J-S39022-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALHT OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAHIMEL WILLIAMS

Appellant No. 955 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 15, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0001329-2016

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2019

Appellant, Jahimel Williams, appeals from the February 15, 2018 

judgment of sentence imposing an aggregate five to ten years of incarceration 

followed by five years of probation for possession of a controlled substance, 

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), and several 

violations of the Uniform Firearms Act.1 We affirm. 

The trial court recited the pertinent facts in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) 

opinion: 

On October 31, 2015, shortly after 9:00 p.m., Sergeant 

Matthew White and his partner were traveling northbound on 23rd

Street at the 2400 block of Tasker Street when he noticed a white 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) and (30); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105, 6106, 6106.1, 

and 6108. 
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2016 Jeep Grand Cherokee traveling westbound on Tasker Street

across 23rd Street. Sgt. White testified that the vehicle had 

‘extremely dark’ tint on the side window and rear windows. An 

MDT scan of the vehicle’s license plates returned that it was a 

rental vehicle. The officers attempted to stop the vehicle at the 

2500 block of Tasker Street, but the vehicle did not immediately

stop despite several opportunities to do so. Sgt. White testified 

that this ‘heightened his suspicion.’ The officers eventually 

effected the stopped vehicle on 26th Street and Dickinson Street. 

Sgt. White and his partner approached the driver’s side and 

front passenger side windows, respectively. Robert McCrae (Codefendant) was the driver, [Appellant] was seated behind the 

driver’s seat, and an unidentified third passenger was seated in 

the front passenger seat. Sgt. White then obtained the driver’s 

information. Sgt. White testified that he had intended to remove 

and frisk the occupants of the vehicle due to the totality of events 

that led to the stop, citing several reasons: 1) the 2400 block is 

a high crime area; 2) the vehicle had an excessive amount of tint; 

3) the ‘long delay’ between the his [sic] first attempt to stop the 

vehicle and when it finally did stop; and 4) the fact that it was a 

rental vehicle with excessive tint. Specifically, Sgt. White testified 

that due to the excessive tint on the vehicle, he would not be able 

to maintain observation of the occupants should he return to his 

vehicle to check the driver’s information. 

As Sgt. White removed the co-defendant from the car, he 

observed a small, translucent container fall from the codefendant’s lap and land on the floorboard. Sgt. White testified 

that its contents appeared to be marijuana. He immediately 

placed the co-defendant under arrest and summoned additional 

police units to assist with the removal of Appellant and the third 

passenger. Once the driver was secured in the back of the police 

vehicle, Sgt. White returned to inspect the container that had 

fallen from the driver’s lap and verified that it did, in fact, contain 

marijuana. [Appellant] and third passenger were removed from 

the vehicle and placed in separate police cars. Sgt. White then 

proceeded to inspect the car and noticed some loose paneling on 

the center console. He knew from his training and experience that 

natural voids frequently exist within this area of the vehicle where 

firearms and narcotics are often hidden. As Sgt. White further 

inspected the area, he felt a thick cloth beneath the paneling that 

was not part of the vehicle. He removed a sock with a single bullet 

wrapped inside of it. 
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Sgt. White testified that the bullet ‘heightened [his] 

suspicion’ that a firearm was in the vehicle. He proceeded to 

inspect an air vent with a loose panel, misaligned grates, and an 

attached air freshener. He recovered a plastic bag containing 133 

clear bags of heroin stamped ‘Monroe,’ a loaded firearm, and a 

torn piece of black cloth. He also recovered six cell phones from 

inside the vehicle and a car rental agreement in Appellant’s name. 

Finally, the officers searched the all [sic] of the passengers and 

recovered a cell phone and $202 from the co-defendant, a cell 

phone (but no money) from Appellant, and $544 from the third 

passenger. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/18, at 2-4. 

On December 13, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on 

Appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the 

vehicle search. After the trial court denied relief, the parties proceeded to a 

bench trial the following day. The trial court found Appellant guilty and 

imposed the sentence as set forth above. This timely appeal followed. 

Appellant raises two assertions of error: that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress and that the evidence is insufficient as to all 

charges. We will take these in turn. 

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth 

prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the 

evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for 

the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context 

of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound 

by those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination 

of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an 
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appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. McClellan, 178 A.3d 874, 880–81 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 

2015), appeal denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016)). Our scope of review is 

limited to the suppression hearing transcript. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 

2013). 

Appellant argues the suppression court erred because police did not 

have reasonable suspicion for the vehicle stop and because police had no 

lawful basis for the vehicle search. Appellant’s brief contains no law in support 

of his challenge to the vehicle stop, and we can deem that portion of the 

argument waived for that reason. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); Commonwealth v. 

Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 412 (Pa. Super. 2112), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 

1244 (Pa. 2013). In any event, the record reflects that, prior to the stop, 

Sergeant White observed an “extremely dark tint” on vehicle’s rear windows. 

N.T. Suppression, 12/13/17, at 12. The tint was so dark Sergeant White could 

not see through the windows. Id. at 13, 24-25. Furthermore, a license plate 

scan revealed that the vehicle was a rental, and Sergeant White knew that a 

rental car would not have darkly tinted windows. Id. at 14, 18-19. Sergeant 
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White therefore had reasonable suspicion2to stop the vehicle for a violation 

of the Motor Vehicle Code.3

Appellant also argues that the vehicle search was unlawful. In 

Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 104 (Pa. 2014) (plurality),

4 our 

Supreme Court held, in accordance with federal law, that police may conduct 

a warrantless search a stopped vehicle if they have probable cause to do so, 

regardless of any exigency beyond the vehicle’s inherent mobility. In Gary, 

as here, police stopped a vehicle for excessive window tint. Id. at 104. As 

police approached the stopped vehicle, they notice an odor of marijuana 

coming from the vehicle. Id. The driver acknowledged that there was some 

“weed” in the car. Id. A search of the vehicle revealed a two-pound bag of 

marijuana under the hood. Id. The Gary Court held that the vehicle search 

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2

 A police officer has authority to stop a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of 

a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). Reasonable 

suspicion exists where a police officer has a particularized and objective basis 

for suspecting the violation. Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 

1203-04 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

3

 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1) (“No person shall drive any motor vehicle with 

any sun screening device or other material which does not permit a person to 

see or view the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or side 

window of the vehicle.”). 

4

 Then-Justice Saylor joined the opinion announcing the judgment of the court 

(authored by Justice McCaffery and joined by Chief Justice Castille and Justice 

Eakin) subject to his observations about “inconsistency in the courts’ rejection 

of bright-line rules restraining law enforcement as a means of protecting 

individual rights, while simultaneously embracing such rules when they 

facilitate law enforcement.” Gary, 91 A.3d at 138-39 (Saylor, J. concurring). 
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was lawful, as there was not dispute that police had probable cause. Id. at 

138. 

The facts of the instant case are very similar, in that police lawfully 

stopped the vehicle for excessive window tint, and then Sergeant White 

observed a packet of marijuana falling from the driver’s lap as he exited the 

vehicle. Given Sergeant White’s direct observation of marijuana, he clearly 

had probable cause for the vehicle search. 

Appellant acknowledges Gary, but argues that Commonwealth v. 

Shiflet, 670 A.2d 128, (Pa. 1995) is “more on point” in this case. Appellant’s 

Brief at 17. In Shiflet, the defendant was the passenger in a lawfully stopped 

vehicle. Shiflet, 670 A.2d at 128-29. Police arrested the driver for DUI, and 

another passenger for disorderly conduct, but did not arrest the defendant. 

Id. Police offered the defendant a ride home, as she did not have a driver’s 

license, but searched her purse without her consent before permitting her to 

ride in a police cruiser. Id. at 129. The purse search revealed a small pouch 

of marijuana, and the defendant was placed under arrest. Id. Our Supreme 

Court held that the purse search was unlawful, because the defendant was 

not under arrest at the time, and because the Commonwealth conceded that 

police had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the defendant had 

engaged in any illegal activity. Id. at 130-33. 

Appellant’s reliance on Shiflet is entirely misplaced. Shiflet involved 

the search of the defendant’s personal effects after she was ordered out of the 
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vehicle. The instant case involves a vehicle search after a police officer 

observed marijuana falling from the driver’s lap as he exited the vehicle. 

Appellant also states that the search of various compartments in the vehicle

was unlawful, but he cites no law in support of this argument. Appellant’s 

Brief at 16-17. 

In short, Appellant has failed to articulate any basis upon which the 

either the vehicle stop or the vehicle search was unlawful. We therefore reject 

Appellant’s first argument. 

Next, Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient as to all of his 

charges. Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and his appellate brief 

clarify his particular challenge—that the Commonwealth failed to prove 

Appellant was in constructive possession of controlled substances or firearms. 

Our standard of review is de novo, and “our scope of review is limited to 

considering the evidence of record, and all reasonable inferences arising 

therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the 

verdict winner.” Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 416, 420–21 (Pa. 

2014). 

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic 

construct to deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. 

Constructive possession is an inference arising from a set of facts 

that possession of the contraband was more likely than not. We 

have defined constructive possession as conscious dominion. We 

subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to control 

the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. To aid 

application, we have held that constructive possession may be 

established by the totality of the circumstances. 
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Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 78 A.3d 1090 (Pa. 2013). A defendant’s mere presence at a place 

where contraband is found is not, without more, sufficient to prove conscious 

dominion. Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31 (Pa. Super. 2018), 

appeal denied, 202 A.3d 42 (Pa. 2019). Additionally, our Court has 

recognized that “[c]onstructive possession may be found in one or more actors 

where the item in issue is in an area of joint control and equal access.” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 26 A.3d 1078, 1094 (Pa. 2011). 

Appellant notes that the firearm and the controlled substances were 

retrieved from the front of the vehicle, and he was in the rear passenger seat. 

He relies on Parrish, in which this Court vacated controlled substances, 

paraphernalia, and firearms convictions of a backseat vehicle passenger. In 

Parrish, police effected a vehicle stop for a window tint violation. Police, after 

observing marijuana in plain view, searched the vehicle and located drugs and 

a gun in a bag on the floor by the front passenger seat. Parrish, 191 A.3d at

at 32-33. Marijuana was in the cup holder of the front passenger side door 

and another firearm was under the front passenger seat. Id. at 33. Police 

found a magazine of bullets in the glove compartment and a bulletproof vest 

in the trunk. Id. The defendant was not the registered owner of the vehicle 

and did not have a key to the glove compartment or trunk. Id. at 34. Neither 

firearm was registered to him. Id. at 38. The defendant was cooperative and 

correctly identified himself. Id. at 34. The driver was straddling the console 
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between the driver’s seat and front passenger seat when police approached 

the vehicle. Id. at 33. A witness testified that the defendant was receiving a 

ride home from a party, and that he did not have a bag with him when he 

entered the car. Id. 

Thus, the defendant did not own or have a key to the car, and he was 

seen getting into the car without the black bag. The evidence indicated that 

he merely accepted a ride home from a party. The driver was exhibiting 

furtive movements in the front of the vehicle as police approached, whereas 

the defendant was in the back and placed his hands on the headrest. Thus, 

there was no positive connection between the defendant and the vehicle or 

the contraband, and his connection to the contraband was a matter of 

speculation. Under those circumstances, this Court concluded that evidence 

of his constructive possession of the contraband was insufficient. Id. at 38. 

Several important pieces of evidence distinguish this case from Parrish. 

First, the vehicle was rented in Appellant’s name. Second, the rental vehicle 

had an obvious alteration—the side and rear windows were tinted so dark that 

police could not see inside the vehicle. Sargent White testified that in his 

experience, a rental vehicle would not have an illegal tint. N.T. Suppression, 

12/13/17, at 18-19. Thus, the trial court could reasonably infer that Appellant 

was aware that his rental vehicle had been altered to conceal the vehicle’s 

contents. Given this, the court also could reasonably infer that Appellant was 

aware of other alterations—to the center console and air vent—done for the 
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same purpose. The instant record, unlike that of Parrish, establishes much 

more than Appellant’s mere presence in the vehicle. He was present in his 

own rental vehicle, which was subsequently altered to conceal contraband. 

The court was free to discredit Appellant’s claims that he re-rented the vehicle 

to make money, and that he just happened to be in the vehicle when police 

pulled it over. 

In summary, the evidence, construed in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, supports an inference that Appellant had knowledge of and 

exercised conscious dominion over the controlled substances and firearm in 

his altered rental vehicle. We therefore reject Appellant’s claim that the 

Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence of constructive 

possession. 

In light of all of the foregoing, we reject Appellant’s assertions of error 

and affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/22/19