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Filed 4/11/23 P. v. Stockman CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JESSE ARTHUR STOCKMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A164669

 (Napa County

 Super. Ct. No. 21CR001775) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Jesse Arthur Stockman was charged with various offenses in a sixcount information arising from a violent altercation with his ex-girlfriend,

Jane Doe, during which he broke her nose. He pled no contest to a single 

count of corporal injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and admitted a 

great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). In exchange for his 

plea, he was promised a five-year maximum prison sentence, and he 

indicated in his plea form that he understood he was pleading to a violent 

felony. The trial court accepted the plea and, on motion of the district 

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California 

Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1, reciting only those facts 

necessary to resolve the issues raised.

All undesignated statutory references appearing within are to the 

Penal Code.
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attorney, dismissed all of the remaining counts with a Harvey waiver.2 The 

defendant also entered an Arbuckle waiver,3 such that another judge could 

sentence him at a later date. 

At a sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the trial court to grant 

probation, arguing the evidence showed that Jane Doe was the initial 

aggressor and that defendant reacted with excessive force. The court 

continued the hearing so it could consider the preliminary hearing transcript,

and the court also allowed the parties to file additional briefing, in part, 

about whether to strike the great bodily injury enhancement or the 

punishment for that enhancement. 

At the continued sentencing hearing on November 22, 2021, the 

prosecutor noted that the enactment of Senate Bill No. 567 (Senate Bill 

567)—which would take effect at the beginning of the new year—would 

generally require imposition of the middle term unless the defendant 

stipulated to aggravating circumstances, or a jury or the court found such 

circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor stated that if 

the court were inclined to strike punishment on the great bodily injury 

enhancement, then she would ask the court to impose the upper term of four 

years for the section 273.5 count. The prosecutor pressed for defendant’s

stipulation to aggravating circumstances out of concern that, absent such a 

stipulation, an upper term sentence would be reversed due to Senate Bill 567. 

The trial court indicated that if defendant would stipulate to 

aggravating factors, it would consider imposing the upper term of four years

for the section 273.5 count and striking the punishment for the great bodily 

injury enhancement, rather than sentencing him to five years. Defense 

2 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

3 People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749.
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counsel stated defendant would surely prefer four years to five and stipulate 

to circumstances in aggravation, but defendant interjected “no.” Defendant 

then made a short statement, during which he took responsibility for 

breaking Jane Doe’s nose, while also saying he did not “want to aggravate 

anybody.” The prosecutor then pressed for defendant’s stipulation to all of 

the aggravating circumstances found applicable by the probation department, 

at which point the court said the prosecutor might as well proceed to 

sentencing. After defense counsel indicated he had nothing to add, the court

sentenced defendant to a five-year term: two years for the section 273.5 

count, and three years for the great bodily injury enhancement.

Defendant appeals, arguing that remand for resentencing is necessary 

because the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion under Senate 

Bill 567. The People concede the error, stating that by admitting to the great 

bodily injury enhancement, defendant effectively stipulated to at least one 

aggravating circumstance (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)

4), which could 

have justified imposition of the upper term of four years even under Senate 

Bill 567. The People further concede that a remand is necessary so that the 

trial court can resentence defendant “with a proper understanding of its 

power under [Senate Bill] 567.” 

We accept the People’s concessions. Under rule 4.421(a)(1), 

circumstances in aggravation include: “(1) [when] [t]he crime involved great 

violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts 

disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.” In this case,

defendant admitted that he “personally inflict[ed] great bodily injury”

(§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), which permitted the trial court to rely upon the 

aggravating circumstance set out in rule 4.421(a)(1).

4 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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Moreover, rule 4.420(g) provides that “a fact charged and found as an 

enhancement may be used as a reason for imposing a particular term only if 

the court has discretion to strike the punishment for the enhancement and 

does so. The use of a fact of an enhancement to impose the upper term of 

imprisonment is an adequate reason for striking the additional term of 

imprisonment, regardless of the effect on the total term.” Furthermore, 

Senate Bill 567 did not alter the rule that a single aggravating factor may 

justify imposition of the upper term. (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 

813; People v. Berdoll (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 159, 163.) As such, it appears 

the trial court could have struck the punishment for the great bodily injury

enhancement, in order to rely on the aggravating factor set out in 

rule 4.421(a)(1) to justify the upper term.

“ ‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise 

of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court 

which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more 

exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have 

been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s 

record.’ [Citations.] In such circumstances, we have held that the 

appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly 

indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even 

if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 

58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) Here, because the record reflects that the trial court 

was unaware of the scope of its discretion, we will remand the matter for 

resentencing.

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5 In light of our conclusion, we need not and so do not consider 

defendant’s alternative contention that the trial court abused its discretion in

wrongly believing it needed the prosecutor’s assent as to the number of 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment of conviction is affirmed, but the matter is remanded to 

the trial court for resentencing in a manner not inconsistent with this 

opinion.

FUJISAKI, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

TUCHER, P.J. 

RODRÍGUEZ, J. 

People v. Stockman (A164669)

aggravating circumstances requiring defendant’s stipulation before the upper 

term could be imposed. Nor do we consider defendant’s argument that, if his

trial attorney forfeited his appellate issues by failing to object, then he 

suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel.