J-S39008-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MIGUEL A. TORRES

Appellant No. 625 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 9, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No: CP-06-CR-0000183-2014

BEFORE: STABILE, PLATT,*and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 21, 2016

Appellant, Miguel A. Torres, appeals from the March 9, 2015 judgment 

of sentence imposing life in prison without the possibility of parole for the 

murder of his wife, Barbara Torres. We affirm. 

The murder occurred on September 12, 2005 in the parking lot behind 

the Wachovia Bank branch in Reading, Pennsylvania, where the victim and 

Josefa Delosreyes (“Delosreyes”) worked together at adjacent teller desks. 

N.T. Trial, 1/26/2015–2/2/2015, at 70-72. Delosreyes and the victim were 

conversing on their way to their parked vehicles after completing their work 

for the day. Id. at 78. The victim’s vehicle was a white Cadillac Escalade 

registered to Appellant and the victim. Id. at 755. Shortly after Delosreyes 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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and the victim parted to walk to their respective vehicles, Delosreyes heard 

the victim scream, “Mikey.” Id. at 79-80. Delosreyes heard one gunshot 

and then observed, in her rearview mirror, the victim attempting to flee. Id.

at 80-81. Instead, the victim fell, and Delosreyes observed Appellant 

standing and firing a second shot at close range at the victim’s head. Id. at 

82. Delosreyes was acquainted with Appellant, as she had Christmas dinner 

with Appellant and the victim in 2004. Id. at 73, 100-01. Delosreyes also 

saw Appellant two weeks before the murder. Id. at 73. Appellant departed 

from the scene in the Torres’ Escalade. Id. at 83. 

Police found the Escalade parked several blocks from the scene of the 

murder. Id. at 286. Inside the vehicle was a nine-millimeter handgun 

Appellant purchased in 1998. Id. at 758. Forensics testing revealed that 

bullet casings found at the scene were fired from that gun. Id. at 350. The 

Escalade’s driver’s side door and running board were stained with blood. Id.

at 287-88, 300. 

Earlier on the day of the murder, Appellant rented a conversion van 

with a sleeper in it. Id. at 534-43. Appellant never returned the van to the 

rental car company. Id. at 544. Authorities later found the van abandoned 

at LaGuardia Airport in New York. Id. Appellant fled to the Dominican 

Republic, where he remained until 2010. Id. at 940-41. In 2010, he moved 

from the Dominican Republic to Italy. Id. According to a Dominican 

Republic passport and a Dominican Republic voter identification card, 
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Appellant assumed the name “Rene Rondon.” Id. at 754-56. Italian 

authorities apprehended Appellant in March of 2013. Id. at 749-50. A 

Berks County Assistant District Attorney and several United States Marshals 

traveled to Italy and took custody of Appellant in November of 2013. Id. In 

between the crime and Appellant’s apprehension, Appellant underwent 

plastic surgery to change his fingerprints. Id. at 802-03, 938-40. Appellant 

also had his nose altered by plastic surgery, and lost significant weight. Id.

at 74, 938-40. 

On February 2, 2015, after a lengthy trial, a jury found Appellant 

guilty of first and third degree murder, aggravated assault, and related 

offenses. On December 17, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life 

in prison without the possibility of parole. This timely appeal followed. 

Appellant raises five questions for our review: 

1. Whether the trial court erred and/or committed an abuse of 

discretion depriving [Appellant] of his right to due process, 

his rights under the Confrontation Clause, and/or to a fair trial 

by granting the Commonwealths’ Motion in Limine, allowing 

the Commonwealth to introduce hearsay evidence of alleged 

incidences of domestic abuse or violence through several 

witnesses that were extremely prejudicial, outweighed by any 

probative value and should not have been admitted and 

furthermore the evidence presented at trial exceeded side bar 

proffers and the proposed evidence contained in the 

Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine? 

2. Whether the trial court erred and/or committed an abuse of 

discretion depriving [Appellant] of his right to due process, 

his rights under the Confrontation Clause, and/or to a fair trial 

by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce the contents of a 

PFA Petition that was not written by the alleged victim, but in 

fact by the alleged victim’s sister concerning alleged 
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incidences of domestic abuse or violence that the witness had 

no firsthand knowledge of, was the product of hearsay and/or 

were extremely prejudicial, outweighed by any probative 

value and should not have been admitted? 

3. Whether [Appellant] was denied a fair trial by the trial court 

allowing the Commonwealth to rehabilitate it’s [sic] witness, 

Eugene Deren, who identified the prosecuting police officer as 

the person who committed the murder, by further directing 

the Commonwealth to pull up Exhibit #26 (a picture of 

[Appellant]) again and facilitating a tainted in court 

misidentification thereby warranting a new trial? 

4. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

presented by the Commonwealth in their case in chief and 

was insufficient as a matter of law to establish [Appellant’s] 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given the extremely 

contradictory, inconsistent, biased and patently unreliable 

testimony of the Commonwealth witnesses who had a vested 

interest in the outcome of the trial, failed to identify 

[Appellant] as the shooter, and/or established facts that 

[Appellant] could not be the shooter, thereby warranting a 

judgment of acquittal and/or new trial. 

5. Whether the trial court erred and/or committed an abuse of 

discretion depriving [Appellant] of his right to due process, 

his rights under the Confrontation Clause, and/or to a fair trial 

by granting the Commonwealths’ Motion in Limine, allowing 

the Commonwealth to introduce hearsay evidence of alleged 

incidences of domestic abuse or violence through Josefa 

Delosreyes that were extremely prejudicial, outweighed by 

any probative value and should not have been admitted. 

Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. 

In his brief, Appellant analyzes issues one, two, and five together. We 

will do the same. Each of these issues challenges the admission of evidence. 

Admission of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, 

and we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. 

Flor, 998 A.2d 606, 623 (Pa. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 941 (2011). 
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“[A]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment. Rather, 

discretion is abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record.” Id. at 

620. 

Several deficiencies in Appellant’s brief hamper our review of this 

issue. Appellant’s questions presented pertain to a PFA petition the victim’s 

sister helped her fill out, Delosreyes’ testimony, and other hearsay evidence. 

Appellant cites the Commonwealth’s motion in limine, but he does not 

develop any legal argument pertaining to any item in that motion. 

Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant simply states that a “review of the 

Reproduced Record in the case at bar, clearly establishes the improper 

admission of evidence regarding [Appellant’s] alleged tumultuous 

relationship with Barbara Torres.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant limits 

his legal argument to basic principles of evidence admissibility. Appellants’ 

Brief at 17-18.1 Appellant does not address the relevance, probative value, 

or potential unfair prejudice of any specific evidence. 

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1

 The Commonwealth argues the victim’s statements were admissible under 

the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 

353 (2008). The trial court relied in part on Crawford v. Washington, 541 

U.S. 36 (2004), wherein the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation 

Clause prohibits admission of testimonial hearsay from an unavailable 

witness. Appellant does not cite either case or develop any argument 

regarding these doctrines. 
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The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require appellants to 

support their arguments with citations to pertinent legal authority and 

pertinent portions of the record. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b) and (c). Failure to do so 

results in waiver. Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1258 (Pa. 

Super. 2008). 

The court will not become the counsel for an appellant, and 

will not, therefore, consider issues ... which are not fully 

developed in his brief. Failing to provide factual background and 

citation to the record represent[s] serious deviations from the 

briefing requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Because such an omission impedes on our ability to address the 

issue on appeal, an issue that is not properly briefed in this 

manner is considered waived. 

Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). Appellant’s failure to cite legal 

authority and record citations pertinent to any specific evidence renders his 

claim unreviewable and waived. 

Appellant’s third argument is that the trial court erred in permitting the 

Commonwealth to rehabilitate eyewitness Eugene Deren (“Deren”) after 

Deren failed to identify Appellant at trial. The record reflects the following: 

[Prosecutor]: Sir, the person you saw holding the woman 

and holding the gun and the person who drove the Escalade 

away, was that the same person or a different person? 

[Deren]: Same person.

[Prosecutor]: Do you see that person in the courtroom 

today? 

[Deren]: Do you want me to just walk over to him? Yeah, 

right here. 
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[Prosecutor]: This individual here? 

[Deren]: Yeah. 

[Prosecutor]: Let me show you Commonwealth Exhibit No. 

26, sir. 

[Defense counsel]: Objection , Your Honor, of him trying 

to rehabilitate his own witness. 

[Prosecutor]: Well, Judge, under the law you’re allowed to 

do that, and it’s certainly not redundant. 

The Court: Overruled. 

[Prosecutor]: The person in this photo, do you recognize 

that person? 

[Deren]: That’s the person I really saw. It’s a better 

picture of what I saw, without the glasses, you know, the more 

body filled up, a little more firm in the face. 

N.T. Trial, 1/26/2015–2/2/2015, at 181. Thus, Deren initially identified the 

prosecuting police officer as the defendant, and then identified Appellant 

from a photograph introduced as Commonwealth Exhibit 26. Deren later 

claimed his eyes were watery when he identified the police officer rather 

than Appellant. Id. at 184-85. On cross-examination, Deren simply said he 

was mistaken. Id. at 186. 

Once again, Appellant cites no law in support of his argument, 

resulting in waiver under Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b). Appellant seemingly concedes 

that the Commonwealth was entitled to refresh Deren’s recollection as to his 

prior identification of Appellant (see Appellant’s Brief at 19), but Appellant 

argues that the prior identification was tainted because Deren identified 
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Appellant only after observing Appellant’s picture in a newspaper. The 

record does not support Appellant’s contention: 

[Defense Counsel]: Mr. Deren, you don’t know who the 

gunman was? You only read something in the newspaper and 

that’s who you believe it is? 

[Deren]: No, I was there. I saw what happened. I saw 

who was there with a gun. [Appellant] is the person with the 

gun (indicating). I saw him holding the woman. 

N.T. Trial, 1/26/2015–2/2/2015, at 197. 

Furthermore, any trial court error was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt.2 The record evidence in support of Appellant’s guilt is overwhelming. 

As summarized above, the record indicates that Delosreyes knew Appellant 

and the victim and identified Appellant without any doubt. Furthermore, the 

record contains ballistics evidence matching the shell casings to Appellant’s 

gun. The record also contains evidence that Appellant rented a conversion 

van on the morning of the murder. That van was later abandoned at 

LaGuardia Airport. Appellant fled the United States for eight years, living in 

the Dominican Republic and then Italy. During that time, he changed his 

appearance by losing considerable weight and having plastic surgery on his 

nose. Deren did not know Appellant prior to the murder, and Deren 

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2

 “A harmless error analysis requires a determination by the appellate court 

that the uncontradicted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and that the 

prejudicial effect of the error is so insignificant by comparison that it is clear 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless.” Commonwealth v. 

Rasheed, 640 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1994). 
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observed Appellant for several seconds. At the time of trial, Deren had not 

seen Appellant for eight years, during which time Appellant altered his 

appearance through plastic surgery to his nose and significant weight loss. 

Appellant’s third argument does not merit relief. 

Finally, we must consider Appellant’s challenges to the weight and 

sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant offers overlapping arguments on these 

doctrines. As we have often explained, a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence is distinct from a challenge to the weight of the evidence: 

The distinction between these two challenges is critical. A 

claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, if granted, 

would preclude retrial under the double jeopardy provisions of 

the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 

Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, whereas a 

claim challenging the weight of the evidence if granted would 

permit a second trial.

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a 

question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support 

the verdict when it establishes each material element of the 

crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to 

support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in 

contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then 

the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. When reviewing a 

sufficiency claim the court is required to view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution 

the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence.

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is 

contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is 

sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is 

under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion 

of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a 
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mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge 

must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and 

allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were 

a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth 

juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that 

notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of 

greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight 

with all the facts is to deny justice. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 853 A.2d 1020, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000)). 

When the trial court denies a motion for a new trial based on weight of the 

evidence, we review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211,1225 (Pa. 2009). 

Once again, Appellant’s brief is very short on specifics. He argues that 

the Commonwealth’s witnesses were “contradictory, inconsistent, and 

biased” without explaining the basis for these assertions. He also does not 

explain which element or elements of his convictions the Commonwealth 

failed to prove. Appellant’s Brief at 20-22. As we already have explained, 

Delosreyes’ eyewitness account, Deren’s eyewitness account, the ballistics 

evidence, and Appellant’s subsequent flight are more than sufficient to 

sustain his murder conviction. Concerning the weight of the evidence, 

Deren’s misidentification at trial and other minor inconsistencies in the 

evidence do not support a conclusion that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying Appellant a new trial. 
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Since appellant has failed to present any meritorious arguments, we 

affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/21/2016