Filed 9/30/14 Estate of Young CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). Th is opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPE AL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Estate of IRMA E. YOUNG, Deceased.
STEPHEN C. PARKER , as Executor, et c., Petitioner and Respondent ,

v. CHARLES DITTES PARKER, Objector and Appellant

. D064609
(Super. Ct. No. P177721)

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Julia C. Kelety, Judge. Dismissed. Charles Dittes Parker, in p ro. per., for Objector and Appellant. Norman Michael Cooley for Petitioner and Respondent. Objecto r and appellant Charles D ittes Parker (Charles or Appellant) appeal s the probate court ' s June 21, 2013 ex parte order extending and reissuing l etters t estam entary that had been issued to respondent Stephen C. Parker, the court

- appointed personal representative of their mother ' s estate (Respondent). Their mother, Irma E. Young, died2

in 2000 and left four children and heirs to her estate (the Estate) . Respond ent also serves as the trustee of her trust. (Prob. Code, § § 8000 et seq. [petition for probate]; 8 40 0 et seq. [ personal representative appointment] ; 16000 et seq. [trust administration] .) 1 Family d ifficulties arose during the administration of the E stat e and trust , beginning in 2000 and lasting until today . The subject issue on appeal is framed by two prior opinions issued by this court . The first is In re Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62 ( Young ) ( Respondent ' s petition under § 850, requesting orders to establish the Estate ' s ownership of disputed real properties and personal property that were held by land trusts and business trusts; held, the Estate was the prevailing party, because it showed sufficient evidence of undue influence and fraud by Charles and others in the establishment of the trusts)

. The second is our unpublished op inion by the same name, resolving three consolidated appeals by Charles arising from a related set of five probate court orders issued in 2012, in proceedings on vari ous petitions filed by different parties, including Charles, during the administration of the E state. ( In re Estate of Young ( March 20, 2014, D0 62420) , our secon d prior op inion.) During preparation of the record, this court sent a letter to the parties d ated November 13, 2013, stating as follows: " The notice of appeal filed by [A ppellant ] indicates he is appealing from an order of the superior court issued on June 21, 2013 that

' reissued and extended ' the letters testamentary to the executor. [¶] In Cal ifornia, the right to appeal is wholly statutory. [Citation s .] To exercise that right, a party must

1 All further statutory references are to the Probate Code unless noted.3

appeal from a statutorily declared appealable judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.) In probate matters, an appeal may be taken from any order m ade appealable by the Probate Code. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(10).) ' With respect to a decedent ' s estate, the grant or refusal to grant the following orders is appealable: [¶] (a) Granting or revoking letters to a personal representative, [et c . ] ' (Prob. Code, § 1303, subd. (a).) The parties are requested to address in their respective appellate briefs whether the order at issue is appealable. " 2
We have reviewed the briefs on appeal and shall explain that Charles ' s current appeal must be dis missed on our own motion, for lack of an appealable order. ( See Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 544, fn. 8 [ " ' A " reviewing court has inherent power, on motion or its own motion, to dismiss an appeal which it cannot or
should not hear and determine ." ' "] .)
I BACKGROUND; PRIOR APPEAL We first take note that t he current appeal is closely related to the issues resolved in the secon d prior op inion, because t he probate court orders that Charles challenged there include d (a) a denial of his fo urth petition to remove Respondent as the personal

2 This court also asked the parties for discussion of the issue of whether the superior court had jurisdiction to deny Charles ' s application to proceed with the appeal as a vexatious litigant. However, we deem that issue to be moot because our presiding justice granted Charles ' s request for permission to appeal, and allowed his s uperior c ourt notice of August 7, 2013 to be implemented. (Code of Civ. Proc. , § 391.7, subd. (b).) We also granted Charles ' s unopposed motion to augment the record

. T he record designated on appeal incorporates the records from the three consolidated appeals that gave rise to our seco nd prior opinion

.4

representative of the E state ; (b) approval of Respondent ' s first amended accounting; (c) the grant of Respondent ' s motion for designation of Charles as a vexatious litigant (Code Civ. Proc., § 391 et seq.) ; and (d) approval of Respondent ' s second and final report and petition. We affirmed each of those orders over Charles ' s objections. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1) [ unpublished opinion may be cited and relied on as relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel] .) Now, Charles is seeking to set aside the probate court ' s order that extended and reissued Respondent ' s letters testamentary . The history of those letters, as set forth in the

secon d prior op inion , shows the original 2000 appoint ment of Respondent w as as Young ' s personal representative and special E state administrator (intestate)

. (§ 8540 et seq.) However, the will was produced and on November 5, 2002 Respondent ' s petition for probate of the will a s personal representative and for letters testamentary was approved (with Charles ' s cons ent) . (§§ 8005, 8400 et seq. ) Subsequently, at the August 26, 2011 ex parte proceedings, the probate court relied on the November 5, 2002 minute order as showing tha t the record supported a finding that the petition for probate of the will was currently ready for further proceedings, based upon the filings and publication already made. Renewed letters testamentary appointing Respondent as executor were filed Septembe r 8, 2011, granting authority to administer the Estate. Also as summarized in the secon d prior op inion, Respondent ' s first amended accounting of Estate expenses was approved on March 23, 2012

. Charles had object ed and sought reconsideration of the prev ious approval order . The probate court denied his5

requests both as to reconsideration and on the merits , at a hearing on May 8, 2012. Charles again requested (for at least the fourth time) that Respondent be removed as the

" De

- Facto Personal Representati ve. " His request was denied with prejudice on June 5,
2012

. On July 31, 2012 , the probate court granted Respondent ' s motion to declare Appellant to be a vexatious litigant . (Code Civ

. Proc ., § 391 et seq.) T he court order ed
him t o furnish security pri or to filing any additional petition seeking removal of Respondent as personal representative of the Estate , and imposed a prefiling order t o prevent Appellant from filing any new litigation in propria persona, without obtaining leave f rom the presiding ju dge. Over the objections of Appellant, on December 7, 2012, the probate c ourt approved Respondent ' s " Executor ' s Second and Final Report and Petition for Accounting, " and allowed final distribution and fees f or both Respondent and his attorney. We affirm ed.
II

APPEAL ABILITY OF SUBJECT ORDER
A . Applicable St andar ds As an appellant, Ch ar les has the burden of providing an adequate record and of showing that error occurred and that it was prejudicial. ( Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295

- 1296; Ag uilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132.) The arguments on appeal must be restricted to documents in the record, and we generally may not consider references to matters outside the record. ( Cal. Rules of Court,6

r ule 8.204(a)(2)(C ) [appellant ' s opening brief must provide a summary of significant facts limited to matters in the record on appeal].) Absent an adequate record to demonstrate error, a reviewing court presumes the judgment or order is supported by the evidence. ( In
re A ngel L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136

- 1137.) It is well established that " [i]n propria persona litigants are entitled to the same, but no greater, rights than represented litigants and are presumed to know the [procedural and court] rules. " ( Wantuch v. Davis (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 786, 795.) For any appellant, " [a]ppellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken. ' When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument an d citations to authority, we treat the point as waived. ' " ( Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.) " We are not bound to develop appellants ' arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as waived. " ( In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119 [a brief ' s lack of any legal argument may constitute abandonment of ap peal, justifying dismissal].)

" ' A " reviewing court has inherent power, on motion or its own motion, to dismiss an appeal which it cannot or should not hear and determine. " [Citation.] An appealed

from judgment or order is presumed correct. [Citation.] Hence, the appellant must make a challenge. In so doing, he must raise claims of reversible error or other defect [citation], and " present argument and authority on each point mad e" [citations]. If he does not, he may, in the court ' s discretion, be dee med to have abandoned his appeal.7

[Citation.] In that event, it may order dismissal. ' " ( Conservatorship of Ben C. , supra , 40 Cal.4th 529, 544, fn. 8; In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)

B . Evaluation of Challenged Order ; Analysis In his curren t challenge to the June 2013 ex parte order that extended and reissued Respondent ' s letters testamentary, Charles again argues (a) the re were fatal jurisdictional defects in the appointments of Respondent as special administrator and/or p ersonal

r epresenta tive during 2000 through 2002, and (b) that th e probate court erred in 2011 by determining that the w ill , once located, had been admitted to probate at an earlier time, and /or it improperly interpret ed the probate examiner ' s notes in the file regarding a p ossible continuance or further publication requirements

. Charles believes he was entitled to a statement of decision, although this ex parte matter was not a trial of contested facts giving rise to such a requirement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.) He also s eems to contend the 2013 extension proceeding should not have been conducted ex parte . (But see Super

. Ct

. San Diego County, Local Rule s, rule 4.7.6 [m atters which may be heard ex parte include enumerated types, or " L. Matters as allowed at the discretio n of the court. The court will not hear contested matters in the absence of extraordinary circumstances

. " ].) We cannot reach any of these claims unless the subject ex parte order wa s properly
appea lable. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subd ivision (a)(10), an appeal may be taken " [f]rom an order made appealable by the provisions of the Probate Code

. . . . " (§ 1300 et seq.) Section 130 3 , subdivision (a) authorizes appeals from the grant or refusal to grant the following orders: " (a) Grant ing or revoking letters to a personal representative

. . . . " ( McDonald v. Structured Asset Sales, LLC (2007) 1548

Cal.App.4th 1068, 1072 [generally, a ruling in a probate proceeding is not appealable unless expressly made appealable by statute].) Our let ter dated November 13, 20 13 inquired about the appealab i l ity of the
June 21, 2013 order that " reissued and extended " the letters testamentary. (§ 1303, subd. (a) ; Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(10).) Charles made only a minimal
response . R es pondent cited to the statutorily required formalities that were already satisfied, thus interpreting the subject order as an interim procedural step that is not properly appealable. (§ § 8120, 8402, 8404.) Initially , a probate court grant s official letters to a personal representative according to the procedures set forth in section 8400 et seq. (setting forth the application procedure, qualifications, oath, statement of duties and liabilities, and form of letters).
Publication wa s required under section 8120 an d bond should be posted, unless waived (§ 8480). Once an estate is closed through final distribution, the personal representative may obtain an order of discharge. (§ 1220 0 et seq. [ closing of estate administration ] .) Here, many years passed while the E state and the related trust were being litigated, including a series of appointments of Respondent to various responsible capacities to act for the E state . H is final report for the Estate was approved in 2012. When Charles appealed that order a nd related o n es, Respondent sought and obtained the ex parte order extending and reissuing the letters during the pendency of the appeal, which concluded with our secon d prior opinion in March 2014. The issues covered there included an affirmance of the probate cou rt ' s order denying the (4th) request by Charles to have Respondent removed as p ersonal r epresentative.9

Now, Charles raises only unintelligible jurisdictional challenges going back to the year 2000 that wholly disregard the subsequent history of the case i n the probate court, and that have already been resolved in the secon d prior opinion. His attack on the extension and reissuance of the letters i s essentially moot ed and unnecessary to decide , due to the result outlined in the seco nd prior opinion. There is " ' no reason to proceed to the merits of any unraised " points "

— and, a fortiori, no reason to reverse or even modify the orders in question. ' " ( C onservatorship of Ben C. , supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 544, fn. 8.) Using an other approach , " it is well establ ished that a probate order ' s appealability is determined not from its form, but from its legal effect. " ( In re Estate of Miramontes

Najera (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) An appellate court will deem probate orders to constitute " a final judgment for p urposes of appeal when .

. . they have all the earmarks of a final judgment. " ( Ibid .) Where a challenged order is the only judicial ruling regarding the contested matter , and " nothing remains for judicial consideration, " and there is " no other avenue for appellate review, " then such circumstances justify treating the order as an appealable final judgment. ( Ibid. ) Under those standards , it cannot be said that the underlying extension and reissuance order falls within any statutory category of appealable order, nor that it was equivalent to a final judgment . It did not determine with finality any rights of the parties in the probate action , but instead it only preserved the status quo, which had been established through compliance with statutory notice, p ublication and court approval requirements , as outlined in our seco nd prior opinion

. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1). ) W e therefore conclude the order is not appealable under section 130 3 ,10

subdivision ( a ), we have no jurisdiction , and we must dis miss this appeal. ( McDonald v. Structured Asset Sales, LLC , supra , 154 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1075

. ) The result of a dismissal of an appeal is to leave the underlying final order or judgment in place, effectively affirming it. Th is order of dismissal effecti vely confirm s the disposition set forth in our seco nd prior opinion . ( Code Civ

. Proc ., § 913 ; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 762, p. 835.)
DISPOSITION The appeal is dismissed. Costs are awarded to Respondent

.

HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O ' ROURKE, J.