alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 601.105 Business relationships. ( a ) *General.* A person or organization wishing to have a continuing business relationship with the Postal Service in purchasing matters is expected to treat the Postal Service in the same manner as it would other valued customers of similar size and importance. The Postal Service reserves the right to decline to accept or consider proposals from a person or organization when that person or organization fails to meet reasonable business expectations or provide a high level of confidence regarding quality, prompt service, and overall professionalism.
( b ) *Declining to accept or consider proposals.* The Postal Service may decline to accept or consider proposals when a person or organization exhibits unacceptable conduct or business practices that do not meet reasonable business expectations or does not provide a high level of confidence about the entity's current or future business relations. Unacceptable conduct or business practices include, but are not limited to: ( 1 ) Marginal or dilatory contract performance;
( 2 ) Failure to deliver on promises made in the course of dealings with the Postal Service;
( 3 ) Providing false or misleading information regarding financial condition, ability to perform, or other material matters, including any aspect of performance on a contract; and
( 4 ) Engaging in other questionable or unprofessional conduct or business practices.
( c ) *Notice.* If the Postal Service elects to decline to accept or consider proposals from a person or organization, the vice president, Supply Management, or his or her designee, will provide a written notice to the person or organization *by Certified Mail, return receipt requested*, explaining: ( 1 ) The reasons for the decision;
( 2 ) The effective date of the decision;
( 3 ) The scope of the decision;
( 4 ) The period of time the decision will be in effect, (a matter at the Postal Service's discretion consistent with the circumstances); and
( 5 ) The supplier's right to contest the decision.
( d ) *Contesting Decisions.* If a person or organization believes the decision not to accept or consider proposals is not merited, it may contest the matter in accordance with § 601.108. The Postal Service may reconsider the matter and, if warranted, rescind or modify the decision to decline to accept or consider proposals.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 22-cv-23753-MOORE/BECERRA

EDWIN GARRISON, et al., on behalf of 

themselves and all other similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAM BANKMAN-FRIED, et al.,

Defendants.

/

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE PRO HAC VICE

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Elizabeth A. Greenman of the law firm Latham & Watkins 

LLP appears as counsel for Defendant Shaquille O’Neal, and requests that all papers served in this 

case also be delivered to and served at the address set forth below. 

Per Rule 4(b)(4) of the Rules Governing the Admission, Practice, Peer Review, and 

Discipline of Attorneys for the Southern District of Florida, Ms. Greenman was previously 

admitted to appear pro hac vice in this case on behalf of Defendants Thomas Brady and Gisele 

Bündchen and states that all information provided in support of her initial pro hac vice motion 

remains current and correct, including the sponsoring co-counsel.

Dated: May 8, 2023. 

Respectfully submitted,

COLSON HICKS EIDSON, P.A.

255 Alhambra Circle, Penthouse

Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Telephone: (305) 476-7400

Facsimile: (305) 476-7444

By: Roberto Martínez

Roberto Martínez

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 185 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2023 Page 1 of 2
2

Florida Bar No. 305596 

Email: bob@colson.com

 Attorney for Defendant Shaquille O’Neal

Case 1:22-cv-23753-KMM Document 185 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/08/2023 Page 2 of 2
#### § 101-29.403-2 Agency responsibility relative to exceptions to Federal product descriptions.

Each agency taking exceptions shall establish procedures whereby a designated official having substantial procurement responsibility shall be responsible for assuring that Federal product descriptions are used and provisions for exceptions are complied with.
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

v.

Senior Airman NICHOLAS R. MARTINO

United States Air Force

ACM S32254

26 March 2015

Sentence adjudged 13 May 201 4 by SP CM convened at Little Rock Air

Force Base

, Arkansas . Military Judge: Lynn Watkins (sitting alone).

Approved S entence: Bad

- conduct discharge, confinement for 12 months

, and reduction to E

- 1

.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Patrick E.

Neighbors and Major Thomas A. Smith

.

Appel late Counsel for the United States: Colonel Katherine E. Oler

.

Before

ALLRED, HECKER, and TELLER

Appellate Military Judges

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent

under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4

.



### PER CURIAM :

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error

materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant occ urred. Article 66(c),

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c); United States v. Reed , 54 M.J. 37, 41 ( C.A.A.F. 2000).

Accordingly, the approved findings and sentence are AFFIRMED

.

FOR THE COURT

STEVEN LUCAS

Clerk of the Court
§ 52.24 Evidence and burden of proof. ( a ) It is the responsibility of the applicant to procure and submit with his or her application such evidence, including official records, as the applicant desires to present in support of his or her case. All such evidence should be submitted with the applicant's DD Form 149 in accordance with § 52.21(c)(1). Evidence submitted by an applicant after an application has been filed and docketed shall be considered late and its acceptance is subject to the provisions in § 52.26(a)(4) and (c).
( b ) The Board begins its consideration of each case presuming administrative regularity on the part of Coast Guard and other Government officials. The applicant has the burden of proving the existence of an error or injustice by the preponderance of the evidence.
[Civ. No. 11873.

Second Appellate District, Division Two.

June 10, 1938.]

#### In the Matter of the Estate of JOHN HARVEY, Deceased. PERCY M. BOKOFSKY, Appellant, v. BEN H. BROWN, Public Administrator, etc., Respondent.

David I. Lippert for Appellant.

Marshall Stimson and Noel Edwards, as *Amici Curiae,*on Behalf of Appellant.

Everett W. Mattoon, County Counsel, and Ernest Purdum, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.

WOOD, J.

In this proceeding Percy M. Bokofsky appeals from an order of the superior court denying his petition for letters of administration with the will annexed and granting the petition of the public administrator of Los Angeles County. The bank named as executor declined to act. Appellant is the nominee of Susan Watts, surviving sister of the decedent and a beneficiary under the will, who resides in the state of Wisconsin.

Appellant contends that it was mandatory upon the probate court to appoint the nominee of the nonresident sister of the decedent. The issue involved has been decided ad*87versely to appellant’s contention in *Estate of Pardue,*22 Cal. App. (2d) 178 [70 Pac. (2d) 678], wherein the identical question was presented for determination and the court held: “It is evident that being a nonresident, and not being a surviving spouse, Carrie Phillips ’ request for the appointment of Marshall Stimson as administrator created no priority right and was not binding on the court.” A petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied in the Pardue case. On the authority of that decision the order appealed from must be affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Grail, P. J., and McComb, J., concurred.

A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on August 8, 1938.
#### CHARLES A. LEWIS and another, Respondents, *v.*THE MAYOR, Etc., OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellants.

Appropriation— *expendiim'e in excess of*— when *a defense.*

Appeal from a judgment, in favor of the plaintiff, entered on a verdict directed by the court.

This action was brought to recover the sum of $548.38, being the price of a quantity of fish delivered by the plaintiffs to the department of public parks for its use. The deliveries were made daily between the 30th July, 1873 and the 1st January, 1874, upon two orders, in writing, of the department of public parks, given to the plaintiff, for the delivery of seventy-five pounds of fish per day, at seven cents per pound. The bills of the fish were presented monthly by the plaintiffs; and it appears that the bill from June first to September thirtieth, amounting to $267.20, had been audited and allowed by the officers of the department of public parks, and that another bill, from October to and including the 31st December, 1873, amounting to $280.98, had also been so audited and allowed, and in their certificates of audit and allowance the officers of the department certified “ that the articles named in the said bills have been received, in good condition, by the department, solely for its use, and were necessary for the lawful uses and purposes of the said department, and that the prices charged therein are reasonable and proper, and that the amount of said bills does not exceed the unexpended balance of the appropriation duly made to the said department therefor.” The answer denied none of the allegations of the complaint, but set up that the sum of $487,966 was appropriated to the department of the public parks, and that prior to the 13th February, 1874, that sum had been paid out and expended, in paying claims lawfully

*242incurred and chargeable to and payable from said appropriation for the year 1873, except the sum of $54.64; and the answer insisted that *“*the department had no power or authority to incur any expense, for any purpose, in excess of the appropriation made for such purpose, and that the claim of the plaintiff, if incurred, had been incurred in violation of the aforesaid provision, and in excess of such expense as made chargeable by law.”

The General Term held, that it was incumbent on the defendants, if they wished to assert that the department had exceeded its authority in incurring the expenses, to have shown upon the trial that the amounts paid out subsequent to January 1, 1874, were paid upon claims which existed, or were prior in right and obligation to those of the plaintiffs, and that as they had failed to show this, a verdict was rightly directed in favor of the plaintiffs.

*D. J. Deem,*for appellant. *W. H.*Townly, for respondents.

Opinion by

Davis, P. J.

Brady and Daniels, JJ., concurred.'

Judgment affirmed.
Exhibit 23.1

                      Consent of WithumSmith + Brown, P.C.



<PAGE>

                       Consent of WithumSmith+Brown, P.C.

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the  incorporation by reference in the Registration  Statements on
Form  S-8  (Nos.   333-47736   and   333-90088)   pertaining  to  the  GoAmerica
Communications Corp. 1999 Stock Option Plan, the GoAmerica, Inc. 1999 Stock Plan
and the GoAmerica,  Inc.  Employee Stock Purchase Plan of our report dated March
4, 2004,  except for note 18 as to which the date is March 10, 2004 with respect
to the financial statements and schedule of GoAmerica,  Inc. for the years ended
December  31, 2003 and 2002  included in the Annual  Report  (Form 10-K) for the
year ended December 31, 2003.

                                                     /s/ WithumSmith+Brown, P.C.

New Brunswick, New Jersey
March 10, 2004
Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO: 22-60242-CR-SINGHAL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

TSVIA KOL,

Defendant.

_________________________________/

AGREED MOTION TO CONTINUE SENTENCING

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Tsvia Kol, by and through her undersigned Counsel, Jason 

W. Kreiss, Esq., and respectfully files this Agreed Motion to Continue Sentencing for a period of 

30 days. As grounds for this motion, the defendant states the following:

1. The defendant entered a guilty plea in this matter on August 30, 2023. 

2. Sentencing in this matter is currently scheduled for April 2, 2024.

3. Members of the defense team are engaged with government counsel for the purpose

of trying to resolve an unrelated matter that could have a significant effect on the instant case or 

vice versa.

4. Pursuant to Local Rule 88.9(a), undersigned counsel conferred with Assistant

United States Attorney Alexandra Comolli, who is in agreement with the relief sought herein.

5. This request for a continuance is made in good faith and will further the interest of

justice.

Case 0:22-cr-60242-AHS Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2024 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

WHEREFORE, the defendant, Tsvia Kol, respectfully requests that this Honorable Court 

grant this motion and enter an order continuing the sentencing hearing in this matter for a period 

of 30 days. 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jason W. Kreiss 

JASON W. KREISS, ESQ.

Florida Bar Number:87912

1824 SE 4th Avenue

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316

Phone: 954-525-1971

Fax: 954-525-1978

Email: jwk@kreisslaw.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion has 

been furnished by CM/ ECF to all counsel of record on this 21

st day March 2024.

/s/ Jason W. Kreiss 

JASON W. KREISS, ESQ.

Case 0:22-cr-60242-AHS Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2024 Page 2 of 2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LURENZO LEE WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

G. KALISHER, Dr., Physician and 

Surgeon/CTF-North Soledad State Prison; et 

al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-16725 

D.C. No. 5:15-cv-03068-NC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Nathanael M. Cousins, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted April 11, 2018***

Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Lurenzo Lee Williams, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the 

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c).

*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 13 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-16725 

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Williams 

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were 

deliberately indifferent in treating Williams’s pain or denying his request for an 

MRI. See id. at 1057-60 (deliberate indifference is a high legal standard; medical 

malpractice, negligence, or a difference in medical opinion concerning the course 

of treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting defendants to file 

a new motion for summary judgment to provide Rand notice in a separate 

document. See Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(standard of review); see also Rand v. Roland, 154 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(en banc) (“[T]he ultimate responsibility of assuring that the prisoner receives fair 

notice remains with the district court.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendants’ 

requests for extensions of time to file a motion for summary judgment. See FTC v. 

Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court has broad discretion to 

control its docket).

We reject as without merit Williams’s contentions that defendant Kalisher 
3 17-16725 

failed to file a timely motion for summary judgment, or that she was required to 

file a declaration in support of defendants’ motion.

AFFIRMED.
#### § 101-5.305 Agency participation.

At the time the space requirements for a building or a group of adjoining buildings are developed by GSA, the prospective occupying agencies will be canvassed by GSA to determine if they wish to participate in the occupational health services program. Each agency desiring to participate in the program will be requested to furnish GSA with a written commitment, signed by an authorized official, that it is prepared to reimburse GSA, or such other agency as is designated pursuant to § 101-5.105(b), on a yearly per capita basis for each of its employees housed in the building or buildings covered by the program.
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 240 (Thursday, December 13, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 74265]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-30128]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 8117]

Designation of Hamad el Khairy, Also Known as Abderrahmane Ould 
Mohamed Lemine Ould Mohamed Khairy, Also Known as Hamada Ould Mohamed 
Kheirou, Also Known as Abou Qumqum, Also Known as Amada Ould Kheirou, 
as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Pursuant to Section 1(b) of 
Executive Order 13224, as Amended

    Acting under the authority of and in accordance with section 1(b) 
of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by Executive 
Order 13268 of July 2, 2002, and Executive Order 13284 of January 23, 
2003, I hereby determine that the individual known as Hamad el Khairy, 
also known as Abderrahmane Ould Mohamed Lemine Ould Mohamed Khairy, 
also known as Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou, also known as Abou Qumqum, 
also known as Amada Ould Kheirou, committed, or poses a significant 
risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of 
U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of 
the United States.
    Consistent with the determination in section 10 of Executive Order 
13224 that ``prior notice to persons determined to be subject to the 
Order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States 
would render ineffectual the blocking and other measures authorized in 
the Order because of the ability to transfer funds instantaneously,'' I 
determine that no prior notice needs to be provided to any person 
subject to this determination who might have a constitutional presence 
in the United States, because to do so would render ineffectual the 
measures authorized in the Order.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register.

    Dated: December 4, 2012.
Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 2012-30128 Filed 12-12-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-10-P
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7847

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

TROY JAMES POWELL,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:01-cr-00005-RLV-7)

Submitted: January 22, 2013 Decided: January 25, 2013

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Troy James Powell, Appellant Pro Se. John George Guise, OFFICE 

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy 

Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Troy James Powell appeals the district court’s order 

denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion. We have 

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. United 

States v. Powell, No. 5:01-cr-00005-RLV-7 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 

2012). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
#### § 101-5.103 Policy.

To the extent practicable, GSA will provide or arrange for the provision of centralized services whenever such services insure increased efficiency and economy to the Government without hampering program activities or essential internal administration of the agencies to be served.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

689 

TP 13-02235 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., LINDLEY, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.

 

IN THE MATTER OF BEATRICE L. CORCORAN, 

PETITIONER, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NIRAV R. SHAH, M.D., M.P.H., COMMISSIONER, 

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, RESPONDENT. 

 

DESMARTEAU & BEALE, ROCHESTER (GEORGE DESMARTEAU OF COUNSEL), FOR

PETITIONER. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (KATHLEEN M. TREASURE

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial

Department by order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County [John J. Ark,

J.], entered December 18, 2013) to review a determination of

respondent. The determination, among other things, imposed an 18-

month delay in petitioner’s Medicaid eligibility. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously

confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed. 

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding

challenging the determination that an 18-month delay in her Medicaid

eligibility was properly imposed as a penalty for transferring

resources in order to qualify for Medicaid coverage. We confirm the

determination. Where a petitioner has transferred assets for less

than fair market value, he or she must “rebut the presumption that the

transfer of funds was motivated, in part if not in whole, by . . .

anticipation of future need to qualify for medical assistance” (Matter

of Mallery v Shah, 93 AD3d 936, 937 [internal quotation marks

omitted]; see Matter of Donvito v Shah, 108 AD3d 1196, 1198). Here,

the New York State Department of Health determined that, during the

60-month look-back period, petitioner and her husband made

uncompensated transfers of approximately $176,000 to their family

members. The evidence presented at the hearing established that

petitioner had mobility issues for several years prior to her

hospitalization and application for Medicaid, and petitioner failed to

submit any medical records to support the allegation that she was in

good health. Furthermore, petitioner failed to establish that the

transfers were “part of a long-standing pattern,” inasmuch as she

presented no evidence that substantial gifts such as the uncompensated
-2- 689 

TP 13-02235 

transfers at issue were made in prior years (see Matter of Lipkin v

New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 146 AD2d 964, 964-965). Thus,

contrary to petitioner’s contention, we conclude that substantial

evidence supports the determination that petitioner failed to rebut

the presumption that the transfers were motivated, at least in part,

by a desire to qualify for Medicaid (see Matter of Barbato v New York

State Dept. of Health, 65 AD3d 821, 822-823, lv denied 13 NY3d 712). 

Entered: June 20, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court