1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) TONIA L. JONES, et al. , ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action N o. 11-215 (RMC) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ) ) Defendant. ) )
OPINION Tonia Jones and Kenniss Weeks we re police officers and squad ca r partners in the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Po lice Department (MPD) in the s ummer of 2006. Ms. Jones, who was known to her colleagues as a lesbian woman, began an in timate relationship with Ms. Weeks, who at the time was know n to her colleagues as a heteros exual woman who had previously been married to a m an. The unexpected relationship between the two women created a wave at MPD, and Ms. Jones and Ms. Weeks now allege that the ripples from that wave created a hostile work environmen t for them, in violation of Ti tle VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA), for which the y sue the District of Columbia (the District or D.C.) Both Plaintiffs allege that they were subjected to harassment and ho stility on the ba sis of sexual orientation and sex, as well as retaliation for complaining. B ecause the claims all emanate from allegations related to Plainti ffs’ lesbian relationship, and th ey have not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to harassment based on sex, the Court will grant D.C.’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ sex di scrimination claims under Titl e VII and DCHRA. However, because there are disputes of material fact concerning Plaintif fs’ claims of a hostile work2 environment due to their sexua l orientation and retaliation for protected activities under DCHRA, the Court will deny sum mary judgment on those claims.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
1. Plaintiffs’ Romantic Relationship Ms. Jones and Ms. Weeks are police officers of the D.C. Metropo litan Police Department. Ms. Weeks has worked for MPD since 2000; she was a ssigned to the Seventh District (7D), first as an offi cer, and later as an investigato r and a detective , from September 2000 until December 2009. See Def.’s Statement of Undis puted Facts [Dkt. 90-1] ¶¶ 74-75, 153 (Def.’s Undisputed); Pl. Weeks’s Statement of Material Facts in Dispute [Dkt. 93-1] ¶¶ W002-03 (Weeks Disputed). 1 Ms. Jones began working for MPD in 2001 and was assigned to 7 D at all relevant times except for a brief assignment in July 2010. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶¶ 2-3; Pl. Jones’s Statement of Material Facts in Dispute [Dkt. 96-1] ¶¶ J 002-03 (Jones Disputed). Prior to the fall of 2006, both Ms . Weeks and Ms. Jones were fr iends with Sergeant Jonathan Podorski, the da y-shift supervisor of Police Service Area (PSA) 703. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶¶ 6, 78; Week s Disputed ¶ W006; Jones Disput ed ¶ J006. 2 Ms. Weeks considered Sgt. Podorski a close friend; she had socialized at his home, he taught her how to play

1 The Court draws its facts from Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Compl aint [Dkt. 26], the admissible evidence submitted by the parties , and Plaintiffs’ disputed fac ts where appropriate, inasmuch as Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of any inferences to be drawn from the facts. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). By doing s o, the Court makes no fi ndings of credibility. Because Plaintiffs have had great difficulty tyin g their arguments to facts in the record, the Court belabors the citations for its findings.

2 MPD divides the District of Col umbia into Police Service Areas , or PSAs, which are defined geographical areas within each M PD District. Each MPD officer is responsible for management and patrol duties within her assigned PSA. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 17. Patrol officers bid for assignments to PSAs and to one of the shifts that cover each 24 -hour period.3 the guitar, and they had gone on group vacations together, alon g with other coworkers. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 79; W eeks Dep. [Dkt. 93-11] at 13, 22. Dur ing this time, Ms. Weeks also believed that Sgt. Podorski had romantic feelings for her. See Weeks Disputed ¶ W007. Ms. Jones and Sgt. Podorski also had afriendly relationship; they had socialized on several occasions and Ms. Jones considered Sgt. Podorski to be a “good guy, a fri end.” See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 6; Jones Dep. [Dkt. 93-7] at 21. Prior to September 2006, people at MPD knew that Ms. Jones identified as a lesbian, but Ms. Weeks was known to her colleag ues as a heterosexual woman.
See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 13. Ms. Weeks and Ms. Jones were assigned to ride together beginning in early 2006. See 3d Am. Compl. [Dkt. 26] ¶ 8. In July 2006, Ms. Jones and Ms. Weeks began a romantic relation ship. See id. ; Def.’s Undisputed ¶¶ 4, 76. By S eptember 2006, both were assig ned to PSA 703, riding together as partners, and reporting to Sgt. Podorski. See Jones Dep. at 113. Ms. Jones testified that around that time, while on duty with Sgt. Podorski in an MPD sc out car, she told him that she was dating another female officer. See Jones Dep. at 28-30. Sgt. Podorski did not react with anger or otherwise negativel y at the time, although Ms. Jones s ays that “at some point he became angry.” Jones Dep. at 37. Also in September 2006, both Plaint iffs together told Sgt. Podorski about their relationship. See Jones Dep. at 42-43; Weeks Dep. at 20-23. According to Ms. Weeks, Sgt. Podorski responded by t elling Ms. Weeks “you let th e kid come out and play,” which she took to mean that she “l et [her] emotions come out.” Weeks Dep. at 24. Ms. Jones did not recall Sgt. Podorski’s reaction during this joint conve rsation. See Jones Dep. at 43-44. Ms. Jones and Ms. Weeks assert that Sgt. Podorski’s behavior to ward them changed after they informed him of their relationship. Shortlyafterwards, Sgt. Podorski told Ms. Jones that Ms. Weeks was a “drama queen.” Jones Dep. at 109-10 ; Podorski Dep. [93-2] at 33-4 35. In another conversation, Sgt. Podorski warned Ms. Jones th at she “shouldn’t mess with” Ms. Weeks, whom he called “pois on.” Jones Dep. at 109; Podorski De p. at 35. Ms. Weeks alleges that Sgt. Podorski also told her that Ms. Jones was “poison.” Weeks Dep. at 91.
2. Alleged Hostile Actions Re lated to Work Assignments On September 24, 2006, Plaintiffs arr ived at a domestic violenc e call where two family members were suspected of hitting and threatening a teen age family member with a knife.
See Podorski IAD File Narrative Repo rt [Dkt. 94-7] at 2 (Podorski I AD); Jones Dep. 120. 3 Plaintiffs talked with the teenag er and determined that she had been attacked for telling her family that she was a lesbian. See Podorski IAD at 5

. Sgt. Podorski ordered Plaintiffs not to arrest the two family members and to bring the teenager to a me ntal health facility for evaluation.
Id. at 4-5. Sgt. Podorski stated tha t he had prior experience withthe teenager and knew she had mental health issues and was a runaway. See Podorski Dep. at 53, 122-24. Plaintiffs disagreed with his order, and called the MPD Gay and Lesbian Unit (GLU) t o complain about it. See Podorski IAD at 5. Sgt. Brett Parsons of the GLU, along with a nother MPD officer, came to the scene, interviewed witnesses, a nd arrested the two family membe rs. Id. Sgt. Podorski was subsequently referred to the U .S. Attorney’s Office for “Failur e to Make a Lawful Arrest,” and cited by MPD’s Internal Affairs D ivision (IAD) for Neglect of D uty. See Podorski IAD Final Report [Dkt. 94-11] at 3. Ms. Jones alleges that after these e vents on September 24, 2006, Sgt. Podorski prevented the Plaintiffs from riding together on a dai ly basis, even during periods when they were assigned to the same PSA. See Jones Disputed ¶¶ J028-29.

3 The District describes this i ncident as having taken place in October 2006, see Def.’s Undisputed ¶¶ 24, 95, but internal MPD files establish that Sep tember 24, 2006 is the correct date. See Podorski IAD at 2.5 In November 2006, Plaintiffs partic ipated in the annual “open s eason” bidding process, in which MPD officers bid on different PSA assignments

. See Jones OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009), Jones OHR File [Dk t. 94-3] at 3. Both Plainti ffs had planned to bid for PSA 703, but Sgt. Podorski assigned Ms. Jones to be out on duty dur ing bidding, and when she returned to the 7D office, PSA 703 was full. See id. As a result, Ms. Weeks bid on and was assigned to PSA 703, Ms. Jones wa s assigned to PSA 701, and Pla intiffs were unable to ride together as squad-car partners. See id. Ms. Jones alleges that Sgt. Podorski intentionally assigned her to be out on patrol during bidding in order to kee p her and Ms. Weeks apart. See
id. ; see also Weeks OHR Rebuttal Affidav it (Nov. 10, 2008) [Dkt. 94-8] at 1. Ms. Weeks also alleges that Sgt. P odorski “would call-in” to in quire about Plaintiffs’ court appearances , which he would not do with other officers. Id. at 6. In November 2006, Sgt. Podorski gave Ms. Jones a performance ev aluation score of 28, representing “exceeds expe ctations,” on her annual perfo rmance evaluation. Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 27. In January 2007 Sgt. Podorski informed Plaintiffs that he belie ved they were unsafe riding together because they had too many Use of Force I ncident Reports (UFIRs). See Podorski Dep. at 42-46. At some point that month, Sgt. Podorsk i posted a notice at 7D, stating that Ms. Jones, Ms. Weeks, and one other officer had too many U FIRs and experienced too many injuries at work. See Jones Dep. at 55-56; Weeks Dep. at 85. Plaintiffs allege that this posting was harassing because it was unusual and violated their privacy , and that the record does not support the District’s contenti on that Sgt. Podorski separated Plaintiffs because of their UFIRs.6 See Jones Opp’n at 33-34; 4 Jones Disputed ¶ J044; see also Jones Dep. at 58 (calling the posted notice an invasion of privacy); W eeks Dep. at 85 (asserting tha t the posting of the notice created a hostile work environment). Sgt . Podorski testified that he t old other sergeants in 7D that Plaintiffs were overly aggressi ve when they worked together, bu t he did not recall “a specific incident” that “trigge red” the notice posting. See Podorski Dep. at 45-46. After the notice on excessive U FIRs was posted, Ms. Weeks told Sgts. Eric Levenberry and Buddy Smallwood that she believed Sgt. Podorski was being unfair. See Weeks Dep. at 63. According to Ms. Weeks , Sgt. Levenberry told her s he could file a complaint with the District’s Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Office, but w arned her that if she did, Sgt. Podorski might tell people that Ms. Weeks had slept with him. Id . Sgt. Levenberry recalled the conversation but not how he advised Ms. Weeks. See Levenberry Dep. [Dkt. 94-12] at 19. Ms. Jones testified that, also in J anuary 2007, she and Ms. Weeks t ogether complained to Lt. Derek Larsen about Sgt. Podorski, tel ling Lt. Larsen that they did no t want to work with Sgt. Podorski anymore because of the way he had been treating them. See Jones Dep. at 69, 72-79. There was apparently no immediate response; Lt. Larsen testified that he advised Plaintiffs several months later, in October 2007, that if they were having a problem withSgt. Podorski they could file an EEO complaint. See Larsen Dep. [Dkt. 94-1] at 42- 43. In February 2007, Plaintiff s also talked with Lt. Ashley Rosenthal, a f ormer EEO counselor for 7D and tr ainer at the Police Academy, about Sgt. Podorski’s allegedly harassing behavior ; Plaintiffs allege that Lt. Rosenthal advised them to document their complaints but did not take further step s to address their concerns. See Weeks Dep. at 333; Rosenthal Dep. [Dkt. 97-9] at 59-62.

4 Throughout this Opinion, citations to the parties’ briefs refe r to the page number provided by the Electronic Case Filing System, identif ied at the top of eac h page, and not to the page number at the bottom.7 In March 2007, Ms. Jones began he r new assignment in PSA 701. During this time, Sgt. Podorski was responsib le for Roll Call assignments t o scout cars, and Ms. Jones alleges that Sgt. Podorski rout inely refused to assign her and Ms. Weeks to the same scout car, even though he would routinely ass ign other officers in heteros exual relationships to ride together. See Statement of Officer Tonia L. J ones, Jones OHR File at 68-74. 5 Also during March 2007, Plaintiffs met with J oel Maupin, Commander of 7D, t o complain about Sgt. Podorski and to request that th ey both be transferred to the mi dnight shift to avoid his supervision. See Weeks Dep. at 137

. CDR Maupin informed Plainti ffs that they could file an EEO complaint, but that he had a policy between open bids of ag reeing to reassignments only with a “body-for-body” replacemen t; that is, a transferring off icer had to find another officer to take her place. See id. at 136-37, 142; Jones Dep. at 127-28. CDR Maupin testified tha t the “body-for-body” requirement is standard procedure because of st affing limitations, see Maupin Dep. [Dkt. 93-12] at 31, while Pla intiffs contend that the “bod y-for-body” policy was not an official policy and was selectivel y enforced in a discriminator y way. See Weeks Dep. at 130-32 (Ms. Weeks describing her understanding that one other officer had been permitted to change her shift without a “body-for-body” r eplacement). Both Ms. Weeks a nd Ms. Jones were reassigned to the midnight shift later in 2007, in August and September, r espectively, when each had found a replacement with whom to switch. See Weeks Dep. at 125-26.

5 In only one of the curlicues in Plaintiffs’ arguments, they co mplain that Sgt. Podorski contributed to a hostile work e nvironment by preventing Ms. Jon es from bidding on PSA 703 and thereby preventing Plainti ffs from riding together, and , after her assignment to PSA 701, by not permitting Plaintiffs to cross PSA boundaries to ride together.8 3. Alleged Hostile Actions at Myrtle Beach Bike Week Sgt. Yurell Washington was th e supervisor in 7D on the midnightshift to whose supervision each Plaintiff volunt arily transferred in late summ er 2007. See Weeks Disputed ¶ W010; Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 80. Bef ore those transfers, in May 2 007, Plaintiffs had traveled with Sgt. Washington and his gi rlfriend to Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for an annual motorcycle rally (Bike Week). See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 82; W eeks Disputed ¶ W012. During the several-hours-long drive, duri ng which the travelers talked and, at various times, Plaintiffs openly kissed in the back seat, Sgt . Washington asked Ms. Weeks why she “switched to being with women,” which Ms. Weeks a lleges was invasive and harassing . Weeks Opp’n at 14; see Washington Dep. [Dkt. 94-15] at 77-79, 116-17. Sgt. Washingtoncontends that the question came up naturally in conversati on and that he had no hidden mot ive in asking it. See Washington Dep. at 77-78. A number of MPD officers travele d to Myrtle Beach for “Bike Wee k” and during the vacation Plaintiffs stayed a t a rental house with other off icers including Sgts. Podorski and Washington. Jones Dep. at 102; see also Washington Dep. at 113. During a party one night at a different house, a clearly drunk S gt. Podorski walked out onto the porch and yelled, “Do you want to f—k?” in front of a larg e group that included Plaintiff s. Jones Dep. at 46. That Sgt. Podorski asked this question is undisputed; there is a dispute as to whether he was seriously propositioning Ms. Weeks or both Plaintiffs, see, e.g. , Weeks Dep. at 118 (“I took it as him being serious.”), or if the outburst was directed at no one in partic ular, see Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 118; Podorski Dep. at 66 (“I don’t know i f I was yelling at them or someone else in the house.”). Ms. Jones testified that other offi cers at the party expressed thei r indignation to her about the Sergeant’s conduct, although appare ntly none presented evidence in discovery. See Jones Dep.9 at 106. Ms. Jones also testified th at she helped to restrain o ther officers from attacking Sgt. Podorski. See id. (“I was trying to stop other pe ople from assaulting [Sgt. Podor ski].”). Plaintiffs argue that their r ecollections of othe r officers’ re actions after Sgt. Podorski’s outburst corroborates Ms. Jones’s testim ony that the outburst was direct ed at either Ms. Weeks or both

women. 4. Alleged Hostile Actions by Sgt . Washington and Other Officers After Ms. Weeks transferred to the midnight shift in August 200 7, Sgt. Washington suggested a couple of t imes that they ride their mot orcycles to work together. Weeks Dep. at 124 (recalling that Sgt. Washington invited her t o ride their bikes “a couple times”); Washington Dep. at 55 (re calling that he asked her onc e, in a casual, friendly manner). Ms. Weeks now complains that she felt harassed by Sgt. Washingt on’s offers to ride their motorcycles to work together. By mid-September 2007, Plaintiffs were both assigned to the midnight shift and were again patrolling together . During a patrol prior to Septe mber 19, Plaintiffs stopped an automobile that had been reported stolen. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 119; Washington Dep. at 53. A woman who was a known prostitute w as driving the car; after t alking with her, Plaintiffs accepted her word that the owner of the car (who had reported i t stolen) had given her permission to drive it. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 120; Week s Dep. at 151-53. Plaintiffs repo rted the encounter to Sgt. Washington, who ordered them to arrest th e woman as a suspected car thief. Plaintiffs refused. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶¶ 120-21 ; Washington Dep. at 53. Sgt. Washington became angry because P laintiffs defied his direct or ders, although he ultimately agreed not to insist that t hey lock up the suspect. See Weeks Dep. at 157. Sgt. Washington testified that Plaintiffs’ in subordination during this incident , particularly Ms. Weeks’s vocal10 resistance to his orders, was “the last straw,” and he determin ed to separate them. Washington Dep. at 54; see also id. at 55 (stating that Ms. Weeks resisted his orders vocally, whi le Ms. Jones was largely silent thr oughout the incident). 6 Sgt. Washington separated Plaintiffs by assigning Ms. Weeks to the so-called “Marjorie Court detail,” a tem porary fixed-post assignment to p rovide protection to a fellow officer at his home, on September 19, 2007. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 124 ; Washington Dep. at 55, 80-81. During such a stint on October 5, 2007, Ms. Weeks a rrested a suspect on an unrelated matter, but Sgt. Washington ordere d her to return to her detail and assigned the arrest to another officer to process at the lock- up. Ms. Weeks charges that in d oing so Sgt. Washington was treating her unfairly. See Weeks Internal Affairs Division Interview at 9-11 (Oct. 7, 2007) [Dkt

. 94-18] (Weeks IAD Interview). Plaintiffs believe that Sgt. Was hington assigned Ms. Weeks to the detail in order to separate Plaintiffs, and that his intent was punitive. Ms. Weeks alleges that another officer asked for the de tail but Sgt. Washington refuse d because he was “saving” it for Ms. Weeks. Weeks OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009), Weeks OHR File at 3 [Dkt. 94-4]; Weeks Dep. at 128; see also Washington Dep. at 60 (testifyi ng that he did not recall telli ng anyone that he was “saving” the detail for Ms. Weeks). Plaintiffs further allege that Sgt. Washington inappropriately referred to their sexual orientation. According t o Ms. Weeks’s testimony, Sgt. W ashington’s girlfriend told Ms. Weeks that he had described the women as “the butch one” (Ms. J ones) and “the femme one” (Ms. Weeks), which Ms. Weeks c onsidered derogatory, harassing, and evidence of Sgt.

6 Plaintiffs also argue that Sgt. Washington had a history of “b ias against females.” See Weeks Disputed ¶ W080; Washington Dep . at 88-89. Finding that the in cidents cited by Plaintiffs had no connection to the workplace and are largely unproved, the Co urt finds the allegations irrelevant and inadmissible.11 Washington’s inappropriate focus on their sexual orientation. See Weeks Dep. at 95-97. Sgt. Washington testified that he di d not recall using those terms, but that it was “a known impression” in 7D that Ms. Jones wa s “butch” and Ms. Weeks was “femme.” Washington Dep. at 79. Plaintiffs also allege that Sgt. Washington frequently initiated frank discussions with Plaintiffs about his sexual attra ction to other women, which Pl aintiffs assert was unprofessional and which they believe Sgt. W ashington would not have done withheterosexual female colleagues. See Weeks Disputed ¶ W097; W ashington Dep. at 131-32. Further, Plaintiffs complain tha t other MPD employees harassed them because of their sexual orientation. The y allege that, in September 2007, they were standing together when Officer Stephen Pristoop, a c olleague, offered $5,000 to Ms. We eks to watch the couple have sex; Plaintiffs rejected the offer. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 135; J ones Dep. at 264-66. Officer Pristoop was later fired by M PD, due to unrelated inappropriate actions. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 138; Washington Dep. at 59-60. Ms . Jones alleges that Sgt. B uddy Smallwood asked her if he “could have a kiss,” adding tha t Ms. Weeks would not find out. See Jones Dep. at 262. Ms. Weeks alleges that Officer William Chapman would frequently tel l her that she should “go back” to men. 3d Am. Compl. [Dkt. 26] ¶ 18. There is no allegation that either Plaintiff reported any of these encounters to MPD at the time. See, e.g. , Weeks Dep. at 266 (“I can ’t remember if I told someone [about Officer Pristoop].”).
5. Investigations of Ms. Weeks for Neglect of Duty and Absence In September and October of 2007, Ms. Weeks was investigated, o n Sgt. Washington’s orders, for two sep arate incidents involving MPD’s absence and leave policies. First, on September 26, 2007, Ms. Weeks was investigated for “n eglect of duty” after allegedly leaving a squad car partner ( not Ms. Jones) behind and neglecti ng to follow MPD procedures12 after doing so. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶¶ 126-28; Wa shington Dep. at 626-3. Ms. Wee ks disputes that she ever left apartner behind and contends that the charge was baseless. See Weeks Dep. at 176-78. She was never formally reprimanded for the all eged violation, and she does not know if anything came of it, but s he argues that being written up contributed to a hostile work environment. She also states th at the investigation remains inher 7D employment file as an “adverse action.” See id. ; Weeks Disputed ¶¶ W087-88. Second, on October 3, 2007, Ms. Weeks called in sick but failed to check in with MPD’s medical clinic upon returning to work as required by offi cial policy; as a result, Sgt. Washington initiated an investiga tion into Ms. Weeks for being absent without leave (AWOL).
See Weeks AWOL Investigation M emorandum (Feb. 27, 2008) [Dkt. 90-9] . Ms. Weeks admits that she failed to comply with e xisting policy (a nd was officia lly AWOL) but complains that Sgt. Washington checked in repeatedl y with medical staff to ask if M s. Weeks had reported to them, which Ms. Weeks contends was atypical and harassing. See, e.g. , Weeks Dep. at 192-93, 195. Ms. Weeks also contends that the AWOL investigation was untimel y as it was not commenced until four days after the incident, and that she herself was no t told about the AW OL charge for a
year. See Weeks Disputed ¶ W091.
6. Plaintiffs’ Stress Leave On October 7, 2007, Ms. Weeks and Ms. Jones attended the weddin g of two fellow officers. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 139; Weeks Di sputed ¶ W102. Plaintiffs eac h requested one hour of leave, a lthough MPD policy provided for s hort periods of personal leave in the form of two- or four-hour blocks. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 140; Weeks Disputed ¶ W102.13 Upon arriving at work, Plaintiffs saw Sgt. Washington just leav ing 7D. 7 They then found that he had marked them out for two hours . They allege that he had not marked other officers out for two hours, even though others may ha ve been gone for as long as or longer than Plaintiffs. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 141; Weeks Disputed ¶ W105. The record is not clear as to whether Plaintiffs were late arri ving on duty by an hour or slightly mo re, but Plaintiffs contend that clarity is unimportant because S gt. Washington had already mark ed them out for two hours before he knew when the y actually reported. See Weeks Dep. at 176; Jones Dep. at 144. Neither Plaintiff brought the mistake t o the attention of Sgt. Washingt on or requested a correction to her leave records through typical channels, although each described the matter when they filed EEO charges with MPD’s Internal A ffairs Division later that month. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 142; Weeks Disputed ¶ W106. Plaintiffs say that they became too stressed to work after Sgt. Washington marked them out for two hours for the wedding and decided to take stre ss leave. On October 8, 2007, both Plaintiffs filed formal stre ss complaints with MPD, allegi ng that their work environment was stressful because Sgt. Was hington was discriminating agains t them based on “sexual preference.” See Jones and Weeks PD-42 Docum ents (Oct. 7, 2007) [Dkt. 94-19] (P D-42 Documents). Both also reported phy siological symptoms such as headaches and nausea due to ongoing harassment. Id. Plaintiffs immediately took tim e off due to stress and did not return to work until November 26, 2007. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 147; Weeks Dep. at 201-02. While on stress leave, both Pla intiffs filed EEO complaints with the Int ernal Affairs Division (IAD), alleging discrimination on the basi s of sexual orientation and retaliation. Ms. Jones complained

7 Because Plaintiffs were worki ng the midnight shift, the Court interprets their allegations as meaning they asked to report fo r work at 1:00 a.m. after attend ing the wedding.14 of such treatment by Sgt. Podorsk i, but not Sgt. Washington, an d Ms. Weeks complained of such treatment by Sgt. Washington, but not Sgt. Podorski. Each Plai ntiff was interviewed by EEO Counselor Debbie Burt. See Weeks IAD Interview; Jones IAD Interview (Oct. 15, 2007) [Dkt. 94-10]. Additionally while on stress l eave, Plaintiffs took a preplanne d, prepaid, oneweek vacation to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶¶ 145-46. The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs had remaini ng paid annual leave to cover the ir vacation or used paid stress leave. Plaintiffs admit that t hey had both exhaus ted their sic k and annual leave at the time, see 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 70, but Ms. Weeks asserts that they both had re ceived approval fo r the vacation prior to requesting stress leav e, and that they used approximat ely 40 hours of annual leave and not stress leave for the vacation. See Weeks Disputed ¶ W113. In addition, Ms. Weeks alleges that MPD categorized her leave time incorrectly. See id. ¶ W115. In November 2007, Sgt. Podorski gave Ms. Jones a performance ev aluation rating of 26, or “meets expectations.” This 2007 rating was two point s lower than his evaluation of her in 2006. See Jones Annual Evaluation 2007 [Dk t. 90-11]. Sgt. Podorski initi ally gave Ms. Weeks a performance rating of 26 a s well but that rating was ra ised to 28 (“exceeds expectations”) by another serg eant in PSA 703, Sgt. Robert Hunt er. See 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 99; Weeks Dep. at 213. Ms. Jones si gned her evaluation on December 2, 2007, but was not given a
copy. See Jones Dep. at 213. Ms. Jones did not grieve her evaluation bec ause, she says, she had not received a copy and the evalu ation was not in her personnel folder when she looked. See id. at 213-14. Ms. Jones received a c opy of her 2006 evaluation onFebruary 8, 2008. See Jones Copy, Jones Annual Evaluation 2007 (signed as having been “Rece ived 2-8-08”) [Dkt. 96-4].15 Plaintiffs returned from stress leave on November 26, 2007. Ms . Jones complains that Sgt. Washington told her “[ Y]ou can feed the dogs but theywill bite you,” which she interpreted as a threat rel ated to her EEO charge. See Washington Dep. at 83-84. In January 2008, Sgt. Washington allegedly tol d Ms. Jones, “Y’all pulled that shit. You jumped on the band wagon with Weeks. I always been s traight with you. That shit is f—ked up. You and your girl f—ked up.” See Jones PD-119 Report (Jan. 22, 2008) [Dkt. 95-6]. After they returned from stress leave in December 2007, both Plaintiffs had been reassig ned to PSA 705, where they were supervised by Lt. Rosenthal. See Jones Disputed ¶ J026; see also Rosenthal Dep. at 27-28 (confirming that she had superv ised both Plaintiffs in PSA 705 around this time). Ms. Jones alleges that Sgt. Podor ski escalated his aggressive b ehavior toward her when, on March 11, 2008, she asked him to sign a routine report , and he threw the papers on the floor in anger and refused to si gn. Another sergeant subsequen tly signed the papers. See Jones Dep. at 52-53. In May 2008, when Ms . Weeks was injured in an o n-duty car accident, Ms. Jones complains that Sgt. (First Name U nknown) LaFranchise refused to grant Ms. Jones’s request to leave work early to pick up Ms. Weeks from the hospital. See Jones OHR Complaint at 3 (Apr. 20, 2009); Statement of Officer Tonia L. Jones ¶ 15 (No. 08-206 -DC(N)), Jones OHR File at 17. Plaintiffs also contend that duri ng the same month CDR Maupin a gain split them up by assigning Ms. Weeks to the “midnight shift s,” and that he told Ms. Jones she need not “follow” Ms. Weeks “everywhere she [goes].” Jones OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009); see also Maupin Dep. at 74 (stating that he did not reca ll making this comment).
7. Detective Applications and Ms. W eeks’s Move to 7D Detectives’ O ffice In the spring of 2008, both Plainti ffs were eligible for, and p articipated in, MPD’s Investigator Qualificatio ns and Selection Process. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 150. A total of 22816 officers, including both Plainti ffs, were found to be eligible for 63 open positions. Id. ¶ 151. The candidates were all ranke d and the 63 highest-ranking offic ers were promoted to Investigator, a precursor to b ecoming a Detective; the other names remained on the list to be awarded promotions as vacancies occurred in the order of the li st. See Investigator Candidate Ranking List [Dkt. 90-15]. The ranking took into account multi ple factors in determining each candidate’s overall ranking. These included a written examinat ion (20 percent) , an interview with a panel (50 percent), and past performance eval uations (10 percent). See Jones Testing Results [Dkt. 90-17]; Weeks Te sting Results [Dkt. 90-16]; Def.’s Mot. Summ. J . [Dkt. 90] at 22 (Mot.). At the end of the appli cation process in October 2008, Ms. Weeks was ranked 16th and was selected to become an Investigator. Ms. Jones, however, wa s ranked 193rd and was not selected, as there were only 63 openings. See Investigator Candida te Ranking List. Although Ms. Jones contends that Sgt. Podor ski’s “meets expectations” pe rformance evaluation in 2006 was the major factor in her rank ing, the Districtmaintains tha t Ms. Jones’s overall low score— including her examination resul ts and poor interview—was the de terminative factor. See Jones Disputed ¶ J099; Def.’s Undis puted ¶ 63. Ms. Jones has withdra wn her allegations that MPD discriminated against her by fa iling to promote her to Investig ator. See Jones Opp’n at 22 n.6 [Dkt. 96]. When Ms. Weeks was promoted t o Investigator in October 2008, sh e ceased to work as a patrol officer. Inst ead, Ms. Weeks began to work in the 7D Detectives’ Office as an Investigator. See MPD Investigator Selection for Cri minal Investigations Division(Oct. 23, 2008) [Dkt. 95-2]. Ms. Weeks alleges that she continued to suffer a hostile work environment despite the change in work loc ation and supervisors. She alleg es that she was given less desirable assignments than thos e assigned to male colleagues, a rrest warrants she initiated were17 given to male colleagues for closure, and her cases were reassi gned to male detectives. See Weeks Handwritten Notes [Dkt. 95- 3] at 1-2. She complains that a superior asked her if she was “timid” and that she was “ridicul ed” once when she requested tr aining. Weeks Dep. at 259, 227. Ms. Weeks also complains that he r supervisor, Sgt. Avis King, v erbally counseled her for contacting a friend working in MPD ’s Homicide unit for help on a case and that Sgt. King then sent an email to all 7D detectiv es to condemn the practice of “ going outside of this unit crying about not receiving assistance wi th cases” without following pr oper protocol, a practice Sgt. King called “cancerous.” Avis King Email (Dec. 9, 2008) [Dkt. 95-4]. Later in December 2008, Ms. Weeks requested an hour of leav e to attend a funeral servic e for a fallen police officer, but was denied leave by Sgt. King because there was a mandatory mee ting. See Weeks Handwritten Notes at 2. Ms. Weeks complains that another sergeant counsele d her for requesting leave. Id. Further, Ms. Weeks alleges th at, in February 2009 in the 7D Det ectives’ Office, she opened one of her desk draw ers to find an unwrapped tampon, which she believes had been placed there to harass her. See Weeks Dep. at 249-51. Ms. Weeks re ported the incident to her supervisors, and she complains t hat they did not initiate an investigation to identify the person who placed the tampon in the drawer. See Weeks Dep. at 249-51. The District maintains that the tampon incident is immaterial because Ms. Weeks fails to link i t to “any supervisor action or inaction.” See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 155. Ms. Weeks was promoted to Det ective in October 2009 and transfe rred out of 7D in December 2009. See Weeks Transfer Email [Dkt. 95-9].18 B. Procedural Background
1. Plaintiffs’ MPD and D.C. A dministrative Complaints Under D.C. regulations, an empl oyee is entitled to a final inte rview with her EEO counselor, at which the empl oyee must be given an “Exit Letter” informing her of the disposition of her EEO charge and of her rightto file a complaint with the Director of the D.C. Office of Human Rights (OHR) within 15 days. See D.C. M UN

. R EGS . tit. 4 § 105.5-105.6. At her request, Ms. Weeks received such an E xit Letter on December 14, 2007; th e document warned her that she had 15 days to file a complaint with OHR if she wished to p ursue her charges. See Weeks Exit Letter [Dkt. 64-19]; see also Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 158. Desp ite the warning in the Exit Letter, Ms. Weeks waited until March 31, 2008, to file a compla int of discrimination with OHR alleging discrimination based on sex ual orientation. Weeks OHR Complaint (Mar. 31, 2008). Ms. Jones did not ask for an Exit Letter and did not receive on e until March 31, 2008. Jones Exit Letter [Dkt. 64-20]. Unlike Ms. Weeks, Ms. Jones promptly file d a sexual orientation-based complaint with OHR on the same day. See Jones OHR Complaint (Mar. 31, 2008), Jones OHR File at 1-2. On December 23, 2008, Plaintiffs’ c ounsel sent letters to MPD s tating that both Plaintiffs wanted to amend their i nitial OHR Complaints to incl ude gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and reprisal, but the letters did not include any s worn statements or charges from Plaintiffs themselves, and were , therefore, ineffective for the purpose. See Jones OHR File at 20; Weeks OHR File at 20. On Apr il 1, 2009, Plaintiffs’ counsel se nt an email to OHR, attaching statements from Ms. Jones and Ms. Weeks in which they alleged d iscrimination on the basis of gender in addition to their earlier claims. See Juliette Niehuss Email (Apr. 1, 2009) [Dkt. 90-22]. The date on the signature line of each of Plaintiffs’ amended O HR complaints is April 20, 2009,19 see Weeks OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009), Weeks OHR File at 4; Jones OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009), Jones OHR File at 12, and the District concedes that April 1, 2009, the date of the email with Plaintiffs’ statements attached, is the formal filin g date of the amendments. See, e.g. , Mot. at 27 (“Plaintiff [Jones] did not file her EEOC complaint until April 1, 2009.”); see also id. (citing the April 1, 2009 email as the record citation for Ms. Jones’s filing of her amended OHR complaint). The complaints were cross-filed with the Washingto n Field Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commissi on (EEOC) as charges of sex disc rimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Ms. Jones alleges that, several months later, Sgt. Levenberry e mailed OHR investigators to tell them that Ms. Jones threatened EEO compla ints whenever she did not get her way; Ms. Jones argues that Sgt. L evenberry sent these emails inretaliation for Ms. Jones having mentioned him in her OHR complaint. See Levenberry OHR Emails [Dkt. 95-7]. Sgt. Levenberry has testified that he was merely answering questions from OHR investigators concerning an EEO charge filed by Ms. Jones against him. See Levenberry Dep. at 52.
2. Procedural History of the Present Action 8
Plaintiffs filed this laws uit on January 25, 2011. Complaint [ Dkt. 1]. Their Third Amended Complaint, filed December 28, 2012, included thirteen c ounts. See 3d Am. Compl. [Dkt. 26]. This Court dismissed P laintiffs’ constitutional cla ims, Counts XI, XII, and XIII, on July 25, 2012. See 7/25/2012 Order [Dkt. 16]. 9 The Court dismissed Counts VIII and X,

8 The Court has previously consid ered its jurisdiction over all claims in this case, and found that the Court has jurisdiction. See 7/25/2012 Mem. Op. at 9 n.4 [Dkt . 15]; 5/19/2014 Mem. Op. at 6 [Dkt. 56].

9 Plaintiffs repeated these alr eady dismissed counts in their Th ird Amended Complaint in order to preserve their appeal rights. See 3d Am. Compl. at 1 n.1.20 alleging retaliation in viola tion of Title VII, on June 30, 201 6. 6/30/2016 Order [Dkt. 89]. In her Opposition to Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment, M s. Jones withdrew her claims based upon discriminatory non-promotion, Counts II, IV, VI, IX, and X. See Jones Opp’n
at 22 n.6. 10 Both Plaintiffs now advance a cas e of an alleged hostile work environment due to their sexual preferen ce and a retaliator y hostile work environm ent due to their protected activities. They also allege a hos tile work environment due to their sex. Remaining for decision are: Count I, which alleges a hos tile work environment in viol ation of DCHRA due to Plaintiffs’ sexual orientation; Count III, w hich alleges a hostile work env ironment in violation of DCHRA on the basis of Plaintiffs’ sex; Count V, which alleges a hosti le work environment in violation of Title VII on the basis of Plaintiffs’ sex; and Count VII, whichalleges a retaliatory hostile work environment in violation of DCH RA due to Plaintiffs’ protected activities. See 3d Am. Compl.
at 25-31. 11

10 The Court interprets Ms. Jones’ s withdrawal of Counts II, IV, VI, and IX as notice of voluntarily dismissal, and accordingly these claims will be dis missed with prejudice. As noted previously, the Court had a lready dismissed Count X. See 6/30/2016 Order.

11 Plaintiffs also argue that the y are entitled to an adverse evi dentiary inference—precluding summary judgment—with regard to re levant evidence that the District failed to maintain, namely, Patrol System (PSS) log books and relevant emails sent prior to July 2009. To warrant an adverse inference, three elemen ts must be satisfied: (1) th e party having control over the evidence must have had an obliga tion to preserve it at the time the evidence was destroyed or altered; (2) the destruction or loss must have been accompanied by a “culpable state of mind”; and (3) the evidence that was de stroyed or altered must have be en “relevant” to, i.e. , supportive of, the claims of the party that sought the discovery of the sp oliated evidence. Bolger v. D.C. , 608 F. Supp. 2d 10, 30 (D.D.C. 2009). Plaintiffs argue that th e PSS log books could have supported their claims by providi ng evidence that officers in h eterosexual relationships were permitted to ride together while Plaintiffs were separated. Th e District count ers that this additional evidence would not be mat erial or relevant to the cl aims at issue, notably because the District concedes that other c ouples were not separated, while Plaintiffs were separated, albeit for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. See Mot. 62-63. In light of the D istrict’s concession, the Court finds that the m issing log books would not be materia l to Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiffs have failed to show a“culpable state of mind.” Pla intiffs further contend that the District improperly destroyed MPD emails that were sent or rece ived before July 2009. They raise vague suggestions that the deleted emails might have prov ided additional evidence related21 The Court advised the parties a t a status conference on June 30 , 2016, that supplemental briefing was require d due to internal inconsistenc ies, lack of clarity, and the lack of record citations in Plantiffs’ briefs. See 6/30/2016 Minute Entry; Tr. of Status Conference (June 30, 2016) [Dkt. 91]; 6/30/2016 Order ( ordering supplemental bri efing). The parties subsequently filed supplemental briefs, whic h are ripe for decision. The Di strict filed a renewed motion for summary judgment. See Mot. Ms. Weeks and Ms. Jones fi led separate briefs in oppositi on. See Weeks Opp’n to Def.’s 2d Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 93] (Weeks Opp ’n); Jones Opp’n to Def.’s 2d Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 96] (J ones Opp’n). The District rep lied. Reply to Opp’n to 2d Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 99] (Reply).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion for Summary Judgment Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that the re is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to j udgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “mat erial” if it is capable of aff ecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if there is sufficient admissible evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial respons ibility of identifying portions of the recor d which demonstrate the absenc e of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P.

to their claims. The District e xplains that its policy was to reuse tapes that stored old emails after one year, and that the emails wer e destroyed according to this established retention policy and not in bad faith. The Court concl udes that Plaintiffs have fai led to show a “culpable state of mind” or that the lost materials would have supported their cas e. The Court declines to make a finding of spoliation.22 56(c)(1)(A) (providing that the movant may cite to “depositions , documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials”). In response, the non-moving party must similarly designate specific facts in the record that reveal a genuine issue for tr ial. See Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324. On a motion for summary judgment, a c ourt must analyze all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255. However, to the extent the non-moving party relies on conclu sory assertions offered withou t evidentiary support, such assertions do not establish a genuine issue for trial. See Greene v. Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
B. Hostile Work Environment U nder Title VII and DCHRA Title VII of the Civil Right s Act of 1964, as amended by the Eq ual Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Title VII) , prohibits status-based dis crimination in federal and D.C. workplaces. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Title VII generally prohibi ts an employer, including specifically the District, fro m taking any “personnel action[]” based on an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Title VII protects employees not only from discrete d iscriminatory acts, but also from a hostile work environment, that is, a workplace permeate d by discriminatory harassment bas ed on an employee’s protected status. To establish a hostile wo rk environment, the employee must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that the harassment is “sufficiently severe or perv asive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment”: A plaintiff pleading a hostile work environment claim must show that he was exposed to “‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” To assess a claim of hostile work environment, the court considers “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; i ts23 severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and wh ether it unreasona bly interfere s with an employee’s work performance.”
Durant v. D.C. Gov’t , 875 F.3d 685, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) 510 U.S. 17, 21, 23 (1993), and Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)) (internal ci tations omitted). There is no bright-line test f or a hostile work environment, and a plaintiff n eed not show psychological harm o r any specific adverse employment outcome. See Harris , 510 U.S. at 23. To make a prima f acie Title VII hostile work environment claim based on sex, the plaintiff employee must sho w: (1) the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome[] sexual harassment []; (3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex; (4) the charge d sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering wi th the plaintiff’s work performance and creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working e nvironment []; and (5) the exist ence of respondeat superior liability. Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc. , 275 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc. , 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997)). Almost all of the legal tenets developed under Title VII are ap plied by D.C. courts when applying the D.C. Human Rights Act. See Attakora v. D.C. , 943 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Am. Univ. v. D.C. Comm’n on Human Rights , 598 A.2d 416, 422 (D.C. 1991) (“In deciding cases brought unde r [DCHRA], we follow the allocations of burdens and order of proof prescribed for cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”)). In addition to sex, DCHRA establis hes sexual orientation as a p rotected class. See D.C. C ODE § 2-1401.01 (stating the intent of D CHRA is to end “discriminat ion for any reason other than that of individual merit, i ncluding, but not limited to . . . s exual orientation [or ] gender identity or expression”).24 DCHRA defines “sexual harassmen t” as a type of discrimination that encompasses hostile work environment claims. The D.C. Municipa l Regulations define sexual harassment fairly broadly: Sexual harassment -- unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when the following occurs: (a) Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; (b) Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an employee i s used as the basis for employmen t decisions affecting the employ ee; or (c) The conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably inter fering with an employee’s work performan ce or creating an intimidating , hostile, or offensive working environment. Sexual harassment may include, but is not limited to, verbal harassment or abuse, subtle pressure for sexual activity, patti ng or pinching, brushing against another employee’s body, and demands for sexual favors.
D.C. M UN

. R EGS . tit. 4, § 199.1 (2010); see also D.C. Mayor’s Order 2004-171 (Oct. 20, 2004) (summarizing the definition of sexual harassment under D.C. lawand including as examples of sexual harassment that may contribute to a hostile work environ ment “sexually offensive comments or off-color language . . . belittling or demeaning to an individual or a group’s sexuality or gender”). 12 A hostile work environment charge under DCHRA is subject to the same test as complaints of a hostile work environment under Title VII. See Campbell-Crane & Assoc., Inc. v.

12 Mayor Anthony Williams issued the District’s regulation on sex ual harassment on October 20, 2004 (Mayor’s Order 2004-171). Evide ntly it was re-adopted and re-posted by the Mayor’s Office on October 7, 2011 and remains outstanding. See http://ohr.dc.gov/publication/dc-sexualharassment-policy (las t visited June 1, 2018).25 Stamenkovic , 44 A.3d 924, 933 (D.C. 2012) (“The law i s clear that to estab lish a claim of discrimination based on a hostile work environment under the DC HRA, a plaintiff must show: ‘(1) that he is a member of a pr otected class, (2) that he has been subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) that the harassm ent was based on membership in a protected class, and (4) that the harassment is severe and pe rvasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment

. ’”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Daka, Inc. v. Breiner , 711 A.2d 86, 92 (D.C. 1998)).
C. Retaliation Under DCHRA DCHRA specifies that it is an “ unlawful discriminatory practice ” to retaliate against an employee for ha ving “exercised or enjoyed, or . . . aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoym ent of any right granted or pro tected under [DCHRA],” or “because that person has opposed any [discriminatory] practice . . . or because that person has made a charge, testified, assist ed, or participated in any mann er in an investigation, proceeding or hearing authorized un der [DCHRA].” D.C. C ODE § 2-1402.61(a)-(b). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under DCHRA, a p laintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she was engaged in protected activity; ( 2) the employer took a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connectionbetween the protected activity and the materially adverse action. See Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth. , 957 A.2d 45, 54 (D.C. 2008); see also Bryant v. D.C. , 102 A.3d 264, 268 (D.C. 2014) (noting tha t the analysis for DCHRA retaliation is the same as for Title VII). In order for a factfinder to infer a causal connection between an employee’ s protected activity and an adve rse action, there must be evidence that the employer was aw are of the employee’s protecte d activity. See McFarland v. George Washington Univ. , 935 A.2d 337, 357-58 (D.C. 2007).26 The D.C. Circuit has recognized that a hostile work environment can be retaliatory, as Plaintiffs complain. See, e.g. , Hussain v. Nicholson , 435 F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“In this circuit, a hostile work environment can amount to retaliation under Title VII.”);
see also Hammel v. Marsh USA Inc. , 206 F. Supp. 3d 219, 240 (D.D.C. 2016) (denying summary judgment on alleged retaliatory hostile work environment under DCHRA). To prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must show t hat she was subjected to “discr iminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ of such ‘sever[ity] or pervasive[ness] [as] to alte r the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Hussain 435 F.3d at 366 (quoting Harris , 510 U.S. at 21-22).
D. Timeliness Hostile work environment claims involve repeated, ongoing condu ct that need not fully manifest in any single instance or on any particular day: the facts alleged in support of the claim may be cumulative and may take place over an extended per iod of time. A hostile work environment charge is timely s o long as one of the acts contrib uting to the hostile work environment occurred within the applicable statute of limitatio ns. Moreover, additional hostile acts occurring later may be considered: Provided that an act contributin g to the claim occurs within th e filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may b e considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability

. That act need not, how ever, be the last act . As long as the emp loyer has engaged in enough activity to make out an actionable hostil e environment claim, an unlawfu l employment practice has “occurred,” even if it is still occurring. Subsequent events, however, may still be part of the one hostile work environment claim and a charge may be filed at a later da te and still encompass the who le. . . . . The statute does not sep arate individual acts that are part of the hostile environment claim from the whole for the purposes of ti mely filing and liability. And the statute does not contain a requi rement27 that the employee file a charge prior to 180 or 300 days “after ” the single unlawful practice “occurre d.” Given, therefore, that the incidents constituting a hostile work environment are part of o ne unlawful employment practice, the employer may be liable for al l acts that are part of this single claim. Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 117-18 (2002) (footnotes omitted). Any prior related conduct must , however, be “sufficiently relat ed” to the activity that is not timebarred to be part of the same alleged hostile work environment practice. McGullam v. Cedar Graphics, Inc. , 609 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing Morgan and describing the assessment as “fact-specific and sensitive”). Title VII requires an employee to file an EEOC charge with that agency within 180 days from a discrete discrim inatory act or within 300 days if the employee first files with a state or local agency tasked w ith handling Title VII violations , as happened here. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Morgan , 536 U.S. at 101-02 (applying Title VII’s timelimitation provision to a hostile work environment claim). As this applies to a charge of a hostile work environment, at least one of the alleged acts constituting hostility must have occurred within the relevant timeframe. Charges brought under DCHRA mustbe filed with OHR “within one year of the occurrence or discovery of the alleged act.” D.C. C ODE § 2-1403.16(a) (2001). In most instances, a D.C. employee must f irst “consult an EEO counselor within one hundred-eighty (180) days of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful discrimina tory practice.” D.C. M UN

. R EGS

. tit. 4, § 105.1. The EEO counselor mus t seek a solution on an informal basis and, within 30 days, conduct a final intervi ew with the complainant. Id. §§ 105.3(c), 105.4. Following the final interview, the EEO counselor mus t issue an Exit Letter constitu ting written notice that an employee must file a formal comp laint with OHR within 15 days i n order to pursue her charge28 with OHR. Id. §§ 105.5-105.6. However, “a complaint of sexual harassment maybe filed directly with OHR”— i.e. , an employee alleging a hostile work environment may bypass th e internal EEO counseling a nd Exit Letter process. See id. § 105.1. Under D.C. law, a claim of a hostile work environment may be brought directly to OHR within one year of a timely alleged incident. See id. To bring an EEO lawsuit under DCHR A, a District employee must f ile “within one year of the unlawful discrimi natory act, or the discovery thereof,” which deadline is tolled for as long as a timely complaint is pending with OHR. See D.C. C ODE § 2-1403.16(a) (“The timely filing of a complaint with the Office, or under the admi nistrative procedures established by the Mayor pursuant to § 2- 1403.03, shall toll the running of the statute of limitations while the complaint is pending.”).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Hostile Work Environment Based on Sexual Orientation At the heart of this case are Pl aintiffs’ allegations that theywere subjected to a hostile work environment on the ba sis of sexual orientation in violation of DCHRA. 13 To the detriment of their allegations , Plaintiffs have adopted an “eve rything but the kitchen sink” litigation strategy, by which ever y perceived impropriety, triv ial slight, or unwelcome management decision is allege d to have contributed to a hostile work environment. The Court has spent an inordinate amount of time scrutinizing Plaintiffs’ facts and attempting to impose

13 Mses. Jones and Weeks have filed separate Statements of Materi al Facts in Dispute. Weeks Disputed [Dkt. 93-1]; Jones Dis puted [Dkt. 96-1]. Given the le ngthy discovery process and a history of inaccuracies in thi s case, the Court relies on under lying documents in the record in assessing the allegations on summary judgment.29 order on the parties’ arguments with regard to which claims fin d support in the facts of record.
See Tr. of Status Conference (June 30, 2016) at 2-3. However, on summary judgment it is the moving party—the Distric t—that bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material f act exists as to each remaining Count. In this analysis, Plaint iffs are given the benefit of a ll reasonable inferences that may be derived from the facts and the Court assesses the totality of t he circumstances to determine whether a claim is supported. See, e.g. , Brooks v. Grundmann , 748 F.3d 1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting that the strength of a plaintiff’s hostile work e nvironment claim is determined by the “totality of the circumstances”) (quoting Baloch v. Kempthorne , 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). Having considered all of the circumstances, the C ourt concludes that Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to r aise a genuine issue of material fact as to their claim of a hostile work environment on the basi s of sexual orientation. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50. 1. Timeliness Ms. Weeks filed her first OHR complaint on March 31, 2008; init, she alleged harassment on the basis of sexua l orientation in violation of D CHRA, including the following allegations in her written statement:
DISPARATE TREATMENT In early 2007, I began a relationship with another officer (les bian). From March 2007 thru present, when my Sergeant (SGT) was informed of our relationship, my partner and I was [ sic ] not allowed to ride together as other officers (heterosexual) who were invo lved in relationships were allowed to. The department tried to say that we could not ride together because we were assigned to differen t Patrol Service Area (PSA); howev er other officers (heterosexual ) who were also assigned to different PSA’s [ sic ] were allowed to ride together.
HARASSMENT From early 2007 thru present, two SGTs (heterosexual) have made remarks about my partner and me, in regards to our relationship30 (lesbian), and also threatened me with disciplinary write ups. My SGT (heterosexual) made comments regarding my relationship with other officers and officials. Since I began working for the Department, I have always receive d “Exceeds Expectations” ratings for my performance evaluation. However, in February 2008, I received an “Average” rating on my evaluation, which was performed by a SGT (heterosexual) who was not my direct supervisor. Weeks OHR Complaint (Mar. 31, 2008). 14 The Court interprets Ms . Weeks’s complaint of harassment to raise a claim of hostile work environment. Becau se DCHRA provides that such complaints may be brought within o ne year of the latest alleged behavior, Ms. Weeks’s OHR complaint was timely if any of the alleged harassing incidents of which she complains occurred on or after March 30, 2007. See D.C. M UN

. R EGS . tit. 4, § 105.1. Ms. Weeks alleged that her sergeant (presumably Sgt. Podorski, who was her sergeant until August 2007) did no t allow her and Ms. Jones to ride togeth er “[f]rom March 2007 thru present, ” even though “other officers (heterosexual) who were involved in relationships were allowed to” ride together, including some who were “assigned to different PSA’s [ sic ].” Weeks OHR Complaint (Mar. 31, 2008). Ms. Weeks also alleged that, [f]r om early 2007 thru present, tw o SGTs,” presumably Sgts. Podorski and Washington, “have made remarks about my partner an d me, in regards to our relationship (lesbian), and als o threatened me with disciplinar y write ups.” Id. Ms. Weeks also mentioned her lowered Novemb er 2007 performance rating, which s he claimed to have received

14 The parties’ briefs and record documents confirm that Ms. Week s’s OHR complaint misstated the date of her performance evaluation, which occurred in Novem ber 2007.31 in February 2008, and which she a lleged was an harassing incide nt motivated by Sgt. Podorski’s disapproval of Plainti ffs’ relationship. See id

. The District challenges the tim eliness of Ms. Weeks’s OHR com plaint. The District argues that “[a]ny se xual orientation claims based on discrete incidents occurring before October 3, 2007 are time-barre d,” because that date is 180 days before March 31, 2008, when Ms. Weeks filed her OHR complaint. See Mot. at 55-56. This argument is based on the D.C. Code requirement that a claim of discrimination under DCHRA is timely only if the claimant first consults with an EEO couns elor within 180 days of a discr iminating incident. Id. Ms. Weeks counters that, as to her hos tile environment complaint, t he statute of limitations is one year, not 180 days, see D.C. M UN

. R EGS . tit. 4 § 105.1, and because her complaint is based on a theory of a hostile work environment, i.e. , “HARASSMENT,” she need only have alleged one incident contributing to ongoi ng illegal hostility within the r elevant time period. The Court finds that Ms. Week s’s March 31, 2008 complaint to OH R raised a timely claim of a hostile work environment based on sexual orie ntation, sex, and retaliation under DCHRA (Counts I, III and VI I). That complaint included asubsection titled “HARASSMENT” in which Ms. Weeks alleged “remarks” by Sgts. Podo rski and Washington about her relationship with Ms . Jones and threatening disciplin ary write-ups, as well as her temporarily lowered performance rating. See Weeks OHR Complaint (Mar. 31, 2008). Harassment based on an employee’s protected status—here, sexual orientation, sex, and protected activity under DCHRA—is a descriptor of a hostile work environment which is shown by a series of ongoing events that are sufficiently severe and pervasive to interfere unreasonably with an employee’s work performa nce. A number of Ms. Weeks’s a llegations occurred within the one-year time frame. See Brooks , 748 F.3d at 1278 (“‘[A] plainti ff may not combine discrete32 acts to form a hostile work envi ronment claim without meeting t he required hostile work environment standard,’ but a hos tile work environment claim is not rendered invalid ‘merely because it contains discrete acts that the plaintiff claims (co rrectly or incorrectly) are actionable on their own.’”) (quoting Baird v. Gotbaum , 662 F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). Moreover, the District’s argument about the timeliness of allegations bas ed on “discrete” acts simply does not apply to the hostile work e nvironment claims at bar. See, e.g. , Baird , 662 F.3d at 1251-52 (“[T]he district court erred to the extent that it categoricall y excluded [plaintiff’s] time-barred complaints in considering the hos tile work environment claim, thus failing to employ the Morgan analysis, including, of course, adetermination of which acts e xhibit the relationship necessary to be considered ‘partof the same actionable hostile environment claim.’”) (quoting Morgan , 536 U.S. at 103). The District also argues that Ms. Weeks failed to file her orig inal OHR complaint (March 31, 2008) within 15 days of rece iving her Exit Letter (D ecember 14, 2007) so that all of her DCHRA claims should be dismi ssed. DCHRA provides that “tim ely filing of a complaint with [OHR] shall toll the runni ng of the statute of limitations while the complaint is pending.”
D.C. C ODE § 2-1403.16(a). The District is c orrect concerning any claims by Ms. Weeks that were not based on an alleged hostile work environment. As to h er allegations of a hostile work environment, due either to her se xual orientati on, sex, or in r etaliation for her pr otected activity, her complaint is timely under D.C. law. Although a closer question, the C ourt is not persuaded by the D istrict’s further argument that Ms. Weeks failed to raise an adequate claim of a hostile work environment. The District argues that the initi al OHR complaint filed by Ms. Wee ks “clearly alleged sexual
orientation discrimination” but not a hostile w ork environment. Reply at 3 -4. However, as33 stated above, the Court interprets Ms. Weeks’s OHR complaint—al leging harassment through “remarks” by Sgts. Podorski and Washington about her relationsh ip with Ms. Jones, threatening discipline, and a lowered evalua tion score—as advancing a claim of a hostile work environment. Ongoing harassment due to protected s tatus is exactly what may be sufficiently severe so as to constitute a hostile work envir onment that intrudes on an emplo yee’s ability to work. Ms. Jones also filed her origin al OHR complaint on March 31, 20 08, describing similar allegedly hostile acts, i ncluding the incident in which Sgt. Podorski allegedly refused to sign Ms. Jones’s report and thr ew it on the ground in anger. See Jones OHR Complaint (Mar. 31, 2008). As did Ms. Weeks, Ms. Jone s included a section enti tled “HARASSMENT.” Ms. Jones filed her OHR Complaint a lmost immediately after receivin g her Exit Letter, see Jones Exit Letter (Mar. 28, 2008). Some of the allegedly ongoing beh aviors took place during the o neyear period before that filing w ith OHR. Therefore, Ms. Jones timely complained of a hostile work environment due to her sexua l orientation, sex, and/or ret aliation for protected activities under DCHRA.
2. Merits

At this point in this litigati on, Plaintiffs allege that they e xperienced a hostile work environment on the basis of sexual orientation beginning i n September 2006, when they informed Sgt. Podorski that they w ere in a same-sex relationshi p. Plaintiffs contend that the news of their relationship led t o different treatment throughou t the fall of 2006, with increasingly hostile behavior in 2007 and later . They argue that they were subjected to hara ssing comments in the workplace, with Sgt. Podorsk i criticizing each woman to the other and making disparaging remarks about the rela tionship in the fall of 2006. See, e.g. , Jones Dep. at 109-10 (recalling that around this time Sgt. Podorski to ld Ms. Jones that Ms. Weeks wa s a “drama queen” and34 “poison”). They complain that Sgt. Podorski prevented them fro m bidding on the same PSA in late fall 2006 because he assigned Ms. Jones to be out on duty during bidding. In addition to this central complaint, Plainti ffs allege that Sgt. Podorski fr equently targeted Plaintiffs with hostility such as his inappropriately posted notice concerning their UFIRs in January 2007 to embarrass Plaintiffs, see Jones Dep. at 55-56; Weeks Dep. a t 85; made other staffing dec isions to prevent them from riding toge ther during the fall of 2006 and i nto the spring of 2007, see, e.g. , Jones OHR File at 13-14 (alleging that Sgt. Podorski’s Roll Cal l assignments were discriminatory); shouted “Do you w ant to f—k?” at them during a Bike Week party in May 2007, see, e.g. , Podorski Dep. at 66; gave or e ncouraged others to give both P laintiffs lowerthan-deserved performance eval uation ratings in November 2007, see Jones Annual Evaluation 2007; 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 99; 15 and refused to sign a routine re port for Ms. Jones in March 20 08,

see Jones Dep. 52-53. Plaintiffs also allege hostility on the part of Sgt. Washington : allegedly, he asked Ms. Weeks why she “switched to be ing with women” while driving together to South Carolina for Bike Week in May 2007, see Washington Dep. at 77-79; assigne d Ms. Weeks to the Marjorie Court temporary detail in September and October 2007, see Washington Dep. at 55; Weeks IAD

15 Ms. Weeks also points to MPD’s i nternal assessment of Plaintiffs’ complaints, the VaughanRoach Report, in which MPD’s int ernal reviewer concluded that S gt. Podorski improperly gave Plaintiffs “meets expectat ions” ratings in November 2007, and t hat his behavior toward them appeared to have been motivate d by personal factors unrelated t o job performance. See MPD Internal Memo on Plaintiffs’ Clai ms [Dkt. 93-6] (Vaughan-Roach Report). The Vaughan-Roach Report, authored by an MPD employ ee named Sharon Vaughan-Roach, included a summary of internal mediation related to Pla intiffs’ complaints, as well a s Ms. Vaughan-Roach’s findings regarding the allegations. There is insufficient information i n the record regarding Ms. Vaughan-Roach’s qualifications or s eniority to attribute her fi ndings to MPD; the Court may cite to this and other adm inistrative documents in the record in ana lyzing the claims at bar to the extent the documents provide evidence of timing.35 Interview at 9-11; 16 had Ms. Weeks investigated for “ neglect of duty” in October 20 07, see Weeks Dep. at 176-78, and marked her as AWOL the following month, see Weeks AWOL Investigation Memorandum; mar ked Plaintiffs out for two hours, rather than the one hour they requested, when they attende d a wedding in October 2007, see, e.g. , Weeks Dep. at 176; and expressed anger toward Plainti ffs when he allegedly told Ms. Jo nes in November 2007 “you can feed the dogs but they will bite you,” and “You and your girl f —ked up.” See Jones PD-119 Report. Ms. Weeks also testified that Sgt. Washington’s girlfr iend told Ms. Weeks that he had described Ms. Jones as “the butch one” and Ms. Weeks as “the fe mme one,” which Ms. Weeks considered evidence of Sgt. Was hington’s inappropriate focus ontheir sexual orientation. Weeks Dep. at 95-97. Sgt. Washingt on testified that he did not recall using those terms, but that the description was “a known imp ression” in 7D. Washington Dep . at 79. The District counters that its actions were based on the legiti mate needs of the workplace and not motivated by animus based on Plaintiffs’ sexu al orientation or protected activity. For example, the Distr ict argues that Plaintiffs had increased UFIRs when they worked together (a point Plaintiffs do not challenge) and that Ms. Jon es had long been known by her colleagues to be a lesbian, so it would not make sense to attri bute hostility in the workplace against Ms. Jones due to her re lationship with Ms. Weeks. See Def.’s Undisputed ¶ 13. Additionally, the District rais es non-discriminatory bases for the allegedly hostile behavior of

16 Sgt. Washington testified that he assigned Ms. Weeks to the Ma rjorie Court detail because Plaintiffs needed to be separat ed after they refused to obey hi s direct order to make an arrest based on reports of a stolen car. Plaintiffs do not dispute th at they refused to obey Sgt. Washington’s order. Instead they cite to hearsay or lay opinio n testimony which is inadmissible in federal court, in particular, testimony from Sgts. Branham a nd Rosenthal giving their opinions that Sgt. Washington bore ill will towards Plaintiffs. See, e.g. , Branham Dep. at 29; Jones OHR Letter of Determination: Cau se Finding at 9-10 (July 16, 2010) (quoting Sgt. Rosenthal) [Dkt 97- 5]. Opinion testimony from lay witn esses is generally inadmiss ible in federal court. See Fed. R. Evid. 701.36 Sgts. Podorski and Washington. Aside from the danger posed by Plaintiffs’ UFIRs when they worked together, the District contends that Sgt. Podorski’s all eged hostility toward Plaintiffs is traceable to their refusal to f ollow his orders in handling the domestic violence call on September 24, 2006. Similarly, Sgt. Washington became frustrated and ang ry when Plaintiffs outright refused, in September 2007, to arres t a prostitute suspected of stealing a reported stolen car as he ordered. To determine whether a work e nvironment is hos tile, courts look to “‘all the circumstances,’ including the ‘ frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utte rance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Vickers v. Powell , 493 F.3d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998)). The alleged hostility must be “severe or perv asive” to support the claim. Stewart v. Evans , 275 F.3d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2002); accord Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc. , 523 U.S. 75, 78, 81 (1998); Harris , 510 U.S. at 21. A court’s determ ination is not based on a si ngle factor but on the totality of the circumstances and “ the timeline of events as a whole.” See, e.g. , Brooks , 748 F.3d
at 1276. In this analysis, “not all abusiv e behavior, even when it is mo tivated by discriminatory animus, is acti onable”; rather, to support a cla im of hostile work environment the plaintiff must show that “offens ive conduct ‘permeate[s] [the w orkplace] with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.’” Stewart , 275 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Barbour v. Browner , 181 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and Oncale , 523 U.S. at 78). In Baloch v. Kempthorne , the D.C. Circuit specifically held that “the totality of circumstances” failed to support a hostile work37 environment claim where “none of the comments or actions direct ed at [the plaintiff] expressly focused on his race, religion, age, or disability”; there was n o evidence of “tangible workplace consequences”; and the employer identified “legitimate reasons and constructive criticism” for the letters of reprimand at the ce nter of the plaintiff’s claim s. Baloch , 550 F.3d at 1201. Similarly, in Brooks , the D.C. Circuit affirmed summa ry judgment against a plaintif f who complained of a hostile work environment on the basis of her ra ce and gender and argued that abusive conduct added to an “alleged aura of hostility,” but co uld not point to any explicitly discriminatory comments or actions. See Brooks , 748 F.3d at 1276-77. The District urges the Court to adopt the reasoning of Bryant v. Brownlee , 265 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2003). It tries to frame Plaintiffs’ hosti le work environment claims as simply an amalgam of the sergea nts’ alleged improper actions, w hich may have been uncivil but were separated by gaps of time, r endering them only ordinary wo rkplace trials and tribulations.
In Bryant , however, the district court gr anted summary judgment after de termining that almost “none of the events described i n plaintiff’s 21-page complaint [had] any racial or age-related
overtones.” Bryant , 265 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (emphasis added) . The two alleged inci dents in Bryant that were not “completely neutra l” with regards to any protect ed status were comments by co-workers, one of whom allege dly called the plaintiff an ex tremely offensive racial epithet while in a Metro station, and the other of whom allegedly told plaintiff that she believed “black women were at the bottom” of a pe rceived hierarchy for advancem ent in government jobs. Id. at 64. The Bryant case is not, however, the perfec t analog that the District wis hes it were. Mses. Weeks and Jones allege that Sgt . Podorski explic itly disparaged their relationship and made sexual comments, in the context of other allegedly hostile acti ons that could be interpreted to have been motivated by hostility b ased on the relationship; Ms. Jones also alleges that Sgt.38 Smallwood, also her superior, aske d her if he could “have a kis s.” Such allegations of explicit sexual behavior, or inappropriate comments regarding the same-s ex relationship, render the comparison to Bryant inapposite. See, e.g. , Hammel , 206 F. Supp. 3d at 239 (discussing a manager’s inappropriate referen ce to plaintiff’s and other empl oyees’ sexual orientation). The District also argues that “Plaintiffs’ multiple complaints regarding personnel decisions”—including the claim at the heart of this case, that Sgt. Podorski began to separate them after learning of their sam e-sex relationship—do not suppo rt a harassment claim. The District argues that its “legi timate need to manage employee st affing levels and employee assignments is not trumped by Pla intiffs’ desire to ride in the same car.” Mot. at 39. Of course, this is true—so long as the need is legitimate. The problem is that D.C. has discarded the records that would show officer assignmen ts so that a comparison of Pla intiffs’ experience and that of others could be made. As a resu lt, the nature of MPD’s legitim ate needs and Plaintiffs’ experiences between fall 2006, when Plaintiffs informed Sgt. Po dorski of their same-sex relationship, and August 2007, when Ms. Weeks transferred to th e midnight shift under Sgt. Washington, must be based on credi bility determinations of witn ess testimony by a fact-finding jury. 17 Further to this point, the Distri ct argues that Mses. Jones and Weeks had increased UFIRs when they worke d together, which provides a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory reason why Sgt. Podorski separate d them. While Plaintiffs comp lain that Sgt. Podorski inappropriately posted informa tion about their UFIRs, they do n ot deny the number of UFIRs

17 The District also contends th at because none of these personne l decisions is “actionable” they do not support the hostile work environment claim. Mot. 37. A s applied to the remaining claims at bar, all of which are based on a hostile work environment th eory, this point is incorrect on the law: individual al legations need not be actionable to support a hostile work environment claim.39 they filed. Ultimately, the written record is insufficient to make this determination and a jury will have to evaluate witness credibility. 18 Further potential ev idence of a hostile work environment could be found by a jury in Sgt. Podorski’s drunken shout , “Do you want to f—k?” during a party at Bike Week. The District argues that the outbur st was an isolated incident and stresses that it occurred outside of work. It cites Bergbauer v. Mabus , 934 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2013), in which summary judgment was granted even though the plaintiff’s supervisor had touched her sexually on one occasion outside of work. It is true that antidiscrimination s tatutes do not consti tute “a general civility code.” Oncale , 523 U.S. at 81. It is also true that Sgt. Podorski’s outburs t occurred in a social setting, away from the Di strict of Columbia. However, t he party was attended by many coworkers and supervisors and the offending comment was made bya direct supervisor. Actions outside the workplace can contribute to a hostile work environm ent. See, e.g. , Greer v. Paulson , 505 F.3d 1306, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“We join our sister circu its in rejecting a per se rule against considering i ncidents alleged to ha ve occurred while anemployee was physically absent from the workplace.”). While a s ingle offensive utterance outs ide the workplac e does not create a hostile work environment at work, the Court cannot make that distinction here on the written

18 Sgt. Branham testified that offi cers in heterosexual relations hips were permitted to ride together, see Branham Dep. at 16-17, 26, 29; reca lled that she had heard Sgt. Washington saying he was going to “get” Plaintiffs, id. at 20; and stated that Plain tiffs had been separated by Sgt. Podorski or Sgt. Washington i n Roll Call assignments. Id. at 26. Plaintiffs also cite to other portions of Sgt. Branham’s testim ony in which she attributes mo tives to the alleged behavior of Sgts. Podorski and Washington. To the extent that these portio ns of Sgt. Branham’s testimony are raised to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that is, t o assign discriminatory motives to Sgts. Podorski’s and Washington’s actions—they are, of course, hearsay and inadmissible and also lay opinion that is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); see also Fed. R. Evid. 701 (restricting opinion testimony by l ay witnesses to opinions tha t are “rationa lly based on the witness’s perception,” and “helpfu l to clearly understanding th e witness’s testimony or to determining a f act in issue”).40 record. Further, it is uncontested that Sgt. Podorski lowered the annual evaluations of Mses. Jones and Weeks (whose rating was quickly raised by another ser geant) in late fall 2007. As the District correctly argue s, “not everything that makes anemployee unhappy is an actionable adverse action, ” and allegations must objectiv ely contribute to the discrimination alleged in order to be actionable. See Mot. at 39 (quoting Lester v. Nastios , 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 28 (D.D.C. 2003)). The Court finds that this principle bars Pl aintiffs from pres enting the entirety of their allegations to a jury. S ome of the incidents of whichPlaintiffs complain are mere trivialities that do not support their allegati ons. These incl ude Sgt. Washington asking Ms. Weeks “a couple times” to ride th eir motorcycles to work togeth er in August 2007; Sgt. Podorski throwing a form to the floor i n annoyance in March 2008; Sgt. W ashington accusing Ms. Weeks of being AWOL in October 2007 when she was admittedly AWOL and did not learn of this AWOL until a full year later— i.e. , clearly it could not have creat ed a hostile work environment in 2007; and Sgt. Washington marki ng each Plaintiff absent for two hours, the minimum time for personal leave, when they reporte d for work late after attendin g a wedding. Plaintiffs do not dispute the MPD policy to grant such personal leave in two-or-f our hour increments or that Sgt. Washington marked them out before he left 7D, before they arriv ed at 7D, and before he knew when Plaintiffs actually reported for work. In addition, Plaintiffs did nothing to correct the record, not speaking with Sgt. Wa shington or the timekeepers. This small snafu is merely one of those trivial annoyances any employee might suffer. The Court also finds that Sgt. Washington’s assignment of Ms. W eeks to the temporary Marjorie Court deta il in the fall of 2007 was provoke d by her refusals to follow his direct orders to arrest the pr ostitute driving a stolen car. M s. Weeks complains she could not ride with Ms. Jones and that Sgt. W ashington had “informed other off icers who asked for the41 Marjorie Court detail that he w as ‘saving this for my girl.’” Weeks OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009) at 3; see also Washington Dep. at 157 (stating that he did not recall saying he was saving the Marjorie Court detail for Ms. Weeks but that “[i]t may have happened”). Ms. Weeks does not deny that she refused to follo w Sgt. Washington’s direct or der, that she argued with him about it, and that he became angry as a result. This uncontest ed insubordinate conduct provides a legitimate non-discriminatory r eason for Sgt. Washington’s te mporary assignment not connected by word or inference t o Ms. Weeks’s sexual preference

. 19
The Court also finds that the uncontested evidence related to C DR Maupin’s “body-for-body” policy is insuffici ent to suggest that he targe ted Plaintiffs because of their sexual orientation. Ms. Weeks iden tified a single comparator, whom she thought may have been allowed to transfer between bi ds despite the alleged policy. See Weeks Dep. at 130-32. That single possible example does not discount the legitimate busine ss purpose of CDR Maupin in deciding not to institute the mandatory transfer of a replaceme nt—or work short-handed—to accommodate a transfer request outside the bid process. CDR Maupin suggested that Plaintiffs file an EEO complaint about Sgt. Podorski with IAD if they want ed to do so but they apparently decided to forego that ro ute. Notably, Plaintiffs do not complain that CDR Maupin failed to

19 Because there is insufficient evidence in the record to suppor t a claim that Sgt. Washington’s actions were motivated by hostility based on sexual orientation , his alleged use of loaded terms (“the butch one” and “the femme one”) when speaking privately t o his girlfriend, a nonemployee, cannot support an allega tion that his actions were mo tivated by hostility based on sexual orientation. As will be e xplained below, the Court find s that the allegations concerning some of Sgt. Washington’s remarks ( e.g. , “You and your girl f—ked up” ) and behavior could support Count VII, which alleges a retaliatory hostile work environment, but not Count I, which alleges a hostile work environm ent based on sexual orientation. Even as alleged, Sgt. Washington’s behavior was not “se vere” or “pervasive” enough to create a hostile work environment on the basis of sexual orientation.42 investigate their report that S gt. Podorski was treating them i nequitably, but only complain about the body-for-body policy, as to whi ch they have no evidence of illegal hostility. Finally, some of Plaintiffs’ allegations of inappropriate sexual comment s by coworkers cannot as a matter of l aw support their claims. Where these allegations concern the offensive behavior of other non- supervisory officers that was n ot reported, MPD cannot be held liable. See, e.g. , Curry v. D.C. , 195 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (hol ding that an employer may be held liable for harassment by a non-supervisory co-worke r only if the employer knew or should have known of harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action). Thus, Officer Pristoop’s alleged offer to pay P laintiffs to watch them have s ex, see Jones Dep. at 264-66, and Officer Chapman’s allegedly enc ouraging Ms. Weeks to “go back” to dating men, see 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 18, do not support Plainti ffs’ claims, because there i s no evidence that e ither Plaintiff told MPD about these incidents.
B. Hostile Work Environment Based on Sex 1. Timeliness

Plaintiffs’ charges of gender discrimination under Title VII mu st have been brought within 300 days of at least one of the acts alleged to have contributed to the hostile work environment or they are time-barred. See Glenn , 2006 WL 401816 at *15. Plaintiffs’ amended OHR Complaints, in which Plainti ffs first raised allegations of a hostile work environment based on sex, were signed on April 20, 2009, see Weeks OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009); Jones OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009), but because Plaintiffs’ counsel emai led Plaintiffs’ statements amending their OHR complaints on April 1, 2009, the Court accep ts April 1, 2009 as the date the43 amended charges were filed. See Juliette Niehuss Email (Apr. 1, 2009). 20 Given the April 1, 2009 filing date, Plaintiffs must have alleged at least one inc ident contributing to the alleged hostile work environment that occurred on or after June 5, 2008 (300 days before April 1, 2009). Ms. Jones’s amended OHR complai nt contains no allegations based on incidents that occurred on or after June 5, 2008. See Jones OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009). The latest incidents alleged in Ms. Jones’s amended OHR complaint occurred in May 2008. Ms. Jones’s Title VII claims are therefore time-barred. The amended OHR complaint file d by Ms. Weeks, in contrast, al leged two incidents that occurred after June 5, 2008: (1) she learned inAugust 2008 (before moving to the Detectives’ Office) that she had received an AWOL charge and ha d been the subject of an AWOL investigation in October 2007; and (2) she was not treated as well as her male colleagues in the 7D Detectives’ Office and discovered on February 17, 200 9 an open tampon in her desk at

20 The District also concedes April 1, 2009, as the filing date f or the Title VII charges. See Mot. at 57 (acknowledging that Ms. Jones’s complaint was amended on April 1, 2009, and citing Ms. Niehuss’s email to OHR for this date); see also D.C. Office of Human R ights, How to File a Complaint, https://ohr.dc.gov/se rvice /file-discrim ination-complaint (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) (noting that “submi[ssion]” to OHR constitutes filing a complai nt); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, How to File a Charge of Employment Disc rimination, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/howtofile.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) ( providing that a state or local agency that enforces e mployment-discrimination laws can automatically cross-file a charge with EEOC). Plaintiffs’ ar guments that their amended OH R complaints w ere filed prior to April 2009 are unavailing. On December 23, 2008, Plaintiffs ’ counsel sent letters notifying MPD of Plaintiffs’ intenti on to amend their complaints. See Weeks OHR File at 20; Jones OHR File at 20. Plaintiffs contend tha t, for purposes of the Title VII analysis, the 300-day limitations period should be measured fro m December 23, 2008. To the contr ary, the statute i s clear that the relevant date is when a charge is actually filed under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (providing that “[a] charge unde r this section shall be filed” within three hundred days of the alleged unlawful action and separ ately providing for notice to the employer).44 the Detectives’ Office. See Weeks OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009). The other incidents described in the amended OHR c omplaint occurred before June 5, 2008.
2. Merits

Although her claim is timely, Ms. Weeks fails to make out a cas e of hostile work environment based on sex under DCHR A (Count III) or Title VII ( Count V). Both plaintiffs’ sex discrimination arguments rely on th e theory that they suffered harassment in 7D because they, as women in a lesbian relationshi p, failed to conform to “typical gender stereotypes.” Weeks Opp’n at 28; Jones Opp’n at 26- 27. Ms. Weeks also alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment due to her sex when she became an Investigator in November 2008 and joined the Detectives’ Office. Again, s he attributes “examples of the harassment” to “[her] nonconformity with gender stereotypes and perceptions about her se xual orientation,” not to her female sex. Weeks Opp’n at 34. 21 This Court disagrees with thos e courts that have held that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation; whether it should have then, or should be amended to do so now, the Court finds no suggestion that the Congress of 1964, or the Supreme Court cases, intended the language of Title VII to be s o broad. Rather, this Court agrees with the District that se xual orientation is a separate class of protected individuals and

21 To support her sex discrimination c harge, Ms. Weeks cites a c oncurrence from the Ninth Circuit, Latta v. Otter , 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berz on, J., concurring), as wel l as an amended denial of rehearing from the Seventh Circuit, Muhammad v. Caterpillar Inc. , 767 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 2014, as amended on denial of rehearing, Oct. 16, 2014). See Weeks Opp’n at 30 n.11 and accompanying tex t (arguing that discrimina tion on the basis of sexual orientation is illegal under Title VII). The Court is aware th at there has been some expansion of Title VII in some jurisdictions as Ms. Weeks argues, see, e.g. , Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. , 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc); how ever, the Court disag rees with the logic behind these decisions, and the case law is, a t best, unsettled. Moreover, there is no D.C. Circuit precedent departing from the established interpretation of f ederal law th at harassment based on sexual orientation does not support a cl aim of gender discrimination under Title VII and DCHRA clearly differentiates the two statuses.45 notes that Plaintiffs make suc h allegations in Count I. A chan ge in federal law awaits congressional action. For this reason, as well as the untimeli ness of Ms. Jones’s Title VII charge, the lack of merit to Ms. W eeks’s Title VII sex-discrimi nation charge, and the lack of merit to Plaintiffs’ DCHRA charge of sex discrimination, this C ourt will grant summary judgment to the Distr ict on Counts III and V. Even were Ms. Weeks’s allega tions based on her sex, rather thanher sexual orientation, the Court finds that she fails to demonstrate a ho stile work environment in the Detectives’ Office. Ms. Weeks alleges that her “cases, search warrants, and other job duties” were routinely given to “male inve stigators or detectives with less experience.” Weeks Opp’n at
33. 22 She offers no specifics and, on the question of whether cases were transferred to males when they were ripe for arrestwarrants, she provided only vagu e testimony that this happened one time. While Ms. Weeks argues in brief that she was told “t o not be so ‘timid,’” id. , she testified that she was asked whether she was “timid.” See Weeks Dep. at 259. Ms. Weeks claims that she was “ridiculed ” by Sgt. King, her supervisor inthe Detectives’ Office, when she requested training. Weeks Opp’ n at 34. In fact, however, Sgt. King did not expres s ridicule but annoyance at Ms. Weeks’s having sought help outside the unit. See Avis King Email (Dec. 9, 2008). This incident had nothing t o do with Ms. Weeks’s sex; m oreover, Sgt. King’s email was directed to all officers who reported to Sgt. King and did not name or otherwise identify Ms. Weeks. See id. Ms. Weeks also complains that, when she became a detective, s he wanted to work in homicide but initially rec eived less desirable assignme nts; her personal preference does not provide evidence that the assignment was based on her sex. Finally, as to the incident

22 Since Ms. Weeks had just been promoted, it seems implausible t hat there were other investigators who had les s experience than she.46 involving an unused tampon, Ms. Week s interpreted it as an aggr essive act against her as a woman and makes a general assertion that the District is respon sible for maintaining the workplace. See Mot. at 13. While the tampon ma y have offended Ms. Weeks, it was not threatening or even particularl y offensive. It appears to have been, at worst, an anonymous crass joke. These allegations do not rai se a genuine issue of materi al fact as to whether Ms. Weeks suffered severe or pervasive hara ssment in the Detectives’ Offi ce. Plaintiffs also bring sex-base d hostile work environment claims under DCHRA, supported by the same facts as t hose alleged in support of thei r Title VII claims. See Weeks Opp’n at 28-34; Jones Opp’n at 26- 31. For the same reasons dis cussed in the context of her Title VII claim, summary judgment w ill also be granted as to Ms. Week s’s sex-based harassment claims under DCHRA. 23
C. Hostile Work Environment Based on Retaliation Finally, Plaintiffs allege that th ey were subjected to a hostil e work environment in retaliation for their complaints about harassment due to their sexual orientation, in violation of
DCHRA. See D.C. C ODE § 2-1402.61(a) (2001) (establishing that retaliation constitut es an “unlawful discriminatory pract ice” under DHCRA). To prevail onsuch a claim, a plaintiff must show that she was subjected to “ ‘discriminatory intimidation, r idicule, and insult’ of such ‘sever[ity] or pervasive[ness] [ as] to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Hussain 435 F.3d at 366 (quoting Harris , 510 U.S. at 21-22). Plaintiffs allege that the workplace hostility “became even mor e abusive” after they complained, which included their superiors making “specifi c reference to [their] having

23 Ms. Jones’s arguments, which largely mirror Ms. Weeks’s, see Jones Opp’n at 29-31, would be similarly unavailing i f they were timely.47 engaged in protected activity.” See, e.g. , Jones Opp’n at 47. Plaintiffs place their first complaints in January 2007, when they spoke together to Lt. Der ek Larsen about Sgt. Podorski, telling Lt. Larsen that they di d not want to work with Sgt. Pod orski anymore because of the way he had been treating them. See Jones Dep. at 69, 72-79. Around the same time, Ms. Weeks also spoke to Sgts. Levenberry and S mallwood about Sgt. Podorski’s a lleged harassment; she claims that although they informed her of her right to file an EEO com plaint, they warned that if she did so, Sgt. Podorski might claim that she had slept with him. See Weeks Dep. at 63. In February 2007, Plaintiffs also discussed Sgt. Podorski’s allegedly haras sing behavior with Lt. Rosenthal.
See Weeks Dep. at 333; Rosenthal Dep. at 59-62. Sever al months later, in October 2007 , Plaintiffs went out on stress leav e, filing forms with MPD that identified Sgts. Podorski and Washington by name and advanced a llegations of harassment. Pla intiffs filed their OHR complaints in March 2008 and amended them in April 2009. A rea sonable juror could conclude that these complaints support a retaliatory hostile work enviro nment claim. Plaintiffs allege that Sgt. Wash ington confronted Ms. Jones in November 2007 and “yelled . . . ‘[y]ou can feed the dogs but they will bite y ou,’” which she understood to be a threat related to her complaints of harassment. See Jones Disputed ¶ J088; Washington Dep. at 83-84 (“I think I may have said th at, yeah.”). According to a written statement in one of Ms. Jones’s administrative comp laints, on January 22, 2008 Sgt. Was hington said to her, “Y’all pulled that shit. You jumpe d on the band wagon with Weeks. I always been straight with you. That shit is f—ked up. You and your g irl f—ked up.” Jones PD-1 19 Report (Jan. 22, 2008).48 Both Plaintiffs also believe that their lowered performance rat ings of “meets expectations” by Sgt. Podorski in November 2007 wer e motivated by retaliatory an imus. 24
The District counters that Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims fail, primarily because the claims are based on the same f acts as the hostile work environm ent claims, which the District argues have not been establishe d. As stated above, the Court d isagrees with the premise of this argument. The District also argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insuf ficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditi ons of their employment, but, aga in, the Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ allegations suggest that, in the w ake of their taking concrete steps to raise their claims of discrimination and harassment ba sed on sexual orientation in fa ll 2007, Sgt. Podorski and, later, Sgt. Washington became increasingly hostile toward them. In particular, Plaintiffs attribute Sgt. Podorski’s lowered performance evaluations in 2007 as well as i ncreased anger and hostility from Sgts. Podorski and Washi ngton in late 2007 and January 200 8 to retaliatory motives. From the written record, the Court cannot make the cre dibility determinations needed to decide the facts, i.e. , whether the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere with Plaintiffs’ abilities to perform their jobs, and whether it was provoked by disdain for their sexual orientation or in retaliati on for their complaints.

24 Plaintiffs point to other incidents in support of their retali atory hostile work environment claims, but many of these allegati ons are too attenuated in tim e and insufficiently extreme or suggestive of retaliatory animu s to have contributed to a sever e or pervasive hostile work environment. For this reason, the Court finds that, as a matte r of law, neither CDR Maupin’s reassignment of Ms. Weeks to the midnight shi ft in May 2008, no r his allegedly telling Ms. Jones she need not “follow” Ms. W eeks “everywhere she [goes],” can support the retaliatory hostile work environment claim. See Jones OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009). Nor can Ms. Jones’s contention that she was prevented from leaving work ear ly to visit Ms. Weeks in the hospital after Ms. Weeks was in a car accident, also in May 200 8. Id. These appear to have been discrete incidents and the r ecord cannot support an assumption that they were motivated by animus stemming from the OHR complaints.49 The District’s motion for summa ry judgment will be denied as to Count VII.
III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Dis trict’s Motion for Summary Ju dgment [Dkt. 90] will be granted in part and deni ed in part. The motion will be granted as to Counts III and V in Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Compl aint [Dkt. 26]; Counts II, IV, V I, and IX, which Ms. Jones has withdrawn, will be dismissed with prejudice. The District’s mo tion will be denied as to Counts I and VII. Plaintiffs also have moved f or attorney fees and costs. See Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs [Dkt. 78]. This motion will be denied without p rejudice as premature. The Court will consider any motions for attorney fees and costs after the completion of this case. A memorializing Order accompanies this Opinion.

Date: June 4, 2018 /s/ ROSEMARY M. COLLYER United States District Court