 10 percent to be unsafe, abnormal, or unprofessional. We assess that limited aggressive 

interactions will continue and are probably intended to project an image of strength and possibly to gauge 

US responses. 

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Yemen 

Fighting In Yemen will almost certainly persist In 2017 despite intamational attempts to forge cease-fires 

between Huthi-aligned forces, trained by Iran, and the Yemeni Government, backed by a Saudi-led __ 

coalition. Neither the alliance between the Huthis and former Yemeni President All Abdallah S!!llh nor the 

government of Yemeni President Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadl has been able ta achieve decisive results 

through military force, despita their prominent international backers. Efforts at peace talks are nascent, 

and both sides remain wary of the other's intentions. 

As of lata 2016, the fighting had displaced more than 2 million people and left 82 percent of Yemen's 

population in need of humanitarian aid. Temporary cease-fires have allowed for some increased access 

for humanitarian organiZations, but relief. operations ara hindered by lack of security, bureaucratiC 

constraints, and funding shortages. More than half the population Is experiencing crisis or emergency 

levels of food insecurity. 

AQAP and ISIS's branch in Yemen have exploited the conflict and the collapse of government authority to 

gain new recruits and allies and expand the.ir Influence. Both groups threaten Western Interests in 

Yemen and heve conducted attacks on I:Juthi, Yemeni Government, and Saudi-led coalition targets. 

SOUTH ASIA 

Afghanistan 

The overall situation in Afghanistan will very likely continue to deteriorate, even If International support Is 

sustained. Endemic state weaknesses, the govemmenrs political fragility, deficiencies of the Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF), Taliban persistence, and regional interference wilfremain key 

impediments to improvement. Kabul's political dysfunction and Ineffectiveness will almost certainly be the 

greatest vulnerabilitY to stabilitY in 2017. ANSF performance will probably worsen due to a combination 

of Taliban operations, ANSF combat ces'ualties, desertiO!JS, poor logistiCs support, and weak leadership. 

The ANSF will almost certainly remain heavily dependent on foreign military and financial support to 

sustain themselves and preclude their collapse. Although the Taliban was unsuccessful in seizlng a 

provincial capitailn 2016, it effectively navigated its second leadership transition In two years following 

the death of Its former chief, Mansur, and is likely to make gains in 2017. The fighting will also continue 

to threaten US personnel, allies, and partners, particularly in Kabul and urban population centers. ISIS's 

Khorasan branch (ISIS.K}-which constitutes ISIS's most significant presence In South Asia-will 

probably remain a low4evel developing threat to Afghan stability as well as to US and Western interests 

in the region in 2017. 

Pakistan 

Pakistani-based terrorist groups will present a sustained threat to US interests In the region and continue 

to plan and conduct attacks In India and Afghanistan. The threat to the United States and the West from 

Pakistani-based terrorist groups will be persistent but diffuse. Plotting against the US homeland will be 

conducted on a more opportunistic basis or driven by Individual members within these groups. 

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Pakistan will probably be able to manage itS Internal security. Anti-Pakistan groups will probably focus 

more on soft targets. The groups we judge will pose the greatest threat to Pakistan's Internal security 

Include Tehrik-e Tallban Pakistan, Jamaat ui-Ahrar, ai-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent. ISIS-K, Laskhare Jhangvi, and Lashkar-e Jhangvi ai-Aiami. The emerging China Pakistan Economic Corridor will 

probably offer militants and terrorists additional targets. 

Pakistan's pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons potentially lowers the threshold for !hair use. Early 

deployment during a crisis of smaller, more mobile nuclear weapons would increli!&e the amount of time 

that systems would be outside the relative security of a storage site, increasing the risk that a coordinated 

attack by non-state actors might succeed In capturing a complete nuclear weapon. 

India-Pakistan 

Relations between India and Pakistan remain tense following two major terrorist attacks in 2016 by 

militants crossing Into India from Pakistan. They might deteriorate further in 2017, especially in the event 

of another high-profile terrorist attack in India that New Delhi attributes to originating in or receiving 

ass_lstance from Pakistan. Islamabad's failure to curb support to anti-India militants and New Delhi's 

g~wing Intolerance of this policy, coupled with a perceived lack of progress In Pakistan's investigations 

into the January 2016 Pathankot cross-border attack, set the stage for a deterioration of bilateral relations 

in 2016. Increasing numbers offlraflghts along the Line of Control, including the use of artillery and 

mortars, might exacerbate the risk of unintended escalation between these nuclear-armed neighbors. 

Easing of heightened Indo-Pakistani tension, including negotiations to renew official dialogue, will 

probably hinge in 2017 on a sharp and sustained reduction of cross-border attacks by ten:orist groups 

based In Pakistan and progress In the Pathankot investigation. 

SUB..SAHARAN AFRICA 

South Sudan 

Clashes between Juba and the armed opposition will continue, heightening ethnic tensions and 

exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and famine amid a declining economy. Both sides' use of ethnic 

militias, hate speech, and the govemmenfs crackdown against ethnic minorities raise the risk of 

additional mass atrocities. The government will probably continue to restrict political freedoms and civil 

liberties and obstruct humanitarian assistance. 

Sudan 

Khartoum probably hopes to continue constructive engagement with the United States following 

Washington's decision In January 2017 to suspend some sanctions on Sudan. The regime will probably 

largely adhere to a cessation of hostilities In conflict areas--f9qulred to receive sanctions relief-but . · 

skirmishing between the Sudanese military and rebel forces is likely to result in low levels of violence and 

population displacement. The regime's military gains since March 2016 and divisions among ermed 

opponents will almost certainly inhibit the insurgents' ability to make significant political or military gains. 

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Public dissatisfaction over a weakenad economy and austerity measures, however, will test the 

government's ability to maintain order. 

Nigeria 

The Nigerian Government will confront a wide range of challenges in 2017, many of which are deeply 

rootedand have no •quick fix." Despite Nigeria's progress in 2016 reclaiming territory from ISIS in West 

Africa (ISIS-WA) and Boko Harem, both terrorist groups will remain a threat to military and civilians in 

northeastern Nigeria, as well as in neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Moreover, Nigeria, with 

Africa's largest economy, is suffering a recession brought on by low oil prices and militant attacks on its 

oil infrastructure. This recession is handicapping Abuja's efforts to combat the terrorists and respond to a 

growing humanitarian crisis in the northeast. 

Sahel 

Governments in Africa's Sahel region-particularly Chad, Mall, Mauritania, and Niger-will remain at risk 

of. internal conflict and terrorist attacks in 2017. The region's shared geography, ethnic and religious 

connections, and a pervasive lack of border security have facilitated a rise in extremist groups, traffickers, 

and antigovernment militias since the collapse of Ubya in 2011 and the northern Mali uprising In 2012. 

AI-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. (AQIM), ai-Murabitun, Ansar al-Oin, and other violent 

extremist groups will continue attacking Western and local Interests In the region. 

Somalia 

The Somali Government will continue to rely on international assistance, Including In the areas of civilian 

protection, service provision, dispute resolution, security, and humanitarian relief. Progress In these 

areas is critical to maintain support from troop..contrlbutlng cauntries of the African Union Mission In 

Somalia (AMISOM), which plans to begin withdrawing from Somalia In 2018. 

Ethiopia 

Ethiopia has faced widespread public protests and ethnic tensions and will struggle to address the 

underlying grievances while preserving the power of the ruling party. The risk of instability is high. Addis 

Ababa declared a state of emergency in October 2018 and continues mass arrests, targeting opposition 

leaders. 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

A deal between the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Congolese 

opposition and civil society over President Joseph Kabila's term extension has bought the regime time. 

Kabila named an opposition member as prime minister In April, but elections are unlikely to be held by the 

end of 2017 as called for under the agreement Meanwhile, armed conflict In the east perpetrated by 

militia groups will exacerbate serious humanitarian challenges. 

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

Mexico 

The Mexican Government will focus on domestic priorities to help position the country for the presidential 

election in 2018 while also seeking to limit fallout from potential shifts in the bilateral relationship with the 

United States. Mexico will be challenged to make gains against corruption and rising crime and will 

continue to rely on the military to stymie criminal violence. Its $1.1 trillion economy has benefitted from 

strong economic fundamentals and robust exports, but changes in trade relationships might weaken the 

export sector and slow economic growth. Mexican mig~tion to the United States, which has decreased 

In recent years, might increase if economic opportunitY at home declines. Apprehensions of 

undocumented Mexicans fell from about 268,000 In FY 2013 to 193,000 in FY 2016, according to DHS 

statistics. 

Central America 

Insecurity, lack of economic opportunities, deSire for family reunification, and views of US immigration 

policy are likely to remain the principal drivers of migration from the Northern Triangle countries of El 

Salvadl?r, Guatemala, and Honduras to the United States. Human smuggling networks will continue to 

help migrants navigate travel routes and security at the US and Mexican border. Homicide rates in these 

countries remain high despite a decline in 2016, and gang-related violence Is still prompting Central 

Americans to flee. OHS apprehensions along the southwest border of migrants from the Northern 

Triangle reached nearly 200,000 in FY 2016 but have declined sharply since February 2017. 

Colombia 

The Colombian Government's ability to Implement its historic peace ileal With the Revolutionary Armed 

Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2017 will be key to the country's ptospects for fully harnessing economic 

and investment opportunities. The peace deal ended the country's 52-year eM! war with the FARC and 

demobilized the Western Hemisphere's largest and longest-running insurgency. Colombia was already 

politically stable and markedly less violent than 20 years &go. Even so, sol)1e immediate post-conflict 

challenges will include stemming rising drug production and addressing social and economic Inequality In 

rural areas. 

Cuba 

As Cuba heads Into the final year of preparations for Its planned historic leadership transition In early 

2018, the government's focus wUI be on preserving the regime's hold on power and dealing with the 

falling economic growth rate. Cuba blames Its slowing economy on lower global commodity prices, the 

US embargo, and the economic crisis in Venezuela, a top trade partner and Important source of political 

support and petroleum at generous financing terms. Havana, however, has stalled Implementation of Its 

own reform program, Including changes to investment laws needed to address iongstanding inliestor 

concerns and plans to unify Its dual currency and exchange rate system. 

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Some Cuban migration to the United States via land routes through Central America and Mexicoespecially by Cubans already In transit-is likely to continue despite a significant decrease following the 

end of the US "Wet Foot, Dry Foot" policy in January 2017. That policy allowed most undocumented 

Cubans who reached US soil-as op~JCS!!d to being intercepted at sea-to remain in the United States 

and then apply for lawful permanent residency status after .one year under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 

1966. In FY 2016, some 42,000 Cuban migrants arrived at the US southwest border and maritime flows 

exceeded 7,300 migrants because of poor economic prospects in Cuba and apprehension about potential 

US policy shifts. 

Venezuela 

Venezuela's regime and the political opposition will remain at odds In 2017 as Venezuela's domestic 

political and economic tensions intensify. The regime is struggling to contain spiraling inflation and 

finance Imports, creating shortages of foodstuffs and medicines In the oil-rich country. The unpopular 

government charges that the opposition Is waging an economic wer and trying to stage a political coup 

and will probably ratchet up repression to maintain power. Shortages of food, medicine, and basic 

supplies will probably continue to stoke tensions through 2017. 

28 
44 

Chairman BURR. Director Coats, thank you for that very thorough and comprehensive testimony on behalf of the intelligence 

community. Dan, quite frankly, you make us proud, seeing one of 

our own now head the entire intelligence community, and I want 

to thank you and Marsha personally for your willingness to do 

that. 

Director COATS. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. And to also pass to you, we are anxious for your 

deputy to be considered by the committee. Would you please send 

us a nomination? 

Director COATS. We are doing our very best to do that. Nobody’s 

more anxious than me. 

Chairman BURR. I’m sure that’s the case. 

I’m going to recognize myself for five minutes. 

Director McCabe, did you ever hear Director Comey tell the 

President that he was not the subject of an investigation? Excuse 

me. Did you ever hear Director Comey tell the President he was 

not the subject of an investigation? 

Director MCCABE. Sir—— 

Chairman BURR. Could you turn on your microphone, please. 

Director MCCABE. Rookie mistake. I’m sorry. 

Sir, I can’t comment on any conversations the Director may have 

had with the President. 

Chairman BURR. Okay. 

General Stewart, you heard Director Coats state on everybody’s 

behalf that there is an expected deterioration of conditions in Afghanistan. Can you give us DIA’s assessment of the situation today 

in Afghanistan and what would change that deterioration? 

General STEWART. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I pay close attention 

to the operations in Afghanistan. I make two trips there each year, 

one before the fighting season and one following the fighting season. That way I get on the ground my own personal assessment of 

how things are going. 

I was there about six weeks ago. The ANDSF, two years into taking control of the security environment, has had mixed results in 

this past year. Those mixed results can characterize the security 

environment as a stalemate and, left unchecked, that stalemate 

will deteriorate in favor of the belligerents. So we have to do something very different than what we’ve been doing in the past. 

Let me back out just a little bit and talk about the fact that the 

Taliban failed to meet any of their strategic objectives that they 

outlined during the last fighting season. They controlled no district 

centers. They were able to execute high-visibility attacks, which 

causes a psychological effect, that has a debilitating effect. They 

maintained some influence in the rural areas, but they controlled 

none of the large district centers. 

Having said that, the Afghan National Defense Security Forces 

did not meet their force generation objectives. They had some success in training the force. They were able to manage a crisis better 

than they have in the past. They were able to deploy forces, but 

failed in my opinion to employ the ISR and the fire support to 

make them as effective on the battlefield as possible. 

Unless we change something where we introduce either U.S. 

forces or NATO forces, that changes the balance of forces on the 

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45 

ground, changes the fighting outputs on the ground, or add additional training and advising capability at lower levels than we do 

now, the situation will continue to deteriorate and we’ll lose all the 

gains that we’ve invested in over the last several years. 

So they’ve got to get more trainers below the corps level, I believe—not sure how far down—or they’d have to get more personnel 

on the ground, generate greater forces, greater fire support, greater 

use of ISR, or this will in fact deteriorate further. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, General. 

Admiral Rogers, every aspect of our daily lives continues to become part of a traceable, trackable, interacting environment now 

known as the Internet of Things. In addition, artificial intelligence, 

or AI, has increasingly enabled technology to become autonomous. 

What is the IC’s current assessment of the ever-changing capabilities of the Internet of Things and what it presents? 

Admiral ROGERS. It represents both opportunity, but from an information assurance or computer network defense perspective it 

represents great concern, where the ability to harness literally millions of devices that were built to very simple, day to day activities, 

suddenly can be tied together and focused and oriented to achieve 

a specific outcome. We’ve seen this with denial of service attempts 

against a couple significant companies on the East Coast of the 

United States in the course of the last year. 

This is going to be a trend in the future. It’s part of the discussions we’re having. I’m in the midst of having some discussions in 

the private sector. This is going to be a problem that’s common to 

both of us. How can we work together to try to, number one, understand this technology and, number two, ask ourselves how do we 

ensure that it’s not turned around, if you will, against us. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you for that. 

Admiral Rogers, I’ll probably put this to you as well. Section 702 

of the FISA Amendments Act authorizes the government to target 

only non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the 

United States for the purposes of acquiring foreign intelligence information. Section 702 cannot be used to target any person located 

inside the United States, and the law prohibits the government 

from reverse targeting, that is targeting a non-U.S. person outside 

the United States specifically for the purpose of collecting the communications of a person inside the United States. The IC uses 

FISA 702 collection authority to detect, identify, and disrupt terrorist and other national security threats. 

How would you characterize 702 authority and its importance to 

the current intelligence collection platform overall? 

Admiral ROGERS. If we were to lose 702’s authorities, we would 

be significantly degraded in our ability to provide timely warning 

and insight as to what terrorist actors, nation-states, and criminal 

elements are doing that is of concern to our Nation, as well as our 

friends and allies. This 702 has provided us insight that is focused 

both on counterterrorism quite as well as counter-proliferation, understanding what nation-states are doing. It’s given us tremendous 

insights in the computer network defense arena. I would highlight 

much—not all—much of what was in the intelligence community’s 

assessment, for example, on the Russian efforts against the U.S. 

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46 

election process in 2016 was informed by knowledge we gained 

through 702 authority. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you for that. 

Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ve got a couple questions that hopefully will only require yes or 

no answers. First, for the whole panel, the assembled leadership of 

the intelligence community: do you believe that the January 2017 

Intelligence Community Assessment accurately characterized the 

extent of Russian activities in the 2016 election in its conclusion 

that Russian intelligence agencies were responsible for the hacking 

and leaking of information and using this information in order to 

influence our elections? A simple yes or no would suffice. 

Director CARDILLO. I do, yes, sir. 

General STEWART. Yes, Senator. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, I do. 

Director COATS. Yes, I do. 

Director MCCABE. Yes. 

Director POMPEO. Yes. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. I guess the presumption, the next presumption—I won’t even ask this question—is, consequently that 

community assessment was unanimous and is not a piece of fake 

news or evidence of some other individual or nation-state other 

than Russia. So I appreciate that again for the record. 

I warned you, Mr. McCabe, I was going to have to get you on the 

record as well on this. Mr. McCabe, for as long as you are Acting 

FBI Director do you commit to informing this Committee of any effort to interfere with the FBI’s ongoing investigation into links between Russia and the Trump campaign? 

Director MCCABE. I absolutely do. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you so much for that. I think, in 

light of what’s happened in the last 48 hours, it’s critically important that we have that assurance. And I hope you’ll relay, at least 

for me, to the extraordinary people who work at the FBI that this 

Committee supports them, supports their efforts, supports the professionalism, and supports their independence. 

Director MCCABE. I will, sir. Thank you. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. In light of the fact that we just saw 

French elections where it felt like de ́ja` vu all over again in terms 

of the release of a series of emails against Mr. Macron days before 

the election, and the fact that this committee continues to investigate the type of tactics that Russia has used, where do we stand 

as a country in terms of preparation to make sure this doesn’t happen again in 2018 and 2020? 

Where have we moved in terms of collaboration with State voter 

files, in terms of working more with the tech community, particularly the platform entities, in terms of how we can better assure 

real news versus fake news? And is there some general sense—Director Coats, I know you’ve only been in the job for a short period 

of time—of how we’re going to have a strategic effort? Because 

while it was Russia in 2016, other nation-states could launch similar-type assaults. 

Director COATS. Well, we will continue to use all the assets that 

we have in terms of collection and analysis relative to what the inLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

47 

fluence has been and potentially could be in future. The Russians 

have spread this across the globe. Interestingly enough, I met with 

the Prime Minister of Montenegro, the latest nation to join NATO, 

the number 29 nation. What was the main topic? Russian interference in their political system. 

So it sweeps across Europe and to other places. It’s clear, though, 

the Russians have upped their game using social media and other 

opportunities in ways we haven’t seen before. So it’s a great threat 

to our democratic process, and our job here is to provide the best 

intelligence we can to the policymakers as they develop a strategy 

in terms of how to best reflect a response to this. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. One of the things I’m concerned about 

is, we’ve all expressed this concern, but since this doesn’t fall neatly into any particular agency’s jurisdiction, who’s taking the point 

on interacting with the platform companies, a` la the Google, 

Facebook, and Twitters? Who’s taking the point in terms of interacting with DHS, I imagine, in terms of State boards of election? 

How are we trying to ensure that our systems are more secure? 

If we could get a brief answer on that because I have one last 

question for Admiral Rogers. 

Director COATS. Well, I think obviously our office tasks and takes 

the point, but there’s contribution from agencies across the IC. I 

might ask Director Pompeo to address that, and others might want 

to address that also. But each of us, each of the agencies, to the 

extent that they can and have the capacity, whether it’s NSA 

through SIGINT, whether it’s CIA through HUMINT or other 

sources, will provide information to us that we want to use as a 

basis to provide to our policymakers. 

Relative to a grand strategy, I am not aware right now of any— 

I think we’re still assessing the impact. We have not put a grand 

strategy together, which would not be our purview. We would provide the basis of intelligence that would then be the foundation for 

what that strategy would be. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. My hope would be that we need to be 

proactive in this. We don’t want to be sitting here kind of looking 

back at it after a 2018 election cycle. 

Last question very briefly. Admiral Rogers, do you have any 

doubt that the Russians were behind the intervention in the 

French elections? 

Director ROGERS. Let me phrase it this way. We are aware of 

some Russian activity directed against the Russian—excuse me— 

directed against the French election process. As I previously said 

before Congress earlier this week, we in fact reached out to our 

French counterparts to say: We have become aware of this activity; 

we want to make you aware; what are you seeing? 

I’m not in a position to have looked at the breadth of the French 

infrastructure, so I’m not really in a position to make a whole simple declaratory statement. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McCabe, can you—without going to the specifics of any individual investigation, I think the American people want to know, 

has the dismissal of Mr. Comey in any way impeded, interrupted, 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

48 

stopped, or negatively impacted any of the work, any investigation, 

or any ongoing projects at the Federal Bureau of Investigation? 

Director MCCABE. As you know, Senator, the work of the men 

and women of the FBI continues despite any changes in circumstance, any decisions. So there has been no effort to impede our 

investigation to date. Quite simply put, sir, you cannot stop the 

men and women of the FBI from doing the right thing, protecting 

the American people and upholding the Constitution. 

Senator RUBIO. This is for all the Members of the Committee. As 

has been widely reported—and people know this—Kaspersky Lab 

software is used by, not hundreds of thousands, millions of Americans. To each of our witnesses, I would just ask: would any of you 

be comfortable with Kaspersky Lab’s software on your computers? 

Director COATS. A resounding no for me. 

Director ROGERS. No. 

Director POMPEO. No, Senator. 

Director MCCABE. No, sir. 

Director STEWART. No, Senator. 

Director CARDILLO. No, sir. 

Senator RUBIO. Director Pompeo, on Venezuela, which was mentioned in Director Coats’ statement, as all of you are probably well 

aware, armed civilian groups or colectivos, these militias in the 

street, have been armed by the regime for purposes of defending, 

for lack of a better term, the regime from protesters. We all are 

aware of the Maduro regime’s cozy relationship with Hezbollah, 

with the FARC, which is a designated terrorist organization, and 

links to narcotrafficking. 

Among the weapons in the stockpile of the military in Venezuela 

are Igla-S, these basically Russian variants of our Stinger missiles. 

Director Pompeo, if you could comment on the risk that I believe 

exists that as these groups become more desperate, potentially 

even operate at some point outside the control of the Maduro regime, running around in the streets, also in search of money and 

food and anything else that they want to get their hands on, the 

threat of any advanced weaponry such as what I just mentioned 

being sold or transferred to the FARC, a terrorist organization, sold 

to drug cartels in Mexico potentially, or even sold to terrorist organizations on the black market? Is that a real threat? Is that something we should be cognizant of? 

Director POMPEO. Senator, it is a real threat. As we have all 

seen, the situation in Venezuela continues to deteriorate. Maduro 

gets more desperate by the hour. The risk of these colectivos acting 

in a way that is not under his control increases as time goes on 

as well. 

In a classified setting, I’m happy to share with you a little bit 

more about the details of what we know. We have not seen any of 

those major arms transfers take place. We don’t have any evidence 

that those have taken place to date. But those stockpiles exist, not 

only in the Maduro regime, but other places as well. There are 

plenty of weapons running around in Venezuela and this risk is incredibly real and serious and ultimately a threat to South America 

and Central America, in addition to just in Venezuela. 

Senator RUBIO. Staying in the Western Hemisphere for a moment—and this potentially is also to the Director, Director McCabe, 

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and to you, Director Pompeo. I continue to be concerned about the 

potential and I believe is the reality of a concerted effort on the 

part of the Cuban government to recruit and unwittingly enlist 

Americans, business executives and others, even local and state political leaders, in an effort to have them influence U.S. policymaking on Cuba, and particularly the lifting of the embargo. 

Would this be a tactic consistent with what we have seen in the 

past from other nation-states, including the regime in Cuba? 

Director POMPEO. I’ll let Mr. McCabe comment as well, but yes, 

of course. Frankly, this is consistent with—the attempt to interfere 

in the United States is not limited to Russia. The Cubans have 

deep ties. It is in their deepest tradition to take American visitors 

and do their best to influence them in a way that’s adverse to U.S. 

interests. 

Director MCCABE. Yes, sir, fully agree. We share your concerns 

about that issue. 

Senator RUBIO. My final question is, with all this focus on Russia 

and what’s happened in the past, is it the opinion of all of you or 

those of you—certainly all have insight on this—that even as we 

focus on 2016 and the efforts leading up to that election, efforts to 

influence policymaking here in the United States vis-a`-vis the Russian interests are ongoing, that the Russians continue to use active 

measures even at this moment, even on this day, to try, through 

the use of multiple different ways, to influence the political debate 

and decisions made in American politics, particularly as they pertain to Russia’s interests around the world? In essence, these active 

measures are an ongoing threat, not simply something that happened in the past. 

Director MCCABE. Yes, sir, that’s right. 

Director POMPEO. Senator, it’s right. In some sense, though, we 

ought to put it in context. This has been going on for a long time. 

There’s nothing new. Only the cost has been lessened, the cost of 

doing it. 

Director COATS. I would just add that the use of cyber and social 

media significantly increased the impact and the capabilities. Obviously, this has been done for years and years, even decades. But 

the ability to have—to use the interconnectedness and all that provides, that it didn’t provide before—they’ve literally upped their 

game to the point where it’s having a significant impact. 

Director ROGERS. From my perspective, I would just highlight, 

cyber is enabling them to access information in massive quantities 

that weren’t quite attainable to the same level previously. That’s 

just another tool in their attempt to acquire information, misuse of 

that information, manipulation, outright lies, inaccuracies at times, 

but in other times actually dumping raw data, which we also saw 

during this last presidential election cycle for us. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

There’s obviously more than one threat to our country. I would 

argue that the greatest danger to the United States is North 

Korea. I’m one of those who has been very worried and trying to 

follow this as close as possible. 

In the statement for the record, you state, and I quote: ‘‘North 

Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs will continue to 

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pose a serious threat to U.S. interests in to the security environment in East Asia in 2017.’’ You go on to state: ‘‘Pyongyang is committed to developing a long-range nuclear-armed missile that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States.’’ 

These assessments, combined with North Korea’s behavior, recent ballistic missile launches, and proximity to U.S. forces and allies in Asia, are deeply concerning. For the purpose of this open 

hearing, could each of you express the threat posed by North Korea 

in this public setting and then address, most importantly, some of 

the specific actions we’re taking as a Nation? Some of it you may 

want to do in the closed hearing later. 

Director COATS. I think we could get into greater detail in the 

closed hearing. But it’s clear that we have assessed this as a very 

significant, potentially existential, threat to the United States that 

has to be addressed. You’re aware there has been considerable discussion among the policymakers, with our providing intelligence 

with the Administration, relative to steps moving forward. General 

Mattis has taken a major role in this, as well as our Secretary of 

State and others. 

The interaction with the Chinese of late we think can play a significant role in terms of how we deal with this. We have dedicated 

a very significant amount of our intelligence resources to the issue 

of North Korea. I think we’d look forward to going deeper into all 

of that in the classified session. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, let me ask this. Is it possible in this 

hearing to estimate when they will have an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of taking a nuclear warhead? 

Director COATS. I think it would be best if we save that, those 

kind of details, for the closed session. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Can you say in this session how effective 

China has been in stopping some of the testing? 

Director POMPEO. Senator Feinstein, let me try and answer that 

as best I can. I actually just returned from Korea. I was there last 

week. I had a chance to be with our great soldier, General Brooks, 

and his team, as well as the great soldiers of the Republic of Korea 

Army who are on the front lines there. They’re doing amazing work 

in a difficult condition. 

With respect to the Chinese, they have made efforts in a way 

that they have not made before in an effort to close down the trade 

that they have and putting pressure, diplomatic pressure as well, 

on the North Koreans. The intelligence would suggest that we’re 

going to need more to shake free this terribly challenging problem, 

and that they could do more and they have the capacity to do more 

as well. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Could you be specific? Have they entirely 

stopped coal? To what degree have they reduced it? How about oil 

and other commodities? 

Director POMPEO. I’d prefer to defer the details of that to the 

classified setting, but there have been restrictions on coal that have 

been significant. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Is there any other comment? 

Director STEWART. If I could, Senator. North Korea has declared 

its intent. It said it publicly. It produces propaganda images that 

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armed. What we have not seen them do is do a complete end to 

end test of an ICBM with a nuclear device. 

In the closed session we can talk about how close they might be 

to doing that. But they’re certainly on parallel paths: a nuclear device, processing enough fissile material for nuclear warheads, and 

developing a wide range of missile technology—short, intermediate, 

long-range missile technology. So they’re going to put those two together at some point, but we have not seen them do that, test it 

end to end, missile launch, intercontinental range, miniaturization, 

and survival of a reentry vehicle. But they’re on that path and 

they’re committed to doing that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Director CARDILLO. I’d just add, Senator, on top of General Stewart’s comments that they are in a race. He’s pushing very hard on 

the accelerator here. This whole panel is well aware of that and we 

are doing everything in our power—and we can give you the details 

in closed—to make sure that we give you and our customers the 

advantage to win that race. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. If I might just say, Mr. Cardillo, you’ve given 

us very good information, very solid information. It is much appreciated. I think it is time for the American people to begin to understand that, as the Director said, we do in fact have an existential 

threat in the Pacific Ocean and we need to come to grips with it. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Coats, let me join everybody else in welcoming you back 

to the Committee, this time on the other side of the hearing table, 

but pleased along with others as you take this responsibility. 

It’s my understanding—I want to talk just a little bit about two 

executive orders on vetting that the President has been challenged 

on in court. My understanding is you’re, as the DNI, involved in 

that vetting, in that process; is that right? The screening process, 

is that something that reports up through you? 

Director COATS. You’re talking about the classification process? 

Senator BLUNT. Well, I’m talking about the extreme vetting, 

where the President’s issued—the first executive order was January the 27th, where the President’s order said that we’d suspend 

refugee admissions from certain countries for 90 days pending a review. There’s also 120 days mentioned in that order. 

Since we’re beyond 90 days and approaching 120 days, my real 

question is, are we, in spite of what’s happening outside of the organization, are we continuing to pursue that time line and are we 

about to get to the 120 days of having that review period behind 

us? 

Director COATS. I would like to take that question and get back 

to you with the specifics relative to the days away, what has been 

done to this particular date, and are we on target. Obviously, this 

is going forward. I don’t have the details in front of me right now, 

but I’d be happy to get that information for you. 

Senator BLUNT. Good. I’d be interested in that. And I’d be very 

concerned, frankly, if we’re now over 100, close to 120, days into 

that time frame, to find out that the 120 days didn’t get the job 

done because we were waiting to figure out how the order could be 

properly enforced. So I’d be very interested in that. 

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On the cyber front, Director Cardillo, I know, among other 

things, your organization has conducted what you’ve called 

hackathons, or at least have been called hackathons. What has 

that done in terms of bringing other people into the discussion of 

how we protect ourselves better from these cyber attacks? 

Director CARDILLO. Thank you, Senator. We’re quite proud at 

NGA of our history of support to the community and to you, but 

through predominantly historically closed systems, governmentowned systems, etcetera. As the committee has already discussed 

and the panel has responded, clearly the high-tech reality of our 

world, the interconnectedness of the internet, etcetera. What we’re 

trying to do is take that historic success of our expertise and our 

experience and then engage with that community in a way that we 

can better leverage our data in a way to inform and warn you. 

I’m trying to tap into the agility and the innovation of that community. We use these hackathons to put out challenge questions in 

which we can engage with industry and academia in a way that 

will enable us to do our job better. 

Senator BLUNT. Let me ask one more question of you. We had 

a witness before this committee on March 30th in an open hearing, 

Clint Watts, who observed that—he said, quote: ‘‘The intelligence 

community is very biased against open source information.’’ That 

ends his quote. 

I may come to you on that, too, Director Pompeo. But in terms 

of Geospatial, what are you doing there with open source information? 

Director CARDILLO. We’re engaging. As Admiral Rogers mentioned, though, there’s an up side to this connectedness and the 

fact that the commercial market and the commercial imagery market is getting into a business that was prior a government-only entity has great advantage. We seek to build on that and take advantage of those developments. 

We also need to go in eyes wide open and realize that there is 

a risk. So I don’t have a bias. I have an awareness and appreciation for this open development and innovation. My commitment is 

to smartly engage with it, to make sure that we use the best of it, 

while we’re aware that there is a risk as we do so. 

Senator BLUNT. Director Pompeo, do you think that was a fair 

criticism, that the intelligence community is biased against using 

open source information? 

Director POMPEO. Senator Blunt, I think historically that may 

well have been true. I don’t think that’s the case today. We have 

an enormous open source enterprise that does its best to stay up 

with and be world class in information management and get information that is not stolen secrets, but open source information, to 

the right place at the right time to help inform the intelligence that 

we provide to you and to our other customers. 

So today I would say that statement is inaccurate. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Director. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me ask—let me highlight one issue and ask a question, Director Coats, about another issue. And I’d invite comment from 

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anyone who has something they want to offer. I’ve been increasingly concerned about foreign governments hiring lobbyists here in 

Washington and, unbeknownst to members of Congress, actually 

lobbying Congress to enact policies which may be contrary to the 

best interests of the American people. 

Of course, the Foreign Agent Registration Act provides some 

level of transparency for that. But I just highlight that issue and 

we can come back to it at a later time because I want to ask you 

about another topic as well. 

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or 

CFIUS, provides a very important role in determining whether 

there are technology transfers from the United States to foreign 

governments. I’m happy to see, Director Coats, your comments on 

page 4 of your written statement specifically regarding China’s increasing effort to use investment as a way to improve its technological capabilities. 

China we’ve seen continues to use an aggressive campaign to 

vacuum up advanced U.S. technology however and whenever it can, 

whether stealing it through cyber or buying it on the open market. 

Do you feel like the current CFIUS process adequately protects 

against this threat vector, and are all elements of the U.S. Government cognizant of these vulnerabilities? 

Director COATS. I can’t speak to how many agencies of the U.S. 

Government are as cognizant as perhaps they should be, but I certainly think that, given China’s aggressive approach relative to information-gathering and all the things that you mentioned, it merits a review of CFIUS in terms of whether or not it needs to have 

some changes or innovations to address the aggressive, aggressive 

Chinese actions, not just against our companies but across the 

world. 

They clearly have a strategy through their investments. They 

started a major investment bank. You name a part of the world, 

the Chinese probably are there, looking to put investments in. 

We’ve seen the situation in Djibouti where they’re also adding military capability to their investment in a strategic area on the Horn 

of Africa there, that you wouldn’t necessarily expect this. But 

they’re active in Africa, northern Africa. They’re active across the 

world. 

Their ‘‘One Belt, One Road’’ process opens their trade and what 

other interests they have to the Indian Ocean in a different way 

to address nations that they’ve had difficulty connecting with. 

So it’s clearly an issue that we ought to take a look at. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. 

Director POMPEO. Senator Cornyn, if I might just add one comment, two quick comments, one on CFIUS. It mostly deals with 

change of control transactions, purchases. There are many other 

ways one could invest in an entity here in the United States and 

exert significant control over that entity. I think that ought to be 

looked at. 

Then second and apart from CFIUS, there are many vectors. You 

mentioned several. Other places are educational institutions, where 

there are many folks coming here, some who are coming here in 

good faith to learn, but others who are being sent here with less 

noble undertakings and missions. 

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Director ROGERS. The only additional comment I was going to 

make is, it is clear as we watch China and other nations they are 

gaining greater insights as to our CFIUS processes, the criteria 

that we use that tend to shape our decision process. So I think 

that’s also an issue of concern that we’re aware of here. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. I look forward to visiting with you 

in the closed session later on. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, it’s fair to say I disagreed with Director Comey as 

much as anyone in this room. But the timing of this firing is wrong 

to anyone with a semblance of ethics. Director Comey should be 

here this morning testifying to the American people about where 

the investigation he has been running stands. 

At our public hearing in January when he refused to discuss his 

investigation into connections between Russia and Trump associates, I stated my fear that if the information didn’t come out before 

Inauguration Day it might never come out. With all the recent talk 

in recent weeks about whether there is evidence of collusion, I fear 

some colleagues have forgotten that Donald Trump urged the Russians to hack his opponents. 

He also said repeatedly that he loved WikiLeaks. So the question 

is not whether Donald Trump actively encouraged the Russians 

and WikiLeaks to attack our democracy. He did. That is an established fact. The only question is whether he or someone associated 

with him coordinated with the Russians. 

Now, Mr. McCabe, the President’s letter to Director Comey asserted that on three separate occasions the Director informed him 

that he was not under investigation. Would it have been wrong for 

the Director to inform him he was not under investigation? Yes or 

no? 

Director MCCABE. Sir, I’m not going to comment on any conversations that the Director may have had—— 

Senator WYDEN. I didn’t ask that. Would it have been wrong for 

the Director to inform him he was not under investigation? That’s 

not about conversations. That’s a yes or no answer. 

Director MCCABE. As you know, Senator, we typically do not answer that question. I will not comment on whether or not the Director and the President of the United States had that conversation. 

Senator WYDEN. Will you refrain from these kinds of alleged updates to the President or anyone else in the White House on the 

status of the investigation? 

Director MCCABE. I will. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you. 

Director Pompeo, one of the few key unanswered questions is 

why the President didn’t fire Michael Flynn after Acting Attorney 

General Yates warned the White House that he could be 

blackmailed by the Russians. Director Pompeo, did you know about 

the Acting Attorney General’s warnings to the White House or 

were you aware of the concerns behind the warning? 

Director POMPEO. I don’t have any comment on that. 

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Senator WYDEN. Well, were you aware of the concerns behind the 

warning? I mean, this is a global threat. This is a global threat 

question. This is a global threat hearing. Were you aware? 

Director POMPEO. Senator, tell me what global threat it is you’re 

concerned with, please? I’m not sure I understand the question. 

Senator WYDEN. Well, the possibility of blackmail. I mean, blackmail by an influential military official, that has real ramifications 

for the global threat. So this is not about a policy implication. This 

is about the National Security Adviser being vulnerable to blackmail by the Russians. The American people deserve to know whether in these extraordinary circumstances the CIA kept them safe. 

Director POMPEO. Yes, sir, the CIA has kept America safe, and 

the people at the Central Intelligence Agency are committed to that 

and will remain committed to that. And we will do that in the face 

of—— 

Senator WYDEN. You won’t answer the question. 

Director POMPEO. We will do that in the face of political challenges that come from any direction, Senator. 

Senator WYDEN. But you will not answer the question of whether 

or not you were aware of the concerns behind the Yates warning? 

Director POMPEO. Sir, I don’t know exactly what you’re referring 

to with ‘‘the Yates warning.’’ I wasn’t part of any of those conversations. 

Senator WYDEN. The Yates warning was—— 

Director POMPEO. Senator, I have no—— 

Senator WYDEN [continuing]. That the White House could be 

blackmailed. 

Director POMPEO. I have no firsthand information with respect to 

the warning that was given. She didn’t make that warning to me. 

I can’t answer that question, Senator, as much as I would like to. 

Senator WYDEN. Okay. 

Director Coats, how concerned are you that a Russian government oil company run by a Putin crony could end up owning a significant percentage of U.S. oil refining capacity, and what are you 

advising the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 

States about this? 

Director COATS. I don’t have specific information relative to that. 

I think that’s something that potentially we could provide intelligence on in terms of what the situation might be. 

Senator WYDEN. I’d like you to furnish that in writing. 

Let me see if I can get one other question in. There have been 

mountains of press stories with allegations about financial connections between Russia and Trump and his associates. The matters 

are directly relevant to the FBI. My question is, when it comes to 

illicit Russian money and in particular its potential to be laundered 

on its way to the United States, what should the Committee be 

most concerned about? 

We hear stories about Deutschebank, Bank of Cyprus, shell companies in Moldova, the British Virgin Islands. I’d like to get your 

sense, because I’m over my time, Director McCabe. What should we 

be most concerned about with respect to illicit Russian money and 

its potential to be laundered on its way to the United States? 

Director MCCABE. Certainly, sir. As you know, I am not in a position to be able to speak about specific investigations and certainly 

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not in this setting. However, I will confirm for you that those are 

issues that concern us greatly. They have traditionally and they do 

even more so today. As it becomes easier to conceal the origin and 

the track and the destination and purpose of illicit money flows, as 

the exchange of information becomes more clouded in encryption 

and more obtuse, it becomes harder and harder to get to the bottom of those investigations that would shed light on those issues. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER [presiding]. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, the purpose of this hearing, as the Chairman expressed, is to give the American people some insight into what we 

all do which they don’t see pretty much at all. So I think what I 

want to do is I want to make an observation and then I want to 

get your take on it, anybody who wants to volunteer, and I’m going 

to start with you, Director Coats, as a volunteer. 

I’ve been on this Committee all the time I’ve been here in the 

Senate and all through the last Administration, and I have been 

greatly impressed by the current Administration’s hitting the 

ground running during the first 100 days as far as their engagement on intelligence matters and their engagement with foreign 

countries. 

The national media here is focused on domestic issues, which is 

of great interest to the American people, be it health care, be it 

personnel issues in the government, and they don’t—the media 

isn’t as focused on this Administration’s fast, and in my judgment, 

robust engagement with the intelligence communities around the 

world and with other governments. 

My impression is that it’s good and it is aggressive. I’d like your 

impression of where we’re going. Almost all of you had real engagement in the last Administration. All administrations are different. 

Director Coats, do you want to take that on to start with? 

Director COATS. I’d be happy to start with that. I think most 

Presidents that come into office come with an agenda in mind in 

terms of what issues they’d like to pursue, many of them issues 

that affect—domestic issues that affect infrastructure, education, a 

number of things, only to find that this is a dangerous world, that 

the United States—the threats that exist out there need to be 

given attention to. 

This President, who I think the perception was not interested in 

that—I think Director Pompeo and I can certify the fact that we 

have spent far more hours in the Oval Office than we anticipated. 

The President is a voracious consumer of information and asking 

questions and asking us to provide intelligence. We are both part 

of a process run through the National Security Council, General 

McMaster, all through the deputies committees and the principals 

committees, consuming hours and hours and hours of time, looking 

at the threats, how do we address those threats, what is the intelligence that tells us, that informs the policymakers in terms of how 

they put a strategy in place. 

So what I initially thought would be a one or two time a week, 

10 to 15-minute quick brief has turned into an every day, sometimes exceeding 45 minutes to an hour or more just in briefing the 

President. I have brought along several of our directors to come 

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and show the President what their agencies do and how important 

it is, the information they provide, for the basis of making policy 

decisions. 

I’d like to turn to my CIA colleague here to let him give you, and 

others, to give you their impression. 

Senator RISCH. I appreciate that. We’re almost out of time. But 

I did—Director Pompeo, you kind of sat in the same spot we all sit 

in through the last several years. I’d kind of like your observations 

along the line of Director Coats. 

Director POMPEO. I think Director Coats had it right. He and I 

spend time with the President every day briefing him on the most 

urgent intelligence matters that are presented to us in our roles. 

He asks good hard questions, makes us go make sure we’re doing 

our work in the right way. 

Second, you asked about engagement in the world. This Administration has reentered the battle space in places that the previous 

administration was completely absent. You all travel some, too. 

Senator RISCH. Yes. 

Director POMPEO. You will hear that when you go travel. I have 

now taken two trips to places and they welcome American leadership. They’re not looking for American soldiers. They’re not looking 

for American boots on the ground. They’re looking for American 

leadership around the globe. And this President has reentered that 

space in a way that I think will serve America’s interests very well. 

Senator RISCH. I couldn’t agree more. We deal with them not 

only overseas, but they come here, as you know, regularly. 

Director POMPEO. Yes, sir. 

Senator RISCH. And the fact that the President has pulled the 

trigger twice as he has in the first 100 days, and done it in a fashion that didn’t start a world war, and was watched by both our 

friends and our enemies, has made a significant and a huge difference as far as our standing in the world. 

My time is up. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Director McCabe, you obviously have several 

decades of law enforcement experience. Is it your experience that 

people who are innocent of wrongdoing typically need to be reassured that they’re not the subject of an investigation? 

Director MCCABE. No, sir. 

Senator HEINRICH. I ask that because I’m still trying to make 

heads or tails of the dismissal letter from earlier this week from 

the President, where he writes: ‘‘While I greatly appreciate you informing me on three separate occasions that I am not under investigation.’’ I’m still trying to figure out why that would even make 

it into a dismissal letter. 

But let me go to something a little more direct. Director, has 

anyone in the White House spoken to you directly about the Russia 

investigation? 

Director MCCABE. No, sir. 

Senator HEINRICH. When did you last meet with the President, 

Director McCabe? 

Director MCCABE. I don’t think I’m going to comment on that. 

Senator HEINRICH. Was it earlier this week? 

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Director MCCABE. I have met with the President this week, but 

I don’t really want to go into the details of that. 

Senator HEINRICH. But Russia did not come up? 

Director MCCABE. That’s correct, it did not. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. 

We’ve heard in the news claims that Director Comey had lost the 

confidence of rank and file FBI employees. You’ve been there for 

21 years. In your opinion, is it accurate that the rank and file no 

longer supported Director Comey? 

Director MCCABE. No, sir, that is not accurate. I can tell you, sir, 

that I worked very, very closely with Director Comey from the moment he started at the FBI. I was his Executive Assistant Director 

of National Security at that time; then worked for him running the 

Washington Field Office; and of course I’ve served as Deputy for 

the last year. 

I can tell you that I hold Director Comey in the absolute highest 

regard. I have the highest respect for his considerable abilities and 

his integrity, and it has been the greatest privilege and honor of 

my professional life to work with him. 

I can tell you also that Director Comey enjoyed broad support 

within the FBI and still does to this day. We are a large organization. We are 36,500 people across this country, across this globe. 

We have a diversity of opinions about many things. But I can confidently tell you that the majority, the vast majority, of FBI employees enjoyed a deep and positive connection to Director Comey. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you for your candor. 

Do you feel like you have the adequate resources for the existing 

investigations that the Bureau is invested in right now to follow 

them wherever they may lead? 

Director MCCABE. Sir, if you’re referring to the Russia investigation, I do. I believe we have the adequate resources to do it and 

I know that we have resourced that investigation adequately. 

If you’re referring to the many constantly multiplying counterintelligence threats that we face across the spectrum, they get bigger and more challenging every day and resources become an issue 

over time. But in terms of that investigation, sir, I can assure you 

we are covered. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. 

Director Coats, welcome back. Would you agree that it is a national security risk to provide classified information to an individual who has been compromised by a foreign government, as a 

broad matter? 

Director COATS. As a broad matter, yes. 

Senator HEINRICH. If the Attorney General came to you and said 

one of your employees was compromised, what sort of action would 

you take? 

Director COATS. I would take the action as prescribed in our procedures relative to how we report this and how it is processed. It’s 

a serious issue. I would be consulting with our legal counsel and 

consulting with our inspector general and others as to how best to 

proceed with this. But obviously we would take action. 

Senator HEINRICH. Would one of the options be dismissal, obviously? 

Director COATS. That very potentially could be a dismissal, yes. 

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Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Director. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman or Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Mr. McCabe, is the agent who is in charge of this very important 

investigation into Russian attempts to influence our elections last 

fall still in charge? 

Director MCCABE. We have many agents involved in the investigation at many levels. So I’m not sure who you’re referring to 

here. 

Senator COLLINS. The lead agent overseeing the investigation. 

Director MCCABE. Certainly almost all of the agents involved in 

the investigation are still in their positions. 

Senator COLLINS. So has there been any curtailment of the FBI’s 

activities in this important investigation since Director Comey was 

fired? 

Director MCCABE. Ma’am, we don’t curtail our activities. As you 

know, are people experiencing questions and are reacting to the developments this week? Absolutely. Does that get in the way of our 

ability to pursue this or any other investigation? No, ma’am. We 

continue to focus on our mission and get that job done. 

Senator COLLINS. I want to follow up on a question of resources 

that Senator Heinrich asked your opinion on. Press reports yesterday indicated that Director Comey requested additional resources 

from the Justice Department for the Bureau’s ongoing investigation 

into Russian active measures. Are you aware of that request? Can 

you confirm that that request was in fact made? 

Director MCCABE. I cannot confirm that request was made. As 

you know, ma’am, when we need resources we make those requests 

here. So I’m not aware of that request and it’s not consistent with 

my understanding of how we request additional resources. 

That said, we don’t typically request resources for an individual 

case. As I mentioned, I strongly believe that the Russia investigation is adequately resourced. 

Senator COLLINS. You’ve also been asked a question about target 

letters. Now, it’s my understanding that when an individual is the 

target of an investigation, at some point a letter is sent out notifying the individual that he is a target. Is that correct? 

Director MCCABE. No, ma’am, I don’t believe that’s correct. 

Senator COLLINS. So before there is going to be an indictment 

there is not a target letter sent out by the Justice Department? 

Director MCCABE. Not that I’m aware of. 

Senator COLLINS. That’s contrary to my understanding. But let 

me ask you the reverse—— 

Director MCCABE. Again, I’m looking at it from the perspective 

of the investigators. So that’s not part of our normal case investigative practice. 

Senator COLLINS. That would be the Justice Department, though, 

the Justice Department. 

Director MCCABE. Yes, ma’am. I see. 

Senator COLLINS. I’m asking you, isn’t it standard practice when 

someone is the target of an investigation and is perhaps on the 

verge of being indicted that the Justice Department sends that individual what is known as a target letter? 

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60 

Director MCCABE. Ma’am, I’m going to have to defer that question to the Department of Justice. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, let me ask you the flip side of that, and 

perhaps you don’t know the answer to this question. But is it 

standard practice for the FBI to inform someone that they are not 

a target of an investigation? 

Director MCCABE. It is not. 

Senator COLLINS. So it would be unusual and not standard practice for there to have been a notification from the FBI Director to 

President Trump or anyone else involved in this investigation, informing him or her that that individual is not a target, is that correct? 

Director MCCABE. Again ma’am, I’m not going to comment on 

what Director Comey may or may not have done. 

Senator COLLINS. I’m not asking you to comment on the facts of 

the case. I’m just trying to figure out what’s standard practice and 

what’s not. 

Director MCCABE. Yes ma’am. I’m not aware of that being a 

standard practice. 

Senator COLLINS. Admiral Rogers, I want to follow up on Senator 

Warner’s question to you about the attempted interference in the 

French election. Some researchers, including the cyber intelligence 

firm Flashpoint, claim that APT28 is the group that was behind 

the stealing of and the leaking of the information about the President-elect of France. The FBI and DHS have publicly tied APT28 

to Russian intelligence services in the joint analysis report last 

year after the group’s involvement in stealing data that was leaked 

in the run-up to the U.S. elections in November. 

Is the IC in a position to attribute the stealing and the leaking 

that took place prior to the French election to be the result of activities by this group, which is linked to Russian cyber activity? 

Admiral ROGERS. Again, ma’am, right now I don’t think I have 

a complete picture of all the activity associated with France. But 

as I have said publicly both today and previously, we are aware of 

specific Russian activity directed against the French election cycle 

in the course particularly of the last few weeks, to the point where 

we felt it was important enough we actually reached out to our 

French counterparts to inform them and make sure they had 

awareness of what we were aware of and also to ask them, is there 

something we are missing that you are seeing? 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Mr. McCabe, thank you for being here today 

under somewhat difficult circumstances. We appreciate your candor 

in your testimony. 

On March 20th, Director Comey—then-Director Comey testified 

to the House of Representative: ‘‘I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes 

investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and 

whether there was any coordination between the campaign and 

Russian efforts. As with any counter intelligence investigation, this 

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61 

will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.’’ Is that statement still accurate? 

Director MCCABE. Yes, sir, it is. 

Senator KING. And how many agents are assigned to this 

project? How many—or personnel generally within the FBI, roughly? 

Director MCCABE. Sir, I can’t really answer those sorts of questions in this forum. 

Senator KING. Well, yesterday a White House press spokesman 

said that this is one of the smallest things on the plate of the FBI. 

Is that an accurate statement? 

Director MCCABE. It is—— 

Senator KING. Is this a small investigation in relation to all—to 

all the other work that you’re doing? 

Director MCCABE. Sir, we consider it to be a highly significant 

investigation. 

Senator KING. So you would not characterize it as one of the 

smallest things you’re engaged in? 

Director MCCABE. I would not. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Let me change the subject briefly. We’re—we’ve been talking 

about Russia and—and their involvement in this election. One of 

the issues of concern to me, and perhaps I can direct this to—well, 

I’ll direct it to anybody in the panel. The allegation of Russian involvement in our electoral systems, is that an issue that is of concern and what do we know about that? And is that being followed 

up on by this investigation? 

Mr. McCabe, is that part of your investigation? Now, I’m—I’m 

not talking about the presidential election. I’m talking about Statelevel election infrastructure. 

Director MCCABE. Yes, sir. So obviously not discussing any specific investigation in detail, the issue of Russian interference in the 

U.S. democratic process is one that causes us great concern. And 

quite frankly, it’s something that we’ve spent a lot of time working 

on over the past several months. And to reflect comments that 

were made in response to an earlier question that Director Coats 

handled, I think part of that process is to understand the inclinations of our foreign adversaries to interfere in those areas. 

So we’ve seen this once; we are better positioned to see it the 

next time. We’re able to improve not only our coordination with— 

primarily through the Department of Homeland—through DHS, 

their—their expansive network, and to the State and local election 

infrastructure, but to interact with those folks to put them in a better position to defend against whether it’s cyber attacks or any sort 

of influence-driven interactions. 

Senator KING. Thank you. I think that’s a very important part 

of this issue. 

Admiral Rogers, yesterday a camera crew from Tass was allowed 

into the Oval Office. There was no any American press allowed. 

Was there any consultation with you with regard to that action in 

terms of the risk of some kind of cyber penetration or communications in that incident? 

Admiral ROGERS. No. 

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62 

Senator KING. Were you—you were—your agency wasn’t consulted in any way? 

Admiral ROGERS. Not that I’m aware of. I wouldn’t expect that 

to automatically be the case. But no, not that I’m aware of. 

Senator KING. Did it raise any concerns when you saw those pictures that those cameramen and crew were in the Oval Office without—— 

Admiral ROGERS. I’ll be honest. I wasn’t aware of where the images came from. 

Senator KING. All right, thank you. 

Mr. Coats, Director Coats, you lead the intelligence community. 

Were you consulted at all with regard to the firing of Director 

Comey? 

Director COATS. I was not. 

Senator KING. So you had no—there were no discussions with 

you even though the FBI’s an important part of the intelligence 

community? 

Director COATS. There were no discussions. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator King. 

Senator Lankford. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Let me just run through some quick questions on this. Director 

McCabe, thanks for being here as well. Let me hit some high points 

of some of the things that I’ve heard already, just to be able to confirm. You have the resources you need for the Russia investigation, 

is that correct? 

Director MCCABE. Sir, we believe it’s adequately resourced. 

Senator LANKFORD. Okay, so there’s not limitations on resources? 

You have what you need? The—the actions about Jim Comey and 

his release has not curtailed the investigation from the FBI? It’s 

still moving forward? 

Director MCCABE. The investigation will move forward, absolutely. 

Senator LANKFORD. No agents have been removed that are the 

ongoing career folks that are doing the investigation? 

Director MCCABE. No, sir. 

Senator LANKFORD. Is it your impression at this point that the 

FBI is unable to complete the investigation in a fair and expeditious way because of the removal of Jim Comey? 

Director MCCABE. It is my opinion and belief that the FBI will 

continue to pursue this investigation vigorously and completely. 

Senator LANKFORD. Do you need somebody to take this away 

from you and somebody else to do? 

Director MCCABE. No sir. 

Senator LANKFORD. Okay. Let me ask you a separate question. 

As I go through the report tracking through the worldwide threats 

that were put out, that Director Coats put out, there’s a section on 

it on narcotics and the movement of illegal drugs. And there’s a 

section on it about tens of thousands of illegal pharmacies that are 

online at this point distributing narcotics. And 18 to 20 of those go 

online a day still. 

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63 

Can you help me understand a little more about what the FBI 

is doing to be able to interdict, to be able to engage? How many 

of those are American? How many of those are international, and 

what we can do to be able to stop the movement of narcotics 

through our mail system? 

Director MCCABE. Yes, yes, sir. It’s a great question and one that 

we spend a great deal of time on. As you know, the traffic of illegal 

narcotics is something that we, along with our partners at the DEA 

and other law and Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners have focused on for many years. We’ve had great success. 

But the issue, the threat continues to change, continues to develop and confront us in new ways. The profusion of illegal online 

pharmacies is certainly one of those ways. And quite frankly, it’s 

something that we are learning more about, spending more time on 

every day. 

Senator LANKFORD. Well, I’m glad that it is highlighted in the report. With tens of thousands of these pharmacies that are out there 

in the distribution systems, it’s no longer a drug dealer on the corner anymore. They just deliver it to your house now and there’s a 

whole different set of issues that we aggressively need to address 

on this. 

Director Coats, I have a—I have a question for you. We’ve talked 

often about a cyber doctrine and it’s one of the issues that keeps 

being raised that other nations and nation-states and actors need 

to understand what our boundaries are and how we’re going to do 

this. This seems to be talked to death and everyone that I raise it 

with says yes, it needs to occur. 

What I need to know is, who has the ball on leading out to make 

sure a year from now we’re not talking about we need to get a 

cyber doctrine? I guess specifically, when we do this hearing next 

year who should we hold accountable if we don’t have a cyber doctrine? 

Director COATS. Well, that’s a very good question. I think all of 

us would agree we need a cyber doctrine because clearly it is one 

of the top, if not the number one threat today, that we’re dealing 

with. As you know, the President tasked an effort under the direction of former Mayor Giuliani with this. That has not led to a conclusion at this particular point in time. I don’t have the details on 

that. 

I would agree with you, however, that this is a threat that our 

policymakers need to—need to address. I’m hoping that when we 

are here next year, we will have a solid response to your question, 

but at this particular point in time, frankly, given the proliferation 

of issues that we’re trying to deal with, it’s almost overwhelming 

getting our hands on all of them. 

Senator LANKFORD. And it is and that’s been there are just so 

many things that are flying around, this keeps getting left, and it 

has been for years, been left. And what we need to try to figure 

out is how do we actually find out who’s got the ball and who do 

we hold to account to be able to help us work through this or is 

this something that we need to be able to work through? 

I noticed as I read through your report, which was excellent by 

the way, on all the worldwide threats, every single section of your 

report, every section of it, had a section on Iran, every part of it, 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

64 

that there was a threat. In fact, in one section of it you wrote ‘‘Iran 

continues to be the foremost state sponsor of terrorism.’’ 

Whether it was cyber, whether it is active terrorism, whether it 

is involvement in every different nefarious action, it seems to always circle back to Iran at some point in some way of facilitating 

this. So this is one of those areas that we’ve got to be able to figure 

out how to be able to deal with. 

Just in a broad question on it, and maybe, General Stewart, 

you’d be the right one to be able to deal with this, but anyone 

could—could answer this. My concern is that when we’re dealing 

with Syria the focus seems to be on Russia in Syria or ISIS in 

Syria and we’re losing track of the movement of Iran through Iraq 

into Syria. We’re losing track of what’s happening in Yemen and 

other places. 

What is your perception of Iran’s goal through the Middle East? 

Is their goal higher for Yemen or is it higher going into Syria and 

into Iraq and to be able to occupy and stay? And is the perception 

that the Russians want to remain there or Iran wants to remain 

in Syria and be the dominant force there? 

General STEWART. Clearly, Iran views themselves as the regional—the dominant regional power. They will continue to use militia forces and asymmetric forces to achieve the aims of controlling 

large parts of the region. And if they can’t control them physically, 

they tend to influence them politically. Syria becomes a very key 

strategic point for them. It allows them to leverage the Syrian 

forces, Lebanese, Lebanese Hezbollah, and move capability and 

forces across the region. They will be in competition, at some point, 

with Russia. 

Russia views themselves as the regional power, at least the dominant regional power today. I’m not sure that Russian and Iran’s 

influence will remain aligned in the long term. In the near term 

they’re very closely aligned as it relates to propping up and securing the Syrian regime. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you for being here. I really appreciate it. And I 

know that, Mr. McCabe, you seem to be of great interest of being 

here. And we’re going to look forward to really hearing from all of 

you all in the closed hearing this afternoon, at which I think that 

we’ll able to get into more detail. So I appreciate that. 

I have just one question for Mr. McCabe. It’s basically the morale 

of the agency, the FBI agency and the morale basically starting 

back from July 5th to July 7th, October 28th, November 6th, and 

Election Day. Did you all ever think you’d be embroiled in an election such as this and did—what did it do to the morale? 

Director MCCABE. Well, I—I don’t know that anyone envisioned 

exactly the way these things would develop. You know, as I said 

earlier, Senator, we are a large organization. We are—we have a 

lot of diversity of opinions and—and viewpoints on things. We are 

also a fiercely independent group. 

Senator MANCHIN. I’m just saying that basically before July 5th, 

before the first testimony that basically Director Comey got inLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

65 

volved in, prior to that, did you see a change in the morale? Just 

a yes or no, yes a change, more anxious, more concern? 

Director MCCABE. I think morale has always been good. However, we had—there were folks within our agency who were frustrated with the outcome of the Hillary Clinton case and some of 

those folks were very vocal about those concerns. 

Senator MANCHIN. I’m sure we’ll have more questions in the 

closed hearing, sir. But let me say to the rest of you all, we talked 

about Kaspersky, the lab, KL Lab. Do you all—has it risen to your 

level, being the head of all of our intelligence agencies and people 

that are mostly concerned about the security of our country, of having a Russian connection in a lab as far outreaching as KL Labs? 

Has it come with your IT people coming to you or have you gone 

directly to them making sure that you have no interaction with KL 

or any of the contractors you do business with? Just down the line 

there. Mr. Cardillo? 

Director CARDILLO. Well, we count on the expertise of Admiral 

Rogers and the FBI to protect our systems and so I value—— 

Senator MANCHIN. But you have IT—you have IT people, right? 

Director CARDILLO. Absolutely. 

Senator MANCHIN. Have you talked to the IT people? Has it come 

to your concern that there might be a problem? 

Director CARDILLO. I’m aware of the Kaspersky Lab challenge 

and/or threat. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me tell you, it’s more of a challenge— 

more than a challenge, sir. And I would hope that—I’ll go down the 

line, but I hope that all of you—we are very much concerned about 

this, very much concerned about security of our country and their 

involvement. 

Director CARDILLO. We share that. 

Senator MANCHIN. General. 

General STEWART. We are tracking Kaspersky and their software. There is, as well as I know, and I’ve checked this recently, 

no Kaspersky software on our networks. 

Senator MANCHIN. Any contractors? 

General STEWART. Now, the contractor piece might be a little bit 

harder to define, but at this point we see no connection to 

Kaspersky in contractors supporting our IT—— 

Senator MANCHIN. Admiral Rogers. 

Admiral ROGERS. I’m personally aware and involved as the Director of the National Security Agency of Kaspersky Lab issue, yes, 

sir. 

Director COATS. It wasn’t that long ago I was sitting up there 

talking, raising issues about Kaspersky and its position here. And 

that continues in this new job. 

Director POMPEO. It has risen to the Director of the CIA as well, 

Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Great. 

Director MCCABE. We’re very concerned about it, sir, and we are 

focused on it closely. 

Senator MANCHIN. The only thing I would ask all of you, if you 

can give us a report back if you’ve swept all of your contractors to 

make sure they understand the certainty you have, concern that 

you have, about this, and making sure that they can verify to you 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

66 

all that they’re not involved whatsoever with any Kaspersky hardware. 

I’m going to switch to a couple different things because of national security. But you know, the violent gangs that we have in 

the United States, and I know—we don’t talk about them much. 

And when you talk about you have MS–13, the Crips, you’ve got 

Hells Angels, Aryan Brotherhood, it goes on and on and on, it’s 

quite a few. 

What is are we doing and what is it to your level—has it been 

brought to your level the concern we have with these gangs within 

our country, really every part of our country? Anybody on the gangland? 

Director MCCABE. Yes sir. We spend a lot of time talking about 

that at the FBI. It’s one of our highest priorities. 

Senator MANCHIN. Do you have the resources to go after each one 

of these? Because they’re interspersed all over the country. 

Director MCCABE. We do, sir. We have been focused on the gang 

threat for many years. It, much like the online pharmacy threat, 

it continues to change and develop. We think it’s likely having an 

impact on some of the elevated violent crime rates we see across 

the country, so we’re spending a lot of time focused on that. 

Senator MANCHIN. One last question real quick—my time is running out—is on rare earth elements. I’m understanding ever since 

the closure of the California, which is the Mountain Pass mine, 

which was the last mine that we had that was giving us a domestic 

source of rare earth elements, that’s been closed and now we’re 100 

percent dependent of foreign, on basically foreign purchases of rare 

earth elements for what we need every day to run this country. 

We don’t do any of it in this country anymore. And most of it 

comes from China. Do any of you have a concern about that? 

Director POMPEO. Senator Manchin, I’ll speak to that. Yes, we’re 

concerned. We are—we do a lot of work to figure out where they 

are and help the intelligence community—help the policy community shape policy surrounding how we ought to treat this issue. But 

it’s a very—it’s a very real concern, and it obviously depends on the 

element. But we use them for important technologies that keep us 

all safe, those very rare earth elements. 

Senator MANCHIN. Let me just say that I—it’s been told to me 

that the Department of Defense needs about 800 tons of rare earth 

elements per year, and I want to make sure that you know, West 

Virginia has the opportunity to provide this country with the rare 

earth elements it has because of our mining process and all of that 

that we have extracted through the mining process. We are happy 

to come to aid, sir. 

Director POMPEO. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Manchin. 

Before I turn to Senator Cotton, can I say for members, the Vice 

Chair and I have to step out for a meeting that we can’t push off. 

I would ask Senator Harris, Senator Cotton, to complete their first 

round of questions. Any member that seeks additional questions 

will be recognized by the Chair. I would ask you to limit those 

questions, if you can, but the Chair will ask—will say we’re not 

going over five minutes for the second round of questions. 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

67 

It is my hope that we will give sufficient time to these six gentlemen to have some nutrition before we reconvene at 1:30 in 219. It’s 

my understanding that there will be a vote circa 2:00, and we will 

decide exactly how we handle that. But the closed hearing, we like 

to make sure that nobody misses anything, so we—we might slightly adjust what we are doing. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Chairman, just an inquiry, and I appreciate 

your thoughtfulness. So in your departure, as we work through it, 

it’s still acceptable to begin another five-minute round for those—— 

Chairman BURR. Up to five minutes. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. Inmates are running the asylum. 

[Laughter.] 

So, I think everyone here in this room and most Americans have 

come to appreciate the aggressiveness with which Russia uses active measures or covert influence operations, propaganda, call them 

whatever you will, as your agencies assess they did in 2016, and 

hacking into those e-mails and releasing them, as news reports 

suggest they did, in the French election last week. 

That’s one reason why I sought to revive the Russian Active 

Measures Working Group in the FY17 Intelligence Authorization 

Act. 

These activities, though, go far beyond elections, I think, as most 

of our witnesses know. Former Director of the CIA, Bob Gates in 

his memoir ‘‘From the Shadows,’’ detailed Soviet covert influence 

campaigns designed to slow or thwart the U.S. development of nuclear delivery systems and warheads, missile defense systems, and 

deployment of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces systems to Europe. 

Specifically, on page 260 of his memoir, he writes: ‘‘During the 

period the Soviets mounted a massive covert action operation 

aimed at thwarting INF deployments by NATO. We at CIA devoted 

tremendous resources to an effort at the time to uncovering this 

Soviet covert campaign. Director Casey summarized this extraordinary effort in a paper he sent to Bush, Schultz, Weinberger, and 

Clark on January 18, 1983. We later published it and circulated it 

widely within the government and to the allies, and finally provided an unclassified version for the public to use.’’ End quote. 

I’d like to thank the CIA for digging up this unclassified version 

of the document and providing it to the Committee, ‘‘Soviet Strategy to Derail U.S. INF Deployment,’’ specifically undermining 

NATO’s solidarity in those deployments. I ask unanimous consent 

that it be included as part of the hearing transcript and, since the 

inmates are running the asylum, hearing no objection, we’ll include 

it in the transcript. 

[Laughter.] 

[The material referred to follows:] 

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propooal. They also have hinted in ""tuc terms to West £urop<;:~n 

llovcrnmcntuirc.-nain ''con.::~ssilllls" they might ado!'ll at.th~ iNF 

nciOti<uions in return for treater US hc.:(ibilil)'. 

AI the ume tim.:. Mo$cu.- !t~~ warned !'!A TO of the sc:riell\ con5equenees 

should the US podtion 'fcnuoin unchan2ed in Gc::nc•':l an4 the: Unit~ Sunc~ 

proceed with it~ dc:plc))·mcPtS. Such copsc:qllcncc:$ rrotnbly include; the: 

liftint or their unilateral SS-20 moratorium. deployment of additiollai 

SS-20~ in Eur(IJI<:.. •nd the: dc•·<-lorment of ncu: cruise and ballistic: mis.,il<.-s 

for dcpk.ym~nt QP!l05itt NATO. Thus MoSGOw is lryin: wpcnua<lc the 

Eur.:~~ns tii.M their $c::curily would be bc:llct ~crvcd by it> pto(110Sal for a 

n~issilc subc:d!in.: than by US I !'if deployments offset by CgfTCSPQI!dinl! 

Soviet countcrdcr!o)'mcnt;. 

Alone witll these: ditlfcmatic m<»-c:s. tne Soviou nli¥C :u:rivel)·promoted the 

Eurupan ~peace mllvemem" throuch aze:rc:ssive PTOlXleanda and covert 

activities. They have locu~c:d their efforts primarily on those countries 

scheduled to base th~ new :-:A TO minilcs. with the chid cmr.loa1is on 

West Clt:rm~ny. Their c:ampaign·co~cr~ a whnlc: Sl'CCirum of activities·· 

fr!lm 0\"("tl dforh tu crc:utc::. fear of nuclear war lu <:overt II'IC'Jilltc$. 

including farr.c:ic:s :tnli tfi<in(<>rmation. to put :-.:A TO r:o•-.:rr.ntents in the 

wcrl\pouiblc lir;hl . . 
70 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 35 here 25888.035

Should US clq)to)•menl$ bcstin without "a<:eeptable« p:OflteS$ iq the tall:s. 

tile ~s probably would continue to negotiate, but on a different basisthe Sovi.:t side then WOIIId offer ro trade off its .. new" syS!.QllS ·in ICllchanJ:C 

Cor US lNF S)'Sicms. Ne.c:rtheteu the Soviets probably horx: lhat the 

situation will not deteriorate to tile: (lOin! wf!erc they would find it 

necessary to coumcr NA TO"s deployments with hundreds of' their own 

missiles.. Havin11 aclcnowlcdr;ed in GC~~cva that they c:lCpc:ct NATO to 

procr:cd with its plus, they must have seriously eorttempbted a nr:codaled 

outcome in whicll !'VA TO is allowed 5011\C: level of dc:oJoymcnt. Given thei~ 

panlc:ular concern oYer the Pershine: 11. '"'Soviets mi;:ht c:on.linuc: to C:att 

101" a ban on it. while lfUd&ingly ttet:ptint S<>mc level ofGLCM 

dcpk:l:rmcnt-:r.lbcit sharply redtsecd fr.:~mthc planned 464 launchers. 111 

return. they probably would merely reiterate their missile. subcc:ilinc 

propcsal. tn fac:t.thcy CXHJid insist t!uu a:ty US G LCM deployment 

(:tu~tmenlint: the French and British missile launcbe~t be of(~et h)' 

deployments or addhlllnal Spylct missile: lavn<:bcrs 

B)· late 1983 Moscow sh6u1d be able ca assess wlu::thct an I~ F acrecmcnt 

is pouibtc. If it $Ct:S liulc p1'0$pccl for OR<: and is convinced lhal' rhe :"'A TO 

deployments ... ;n bqin. as sclu:dulcd in· Dc:ecn\bcr 191ll. it prol:iabty .. -m 

bc:a:in imSIICI!'Ienring lite military :ottntcrmca$tof~ foreShadowed lan 

March by Brczhncv and more recently by Aoororoov. In his :u December 

address. lite new Oc:ncral Secretary pledged 10 deplOy :t. new lonc·ranee 

crui~ mil:~ilc if Washington p~OC«ds with cruise missile: deploymc.llt. This 

response could be in t'he form of w:a•btunchcd cruise mi~siic deployment off 

US shores u well as f!round-launc:llc:d cruise missile: deployment Ofli'IO$itc 

NATO. The Soviets also could choose to d"vc:lop 11. .nc;w lP.BM more 

capable than thc:SS·2fl Cot dcplo)'ll!Cllllgainsc We~tcrn Europe. 

Moscow.almost certainly would accompuy such military mO"cs wid-: a 

sbuplr increased cfforl in covert activicie$ in the five INf-basine. coun· 

tries. It probably w011ld fed less constrained tban before ill pr.,motin£ 

demonstn.tk'\ns llnd SUPl>Otting radieal :xacc i!NUI"S. i11cludint; 110me which 

might engage in sabotoEc:again~ NATO fuilitics. Moscow also will U$e 

propapnda. disi,rormation. and sup:>Qrt 10 Cornmunin party and (ron! 

trOvll$ 10 incrc.a~ the political pain or thc &OVC:fnmcnts in the· IN F ·basin£ 

countries. It ,..ill ho:x tlta!this. in turn. wilt c:;~~ullc those coun1rics 10 brine 

prc.s.urc on the Unit<:cl St;ucs to ~cccdc 1u an at:recmc:nt 1h;u eai)S :-<ATfl 

dc;ploymcnt •t a 1ow ·~vel und rnioimilC$ n;du-cliQnS in Sovic:l rorc:t..--s 
71 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 36 here 25888.036

NcvcrtbelC$$. the: Soviets rea·lize that their overt "pcaec:- campaign in· 

Wcstc:rn E111"011C has been tlu:il' most eiTc:ctivc: ta.c:tic:. They 11lso n:cogni:zc: 

that tile peace movement there ha~ indigenous. roots and has :tcq\lircd a 

momentum of il$ own. They will do what they can to nurlUTc it·without 

appc:arint too he2"Yhanded. 
72 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 37 here 25888.037

Key Judcmcnts 

I. Mosrow·s Vitw ofNA TO OcploymeDt Pbns 

II. Soviet Nctctiating:tnd Oven Political Stratqy Until Now 

Nei!Otiatitte Stnlt«Y 

Chlcrt Palidcal Str:atq:y 

1!1. Soviet " ... c:tivc Mcuurcs'' Aeairu; ll':F: The Coven C..mraoicn 

Use of Communist Panics •"" Fr<lftt Orzanituions 

financial SuPDQtt 

Propaca..cb Guideline$ 

Direct lnYOiw:man in Peace Gt:aUII$ 

Influence Thmutb Forciin Mc.dia .ind Disinfnrmacion 

Er.':ctiw:ness or Sovkt Efforn 

I\!. Soviet NccotiatinrOs>tionsiA Mid·IO-Lztc 193} 

Trac!c-of( · 

Suspension 

Wall:ouc 

Merger 

Dro•dr:r Cnmcx• 

v. Future s.,.,;.i'Poeiliat 'Ma--cs 

VI. w~l T:r;,. of Al1'Cem..:., Miliht Mosc:.>w 1\CCCP'! 

vt'i.'i>osr.lblc Scwict PlaAs if NqoliUie>lls mild Politic::tl Mo•c> Foa 

Military 0J)Iions 

Co""rt Me;osurot 

Sicnifit:!IJI lli'F'-Rtl•tcd Evcnll 

Tsblt 

The Missile lloalane< in Europe 

vii 

iii 

) 

4 

4 

s 

6 

6 

6 

7 

1 

II 

8 

II 

9 

9 

9 

10 

10 

II 

ll 
73 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 38 here 25888.038

So•iel Strategy To J)crait 

US JNF OtpiGyment 

A key coal in Moscow's stcurity policy sln.ec 1919 hu 

been to dc~ail NATO'$ pAMiodeplor the Pcn1hin11 II 

m~ium-rancc baUisti.: ml$'iletMR8.Miand doc 

crovnd·lau...:bQd Cfllise missile tGLCMJ. BY blockinc 

t hcse dcp!U)-mcnts. scheduled to bcain in late t 9113, 

the USSR would r<:tain iu eurr«t prcd.lrninaJt« in 

intermediate-ranee: nuctc:ar rarccs IINI'J as well u · 

run her its lone-term objective: of "'Ccl;ertbta: NATO 

and divi<lin11: Wc:sccr11 Europe from the Ualccd Suu:~. 

I. ~;osco···s YicwofN.\TO Dtploy- Plamo 

The s.Mets sa: us dC!>IO)'mcnt or Ike Pcmtlnc !land 

CLCM '"" cnly ;u ;~n c:Cftl<ttoupsctth~ thaltct . 

nudc:ar billaacc. but as an aurmpt tutc"' the cl<lbal 

nuclear balance in fa V1lr o( tile L:nilcd St:tlcs. In their 

View. the ~ymcnl of these SI'SlC:n'l$-v.ith !he 

range a~ a«Urac:y to (lrilt hardcMd largc:l$ deep in 

tbc USSR •• ,.,.ulcl challlt the linboet: l!c:lwccn the· 

atcr aad intctcontincnt:al war 10 lbc aclralltavc of the 

t:mtc:d s,,,.c., \Vithovc rcN>ttlnc to .... .,r;u«Nral 

sys1ems. the l:nucd States would be alllc 10 threaten 

the Suvict llomc;lam;l, inc:llldin& 1 purtioa o( :l;c: 

USSR'$ stratq1c r..rccs snd its «miNind. cno.ttOI. 

and ~ommunic.Ui.>n~ ...,,,.wk IS(C mapt. 

The So•iets ~«I be new t.:S t.)~c...s ouan cffec:Jin: 

covntcc to th•ir SS-lO I IUIM f.,.ee ,.... m&)' btli<:Y<: 

tlun tile scale or"'" TO's llcplo~·mcnts would rto:llify 

the ad•antMIC in eSCO<httioft contRJI that they hac! 

plann<:d 10 SCQII'C with that for«. For c.u.mple. 

Mr.~scnw ...,vld ha...: to conUdc.-that ~ATO. if 

confronted with' a c.>nventiotlal auaek by the Warsaw 

hoct. would be tempted to use its new I~ I' S}'Sicrns 

before they were dc:stroyc4.1fthc5ofkts bclit:Ycd 

~AT() would usc: thc:sc sysCc:ms. they micht feel e\'Cn 

murc cnmoct1cd to la~nC'" a thc::ue:r-widc: pr~tcmplivc 

~trike 

The Soviets probably would c~pea that Pershinr I l$ 

•nd CLCMs .. ·ov.lcl be u><:d concurh:ntb' and in 

coni11nction ..-ilh air· and <c.:~·la••du:d «uisc minil<:> 

V\Lt::O.h &nd SLC,.hl and mile<!' by t•c•ical :uul 

\lratt&k airc<Zfl in :o full·u-•lc IIUclc~r ::tlltlCk. The;· 

'c:e lbc: Pctshine II as parlicularl)' daftJCtOU$. bcc:IIL~c 

its shcm nicbttimc and acc:uncy .. _lei JMkc lt :a 

threat k1 major elemems o( thor command ~ttocturc 

:and $CHlm <If thci• stratqk wrces. wllicll '"L'lllld 1101 

ha~re adc:<;uatc •'llrnina time t<1 «act. In O<:ectnbcj 

[ · .l IIlii MoscO\\ Per· 

d!ll$ ""' i="cAA!IIi {IJ/fi tile """' scri.,.u thrct 10 it~ security,, c.-en moM than the MiMtcm•r. Ill IC&!\.1. 

ba:ausc or the lli&htlimc faCior .. 

The Soviets prob:lbiJ' regard tht Gl.CM .-:s '"' .,rrcc· 

tivc complcm~nt to 111<: J'cr.hint U ia that it wuld be 

u~cclaa:ai11st $lfolqie and tacticallatllCU. that arc ""' 

lime urecnl and. when used ll.'lth sca·l•o~ntloe4 •nd · 

air-launched ~·nils.. "'issilcs • ..-..,ld lC\'CtCit .:.lmrti· . 

catc Savict air C:efcnsc str~lc!!). The: dcplo)ment uf 

both the· l'crsbine II and the: fJLCM ,.,.u!d $criousl)' 

Sttilin Soviet capabilitiolo k>o:at" And utw:k ..:A TO'l 

nuctc:..r mans in Eull>fl<: nrly In u war. From ll 

SOvict'tare.,tinE standpoint. the: OI.CM ,...,ulcl ""'" 

the er~:au::r problem bccaGSc: h wtJUkl be dt~scd 

amon~: five countri<:s. fovt or them dec!> l11 SA TO'~ 

rear ami behind NATO's ;ir <lcfmsc bch • 

II. s..id !':-latina •nd 0. C'fl Polidul St1'11t~ey 

Until Now 

The Soviets ha•c -.,loyccl a muhif3Cded .,,~,.~· to 

achic•c thc:lt INF' artm.COiltrolebjeaivt.5. Tbq· clear· 

ly view the West Europ::~n aavcrn~~~erns as tho k"l' "' 

bloc:Une US INf dcplo)'lftCnt~. Whik: nr&<Kiatinc 

...;tit the Unilcd State$ ln Ocncva, th<)' h•...: earri•d 

out • prupallanda •nd eo.c:n Ac:ticct uffcnsivc:-p.ri. 

marill! fo<:usccl on the pcac:.: movement in WcSicrll 

E.:;rooc-1limilar to tllc:oi'IC chc:r -~eel id 1977-71 to 

~•op NATO f.-- dcptoriqJ enhanced rod"..,tioo we.>p· 

ons. In this cam1>3ia:n the) h:."r nicd bulk uvert o.nd c:ovctt means. lnducctncl'ltS a't u.cU as tlu"ocs. ro 

el(plolt :onti·I:>IF~•ntiment in Well tu ... po:aa a<Wcrn, 

meniS. Perhal'\ tbc mOlt hcdv)-ll•.,dcd IM<'lll intended 
74 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 39 here 25888.039

(or the;e .:overnments: wa.~ contained in :ln intCr"'iew 

8re2;hn., had with D~r SpH'gtt/in No•cmiXr 19&1. 

He said that ~;., order to acutrali:!:c INA TO's) mobile 

mbsilcs it wonld be necessary (fer MO$COwJto deal 

retaliatory urikc:J or II"Cl<l yield attlw: supposed arns 

o( their dcpiOI'rilcnt 

Latct thl<l same month PruidcAt Rcaean aMouncco 

his xctVoptioa propo,<al. "'hi<:n to tht Soviet~· <li:lmay 

was caeorly ""'braced by Wc.<tcrn f.•rOIIC. The ten;) city witll whicb Washineton :!dht:l'cd to Uti$ propOSal 

chninatllc last nqodalinc round probably convinced 

Moscou· t!>:u a new Soviet initiative was needed 10 

bria& further pre:m:rc on the United Statu ;nd 

NATO. Prcvi11us !niti:nivcs-fc~eumptc,the unilat· 

i:r.al moratorium or. S.'i·lO deployment in tilt wcster~t 

USSR ~nd the threat to pol th• Unicod States :~nil 

Western Euro!l< in an ''analoeous" POSition if N.'\TO 

deploys new INF •ystcms-h;.., not yicklcd m""o11r· 

able rc.s.uhs in the nqotiations or in Wc't E.urorean 

capitals 

011c of Moscow's recer\lthrcats was a wamlnz that 

NATO's INFdcploymcnl"'""ld "cccnit:Jtc the sdop. 

lion or a Scwic!ltlune:b-on·"!~•nin~t policy. Tbi$ wu 

imNi~<i ;;; ~ ~b!C11lGnt issued by·thc Novoni P1"dS 

aecncy OD 30 Nov~mbcr lb:lt al)parcndy w~s aimed at 

imimidatine tbc West Europeans. Thi$ threat. HI:.<: the 

other$. probably was counlc:rproduclivt: bcc.3use many 

West E.urO))<:Jin eovcrnmcnu saw it as a rather <:rude 

and dumsy aucmpe 10 pn:.surcthcm to fmco INF 

dcploym<nl. t. 

Nctoriatittg SrriOttfY· 1\hho.uch 8rethnev had hinted 

in an address; lui October lh~t the: SS·20 deployment 

moralorium ntitht tc: lifted sooa .. OcfcnSC' ~inistc:r 

U$Li.nov. in :a. 6 Oc:c:cmbcr incervie""·· :mptie:d rlutt i1 

wu $till in effect. Whatever I he fate of the mor•toti· 

um. Moscow has CJ(hcr diptoma,i-c tapeions to cxp!otc~ 

particularly with the West Euf'OP<;llns. in lilt h<~P.: 

that they win CltCrl prc$$Urc. 0~ '"r United s,ale!f. "' 

ehance its ba rJainin!I positim• C 

In an address 011 21 O<:ccmbcr, General Secretary 

Andropov officially anncupc:cd !he missile subccilin~: 

proposal and emr>l>asiu:d tile redaetiGns thai would be 

made. inelt<dins "'lc:IU oft be latest missiles, \"'-""n in 

the WO<I a< SS-20s;· Tltc Sov;eu r:auld rcdu~c their 

nl issik. !a U!!CMI'\ 10 162 by rc:tir inz 250 SS·-4$ and 

SS·Ss and II SS-l<k Is<:<: cable~ This cutb3ck in 

SS·20s would omounltoonc-thi~ll ol' th.: fon:e in lh< 

Europ;;>n USSR. Altllouch the Soviets ha•c the 

Ol'tion, u:Jdcr their Pt01l0131. of either distmntlint 

tllcir c;xccst SS.20 lavOC'hcrr or rcrn,....,inq cbr~!l. to •he 

eastern USSR. they hav<: hinted f. ...;:z 

willintnc•< 10 dcSifO)" a1 lean !'OniC or then> 
75 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 40 here 25888.040

w .. ,.~d'a 

'll 

119 

.ll!' 

!t~ 

.o. 

~~ 

~ 

•• 

-· 

i I 

I 

I 

i 

! _____ j 

Oral r<>liticol Str41~~Y- n.c $o\'ICIS have l'<CI.III 3 

c.amNien 10 l•ichli.ghl 1hc::it nc:.- l~r: 1oitiatt~·e .and 

Me intcn•ifyin~ tbcir cf(orll In undc<onin~ the NATO 

'tf)klyrucm pl.1n u: I he \S..'c:·u (it:rtll;tU na:\IO.t\al e:1c:c~ 

\iunt :a.fttlflJ;u·h ~ ... \;br~h 

Aruft~;• Sttba:iliac oir; 

MW:Ia Wullcadt 

lfl 

••l -

<16 

. ~ ~ 14l .,J 0 0 

() 0 

tl II 

10 ll) 

- •• •• 

[ 

.. !'::'~!!"!.---~- () ,_'!_. ___ _ 

--~----- 0 

. ~:~=-~-.- 0 6-----

1~ 

•o 

... 

J 

( lJ.•!H:. Soviet• 

have ~ent briclin~; mcmor~•da "" 1 h<lr .tew aflhe · 

INF nc~:otiarion• to m""t o( lhc m,._iu, West cui'Op<:oO\n 

capitals. They pr:>bably believe the)' will have their 

bc:~t shot ar ln1luenclnJ 1\1\i<:d l'<!'h;...,, ;r they •!lpc:nr 

(Q be ncx.;ble in the;. nctotlali('I.,U; 

[ J dhola 

t»C'UpOoc.cnc;n of !'II\ ro·s JN'f dcplurn\C'nl wuuld 

. Utis[y Mo.cow fot the orc><:nl. Thi• co•l bc:c:unc 

mcrc:: c:..-iUc:.n( in c.erly Nov<.tnbcr. whw Qr-cdu·~v sen\ 

a l~ttc-r to Wct.t CettnU\ Chaf'Cc:Uo.- Kohl request inc 

lbal sucb <k:ploymcru Mil niocccd autom,uically be· 

c:.ausc: more time: was f"CC.dcd &o ac::hic¥c tc:sults I( the 

INF n<"COtiatillns. After 111< Brc~hnc• ft~ncral, 

Andropov made a similar requcn in J tncclinlt "'-il.h 

W<l1 G<trm:ln Preside~ 1 Carstens. 
76 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 41 here 25888.041

Tb<l So•icts arc dirc<:tine their efforts primarily toward public di{lloma<:y-tu awcic! riskinr I he adverse 

p~~blic rc:action that would n:o~lt it ..,vcr! opcration5 

...,rc capnsc:d: They arc empbasi'Lille the. carrot of 

Moscow's nceoliadn.r llc;otibility ralllcr than the: sticlc: 

or t~rutcninc retaliation to NATO dcplorme.,u. As 

Cromyl::o's rcecrot ..;sit to Bcmn dcmonstr.lcs, Mos· 

ctrN is sockilll! to prc:$Cnl an imare of caution and 

rcuon. prcsur..o bly to'""'"" the door open for future 

cooperation with the Christbn Oemoct;tts if they win 

the c:lcctions, and to a•oid discrediting the Soda! 

Democratic Party's attempts to broker an arrccment 

on INf bc:tw~cil lhc United Stat<S :and the USSR. 

til. S<,.icl ~Acd•e MC11.$urc:s~ Altoiast CNf: 1'lwt 

Co•Ht C&mpalp 

In '~"' IJaSt three years, in suppoN or its direct 

dipk>matic c:ffom to block dcploymcct of US INF on 

West European soli, Moscow hu conduacd an aml>i· 

tiou.< Cllmp;oicn to leliltratc, manirulal"· ~nd '~tploit 

I be European peace movement. To condue< such a 

ampaien. the Soviets rely on a full ranee or ~1!ed 

..,active mcaJ.urcs---a term they usc to rcfct to a<:t.iYi"" 

:icis worldwide tit& I ar~ intended 10 rramole Soviet 

ro:rit:n policy 10'11< t>ut .. ·hiclt '" hc:)'Ot!d traditional 

diplomatic. propatanda, and militar1 mans. Many or 

tbc ~ctiw: """'surcs curreAtly bc:inc employed in the 

uti-lNf campai1n Ate adal)tlltions of those tb:at 

pmvcd c:frc~ivc in the 1'171·78 campaign aC~:inst the 

"neutron bomb." The KOjiC ad intensity ofthc: 

USSR·· public""" C<M:n camp~ri~ll$ can be <:CI>CCicd 

10 erow as sdi.:dulcd deploymcnl dnlc< apPrO«ch. II 

bas aln:ady surpaucd the sca!c of the anti-neutron 

bomb caml)<li~n · 

(/u .UC_,aisr"P#Irdu lUf4 FiiMr Orfll~:i1:4ti<Uts. 

MOKlOw Las instructed Wesl European Communists 

and the leaders of Pt'o-Soviet lntcrnatiOIIII or~:aniza· 

tioRS to mal;c the anti-lNf' caropairn their foremosl 

cot~Cm:t and has pr<>vided (undine and politial~:uid• 

ance for their J>Cacc movement ar;tivity. 

ThcSotricu 

l)anics sJll,'ocirtQII)' 

hove directed 

to assume 

West 

a leadin1 

furopcan 

rete 

~ 

in orca· 

lli:tlnt: aalin•~lcar dcrnonnralioas and mce:linp and 

lo QOOrdial.lc 'll1cir efforts wilb AOII..Communist p:ac:e 

aetMtlcs. Moscow has been most aetlrc: whh tcjl.tlrd 

to the INf-buina cour~tries. P>~niwlatlr West Ccr- ,...."f· the Netherlands. aad lldai!lm. fot ~:~:~mplc:: 

c . :1 

the West German Ccmmunlat P&rty (Dl<.l'l. which 

lakc:s direction from Moscow and East Berlin. ,..._. 

imtrumernal in oraanizinc •he blockaac of the 

NATO wc:apons arsenal in Baden· Wucruemhcra on 

1·8 AU&vst l9il2 and som" subsequent d"monstrations in Wen Gcrm.tny. 

C: .J the West 

O~Un Com~unlsrParty {Sf. WI functions undet the 

ck>se supcrvidon of the: East Germans. The ~tty 

bas lone contributed an or~~niulionai•UCiflOft llet· 

worl: for local pea.:< activiry th•c allp;lr<:nll)' was 

accepted even by troups thai arc opposed 10 tlti 

~ny idcoloaicall)·. 

The Put<:h Communbt Parry fCPI'II rmintain$ frc· 

qucnt contact with Mmeow and East llcrlin and. 

t:: .1· fCCCIVd 

rceular and detailed guidance from the Soviets a.nd 

Ea>t Gcr,..,ns rc:urdi.n~ anli·INF a-:•iwity. 

c:: .J the head or 

tbc: Bclo~;,n National ActiOtt Comrtlin.:.c Cor Pc1cc 

;olld Dcvel.»metH oCNAPD! and lluec other p:acc 

activim •i•itcd Easl Berlin in utc September 1981 

nt the inYil2tion or !he llcl•l"ki-bU<d World Peace: 
77 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 42 here 25888.042

Council (WPCJ. the maiO< Sovic;t.....,lllrollcd inter• 

nltiO<la! or:;;\!liU!ioa. Tbc CNAPD he.td btct cllscu"ed !•bM (or the 2S October anti-lNF dct110t1• 

mat ion i~ Brutfds with official$ of tho East G<ttr~Cn Em busy. 

..... J 

[_ rq>grled !hot Pel o(fii:ials visitin• Moscow in C'",1 1'981 were sub,lectcd U. hea.vy 

prc.uure to raise SlrOftE Opp('Sition to lNl'and 

•~bscq~~ ardc:tcd rcrlonal pany t.ct:rctaries co 

step up •n•i-INF I>I'OI"li'Ailda alld illldatc dem0<1• 

uruicnl and rm:.rchc:s. 

The Soviet< also a•e usin11. tbcir internalion:t.l front 

cu~uit.aticns to ini1iuc and direct some of the e.nli• 

nucle-ar acti,.oitics in Wc!\aa Europe; :!nd to'try to 

attr~ct non-Communist parcicl~~ants to l<:nd crcdibil· 

i1y to Sov-iet obioctiVQ:: 

• Th< Wf'C is pani~luly acti•c inofanninr and 

,ryinc 10 coorditt:uc: :and conuol antitu.«:lear -.~'livi&y 

in 11\c Welt. Tile WPC's draft ··action ~~-ram·· for 

19~ l provi4c.s ''" Jcvcra! ;nu:rnacionll Qln(c:• 

cnce•-<amc sl>CCilicall)• <ttlltcstcd b~ the Soviets. 

Thi! hichl•ct.l will be the -world Pcar:c 1\:nembly~ 

1'13 nncd lor l S·19 JuM in l'urue: this .:u be 

c.~pc:..t:.Ic.d to fe-ature ~he anti~tNF theme. 

.The So•itH»<::Ced IJitcra~cion•l Union of Studentt 

Ut:S) wa, ""''f"~int. '"' urt.r October 1981 10 attract 

man panici!l>tioo in IUS~t>OMOre<! peace n.ovc· 

rnc.rn »ctivuics 

iH ~4th H 1978. c .:J 

1 d"¢ Soviet c '-·etc c~Jcn Cl::f'iOtmt 1hc fiOUibi.l .. 

"I' c>( ·~••c IIi< Umlcd Nllicn1 Educuion. Sdentif • 

..:. and (ol•.utal Orc•nil•tioo IUNl\SCO! u &n 

un~o~;·iutnc front 0TflliJ.::"Iir11'\ tn FfOf1im.t ~~- ..... d 

..t>.;:ll:tfl:'"""'t"nf 11\(':UI,.~ l. 

.. J •c:c~;.n \O liro.adc.au \C:n.·iect. tf"te a"aib.biUty of 

furtd\ilC (Ot f'IUbltcatd)ns. •nd 1hc- o<hc.t ~tt,~niti« 

•"'~i: .. bh: to ~O\."it:l P<:fSOnr.r1 t~~.·lto could be phacerl on 

the ,tart or chc UN!!SCO !nlornl>lion Sctvicc 

Fi~<ud•l Sllt>P"'l, 1':trc USSR: and i~ EAst Sls<O(.II>..1n 

allies contribute cnn•ldc.cablc fimo..O..I and m:atcrill! 

support covcrtl}'lo the Wen Eu-11 pct.e<: movcmettl throlltrh Communi$t p1.11ics aAd rnun 

oncaniu.tions: 

• The West G.:rrnan Govcrnm<nl pc;blicly d!artcd in 

Doccmb<:r that tbc E:m GCNIIan5 socreU:r PfCI"idc 

mot!' tll:a? $2 miUion a "=!,h 10 the We~ Gc~man 

s;ommuntsl P~.(DKP~\., · 

• l n Octofx.r ! 98 l the Oaclth Government u.pclk.cl 

KGB ofticcr Vladimir Mcrbtlov. a "'>CCni! secretary 

in tile: Soviet Eml;oauy in Copcnb•cca tar. amcng 

other tbint~. usin1 ._ Oaaish journalin aa.:nt to 

manipulate and fund tile D•nish peace rnovcmcm. 

• The World Peace Council wu cio<:n ao cscimat<d 

S6J million by Most'<>- in .,80 ~~d •:.0 rcc~iO'Cd 

conttibutions (rom otlicr Communitl rrartit:s. t'<l<tic. 

"'"'ly i• &stern Eutopc 

• haUan CornmunisJ f>¥rtY offiei~b be:He:vc lhU an 

independent mcrnbc:r of PatJi:ttncnc """•M ha~ otaa~ 

nized a "Gtoup for World !'~cc" and fldblisbe~ 11 

mae.az.inc:. Strut~~ for Pcot'~ .. r.ccce'f"(~ ltt$1n.ti::tions 

and lin~nciol aid from the So--ict 

The SQvi~IS ll.SO fund I lie (1<!1(1; mc•cm:nt <>reilly: 

• ln. :an interview last Mar tn the: Austrt~u fM'C~'S. 

$ovid Ccnual Commiuec: offici~! Vacim Zatladin 

provided details a !lout the ··~·•<t l'nt:< Fvnd" And 

its :Lu~pOl"l t.o \\·c'Stcrfl ('teaCC trOt~fl'\.1fJcli.dint the;. 

WPC: at\d H<i: affiliuet in vat\ous "' .. C''Sl l!urOJ)C:ll'l 

countries . 
78 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 43 here 25888.043

• A. !ormcr Scwict Pace Fund doainnan a$$CI10d in 

an an:idc ln·thc !na:lish-lanc~ Mo_.., ~~~ Ia 

thesprlncof l9&1 t'h•t•hiseli=uindmlcd.~ 

of the ill~national dCI'IIO<:tatic otPIIiU.tioiiS worl:-

inc rO.. peacc~ and COOI'U•tcd with anothct Qlt...U. 

bly '"public'' Soviet orcanlzatimo. dlc Ccnnmiltcc (or 

the OcCcnsc or Peace: (SCDPI r.o ~madc:r f"wllldal 

aid ro orpnlzati<ms. l1'lO<IC(n<:ntJ,aad ~ld.-

l'rl1p~~p11dn G.Utldins. The SovH:Is haw: soucbt to 

direcctllc: focu$ of the WC$1 E~ pcaeo tROVemen! by providlnc Cammu.W:t panics :ud froat «J:•-

niz:atic!Rl with propacanda dtGUl<:S k..")'C(( J.<> loc:sl 

canams and to US and NATO pOiiei""-J:" . - _, 

Sovie1 Peace Committe<: reportedly tried to auil:~ cxiniltr eonecrns that the United Slates wouhl Cater. 

Wcsu:rn Europe to lli:Ccpt mo<c Pc:rsllil'a II mmilcs 

tban orl~inally agn:cd.. 

Soviet propo.pnda cuidancc: also has rcn.eted --

cern abo:lut the a:rowin1 u:ndcm:y amonc Wc:st S..r<>-

pcan peace activist's 10 blame lhc USSR as wdi&J tlt<: 

Vnitcd Sratc$ fOr the. arms race: 

• ~ :J <IK Sovi<.ts told 

Finnisll Communist Party ori'ici•ls last~"'"""' th:at 

the CI'SU Ccn ual Commhu:c: hu issued a dirc«i-<c 

to its departments. a od cmba .. ies to CCil!c<:t lal'otma· 

lion Oil ·-..nti-Soviet phenomena- in West E•tvP<3n 

countti<:S (or use in tbe propaaamb baule OV« IN I'. 

• T'- IV.vl"" repOrtedly told lcadcl"s of tkc WPC in 

t:.. 1 to iry to limit the cffcc:tiVC11C$S cC a 

!"'•~ crooj> tbat had critici:l:od Sooict palici ... 

J)in<tl•..,IKnuuot ;,. P"""" Cr<H~(IL B<:et.usco( the 

urccACY'I>f their anti·INF ca~. the Soviets lmvc 

ri<ked dlscrcditine some: Wcst Europc&n P<3CC &rOUP" 

b:y dir<:cline diplom.&ts and other Soviet oCfld•ls 

abro;~d 10 undertake COVGtl involvcnt<:n\ i• thol~ 

troups· .:2etivilies. Fur c:xamplc: 

• On t 9 N<1VCmbcr the: O..t-;lo pn;ss tci>Orted that 

representatives o( the Soviet Embassy 11110 !lade 

~nissiO~> In thc Ncal!r;.t!a~>ds !lad violatcd-lliplomati: 

rulc5, b.y acttine-di=tly involved in the peace 

"""""""'· 

r ] /llfltt~tau Tltt-1:. F<m:lt• MtNiitJ ad Di•ittl'--

,;.,.._ The Sovicu .-outinc:ly try to.ca:pl<llt thc Western 

~to advance the USSR'• pcae<: mowcmCJ~f 

objc.;ti>t::o: 

• The lcfl·lanine West Germo.n maaa:rine D~~r Spli!-

r:l. ror c:.ampk:. i" a leader i-n publishinz interviews. 

wltb the Soriou, particularly on a.ms control U.Ues.. 

• Thc ICGB. usu•ll:r throu•b fMnt ora•nlutlons. provid,. fundin,; for Wat European media sympathct· 

ie to Soviet interests. f'4r example. late l.u~ year It 

r:rovi<lcd, ¥Ia " Lu«mbour~bascd East German 

front Orf$llil::lthm; the rundin~ to finance the IIC'W 

.,rindnc instillations er tlte pro-Soriet Grc:ck Commu.U..t P,artr. 

• The prcuor(.onS or pro-Soviet European Commu· 

nisi J)lnic:s. a!thourb they have limhod cireulatlon, 

provid<. Jympuhctic coverage: oC the USSR's Po>li· 

cics and activities "'lardinl .nlin10clear issue$. TbiJ 

prevails c•cn on the lowest lev<l. as In tho""" or the 

local <.:omm»nist ~>&rty ncwspopc~ that rcpo.-ted 

daUy on a SoTict peace ddetalion 1ourin2 Denmark 

lut November 

Disinfo:rn .. tion and f'orcerics: are: tttltc:r -:active mea• 

lun:s·• tile Scwicu. and chdt :a.Jlies lHc usina !n the: 

e>.m~»irn acaiout IN F basin1e: 

• In ~"Y 1"82 a forced letter, pul'p')rtc:dly from 

former Sc«ctu)' of State Haicto NATO Se.,relar~· 

Genua! Lum rctardint t>...:lcar arms i:~Sucs. wu 
79 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 44 here 25888.044

circvi.Ucd in 8clciu"' and l.va<:mt.ov<c. II distorted 

NATO au.;lcar $IU.Iqy ~tnd pb~ o« the fear of 

Nl\ TO usc crf nuclear weapon$'" ;t limited '14-a.". 

• The Wc:st Gc:<man Communist P.uty may have 

bcO'I iavalvcd it~ fabric:Ull\t: or di<scmina;la.: " 

parponcdlt official f!Oticl:: cl>at wu por.tCd It\ KO-cral 

arcH crf lloft41n mld-Ntwc:cn!Kr alcrtiac dti- co mcuuR:c «lGnQCfninc che tnaspan o( nudear and 

t:C~~n:ntioRal weapons tbn•u~:lz chi: dey. T1te fol'ltcry 

dearly was iltlcru!cd to iactco.., pU111lc= -n 

about a rr.t;<;r&l acddc:Rt lnwolvillr; a Pc:~nt t 

ll'lUI$pC!tll;:ll' and ltad no buic h•t'aet 

. F.JJ'«r/,_N tl/' S-i.rt EO'.,.,t, It is dirrteut& IO cval~· 

ate lh= n::ll cff«:t <:<f Soviet Jt<:ti¥1: mea..utcC &t d>c 

Wc:~t Eufcpcan pc;a<:"c mOVcmelll. Ckart)·. 0111 all 

appOSiOOa to NATO nllclCJ&r fOtCcS ltlodctnizallon is 

Snvicl inspired. There k good C"idcncc. 11<1...-cvcr, t11.11 

the S<wict• hM...: """eht to aploit ... d maqipul:uc t!.c 

mO¥CmCI>t :o,nd tb3t their covet~ SUJli)Orl lias enabled ic 

10 C'O"' bc,ond its C"'tl ct.;Hithlitics. The tnOSI SV<;CC>~· 

fllllactiecmployt:d by the So-tict•to dace.. howC'ICr. 

probably is tllcJncC$:s:uu <::f1".obasis in l!llbfie •lid 

t>rlr.tc tn«tinp: ..-itb West Eur<>pcans on ~tic CSSR'$ 

oot.?IIS!blc commjtmcr;c to dctcn1c and trrm control iR 

CCAitUI tot~ United States' ..Jiqcd drive toward 

~military •ulltcmaey.- Tbis type of *t>Oiitial innu. 

cncc. opc.r::uion- is dif.ficult \0 counter,. bccauce Man.t 

Wc:u Eun:~p<:>~n• meet with s.,ict offici!JIIs and luc;;~l 

Communi.u ol'rcn. i:on<idcrU.o: this IO be a ..,,.,;marc 

m~• nf abt;oininc in((>lmatiO<> 

Tbctc 11&$. ltow<:vci. bc:cn a pcrcqJ(iblc c:hll nee tc«nl· 

ly in the •nit lid<: of'"""' non·Commqnln I>«"C 

£t0\I'PS toward Su•i¢1 .u<l other Commul>ist support: 

• In Uoc: p...st sil< to·eicht months the Dutch Inter· 

chutclt l'co!;cc CounciltlKVJ ~t .fualiCCd i:tciC 

Crcm tbc So<liCI po<ilion And oQQI rno<C SINRCIY 

foe mut<Utll:lintm:um:nl by East ~"d West. 

• The 8ndsh Campicn ror :q"udar O~mc..t 

~CNOJ rcpo<tcdly will 1\01 Sllp!>Orl the \Vpc;·,. 

-world l"caa: 1\uc:mbly- sc:bcdtdcd lo 1M: herd in 

l'r.lcu.e tb\s June 

fV, Sorice lllct:oeiad"lt 0l'll4ns in Mid-to-lace 1783 

MMCDOir will comtinue lo assess NATO's ~nt 

plans and the: tJS stllllal m the ~t l'lllllld oC 

nCCQI!adons. wbic:h will pl'ltballly last ulltillacc: 

Matda. Altlt.OtrCil site PA:IO&flltion hal t1«11 ;;l!dcr w:&}' 

for,..._ tilt\C. the: r'sM ddiw:ri<:$ of I!'Of cqvipmcn1 

art rcfledukd to artiw It\ WC$1 Ocntull)'. du:· United 

Kinl'fotn, and Italy IKI...,.,n 1\pril :and ~obcr. If b).· 

tlaatlime the: Soviet~ cooeludc: there .... bccft itlsum • 

cat mcwcmcnt in tile NATO ncc<Hiuillt pomion 

~nd cbc)· arc eonrit«:ed thai the t:-;F C'l(lipm<:Rt 

dc:li<tetics ...-ill IJc made. fllc:y llfOb>bh· ..-ill 'lROOIUICC 

an en<! '" '"" SS-20 ..... nncrium ) 

L J 

()urine c£c <ummcr ~ound of tlu; INf c:tlb seven! 

cptiorn would be Open 10 tile Soviet~. They could: 

• Shift their tacti.:. u tlu: lNF talks by a~nll: a 

wi11inc:ncu 10 trade 'uff C<""i" aft<! balllsti!: mlssil<* 

c:urrcntly under clcvdopmcnt :acai~st the GLCM 

:ond Pcrsbin~t II. 

• Calf (or a IORJI SU$fi"''Uon a( the: tails, bbuninc 11\c 

Uoitcd Stues fu< th.: stalc:..,.tc. 

• w,n:. t:t<t of u~e tifkS iN:Icrmit,;ly. with 110 due ~tt 

!Of rcsurnpti<tn.. 

• Call ror racfti"C tltc'INF talts with START. 

• Propose 10 the Wett Eurclpc.an• lbat I•Cl' join the 

lalb or succcst am!lhct venue for til: talb. such u 

1 he Co"fcrCAC<: on Se<:uri\.Y a rod Coof1<(.21t0ft in 

fiufOPC (CSCEI 

Tr•J•.....U. Pmbably tl\c S....ict•' m..., lil<dr option 

• ianc! OllC dt:u tlley lurvcsucrcstct[.. ..) b. :t 

proQOSal to :radc offthcir f'*turc a ... s.cwlllliiiKtic 

lniulla acainS( NATO'r.acwly$lcm •. Thcrcvrrcnlb 

jq vc:: a rt1.u1\bcr of svcb Pf"C'Sr&ms In dc.vd\'J)mc;n,,. 

some of which could be tea<Sy (ot dcplcf'mRI t.,· blc 

with the Communis.\ P;arty o..-t:r lhc iuu<::sof 1hc 

nee<! for dis:lrm•mcnt by beth SUP"tpowcrs. '~"""'" 

foe t1w: peace. fttO""attcn\ in !.ast Ciccma.ny ... n.d 

critic:ism of So .. iet :.ctian$ in Poland :lj'{d 

Afcllamsta•. · 

7 
80 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 45 here 25888.045

19!1 ). In ltis :>ddreu on 21 December. Andll'PO" 

""'<:d ''"'' the liSSR was iellin&" loon.c•r:anee c:ruiu 

mit<Silc and "'-uuld deploy it ihhc United St~ta 

rorvcccdcd wllh PbM (or cr~tisc m~ilc dcplo)·mc~t • .. 

1lr m<tto:hinc their"""" ffSICIIU ~a• inc<~ NATO'$, tile 

Sovicu ntiaht lleek to Chanr.c the wknle fOCU$ o( the 

ftCCIItiDtiOftS.. SO thai thc: _,.,. ... would b<: an limit• 

in~ the n:.w ~~'"''"""or bc.>th ~-while prOicctin& 

their subll:lnliallr dc:plo,-cd SS-20 rorcc. Til:11 UJ<:tical 

shift .:~lei I<<:CP Oft <he table their missile $mba:ilin& 

lll'IPIISOI'. with its cntkcm<:nt of substanti~l reduction• 

in the SS-20 force. They ouiaht '"'"'" tl>en to NATO 

ca<·ernmcats that EurOl>Clln !U!Cilrit~· .... auld be beu...-

•••··cd by the mis$ilc subcdlinc p,_..,, thu by t;S 

I :>:I' t!cplcwrncnu ll\4t<:hed bl' SO"icl CGIInterdeploy-

"•C'nl~. 

The threat uf such S<Jvi<t deployments. howo;.-.:r, 

would not be •vdl received in eurCIII<an a.piuds ~nd 

u•icht ... e6 in~rc.\£c Allied sul>ilort for IN F dqoloy· 

mtnt•. l NF propone~~ts "'ould ch:ar~ctcrizc tbe lhre:ll 

as" Scwict cffool to dh·i6c WcstUft Eur(lpe from the 

l;nited Scatc.s .an4 wott!d ur,t: thcit governments \o 

fullo~· lhrcu~~:h wilL dcplo~·menl1. At rhe same rime. 

bowc'll'cr. 1hc Well European ~"CI'nmc:-nls would Ut'&C 

the L.:nired Statcsro persevere at the 1;-.;F talh •o that 

~ deal mir.ht srill be ncaociawl 

Snpush>tr. 0! the oC.O.C <lntions.thc: sec""d >cem• 

Ieos• Hkely. bcClU>It the So•ic" proba~lf ...,uld feel 

that it ,.·ould 1101 be "touth" CttOUrh. With lime 

n11;nin1 ouo bc(orc N,\ TO dcplormcnt. they :almost 

ccnainly "'Uuld bdi<"c th•t murc ~dinnivc m<:asurcs 

wet< rcq~>ircd 10 impress Nl\ TO wilh the crovil)' of 

lhc ~ihun""n. 

lt~•lku.,t. I( 1.hC)' chm.c h.• •-:tlk uul. tM Suvie's mich\ 

arr:uc in iustific~uion dl&l un&i1tbc United Scntc:\ i"S 

iolu~su:d ie1 ··t..rcainia:r serious!)·.""' there: n nQ nc,c:J 

'" (ontinuc INF !>lb. In "'o•cmbcr they iodiratcdC. 

_ )Yhot the ac~l roucd O( nCEOiiot.lion~ icurrcnili· 

"' •~·"""' "'Qali! be a watersbcd- They alsosceme;! to. be l.1)"ine the: e,toundv.."ttrt ror :trl cvcntu:a:l public 

.:tcctlul\l~nl' or thdr ·•ne:.cibilitr .. throu-ch0u& the nc:e,o• 

tiationt. in contra.SI tu t..'"S -"·intnta;,.bUitr.·· /\t v-..a:riuus 

tltM"S: l:lSI fall Scn•icl I ::'\IF c!dq::IIC'$ :~nd p:tt'l)' orfieiatt 

htntc.d :&I il -alkoul ir tht: t:S poshiun r-:m~ia<:d 

undtanged and Wasliin~tton.lx:.Jo.n INF dCJ11oyr.icat$: 

tout :at 1hc: ,.,._ tirne.t' ;Jf-thc:y i..siC:..ted ck:lt · tbcy would c:ondnuc nqotiations CVl:ll ~rtcr 111~ Unit· 

eel States bc:co n 5Uch dcploymc:niS. 

l.t&viac: th.: t•lk• clearly "'auld be rilk)' tO the 

Sovit:U: Wcs1~n public: opinion mi&hl blll·me them for 

1bc collapse of the ~qotiations. If they feared tbis 

possiblli<y. •her could ""'" thdr willin&ndS to coa· 

tinaclo ne.coliate :at START but malic: II c:lcanllt<t no 

procrcss would be possible in that forum until ISF 

qvClltions were rc•olved. 

A,tt:r/IU. The ida of ncaQJiati,,.v. INF in the STAitT 

fnme11•urk micbl lx: an OS!Iion ui>-:n tn lhe SowiciS. as 

Colonel Ccn<:nl Cherv,... of Lb"' Gcnc,...l Staff recent· 

IJ i."'ldiauc.d ill an iou:n•ic""• wilb .a Wal Ccrm;n 

nev.sJ>aper, At pt<:Hflt. Cr.ervov Of'I'OSe5 1 he idea 

bccaus.c of the need to rC3ch <~n INF smlcmeno 

qvicld.r and I he likdibOOd I hal cornblni"& INF tal~< 

with START would<!cll!lyan I!><F .elution for mMr 

yc:an. Nc:Yc;rthclcu. tlu:: Sov.ica~ mi&bt consider this 

apP<oach if they believed that it had Wc$1 European 

suprort and could llclay Nl'l. TO's dcplo,·mcnt plan~. 

MO$C:ow 'WOukf'bc in ;a aood poJ.ition tr the talks. were 

mcracd. because it hal already li~l:ed tile,...., in its 

nc&odatinc al'flroach. Its r<:d..Ctlon ptOflOSDI in 

START is contin~no on u<> US dcr>l~yn•cnl nr new 

iN!' s)'Stcms The all to bloo looe-raau cruise 

rnissilci a 11d r.irMto~w.rra~c ballis.tk misMic:s i5 f'ovnd in 

~~~ 115 INF ~nci its START pr:)pC)Sah.rt .. ,bjcction 

10 IJS PtOIXml~ in b.:l1h IlK IN I' ullktond START is 

tbar Washinrron is aot looking 11 1he wllolc ~noply 

of wc:;tpon •ptcms ~'Omc;>t:;"hcnsi•cl)·. l>u1 b inccrc"cd 

in selectively limi1iJ»c \:mf~ M~C't)w·• jttt':'leth.:. S\lt:~ 

>' ICIJMs •~>d the SS-2<1 

The Soviets milt" wc.U sec 2u' Jdvat~ta~:C il' •U S.)"StcC'It'\ 

with • ••$tntq:ic·· rnis.sion-·inc:udtnr. (..~ ~·rotw-lrd· 

b.ucd- ~) .. tcms and British and f'rcw.h nuclca: 

forc::.t:......wcrc <JA the fiCil.Otfatitljl lAblc ln. lhcir view 

this could open up opronuuitic• for hork uadinc. 

uac;h D."S ~:tec:urrcd durinc S/\ L T II. und cou1d' m:tkc 

more crc::diblc lh-: Sovicr :zr~tumcnt t!\:u thG1'<" u. 
81 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 46 here 25888.046

(l'\:e1a!t '"'u~des;h: parit~ between E:a:tt at1U \\~sf. U b)· 

late. 191!3.MOJ<co,.· U"' Sl\ TO d~ploymo1111 ~ :> 

c:c:rt::~Jinty and was still int~c:$ted in :.. nepi::ucd 

otucomc. i• mithl bdicvc !bat tllis advltnlage wuuld 

O<Jtwcigb an:r disadVIInl~l~ there might be in Imine :s 

scoar~u: f6rum for JNF. !The SCflllt•lc forulf\ h3S been useful in cx:crtin~, ft;t-cnaac on lhe \\*c$1 Eurogc .. 

3n~. p.~rticu1arly lhe Cio:rm•ns.l 

Rrtffldt:r Ct~~ttut, 1\nuthcr opt ian OllCn to 1hc Sovica 

,. . ...,ld be It> inllitc the Wcot Eurap<aM 10 join 1hc I:XF 

talks or propoSe tl>al lhe t.alkl lak< place within • 

btoOldcr Eun>pc.on fromcwork. such as the CSCF.:. 

Tbr::-:could ~u:uc.thllt &he ncc.ttllaliOAS arc or p.~r~­

mount importuncc to £.,n'i)C;: ond shat .:t.lt ma.jot 

;>Owctf SllGdld be in•"Oivcd. There is no evidence 10 

W¥t:<Sl such:. move. but it would be con~istenl whh 

the lone-term Sovicl Sl1'01"iY or c:lptlalitinc On differ· 

cnccs of view amo.nc. :-:A TO c:cun1ries. The SoviciS 

would clearly .rccocnizc. howcvcr.lhe low likelihood 

or:~::ccptancc b)-' !he West Euro:>r:aru:. pulicvbri}'IRC 

french ""d Brilhh. lor the reason c:iled abo\'C, 

v. f'ucure Sarict Polilitol Mo•n 

The: Soviets wiil ot"Ontinuc vigor"OtJs cffons to inOuen:ee 

I he Wc~l G:rman poSition. rcr.~cdl~ll or "'llethcr the 

elc:ctio:>~ reSult in a COli victory or return the SPOto 

pOwer. They moy be more willing dtcr the ciCC\ion• 

to oUer specific i"dutcmcnts. sU<:h as cased cmicro· 

1io~ for ethnic: Germans ir. the E""· since Ill<)" "i!i no 

lmol)er be cor.s;nsincd by rcluct•ncc: to lt~!p the COl: 

in ics camp&i&n. At the sarnc ti.me, th~y m.1y n:.sun 

more openly 10 imimill~tio:i. pwrlicularly it the cu.t..: 

is vic•o~ious. They mi~~tht strc~'li th:n West Gt:ttn:.n)• 

would tx: more uro•cd than other W<SI Europc•n 

~nunu-ic."' 1oSovict rctaU:nion in the: event or;s nudc:-.at 

cxrh•nec. be~;~ usc''"''' Wc>t Ocnn~cw woule1 ~sc 

PC'ntlin& lb 

9 

Throuihout \Vcstet'n Europe the Smicu -.1\:.inkus.ifv 

tbtir r:ublicc.i'm~l~n agai11~1 Cs l:'oOf dcployrncnl. • 

These ~rr~,.,s :ttc iatCW,..Id in~!2,de: 

• Stcppinr; ur concaet wi1b ~ bro&d SJ)C(trum ur 

l;:uropean politicians. media tCf\tt::SCIIIath'dl. o:hurcll 

icaders. and studcar rtcups.4 with 1bc intention of 

ourvcyine "~ widely •s pOssible '"' ima1e of·Sovi.,.. 

reasonableness 11nd • o:umml!mc:nlto a nce<Niattd 

INF ""'lution. 

• Eft\pluyin£ Pl'OP'li:l!lda,IO arou~e rublic :alarm CWe< 

allcc<d liS intention.< uf =kit~a Europe til<: -nuelcu baukli.::ld" or~ L:S·Sovict connie•. 

• lntJVducing new "peace- inillatlvc;, $UCh 3S !heir 

lalC'$1 t'(opusal {c;r ~ t=-.ctic3) nucfc,u:ftcc tanc.l~ 

Cenwal E• m;:c 

V[. Wh•l TYP<' of AKrH""'nl MiRhl ~lose.,..· Ac:ccpt? 

Throuehout I he O<lotiatilliU tile SO\i'!ls ha•·c insisted 

tbal lhe United St~l.,. forgo ckpla,·"'J'nl of i1s new 

sysaems in an INF ~c.rcemcat. Pri,.tcly, b""'"''o;r. 

they h:~\"C indicated llr.ttt~cf ••!'"! Washington to 

~ro<:e<d v:ith deployment. While they hli\'C not p(\)\'id· 

ed an)' clues as 10 wh3t level t..!" !I TO llcp!oymc.~ 

they mi~llt uhim•lch· actt!tl ...... 

C<carlr tltc Soviets would li~c NATO's ~lun 10 foil 

1hr011rh on iu ()wn. but thct cannot be confideAt 1h•• 

this will baJlPCn. The) probably wo~ld nol "'CICOITfe ;~ 

sitution in which to: ATO fully dcploJcd iu <y<lcms 

&Ad \lu:y fouM h n=ury ,., n;spomt ""llllllulldrcds 

o! chcir o..,n nlissilcs. 8c1wcett these- c.,trern~ CXJt· 

comes. tlley muu lla..: r;i•·en consid«~blc l~ouzhl to 

ali acrccmcnt in which ~A TO ispcrmiuo:d some level 

of dcplOJ/m"•l. Given their r>:,rticufar ::onccrn over the 

Pcrshi'*l f I. they micbl continuo to c.aU for a ban on 

it. while crudein1,1ly ace<;Min& somcb·cf ofGI.CM 

dcpiO)'mcnt-albd• sb.uply rctluccd from 1hc planned 

4&4 laun<:ltcr<, In r<l•rn. the Snvict; r<OI»bly wo"l<l 

merdl' rcilcr•te their miuflc sulx:cilil\~ NO\'>M21. In 
82 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 47 here 25888.047

fac1. they C:!)!Jid inlilt trn.t .. ny v"S GLC~ deploy.·. 

mcnt (aucmc:ntinc tile f'rGIICh ami 8riti$h missil~; 

lunc:bcrsl be .,rru< bt dt:t>oyments of additi«.al 

Soviet missile: laun<:kn •• 

Mmcow would vic"' a nqati:uina outCOI!Icthtl tilted 

the P\:rrilirt~'ll procram as a favor.bk initial step. 

bill it still would be crcatiY c-ncd about 'imitiq 

'(be US cruise: miJdlc thi'Clll, II cculd propose ad<li· 

ti"""l arms contl'<ll meast.ces thlu..,ould scvc:rCiy limit 

air· :tnd sca•l:aunc:hcd eruice miritlCJ. !t miclu de· 

mand tlutt ALCM• be Quafttitatlvcly limited on bc:avy 

bombers (a; they """c: in SALT Uland miahl call f« 

a condnuation or the ban on Sl.CM dcpl<ly•cntth•l 

was nc:tolilatc:d in tltc now-cxpirc:4 SALT II Protocol. 

Tc. J:C:I Wuh;,>JIOII more illlcrcs!Cd In such mcuurcs. 

Mos<:ow milllu wanttn hdchten the viubilit)· of lit 

,_ crvi5e mi"ilc systems (u A ndropov did iu his 

21 Occcmbc:r •d4rom.~icularly as those tystclltS 

al)lll'oach openl!iontl capa~ility. pcthaJ>S as arty as 

late thit year. The S.Wicli probabl~ W<!Ukl b¢ willi"S 

to lllC tither tbc I NF talks or STi\R:r to RC&Oti:atc 

t bc:sc mea-cure'! 

vu. POHibk- So•icl f'lans ir NeJothotlo<os ancl Pallclcal Man:s f"ali 

By late 1983 M'oscow prJ!bably will be able to ju<l&<· 

whcth<t an attrccmcnl is ,...,.iblc and whether any or 

the nec.otiolin& option~ and pnlitial mov.:s ovtli~ 

above would be c:frcctivc: ia pootpt>Qinc or dcr~ili~J 

Nil. To•c d"'ploym<:ot pia..._ 1r the Soviet• arc c.,... 

vinceti tha( the initial dt:f'lormcnt will oo:ur as schcd· 

ulc:d in O..cc:mbc:r. they almost ecnainly ,..;u take 

stepS-fnt imcrnalas wc:il as fotci'n potiey ruson•- to implement -hatcvcr milicat;- tcsponH they"""" 

plaAncd to make once NATO·s dcplu)mcnl actuall~ 

b.:& ins. Til is rcspo""' ,. . .,, fcte$hadow<d jq .'\ n<lro• 

p<>o•s ll Oecembcuddre••nnd In March t98Z. when 

Oru:hnt" thn:atcncd rctali.ltory mcasura th;t ,.'OU!d 

put the Unll..J States and its allies -in an .. naloeoll1 

::><>Siti<oll" if N.'\TO dc:plo)'l:d h~ new lNF Sf"l<:n.s. 1 

Miliro,j, Optla11S~ 

"llh:S .... ~lf~-~~~ ....... !.\... ,~.c?d new etuis.e •issiks and s&~l .. nJaiC: b;dUslic 

miuilc~ U!Jpo,;iu Europe lll\d dcpiO)· a lu~:cr SS. 20 

force. 

• Slatior. suluna.rinct"'lllt• so·launcltcd. Ciuisc mi>-

silcs ,...;.tus C....SU. • • • . . . . • 

• lmtall nuc:tcar-i:a'pable o«ao~ wc;oj;Qn systeM$ in 

Cuba. either .,vc:rtly or COYCI'IIy. 

U.st Call tltc:Sovicu 1tintc4 at the .INF talks that tl1cy 

michl fC$p!JIId wilh dcploymc.nc or a lona:·nnt• mise 

missile « a new ballistic mlnlle. or both. fn his 

21 December Spc:Cet.. Andtopcw hlrhllcfued cite Sovkc 

lan,·rane<: Cfllisc: mblitc pro&r.am as a co~tntcr co 

NA ro·s INF dct>lo¥mCIOIS. probably bccaUk tk 

s)'Stcin u already at Ute nlcbt test :Aa,C. The S..ict$ 

-tly bavo modif&c:d a Y ..:Ius "Nbmarinc IUid " 

'"'"'bcr of 8car borillx:.._a-rcntly 10 ICn'C as platforms fttr a lonc;-nnsc crllisc: missile. wblch coald 

'I>¢ Ufi'C(cd aaahl$\ US lctffrOiy. ff they clloos4to 

d~\'dol)a new I RUM for~~ opposite: &rope. 

il ~hly will be a systcm more gpahlc: than the 

SS-20 in terms oi' payload and accvracy. Another 

Soviet option could be dept..,_.,, or the SS.. 20 in 11«: 

nonltdOSI«n USSR.. whCfe it asuld tarcet the north· 

wcstcta United States: A C.. .11 f'oreicn 'Mia& 

tty off~al me~>H,.no,d thi$ IIC>SStO&ulY 1"41 AucuA.and 

~ S<wict S:. .::1 iw.~ it ht October c:! l ~ J 

The above options seem more pb;usiblc than the 

cmpl.accmc:nt or Soviet missiles in Cuba. Mosca-· no 

doubt nndcrst;ond.~ tb::t such an act ion could brina the 

Sut>Cr~rs to I he brinlr:of a 1\vch:ar eottl'tOtltotion. II 

rrobabtr would calcul:uc thai tbc potilh:ltl C0$1S ill 

e•.._ aad the pot<:ntial tisk or ~r~ilhary .. ...,.,tra~>ta· 

!ioa ~~<illt lite US adminitlration--wbich bas msdc 

inlti~tivct io lhc O.ribhc:an &sln a majo( clement of 

its fftfeien policy-Arc 1101 .. orth ... llatcvcc incrust in 

mi6tat;r or politi<:al lcvctiJC they dtinlc such a mm: 

miRhl or~idc. Moscow p<ob•blr .. ;.., would believe 

thai •uch :on act loti -ld <dull in th" collaP<c""' 

oni"...Cthe INF nceotatio>ru;, but of START"' v'CD. 

Nortetbcku. tbc thtcilt of -mis-s41e ..:0::""'"1•,..,.."",.."' .... Cuba bat bc:cn hinted At i• C.. ']. 

sr- 2 This probaooy •• rar~ Of an ...-.:<all 

5-..~,c, MI'Mh:":£Y '0 blia~ as: mueh Pf"CSSU'"C' ::U fWH'~ 

'" be•r on the U.a01e4 Sta''"' ~od E11t0f><' to........., o(f 

tile >cro option posl\lon. 

10 
83 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 48 here 25888.048

c-rf MAttSI<TU. If lhc ~· cvm:nl slratce>·.fll~. 

tile)• probably will shift dtr focus of tlleir actlvc: 

measures campaie:n. They WJ'II attempt to usc'C...-.:ct 

..,.,';ns to complement militr.C)', <lipiO!IIlllic. an<f ;odhi· 

c:al moves. in an effort to lilnu.· t'"'= pee of dcploymelll 

and to'lc""'P hat the lowest ~>MSiblc level. Will! the: 

Eui·W61 attne<p~rc probably ~ria& by that dmc. 

tbey mi&lll fed even less !'Miitraint .;acainst punuint 

rislc:icr mca$urCS-$>.sch as cnC4ur~eine dernunstra· 

cions and supnoMin.t radical f'QC<: II<OUI'S. some of 

which rnicht cnJagc in sabotage at NATO raci!itics. 

Th< Soviets a110 will use pfllpae~R<Ia, c!isinrwm:oti•'"· 

aftd SUppOrt lO Con\munisl Party >ad front zruups ,., 

inctUSC the pOiitial COStS 10 lht toYcttlfl'l¢1115 of lhe 

ba$ifli! count riC$. They will hope tllat thk In ium, ..,;n causr. those countriC$ 10 U!EC: the t:nitcd S11IIC'i 10 

ac.:cdc to-.n 31ttcemc:nt that caps Ni\ TO d~plo>~nc:nts. 

~· a tow h::v~ :u~d minimit..:' r.Ovaicns in So•·kt 

rm..,s. 

ln the Nc:bcdands. the Soviets c.m b<: c"peclcd ~~ 

intcmti!y thci' active mcuun:s with'"" Curnmunist 

Party and iu fronts in the pcriocllnt:lint up to a 

Outc:h dccisianuc:hedulc<f fur lat~ 19831 on I~F 

dc:ploymcnt. Soviet l)t'I!$Sarc 011 tile U:.li:sn Commu· 

nist Party •o intensify •upport uf tn. ;xace mo<cmc:nl 

undoublc:dly wilt inc:rca.sc ~JIM initt•l ClLCM (:(lUlpmO>t dolivcrics to ltal)·ia Och>bc<<lro"' 11c:>r. The 

Suvicts arc c:ul'tclu[y opcratine uodcr 3 liabililr in 

haly, l!owcvct, sine<: their public: lrru:tc tiler~ 113s 

suffered badly ns " re<ult of ancaalions of Soviet 

i!\\'OiYr"""nt in the attempted ~S11iina.t1art N the 

f'opc -

II 

T\lc C...mpaian tcr Nuclear l>iarmafM!!IIIu ~ 

tainlaa politia).dou( in the Uftitc:d..ICiRl!do.n:"'i'Q 

Soviet:<' abilil:r tO lnRucn~ it apJ>c:lr- 'o k C.'ltrcmcl1• 

limited. but lhq will da WTI'lit tht!j.-l!an to SVPPon it. 

pa«i<:ularly '" ~ projo:~I!CI Gt.C~ dcpiO}'ment d<u.: 

(D«c:mkrt :li'J'I'Oilch~. The: Sovi~u Cllln alw k ex· 

pc:c:tcd ta .ancm~tiO perwadc l~tfdst JlliUpS 10 thr<tw 

their supfiOI't khlnd the CNI>. 

Thr. Sovicu probably "'ill be arcrul, IIOWcvct. 1101 tu 

110 too far with 1hcir ac:ti.-c measures eaml>&ii:n. Tbc) 

arc aw:nc that strMa aatinudear -.:menu. .:,.;ou in 

.all'the INF·basinc c:ouatriclr ICJAl<IJK hal)l. ""C'Cllillt· 

out Soviet Or (;'ommunm involvement. Thq·also 

rcatl.tc d~at, by trcadinc &:<tmulty. 1hcr c:an PI'Olit 

r rom thc:sc movement•. ;.,hldt lla¥C ken a<CKISCc! b)· 

.. cit;lucncd East-West IC1'1sions ~od crater nublic: 

a ..... rc:nc:ss <>f nlldcar ~I'OM·pfO&rJUI>s afrcctin11 

WcA Europmo COUfttries. For thuc: fCUCins the s...;. ets t~tobably will continue 10 rc:ly mon: nn 0\'Crt 

political mc:asurcs. whi~b h:ti'C pt•wt:d to be o!telr n1u<t 

cf(ccti"c JCtiviti,,. 
84 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER


Insert offset folio 49 here 25888.049

Appen<llx 

Slf(.lliticanl INF-Related Event~ Scbedutc..t for-1!83 

l1 Januuy 1:-IFtRound IVtresumes 

30 Jan uarv-1 0 Febru~ ry Viec Prcsidcllt Buslt ·, Eur-n trip bccins in Bonll: includ.,. a visit to IN F an..! 

START aegoti:U.IOII$ 

t Fd:iruar} Sc:ssloa I)( tile ON Commitlce on Disarmament bq:in~ in G~v" 

14 February Mcctint of NATO's Ss>«ial C<!li>Sultau"" Group <SCGI 

6 March Ela:1iom in Wcst GcrmaiiJ' 

Mord> NATO Nuclear Planninc Group ministerial mcctint: In l'urltllll 

Much Williarmb11r1 •ummic 

Late: March INF (Round IVJ end> 

Mueh·Ap~il Cf'SU Ccncral Committee meets 

AllFll (71 Vote.~ on INf' infnslroelurc !undine to be held in lklaium. DenmArk. and th~ 

S.etlocrbnds 

April ,, Fint GLCM cquipmcru arrives in U1titcd Kincdom 

9-IOJunc NATO Forcian Minblcn· meeting in f>Jrb 

Ju .. c lNF (Roand VI r""umes 

June Fim ~crsllill& II equipment arrlva In Wcsl Germ~ny 

AtJtU$1 INF CR011nd VI end~ 

October First GLCM oquipmct~t arriYCs in lltly 

!'<Ottcmbcr SA TO Nucl<;u Pk~tninc G«Np miRiStcrial mcetine in Canada 

4 Oc<:cmbcr S!>O Jr.Ortr ccm11.n:s• in West Germany 

December S.:hcdulc<l initial opcratlonalc:apability rQI' l"ctShint. ll ito West Gcr""'"f :.ond 

Gl.C\1 in the: l:ni1cd ll:incllom 

I) 
85 

Senator COTTON. Director Pompeo, earlier this year, Dr. Roy 

Godson testified that he believed that Russia was using active 

measures and covert influence efforts to undermine our nuclear 

modernization efforts, our missile defense deployments, and the 

INF Treaty in keeping with these past practices. 

To the best of your ability in this setting, would you agree with 

the assessment that Russia is likely using such active measures to 

undermine U.S. nuclear modernization efforts and missile defenses? 

Director POMPEO. Yes. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

As I mentioned earlier, the FY17 Intelligence Authorization Act 

included two unclassified provisions that I authored. One would be 

re-starting that old Active Measures Working Group. A second 

would require additional scrutiny of Russian embassy officials who 

travel more than the prescribed distance from their duty station, 

whether it’s their embassy or a consulate around the United 

States. 

In late 2016, when that bill was on the verge of passing, I personally received calls from high-ranking Obama administration officials asking me to withdraw them from the bill. I declined. The 

bill did not pass. It passed last week as part of the FY17 spending 

bill. 

I did not receive any objection from Trump administration officials, to include from our intelligence community. Director Coats, 

are you aware of any objection that the Trump administration had 

to my two provisions? 

Director COATS. No, I’m not aware of any objection. 

Senator COTTON. Director Pompeo. 

Director POMPEO. None. 

Senator COTTON. Do you know why the Obama administration 

objected to those two provisions in late 2016, I would add, after the 

2016 presidential election? 

Director COATS. Well, it would be pure speculation. I don’t—I 

couldn’t read—I wasn’t able to read the President’s mind then and 

I don’t think I can read it now. 

Senator COTTON. Thank you. 

I’d like to turn my attention to a very important provision of law 

I know that you’ve discussed earlier, Section 702. Director Rogers, 

it’s my understanding that your agency is undertaking an effort to 

try to release some kind of unclassified estimate of the number of 

U.S. persons who might have been incidentally collected using 702 

techniques. Is that correct? 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, we’re looking to see if we can quantify 

something that’s of value to people outside the organization. 

Senator COTTON. Would that require you going in and conducting 

searches of incidental collection that have been previously 

unexamined? 

Admiral ROGERS. That’s part of the challenge, how do I generate 

insight that doesn’t in the process of generating the insight violate 

the actual tenets that—— 

Senator COTTON. So you’re trying to produce an estimate that is 

designed to protect privacy rights, but to produce that estimate 

you’re going to have to violate privacy rights? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

86 

Admiral ROGERS. That is a potential part of all of this. 

Senator COTTON. It seems hard to do. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. That’s why it has taken us a period 

of time and that’s why we’re in the midst of a dialogue. 

Senator COTTON. Is it going to be possible to produce that kind 

of estimate without some degree of inaccuracy or misleading information or infringing upon the privacy rights of Americans? 

Admiral ROGERS. Probably not. 

Senator COTTON. If anyone in your agency or, for that matter, Director McCabe, in yours, believes that there is misconduct or privacy rights are not being protected, they could, I believe under current law, come to your inspector general, come to your general 

counsel. I assume you have open door policies? 

Admiral ROGERS. Whistleblower protections in addition, yes, sir, 

and they can come to you. 

Senator COTTON. And they can come to this Committee. 

Admiral ROGERS. They can come to the Committee. 

Senator COTTON. So four—at least four different avenues—I’m 

probably missing some—if they believe there are any abuses in the 

Section 702 program. 

Director MCCABE. And anyone in their chain of command. 

Senator COTTON. I would ask that we proceed with caution before 

producing a report that might infringe on Americans’ privacy rights 

needlessly and that might make it even that much harder to reauthorize a critical program, something that, Director McCabe, your 

predecessor last week just characterized, if I can paraphrase, as a 

must-have program, not a nice-to-have program. 

Thank you. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Senator Cotton. 

Senator Harris. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

Acting Director McCabe, welcome. I know you’ve been in this position for only about 48 hours and I appreciate your candor with 

this Committee during the course of this open hearing. 

Director MCCABE. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator HARRIS. Until this point what was your role in the FBI’s 

investigation into the Russian hacking of the 2016 election? 

Director MCCABE. I’ve been the Deputy Director since February 

of 2016. So I’ve had an oversight role over all of our FBI operational activity, to include that investigation. 

Senator HARRIS. And now that you’re Acting Director, what will 

your role be in the investigation? 

Director MCCABE. Very similar, senior oversight role to understand what our folks are doing and make sure they have the resources they need and are getting the direction and the guidance 

they need to go forward. 

Senator HARRIS. Do you support the idea of a special prosecutor 

taking over the investigation in terms of oversight of the investigation, in addition to your role? 

Director MCCABE. Ma’am, that is a question for the Department 

of Justice and it wouldn’t be proper for me to comment on that. 

Senator HARRIS. From your understanding, who at the Department of Justice is in charge of the investigation? 

LAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

87 

Director MCCABE. The Deputy Attorney General, who serves as 

Acting Attorney General for that investigation. He is in charge. 

Senator HARRIS. And have you had conversations with him about 

the investigation since you’ve been in this role? 

Director MCCABE. I have. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator HARRIS. And when Director Comey was fired, my understanding is he was not present in his office. He was actually in 

California. So my question is: Who was in charge of securing his 

files and devices when that—when that information came down 

that he had been fired? 

Director MCCABE. That’s our responsibility, ma’am. 

Senator HARRIS. And are you confident that his files and his devices have been secured in a way that we can maintain whatever 

information or evidence he has in connection with the investigation? 

Director MCCABE. Yes, ma’am, I am. 

Senator HARRIS. It’s been widely reported, and you’ve mentioned 

this, that Director Comey asked Rosenstein for additional resources. And I understand that you’re saying that you don’t believe 

that you need any additional resources? 

Director MCCABE. For the Russia investigation, ma’am, I think 

we are adequately resourced. 

Senator HARRIS. And will you commit to this committee that if 

you do need resources, that you will come to us, understanding 

that we would make every effort to get you what you need? 

Director MCCABE. I absolutely will. 

Senator HARRIS. Has—I understand that you’ve said that the 

White House—that you have not talked with the White House 

about the Russia investigation. Is that correct? 

Director MCCABE. That’s correct. 

Senator HARRIS. Have you talked with Jeff Sessions about the investigation? 

Director MCCABE. No, ma’am. 

Senator HARRIS. Have you talked with anyone other than Rod 

Rosenstein at the Department of Justice about the investigation? 

Director MCCABE. I don’t believe I have, not recently; obviously, 

not in that—not in this position. 

Senator HARRIS. Not in the last 48 hours? 

Director MCCABE. No, ma’am. 

Senator HARRIS. Okay. What protections have been put in place 

to assure that the good men and women of the FBI understand 

that they will not be fired if they aggressively pursue this investigation? 

Director MCCABE. Yes, ma’am. So we have very active lines of 

communication with the team that’s—that’s working on this issue. 

They have some exemplary and incredibly effective leaders that 

they work directly for. And I am confident that those—that they 

understand and are confident in their position moving forward on 

this investigation, as my investigators and analysts and professional staff are in everything we do every day. 

Senator HARRIS. And I agree with you. I have no question about 

the commitment that the men and women of the FBI have to pursue their mission. But will you commit to me that you will directly 

communicate in some way—now that these occurrences have hapLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

88 

pened and Director Comey has been fired, will you commit to me 

that, given this changed circumstance, that you will find a way to 

directly communicate with those men and women to assure them 

that they will not be fired simply for aggressively pursuing this investigation? 

Director MCCABE. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. 

And how do you believe we need to handle, to the extent that it 

exists, any crisis of confidence in the leadership of the FBI, given 

the firing of Director Comey? 

Director MCCABE. I don’t believe there is a crisis of confidence 

in the leadership of the FBI. I suppose that’s somewhat self-serving, and I apologize for that. 

[Laughter.] 

You know, it was completely within the President’s authority to 

take the steps that he did. We all understand that. We expect that 

he and the Justice Department will work to find a suitable replacement and a permanent director, and we look forward to supporting 

whoever that person is, whether they begin as an interim director 

or a permanently selected director. This organization in its entirety 

will be completely committed to helping that person get off to a 

great start and do what they need to do. 

Senator HARRIS. And do you believe that there will be any pause 

in the investigation during this interim period, where we have a 

number of people who are in acting positions of authority? 

Director MCCABE. No, ma’am. That is my job right now, to ensure that the men and women who work for the FBI stay focused 

on the threats, stay focused on the issues that are of so much importance to this country, continue to protect the American people, 

and uphold the Constitution. And I will ensure that that happens. 

Senator HARRIS. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Director MCCABE. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you. 

Senator King. Second round, five minutes each. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to go back to the question I asked you, Director Pompeo. 

And I went out and reviewed the response that you gave to me. 

And of course, what I’m concerned about is the Sally Yates warning 

to the White House that Michael Flynn could be blackmailed by the 

Russians. 

And you said you didn’t have any first-hand indication of it. Did 

you have any indication—second-hand, any sense at all that the 

national security adviser might be vulnerable to blackmail by the 

Russians? That is a yes or no question. 

Director POMPEO. It’s actually not a yes or no question, Senator. 

I can’t answer yes or no. I regret that I’m unable to do so. You have 

to remember this is a counterintelligence investigation that was 

largely being conducted by the FBI and not by the CIA. We’re a 

foreign intelligence organization. 

And I’ll add only this. I was not intending to be clever by using 

the term ‘‘first-hand.’’ I had no second-hand or third-hand knowledge of that conversation either. 

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Senator WYDEN. So with respect to the CIA, were there any discussions with General Flynn at all? 

Director POMPEO. With respect to what, sir? He was for a period 

of time the National Security Adviser. 

Senator WYDEN. Topics that could have put at risk the security 

and the well-being of the American people. I mean, I’m just finding 

it very hard to swallow that you all had no discussions with the 

National Security Adviser. 

Director POMPEO. I spoke with the National Security Adviser. He 

was the National Security Advisor. He was present for the daily 

brief on many occasions and we talked about all the topics we 

spoke to the President about. 

Senator WYDEN. But nothing relating to matters that could have 

compromised the security of the United States? 

Director POMPEO. Sir I can’t recall every conversation that I had 

with General Flynn during that time period. 

Senator WYDEN. We’re going to ask more about it in closed session this afternoon. 

Admiral Rogers, let me ask you about a technical question that 

I think is particularly troubling and that is the SS7 question and 

the technology threat. Last week the Department of Homeland Security published a lengthy study about the impact on the U.S. government of mobile phone security flaws. The report confirmed what 

I have been warning about for quite some time, which is the significance of cyber security vulnerabilities associated with a Signaling System 7. 

The report says that the Department believes, and I quote, ‘‘that 

all U.S. carriers are vulnerable to these exploits, resulting in risks 

to national security, the economy, and the Federal Government’s 

ability to reliably execute national security functions. These 

vulnerabilities can be exploited by criminals, terrorists, and nationstate actors and foreign intelligence organizations.’’ 

Do you all share the concerns of the Department of Human—the 

Homeland Security Department about the severity of these 

vulnerabilities and what ought to be done right now to get the government and the private sector to be working together more clearly 

and in a coherent plan to deal with these monumental risks. These 

are risks that we are going to face with terrorists and hackers and 

threats. And I think the Federal Communications Commission has 

been treading water on this and I’d like to see what you want to 

do to really take charge of this and deal with what is an enormous 

vulnerability to the security of this country? 

Admiral ROGERS. Sure. I hear the concern. It’s a widely deployed 

technology in the mobile segment. I share the concern. The Department of Homeland Security in their role kind of is the lead Federal 

agency associated with cyber and support from the Federal Government to the private sector, has overall responsibility here. 

We are trying to provide at the National Security Agency our expertise to help generate insights about the nature of the vulnerability, the nature of the problem, partnering with DHS, talking to 

the private sector. There’s a couple specific things from a technology standpoint that we’re looking at in multiple forms that the 

government has created partnering with the private sector. 

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I’m not smart, I apologize, about all of the specifics of the DHS 

effort. I can take that for the record if you’d like. 

Senator WYDEN. All right. I just want to respond before we break 

to Senator Cotton’s comments with respect to Section 702. Mr. Director, glad to see my tax reform partner back in this role. You 

know, Mr. Director, that I think it’s critical the American people 

know how many innocent law-abiding Americans are being swept 

up in the program. 

The argument that producing an estimate of the number is in 

itself a violation of privacy is I think a far-fetched argument. It has 

been made for years. I and others who believe that we can have 

security and liberty, that they’re not mutually exclusive, have always believed that this argument that you’re going to be invading 

people’s privacy doesn’t add up. 

We have to have that number. Are we going to get it? Are we 

going to get it in time so we can have a debate that shows that 

those of us who understand there are threats coming from overseas, and we support the effort to deal with those threats as part 

of 702, that we are not going to have Americans’ privacy rights indiscriminately swept up. 

We need that number. When will we get it? 

Director COATS. Senator, as you recall, during my confirmation 

hearing we had this discussion. I promised to you that I would, if 

confirmed—and I was—go out to NSA, meet with Admiral Rogers, 

try to understand, better understand, why it was so difficult to 

come to a specific number. I did go out to NSA. I was hosted by 

Admiral Rogers. We spent significant time talking about that. 

And I learned of the complexity of reaching that number. I think 

the statements that had been made by Senator Cotton are very relevant statements as to that. Clearly, what I have learned is that 

a breach of privacy has to be made—against American people, have 

to be made in order to determine whether or not they breached privacy. So, there is a anomaly there. There are issues of duplication. 

I know that a—we’re underway in terms of setting up a time 

with this Committee, I believe in June, as early as June, to address, get into that issue and to address that and talk through the 

complexity of why it’s so difficult to say. This is specifically when 

we can get you the number and what the number is. 

So we are committed to a special meeting with the Committee to 

try to go through this, this particular issue. But I cannot give you 

a date because—and number, because I understand the complexity 

of it now and why it’s so difficult for Admiral Rogers to say this 

specific number is the number. 

Senator WYDEN. I’m well over my time. The point really is privacy advocates and technologists say that it’s possible to get the 

number. If they say it and the government is not saying it, something is really out of sync. You’ve got people who want to work 

with you. We must get on with this and to have a real debate about 

702 that ensures that security and liberty are not mutually exclusive, we have to have that number. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator King, I understand you have a question. 

Senator KING. Thank you, Senator. 

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If this hearing had been held two weeks ago, we’d be spending 

the last two hours talking about North Korea. And I think we 

ought to pay some attention to that. Director Pompeo and Director 

Cardillo, could you give us an update on the North Korea situation, 

the nature of the threat, whether some of the pressure that we 

were feeling two and three and four weeks ago has relieved? Is 

there anything going on that should either concern or make us feel 

better about that situation? 

Director Pompeo. 

Director POMPEO. Senator, I don’t see anything that should make 

any us feel any better about this threat. We have a threat from 

flashpoints that something could spark and have a conventional 

war, right, wholly apart from the issues we talk about with ICBMs 

and nuclear, just a well-armed adversary that our Department of 

Defense works hard to make sure and mitigate against. Those risks 

remain. 

The leader continues to develop, test, attempt to verify, not only 

in the launches that we see, many of which have failed, but learned 

from each one, but continue to develop software that improves day 

by day. This threat is very real. 

We should not all focus simply on the ICBMs either. American 

interests are held at risk today by shorter-range missiles in theater, enormous American assets. 

Senator KING. Seoul is held at risk by artillery. 

Director POMPEO. Seoul is held at risk. We have enormous American interests in and around the region in Seoul. 

So, no, I wouldn’t say that, in spite of the fact that it has fallen 

out of the headlines for the moment, that there’s any decreased 

risk associated with the threat from Kim Jung Un. 

Senator KING. There was some discussion after—again, about 

two weeks ago, of entering into some kind of discussions with the 

North Koreans. Has anything—can you report anything on that 

front? 

Director POMPEO. Sir, there are none that I’m aware of related 

to trying to talk Kim Jung Un away from his nuclear missile program. We have taken actions at the Agency. I’ve stood up a Korean 

Mission Center to draw the best minds, the most innovative, creative people from across our Agency, and I’m sure we’ll have others 

join in from across the intelligence community, to try and focus this 

effort so that we can get back on our front foot with respect to foreign intelligence collection against the North Koreans and the capacity to impact what Kim Jung Un is actually doing. 

Senator KING. On that latter point, would you agree that the 

path to influence is through China? 

Director POMPEO. I think it’s among our most productive paths 

and one that I know the President’s committed to working, as is 

Secretary Tillerson. 

Senator KING. Thank you very much. 

Admiral Rogers—— 

Director CARDILLO. Senator King—— 

Senator KING. Yes, please. 

Director CARDILLO. May I just chime in? I was in front of you in 

closed session a couple of weeks ago giving you great detail about 

the threat you’ve just highlighted. What you’ll hear this afternoon 

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is just the continuation of what I was briefing a couple of weeks 

ago. 

So I would agree with the Director that this is—this threat has 

not only been sustained, it’s continued to grow. 

Senator KING. Because it’s fallen out of the headlines doesn’t 

mean it’s not—— 

Director CARDILLO. That’s correct. It’s still our highest priority. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Director COATS. It is the highest priority, one of the highest, if 

not the highest, priority of the intelligence community at this time. 

A great deal of effort is being spent relative to how we can even 

better assess the situation and provide all the relevant intelligence 

to our policymakers. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Two final questions. Admiral Rogers, the reason I was late this 

morning, we had a very informative hearing in Armed Services on 

cyber with Jim Clapper and Admiral Stavridis and General Hayden. The upshot of that hearing was that we still don’t have a doctrine. We still don’t have a policy. We still don’t really fully understand—you would concur, I assume, that cyber’s one of the most serious threats we face? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. And do we need to have a policy and a deterrent 

policy and something further than what we have now, which is 

kind of an ad hoc response to events? 

Admiral ROGERS. Right, it tends to be a case-by-case basis. Yes, 

sir, I agree. And we spoke about that when I testified before the 

SASC last week, as a matter of fact. 

Senator KING. And Senator McCain said what’s the impediment? 

Why can’t we get there? Is it the structure of our government? 

We’ve got too many people thinking about this? What is it going 

to take to get us to the point of having a doctrine that will guide 

us in this incredibly important era? 

We are seeing the notion of warfare change before our eyes. 

Admiral ROGERS. Sir, I don’t have any easy answer for you. My 

role in life, not speaking now as the Director of NSA, but as the 

commander of the United States Cyber Commander, is to be operational commander. So I don’t develop policy. I play a role on the 

doctrine side, trying to provide an operational perspective. 

Senator KING. Well, I hope from your position, though, you would 

be—— 

Admiral ROGERS. Oh, yes, sir. 

Senator KING [continuing]. Telling the Administration and everyone you can think of, because—— 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING [continuing]. I do not want to go home to Maine 

and say, well, we talked a lot about this but we didn’t do anything, 

and when the electric system went down, you know, we might’ve 

been able to prevent it. 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. Director Pompeo, a final question. Do you think 

that Russian activity in the 2016 election was a one-off? 

Director POMPEO. No, sir. 

Senator KING. This is a continuing threat, is it not? 

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Director POMPEO. Yes, sir. 

Senator KING. And things that they learned in this election 

they’re going to apply in—in 2018, 2020, and beyond? 

Director POMPEO. Yes, sir. And I hope we learn from it as well 

and we’ll be able to more effectively defeat it. 

Senator KING. And I believe that’s why the work of this Committee and others is so important, because we’ve got to understand 

what they did, how they did it so that we can deal with it in the 

future. Would you agree? 

Director POMPEO. Yes, Senator, I would. 

Senator KING. Thank you very much. 

Director COATS. Senator King, if I could just add to that. I think 

making this as transparent as possible, not only to our own public, 

but throughout democratic nations that are facing this threat. The 

more we inform our people of what the Russians are trying to do 

and how they’re trying to impact our thinking and our decisions 

relative to how we want to be governed and what kind of democratic institutions that we want to preserve, the better. 

So, my hope is the Russians have overstepped here to the point 

where people will say we absolutely have to do something about it 

and we have to put deterrent efforts in place as well as potentially 

offensive efforts. 

Senator KING. Well, I think your point about open hearings and 

education is incredibly important. You and I were in the Ukraine 

and Poland just about a year ago and what they told us over there 

was that the best defense—they can’t shut down their TV networks, they can’t turn off the internet. The best defense is if the 

public knows what’s happening and they say, oh, it’s just the Russians again. And we have to reach that level of knowledge in this 

country. So I completely agree and hope that as much of our work 

as possible can be done in open hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Senator King. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much. Thank you all for your service. 

Thank you to all the men and women of all 17 agencies for the incredible service they provide to the people of the United States, 

keeping them safe, doing things that most people in America will 

never know nor be able to fully appreciate. 

Mr. McCabe, a special thank you for stepping up to the battlefield promotion and representing your agency quite well here. 

This part of the hearing will be adjourned. And gentlemen, you 

have about an hour and six minutes and we’ll see at the other 

room. Thank you. Meeting’s adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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Supplemental Material 

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Office of the Assistant Attorney General 

The Honorable Richard M. Burr 

Chairman 

The Honorable Mark Warner 

Vice Chairman 

Select Committee on Intelligence 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Legislative Affairs 

K'Oslrington, D. C. 20530 

FEB 1 Z 2018 

Please find enclosed responses to questions arising from the appearance before the 

Committee of FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe on May 22,2017, at a hearing concerning 

worldwide threats. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present oUl' views. Please do not hesitate to contact this 

office if we may be of additional assistance to you. The Office of Management and Budget has 

advised us that from the perspective of the Administration's program, there is no objection to 

submission of this letter. 

~~ 

~en E. Boyd 

Assistant Attorney General 

EnclosUl'e 
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RESPONSES OF 

ANDREW MCCABE 

DEPUTY DmECTOR 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

To QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD 

ARISING FROM A HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

CONCERNING 

WORLDWIDE THREATS 

MAY22,2017 

Questions from Senator Harris: 

(U) As you may be aware, it has been reported that when the FBI learned that the Democratic 

National Committee (DNC) was hacked, it falled to reach out to DNC leadership directly, and 

instead called the Committee's IT "help desk." (See, e.g. The New York Times, "The Perfect 

Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S.," Dec. 13, 2016). 

1. Is the press characterization accurate? If not, please characterize FBI's notification efforts and 

timeline accurately. 

Response: 

(U//FOUO) The timeline and characterization of the FBI's notification efforts to the 

Democratic National Con11l1ittee ("DNC") in the referenced New York Times article is 

incomplete. FBI began its notification efforts to the DNC on 06 August 2015 after FBI 

received reporting that the DNC was compromised by the advanced persistent threat actor 

referred to as Cozy Bear. After FBI requested to speak with the individual responsible for 

maintaining the IT systems, DNC referred the FBI to its Director ofiT Yared Tamene. He 

was quickly identified to be the appropriate person to receive victim notifications on behalf 

of the DNC. The FBI was not initially aware that Tamene was a contract employee. His 

status as a contractor was not an issue because the DNC Chief Operating Officer Lindsey 

Reynolds, Technology Director Andrew Brown, DNC counsel Graham M. Wilson and DNC 

counsel Michael Sussmann were fully aware of the details of the compromise, and the fact 

that Tamene was the FBI's primary point of contact tlrroughout the investigation. DNC 

executive management endorsed the FBI communicating technical details of the compromise 

with Tamene. 

(U//FOUO) FBI provided DNC with two compromised IP addresses during this initial 

notification, indicated the DNC could potentially be a victim or a future victim of an ongoing 
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e-mail spear-phishlng campaign, and advised the activity may be related to open source 

threat reporting under the names Miniduke and Minidionis. FBI had no reason to believe the 

information was·not being handled appropriately, or that an in-person notification was 

warranted. 

(U//FOUO) FBI's ini~al notification to DNC followed FBI's well-defined procedures for 

conducting expeditious notification to victims via the most reliable method available. FBI 

typically notifies the ''individual, organization, or corporation that is the owner or operator of 

the computer at the point of compromise or intrusion" as they are in the best position to take 

inunediate action on the information provided. On multiple occasions thereafter, FBI 

requested to be connected with the individual in charge of the IT systemnt DNC, and was 

always directed to the same individual, Yared Tamene. Furthermore, once senior level DNC 

members became involved in the matter, DNC counsel confirmed that the FBI should 

continue to work through this individual. 

(U//FOUO) FBI re-contacted DNC in December 2015 to advise that DNC systems were 

likely still compromised and to provide additional threat information. In January 2016, the 

FBI provided the DNC with an open source report titled The Dukes: 7 Years of Russian 

cyberespionage, which contained additional background on the threat actors. The FBI 

continued to notify the DNC when information was received that led FBI to believe that the 

DNC was still compromised. In February 2016, the FBI offered the use of a cyber response 

team to help identify the malicious traffic on DNC's network and offered to deploy a sensor 

on the network to help identify the malicious traffic; however, both offers were declined by 

theDNC. 

(U//FOUO) In March 2016 FBI notified DNC about a spear-phishing campaign by a second 

adversary, referred to as Fancy Bear, against the DNC. 'FBI notified DNC again in April 2016 

about a second set ofFancyBear spear-phishing targets and identified users who clicked 

malicious links. FBI requested and received log files from DNC in April2016. FBI 

continued to follow-up with DNC through June 2016, at which point a private security firtiJ. 

began providing mitigation services to the DNC, and the FBI began working directly with 

that firm. 

2. Given the FBI's long-standing knowledge of Russia's influence efforts- including its use 

of cyberattacks to disrupt other countries' political processes- why wasn't the FBI's 

response more aggressive? 

Response: 

(U//FOUO) The cyber campaign in question targeted over 130 US victim companies and 

corporations, just one of which was the DNC. FBI exceeded standard procedures in its 

victim engagement with the DNC and believed the matter was being handled appropriately, 
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so there was no reason to further elevate the notification. Due to the size and scope of the 

malicious campaign in the summer of2015, the most rapid and reliable method available for 

notification was direct telephonic notification. The FBI did recognize the high-profile nature 

of this victim, and acted accordingly .. The FBI had over 30 separate interactions with DNC 

IT and executive management. The FBI offered the use of a cyber response team to help 

identify the malicious traffic on their network and the FBI offered to ·deploy a sensor on the 

network to help identifY the malicious traffic; however, both were declined. Instead, the 

DNC retained a private security firm to manage detection and remediation. 

3. Why did the FBI wait until July 2016 to open an investigation into Russian interference 

in the 2016 U.S. election? 

Response: 

As described in part above, the FBI investigated malicious activity by Russian actors (both 

the theft and dissemination of information) as it learned of it, well-before the election (in 2015 

and earlier) and continuing until after the election, in collaboration with various components of 

the Justice Department, including, after his appointment, the Special Counsel. 

4. What has the FBI done to better assess and respond to these types of cyber intrusions? 

Response: 

(U//FOUO) The Department of Justice is currently conducting a review of the FBI's victim 

notification procedures. Although the review is still ongoing, the FBI believes the DNC 

notification was compliant with both 0395PG (internal notification policy) and PPD-41 (even 

though not in effect at the time of initial notification(s)). [Administrative note: PPD-41 was 

signed Juiy 26, 2016, or approximately 45 days after the DNC data had been posted by online 

persona Guccifer2.0.] PPD-41 advises the private sector and Government agencies have a 

shared vital interest and complementary roles and responsibilities. 

(U//FOUO) FBI has taken steps to increase its outreach efforts with sectors affected by the 

2015/2016 election-related intrusions and intrusion attempts, and FBI continues to use 

unclassified bulletins to inform private sector entities about continuing advanced persistent 

threat activity and mitigation strategies. 

(U//FOUO) In April2016, FBI hosted a tabletop training exercise modeled on the actual 

CozyBear campaign ·from July 2015, which DNC attended. The purpose of the exercise was 

to familiarize participating organizations with spear-phishing campaigns, indicators of 

compromise, and to provide suggestions to improve information sharing between other 
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government agencies, the private sector, and FBI. The Republican National Committee 

(RNC) was also provided information from the exercise. 

(U//FOUO) Between October 2016 and July 2017, FBI and/or Department of Homeland 

Security released five reports to the private sector regarding advanced persistent threat 

tactics, indicators, and recommended actions. 

(U//FOUO) In April and May 2017, FBI Cyber Division re-engaged with voting systems 

companies and asked FBI field offices to have conversations with companies about the threat 

landscape and what, if any, threats they have seen since the 2016 election cycle. As of June, 

voting systems companies have not observed any targeting activity but communication lines 

remain open for information sharing and engagement. Additionally, FBI Cyber Division and 

related field offices are planning multiple tabletop training exercises for the 2018 election 

cycle. 

(U//FOUO) On a larger scale, as far back as 2013, the FBI Cyber Division reorganized the 

manner in which it investigates state-sponsored computer intrusion activity. The Cyber 

Threat Team ("CTI") model established a standard to narrowly defuie, scope, and prioritize 

over 70 nation-state sponsored cyber threats. The traditional FBI investigative model focuses 

on the victim. If a crime occurs in a field office's geographic area of responsibility ("AOR"), 

then that field office opens an investigation. Due to the distributed nature of a cyber actor's 

victims, this created a situation where each field office was investigating dozens of computer 

intrusions. Numerous field offices would be investigating the same actor's criminal activity. 

(U//FOUO) The CTI model shifted the focus to the nation-state actors, with a select group of 

field offices responsible for each cyber threat. Each threat is investigated by a team 

consisting of 2-6 field offices and a FBI Headquarters support team. This team is often times 

assisted by resources from other usrc agencies and allied foreign partners. This proved to 

be a far more efficient and effective use of the FBI's cyber resources. Approximately 80% of 

all field offices are assigned Jess than 3 threats, better distributing the workload and technical 

expertise of the FBI. A comprehensive threat picture is developed and owned by the 

designated CTI, thus enabling those assigned field offices to become the subject matter 

experts on the threat. The 70+ global nation-state cyber threats are banded for prioritization 

purposes. The top priorities are categorized as National Threat Priorities (''NTP"). 

Additional bands are groups 2-6. The actual categorization of various threats are classified 

and are not appropriate for this document. ·· • 

(U//FOUO) In addition, also since approximately 2012, the FBI Cyber Division has worked 

closely with the Department of Justice's National Security Division and U.S. Attorney's 

Offices around the country to bring all legal tools (including but not limited to prosecution) 

to bear on the threats posed by state-sponsored hacking and other malicious activities (like 

influence operations) that might exploit it). Through these efforts, we have charged, arrested, 

and successfully prosecuted individuals working for (or for the benefit of) foreign states. 
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In doing so, DOJ and FBI seek to raise the costs of the activity, including by supporting the 

efforts of other departments and agencies, and to educate the American people about the 

threats we face (so they can better protect themselves and their networks). 

5. Are we better positioned today to prevent, detect, and respond to comparable cyber 

intrusions? If not, what should we be doing differently? 

Respon8e: 

(U//FOUO) The FBI can only respond to reports of computer intrusions and attacks that it 

learns of, and many victims prefer, for a variety of reasons, to remediate intrusions in-house 

or with the assistance of private security firms, rather than report the intrusion to the 

government and avail themselves of our assistance. Encouraging reporting by victims is one 

of the Department of Justice's priorities in its frequent outreach events to the private sector, 

and we would welcome reinforcement of that encouragement. 

6. From September 2015 to July 5, 2016, how was the assessment or preliminary 

investigation into hacking of computer systems belonging to the Democratic National 

Committee and the Republican National Committee (or state or local electoral boards) 

stafied? Please include an explanation of the number of agents assigned fuU-time to the 

investigation and the overall staffing plan. 

Response: 

(U//FOUO) The FBI staffs all investigations with a combination of agent and analytical 

support. The exact number of personnel involved varies depending on the complexity and 

stage of the investigation. 

7. From July 6, 2016 to November 8, 2016, how was the investigation into Russian 

interference in the 2016 election stafied? Please include an explanation of the number of 

agents assigned full-time to the investigation and the overall staffing plan. 

Response: 

(U//FOUO) See the response to the preceding question. 

8. How is the investigation into Russian interference into the 2016 election currently 

staffed? Please include an explanation of the number of agents assigned full-time to the 

investigation and the overall staffing plan. 

Response: 

(U//FOUO) This question should be referred to the Special Counsel.