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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 126,059

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

JENNIFER STOKES,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Lyon District Court; JEFFRY J. LARSON, judge. Submitted without oral arguments. 

Opinion filed April 5, 2024. Affirmed. 

Emily Brandt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. 

Brian J. Henderson, assistant county attorney, Marc Goodman, county attorney, and Kris W. 

Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before WARNER, P.J., ATCHESON and BRUNS,JJ.

PER CURIAM: Jennifer Stokes appeals the district court's order revoking her 

probation and requiring her to serve her 34-month prison sentence. On appeal, Stokes 

contends the district court lacked the authority to revoke her probation. In the alternative, 

she contends the district court abused its discretion in revoking her probation and 

requiring her to serve her prison sentence. We find that the district court appropriately 

exercised its statutory authority to extend or continue Stokes' probation and that she has 

failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her probation 

and imposing her underlying prison sentence. Thus, we affirm. 
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FACTS 

In 2019, Stokes pled no contest to possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute. The district court sentenced her to a presumptive 34-month prison sentence 

with postrelease supervision for 24 months. However, the district court granted Stokes'

motion for a dispositional departure, stayed the imposition of the sentence, and placed her 

on probation for a term of 18 months. One of the conditions of her probation was to 

successfully complete a Drug Court program. 

As part of her probation conditions, Stokes entered into the Drug Court program. 

Unfortunately, Stokes violated the terms of her probation on several occasions. On July 9, 

2020, she received a 48-hour sanction for violation of the conditions of her probation. 

Then, on October 28, 2020, she received an additional sanction "up to 60 days" for 

additional probation violations. 

On November 2, 2020, the State filed its first motion to revoke Stokes' probation. 

At that time, it was alleged that Stokes failed to participate in treatment services as 

required under the conditions of her probation. It was also alleged that she had possessed 

and used illegal substances. Eight days later, Stokes stipulated to violating her probation 

conditions, and the district court imposed a 120-day justice reinvestment incentive. 

Due to her failure to complete the required Drug Court program, on March 15, 

2021, Stokes executed a voluntary modification of probation order in which she waived 

her right to a hearing. The district court approved the modification and entered the order 

extending the term of Stokes' probation for an additional 12 months unless she were to 

successfully complete the required Drug Court program prior to April 17, 2022. A few 

months later, on October 27, 2021, the district court imposed a 14-day sanction as a result 

of her noncompliance with the Drug Court program and other terms of her probation. 
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On February 7, 2022, Stokes signed a second voluntary modification of probation 

order because she had still not completed the Drug Court program. Once again, she 

waived her right to a hearing, and the district court entered the order extending the term 

of her probation for 12 months unless she successfully completed the Drug Court

program prior to April 17, 2023. A review of the record reveals that between March 16, 

2022, and January 11, 2023, the district court imposed four additional intermediate 

sanctions for Stokes' failure to comply with requirements of the Drug Court program. 

On January 12, 2023, the State filed a second motion to revoke Stokes' probation. 

In support of this motion, the State alleged that she had violated the terms of her 

probation by failing to obtain and maintain employment; engaging in a curfew violation; 

missing 23 appointments with service providers between March 24, 2022, and December 

28, 2022; possessing marijuana in her home on January 4, 2023; and being dishonest with 

community corrections officers. In addition, in an affidavit filed by her intensive

supervision officer (ISO), it was asserted that "Stokes has been in the Drug Court 

program for over 3 years and has not progressed through the phases. She continues to 

have violations and has exhausted all resources available in the community. Our 

recommendation is that her probation be revoked."

The district court held a probation revocation hearing on January 25, 2023. After 

considering the evidence and arguments presented, the district court found that Stokes 

had violated the conditions of her probation by failing to maintain employment, missing

numerous treatment appointments, possessing marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and 

using drugs. Consequently, the district court revoked Stokes' probation and ordered her to 

serve her underlying sentence.

In reaching its decision, the district court explained that it found Stokes' failure to 

successfully complete the Drug Court program after being given multiple opportunities to 

do so since 2019 showed two things: "One, your supervising officers and the Drug Court
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Team have been very patient with you; and you're just not going to do it." The district 

court further found that since the original sentence was imposed, Stokes had received 177 

days of intermediate sanctions. The following day, the district court filed a journal entry 

reflecting its ruling and granting Stokes 177 days of jail credit against her prison sentence 

for the time she spent serving her multiple sanctions for violating the conditions of her 

probation.

Thereafter, Stokes filed a timely notice of appeal. 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Stokes contends that the district court lacked "jurisdiction" to revoke 

her probation and order her to serve her underlying prison sentence. However, the 

substance of her argument set forth in her brief is that the district court did not have the 

statutory authority to revoke her probation under the circumstances presented. 

Specifically, Stokes argues that the voluntary modification of probation orders entered by 

the district court to extend the term of her probation were not sufficient to satisfy 

statutory requirements. 

Under K.S.A. 22-3716(b)(2), a probationer can make an informed waiver of his or 

her right to a district court hearing on an alleged violation of the conditions of probation. 

Based on our review of the language used in the voluntary modification of probation 

orders signed by Stokes and entered by the district court, we find that this is what she 

plainly did here. Significantly, Stokes does not challenge the voluntariness of the waivers 

she signed as set forth in the voluntary modification of probation orders entered by the 

district court.

We note that in the voluntary modification of probation orders, Stokes expressly 

acknowledged that she had "the right to an open hearing before the District Court," the 
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right to "be represented by counsel," the right to an appointed attorney in the event she 

was "unable to employ counsel," and the right to "call witnesses and present evidence for 

[her] benefit." She also acknowledged that she waived these rights "knowingly" and 

"with full understanding." Finally, she acknowledged that she "agree[d] to the 

modifications of my Order of Probation . . . ." 

Once a violation of the conditions of probation have been established, the district 

court then has the discretion to grant a "[c]ontinuation or modification of the release 

conditions of the probation." K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(1)(A). This statutory provision does not 

require a district court to hold a hearing if the probationer has admitted a violation and 

waived his or her rights. Moreover, we note that the common definition of the word 

"continuation" includes "going on without interruption" and "a part or thing added to 

make something reach further or last longer; extension" Webster's New World Dictionary 

322 (5th ed. 2016). Under this definition, a continuation of probation includes an 

extension of probation.

Because we find K.S.A. 22-3716—which provides the specific process to be used 

by district courts for handing probation violations and the imposition of sanctions—to be 

applicable to this case, it is not necessary for us to look to the more general provisions

found in K.S.A. 21-6608. Likewise, we decline Stokes' invitation to revisit the holding of 

the panel in State v. McCreary, 32 Kan. App. 2d 814, 89 P.3d 659 (2004) (interpreting 

K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4611(c)(8), which is now codified as K.S.A. 21-6608). 

Furthermore, we find Stokes' reliance on State v. Owens, 210 Kan. 628, 634-36, 504 P.2d 

249 (1972), to be misplaced because the district court fulfilled its judicial function by 

considering her representations and deciding to grant her requests for extensions to give 

her the opportunity to successfully complete the Drug Court program.

In granting the continuations or extensions of probation in this case, we find that 

the district court appropriately relied on Stokes' acknowledgment that she had "not 
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successfully completed the Drug Court program" as required as a condition of her 

probation. We also find that the district court appropriately relied on Stokes' agreement to 

extend her probation for a period of 12 months, with a new termination date of April l7, 

2023, or upon successful completion of all requirements of the Drug Court program prior 

to that time. Consequently, we conclude that the district court had the statutory authority 

under K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(1)(A) to continue or extend the term of Stokes' probation and 

that it continued to have jurisdiction over Stokes personally when it ultimately revoked 

her probation in January 2023. 

In the alternative, Stokes contends that the district court erred by revoking her 

probation and ordering her to serve her underlying sentence. We review a district court's 

decision to revoke probation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Coleman, 311 Kan. 332, 

334, 460 P.3d 828 (2020). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion only if (1) 

it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it is 

based on a mistake of fact. State v. Ingram, 308 Kan. 1466, 1469, 430 P.3d 931 (2018). 

As the party claiming that the district court abused its discretion, Stokes bears the burden 

of proof. See State v. Thomas, 307 Kan. 733, 739, 415 P.3d 430 (2018).

Based on our review of the record on appeal, we find that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion. Rather, the record reveals that the district court gave Stokes multiple 

opportunities to successfully complete the conditions of her probation. Unfortunately, she 

was unable to do so and repeatedly violated those conditions. Under these circumstances, 

we find it was reasonable for the district court to ultimately conclude—following the 

imposition of several intermediate sanctions—that Stokes was not amenable to probation. 

Stokes also asserts that her due process rights were violated because she did not 

receive written notice of her probation violations. Our review of the record reflects that 

Stokes was provided notice of the alleged violations of the conditions of her probation. 

These allegations were detailed in the affidavits of her ISO that were attached to the 
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State's motions for revocation of probation. In addition, the district court issued a bench 

warrant describing the alleged probation violations.

At her first probation revocation hearing, Stokes stipulated to the violations 

alleged by the State. These violations included "failure to attend ordered meetings, 

continued use of substances, [and] failure to attend treatment sessions." After the district 

court accepted the stipulation, it ordered a 120-day sanction.

Because Stokes was still unable to successfully complete the conditions of her 

probation, the State filed a second motion for revocation of probation—which is the 

subject of this appeal—on January 12, 2023. Once again, the State attached an affidavit 

from Stokes' ISO in support of its motion. Specifically, the affidavit asserted that Stokes 

failed to maintain employment, failed to comply with tasks assigned by community 

corrections, violated her curfew, missed numerous appointments, had been found to be in 

possession of marijuana and a pipe, and had still not successfully completed the Drug 

Court program. As a result, the ISO recommended that Stokes' probation be revoked and, 

once again, the district court issued a bench warrant describing the alleged probation 

violations.

At her second probation revocation hearing, Stokes participated in person and was 

represented by counsel. After both parties presented evidence, the district court found 

Stokes to be in violation of the conditions of her probation. As discussed above, the 

district court found that she had failed to maintain employment, failed to attend 

appointments, found to be in possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and 

admitted to using drugs. The district court also found that Stokes had still not 

successfully completed the Drug Court program. 

Under the facts and circumstances presented in this case, we find that a reasonable 

person could reach the same conclusion as the district court. We do not find the district 
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court's decision to revoke Stokes' probation or to order her to serve her underlying 

sentence to be arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. Likewise, we do not find that the 

district court made an error of law or a mistake of fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Stokes' probation and ordering that 

she serve her underlying sentence. 

Affirmed.