FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J UNE 25, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK

Honora ble Har vey E. Schlesing er, United States Dis t rict Judge f or the Middle District of * Florida , sitti ng by

desig nation. [PUBLISH]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

N o. 07- 1234 9 D. C. Docket N o. 06-00233 -CV -H S-S BRU CE BA KE R, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us BIRM INGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION, De fendant-Appellee.

Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r t h e N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma (J un e 25, 200 8) Before DU BIN A and BARKET T, Circuit Judges, and SCH LE SIN GE R, District * Judg e. DU BIN A, Circuit Judge:2

Appe llant B ru ce Bake r (“ Bake r” ) ap pe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of
summ ary j udgm ent in favor of the Birm ingh am Board of E ducation (the “ Board”), dis m iss ing his 42 U . S. C. § 19 83 c om pla int a lle gin g vi ola tio ns o f 42 U . S. C. § 19 81
as barr ed by the statut e of

li m itatio ns. I. BACK GROUND Bake r fi le d hi s c om

pla int in January

200 6, appr oxi m at el y

tw o and a

ha lf y ears a ft er

he w as te rm ina te d f

ro m his pos iti on a s aphy sic al e duc at ionte ac he r in
ane le m en tary

sc hool
. B ak er ’ s c om

pla int a lle ge d th at

the Bo ar d vi ola te d hi s r igh ts unde r 42 U . S. C. § 19 81, by a nd thr ough42 U . S. C. § 19 83, by : 1) dis cr im ina tin g against him

because of his rac e; and 2) reta liating agains t him for ac tivities pr ote ct ed by § 19 81. A ft er

the c los e of

dis co ve ry , the Bo ar d f

ile d am oti on f

or summ ary j udgm ent, arguing th at 1) Baker’ s claim s wer e tim e-barr ed; 2) the Board pr es en te d le git im at e, non -d isc ri m ina tor y r ea sons f or Bake r’ s te rm ina tio n; and 3 ) the Board could not b e held liable for the alleged violations. The district court fo und tha t the tw o- y ear § 19 83 s ta tut e of li m itatio ns a

ppl ie d to Bake r’ s c la im s and gr an te d th e m oti on. II. ST AN DA RD OF RE VIEW

“ W e re vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t de novo , ap ply ing the sa m e le ga l st an da rd s th at bou nd the dis tr ic t c ourt, a nd v ie w ing a ll3

fa ct s and r ea sona

ble inf er en ce s inthe li ght

m ost f av or ab le to the non m ovi ng party .” Cruz v. P ublix Su

per Markets, Inc. , 428 F . 3d 1 379, 138 2 ( 11th C ir
. 200 5) (c itatio n and quot at ionom itt ed ). “ Su m m ar y j udgm en t i s a

ppr opr ia te w he n ‘ the re is no g enuin e iss ue a s to a ny m at er ia l f

ac t and .
. . the m ovi ng p ar ty is en tit le d to a j udgm ent as a m atter of law. ’ ” Id
. (quot ing F ED . R. C IV . P. 56 (c)) “ W e rev ie w de
nov o the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in te rp re ta tio n and a ppl ic at ionof

the statut e of lim itations .” Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles , 33 5 F .3d 12 59 , 12 61 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003). III. DIS CU SSION Se ct ion198 1 do es not

pr ovi de ac au se of

a ct iona ga ins t st at e ac tor s; i nst ea d, cl ai m s a ga ins t st at e ac tor s or a lle ga tio ns o f § 19 81 v iol at ion s m ust be br ough t pu rs ua nt to § 1 98 3. B utt

s v . Co unt y of V olu sia , 222 F. 3d 89 1, 892-94 (11th Cir. 2000 ). “ [T ] he tw o- y ear lim itatio ns p er iod of A la
. Co de § 6- 2- 38( l) appl ie s to section 198 3 actions in Alabam a. ” Jo nes v . P re uit & M auldin , 876 F . 2d 1 480, 1483 ( 11th C ir
. 198 9)
. H ow ev er , af our -y ear sta tut e of

li m itatio ns a

ppl ie s to “ ci vil
ac tio n[ s] a ri sin g un de r anA ct of Co ngr es s e na ct ed

a ft er ” D ec em

be r 1, 199 0. 28 U . S. C. § 16 58( a)
. I n th is c as e, Bake r’ s § 1 981 cl ai m s w er e m ad e poss ibl e by the 19 91 am en dm en ts to § 1 98 1; th us , th os e cl ai m s ar is e u nd er a p os t-1 99 0 e na ct m en t. See Jo nes v . R
. R
. D onne lle y & Son s C

o. , 541 U. S. 369, 124 S. Ct. 1836 (2004).In Ha rm on v . P atrolm an ’s Be ne v ole nt As so c iat ion of the City of N e w York, 1 9 9 F e d
. Ap p x. 1 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2006), the Second Circ uit noted that “the applica ble statute of limitations on section 1983 claims is . . . 4 y ear s, if the claims ar e set for th under 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) .” 4 T he que sti on w e nowf

ac e is whic h st at

ute of li m itatio ns a

ppl ie s to Bake r’ s c la im s: the tw o- y ear sta tut e of

li m itatio ns f

or § 19 83 a ct ion s or

the f our -y ear sta tut e of lim itations for § 1981 actions
. The district court deter m ined that the two-y ear § 1 9 8 3 s t at u t e o f l i m i t at i o n s ap p l i ed an dd i s m i s s ed Ba k er ’s cl ai m s as u n t i m el y. W e disagree. N o c ir cu it co urt of

appe al s ha s a ddr es se d th is i ssu e in a pub lis he d op ini on. 1 In Palm er v. Stewart Count y School District , 178 Fed. Appx. 999, 1003 (11th Cir. 2006 ), w e co nc lud ed

that the tw o- y ear § 19 83 s ta tut e of li m itatio ns a

ppl ie d to the plaintiff’ s § 198 1 claim s. H owever , bec ause P alm er is an unpubl ish ed de ci sio n, it is no t b in di ng pre ced en t. Se e Twi n C it y Fir e In s. Co ., Inc . v. Ohi o C as . Ins . Co., In c ., 480 F.3d 1254 , 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2007); 11th Cir. Rule 36-2. T he district
co ur ts th atha ve ad dr es se d t he is su e h av e co m e to op po si te co nc lu si on s. Se e, e . g. , W ill iam s v . H

aw ke ye Cm ty . Co lle

ge , 49 4 F . Sup p. 2 d 1 03 2, 1 03 9- 42 (N.D. Iowa 2007 ) (c onc lud ing that the f our -y ear § 19 81 s ta tut e of li m itatio ns a

ppl ie d to § 1981 c la im s br ough t un de r § 19 83) ; Kn oxv . Ci tyof M onro e , — F . S upp. 2d — , 20 08 W L 67 90 29 , *6 (W .D. La. 20 08 ) (s am e). But see Bryant v. Jones , 464 F. Su pp. 2d 1 273, 129 0- 92 (N . D . G a. 200 6) ( co nc lud ing that the tw o- y ear § 19 835

sta tut e of li m itatio ns a

ppl ie d to § 19 81 c la im s br ough t un de r § 19 83) ; B lac kl ed ge v. A la. D ep t. of M

en tal H ea lth & M

en tal R etarda tio n , N o. 2:0 6c v321 -I D , 200 7 W L 3124452 , at *10 (M.D . A la. Oc t. 25, 2007 ) (sam e). In Jones , 541 U. S. 369, 124 S. Ct. 1836 , the S uprem e Court applied a broad int er pr et at ionof

28 U . S. C. § 16 58. T he Co urt he ld tha t “ a ca use of a ct ion‘ ar is[ es ] unde r anA ct

of Co ngr es s e na ct ed ’ a ft er

D ec em be r 1, 199 0—and the re fo re is gove rn ed by § 16 58’ s 4- y ear sta tut e of li m itatio ns— if

the pla int if

f’ s c la im a ga ins t the defendant was m ade possib le by a post-1990 enactm ent.” Id . at 3 82 , 12 4 S . Ct. at 1845. The Court expressly rej ected “ an interpretation as narrowas that
en dor se d by

the Co urts o f Appe al s, und er w hic h ‘ ar isi ng u nde r’ m eans s om ethin g akin to ‘based solely

upon .’ ” Id
. at

383 , 124 S
. Ct
. a t 18 45. S uc h an in te rp re ta tio n w oul d im pr ope rl y r es tr ic t § 1658 “ to c as es in w hic h th e pla int if f’ s c au se of

a ct ion is b as ed sol el y on a pos t- 1990 statut e tha t e sta bli she s ane w c au se of

a ct ion without refer ence to preexisting law. ” I d. a t 38 1, 124 S
. Ct
. a t 18 44 ( ci ta tio n and quot ation om itted). In this case, Baker’ s claim s arise under a post-1990 Act of Congress. W ere it no t fo r th e 1 99 1 Act , Bak er’s co m pl ai nt wou ld fai l t o s ta te a cl ai m un de r § 1 98 3. T o c onstru e 28 U . S. C. § 16 58 i n th e w ay a dvoc at ed

by the Appe lle es w oul d be inc onsi ste nt w iththe S upr em e Co urt’ s in te rp re ta tio n of that st at ute a s se t f

orth i nW e f i n d th e f o l l o w i n g l an g u a g e fr om City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams , 544 2 U.S. 113, 125 S. C t. 1453 (2005), instructive:

The statute of

limit ations for a § 1983 claim is g ener ally the applica

ble statelaw per iod for per sonal-injury torts. On this ba sis, the applicable limit ations period for r espondent’s § 1983 a ction would presumably be one year . I t may

be, howe ver, that this limitations per iod doe s not a pply to r espondent’s § 1983 claim
. I n 1990, Congr ess ena cted 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) , which provides a 4-y ear , catc hall limit ations period a pplicable to “c ivil action[ s] arising under an Ac t of Congr ess ena cted a fter” Dec e mb e r

1 , 1 9 9 0 . In[Jo n e s , 5 4 1 U . S. 3 6 9 ], w e h e ld th a t t h is 4
- y e ar li mi tations pe ri od a pp lie s to a ll c la ims “ ma de po ssi ble by a po st-1 99 0 [c on g re ssi on a l] enac tment.” Since the c laim he re rests upon violation of [a post-1990 cong ressional e n a c t m e n t ] , § 1 6 5 8 w o u l d s e e mt o a

p p l y. Id. at 123 n.5, 125 S. Ct. at 1460 n.5 (citations omit ted). 6 Jones . B ak er ’ s c la im s a ga ins t the Bo ar d w er e “ m ad e poss ibl e by apos t- 1990
en ac tm en t” a nd “ the re fo re [ ar e] gov er ne d by § 16 58’ s 4- y ear sta tut e of li m it at io ns .” Id

. at 3 82 . 2 IV. CO NC LUS ION T he dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in ap ply ing the tw o- y ear § 19 83 s ta tut e of lim itatio ns. T he statut e of li m itatio ns a

ppl ic ab le to Bake r’ s c la im s is 4 y ears , pur suant t o 28 U . S. C. § 16 58. W e the re fo re r ev er se the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of
sum m ar y j udgm en t and r em an d th e ca se f or f urthe r pr oc ee din gs c onsi ste nt w ith thi s op ini on. REVERSED a nd REMANDED.