UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WARII 

The Technical Services 

THE CHEMICAL WARFARE 

SERVICE: 

CHEMICALS IN COMBAT 

by 

Broolu E, Kleber 

and 

Dale Birdsell 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.c., 1990 





Foreword

This is the third and final volume of the Chemical Warfare Service

subseries of The Technical Services in the series UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Concluding the chemical warfare story

that was begun in Organizing for War and was continued in From

Laboratory to Field, Chemicals in Combat records in meaningful detail the ultimate and most rigorous test of all things military: performance in battle.

Entry of the United States into World War II found the nation's

Armed Forces, like those of its principal allies and enemies, mindful

of the possibility of gas warfare. The gas attacks of World War I

did not recur, but the Chemical Warfare Service was in the position of

being ready for a type of war that did not happen. Thus the CWS, the

only technical service having combat troops armed with weapons it

had specifically provided for itself, was forced to show its flexibility.

The Service sought to fulfill its supporting role with smoke, flame, and

incendiaries; with 4.2-inch mortars and flame throwers; and, having no

gas to contend with, its decontamination companies provided front-line

troops with the means for simple physical cleanliness. Chemicals in

Combat recounts the administrative, logistical, and tactical problems

arising from the Service's dual responsibility, and highlights the flexibility and ingenuity demanded of chemical troops in World War II.

These are, of course, qualities that military men have and will always

find essential.

Washington, D.C.

15 March 1965

HAL C. PATTISON

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History
The Authors

Dr. Brooks E. Kleber received a Ph.B. degree from Dickinson College

and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from the University of Pennsylvania. From 1950 to 1963 he served as historian with the U.S. Army

Chemical Corps Historical Office. In January 1963 Dr. Kleber was

appointed Chief Historian, United States Continental Army Command.

Dr. Dale Birdsell holds an A.B. degree from Reed College, an M.A.

from Brown University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He served as historian with the U.S. Army Chemical Corps

Historical Office from 1952 to 1963 and is now Chief, Historical

Division, U.S. Army Munitions Command.
Preface

Chemicals in Combat is the last of three volumes concerned with the

activities of the Chemical Warfare Service in World War II. It is devoted to the overseas story—administration, logistics, and combat. In

World War II the CWS faced a unique situation, in that it found itself

in the unenviable position of preparing for an unconventional kind of

warfare that never came to pass. Yet, even as it served as insurance in

the event of the introduction of gas by the enemy (United States policy

permitted the use of gas only in retaliation), it also had to be useful in a

gasless war.

The CWS was useful in World War II. Its contributions included the

missions of smoke, flame, and incendiary weapons, which, less heralded

at first, eventually eclipsed the gas mission. How the CWS carried out

these various missions in the theaters of operation is the main theme of

this volume.

"Chemical Warfare" is a term meant to include the employment of

artificial smoke, flame, and incendiary munitions as well as gas offensive

and defensive munitions. While the practice at the time of this writing

is to refer to the "employment of chemical weapons" rather than to

"chemical warfare," the latter term is appropriate to a World War II

setting, and the term "chemicals" retains its inclusive World War II

meaning.

In planning a volume devoted to the overseas activities of the CWS,

the authors found the logic of either of two alternative organizational

methods was appealing: (1) trace each CWS activity, such as preparedness, administration, and logistics, and each of the combat functions,

from war area to war area in a unified account by subject; or (2) treat

all CWS activities for each overseas area in a unified account under an

area heading. The first alternative tended to obscure the administrative

and logistic individuality of the CWS overseas branches. It also tended

to minimize the impact of area physical characteristics, of area organizational policy, and of area tactics. Even two theaters so intimately con-
nected and in many ways so parallel as the European and North African

were decidedly different entities from the CWS point of view. The

theater chief chemical officers operated from different echelons of command, and these individuals did not hold the same conception of

operating control. The possibility of gas warfare was great in Europe

but usually remote in North Africa. The CWS supply system was

highly centralized in Europe; it was in part decentralized in the Mediterranean area. But neither did the second alternative solve all the

problems. The development of mortar and smoke tactics and techniques in the Mediterranean area was much more closely related to the

employment of those tactics and techniques in the European theater

situation than it was to the evolution of the Mediterranean theater

supply systems. Further, in the Pacific the development of flame

weapons and tactics would not observe area boundaries, and Pacific

incendiary bomb experience was only a grand enlargement of European

experience.

The authors fully realize that the war was carried on in more than

the four major areas usually considered herein. They have no desire to

detract from the considerable contributions of the CWS branches in the

other major areas and in those outposts which could not be designated

major. But the authors believe that most CWS problems can be illustrated from activities in the European and North African/Mediterranean theaters and the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas with some

reference to the South Pacific Area. The China, Burma-India, North

Pacific, and Middle East areas are thus excluded.

The CWS in the United States is treated in two complementary

volumes which have preceded the publication of Chemicals in Combat.

The first of these, Organizing for War, traces matters of organization,

administration, and training from World War I CWS origins through

the end of World War II. The second, From Laboratory to Field, deals

with CWS research, development, and supply.

The present volume was begun by and under the direction of the

late Dr. Paul W. Pritchard, then Chief, U.S. Army Chemical Corps

Historical Office. While Dr. Pritchard's work appears only in portions

of the chapters on smoke, the authors greatly benefited from his guidance and advice and from his unflagging interest in overseas military

operations. He was one of those historians who could become personally

involved in and enthusiastic about his subject without impairment of

objectivity. Dr. Pritchard's successor, Dr. Leo P. Brophy, continued to
provide valuable guidance and advice. Dr. Brooks E. Kleber wrote

Chapters VIII through XVII. Dr. Dale Birdsell wrote Chapters II

through VI. These authors collaborated on Chapters I and XVIII.

Mr. Sherman L. Davis wrote Chapter VII. Dr. Kleber co-ordinated

the work on the volume.

The authors are greatly indebted to Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, and to Dr. John Miller, jr., Deputy Chief Historian, Office,

Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, for guidance and

suggestions. Many members and former members of the staff of the

U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office also contributed knowledge, preliminary research, or early drafts of portions of this volume.

Individuals who were especially helpful and their areas of interest are:

Mr. H. Gilman Wing, flame throwers and administration; Lt. Col.

Leonard J. McKinney, flame throwers; Dr. Ben R. Baldwin, mortars

and readiness; Dr. Alfred J. Bingham, mortars, readiness, administration; and Mr. Innis Brown, chemical troop units. The following U.S.

Army Chemical Corps Historical Office enlisted research assistants were

especially helpful: Thomas J. Morgan, Nelson Ledsky, Richard Breault,

William Piez, Harvey Fergusson, John J. Keeley, Victor H. Walton,

and Arthur Macqueen. Mrs. Alice E. Moss supervised the preparation

of the manuscript, did yeoman service in checking source locations, and

diligently performed preliminary editorial tasks. Mrs. Doris M. Jacobson displayed extraordinary skill in preparing the final typescripts.

Research for this volume was greatly facilitated by personnel of the

World War II Records Division, National Archives, especially Mrs.

Lois Aldridge, Mrs. Hazel Ward, and Mrs. Caroline Moore. Mr.

Howard Bauté, Mrs. Mary K. Stuart, and Mrs. M. Virginia Nester of

the Federal Records Center in Alexandria were most helpful in locating

CWS records, and personnel of the Federal Records Center, Kansas

City, the Archives Division, The Air University, and the Marine Corps

Archives provided many collections of overseas records. Mr. Israel Wice

and Miss Hannah Zeidlik of the Office, Chief of Military History,

steered the authors to many records sources they might otherwise have

overlooked. Miss Ethel M. Owens, Office of the Chief Chemical Officer,

provided valuable information on the careers of CWS officers.

The veterans of the Chemical Warfare Service have been remarkably

frank in supplying materials which do not appear in the official records, and many have given unstintingly of their time. The authors are

grateful to all these officers whose interviews or comments have been

cited as well as to others who provided more general background in-
formation. They are especially grateful to Maj. Gen. Alden H. Waitt,

Brig. Gen. Hugh W. Rowan, and Col. Maurice H. Barker, all of whom

followed the project throughout the entire span and contributed much

to the authors' understanding of the World War II experience of the

CWS. The following officers were always ready with good counsel:

Cols. William A. Copthorne, Alexander Batlin, Frank M. Arthur, and

Nelson McKaig, Jr., Lt. Col. Levin B. Cottingham, Maj. Gen. William

N. Porter, Cols. Siegfried P. Coblentz, James H. Batte, and Robert W.

Breaks, Brig. Gen. Charles S. Shadle, Cols. Alfred J. P. Wilson, Alexander Leggin, John C. MacArthur, Thomas H. Magness, Jr., Claude J.

Merrill, Carl V. Burke, Irving R. Mollen, John C. Morgan, Harold

Riegelman, and Patrick F. Powers.

Thanks are also due to several other members of the Office of the

Chief of Military History: Mr. David Jaffé, editor, Mrs. Marion P.

Grimes, assistant editor; Miss Ruth A. Phillips, who selected the

photographs; and Mr. Elliot Dunay, who prepared the maps.

For errors in the facts presented and in the conclusions drawn, the

authors assume sole responsibility.

Washington, D.C.

15 March 1965

BROOKS E. KLEBER

DALE BIRDSELL
Contents

Chapter Page

I. ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE .... . 3

World War I .................... . 5

The CWS Between the Wars .............. . 24

II. THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER ........ . 36

Planning and Organization: 1940-43 .......... . 36

Planning and Organization: 1944-45 .......... . 61Summary

 ..................... . 8 4

III. CWS ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN . 86

Chemical Supply—The Beachhead Phase ......... . 94

Chemical Supply—Theater Organization Phase ....... . 99

Theater Chemical Supply Problems ........... . 125

IV. THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE .............. . 136

Evolving the Theater CWS Supply System ........ . 136

Air Chemical Supply ................. . 149

Ground Chemical Supply ............... . 163

On the Continent .................. . 173

V. CWS ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC ........... . 187

The CWS in the West and Southwest Pacific, 1941-42 ... . 187

The Principal Mission—1943 .............. . 200

CWS, Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-45 .......... . 208

Organizing the CWS, Hawaiian Department ....... . 219

The Offensive Period in the Central Pacific ........ . 225

VI. THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC .............. . 236

Foundation of Chemical Supply in Australia ........ . 236

The Tyranny of Climate and Distance .......... . 246

Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Southwest Pacific Area ... 254

The Theater Supply System, Central Pacific ........ . 266

Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Central Pacific ..... . 270

VII. CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS ......... . 277

The Chemical Laboratory Company ........... . 280

xiii
Chapter Page

The Chemical Maintenance Company .......... . 288

The Chemical Depot Company ............. . 295

The Chemical Decontamination Company ......... . 300

The Chemical Processing Company ........... . 304

The Chemical Service Company ............. . 308

Chemical Air Service Companies ............ . 317

VIII. LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO ...... . 321

Background of Large Area Screening ........... . 321

Initial Operations: The Northwest African Ports . ..... . 326

Perfecting the Technique: The Italian Ports ........ . 329

The Changing Mission: Smoke in Amphibious and Beachhead

Operations .................... . 33 4

Smoke in Normal Forward Area Operations ........ . 345

IX. LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO . ...... . 354

The Invasion of Normandy .............. . 354

The Generators, Units, and Missions ........... . 359

The Use of Smoke at River Crossings ........... . 361Summary

 ..................... . 39 2

X. LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC ..... . 394

Early Attempts To Introduce Area Screening in SWPA ... . 394

A Question of Mission ................ . 397

Renewed Interest in Smoke . .............. . 399

The Navy's Use of Smoke ................ 404Screens for Airborne Operations

 . ............ . 411

XI. THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO . ......... . 418

The Authorization of the High Explosive Mission . ..... . 419

Activation of Chemical Mortar Units .......... . 421

Sicily ....................... . 42 4

The Salerno Landings ................. . 432

From the Volturno to the Winter Line .......... . 435

The Gustav Line ................... . 442

The Anzio Beachhead ................. . 445

Cassino ...................... . 44 8

The Drive on Rome .................. . 450

The Invasion of Southern France ............ . 453

The Fighting Ends in Italy . .............. . 455

XII. THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO ......... . 459

Preparations for OVERLORD ............. . 461

The Normandy Campaign ............... . 462

xiv
Chapter Page

Operational Problems ................. . 468

The Drive Toward Germany .............. . 471

Mortar Parts and Their Maintenance ........... . 477

The German Winter Offensive ............. . 480

Mortar Shell Malfunctions ............... . 482

The Final Drive ................... . 484

XIII. THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC ....... . 492

South Pacific Area .................. . 492

Southwest Pacific Area ................ . 497

Central Pacific Area ................. . 516

Amphibious Employment of the 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar ... 520

XIV. THE FLAME THROWER IN THE PACIFIC:

GUADALCANAL TO THE MARSHALL ISLANDS ... 534

The Portable Flame Thrower in the South Pacific . ..... . 536

The Southwest Pacific: The first Years .......... . 543

Introduction of the Portable flame Thrower in the Central

Pacific Area ................... . 55 3

XV. THE FLAME THROWER IN THE PACIFIC:

MARIANAS TO OKINAWA ............ . 558

The Need for a Mechanized flame Thrower ........ . 558

The Marianas .................... . 559

Peleliu ....................... . 56 4

T h e Philippines ................... . 56 8

Iwo Jima ...................... . 578

Okinawa ...................... . 58 4

Preparations for the Invasion of Japan .......... . 589

XVI. THE FLAME THROWER IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 592

The Portable flame Thrower in the MTO ......... . 592

The Portable flame Thrower in the ETO ......... . 596

The Mechanized flame Thrower ............. . 604

XVII. FIRE FROM THE AIR ................. . 614

The Incendiary Bomb: The Strategic Weapon ....... . 614

The fire Bomb: The Tactical Weapon .......... . 630

XVIII. CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION .......... . 636

Administration and Manpower ............. . 637

Logistics ...................... . 64 0

The Weapons .................... . 644

Readiness for Gas Warfare ............... . 648

Why Gas Was Not Used ................ . 652
Charts

Page

1. Organization of Chemical Warfare Service, American Expeditionary Forces,

13 July 1918 ...................... . 20

2. Suggested Organization of Offices of Chemical Officers, Theater of

Operations ....................... . 2 9

3. Planned Distribution of Staff and Service Agencies, Chemical Warfare

Service, Theater of Operations ............... . 39

4. Organization of Chemical Warfare Service Section, Headquarters, European

Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, January 1944 . ....... . 63

5. Actual Distribution of Service Agencies and Combat Units, Chemical

Warfare Service, European Theater of Operations, 1944-1945 ... 66

6. Organization of Chemical Warfare Section, Allied Force Headquarters, and

Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army,

November 1943 ..................... . 117

7. Organization of Chemical Section, Headquarters, United States Army

Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, 1 June 1944 ..... . 209C

 ................. . 226

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ................... . 659

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................... . 664

CODE NAMES ........................ . 669

INDEX ............................ . 67 5

Maps

No.

1. Theaters of Operations, 1943 .................. . 31

1. Theaters of Operations, 1943 . . . . . . . . . .31 of Operations, 1943

2. Pacific Ocean Areas, 1 August 1942 ............... . 192

3. Smoke at Naples, December 1943 ................ . 330

4. Smoke at Anzio, 18 March 1944 . ................ . 338

5. Smoke Along the Garigliano, April 1944 ............. . 349

6. Smoke Generator Operations, 10-15 September 1944 ........ . 364

7. Nadzab Smoke Curtains, 5 September 1943 ............ . 413

Illustrations

Maj. Gen. William N. Porter .................... . 27

General Porter and Top-Ranking Officers in London, 1943 ........ . 49

Col. Maurice E. Barker ...................... . 91

xvi
Page

Col. Charles S. Shadle and Staff in Algiers, 1943 ............ . 120

Decontamination Unit Functioning as a Shower ............ . 131

Chemical Warfare Depot, Loton Deer Park, England .......... . 148

Conferring Somewhere in England Before D-day ............. . 170

"I see Comp'ny E got th' new style gas masks, Joe" ........... . 176

Annex Building, Chemical Warfare School, Brisbane .......... . 195

Col. Harold Riegelman ...................... . 197

Col. Carl L. Marriott Examining Japanese Gas Mask .......... . 203

Col. William A. Copthorne and Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt . ....... . 216

Chemical Warfare Officers at Oro Bay, 1944 ............. . 217

Col. George F. Unmacht ..................... . 223

Repairing Gas Masks for Civilian Use ................ . 233

Capua Arsenal, as the Germans Left It ................ . 291

Plant of 105th Chemical Processing Company, Brisbane ......... . 306

Testing Flame Thrower Fuels, New Guinea .............. . 310

A Chemical Service Company Laboratory, New Guinea ......... . 312

Loading Liquid Smoke Into an M10 Smoke Tank . ........... . 318

Smoke Screen Shields Unloading Operations, Salerno .......... . 333

"My God! There we wuz an' here they wuz" ............. . 341

Effect of Smoke Curtain, Italy ................... . 347

Carrying Smoke Pots Into Position, Rapido River ........... . 348

Smoke Screen Conceals Movements Along Highway .......... . 352

M2 Smoke Generator ....................... . 358

Smoke Screen Begins To Form on the Moselle River . .......... . 365

Smoke Generator in a Dukw, Milne Bay ............... . 396

Smoke Shields a Paratroop Drop, New Guinea ............. . 415

4.2-Inch Mortar Crew, Italy .................... . 423

Pulling a 4.2-Inch Mortar Cart Over Rugged Terrain .......... . 427

Smoke Screen, OMAHA Beach ................... . 463

Chemical Mortars, UTAH Beach ................... . 464

Preparing a 4.2-Inch Mortar Shell for Firing ............. . 480

Roer River Bridge Behind a Smoke Screen ................ 488Artificial Haze on Rhine River 

Artificial Haze on Rhine River................... . 490

4.2-Inch Chemical Mortars on LST ................. . 522

Marines Using CWS Flame Thrower, Tarawa ............. . 554

Flame Thrower on an Amphibious Tractor .............. . 565

Neutralizing a Cave, Iwo Jima ................... . 580

Flame-Throwing Tank, Okinawa .................. . 585

Men Training With Flame Thrower ................. . 600

British Crocodile With Fuel Trailer ................. . 607

Loading Magnesium Bombs Into a B-24 ............... . 623

Tokyo, After Incendiary Bombing ................. . 629

Attaching Fire Bomb Tank to a P-47 ................ . 631

All illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense except for the cartoons by Bill Mauldin on page 176 and page 341 and the photograph supplied by Col.

Thomas H. Magness, Jr., on page 607.

xvii

THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE:

CHEMICALS IN COMBAT

CHAPTER I

Origins of the Chemical

Warfare Service

The great paradox of America's wartime gas experience is that in

World War I, when the nation was unprepared for it, gas was used, and

in World War II, when the nation was prepared, gas was not used. The

gas warfare experience of World War I is important not only as the

sole example of large-scale use of toxic chemicals in battle, but also

because this experience in large measure dictated the chemical mission,

organization, weapons, tactics, and techniques with which the belligerents entered World War II. The Allies and the Central Powers used no

fewer than twenty-eight gases and sixteen mixtures of gases during

World War I. Although the United States retained or developed nearly

a dozen gases, only four, mustard, phosgene, lewisite, and Chloracetophenone, in order of importance, were considered as basic at the

beginning of World War II. The first two were accorded this priority

as the result of actual World War I combat experience; lewisite

owed its prominence to its likeness to mustard, while Chloracetophenone

was similar to, although less expensive and less corrosive than, the

World War I tear gases.1 The ground weapons available for gas at the

beginning of World War II had for the most part likewise been developed and battle-tested in World War I. These included artillery with

toxic shell, the Livens projector, chemical cylinders, and toxic candles.

The Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in the United States had modi1

 (1) Brig. Gen. Amos A. Fries and Maj. Clarence J. West, Chemical Warfare (New York: McGrawHill, 1921), pp. 24-27. (2) WD TM 3-215, 1 Oct 40. (3) Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles, and

Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 49-74.
4 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

fied the 4-inch Stokes mortar into the longer range, more accurate

4.2-inch chemical mortar, again on the basis of World War I experience.2

 The aerial chemical bomb was a development of the period between the wars, but even this new weapon did not significantly alter

gas warfare tactics. The concept of the massive gas attack adopted by

most of the major World War I combatants dominated tactical doctrine in the period following the war. Retained too was the practice of

using mustard in defensive operations. In offensive chemical operations

nonpersistent agents were to be used in terrain over which friendly

troops would advance, whereas the persistent mustard would be placed

on areas to be neutralized and bypassed.3 In general, the troops who

successfully stood up in the face of such gas attacks were those who had

training and gas mask discipline.

Two comments about the American use of gas in World War I are

in order. First, troops in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF)

used a disproportionately large amount of Allied materiel. In time, the

United States did send bulk toxics to Europe where they were poured

into British and French shells. And although four million Americanmade masks were eventually shipped to Europe, soldiers of the AEF

initially used almost a million British and French masks. The second

point concerns the place of gas warfare in the thinking of American

battle leaders. These officers had to be won over to the usefulness of gas

warfare and this task was not always easy. Brig. Gen. Amos A. Fries tells

of the case of the operations officer of an American corps demanding

written assurance that gas used in support of an attack in the Argonne

would not cause a single friendly casualty. Fries also brings out another

point, supported by contemporary documents, which involves the reluctance of American commanders to use gas because of the possibility

of retaliatory fire. They held this attitude despite the fact that the

Germans had made good use of the chemical weapon regardless of

enemy reaction.4

2

 (1) Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 123-38. (2) The gas cylinder and

the Livens projector were dropped early in World War II because the range of both and the accuracy of

the Livens projector suited them only to trench warfare conditions. 3

 (1) Maj. Gen. C. H. Foulkes, "Gas!" The Story of the Special Brigade (Edinburgh and London: W.

Blackwood & Sons, 1934) (hereafter cited as Foulkes, Gas!) p. 267. (2) Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt,

Gas Warfare (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), pp. 137-54. 4

 Amos A. Fries, MS, History of Chemical Warfare in France, 1919, pp. 52-53.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 5

World War 1

The First Gas Attack

Late in the afternoon of 22 April 1915 three flares glowed from a

German balloon hoisted in the salient near Ypres, Belgium. At this

signal plumes of greenish-gray smoke began to pour from the earth in

front of the German trenches. The plumes suffused into a yellowish

cloud rolling downwind toward the Allied trenches at the juncture of

the French and British lines. The first notable gas attack in military

history was in progress, The chlorine gas cloud enveloped a French

colonial regiment. Some soldiers emerged from the cloud blinded,

choking, and coughing, but other soldiers, incapacitated, dying, or

dead from the effects of the gas were left in the trenches. German gas

breached the Allied lines for four miles, and German soldiers captured

fifty French guns.5

The French did not announce their casualties from this first attack,

but the Germans estimated them at 15,000, including 5,000 deaths in

the attack of 22 April and in that of 24 April in the same sector.6

Although the German estimate may have been high, the casualties were

nonetheless extensive. These losses, along with the shock and panic resulting from the surprise introduction of a new weapon, could have

been a serious blow to the Allies had the Germans followed up their

initial success. They failed to advance more than a few hundred yards,

however, and before they could gain ground significantly, the Allies

had plugged the hole in their line.7 The failure of the Germans to exploit

their initial success and Allied lack of preparation for the introduction

of gas can best be understood in the light of the strategic concepts and

views of the military art held by the belligerents before World War I.

5

 (1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 18-19. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 10-13 (eyewitness accounts cited). (3) Victor Lefebure, The Riddle of the Rhine (New York: The Chemical Foundation,

1923), pp. 31-32 (statement of Sir John .French, British Commander-in-chief in the field, cited). (4)

Waitt, Gas Warfare, pp. 16-19. (5) Capt. Basil H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918 (Boston:

Little, Brown and Co., 1931), pp. 130, 175-81. (6) Rudolph Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg (3d

ed., Berlin: Mittler, 1937), I, 16-17. All references to this work are to the third edition unless otherwise

noted. 6

 (1) Foulkes in Gas!, page 306, cites these figures, which appear in Hanslian et al., Der Chemische

Krieg (2d ed., 1927), page 12, but believes they are exaggerated. In the 24 April attack 122 soldiers of

the Canadian forces holding a section of the British line were hospitalized and eleven died. (2) Waitt,

Gas Warfare, page 18, indicates 5,000 casualties. (3) A French authority, Henri le Wita, Autour de

la Guerre Chimique (Paris: Tallandier, 1928) page 34, accepts the German estimate without question. 7

 Liddell Hart, The Real War, p. 176.
6 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Background of Gas Warfare

While the nineteenth century industrial and technological revolutions produced a new arsenal of weapons that radically altered the

character of warfare, the new technology produced no toxic war gases.

Such were envisaged, however, and several suggestions for the use of

toxic chemicals in war had been made.8 The prospect of the union of

the science of chemistry with the art of war was sufficiently real by the

end of the nineteenth century to cause the nations deliberating at The

Hague during the International Peace Conference to attempt to ban

the use of "projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of

asphyxiating or deleterious gases."

 9

The attempted ban did not run counter to any area of military opinion. Military leaders, theorists, and innovators were engrossed, and in

the early years of the twentieth century became even more engrossed,

in the concepts of mass armies, grand strategic offensives, and the

undreamed-of firepower of modern weapons.10 The nations of Europe

entered World War I dominated by the grand strategic conception of

mass offensive through which one set of belligerents or the other would

claim victory—probably in as short a time as six weeks.11 No nation

envisioned the need for large-scale industrial preparation; the initial

stockpile of weapons and ammunition would serve for the brief duration of the war.12

 Since gas was expected only to hamper the progress

of assaulting forces in mass offensive, each nation reviewed its potential

for producing toxics in but cursory fashion.

Only Germany, with the world's largest and most varied chemical

industry, appeared to have the potential for war gas production.

Germany set Professor Fritz Haber, director of Berlin's Kaiser Wilhelm

Institute, and a small group of chemists to work on war gases in Haber's

own institute in the first month of the war.13 At first there must have

2

 See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 1-2. 9

 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet 8, The Hague

Declaration (IV, 2) of 1899 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases (Washington: The Endowment, 1915). 10

 For pre-World War I military theory, see (1) Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (Durham,

N.C.: Duke University Press, 1959}, pp. 143-212; (2) Lynn Montross, War Through The Ages

(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 590-698. 11

 Ropp, War in the Modern World, pp. 177-217. 12

 Liddell Hart, The Real War, pp. 44-45, 127-29. 13

 (1) Lefebure, Riddle of the Rhine, p. 35. (2) Foulkes, Gas!, p. 25. (3) Hanslian et al., Der

Chemische Krieg, pages 9-10, denies that the Germans were working on war gases prior to October 1914

and he cites Professor Haber to refute Lefebure. It is noteworthy that the quotation from Haber is given

in the second edition, pages 6 — 7n., as: "Wahrend der ersten drei Monate des Krieges hat in Deutschland
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 7

seemed little likelihood that any product of Haber's laboratory would be

used. The German strategy of mass offensive was overwhelmingly successful until the Allies decisively halted the German advance in the

famed September 1914 battle of the Marne.14 In October and November 1914 the first battle of Ypres taught the Germans that they could

not resume their offensive in the west, at least for the time being. The

Germans reacted promptly by digging in. Deadlock, static trench

warfare, soon characterized the Western Front while the Germans prepared to press the offensive on the Eastern Front and to undertake

large-scale, long-term economic and industrial war mobilization within

the homeland. In these preparations Germany began to look for "keys

to the deadlock."15 War gas could be such a key.

A Period of Improvisation

German forces experimented with an eye and nose irritant powder

on the Western Front in October but it was so ineffective that little or

no notice was taken of it. Gas was then used on the Eastern Front,

possibly as early as December 1914, but certainly in January and

February 1915.16 British and French disregarded other more definite

warnings of the impending German employment of gas. In March

1915 a German officer captured in a raid told a British noncommissioned officer that gas cylinders were in place, ready to use, on the

Western Front. On 30 March the French 10th Army bulletin contained a prisoner of war report that indicated where gas cylinders were

emplaced, how they were to be used, and what protection German

troops had against gas. The 10th Army information was confirmed by

another war prisoner on 15 April and again confirmed shortly thereniemand an Gas gedacht. Wir Lasen in der "Pall Mall Gazette" von 17 September 1914 zum erstenmal

von Gasvorbereitungen des Feindes. Erst drei Monate nach Beginn des Kreiges begannen wir mit

Gasarbeiten." In the third edition, page 10n., the quotation is given: "We had actually first to read in

the French, Italian and English Press—as for instance in the Tall Mall Gazette' of Sept. 17, 1914—of

the terribly [sic] things that were in preparation for us before we began to make similar preparations in

view of the commencement of the war of position." Foulkes, in Gas!, page 24, points out that the tall

Mall Gazette reference was not to gas but to a new French explosive, "Turpinite." 14

 Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 15. 15

 (1) Ropp, War in the Modern World, pp. 222-25. (2) Liddell Hart, The Real War, pp. 67-70,

80-102, 115-16, 127-35. The phrase quoted above is Liddell Hart's. 16

 (1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 30, 31. (2) Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg, I, 12, 15. Foulkes, page 30,

cites a report that gas was used on the eastern front in December 1914 but indicates that the first confirmed attack was in January 1915. Hanslian, volume I, page 15, indicates that a tear gas was employed

on the Eastern Front in January 1915.
8 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

after by a captured German document and a Belgian General Staff

report on German offensive and defensive measures. The Belgians further advised their allies that the Germans were manufacturing gas

respirators in Ghent. Again, British and Canadian air and ground troops

actually saw and even counted gas cylinders and shell. And, perhaps

as a final indication of intent, the Germans were accusing the Allies of

employing gas.17

All warnings went unheeded. The German gas attack on 22 April

took the Allied forces by complete surprise, and, what is more astonishing, its success was a surprise to the Germans. The German high command initially had looked upon the scheme with tolerant acquiescence,

not bothering to provide the reserves to exploit a possible breakthrough.18

 Consequently, instead of achieving a major victory, the

Germans had to settle for merely straightening their line. But major

victory or no, after Ypres toxic chemical warfare clearly became a

force to reckon with.19 The French, the British, and the Germans all

began to concentrate on the offensive and defensive aspects of gas

warfare.

Within a few days after the Ypres attack, on the appeal of Lord

Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, British women had equipped

the entire British Expeditionary Forces with gauze pads which could be

used as a crude mask to protect against toxics.20 The French provided

similar pads, and, like both the British and Germans, furnished chemicals to wet the pads in order to increase their filtering potential.21

 The

development of an offensive capability in gas warfare naturally took

longer. The British designated elements of the War Office to initiate

17

 (1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 28-35. (2) Hanslian repeats charges that the French were using gas, but

he doubts the authenticity of reports detailing the lethality of so-called Turpinite. The French had

used a riot control agent (tear gas) in grenades, but it had not been effective. It is unlikely that the

French would have used lethal gas offensively without being prepared defensively, and there is no indication that the French took any protective measures until after the Ypres attacks. Der Chemische Krieg,

I, 11—15, and 2d ed., pp. 7-10. 18

 One German authority states that German commanders lacked faith in the weapon and only allowed

the attack as an experiment. (Ulrich Mueller-Kiel, Die Chemische Waffe Im WeltKrieg Und—Jetzt

(Berlin: Verlag Chemie, 1932; unpublished U.S. Army translation, 1932), p. 17) Maj. Gen. William N.

Porter, USA (Ret.), World War II Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, speculated that German

commanders and staff officers who were nearly all professional soldiers disapproved of a weapon developed

and managed by reserve officers and civilians. Professor Haber personally supervised the Ypres attack.

Interv, Hist Off with Gen Porter, 24 Aug 61. 19Liddell Hart, The Real War. pp. 129-30. 20

 Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 36-37. 21

 (1) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 195-96. (2) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg,

pp. 190-93.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 9

and supervise work on both protection and weapons and organized a

chemical laboratory in France. Sir John French, commander-in-chief

in the field, made Lt. Col. Charles H. Foulkes (later promoted to

brigadier) his adviser on gas and gave him the responsibility for gas

offensive operations in the field.22

The availability of weapons dictated the tactics of gas warfare. The

Germans used chlorine cylinders because chlorine was readily available

and because the cylinders provided the best method of placing large

quantities of an agent on a nearby enemy. Toxic fillings in artillery

shells were not immediately effective because of problems of containing

a liquid, corrosive toxic under pressure and because use of liquid fillings

required ballistic re-engineering. Moreover, an artillery shell contained

a relatively small amount of agent. Most of the early German and

British attacks thus took the form of the chlorine cloud of Ypres.23

The first British cloud attack took place at Loos, Belgium, on 25 and

27 September 1915 and involved 6,400 chlorine cylinders on a twentyfive mile front.24

 Since it was impossible to cover so large a front with

the available cylinders, an innovation was introduced—more than

12,000 newly developed smoke candles were deployed to supplement

and simulate the gas cloud and to conceal troops moving forward.

While natural smoke had been used for battlefield concealment for

centuries, this was probably the first use of artificial smoke on a battlefield of a modern war. The tactical employment of artificial smoke

gave the new chemical warfare and gas services another mission.25

The use of cylinders to disperse gas had inherent disadvantages. These

munitions were difficult to transport, hard to emplace, and quick to

expend their filling—they took three to five minutes to empty. Moreover, the success of a cylinder attack depended on the wind direction.

The fact that the prevailing winds in France were westerlies might cast

22

 Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 16-17, 36-41.

23

 (1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 36-48. (2) Wyndham Miles, "Fritz Haber, Father of Chemical Warfare,"

Armed Forces Chemical Journal, XIV (January-February, 1960), 28-30.

24British tactical organization provided a section headed by an officer to handle the cylinders for 250

yards of trench. Ten sections made a company, four of which were authorized by the time of this first

attack. Foulkes, Gas!, p. 57.

25

 (1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 54—66. (2) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg (second edition pages

322-24) credits the first use of smoke to the Germans, but he names neither date nor place, and he indicates that British smoke apparatus were being delivered to the front as early as July 1915. In his third

edition, volume I, pages 619-20, Hanslian credits the English claim, citing Foulkes.
10 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

some doubt on the wisdom of the Germans in introducing the cylinder

method of gas warfare.26

In December 1915, again near Ypres, the Germans introduced a new

war gas, phosgene, a highly toxic commercial gas used in the dye industry. As a matter of fact, the Germans, British, and French had discovered the military effectiveness of phosgene almost simultaneously

during the summer of 1915, but the Germans used it first because they

were in a much better position to produce it in large quantities.27 While

Germany was first to use gas in cloud attacks, the French retaliated with

phosgene-filled artillery shells in February 1916. The first employment

of a nonexplosive artillery shell for gas represented a decided technological breakthrough. The use of explosive shell had resulted in too

great a dispersion of gas, but a shell with only enough explosive to

rupture the container allowed the toxic contents to form a small cloud

at the point of impact. A tremendous bombardment was required to

create a large cloud, and the French possessed the means for firing such a

bombardment in their astonishingly effective 75-mm. gun. French

artillery fire, both the phosgene-filled shells and later Vincennite, a

hydrocyanic gas mixture, was significantly more effective than German

artillery gas fire at the time. A measure of this greater effectiveness was

the statement of a German commander: "In order to reply to the

dangerous gas shells of the French I have only shells which are filled

with 'eau de Cologne'."28

Allied intelligence had predicted the German introduction of phosgene, and the British developed the small box respirator to cope with

this new agent. Air was taken into this mask through a canister filled

with charcoal and soda lime. The wearer inhaled and exhaled through a

rubber tube held in the mouth. The tube was connected to the canister

for fresh air and to a "flutter valve" for exhalation. Nose clips were an

integral part of the rubberized fabric facepiece as were eye lenses. The

mask was uncomfortable and become more so with long wearing, and

the heat of the face on the lenses caused condensation which greatly

26

 (1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 43-44, 48, 64-65, 86-88, 122-26, 176-78, 182-83, 186, 206-09. (2) Fries

and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 390-91. 27Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 72-53. 28

 Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 20—23. The quotation, page 21, is from General von Deimling: "Zur Beantwortung den gefarhlichen Gasgeschosse der Franzosen habe ich legidlich Granaten, die

mit 'Eau de Cologne' gefullt sind."
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 11

interfered with vision.29 The British mask was the best protection available despite its defects. It had replaced gas helmets—porous fabric

hoods impregnated with chemicals to filter gases—which were much

less effective. The French M2 mask which was standard until nearly

the end of the war was a modification of the gas hood wherein a facepiece was attached to the head with straps.30

Full-Scale Gas Warfare

The British gas offensive at Loos, the German introduction of phosgene, and the French employment of phosgene-filled artillery shell

ended the first phase of gas warfare in World War I. The British at Loos

successfully challenged German domination of gas warfare and the

French improved upon the German introduction of phosgene. The

era of emergency improvisations of weapons and protective equipment

and of dependence upon the only readily available commercial toxic,

chlorine, was over. The chlorine cloud attack had been effective when

used with surprise against unprotected troops, but protection against

chlorine had not been difficult to provide and surprise could not be

counted upon since an enemy could be on guard when wind conditions

favored an attack. The remainder of the war was to be characterized

by a fairly equal race between Germans and Allies to discover and employ new methods of protection, new gases, and new methods of conducting attacks. Gas warfare became a series of technical and scientific

battles, with sometimes one set of belligerents ahead and sometimes the

other. Gas warfare, along with the tank and military aircraft, became

part of the World War I revolution in the art of war.

In 1916 the British introduced a new means of projecting gas, the

4-inch Stokes mortar, developed from the 3-inch version of this

weapon, which had been the standard mortar in the British Army. Because of their inability to manufacture gas shells, the British first used

the mortar to fire improvised smokes and incendiaries. The Stokes gas

shell, or bomb, as the British called it, contained six pounds of agent as

compared to three pounds for the British 4.5 -inch heavy howitzer shell.

29

 (1) Ibid., pp. 198-200, 214-18. (2) A number of interviews with World War I veterans confirm

the discomfort and poor vision experienced by wearers of the British mask. Interv files in CMLHO. 30

 (1) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, volume I, pages 195-207, maintains that the German

leather mask, with a filtering canister attached directly to the facepiece, was the best mask of World War

I, but Foulkes, in Gas!, page 119, challenges that claim. (2) Foulkes, Gas!, pages 53, 182, 306, comments on the gas helmets. (3) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pages 201-02, described the French

M2 mask.
12 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Its 1,000-yard range was adequate for situations in which opposing

trenches were not far apart, and its accuracy, while not pinpoint, was

good. Crews were capable, under combat conditions, of firing fifteen

rounds per minute, a rate of fire more rapid than that of the howitzer.31

Still, the Stokes mortar had its limitations.

The British and French had adopted a tactic of gas warfare dependent on overwhelming the enemy with vast quantities of toxics.32

 The

massive cylinder attacks of the British and the artillery barrages of the

French met this requirement. The Stokes mortar also could have met

such requirements for targets less than 1,000 yards distant, but the

number of mortars, shells, and crews necessary was beyond the capacity of the Allies at this time. The need was for a simple inexpensive

projector with a longer range and a larger capacity shell. Such a projector was invented almost by accident.

Capt. William H. Livens, commander of the British Special Brigade

flame projector company, sought to extend both the range over which

incendiary materials could be dispersed and the quantities of materials

which could be employed. He found that a large steel drum buried in

the ground almost up to the open end made a makeshift mortar from

which could be fired a smaller drum filled with oil and cotton waste. He

used black powder as a propellant and guncotton to ignite the oil. The

improvised weapon was capricious and dangerous to its crew, but it was

effective. What was more pleasing to the British was that it turned out

to be equally effective for the projection of toxics. Livens, accordingly,

set about making a more reliable version, one which used a boxed propellant charge detonated electrically and which fired a cylindrical bomb

equipped with a light bursting charge. This Livens projector could

shoot a thin-cased bomb nearly 8 inches in diameter and 20 inches long

and filled with 30 pounds of toxic for a distance of nearly a mile. Range

could be varied by increasing or decreasing the propellant charges; direction was determined by careful placement at the time the weapon

was buried. The weapon was not accurate but it did not have to be:

31

 (1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 182-83. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 20. 32

 (1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 197-98. It is evident throughout Foulkes' work that the massive attack tactic

was adopted early (see Chapter VIII) and was increasingly dominant as the war progressed (see especially

Chapter XVI). (2) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 23—27. The implication in Hanslian's work

is that the Allied tactical concept placed more emphasis on massive gas attack than did the Germans, at

least until the use of projectors became common, but it is difficult to see any great difference between the

tactical concepts of the Allies and those of the Germans.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 13

the simultaneous firing of a 25-projector battery, each projector firing

a 61-pound drum, was ideal for a large area gas barrage.

Emplacing the Livens projector entailed a good deal of work. A

trench had to be dug for each battery, the weapons emplaced, and then

the trenches filled. Once this task was done the projectors could not be

re-aimed. Even considering the amount of work involved, emplacement

of the Livens projectors had certain advantages over the emplacement

of cylinders. While the Livens projectors could usually be dug in some

distance behind the front lines in daylight, cylinder emplacements were

usually made at night because there was no practical means of denying

enemy observation of the forward trenches. Although enemy observation was denied by nighttime emplacement of cylinders, the sound of

digging in positions close to the front provided noisy clues as to the

imminence of a gas attack.

An advantage of the Livens projector, as well as of any means of

projecting gas, was that the warning period was reduced to the few

seconds between the time the projectiles struck and the gas clouds

formed. By way of contrast, the cylinder-bred clouds which billowed

across no-man's-land gave much greater forewarning, although this

might not prove an unqualified disadvantage to the attacker because

the more widespread the alarm the more the enemy might be hampered

by protective devices. Use of cylinders continued but the projector

proved to be a formidable weapon and became a major means of launching gas attacks.

The first combat use of the Livens projector took place on 4 April

1917, the beginning of the battle of Arras. Three thousand projectors

fired nearly 50 tons of phosgene on 31 targets. At the same time 48

Stokes mortars alternately fired phosgene and a new gas, Chloropicrin.

Chloropicrin, which was also used by the French and the Germans,

is a lethal gas and a strong lachrymator, but because of its lightness

and instability it was first used primarily as a means for penetrating

the German protective mask. The battle of Arras also saw the first

employment of a substantial amount of British toxic artillery shell.33

The Arras experience evidently convinced the Germans of the usefulness of the projector for it prompted them to rush into production

their own version of the weapon which was to be first used on the

Italian front during the following October.34

33Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 165—72, 191-92, 202—03, 206-09, 211-13. 34

 Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 24—25, 164—71, 177—82.
14 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

But the immediate German counter to this successful Allied use of

gas was the introduction of two new agents, diphenylchloroarsine35

and dichloroethyl sulfide. The latter, better known as mustard,36 is a

liquid in its natural state, not a gas, although it readily vaporizes.

It is a vesicant, that is, it inflames and burns those parts of the body

with which it comes in contact. This characteristic means that a

mask alone is insufficient protection against the agent. Mustard, persistent in its staying power, clings to clothing and equipment, covers

vegetation, lies in pools in low places.37 The agent is thus particularly

effective in defensive situations or in keeping areas clear of the enemy.

Such a saturation as required for interdiction demanded heavy bombardment—the Germans used more than a million shells containing

about 2,500 tons of gas in the ten days following the introduction of

mustard.38

The implication of Germany's use of mustard was not lost on the

Allies. The American expert, General Fries, termed its introduction

"probably the greatest single development of gas warfare."39 Brigadier

Foulkes declared that with it the enemy had achieved "undoubted

success in the gas war."

 40

 While most mustard victims were incapacitated, not killed, the casualty rate was high and most of these victims

had to be evacuated for treatment. Evacuation of so many soldiers

greatly weakened the Allied line. The Allies immediately wanted to

retaliate in kind, but it was more than a year before the gas could be

manufactured in sufficient quantity. Mustard had been known before

35

 Diphenylchloroarsine was not a gas but a solid, dispersed from artillery shells in a particulate cloud.

The Germans first used it in Flanders in July 1917. Because contemporary masks could filter most

vapors but not solid particles, this agent was often used with lethal phosgene in order to "break" the

masks. 36To the French this agent was known as yperite, after the place of its introduction. The Germans

called it Lost, combining the first two letters of the names of the two chemists who devised its manufacturing process. It was also known as Gelb Kreuz and yellow cross after the marking on German

munitions in which it was contained. 37

 (1) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 26-29; 2d ed, pp. 18-20, 48-55, 56-58. Hanslian

indicates (second edition, page 52) that mustard is effective from twenty-four hours in hot dry

weather to one month or more in cold weather in a location protected from wind. In enclosed areas

such as dugouts and cellars, it is effective for a year or more. (2) Mustard, after heavily soaking into

porous concrete protected from weathering, has been known to cause burns after more than twenty

years. (3) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 150—51, 168-76. 38Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 28-29. 39

 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 150. 40

 Foulkes, Gas!, p. 323.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 15

the German attack, but the Allies had not adopted it because its manufacture presented so many difficulties.41

Gas warfare required not only agents and weapons but also military

organizations to handle the myriad technical and tactical problems of

its employment. The appointment of Colonel Foulkes as gas adviser for

the British Expeditionary Forces and as responsible officer for offensive

gas operations, mentioned earlier, initiated attempts to set up an efficient organization in the British Army. Foulkes' organization, designated the Special Brigade early in 1916, grew from four to twenty-one

companies. Sixteen of the companies were organized in four battalions,

each battalion having four companies assigned to handle gas cloud

attacks; four special companies fired the 4-inch Stokes mortar; and a

separate company operated flame projectors.42

The employment of flame projectors as tactical weapons was a

concept that appealed to the Western Front belligerents, perhaps not

as a key to the deadlock but as a nonetheless valuable device. The Germans had first used a portable apparatus for projecting flaming oil in

June 1915. The French soon developed a similar apparatus, and shortly

thereafter Germans, French, and British each developed small portable,

as well as large, semifixed, projectors. The value of flame at the time

was principally psychological—the fiery spurt of burning oil, the roar

of the flame, and billowing clouds of black smoke had a terrifying effect

on troops in the trenches. But the portable equipment was cumbersome, resupply was difficult, the field of fire was small, and the range

rarely exceeded 30 yards. Furthermore, the operator of the portable

apparatus was easily distinguished and highly vulnerable to small arms

fire. The various semifixed projectors soon developed, with a range of

from 40 to 50 yards and a protected position for the operator in a

trench, were a little better, but the field of fire was still small and the

equipment difficult to install, maintain, and resupply. The flame projector, with all its faults, became a responsibility of the chemical warfare services.43

With the addition of the flame mission, the British chemical warfare

elements had their full quota of missions for World War I—gas, smoke,

and incendiary. The British still had no central organization to handle

41

 (1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 263-66, 323-26. (2) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 29-30.

(3) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 151-52. (4) Liddell Hart, The Real War. p. 340. 42

 Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 94-96. 43

 (1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 49-50, 111-12, 162-65. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 347-52.
16 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

chemical warfare research and development, training, supply, and field

employment and remained without one until mid-1916, when they

formed a new combined organization of offensive and defensive chemical elements in the field and appointed a director of gas services, Brig.

Gen. Henry Thuillier. Although this reorganization made little significant change in the status of Foulkes's Special Brigade, it did create a

co-ordinated chemical arm in the field.44 The French, meanwhile, had

established a centralized organization, the Service Chimique de Guerre,

in September 1915. But the French industrial potential was insufficient

to provide the logistic capability for any significant gas warfare offensive until 1916 and the introduction of toxic artillery shells.45

The Gas Service, AEF

The discussion of Allied chemical organizations, particularly that

of the British, is of special interest from the American point of view

since the overseas chemical warfare contingent of the United States

patterned its organization after the British who trained the contingent.

Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing and the advance elements of the AEF

landed in France in June 1917. The United States was unprepared for

waging chemical warfare even though it had been waged in Europe for

over two years. Research on toxics had begun in the United States only

a few months earlier. The nation had no gas weapons, no toxics, no

military gas organization, and no protective supplies. It did have some

information on gas warfare gathered by War Department observers

with the Allies, notably by Dr. George A. Hulett of Princeton University. Although the War Department had not viewed gas warfare

seriously, Pershing's staff saw an immediate need for action, even

before the first mustard attack, and appointed a board to make recommendations concerning gas warfare.46

The AEF board, which met on 18 June 1917, recommended assigning

an officer to "create and handle" an AEF gas organization and providing him with assistants, funds, and authority.47

 A week later Head44

 Foulkes, Gas!, p. 97. 45

 (1) Lefebure, Riddle of the Rhine, pp. 91-110. (2) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I,

20-21. 46

 Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 1-5. 47

 Memo, Lt Col John McA. Palmer, Chief Opns Sec Hq AEF, for CofS AEF, 30 Jul 17, sub: Gas

and Flame Serv, Offensive and Defensive. A copy of this memo appears as General History, Appendix

2, in History of Chemical Warfare Service, American Expeditionary Forces (unpublished official history).
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 17

quarters, AEF, asked the War Department for such an officer and

soon thereafter temporarily assigned gas offensive responsibilities to the

AEF chief engineer and gas defensive responsibilities to the AEF chief

surgeon. Despite advice from the War Department in July that gas

responsibilities in the United States were apportioned among the Ordnance and Medical Departments and the Corps of Engineers, Lt. Col.

John McA. Palmer and Lt. Col. James R. Church of the AEF staff, in

consultation with Dr. Hulett and Capt. Walter M. Boothby, advanced

a strong case for the organization of gas services in the United States

and France. Church declared that the gas service in the United States

should be subordinate to that in France in matters of policy and equipment. Both officers emphasized the necessity of immediate action,

especially for protection. The commander of the 1st Division, comprising the first Army troops in France, had called for gas masks—his

organization had none at all.48 The timing of the comments by Church

and Palmer suggests that the recent employment of mustard could have

fostered their sense of urgency.

By the middle of August 1917 the AEF had received from the United

States 20,000 gas masks and the news that a gas and flame regiment

had been authorized. No other supplies, officers, or advice were received.

About the same time Lt. Col. Amos A. Fries, Corps of Engineers, arrived in France and was about to be named director of roads when his

orders were changed to make him engineer in charge of gas as well as

Chief of the Gas Service, AEF. Headquarters, AEF, dispatched a cable

to the War Department indicating that, since no further delay was

possible, the appointment had been made. The AEF staff requested that

Fries be designated to command the authorized gas and flame regiment.49

Colonel Fries took up his new duties on 22 August 1917 and left

Paris on the same day to make his own appraisal of the British gas

service in the field and to determine American requirements for gas

organization, protection, and weapons. He learned from the British

that the American masks recently received had failed to afford adequate

protection in British tests, and on 23 August 1917 he accordingly

recommended the adoption of the British small box respirator as the

standard American mask. American troops were also to carry the

48

 (1) Ibid. (2) AEF GO 8, 5 Jul 17- (3) Maj James R. Church, MC, "A Suggested Organization

of the Gas Service of the American Army," 26 Jul 17, apps. 3 and 5 of General History, in History

of CWS AEF. 49

 (1) Memo, H. Taylor, Hq AEF, for CofS AEF, 17 Aug 17, sub: Gas and Flame Service, app. 8,

General History, History of CWS AEF. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 72-75.
18 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

French M2 mask for emergency use in event the British mask was lost

or became no longer wearable.50

Fries returned to Paris on 28 August and completed the draft organization for the AEF gas service. He also drafted the order formally

establishing the AEF Gas Service.51 The AEF order, issued on 3

September 1917, charged the Chief of the Gas Service "with the organization of personnel, the supply of material, and the conduct of the

entire Gas Service both Offensive and Defensive, including instruction."

 52

 At the same time Fries became colonel and titular commander

of the 30th Engineers, Gas and Flame, later the 1st Gas Regiment, then

being organized in the United States under the actual command of

Maj. Earle J. Atkinson.53 Fries's initial problems were many: he needed

officers and men; he needed supplies; he needed to train American

troops; and, in order to help discharge the offensive portion of his mission, he needed to persuade American commanders that gas was a useful

offensive weapon.

In meeting all these needs except that for officers and men he had to

rely on Allied, especially British, help and experience. His own service

he organized into an Offensive Branch and a Defensive Branch. Colonel

Church became chief of the Defensive Branch, and Fries himself assumed the duties of the Offensive Branch. These branches were intended to operate in the field through gas officers assigned to army,

corps, divisions, and regiments, as in the British organizational pattern.

Both branches were to join in the operation of gas schools, the first

two of which Fries and Boothby opened in the Army school at Langres

on 10 October 1917 and within the I Corps Center of Instruction at

Gondrecourt on 15 October 1917. The Offensive Branch was to direct

the operations of gas and flame troops according to the British brigade

pattern. There were then no troops to direct. The first companies of

the 30th Engineers did not arrive in France until February 1918, and

it was not until the summer of 1918 that officers began arriving in

sufficient numbers to staff the gas service.54

50

 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 75-77. 51

 Ibid., p. 76. 52

 AEF GO 31, 3 Sep 17. 53

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Gen Amos A. Fries, USA (Ret.), 4 Aug 55. (2) Historical Division,

Department of the Army, UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR: 1917-1919, vol. 15, Reports

of Commander-in-chief, A. E. F. Staff Sections and Services (Washington, 1948), p. 291 (hereafter

cited as Reports of Commander-in-chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections and Services). 54

 (1) General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 6-12 and apps. 12-15, 18. (2) Fries and West,

Chemical Warfare, pp. 78-79, 93-95.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 19

As indicated above, supply, both offensive and defensive, came mainly

from the British and French. At first, Fries attempted to handle supply

personally through liaison offices established in London and Paris and

through the supply services of the AEF. Maj. Robert W. Crawford, as

Chief of Gas Service supply, soon relieved Fries of supply operating

functions. Crawford found that the Gas Service was automatically

assigned lowest priority by the established supply services who had their

own problems. He accordingly secured direct purchase authority for

the Gas Service and arranged for the Gas Service to handle its own

supply system all the way from requisition or purchase to actual supply

to troops in the field.55

Fries felt that his most difficult problems were to persuade American

commanders to employ gas and to educate troops to take adequate protection against gas. It was necessary for Gas Service officers to "go out

and sell gas to the Army."

 56

 A service which intended to sell its method

of warfare, train the Army in the field, operate its own supply system,

conduct offensive operations with its own troops, and advise on the

conduct of both offensive and defensive operations by other combat

troops clearly required more than a handful of officers and a more

comprehensive organization than the one originally envisioned.

The Gas Service was enlarged to meet the demands of its many responsibilities whenever men and equipment became available. For example, a completely staffed and equipped laboratory arrived in France

early in 1918 and an officers' training camp was organized in France

later in the year.57 The provision of a laboratory had been one of the

projects of the Office of Gas Service since the time of its organization

in the United States in October 1917.58 The increasing demands on the

service resulted in the reorganization of Fries's immediate office in

March 1918 to combine offense and defense into a Military Division

and to establish a Technical and a Production and Supply Division.

In May the Military Division was again separated into Offense and

Defense Divisions. Finally, in June, the Gas Service in the United

States was converted into the Chemical Warfare Service, National

Army. The Gas Service, AEF, became the CWS AEF, officially the

55

 (1) General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 12-14. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare,

pp. 76-79.

56

 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 90. 57 (1) General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 18-19. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare,

p. 88. 58

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 9-13.
CHART 1—ORGANIZATION, CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE, AMERICAN

EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, 13 JULY 1918

Staff and Technical Channel

NOTE: Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, a member of the staff of the Commander in Chief, reported to the Commanding General, SOS, in marten of

procurement, supply, transportation, and construction. GHQ AEF GO 31, 16 Feb 18.

Source: Adapted from: Plate VII, General History, History, CWS, AEF.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 21

Overseas Division, CWS, and Fries, now chief of CWS AEF, was promoted to brigadier general.59

 The final CWS AEF organization which

was prepared at that time included six divisions, and the duties of these

divisions are evidence of the scope of gas warfare activities in the final

year of the war. (Chart 1)

The Offense and Defense Divisions within the Office of the Chief,

CWS AEF, exercised staff supervision over tactical gas warfare activities,, evaluated combat experience, planned the employment of gas and

flame units, and suggested changes in gas warfare tactics and techniques

for all combat elements through army, corps, and division gas officers.

These "military" divisions co-operated with the Technical Division

in supervising the AEF Gas School and the army and corps gas schools.

The Defense Division was also charged with the issue of defensive

equipment and therefore supervised the CWS Services of Supply (SOS)

troops immediately involved in combat supply support and training.60

The Technical Division, in addition to controlling the AEF Gas School,

directly operated chemical and medical laboratories and a gas research

experimental station. The Office of the Medical Director, with divisional status, translated Technical Division findings into procedures for

the care of gas casualties and co-operated with the Medical Corps in the

development of treatment equipment and the application of care procedures. The Intelligence Division collected chemical warfare intelligence material for the use of the operating divisions and served as a

clearinghouse for all CWS reports and requests for information. While

the "military" divisions and the other divisions supporting them were

mainly oriented toward combat operations, the remaining division,

Production and Supply, was the element charged with those functions

most clearly associated with the basic, logistics-oriented SOS mission.

The organizational relationship of the CWS AEF to the SOS therefore

largely depended upon the functions of the Production and Supply

Division. Branches of this division computed chemical materiel requirements, procured munitions and equipment, supervised manufacturing

plants in England and France, directed field salvage of chemical materials, and controlled four CWS SOS depots, chemical sections in six

59

 (1) General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 25, 29-32. (2) WD GO 62, 28 Jun 18. 60General Pershing, in February 1918, had organized the Services of Supply under Maj. Gen. James

G. Harbord, formerly his chief of staff, as a major AEF command charged with co-ordinating all the

supply services and all AEF supply functions.
22 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ports of debarkation, and chemical sections of several field army

depots.61

Fries's own office, after the establishment of the SOS command, was

located in SOS headquarters at Tours, but Fries continued to report

to General Pershing's General Headquarters (GHQ), AEF. Most CWS

administrative matters, except those directly relating to SOS, were

handled through GHQ with the assistance of a CWS representative

stationed at that headquarters. Fries handled detailed administrative

work, including the assignment of CWS officers throughout the AEF,

through his own administrative staff which included an adjutant, a

personnel officer, and representatives in the AEF Liaison Service in

London and Paris. Fries, by the time of the armistice, immediately

supervised more than 150 officers. More than half of these officers were

assigned to CWS staff and liaison duties while the remainder carried on

laboratory and training work. Approximately another 30 officers directly supervised CWS SOS field operations. While Fries deferred to

field commanders in their supervision of tactical chemical operations,

he could exert considerable pressure on tactical planning officers because of his direct control of 168 field army, corps, and division gas

officers. These gas officers reported to and advised their organization

commanders according to the accepted staff pattern. The Chief, CWS

AEF, was empowered to and did require detailed reports of offensive

and defensive chemical operations. His "military" divisions presented

their summaries and analyses of these reports in a weekly bulletin to

organization gas officers. The bulletins contained criticisms of past

chemical operations and suggestions for improvement. Gas officers on

regimental and battalion staffs, as well as noncommissioned officers, were

not members of the CWS; they were chosen by unit commanders from

the unit complement. Yet, Fries could exercise some measure of control

over these officers inasmuch as AEF orders specified that they be trained

at CWS schools and that they be given gas warfare work as their principal duty.62

Another change which took place with the formation of the Chemical Warfare Service in the National Army was the redesignation of the

61

 General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 29-33, 38-41, 53-58. 62

 (1) General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 24-25, 55-56. (2) AEF GO 79, 17 May 18,

and GO 107, 2 Jul 18. Apps. 47 and 48 to General History of CWS AEF. (3) Commissioned

Pers of the CWS AEF, November 11, 1918, in History of CWS AEF. (4) Comments on draft of this

volume, Brig Gen Hugh W. Rowan, USA (Ret.), 16 Dec 60.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 23

30th Engineers, Gas and Flame, as the 1st Gas Regiment, CWS. This

organization had been gradually growing as the war progressed, and by

the time of the armistice it comprised 4 battalions with a total of 6

American companies and 4 attached British companies. Three platoons

of each company fired projectors, and the fourth fired Stokes mortars.

The authorized goal of one gas regiment for each field army was not

achieved by the time the war ended.63

The extent of Fries's control over CWS activities in World War I is

important since some CWS officers subsequently viewed Fries's authority as setting a precedent for the authority of principal CWS officers in World War II. The nature of Fries's position is also important

because it was one of the factors in determining general and special

staff relationships and duties. The U.S. Army had not employed the

general and special staff concepts in war before World War I. AEF

experience played a part in molding these concepts as they emerged in

the period between the wars. General Pershing kept a tight rein on all

elements of the AEF organization, and he apparently expected all his

staff officers, including his Chief, CWS, to act as extensions of his own

person throughout his organization.64 Thus, Fries dealt with gas warfare matters while cloaked with his commander's rank and authority.

The extent of his control is illustrated by the fact that Fries on one

occasion relieved a division chemical officer.65 Fries clearly believed in

the necessity for maintaining a field chemical warfare organization

broad enough to link research in chemical weapons and protection by

"the closest possible ties to the firing line." He felt that he had established a strong, well co-ordinated service in the AEF which encompassed research, development, manufacturing and supply, tactical employment of chemicals, and employment of chemical weapons by

chemical troops in the field. "The success of the CWS in the field and at

home," he wrote, "was due to this complete organization."

 66

The organizational maturity achieved in the AEF quite early in the

war unhappily was not paralleled within the military structure in the

63

 (1) James T. Addison, The Story of the first Gas Regiment (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919),

pp. 256-58. (2) Three regiments and a total of fifty-four companies had been authorized in September

1918, but most of these had not been activated. Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 94. 64

 Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff (Washington: Infantry

Journal Press, 1946), pp. 245-300. 65

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Rowan, 26 Sep 58. General Rowan was an assistant division gas officer

and later division gas officer under Fries. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Gen Alden H. Waitt, USA

(Ret.), 13 May 61. 66

 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 73.
24 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

United States. Unprepared for gas warfare when the United States

entered the war in April 1917, the War Department divided responsibility for this new form of warfare among five different agencies, one

of which was a civilian bureau.67

It is not strange that the people responsible for the battlefield employment of chemical warfare were stanch and vocal pleaders for a

more rational chemical organization in the War Department. Fries's

dealings with the Hydra-headed, un-co-ordinated chemical warfare

complex in Washington led to repeated requests for organizational

improvements which would ease his labors. In making these requests,

Fries had the full support of General Pershing.

As indicated earlier, the War Department set up a co-ordinating

agency known as the Office of Gas Service in October 1917. This clearinghouse for chemical matters consisted of a director and representatives from the Ordnance and Medical Departments and from the

Chemical Service Section of the National Army—a section established

at the same time as the Gas Service with a principal mission of providing

the AEF with a chemical laboratory. In February 1918 the Chemical

Warfare Service and the Gas Division were joined in a move that failed

to provide the administrative centralization and the prestige that could

only come from the formation of an independent gas corps. This final

step was taken on 28 June 1918 with the creation of the Chemical

Warfare Service, National Army, with Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert as

director.

The CWS Between the Wars

Defining the Role and Responsibilities

When General Fries returned from France after World War I he

applied all of his considerable vigor to the establishment of the Chemical

Warfare Service as a permanent part of the Regular Army. In July

1919 Congress had given the CWS a year's reprieve, and, in 1920, after

debate in which the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, the Chief

of Staff, General Peyton C. March, and General Pershing registered

67The organizations and their responsibilities were: (1) Bureau of Mines: research on chemical agents;

(2) Medical Department: the provision of defensive equipment; (3) Ordnance Department: manufacture and filling of gas shells; (4) Corps of Engineers: the formation and training of gas and flame

units; and (5) Signal Corps: the provision of gas alarms. The organizational difficulties are fully

discussed in the first chapter of Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 25

dissent, the Congress of the United States amended the National Defense Act of 1916 so as to make the CWS a permanent part of the

Military Establishment. The new service received the functions of development, procurement, and supply of all toxic, smoke, incendiary,

and gas defensive materials, the training of the Army in chemical warfare, and the "organization, equipment, training and operation of

special gas troops."

 68

The dissent of people as influential as Baker, Pershing, and March

should have augured ill for the newly formed Chemical Warfare Service. The fact is that the period of the 1920's and 1930's was a difficult

one for the Army establishment in general and the Chemical Warfare

Service in particular. Reasons for this are not hard to find. This period

between the world wars was one of disillusionment, disarmament, and

depression. A nation, indeed a world, appalled by the costs of the recent conflict, looked for ways to prevent such a holocaust from recurring. The Washington conference of 1921 tried to limit the types

of armament civilized nations might use in warfare, and four years

later the Geneva conference on the regulation of arms traffic looked

toward the same end. Both conferences drew up conventions outlawing gas warfare. The Washington treaty failed by one to achieve the

required unanimous agreement of the five participating powers.69 The

Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 did receive the support of over forty

nations and thus became the most influential statement regarding gas

warfare in the body of international law. The United States and Japan

were the two major powers that did not ratify this protocol.

Nonetheless, the War Department General Staff took a defensive

position toward gas warfare throughout most of this period—defensive

both in the attitude with which it approached the subject and in the

type of warfare upon which it concentrated. In 1922 it suspended

work on toxic agents and restricted other CWS efforts to defensive

measures. Although this restrained approach was frequently reaffirmed

in the 1920's and 1930's, modifications in the War Department prohibition of research on toxic gases allowed some work in this field—one

had to know the offensive potential of an agent in order to defend

against it.

68

 (1) Public Law 242, 66th Congress, sec. 122. Reproduced in WD Bulletin 25, 9 June 1920, the

source of the above quotation. (2) See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 11—17. 69

 The dissenter was France, which objected to the antisubmarine provision in the convention, not

to the one against gas.
26 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

In addition to these handicaps, the new service faced another rather

unpleasant situation. It would seem that the large majority of the

people who had faith in gas as a viable system, capable of contributing

to success in battle, was centered in the Chemical Warfare Service.

There was little support for it within the combat arms. AEF commanders did not properly utilize chemical warfare in World War I, and

it is quite probable they later looked upon it with skepticism. Many

felt it would be an encumbrance added to the battlefield, not merely

in the increased logistical support it would entail but in the burdens it

would place on the infantryman and in the difficulties of decontamination it would involve. If it were successfully used by both combatants

it would be something akin to two fighters, each with one arm tied

behind his back. And why fight under such handicaps?

The Chemical Warfare Service set about accomplishing its rather restricted mission with meager resources of men and money. These

restrictions lasted throughout the depression, but by 1939 the war in

Europe and subsequent reaction in the United States brought about

a definite change. The annual Congressional appropriation for the

CWS from 1927 to 1935 came to about one and a quarter million dollars. In 1939 it was almost 3 million dollars, in 1941 it was 60 million,

and in 1942 it was over a billion. Manpower was a similar story. In

1933 the CWS had an actual strength of 77 officers and 413 enlisted

men; in 1940 the numbers were 93 and 1,035; in 1941, 833 and 5,059;

and the peak in 1943, 8,103 and 61,688. Civilian employees ranged

from 742 in 1931 to a peak of 29,000 in 1943.70 The uneasy situation in Europe also helped modify the restrictions

imposed upon the CWS. Two years before the outbreak of war the

service began work on a mustard gas shell filling plant at Edgewood

Arsenal, Md.

In the process of CWS expansion gray areas of mission responsibility

were clearly defined, much of this work done under the direction of Maj.

Gen. William N. Porter who became Chief, Chemical Warfare Service,

in May 1941. This effort to define responsibilities resulted in expanded

duties for the CWS, for example, development of a high explosive shell

for the 4.2-inch mortar and the acquisition of complete responsibility

for the incendiary bomb program. In 1941 the War Department gave

the CWS the mission of biological warfare research.

70

 For complete statistics, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 25-27.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 27

GENERAL PORTER

Many of the 93 Regular Army officers in the CWS in 1940 had served

under and been tutored by Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries. Many of them

believed as strongly as he did in the military efficacy of gas, and they

looked upon themselves as custodians of one of the most awesome weapons to come out of World War I. They considered the CWS unique

among the services because it had a legal operational function such as

only the combat arms had. True, the Corps of Engineers and the Signal

Corps had combat roles, but neither had its own weapons which its

own troops would employ in combat. There were also dissenters in

the ranks of the CWS who felt that Porter and some of their fellow

officers overemphasized the uniqueness of the CWS and the extent

of its probable contribution to the next war. In countering these dissenters, and they were probably in the minority, the advocates of gas

warfare could point out that gas appeared to be the ideal weapon for
28 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

aerial bombardment. General Porter, as chemical instructor at the

Army Air Corps Tactical School 1933-37, had in co-operation with Air

Corps tacticians successfully evolved a tactical system for aerial bombardment which was well received by many Air Corps officers.71

 Some

CWS officers felt that a prediction made in 1920 was about to come

true: "gas and military aeronautics will play the principal parts in the

next war, which will be literally finished in the chemical laboratory."

 72

While military aviation became important soon after the 1939 outbreak of World War II in Europe, gas warfare, to the surprise of many

observers, was not initiated. Great Britain, on 3 September 1939, the

day of her declaration of war, sought assurances from the belligerents

that they would observe the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use

of gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland, and Japan replied that the protocol would be

observed.73 Gas was therefore not used, and Japan, in accordance with

her assurance to Great Britain that the Geneva Protocol would be observed, did not use gas in the Pearl Harbor attack which brought the

United States into the war. Six months later, on 5 June 1942, the

President of the United States threatened the initiation of gas warfare,

but only in retaliation against Japan in the event that that nation used

gas upon China.74 Since the President's statement was accepted as

national policy, it began to appear that gas warfare might not be employed unless Germany or Japan initiated it. The possibility of enemy

initiation demanded that the United States take protective measures

and that it prepare for offensive retaliation, but the preparedness

mandate lacked force and precision.75 While these events determining

the role of chemical warfare in international policy were taking place,

the War Department was shaping the role the services were to play in

possible future overseas operations. War Department planners built

their concepts of mobilization organization around a combined field

and theater of operations headquarters designated, as the AEF headquarters had been, General Headquarters. Under the GHQ plan, when

71 (1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. Waitt was Porter's successor as

instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School. (3) Interv, Hist Off with Col John C. MacArthur, USA

(Ret.), 19 Sep 61. (4) Interv, Hist Off with Col Augustin M. Prentiss, Jr., USAF (Ret.), 25 Oct 61. 72Edward S. Farrow, Gas Warfare (New York: Dutton, 1920), p. vii. 73

 Dale Birdsell, The Department of State and the Gas Warfare Question (unpublished Monograph

in CMLHO), p. 1. 74

 For additional information on the President's statement, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for

War, pp. 63-64. 75

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 59-67.
CHART 2—SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION OF OFFICES OF CHEMICAL OFFICERS

THEATER OF OPERATIONS

OFFICE OF CHEMICAL OFFICER, THEATER OF OPERATIONS
30 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

war came the Chief of Staff or the ranking War Department officer

designated by the President was to assume command of GHQ, assemble

and train troops, and move them into a theater of operations for combat. The GHQ commander would then convert his headquarters into

a theater headquarters, or he would designate a theater commander

who would organize a theater headquarters. Representatives of the War

Department administrative and supply services were to form a special

staff for the GHQ and theater commander, and the senior representative

of each service was to be the theater chief of his service.76

The War Department-approved CWS field operations manual provided that the theater chief chemical officer, "a general officer of the

Chemical Warfare Service," would organize and administer his own

service and would exercise "technical control" over CWS activities

through subordinate service and combat chemical officers. (Chart 2)

So far these provisions recapitulated World War I experience, but thereafter the emphasis changed to stress the role of the theater chief chemical

officer as a representative of the War Department Chief, CWS. The

manual indicated that the CWS organization in the United States would

plan theater materiel requirements, set initial stockages and issues, determine the extent of theater materiel procurement, prescribe the movement, supply, and training of officers and troops, specify utilization of

civilian labor, approve interservice agreements, and fund theater financial transactions.77

 The GHQ CWS was to be much more closely tied to

the War Department CWS than the CWS AEF had been. This closer tie

was a direct outgrowth of Fries's idea of a broad-scope, co-ordinated

service which he had helped make possible by having a clause inserted

in the National Defense Act of 1920 assigning the responsibility for the

supervision and operation of chemical troops to the Chief, CWS.78

The Administrative System

When the United States entered World War II, the prewar plans

had to be adapted to a multitheater war and previously unexpected

demands for a strongly centralized Army command in Washington.

(Map 1) The GHQ concept was abandoned and a "Washington Com76

 (1) Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), pp. 2, 295-96. (2) WD FM 100-10, 9 Dec 40. 77WD FM 3-15, 17 Feb 41. 78Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61.

32 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

mand Post" was created within the General Staff, and through this post

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, exercised command of the

worldwide activities of the Army. At the same time, in March 1942,

the President and General Marshall delegated the zone of interior (ZI)

operating functions of the War Department to three major commands,

one each for ground, air, and service.79 Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell,

the service commander, brought the reluctant technical services, including the CWS, under the jurisdiction of his Services of Supply

(SOS), later Army Service Forces (ASF). Somervell interposed his

headquarters organization between the CWS and other operating elements. Thus, while chemical sections were created in the ground and

air forces commands, the formal route of communication for the Chief,

CWS, was through Somervell's organization. The question almost immediately arose of forming theater organizations.80

There was little chance, in view of the subordination of the services

to ASF and considering the command and staff doctrines which had

reached formal statement in the period between the wars, that the

Chief, CWS, would have any control within overseas organizations.81

But there were still those Fries-trained officers who were unaware of or

prepared to disavow the extent of ASF control. These officers also believed that should command and staff doctrines be so interpreted as to

subordinate the CWS in overseas organizations, those overseas organizations would be forced to accommodate themselves to the unique character of the CWS by delegating extraordinary controls and channels

to their service.82 These officers felt that, as an absolute minimum, the

Chemical Warfare Service would control gas warfare planning and

chemical supply at all echelons from development in the United States

to expenditure on the overseas firing line. The new War Department

reorganization and the new doctrines were to lead to the establishment

of procedures that were not in accord with CWS convictions.

79

 Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), chs. VI, VII. 80

 John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service forces, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), chs. II and XII. 81

 Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. 82

 Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. General Waitt, postwar Chief, U.S. Army Chemical Corps, successor

to the CWS, counts himself among the Fries-trained officers who strongly believed in the necessity for

a unitary CWS organization.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 33

The Logistics System

The global logistics system of the United States was oriented to an

"impetus from the rear" pattern.83 Global warfare and the role of the

United States as the principal arsenal of the United Nations made it

impractical from a War Department point of view for the World War

II logistic impetus to come from the theater commander as it had often

come from the theater commander in World War I. Accordingly, the

Chief of Staff, or, more specifically, his right arm, Operations Division

(OPD), War Department General Staff (WDGS), was the principal

logistics authority, the allocator of resources, of the World War II

Army. OPD served as the Army logistics policy arbiter whose duties

included approving requirements, priorities, and plans, acting as intermediary between the theaters and the forces in the United States, and

setting up the formulas and objectives of logistics operations. The

Services of Supply supervised all phases of the logistics operations in the

United States and served as the principal troubleshooter on theater

logistics problems. OPD and other WDGS elements often referred such

problems to ASF. The continental technical services, each in its own

field, were responsible for the basic computation of requirements and

for the provision of materiel. In the Chemical Warfare Service,

troubleshooting, both formal and informal, on overseas problems was

the province of Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, Assistant Chief, CWS, for

Field Operations.84

The operational focus of overseas supply was the port of embarkation.

Each major port was responsible for a theater or theaters of operations,

processing theater requisitions, or its automatic supply, requesting materiel from the technical services, and actually shipping approved allowances. The responsibilities of the continental technical services

ended at the port; the port of embarkation was in charge until cargo

cleared the harbor. Technically, the theater became accountable for

shipments at sea, but the physical responsibilities of the theater organi83

 The following comments on the nature of the logistics system and theory of supply are derived

from: (1) Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-45,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), chs. IX, XIII; (2) Cline,

Washington Command Post, chs. I, VII, XIV; (3) Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, 30

November 1945, compiled under the direction of Cresswell G. Blakeney, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4,

ch. II. 84

 (1) For discussion of requirements computation, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory

to Field, ch. XII. (2) For organization and functions of the Office of the Assistant Chief, CWS, for

Operations, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. V.
34 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

zation began at the port of debarkation.85 The War Department governed supply activities of the ports of embarkation and, theoretically

at least, those of the theaters of operations through a War Department

provision which specified procedures for computing requirements, requisitioning, and effecting supply.86

 The War Department system thus

ordained clearly precluded any unitary control by any technical service, but even had the system permitted such control, the CWS would

have been poorly prepared to take advantage of the opportunity.

CWS resources available at the outbreak of war for the evolving

global logistics system were slim indeed. Actual CWS supplies in potential overseas bases in the month of Pearl Harbor included 12 major

items for gas warfare protection and decontamination and 5 major

offensive munitions. In all, the overseas departments stocked 28 items

from an active supply list of 34 in limited normal maintenance stocks

or war reserves. The most important single item of antigas protective

equipment, the service gas mask, in late 1941 was stocked overseas in

quantities totaling 281,207.87 For offensive use in the event of necessity,

the CWS and the Ordnance Department in 1941 in the overseas departments stored 242 tons of bulk persistent gases, 259 tons of nonpersistent gases, a small quantity of toxic-filled artillery shell, and a

small quantity of toxic-filled 4.2-inch chemical mortar shell. Even

in an emergency, combat delivery of toxics on the enemy would have

been only by air or artillery. The CWS lacked standard weapons to

project toxics except for the 4.2-inch chemical mortar which was

stocked in sufficient quantity to equip a battalion in Hawaii, a platoon

in Panama, and a company in the United States.88 Consequently, despite phenomenally accelerated CWS materiel production in the United

States, the first large-scale wartime CWS logistics experience overseas,

85

 For a discussion of CWS continental distribution, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory

to Field, ch. XVI. 86

 WD Memo W-700-8-42, 10 Oct 42, sub: Sup of Overseas Depts, Theatres, and Separate Bases. 87

 Stockages in the United States were likewise extremely limited. For example, the total mask

stockage, including that in the continental United States, in late 1941, was 2,855,500, an amount

almost a million less than the war-end stockage of the lightweight service mask in the European

Theater of Operations alone. 88

 (1) Weekly Rpt for CofS, CWS Munitions on Hand as of 12 Dec 41, dated 20 Dec 41. CWS

319.1/2249. (2) CWS Materiel Status Rpt for Overseas Theaters, Mar 45, cited in Ben Baldwin,

Alfred J. Bingham, and Paul W. Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Operations,

CMLHO draft MS. (3) Memo, Lt Col Charles C. Herrick, WPD, to Chief Opns Gp WPD, 10 Feb 42,

sub: Use of Toxic Gases. WPD 165-23, in OPD 165-10 through 165-24.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 35

in North Africa, involved at the outset no offensive materials and only

one new piece of equipment, the mechanical smoke generator.

The administrative arrangements of the CWS and the War Department were to be tested earlier than the logistic procedures. Before

United States entry into World War II, the CWS had staff officers and

units in the Philippine and Hawaiian Departments, and a CWS officer

was on duty as assistant military attache in London. These overseas

CWS elements played a role in the military events following the Pearl

Harbor attack, and a CWS section was established in Australia when

the first American troops reached that continent. But the first War

Department effort to establish a theater

 89

 headquarters in its own image

took place in England. This theater, which was to become the European Theater of Operations (ETO), represented the largest overseas

undertaking of the Army in terms of men and materials during World

War II. In the European theater, perhaps more extensively than in

other theaters, those CWS officers who believed in a unique and unitary

service first tried and then modified their administrative concepts.

89

 The term theater is used in this volume to indicate any overseas area of operations of the United

States Army. It is also used to mean the principal United States headquarters in the area under consideration.
CHAPTER II

The CWS in the European Theater

Planning and Organization: 1940-43

Erecting the Framework for an Overseas Command

CWS officers in the United States followed the initiation of World

War II in Europe with keen interest as a chance to test predictions that

gas would become a major weapon of the war. There was no indication

that gas was used in Hitler's attack on Poland, but the British Government had begun issuing gas masks to military and civilians alike even

before the declaration of war. Lt. Col. Charles E. Loucks, CWS, in

June 1940 arrived in France to fill the position of assistant military attache in the American Embassy and to serve as CWS observer. With

the fall of France shortly thereafter, Loucks was transferred to England

in the same capacity. The most interesting development early in the

European war from the CWS point of view was the German incendiary

bombing of England. Loucks reported extensively on bomb types and

effects of bombing.1

Loucks did not become a member of the American Special Observer

Group (SPOBS), which was organized in England prior to the United

States entry into the war, but in February 1942 his successor as military

attache, Col. Carl L. Marriott, was also designated Chemical Officer,

United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), the first

official American command in Europe, in fact a redesignation of

SPOBS.2 Marriott thus assumed the duties of reporting, still principally

1

 CMLHO Biographical Sketches: Maj Gen Charles E. Loucks. 2 ( 1 ) CMLHO Biographical Sketches: Col Carl L. Marriott. (2) [Henry G. Elliott] MS, The

Predecessor Commands, SPOBS and USAFBI, pt. I of The Administrative and Logistical History of the

PTO, Hist Div USFET, 1946, p. 239, OCMH.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 37

reporting on incendiary bombings, and he began to oversee the chemical

warfare protection and training of American troops. Lt. Col. Lewis

F. Acker established a chemical section in the headquarters of U.S.

Army V Corps, the first U.S. ground forces organization to arrive in

the British Isles.3

On 2 May 1942 Colonel Marriott was forced by ill health to return

to the United States, and Col. Charles S. Shadle assumed the dual role.

By the time of Shadle's appointment, the duties of Chemical Officer,

USAFBI, were demanding full time: there was not only the necessity

of seeing to the equipment and training of increasing numbers of

American troops but also the requirement for participating in and

initiating administrative, supply, and operational planning for what

was clearly to become a major overseas command. At that time, a little

more than a month before the President's first pronouncement on gas

warfare, neither national nor international policy on gas warfare was

clear. CWS officers always assumed, in absence of definite information

to the contrary, that their first duty was to make as many defensive and

offensive gas warfare preparations as possible. In June Col. J. Enrique

Zanetti, CWS incendiary expert and World War I liaison officer on

Fries's staff, arrived to relieve Shadle of the attache position.4 Also in

June Col. Crawford M. Kellogg, six officers, and nine enlisted men of

the Chemical Section, Eighth Air Force, arrived in England. The Eighth

Air Force Chemical Section had been activated along with the Eighth

Air Force headquarters at Boiling Field in April.5

While the chemical sections in the British Isles were organizing and

embarking on their planning and supply duties, other organizational

developments were taking place in the United States. The President and

his military advisers in consultation with the British had decided to

establish a theater of operations headquarters in England. A manual

describing theater headquarters organization existed, but the manual

had been written before the War Department reorganization into

three commands with the attendant revision of organizational policy.

Furthermore, United Nations strategists had not yet decided upon

launching a ground offensive, so that the first mission of the American

3

Interv, Hist Off with Col Lewis F. Acker, USAR (Ret.), 9 Jun 61. 4

 (1) CMLHO Biographical Sketches: Brig Gen Charles S. Shadle. (2) MS, CWS History, Hq SOS

ETO (hereafter cited as CWS SOS History), n.d. (3) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. 5

History of the Cml Sec Eighth AF VIII AFSC for the Period 21 Apr 42 to 31 Dec 42 (hereafter

cited as History, Cml Sec Eighth AF). CWS 314.7 Eighth AF.
38 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

theater headquarters would be co-operation with the British and supervision of a materiel build-up in anticipation of a combined assault upon

the European continent at some future date. The second mission

would be the support of Eighth Air Force operations and the support

of ground and service troop training and equipment. Emphasis upon

logistics organization was clearly indicated. The War Department

tricommand organization was not prescribed for a theater in the regulations which antedated this organization, but neither was it proscribed.

General Marshall set about organizing a tripartite theater command,

and, since the air element in the form of Eighth Air Force already

existed and the ground element would not be important for the time

being, he concentrated on that service element. Generals Marshall and

Somervell picked Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee to be the European theater

SOS commander. They oversaw the organization of Lee's headquarters

in the United States, and they instructed Lee on Marshall's desires concerning theater organization.6

Marshall's, Somervell's, and Lee's organization and organizational

concepts proved important to the CWS. The manual provided that a

theater chief chemical officer would restrict himself and his immediate

staff to the formulation of broad policy. He would operate his service

through technical control of subordinates. Subordinates for combat

matters, as in the CWS AEF, were to be army, corps, and division

chemical officers. Subordinates for service and supply matters were

to be on the staffs of the communications zone, regulating station, and

advance, intermediate, and base section commanders.7 (Chart 3) With

such decentralization of operations, the immediate office of the theater

chief chemical officer was to have only one operating division for research, development, and intelligence and a small staff. General Fries,

working under a highly centralized policy, had needed a large staff and

six operating divisions. The problem in the case of the European theater

organization was that neither the World War I type of organization

nor the manual organization seemed to apply.

General Somervell's ASF instructed the chiefs of the services in the

United States to provide top-quality officers to join Lee's staff before it

6

 Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume 1, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 31-38. 7

 (1) WD FM 3-15, 17 Feb 41. (2) WD FM 100-10, 9 Dec 40. (3) WD FM 3-5, 20 Jul 42.

Previously published in draft, 1 June 1942, and in an unnumbered WD series as Chemical Warfare

Service Field Manual, Volume I, Tactics and Technique, 1 August 1938.
CHART 3—PLANNED DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF AND SERVICE AGENCIES, CHEMICAL

WARFARE SERVICE, THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Source: Adopted From: FM 3-15, 17 Feb 41 and C2, 6 May 43.
40 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

left to go overseas. General Porter, under the assumption that he was

appointing a theater chief chemical officer, chose Col. Edward Montgomery, one of the four Regular Army colonels in the appropriate age

group within the CWS, to head the group. Montgomery's deputy, Col.

Lowell A. Elliott, and three of his division chiefs, Cols. Hugh W.

Rowan, John C. MacArthur, and Edwin C. Maling, were top-ranking

Regular Army lieutenant colonels then recently promoted to temporary colonel. These officers, several junior officers, and a number of

enlisted men joined Lee's headquarters at Indiantown Gap Military

Reservation to await transportation to England.8

General Lee and a small advance echelon of his headquarters arrived

in London on 24 May 1942 and immediately set to work activating the

SOS USAFBI. Lee just as immediately ran into a storm. The USAFBI

staff was adamantly opposed to Lee's planned subordination of the

theater service chiefs to the SOS commander since that subordination

implied exactly what the War Department intended—SOS control of

theater service and supply policy. After much discussion and reviewing

of directives, the first of many compromises on theater organization

was reached in June closely following the redesignation of USAFBI as

the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA).

In this compromise the chemical warfare and ten other theater special

staff sections were given over to the control of Lee's SOS while retaining their titles as theater special staff sections. Colonel Montgomery, who arrived in June, was designated chief chemical warfare

officer and a member of the theater special staff. The SOS headquarters

and the offices of the theater service chiefs were moved from London

ninety miles to Cheltenham. The theater headquarters, now commanded by Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, remained in London.

Shadle was named CWS representative at Headquarters, ETOUSA,

and given two officer assistants. Shadle's position, reminiscent of the

position of CWS AEF representative at GHQ, was established in accordance with the basic theater organizational directive which provided for a service representative when the theater chief of service was

not located at theater headquarters.9

Still, from the CWS point of view, the situation was not a happy one.

If Montgomery was to be represented in, rather than resident in, theater

8

 (1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) CWS SOS History. 9

 (1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 37-39. (2) CWS SOS History.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 41

headquarters, the CWS preparedness and advisory mission could only

be properly performed if he had a large, strong operational staff such as

Fries had had at Tours. The prospects of getting such a staff at Cheltenham were dim since Cheltenham was intended to be a service and supply

headquarters only. Montgomery consequently spent much of his time

in the London echelon of SOS while Elliott proceeded to Cheltenham in

the dual role of deputy and temporary chief of the Supply Division. In

Cheltenham, Capt. Warren S. LeRoy, Acting Chief, Storage and Issue

Section, Supply Division, at once resumed work on storage and issue

procedures for chemical supplies which he and the OCCWS (Office of

the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service) staff had begun in the United

States. Maj. Maurice H. Wright activated the Procurement Section,

Supply Division, while Maj. John J. Hayes set up a Requirements Division. Rowan and MacArthur reported to Cheltenham early in July.

Rowan set up the Technical Division while MacArthur established the

Operations and Training Division, but for several weeks both officers

were confined to planning and background work since their activities

were inappropriate to the work of the Cheltenham command and since

they had no assistants and very little equipment.10

By the end of July Montgomery was able to bring about some improvement in the maladjusted organizational distribution. He secured

the transfer of Rowan's Technical Division and Wright's Procurement

Section to the London echelon of SOS. The Technical Division was

charged with liaison concerning all technical matters both with the

British and with headquarters other than the SOS, and Wright was

given the additional duty of liaison with the British on lend-lease matters. In both cases, location in Cheltenham would have greatly complicated communications and the discharge of normal functions.11

Rowan set up his London office at the end of the first week in August

with two officer assistants. Wright was allotted one assistant. Approximately two weeks later Shadle was designated Chief Chemical Officer,

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), a position at least in theory

superior to that of theater chemical officer. AFHQ, a combined supreme headquarters, was preparing for the North African invasion.

10

 (1) CWS SOS History. (2) Personal Ltr, Col Rowan to Col William C. Kabrich, Chief, Tech

Serv OCCWS, 8 Sep 42. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO. Unless otherwise noted, all personal letters

relating to the European theater cited hereafter are from this file (see Bibliographical Note). (3)

Comments on draft of this volume, Col Lowell A. Elliott, USA (Ret.), 16 Jan 61. 11

 Personal Ltr cited in n. 10 (2), above.
42 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MacArthur moved in as his replacement and took over supervision

of the chemical warfare exercises for which planning, in co-ordination

with British chemical warfare authorities, was virtually complete.

Since MacArthur was Montgomery's planning officer and his training

policy chief, MacArthur's move to London completed the physical

transfer of all chemical warfare policy, technical, advisory, and liaison

functions to theater headquarters while organizationally all but MacArthur remained in the SOS.12

Also in August 1942 the operating elements of the CWS began to

sort themselves out. Col. Leonard M. Johnson arrived in Cheltenham to

become Chief, Supply Division. Although few CWS supplies were

arriving in England, the Supply Division was already working on storage and distribution measures. At about the same time, Colonel Maling,

his four officers and five enlisted men, began the establishment of the

CWS training operations within the newly authorized American School

Center at Shrivenham. The CWS had hoped and planned to establish its

own school but had been obliged to participate in the centralization of

theater training activities. Centralization did offer advantages of better

facilities and equipment and better handling of admissions than a single

service could manage.13 Kellogg, meanwhile, had distributed his ten

Eighth Air Force chemical officers among three chemical sections—

one, to control supply and training branches in the Eighth Air Force

headquarters, another, to direct supply operations in the VIII Air

Force Service Command (AFSC), and a third, to supervise ground

service and training in the VIII Bomber Command. While these sections were in the process of organization, Kellogg and his staff worked

on a revision of the war gas supply plan which had been formulated by

his section in the United States. Since, even in this early period, both

the War Department and the forces in the theater had accepted the

policy that any gas warfare retaliatory or offensive effort would be

the operating responsibility of the air forces, the Eighth Air Force toxic

supply plan was crucial to the gas warfare potential of the CWS

ETO.14 It then appeared that the CWS ETO pattern was set, and the

pattern followed neither the World War I precedent nor the prescriptions of regulations. Whether the CWS ETO could accomplish its

12CWS SOS History. 13Ibid. 14

 History, Cml Sec Eighth AF.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 43

mission through the use of this pattern remained to be seen. The first

test soon came when England became a base for the North African

invasion (TORCH operation) for which the European theater provided

logistical support. Largely as a result of providing officers and men for

TORCH, CWS ETO experienced sweeping staff changes.

Colonel Montgomery was recalled to the United States for special

duty in September 1942. Elliott was appointed to establish a chemical

section for the forming Twelfth Air Force headquarters, destined for

North Africa, and Maling was attached to the AFHQ planning staff

in a nonchemical capacity. One lieutenant colonel, six majors, and

three captains from the London and Cheltenham CWS elements soon

joined the North African forces. Kellogg was the senior CWS officer

remaining with European theater forces, but Rowan, senior CWS officer

in the SOS, succeeded Montgomery in acting capacity.15 Elliott's duties

as deputy were divided between Johnson in Cheltenham and MacArthur in London. Maling's post at Shrivenham went to a succession of

junior officers.16

By mid-September TORCH was not only creating a constant drain

on manpower, but it was also demanding materiel, support for operational planning, and readiness inspection. At the same time, the base

sections, local supply and service organizations, were organizing in the

United Kingdom, and supply and service installations were being activated as rapidly as possible. Furthermore, although the materiel and

troop build-up in England had been brought virtually to a standstill

in deference to the North African venture, operational and informational demands in the theater were growing apace. Theater officers regarded the strategic hiatus with respect to ETOUSA as only temporary,

and they continued to believe that the prime task in the United Kingdom was to prepare for eventual assault on the Continent. To meet an

important CWS need for intelligence information, the CWS arranged

for Colonel Zanetti, assistant military attache, to become in effect chief

of an intelligence division. Capt. Philip R. Tarr and two other officers

were transferred from Cheltenham to London on 19 September 1942

to assist Zanetti. One of Maling's successors at the American School

15While the manual provided that the senior CWS officer in the theater would be chief of service

(see above, p. 30) and while Montgomery's seniority had been a factor in his appointment, the seniority

principle did not consistently apply during World War II. Still, Kellogg could probably have secured

the appointment had he desired it. Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. 16

 CWS SOS History.
44 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Center and a Supply Division section chief moved out to establish

chemical sections in two newly activated base sections. Maj. Frederick

E. Powell, another section chief, and seven company-grade officers

went from Supply Division to establish chemical sections in general

depots and chemical branch depots. Since three other Supply Division

section chiefs had gone to the TORCH forces, newly arrived lieutenants

filled most supply division staff positions.17

First Reorganization

On 9 November 1942 the War Department notified the theater

headquarters that Colonel Montgomery, who had been appointed

chemical officer in the War Department Air Forces Headquarters,

would not be returning to the European theater. The theater commander appointed Colonel Rowan chief chemical warfare officer and

assigned him to theater headquarters in London. Thus, Rowan officially

became resident at theater headquarters and the position of CWS representative was automatically abolished. Rowan appointed MacArthur

his deputy and executive officer.18 While General Porter had not had

a hand in Rowan's appointment, he was well satisfied with it.19 Rowan's

qualifications were good. At 48, he was a year younger than the average

age of the ETO technical services chiefs. He held the same permanent

rank, lieutenant colonel, as all but one of his peers. At the time of his

appointment he held the same temporary rank as three of the service

chiefs—the four others having attained general officer rank. Like most

other senior CWS officers, Rowan had World War I experience, as assistant gas officer and gas officer of the division in which General Lee

had been chief of staff. He was a chemist, a graduate of Yale University, the Chemical Warfare School, and the Army Industrial College.

Early in his Army career, Rowan had been marked as an expert on industrial mobilization in the chemical field, and he had served several

tours, including one in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, in

positions relating to that specialty. He had also had assignments in

war planning, in chemical technical work, and in troop training, and

17

 (1) Ibid. (2) History, Sup Div CWS Hq SOS ETOUSA (hereafter cited as History, Sup Div,

42-43). ETO Admin 545A Cml Warfare. 18

 CWS SOS History. 19

 Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 45

he had served a 4-year tour as assistant military attache in Berlin at the

beginning of the Nazi period.20

A week after Rowan's appointment ETOUSA clarified and regularized the status of the theater CWS. ETOUSA assigned specific

duties and functions to the CWS office at Cheltenham under the control of SOS. These included supervision of all CWS supply activities

across the board from requirements, purchasing, and manufacture

through storage and issue and maintenance and repair to transportation

and shipping as well as supervision of CW training for SOS troops, and

CWS administration within SOS.21 The specification of duties at

Cheltenham and the additional provision that he could transfer personnel needed in his theater headquarters office to provide planning,

policy, training, technical, and intelligence services from Cheltenham

or the London SOS offices, left Rowan free to organize his office as the

situated dictated. On 18 November he submitted his proposals to G-3,

ETOUSA, and on 23 November published the approved pattern in

Office of the Chief Chemical Warfare Officer, ETOUSA, Office Order

No. 1. MacArthur officially resumed the post of Chief, Operations and

Training Division, which in fact he had never left, in addition to his

duties as executive officer and deputy. Lt. Col. Walter M. Scott's position as Chief, Technical Division, was affirmed, and he was given

supervision of a liaison officer who had been stationed at the British

chemical warfare experimental center at Porton. Rowan named Maj.

Roy LeCraw to head a new Administrative Division. Captain Tarr, 1

officer, and 2 civilian clerks were to form an Intelligence Section, primarily an office of record since Colonel Zanetti continued to handle

intelligence, within the Administrative Division. The total complement

of Rowan's theater headquarters office, besides himself, was 12 officers,

5 enlisted men, and 5 civilians.22

The November 1942 reorganization of the CWS ETOUSA produced

an organization similar to the one suggested in the manual for the

office of a theater chemical officer. The situation of the CWS and the

theater itself was not a "book" situation. The theater was active

logistically but its strategic destination was more in doubt than it had

20

 (1) CMLHO Biographical Sketches: Brig Gen Hugh W. Rowan. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical

Support, I, 1-10. 21

 ETOUSA GO 59, 16 Nov 42. 22

 (1) OCCWO ETO Off Order 1, 23 Nov 42. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare. (2) CWS SOS

History.
46 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

been before the North African invasion. The lines of the theater

commands were not clear and no chief of service could be positive

about the precise character and scope of his service's mission. In

Rowan's case, one element of his office, his Supply Division, was located

ninety miles away from him under the jurisdiction of a command

which might be considered an SOS field organization. A "book"

solution to these problems of communications, relationships, and supervision within the CWS ETO would have been to designate the Supply

Division as a communications zone chemical section, but when the

SOS command at Cheltenham decided upon this action it served only

to further confuse the issue of mission and supervision. Neither

Rowan's London office nor the Cheltenham branch was prepared to

operate as a separate entity under the prevailing theater pattern.

On 18 October 1942 when Supply Division absorbed Requirements

Division, Colonel Johnson supervised eleven CWS officers and twentytwo enlisted men in Cheltenham. He also supervised the procurement

and reverse lend-lease activities of Major Wright and his assistant in

London. Support of the North African operation and activation of

a logistics system in the United Kingdom kept this staff fully

occupied.23 After the reorganization of Rowan's London office and

just before Johnson's transfer to the North African forces, the

Cheltenham SOS headquarters designated Johnson as Montgomery's

successor as Chief Chemical Warfare Officer, SOS, and renamed the

CWS Supply Division as the SOS Chemical Warfare Section.24 Johnson

took the position that the SOS order was meaningless. Rowan was

clearly Montgomery's successor, and he considered himself as Rowan's

assistant. He furthermore lacked the staff and the authority in the

field to establish a communications zone (SOS) chemical section.

While his office had the operating functions of determining materiel

requirements, preparing requisitions on the United States, and directing

distribution of chemical supplies within the theater, its functions were

more nearly those of a supply policy division in the office of a theater

chief chemical officer than they were the functions of a theater supply

and distribution command chemical section. Also, if Johnson had

attempted to establish a communications zone chemical section, he

would have deprived Rowan of the direct control of chemical supply

23

 History, Sup Div, 42-43. 24

 SOS ETO GO 80, 10 Dec 42.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 47

since Rowan had no supply policy element in his London office.25

The only outcome of the SOS order was the establishment of the

largely inactive Cheltenham element of the CWS Operations and

Training Division as the Training Branch, Supply Division. A lieutenant was assigned to head the Training Branch and he was allotted

one part-time adviser and one part-time assistant. The branch was

assigned the function of supervising chemical training within SOS

ETOUSA.26

Major LeRoy, who succeeded to the position of SOS chemical warfare officer when Johnson was designated Chemical Officer, Mediterranean Base Section, North African Theater of Operations (NATO),

in December, made no change in policy. Indeed, LeRoy experienced

enough difficulty in staffing Supply Division without trying to extend

the scope of his activities. He was the only field-grade CWS officer

left in Cheltenham, and he had no captains on his immediate staff of

fourteen officers. His executive officer, Lt. Arthur T. Hingle, also

served as Chief, Statistical Section. Lt. Ingalls S. Bradley headed both

the Operations and Service Sections while another lieutenant was

Chief, Processing Section, and assistant in the Service Section. LeRoy

did not staff prescribed subsections for salvage, maintenance, impregnating, and filling plants in order to concentrate manpower in the

requirements, control, transportation, and issue areas.27 Such concentration of effort was demanded in order to meet the needs of the North

African forces, but late in 1942 and early in 1943 when chemical

supply requirements for North Africa were increasingly met by direct

shipment from the United States, the need for concentration in the

same areas did not lessen because now the task of top priority was

preparing the European theater for gas warfare. The first question

raised in connection with theater gas warfare preparedness was that

of the requirement for chemical offensive and defensive materials and

service troops. Once requirements had been estimated, it was necessary

to plan storage and distribution within the theater.

25

 Interv, Hist Off with Col Leonard M. Johnson, USA (Ret.), 18 Aug 59.

26

 History of the Tng Div CWS Hq SOS ETOUSA, 27 Jul 42-31 Dec 43 (hereafter cited as History,

Tng Div SOS). ETO Admin 545A Cml Warfare. 27

 (1) History, Sup Div, 42-43. (2) CWS SOS ETO Memo 19, 20 Dec 42, sub: Assignment of

Pers. SOSCW 200.3 (19 Sep 42)SD, in ETO Admin 545A Cml Warfare.
48 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Gas Warfare Planning

Rowan's staff had completed most of the basic work on a comprehensive gas warfare plan for the European theater before the War

Department letter requiring such a plan was received.28 Kellogg and

his staff had prepared air force supply and storage estimates for the

offensive portion of the plan. Late in 1942 LeRoy took a draft of the

ETO plan to Washington where he discussed it in detail with General

Porter's staff and exchanged information on theater and stateside

preparations. Later OCCWS referred the draft plan to the chemical

liaison officer on the OPD staff.29 But since the ETO plan was predicated on the vast expansion of the theater for a continental invasion,

as yet uncertain, it could only be brought to an indefinite conclusion.

Policy and strategy were in the making. The Allied leaders decided

at the January Casablanca Conference to revive the build-up in the

United Kingdom and took a number of actions during 1943 to flesh

out that decision.30 In November 1942 the Combined Chiefs of Staff

had briefly turned their attention to gas warfare and now an Allied

as well as a United States policy was emerging. This policy required:

(1) a co-operative American and British effort aimed at arranging

the defensive preparedness of all United Nations troops; and (2) the

accumulation of sufficient toxic munitions to make immediate retaliation possible should the enemy initiate gas warfare anywhere in the

world.31

The Second Reorganization

In connection with the determination of Allied policy on chemical

warfare and in order to evaluate the status of chemical warfare preparedness among American troops, General Porter and Brig. Gen.

Charles E. Loucks of his staff journeyed to England in March of 1943,

and from there went on to North Africa. Loucks, writing his own

28

 Ltr, TAG to CG ETOUSA et al., 19 Dec 42, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. AG 381

(12-18-42) OB-S-E-M. 29

 Draft Plan, Hq ETO, Jan 43, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare (noted: "by hand from

Major LeRoy"), with cover Memo, CCWS to Maj F. G. Schmitt, WDGS, 5 May 43, sub: Tentative

ETO Plan. CWS SPCVO 381, ETO. 30

 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, ch. HI. 31

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. IV.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 49

GENERAL PORTER AND TOP-RANKING CHEMICAL OFFICERS IN LONDON, 1943.

(Left to right) General Porter, General Loucks, Colonel Kellogg, Colonel

Rowan, Colonel MacArthur, and Colonel Zanetti.

and Porter's impressions, advised OCCWS on several European theater

problems and developments. The two officers found that the ETO had

enough supplies for the force then in the theater, but they considered

some of the items from the United States poor in quality.32 The theater

organization situation, they believed, was unsatisfactory. It appeared

to them that "the Commanding General, Army Service Forces in

Great Britain [sic] is entirely independent of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations. The latter is dependent on the

former for the supply but does not function as his superior."33

Officially, the theater commander, now Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews,

certainly functioned as General Lee's superior, but Loucks's words were

probably intended to describe the de facto rather than the de jure

32

 Ibid., pp. 100-101. 3 3Ltr, Gen Loucks to All Concerned [OCCWS], 23 Apr 43, sub: Inspection of Cml Warfare Activities in Great Britain. CWS SPCWS 319.1 (Cml Warfare Activities in Great Britain).
50 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

situation with respect to the CWS. The import of these remarks was

that Rowan, despite his official status as theater chief chemical warfare

officer, could in fact work only through Lee under whose jurisdiction

his office fell. Consequently, he had no direct channel of communication and authority through which he might, in the words of the manual,

exercise "general technical supervision over his service as a whole."

 34

Such supervision was vital. Although the European theater was active

at the time only in the air war, the greatest threat of gas warfare

initiation was posed by the known German industrial chemical potential. The heavy concentration of American and British strength in

the United Kingdom and the proposed build-up of men and materials

there presented to the Germans excellent targets for vesicant gases.

Germany was unlikely to launch a gas attack on the United Kingdom

since she had not done so in the great blitz bombings of 1940-41 and

since she would fear retaliation. But no chances should be taken, from

the CWS point of view, by failing to build up a retaliatory potential.

Developing such a potential, laying the defensive and offensive plans,

and co-ordinating CWS operations in the theater demanded that

Rowan have some direct channel through which to operate.

Porter's solution for the organizational impasse was to suggest that

"the officer occupying the position of chemical officer for the theater

commander" take the initiative in securing the co-operation and coordination of all the principal chemical officers in the theater. In other

words, he proposed using the informal channels of personal and technical correspondence and communication among officers of the same

service, known as technical channels, in place of formal command

channels. Porter further suggested that he would personally elicit such

co-operation. It is interesting to note that Loucks did not refer to

the theater chief chemical warfare officer nor to the chief of service.

In a listing of personnel, he cited Rowan as "Chemical Officer, Army

Service Forces" and "for the present . . . also the staff chemical officer

for the European Theater of Operations."

 35

Clearly, while Porter and Loucks accepted Rowan as theater chief

chemical officer, they were not prepared to acknowledge that there

was a theater chief of the CWS. Rowan was, as he had been from the

previous November, Chief Chemical Warfare Officer, ETOUSA. In

34

 FM 100-10, 9 Dec 40. 35

 Ltr, Loucks to [OCCWS], 23 Apr 43.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 51

the same month of Porter's visit, the theater commander ordered SOS

headquarters back from Cheltenham. He relocated the service chiefs

in SOS.36 The fiction of a separate chemical section in Cheltenham

was thereby dropped, and Rowan officially became Chemical Officer,

SOS ETOUSA. Neither of these positions fitted the manual definition

of the chief of service nor did they compare to the positions which

Fries had held. Rowan, accepting Porter's advice, decided to make

his position as theater chief chemical officer equivalent to that of chief

salesman for such services and supplies as the CWS could contribute

to the war effort in the theater. He found it necessary to employ his

own prestige and ability to persuade commanders that it was in their

best interest to be prepared against gas warfare, and to use smoke,

flame, and chemical mortars. Porter was right in his observation that

Rowan did not have the usual channels of a theater staff officer;

Rowan could seldom speak with the authority of the theater commander as Fries had done.37

 Indeed, he could sometimes not speak with

the authority of his other and more immediate commander, General

Lee. Lee, for example did not authorize his chiefs of service to operate

within his field commands, the base sections, chiefly because base

section commanders complained that the service chiefs interfered in

their command procedures.38 The service chiefs did most of their

volume business, supply, through the base sections and were therefore

required to control a part of the operation. Rowan solved this problem

by using technical channels to base section chemical officers and by

frequently meeting with these officers to resolve CWS difficulties.39

The looseness of control within the theater organization and within

the SOS which created so many problems for the technical services

and particularly for the CWS was by no means peculiar to the European theater. Under the principle of "unity of command" General

Marshall advocated placing theater and supreme commanders in a

position of controlling all forces in their area. Probably as an extension

of this principle he gave the theater and supreme commanders broad

36

 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 160-63.

37

 Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58.

38

 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 168-71.

39

 Ltr, Col Ferris U. Foster, USAR, to Hist Off, 13 Oct 59. Colonel Foster was Chemical Officer,

Southern Base Section, in the United Kingdom.
52 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

discretionary powers.40 Perhaps as an extension of the delegation concept or perhaps as simply a reaffirmation of the normal staff and command doctrine propounded in the period between the wars, theater

and subordinate commanders tended to de-emphasize the operating

and co-ordinating functions that members of their special staffs could

perform for their own services. Dual exercise of staff and command

functions, as permitted by regulations,41 became virtually unknown,

at least in the CWS. As logical and necessary as was the emphasis on

command authority and control, it did not make any easier the operation and control of a service which fitted neither into staff nor command lines. Fries had found it necessary to be a salesman in 1918, but,

since he controlled CWS staff officers down to the division level, he

had a better means than Rowan, two decades later, of conducting his

sales campaign.42 Rowan perforce substituted liaison between his

office and the chemical and command elements of the various theater

commands for control of his chemical subordinates as a means of

selling chemical warfare munitions and services.43

Rowan's problems were many in molding his staff to constant liaison

with the British, with the ground and air forces, and with the zone

of interior. In addition he possessed SOS supply and liaison duties which

would normally have devolved upon a communications zone chemical

officer. He still lacked officers in sufficient numbers and with sufficient

rank to handle all liaison and operating duties.

The April Reorganization

When General Porter left the theater, Rowan asked him to carry

back to Washington a list of proposals for less hurried consideration.

40

 (1) Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1954), pp. 41-42. (2) Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for

Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953).

pp. 123-24, 196-97, 262-63. (3) Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-

1944, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 102-05. (4) Cline,

Operations Division, pp. 21-22, 161-62, 184, 293-94. 41

 WD FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40. 42

 See above, ch. I. 43

 Some CWS officers objected to the point of view that declared "selling" necessary and objected

to the use of the term selling. These officers believed that the relationship of each CWS special staff

officer to his commander was the only important relationship so far as the CWS was concerned. It was

the duty of each special staff officer to suggest the employment of CWS munitions and units to

his commander when appropriate. No control within the CWS was required, from their point of

view, as long as technical information could be disseminated through technical channels. (Col MacArthur, Comments on draft of this volume, 10 Apr 61.)
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 53

These proposals related to Rowan's desire to increase the strength and

prestige of his immediate office in order better to perform both liaison

and operating functions. Foremost on this list was a request for the

return of Colonel Johnson from the North African theater or the

dispatch of a well-qualified lieutenant colonel to head his Supply

Division. Rowan also asked for four or five majors, high-ranking

captains, or low-ranking lieutenant colonels with staff experience and

training. He further asked that Col. James H. Defandorf and an

officer assistant, who had recently been assigned to his office to work

on medical liaison and the new, and then secret, work on defense

against biological warfare, not be charged against his allotment since

their work was on a special project basis and since he desperately needed

the spaces.44 The request for Johnson or a substitute was not intended

to disparage Major LeRoy whom Rowan later called "my very best

supply officer," but it was intended to point up the fact that LeRoy

was still the only field-grade supply officer available and that the

important supply operation needed more rank and prestige.45 The

request for majors, captains, or lieutenant colonels was necessary because the CWS needed field-grade officers for staff positions, but the

space allotment was such that Rowan could not risk taking a full

colonel or a lieutenant colonel about to be promoted.46

Porter's reply to Rowan's requests demonstrates that Rowan did not

yet realize how weak the ties between the theater CWS and its parent

service had become with the growing strength of ASF, OPD, and the

theater organizations. Porter pointed out that the matter of Johnson's

transfer from the North African to the European theater was out of

his hands: it could only be handled officially by intertheater request.

Porter could and did attempt to smooth this process by asking a

chemical officer in North Africa to intercede in favor of the transfer,

but nothing came of this attempt. On the matter of Colonel Defandorf's status and on that of securing additional staff officers for Rowan,

Porter's hands were equally tied since the status of officers within the

theater as well as requests for additional personnel were considered to

be within the province of the theater commander. Porter agreed to

evaluate qualifications of officers to be sent upon receipt of the official

44

 Memo [Rowan for Porter], n.d., sub: Things for General Porter's Attention Upon His Return

to the U.S. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr Files. 45

 Personal Ltr, Rowan to Gen Waitt, ACCWS for Field Opns, 22 Jul 43. 46

 Personal Ltr, Rowan to Gen Porter, CCWS, 22 Jul 43.
54 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

request, but even in this there was a strictly limiting factor—officers

with staff experience were hard to find in 1943.47 It began to appear

that the solutions for staffing and prestige problems must be found in

the European theater.

In April 1943 Rowan reorganized his own office to reflect the

expanding responsibilities of the CWS ETO and for better liaison. He

took the Intelligence Section from the Administration Division and

made it a division with Maj. Philip R. Tarr, recently promoted, as

chief. The creation of a new division was no duplication of Colonel

Zanetti's efforts. Zanetti specialized in strategic intelligence and intelligence liaison with the British and with the continental United

States while Tarr assumed the growing burden of chemical tactical

intelligence, which also involved liaison with the British but at a

different level. The Intelligence Division continued to process attache

reports for Colonel Zanetti.48 Lt. Col. Maurice H. Wright, also recently

promoted, headed a new Supply Liaison Division whose chief function

was to effect co-ordination between London, where broad supply policy

was determined in the Operations and Training Division, and Cheltenham, where direction of all requirements and supply operations

remained. Wright's procurement and reciprocal-aid duties were delegated to an assistant with the title of branch chief. The Administration

Division, now headed by Lt. Col. Chester O. Blackburn, included three

office service branches and one branch to handle personnel for the

CWS as a whole. The Technical Division, with its important liaison

functions, was assigned more higher ranking officers than the other

divisions: Colonel Scott remained as chief; Colonel Defandorf headed

the Special Projects Branch; Lt. Col. Melville F. Perkins handled liaison

with Porton, the British chemical research establishment, and the CWS

Laboratory, for which a chemical laboratory company had not yet

been received; Lt. Col. Thomas H. Magness, Jr., was in charge of

Offensive Munitions Branch while a captain headed the Defensive

Munitions Branch. In Operations and Training Branch, Colonel

MacArthur had a Training Branch headed by a lieutenant colonel,

who was also his executive officer, an Equipment Branch, and a Plans

Branch.49

47

 Personal Ltr, Porter to Rowan, 3 Jun 43. 48

 (1) History, CWS SOS. (2) Ltr, Col J. Enrique Zanetti, CmlC, USAR (Ret.), to Hist Off,

26 Jun 60. 49

 (1) OCCWO ETO Off Order 5, 22 Apr 43. (2) OCCWO ETO Off Order 7, 12 May 43.

Both in ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 55

LeRoy, now a lieutenant colonel, had 20 officers in his Supply

Division, but he still lacked field-grade assistants. His Executive

Officer and Chief, Statistical (requirements and control) Branch, and

his Operations Branch chief had been promoted to captain along with

the Transportation and Issue Section chief. The Processing (formerly

Impregnating) and Training Branches were still one-man branches

while the Service Branch had a chief and an assistant. One-man

branches were common in the London office where five branches were

wholly unstaffed. The London office was assigned 22 officers, three of

whom were on duty with the Administrative Branch of the Administration Division at Cheltenham. In all, Rowan had 41 officers, 28

enlisted men, and 16 civilians.50 While 14 officers had been added since

the previous fall and while section prestige had increased, mostly

through promotions, both members and prestige were still low in relation to the tremendous expansion in theater activities contemplated

in the year before the D-day target, which was established in May.

Rowan had a personal prestige problem in that the other technical

service chiefs had all been advanced to general officer grade.

The First Gas Warfare Plan

An example of the contemplated expansion of theater activities was

the issuance, also in April 1943, of the first theater gas warfare plan.

Enough strategic information had become available by that time to

complete the draft plan of the previous December. The final plan,

personally signed by General Andrews, called for an eight months'

supply of aircraft gas munitions and a four months' supply of ground

gas munitions. The theater requested, in the event of gas warfare, at

least 2 chemical combat battalions per corps, 40 air chemical service

and supply units, 30 ground chemical service and supply units plus

5 smoke generator companies for ground service, and 23 SOS service

and supply units plus 5 smoke generator companies for the communications zone. It also requested 3 base section staffs totaling 9 officers

and 30 enlisted men, 75 officers and 150 enlisted men for depot administration, and an SOS headquarters staff of 93 officers and 339 enlisted

men. Pointed out in the plan was the fact that the theater was then

50

 OCCWO ETO Off Order 5, 22 Apr 43. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
56 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

capable only of passive defense and individual protection against gas

warfare.51

The theater and air forces chemical sections modified the plan's

supply and troop build-up schedule to make it accord with the current

theater build-up level and the nongas warfare situation. They then

submitted requisitions against the modified schedule, but while cargo

flow began to increase, needed supplies, especially toxic munitions,

were not forthcoming. A month after the submission of the theater

plan, Maj. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Commanding General, Eighth Air Force,

forwarded a strong plea for an interim toxic munitions supply plan.52

By the end of July, General Eaker's plan had been approved for munitions shipment. But long before the approval was received—in fact,

before the original Eighth Air Force interim plan had been dispatched—Rowan had become concerned about War Department slowness in handling theater requests and particularly about the burden

placed upon the theater by the necessity of planning and replanning.

Rowan expounded the theater point of view to General Waitt, Assistant Chief, CWS, for Field Operations, early in May 1943. He considered it to be the function of the War Department "to assist overseas

Commands, and not to attempt to sit in judgment upon their actions

and requisitions." He further indicated that he believed the policy

of requiring theater commanders to disclose detailed plans of contemplated operations in justification for requisitions of an unusual

nature to be an unsound one.53 Waitt replied that he, personally,

agreed completely, and he gave assurance that his own office would

not attempt to "sit in judgment on theater requests or actions." He

asked only that the theater keep his office well enough informed so

that the War Department CWS might "go to bat for you." He

pointed out that the War Department higher echelons had to know

enough about plans of contemplated operations to act intelligently

on requests.54

The higher echelons which Waitt defended were not always as

reasonable as he was in considering theater requests. Porter, Waitt,

51

 Ltr, CG ETO to TAG, 17 Apr 43, sub: Gas Warfare Plans, ETO. ETO AG 381; also in OPD

385 CWP. 52

 (1) Ltr, CG Eighth AF to CG ETO, 20 May 43, sub: Eighth AF Preparedness for Offensive Cml

Warfare, with 1st Ind, CG ETO to TAG, 9 Jun 43. Eighth AF 353, ETO AG 381 x 475.9 MDGS.

(2) 2d Ind, TAG to CG ETO, 30 Jul 43. AG 381 (20 May 43) OB-S-E. 53Personal Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 5 May 43. CWS ETO CWO-400/32-Sec. 54

 Personal Ltr, Waitt to Rowan, 21 Jun 43. CWS SPCVO 016 APO 887.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 57

and Rowan were satisfied that the CWS in the United States was

doing everything in its power to assist the theater CWS in meeting its

obligations as to organization, planning, and supply.55 Waitt placed

the blame for delays and for modification of theater plans on ASF.56

While approximately ten weeks was not an extraordinary amount of

time for War Department action on the Eighth Air Force request, this

request was only one of a stream of Eighth Air Force schedules and

plans which had followed from the original plan made in April 1942

when Kellogg's section was still in the United States. In many other

cases, such as the projects for continental operations begun in mid1943, the processing delays seemed longer than final results warranted.

The theater CWS found itself in a frustrating position: the theater

staff was to plan in detail within the framework of the basic plans laid

down in Washington because the War Department would not invade

the theater prerogative by doing detailed planning; but the War

Department apparently felt no compunctions about redoing the

theater's detailed planning. A like difficulty existed in organization.

The prewar theory of theater organization, under which the theater

commander channeled authority through his technical services chiefs

as well as his tactical commanders, had been discarded in the ETO

under War Department pressure so that the planned channels of authority no longer remained, yet the War Department did not consider

the provision of a new authority channel as being within its province.

The June Organization Plan

In June the ETO SOS chief of administration asked Rowan to

submit his plans for handling the theater build-up load. Rowan's plan

reflected his desire to meet both problems. If he could have direct

control of the theater CWS organization, he wanted enough officers

of sufficient rank to control it by persuasion. If he must do the planning which, according to the manual, should have been done in the

United States, and if he must perform the operation normally the

responsibility of the communications zone, he wanted the staff to

handle planning and operating functions. Rowan replied by submitting

a comprehensive organizational and functional justification for a staff

of 100 officers.

55

 (1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. (3) Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58. 56

 (1) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. (2.) Waitt Comments on draft of this volume, 5 Jan 61.
58 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

He asked for a deputy and two assistant chiefs but suggested that

the position of deputy and one of the assistant chief positions could

be held by one officer. While MacArthur had in fact been deputy

since August of 1942, he had in title been Executive Officer and Chief,

Operations and Training Division. Rowan proposed that he should

officially be deputy and assistant chief for plans and training. As

mentioned above, Rowan had become "outside man" for his organization, so that he needed a deputy who could function in his absence.

He also needed an additional executive officer who would be "inside

man" and function in his or his deputy's stead when both were absent.

The second assistant chief was to be the operating supervisor of supply

and service functions. Since half of Rowan's staff was to be occupied

with these functions and since this portion of the staff was located at

Cheltenham, he felt that the position warranted the assignment of a

general officer. Considering the growth of the technical services within

the theater and considering that the CWS ETO was destined to become

fourth ranking among the seven technical services in the operation of

general storage space and second ranking in the operation of ammunition storage and shop space, and further considering that the Cheltenham echelon was charged with the chemical warfare training of about

375,000 SOS troops, the establishment of an assistant chief position in

the general-officer grade was not unreasonable.57

Since Rowan planned for his deputy to hold the position of assistant

chief for plans and training, there seems to have been little reason for

establishment of the second position of assistant chief except the

psychological factor of acknowledging the unique position of the

CWS chief as tactical adviser in chemical warfare to the theater

commander and to all theater forces. A subsidiary reason for establishing the second position could have been to parallel the OCCWS

organization which had recently been revised to provide assistant chiefs

for materiel and for field operations.58 In effect, the two assistant

chiefs in the ETO would perform comparable functions to the two

in OCCWS. Only one officer, a lieutenant colonel, to act in an

executive capacity, was to be assigned directly to the assistant chief

for plans and training.59

57

 (1) Study, Rowan [to Chief, Admin SOS], Functions and Duties of the OCCWO, 13 and 17 Jun

43. ETO Admin 545A Cml Warfare. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, p. 128. 58

 Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 101-04. 59

 Functions and Duties of the OCCWO.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 59

Six of the nine divisions proposed were to be organized on the pattern

already established in the Technical Division—colonels and lieutenant

colonels would primarily perform liaison and inspection functions

outside the Office of the Chief Chemical Warfare Officer. These

divisions were: Technical; Plans and Training; Intelligence; Medical

Liaison; Supply Liaison and CWS Representative to AC of S, G-5,

ETOUSA; and SOS Training (at Cheltenham). The liaison divisions were to contain branches or sections staffed by lower ranking

officers and enlisted men to perform planning, supervisory, and reporting duties. Colonel Wright had already been appointed CWS representative to ACofS, G-5, ETOUSA, in addition to his duties as Chief,

Supply Liaison Division. His duty as representative consisted of liaison

with the Allied forces planning command (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander [Designate] COSSAC). The SOS CWS

Training Division, to be headed by a major, was to operate under the

assistant chief for supply.60 The SOS CWS Training Division was not

to duplicate the training policy role of the training element in London,

but was to provide staff supervision for chemical training within SOS.

Rowan meant for two of the remaining three divisions to handle

internal administrative functions, but both of these divisions, Administration in London and Supply Administration in Cheltenham, were

also to have advisory roles with respect to the assignment of CWS

personnel in the theater and in SOS, respectively. Rowan and LeRoy

redesigned Supply Division to re-emphasize the position that this

division had always held as an independent CWS supply and service

agency which LeRoy operated, on a small scale, under Somervell's and

Lee's principle of centralized control and decentralized operation.

Supply liaison at levels co-ordinate with and above SOS was to remain

in Wright's hands in both of his capacities. Liaison at SOS level was

to be accomplished by the division itself. To supplement the division

liaison at subordinate levels, Rowan and LeRoy wished to create an

Inspection Branch headed by a lieutenant colonel who would be a

troubleshooter for field problems and carry on technical inspection

of field installations. The pattern of liaison, and indeed the organizational plan of the whole division, demonstrated how free a hand the

CWS had in determining its own supply concepts and procedures.

The division was to have, and in most cases already had, branches or

6 0 Ibid. (2) OCCWO ETO Off Order 8, 20 May 43. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
60 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

sections to determine requirements, to control materiel, to ordain

storage, issue, and transportation procedures, and to regulate maintenance and services such as processing.61

 In sharp contrast to the practice in the Pacific areas, policy could originate within the division or

with the chief chemical warfare officer; higher level direction was

minimal.

As far as his own office was concerned, Rowan had already implemented a part of the organization of the June plan, since that plan

did not differ greatly in pattern from the reorganization of April.

Some features of the new plan, such as the official designation of

Colonel MacArthur as deputy and the appointment of an executive

officer, were implemented piecemeal. The post of assistant chief chemical warfare officer for supply was established, but Rowan could find no

one to fill it. Several colonels arrived in the theater during 1943, but

they were either already assigned to the staffs of field organizations or

were needed in the rapidly proliferating field headquarters. Rowan

was forced to use captains, majors, and some lieutenant colonels in

positions he had intended to fill with lieutenant colonels and colonels.

For liaison and inspection he sometimes sought the assistance of field

chemical officers. He was still short of manpower. At the end of 1943

his officer allotment totaled forty-six. In Cheltenham he lost Colonel

LeRoy who was returned to the United States under a policy of rotating

officers with field experience. Major Powell, who had filled assignments

both in Cheltenham and in the SOS depot system, became LeRoy's

replacement.62

The importance of the June plan does not lie in its implementation,

although it was implemented at about half strength and became the

basic pattern for the remainder of the war. Its importance lies in the

fact that its concept and scope demonstrate the changed character

of the overseas CWS in World War II. It represents the anomaly of

World War II: the technician and the specialist were taking a back

seat in the war which was being touted as the technicians' and specialists'

war. The technician, the specialist, and the logistician, had achieved

positions of great importance in the warfare of World War I. In the

period between the wars most CWS technicians, specialists, and logis61

 Functions and Duties of the OCCWO. 62

 (1) History, Sup Div, 42-43. (2) Ltrs, Rowan to Porter and Waitt, 22 Jul 43. (3) Ltr,

Waitt (in ETO) to Col Herrold E. Brooks, Chief, Pers Div OCCWS, 13 Sep 43. CWS 314.7 Pers

Files, ETO. (4) Ltr, Col Ernest Greene, USAR, to Hist Off, 22 Jan 60.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 61

ticians had been led to believe that they would work with bureaulike

unity. Strategy, plans, materiel, and personnel would emanate from

OCCWS to be translated into the theater commander's policy by the

theater chief chemical officer who would supervise execution at subordinate levels. More than a year's experience in the theater proved

that the interposition of theater headquarters, OPD, and ASF between

the theater CWS and OCCWS prevented OCCWS from accomplishing

its planned direction. Theater emphasis on the discretion of the individual commander, plus the organizational setup, in effect demoted

the special staff officer to the role of supply administrator whose control

even in the supply field depended on his ability to institute and maintain decentralizing procedures. In the supply role Rowan and his staff

fared very well despite the failure to acquire the personnel specified in

the June plan. In the liaison role the failure to acquire the staff and

rank indicated in the June plan threw the entire burden on Rowan

and a few members of his staff. The Technical Division very successfully maintained liaison with the British in the research and development areas.63

 CWS officials also found the British very helpful in

arranging reverse lend-lease for service and supply, areas in which

Rowan and many members of his staff performed liaison.64 In matters

of policy, liaison with the British was excellent since Rowan was

Porter's representative to the British policy group, the Inter-Service

Chemical Warfare Committee.65 It was in liaison with the American

ground forces that difficulties arose. So small a staff with such varied

duties could not maintain a regular ground forces liaison program. The

partial solution for this problem was to emerge later during operations

on the Continent.

Planning and Organization: 1944-45

By the end of 1943 the build-up in the ETO had reached a furious

pace. All the CWS ETO supply installations and sections in the United

Kingdom were firmly established and supplies, even the long-awaited

toxic munitions, were coming in. In the SOS the base sections, the

ports of debarkation, and selected general depots had working-strength

chemical sections, and scarce chemical service units or detachments

63

 Interv, Hist Off with Col Thomas H. Magness, Jr., 5 May 59. 64

 Ltr, Gen Rowan to Hist Off, 8 Jul 60. 65

 Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58.
62 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

were attached where necessary for operation. Arriving ground force

organizations usually brought their own chemical sections.

Staff and Organization Changes

Many staff changes were made—some the result of organization and

unit activations and some arising from a desire to have officers with

theater experience in the United States. As noted above, Colonel

LeRoy had for the latter reason returned to the United States in the

fall of 1943. Colonel Kellogg had returned to the United States in

July 1943 and his position as Chemical Officer, Eighth Air Force, had

been assumed by Col. Harold J. Baum who subsequently became Chemical Officer, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF) ,66

One lieutenant colonel from Rowan's London staff also returned to the

United States, while Colonel Blackburn left the Administration Division to become Chemical Officer, Ground Forces Replacement Command, in the theater.67

 Three field-grade officers arrived from the

United States for duty in the London office.68

With the organization of several ground commands late in 1943,

the build-up reached the point where defensive gas warfare planning

for specific forces had to be undertaken with a probable cross-Channel

mission in mind. The requirements portion of such specific planning

depended upon the ground forces elements themselves, but Rowan's

staff would be called on to co-ordinate planning and, more importantly,

to translate plans and estimates into actual supply. The fact that

supply lead time was running at about 180 days impressed Rowan's

staff with the necessity of anticipating the requirements of ground

forces planners as far ahead as possible. Just before leaving for an

extensive briefing and conference tour in the United States late in

December 1943, Rowan designated a transitional Planning Group

within the Operations and Training Division to work under the direct

supervision of the deputy chief chemical warfare officer, Colonel

MacArthur. This group was, in addition to its planning duties, to

absorb the functions of the Supply Liaison Division.69 A few days

later, MacArthur, acting chief chemical warfare officer, brought about

66

 History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. 67

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Chester O. Blackburn, CmlC, USAR (Ret.), 21 Sep 59. 68

 Interv, Hist Off with Col Alexander Leggin, USAR, 13 Oct 61. Leggin served as Rowan's

executive officer during this period. 69

 OCCWO ETO Off Order 21, 28 Dec 43. ETO Admin 744 Cml Warfare.
CHART 4—ORGANIZATION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS. EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

U.S. ARMY, JANUARY 1944

Source: Adapted from: Ruppenthal, I, 198-201; CWS SOS ETOUSA, Office Orders No. 23, 4 Jan 44, No. 25, 25 Jan 44. ETO Adm 544.
64 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

a realignment of the theater office. (Chart 4) The Planning Group

became the Planning Division under Lt. Col. Albert C. Bilicke, with

Maj. Arthur T. Hingle, who was moved up from Cheltenham, and

another field-grade officer as his principal assistants. This division was

given the task of determining broad troop and supply requirements for

future operations. The parent Operations and Training Division had

like responsibilities for current operations as well as for training supervision.70

The other divisions remained as indicated in the modified plan of

June 1943, but a sign of the times was the appointment of Maj.

Alexander Leggin, Executive Officer, OCCWO, ETO, to the added

role of liaison officer to First United States Army Group (FUSAG).

Leggin's verbal instructions were to initiate the formation of a chemical

section and to start chemical planning for FUSAG, then organizing

in the United Kingdom as the principal American ground forces headquarters.71

 Also, Maj. William Foley came from the American School

Center to Cheltenham to head an SOS Training and Equipment Section,

an upgrading of the Training Branch, Supply Division.72 By the end

of January it had become apparent that the Operations and Training

Division could not handle all the detailed transactions concerning

troops. A new Personnel Division was therefore established, and to it

were assigned the personnel records functions of Administration

Division.73

The Personnel Division had a number of individual changes to

record. Col. Marshall Stubbs in January had moved from Ninth Air

Force to establish the chemical section for and become the deputy

assistant chief of staff, G-4, of Advance Section, Communications

Zone (ADSEC), the mobile base section scheduled to operate directly

behind the combat forces. ADSEC, as an important distribution

agency and link between combat and SOS forces, was of considerable

interest to the CWS ETO. The ability to discover ground forces

chemical supply requirements and to meet them could well depend

on the successful operation of the ADSEC Chemical Section. Maj.

Ingalls S. Bradley of Supply Division soon joined Stubbs as his

70

 OCCWO ETO Off Order 23, 4 Jan 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare. 71

 (1) OCCWO ETO Off Order 22, 4 Jan 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare. (1) Leggin

Interv, 13 Oct 61. 72

 OCCWO ETO Off Order 23, 4 Jan 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare. 73

 OCCWO ETO Off Orders 25 and 26, 25 Jan 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 65

assistant.74 Leggin left his executive officer post in February formally

to activate the FUSAG Chemical Section.75 In March, after Rowan's

return from the United States, MacArthur became FUSAG chemical

officer with Leggin serving as his deputy. Col. Alfred C. Day, a

Reserve officer and veteran of World War I's 1st Gas Regiment, who

had been on temporary duty as chemical officer of the assault and

amphibious training center in England, became Rowan's deputy.76

Col. Roy C. Charron, another Reserve officer with World War I

experience, arrived from the United States to assume, after briefly

filling the long-vacant position of assistant chief at Cheltenham, the

post of Chemical Officer, Forward Echelon, Communications Zone

(FECOMZ). The Forward Echelon was essentially a planning headquarters, a smaller version of SOS itself, which was to plan for and

provide logistical support to the combat forces on the Continent from

D-day plus 41 to D plus 90 when the main headquarters of SOS,

renamed Communications Zone (COMZ), was expected to be in

operation on the Continent.77 The CWS SOS-COMZ complement was

filled in May by the arrival of Col. Hubert B. Bramlet, a Regular Army

officer who had been commissioned in the CWS during World War I,

to fill the position of assistant chief at Cheltenham.78 (Chart 5)

The change in staff assignments and the addition of the ADSEC

and FECOMZ Chemical Sections enabled the CWS ETO to operate

more effectively within the theater. Officers entirely familiar with the

theater CWS system, such as MacArthur, were now in key positions

while the new chemical sections were created in new organizations

designed within the theater to serve theater purposes. These organizations therefore had channels of communication, authority, and operations specially suited to theater needs. Thus FECOMZ was a planning

headquarters with "built-in" liaison to the parent SOS.79 ADSEC was

74

 Biographical Sketch, CMLHO: Maj Gen Marshall Stubbs. Thirty-seven years old at the time

of his appointment, Stubbs was a Regular Army officer and a Military Academy graduate. Of the

prominent chemical officers in the European theater, he was the first who was too young to have had

World War I experience. (2) Opns History of ADSEC COMZ ETOUSA, Oct 43-10 Jul 45 (hereafter cited as History, ADSEC). 75

 OCCWO ETO Off Order 28, 16 Feb 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare. 76

 OCCWO ETO Off Order 33, 23 Mar 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare. 77

 (1) History, FECOMZ ETOUSA, From Inception to Termination (9 Feb to 7 Aug 44) (hereafter cited as History, FECOMZ). ETO Admin 136. (2) Personal Ltrs, Col Charron to Waitt, 2 Feb,

19 Mar 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO, Feb 44-Dec 44. 78

 OCCWO ETO Off Order 42, 30 May 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare. 79

 History, FECOMZ.
CHART 5—ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF SERVICE AGENCIES AND COMBAT UNITS

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, 1944-1945

a. Position abolished, October 1944.

b. January 1944 reorganization. Allied Expeditionary Air Forces abolished 15 Oct 44.

c. First and Ninth Armies attached to the Northern Group lor periods in 1944-1945. Fifteenth Army added to 12th Army Croup in 1945. Chemical Officer, 12th Army Group, conducted

liaison with chemical officer (British), 21 Army Group

d. As of December 1944.

e. Theater and Communications Zone (then Services of Supply) Headquarters combined, January 1944.

f. Base Air Depot Area supported Eighth and Ninth Air Force Service Commands in some functional areas.

g. Fifteenth Air Force under USSTAF operational control. Under administrative control Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Source: Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 159, 562, 379, 458, 455, Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. I, p. 199, Craven and Cate, Europe—TORCH to POINTBLANK, pp. 745,

753, 839, Craven and Cole, Europe—ARGUMENT to V-E Day, pp. 111, 398, 576
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 67

a planning headquarters with "built-in" liaison to First Army (FUSA)

and Third Army (TUSA), whose basic logistics planning it was

handling and extending, as well as to SOS-COMZ, of which it was

an organizational subordinate echelon.80 The ground forces-CWS

ties were therefore good.

First Army, whose chemical section was headed by Col. Joseph D.

Coughlan, was to direct all American operations on the Continent

in the beachhead period. FUSAG co-ordinated all ground planning,

and a successor army group headquarters, as yet unannounced, was

to take over control of First Army and Third Army when the "secret"

Third became operational. Third Army chemical officer was Col.

Edward C. Wallington.81

Air Forces liaison was more tenuous. Air Forces officers, probably

as part of their bidding for a status independent of the Army, took

the position that the theater and SOS headquarters had a ground forces

jurisdiction only, even in logistics matters. Since Rowan and his

staff were firmly identified with theater and SOS headquarters, they

were doubly handicapped in approaching the Air Forces. The CWS

situation in the Air Forces became worse when USSTAF combined

its Ordnance and Chemical Sections under the ordnance officer, but

Colonel Baum in USSTAF, Col. Joseph Triner, chemical officer in the

Ninth Air Force, and Maj. Leonard C. Miller of Allied Expeditionary

Air Forces (AEAF) managed to keep Rowan informed of their more

important plans through their personal channels to the chief chemical

warfare officer and his assistants.82 After January 1944 the planning

channel for the Air Forces was through the Supreme Headquarters,

Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), rather than through theater

headquarters. In January theater and SOS headquarters were combined

with the staff serving in a dual capacity. While General Lee became

deputy theater commander, the staff carefully defined their theater

functions which they performed in General Eisenhower's name and

their SOS functions which they carried out in General Lee's. Despite

the careful definition, the activation of other operational and planning

commands restricted the combined headquarters to administrative and

80

 History, ADSEC. 81

 Biographical Sketches, CMLHO. Coughlan and Wallington were senior Regular Army CWS

officers. Both were graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, Class of 1915. 82

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Col Leonard C. Miller, 2 Feb 60. (2) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58. (3)

Rowan Comments 16 Dec 60.
68 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

supply matters and ultimately resulted in the predominance of logistic

function.83

In March Col. Adrian St. John arrived in the theater and became the chemical representative on the SHAEF staff. Although

Colonel Wright, as liaison officer to COSSAC, the SHAEF predecessor,

had been on Rowan's staff, Colonel St. John did not report to Rowan.

The air forces chemical officers co-ordinated their gas warfare planning

with St. John. Organizational confusion resulted.84 Even General

Porter believed that Rowan was no longer the principal chemical officer

in the theater. He was under the impression that St. John, who was at

the time senior to Rowan, had been appointed "Chief Chemical Officer,

SHAEF," and he asked Brig. Gen. Augustin M. Prentiss, who was on

an observer mission to the theater, to indicate proper communications

channels.85 Prentiss replied that the confusion in the United States

was understandable since many individuals in the theater were also

confused, but he affirmed Rowan's position as theater chief of service,

and St. John's as chemical adviser to G-3, SHAEF, and indicated that

communications should be channeled through Rowan.86 Rowan's

status became more clearly defined upon his advancement to brigadier

general on 25 May 1944.

During the three months of his European duty before the continental

invasion, St. John assumed some of the gas warfare readiness planning

responsibilities as appropriate to his assignment to the highest planning

headquarters. He approved and staffed air forces operational readiness

plans which included stocking toxics available for immediate retaliatory

missions at operational airfields. He also secured the issuance of a

SHAEF directive which required all commanders to make both offensive and defensive plans. Again, Porter was apparently under the impression that this directive had greater significance than it actually

did.87 The SHAEF directive was in fact only a slightly stronger

restatement of a number of theater directives which had preceded it,

83

 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 195-201. 84

 SHAEF had special staff divisions in only three technical services areas, Signal, Engineer, and

Medical. These were all combined staff branches whose roles outside their own headquarters were like

those of inspectors general; they did not perform the functions of theater sections or services (Pogue,

Supreme Command, pages 91-93). St. John was not in a special staff position. He was originally assigned as chemical adviser to G-4, SHAEF, and was shortly thereafter transferred to G-3 with the same

title since little of his work had to do with logistics. (Personal Ltr, St. John to Porter, 28 Mar 44). 85 Personal Ltr, Porter to Prentiss, 22 Mar 44. 86

 Personal Ltr, Prentiss to Porter, 14 Apr 44. 87

 Ltr, Porter to Prentiss, 22 Mar 44.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 69

and the real key to readiness lay in the supply planning which was

being handled by Rowan's office, the air forces chemical sections, and

the chemical sections in FECOMZ, ADSEC, FUSAG, FUSA, and

TUSA.

The liaison method of planning and the organizational confusion

in the theater made chemical planning difficult at times and occasionally

resulted in personal differences which normally occur in any organization, but both Rowan and St. John could informally handle problems

as they arose. One problem was that Coughlan was reluctant to submit

to direction and co-ordination by the FUSAG Chemical Section or by

Rowan's staff. St. John managed to bring this matter to the attention

of the FUSAG commander and planning co-ordination thereupon

became effective. On the whole, both planning and actual preparations

in the field proceeded apace.88

When Porter indicated to Prentiss that, according to the reports,

unspecified, which he had received, something was amiss in ETO

chemical activities Prentiss replied that he could find nothing wrong.

Plans were complete, the staff was competent, the supply situation,

at least for immediate needs, was good, and the chemical officers

seemed to enjoy the confidence of higher authority.89 In fact, Rowan

felt that he had done precisely as Porter had recommended—he had

"sold" his services to the theater forces.

General Porter got the same impression that Prentiss did when he

arrived in the European theater shortly before the cross-Channel attack.

He inspected gas warfare readiness in both ground and service commands. He found no reluctance to acknowledge Rowan as the theater

chief chemical officer and he found theater forces well prepared, from

a CWS point of view, for the operation they were about to undertake.90

On the Continent

American commanders and staff officers knew that the assault on

the Normandy beaches provided the enemy with an ideal opportunity

to inaugurate gas warfare. General Omar N. Bradley, then First Army

commander and principal United States ground commander for the

assault, later wrote that "even a light sprinkling of persistent gas on

88

 (1) Leggin Interv, 13 Oct 61. (2) MacArthur Interv, 19 Sep 61. (3) Interv, Hist Off with

Col Maurice H. Wright, USAR (Ret.), 10 Jul 61. 89

 Prentiss to Porter, 14 Apr 44. 90

 Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61.
70 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Omaha Beach could have cost us our footing there."91 American

intelligence experts believed that the German forces had the logistic

capability to launch a gas attack although it was a comfort to know

that their lack of aerial superiority made it unlikely that such an

attack could be launched by aircraft. All assault forces wore antigas

protective clothing and carried gas masks and other protective

articles. While the adequacy of such protection was assured against

known gases in a situation in which warning could be given, the danger

of a high casualty rate was great in the event of surprise attack or the

introduction of an unknown gas. Further, the adequacy of the warning,

service, and retaliatory offensive systems could only be estimated.

First Army requested 3 chemical mortar battalions for retaliation

and 4 chemical service companies to meet possible gas warfare. The

3 battalions, 1 chemical depot company, 1 chemical maintenance company, 1 smoke generator battalion headquarters and 4 companies, and

1 small detachment from a chemical laboratory company were assigned

or attached to FUSA and scheduled for the assault echelons. The

laboratory detachment and 3 chemical decontamination companies

assigned to engineer special brigades joined the earliest assault waves

with the mission of determining if gas was being used. These units

were to identify the gas and take immediate protective measures.92

The first chemical staff sections ashore in Normandy were those in

the headquarters of the engineer special brigades, the V and VII Corps,

and the 1st, 29th, 4th, and 30th Divisions. Three officers of FUSA

Chemical Section landed on 9 June, three days after D-day. They

found the chemical supply situation adequate and the 30th Chemical

Decontamination Company ready to provide artificial smoke protection if needed. The fear of enemy gas attack was still lively as demonstrated by several "gas scares," reports that the enemy had employed

war gases. All such reports proved false.93

Since First Army was responsible for all logistics arrangements on

the Continent in the early period, the first job was to establish dumps,

especially dumps at which the chemical mortar battalions could draw

ammunition. The initial supply of several chemical items, including

91

 General Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1951),

p. 279. 92 (1) FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44, an. 17, Cml Warfare Sec. (2) Ian F. Fraser,

Clifford L. Jones, and Hugh Williamson, Opn Rpt NEPTUNE, 30 Sep 44, pp. 38-39, 126. In CMLHO. 93

 FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44, an. 17.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 71

ammunition, was being expended faster than anticipated. The FUSA

Chemical Section and the assigned chemical service units handled these

problems. Officers of the ADSEC Chemical Section, who had arrived

a day after Coughlan and his assistants, assisted the FUSA section in

these tasks.94

The ADSEC Chemical Section gradually assumed direction of the

distribution functions in the areas nearest the beaches. The FUSA

Chemical Section retained its direct interest in all chemical supply

since FUSA did not relinquish supply control to ADSEC.95 During

July the FECOMZ, TUSA, and nth Army Group Chemical Sections

were established on the Continent as the headquarters of which they

were part became established. FECOMZ never assumed operating responsibility and the members of its chemical section, like those of Third

Army and 12th Army Group, acted as observers and reporters on the

combat, supply, and service situations until early August when the

main COMZ (formerly SOS) headquarters began to arrive and

absorb FECOMZ. Members of the chemical section then assumed

their planned operating roles. Third Army and 12th Army Group

became operational on 1 August 1944 and MacArthur's chemical section became the senior chemical policy organization on the Continent

pending the arrival of the remainder of Rowan's office.96

Rowan, Day, and St. John visited on the Continent during the

beachhead and breakout period (June-August 1944), as did General

Porter.97 They found little evidence of any enemy intention to initiate

gas warfare, but, as insurance the CWS sections and units ashore were

striving to increase and improve the level of gas warfare protection

by collecting and refurbishing discarded gas masks, by distributing

decontaminating equipment and supplies, and by setting up antigas

clothing processing plants. The chemical mortar battalions were fully

occupied and highly prized in their nongas warfare role, an intended

one, of firing high explosive and smoke missions in direct combat

support of the infantry. Artificial smoke, other than that produced

94

 Informal Comments of CWS Officer [Maj Hingle to Col Charron, CmlO FECOMZ], 20 Jun 44.

CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO. 95

 (1) FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43—1 Aug 44, an. 17. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I,

433-36. 96

 (1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 436-37. (2) MacArthur Interv, 19 Sep 61. (3) TUSA

AAR, 1 Aug 44-9 May 45, vol. II, CWS Sec. (4) 12th Army Group Rpt of Opns, vol. XI, Cml Warfare Sec, pp. 104-33. 97

 OCCWO COMZ ETO, Daily Journal, Jul and Aug 44. ETO Admin 467.
72 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

by white phosphorus shell, had not been used in expected quantities,

and expensive fog oil, the smoke agent used in mechanical smoke

generators, was being used to oil emergency aircraft landing strips.

The smoke generator units were used as service units. The chemical

supply situation was satisfactory at the moment, but Rowan and

St. John predicted growing supply problems as the mortar battalions

became more extensively used and the distribution area for smoke,

flame, and gas warfare supplies became larger. From Rowan's point

of view the most immediate problem was the supply and allotment

of CWS officers and enlisted men, particularly those for the chemical

mortar battalions.98

While Rowan had organized a Personnel Division and expanded it

into a Personnel and Troops Division, he did not control the assignment of CWS-trained men. All assignments in the European theater

were made under the supervision of the ETO SOS assistant chief of

staff, G—1, by the theater adjutant general or a command adjutant

general or by the Ground Forces Reinforcement System. The assigning

agency commonly considered all CWS officers and men as service troops

and indiscriminately assigned individuals to any CWS vacancy. While

such indiscriminate assignment produced some problems in service

units, such as the assignment of decontamination specialists to maintenance units, the real difficulty arose in connection with CWS combat

assignment. Mortar battalion commanders found they were receiving

service specialists or clerks while CWS-trained combat soldiers were

assigned to service units. Chemical mortar battalion commanders consequently requested infantry- or artillery-trained men in preference

to those trained by the CWS. It was easier to retrain men who could

be counted upon to have received basic combat training than it was

to retrain CWS men who had no combat training at all."

Rowan immediately began to tackle this problem both from the

field end and from the theater staff end until he persuaded the theater

adjutant general to consult the CWS in the allotment of both men

and units. While it was still necessary to work through the theater

98

 (1) St. John to Porter, Rpt for CCWS, 28 Jun 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Ltr Files, ETO. (2) Personal

Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 2 Sep 44, inclosing Memo, Rowan, no addressee, 26 Aug 44, sub: Notes on Trip

to Far Shore. (3) MacArthur Interv, 19 Sep 61. (4) Leggin Interv, 13 Oct 61. (5) Wright

Interv, 12 Jul 61. 99

 (1) History of Pers and Troops Div OCCWO COMZ ETO, D Day to V-E Day (hereafter cited

as History, Pers and Troops Div). ETO Admin 545A. (2) Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58. (3) Waitt

Comments, 5 Jan 61.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 73

system, and while the preference of individual commanders could still

outweigh OCCWO planning, this concession gave Rowan a much

larger hand in the solution. Rowan and his subordinates were thereafter able to correct many inequities in chemical assignments.100

On moving to the Continent in September, Rowan began consolidating his offices. FECOMZ, its operational period having been curtailed on the one end by the extension of First Army's control and on

the other by the early arrival on the Continent of the main echelon,

was absorbed into the COMZ headquarters. Little change was made

in the theater chemical section organization when the section was

established in Paris. The Supply Division carried on its day and night

job much as it had in Cheltenham. The Technical Division remained

in the United Kingdom with a liaison section in Paris. Colonel Bramlet

remained in England to become Chemical Officer, United Kingdom

Base Section, which was in fact a rear echelon of COMZ. The one

significant change was the recombination, just after the arrival in

Paris, of the Planning and the Operations and Training Divisions into

a Planning and Training Division. Since there were no gas warfare

operations, the concept of an Operations and Training Division as a

successor to General Fries' "military" offensive and defensive divisions

faded completely, and toward the end of the war the division devoted

itself to demobilization and redeployment planning.101 Since Colonel

St. John had also primarily been employed in planning, his position

was abolished in the fall of 1944. He, too, turned to demobilization

work, mostly outside the CWS sphere.102

Rowan gave much of his personal attention to the problems of

operating in a nongas warfare situation. The chemical mortar battalions were in considerable demand for close infantry support from

the time of their debut on the Continent, but since their extensive

use in a nonchemical role had not been envisioned before the war,

there was no well-established body of doctrine relating to their employment. In the resultant controversy over infantry or artillery fire

100

 (1) History, Pers and Troops Div. (2) Personal Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 1 Sep 44. (3) Personal

Ltr, St. John to Waitt, 1 Sep 44. 101

 (1) CWS History, 1 Jan 44 to "D Day." (2) History of the Administrative Div OCCWO,

D Day to V-E Day, Hq COMZ ETOUSA. Both in ETO Admin 545A. (3) History of Sup Div

OCCWO Hq ETOUSA, D Day to V-E Day (hereafter cited as History, Sup Div, II.) ETO Admin

544. (4) History of CWS Plans and Tng Div in the ETO, 6 Jun 44 to 9 May 45. (5) History of

the Tech Div CWS Hq ETOUSA, 6 Jun 44-9 May 45. Both in ETO Admin 545B. 102

 Personal Ltr, St. John to Col Elliott, DCCWS, 22 Nov 44.
74 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

direction, Rowan aligned himself firmly with the proponents of

infantry control.103 Lacking the means to establish doctrine as a representative of the theater commander, Rowan chose to visit combat

commanders to persuade them to use attached chemical mortar battalion elements under infantry control. Though he was sometimes

frustrated in this attempt, Rowan usually found personal persuasion

effective.104

The theater chief chemical officer also used personal persuasion in

an attempt to secure the proper employment of smoke generator units.

Since many commanders were unaware of the new techniques in use

of smoke which had been developed in the Mediterranean theater,

they were unprepared and unwilling to initiate the employment of

smoke. As a result, many smoke generator troops made their way

across France engaged in such miscellaneous activities as service and

transportation troops. General Rowan tried to persuade field commanders to maintain the integrity of these units, to keep up their

equipment and to employ them on their primary mission wherever

possible. Smoke came into great demand for concealment in Germany

when the river-crossing operations began. At that time many smoke

units were recalled to their primary mission, but re-equipping and retraining was no easy task. Some units and their equipment had been

so dispersed that they were never called back to their primary mission.105

Rowan's activities on the Continent, such as those in connection

with the mortar battalions and the smoke generator units, raise the

question of the proper role, in the absence of gas warfare, of the

Chemical Warfare Service and of the various staff chemical officers.

Neither Porter nor Rowan felt that the absence of gas warfare significantly altered the basic mission of the CWS or of CWS staff officers.

Both believed that Fries's concept of a service in which "research was

linked with the closest possible ties to the firing line" still applied.106

Although toxics had not been used and although the likelihood of

their use became more remote with each succeeding month of the war,

there was always the possibility that the Germans might use gas to cap

the offensive which had created the "bulge" in the Ardennes, or to

prevent the crossing of the Rhine, or in last-ditch defense of the

103

 See below, ch. XII. 104

 Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58. (2) Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60. 105

 (1) Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58. (2) Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60. 106

 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 73.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 75

homeland.107 These possibilities were sufficiently real so that European

theater forces had to be at least prepared to wage gas warfare. Preparedness meant that gas masks and protective clothing must be

available for all troops in potential danger zones, that decontamination

equipment and supplies must be available, that gas alarms and detection

devices must be in the hands of line units or ready for issue and that

gas defensive training for all troops must not be neglected. Furthermore, preparedness meant that chemical intelligence information must

be gathered and interpreted, that chemical advisers and service and

combat troops must be ready to begin offensive or defensive operations

or both with very short notice. And there was yet another threat—the

threat of biological warfare. The gas warfare defensive system would

serve for defense against biological warfare, but CWS officers had to

be acquainted with the latest developments so that should such warfare

be initiated, they could recognize it, furnish needed advice, and take

proper defensive measures. Retaliation in this field was out of the

question since the CWS had no biological munitions.108 Preparedness

was no small task. But preparedness was only the first of the CWS

tasks. There were also the tasks connected with the nongas warfare

operations of the chemical mortar battalions, with the supply and field

employment of artificial smoke, and with the supply and training for

incendiary and flame weapons employment.

Rowan had to reconsider, once the pattern of operations on the

Continent was apparent, how to accomplish the CWS tasks. Since his

own office operated a CWS supply system, he only had to see that his

Supply Division was operating and secure the co-operation of the base

sections in distribution and of the combat elements in stating requirements. The contacts with the base sections were maintained, as in

England, through the base section chemical officers who kept in informal touch with his office.109

 The base section chemical officers also

107

 (1) Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58. (2) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (3) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61.

(4) Interv, Hist Off with Col Kenneth A. Cunin, 5 Dec 45. 108

 See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 101-22. 109

 Information on the base sections is drawn from: (1) Wright Interv, 16 Jul 61 (Colonel Wright

was Chemical Officer, Loire Base Section); (2) Intervs, Hist Off with Col Christian O. Christensen,

USAR (Ret.), 13, 23 Oct 61 (Colonel Christensen was Chemical Officer, Oise Base Section); (3) Ltr,

Col Greene to Hist Off, 22 Jan 60 (Colonel Greene was Chemical Officer, Brittany Base Section and

Seine Base Section); (4) Ltr, Col Hubert B. Bramlet, USA (Ret.), to Hist Off, 6 Oct 59 (Colonel

Bramlet was Chemical Officer, United Kingdom Base Section); (5) Ltr, Col Ferris U. Foster, AUS

(Ret.), to Hist Off, 13 Oct 59 (Colonel Foster was Chemical Officer, Southern Base Section in England

and subsequently assigned to United Kingdom Base Section).
76 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

maintained informal liaison with each other and with combat organization chemical officers. Base section chemical officers operated under

their own command, but most of them asserted some independence in

chemical supply matters. They were usually able to arrange transportation as they saw fit, and they supervised the activities of chemical

service units in their areas. Problems were handled directly with

Rowan's office—usually by telephone.

The supply and service aspects of preparedness thus taken care of,

Rowan could devote most of his time to his duties as "roving ambassador." He or Day frequently talked to MacArthur and his successor,

Col. Patrick F. Powers, or their deputy, Leggin, in the 12th Army

Group Chemical Section.110 These officers regularly, both officially

and informally, saw and corresponded with the chemical officers of

First, Third, and Ninth Armies, and they occasionally heard from

Col. Benjamin F. Mattingly, chemical adviser to G-3, 6th Army

Group, and from the chemical officer of Seventh Army. The 12th

Army Group Chemical Section also maintained liaison with the British

21 Army Group Chemical Section as long as General Sir Bernard L.

Montgomery, 21 Army Group commander, was also Allied land commander. In September 1944, 12th Army Group was transferred to the

direct control of SHAEF, and the chemical officers continued, as they

had throughout the planning and early continental period, to correspond with St. John.111

 Preparedness occupied much of the time of

the 12th Army Group Chemical Section. MacArthur's first problem

on arriving on the Continent was to determine what might be done

to relieve the combat troops of the need to carry the gas mask.

Soldiers individually discarded burdensome masks whenever they felt

that there was no further danger of gas or whenever they had what

they regarded as a more important item to carry. Even when retained

masks suffered abuse because carriers were used as catch-alls. Instruction and training were useless in persuading soldiers to care for their

masks. MacArthur met with members of the army group staff on this

problem, and General Bradley himself suggested at the conference

that division commanders be given the option of withdrawing masks

110

 Information on the 12th Army Group Chemical Section is from: (1) MacArthur Interv, 19 Sep

61; (2) Leggin Intervs, 13 Oct 61, 22 Nov 45; (3) Interv, Hist Off with Col Powers, USA (Ret.), 24

Sep 59; (4) 12th Army Group, Rpt of Opns, vol. XI, Cml Warfare Sec. 111

 MacArthur (comments on draft of this volume) minimizes St. John's role since it was only that

of an adviser with SHAEF headquarters.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 77

from individuals if transport could be found which would carry the

masks with advancing troop units, making them readily available for

reissue. Since no combat element either below or above division had

an organizational baggage train, the only feasible solution from the

army group point of view was to suggest that divisions allot the necessary space for masks in their division trains and this soon became

SHAEF approved policy.

The 12th Army Group Chemical Section was to perform its more

routine duties through an organization which consisted of four

branches: Administrative, Supply and Logistics, Operations, and Technical and Intelligence. Five officers and 7 enlisted men were allotted

to the organization, and on 13 October 1944 this allotment was reduced

to 3 officers and 3 enlisted men. The duties of stating requirements for

supplies and dividing scarce supplies, such as chemical mortar ammunition, among the three armies proved to be time consuming. Formulating chemical annexes for army group tactical plans was also time

consuming. Liaison, inspection, and intelligence duties and the constant

and thorny problems posed by the necessity of advising on the allotment of chemical mortar units took the remaining time. Powers

greatly regretted that no time remained to co-ordinate the direct gas

warfare training being carried on by division chemical officers. He

was not satisfied with the state of gas warfare preparedness although

he felt that Rowan and his staff were doing an excellent job, considering

the personal effort required for communication among the various

elements in the theater. Powers managed to reverse the earlier policy

and secure the reissue of the gas mask to individual soldiers. He felt

that even a gas scare would have caused panic at the time of the Battle

of the Bulge when troops had no individual protection.112 He was

never able to achieve the movement of more than a token stock of

toxic ground ammunition to the Continent, and no aerial toxic munitions were ever moved from England. On the point of the adequacy

of aerial retaliation, Powers disagreed with both Porter and Waitt. He

shared the view of the Chief and Assistant Chief of the CWS that

strategic aerial retaliation in kind against the initiation of gas warfare

was possible, but he maintained that essential tactical retaliation, which

would have taken a ground effort, had been overlooked. Because

ground retaliatory preparation was only token, Powers, like many of

112

 For discussion of supply problems caused by this decision, see below, Chapter IV.
78 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

his colleagues, believed the Allied forces fortunate in that the Germans

never took advantage of their opportunities to initiate gas warfare.

Lt. Col. Kenneth A. Cunin, who succeeded Coughlan as First Army

chemical officer on 24 July 1944, also believed the American forces

inadequately prepared for gas warfare because of the shortage of

ground toxic ammunition.113 Cunin considered the protective supply

adequate, but his section agreed with nth Army Group policy in

reissuing individual protection at the time of the December threat.

The First Army Chemical Section could do little to improve the preparedness situation from the standpoint of toxic supply or gas warfare

training. Although the section allotment was 6 officers and 16 enlisted

men, 3 officers and 13 enlisted men more than the 12th Army Group

Chemical Section, First Army chemical officers found themselves fully

occupied with the problems of the mortar battalions and those of

nongas chemical supply and gas warfare intelligence.114

Colonel Wallington, Chemical Officer, Third U.S. Army, throughout the European campaigns, was less concerned about gas warfare

preparedness than Powers and Cunin. He believed in preparedness, but

he considered the gas warfare retaliatory potential in the European

theater adequate in view of the absence of gas warfare. In Wallington's

opinion the theater command and combat commanders in Europe

justifiably took the risk of being less than fully prepared for gas

warfare. He believed the risk was justifiable because there were so

many other pressing demands on commanders' resources, because

United States national policy forbade the initiation of gas warfare,

and because intelligence was expected to provide warning if a policy

change was required.115

While Wallington believed that the state of gas warfare training

among U.S. forces in Europe was such that the initiation of gas

warfare would have resulted in panic, he conceived his job as being

primarily that of supporting nongas warfare activities of the corps and

divisions under Third Army. At the same time, he gave all the support

he could to protective preparedness and intelligence activities.116 This

conception of duties meant that the TUSA Chemical Section, like the

113

 Cunin Interv, 5 Dec 45. Cunin was succeeded as First Army chemical officer by Col. Frederick

W. Gerhard in April 1945. 114

 FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44-22 Feb 45, vol. 4, an. 13, Cml Warfare Sec Rpt, pp. 253-67. 115

 Interv, Hist Off with Brig Gen Edward C. Wallington, USA (Ret.), 1 Dec 59. 116 Ibid.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 79

FUSA Chemical Section, devoted maximum attention to supply and

to the needs of the chemical mortar battalions. It also meant the provision of supply support and tactical advice for the smoke generator

units which were heavily employed by TUSA, especially in its river

crossings. As a result of experience in these tasks, the TUSA Chemical

Section found that the one chemical depot company attached could

not handle all supply requirements. It recommended that two such

companies be assigned, and more important still, that CWS should

have far more transportation for the depot company, the smoke generator, and the mortar units. The CWS could not operate its own

supply system, which it did with very little help from other supply

services, and at the same time shift men and equipment in a fastmoving war without greatly increased transportation. The chemical

section suggested addition of a truck company to the Army for CWS

use.117

To accomplish the intelligence mission, which Wallington deemed

so important since warning of necessary policy change was to come

from intelligence information, two technical intelligence teams were

attached to Third Army. Several of these CWS technical intelligence

teams were organized and trained by the CWS in the United States

and several more were organized and trained by Rowan's office. These

teams were attached to Army chemical sections. They reported to

the section to which they were attached and to Colonel Tarr's Intelligence Division in Rowan's office and to the CWS in the United States.118

The work of all such teams is revealed in an account of the activities

of CWS Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Team (EEIST) Number One, under Capt. James F. Munn.119

EEIST Number One, consisting of Captain Munn and three enlisted

men (a driver, a photographer, and an interpreter) was organized and

trained in the United States and shipped to Europe in time to arrive

in France on 18 July 1944. It was first attached to FUSA and was

later under orders of the nth Army Group Chemical Section until

attached to the TUSA Chemical Section in September. During the

campaign across France, the team investigated several French laboratories and chemical factories used by the Germans, and analyzed, photo117

 TUSA AAR, 1 Aug 44-9 May 45, vol. II, CWS Sec. 118

 CWS COMZ ETO History of Intell Div, From D Day Through V-E Day. ETO Admin 545B. 119

 The following account is derived from: (1) Rcds of CWS EEIST No. 1, Apr 44—Aug 45, CWS

314.7 EEIST No. 1; (2) Information furnished by Lt Col James F. Munn, USAR (Ret.).
80 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

graphed, and inventoried laboratory, manufacturing, and protective

equipment. Although several rumors of German toxic stores were

reported, the team found no German toxics and no equipment for

manufacturing them.120 Interviews with Frenchmen who had been

pressed into German employment revealed only that the Germans were

interested in and had continued French toxic and munitions development. As the campaign moved into Germany, the team was called

upon for numerous similar analyses and descriptions, and it became

increasingly involved in the interrogation of prisoners of war who

might have chemical information. Such interrogations were carried

on in co-operation with Army prisoner of war and intelligence

authorities. This team and others operating on the battlefront gradually accumulated a fairly good store of information concerning German

individual and collective protection, doctrine, and instructions for

civilians as well as military forces. The teams also collected adequate,

although not abundant, information on German weapons and agents

and chemical investigative processes. On 20 April 1945 the Chemical

Officer, Seventh Army, informed EEIST Number One that the forward

elements of the 14th Armored Division had discovered a German war

gas factory in Velden, Germany. The XV Corps Chemical Section

moved in to investigate.121 A few days later, on 24 April 1945, XII

Corps discovered a German toxic depot, whereupon the team set out,

in co-operation with Colonel Wallington and Col. Ragnar E. Johnson,

XII Corps chemical officer, to investigate and inventory this depot.

The chemical analysis of captured munitions was beyond the capacity

of this small team, but they were able to sort out munitions which

could be sent to Rowan's Intelligence and Technical Divisions for

further analysis. The findings of EEIST Number One proved beyond

a doubt that the Germans were well and elaborately prepared for gas

warfare and that they possessed toxic munitions unknown to the

Allied forces.

The Ninth Army Chemical Section under Col. Harold Walmsley

and the Seventh Army Chemical Section under Lt. Col. Bruce T.

Humphreville operated in much the same way as the First and Third

Army Chemical Sections. Again the principal interest was in nongas

warfare and defensive gas warfare supply. The Ninth Army Chemical

120

 A small store of French toxics was found. Ltr, Chief EEIST No. 1 to CmlO TUSA, 3 Oct 44,

sub: Ammunition Dump at Fameck, France. CWS-EEIST-ETO-R13 in CWS 314.7 CWS EEIST. 121

 Journal Memo, CmlO Seventh Army, 20 Apr 45. CWS 314-7 EEIST.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 81

Section additionally performed extensive liaison functions since that

Army was for a time attached to the British 21 Army Group.122

Rowan was satisfied that chemical matters were well handled at the

army group and army level. His greatest concern was that corps and

division do their job well.123 This job was a demanding one. The

division chemical officer was actually in charge of field training and

intelligence. He was adviser to his commander on gas warfare preparedness and on the employment of mortar battalions and was also

adviser to his commander and to engineer and infantry teams on the

employment of the flame thrower. His section either actually handled

or kept close track of the handling of chemical supply and it was

called upon to mix flame thrower fuel and fill flame throwers whenever

they were used. The ability of the division chemical officer to handle

this job depended upon his own energy and inventiveness since he was

handling weapons and materials not familiar to most line soldiers and

since his job concerned gas warfare preparedness, which was not popular with many commanders and most troops. His ability to do his job

also depended upon the encouragement and support he got from the

division commander and his staff and from higher echelon chemical

officers. It was the duty of the corps chemical officer to oversee all

these activities for the several division chemical officers under his corps

except that he had no specific duties in supply. Since the corps head122

 (1) Ninth U.S. Army G-4 Per Rpts, 3-16 Sep 44; AAR's 1-31 Oct 44, Dec 44-Jun 45. Files

L196-Envelope 10 Cml Sec and L216-Envelope 1; (2) Seventh U.S. Army CWS Staff Sec Rpts,

1 Jan-31 Oct 44, and Dec 44. File L-1139 7th Army Staff Sec "43." 123

 The following account of the corps and division chemical officer's activities is derived from: (1)

Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58; (2) Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60; (3) Col Ragnar E. Johnson, CWS,

Study, Functions and Orgn, Cml Warfare-Liaison Sec Hq XII Corps, n.d.; (4) Interv, Hist Off with

Col William C. Hammond, 26 Nov 56 (Colonel Hammond was Chemical Officer, VI Corps); (5) Ltr,

Col John B. Cobb, USAR (Ret.), to Hist Off, 17 May 60 (Colonel Cobb was Chemical Officer, 35th

Infantry Division and XIX Corps); (6) Interv, Hist Off with Col Edward J. Barta, USAR (Ret.), 23

Sep 59 (Colonel Barta was Chemical Officer, XVIII Corps); (7) Cunin Interv, 5 Dec 45 (Colonel

Cunin was Chemical Officer, 1st Inf Div, before becoming Chemical Officer, FUSA); (8) Interv Hist

Off with Lt Col Levin B. Cottingham, 9 Oct 45 (Colonel Cottingham was Chemical Officer, 5th

Infantry Division); (9) Intervs, Hist Off with Col William Foley, 16 Oct 46, 19 Dec 57 (Colonel

Foley was Chemical Officer, 1st Infantry Division, succeeding Colonel Cunin); (10) Intervs, Hist Off

with Col John L. Miles, 12 Apr 56, 9 Mar 61 (Colonel Miles was Chemical Officer, 26th Infantry

Division); (11) Interv, Hist Off with Col Russell W. Dodds and Lt Col Samuel J. Boyles, 8 May 56

(Colonel Dodds was Chemical Officer, 65th Infantry Division, and Colonel Boyles was Chemical Officer,

91st Infantry Division); (12) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Thomas B. Crawford, USAR, 18 Apr 56

(Colonel Crawford was Chemical Officer, 80th Infantry Division); (13) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col

Herbert B. Livesey, Jr., USAR (Ret.), 8 Jun 56 (Colonel Livesey was Chemical Officer, 106th Infantry

Division); (14) Interv, Hist Off with Col Alfred G. Karger, USAR, Jun 56 (Colonel Karger was

Chemical Officer, 8th Infantry Division); (15) Daily Log, Cml Warfare Sec, 29th Inf Div, 6 Jun

44-30 Dec 44.
82 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

quarters was primarily a tactical element, the corps chemical officer

naturally centered his attention on tactical employment of chemical

weapons and equipment.

Rowan was of course concerned about the energy and resourcefulness

of division and corps chemical officers since he, like Fries, believed that

CWS services should be sold to combat commanders, but even after

his arrangement on manpower with the ETO adjutant general, he

could seldom control the assignment of division chemical officers since

most such officers arrived with their divisions from the United States.

Even in the few instances when replacements were made in the theater,

the nearest ranking CWS officer was usually chosen by the organization

commander without reference to theater manpower channels. Rowan

was most anxious that the organization give the chemical officer a

chance to do his job. Many commanders felt that in the absence of gas

warfare, the corps or division chemical officer had nothing to do and

was therefore available for any assignment in which there might be a

vacancy. Rowan and the organization chemical officers expected that

organization chemical officers would receive the normal quota of

additional assignments to military courts, investigating and inspection

teams, and the like, but Rowan urged all chemical officers to resist

assignments to nonchemical duties which would occupy most or part

of their time. Whenever Rowan had an opportunity in his tours he

asked corps and division commanders or their chiefs of staff to permit

chemical officers to devote most of their time to what were, in his

opinion, the crucial duties of chemical training and intelligence. He

also felt that chemical officers should be active in the staff supervision

and tactical control of chemical mortar and smoke units which operated under the organization commander. Despite Rowan's pleas, most

chemical officers received additional assignments which consumed most

of their time. The usual assignment was the operation of the organization liaison section which handled liaison with other organizations and

higher echelons, received and briefed visitors, and maintained a tactical

and/or intelligence information center. One energetic chemical officer

so assigned maintains that he spent precisely one and a half hours

exclusively on chemical work while his division was in combat, but

he believes he was a better division chemical officer because of his

additional assignments.

Those organization chemical officers not assigned the liaison task
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 83

had many other regular or part-time assignments such as reconnaissance for the division commander, acting as headquarters commandant,

and even serving as divisional mess officer. Many organization chemical

officers disagreed with Rowan and welcomed these nonchemical assignments since they were usually with the forward or command echelon

of the division where the chemical officer could not expect to be in

a nongas warfare situation, and since the work usually kept them in

better touch with the tactical situation than most staff officers. As one

chemical officer phrased it, the CWS officer was an orphan, away from

any CWS command echelon—he increased his own prestige and that

of his service if he could make himself useful in a combat organization.

Frequently his ability to sell CWS services varied in direct proportion

to his usefulness in a nonchemical capacity. Lt. Col. William Foley,

Chemical Officer, 1st Infantry Division, was assigned as assistant to

the division assistant chief of staff, G-3. He felt that this assignment

to the operations and plans element was ideal since in the event of gas

warfare he would have been acquainted with the tactical situation and

able to render his advice as a member of the staff section charged with

applying the tactical plan. Most organization chemical officers with

other assignments, like Foley, believed that they were not neglecting

their chemical job. The assistant division chemical officer, a captain,

and some or all of the four enlisted men in the section could handle

supply and administrative functions from the division rear echelon.

The assistant chemical officer could and usually did refer really knotty

problems involving liaison with higher echelons or special requests for

authority or supplies to the organization chemical officer in forward

echelon.

Many assistant division chemical officers and their enlisted assistants

became proficient at handling chemical training, to which the whole

section had usually devoted most of its efforts in the United States.124

Because of severe manpower restrictions on the CWS, every combat

organization, just as in World War I, usually maintained unit gas

officers (UGO's) in all elements at regiment and battalion levels.

Unlike the World War I precedent, these officers were usually given

this duty as an additional assignment, and they did not report to the

organization chemical officer except for training. The division chemical

officer was also responsible for training unit gas noncommissioned offi124

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 382-93.
84 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

cers (UGNCO's) for every company-sized unit. This, too, was an

additional duty and UGNCO's usually reported for this duty to UGO's.

Most chemical officers attempted to keep the roster of UGO's and

UGNCO's current by offering courses and demonstrations, even conducting them in forward areas, whenever commanders and operations

officers would allot the time. The more ambitious chemical officers

also trained decontamination squads from combat units, gave flame

thrower training, and demonstrated the use of incendiary and smoke

grenades. Corps and army chemical officers frequently co-operated,

or at least provided moral support when the physical assistance they

could give was limited.

Division and corps chemical officers, like their seniors in army and

army group, emphasized intelligence activities. Protecting captured

munitions from souvenir hunters was one of the problems in this

field as was securing transportation to take samples back for analysis.

Corps chemical officers usually called upon the army chemical officer

for EEIST assistance in such cases.

A few corps and division chemical officers found it possible to participate actively in tactical plans and preparations, especially for

smoke operation.

Nearly every activity of the division and corps chemical officers

presented problems. They were perpetually short of transportation

and of service personnel. Supply of wanted items, such as incendiary

or smoke grenades and mortar ammunition, was often short and communication to the rear to remedy these shortages was difficult. But

despite these drawbacks, most corps and division chemical officers felt

that they accomplished their mission and that their organizations were

reasonably well prepared for gas warfare and had made effective nongas

warfare use of mortars and smoke. The few who had biological warfare

defensive training also felt that they were ready to cope with this kind

of warfare should it come. Very few organization chemical officers

seriously considered offensive gas warfare since, aside from the mortar

battalions, they had no contact with any of the units scheduled to

wage it and did not handle offensive supplies.

Summary

There is no simple way of measuring the work of the CWS in the

theaters of operations. There is no accounting comparable to that of
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 85

tactical objectives taken, bridges built, and miles of communication

wire laid. The 2,097 CWS officers and 26,909 CWS enlisted men in

the European theater in March and April of 1945 were there, first, to

provide the insurance that the American forces could continue to fight

and retaliate in kind if the enemy initiated gas warfare.125 Second,

these "chemicals" as some denominated themselves, were there to

provide CWS gas protective services, fire CWS nongas weapons, provide supply of CWS items, and support the combat forces in any way

which they or the theater commanders could devise. There was no

question in Porter's, or Waitt's, or Rowan's mind that they provided

gas warfare insurance and that they performed extraordinarily well

at their nongas warfare tasks.126

Theater commanders, with a few exceptions, willingly supported

the preparedness effort since they valued the insurance. They increasingly welcomed the CWS nongas warfare activities as the war progressed. They had no heavy mortar other than the chemical mortar,

which proved tremendously effective, and they had no means for

sustained provision of artificial smoke other than the smoke generator

units and CWS-furnished smoke pots and ammunition.

There were many problems in accomplishing the CWS tasks ranging

from lack of staff and service manpower to a general lack of understanding of what the CWS might do in a nongas warfare situation.

As in the Fries and Porter ideal, the ties between research and the

battle lines, although tenuous, did exist, and Porter's conception of

the CWS as a unique service, which participated and aided in almost

every phase of military activity, was most nearly realized in the

European theater. Rowan came closer than any other theater chief

chemical officer to Porter's goal of operating a unified service although

the unity in many cases completely depended on the personal obligation

which most chemical officers felt toward their service and its senior

representatives in the theater.

125

 Strength figures compiled from STM-30, Strength of the Army, prepared by The Adjutant

General's Machine Records Branch monthly. The 31 March 1945 figure of 26,909 enlisted men is the

peak CWS strength for the European theater as is the 30 April 1945 strength of 2,097 officers. (Brophy

and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. B.) 126

 (1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. (3) Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58.
CHAPTER III

CWS Administration and Supply:

Mediterranean

The Chemical Warfare Service, like the rest of the Army, matriculated in the logistics school of the North African campaigns. The

Army had directly participated in the global supply effort for eight

months before the planning for North Africa got under way, but

this was the first Army participation in an Allied logistics operation

of great magnitude. Supply of any considerable force at any time

during the war was far from a simple matter, but probably no other

logistics operation of the war was surrounded by so many complicating

circumstances as this initial venture. Planning got under way late.

Allied forces strategy for a landing originally projected for October

1942 and finally for November did not assume a clear pattern until

5 September 1942. The Allied commander-designate, General Eisenhower, set up his planning headquarters, AFHQ, in England, though

the source of the bulk of materials was the United States, and a major

combat force under Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., was to sail directly

from the United States for the assault. The Navy had determined

that an acute shortage of cargo ships, the grave threat of submarine

warfare, and the shortage of escorts made small, fast-moving, infrequent

convoys a necessity; thus, the quantities of materials and the numbers

of men to be shipped were severely limited and the intervals between

deliveries were lengthened. Few troops had received enough training

to be considered ready for operations, and elsewhere in the Army,

as in the CWS, few production lines were furnishing equipment,

especially new equipment, in desired amounts. Furthermore, the

administrative mechanisms were not yet working properly. Jurisdic-
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 87

tional boundaries between the Army Service Forces and the two other

major War Department commands, Army Ground Forces and Army

Air Forces, had not been clearly delineated. Strategic or tactical alterations time and again upset logistical plans. Details of port operation

and organization still had to be fixed, and co-ordination among the

ports, the technical services, and the Services of Supply headquarters

was to be developed through the North African experience. General

Eisenhower later wrote that the operation was ". . . in conflict with

all operational and logistical methods laid down in textbooks. . . ."1

General Eisenhower called in Colonel Shadle one day in the middle

of August 1942 and told him that he was appointed Chemical Warfare

Officer, AFHQ.2 This appointment to a supreme allied headquarters

placed Shadle in a position that no CWS officer had ever been in

before; the headquarters of Marshall Ferdinand Foch, the only pertinent World War I example, had no special staff. General Eisenhower

created AFHQ from a number of military concepts both current and

new to comply with his basic directive. AFHQ was, first, an instrument

for co-ordinating Allied strategic plans and operations and a combined

command for ground, sea, and air forces. It was next a theater headquarters or at least it was designed to contain the nucleus of a theater

headquarters in that it had a full general and special staff oriented to

the direction of American Army activities in a theater of operations.

It was, third, a tactical and operational headquarters approximating

that of a field army with initial supervision of three corps. It was,

fourth and least, the parent organization for a communications zone

headquarters whose operating elements, the base section headquarters,

were being formed as adjuncts of the corps headquarters.3

Shadle and an officer assistant immediately set about making general

chemical plans for the scheduled invasion, known as Operation TORCH.

On 15 September 1942, Shadle's section was officially organized as the

Chemical Warfare Section, AFHQ. Lt. Col. Ian A. Marriott, British

Army, was appointed deputy and one of the two American officers

assigned became executive officer. One British major, three American

enlisted men, and two British enlisted men completed the staff. While

1

 (1) George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957), ch. II. (2) Leighton and Coakley, ch. XVI. The

quotation from General Eisenhower is cited on page 455. (3) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 87-90. 2

 Interv, Hist Off with Gen Shadle, 16 May 61. 3

 History of AFHQ, pt. I, Aug-Dec 42, pp. 1-26. (2) Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 56-58. (3)

Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 32-59.
88 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the section was intended to serve both AFHQ and the planned American theater Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations,

United States Army (NATOUSA), the manpower allotment, as

authorized by the AFHQ chief of staff, was sufficient only to form

two divisions, one Administration, the other Technical and Intelligence.

Despite the lack of a supply or logistics division, the AFHQ Chemical

Section, in its NATOUSA role, was assigned staff responsibility for

chemical materiel through the entire overseas span from requirements

to salvage.4

Since at this time national policy and the toxic supply capability of

the Army forbade the employment, even in retaliation, of war gases,

Shadle and his staff made no gas warfare offensive plan.5 They were

also unable to make any nongas warfare offensive plans involving the

use of chemical mortar units or the new portable flame throwers as

neither units nor weapons were yet ready. Brig. Gen. Lyman L.

Lemnitzer, AFHQ assistant chief of staff, G-3, suggested to Shadle that

artificial smoke protection would be valuable in view of German air

superiority over the Mediterranean and North Africa. Shadle accordingly requested smoke pots both from the United States and from the

British and drew up tactical smoke plans. The CWS in the United

States could furnish only the prewar training allowance of one pot

per twenty soldiers, a ratio which Shadle viewed as entirely inadequate.

A part of the smoke deficit was made up by the supply of British pots

and another part by the inclusion of some new mechanical smoke

generators and a. smoke generator unit in the forces to arrive from

the United States. Still, Shadle considered preparedness for smoke

operations to be below the desirable standard.6

In the absence of gas warfare supplies, and with inadequate nongas

warfare supply, the principal responsibility of the AFHQ and

NATOUSA Chemical Sections was to provide for gas warfare protection, and the prime corollary task was the computation of protective materiel and service requirements for all forces expected to be

in North Africa. Time was too short and the AFHQ staff section too

small to accomplish this prime task without aid. Consequently, all

4

 (1) History of AFHQ, pt. I, pp. 35-37, 59-61. (2) Personal Ltr, Shadle, Chief Cml Sec AFHQ, to

Porter, CCWS, 11 Feb 43. CWS 201—Shadle, Charles S. (O) in CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO,

Feb 43-Feb 44. 5

 For national policy and toxic supply potential in 1942, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War,

Chapters III and IV, and above, Chapter I. 6

 Shadle Interv, 16 May 61.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 89

the existing and forming chemical sections in the European theater,

the Office of the Chief, CWS, in the United States, and the Chemical

Section of General Patton's newly organized Western Task Force

(WTF) headquarters in the United States pitched into the job, not

only of estimating requirements, but also of actually supplying staff

sections, materials, and troops. The OCCWS participated in these

activities through liaison provided by ASF and OPD with the overseas

staffs and with the WTF headquarters which was at first divided

between Washington's Munitions Building and Indiantown Gap Military Reservation and was later consolidated at Fort George G. Meade,

Md.7 All echelons began planning before the character of the TORCH

operation had definitely been determined.

In the United Kingdom, Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark's II Corps Headquarters, in which Col. Walter P. Burn was chemical officer, assumed

most of the planning burden for what was to become Center Task

Force (CTF), an American force scheduled to make an assault on and

in the vicinity of Oran, Algeria. The Office of the Chief Chemical

Warfare Officer, European theater, transferred one officer and four

enlisted men into II Corps headquarters in September 1942. During

September, October, and November, the remainder of the planning

period, a number of CWS ETO officers and men were transferred into

or detailed for service with the forming Mediterranean Base Section

(MBS) and Twelfth Air Force headquarters in which supply matters

were being co-ordinated with II Corps.8 Maj. Herbert F. Croen, Jr.,

scheduled to be acting chief of the MBS Chemical Section, remained

for some time with the CWS ETO to assist in the task of apportioning

available chemical resources in England for TORCH. Although SOS

ETO had been advised that all TORCH troops arriving from the United

States to assemble in the United Kingdom would be fully equipped,

the CWS ETO discovered that units and organizations inspected on

7

 (1) Memos, ACofS G-2 WDGS for CG's AGF, AAF, SOS, and A Task Force, 11, 20 Aug 42, sub:

Security Control, A Special Opn. (2) Memo, Col Norman E. Fiske, WD Security Officer for All WD

Security Officers, 18 Aug 42, sub: Rules Governing Security in the War Dept for A Special Opn.

(3) Ltr, TAG to ACofS Opns SOS et al., 26 Aug 42, sub: Security Control, A Special Opn. SPX

312.11 (8-25-42) MS-SPEX-M All in CWS 314.7, A Special Opn, TORCH. 8

 (1) History of CWS Per Activities, in History, Sup Div CWS ETO (ca. Jan 1944). ETO Admin

545A. (2) Narrative History of Mediterranean Base Section, NATOUSA-MTOUSA, Sep 42 to May 44

(hereafter cited as History of MBS), no paging. OCMH. (3) Ltr, Maling, CmlO XII AFSC, to

Porter, CCWS, 3 Apr 43, sub: Orgnl History of Cml Warfare Sec, Twelfth AF. CWS 314.7

Twelfth AF.
90 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

disembarkation reported critical shortages of chemical equipment,

especially protective equipment.9

The European theater BOLERO build-up was brought to a sudden

halt.10 The CWS ETO diverted chemical equipment and supplies from

BOLERO reserves and from ordinary issues to fill shortages for TORCH

organizations and units. These organizations and units made requisition

directly upon the CWS ETO for chemical supply, and the CWS in

turn extracted requisitions to depots. Shortage of time, shortage of

materials, and the fact that establishment of the depots had just begun

did not permit the operation of the normal supply pattern under which

a designated depot would receive requisitions from and make issues to

all units in its geographical area. Since the impromptu supply arrangements were unlikely to cover all cases of critical shortage, the CWS

ETO also undertook a program of inspecting the chemical readiness

of units about to be shipped to North Africa in order to remedy needs

which had been overlooked.11

In the United States, OCCWS and the Chemical Section, WTF,

computed requirements and determined shortages, as did the CWS ETO,

by checking tables of basic allowances (TBA's) and tables of organization and equipment (TOE's) against unit and organization requisitions

and against inventories of materials in the hands of troops. While the

supply of troops scheduled for the assault was being completed,

OCCWS and the various chemical sections of organizations scheduled

for TORCH also computed the reserves necessary to maintain supply

when forces were operating in the combat zone. The level of supply

reserves in terms of days of supply was set by agreement among War

Department agencies, AFHQ, and ETO headquarters, and OCCWS

arrived at estimated expenditure rates in order to translate day of

supply into actual quantities of materials.12 Since no conclusive expenditure data were available, these estimates were at best educated

guesses, but problems arising from lack of experience did not become

apparent in the planning and early operational period. The CWS was

able to supply gas warfare protective items, which made up the largest

9

 Interv, Hist Off with Col Herbert F. Croen, Jr., USAR, 21 Sep 59. 10

 BOLERO was the code name for the build-up of supplies in the British Isles for a projected Allied

attack on continental Europe. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, pp. 87-99. 11 History of CWS Sup System, CWS ETO (27 Jul 42-1 Jan 44) (hereafter cited as History, Sup

System). ETO Admin 545A Cml Warfare. 12

 A "day of supply" was the amount of any item, group of items, or entire category of supply

calculated to support a given number of men (force or theater strength) in one day's operation.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 91

COLONEL BARKER

portion of the requirements list,

in sufficient quantities to meet

demands.13 Problems arose in providing commanders' special requirements, in providing service

troops, and in limiting both

troops and supplies to available

shipping space.

In connection with commanders' special requirements,

Col. Maurice E. Barker, WTF

chemical officer, declared that

General Patton would have "included a regiment of wizards" if

such an inclusion would have

given promise of help on the far

shore.14 Regiments of wizards

were in short supply, but each

service conducted a search for any special equipment or special allowances of ordinary supplies which might be valuable in the operation.

One OCCWS contribution was the recently developed mechanical

smoke generator which was not available in time for shipment to

the forces assembling in England but was included in WTF.15 WTF

also requested and received special allowances of incendiary hand

grenades so that six grenades could be placed in every vehicle of

the force and be used for destroying the vehicle in event of capture.16

 Army Service Forces made a special allotment of chemical

land mines for Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon's Subtask Force BLACK13

 (1) Requisitions and statements of shortages checked by OCCWS appear in CWS 320.2 files.

(2) Memo, Brig Gen LeRoy Lutes, ACofS Opns SOS, for Chief of Sup Servs; Dir of Distr Div SOS;

and Dir of Mil Pers Div SOS, 14 Sep 42, sub: Distr of Equip. SPOPP 475 in file CWS 314.7

A Special Opn, TORCH. (3) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Lyman C. Duncan, 3 Jun 55. (Colonel

Duncan was a member and chief of the OCCWS requirements staff during most of the war period.)

(4) Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 65-67. (5) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Matthew A. Capone,

USAR, 24 Apr 58. (Colonel Capone worked at requirements computation in CWS ETO in the

fall of 1942.) 14

 Personal Ltr, Col Maurice E. Barker, USA (Ret.), to Hist Off, 12 Jul 49. 15

 (1) For development of the mechanical smoke generator, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From

Laboratory to field, Chapter IX. (2) For smoke generator operations in North Africa, see below,

Chapter VIII. 16

 (1) Ltr, AG Task Force A [WTF] to ACofS OPD WDGS, 10 Oct 42, sub: Request for Grenades,

Incendiary, M14. (2) DF, ACofS OPD to CG SOS, 11 Oct 42, sub: Request for Grenades, Incendiary,

M14. OPD 400 TF (10-10-42). Both in Class V Sup File, Theaters Br Plans Div SOS.
92 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

STONE, an element of WTF, and in answer to Shadle's request, ordered

16,000 smoke pots and 11,300 incendiary grenades shipped to England

for early delivery to CTF.17 While the number of smoke pots was inadequate from Shadle's point of view, the shipment at least denoted the

firm intention of providing smoke cover for the debarkation ports.

This port concealment operation was one the CWS had not previously

attempted.

Port defenses required the provision of chemical troops not only

for smoke generator operation and for manning pot lines but also for

supply, service, and maintenance of smoke units and their equipment.

Very early in North African planning, before the operation had even

acquired a code name, and before even chemical officers realized how

large the smoke mission might be, the OCCWS decided that no

chemical troops would be required in the initial phase of the operation

and recommended that two chemical composite companies and three

decontamination companies be landed only after beachheads were

firmly established. The OCCWS also suggested that four impregnating

companies should be considered as later additions to the force then

contemplated while requirements for depot units and smoke generator

units should be determined by the field commander on the basis of the

tactical and logistical situation.18

These OCCWS troop recommendations and suggestions established

the minimum chemical service requirement according to doctrine then

current, and reflected the idea that gas warfare protection would be

needed until forces started moving inland. Even this minimum service

could not be provided until long after the beachheads were established.

Lack of shipping space and lack of troops who could complete training

and be prepared for overseas shipment in a short time caused a drastic

alteration of plans. Commanders of the troops mounting in England,

assuming that reserve stocks of chemical supplies would not arrive in

the combat zone before service troops could be made available to

handle them, and agreeing with the view that gas warfare would not

start early, accepted a schedule under which chemical service troops

were not provided in the initial phases of the operation. The possibility

17

 (1) Memo, CG SOS for CCWS, 23 Oct 42, sub: Mines, Land, for Mvmt 9999-Q-CWS-V. SPDDO

476 Mines. (2) Memo, CG SOS for Dir Distr Div SOS and CofT, 3 Oct 42. SPOPP. (3) Memo,

CG SOS for CCWS, 2 Nov 42, sub: Ammunition for 9999-R.. SPDDO 471.6 Grenades. All in Class

V Sup File, Theaters Br Plans Div SOS. 18

 Ltr, Chief Field Serv OCCWS to Lt Col George H. Decker, Opns Div SOS, 28 Jul 42, sub: Cml

Troops for BOLERO. CWS 320.2/314 (7-28-42). CWS 314.7, A Special Opn, TORCH.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 93

of enemy initiation of gas warfare before arrival of chemical service

troops was accepted as a calculated risk. Even had commanders requested such troops, few were available; the 6th Chemical Depot

Company was the only chemical service unit available in England. The

planners scheduled this company to arrive in the CTF area about one

month after the initial landings. CTF planners also requested that a

smoke generator company be scheduled to arrive as soon as possible

from the United States. General Patton and his chief of staff, Col.

Hobart R. Gay, wanted both service and smoke generator troops in

the initial phase. WTF plans provided, because of superior resources

in the United States and because General Patton deemed it a logistic

necessity, for building up both reserve and operating stockages, including chemical, to a 90-day level as soon as troops and supplies could

be landed. Colonel Barker decided to take along in the earliest echelon

one platoon of a decontamination company, since such a unit could

provide decontamination services in event of gas warfare, could initially

handle chemical supply, and could use its decontaminating equipment

to clean and disinfect buildings to be occupied by WTF headquarters

and troops. He also obtained a smoke generator company to embark

on the initial resupply convoy in order that smoke cover might be

provided in port areas as soon as supplies began to be landed in quantity.

Colonel Barker devised a plan under which the smoke generator company could provide convoy smoke cover using deck-mounted generators from its own organizational equipment.19

Planning completed, or at least terminated, the assault and assault

support convoys, late in October and early in November, sailed from

Hampton Roads, Va., and England's Mersey ports. The first convoy

from England entered the Strait of Gibraltar on 5 November 1942.

19

 (1) For data on units, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, Appendix F. Units involved

were the 6th Chemical Depot Company and the 69th Chemical Smoke Generator Company for CTF,

and one platoon of the 21st Chemical Decontamination Company and the 78th Chemical Smoke

Generator Company for WTF. No chemical units were originally scheduled for Eastern Task Force,

a predominantly British force scheduled to land near Algiers. (2) Memo, ACofS OPD for CG SOS,

6 Oct 42, sub: Preparation of the 78th Cml Co, Smoke Generator, for Overseas Mvmt. OPD 370.5/CT

(10-6-42). (3) Memo, ACofS OPD for CG SOS, 6 Oct 42, sub: Assignment of the 69th Cml Smoke

Generator Co. OPD 320.2 (10-6-42). (4) Memo, with Incl, ACofS G-3 Hq II Corps CTF for CG

II Corps, 9 Oct 42, sub: Over-all Troop Rqmts, (5) Ltr, CG Task Force A to ACofS OPD, 7 Oct 41,

sub: Request for Cml Co, Smoke Generator. (6) DF, ACofS OPD to CG SOS, 11 Oct 42, sub:

Request for Cml Smoke Generator. OPD 320.2 TF (10-7-42). Last three in 7B Troop Unit File,

Theaters Br Plans Div SOS. (7) Personal Ltr, Barker to Hist Off, 12 Jul 49. (8) Ltr, Burn, CmlO

Hq II Corps CTF, to CCWS, 5 Dec 42, sub: CWS Opn in the Field. MTO CWS 370, Employment,

Opn and Mvmt of Troops. (9) Barker, Comments on draft of this volume, Feb 61.
94 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The WTF convoy moved into assault position off the Moroccan coast

a day later. On 8 November the three task forces struck and war in

the Atlantic area began for the United States ground forces.20 The

token chemical sections and units still at sea on the support convoys

probably had but little comprehension of the magnitude of the logistics

operation in which they were about to participate.

Chemical Supply—The Beachhead Phase

Chemical supply experience in the North African and Mediterranean

Theaters of Operations passed through several phases, each illustrative

of a development in both the theater supply system and the chemical

supply system. The terms theater supply system and chemical supply

system are employed advisedly, because the theater system and each

technical service system tended to develop independently although

both were dependent to a considerable degree upon the War Department system. But that War Department system was only eight months

old at the time of the landings in North Africa, and, as it was never

able completely to overcome the traditional autonomy of the technical

services in the United States, so was it even less able to exert its influence

on the theater technical services through the intermediary of the

theater organization.

The theaters themselves had developed no consistent policy of supply

organization. It was, for example, more than two years after the

initial landings before the North African theater corrected a "serious

flaw in the structure of organization," the assignment of base sections

to NATOUSA rather than SOS NATOUSA headquarters.21 War

Department and theater attempts at supply system evaluation and

co-ordination were consequently sporadic. With an almost overwhelming amount of logistical work to be done in an unfamiliar and difficult

set of circumstances and in the apparent absence of specific and consistent guidance from the major commands, each supply officer in the

theater, whether of high or low echelon, pitched in to do the job as

he saw it, creating his own policy in the process. Such ad hoc procedures

inevitably resulted in the establishment of several systems, and, as the

Mediterranean theater assistant chief of staff, G-4, later pointed out

20

 Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 84-96. The third force was Eastern Task Force, a British controlled element. 21

 Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 30.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 95

with some asperity, each theater chief of technical service developed his

own supply system.22

The period of the landings and the two months thereafter represent

the initial phase in the establishment of the theater CWS supply system.

During this phase the confusion and frustration of the lower echelon

chemical supply officers led to measures for co-ordination at theater

technical service level.

Western Task Force

Maj. Bruce T. Humphreville, Colonel Barker's assistant, who had

won a coin toss with his chief for the honor, and four of the chemical

section's enlisted men went in with the first wave of the WTF landing

at Fedala and in the process lost all their personal equipment except

the clothing they were wearing and their weapons. Colonel Barker,

Capt. James J. Heffner, and the remainder of the WTF CWS contingent arrived in the D+5 (11-13 November 1942) support convoy

outside the wreckage-strewn harbor of Casablanca, French Morocco,

but the lack of facilities ashore kept them from landing. A few hours

before debarkation at Casablanca on 19 November 1942, Colonel

Barker informed the men of the decontamination platoon through

their commanding officer, 1st Lt. Robert D. Myers, that they were to

operate the task force chemical depot while the 78th Chemical Smoke

Generator Company, which was to arrive with the D+20 convoy,

worked with the Navy and the antiaircraft regiment on port air

defense. Depot operation proved to be more of a job than the sixty

days of chemical supply carried on the D+5 convoy and the thirty

days from the assault convoy would seem to indicate. The principal

difficulty was the lack of operating equipment and vehicles. The first

platoon unit equipment was never unloaded from the transport, at

least not at Casablanca, since the support convoy turned back after

discharging only half its load. Unit transportation was scheduled to

arrive on a later convoy. Most of the equipment and transportation

of the task force chemical section had been lost when three transport

ships were torpedoed and burned off the Moroccan port of Fedala.

Chemical supplies were widely scattered throughout the CasablancaFedala area, even as far away as Safi (120 miles from Casablanca),

22

 Ibid., p. 76.
96 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

in an all-services, all-classes

 23

 jumble which became only the more

confused with each incoming shipload.24

Barker and Humphreville had fortunately been furnished money

belts well stuffed with worn French francs, mostly in large notes. They

bought a Ford truck and a Renault sedan, rented a tile factory for a

depot, and hired some local labor. In Barker's opinion the money was

the most valuable commodity they took ashore. The first platoon

moved into a part of the tile factory, borrowed some quartermaster

trucks, and proceeded to collect, transport, sort, stack, and inventory

chemical supplies, most of which were located by a bicycle-mounted

squad that regularly patrolled the docks. Barker's own WTF Chemical

Section, except for two men, worked with them. The bulk of the

supply, Class II protective items, was stored in the factory warehouses.

Class V items, mostly incendiary and smoke grenades and fog oil, were

stored in an open courtyard adjacent to the factory. On 21 December

Colonel Barker reported the local supply position stabilized with about

3,000 tons of all supplies in storage. The chemical supply plan was

entirely of chemical section creation. WTF headquarters, while it had

not interposed objections, had offered no help and no direction to the

chemical procedures. Each of the other technical services represented

had likewise set up its own procedures and was operating according

to its own policy.25

Center Task Force

Chemical officers with CTF—Colonel Burn, task force (II Corps)

chemical officer, Major Croen, acting chemical officer of Mediterranean

Base Section, and Colonel Elliott, chemical officer of Twelfth Air Force

and XII Air Force Service Command—landed near Oran from the

assault and assault support convoys (11-21 November 1942) to find

23

 Classes refers to classes of supply, designated as follows: Class I, food; Class II, unit and organization allowances of clothing, weapons, vehicles, and tools; Class III, fuels and lubricants; Class IV, unit

and organization special equipment not subject to prescribed allowances but allotted according to operational needs; Class V, ammunition, pyrotechnics, mines, and chemical warfare agents. 24

 (1) Personal Ltr, Barker, CmlO WTF, to Porter, 20 Nov 42, no sub. CWS SPCW 314.1/188 in

file CWS 314.7 Barker Corresp, NATO, 1942-43. (2) 21st Cml Decontamination Co History, Sep 42

to Sep 44. (3) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-45, pp. 449-51. (4) Ltr, Barker to

Hist Off, 11 Aug 59. 25

 (1) 21st Cml Decontamination Co History, Sep 42 to Sep 44. (2) Personal Ltr, Barker to

Porter, 21 Dec 42. CWS SPCW 319.1/188 in file CWS 314.7, Barker Corresp, NATO. (3) Barker

to Hist Off, 11 Aug 59.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 97

a supply situation as bad as the one first experienced at Casablanca.26

Although the lack of service units and materials had enabled the planners to schedule only twenty-seven tons of Classes II and IV and only

nineteen tons of ammunition for these convoys, the landing organizations had strewn poorly marked supplies of all shapes and sizes throughout the beachhead area. The chemical officers found that to distinguish

between maintenance supplies and the 60-day reserve, which organizations and units were scheduled to retain as their property, was virtually

impossible. Even when the organization property was identified, the

combat commanders understandably asked to be relieved of the burden

of caring for it.27

Colonel Burn, his 3 officers and 7 men, established a chemical depot

in a slaughterhouse on the outskirts of Oran, Algeria, in which they

handled more than 70 tons of Classes II and IV in less than a month

with the help of local labor and a detail of engineer troops. Burn

vigorously stated his need for chemical service troops and suggested

that service troops be assigned to the leading elements of any future

operation.28 Croen and his section, which eventually numbered 8

officers and 17 men, established themselves in Oran where Mediterranean Base Section became operative under the supervision of II Corps

on 11 November 1942, the day on which the first echelon landed. The

MBS Chemical Section concentrated on setting up chemical storage

and supply operations. The base section group took over the slaughterhouse depot and began gathering such chemical supplies as Burn and

his men had been unable to locate or unable to move. Knowing that

British smoke pots were subject to spontaneous combustion when wet,

Croen made an extra effort to collect them with the idea of establishing

several small ammunition dumps at some distance from the city. The

sites had been prepared and most of the pots collected in the slaughterhouse courtyard awaiting the availability of transportation, when one

of the pots ignited. The courtyard, which had been the only storage

point, became an inferno minutes after the first pot flared. Most of

the other supplies were saved, and the slaughterhouse was sufficiently

isolated so that no other damage was done, but the new AFHQ head26

 Colonel Maling, who was at the time assigned to staff duty with the advance echelon of AFHQ,

reached the landing area from a ship which was torpedoed and sunk just offshore. 27

 (1) Burn Ltr, 5 Dec 42. (2) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58. (Major Capone was a member of the

Twelfth Air Force Chemical Section.) (3) History of MBS. (4) Maling Ltr, 3 Apr 43. 28

 Burn Ltr, 5 Dec 42.
98 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

quarters in Algiers had to await resupply before effective smoke concealment could be provided. The lesson of this unfortunate accident

was that specialist service troops and transportation are needed early

in any operation. After the arrival of the 6th Chemical Depot Company with the base section third echelon on 6 December to take over

the job of establishing chemical depots and depot sections, the service

problem was considerably eased.29

Since there was no transportation available, members of Elliott's

section hiked several miles to their designated area near La Sénia,

Algeria, on the day of their landing. They bivouacked in a sea of mud

and returned the next day to the port area to begin collecting supplies.

Whenever any form of transportation could be begged or borrowed

or whenever space could be obtained on any truck going in the right

direction, they shipped supplies to La Sénia. Since they had no materials-handling equipment, no shelter and no depot setup, the only

virtue in sending the material to La Sénia was that it could be sorted,

identified, and piled in some sort of order. They hired local workers

whenever possible, sometimes paying them from personal funds or by

bartering personal possessions. Arrangements had been made in planning for the Twelfth Air Force to draw chemical supply from II Corps

stocks while that organization controlled supply and subsequently from

the base section. II Corps was unable to meet the air force's demands,

and when the responsibility passed to the base section, that headquarters

was forced to restrict the air force share to 25 percent of available

supplies. MBS early became the focal point of supply for the Tunisia

Campaign, and, in view of the fact that its original maintenance level

was half that of WTF, a quota issue policy was the only answer to an

increasingly perilous stock situation. Air force's chemical officers

approved the quota imposition because they understood that their

requisitions would otherwise have exhausted base section supplies.

Under these conditions, the Chemical Section, XII AFSC, was six

months in building up to a 30-day balanced supply.30

Shadle, his 2 British colleagues, 1 other American officer, and 2

American enlisted men arrived in the theater in early December. As

29

 (1) History of MBS. The base section became independent of II Corps on 6 December. (2)

Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 20-22. (3) 6th Chemical Depot Co History (12

Jul 42 to 8 Aug 43), 1944. (4) Croen Interv, 21 Sep 59. 30

 (1) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58. (2) Maling to Porter, 3 Apr 43. (3) Elliott Comments

16 Jan 61.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 99

Shadle indicated to the Chief, CWS, 2 officers could not thoroughly

perform the multifarious duties demanded of the American

(NATOUSA) complement of the Allied Force Headquarters, but

they devoted as much time as possible to "one of the biggest jobs"

they had, the supply of troops. Shadle examined operations in MBS

and noted that, despite great obstacles, Croen was doing "a 'bang-up*

job." Then, accompanied by Elliott, he visited WTF, which had not

yet received the designated base section complement from the United

States, and discussed chemical matters with Barker. Shadle found the

whole theater force prepared to provide individual protection against

gas warfare, and he found the CWS capable of meeting its supply

responsibilities of the moment, but offensive preparedness was only

in the early planning stage while almost the entire theater chemical

supply organization and process remained to be developed.31

Chemical Supply—Theater Organization Phase

Colonel Shadle's first task in the second phase of North African

logistics development, after the task force service groups were absorbed

in and supplanted by Atlantic Base Section (WTF) and Mediterranean

Base Section (CTF) under AFHQ on 30 December 1942, was to decide

upon an issue policy and to make corresponding storage and handling

arrangements.32 In theory, the base section chemical sections would

simply have ordered their depots to fill table of equipment or table of

allowance shortages for any organization or unit according to unit or

organization requisition, but continental theory failed to cover the

rough facts of life on the far shore. Many tables of allowances and

tables of organization and equipment were incomplete, and the chemical sections were unacquainted with many others which had recently

been revised or introduced. Even had information concerning new

tables been provided in the theater, it would have been of no help. The

North African logistics arrangements had been made with the old

tables in mind and implemented with materiel available; therefore,

chemical section depots lacked the quantity and variety of equipment

demanded. Furthermore, many units arrived without basic equipment

or with unusual demands for equipment to suit special operational

31

 (1) Personal Ltr, Shadle, Chief Cml Sec AFHQ, to Porter, CCWS, 11 Feb 43. CWS 201—Shadle,

Charles S. (O) in file CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO, Feb-Dec 43. (2) Barker to Porter, 21 Dec 42. 32

 Base sections were organized by AFHQ General Orders, 38, 30 December 1942, cited in History

of AFHQ, Part II, Section 1, pages 169-75.
100 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

needs. Shortages developed, but the chemical supply officers' immediate

concern was the determination of the extent of these shortages and the

forecasting of future demands on the issue system. Colonel Shadle;

Col. Siegfried P. Coblentz, Chemical Officer, Atlantic Base Section,

who had arrived with part of his section in Casablanca on Christmas

Eve, 1942; Colonel Johnson, who arrived in February 1943 to become

Chemical Officer, MBS; and Colonel Barker, who became Chemical

Officer, Fifth United States Army, when it was activated at Oujda,

Morocco, on 5 January 1943—all found that the principal obstacle to

the determination of an issue policy was lack of information on current

and forecast demand and on supply allowances.33

As an interim measure pending the establishment of an issue policy,

Shadle adopted a compilation of chemical logistics data prepared by

Colonel Barker on the basis of his experience.34 This compilation was

intended to serve as a guide in estimating issue, storage, and handling

requirements, but the chemical officers were aware of the fact that

it was far from definitive. They exhorted their colleagues in the

United States to supply them with such information as the number

of troops scheduled for the theater, the current descriptions of items

and packaging in shipments, and the new development of material and

techniques. Barker particularly requested a compact compilation of

logistics data for field use which would be so handy and so valuable

that it could compete for space in personal baggage with such essential

items as candy bars and toilet paper. General Waitt, Assistant Chief,

CWS, for Field Operations, promised that a pocket-size supply and

issue catalog would be forthcoming, but no War Department approval

for such a publication was ever secured.35

OCCWS found it difficult to provide information to the theater

chemical officers. Both Porter and Waitt tried to include all information possible in personal letters. The personal letter method was un33

 (1) Shadle to Porter, 11 Feb 43. (2) Personal Ltr, Coblentz, CmlO ABS, to Waitt, Chief Opns

Div OCCWS, 25 Feb 43. CWS SPVCO (4-3-43) in file CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO, Feb-Dec 43.

(3) Ltr, Johnson, CmlO MBS, to CCWS, 12 Apr 43, sub: Résumé of CWS Problems. CWS 314.7

Corresp, NATO, Apr-Jun 43. (4) Ltr, Barker, CmlO Fifth Army, to CCWS, attn: Waitt, 9 Jan 43,

no sub. CWS 314.7 Barker Corresp, NATO, 1942-43. 34

 (1) Coblentz to Waitt, 25 Feb 43. (2) Hq Fifth Army Cml Warfare Memo 1, 4 Feb 43, sub:

Data on Cml Warfare Sups [Col Barker's logistics data compilation]. CWS MTO 050 Logistical Data. 35

 (1) Ltr, Waitt, Chief Opns Div OCCWS to CmlO Fifth Army, 5 Mar 43, sub: Development of

CWS Items. CWS SPCVO (3-5-43) in file CWS 314.7 Barker Corresp, NATO, 1942-43. (2) Ltr.

Waitt, ACCWS Fld Opns, to CCmlO [sic] MBS, thru CCmlO AFHQ, 30 Jun 43, sub: Résumé of CWS

Problems. CWS SPCVO (30 Jun 43) in file CWS 314.7 Corresp, NATO, Apr-Jun 43.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 101

orthodox, but it was effective for some kinds of information particularly since the small number of regular CWS officers were so well

acquainted with one another that there was little chance that personal

letters would be misunderstood. When Porter and Loucks came to

North Africa in April 1943 after their sojourn in the European theater,

Porter appraised the information problem as being the most serious

matter facing the chemical officers overseas. He accordingly directed

the establishment of a liaison officer position for each theater in his

own office.36 These liaison officers were assembled in a theaters division

operating under Waitt. Waitt inaugurated a special series of "Theater

of Operations Letters" in May to let all principal overseas chemical

officers know what was going on in the United States and in other

theaters. Waitt almost immediately ran into a stumbling block. ASF

wished to clear all information sent to the theaters and even wanted

to control the content of technical channels communications. The

CWS and the other technical services were forbidden to reproduce or

even make extracts from official publications. Waitt deemed it necessary to continue technical channels communications which, as he later

expressed it, "short-circuited ASF."

 37

 The use of theater of operations

letters continued, but they were carefully oriented to technical, mostly

research and development and intelligence, matters. Waitt's listing

of official publications must have been frustrating to North African

chemical officers since assembling a set of such publications was not

possible at the time.38 Indeed, Waitt and his liaison officers in the

United States were frustrated at being unable to furnish all the information required in any form the chemical officers overseas might

want it. Waitt felt that most of the information desired was eventually

supplied, even if by means almost clandestine.39

 But the problem of the

moment early in 1943 was information on which to base an issue policy

and that need was not met at the time. During the second phase of

NATOUSA CWS development, for approximately the first six months

of 1943, each of the base section chemical officers decided what allow36

 Ltr, Loucks to All Concerned [OCCWS], 23 Apr 43. CWS SPCWS 319.1 (CW Activities in

Great Britain). 37

 Ltr, Waitt to Hist Off, 14 Sep 59. 38

 (1) Barker to Porter, 9 Jan 43. (2) Johnson to Porter, 12 Apr 43. (3) Croen Interv, 21 Sep 59. 39

 (1) Waitt Comments, 5 Jan 61. (2) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61.
102 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ances of materiel to make as each instance of demand on the chemical

supply system arose.40

Theater Chemical Section Organization

The fact that base section chemical officers had to make their own

interim policy decisions demonstrates that Shadle had a communications problem of his own. During the first two months ashore, no communications system was operating well enough across the 1,500-mile

range of the North African campaign to permit a comprehensive

assessment of the situation. Personal visits provided the only feasible

solution to this problem. Shadle visited the field elements, as he had

done soon after arriving in North Africa, whenever he could, and

field officers, in turn, visited him and each other. As a means of control

these visits were too infrequent and too brief to be effective, but they

at least kept chemical officers informed on the activities of their colleagues. In February 1943 the War Department drew new boundaries

and created the North African Theater of Operations. While Americans in AFHQ had long assumed that this theater was to be activated,

there was officially no theater organization in North Africa. The

theater organization in charge was the ETO in recognition of General

Eisenhower's dual role as AFHQ and European theater commander.

Upon the official creation of a new theater, Eisenhower designated the

American element of AFHQ as the NATOUSA headquarters without

physically separating the Allied and American elements. Shadle then

added to his own office two American-staffed divisions, one for operations and training, the other for supply and requirements.41

Neither of these new divisions had any operating function comparable to that of Supply Division in the European theater. Again, distance prevented direct control. Barker was handling training in the

Fifth Army headquarters, and supply operations were still handled by

the base section and combat organization chemical officers. A supply

co-ordinating and operating agency was in the process of activation.

The Services of Supply, NATOUSA, had been organized, and Maj.

Arthur C. Rogers, assisted by one enlisted man, opened the chemical

section on 25 February 1943.42 Col. Lewis F. Acker served as Chemical

40

 (1) Col Siegfried P. Coblentz, USAR (Ret.), Comments on draft of this volume, 9 Jan 61. (2)

Croen Interv, 21 Sep 59. 41

 History of AFHQ, pt. II, sec. 4, pp. 510-11. 42

 History, COMZ NATOUSA-MTOUSA, Nov 42-44, pt. I.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 103

Officer, SOS NATOUSA, during the month of March, but he could

accomplish little beyond arranging section organization since supply

supervision channels were not yet in operation. In any case, early SOS

lines of authority were not clear, manpower was not allotted in sufficient numbers for the task at hand, and existing regulations failed to

cover the functions or the procedures of the organization. During

April, with a section enlarged to three officers and twelve enlisted

men, Maj. Alfred J. P. Wilson, acting chemical officer, began to

assume the responsibilities of requirements computation and supervision of supply status reporting. Shadle pointed out to Wilson and

to Col. Alfred L. Rockwood, who became SOS NATOUSA chemical

officer in May, that chemical supply policy was the province of the

theater chief of service. Shadle exercised his policy control through

his Supply and Requirements Division which was assigned the additional duty of compiling and reporting statistical data on supply levels

and on handling of chemical warfare supplies in the theater. In practice, the function of Shadle's office became more one of review than

of control since nearly every operational act involved policy decisions,

and the SOS headquarters at Oran was too far removed from AFHQ

and NATOUSA organizations in Algiers to permit concomitant

review.43 The control-review situation was, however, not the only

complication. The base sections continued to report to NATOUSA

rather than to SOS, and base section chemical officers sometimes looked

to Shadle's office for co-ordination of activities. Further, as in the

European theater, many chemical problems continued to be handled

through informal, personal contact outside the established channels

of authority. Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin, SOS NATOUSA commander, once asked Shadle to handle a chemical staffing problem in

SOS. When Shadle pointed out that the SOS, a separate command,

was outside his area, Larkin disagreed and reasserted that Shadle as

theater chief chemical officer should deal with the matter.44 Shadle

did provide a solution to this problem and in so doing set his own

precedent for an authority crossing a command line. Subsequently,

43

 (1) History of COMZ NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pt. IV, Introduction, and History of Cml Warfare

Sec SOS NATOUSA. (2) History of AFHQ, pt. II, sec. 4, pp. 510-13. (3) Personal Ltr, Shadle

to Waitt, 26 May 43. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO, Feb 43-Feb 44. (4) Interv, Hist Off with Col

Alfred J. P. Wilson, USAR, 16 Oct 58. 44

 Shadle Interv, 16 May 61.
104 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Shadle, or members of his immediate staff, did informally handle a

number of other problems outside the theater headquarters.

While problems of control did arise and while the CWS of AFHQ

and NATOUSA was tending to be a separate service as in the European

theater, Shadle did not view his control problem as being as serious as

Rowan's. Shadle was in a better prestige position than Rowan since

his position on the AFHQ and NATOUSA staffs was not complicated

by an SOS jurisdiction over the technical services. Also, while Rowan

from the end of 1942 to the end of 1943 was left largely without the

support of ranking, experienced chemical officers, Shadle had experienced, aggressive, ranking chemical officers in almost every field

position.45 He could count on the field officers to perform their own

liaison with field elements and to direct field CWS activities. Shadle

did have a matter of some personal embarrassment in this connection—

both Rockwood and Barker were his seniors in rank and the seniority

rule for appointment to top positions had been almost inflexible in the

Army prior to World War II. Shadle did not view seniority as being

of great importance in his own case; only on one occasion did a senior

officer point out his junior status.46 On the whole, the autonomy of

the field chemical sections and the rank represented there worked in

the favor of the NATOUSA CWS and its chief.

Shadle concentrated on the staff relationships within his own headquarters and he consulted with or worked with the AFHQ and

NATOUSA assistant chiefs of staff whenever chemical warfare matters

were under consideration. He informed Waitt that his advice was

sought and accepted by these officers.47 This is not to say that there

were no stresses and strains in CWS administration in North Africa.

At the time of the organization of NATOUSA, Shadle praised the

work of his American and British subordinates, but privately complained to Porter that Rowan and Montgomery had prevented his

acquisition of more experienced officers. How the European theater

officers could have blocked him he did not make clear since his own

headquarters allotment prevented an increase in his immediate staff and

45

 Rowan highly valued the Reserve and AUS officers serving on his staff and in the field in the

European theater. Both he and General Porter indicate that the contribution of such officers to the

success of CWS operations in Europe can hardly be overstated, but the fact remained that prior to the

cross-Channel attack Rowan suffered from a lack of sufficient rank and experience among ETO CWS

officers, (1) Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60. (2) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. 46

 (1) Personal Ltr, Shadle to Waitt, 26 May 43. (2) Shadle Interv, 16 May 61. 47

 (1) Shadle to Waitt, 26 May 43. (2) Shadle Interv, 16 May 61.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 105

since most of the senior ETO CWS officers had moved into North

African field commands.48 By the time of Porter's and Louck's visit

to North Africa in April, the CWS NATOUSA had apparently adjusted to the staffing situation since the visiting officers did not mention

it in their letters reporting North African troubles. The pressing

problem at the moment was that the chemical supply situation as a

whole in North Africa had deteriorated to a "dangerously low

position."

 49

Chemical Supply Situation: Spring 1943

The serious threat to the North African theater's chemical warfare

potential in April was the result of failure to obtain sufficient material

from the zone of interior to raise the theater stock level and to balance

it. As in the case of issue, the acquisition and balancing of theater

stocks was, in theory, a simple matter. Theater levels were determined

by the War Department on the advice of the theater commander. The

ports of embarkation then automatically furnished food, fuel, and

spare parts according to theater strength and number of vehicles in use.

The theater requisitioned shipments in supply Classes II and IV to

bring stocks up to desired levels. Ammunition was to be furnished

according to War Department allotment.50 But again, as task force

experience demonstrated, theory rode high in the clouds while fact

plodded the Tunisian sands. In the first place, the War Department

instructions were issued at the time that planning for the North

African operation was at its peak; even if the official publication was

immediately and widely circulated, it is doubtful that supply officers

would have had the time to give it much consideration. In the second

place, the War Department for some time in effect suspended its own

procedures, supplying Class II and IV supplies automatically rather

than on requisitions based on actual consumption rates in the theater.

The New York Port of Embarkation (NYPE) could not adjust

quantities or kinds of supply until there was a considerable easing

of the problems of shipping space and supply documentation.51 The

48

 Shadle to Porter, 11 Feb 43. 49

 Rpt, Cml Warfare Statistical Summary, Text Summary (hereafter cited as Statistical Summary),

30 Apr 43. MTO CWS 400.19 Statistical Summary. 50

 WD Memo 700-8-42, 10 Oct 42. 51

 (1) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, p. 321 and ch. XVI. (2) Logistical

History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 51-54.
106 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

theater staff found over-all supply documentation virtually impossible:

there was no common reporting form, and, if there had been, the

situation was too fluid and communication too poor for assembling

data, particularly from the combat units.

The base section chemical officers assumed the burden of evaluating

chemical supply status on the receiving end because no one else possessed as much chemical information. They then submitted requisitions

for shortages to the United States (NYPE), but some of these were

edited or rejected by the port of embarkation because of noncompliance

with the WD overseas supply procedures memorandum. Even in cases

when the material was shipped, the port required a 90-day processing

and shipping period. The base section chemical officers pleaded with

the OCCWS to expedite supply, particularly items such as FS smoke,

colored smoke, white phosphorus and thermite grenades, stocks of

which were entirely depleted. General Waitt replied that he was

unable to influence the requisitioning and shipping situation which

was entirely governed by ASF and higher headquarters.52

The North African chemical officers could do little but wait and

hope that shipments would be forthcoming from the United States.

Their hopes were met, quantitatively at least, during the next month.

Shipments received during May increased stocks so that 80 percent

of major ground forces items were stocked in levels above the authorized forty-five days. The air force's chemical supply position also

improved although not as much as the ground force supply. The

Chemical Section, Eastern Base Section, established by Capt. Carl E.

Grant in February, was authorized to allot 50 percent of its stocks to

the XII Air Force Service Command. Balancing stocks among the

base sections continued to be a problem until at least the fall of 1943,

since congested ports and inadequate railroad facilities rendered interdepot transfers extremely difficult.53

Qualitatively, the supply picture was not so bright. Most of the

items reported stocked at or exceeding authorized levels were protective

items. The level of individual gas protection had been high and had

52

 (1) Personal Ltr, Barker to Porter, 21 Feb 43. CWS 412.3 APO 464 (Sabotage Device) in CWS

314.7 Barker Corresp NATO, 1942-43. (2) Personal Ltr, Coblentz to Waitt, 3 Mar 43. CWS 314.7

Pers Files, NATO, Feb-Oct 43. (3) Personal Ltr, Coblentz to Waitt, 22 Apr 43. ABSCW in same

file. (4) Personal Ltr, Waitt to Coblentz, 3 Apr 43. CWS SPCVO (4-3-43) in CWS 314.7 Pers

Files, NATO, Feb-Oct 43. (5) Waitt to CmlO MBS, 30 Jun 43. (6) Johnson to Porter, 12 Apr 43. 53

 (1) Statistical Summary, 30 Apr, 31 May 43. (2) Maling Ltr, 3 Apr 43. (3) Logistical History

of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 23.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 107

remained so although the quantity of individual protective items in

the resupply system was low in April. The collective protection

potential,54 on the other hand, was lower than that for individual protection: the SOS Chemical Section reported shortages of the common

decontaminating agent, bleach (chloride of lime), of the power-driven

decontaminating apparatus, and of the collective protector.55 These

shortages of protective supplies were important given the assumption

that gas warfare could be initiated at any time, but the supply of gas

warfare items to be used offensively should gas warfare retaliation be

necessary was even more important. Supply of the nongas warfare

chemical munitions such as incendiary bombs and high explosive mortar

shell was highly important also.

At the end of May, Shadle expressed his satisfaction with the chemical

offensive potential and ammunition status in the North African theater.

His view seems to have been overly optimistic since smoke pots, tear

gas, and HC smoke grenades were the only ammunition items available

in sufficient supply. All the chemical supply officers reported urgent

requests for unavailable white phosphorus grenades. The Twelfth Air

Force reported limited quantities of ANM50A1 4-pound incendiary

bombs, a few M52 500-pound incendiary bomb clusters, and a considerable number of M54 100-pound incendiary bomb clusters. There

was no other chemical ammunition in the theater although the New

York port had promised that 120 days' supply of high explosive and

smoke shell was en route for the three chemical mortar battalions which

had recently arrived in the theater. Aside from a small amount of

artillery shell stored by Ordnance, no toxics were available in the

theater and none was scheduled to arrive until the fall of 1943. The

March theater plan for gas warfare, the first such plan, was based on

meeting possible enemy gas attack with this plainly inadequate supply

of artillery shell. The new War Department policy for retaliation in

event of enemy initiation of gas warfare called for the use of aerial

munitions as the principal gas weapons. Shadle's satisfaction with the

toxic supply status can be explained by the fact that he did not con54

 Collective protection is that provided to units or groups of men. For example, units and organizations were provided with area and equipment decontaminating agents and the means to apply them

should vesicant gases be used. The collective protector, a machine for filtering and circulating air,

was to be provided for command posts and other crucial command and service installations which could

not readily be moved in the event of gas attack. Brophy, Miles and Cochrane, From Laboratory to

field, ch. IV. 55

 (1) Statistical Summary, 30 Apr, 31 May 43. (2) Shadle to Waitt, 26 May 43.
108 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

sider the lack of aerial munitions to be a critical problem. He believed

that the Axis Powers were in no position to initiate gas warfare in

North Africa, a correct estimate, as it happens, for subsequent investigation proved that there were no German toxic munitions in North

Africa. Still, in terms of War Department policy and authorized

theater levels, the North African theater was critically short of offensive chemical munitions.58

Field conditions produced a further complication in the supply

problem which was not unanticipated among chemical officers but

which was not provided for by the War Department. Troops in the

field are ingenious at adapting supplies to their own purposes. While

the use of the gas mask carrier as a carry-all was frowned upon because

it meant loss of the mask, chemical officers overlooked or unofficially

encouraged secondary use of other gas warfare supplies in a nongas

warfare situation. An acetate eyeshield had been developed by the

British to provide readily available individual protection against liquid

vesicant droplets in the absence of the gas mask. The United States

forces in North Africa had been supplied with these eyeshields before

the War Department declared them obsolete. North African troops

used eyeshields in lieu of sunglasses and as protection against swirling

dust and sand. Constant demand nearly exhausted the supply and,

since there was no resupply channel for obsolete items, created a problem for which chemical officers saw only one solution. The War

Department had to be convinced that gas warfare items such as the

eyeshield could be used in a nongas warfare situation so that a resupply

channel such as existed for other items could be provided. Antigas

shoe impregnite could be used as "canned heat," as could the chemical

fire starter, and, when applied to tents, shoe impregnite proved an

excellent waterproofing substance and served as a base for sand camouflage. Antigas covers could also be used as a waterproof covering for

shelter tents, and antigas curtains, when obtainable, served as ground

sheets, tarpaulins, and foxhole covers. The decontaminating appa56

 (1) Statistical Summary, 30 Apr, 31 May 43. (2) Shadle Ltr, 26 May 43. (3) Maling Ltr, 3 Apr

43. (4) Col Gerhard to CCWS, 13 May 43, Notes on Visit by Col Frederick W. Gerhard, CWS, to

Theaters of Operations in England and Northern Africa. CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts. (5) Memo,

Actg ACofS OPD WDGS for CG ASF, 11 Aug 43, sub: Implementation of Theater Plans for Gas

Warfare NATO. OPD 385 CWP (11 Aug 43). (6) Ltr, CinC AFHQ to TAG, 19 Mar 43, sub:

Cml Warfare Plan for NATO. AFHQ AG 322.095/378 CWS-M in file OPD 385 CWS sec. 11B.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 109

ratuses could be used for insecticide spraying, carrying water, fighting

fires, and giving showers. CWS nongas warfare supply turned out to

be a considerably more active business than had been intended, particularly since CWS officers could not allow the secondary uses of

chemical items to lower the gas protective potential.57

As the second phase of the chemical supply operation in the North

African theater drew to a close in June, the weapons and ammunition

status took a turn for the worse. Supplies earmarked for the Sicilian

operation were withdrawn without the prospect of immediate replacement. The process of chemical supply planning for the assault on

Sicily had begun in March when Major Humphreville, newly designated Chemical Officer, Seventh Army, sent the supply unit of his

section to Oran to plan with the Chemical Section, SOS NATOUSA.58

Since logistic data were not available, the Chemical Section, MBS,

supplied estimated data which the SOS and Seventh Army sections

used to compute requirements. The SOS Chemical Section submitted

requisitions to the zone of interior for assault materiel requirements

and for maintenance stocks which were to be built up to a 30-day

level as soon as depot operations in Sicily were practicable. The SOS

section computed requirements on a regular table of allowance and

maintenance factor basis, relying on estimates in cases when information was lacking.59

 This system presented no problems in Class II

supply except for spare parts for which maintenance factors were

unavailable. Any determination of spare parts usage rate was purely

guesswork, and, even had estimates been accurate, spare parts stocks

both in the theater and the ZI were wholly inadequate to meet the

demand. The SOS supply officers found that the great drain on

theater reserves came in the Class IV and special equipment categories.

Major Humphreville requested special allotments of grenades and flame

throwers and, in view of the constant need for smoke concealment in

57

 (1) Statistical Summary, 30 Apr, 31 May 43. (2) Barker Comments, Feb 61. (3) Coblentz

Comments, 9 Jan 61. (4) For more information on eyeshields, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From

Laboratory to Field, Chapter IV. 58

 Seventh Army was not officially activated until 10 July 1943. The predecessor headquarters was

I Armored Corps. 59

 A maintenance factor was the estimated resupply quantity per month, stated as a percentage of the

total theater stock, or of any item, necessary to maintain stock level, both in depots and in the hands

of troops, while losses because of wearing out, capture, abandonment, pilferage, and the like were

occurring. This designation was, in November 1943, changed to "replacement factor" to avoid

confusion between repair and resupply. WD Cir 297, 13 Nov 43.
110 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the North African ports, 100,000 smoke pots for emergency use in the

Sicilian ports.60

Major Wilson, then acting chief of the SOS Chemical Section, protested this smoke pot allotment to the SOS commander, General Larkin,

for two reasons: (1) regardless of requirements, a lack of shipping

dictated a space allotment plan for Sicilian cargo, and most of the

CWS space would be filled with smoke pots; (2) filling the Seventh

Army demand for smoke pots would exhaust theater stocks and would

require special shipments from the United States. General Larkin

agreed to revise the Seventh Army requisition to a smaller amount,

but General Patton, now Seventh Army commander designate, appealed directly to General Eisenhower. Reasoning from the point of

view which thereafter governed supply policy for both the North

African and European theaters—that the combat commander should

have anything he wanted—General Eisenhower insisted on the supply

of the original smoke pot requisition.61

In this particular instance Major Wilson was probably right. But,

in retrospect, this incident and the supply operations which it represents

assume more significance than the immediate problems imply, for this

operation marks the bifurcation of the chemical supply system. Henceforth, one element of the chemical supply system was oriented, despite

doctrine to the contrary, to an impetus from the front.62 This element

of the system was primarily devoted to meeting the demands and

special requirements of the combat forces, especially for new equipment, such as the lightweight mechanical smoke generator, or equipment used in new missions, such as the 4.2-inch chemical mortar.63

60

 (1) Maj Humphreville, CmlO Seventh Army [to CG Seventh Army] (copy to CCWS), 15 Sep 43,

Rpt of Cml Warfare Opns, Sicilian Campaign, reproduced as sec. H, pt. II, of Rpt of Opn of the U.S.

Seventh Army in the Sicilian Campaign, 10 Jul—17 Aug 43, Sep 43. (2) History of Cml Warfare Sec

SOS NATOUSA, in History of COMZ NATOUSA-MTOUSA. (3) Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58. (4)

IOM, A.L.R. [Col Alfred L Rockwood, CmlO SOS NATOUSA] to CofS [SOS NATOUSA], 20 Jul 43,

no sub. CWS MTO 400.19 Statistical Summary, (5) MBS reported no spare parts, except for a wholly

inadequate supply of some mortar parts, on hand as of 28 June 1943. CWS MBS [to Cml Sec SOS

NATOUSA], Stock Status and Materiel Issue Rpt, 28 Jun 43. CWS MTO 142.1 Inventory (Corresp). 61

 (1) Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58. (2) Memo for Red, Rpt of Material on Hand in Depots and ASP's

in Sicily as of 20 Aug 43, dated 29 Aug 43, Cml Sec AFHQ and NATOUSA. In CWS MTO 142.1

Inventory (Corresp). (3) Min of Staff Conf, Hq SOS NATOUSA, 4 May 43. CWS MTO 337 Confs. 62

 Colonel Coblentz maintains (Comments, 9 January 1961) that the impetus from the front orientation started earlier when base section chemical officers began deciding their own issue policy. 63

 For use of new equipment and smoke technique development, see below, Chapter VIII, and for

mortar operations, see Chapter XI.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 111

Impetus from the front meant that line organizations determined their

own requirements for materials, determined how those materials should

be used, and what the procedures of the supply system which provided

them should be. It must be noted that under the impetus from the

rear theory the line organizations had also always determined their own

requirements, but the point of difference is that they selected their

requirements from a list provided by and with procedures ordained

by supply organizations, whereas under impetus from the front they

drew up their own lists and established their own procedures. The

other element, which retained the impetus from the rear orientation,

was concentrated on the development of gas warfare offensive and

defensive potential. Although the two elements of the chemical supply

system overlapped and although they were both handled by the whole

CWS organization in the theater, base and field chemical sections

became increasingly concerned with the immediate nongas warfare

support of combat forces and their routine preparedness for gas warfare defense. The impetus from the front pattern imposed great

strains on the supply system. War Department long-range supply

planning and even the planning of the SOS in the theater was frequently scrapped or greatly amended when combat forces demanded

a 6-month supply of an item for a 30-day operation or when a standard

item of supply was rejected. This pattern also called for many

improvisations. Many front-line organization chemical officers gave

reality and immediacy to Fries's concept of the closest possible connection between research and the fighting line by carrying on a certain

amount of research and even manufacture in the combat zone.

Initially, the CWS in the theater used the same supply channels and

procedures for both elements of the system, but as the Joint and

Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subsidiary committees assumed

more direct control of gas warfare policy,64 the impetus of supply

for the preparedness mission moved even farther to the rear than

formerly.

Chemical Supply and Administration—Development

of the Theater Chemical System

The accommodation of the existing system of impetus from the

rear to the new demands of the unofficial system of impetus from the

64

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. IV.
112 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

front characterized the third phase of chemical supply in North Africa.

This phase in the theater CWS supply and administrative system, in

contrast to the second phase, was marked by the availability of an

increasing amount of supply information to chemical supply officers.

This development had its inception in the establishment, mentioned

above, of a statistical reporting function in Shadle's office. It gathered

momentum from the activities of each supply officer in the field and

from the operation of the SOS Chemical Section and from the improved

communications throughout the theater. In April, for example, Major

Wilson invited the chemical supply officers to a conference in which

they arrived at a common understanding of procedures and where they

received the latest information available to SOS NATOUSA.65 At the

end of May the theater "went on" the materiel status report, which

was a War Department prescribed report prepared in the ports of

embarkation to show the zone of interior, in-transit, and theater status

of certain controlled and critical items. Since only about one-quarter

of the 200 stock chemical items in North Africa was included, the

immediate impact on theater chemical supply was not great, but the

materiel status report and its supporting perpetual inventory in the

ports of embarkation required more exact reporting of theater on-hand

and expenditure data—data which became part of a more extensive

accounting and reporting system.66

The base sections had begun to report stock status to the theater

and SOS chemical sections in April under the increased reporting

requirement. However, their reports were little more comprehensive

than the earlier informal reports until June, when comprehensive

reports from ABS and MBS and a partial report from Eastern Base

Section permitted the theater and SOS chemical sections to compile

the first full-scale stock status report. Even then, quantity in the

hands of troops was known for only one item, the eyeshield, which

had been reported 500,000 short. The theater chemical section assumed

65

 Min of Sup Officers Mtg, Hq SOS NATOUSA, 24 Apr 43. CWS SOS NATOUSA 337/4 in CWS

MTO 337 Confs.

66

 (1) Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 59-60. (2) History of COMZ NATOUSA,

pt. I. (3) Rqmts and Stock Contl Div ASF, Rpt, Survey of the Opn of the Materiel Status Rpt, Aug

44. Files of Rqmts and Stock Contl Div ASF.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 113

that supply of all other items in the hands of troops equaled authorization since no other complaints had been received.67

The SOS Chemical Section requested, in July, that the Commanding

General, NATOUSA, require troop units and organizations to submit

full reports of chemical materials in their hands.68 These reports began

to arrive in August, and the chemical supply officers thereafter calculated the status of theater supply much more realistically. The

improvement in calculating supply status again raised the question of

the adequacy of requirements and logistical data computations. While

the CWS supply catalogs, which contained detailed information on

requirements, allowances, spare parts, and item nomenclature, were

not available until January 1944, chemical supply officers assembled

such data from other sources in 1943.69

The Army Service Forces manual, Logistical Planning and Reference

Data, arrived in the theater in May 1943. Although the ASF manual

primarily dealt with transportation of supplies, it did present some

helpful examples of requirements computations.70 Such information

as the ASF manual provided was useful, both in the headquarters and

to the supply officers in the field, but it met only part of the need.

To satisfy the whole need, Colonel Coblentz, Chemical Officer, ABS,

made his own compilation of logistical data.71 In July he obtained

OCCWS Circular No. 1, issued on 20 June 1943 as a predecessor to

CWS supply catalogs. Although the OCCWS circular contained the

latest War Department information, Colonel Coblentz' experience in

the theater led him to reproduce a table of maintenance factors prepared by the CWS ETO. The European theater was not engaged in

67

 (1) Ltr Rpt, AG EBS to CG SOS NATOUSA, 3 Jul 43, sub: Stock Status and Material Issue Rpt.

EBS CWS 400.11 in CWS MTO 142.1 Inventory, Base Sec, vol. I. (2) AG ABS to CG SOS NATOUSA,

4 Jul 43, Stock Status and Material Issue Rpt. ABS AG 319.1 in CWS MTO 142.1 Inventory, Base Sec,

vol. I. (3) CWS MBS [to CG SOS NATOUSA], Stock Status and Material Issue Rpt as of 28 Jun 43,

2400 H [29 Jun 43]. CWS MTO 142.1 Inventory (Corresp). (4) [Chief Cml Sec AFHQ and

NATOUSA to CG NYPE thru CG NATOUSA], ca. 15 Jul 43, Rpt, Theater Status, Chemical Warfare,

Selected Class II Items—30 Jun 1943, and Chemical Warfare, Selected Class V Items—In Depots 30 Jun

1943. CWS MTO 050 Logistical Data. 68

 Ltr, AG SOS NATOUSA to CG NATOUSA, 10 Jul 43, sub: Inventory of Cml Warfare Materiel

in Hands of Troops. SOS AG 142.1 in CWS MTO 142.1 Inventory (Corresp). 69

 1st Ind, Lt Col Lloyd E. Fellenz, ExO CW Sec Hqs NATOUSA, to CmlO Seventh Army, 15 Jan

44, on Ltr, CmlO Seventh Army to CmlO NATOUSA, 8 Jan 44, sub: Request for Logistical Data.

Seventh Army 400-CW in CWS MTO 050 Logistical Data. 70

 Unnumbered manual, Hqs SOS, Feb 43, Logistical Planning and Reference Data. Stamped "May

1943" in Cml Sec AFHQ and NATOUSA. CWS MTO 050 Logistical Data. 71

 Memo, Off of CmlO ABS, no addressee, 4 Jul 43, sub: Logistical Data—CWS Supplies. CWS MTO

300.6 Memo Book 1.
114 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ground combat, but, from the point of view of the chemical supply

officer, the data compiled by the CWS ETO was the best and most

realistic then available. Accordingly, the NATO Chemical Section

relayed through the OCCWS a request for a complete set of the CWS

logistical tables prepared by CWS ETO. In August CWS ETO forwarded to NATO a complete set of its tables plus a description of the

computing processes and a listing of pertinent authorities. But, shortly

after this material was received the situation in NATO changed. A 26

October note on the ETO letter of transmittal indicated that Colonel

Shadle consigned the ETO material to the dead file "as ETOUSA logistics [are] not necessarily applicable here." 72

It seems probable that Colonel Shadle meant that the ETO data had

been useful only until the North African theater had revised and

adapted the information to its own use. Theater officers quickly learned

a lesson which the War Department seemed to have great difficulty in

understanding—that the procedures of one theater were not necessarily

applicable to the conditions of another. The theater and SOS chemical

sections, having learned this lesson, were consequently in the process of

adapting and revising all logistical data to fit the experience of the

Tunisian, Sicilian, and early Italian campaigns. Many theater supply

officers continued to believe that the War Department supply authorities were unresponsive to their needs, but their logistics analyses led

them to request adjustments in the War Department governing

directives. For example, the theater CWS suggested, as early as July,

a revision in some War Department maintenance factors. As such

suggestions demonstrated, chemical supply officers were becoming more

sophisticated in the handling of their system, and, as a consequence,

the system was becoming more standardized internally; yet, at the

same time, it was becoming more individual since its logistical data,

the basis for its operation, was compiled and controlled within the

system.73

By the end of August, Colonel Coblentz, then chemical officer desig72

 (1) Ltr with Incls, Col LeRoy, Chief Sup Div CWS ETOUSA, to CmlO NATOUSA, 14 Aug 43,

sub: Transmittal of Logistic Tables. CWS ETO SOS CW 050/77 (10 Aug 43)SD in CWS MTO 050

Logistical Data. (2) For more information on the CWS ETO system, see below, Chapter IV. 73

 (1) Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58. (2) Statistical Summary, 31 Jul 43. (3) Ltr, Harold L. Field

to Hist Off, 1 Feb 59. Mr. Field, as lieutenant and captain, was a supply officer in the Chemical Section, SOS NATOUSA. (4) Lt Col Joseph F. Padlon and Maj Howard P. McCormick, War Plans Br

OACCWS Field Opns, to CCWS, Rpt on Visit to NATOUSA (hereafter cited as Padlon-McCormick

Rpt), 24 Feb 44. CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 115

nate of Peninsular Base Section, which was organizing within Atlantic

Base Section for supply operation in Italy, had assembled enough

information to compile a detailed set of chemical supply instructions

covering definitions, organization methods, reporting forms, distribution, and storage operating data.74

 This compilation is evidence of a

significant improvement in procedures, and it is noteworthy that these

procedures and the reports which controlled them were largely of

theater CWS origin.

At the same time individual performance was improving as the

chemical supply officers gained confidence in themselves and their

system. Colonel Shadle had advised General Porter in May that

". . . everything pertaining to supply knowledge is deficient. Our

officers are simply not trained in supply work and staff procedure."

Major Wilson agreed.75 But in November Colonel Shadle wrote to

General Porter, "All of the officers over here . . . are doing a splendid

job."

 76

 The change had been wrought by extensive on-the-job supply

training afforded by actual supply experience and by such compilations,

both official and unofficial, as Colonel Coblentz had prepared. As

Colonel Shadle also declared, ". . . we now know what we are talking

about and what is needed. . . ."

 77

 In other words, the field elements

of the chemical supply system, with the exception of that portion

applying to the Army Air Forces, were well established during the fall

of 1943. In October Colonel Maling's Twelfth Air Force Chemical

Section still lacked a basis for requirements computation both for

incendiary bombs and toxics. Such information by War Department

decision could emanate only from Army Air Forces headquarters in

Washington.78

At the same time that the supply level was improving during 1943,

the supply handling situation was also improving. The SOS Chemical

Section increased its operating responsibilities with the addition of

such duties as those assigned in June of editing, consolidating, and

74

 CWS Sup Cir Ltr No. 1, 1 Sep 43. CWS MTO 300.6 Memo Book I. This copy, apparently a

draft, is headed, "Chemical Section, Base Headquarters." There is no signature and no indication that

the draft was submitted for staff comment or that the circular was ever issued, either by Peninsular

Base Section or by Headquarters, NATOUSA. 75

 (1) Personal Ltr, Shadle to Porter, 4 May 43. CWS 320.2/20 in file CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO,

Feb-Dec 43. (2) Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58. 76

 Personal Ltr, Shadle to Porter, 23 Nov 43. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO, Feb-Dec 43. 77

 Personal Ltr, Shadle to Waitt, 2 Dec 43. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO, Feb-Dec 43. 78

 (1) Padlon-McCormick Rpt, 24 Feb 44. (2) Notes on visit to North African theater made by Brig

Gen Alden H. Waitt and Lt Col Jacob K. Javits, OCCWS, 17-26 Oct 43. CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts.
116 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

forwarding to the zone of interior base section chemical requisitions.

Rockwood's section increased to seven officers, a warrant officer, and

thirteen enlisted men and women organized into Administration,

Supply, Control, and Technical Divisions.79 These divisions supervised

base section requisitioning, inventorying, and reporting activities on

what SOS termed "a sort of individual project" basis. The lines of

supervision were by no means direct or consistent since SOS still did

not have command control of base sections.80

The base section chemical officers and those in the air forces continued to develop their own systems of operation. Each chemical

officer received a different type of assistance from his own command

organization. In Coblentz' opinion, base section headquarters' attempts

to help created "nothing more than a bottleneck," because the base

section staff knew no more than the chemical officers about supply

procedures, and because the staff officers lacked such chemical information as the chemical officers compiled for themselves or got from their

colleagues in the United States and in the theater.81 The base sections

did designate storage locations and did provide some co-ordination

among the services. Chemical sections improved storage and handling

at these locations with the help of a number of service units.82 By the

end of February 1943, the Twelfth Air Force had received its complement of four chemical air service companies.83

CWS Staff and Functions, AFHQ and NATOUSA

During 1943 Shadle's office acquired several new functions, in addition to those authorized when the AFHQ Chemical Section was first

established. (Chart 6) An analysis of actual performance of these

functions demonstrates what role the CWS NATO had come to play.84

79

 History of Cml Warfare Sec SOS NATOUSA, in pt. IV, History of COMZ NATOUSA-MTOUSA. 80

 Ibid.

81

 (1) Coblentz to Waitt, 25 Feb 43. (2) Croen Interv, 21 Sep 59. (3) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58. 82

 In addition to the early units mentioned above, the nth Chemical Maintenance Company arrived in

January 1943; the 63d Chemical Depot Company and the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company in

March; the 41st Chemical Laboratory Company, the 92d Chemical Composite Company, the remainder

of the 21st Chemical Decontamination Company, and the 52d and 53d Chemical Processing Companies

in May; and the 24th and 25th Chemical Decontamination Companies in June 1943. See Brophy and

Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H, and see below, ch. VII. 83

 The 751st and 758th Chemical Depot Companies, Aviation, arrived in December 1942; the 753d

Chemical Depot Company, Aviation, and the 875th Chemical Company, Air Operations, reached the

theater in February 1943. 84

 Functions are stated in History of AFHQ, Part I, pages 59, 60, Part II, Section 4, page 511. This

analysis, unless otherwise noted, is derived from a survey of the collected files of CWS MTO.
CHART 6—ORGANIZATION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION, ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, AND HEADQUARTERS,

NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY, NOVEMBER 1943

Source: Adapted from: History of AFHQ, pt. Il, pp. 203, 223-24, 241, 512, History of COMZ, NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pts. Ill and IV.
118 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The principal function was to advise the commander in chief (AFHQ

and theater commander) and his staff on chemical matters. This was a

standard special staff function which involved, for the CWS, gas

warfare planning and any other matters which might require theater

supervision. In the absence of gas warfare, performance under this

function became a routine matter of concurring or advising on theater

personnel, operation, and supply.

Another function was to plan the use and allotment of chemical

troop units, and in 1943 the scope of this planning was extended to

the procurement and supervision of all CWS personnel in the theater.

Performance under these functions was advisory since Shadle had no

command responsibilities. The advisory capacity was severely limited

by theater quotas on both personnel and units, and by the requests of

individual field commanders for personnel and units—requests which

usually overrode staff advice. Shadle's Chemical Section managed to

get enough service units even when training in the United States could

not keep pace with worldwide demand. Combat units were eventually

obtained on about the same basis on which they were furnished other

theaters, three battalions per authorized army during peak combat

activity.85 With respect to officers, Shadle experienced difficulties similar

to Rowan's—the theater received a number of CWS casual officers

who frequently were badly handled by the replacement system. It was

practically impossible to find vacancies for all arriving officers, and it

was absolutely impossible to determine their qualifications so as to

channel officers to duties for which they were fitted.86

The principal mission of the theater CWS in the event of gas warfare

was to supervise "chemical operations, gas-proofing, decontaminations,

and filling of chemical munitions in the Theater,"

 87

 as well as chemical

training. This mission resulted in the establishment of review activities

rather than of supervisory controls since, in a nongas warfare situation

and under the organization of the theater, actual supervision devolved

upon the base section and field army chemical officers and their subordinates. The theater chemical section usually learned of chemical

operations after their accomplishment. Shadle did use field reports of

experience to supplement War Department directives with theater

85

 Sec Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H-1. 86

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Wilson, 16 Oct 58. (2) Waitt Comments, 5 Jan 61. Waitt's comment

on the replacement system is "scandalous." 87

 History of AFHQ, pt. 1, p. 60.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 119

directives on operation, and he did make his office serve as a clearinghouse for operational information, but these activities were too remote

to be classed as supervision. In unusual cases either the theater or the

SOS Chemical Section followed up on compliance with directives or

solutions to problems, but the staff was not large enough to make this

an invariable practice.88 Functions added in the operational sphere

during 1943 were planning and advising on the smoke protection of

port areas and distributing technical information on area smoke screens.

While the theater chemical section became more directly involved in

the direction and appraisal of smoke operations, these functions, too,

were usually performed by working with field chemical officers who

had prime supervisory responsibilities.

Two functions, intelligence and co-operation with the theater surgeon, were primarily liaison and reporting functions. Intelligence was

initially handled by the British complement of the AFHQ Chemical

Section, and the British continued to play a large part in this activity

after it became a joint enterprise. One officer, Lt. Col. Henry I.

Stubblefield, was added to the section for medical liaison and to plan

protection against the possibility of biological warfare.

Three of the remaining original functions covered the supervision

of supply from requirements to distribution. Since the theater section

was not staffed to handle supply supervision, since the theater chemical

section had no opportunity to inaugurate a basic supply plan like that

used in the ETO, and since theater organization in effect decentralized

supply operations to such a degree that field chemical officers in fact

instituted their own supply plans, the 1943 assignment of functions

provided that the theater chemical section should "merely" procure

"logistical and statistical data on chemical warfare supplies in the

theater."

 89

 Shadle spent most of his own time dealing with supply

matters. He was proud of his accomplishments, and he was commended

by British as well as American authorities for performance in this

area.90 From Shadle's own point of view, he and his AFHQ section

performed exactly those functions which should have been theirs in

the light of tradition and of theater conditions. He saw no need, as

chief chemical officers in other theaters did, for enlarging his planning

88

 Interv, Hist Off with Julius F. Klaswick, 6 Mar 59. (Mr. Klaswick, as lieutenant and captain,

served with the SOS and theater chemical sections.) 89

 History of AFHQ, pt. II, sec. 4, p. 511. 90

 Ltr, Shadle to Hist Off, 18 Aug 59.
120

 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

COLONEL SHADLE AND STAFF IN ALGIERS, FALL OF 1943

responsibilities, or for attempting to influence combat operations, or

for striving to exercise control of the theater CWS through technical

channels. He felt that he appropriately operated most of the time

through command channels. He later pointed out that his position

as a staff officer in a supreme headquarters, AFHQ, made it possible

for him to operate differently from Rowan, who did not occupy such

a position.91

By the end of 1943, Shadle's AFHQ section was authorized 5

American officers, 3 more than authorized at the time of the invasion,

and 3 British officers, one more than in the previous year. Enlisted

strength had grown from 2 to 4 Americans, but the number of British

soldiers had remained at 2.92 Lt. Col. Lloyd E. Fellenz, a Regular Army

officer and a smoke expert, had arrived to become executive officer.93

Lt. Col. Ian A. Marriott had returned to London to be replaced by

Lt. Col. G. des C. Chamier as British deputy.

91

 Shadle Interv, 16 May 61. 92

 History of AFHQ, pt. II, sec. 4, p. 513. 93

 Shadle to Porter, 4 May 43.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 121

Theater and CWS Reorganizations

When, early in 1944, General Eisenhower left the North African

theater to take command in Europe, the character of the North African

organization was changed slightly to accommodate to a British supreme

commander and to new responsibilities. The theater at last corrected

what from a staff point of view had been a serious error in the original

organization.94 The Communications Zone, which had been inseparable

from the theater organization except in the person of its commander,

Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes, also deputy theater commander, was

combined with the theater SOS, and the new command was given

those theater functions which pertained to the COMZ. At the same

time, the remaining American responsibilities were restricted to administration—all control of combat operations passing to AFHQ or

the combat organizations. The result was essentially the creation of

a tricommand organization like that of the War Department.95

Shadle's office maintained its staff and its AFHQ-theater position,

but the functions of control of COMZ personnel and units, COMZ

training and gas warfare defense, and all allocation and issue of supply

passed to the SOS Chemical Section. Colonel Maling moved from

Twelfth Air Force to assume Rockwood's position as chief of this

section which was augmented by the addition of one colonel, three

majors, and a captain.96

The COMZ Chemical Section then assumed control of the "impetus

from the rear" supply system and took over some of the administrative

functions which had been the province of AFHQ, and of NATOUSA,

then renamed Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTOUSA).

Shadle, who became a brigadier general on the same day that Rowan

received his promotion, maintained his section as a clearinghouse for

chemical information and did a considerable amount of troubleshooting

in the field of both CWS supply systems. But the work of the theater

headquarters chemical section was declining while that in the European

theater section was as great or greater than it had been.97 One reason

for this was the growing emphasis in MTOUSA on combat organization and function rather than theater organization. Another reason

94

 Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 30. 95

 (1) Ibid. (2) History of AFHQ, pt. III, sec. I. 96 (1) History, Cml Warfare Sec SOS NATOUSA. (2) History of AFHQ, pt. III, sec. 4, pp. 979-80.

97

 Interv, Hist Off with Col Johnson, 18 Aug 59. (Johnson at the time was Shadle's American

deputy.)
122 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

was Shadle's view of his own function. Since he emphasized the staff

role and since, ideally, staff work declines when administrative systems

are functioning smoothly, it was appropriate that the work of his own

section would decline. The administrative systems were, for the most

part functioning smoothly by the middle of 1944, or, at least, the

problems which had beset the systems had become less important.

If gas warfare had ever been a threat in the Mediterranean area, it

would have been at the time of the assault landings. Shadle had been

proved right in his estimate that there was little threat in the North

African landings. In the Sicilian landings small stores of enemy toxics

were found, but their placement and manner of storage indicated

that there was no intention of using them.98 For the landings on the

Italian mainland, Allied intelligence officers feared that toxics would

be employed by the enemy, and as a result retaliatory stocks were

brought in too soon. A tragic gassing of Allied forces in the harbor of

Bari, Italy, occurred when enemy action breached a ship carrying

Allied gas." No clear signs of German intent were found when troops

broke through into the Italian mainland. The prolonged struggle along

the Rapido and the Winter Line would have given the Germans an

excellent tactical opportunity to use gas, but again no evidence turned

up that they had considered the employment of toxics.100 The principal

CWS mission, preparedness for gas warfare, therefore lost weight in

the Mediterranean theater, and the part of the COMZ Chemical

Section mission which related to gas warfare supply became of little

importance. The whole of the COMZ organization declined in importance late in 1944, possibly because the impetus from the front

system had its own de facto communications zone. In the opinion of

the chemical officer, Peninsular Base Section—which supported Fifth

Army—was a communications zone itself.101 His opinion was confirmed by an organizational change in November 1944 under which

COMZ was discontinued and its functions delegated to Peninsular Base

Section.102

98

 Hammond Interv, 26 Nov 56.

99

 (1) Shadle Comments on draft of this volume, 24 Jan 61. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Col Francis

Browne, USAFR (Ret.), 23 Oct 61. (3) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58. 100

 Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61.

101

 Memo, Coblentz to Rowan [ca. 1946], sub: Comments on Theater CWS Orgn. CWS 314.7.

102

 Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 37-38.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 123

Still another reason for the decline of the theater headquarters CWS

sections was that the intelligence activity, largely managed by the

British, had never assumed much importance in the American group.

Furthermore, since facilities were lacking for a technical activity and

since liaison with the British on technical matters was carried on by

the European theater CWS, there was no need for a large technical

organization in NATOUSA-MTOUSA. The theater chemical laboratory company did not experience, as did chemical laboratory companies in most other theaters, frequent calls for development work.

A recurrent theme of the CWS effort in the Mediterranean area

was that the service's most important experience here was supply

experience. The CWS MTO supply system entered its fourth phase

in the winter of 1943-44. During this phase, which eventually included

most of the period prior to victory in Europe, the bifurcation of the

supply system was most marked. Ground chemical supply officers

brought nearly all of their attention to bear on item troubleshooting

which had been a part, but only a subsidiary part, of their concern

since the initial landings. As they became more and more concerned

with the immediate needs of the combat forces it became more apparent that to wait for instructions and supplies to filter down through

the complicated system from the zone of interior was not always

possible. The local arrangement, the informal agreement, and the

field expedient became the order of the day. The officers in the field

evolved new techniques and used supplies and equipment where and

when they were needed, regardless of the original intention or function.

Whenever it was possible they manufactured supplies or adapted

equipment to their immediate needs. They tended to suspect the

motives of every rear area organization, even that of their own theater.

One base section chemical officer bitterly remarked, perhaps with some

exaggeration, that it was easier to manufacture spare parts than it was

to "argue SOS [NATOUSA] out of them."

 103

The basic problem was that the War Department's impetus from

the rear supply system was not sufficiently responsive to the immediate

needs generated by changing conditions in the field. Yet even the

suggestion that an impetus from the front policy was being employed

103

 Memo, Lt Col Henry C. Hall for Col Rockwood [CmlO SOS NATOUSA], 21 Mar 44, no sub.

CWS MTO 333 Inspections and Investigations.
124 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

was enough to call forth official investigators.104 Despite this official

disapproval, CWS and other ground supply officers in MTO accomplished their supply tasks.

For example, Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army set up its own

system. Ammunition supply points (ASP's) were set up close to the

front for each corps plus one ASP for troops not attached to corps.

Each supply point contained a chemical, an ordnance, and an engineer

section manned by service troops of the appropriate branch but commanded by the Ordnance Department representative. Combat troops

drew what they needed from the ASP after certifying that the amount

drawn plus that on hand would not exceed the basic authorized load

for their organization. Supply points for other classes of supply were

so located that each combat organization could form one convoy to

bring up all its supplies. Late every afternoon, Colonel Barker's

assistants visited each supply point and reported back to him an

estimate of stock status. Barker consulted operational plans furnished

him by the Army staff and calculated necessary levels in each ASP.

He then telephoned Coblentz in base section headquarters at Naples

to tell him what supplies were needed at what points and depots.

CWS officers and men waiting in trucks loaded with supplies, which

usually had been sorted, cleaned, reboxed, and marked in the base

section depots, received Coblentz' instructions and departed to replenish all Army ASP's and depots before daylight. As the Army

moved forward, the base section took over and expanded forward area

depots established by Fifth Army so that there would be no change

in the distance through which immediate supply action need take

place.105

Coblentz and his section, plagued by continual shortages of manpower and equipment, by what he considered to be a lack of understanding of combat needs on the part of all echelons to the rear, and

by the continual necessity of refurbishing or even making wanted items,

found themselves hard put to keep up with Fifth Army needs.106

104

 IOM, ACofS G-4 MTO to CofS MTO, 13 Dec 44, sub: Rpts of Inspection Made by War Dept

Inspectors. CWS MTO 333 Inspection and Investigations. 105

 (1) Barker to Hist Off, 11 Aug 59. (2) Ltr, Coblentz to Hist Off, 17 Aug 59.

106

 Coblentz to Hist Off, 17 Aug 59.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 125

Theater Chemical Supply Problems

The first of the troubleshooting problems the CWS dealt with in

the Mediterranean area was that of item overages and shortages. The

second was the fact that the condition of some material on reaching

the theater was such that extensive repair, renovation, or adaptation

was required—this was the maintenance problem. There were many

other troubleshooting problems, but, examples of the overages and

shortages and of maintenance problems not only demonstrate solutions

but also show how the practice of impetus from the front operated.

Overages and Shortages

The problem of item overages and shortages resulted from several

causes. Overages were brought about by oversupply from the United

States or by failure to deplete stocks as anticipated. Shortages were

caused by breakdown of faulty or damaged materials, by failure to

unload ships because of lack of facilities, by failure to estimate needs,

or by enemy destruction of ships or depots. One major cause of overages was automatic supply. The New York Port of Embarkation continued automatic supply or materiel status report supply, which was

virtually automatic, on many items. Consequently, by the end of

July 1943, the stocks of three items, noncorrosive decontaminating

agent, protective ointment, and shoe impregnite ranged from 125

percent to 143 percent of authorization. Before the end of the year

the overages on some of these items reached nearly 200 percent of

authorization. Although the SOS Chemical Section cabled the port

of embarkation canceling requisitions and requesting discontinuance

of automatic supply on the grounds that the storage and transportation

expenditures exceeded the value of stocks, stock continued to accumulate. In desperation, theater chemical officers appealed to General

Somervell during one of his trips to the theater, but it was 1944 before

shipments began to decline. The first three items remained in excess

stockage until disposal procedures were instituted late in 1944. Shadle,

claiming that the Arabs sometimes pilfered shoe impregnite for use

as a butter substitute, suggested that one solution for the problem of

excesses was to encourage this practice.107

107

 (1) Statistical Summary, 31 Jul 43, 31 Aug 43, 30 Sep 43, 25 Oct 43, 31 Oct 43, 25 Nov 43,

30 Nov 43, 25 Dec 43, 31 Jan 44. (2) Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58. (3) Ltr, Shadle to Hist Off, 18

Aug 59. (4) "Sup Status of CWS Protective Materiel in MTO," table compiled from theater matériel

status reports, reproduced in Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters

of Operations, app. B.
126 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Other overages in the stocks of canisters for collective protectors,

diaphragm gas masks, and dust respirators resulted from changes in

the basis of issue. In the absence of gas warfare, replacement stocks

of collective protector canisters were not sent forward, and, since

there was no expenditure, excess stocks accumulated in depots. The

diaphragm gas mask, equipped for voice transmission, proved to be

cumbersome and not much more efficient for voice transmission than

the service mask with M8 outlet valve. The basis of issue was therefore

eventually changed from 30 percent of issue requirements for gas

masks of all kinds to issue to artillery and Signal Corps units only.

But meanwhile shipments of diaphragm masks continued to arrive at

the rate set by estimate, resulting in excess stocks. Although the troop

demand for dust respirators in North Africa was heavy, individuals

in the field found that they were principally used by drivers of vehicles

and that other soldiers were so weighted down with equipment that

the respirator could not conveniently be carried. Respirators were

therefore issued in substantially reduced numbers on a per-vehicle

rather than per-person basis. The new issue policy led to overages in

depots. Excess stocks of the diaphragm mask were returned to the

United States after issue of the new lightweight service mask, which

began late in 1943, was complete. Excess stocks of the collective protector canister and dust respirator were held in the theater until late

in the war since it was considered possible that the theater commander

might again have to change the basis of issue if events took a different

turn.108

While theater chemical supply officers found the problems presented

by overages annoying, as the overages tended to create inefficiency in

the supply system, the problem of shortages threatened, on several

occasions, to destroy part of the CWS effectiveness in the theater. The

first serious shortages after the stabilization of the supply system were

holdovers from the prestabilization period. The CWS in the United

States was unable to initiate production of the M15 white phosphorus

grenades until July 1943 and was unable to supply the theaters during

that year.109 The M8 HC smoke grenade was substituted in the North

108

 (1) Statistical summary cited in n. 107 (1) above. (2) Sup Status of CWS Protective Materiel

in MTO cited in n. 107 (4), above. 109

 (1) CWS Consolidated Rpt of Procurement, 1 Jan 40-31 Aug 45. (2) 2d Ind, ACCWS Field

Opns to CCmlO NATOUSA, 15 Dec 43, on basic Ltr, CmlO Seventh Army to CCWS, thru CCmlO

AFHQ and NATOUSA, 24 Sep 43, sub: Cml Warfare Opns Sicilian Campaign. CWS SPCVO 319.1.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 127

African theater, but Seventh Army chemical officers reported that

the M8 grenade was not effective in the Sicily Campaign because it

produced an insufficient volume of smoke and because it lacked the

antipersonnel effect of the white phosphorus grenade. The M8 grenade

was nevertheless again substituted for the white phosphorus grenade

early in the Italian campaign as there was still no theater stock of the

M15. The theater CWS acquired some white phosphorus grenades in

the fall of 1943, and a sufficient stock was built up by December 1943.

Although a total of 269,639 white phosphorus grenades was used in

combat in the theater by the end of the war, this munition would

probably have been more extensively employed had combat soldiers

become acquainted with it during the initial campaigns.110

Another, and even more critical item was the 4.2-inch chemical

mortar, with spare parts and ammunition. After twenty days of

fighting in Sicily, where the chemical mortar battalions saw their first

extensive action and where they proved themselves invaluable and

practically indispensable in a close support role, the theater had only

one complete mortar and about a dozen barrels and base plates in depot

stock.111 Since the mortar was already being used considerably more

than had been intended, barrels wore out rapidly—so rapidly in fact

that a dozen replacement barrels did not begin to satisfy the demand.

The really critical need, however, was not for the barrel, nor even for

the base plate, which broke at the excessive ranges demanded of the

weapon, but for elevating screws and recoil springs, which were not

even listed among spare parts available. In August CWS supply officers

listed no mortars or mortar parts whatever. In September they received

stocks although still insufficient to meet demands; and the SOS Chemical Section noted that Shadle had requested 120 days' reserve of mortars, comparable to the reserve for ammunition rather than that for

other Class II weapons. The need for parts was so great that mortars

received in working condition were broken down for this purpose.112

In October the North African CWS again had no mortars. In

110

 (1) Statistical Summary as cited in n. 107 (1), above. (2) Ammunition Sup Rpt, 31 Oct 43,

31 Dec 43, 31 Jul 45. This report was a feeder report prepared in OCCWS for the ASF monthly

progress report. Ltr, CG ASF to CofOrd and CCWS, 3 Nov 43, sub: Instructions for Preparation of

Ammunition Supply of MPR. ASF SPX 319.1 (30 Oct 43) OB-P-SPDDL-MB-A. (3) Rpt of Cml

Warfare Opns Sicilian Campaign. (4) Padlon-McCormick Rpt, 24 Feb. 44. 111

 Statistical Summary, 31 Jul 43. 112

 (1) Statistical Summary, 31 Aug 43, 30 Sep 43. (2) Padlon-McCormick Rpt, 24 Feb 44. (3)

Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58.
128 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

November the War Department increased the maintenance factor

from 7 percent to 121⁄2 percent, but experience in Italy outmoded

the new factor before it was received.113 By the end of 1943 General

Porter had personally intervened to secure air shipment of 12 mortars

and a few critical mortar parts to the theater. In all, late in 1943 and

early in 1944, 172 mortars were scheduled to arrive by air or by

convoy to relieve the situation in which depot stocks were nil and there

was an actual shortage of 16 mortars in the operating battalions. Also

in November 1943, the first serious theaterwide shortage of 4.2-inch

mortar ammunition was reported. Despite the mortar shipments and

the 40,000 rounds of HE mortar shell en route to the theater, supply

proved to be insufficient.114

In February 1944 Rockwood diagnosed the difficulty as a lack of

systematization in mortar supply and repair and the failure of the

CWS in the United States to observe existing directives with respect

to spare parts and replacement.115 His analysis undoubtedly covered at

least part of the problem, but the CWS in the zone of interior could

not supply the parts it did not have. The CWS inaugurated its first

comprehensive procurement plan for spare parts in 1944, and it was

not until late 1944 and early 1945 that the products of this plan

became available in quantity through an integrated spare parts operation.116

 The CWS also made herculean efforts to supply ammunition,

and, while theater problems of maintenance and distribution, as will

be indicated below, and occasional lags in delivery to the theater caused

critical local situations and ammunition rationing, the over-all supply

met the demand in 1944 and 1945.117 Rationing of ammunition also

became necessary at Anzio in January of 1944 because of the large

113

 Coblentz Comments, 9 Jan 61. 114

 (1) Statistical Summary, 31 Oct 43, 25 Nov 43, 25 Dec 43. (2) Ammunition Sup Rpt, 31 Dec

43. (3) Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58. (4) Msg, CM-IN-14914, CG NATOUSA to WD, 24 Nov 43.

(5) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO AFHQ and NATOUSA, 11 Dec 43. (6) ASF, Cml Warfare Serv Monthly

Maint Factors, 4 Nov 43; ASF, Cml Warfare Monthly Replacement Factors, 13 Jan 44. CWS MTO

400.6 Replacement and Maint Factors. (7) Ltr, CG SOS NATOUSA to CG NATOUSA, 3 Feb 44,

sub: Replacement of 4.2-inch Cml Mortar Parts. SOS NATOUSA 472.4 in CWS MTO 400.6

Replacement Factors. 115

 Col Rockwood, CmlO SOS NATOUSA to CG NATOUSA (attn: CmlO), 1 Feb 44, sub: Sup

Procedure of 4.2-inch Cml Mortar. SOS CWS 319.1/48 in CWS MTO 400 Supply of Base Secs,

Units, etc. 116

 For discussion of the spare parts situation in the zone of interior, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane,

From Laboratory to field, Chapter XIII. 117

 (1) Ammunition Sup Rpt, Monthly, 1944-45. (2) IOM, Col Walter A. Guild, CCmlO

NATOUSA for ACofS G-4 MTOUSA, 29 Oct 45, sub: CWS Sup Methods. CWS MTO 400 Supplies,

Servs and Equip.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 129

number of ammunition dumps destroyed by enemy action. Fifth Army

chemical officers improvised ammunition protection by bulldozing

earth over stacked ammunition boxes.118 The parts situation on the

other hand became so critical that Barker, acting in the spirit of

General Clark's instruction to give the combat commanders what

they wanted even if it was necessary to manufacture the material,

in December 1943 joined the Fifth Army ordnance officer in reestablishing operations at the Italian Capua arsenal.

At Capua a composite Fifth Army chemical group and nearly 1,000

Italian workmen under the direction of 1st Lt. Anthony Notorangelo

cast and machined mortar and smoke generator parts. The "Capua"

mortar slide, cast from Italian navy bronze taken from the Naples

harbor, was considered superior to the stateside product, as was the

"Capua" integrally cast barrel cap and firing pin. For some time in

1944 more than half of the mortar and smoke generator maintenance

supplies used were made in Italy at Capua and in chemical service unit

shops at Florence and Leghorn. After Fifth Army moved on, Peninsular Base Section assumed the job of operating the CWS half of

Capua arsenal with Lieutenant Notorangelo remaining in charge.119

In August of 1944, the Army Service Forces promised an adequate

stock of spare parts within the next six months.120 Also in August the

theater formulated, and in September put into practice, an individual

CWS NATOUSA spare parts policy, concentrating supply and control

of spare parts in Peninsular and Delta Base Sections.121 But, as the

investigations of a CWS spare parts team from December 1944 to

February 1945 demonstrated, the Mediterranean theater CWS never

reached the goal of adequate parts stockage.122

Despite these handicaps, the chemical mortar battalions in the North

African-Mediterranean theater reported only one instance when mortar

fire was actually curtailed because of the shortage of weapons, parts,

or ammunition.123 That there was only one such instance, in this case

118

 Barker Comments, 15 Dec 60. 119

 (1) Col. Maurice E. Barker, USA (Ret.) "War Is Not All Fighting," Armed Forces Chemical

Journal, VII (October, 1953), 16-19, 27. (2) Barker to Hist Off, 11 Aug 59. (3) Coblentz to Hist

Off, 17 Aug 59. 120

 Ltr, Actg Dir Plans and Opns ASF to CG SOS NATOUSA, 25 Aug 44, sub: Theaters Plans for

Cml Warfare. ASF SPOPP 381 in file CWS MTO 381 Theater Plans for CW. 121

 SOS NATOUSA, Cir 109, 26 Sep 44. 122

 OCCWS, Final Rpt, CWS Spare Parts Team in MTO and ETO, 19 Jun 45. (2) See below, Chapter

IV. (3) Statistical Summary, 30 Jun, 31 Aug 44. 123

 History of 3d Cml Mortar Bn, Nov 43, Journal of Co D, 29-30 Nov 43.
130 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

an ammunition shortage, is a testimonial to the ingenuity and energy

of theater chemical officers who manufactured parts, as at Capua, and

arranged for welding teams to repair broken weapons right in the

front-line mortar positions.124 Thus the most serious supply threat to

CWS operations in the theater was met.

There were shortages besides those of weapons and ammunition, but

none so critical. An example of such shortages was the power-driven

decontaminating apparatus, which was diverted from its gas warfare

role to water carrying, fire fighting, and providing showers.125 It was

this type of apparatus that was used to provide all the water for the

city of Naples during the first ten days after Allied forces took the

city because the Germans had cut off the water supply and the Army

engineers were unable to re-establish service immediately. The highpressure pump on the apparatus was also used to open sewage drains

which had dried up and become clogged because of the lack of water.

The apparatus, using a chloride of lime mixture spray, was also used

to disinfect and delouse buildings subsequently used as hospitals and

barracks.

 126

The Twelfth Air Force considered the provision of showers for

combat pilots returning from missions essential to morale and efficiency,

but only in rare cases was it able to acquire engineer or quartermaster

shower facilities. Consequently, the power-driven decontaminating

apparatus became the most jealously guarded item of chemical equipment allotted to the air force. Stocks of the truck-mounted M3A1

apparatus were low when supply status was first reported in May 1943,

and by the end of July the air forces were forty short. Accounting

for these had been transferred to the materiel status report, indicating

that supply was automatic. Despite automatic supply, the total theater

stockage in November was only about 80 percent of authorization and

demand had increased so much in the Twelfth Air Force that the

AFSC chemical officer maintained a waiting list for issues. At one

time the Commanding General, XII AFSC, personally assumed responsibility for distribution within his command. The AFSC chemical

124

 Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58. 125

 (1) Postscript on Ltr, Barker to Porter, 27 Feb 43. CWS 314.7 Barker Corresp, NATO, 1942-43.

(2) Barker, "War Is Not All Fighting," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, VII (October, 1953), 16-19, 27.

126

 Coblentz Comments, 9 Jan 61.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 131

DECONTAMINATION UNIT FUNCTIONING AS A SHOWER

officer secured copies of ship manifests from SOS and base section

chemical officers so that he could have someone on hand to claim the

air force allotment as soon as the ship carrying the cargo docked.

Since the apparatus was also one of the items which presented almost

insuperable maintenance problems, supply was frequently complicated

by a large number of apparatus deadlined for repairs. In the month

before V-E Day the theater at last reached its quota of apparatus.127

Maintenance Problems

Chemical maintenance officers, like many others, got their first real

experience and learned their first logistics lessons in the Mediterranean

area. For one thing, the Mediterranean campaigns were among the

earliest of World War II, and in many instances the latest refinements

in equipment and materiel did not arrive there until after the peak

of combat activity. Then, too, adverse conditions, such as the damp

climate and rough terrain in Italy, made faults and defects far more

serious than they would have been elsewhere. Maintenance problems

127

 (1) Statistical Summary, 31 May, 31 Jul 43, 25 Nov 43. (2) Sup Status of CWS Protective

Materiel in MTO. (3) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58.
132 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

had their greatest impact in the forward areas where weapons, equipment, and ammunition saw the heaviest use and where, by the time

they reached these positions, they had been heavily exposed to weather

and rough handling. Again chemical officers were forced to reorient

their thinking—repair, renovation, and rebuilding of materiel and

equipment had to take place wherever feasible and wherever needed

rather than, as planned, in some rear area shop. Again, improvisation

was the order of the day.

Theater chemical officers found maintenance and repair of the

power-driven decontaminating apparatus only one of their extremely

difficult maintenance problems. In the case of the apparatus the prime

difficulty was caused by the fact that four different manufacturers

produced the equipment, essentially a truck-mounted orchard

sprayer.128 Each manufacturer produced an item according to his own

specifications with the result that four stocks of spare parts had to

be maintained and that operating instructions varied according to the

product used. This situation was further complicated by the fact that

another apparatus mounted on skids rather than on a truck was also

supplied to the theater. The skid-mounted apparatus early proved

unsatisfactory because shortage of trucks made it immobile and mobility was of great importance either for primary or secondary missions.

Depending on the local situation, maintenance and repair of the apparatus was performed by using units or by chemical and ordnance

maintenance companies. Although the spare parts problem was largely

solved by the end of 1944, theater distribution of parts remained

difficult. The SOS (COMZ) Chemical Section sometimes found itself

in the peculiar situation of dealing with an overage of spare parts,

especially small items such as nuts and bolts, interchangeable among

apparatus, while field units failed in attempts to acquire an adequate

supply of the more critical parts which were not interchangeable.129

128

 For an account of development and procurement, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, ch. XIV. 129

 (1) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58. (2) Padlon-McCormick Rpt, 24 Feb 44. (3) Brig Gen William

C. Kabrich, Chief Tech Div OCCWS, and Maj Francis B. Stewart [to CCWS], n.d., Rpt of Inspection

Trip to NATO, 22 Feb-3 Apr 44. CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts. (4) Ltr, AG Delta Base Sec to CG

COMZ MTOUSA, 19 Nov 44, sub: Study To Determine Necessary Replacement of CWS Major Items

of Equip. DBS AG 400.61 (DBSCW) in CWS MTO 400.6 Reclamations and Replacements. (5)

Ltr, AG MBS to CG MTOUSA, 19 Nov 44, sub: Study To Determine Necessary Replacement of CWS

Major Items of Equipment. MBS AG 47 (BMCML) in same file as (4), above. (6) Ltr, Shadle,

CCmlO MTO, to CCWS, 22 Dec 44, sub: Rpt of Study To Determine Necessary Replacement of

CWS Major Items of Equip. CWS MTO 400.6 CWS. (7) Klaswick Interv, 6 Mar 59.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 133

While the problem of maintaining the decontaminating apparatus

was tied in with the problem of shortages, maintenance of 4.2-inch

mortar shell and its propellant charges—in many ways the most critical

theater maintenance problem—was complicated by problems of ammunition shortages, provision of service troops, packing and packaging,

and poor condition of supplies and equipment. Experience in the

maintenance of mortar shell is illustrative of similar experience with

M1 and M4 smoke pots, grenades, bombs and clusters, and gas masks.

From the outset of the Sicily Campaign, the Seventh Army Chemical

Section discovered chemical mortar shells in need of reconditioning.

The shells were corroded as a result of becoming wet while poorly

packaged. The nth Chemical Maintenance Company, which was

attached to Seventh Army for the campaign, was assigned the responsibility of renovating and repacking shells in addition to its supply

and mortar repair duties.130 In the campaign on the Italian mainland

the situation was worse. Shell cartridges and fuzes proved to be

defective, shells needed cleaning, and, as Barker reported, "the powder

came in wet and got wetter."

 131

 Barker set up a drying operation for

propellant charges at the army supply point, and Coblentz started

another at the base section. Both used blowers from collective protectors to force air through a heater fabricated from a 55-gallon drum.

The charges were hung on wooden rods in a box through which the

hot air passed. After the charges were thoroughly dry, the maintenance

crews replaced them in their original "ice cream" cartons and then

packed the cartons in German shell containers which were sealed to

be opened only at the mortar position. German containers were so

prized that Fifth Army Chemical Section made it a regular practice

to scavenge the battlefield for these items on the heels of the retreating

enemy.132 The drying operation was carried on at Naples in a series of

caves which the Germans had used for ammunition storage. A serious

fire, later attributed to an unknown store of German ammunition,

broke out in the caves and the fire and the explosions which followed

destroyed so many rounds of mortar shell, so many smoke pots, incendiary grenades, gas masks, and other chemical supplies that Fifth Army

was short until resupply could be effected. Coblentz resumed propel130

 Humphreville, Rpt of Cml Warfare Opns, Sicilian Campaign. 131

 Personal Ltr, Barker to Shadle, 20 Dec 43. CWS 314.7 Pers files, NATO. 132

 (1) Ibid. (2) Barker to Hist Off, 11 Aug 59.
134 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

lant drying operations on the new supply with an improved steam coil

dryer.133

The number of bad fuzes which caused premature shell explosions

plagued both CWS and Ordnance throughout the war. During the

winter of 1943-44, Barker was forced to set up a line near San Pietro,

Italy, to disassemble all chemical mortar shell fuzes and check and

clean the components. Coblentz later established a similar line at

Naples.134

Meanwhile, the OCCWS made strenuous efforts to improve the

ammunition and the packing and packaging.135 A new cartridge was

provided. On 1 August 1943 ASF adopted a new method of packing

in which two unassembled rounds coated with cosmoline or a corrosion

preventative and with noses covered by vinylite sacks were packed in

a stained wooden box.136 Propellant charges and cartridges were packed

in sealed waterproof tin cans. A final packing method was developed

for all shipments after 1 February 1944 whereby the assembled round

was sealed in a laminated fiber cylinder before being packed in the

box.137 These packing methods lessened theater problems with respect

to newly received shell except when shipping damage resulted in leaking containers or when shell was reclaimed or repacked in the theater.138

The 76 officers and 575 enlisted men of the CWS in North Africa

by the end of December 1942 knew their mission—to prepare for the

eventuality of gas warfare, to provide artificial smoke concealment, and

to support combat troops with chemical weapons and equipment—but

few of these men could have had much conception of what the mission

involved or how they were to accomplish it.139 They had no toxics and

no means to use them. The mechanical smoke generator was a new

133

 (1) Barker Comments, 15 Dec 60. (2) Coblentz Comments, 9 Jan 61. 134

 Barker Comments, 15 Dec 60. 135

 For general packaging improvement, see Brophy, -Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field,

ch. XVI. 136

 Fifth Army Peninsular Base Section earlier sprayed white pine ammunition boxes with a tar mixture

so that they could more readily be camouflaged in forward positions (Coblentz Comments, 9 Jan 61). 137

 (1) Personal Ltr, Porter to Shadle, 5 Feb 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO. (2) IOM, Col

B. L. Neis, Chief Conservation Br ASF, for Dir of Materiel ASF, 9 Feb 44, sub: Extracts from History

of 2d Cml Bn in Sicilian and Part of Italian Campaigns, 1 May to 9 Sep 43, Commenting Upon Packaging 4.2-inch Cml Mortar Ammunition. ASF SPUPC 4051, in files Off Dir of Materiel ASF. 138

 Such difficulties are illustrated in Proceedings, Board of Investigation, Lt Col Lawrence M. Hoover,

President, Hq Fwd Echelon PBS, 2 Oct 44. CWS MTO Folder 100 Accidental Explosion of 4.2-inch

HE Shell in MTO. 139 For strength figures, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. A.
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 135

item unfamiliar to most men of the CWS. The 4.2-inch chemical

mortar had not yet been officially recognized as a weapon which could

fire high explosives, and, in any case, there were neither mortar units

nor mortars in North Africa at the time. Some of the officers who

had come from England and a few from the United States were acquainted with incendiary bombs, but not even all of these few had

seen such bombs or knew of the existence of the portable flame thrower.

Organizationally, the man who was soon to be theater chief chemical

officer then occupied a supreme headquarters position, as AFHQ chemical officer, which was unlike any position ever held by or planned for

any chemical officer. No field army chemical section had been organized overseas since World War I. Supply procedures, still in the process

of formulation late in 1942, were known but vaguely if at all.

In this situation it is not strange that not only did an autonomous

CWS develop in the Mediterranean area but also that each element

of it developed its own independence. Such independence was encouraged by Shadle who believed in the importance of his staff

function and preferred to give strong field elements their head. The

organizational situation was, in turn, excellent seed ground for the

development of two chemical supply systems, one oriented toward

impetus from the front and the other toward impetus from the rear.

In the final analysis, the CWS in the North African-Mediterranean

theater accomplished its tasks and that accomplishment was largely

the product of great independence of spirit and a great willingness of

chemical officers and men at all levels to improvise and innovate—to

adapt the procedures and the equipment and the organization as each

new situation demanded.
CHAPTER IV

Theater Supply: Europe

Evolving the Theater CWS Supply System

European Theater—The Strategic and Logistical Pattern

The theater environment in which the Chemical Warfare Service,

European Theater of Operations, performed its supply tasks was

unusual in that the theater, after remaining uninvolved in ground

combat for nearly a year, directed the largest combat effort of the war.

While the Army Air Forces was on the offensive in several overseas

areas and the Navy was strategically and tactically involved in the

Pacific early in the war, the ETO ground forces in 1944 were still

striving to build up launching places for assaults. In the Pacific the

ground assaults began in August of 1942 and continued in November

in North Africa. At the end of June 1943 General MacArthur

launched his broad-scale offensive in the Southwest Pacific, and by

early winter the ground forces were fighting in the middle Pacific atolls.

The European theater, activated in June 1942, had theoretically been

responsible for early operations in North Africa, but the whole theater

organization had been primarily devoted, from the U.S. Army point

of view, to the conversion of the British Isles into a vast supply base

for the greatest ground offensive of the war. Two years, lacking a

few days, elapsed between activation of the theater and the initiation

of that offensive. During those two years the theater, and the Chemical

Warfare Service within the theater, built up the most comprehensive

overseas supply operation of the war. Under such circumstances it

would seem axiomatic that theater control of the technical services

would be more encompassing than in any other theater. The fact of

the matter is that the CWS ETO was the most independent of all

overseas CWS organizations. The CWS ETO developed a supply
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 137

system unlike any other in the European theater and unlike that of

any other CWS organization in any theater, although some supply

problems and their solutions were markedly similar to those of the

CWS MTO.

The CWS ETO was the largest overseas organization of the service.

The extent of CWS activity is shown by the fact that, at peak

strength, the number of CWS officers and men in the theater was

nearly twice as great as in any other theater or overseas area.1 The

service supplied every individual in this, the theater with the greatest

total strength, with complete gas warfare protection. And, although

chemical mortars were in action almost a year longer in the North

African-Mediterranean theater, the sixteen mortar battalions in the

ETO expended nearly twice as much ammunition as did those in the

Mediterranean.2 CWS ETO officers forecast the demands of this supply

job in terms of procedures which must be developed almost immediately

after establishment of a theater headquarters.

Supply Role of the Chief, CWS ETO

Soon after the activation of the theater and its special staff agencies,

Captain LeRoy, acting chief of the Storage and Issue Section of the

Supply Division, Office of the Chief, CWS ETO, laid the groundwork

for the CWS ETO supply system. Introducing the medium which

remained throughout the war as the principal means of disseminating

supply instructions, CWS ETO supply circular letters, LeRoy, by

authority of Colonel Montgomery, then Chief, CWS ETO, briefed

chemical supply officers on their duties and responsibilities and on the

theater chemical supply procedures. This initial supply circular letter

indicated that the Chief, CWS ETO, would: (1) exercise technical

control over CWS depots and chemical sections of general depots;

(2) set chemical stock levels for the theater; (3) allocate credits to

major theater commands;3 (4) distribute stocks arriving from the

1

 For a comparison of CWS theater strengths, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, Appendix A. 2

 (1) Ammunition Sup Rpt, 31 Jul 45. This was a feeder report prepared in OCCWS for the ASF

monthly progress report. (2) Ltr, CG ASF to CofOrd and CCWS, 3 Nov 43, sub: Instructions for

Preparation of Ammunition Sup of MPR. ASF SPX 319.1 (30 Oct 43) OB-P-SPDDL-MB-A. 3

 "A credit consists of a notification to a Headquarters that specific items are available in definite

quantities in a specified depot subject to requisition [draft] by the Headquarters for whom the credit is

established. Materials which have been credited to a Headquarters may be withdrawn at the discretion

of the using Headquarters without reference to Tables of Basic Allowances or Tables of Allowances."

In CWS ETO Sup Circ Ltr 1, 30 Jul 42. CWS ETO 300.4/1 (26-7-42)SD. In ETO Admin 545A.
138 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ports of debarkation among the depots; (5) order interdepot transfers;

(6) determine stock reporting and recording procedures; (7) receive

requests for supplies and services required for depot operations when

not available locally; and (8) provide policy for and control over

chemical service operations. The depot commanders or chemical supply

officers were charged with operating the depots, supervising service

operations, securing transportation not otherwise provided, and reporting to the Chief, CWS ETO.4

The chemical supply officers of the chemical supply sections which

had been established on 11 July 1942 in general depots at Ashchurch

and Bristol in Gloucestershire, at Thatcham in Berkshire, and at

Taunton in Somersetshire, and the commanding officers of chemical

depots which had been activated on 15 July at Savernake Forest in

Wiltshire and at Marston Magna in Somersetshire received these instructions, but lacked the means to comply. It was late in August

before the 6th Chemical Depot Company and the 51st Chemical Impregnating Company, the only chemical service units in the theater,

could provide sufficient men to carry out the operating instructions.5

Supply Status, July-December 1942

There was in any case not a large quantity of supply with which

to operate. By the end of July, the total accumulation of all supplies

in the theater amounted to only 181,979 long tons, and, judging from

the CWS portion of total supply arriving in the theater during the

first year, CWS stockages could hardly have exceeded 2,000 tons.6

The 10 August 1942 ETO materiel status report indicates the CWS

had received a smaller proportion—69 percent—of its authorized

supplies than any other service in the theater. Detailed listings in the

same report reveal that fewer than half the number of service gas

masks authorized was available.7

By the end of September, the CWS ETO reported the supply prospects as encouraging, but the actual status of stocks had not improved.

The average number of days of combat maintenance of all items was

4

 (1) History, Sup Div, 42-43. (2) CWS ETO Sup Circ Ltr 1, 30 Jul 42. CWS ETO 300.4/1

(26-7-42)SD. (3) History, Sup System. 5

 (1) History of CWS Depot Installation in the ETO, CWS ETO (May 42-Dec 43). ETO Admin

545A. (2) History, 6th Cml Depot. (3) History of the 51st Cml Processing Co. 6

 (1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 103. (2) Transportation Service ETO, Rpt, U.S. Army

Cargo Arrivals—UK: Percentage Composition by Serv, 10 Jan 44. ETO Admin 424. 7

 Msg, 8724, CG SOS ETO (G-4) to AGWAR, 10 Aug 42. ETO Admin 311A.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 139

24, but in view of the imbalance of stocks, ranging from 873 days

for the gas alarm to zero days for vesicant detector crayon, the

average was not significant. The significant fact was that even based

on a troop strength of 217,123 then reported in the United Kingdom,

there was a serious shortage of both individual and collective protection

items, such as the gas mask and the portable decontaminating apparatus. This strength was slightly more than half the strength, 427,000,

for which ETO planners set requirements in the same month. The

real CWS supply level was estimated at 12 days for Class II (general

supplies issued against established allowances) items and practically

nil for all other classes. This real level was not more than one-sixth

of the lowest authorized theater supply level computed on the 427,000

strength figure for 60 days of supply. The figure for the number of

days of supply fluctuated from 60 to 90 days in the several versions of

the theater plan formulated in the fall of 1942.8 The quantity of supply

immediately available was critically low. Yet, the ETO was then

primarily a planning theater, and CWS ETO officers took the longrange view that the immediate problem of supply shortages was important only insofar as the shortages reflected the need for planning

to meet the ultimate goal—supplying the theater at full strength.

Major Hayes, Chief, Requirements Division, CWS ETO, stated in

the October supply report to the War Department that the immediate

supply shortage resulted from the necessity for filling initial shortages

for all units and organizations in and arriving in the United Kingdom.

Filling initial shortages depleted stocks much more rapidly than replacing normal consumption, and Major Hayes was anxious to know

if plans should provide for the greater issue rate. If so, he pointed out,

the CWS ETO planners would have to know the approximate extent

of shortages among arriving troops. The CWS ETO was in a poor

position to forecast issue requirements even if only normal replacement

supply would be required. Planners did not know the theater priority

for supply, nor did they know how much shipping tonnage would be

allocated to CWS supply and how much of that allocation might be

lost because of extensive enemy submarine warfare. Further, they

had not been informed whether CWS ETO requisitions would be honored in the United States, and they had received no information on

8

 (1) Actg CCWS Hq SOS ETOUSA to ACofS G-4 WDGS, thru channels, Initial G-4 Per Rpt,

From Arrival in Theater to 30 Sep 42, 2400 Hours, 1 Oct 42 (hereafter cited as G-4 Rept, 1 Oct 42).

CWS 319.1/3040 1942. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 103-05.
140 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the War Department ammunition supply policy. Apparently the

failure to provide information extended even to their own theater

headquarters. At the end of September, the CWS ETO was still planning on a 180-day level of supply for Class II instead of on the 90- to

60-day level mentioned above.9 Hayes urged the War Department to

provide requirements information at once since, despite the lack of

supplies, supply officers were convinced that the BOLERO and ROUNDUP

build-ups would result in the theater having to handle vast quantities

of materials within a few months.10

The CWS Credit System

Anticipating a greatly increased workload, CWS supply officers bent

their efforts to turning out a comprehensive supply plan. The completed plan made the Chief, CWS ETO, as stated above, directly

responsible for stating requirements and preparing theater requisitions

on the United States and for supervising the receipt and storage of

goods. In handling the third element of the supply system, distribution, LeRoy realized that the small number of men and the lack of

available facilities meant that distribution would have to be decentralized for efficient operation. He accordingly based the distribution

system on the allocation of supply credits. The allocation of supply

credits to using units and organizations was an established War Department procedure which the CWS in the United States had incorporated into its supply manual.11

 Credit allocations were made sporadically throughout the Army's distribution system and in many

cases, as in corps area distribution in the United States, these allocations

were used early in the war to establish quota distributions for short

supply items of lesser importance than controlled items.12

The CWS ETO anticipated a credit-employment trend in the

United States by using the credit system to govern the issue of con9

 G-4 Rpt, 1 Oct 42. 10

 ROUNDUP was an Allied plan for a cross-Channel attack in 1943. BOLERO was a more encompassing

plan for building up Allied strength in the British Isles for continental invasion and follow-through.

The two plans were complementary until TORCH (the North African plan) outmoded ROUNDUP.

BOLERO continued, through many modifications, as the build-up plan. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support,

I, ch. II. 11

 (1) FM 100-10, 9 Dec 40. Revised 15 Nov 43. (2) FM 3-15, CWS, 17 Feb 41. 12

 Controlled items were scarce and important items whose issue was controlled by the War Department (OPD and/or ASF) on a priority or urgency basis. Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and

Strategy, 1940-43, p. 304.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 141

trolled as well as less important items when, as early as 31 July 1942,

they made all Class II noncontrolled items and the majority of Class II

controlled items subject to credit allocations. Theater requirements

for Class IV (special supplies outside regular allowances) items were

not firm enough to warrant credit allocations, but procedures were

adopted to place ammunition (Class V) on credit in accordance with

authorized training allowances whenever a sufficient supply became

available.13 Total stocks of air chemical Class V were credited to the

Eighth Air Force from the inception of the system.14 The CWS ETO

thus inaugurated the only comprehensive credit distribution system

to be used in the theater.

Although administrative arrangements for the CWS ETO issue

system were complete by the end of July 1942, operating difficulties

prevented more than token allotment of credits during the remainder

of the year. The first of these difficulties arose because there was too

small a staff at all levels of theater organization to manage the system.

The great advantage in the credit issue system was that only one action,

the allocation of credits, had to be performed at theater or SOS headquarters level; the responsibility for requesting allocations and for

receiving issues from depots lay with major commands subordinate

to the theater commander. Issuing allocations to minor commands

would have involved theater headquarters in so much detail that the

purpose of decentralizing supply operations would have been defeated.

Throughout 1942, there were insufficient numbers of chemical supply

management officers at the subordinate major command levels to

handle the workload for their commands. The planned use of the new

base section organizations for area distribution of chemical supplies to

SOS units was likewise thwarted by the lack of chemical manpower.15

The expected major ground forces command comparable to Army

Ground Forces in the United States was never organized in the theater,

and no acceptable alternative co-ordinating command was available

until the activation of an army group headquarters late in 1943.

Although the Eighth Air Force became operational in August 1942

and although a bulk Class V credit was issued, the air force head13

 (1) Ibid., pp. 303-04. (2) History, Sup System. (3) CWS ETO Sup Circ Ltr 4, 31 Jul 42.

CWS ETO 400-35 (28-7-42)SD. (4) G-4 Rpt, 1 Oct 42. 14

 For more information on air chemical ammunition, see below, pp. 149-63. 15

 The Eastern, Western, Southern, and Northern Ireland Base Sections were organized by SOS ETO

on 20 July 1942, but only with skeleton staffing. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 84-85.
142 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

quarters, which served as the theater air command, was not well enough

organized for the next several months to handle the issue accounting

problems which would result from crediting other supplies.16

The burden placed on the supply system by the requirements for

TORCH and the virtual suspension of the BOLERO build-up resulted

in a diversion of the supply effort from the long-range goal. Shipments

earmarked for TORCH began to replace BOLERO shipments in August.

In the ensuing three months almost the entire theater supply effort

was directed toward equipping units alerted for the TORCH operation

and, for two months thereafter, to setting up maintenance shipments

for North Africa. The seriousness of the supply situation was greatly

aggravated. The CWS ETO participated in the TORCH effort by

assuming the burden of detailed supply operations which included

receiving unit requisitions from alerted units, extracting requisition

items to the depots where stock was known to exist, and conducting

unit "show down" inspections to determine if requisitions had been

placed for basic equipment and if supplies had been received. To speed

up and to simplify the actual details of requesting and handling

materials, Captain LeRoy's section devised a multicarbon single control

form which could be used as a requisition, tally sheet, packing slip,

bill of lading, and notice of receipt. A Control Division, SOS, officer

visiting in the ETO saw the CWS forms in Supply Division, CWS ETO,

and took a number of them to Washington with him. About six

months later ASF published a "War Department Shipping Document"

which was similar to the CWS ETO form.17

Some conception of the magnitude of the TORCH supply tasks can

be derived from the fact that 10,020 U.S. troops sailed as part of

Eastern Task Force and 70,800 as part of Center Task Force in convoys

originating in the United Kingdom. Many of these troops had to be

equipped in part and almost all had to be inspected in the United

Kingdom. Also, the War Department directed the European theater

to set up twenty-two maintenance shipments of CWS supplies totaling

3,133 deadweight tons to be sent in twelve North African resupply

16

 (1) History, Sup System. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 1, 84-85, 202-03. (3) Wesley F.

Craven and James L. Cate, eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War II," vol. II, Europe: TORCH to

POINTBLANK, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp.

210-11, 216. (4) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. 17

 (1) History, Sup System. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Col LeRoy, 17 Apr 52. (3) WD SM 38-401,

Jul 43.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 143

convoys between November 1942 and February 1943.18 Despite the

amount of this work, or perhaps because of it, the headquarters supply

officers were unaware of the inroads TORCH was making into BOLERO.

The CWS ETO supply policy consequently remained unchanged and,

indeed, supply officers found it possible to issue twenty credits for

local supply during the second half of calendar year 1942.19

Logistical Data

While theater stocks were virtually exhausted when the ETO was

finally relieved of responsibility for North Africa in February 1943,

it was probably fortunate that there had been no change in CWS ETO

supply policy. The Allied leaders agreed at the Casablanca Conference

in January 1943 to reinstate BOLERO and, at the TRIDENT Conference in

Washington in May, they set targets for an approximately 1.5-million

troop strength to be ready for a cross-Channel operation about 1 May

1944. The CWS system, which had been predicated on such a build-up,

was therefore ready to go into more extensive operation when, about

the middle of 1943, BOLERO moved from crawl to sprint. But, in the

meantime, from November 1942 to May 1943, the theater staff, including the CWS, had not been idle. The theater and SOS general

staffs drew up detailed plans of troop requirements to be used when

the order to proceed with the build-up was received, and they decided

how to allot forces for the air and supply effort and the eventual ground

effort. The G-4, SOS, compiled basic logistical planning factors, such

as required storage space per 1,000 men per 30 days' maintenance and

tonnage per day required to support given strengths. Colonel LeRoy,

now chief of the Supply Division, CWS ETO, realized that these

computations prepared at higher echelons would have little meaning

for the CWS as long as they lacked basic logistical data for CWS

items.20 The information which Hayes had urgently requested from

the United States in October had not yet been received since it was not

18

 (1) History, Sup System. (2) History of CWS ETO Statistical Summaries. ETO Admin 545A.

Africa, (3) Leighto (3n) Rowa and Coakley n Comments , Global , 16 Logistics Dec 60 an . d Strategy, 1940—43, p. 437. (4) Howe, Northwest

19

 (1) History, Sup System. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 87-113. 20

 LeRoy was acting chief of the Storage and Issue Section, Supply Division, from 27 July to 19

September 1942 and executive officer from that time until 5 December; he was acting chief of the Supply

Division from December 1942 to 17 February 1943, then on temporary duty in the United States until

4 April 1943 when, now a lieutenant colonel, he returned to the theater as chief of the Supply Division;

on 26 October 1943 he was reassigned and sent to the United States.
144 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

then available in the United States. Preparations for the TORCH operation had made CWS ETO planners understand how essential such

logistical data were for adequate supply planning. LeRoy accordingly

embarked on an extensive project for the assembly of CWS logistical

data.21

The job done by Colonel LeRoy and the members of the Supply

Division on CWS logistical data was monumental. The work was

begun in December 1942, and distribution of the initial portions took

place in February and March 1943. In June 1943 the CWS ETO sent

out a complete set of compiled tables for the guidance of all supply

officers and of chemical officers at all echelons of command. The

compilation was divided into four sections. The first section provided

basic data, a list of all items for which the CWS had procurement,

storage, and issue responsibilities together with correct nomenclatures,

types of packaging, unit and package weights and cubages, storage and

shipping factors, and a list of all British and American cargo vehicles

and railway cars which showed weight and load limit and cargo measurement for each type. The second section set forth the basis for

computing requirements, giving consolidated chemical supply listings

from tables of basic allowances, tables of allowances, tables of organization and equipment, and lists of chemical expendable supplies. This

section also listed the basis for issue of ammunition and gave established

units of fire, days of supply, and replacement factors on specific items.

In the third section the logistic requirements of each type of organization in the Army were analyzed in terms of initial issue of chemical

materiel, and the weight and cubage of each item authorized were

given together with total weights and cubages converted into total

tonnage and shipping space needed. Such special logistic problems as

the supply of impregnating materials and the proper calculation of

payloads per aircraft for chemical or incendiary aerial bombardment

were set forth in detail in the fourth section. The compilation closed

with a detailed account of the use of these data in planning operations.

This invaluable compilation was amended many times as required by

changes in equipment and organization, and an extensive revision was

issued, section by section, in 1944. It was the foundation of all CWS

21

 (1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 113-23. (2) History of CWS Logistics in the ETO (hereafter cited as History, Logistics). (3) For logistical data problems in North Africa, see above,

Chapter III.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 145

ETO logistical planning throughout the war, even after the issuance

of the CWS supply catalogs which covered some of the same area.22

The CWS ETO logistical data compilation served, on the one hand,

as the basis for computing total theater chemical materiel requirements

according to present or expected strengths, and on the other hand, as

a source of shipment, storage, and distribution information, including

a rapid means of calculating credit allocations once the materiel arrived

in the theater. In March 1943 the decentralization of the supply distribution process was encouraged by extending the credit allocation

plan to cover all classes of supply.23 While the basic credit system

procedures were thus set, the CWS ETO was well aware of the fact

that the system would be workable only when field elements were

prepared for storage, issue, and accounting.

Storage and Issue

Storage and issue was one of the original CWS ETO problems.

Supply authorities, as mentioned above, had a difficult time staffing the

depots and depot sections. This problem was somewhat alleviated, at

least in the management sphere, when supply officers arrived in September 1942 to replace the troop officers who had been managing the

depots and depot sections. This benefit was almost immediately canceled out, however, by the transfer of some of these officers and most

of the enlisted men to the North African forces then being assembled.

The 6th Chemical Depot Company, the only such unit in the theater,

also embarked for North Africa. The 51st Chemical Impregnating

Company became the sole theater chemical service unit. The staff

reduction was so drastic that the chemical section of the general depot

at Taunton was left with one officer and no enlisted men, and the

chemical section of the general depot at Thatcham with two officers

and no enlisted men. The chemical section of the Ashchurch general

depot had one officer and eleven enlisted men while the chemical section

22

 (1) History, Logistics. (2) Sup Div CWS SOS ETO, Cml Warfare Logistics, various portions

dated from 1 Feb 43 to Jun 43. ETO Admin 545A. (3) Sup Div OCCWO Hq SOS ETO and Hq

COMZ ETO, CWS Logistics, various portions dated from. 15 Jan 44 to 10 Aug 44. ETO Admin 544.

(4) Sup Circ Ltr 31, CWS SOS ETO, 18 Mar 43, sub: Computation of Rqmts. SOSCW 471.6/11

(15 Mar 43)SD. ETO Admin 545A. (5) ASF Cml Warfare Sup Catalog, prepared by Field Rqmts

Div OCCWS, 1 Apr 44. (This catalog is an assembly of various catalogs and lists on which publication began 23 September 1943.) 23

 Sup Circ Ltr 31, CWS SOS ETO, 18 Mar 43.
146 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

in the Bristol general depot had two officers and six enlisted men.24 The

heavy demands of the TORCH preparations could not have been met

but for the help of British pioneer troops and civilians. The British

could not provide manpower on a permanent basis since their own

manpower shortages were severe and since they operated on a strict

priority system. The labor problem was further complicated by a lack

of facilities. Storage buildings provided were not well lighted, floors

were rough and uneven, and in one of the designated locations the

maximum safe floor load was so low as to preclude efficient storage

operation. In another depot the chemical section was assigned space

on the fifth floor of a building with only one small elevator. Only

one depot possessed car-level loading platforms, and the lack of

mechanized equipment and even roller conveyors meant that all

lifting, loading, sorting, and stacking had to be performed manually.

This bad situation was made worse by a lack of adequate communications between the SOS headquarters, the ports, and the depots and,

until January 1943, the absence of maintenance facilities. The one

chemical maintenance company in the theater was being used in depot

operation, and the second company did not arrive until November

1943.25

The CWS ETO storage manpower situation reached a low in

December of 1942. From the supply handling point of view it was

fortunate that theater stocks were virtually exhausted and that few

shipments were arriving. The 7th Chemical Depot Company arrived

in the theater in December and by early January had been parceled

out into detachments to operate the two chemical depots and four

chemical sections of general depots which had been established six

months earlier, and one general depot chemical section which had

been established at Sudbury Egginton, Derby, Staffordshire, in December. At the time these detachments were sent out, a new chemical

depot, soon to be converted into a chemical section of an ordnance

depot, was activated at Cinderford, Gloucestershire. Another general

24

 History of CWS Installations in the ETO, CWS ETO, Jul 42-Dec 44 (hereafter cited as History,

Depot Installations). ETO Admin 545A.

25

 (1) History, Depot Installations. (2) Personal Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 5 May 43. CWO-400/32

Sec in CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO, Oct 42-Jan 44. (3) G-4 Rpt, 1 Oct 42. (4) For maintenance

companies in the theater, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, Appendix H-9. As indicated in

Appendix H-7, one chemical maintenance company (aviation) arrived in the theater in August 1943.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 147

depot chemical section was activated at Moneymore, Northern Ireland,

before the end of January.26

While the Allied leaders had agreed in January to renew the BOLERO

build-up, tonnage arrivals remained light for the first three months of

1943, the March incoming CWS shipments amounting to only 25 long

tons. The April figure suddenly shot up to 826 long tons of CWS

supplies, and, after the official rescheduling of BOLERO targets in May,

the June figure reached 4,004 long tons.27 Such a cargo inflow was

certainly more than one depot company could handle, particularly

since work had been increased by the establishment of another chemical

depot in Sudbury, Suffolk, on 1 June 1943. On 1 July 1943, the

handling situation was relieved by the arrival of the 60th Chemical

Depot Company. The two companies were then able to operate with

a maximum of five detachments each. Incoming tonnage rates soared,

plummeting occasionally, but reaching more than 9,000 tons in

September, more than 12,000 in December, and a peak of 34,604 tons

in June 1944. The handling situation would have grown rapidly

worse again but for the arrival of new units and a comprehensive

depot installation plan which had been laid down in May 1943.28

The unit complement for the build-up period in the British Isles

was rounded out during the last six months of 1943. One chemical

depot company (aviation) arrived in July and two in August. The

65th Chemical Depot Company disembarked in England about 6

October, and the 761st Chemical Depot Company (Aviation) followed

a few days later. Three chemical depot companies, the 9th, the 61st,

and the 64th, completed the list in November. Meanwhile, the SOS

depot plan brought about the establishment of chemical sections in

general depots at Barry, Glamorganshire, in July, and at Hilsea, Hampshire, at Westbury, Wiltshire, and at Histon, Cambridgeshire, in November. Chemical ammunition depots were activated at Shepton

Mallet, Somersetshire, and at Loton Deer Park, Alderbury, Shropshire,

in November. From December 1943 until after the invasion of the

Continent six months later, the CWS ETO, in 9 of the theater's 18

general depots and in 6 of its 54 branch and ammunition depots,

managed more than 700,000 square feet of closed storage space, more

26

 History, Depot Installations. 27

 Summary of Army Cargo Arrivals by Port Area and Serv, Statistical Summary prepared by Program

Div SOS ETO, n.d. ETO Admin 416. 28

 (1) Ibid. (2) History, Depot Installations.
148 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPOT, LOTON DEER PARK, ENGLAND

than one million square feet of open storage space, more than 50,000

square feet of shop space, and space for 68,400 long tons of ammunition.29

 The CWS ETO stood fourth, approximately equal with the

Engineers, among the technical services in operation of both closed

and open space. The only service other than Ordnance and Engineers

operating shop space and the only service other, than Ordnance oper29

 (1) History, Depot Installations. Exact totals of storage space given are as follows:

(2) ICAF SR 46-8, Rpt of Committee on Production, Jan-Jun 1946 course, sub: Transportation,

Storage, Packaging, cites report (of travel) of Col. A. B. Drake to the United Kingdom, 1943, which

gives the following total figures for the CWS ETO:

(3) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 158.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 149

ating ammunition storage space, the CWS ETO was a poor second in

these two categories.30

Air Chemical Supply

After eighteen months of operations in the theater, the CWS ETO

was at last in a position to handle supply adequately. Admirable procedures had been established; facilities and installations were satisfactory if not ideal; and sufficient manpower was available to implement

the procedures and to staff the installations. Problems for the remaining

six months of the build-up period, as well as for the major part of the

subsequent operational period on the Continent, centered about the

provision of specific items of supply and the operation of specific

supply plans. The CWS ETO was not without experience in these

problem areas. While most of the activities of the theater had been

directed toward build-up, the CWS ETO had received its logistics

baptism of fire in the preparations for the North African campaigns,

and the steadily increasing combat activities of the Army Air Forces

kept the theater in operational status throughout the build-up period.

The CWS ETO was heavily involved in the Army Air Forces efforts

for two reasons: (1) the CWS provided the incendiary and fire bombs

which became major weapons for both bomber and fighter elements

of the air arm; and (2) the greater part of the gas warfare retaliatory

effort was to be concentrated in the air forces should the enemy initiate

gas warfare.31

Founding the Air Chemical Supply System, ETO

CWS computations of air chemical munitions requirements for the

European theater were begun in the United States before the activation

of the theater organization. Colonel Kellogg initiated the requirements

work immediately upon his assignment as Eighth Air Force chemical

30

 The Drake report, cited above, lists:

31

 For description of incendiary and fire bombs, see below, Chapter XVII.
150 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

officer and the organization of his chemical section in April 1942.

Colonel Kellogg's section, proceeding on inadequate data as to aircraft

strength and capacity, submitted its requirements estimate for the

second half of 1942 on 16 May, a few days before the Eighth Air

Force headquarters moved to an overseas staging area. On reaching

England in June, Colonel Kellogg realized that the probable inaccuracy

of the May submission was not significant since there was little hope

of acquiring any substantial stockage of munitions during 1942.32

He at once inaugurated a threefold program in the supply field. His

objectives were: first, to secure materiel, such as gas defensive equipment, aerial incendiaries, toxics, and smoke munitions, from the

United States, or, as an interim measure, from the British; second,

to acquire or construct storage space for toxics and incendiaries; and

third, to provide a firm basis for supply planning and requirements

computations.33 While the air forces in the theater, like the Army

Air Forces headquarters in the United States, were tending to become

independent in matters of supply, the whole CWS organization in the

theater was vitally involved in all the elements of the Eighth Air Force

program because the theater CWS was charged with co-ordination

of all theater chemical warfare policy, including liaison with the

British. Also, the SOS section of the CWS ETO was already providing

storage for air chemical supplies and had begun, as noted above, to

work on air chemical logistical data.

The accomplishment of all phases of the Eighth Air Force chemical

supply program was fraught with difficulties. The only incendiary

bombs in production in the United States in this early period were

the small 4-pound magnesium and steel case bombs. Most of the

magnesium bombs were going to the British under lend-lease, and all

production was slowed by the scarcity of magnesium. The steel case

bomb was not an effective incendiary for use on many targets, and it

was consequently rarely issued to the theaters of operations. The

32

 (1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF.. (2) History, Hq Eighth AF, vol. II, pt. 2, 17 Aug 42 to 1

May 43. Eighth AF 520.01-36, 17 Aug 42-1 May 43. (3) For CWS organization in the ETO Army

Air Forces, see above, Chapter II. 33

 (1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) Capt John F. Crowther, Cml Sec Eighth AF, to Col

Kellogg, CmlO Eighth AF, Staff Study, Study of Tactical Rqmts for New Types of Cml Bombs,

27 Jul 42. Eighth AF 471.6 in app. C, History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (3) Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for

ACofS G-3 Eighth AF, 11 Aug 42, sub: Summary of Requests for Cml Warfare Servs Munitions.

App. C, History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (4) Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for CofS, ACsofS G-3, G-4

Eighth AF, 28 Jul 42, sub: Conf With Principal RAF Officers of 42 Group, Reading, England.

Eighth AF 519.225, 4 Jul 42-May 45.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 151

M47 100-pound bomb with an incendiary filling was satisfactory, but

it was late in 1942 before a successful filling could be produced in

quantity.34 Quantity production of toxics was just beginning, and

not even token shipments to the European theater were authorized

until January 1943.35 Defensive equipment and service supplies were

no more available to the air forces than they were to the ground and

service forces, and all stockages in and destined for the European

theater were subject to the demands of the North African campaigns.

Existing demands on the British supply system had reached monumental

proportions, but the British were in a position to be of some assistance

to the chemical preparedness of the United States forces.

Air Toxic Supply

The United Kingdom had the capacity to produce toxics, but production had almost come to a standstill for lack of containers in which

to store the finished product. The small British supply of corrosionresistant steel, the ideal container material, was diverted to other highpriority purposes. While the chances of obtaining such steel were

slightly better in the United States, rigorous shipping priorities forbade

the shipment of empty containers.36

 As to munitions for the delivery

of toxics on the enemy, the United States had the M47 100-pound

bomb which was considered to be satisfactory and which was available

in limited quantities. The British had a 65-pound and a 30-pound

bomb, but the Eighth Air Force was skeptical about their usefulness;

furthermore, the bombs did not lend themselves to economical operational loading in American aircraft. Neither the United States nor

Great Britain had a bomb cluster for toxics, but the British 250-pound

bomb was considered acceptable pending the availability of larger

bombs or clusters of smaller bombs. The British 500-pound bomb for

filling with nonpersistent agents was considered so highly effective that

air chemical officers requested a comparable American munition. Smoke

tanks adaptable to aerial vesicant spray missions were the American

500-pound, available in small quantities but virtually obsolete because

of the scarcity of aircraft on which it could be carried, the American

34

 See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to field, chs. VIII and XV. 35

 Personal Ltr, Waitt to Kellogg, 11 Jan 43. 36

 (1) Waitt to Kellogg, 11 Jan 43. (2) Rpt of Visit of Col W. Hepburn Chamberlain and Capt

John L. Armitage to ETO, 18 Mar 44 (hereafter cited as Chamberlain-Armitage Rpt). CWS 314.7

Observer Rpts.
152 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

2,000 pound, which was not expected to be available in quantity for

some time, and the British 400-pound Flying Cow, a bomb which

sprayed smoke or toxics when released from an airplane. The British

were able to manufacture the Flying Cow for the American Air

Forces, and it was consequently scheduled to be the mainstay of the

potential for spraying toxics from aircraft until a better munition

should become available.37

In addition to supplying the Flying Cow and a small reserve of toxics,

the British agreed to provide their 30-pound bomb with an incendiary

fill, their 250-pound bomb with an oil incendiary fill, and about 6,500

of the 500-pound phosgene-filled bombs. Also, since the Eighth Air

Force was occupying air stations established by the Royal Air Force

(RAF), Colonel Montgomery was able to get the RAF to leave their

protective equipment and decontaminating facilities intact when vacating the stations. The British further agreed to manufacture some

protective, warning, and detection supplies for the United States

Army forces, including the air forces.38

While the total quantity of British chemical warfare materials

furnished the United States Forces was small, and while only token

deliveries were made in 1942, awareness of British capability and

British reserves was nearly the only reassuring gleam in the dark

chemical supply picture from July 1942 to July 1943. The entire

gas warfare retaliatory potential depended on British resources for

most of that period. CWS ETO officers measured the British contribution as much or more in terms of their willingness to co-operate and

their readiness to provide technical and operating experience data as

they did in their provision of supplies under reverse lend-lease.39

Through the provision of such technical advice as well as actual labor

and materials, the British helped to solve the dilemma with respect to

toxic storage. Late in 1941 and early in 1942, the British experimented

with the storage of toxics in concrete tanks only to reject that method

in the spring of 1942 because the toxics seeped through the concrete.

37

 (1) Crowther Staff Study, 27 Jul 42. (2) Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for ACofS 6-3 Eighth AF,

11 Aug 42, sub: Summary of Requests for Cml Warfare Servs Munitions. (3) Memo, CmlO Eighth

AF for CmlO's Eighth AF, 11 Dec 42, sub: Cml Warfare Munitions on Order for 1943. In app. C,

History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. 38

 (1) Memo for File, CmlO Eighth AF, 24 Jun 42, sub: Conf, 22 Jun 42. (2) Ltr, Chief Sup

Div CWS ETO to General Purchasing Agent SOS ETO, 2 Sep 43, sub: Rpt of Material Procured by

U.S. Forces in the U.K. SOSCW 400.12/121-Sec (2 Sep 43)SD. (3) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. 39

 (1) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58. (2) Magness Interv, 5 May 59.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 153

Almost immediately after the rejection, however, scientists of the

Imperial Chemical Industries working for the Ministry of Supply and

the Ministry of Aircraft Production hit upon a simple method of leadlining the concrete tanks to provide a seepage-proof seal. The British

quickly constructed a number of lead-lined tanks at three installations

to store some of their own reserves, and they offered to build similar

facilities for the U.S. Eighth Air Force. Working with the RAF, the

Ministry of Supply, and the Imperial Chemical Industries under reverse

lend-lease authorizations, Kellogg and Lt. Col. Albert H. Hooker,

Chemical Officer, VIII Air Force Service Command, selected sites for

advance chemical parks at Barnham, Suffolk, and at Melchbourne Park,

near Kettering, Northamptonshire, and the Imperial Chemical Industries agreed to construct three 500-ton tanks at each location. Hardstandings and Romney huts were also built at each site for the storage

of 4,000 tons of chemical ammunition and 6,000 tons of incendiaries.

The VIII AFSC later installed American toxic and incendiary filling

apparatus at both locations. The tanks at the Barnham site were completed and filled by the end of 1943 and, while the Melchbourne Park

facility was not completed until the spring of 1944, 1,215 tons of toxics

were in storage there in December 1943.40

Although the construction of the advance chemical parks represented a major achievement, Army Air Forces chemical officers never

assumed, even at the outset, that these parks would solve the problems

of storage space for air chemical supplies. For example, against the

air park capacity of 3,000 tons of bulk toxics and 8,000 tons of chemical ammunition, the initial estimate of requirements for bulk persistent

toxics alone was 34,000 tons.41 Furthermore, the air chemical officers

were concerned not only with storage of reserve and normal station

issue supplies but also with the daily munitions requirements of aerial

operations. Combat operations requirements, principally of incendiary

40

 (1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) Ltr [CG USSTAF] to CG AAF (Attn: Air CmlO)

[1 Aug 44], sub: Status of Cml Cos, Air Opns and Cml Depot Cos, Aviation Assigned to Orgns of

USSTAF in Europe. Eighth AF 225 Cmls. (3) Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for CofS, ACsofS G-3 and

G-4 Eighth AF, 28 Jul 42, sub: Conf With Principal RAF Officers of 42 Group, Reading, England.

(4) History of VIII AFSC (Eighth Strategic Air Depot Area), vol. I, Narrative. Eighth AF 528.01,

17 Feb 42-1 Mar 44. (5) Memo, no signature for Col Kellogg et al., 3 Nov 42, sub: Notes on a

Mtg to Discuss FFD, 1 and 2 held at Special Products Dept on 30th Oct 1942. Eighth AF 226.9(8)

Cml Warfare Confs. (6) Memo for File, CmlO Eighth AF, 11 Mar 43, sub: Conf on Advanced

Cml Parks. Eighth AF 400.24 in Eighth AF 226.9(8) Cml Warfare Confs. 41

 Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for CmlO's Eighth AF, 11 Dec 42, sub: Cml Warfare Munitions on

Order for 1943.
154 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

bombs, had to be immediately available at each operational base from

August 1942, when the Eighth Air Force initiated its famous raids on

the Continent, until the end of the war in Europe. In the first month,

6.1 tons of incendiary bombs were expended.42 Despite the fact that

Ordnance was officially charged with storage of toxic munitions and

usually with the storage of incendiaries, air chemical officers found it

almost as difficult, for the whole of the combat period, to find and

maintain adequate storage space as it was to obtain munitions.

As supplies began rolling in, in the second half of 1943, air force

storage facilities were soon filled. For example, while 18,875 mustardfilled loo-pound bombs were brought into SOS depots and 12,000 into

air force depots between April and July 1943, 205,485 toxic-filled M47

bombs were in theater storage by the end of December.43 Despite the

fact that all ammunition storage was an Ordnance function, SOS CWS

and even RAF chemical ammunition depots initially assumed most of

the load of air force chemical storage. Eventually so much of the air

force storage backlog was in SOS depots that the chemical section of

the ordnance ammunition depot at Cinderford became in fact, if not

in name, a Ninth Air Force depot operated by air chemical service

units.44 The largest SOS CWS ammunition storage facility, that at

Loton Deer Park, was designed primarily for incendiary storage, secondarily for toxic storage, mostly of air force munitions, and only

incidentally for the storage of ground forces ammunition.45

A comparison of ground and air forces toxic stockages in the theater

is illuminating, both because it indicates the scope of the storage problems and because it states retaliatory capability in terms of munitions

available. The level of ground forces toxic artillery ammunition, all

of which was stored by Ordnance, increased only slightly from December 1943, at approximately 301,000 rounds, until March 1945

42

 (1) History of the Cml Warfare Sec 1st Bombardment Div, Aug 42-Feb 44. Eighth AF 525.

(2) Statistical Summary of Eighth AF Opns, European Theater, 17 Aug 42-8 May 45. Eighth AF

520.308A, Archives of AF Hist Off Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 43

 (1) Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Operations, app. B.

(2) Draft, History of Eighth AF—History of Special Staff Sec, May to Dec 43. Eighth AF 520.01-

48. (3) History, VIII AFSC (Eighth Strategic Air Depot Area), vol. I, pt. I, Narrative. 44

 (1) IOM, Col Hooker, CmlO VIII AFSC, for Col Stuart, Plans Sec, 3 Feb 43, sub: Supplies for

Advanced Air Depots. (2) Ltr, Chief Admin IX AFSC to CG ASC USSTAF, 17 Mar 44, sub: Use of

Savernake Forest as an Advanced Cml Warfare Class V Depot for Ninth AF Stations. (3) IOM, Col

Baum, CmlO USSTAF, for Dir of Pers, Dir of Sups, Dir of Admin Serv USSTAF, 21 Aug 44, sub:

Transfer of Cml Depot Cos (Colored). All in Eighth AF 519.225-4 Jul 42-May 45. 45

 History of CWS Storage Depot C-900 at Loton Deer Park, Alderbury, Shropshire. ETO Admin

545A.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 155

when the number of rounds stored nearly doubled. The February 1945

stockage of 308,352 rounds contained approximately 895.45 long tons

of toxic filling while the March stockage of 568,225 rounds contained

about 1,500 long tons. Nearly a million rounds in storage at the end

of the war in Europe contained only about 650 long tons more filling

than the March stockage because the type of shell acquired after

March included a small payload. The stock of 4.2-inch chemical

mortar toxic shell, also stored by Ordnance but of more direct concern

to the CWS, was built up from approximately 26,000 rounds in

December 1943 to more than 60,000 rounds in March 1944 and then,

suddenly, to 137,732 rounds in February 1945. This peak stock, less

than half of the 345,000-round peak authorization level, contained

approximately 375 tons of toxics. Bulk persistent toxics which, except

for the amount stored in the air chemical park tanks, were stored in

ton containers and 55-gallon drums, rose from about 6,600 to 8,200

long tons from December 1943 to April 1945. In April 1945 aerial

munitions stocks amounted to 306,963 100-pound bombs, 13,081 500-

pound bombs, and 35,898 1,000-pound bombs with a total of approximately 16,785 long tons of toxic filling.46

The problem of toxic storage in England was finding, improving,

and managing storage space. The difficulties encountered in other

theaters, such as corroding and leaking munitions, were not experienced

to any significant extent. General Waitt and chemical officers in the

theater examined toxic munitions stocks in the theater at the end of

the war in Europe. They found a small number of M47 bombs, about

one percent, that were leaking persistent gas. A small percentage of

the remainder were seriously corroded, and a large percentage slightly

corroded. The leaking and seriously corroded bombs were destroyed

while the rest were cleaned and painted and prepared for shipment out

of the theater. A few of the 55-gallon drums were leaking and others

needed cleaning and painting. The cleaning and painting process had

been continuous during storage in the theater. No serious defects were

found in other toxic munitions.47

Despite the problem of finding space for the storage of aerial toxic

munitions, the level of supply mentioned above was by no means over46

 Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Opns, app. B. 47

 (1) Ltr, Maj J. T. Herndon, Tech Div CWS ETO to Gen Waitt, 4 Jun 45, sub: Shipment of U.K.

Base Stored CWS Toxic Munitions to the Pacific Theater. CWS ETO CWOTD 471/8 in CWS 314.7

Observer Rpts. (2) Chamberlain-Armitage Rpt.
156 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

generous. Though ground toxic munitions were available, they were

considered only supplementary to the basic retaliation potential. The

CWS ETO based its gas warfare retaliatory potential on the bomb

stockage plus a large portion of the bulk gas intended to fill aerial

munitions, and chemical planners reckoned this aerial supply as capable

of supporting only 14 operational days of retaliatory gas warfare.48

Had the Germans resorted to gas warfare, the possible 2- or even 4-

week duration of the initial operation would have been a short time in

which to move additional supplies from the United States. Indeed, in

May 1944 air planners estimated that 45 days would be required to

move a stock of the principal toxic weapon, persistent-gas-filled M47

bombs, into the theater. At that time, less than a month before D-day,

the theater command considered the threat of German initiation of

gas warfare serious enough to order combat-ready toxic bomb loadings

sent to operating air stations so that a retaliatory strike could be

launched in a maximum of 24 hours.49 When the continental invasion

produced no indications of the initiation of gas warfare, no new preparations for retaliation were made in the fall of 1944. On two subsequent occasions, in December 1944 and near the end of the war,

theater planners feared that Germany might turn to gas warfare as a

last-ditch defense of the homeland although Rowan believed there

was little danger. Aside from the increase in toxic munitions stocks

in the early months of 1945, no further aerial bombardment retaliatory

preparations were made in response to the last-ditch threat.50

Incendiary Bombs

The CWS ETO was unable for most of 1942 to supply incendiary

bombs.51 The British 30- and 250-pound incendiaries were therefore

48

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Col Baum, formerly CmlO USSTAF, 5 Dec 45. (2) Estimates of aerial

gas warfare capabilities varied. Chemical Section, 12th Army Group, believed the theater air forces

capable of supporting 21 operational days. Leggin Interv, 22 Nov 45. 49

 (1) Memo for Red, Baum, 18 May 44, sub: Notes on the State of Preparedness of USAAF in the

U.K. for Retaliatory and Sustained Effort in the Event Gas Warfare Is Initiated by the Enemy. Eighth

AF 519-253, 1944. (2) Baum Interv, 5 Dec 45. (3) Miller Interv, 2 Feb 60. Air Chief Marshal Sir

Trafford Leigh-Mallory, AEAF commander, was designated Air Commander-in-chief for the initial

phase of the continental operation. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., "The Army Air

Forces in World War II," vol. III, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1951), pp. 80-82. 50

 Notes by Col M. T. Hankins on Conf of CmlO's at Dillingen, Germany, 29 Apr 45. CWS 314.7

Observer Rpts. 51

 For a discussion of European theater development and employment of incendiary bombs see below,

Chapter XVII.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 157

adopted for American use, but the British were little more prepared

than the Americans to provide supply in the quantities soon demanded.

Kellogg obtained 10,000 American thin cased, 100-pound (M47)

bomb bodies late in 1942 and had them filled with an incendiary mixture by air chemical service units in England. Just about the time this

field improvisation was completed, a substantial supply of American

100-pound clusters of 4-pound magnesium bombs began to arrive.

Just as the incendiary supply situation was beginning to look good,

air chemical officers discovered that the 100-pound clusters were

defective. They were forced to withdraw the clusters from issue.52

Beginning with successful incendiary raids on German industrial

targets in occupied France during the summer of 1943, incendiary

bomb expenditures, especially of the M47 bomb, then available from

the United States, reached large proportions in the fall of 1943 and

by December accounted for 40 percent of the total American bomb

load.53 The Chemical Section, VIII AFSC, took extraordinary measures to meet operational demands. They routed incendiary shipments

from the United States directly from the port of debarkation to the

operational air stations. Short supply M126 fuzes for the M47 were

airlifted from the United States. Still there were shortages and some

of the tonnage expended included the alternative British oil-perspexfilled 250-pound bomb. At the end of December 1943, M47 stocks

were double the tonnage expended in that month, and 1,424 tons of the

new 500-pound aimable cluster, M17, had been received. Nearly

16,000 of the 100-pound clusters of 4-pound bombs, now capable of

modification by a special fuze to permit cluster opening at an altitude

safe to carrying aircraft, were on hand. Seven other clusters of small

bombs and the British 250-pound bomb were also stocked in small

quantities, in one case as low as six tons. By January 1944 the M17

cluster, which contained no 4-pound magnesium bombs, had reached

VIII Bomber Command stations, and within a week, on 11 January

1944, three groups of the 1st Bombardment Division dropped M17's

on Wilhelmshaven. Although bombardiers had to learn its aiming

52

 (1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) History, Cml Warfare Sec 1st Bombardment Div. (3)

Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col John A. Martin, formerly OpnsO Cml Sec Eighth AF, 28 Aug 51. 53

 Statistical Summary of Eighth AF Opns, European Theater.
158 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

characteristics, the new cluster proved to be an accurate weapon of

great power.54

The long awaited M76 500-pound bomb filled with incendiary gel

arrived in the theater early in 1944, but operational results of this

weapon, dubbed the Block Burner, were disappointing. While the

M76 was used with moderate success against Berlin on 6 March 1944,

subsequent operations proved that target opportunities for so large a

bomb, which contained a low percentage of incendiary fuel with

respect to total weight, were few in number. By September the Eighth

Air Force had no plans for use of this munition, and a large portion of

the stock was turned over to the Ninth Air Force whose tactical targets

were more suitable.55

The 1944 and 1945 expenditures of incendiary bombs were spotty—

the highest month of Eighth Air Force expenditure was October 1944

at 11,337.1 tons while the next month was the lowest at 566.4 tons.

The monthly average expenditure for 1944 was nearly 5,200 tons and

for 1945 nearly 6,400 tons, approximately one-seventh the monthly

average of all Eighth Air Force bombs on target. The M17 cluster

comprised about 70 percent of the expenditure, and most of the remainder was the M47. Although on one occasion air chemical officers

had to request that M17 shipments be rushed, supply was normally

excellent. The curtailed usage of M76 and M47 bombs resulted in

stockages beyond the authorized theater 75-day level, and supply

officers recommended, in the fall of 1944, that further shipments from

the United States be halted. They did not propose that the theater

overage be returned since variation in operations or types of targets

available might again have meant a large demand.56

54

 (1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) Cml Sec VIII AFSC, Rpt, Incendiaries, Eighth AF, 1943,

Jun-Dec, prepared by Statistical Contl Eighth AF, 7 Jan 44. Eighth AF 519.225-1. (3) Hist, Cml

Warfare Sec 1st Bombardment Div. 55

 (1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) CG USSTAF to CG AAF, Rpt, Monthly Ammunition

Rpt, 6.Oct 44. Eighth AF 519.225-1. (3) Ltr, CG USSTAF to CG AAF [5 Aug 44], sub: Level of

Sup of Incendiary Bombs. Eighth AF 519.225-1. 56

 (1) Ltr, CG Base Air Depot Area ASC USSTAF to CG ASC USSTAF, 16 Sep 44, sub: Level of

Sup of Incendiary Bombs. (2) IOM, Baum, CmlO USSTAF, for Dir of Sup, Dir of Opns, OrdO,

and AG USSTAF, 4 Sep 44, sub: Rqmts for M76 500-lb. Incendiary Bombs. (3) Msg, Doolittle

[CG Eighth AF] to AWW, 3 Sep 44. (4) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup USSTAF, 3 Oct 44. (5) Ltr,

CmlO USSTAF to Chief, Sup Div CWS COMZ ETO, 14 Oct 44, sub: USSTAF Incendiary Bomb

Rqmts. (6) Msg, CG USSTAF to CG Eighth AF [20 Jun 44]. (7) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup

and AG USSTAF, 1 Nov 44, sub: Shipments of M17 Incendiary Bomb Clusters. (8) Msg, MF-O3482,

CG USSTAF to CG Eighth AF [30 Dec 44]. (9) IOM, Lt Col Clarance H. Breedlove, Asst OrdO

and CmlO, Eighth AF for Opn/Research Sec, 5 Jan 45, sub: MF-03482. Eighth AF 471.18. (10)

Msg, D-65036, CG Eighth AF to CG USSTAF, 8 Jan 45. All in Eighth AF 519.225-1. (11) Statistical Summary of Eighth AF Opns European Theater.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 159

Fire Bombs

During the second half of 1944 the most pressing air chemical supply

problem concerned the provision of another field expedient, the fire

bomb. This bomb was a field improvised incendiary bomb fabricated

from expendable, auxiliary, aircraft gasoline tanks. Air service units

filled the tank with a mixture of gasoline and a thickener (usually

napalm) and wired on an incendiary grenade or part of a magnesium

bomb as an igniter. The fire bomb was an excellent tactical weapon

to use against supply dumps, troop concentrations, convoys, and

vehicles. Air chemical officers in the United Kingdom anticipated

post-D-day use of fire bombs by the VIII and IX Fighter Commands.

The Air Service Command, USSTAF, accordingly increased amounts

and priorities on their orders for thickeners and other fire bomb components from the United States. By June of 1944 it was apparent that

shipments would not be received in time to meet the demand, and air

chemical officers conducted a theaterwide survey of thickener supply.

They concluded that interim needs could be met, but with difficulty.57

Intensive fire bomb missions were inaugurated in July, and supplies

proved adequate, particularly since the Ninth Air Force was using

the M76 500-pound bomb on the same kind of mission.58 At the same

time, USSTAF requested that SOS transfer 50,000 gallons of the

ground forces flame thrower fuel, which was not being used in anticipated quantities, to the air forces.

By the first week in August, SOS had delivered 20,000 gallons of

fuel to the air forces and had agreed to lend enough packaged dry

napalm from SOS depots for mixing the remaining 30,000 gallons.

Air Service Command delivered the entire loan of napalm to the

Ninth Air Force and directed the Commanding General, Base Air

Depot Area, to complete arrangements, already informally approved,

to have the British mix some or most of this fuel. The IX Air Force

57

 (1) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup, Dir of Opns, and AG USSTAF, 17 Jun 44, sub: Thickened Fuel

for Use in Jettisonable Gasoline Tanks. (2) Ltr, CG USSTAF to CG's Eighth and Ninth AF's and

ASC, n.d., sub: Nomenclature and Rcds for the Blaze Bomb. Both in Eighth AF 519.225-1.

58

 Ltr, CmlO USSTAF to Air CmlO AAF WD, 5 Aug 44, sub: Eighth and Ninth AF's Expenditure

of Incendiaries, Jul 44. Eighth AF 5 19.225-1.
160 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Service Command was to mix, using a borrowed Canadian mixing

apparatus, any fuel that the British could not handle.59

Despite the SOS loan and the successful completion of arrangements

for British mixing, the anticipated shortage became critical. USSTAF,

during August 1944, reminded SOS that the 59 tons of napalm scheduled to arrive from the United States must be available by 25 August

and that 64 additional tons already on order must be received by 16

September. Two more pleas for expedited delivery were sent before

the first shipment arrived in two parts late in August and about the

middle of September.60

About 70 percent of the first two shipments—the second had arrived

early in October—was dispatched directly to a plant of the National

Oil Refining Company, subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,

in Swansea, Wales, which had been ready for processing since 21

August. The rest of those shipments were sent for field mixing by

the air force service commands. The British plant mixed more than

375,000 gallons of fuel before the end of October and contracted to

continue this job. In addition, a factory in the north of England contracted to supplement the American supply by providing 185,500

gallons of perspex mix fuel from September through November.61 The

fuel supply in the mixing process plus the assured prospect of continuing deliveries from the United States should have removed the fire

bomb supply problem from the critical list by the end of September,

but plans were knocked awry during the month by startling statements

of new requirements and by a distribution problem.

Eighth Air Force in September 1944 decided to drop fire bombs from

heavy bombers on targets so well fortified as to have withstood high

explosive bombardment. The air force initially requested 600,000

gallons of mixed fuel and in November increased that request to

1,000,000 gallons to be expended at the rate of 130,000 gallons per

month. As an alternative to the availability of mixed fuel, the air force

59

 (1) Ltr, CG USSTAF to CG ETOUSA (Attn: CCWO), 21 Jul 44, sub: Flame Thrower Thickened Fuel, with 1st Ind, CG ETOUSA to CG USSTAF, 3 Aug 44, and 2d Ind, CG USSTAF to CG

BADA ASC, n.d. (2) Msg, Brig Gen Hugh J. Knerr [CG ASC] to CG BADA ASC, 7 Aug 44, no

sub. Both in Eighth AF 519.225-1. 60

 (1) IOM, Baum for AG USSTAF, 16 Aug 44, no sub. (2) Msg, CG ASC USSTAF to CG

ETOUSA, 26 Aug 44, no sub. (3) Ltr, CG ASC USSTAF to CG ETOUSA, 28 Aug 44, sub: Rqmts

of Napalm and M15 Grenades for Blaze Bomb Fuel. All in Eighth AF 519.225-1. 61

 (1) Ltr, CG BADA ASC to CG ASC USSTAF, 19 Aug 44, sub: Thickened Incendiary Fuel.

(2) Personal Ltr, Baum to Brig Gen Edward Montgomery, Air CmlO AAF WD, 16 Oct 44. Both in

Eighth AF 519.225.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 161

requested 75 tons of dry napalm and a sufficient number of mixing units

to handle it. USSTAF chemical officers reshuffled their planned distribution schedule and notified Eighth Air Force in tones of justifiable

pique that, while its original request was out of the question, 60,000

gallons could be furnished at the end of September, an additional 30,000

gallons during October, and that attempts would be made to meet

the 130,000-gallon requirement in November and December. At this

point the air chemical officer in War Department Headquarters, Army

Air Forces, cabled to ask if his headquarters could be of assistance in

improving the fire bomb supply situation. USSTAF answered that

the greatest possible assistance would be in insuring the delivery of

100 tons of dry napalm per month by setting up fast ship and air

transportation in addition to that already allotted to USSTAF. This

plea was renewed after Eighth Air Force increased its requests.

Meanwhile, air chemical officers even canvassed the Twelfth Air Force

in the Mediterranean area in the hope of securing thickener, but the

Twelfth Air Force was itself then attempting to borrow thickened

fuels from the Ninth. In December 1944 and in 1945 the problem

was solved by the arrival of a sufficient supply of thickeners from the

United States. About the same time, American mixing and transfer

kits became available in quantity. AAF enlarged the table of equipment for chemical air operations companies to provide eight of these

mixing and transfer kits for each unit, and USSTAF secured special

kit allowances for the Eighth Air Force. Thus, field units could mix

enough fuel to greatly augment the British capacity.62

The use of mixing and transfer units also helped to solve the distribution problem arising from the supply of fire bomb fuel. The

nature of this problem was that the Ninth Air Force was already

operating from the Continent by the time mixed fuels began to come

off the processing lines in the United Kingdom, sometime in September.

62

 (1) Msg MF-00742, Lt Gen Carl Spaatz to CG Eighth AF, 21 Sep 44, no sub. (2) IOM, Baum

for Dir of Opns USSTAF, 30 Sep 44, Sup of Thickened Fuel for Eighth Air Force. (3) IOM, Baum

for Dir of Sup and Dir of Opns USSTAF, 2 Oct 44, sub: Cable From Gen Henry H. Arnold re Fire

Bombs. (4) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup and AG ASC USSTAF, 4 Oct 44, no sub. (5) Msg MF01268, Spaatz for CG Eighth AF, 11 Oct 44, no sub, with 1st Ind, CG Eighth AF to CG USSTAF,

n.d., and 2d Ind, CG USSTAF to CG Eighth AF, n.d. (6) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup, Dir of Opns,

and AG USSTAF, 13 Oct 44, no sub. (7) Baum to Montgomery, 16 Oct 44. (8) IOM, Baum for

Dir of Opns, Dir of Sup, and AG USSTAF, 1 Nov 44, sub: Supply of Napalm for Fire Bomb Fuel.

(9) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup and AG ASC USSTAF, 4 Nov 44, sub: Eighth Air Force Fire Bomb

Fuel Rqmts. (10) IOM, Baum for AG USSTAF, 10 Nov 44, sub: Mixing and Transfer Units.

(11) Msg, Spaatz to CG Ninth AF, 19 Nov 44, no sub. All in Eighth AF 519.225.
162 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Routing these fuels, packed for the most part in still scarce 55-gallon

drums, through normal supply channels resulted in insupportable

delays. The USSTAF Chemical Section accordingly arranged with

COMZ ETO to transfer fuel distribution from the normal channels

to Army Air Forces priority supply channels from the beachheads and

ports forward. The change in channels resulted in special and rapid

handling of fuel. Colonel Baum stationed "expediters," chemical officers or air chemical units, at crucial points along the supply line to

see that the fuel kept moving. The mixing and transfer kits also permitted the air chemical units attached directly to the operation groups

to fill fire bombs on the spot, thus eliminating drum shortage complaints

and relieving the overtaxed distribution system.63

By the beginning of 1945 air chemical supply was proceeding

smoothly, and more than a month before the end of the war in Europe

air chemical officers turned their attention to the disposition of supplies on hand. For the air forces as for all forces in the theater, D-day

had been a momentous event, and the character of air forces operations

had changed substantially because of the nature of D-day preparations

and post-D-day requirements, but D-day was not a turning point in

air chemical supply as it was in ground chemical supply. The turning

points in air chemical supply were two: the first at the beginning of

1944 when the minimum required supply for toxic retaliation was at

last reached and when incendiary supply was at last equal to operational

demands, and the second at the beginning of 1945 when the availability of fire bomb material could be counted on to meet operational

demands. Despite this difference in culmination of air and ground

efforts, the problems of air and ground chemical supply were essentially

alike. The foremost question was always how to compute requirements

for toxics, a weapon which might not be used, or for incendiaries and

fire bombs, weapons which had not previously been used. But the

question which required greater expenditure of energy and ingenuity

was how to meet the requirements once computed or presented by

operational usage. The air chemical supply system answered both of

these questions but neither answer was quick and easy. To consider

ground chemical supply it is therefore necessary to return to the end

63

 (1) Baum to Montgomery, 16 Oct 44. (2) Mgs, Gen Spaatz to Maj Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg

[CG Ninth AF], cited in IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup, Dir of Opns, and AG USSTAF, 5 Oct 44, no

sub. Both in Eighth AF 519.215.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 163

of 1943 when ground preparations for the scheduled spring continental

operation became the dominating theater activity.

Ground Chemical Supply

The CWS ETO and all its sister services in the theater had been

involved in preparations for D-day ever since the establishment of the

theater headquarters in June 1942, for a build-up supporting the

cross-Channel operation was the aim of the BOLERO plan under which

they functioned. But, until the end of 1943, the problems of the

build-up and of supply shortages were so grave as to obscure the main

objective. In the fall of 1943 chemical supply was arriving in a sufficient quantity, as noted above, to make the assault on the Continent

seem more feasible. Furthermore, in November and December 1943

the Allied Staffs were beginning to consider the precise nature and

scope of OVERLORD, the forthcoming operation.64 The basic question facing the ground planners was tactical: how can a Normandy

beachhead large enough to serve as a point of departure for continental

operations be secured? This basic question quickly resolved itself into

two logistical questions: (1) how many men could the Allied forces

get across the Channel and on the beachhead; (2) how much build-up

of materiel would be required to support them?

Plans and Planning Agencies

The answer to the basic tactical question from the American point

of view was to mount an overwhelmingly superior force, which would

mean using all the men in every combat-ready unit which could be

assembled in the United Kingdom and which could be provided with

transport to the Continent. The technical services in turn would have

to accumulate sufficient materiel to support such a force. The CWS

ETO portion of the materiel project involved three basic categories

of supply: (1) individual and collective gas warfare protective and

decontaminating items for the entire force; (2) weapons and ammunition for chemical mortar units plus flame and smoke weapons and

equipment for all combat forces; (3) and special operational requirements such as smoke protection for the beachhead. The first job was

64

 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 175-89.
164 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

to secure statements of chemical requirements in each category from

each of the responsible planning headquarters.

Activation of the planning headquarters had begun late in 1943.

First United States Army was to be responsible for all supply operations until two weeks after D-day. Advance Section, Communications

Zone, a mobile base section headquarters, was to take over for the

next twenty-seven days. Forward Echelon, Communications Zone,

was to assume control of supply operations in the remaining forty-nine

days of the first three months on the far shore. It was assumed that

Communications Zone, the redesignated SOS ETO, would be in operation on the Continent at the end of the third month. Major Hingle

moved over from Supply Division, CWS ETO, in January to establish

a supply division in the FECOMZ Chemical Section. Chemical sections

of all these closely co-ordinated agencies immediately set to work on

their requirements planning. Since initial issue of all regular supplies

had already been made or materials credited to all units and organizations in or arriving in the United Kingdom, the requirements plans

were for cross-Channel resupply.65

On 15 April FUSA began submitting requisitions for the materials

in its chemical supply plan which had been the last of the major plans

to be formulated.66 CWS Supply Division issued 375 shipping orders

releasing 8,364 ship tons of Classes II and IV supplies and 12,072 ship

tons of Class V supplies for movement over the beaches in the first 2-

week phase. Three weeks later Third United States Army, the organization to which ADSEC was scheduled to render most of its support,

submitted requisitions for chemical resupply in the ADSEC control

phase. Materials requisitioned totaled 4,026 ship tons of Classes II

and IV and 7,815 tons of ammunition. The CWS ETO discovered some

shortages in filling these requisitions, but none were serious, and

acceptable substitute items were available. FECOMZ phase requisitions

required 400 shipping orders for 9,053 ship tons of protective items,

weapons, and equipment, and 9,084 ship tons of ammunition. Again,

some substitutions which FECOMZ considered satisfactory were

made.67

65

 (1) History, Sup Div, II. (2) Hq 12th Army Group Final AAR, 31 Jul 45. (3) History,

ADSEC. (4) History, FECOMZ. (5) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 219-26. 66

 Personal Ltr, Prentiss to Porter, CCWS, 12 Apr 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO. 67

 History, Sup Div, II.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 165

While normal resupply was being set up, theater headquarters, anticipating unpredictable and unusual demands once the operation

started, set up two procedures for rapid filling of spot needs. The

"Red Ball Express"

 68

 provided for a daily coaster service shipment

of 100 long tons of urgently needed general cargo unobtainable from

normal resupply. "Red Ball Express" shipments were to be called

for and allocated by the senior commander ashore. The CWS ETO

was called upon to provide a total of 90 ship tons during the 3-month

operation of this measure. The "Green Light Supply" plan was

evolved just a few days before D-day to meet extraordinary ammunition requirements, unavailable from normal resupply, at an estimated

rate of 600 long tons per day in the critical period from D plus 14 to

D plus 41. CWS shipped 400 ship tons of ammunition through "Green

Light."69 Chemical resupply was thus expeditiously handled with

minimum difficulty from the wholesale issue point of view, but the

acquisition of some of the items and of services which went into the

CWS resupply effort and the initial issue effort had not been easy.

Protective and Decontaminating Equipment

Since the service gas mask had been proved too bulky and too heavy

during the North African campaigns, chemical officers in the ETO

hoped that the CWS in the United States would be able to provide a

promised lighter weight mask before their own campaigns began.

Late in 1943 the new lightweight mask began to arrive and the CWS

ETO embarked on the not inconsiderable task of exchanging the old

masks in the hands of each individual in the theater for the new. Unit

and organization and depot mask reserves were also exchanged.

Chemical officers and gas officers at all echelons then examined the fit

and adjustment of every mask in the possession of every individual

and conducted gas chamber and wearing exercises and tests, even in

the Supreme Headquarters. The tests and exercises sometimes turned

up masks that did not fit and could not be adjusted to fit. Fortunately,

the number of nonadjustable masks, a defect which OCCWS blamed

on the molds used by one manufacturer in early production, was not

great. These masks were called in and facepieces from the old masks

were assembled to render them serviceable. Issue of the new masks

68

 Not to be confused with the later and better-known motor transport operation of the same name. 69

 History, Sup Div, II.
166 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

was completed in March 1944, and chemical maintenance companies

examined, cleaned, and repaired salvageable old masks turned in to

provide a secondary reserve and to build up an inventory of repair

parts. Not long after the invasion, Colonel St. John, chemical adviser

to G-3, SHAEF, wrote, "There are sufficient gas masks in the UK to

cover the faces of all Europe and Asia."

 70

The gas mask was the most important of the protective items, but,

since chemical officers assumed that vesicant gases would be employed

in far greater quantities than nonpersistent gases, protective clothing

was also very important. Storage and issue of protective clothing was

a responsibility of the Quartermaster Corps, but the CWS was charged

with impregnating permeable clothing with gas-resistant chemicals.

The CWS provided chemical processing companies to perform this

service in the theaters. As noted above, the 51st Chemical Processing

Company was one of the first two chemical service units in the

European theater. Late in 1942 this company began to set up a large

capacity impregnating facility, in fact a modified commercial drycleaning plant, in the factory of the Blythe Colour Works at Cresswell,

Staffordshire. This "zone of the interior impregnating plant," which

crated weighed nearly 215 long tons and occupied more than 43,000

cubic feet, was intended to be the first of nearly a dozen such plants

to be erected in the United Kingdom; but, when it was discovered

that sites were unavailable and that requirements for water, waste

disposal facilities, and power were more than the overburdened British

economy could bear, the CWS ETO requested that the schedule be

changed to provide the smaller "theater of operations" plant.71

By the end of 1943, ten more chemical processing companies had

arrived in the United Kingdom, had been equipped with two theater

of operations impregnating plants each, and had been installed, usually

within or adjacent to quartermaster clothing depots. A number of

70

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, TAG to CG's AGF, AAF, ASF, POE's et al., 28 Oct 43, sub: Instr on

Issuing New Type Gas Masks. AG 470.72 (26 Oct 43) OB-S-E-SPMOT-M, in Rqmts and Stock

Contl Div, ASF 470.72 Gas Masks. (3) Ltr, CCWO ETO to CmlO USSTAF, 22 Aug, sub: Special

Fitting of Gas Masks. CWO 470.72/499 in Eighth AF 225.5 Protective Equip. (4) 8th Ind (Basic

Ltr not available), CmlO USSTAF to Air CmlO AAF WD, 1 Sep 44, no sub. AAF 470.72 (25 Apr

44) in Eighth AF 225.5 Protective Equip. (5) Personal Ltr, Porter to Prentiss, 22 Mar 44. CWS

314.7 Pers Files, ETO. (6) Rpt for CCWS, St. John, 28 Jun 1944. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO.

(7) Personal Ltr, Porter to St. John, 2 Aug 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO. (General Porter

pointed out that ETO mask stockage was 2,246,000, with 213,000 in the hands of troops. This quantity, even considering the 719,000 old-style masks still in reserve, was not a significant overage.) 71

 History, Impregnation in ETO, 1 Jul 42-1 Jan 44, CWS ETO. ETO Admin 545A.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 167

the plants utilized the new water emulsion impregnating process. The

Quartermaster Corps had been able to obtain impregnated clothing

from the United States to satisfy most of the theater's planned needs,

so that there was little initial impregnating work to do. By agreement

between the theater quartermaster and the CWS, all but one of the

processing companies were given laundry work. Most of the companies

"kept a hand in" by doing reimpregnation on clothing which had

been turned in and by doing initial impregnation of Navy uniforms.

In January 1944 the theater commander assigned to the CWS ETO

the responsibility of inspecting clothing in storage to determine how

impregnation was holding up. Rowan delegated the inspection function to teams picked from the processing companies. The inspection

operation further improved the technical proficiency of the companies

and also served to identify lots of clothing needing reimpregnation.72

The theater quartermaster called in and reissued protective clothing

for every individual in the theater at the same time that the distribution

of the lightweight mask was in progress. The European theater was

authorized an initial issue of double layer protection, that is, antigas

impregnated underwear and socks, hood, combat uniform, gloves, and

leggings, for every individual. In April 1944 the War Department

authorized in addition to this initial issue a theater reserve (in the

absence of gas warfare) of double layer protection for 35 percent of

the theater force and one and one half layer, that is, antigas socks,

drawers, and outer uniform plus hood, gloves, and leggings, for the

remainder of the theater force.73 Thus, every soldier in the theater

had available two complete sets of protective clothing except that 65

percent of the force would lack a second protective undershirt. The

invasion plan called for every soldier to wear protective outer garments

for the landing, to carry the gas mask, and to carry two cellophane

protective covers, four eyeshields, one tube of eye ointment, one can

of shoe impregnite, and one package of protective ointment. Most

soldiers were also equipped with sleeve detectors (a brassard of gas

detector paper) which the CWS had procured from the British.74

While most items of chemical protective, gas warning, and decontaminating equipment existed in ample supply by January 1944,

72

 History, Sup Div, II. 73

 Ltr, TAG to CinC SWPA et al, 24 Apr 44, sub: Cml Warfare Protective Clothing Accessories and

Equip. AG 420 23 May 42(2 ) sec. 2. 74

 History, Sup Div, II.
168 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

there were several shortages. One acute shortage was for gas alarms,

and the CWS ETO through reverse lend-lease procured the British

trench rattle as a substitute. Another more acute shortage was for the

power-driven decontaminating apparatus. As in North Africa and

Italy, the decontaminating apparatus was cherished by the Army Air

Forces in the United Kingdom for its secondary uses, such as giving

showers, hauling water, serving as fire-fighting equipment, and washing

aircraft. The Army Air Forces found the skid-mounted M4 powerdriven apparatus completely unsatisfactory for their needs, and the

ground and service forces took an equally dim view of this immobile

equipment. Consequently, the CWS ETO set its maintenance companies to work truck-mounting the M4 apparatus. The job was completed in the spring of 1944, and, while the M4 apparatus failed to

meet Air Forces requirements even when mounted, the ground forces

and service forces were willing to accept it. As of June 1944 the authorized theater level for the M3 and M4 apparatus was 1,336 while

the supply was 1,298. In the absence of gas warfare, this shortage

was not a serious matter, but it did present chemical officers with the

problem of giving air forces and ground forces elements reasons for

not supplying them with all the apparatus they wanted for secondary

uses.75

Weapons, Ammunition, and Smoke Equipment

The availability of and requirement for chemical mortar battalions

remained in doubt during the entire preparation period, and consequently no firm basis existed on which to compute weapons and ammunition requirements. Weapons supply and ammunition supply,

in Colonel St. John's opinion, were adequate, and he believed that the

only serious preinvasion chemical shortage was in repair parts for the

mortar. ETO chemical officers, aware of the spare parts problems in

the Mediterranean area, attempted to improve their own situation by

requesting supply from the United States. The CWS at home had

not yet remedied the repair parts situation. The task was doubly

difficult because ASF was attempting to standardize all repair parts

requirements computations, and, owing to the uncertain weapons

75

 (1) Ibid, (2) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (3) Msg D-1441, Maj Gen Ira C. Eaker [CG

Eighth AF] to Arnold [CG AAF], 30 Jun 43. Eighth AF 519-253 1944. (4) Baldwin, Bingham,

and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Opns, app. B.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 169

requirement situation and the lack of expenditure experience in the

ETO, CWS could furnish ASF with recommendations based only on

roughly estimated data. But even had requirements recommendations

been firm, it is doubtful that the supply system could have operated

rapidly enough to furnish the ETO with stocks in the few months

before the cross-Channel attack. Experience was to prove the limited

supply of repair parts grossly inadequate.76

Other weapons and ammunition furnished by the CWS ETO to the

combat forces included the flame thrower, smoke pots, and smoke

grenades. The CWS ETO had acquired a sufficient supply of the

portable flame throwers, and chemical units had mixed a substantial

quantity of thickened fuel. No American tank-mounted flame thrower

was available, but fuel had been mixed for use in British models on

loan in limited numbers to the United States forces. Soon after the

invasion, St. John reported critical shortages of both portable and

mechanized flame throwers and of fuels as well as of mortars and

mortar parts, but subsequent experience did not warrant the critical

designation since flame throwers were not popular in Europe.77

Not enough smoke pots or grenades were available to meet anticipated requirements. British No. 24 smoke generators, similar to the

American smoke pots, were procured as substitutes, and the British

No. 79 grenade was procured as a substitute for the American M8

smoke grenade. The American mechanical smoke generator should

also be included in this category although it was not technically classed

as a weapon. The bulky semimobile M1 generator was available in

sufficient quantity, but a supply of the newly produced, highly mobile

M2 was considered essential for combat operations. The CWS in the

United States sent new generators, some by airlift, just in time to be

used in the invasion. Generator fuel was provided by the British.78

Special Requirements

ETO chemical officers, anticipating the need for concealing mounting areas in England and assault beaches in France, had long expected

that the need for smoke materials would far exceed the normal demands

76

 (1) History, Sup Div, II. (2) Personal Ltr, St. John to Waitt, 17 May 44. CWS 314.7 Pers

Files, ETO. (3) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58. 77

 (1) For additional information on flame thrower experience in Europe, see below, Chapter XVI.

(2) History, Sup Div, II. (3) St. John to Porter, 28 Jun 44. 78

 History, Sup Div, II.
170 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

CONFERRING SOMEWHERE IN ENGLAND JUST BEFORE D-DAY. (Left to right)

Colonel Cunin, General Porter, Lt. Col. Thomas H. James, and Colonel St. John.

of combat operations. They also anticipated a number of special demands for other CWS materials for use on the Continent. The fact

that the Germans were to lose their air superiority by the time of the

invasion, negating the need for smoke during the mounting and assault

phases, could not have been counted on or, indeed, foreseen by these

planners.

To take care of such special demands, the War Department set up

a project system known as PROCO (projects for continental operation) soon after the 1943 reinstatement of BOLERO. PROCO was to

be set up by the technical services in the theater. Each technical service

was to state specific requirements for each project together with

shipping weights and cubages and an extensive justification for the

use of materials beyond regular authorizations. The justifications were

to be reviewed by higher authority in the theater and by ASF and OPD

in the United States. CWS ETO PROCO 1 requested 1,164,508 M1

smoke pots and 20,000 M4 smoke pots. The first project was submitted
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 171

on 20 July 1943, and on that and the following day nine other projects

for decontaminating, impregnating, and gasproofing materials and

supply handling and maintenance equipment were dispatched.79

The first ten CWS projects initially called for 179,283 long tons,

or 590,059 ship tons, of materiel, delivery for which was to be phased

over a period of nearly a year. In view of the fact that this gross ship

tonnage was more than ten times the CWS cubage eventually shipped

to the Continent in the first ninety days, it is apparent that PROCO

was no insignificant matter in the eyes of ETO chemical supply officers;

indeed, PROCO must have been manna to the CWS officers who

believed ETO supply inadequate for chemical warfare. PROCO as

interpreted in the theater presented the first and last opportunity for

the CWS in any theater of operations to prepare for gas, smoke, and

flame warfare on a scale considered by many chemical officers as wise.

CWS ETO in September 1941 accordingly submitted three more

projects, one for flame thrower accessories and two for smoke materials,

before any word had been received from the War Department on the

fate of the first ten. On 22 October 1943 ASF directed shipment of

those items which CWS ETO had scheduled for early theater delivery

in projects one through ten, and theater officers assumed that the

whole schedule would be followed. But, before this first shipment

could be made theater hopes were shattered. On 3 November 1943

ASF withdrew all projects for review by the United States Chemical

Warfare Committee (USCWC).80

ASF restored CWS PROCO after review by the USCWC and after

much correspondence with the theater and the intercession of General

Waitt, Assistant Chief Chemical Officer for Field Operations, but they

restored only 40 percent of the original quantities. Project 12 for

79

 (1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 260-61. (2) Ltrs, CCWO ETO to TAG through CG SOS

ETO, 20 Jul 43, sub: Proj 1, SOSCW 470.72/134-C1-Sec (20 Jul 43)SD; 21 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj

2, SOSCW 470.72/311-Sec (21 Jul 43)SD; 21 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 3, same file; 20 Jul 43, sub:

CWS Proj 4, SOSCW 470.72/309-Sec (20 Jul 43)SD; 20 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 5, SOSCW 470.72/

310-Sec (20 Jul 43)SD; 20 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 6, SOSCW 470.72/134-C1-Sec (20 Jul 43)SD;

21 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 7, SOSCW 470.72/311 Sec (21 Jul 43)SD; 21 Jul 43, sub: CWS Project 8,

same file; 20 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 9, same file; 20 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 10, SOSCW 470.72/134-

Ci-Sec (20 Jul 43) SD. All in Planning Div ASF Proj for Continental Opn PROCO. 80

 (1) Ltrs, CCWO ETO to TAG through CG SOS ETO, 22 Sep 43, sub: CWS Project 11; CWS

Project 12; CWS Project 13. All SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (22 Sep 43) SD in Planning Div ASF, Proj for

Continental Opn PROCO. (2) Memo, Col Carter B. Magruder, Chief Planning Div ASF, for Deputy

Dir for Plans and Opns ASF, 28 Apr 44, sub: History of Opnl Projects for ETO. ASF SPOPP 400

(ETO) in Off of CG ASF 400.
172 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

smoke grenades was disapproved on the theory that increases in normal

allowances would take care of the requirement. Projects 11 and 13

were approved after a 60-percent slash. ASF again directed shipment

of the materials specified in these modified projects and six additional

projects in February, March, and April of 1944. The CWS ETO had

submitted Project 14 for smoke (WP) bombs in November 1943,

and Project 16 for smoke grenades, Project 18 for gas mask parts, and

Project 19 for flame thrower parts and accessories in February 1944.

In March it submitted Project 23 for flame throwers and Project 20

for flame thrower pressure cylinders. ASF disapproved Project 17 for

grenades and smoke pots to be used by the air forces, indicating that

regular theater stocks would cover the requirement. It disapproved

Project 15 for equipment to convert decontamination companies to

smoke generator companies, and Project 22 for a combat reserve of

smoke generators, on the ground that these materials also could be

provided from theater stocks. Project 21 seems to have vanished from

the record.81 The significant feature of the 1944 projects as opposed

to the 1943 projects was that the 1944 projects were so limited in scope

as to seem almost niggardly. Gone were the implications of vast and

all-out preparations for gas, smoke, and flame warfare.

While the curtailed PROCO shipments did help out in the operational period, PROCO did not live up to theater expectations. The

CWS ETO undoubtedly expected too much, and it is apparent in

retrospect that theater chemical officers got along despite shortages.

Materials which CWS ETO requested under the original PROCO

would certainly have added to the theater gas warfare defensive potential since they would have provided for more collective protection

and more decontamination. ETO combat forces would probably not

have used smoke and flame in any greater quantities had more materials

been available. That ASF after postwar analysis found it had guessed

right with respect to requirements does not alter the fact that ASF

81

 (1) Magruder for Dep Dir for Plans and Opns ASF, 28 Apr 44. (2) Ltrs, CCWO ETO to

TAG through CG SOS ETO, 27 Nov 43, sub: CWS Proj 14, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (27 Nov 43)SD;

15 Jan 44, sub: CWS Proj 15, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (15 Jan 44)SD; 11 Feb 44, sub: CWS Proj 18,

SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (11 Feb 44)SD; 12 Feb 44, sub: CWS Proj 19, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (12 Feb

44)SD; 3 Apr 44, sub: CWS Proj 20, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (3 Apr 44)SD; 17 Mar 44, sub: CWS

Proj 22, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (17 Mar 44)SD; 31 Mar 44, sub: CWS Project 23, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec

(31 Mar 44) SD. (3) Msg WL-470, Lee (CG SOS ETO) for War, 21 Jan 44 (Project 16). (4)

Msg W-11067, Lee for War, 12 Feb 44 (Project 17).
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 173

handling of PROCO violated the principle of theater requirements

determination.

PROCO's importance from a chemical point of view is that the

history of the system demonstrated the lack of understanding and lack

of adequate communication between the theater and War Department

headquarters, and perhaps even between ASF and its technical services

at home. Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, Director for Planning and Operations, ASF, complained in May 1944 that theater officers had misunderstood and misapplied the concept of PROCO. He charged that the

theater had failed to plan adequately in advance.82 General Lutes

undoubtedly had grounds for complaint as far as theater strategic and

tactical decisions were concerned, but the CWS ETO could hardly

have begun requirements planning any earlier since CWS officers did

begin planning in the month of theater activation, and CWS ETO

could hardly have had less help in such planning from ASF. Specifically

with respect to PROCO, the War Department allowed the theater to

labor under a misapprehension of the PROCO concept from June

until November 1943, and apparently the War Department concept

was not understood by the CWS ETO until the reinstatement of the

revised projects in February 1944. Almost a year elapsed between the

system authorization and General Lutes' statement of his complaints.

It is not strange, therefore, that at the time of the Normandy assault

the CWS ETO was a vigorously individualistic organization many of

whose officers and enlisted men felt that they must meet their own

needs without much help from the official logistics organization. The

experience of these officers and enlisted men on the Continent was to

confirm this belief.

On the Continent

The Landings

The 1st Platoon, 30th Chemical Decontamination Company, under

the command of 1st Lt. Bernard Miller, landed on OMAHA Beach at

H plus sixteen minutes. The platoon fought its way ashore with the

first wave, providing grenade smoke screens to conceal infantry landings. Lieutenant Miller and six enlisted men were wounded or missing

82

 Memo, Lutes for ACofS OPD, 25 May 44, sub: Opnl Projects for ETO. Plng Div ASF 400

History of Projects. (Also cited in Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 260).
174 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

in action. Sgt. John J. Cunningham assumed command of the platoon,

which then pushed on, probing for land mines, giving aid to the

wounded, fighting as infantrymen, and providing what smoke concealment it could. At 1300 the 3d Platoon under 1st Lt. James W.

Cassidy joined the 1st Platoon, and together they salvaged and put

into working order a few of the M2 smoke generators which had been

sunk on an incoming Dukw. On D plus one Capt. Milton M. Moore,

company commander, arrived with the remainder of the company,

and the entire unit launched more extensively into its special mission

activity, gas reconnaissance. First Army, then commanding all

American forces on the Continent, made few calls on the company's

secondary mission, provision of smoke concealment, but the company

got smoke pots ashore and set up smoke lines in the vicinity of Colleville sur Mer. By the time a company overstrength had been landed,

14 June, the 30th Chemical Decontamination Company was in the

supply and service business, setting up and working in supply dumps,

furnishing showers, settling road dust, and fighting fires with powerdriven decontaminating apparatus.83

The id Platoon, 33d Chemical Decontamination Company, went

ashore on UTAH Beach at approximately H plus 3 (0930). Since

resistance at first was light on UTAH, the 2d Platoon at once established

the first CWS beach dump of the invasion. By D plus 2 detachments

of the company which had landed with elements of the 53 1st Engineer

Shore Regiment were ordered to assemble under the command of Lt.

Carroll W. Wright. The assembled 33d Company expanded the

original CWS dump into a CWS maintenance and supply dump which

the unit operated until D plus 21. It handled about 5,000 tons of

CWS Class II and IV supplies during this period. Like their colleagues

on OMAHA Beach, the men of the 33d also performed gas reconnaissance, provided showers, and fought fires.84

Headquarters Detachment, 60th Chemical Depot Company, Capt.

George W. Brown, commanding, debarked on OMAHA on D plus 4

(10 June) and on the following day set up operations of a FUSA CWS

dump at Mosles. The advance party of another detachment joined the

33d Company on UTAH on the next day. The whole company was

83

 History, 30th Cml Decontamination Co. 84

 (1) History, 33d Cml Decontamination Co. (2) Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp. 302-05.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 175

at work operating FUSA dumps by 28 June.85 Meanwhile, Major

Hingle, FECOMZ chemical supply chief, arrived on D plus 13 (19

June) in ADSEC headquarters, which had become operational three

days earlier, to begin preparations for the FECOMZ assumption of

supply control. He found Colonel Stubbs's ADSEC Chemical Section,

staffed by Major Bradley and six other officers, without enlisted men

or the scheduled stock control team. Since the invasion had not been

going as rapidly as planned, FUSA had not transferred supply control

to ADSEC, and the ADSEC staff members on the Continent were

assisting FUSA while preparing for their own operational role. Hingle

also visited Colonel Coughlan, Chemical Officer, FUSA, and learned

from his assistant for supply, Capt. J. R. Yankhauer, that chemical

supply, unlike that of other services, had run into no very serious

problems. The expenditure of chemical mortar shell was running

greater than had been expected, and a greater proportion than

expected, about 35 percent, was white phosphorus shell. Both combat

and service troops made extensive use of dust respirators and eyeshields

against dust, and Captain Yankhauer called upon the CWS in the

United Kingdom for increased resupply of these items. He also requested that the quota be cut on smoke materials which were piling

up.86

Hingle decided that principal CWS supply efforts on the Continent

in the immediate future would need to be directed toward storage,

maintenance, salvage, and service. While chemical supplies were

arriving in good shape, except for a few inevitable instances of excessively rough handling, he did not believe that all stocks would stand

up well under the expected ninety days' open storage. Some chemical

weapons and equipment, such as the chemical mortar and the powerdriven decontaminating apparatus, were being employed at or beyond

rated capacity. Flame throwers and gas masks were discarded by

advancing troops. A number of men had their masks hit because the

mask bulge in silhouette offered a sniper target. Some troops had

ceased to wear gas protective clothing, and, while salvage was a quartermaster problem, the CWS was likely to be called upon for laundering

garments as well as for reimpregnation. All these factors meant extensive repair and materials rehabilitation work, particularly since the

85

 History, 60th Cml Depot Co. 86

 Informal Comments of CWSO [Hingle to Charron, CmlO FECOMZ], 20 Jun 44. CWS 314.7

Pers files, ETO.
"I see Comp'ny E got th' new style gas masks, Joe."
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 177

demand for mortars was increasing and that for flame throwers was

expected to increase.87 FUSA also insisted that the gas warfare protection level be maintained. While several gas warfare scares had all

proved false, the Germans still might initiate gas warfare. Capt.

John J. O'Brien, Acting Chemical Officer, 29th Infantry Division,

who had been captured and had escaped, reported that the Germans

would use any weapons in their possession, including gas, to stop the

Allied advance. Since Allied progress at the time was halting and

uncertain, enemy initiation of gas warfare would have been catastrophic. Hingle, accordingly, in order to accelerate rehabilitation of

protective equipment which ADSEC was gathering up, asked FUSA

to lend its chemical maintenance company to ADSEC, and accompanied Major Bradley in a search for shop space. He recommended to

his chief, Colonel Charron, that chemical supply and service officers

and men be sent to the Continent as soon as possible and that service

troop build-up plans be closely followed up.88

Establishing the CWS Supply Base

Since FECOMZ never assumed control of supply operations on the

Continent,89 Colonel Charron, in his FECOMZ capacity, did not

have the opportunity to put Major Hingle's recommendations into

effect, but FECOMZ officers did assist ADSEC in its efforts and later

opened the COMZ headquarters CWS section on the Continent.

ADSEC gradually assumed responsibility for various supply installations after FUSA, while still retaining supply control, on 20 June

designated an ADSEC area of operations. ADSEC retained the three

FUSA supply dumps. The dump at Mosles it converted into a Class

II and IV depot while the the dump at Longueville behind OMAHA

became a Class V depot and that at Audouville-la-Hubert behind

UTAH became an all-classes depot. Audouville materials were soon

transferred to a permanent installation at Montebourg, and both

Audouville and Longueville were closed out by COMZ in October.

The American lodgment on the Continent failed to grow as planned,

but manpower increased almost on schedule, as Hingle had hoped, and

tonnages, despite port and beachhead discharge difficulties, accumu87

 The flame thrower demand did not materalize, but the CWS could not afford to be unprepared in

event demand should arise. 88

 [Hingle to Charron], 20 Jun, 21 Jun, 22 Jun 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO. 89

 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 436.
178 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

lated at a rate in excess of the June-August needs. The ADSEC Chemical Section accordingly established an all-classes depot at Cherbourg,

a II and IV depot at Villedieu, a II and IV depot and an ammunition

depot at Le Mans, and at Rennes an all-classes depot, which COMZ

split into a II and IV and an ammunition depot. The 65th and 7th

Chemical Depot Companies and the 66th and 9th Chemical Base

Depot Companies operated these installations while the 711th Chemical

Maintenance Company set up a shop at Valognes, the site of the first

continental COMZ headquarters.90

On D plus 20 St. John analyzed the chemical supply situation on

the Continent. He noted critical shortages of mortars and mortar parts

and expressed the belief that flame thrower supply would not meet

demand. On the other hand, he took the view that some protection

and decontamination materials were excess to all future needs while

smoke materials, for which he expected demand to increase, were

adequate for the time being.91 In reply to these observations, General

Porter indicated that while the theater had reached or slightly exceeded

supply authorizations in all categories mentioned except mortar spare

parts, he could not concede that any of these excesses were significant.

Porter believed that the parts need could be met by supplying an overage of complete mortars. The CWS had no outstanding unfilled orders

from the theater, and General Porter was powerless to increase any

allotment without a specific theater request approved through War

Department channels.92 As in the case of NATO-MTO CWS supply,

here was the rub. A supply crisis was coming in the ETO which would

affect the CWS, although not as extensively as the other services, but

the individuals most concerned could do little to forestall its arrival.

Although the theater had top supply priority over all other theaters

and although the theater commander was firmly committed to the

policy of giving combat commanders everything they desired, the

exigencies of transportation and War Department-controlled supply

authorization procedures tended to block timely measures for preventing a crisis. Just how much of the ensuing supply crisis might be

attributable to physical limitations in obtaining and moving supplies

and how much to the complications of supply management in the

90

 (1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 434-44. (2) History, FECOMZ. (3) History, ADSEC.

(4) History, Sup Div, II. 91

 St. John to Porter, 28 Jun 44. 92

 Porter to St. John, 2 Aug 44.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 179

theater and in the United States is, from the CWS point of view,

impossible to say.

The Supply Crisis

General Rowan, on D plus 44, pointed out even more vigorously than

Colonel St. John the critical nature of mortar parts and ammunition

supply. He suggested to General Waitt that the CWS plan to double

its production quotas for those items. The last CWS ETO ammunition

requisition, he wrote, had been cut in half, presumably by NYPE, and

he had been unable to determine on what basis the cut was made.93

The CWS in the United States could not raise its production quotas

until theater recommendations for increases in War Department

allowances had been approved. Three weeks later Rowan paid a

flying visit to his new office, which Charron had established in the

Valognes COMZ headquarters. Rowan joined St. John for a tour of

mortar units, field headquarters, and forward areas. He found the

CWS supply situation still satisfactory on the whole, but he noted

not only that the shortage of mortars, mortar parts, and ammunition

was critical but also that some of the mortar battalion equipment

needed replacement.94

As the combat forces broke out of the beachhead in July 1944 and

headed toward Germany, all chemical sections in the combat organization became increasingly involved in supply.95

 The chemical sections

in the base sections became active, as ADSEC had already been, in

the support of combat organizations. The 12th Army Group Chemical

Section allotted supplies to the armies and kept Rowan's office and

sometimes the base section chemical officers informed as to long-range

requirements and immediate needs.96 The 12th Army Group Chemical

Section considered protective supply adequate throughout the European campaigns except for a brief period late in 1944 when "cold set"

destroyed the usefulness of the synthetic rubber facepiece of the lightweight mask.97

 The First and Third Army chemical officers likewise

93

 Personal Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 20 Jul 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO. 94

 Memo, Rowan, no addressee, sub: Notes on Trip to Far Shore, 26 Aug 44, in Ltr, Rowan to

Waitt, 2 Sep 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO. 95

 See above, ch. II. 96

 (1) MacArthur Interv, 19 Sep 61. (2) Leggin Intervs, 13 Oct 61, 22 Nov 45. (3) Powers

Interv, 24 Sep 59. 97

 12th Army Group, Rpt of Opns, vol. XI, Cml Warfare Sec.
180 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

considered protection adequate except in isolated circumstances.98

Dissent on the adequacy of protection came from base section chemical

officers who felt that, in the early period on the Continent, the CWS

distribution plan looked better on paper than it did in practice. The

problem was that since supplies were so scattered about in dumps and

since so much equipment, especially masks, had been abandoned by

troops moving forward, it would have been a tremendous and perhaps

impossible task to assemble, rehabilitate, and reissue protective equipment in event of need." Fortunately, no large-scale call for protective

equipment was made until the following December by which time

chemical service units had collected and refurbished protective equipment. Also, by December the distribution system was working well

with the aid of a considerable amount of troubleshooting from most

chemical officers in both COMZ and combat organizations.100

The CWS supply problems began to multiply with the September

1944 supply crisis. Most of these problems arose not because of the

malfunctioning of the distribution system but because of a general

shortage of supplies, equipment, and transportation. The CWS problem

was increased by the flaws in certain chemical items, notably chemical

mortar shell, spare parts, and protective materials.

Chemical Mortar Shell

The armies were moving rapidly forward in September when Rowan

and the United Kingdom section of his office moved into the new

COMZ headquarters in Paris. Supply of fast-moving items was by

then on a hand-to-mouth basis. General Rowan personally visited the

ports to expedite the distribution of chemical mortar shell which was

finally arriving from the United States. Shortage of docking facilities

frequently made it difficult to unload ships. But, when he could get

shells ashore, he got the theater chief of ordnance to allot railway

ammunition cars for his use and he had these cars included in priority

supply trains. Usually no more than one day's reserve of shell was

available in forward areas.101

In November two barrel bursts of high explosive shell in chemical

98

 (1) Cunin Interv, 5 Dec 47. (2) Wallington Interv, 1 Dec 59. 99

 (1) Wright Interv, 16 Jul 61. (2) Christensen Intervs, 13, 23 Oct 61. 100

 (1) Christensen Intervs, 13, 23 Oct 61. 101

 Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 181

mortars led to the assumption that some shell was defective.102 This

assumption complicated the supply situation since no one knew how

much of the available stocks was serviceable. But in the same month,

when a shell shortage in southern France imperiled operations supplied

by Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), the CWS ETO

released 50,000 shells to SOLOC in return for a December shipment

scheduled for that area.103 Chemical mortar units in northern France

had enough shells at the time to continue operations although rationing

was frequently necessary. But rationing had been necessary from time

to time since early in the Normandy campaign, and, while mortar men

could have used more shell, the 20 rounds per weapon per day usually

allotted against the official 25 to 30 rounds per day of supply was

enough to keep them going. In December, 12th Army Group Chemical

Section, the agency charged with shell allocation, requested 40 rounds

per weapon per day for the next six months.104 Using the 40-round

base for all the 10 battalions then in the theater and assuming 36 operational mortars per battalion as allotted under the tables of organization

and equipment then going into effect, the 12th Army Group recommendation would have meant immediate supply of almost 15,000

shells per day. Computed on the basis of 15 battalions in the line in

1945 nearly 22,000 rounds per day would have been required.105 The

12th Army Group ammunition supply goal was never reached.

In January 1945, barrel and muzzle bursts reached epidemic proportions. During theater and OCCWS investigations of the problem,

CWS ETO impounded lot after lot of shell until nearly the whole

theater supply was impounded. Allotment per weapon sometimes fell

from twenty to ten rounds per day. When spring weather came, faulty

shell ceased to be a problem. Shell supply improved, but supply never

equaled demand during the period of combat.106

102

 Personal Ltr, Powers, CmlO 12th Army Group, to Porter, 21 Nov 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files,

ETO.

103

 History, Sup Div, IL 104

 Leggin Interv, 22 Nov 45. 105

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, Appendix H-1, for information on battalions in the

theater. Sixteen battalions had entered action by V-E Day, but the sixteenth saw only a few days of

combat. 106

 (1) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58. (2) Leggin Interv, 22 Nov 45. (3) For more details on the

faulty shell problem, see below, Chapter XII.
182 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Spare Parts

The parts situation also failed to improve during continental operations. According to Rowan the "lack of spare parts was the outstanding failure of the American Army supply system, and the CWS was

just as bad as the rest of the technical services."

 107

 In early October,

CWS ETO found it necessary to embargo all CWS spare parts issues

except "Red Ball Express" shipments which were directed to chemical

maintenance companies operating with the armies. Issue for levels of

maintenance less than major overhaul was banned. Some items in need

of repair, such as masks, dust respirators, and hand decontaminating

apparatus, were exchanged for serviceable items in lieu of repair.108

Chemical maintenance companies repaired chemical mortars, flame

throwers, and power-driven decontaminating apparatus on a "parts

available" basis and exchange items were supplied, with the specific

approval of the Supply Division, CWS ETO, when parts were not

available but alternative end items were. The maintenance companies

also fabricated parts whenever possible and some parts which would

normally have been considered beyond repair were rebuilt. Late in

1944 orders were given to French firms for the manufacture of parts

for mortars, smoke generators, then being heavily employed to produce

tactical smoke concealment, and flame throwers. In January 1945, the

CWS ETO engaged firms in Belgium and Luxembourg to manufacture

mortar base plates, reinforcing plates, shock absorber slides, cup forks,

tube caps, and base caps. As in the case of manufacture in Italy,

many chemical officers preferred the parts manufactured in Europe

to those shipped from the United States. In Europe greater skill and

better equipment were available for small parts manufacture than in

the war-burdened United States industry.109

The CWS spare parts team which surveyed the theater situation in

1945 found parts supply still inadequate, and General Waitt confirmed

this finding in his visit to the theater at the end of the war.110

107

 Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60. 108

 The mask parts situation was one of the few not critical. The principal problem here was the great

volume of maintenance work caused by abuse of the mask. Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60. 109

 (1) History, Sup Div, II. (2) Histories, 211th (71th), 12th, 13th, and 14th Cml Maintenance

Cos. (3) Magness Interv, 5 May 59. (4) Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60. 110

 (1) OCCWS, Final Rpt, CWS Spare Parts Team in MTO and ETO, Dec 44-Feb 45, prepared by

OCCWS, 19 Jun 45. (2) IOM, Lt Col J. C. Morgan, Chief War Planning Br OCCWS, for Chief War

Plans and Theaters Div OCCWS, 13 Apr 45, sub: Topics for Discussion in ETO and MTO. CWS

314.7 Observer Rpts.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 183

Protective Material

Although FUSA and FUSAG insisted on having each individual

maintain his gas mask during the beachhead period, the breakthrough

and rapid advance after the end of July brought a change in attitude.

Many commanders and some chemical officers assumed there would be

no further risk of gas warfare. Indeed, SHAEF itself seemed to

assume that the risk of gas warfare was past and St. John, whose

position in SHAEF was abolished in the fall, did not express disagreement.111

 MacArthur and other members of the FUSAG/12th Army

Group staff were concerned lest mistreatment and abandonment of

the mask by individual soldiers drastically reduce the gas warfare

defensive preparedness on the Continent. They consequently decided

to act upon General Bradley's suggestion that masks be withdrawn

from individual soldiers on the organization commander's option. One

of St. John's final acts in his SHAEF position was to make the army

group decision SHAEF policy.

Rowan conceded, in September, that reduction in the theater protective clothing level was not inconsistent with the calculated risk

policy. He further advised reducing the protective clothing reserve to

two-layer protection for 50 percent rather than 100 percent of theater

strength as he had earlier recommended.112 Commanders in most cases

authorized the withdrawal of protective clothing and masks from individuals. The masks were theoretically available in unit supply trains.

A number of chemical officers felt that calling masks back to regimental

and even divisional trains was a hazardous policy, particularly since

it was reasonable to expect the likelihood of gas warfare to increase

as the German homeland was approached. In October when he succeeded MacArthur, who had been requested for a position in the

United States, Colonel Powers strongly expressed his disapproval of

the mask policy.113

Powers paid a call on the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower,

a prewar fellow staff officer. He expressed his misgivings concerning

protective policy to General Eisenhower and General Bradley, who

happened to be visiting the supreme commander. General Eisenhower

111 Personal Ltrs, St. John to Waitt, 1 Sep 44; to Col Lowell A. Elliott, Deputy CCWS, 23 Oct 44;

to Elliott, 8 Nov 44. 112

 Personal Ltrs, Rowan to Waitt, 17 Sep 44. (2) See above, p. 167. The actual reserve authorization at the time of the Normandy operation had been 35 percent double-layer protection. 113

 Powers Interv, 24 Sep 59.
184 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

indicated that he thought German initiation of gas warfare most

unlikely, but he displayed some interest in the defensive situation.114

Although not immediately successful in his campaign to increase the

availability of individual protection, Colonel Powers found he had

strong support among the Army chemical officers. He recommended

to the Chief of Staff, 12th Army Group, that the theater be requested

to reverse the policy decision so that each individual soldier could again

carry a mask.115

The 12th Army Group did request a change which was approved

by SHAEF in December. Shortly thereafter the German counterattack

in the Ardennes threatened the American advance and many commanders were given added incentive to insure individual gas protection

since it appeared conceivable that the German forces might try to

consolidate their initial success in the Battle of the Bulge by using gas.

The reissue of masks caused a flurry throughout the CWS supply

system. Some organizations could find no trace of their masks. Others

discovered that many masks had become unserviceable because of frequent moves and poor storage conditions. One corps chemical officer

finally managed to scrape up enough transportation to send several

truckloads of masks forward, only to hear that both trucks and masks

were destroyed or captured in the German advance. Spot issues to

replace such losses caused temporary shortages, but fortunately the

reserve was large enough so that demands could be met and reserves

restocked from the United States on an emergency basis.116 St. John's

assertion that there were enough masks in the theater to cover all the

faces of Europe and Asia proved to be even more overdrawn than he

had intended.117 Some of Powers' colleagues were critical of his action,

contending that his lack of experience in the theater made him overzealous. The possibility exists, however, that the reissue of masks, which

could hardly have been unknown to German intelligence, deterred the

Germans from exploiting what would have been an excellent opportunity to turn the Bulge into a World War II Ypres.118

The maintenance load imposed by mask rehabilitation, particularly

in view of occasional parts shortages, was very heavy. When "cold set"

114 Ibid. 115

 Personal Ltrs, Powers to Elliott, 7 Nov 44, and to Porter, 21 Nov 44. 116

 (1) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58. (2) Powers Interv, 24 Sep 59. (3) Barta Interv, 23 Sep 59. 117

 See above, p. 166. 118

 Leggin Interv, 13 Oct 61.
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 185

(cold weather hardening) was discovered in reclaimed and synthetic

rubber mask facepieces during the winter, the CWS ETO maintenance burden became greater than the maintenance units could

handle.119 Since the facepieces hardened by "cold set" could not be

properly fitted, CWS ETO contracted with eight French firms for

the exchange of 400,000 faulty facepieces for the natural rubber facepiece from the old-style mask. At the same time another French firm

initiated remanufacture of old-style gas mask carriers into 133,000

lightweight mask carriers.120 After considerable effort, the CWS ETO

successfully met the challenge of bringing protective supply up to a

highly effective level for the remainder of the war.

The CWS ETO Supply System—Final Form

Considering the many unexpected problems it ran into, the CWS

ETO supply system changed amazingly little during the period of

continental operation. The credit system continued to operate effectively although during the fall supply crisis it became necessary to

delegate credit allocation for ammunition and certain critical supplies

to 12th Army Group. Supply Division, CWS ETO, headed during

the entire period on the Continent by Col. Frederick E. Powell, continued to allocate credits for normal Class II and IV supply. The

supply pattern brought materials into CWS branch depots from the

ports and beaches.121 CWS ETO established forty such depots under

COMZ control in the advance across France and Germany. Supply

Division or 12th Army Group allocated materials in depots to using

organizations on credits or assigned them to reserve stocks. Credit

allocation notices were forwarded to ADSEC or to Continental Advance Section (CONAD), to the regulating stations which distributed

materials to combat echelons, to the depot commanders, and to the

credited organizations. The using combat organizations in northern

France and northern Germany then called forward from the depots

through the regulating stations and ADSEC, or in southern France

and Germany, through CONAD, such materials from their credited

119

 (1) For a discussion of "cold set," see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to field,

pp 323-24. (2) Leggin telephoned the development authorities in the United States when "cold set" was

discovered to ask advice. The only recommendation offered was that the CWS ETO provide warm storage for masks! (Leggin Interv, 13 Oct 61.) 120

 History, Sup Div, II. 121

 No general depots were established on the Continent.
186 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

stocks as they desired. The using organization, the regulating stations,

and the advance section could always easily calculate the quantities of

any item to be transported and the quantities remaining to the credit

of any organization in the depots.122

122

 History, Sup Div, II.
CWS Administration: Pacific

The CWS in the West and Southwest Pacific, 1941-42

Defending the Philippines

After the Japanese attacked Clark Field on 8 December 1941 and

brought World War II to the Philippines, Col. Stuart A. Hamilton,

Chemical Officer, Philippine Department, the 14 officers, 275 enlisted

men, and 12 Philippine Scouts assigned to the CWS in the Philippines

immediately stepped up efforts to prepare for gas warfare.1 Intensive

preparations for gas warfare in the department had begun the preceding

spring with the dedication of a new impregnating plant in the Manila

port area for the production of gas resistant clothing. By the day of

the attack the department's defense preparations were in many respects

satisfactory, but chemical officers were disturbed that training rather

than service masks had been the authorized issue to individual soldiers

and that the protective clothing supply was completely inadequate

even with the new plant in operation.

Both the U.S. forces and the enemy greatly feared that the other's

next move would be a gas attack. On 8 December the Japanese assault

commanders on Formosa issued masks to their troops.2 In Manila,

requests for masks poured in to the departmental chemical office. On

10 December General MacArthur's Headquarters, United States Army

1

 This section is based on: (1) Log Book and Journal—CWS, Hq Philippine Dept USAFFE and

USFIP, 8 Dec 41-17 Apr 42. (Mailed to CCWS in one of the last mails leaving the Philippine Islands

before the surrender.) CWS 319.1/2275. (2) Hamilton to CCWS, 6 Apr 1946, Rpt, Personal Experiences During World War II. (3) Hamilton to CG USFIP (Gen Jonathan M. Wainwright), 22

Nov 46, Rpt Activities, CWS, Philippine Islands, World War IL (4) Louis Morton, The Tall of the

Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953). (5) Lt Col

Charles A. Morgan, Jr., Comments on draft of this volume, 16 Jan 61. 2

 Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 80.
188 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Forces, Far East (USAFFE), ordered training masks exchanged for

service masks. On the same day the CWS began issuing service masks

to Philippine Army units. Some training and service masks were later

provided for civilian employees of the Army. Chemical troops under

1st Lt. Charles A. Morgan, Jr., operated the new impregnating plant

on a 24-hour basis until 23 December, when the power plant was

bombed. The clothing was to provide individual protection against

expected gas attacks and to equip unit gas warfare decontamination

details. About a week later Colonel Hamilton supervised the destruction of the plant, along with supplies and records, to prevent capture.

After the loss of the plant, the CWS contingent on Bataan continued

clothing impregnation by hand in order to finish equipping the decontamination squads. A day after the plant was destroyed Hamilton

moved his office into an improvised chemical laboratory in the Malinta

Tunnel, Fort Mills, Corregidor. The CWS hastily completed part of

a large gasproofing project so that the ventilating blowers could be

used to make the Malinta Tunnel usable for a hospital, offices, and

quarters.

The few CWS officers and men not continuously used as infantry

labored mightily to adapt existing materials to emergency needs.

Hamilton's men improvised field plants to produce liquid bleach

(chloride of lime) for sanitation purposes both on Bataan and Corregidor. These plants used lime and liquid chlorine originally intended

for decontamination of vesicant gases. Bleach was also used as an

insecticide by the hospitals, around latrines, and on the battlefields.

The field plant on Corregidor continued to operate even after the

Japanese occupation. The CWS laboratory assayed and packaged another vesicant decontaminant, high-test hypochlorite, for water purification. The Philippine Chemical Depot staff, operating on Bataan,

prepared tiki-tiki extract from rice bran for the prevention and

treatment of beriberi and polyneuritis, but an effort to develop a

substitute for quinine sulphate was only partially successful. The

CWS also converted FS smoke fillings from Livens projectors and

4.2-inch chemical mortar shells into sulphuric acid to keep in operation

the storage batteries in electric generator units, radio sets, and vehicles.

After an enemy bomb destroyed the first field acid plant and killed

four of its five operators, another plant was set up where production

continued until the week of the Corregidor surrender. To aid the
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 189

fighting units, Lt. Frank L. Schaf, Jr., CWS, assisted by a U.S. Navy

detachment, improvised a flame thrower from two 3-gallon decontaminating apparatus. The chemical depot group also contributed to

the fighting units thousands of Molotov cocktails hastily improvised

from beer bottles and other scrap materials.

When not busy with emergency improvisations, the CWS laboratory

analyzed and described captured Japanese materials, such as gas masks

and canisters, explosive charges, and flame throwers, brought in by

men of the Philippine Chemical Depot. These analyses and descriptions

were radioed to OCCWS, and samples of captured equipment were

shipped to the United States. When surrender seemed inevitable, the

CWS destroyed all remaining chemical materials. Colonel Hamilton

and his surviving men were taken prisoner after the surrender of

Corregidor on 6 May 1942 and remained in Japanese prison camps

for the rest of the war.

Establishment in Australia

On 7 December 1941 the 3d Chemical Field Laboratory Company

was aboard a Pacific convoy carrying units and individual officers and

men destined to augment the American forces in the Philippines. On

12 December Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, the senior officer aboard,

organized the Army forces in the convoy into Task Force, South

Pacific, and appointed a general and special staff. The War Department next day ordered General Barnes's convoy and task force to

proceed to Australia where Barnes would assume command of United

States troops. The convoy docked at Brisbane on 22 December, and

General Barnes spent the following month straightening out the confused command situation, organizing the United States Army Forces

in Australia (USAFIA) at Melbourne, and making desperate and

unsuccessful attempts to send troops, aircraft, and supplies to the

Philippines. On 28 January 1942 Capt. John C. Morgan, an officer

of the 3d Chemical Field Laboratory Company, set about establishing

a chemical section in USAFIA. Col. William A. Copthorne arrived

on 2 February with a number of experienced officers and enlisted men.

Known as the Remember Pearl Harbor Group, these men were being

rushed to the Pacific to serve wherever senior command and staff

officers and specialists were needed. Copthorne became chemical officer
190 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and was assigned to the USAFIA chief of staff's special mission for

co-ordinating relief shipments to Corregidor.3

The CWS, U. S. Army Forces in Australia

Colonel Copthorne and Maj. John C. Morgan, now assigned as

Copthorne's executive officer, tackled the job of setting up a CWS

for USAFIA. First, they had to set up and staff the territorial organization in Australia and allocate personnel and units among other

organizations, both those already in the area and those being activated.

Then there was the task of providing chemical supplies for American

forces. The third undertaking was the establishment of CWS planning

and training functions. And the fourth act was to expand and supervise CWS technical and technical intelligence functions established by

the laboratory company.

Six numerically designated base sections with headquarters at Darwin, Townsville, Brisbane, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Perth were set

up on 3 March 1942. The seventh base section was established at

Sydney in the following month. Sixteen CWS officers arrived in April,

and Copthorne managed to assign one or two officers and one or two

enlisted men to the chemical section of each base section, after a brief

period of training and orientation in his own office. Chemical officers,

like other base section special staff officers, were directly responsible

to their chief of service in matters of plans, policies, and supply, but

they served the additional function of advisers to base section commanders under whose administrative control they worked. Since the

original intention of the Australian establishment was to support

Lt. Gen. George H. Brett's Far East Air Force, Copthorne and Morgan,

who held a second position as chemical officer in the Air Section,

USAFIA, also sought to provide chemical manpower and service for

the air forces.4 His ability to accomplish such work was severely

3

 (1) MS, Mil History of USASOS in the Southwest Pacific, vol. I (hereafter cited as History,

USASOS). OCMH. (2) Elizabeth Bingham and Richard Leighton, MS, Development of the U.S.

Supply Base in Australia, pp. 1-10. OCMH. (3) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col John C. Morgan,

1 Oct 45. (4) Col William A. Copthorne, USA (Ret.), Comments on draft of this volume, 13 Jan 61.

(5) Col John C. Morgan, USAR (Ret.), Comments on draft of this volume, 9 Feb 61. 4

 The United States establishment in Australia had been set up to provide air and logistical support for

the Philippines and for the forces operating in the Netherlands East Indies. After Japanese seizure of

the Netherlands East Indies and after it proved to be impossible to support the Philippines, Fast East Air

Force was inactivated and the conception of the American command in Australia as predominantly an

air command was abandoned. The air command, subsequently designated Fifth Air Force, became an

important element of the Allied land, naval, and air forces. History, USASOS, vol. I.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 191

limited by lack of officers and men and by a lack of information as

to air forces chemical organization and duties. The information finally

arrived from OCCWS in July, and two months later the theater

acquired enough personnel to activate four chemical air operations

companies, using detachments and a platoon of the 3d Chemical

Service Company (Aviation), already in the theater, as nuclei.5

Organizing the Chemical Section, U.S. Army Services of Supply

In March 1942 Allied leaders designated the Pacific as one of the

three main theaters for prosecuting the war against the Axis. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff in turn subdivided the Pacific into areas: the

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) from Australia to the Philippines,

and the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) to the east of the Philippines,

the Netherlands East Indies, and Australia. (Map 2) POA was again

subdivided into North Pacific Area, Central Pacific Area (CENPAC)

(including the Hawaiian, Gilbert, Marshall, Mariana, Bonin, and

Ryukyu Islands), and South Pacific Area (SOPAC) (including New

Zealand and New Caledonia). POA came under the command of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz who designated a deputy to head the South

Pacific Area. In April MacArthur, now in Australia, organized GHQ,

SWPA, an Allied and supreme command over all air, land, and sea

forces in the area.6 The Southwest Pacific Area was not technically a

theater but GHQ, SWPA in mission and responsibility was an Allied

headquarters as well as the senior American strategic and tactical

headquarters in the area. After the creation of GHQ, USAFIA became

a supply and service headquarters,7 redesignated United States Army

Services of Supply (USASOS) in July. Copthorne retained his position in USAFIA and its successor. Although he was regarded as chief

chemical officer for the U.S. forces, he had no direct role in GHQ.

By 1 July Copthorne and Morgan had their section in operation. The

5

 (1) History, USASOS. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Col Burton D. Willis and Col Robert N. Gay,

12 Jun 50. Colonel Willis' first assignments were chemical officer of the base sections at Brisbane and

later at Townsville. (3) Personal Ltr, Copthorne, CCmlO USAFIA, to Brig Gen Alexander Wilson,

Chief Field Serv OCCWS, 13 Jul 42. CWS 319.1 1942. (4) Personal Ltr, Copthorne to Porter, 17

Aug 42. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, SWPA. (All personal letters hereafter cited, unless otherwise noted,

are from this file.) 6

 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 164-73. 7

 The term theater will hereafter be used to indicate each of the Pacific areas and the senior U.S.

Army headquarters therein. The North Pacific and the South Pacific Areas will not be considered here

since the major features of the Chemical Warfare Service experience are apparent in the SWPA and

POA accounts.
192 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MAP 2

technical function, involving liaison with Australian chemical warfare

authorities, and the supervision of the chemical laboratory, recently

redesignated the 42d Chemical Laboratory Company, Copthorne exercised through his technical and intelligence officer, Maj. Walter W. F.

Enz. Capt. Arthur H. Williams, Jr., handled fiscal and administrative

matters, including supply, and was purchasing and contracting officer

for the CWS. Capt. Carl V. Burke was operations and training officer.

One other officer and three enlisted men completed the section.8

8

 (1) History, USASOS. (2) History, Cml Sec Hq USASOS, SWPA Orgn Files, AFWESPAC,

Folder USASOS History of Cml Warfare School, APO 923, Jul 42-May 44. (3) Ltr, Copthorne to

Hist Off, 16 Feb 51. (4)Copthorne Comments, 13 Jan 61. (5) Morgan Comments, 9 Feb 61.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 193

Copthorne was the only CWS Regular Army officer in SWPA, not

only at the time of organization but also for another year. A Military

Academy graduate, he was 52 years of age at the time and had seen

service in World War I but not overseas. He had a variety of chemical

experience, including a tour as Philippine Department chemical

officer, a tour as a corps area chemical officer in the United States, and

had most recently been an instructor at the Army's Command and

General Staff School.9

Supply was a very difficult matter to handle. Since there had been

no preplanning for a theater headquarters based in Australia, all supplies obtained in the early period were destined for arriving organizations. There was no theater reserve. American forces supplies and

services of all kinds were obtained from the Australians when possible

through a necessarily complicated series of procedures which prevented

a fatal drain on the Australian economy and which precluded competition among American and Allied forces for available goods and

services. Captain Williams had little to work with; Copthorne wrote

to OCCWS that he could determine neither theater strength nor the

availability of supplies in the hands of troops.10

The Theater CWS School

The training job was more readily, although not easily, handled.

Copthorne urged all base section chemical officers to give the troops

as much chemical training as possible. Many of them were too shorthanded to accomplish much training outside their immediate headquarters, but Maj. Burton D. Willis, Chemical Officer, Base Section 3

in Brisbane, had a larger staff, and he could call upon the 42nd Chemical

Laboratory Company (formerly the 3d Chemical Field Laboratory).

He gave several courses in chemical warfare defense, using a classroom

in the University of Queensland. Although base section training was

on a part-time basis, such training was a good foundation on which

to build, and Copthorne dispatched Captain Burke to open a theater

school. On 12 July 1942 Burke reported to the Brisbane base section

headquarters to establish a chemical warfare school for all American

forces. Since no authority existed for such an establishment, Burke

9

 CMLHO Biographical Sketches. Copthorne was also Acting Adjutant General, USAFIA, from

March to May 1942. 10

 Copthorne to Wilson, 13 Jul 42.
194 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

officially assumed the operation of the base section school while in

fact preparing for the establishment of a SWPA CWS school. The

first class with thirty-three unit gas officer students was in session

before the school was approved in August, and the third class, also

of unit gas officers, was ready to graduate before September, when the

school officially became a theater activity as part of the Chemical

Warfare Service Training Center.11

Burke started his school in a converted private residence with one

officer and two enlisted assistants. He called on Willis, soon promoted

to lieutenant colonel, on officers of the laboratory company, the 62d

Chemical Depot Company, and on the 10th Chemical Maintenance

Company to assist him with instruction. In the following year, with

a peak staff of five officers, the CW school conducted thirty courses,

including those for unit gas officers, unit gas noncommissioned officers,

and special, technical, decontaminating, and demonstration courses for

other soldiers. These courses, usually of two weeks' duration, graduated

nearly 1,000 students.12 But even this accomplishment was not equal

to the task at hand of training and retraining SWPA forces in defense

against gas warfare. Even before the school started, Copthorne drew

upon his meager supply of officers, again supplementing them with

details from the chemical service units, to establish four mobile training

teams for the purpose of instructing widely dispersed units in chemical

warfare defense. In driving home instruction these training teams

demonstrated chemical warfare defensive and decontaminating equipment and tested procedures in which live toxic agents were used. The

demonstrations and tests were usually given at company level for

selected officers and NCO's. Length of instruction varied from a few

hours to two days, according to the company's needs and schedules.13

The training teams, like the school, were attached to the Chemical

Warfare Service Training Center, which was supported by the base

section headquarters at Brisbane. The training center, in addition to

administering the school and the teams, also arranged or conducted

special co-operative instruction and demonstrations which called for

11

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Carl V. Burke, 28 Jan 46. (2) Summary of Past History of

the Cml Warfare School, APO 923 (hereafter cited as History, Cml Warfare School). Orgn Files,

AFWESPAC, Folder USASOS History of Cml Warfare School, APO 923. (3) Willis-Gay Interv, 12

Jun 50. 12

 History, Cml Warfare School. 13

 (1) History, Cml Sec USASOS. (2) Burke Interv, 28 Jan 46. (3) Copthorne Comments, 13

Jan 61.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 195

ANNEX BUILDING, CHEMICAL WARFARE SCHOOL, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA

more equipment or a greater instruction load than the school or the

teams could handle individually. Standard U.S. training aids and

equipment were not available. Major Enz acquired a small laboratory

at the University of Melbourne and manufactured gas identification

sets using commercial materials and toxics furnished by the Australian

and American Armies. Instructors or chemical service units fabricated

other equipment and aids. The school got very little instruction and

no materials from the United States, but it did benefit by an exchange

of information with the Australian Antigas School near Toowoomba.14

The newly established training facilities were used by the 32d and

41st Infantry Divisions, first American tactical ground forces organizations in the theater. The 41st Division had reached Australia on

7 April 1942, and the 32d Division on 14 May 1942. Both organizations

14

 Burke Interv, 28 Jan 46.
196 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

included chemical sections, the 41st section headed by Maj. Frank M.

Arthur, and the 32d section by Capt. Edward H. Sandell. Both of

these officers established division chemical warfare schools.15

When General MacArthur converted USAFIA into USASOS on

20 July 1942, general and special staffs retained their responsibilities

virtually unchanged. Such reorganization as was accomplished was

apparently intended to bring USASOS into line with a War Department directive for theater communications zone organization.16

Copthorne felt that there should be a chemical officer in General MacArthur's GHQ, but, he also felt that for the time being his location

in USASOS permitted him close supervision of the matters in which

the CWS had the greatest immediate concern.17 A position in GHQ

would presumably have been an Allied staff position similar to the one

which Shadle had just taken over in AFHQ. Since there was no World

War I precedent and since Shadle's was the only such CWS appointment in World War II, a like appointment in GHQ would have been

unusual.

CWS Functions

CWS functions of immediate concern were those of personnel,

supply, and training, as they had been earlier; but now Copthorne also

had reason to become deeply interested in the technical preparations

for gas warfare. As theater chemical officers the world over were then

discovering or were about to discover, he had found that they had

"almost an independent Chemical Warfare Service out here."

 18

 The

manifestation of this independence in SWPA was not, as in other

theaters, in the realm of supply, but rather in the provision of technical

chemical information to all forces in the theater and in the exchange

of information with the Allies. As far as supply was concerned, the

time lag between the United States and the theater was so great that

the individual service could as yet do little to influence shipments.

Distribution within the theater was tightly controlled by USASOS

since critically short transportation had to be centrally controlled. In

technical matters, however, Copthorne had charge of the only fullfledged laboratory in the theater, and he strongly believed that it was

15 Ibid.

16

 History, USASOS, pp. 27-29. 17

 Personal Ltr, Copthorne to Porter, 17 Aug 42. 18 Ibid.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 197

COLONEL RIEGELMAN

to the advantage of the service for

this laboratory to handle any technical problem referred to it. Since

the Japanese had reportedly employed gas in China, since they

were apparently logistically capable of mounting a gas attack, and

since it would be to their advantage to initiate such an attack before the American defenses were

organized, Copthorne also believed

that the Japanese might initiate

gas warfare at any time. This possibility, he felt, called for active

intelligence work and extensive

technical investigation of the

characteristics of available munitions in the theater's tropical environment. He also saw the need for

improvising new munitions and techniques to be used before supplies

and information became available from the United States.19

In order to meet the technical portion of his functions, Copthorne

had set up a Technical Advisory Board to maintain scientific liaison

with the British, the Australians, and within the U.S. forces, and to

advise the laboratories. Also, several of Copthorne's subordinates had

begun munitions testing. Two of them, Capt. Richard H. Cone and

Lt. James W. Parker were killed in an air accident while carrying out

experiments to determine whether incendiary bombs could be improvised from training bombs, using gasoline thickened with crude

rubber as a filling.20

In September 1942 the chemical section went along with USASOS

headquarters to Sydney, but the change in location made little change

in the section's operation. In the following month the chemical section

began circulating a mimeographed Chemical Warfare information

bulletin designed to apprise officers in the field of technical and intelligence developments.21

 Also, during this period Headquarters, I Corps,

under the command of Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, arrived in

19 Ibid. 20

 Ibid.

21

 History, Cml Sec USASOS.
198 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Australia to become the senior tactical American ground command.

The I Corps chemical officer was Col. Harold Riegelman, a distinguished

New York attorney who had served in World War I as a gas officer

and had since been prominent in Reserve activities. In the words of

his commander, he was "a loyal efficient staff officer with an analytical

brain who pursued his work with diligence."

 22

 Riegelman's section

included an officer assistant, a warrant officer, and six enlisted men.23

On arrival in Australia, Colonel Riegelman at once began to lay plans

with Major Arthur of the 41st Division, and to await an opportunity

to confer with Captain Sandell of the 32d Division.

CWS Baptism—The Papua Campaign

This opportunity never arose. Two regiments of the 32d Division

had been ordered forward to New Guinea in September, and on 18

October Sandell, T/Sgt. John K. King, and Sgt. Raymond F. Dasman,

as the advance detail of the chemical section, reported to their commanding general at Port Moresby on the southern tip of New Guinea.24

Sandell's was among the first chemical sections to participate in combat

in World War II after the fall of the Philippines. The duties performed

by the 32d Division Chemical Section, while they might not be categorized as either administrative or staff work, which were theoretically

the section's main responsibilities, demonstrate the ingenuity with

which chemical sections in many combat elements in all parts of the

world approached and defined their tasks.25

Sandell and his sergeants spent a few days in the Port Moresby area

locating the chemical equipment which the regiments had discarded

on landing. Most of the equipment was in a deplorable state, having

been scattered in odd piles about Port Moresby and exposed to the

elements. The gas masks, approximately 5,000, had been collected and

put under cover. USASOS had established a forward base at Port

Moresby, but the base chemical officer, inexperienced and recuperating

from malaria, had been unable to locate either the labor or the materials

22

 Gen Robert L. Eichelberger, USA (Ret.), "A Prefatory Note," in Harold Riegelman, Caves of Biak

(New York: Dial, 1955). 23

 Riegelman, Caves of Biak., pp. 3-4. 24

 For a complete account of the Papua Campaign, see Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957). 25

 The following account of the initial activities of the 32d Division Chemical Section is based on:

Acting Div CmlO to CG 32d Inf Div, 18 Feb 43, sub: Rpt on the Activities of the 32d Inf Div Cml

Sec During the Papuan Campaign.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 199

to build storage places and to collect and store other equipment.

Nearly all troops in the area had been fighting to repel the Japanese

invasion until a short time before Sandell's arrival.

Sandell managed to get a 10-man detail from the 107th Quartermaster Battalion, then assigned to the Port Moresby base, and with

this help he and his men gathered, inspected, and stored any materiel

that gave promise of serviceability. Sandell and his men were also given

the mission of searching the jungle to discover if any native garden

or jungle foods could be found to supplement the ration. From 8 to 21

November Sandell attended the New Guinea Force school on jungle

tactics as a student and presented briefings on chemical warfare as an

instructor.

On 27 November Sandell was ordered forward to the Buna-Gona

area, where an assault had been launched ten days earlier, to see if

chemical smoke or incendiary supplies would be useful in pushing the

attack. The assault was going badly because locating the enemy in

his cleverly camouflaged positions was difficult and driving him from

well-fortified bunkers with the weapons available was almost impossible. To get a line on enemy fortifications and master the assault

problem, Sandell led a patrol to a point south of the Buna Mission.26

He returned to Port Moresby, joined forces with Sergeants King and

Dasman, and together they collected HC smoke pots, Australian rifle

smoke grenades, thermite aerial bombs, blasting powder, gelignite,

safety fuzes, detonators, and friction tape. Back in the fighting zone

on 4 December, they set to work improvising hand grenades from the

rifle smoke grenades. They had some difficulty persuading infantrymen

to use them until an infantry captain demonstrated that it was safe

to pass through the smoke released by two grenades thrown directly

in front of an active bunker. The grenades were then much in demand.

On 7 December 1942 men of the 114th Engineer Combat Battalion

brought forward the first two portable flame throwers to arrive in the

combat area. Despite King's one attempt to put the flame throwers

in operating condition, they failed to fire properly. Flame throwers

were not again used in the Papua Campaign.27 After receiving chemical

and ordnance supplies on 11 December, King and Dasman refined their

modified smoke grenade. Persisting in spite of a number of false starts,

they also produced a dependable Molotov cocktail and developed a

26

 For this patrol action Captain Sandell was awarded a Silver Star. 27

 See below, Chapter XIV, for full account of this failure.
200 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

hand-thrown concussion torpedo capable of killing all the occupants

of a large bunker. After combat testing the improvised weapon, the

127th Infantry requested all the torpedoes the CWS sergeants could

manufacture.

Captain Sandell was killed in action on 26 December 1942, and

Dasman became a victim of malaria. King carried on at the front

until the division was relieved late in January 1943.28 The initiative

and resourcefulness of Sandell and his men fitted in well with the concept of the CWS developed by Fries and Porter.

The Principal Mission—1943

Preparedness for Chemical Warfare

In February 1943 Riegelman visited New Guinea to assess the combat

situation. He felt that Sandell and his men had done a fine job under

extremely difficult circumstances, but he was disturbed by the lack of

chemical weapons and the evidences of the poor use of smoke in the

whole campaign. Like Copthorne, he was firmly convinced that the

chemical officers should learn what effect gas would have in the tropics,

and he agreed with Copthorne that the best place to find out was on

the spot. While he believed defensive training was better than it had

been in World War I, he was still concerned about the adequacy of

both training and equipment since he believed the Japanese to be

capable of using gas, and feared that even if they did not, some of the

jungle odors might cause gas scares, which like an actual attack would

result in panic if more specific training was not given. Riegelman

reported his observations to his superiors and set to work in corps headquarters to provide remedies to the problems he foresaw.29

Copthorne likewise continued to be much concerned with the tactical

problems of preparedness, but he believed that his position in USASOS

prevented him from acting adequately in the tactical and planning

field. In February 1943 he and his section moved up to the newly

reconstituted U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, a headquarters somewhat comparable to the army theater headquarters in Europe and

North Africa. He took with him to Brisbane Lt. Col. John C. Morgan,

28

 King was later commissioned and served in the Sixth Army Chemical Section. 29

 (1) Riegelman, Caves of Biak, pp. 26-30. (2) Personal Ltrs, Riegelman to Waitt, 26 Jan 43, and

Riegelman to Porter, 26 Feb 43. CWS 314.7 Pers Ltrs of Colonel Riegelman.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 201

recently promoted, Major Enz, and three other officer assistants. Lt.

Col. John C. Morcock, Jr., became Chemical Officer, USASOS, serving

with Captain Williams and two other officer assistants.

Copthorne still felt that he should be in GHQ where the chief

engineer and chief signal officer resided but recognized that although

the new USAFFE was a headquarters without tactical functions, it at

least promised to offer a better place for gas warfare preparedness

planning than USASOS.30

 USAFFE headquarters did not offer channels for formal co-ordination of the preparedness effort with Australian

chemical warfare authorities. Although informal relationships with

the Australians were good, Copthorne strongly felt that there should

be a formal relationship, particularly since the Australians found it

possible to communicate through their technical channels with the

chemical warfare establishment in England, and thereby with the

CWS and with the U.S. Chemical Warfare Committee in the United

States. Copthorne himself had found neither a command nor a technical channel which permitted easy communication with the technical

and planning authorities in the United States.31 The Australians had

established a Chemical Warfare Service early in 1942 which like the

British counterpart was a joint effort of their army, navy, and air

force. Lt. Col. F. S. Gorrill of the British establishment was on duty

in Australia, and in 1943 he undertook an investigation of gas warfare

in the tropics.32

Staffing Problems

The move to higher headquarters and the completion of the first

theater gas warfare plan in March 33

 again brought to the fore the

problem, which had been troublesome from the beginning, of providing

a chemical staff. Copthorne had still received no allotment of officers

in which each officer was earmarked for the kind of job he was intended

to fill. The only officers with appropriate rank, military education,

and experience to fill the top positions were Col. Carl L. Marriott who

arrived in April as Chemical Officer, Sixth Army, and Colonel Riegel30

 (1) History, Cml Sec USASOS. (2) Ltr, Copthorne to Hist Off, 22 May 51. 31

 Interv, Hist Off with Copthorne, 26 Apr 61. 32

 D. P. Mellor, "Australia in the War of 1939-45," The Role of Science and Industry (Canberra:

Australian War Memorial, 1958) pp. 372-76. 33

 Ltr, CinC GHQ SWPA to TAG, 7 Apr 43, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. GHQ AG 381

(12-8-42)C.
202 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

man. Both men already had important posts and were unavailable to

the theater organization. By the end of July 1943, no requisition for

CWS personnel channeled through the USAFFE G-1 had yet been

filled. Copthorne took the view that most of the young Reserve officers

assisting him were doing excellent, and in some cases, outstanding work,

but in implementing and revising the theater gas warfare plan and

the training responsibilities which were growing daily, he had no one

with sufficient rank and experience to handle the operations (planning)

tasks. Furthermore, a large part of offensive gas warfare planning had

to originate with the air forces where preparation for the retaliatory

effort would be concentrated. Neither in USASOS nor in USAFFE

did Copthorne have any power to control the Fifth Air Force, which

reported to GHQ through Allied Air Forces. His relationship with

Maj. Walter C. Weber, Fifth Air Force Air Staff chemical officer, was

so cordial that he could practically consider him as an assistant, but

Weber, then the only field-grade chemical officer in the Fifth Air

Force, had his hands too full with supply and service functions to

give any deep consideration to long-range planning.34

In the face of such problems, Copthorne increased his strength as

best he could. It had been demonstrated by the time of the move to

USAFFE that the existing organization for securing chemical technical

intelligence through unit gas officers and NCO's was ineffective. Copthorne accordingly assigned Maj. John A. Riddick, who had been Enz's

assistant, to head a new Intelligence Section in his office. He charged

Riddick with securing six junior officers and twelve NCO's to organize

and train six technical intelligence teams. Riddick found the officers

and men and brought them into the USAFFE Chemical Section for

training. At the same time the headquarters rule that all captured

equipment must be channeled to the Australians was relaxed. The

teams soon went out on attachment to combat units. Riddick compiled

their findings, together with laboratory analyses and descriptions of

captured enemy equipment, and forwarded the resulting report to

chemical officers and unit gas officers as well as to the headquarters of

other theaters and areas in contact with the Japanese.35

At the same time the CWS SWPA began to rotate chemical officers

among assignments so that as many officers as possible could have field

34

 Personal Ltrs, Copthorne to Waitt, 14 Jul 43; Copthorne to Porter, 27, 28 Jul 43. 35

 (1) Copthorne Comments, 13 Jan 61. (2) Morgan, Comments, 9 Feb 61.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 203

COLONEL MARRIOTT examining

Japanese gas mask.

and staff experience. Lt. Col.

Robert W. Smith became Morcock's executive, and Maj. Irving

R. Mollen came from Base Section

3 to be his supply officer. The

Melbourne base section chemical

officer came in to be supply officer

in the USAFFE section for a few

months and then returned to Melbourne. Another field officer was

assigned to a brief tour as operations and training officer in the

Chemical Section, USAFFE, before becoming commandant of

the school. Maj. Carl V. Burke

replaced Colonel Morgan as executive officer in the USAFFE section after Morgan became CWS

Liaison Officer with the Australian Army, a position established in

place of formal co-ordination. Colonel Willis moved from Brisbane

to Townsville since Townsville was the base most actively in support

of forward operations. He then served a short tour in the Advance

Section, USASOS, in New Guinea, and returned to Townsville.

Morcock moved out to become chemical officer of the Advance Section

and Colonel Smith took his place in USASOS.36

Co-ordinating the Theater CWS

Copthorne felt the CWS in the United States should provide gas

warfare technical and preparedness doctrine for the tropics, or else

that it should assist him and his colleagues in the Pacific areas in formulating such doctrine, but he was not satisfied that his appeals for help

had received sufficient attention in the United States.37 He found

communication with the Central Pacific Area chemical staff too difficult in 1943 to offer adequate opportunity for co-ordinated study of

chemical problems, but his colleagues in the South Pacific were closer

36

 (1) Information Bull, CWS Hqs USAFFE Nos. 8-16, 10 May-10 Sep 43. (2) Morgan Interv,

10 Oct 45. (3) Burke Interv, 28 Jan 46. 37

 Copthorne Interv, 26 Apr 61.
204 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and had more experience with tropical warfare so there the opportunities for exchange of information seemed better. The Chemical

Section, U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA),

had been organized by Col. Leonard J. Greeley in August 1942. In

November 1942 Greeley was designated Deputy Chief of Staff,

USAFISPA, and Lt. Col. Joel L. Burkitt became chemical officer.

While the USAFISPA Chemical Section had been hampered by shortage of manpower, lack of chemical materials, and the perpetual Pacific

problems of difficulties in communication and transportation, its staff,

as Copthorne knew, had kept in close touch with the combat organization chemical officers.38

Copthorne decided that he might be able to accomplish gas warfare

doctrinal formulation by "committee." He accordingly invited

Greeley and Burkitt along with the principal chemical officers in

SWPA to a conference at the SWPA CWS school from 1-3 July 1943.

Col. Robert N. Gay, Chemical Officer, XIV Corps, then in SOPAC,

joined Greeley and Burkitt. From SWPA came Marriott, Riegelman,

Lt. Col. Lyle A. Clough, Chemical Officer, 32d Division, Lt. Col.

James O. Andes, who was soon to replace Clough, and Major Arthur,

along with principal members of the USAFFE and USASOS staffs.

The conference first "defined" the tropics in terms of the effect of prevailing meteorological conditions and terrain on gas warfare. Next

the conferees observed demonstrations of incendiary, flame, and smoke

weapons and munitions. They then spent a day on tactical gas warfare

requirements and a half a day on tactics of smoke employment. The

meeting concluded with a half-day session on ammunition supply

requirements. The principal value of the conference appears to have

been that the chemical officers were able to agree on what they did

and did not know. What they did know or were able to conclude

concerning the performance of available munitions in the tropics was

stated as area tactical doctrine for the employment of chemical agents

and weapons. A list of items related to munitions performance characteristics about which they were in doubt was drawn up for investigation in the theater or referral to OCCWS.39

As Riegelman expressed his views on the conference, "Everybody

38

 (1) CMLHO Biographical Sketches. (2) 1st Ind, CG USAFISPA to TAG, 1 Apr 43, on Ltr,

TAG to CG USAFISPA, 19 Dec 42, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. AG 381 (12-8-42) OB-SE-M. (3) Interv, Hist Off with Col Nelson McKaig, USA (Ret.), 27 Apr 61. 39

 Rpt of Conf of Cml Warfare Officers, 1, 2, 3 Jul 43, Cml Sec USAFFE, n.d.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 205

profited enormously. Everybody contributed values from his own

experience."40 But in retrospect, the conference was more significant

than its immediate value in providing a forum for the exchange of

experience and as a means of formulating temporary doctrine would

indicate. Its significance lay in the fact that it presented practically

the only means of integrating the CWS in SWPA. It accomplished

for Copthorne a measure of the co-ordination of effort which Rowan

achieved in the ETO through supply control and continuous personal

liaison. It was less successful as a means of control than Rowan's

because a conference is a transitory affair, and in the SWPA the means

of sustaining its co-ordinating benefits were few. The organization

of the SWPA forces, the tremendous physical distances over which

the forces in the theater had to move troops and materiel, and the

continuing difficulty of communication within the theater and with

the United States all militated against maintaining a continuously coordinated effort. Copthorne could only hope to provide a link between

research and the firing line by enlarging and continuously revitalizing

his two greatest sources of strength, control of technical intelligence

and authority to advise on, and sometimes even to make, CWS personnel assignments. He also still sought to build up the function of

formulating supply policy and the capability of planning within his

own staff.

A temporary hitch in the operation of Copthorne's plans came in

September 1943 when he and the other service chiefs were transferred

back to USASOS. Except for about two weeks' confusion attendant

upon the move, the transfer had little impact on Copthorne's functions

because the promise of improved prestige and capability and of better

lines of communication in USAFFE had not been fulfilled. An officer

remained in the G-4 office in USAFFE as CWS representative. The

reorganized USASOS office included Enz, Burke, and Riddick in their

respective technical, training, and intelligence positions. Smith became

supply officer and Mollen remained as his assistant. A lieutenant colonel

recently arrived from the United States became operations and training

officer. Two other officers and two warrant officers completed the

section. Intelligence trainees were transferred to the 42d Laboratory

for further training.41

40

 Personal Ltr, Riegelman to Waitt, 9 Jul 43. 41

 Info Bull, CWS USASOS, No. 18, 25 Oct 43.
206 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Preparedness—The Theater CWS Situation at the End of 1943

After the period of adjustment, prospects for the chemical section

became brighter. Lt. Col. John P. Youngman, a supply officer with

considerable background and experience whom Copthorne had long

wanted in the theater, arrived from the United States to take over

the supply position. Colonel Smith became Copthorne's deputy. Maj.

Jack F. Lane, a young officer with a training background, arrived to

take a training center assignment. Lt. Col. Augustin M. Prentiss, Jr., a vigorous, young (28 years old) Military Academy graduate with infantry, CWS, and air experience, also arrived from the United States

to become Chemical Officer, Fifth Air Force. Major Weber became

Chemical Officer, V Air Force Service Command, thus giving Prentiss

an opportunity to devote his time to planning and policy.42

Lt. Col. Donald G. Grothaus and Maj. Richard T. Brady of the

Field Operations staff, OCCWS, agreed with Copthorne's estimate of

his problems and accomplishments during their visit to the theater

late in 1943 and early in 1944. Grothaus agreed with Copthorne that

the Pacific was the most likely area for the initiation of gas warfare,

and he pointed out, as Copthorne had, that the CWS deficiency of

knowledge as to the employment of gas in the tropics was a serious

drawback in planning and could well be a vital defect should actual

gas operations commence.43 He also noted that Prentiss was hampered

in planning for gas warfare retaliation by a lack of information on

the effectiveness of toxic munitions in a tropical environment. Grothaus praised Copthorne's policy of setting the service units, such as the chemical laboratory, to work on any technical problem

within their range of competence whether the solution would have

chemical significance or not. He believed that these services performed

for a number of theater elements had added significantly to the respect

for and acceptance of the CWS in the theater. Other factors increasing

respect resulted from four successful Fifth Air Force smoke operations

42

 (1) Info Bull, CWS USASOS, No. 19, 25 Nov 43. (2) Personal Ltr, Copthorne to Porter, 24

Nov 43. 43

 The following remarks on Grothaus' and Brady's estimate of the situation are drawn from: Grothaus

and Brady, OCCWS to CCWS through ACCWS Field Opns, 29 Mar 44, Rpt on Visit to SWPA, SOPAC,

and CENPAC (hereafter cited as Grothaus-Brady Rpt). CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts. While Grothaus

and Brady worked part of the time as a team, Brady was charged only with the investigation of technical

intelligence and wrote only that portion of the report.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 207

in New Guinea,44 and from excellent liaison with the Australian forces.

One CWS officer, Capt. Howard E. Skipper, had been sent to work

in the Australian Chemical Warfare experimental station, and Grothaus

believed that the CWS should provide more help, both in manpower

and materials, to further the Australian experiments on gas in the

tropics. Another source of increased respect was the record of the

4.2-inch chemical mortar battalion in the South Pacific Area. In the

United States this mortar battalion had been assigned to SWPA, but

since the SWPA chemical staff was not informed that the unit was

authorized to fire high-explosive shells nor that such shells were

available, the battalion had been given so low a movement priority as

a gas warfare unit that it was diverted to SOPAC.45 Reports filtering

into SWPA on the effectiveness of the chemical mortar using highexplosive shells made several ground commanders eager to obtain battalions for their own employment. On the debit side, Grothaus, again

as Copthorne had, deplored the poor condition of CWS materiel

arriving in the theater and indicated that OCCWS action to improve

the situation was imperative. Also, despite some recent improvements

in the manpower situation, SWPA still had a greater shortage of

experienced officers than any other major theater. While strict theater

personnel ceilings prevented large additions to the theater CWS complement, Grothaus was of the opinion that in future shipments

OCCWS could do much to make up in quality what was lacking

in quantity.

Major Brady, whose specific mission was to investigate intelligence,

was so impressed with Major Riddick's accomplishments that he forwarded to OCCWS Riddick's schedule for training technical intelligence teams. Brady recommended that these teams be trained in the

United States. He visited some of the teams which had begun to

operate in forward areas with command sanction early in November

and approved their activities.46 The intelligence teams were a valuable

aid to the CWS SWPA for the remainder of the war. Copthorne later

44

 (1) Prentiss personally supervised these four operations and flew in the lead plane on the first one.

Prentiss Interv, 25 Oct 61. (2) For details on one of these operations at Lae, see below, Chapter X. 45

 Copthorne Comments, 13 Jan 61. 46

 Personal Ltr, Riddick to Morgan, 14 Nov 43, inclosing: (1) Ltr, AG USAFFE to CG USASOS,

9 Nov 43, sub: Responsibility for Technical Intelligence, FEGC 323.361; (2) Memo for Red, Riddick,

12 Nov 43, sub: Conf with Col E. R. Thorpe, ACofS G-2 USAFFE.
208 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

commented that the organization for intelligence was so effective that

it should stand as an example for all similar theater activities.47

CWS, Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-45

The year 1944 was somewhat paradoxical for the Office of the Chief

Chemical Officer, USASOS. On the one hand, the supply situation

was good; the condition of equipment had improved; planning capabilities improved throughout the year; training was progressing

smoothly; technical intelligence was working well; and technical investigations continued to produce worthwhile information. On the

other hand, until late in the year, the advance of forces toward the

Philippines put increasingly greater distances between Copthorne's

immediate staff and the CWS in the field, thereby making communication increasingly more difficult. Even the advanced echelons of

USASOS communicated more readily with the combat forces than

with their own main echelon. Thus, while the USASOS Chemical

Section was successfully accomplishing its aims and missions, the chief

chemical officer, because of the organization of the theater and its

physical setup, had a less important role in the operation of the theater

CWS as a whole. (Chart 7)

A Solution for Technical Planning Problems

Copthorne made a trip to Washington in the spring of 1944 for

consultations in OCCWS, where he gave special attention to his manpower and planning problems. Lt. Col. William A. Johnson, an officer

whom Copthorne had several times requested, arrived in the theater

during Copthorne's absence to take over the operations and training

functions. In June the theater gas warfare plan was revised, and the

revision indicated a considerable improvement in the theater situation

both with respect to supply and plans. Technical and munitions performance information was still deficient, but a team of two officers

sent out to SWPA by OCCWS had made a preliminary survey of

requirements for information on gas warfare in the tropics just before

Copthorne's departure, and OCCWS was soon to set up a project for

assessment of gas in tropical situations in the western hemisphere.48

47

 Copthorne to Hist Off, 22 May 51. 48

 (1) Info Bulls, CWS USASOS, Nos. 24 and 25, 25 Apr and 25 May 44. (2) History of the Cml

Sec USASOS, Mar 44-Jul 45. USASOS Mil History Rpts.
CHART 7—ORGANIZATION OF CHEMICAL SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY SERVICES OF SUPPLY

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, 1 JUNE 1944

Source: Adapted from: SWPA Personnel and Administration, CWS 314.7; Organizational Manual, U.S, Army Services of Supply, SWPA, revised 1 Jun 44, ASF 200, Cannon, Leyte: Return

to the Philippines, p. 25.
210 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

By the end of 1944 the SWPA gas warfare planning enterprise at

last reached the echelon where it had been in theory but not in fact

for three years.49 Copthorne personally went on temporary duty with

G-3, GHQ, to make another revision of the gas warfare plan. This

superior headquarters could co-ordinate the activities of the ground,

naval, air, and service commands affecting plans for gas warfare. The

remaining technical problems were also approaching solution. In

November 1944 the theater and the Allies concurred in a proposal

forwarded to the theater by General Waitt for the establishment of a

Far Eastern Technical Unit (FETU) to investigate the performance

of toxics and toxic munitions in the theater. Enz had originally suggested such an establishment to OCCWS. FETU, under the command

of Lt. Col. John D. Reagh, completed its tests and analyses during

1945 and in the process furnished needed planning data to the theater.

The unit employed officers and civilian scientists from the United States

and drew upon the theater CWS for assistance, service, and supply.50

Theater Training—Final Phase

The Chemical Warfare Service training center continued to be a

SWPA focus for chemical training during 1944 although corps and

division courses had become common in the latter half of 1943. Early

in 1944 the distance of most combat units from Australia made it

impractical to send large groups back to Brisbane. A new Chemical

Warfare Service training center was therefore established at Oro Bay

in New Guinea. At first the school remained at Brisbane, but gave

some assistance in conducting courses at Oro Bay. About the middle

of 1944, a little less than two years after its establishment at Brisbane,

the school moved to Oro Bay where it remained until early in 1945.

The Chemical Warfare Service Training Center and the school were

subsequently re-established in the Manila area, but the war ended

before the school was in full operation.51

In the Oro Bay location, the training center and school came under

the jurisdiction of the Chemical Officer, Intermediate Section, USASOS. Intermediate Section (later New Guinea Base Section) was a

forward area service and supply command with jurisdiction over all

49

 SWPA gas warfare plans from the first officially emanated from GHQ. 50

 (1) History, Cml Sec USASOS, 44-45. (2) FETU's Rpts and Corresp. CWS 314.7 FETU. 51

 (1) History, Cml Sec USASOS, 44-45. (2) Burke Interv, 28 Jan 46.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 211

but the most forward bases. Copthorne had secured the transfer of

Colonel Gay from SOPAC to SWPA in December 1943 to be Chemical

Officer, Intermediate Section. In January 1944 Colonel Gay became

chemical officer of an advanced headquarters of USASOS and Burke,

recently promoted to lieutenant colonel, became Intermediate Section

chemical officer. In this position, Burke was in charge of direct support

to the combat forces as supplied by the New Guinea bases. This was

a difficult position since the occupant in effect served two masters.

General instructions and command came from USASOS, but decisions

on allocation of resources and requests for supply, services, and training

came primarily from Sixth Army.52

The CWS in the Combat Forces, 1944-45

The SWPA combat forces had from the beginning enjoyed a greater

degree of independence than most similar forces elsewhere in the world

because the nature of the area, as noted earlier, made closely co-ordinated operation extremely difficult. The independence, at least with

respect to chemical matters, increased throughout 1944. Sixth Army

was the principal U.S. Army ground combat organization in the

theater in 1944, although Eighth Army was to be organized late in

1944 and to become operational in 1945.53 Colonel Marriott presided

over the Sixth Army chemical establishment. Maj. Leonard L. McKinney was assistant, deputy, and frequently operations officer, for

Colonel Marriott.54 The Sixth Army Chemical Section included a

supply officer with one or sometimes two assistants, and usually an

operations officer. Colonel Marriott was invalided home in mid-1944

and was replaced by Col. John R. Burns.55

The Sixth Army Chemical Section had a major hand in determining

tactical policy, and it not only allocated incoming resources among

the supporting bases, but also allocated resources among subordinate

combat organizations. The allocation duties meant distributing to

Sixth Army organizations such combat units as the chemical mortar

52

 (1) Ltr, CmlO Intermediate Sec USASOS to CmlO's Bases A, B, D, E, F, 1 Apr 44, sub: Ltr of

Instr. ISCW 300 in Unit Files, 93d Cml Composite Co. (2) Burke Interv, 28 Jan 46. (3) Willis-Gay

Interv, 12 Jun 50. 53

 See Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 278, 450n. 54

 (1) Col Harold Riegelman, MS, Admin of CW Functions in Theaters of Opns—SWPA. (2)

CMLHO Biographical Sketches. 55

 CMLHO Biographical Sketches.
212 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

battalions, which belatedly became available to the theater with the

activation of one battalion and the arrival of another in mid-1944,

and of such service units as were available. But service units were not

readily available. When, late in 1943, Marriott asked Copthorne how

he might obtain one of Copthorne's service units, Copthorne wrote,

"you might just as well have nonchalantly asked me how you could

get my right arm or even my bed at Lennon's."

 56

 Copthorne was

understandably reluctant to give up any service unit since USASOS

units were already thinly spread in detachments in an attempt to meet

supply and service requirements. But even had he been willing and

able to release a unit, the organizational cleavage between service and

combat forces was so deep that USASOS did not feel that it was

responsible for supplying units to the combat forces. It was USASOS

policy to retain its badly needed units.57 Eventually, USASOS policy

was changed to permit the release of one unit in January.58 Sixth Army

parceled out this unit, and later others, in detachments to divisions to

service flame throwers, recondition shell, and handle supply. These

detachments were subsequently converted into cellular units, that is,

units composed of smaller self-supporting elements, to perform the

same functions.

Colonel Burns and Col. Ralph C. Benner, Chemical Officer, Eighth

Army, continued to work on the problems of chemical tactical policy

and of allocation of men, units, and materials for the remainder of the

war in the Pacific. They had the job of receiving and evaluating plans

and requirements which originated in echelons subordinate to the army

headquarters. They, in turn, translated these plans and requirements

into the concepts of the whole organization, co-ordinated them through

staff in their own headquarters, and dispatched them through command

channels to GHQ. Using both technical and command channels, the

Army chemical officers received reports of chemical activities and

problems and maintained continuous inspections to insure the greatest

possible effectiveness at field levels.59

Below army level, 1944 and 1945 saw the culmination of a great

change which had taken place since the tragic and heroic improvisa56

 Personal Ltr, Copthorne to Marriott, 19 Nov 43. Sixth Army Cml Sec Memos. (Lennon's was

the best hotel in Brisbane and a highly prized officer's billet.) 57

 Ibid.

58

 History, Cml Sec USASOS, 44-45. 59

 (1) Riegelman, Admin of Cml Warfare Functions in Theaters of Operations—SWPA. (2) Interv,

Hist Off with Lt Col Leonard L. McKinney, 12 Jan 46.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 213

tions of the 32d Division Chemical Section in the Papua Campaign.

USASOS and Sixth Army managed during 1943 and early in 1944 to

obtain a sufficient supply of essentials such as smoke pots, hand grenades, 4.2-inch chemical mortar shells, and individual protective equipment. Colonel Riegelman in I Corps and his subordinates in the

divisions plunged into training and tactical work, and by the time

of the Hollandia operation early in 1944, they had defensive training

of the individual soldier well in hand.60 I Corps had also officially

adopted a policy of using smoke shell to provide a target area marking

system. Riegelman secured approval for the concept of attaching a

mortar company to each assaulting division under the operational

control of the division chemical officer. The misuse of smoke concealment which Riegelman had found in his first tour in New Guinea had

been corrected by troop training and by orienting commanders.61

Flame thrower techniques had also been perfected, and the weapon

itself had been improved through the extraordinary efforts of both

USASOS and field chemical officers and men. The weapon still had its

faults and maintenance and repair problems were to plague SWPA

forces for the duration of the war. With respect to tactical employment of the flame thrower, Sixth Army declared that the weapon

logically belonged with the infantry rather than with the engineers,

who had brought it into the Pacific. Both Sixth Army and I Corps

developed an infantry team for the tactical employment of the flame

thrower, and Sixth Army officially set up a team training program

which was materially aided by a roving demonstration team organized

by Colonel Gay in the USASOS advanced echelon.62

Other corps chemical officers, Col. Francis H. Phipps, X Corps, Lt.

Col. John L. Bartlett, XI Corps, and Lt. Col. Richard R. Danek, XIV

Corps,63 like Riegelman who was replaced by Col. Frank M. Arthur

in 1945, for the most part performed tactical and training functions.

They concerned themselves with supply only with respect to critical

60

 For information on the campaigns in this period, see Smith, The Approach to the Philippines. 61

 (1) Riegelman, Caves of Biak, pp. 64-65, 70-74, 87-96. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Col Harold

Riegelman, USAR (Ret.), 10 Oct 56. 62

 (1) Riegelman, Admin of Cml Warfare Functions in Theaters of Opns—SWPA, (2) Willis-Gay

Interv, 12 Jun 50. (3) Burke Interv. 28 Jan 46. 63

 XIV Corps transferred from SOPAC to SWPA. Col. Hugh M. Milton II, corps chemical officer in

SOPAC, became corps ACofS, G-4, and subsequently corps chief of staff. Col R. N. Gay, XIV Corps

chemical officer, was succeeded by Lt. Col. William H. Shimonek who returned to the United States in

1944 and who was replaced by Danek.
214 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

items, such as the gas mask and 4.2-inch mortar shell, or in emergency

situations. Depending on the training and talents of each officer, corps

chemical officers also performed a variety of staff and operating tasks

not directly related to chemical warfare or completely unrelated,

depending upon their capabilities. Riegelman, who had been an

infantry officer as well as a gas officer in World War I, did a study

on the reduction of Japanese cave defenses on the island of Biak, an

operation which had combined infantry and chemical techniques.64

Division chemical officers had their hands full.65 As their top priority

function, they were directly responsible for gas warfare training of

every man in the division. They accomplished what training they

could through their own sections and also made use of traveling training teams. By these means and by sending quotas (ideally, one officer

per company and one noncommissioned officer per platoon) of unit

gas officers and gas noncommissioned officers to theater and other

schools, they could train UGO's and UGNCO's and in turn help them

establish unit schools and training periods. The training activity was

a constant one since malaria, battle casualties, and ordinary shifts in

personnel frequently necessitated the establishment of an entire new

roster of UGO's and UGNCO's who would likewise be required to

give instruction down to the last private in the last squad. Corps

chemical officers and command inspectors checked on divisional chemical training periodically.

The division chemical officer's duty of next priority was supply.

He cleared requirements statements for gas masks and other protective

supplies, smoke pots, grenades, mortar shell, and various items of chemical equipment with the division G-4, and, if necessary, with the

Ordnance and Quartermaster officers. When supplies were received

64

 (1) Riegelman, Admin of Cml Warfare Functions in Theaters of Opns—SWPA. (2) Riegelman,

Caves of Biak, pp. 140-55. (3) USAFFE Board, n.d., Rpt 126 (Japanese Cave Defenses). 65

 This account of the duties of the division chemical officer is based on: (1) Riegelman, Admin of

Cml Warfare Functions in Theaters of Opns—SWPA; (2) Memo, Arthur for Hist Off, 21 Nov 45,

sub: Review of Col Riegelman's Paper, Admin of Cml Warfare Functions in Theaters of Opns—SWPA

(Colonel Arthur was Chemical Officer, 41st Infantry Division and I Corps); (3) Memo, Lt Col

Maurice A. Peerenboom for Hist Off, n.d. (Colonel Peerenboom served as Chemical Officer, 32d Infantry

Division in 1943); (4) Personal Ltr, Maj David D. Hulsey to Waitt, 3 Jun 45, in CWS 314.7 Pers Ltr

File (Misc) WESPAC, AFPAC, SPBC (Maj Hulsey was Chemical Officer, 6th Infantry Division);

(5) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col James P. Sutton, 18 Dec 45 (Colonel Sutton was assistant chemical

officer and assistant to the Chief of Staff, I Corps, and subsequently the 32d Division chemical officer);

(6) Memo, Capt John M. McDonald, OpnsO, for Col Burns, CmlO Sixth Army [1 May 45], in

Sixth Army 333 Inspections; (7) Riegelman, Caves of Biak, passim; (8) Riegelman Interv, 10

Oct 56.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 215

or in transit, the chemical schedule in loading, storage, issue, and service

plans had to be cleared again with general and special staff officers, and

the actual operation of supply followed down to the regimental and

special staff levels. Division chemical officers in the Pacific found that

co-operative plans, sometimes employed in other theaters, for combining chemical issue and service operations with those of ordnance or

engineer sections seldom worked since these services normally used

their own resources to the limit. Since, in such combined arrangements,

the chemical sections relied heavily on the facilities and services which

Ordnance and Engineers provided in the Pacific, the division chemical

officer acquired the additional duty of securing and supervising his

own service detachments which occasionally worked as far forward

as regimental supply to issue chemical materials, service flame throwers,

and handle mortar shell. The assistant division chemical officer often

devoted full time to supply and service which included field improvisation or adaptation of materiel.

Planning, staff, and advisory functions also occupied the chemical

officer—at least part of the time. Some of this work was chemical;

some was not. The division chemical officer might find himself assigned

to liaison, reconnaissance, or observer duties, or he might move out of

the staff field into the supervision of combat loading or beach discharge

of cargo. Lt. Col. Nelson McKaig, 25th Division chemical officer, an

agricultural chemist in civilian life, inspected and supervised divisional

food preparation and spent a considerable period setting up a divisional

rest camp on Luzon. There were always the additional details that

every staff member drew, such as sitting on courts-martial, assisting

in command inspections, acting as fire hazards inspector, savings bond

officer, and the like. There was an initial impression that the chemical

officer had little to do in the absence of gas warfare, so that the division

chemical officers may have been assigned a proportionately larger

number of staff, command, and operating details than their colleagues.

Some division chemical officers, like their colleagues in Europe, welcomed such details because of the opportunity, lacking in the course

of ordinary chemical activities, to keep in touch with members of the

staff and subordinate units. Some believed, as did Colonel Copthorne,

that any service rendered by the CWS increased the prestige and acceptability of the service.
216 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

COLONEL COPTHORNE (LEFT) WITH

GENERAL WAITT at Colonel Copthorne's Oro Bay quarters in October

1944.

A Second Theater CWS

Conference

To return to the theater level,

the respect for the service was increasing, and after the middle of

1944, Copthorne again laid plans

for co-ordinating the chemical

warfare effort for the Pacific

through the best means available

to him—a service conference such

as the one which had been so successful in 1943. The second theater CWS conference, held from

10-13 October at Oro Bay under

the official direction of Maj. Gen.

J. L. Frink, Commanding General,

USASOS, was considerably more

extensive in scope than the previous conference, but the theme

was still the tactical employment of chemical warfare, including aerial

and land smokes and incendiaries, the chemical mortar, and the flame

thrower.66

General Waitt and Lt. Col. Jacob K. Javits attended as representatives of OCCWS. Col. George F. Unmacht, Chief Chemical Officer,

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, and Colonel Greeley represented POA, while Colonel Kellogg and others represented the ChinaBurma-India theater. The Australian Army, the American corps,

divisions, and chemical mortar battalions also sent chemical officer

delegates as did USAFFE and USASOS. The Navy sent some of its

officers having chemical duties. Colonel Prentiss, now Chemical Officer,

Far East Air Forces (a headquarters supervising the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces) attended with other representatives of the air

forces. Also present were Dr. W. A. Noyes and several other civilian

scientists of the National Defense Research Committee.

The conference made a series of recommendations that were considerably more authoritative than those of the earlier conference. The

66

 This paragraph and the following account are based on: Rpt, CWS Conf, USASOS SWPA. CWS

314.7.
CHEMICAL WARFARE OFFICERS DURING THE ORO BAY CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 1944
218 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

conferees sought a simple table of toxic ammunition requirements

based on operational trials under tropical conditions. This, as already

indicated, they were soon to get.67 They asked for new aerial toxic

munitions, impregnated clothing with increased durability, new gas

grenades, and tactical training material reflecting the behavior of

chemical agents in the tropics. Other requests were for more manpower for mortar battalions, improved mortars, more spare parts,

more and improved field equipment and munitions. But the significance of this conference, as of the previous one, was not so much in

what was recommended and requested as it was in the indication of

joint effort and the revelation of considerable technical knowledge,

much of which had been accumulated through considerable effort and

three years of theater experience. General Waitt was particularly

impressed by the fact that the conference permitted an exchange of

views and experiences among chemical officers of all the Pacific areas,

and he noted that the presence of individuals from the United States

tended to lessen the view held by some theater officers that they had

been neglected by OCCWS.68

The Office of the Chief Chemical Officer—Final Phase

In September 1944 Colonel Copthorne and a part of his section

moved to Hollandia and in October the remainder of the section

followed from Australia. This office in Hollandia served as the base

for setting up the Philippine operation. Copthorne visited Leyte during

the campaign in December, and early in February moved his office to

that island. These moves placed the USASOS Chemical Section nearer

the nerve center of the theater and considerably eased communication

with the forward elements. But even better things were to come. At

the end of March the office of the chief chemical officer moved with

the advanced echelon of USASOS to Luzon. Here command, service,

and supply activities were being centered, and, while the chief chemical

officer still had no official control or function outside of USASOS, his

technical ties and his supervision of theater gas warfare planning at

last gave him a very effective tool for controlling the theater CWS.69

67

 See above, pp. 208-10. 68

 Waitt, 25 Nov 44, Preliminary Rpt on Situation in POA and SWPA Based on Visit to SWPA and

POA, 24 Sep-21 Nov 44. 69

 History, Cml Sec USASOS, 44-45.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 219

General MacArthur was named, after the return to the Philippines,

to command the U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC), with jurisdiction over all Pacific theaters. In July 1945 Copthorne achieved what

since April 1942 he had considered to be his rightful place—he was

named Chief Chemical Officer, AFPAC. He finally had technical

control of the CWS not only in the service command but also in the

air forces and the ground forces.70 Of the theater chemical officers

in World War II only General Shadle as Chief Chemical Officer, AFHQ,

enjoyed a comparable official position.

The war in the Pacific ended in September. Most of the officers who

had served Copthorne during the long period of the war had already

returned to the United States, but he remained as Chief Chemical

Officer, AFPAC, until October 1945 when he was succeeded in turn

by Col. Sterling E. Whitesides, Jr., and by General Loucks, both of

whom served brief tours. Brig. Gen. Egbert F. Bullene served from

July 1945 to March 1946 as Chemical Officer, Army Forces, Western

Pacific—the administrative, supply, and service command which was

organized to succeed USASOS in supporting the invasion of Japan but

which was diverted instead to closing out the activities of SWPA or

rebuilding them to suit occupation needs. Until his departure Copthorne worked, in a new context, on the same kind of problems which

had occupied his attention since February 1942; he requested and

assigned personnel, made plans, traced supplies, sought information,

established intelligence procedures, and tried to put the CWS component of the occupation forces on a firm technical footing.71

Organizing the Chemical Warfare Service, Hawaiian Department

The Emergency

Lt. Col. George F. Unmacht, Chemical Officer, Hawaiian Department, was having breakfast on the morning of 7 December 1941 when

70

 (1) GHQ AFPAC GO 73, 26 Jul 45. (2) GHQ AFPAC Staff Memo 15, 14 Jul 45. (3) Ltr,

CCmlO AFPAC to CmlO's, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies, FEAF, AFWESPAC, 2 Aug 45, sub:

Corresp with the CCWS. AFPAC CW 312.3 in CWS 314.7 Misc Files, WESPAC, AFPAC, SPBC. 71

 (1) Personal Ltrs, Waitt to Copthorne, 4, 17, 29 Aug, 25 Sep, 4, 5 Oct 45. (2) Personal Ltrs,

Copthorne to Waitt, 17, 19, 29 Aug 45. (3) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO AFPAC, 23 Aug 45, sub:

Request for Publications. (4) Ltr, CCmlO AFPAC to CCWS, 12 Aug 45, sub: Japanese Sniff Set.

AFPAC CW 386.3. (5) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO AFPAC, 25 Sep 45, sub: Post-Hostilities Cml Warfare

Mission. (6) Ltr, CCmlO AFPAC to CCWS, 31 Oct 45, sub: Misc Info. AFPAC CW 350 (31 Oct

45). (3). (4), (5), and (6) in CWS 314.7 Misc Files WESPAC, AFPAC, SPBC.
220 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

he saw Japanese planes dropping bombs.72 Within half an hour,

Unmacht reported to the department headquarters from his office at

Fort Shafter and directed Maj. James M. McMillin, Commanding

Officer, Hawaiian Chemical Warfare Depot, Schofield Barracks, to

begin issuing service gas masks to departmental troops then equipped

with training masks. Lt. James E. Reilly and the men of the 5th

Chemical Service Company (Aviation) on duty at Hickam Field also

saw the attack and sprang into action. They shot down one of the

attacking planes.73

Hawaiian Department authorities at the time feared that other air

attacks would be made and that these attacks would include the use of

gas. Unmacht's first responsibility, therefore, was to prepare against

aerial gas attack. Leaving M/Sgt. Ralph I. Libby in charge of the

Fort Shafter office, Unmacht reported to the departmental advance

command post at Aliamanu crater. By noon he had telephoned all

CWS staff officers and units on Oahu and had made sure that all were

preparing for gas attack. The CWS officer ranking next to Unmacht,

Lt. Col. Maurice E. Jennings, Chemical Officer, Hawaiian Air Force,

also reported to the advance command post, with an enlisted assistant.

Lieutenant Reilly and Lt. Melvin F. Fincke remained at Hickam Field

while Lt. Willard H. Blohm took up duty at Wheeler Field. The CWS

officers with the air force had the assistance of the chemical aviation

company. Major McMillin and 1st Lt. William J. Tanner continued

to operate the depot at Schofield Barracks where Capt. Howard S.

Leach, Commanding Officer, Company A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion, was, in addition to his other duties, post chemical officer. The

men of Company A, whose second in command was 1st Lt. Rubert D.

Chapman, were assigned to guard the depot, haul munitions, and furnish details for the post.

Maj. John H. Becque, Chemical Officer, 25th Infantry Division,

was on duty at the Aliamanu crater post with the division staff.

Unmacht secured the appointment of 1st Lt. Woodson C. Tucker as

Acting Chemical Officer, 24th Infantry Division, which lacked a

72

 Unless otherwise noted, this and the following sections are based on History of the Chemical Warfare

Service in the Middle Pacific, a 5-volume collection of journals, historical reports, and documents compiled and edited under the direction of Capt. Jerome K. Holmes, Chief, Intelligence and Technical Division, Chemical Office, Headquarters U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific, 1946, OCMH. 73

 Chronological history of the chemical office, Hawaiian Department to Middle Pacific, History of

Cml Sec, USAFMIDPAC, vol. I, sec. IL Lieutenant Reilly was awarded the Legion of Merit for his

performance on 7 December 1941.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 221

chemical section, on the afternoon of 7 December. Unmacht was himself joined that afternoon by 1st Sgt. Roland P. Fournier and one

other enlisted man. These 11 officers and approximately 375 enlisted

men made up the CWS, Hawaiian Department, until 11 December

when 2 Reserve officers reported for duty.

During those first few days the CWS established several supply

points in addition to the depot and, with the help of a Civilian Conservation Corps company, completed the issue of service masks.

McMillin also put into operation a reconditioned impregnating plant,

a chloride of lime production plant, and a toxic land mine and shellfilling plant, all of which had been refurbished in the month before

the attack.74 One Reserve officer at once began converting a plant of

the Pacific Guano and Fertilizer Company, of which he had been an

employee, to the production of bleach.

Civil Defense

Since the CWS had the only available supply of sirens and horns,

intended to be used as gas alarms, these were distributed as warnings

for air attack pending the acquisition of an air alert system from continental United States. The CWS reconditioned training masks turned

in by troops and reissued them to the home guard, civil defense officials,

police, firemen, public utilities employees, and other civilians in key

positions. At the cabled request of the Hawaiian Department, the

Chief CWS gathered 478,000 new and used training masks in the

United States and shipped them to Hawaii. When these masks began

to arrive early in 1942, Unmacht's men set civilian crews to work

reconditioning the masks and modifying them with sponge rubber

padding to fit oriental faces and the faces of children. Civilian masks

were issued through first aid stations.

Unmacht and nearly all of his officers, including several newcomers

in the theater, together with 2d Lt. Edouard R. L. Doty, who gave up

the post of territorial civil defense director to be commissioned, became

involved in extensive civil defense training. Unmacht, promoted to

colonel on 12 December 1941 and made territorial Co-ordinator for

gas defense in January, gave almost 300 public talks and radio broadcasts. A total of 68,000 civilians attended schools for specialized

chemical warfare defense. After the middle of 1942 civil defense ac74

 Personal Ltr, Unmacht to Porter, 10 Nov 41. CWS 210.3/234.
222 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

tivities began to decrease, but civil defense training continued until

mid-1943.75

Organization—Departmental Chemical Office

Meanwhile, in February 1942, Unmacht reorganized his immediate

office, which in December had consisted only of Libby's Administrative

Section, to include an Administrative Section under a civilian employee,

Miss M. Allegra Clifton, a Training and Civil Defense liaison Section

under Lieutenant Doty and a Supply Section under Lieutenant Libby,

recently commissioned. In July a further reorganization introduced

an executive officer, Capt. James H. Batte, changed Doty's section to

Plans and Training, and put 2d Lt. Roland P. Fournier, who had been

commissioned with 2d Lt. Ralph I. Libby, in charge of supply. This

reorganization in part reflected the addition of responsibilities and

individuals to handle them, but it also helped prepare for the strategic

and organizational decisions then being made in the Pacific theater.

The Hawaiian Department organization, after the organization of the

Pacific areas, continued to be the senior Army command for the Central

Pacific Area. There was at the time no chemical representative on

Admiral Nimitz' joint and Allied POA staff nor on his Pacific fleet

staff. The supreme command and the fleet command were based in

the Hawaiian Islands.

Early Training

The July 1942 organization remained in effect during the second

half of 1942. In this period emphasis shifted from immediate defensive

preparations to preparation for combat in the Central Pacific Area.

The area mission up to that time had been indirect support of operations

in SOPAC and SWPA, and Hawaii had operated as a staging point

for units bound south of the equator. This responsibility had entailed

checking supply and training and providing either or both when

required for troops outward bound. After the middle of 1942 it

became increasingly evident that Hawaii would serve as a base for

mounting forces for combat in the Central Pacific under CENPAC

or POA command. The CWS, Hawaiian Department, stepped up

troop training as its immediate share in the expected CENPAC re75

 Unmacht, Summary of Activities of CWS in POA, 19 Feb 45. CWS 314.7.
COLONEL UNMACHT WATCHING TRAINEES WASH GAS FROM CLOTHING,

Hawaii.
224 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

sponsibilities. Unmacht did not establish a theater school as Copthorne

had done in SWPA, but he inaugurated a series of gas officer and gas

NCO courses for various elements of the department and for combat

organizations. While the first informal instruction had been given

to a group of air wardens only a few days after the attack on Pearl

Harbor, the first course, for 278 UGO's and UGNCO's, was given

17-18 August 1942 in the Fort Shafter gymnasium. Two more advanced courses were given in September and October, and training for

the year was brought to a rousing finish during three days in December

when the departmental CWS staged a chemical warfare maneuver with

1,295 participants.

Position of the Theater Chemical Officer

At the end of 1942 the Hawaiian Department reorganized from

an advance and rear echelon structure in which both echelons were

responsible for all functions under the direction of the rear echelon, to

a more conventional combat forces, service forces, and air forces pattern and added an echelon for military government since the territory

was still under military control. Unmacht remained the department

chemical officer with responsibilities in all four fields. His position was

unique among chief chemical officers overseas in that he was both

staff officer and commander of the chemical warfare troops not assigned

to other organizations.76

In actually commanding troops, Unmacht came closer to the manual

definition of a chief of service than any other chief chemical officer.

But this was not the only way in which Unmacht's position differed

from the positions of the other chief chemical officers. The Hawaiian

Department and its successor commands, U.S. Army Forces, Central

Pacific Area (USAFICPA), U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas

(USAFPOA), and U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific (USAFMIDPAC), were in fact theater headquarters of the kind envisioned in

the War Department organization manuals, and in these headquarters,

unlike those in Europe, North Africa, and the Southwest Pacific, a

commander, who did not double also as a supreme commander, was

resident.77 Unmacht therefore had more opportunity to present his

76

 Hawaiian Dept GO 110, 29 Jul 43. 77

 The Central Pacific Army headquarters was not technically a theater headquarters since no over-all

Pacific theater command was organized and since the Central Pacific Army headquarters was supervised

by POA, a superior headquarters with a larger jurisdiction.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 225

proposals directly to his commander, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, until

May 1943 and Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., thereafter, than

did chief chemical officers in other theaters and areas. As Unmacht

himself phrased the relationship, "We receive a lot of encouragement

and impetus from topside."78 With the theater naval command,

which stood in a position roughly comparable to supreme headquarters

in other theaters, Unmacht had a good relationship although the Navy

took little interest in chemical warfare until combat experience proved

the value of the chemical mortar and flame throwers. Navy and Marine

Corps officers assigned to chemical duties were usually junior, but

commanders frequently consulted Unmacht on chemical supply and

training. A reciprocal agreement was worked out whereby the CWS

would use the Navy impregnation plant at Pearl Harbor in return for

impregnating Navy uniforms. When in the summer of 1944 Navy

interest in chemical warfare quickened, Admiral Nimitz, in his capacity

as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, appointed a chemical officer to

his own staff—Capt. Tom B. Hill, USN, who worked in close cooperation with Unmacht.79

The Offensive Period in the Central Pacific

Organization of the Theater Chemical Office, 1943-45

On the eve of combat operations in the Central Pacific, Unmacht

twice reorganized his office to reflect the increase in activities relating

to combat planning and training. In January 1943 Captain Doty,

recently promoted, became executive officer and chief of a new Intelligence Division. Reilly, now a captain, became chief of Plans and

Training Division and was assigned an officer assistant. Except for

redesignation as divisions, administration and supply remained unchanged from the 1942 organization. At the end of June 1943, with

an increased workload and greater availability of officers, Unmacht

again reorganized his office on a pattern very similar to that prescribed

in prewar planning for a theater chemical office. Doty, now a major,

became operations and executive officer. Intelligence Division was

given the added duty of supervising technical functions. Unmacht

78

 Personal Ltr, Unmacht to Waitt, 29 Oct 42. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, MIDPAC. 79

 Waitt and Javits to CCWS, 15 Dec 44, Rpt of Trip to POA and SWPA. CWS 314.7 Observer

Rpts.
CHART 8—ORGANIZATION OF CHEMICAL OFFICE, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, 1 APRIL 1945

Source: History, CWS USAFMIDPAC, Annexes Ia and IIIa.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 227

had detailed a few men with technical experience to set up a small

laboratory with locally obtained equipment and supplies. At the end

of 1943 a laboratory company arrived to assume technical duties.

The Plans and Training Division was enlarged and redesignated Operations and Training Division.

The June 1943 reorganization established the form from which the

theater chemical section varied but slightly until 1945. At that time

an organization consisting of five policy and supervisory divisions and

one administration division was approved. (Chart 8) Lt. Col. Edouard

R. L. Doty, again promoted, remained as executive officer with duties as

assistant chemical officer, supervisor of the theater chemical plan, and

liaison officer to field chemical sections and the Navy. Operational planning, base development, personnel and unit assignments, and redevelopment planning were assigned to the Operations Division. Capt. Jerome

K. Holmes, in civilian life a chemist, headed the Intelligence and Technical Division which supervised intelligence and laboratory operations

and which prepared or supervised the preparation of all technical and

intelligence reports. Maj. R. Beverly Caldwell headed the Special

Projects Division which was charged with training, inspections, supervision of, and planning for, defense against biological warfare, and

technical developments outside the usual laboratory sphere. The Toxic

Gas Warfare Division was assigned supervision of gas warfare doctrine

development, surveillance of toxic munitions, and liaison with the air

forces, which in this theater, as in the rest of the world, had become

virtually independent of the local Army command.

Colonel Unmacht delegated operating supply functions and detailed

supply planning to the Chemical Office, Central Pacific Base Command,

which had been organized under Maj. Roland P. Fournier on 1 July

1944. In his own office, Unmacht retained the Supply and Logistics

Division. To this division the CWS chief assigned policy functions

relating to operational projects and forecasts for requirements and

transportation and analysis functions relating to supply reporting.

Gas Warfare Preparedness

The Chemical Section, Hawaiian Department, like the chemical

sections all over the world, had a paramount interest in gas warfare

preparedness. Although Unmacht had devoted most of his attention

after the Pearl Harbor attack to immediate individual and collective
228 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

protection, he also surveyed the department's ability to retaliate in the

case of gas warfare. There were some toxics in the area, but the means

of retaliation, like the possibility of being able to reach any enemy

force, were indeed slim in 1942. Even had they been ample, however,

the nearest target was so far away as to make the immediate possibility

of retaliation a remote one. Unmacht set about improving the supply

status and at the same time inaugurated both offensive and defensive

training. He also arranged to check on both methods of training.

In June and July 1942 the War Department ordered chemical offensive training in the theaters, and the CWS in the Central Pacific complied by providing training for CWS units and chemical sections.80

In August the department CWS initiated a schedule for spot-check

inspections of Army units in the Central Pacific to determine their

readiness for gas warfare. Of the 522 units inspected by the end of

October, 12 percent proved to be thoroughly prepared, 69 percent

satisfactorily prepared, and 19 percent partially prepared or without

any preparation. Renewed training, especially of UGO's and

UGNCO's, and new issues of supplies soon enabled all units to come

up to acceptable standards of preparedness. While these preparedness

measures were being accomplished, the War Department in December

1942 called for the submission of a gas warfare plan.81

The first Hawaiian Department gas warfare plan, which was coordinated with the local Navy and Marine Corps commands, was

dispatched to the War Department on 8 February 1943. The plan

simply indicated that in the event of gas warfare maximum use of

available weapons and equipment would be made, and no request for

special supplies was included. The heart of the plan consisted of a

detailed plea for the immediate provision of chemical units and manpower, including a chemical weapons regiment, air and ground service

troops, and chemical staff personnel.82 The War Department at first

indicated that no troops were available but in July requested restudy

and resubmission of the troop request.83 Unmacht replied by reviewing

the problems of preparedness. In his opinion these were: (1) lack of

80

 Ltr, Unmacht to CG Hawaiian Dept, 7 Jan 43, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. CWS 314-7

Central Pacific Theater. 81 Ibid.

82

 Ltr, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 8 Feb 43, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. Hawaiian Dept

AG 381. 83

 Ltr, Unmacht to CG Hawaiian Dept, 17 Aug 43, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. CWS 314.7

Central Pacific Theater.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 229

suitable aircraft and trained airmen for toxic spray missions; (2) lack

of chemical troops for ground retaliation and for providing artificial

smoke protection; (3) inadequate decontamination troops and lack

of centralized control over decontamination squads in the Seventh

Air Force; and (4) insufficient manpower for service operations.

Unmacht asked first priority for service units and a smoke generator

battalion since such troops were urgently needed. He assigned a lower

priority to, but still cited an urgent need for, nine CWS staff officers

in addition to the fifteen authorized, and a chemical mortar battalion.84

During the period from the August 1943 reappraisal until November

of 1944, most of the service, smoke, and mortar units that the Central

Pacific CWS required in the absence of gas warfare were received from

the continental United States or were acquired when the South Pacific

Area organization was consolidated with the Central Pacific.85 Also

during that period Unmacht was delegated the responsibility for coordinating and consolidating all gas warfare plans for Army (including

Army Air Forces), Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard elements in the

Pacific Ocean Areas. Since the POA administrative organization had

long permitted Unmacht to work with all of these elements, he and

his staff were well acquainted with the needs and capabilities of each.

The consolidated gas warfare plan, formulated in June and July, was

consequently extensive and specific, even including an annex listing

and describing selected aerial objectives for possible retaliatory gas

attacks on the enemy. The first concern now was not service units or

weapons since the POA was well equipped or had the promise of being

well equipped early in 1945, but, rather, the strategic plan.86 Also of

concern was the supply of toxics which, considering the scope of the

plan, still existed only in token quantities.

The strategic planning question was to be answered through the

co-ordination of the Pacific area plans by the United States Chemical

Warfare Committee. In General Porter's opinion the CWS would

have been ready for gas warfare in the Pacific had it broken out in

1944 or 194587 No new duties were indicated for the CWS POA by

the strategic plans. Unmacht continued his emphasis on gas warfare

84

 Ibid. 85

 Memo, Unmacht for Waitt, 4 Nov 44. CWS 3 14.7 Central Pacific Theater. 86

 Ltr, Unmacht to CCWS, 8 Jul 44, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. USAFCPA CWS 381 in

CWS 314.7 Central Pacific Theater. 87

 (1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. IV.
230 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and nongas warfare chemical training, on technical intelligence, and

on the special projects assigned to his service.

Training in the Offensive Period

Divisional duties in the 1945 organization reflected the activities of

the CWS in the Central Pacific in the period 1943-45. The tempo of

training, as noted above, increased greatly during these years. During

1943, the CWS presented chemical warfare courses including four for

various Marine Corps elements, two for Navy commands, and eight

for Army combat organization UGO's and UGNCO's. Another chemical field maneuver with 1,376 participants was held 28-31 July.

According to the G-3 report, this maneuver included:

. .. use of smoke, use and types of smoke-producing equipment, use

of chemical land mines and minefields including students' laying of

minefields, firing of chemical munitions from all types of weapons,

decontamination methods and problems, use of protective clothing

and equipment, demonstration of field hospital methods of handling

gas casualties by Medical Corps personnel, tactical use of flame throwers,

incendiaries, filling of airplane spray tanks, and spray attack on

column [of students on a] road.88

The same report indicated that participants were favorably impressed

by the maneuver.

In September 1943, two months before the first Central Pacific

forces assault on Makin Atoll, the CWS presented the first course of

instruction in the operation of the portable flame thrower. Many

similar courses followed since in the Central Pacific as in the South

and Southwest Pacific, the flame thrower became a valued infantry

weapon and a particular favorite of the Marine Corps. From January

to May 1944, Unmacht's immediate staff prepared a total of thirty-two

courses, including, for the first time in February 1944, a course on the

vehicle-mounted flame thrower developed and manufactured by the

CWS, Navy, and Marines in Hawaii.

In July 1944, after giving courses or demonstrations for nearly

37,000 students, Unmacht's office turned over the operating training

responsibility to the Chemical Officer, Central Pacific Base Command.

Between 1 July 1944 and 31 August 1945 the CPBC office conducted

88

 Memo, Capt G. L. Quigley, CAC, for Col Keliher, OACofS G-3, Hawaiian Dept, 4 Aug 43, sub:

Rpt on Dept Cml Field Exercise. Reproduced as an. I-c, History of Cml Sec USAFMIDPAC.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 231

gas courses, lectures, and demonstrations for 38,933 students. In view

of the fact that all of this instruction was given at the highest area

Army (and sometimes Navy) level and that the usual organization

and unit schools continued to be conducted, the training record of

the CWS in the Central Pacific was a particularly outstanding one.

The CENPAC CWS took full advantage of the fact that the Hawaiian

Islands were used as a staging area through which many units and

combat organizations were being rotated and given advanced training.

Lt. Col. James E. Reilly, Unmacht's training officer for most of the

active period, received the Legion of Merit for his accomplishments.

Chemical Warfare Intelligence

The intelligence activities of the Central Pacific chemical office

actually began in January 1943 when Maj. Nelson McKaig, formerly

a member of Unmacht's staff and then Chemical Officer, 25th Infantry

Division, sent in from the South Pacific a Japanese gas mask. The

staff of the improvised laboratory immediately set to work analyzing

the mask. In February McKaig sent a shipment of Japanese chemical

warfare materials. Since chemical intelligence combat teams did not

begin to function in SWPA until the following November, Central

Pacific laboratory analyses of such materials were among the earliest

although the 42d Chemical Laboratory Company in SWPA had obtained some items.89

 Thereafter, a fairly regular flow of captured

chemical items came to the theater CWS, mostly through intelligence

channels. Lt. Robert E. Wingard, the first Intelligence Division chief

who was able to devote most of his attention to the task, set up the

chemical office as a clearinghouse for intelligence information. He both

received information from and transmitted it to the theater intelligence

authorities, OCCWS, the laboratory, and field chemical officers. In

November 1943, Unmacht also assigned Wingard to the supervision

of the CWS portion of an Army-Navy project for the study of micrometeorological conditions in advanced Pacific bases. The data thus

collected became a part of theater gas warfare planning, and the study

was continued for the duration of the war. The Intelligence Division

trained CWS field officers to collect meteorological data, and CWS

elements of island garrison forces contributed to this collection.

89

 (1) See above, pp. 197, 202. (2) For an account of laboratory work, see below, Chapter VII.
232 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Holmes succeeded Wingard in July 1944. Holmes concentrated on

widening the field of intelligence liaison and on building up an extensive

file of intelligence information not only of theater origin but also of

that originating in other theaters or from allied sources. The Intelligence Division also compiled catalogs of enemy materiel for ready

field reference. The section staff interviewed CWS officers returning

from combat in order to find out and publish lessons learned. Holmes

combed the entire catalog compilation for the most significant gas

warfare data which he included in an annex to the theater gas warfare

plan.

Special Projects and Technical Activities

The CWS in the Central Pacific devoted a major part of its attention

during World War II to special projects and technical developments.

The first special project, as recounted above, was the equipping and

training of civilians in gas defense. In connection with this first project,

CWS officers, Medical Corps officers, and civil defense officials developed, tested, and supervised the manufacture of gas protective hoods

for small children. The hoods were made more attractive for children

by the addition of "bunny" ears. Officials also supplied the "bunny"

hood to patients in the leper colony on Molokai Island.

As the combat period approached, Colonel Unmacht and his staff

turned their attention from numerous projects in gas warfare defense

and decontamination to the nontoxic chemical weapons and munitions.

Their work on the flame thrower tank, and later on stabilized flame

thrower fuels, was the outstanding overseas development work of the

worldwide CWS.90 Unmacht was a strong proponent of the use of

the 4.2-inch chemical mortar with high-explosive shell, and the development, testing, and combat supply of a landing craft mortar mounting for Pacific amphibious operations represented one of his achievements in the field of combat support. The mortar gun boat

development was also a noteworthy example of Army-Navy

co-operation.

As did the chief chemical officers in the European and North African

theaters, Unmacht treated defense against biological warfare (BW)

on a special project basis. During the period 1941-44, he co-operated

with the theater surgeon, Brig. Gen. Edgar King, as well as other

90

 See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, ch. VII.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 233

HONOLULU HIGH SCHOOL BOYS REPAIRING GAS MASKS FOR CIVILIAN USE

service chiefs in inspecting water, ice, and food supplies. CWS units

participated in insect and rodent control. These measures were extended to the forward bases through garrison force medical officers.

In August 1944, Unmacht was designated to succeed the surgeon as

theater bacteriological warfare officer in keeping with the assignment

of that function to the CWS on a global basis. Major Caldwell, as

Unmacht's representative, then arranged a co-operative plan with the

surgeon under which the CWS accepted the primary responsibility for

BW intelligence, the physical protection and training of troops, and

strategic and tactical BW defense planning. The Medical Department

reassumed the primary responsibility for inspection of food and water,

the biological protection of troops, epidemiological control, and the

care and treatment of casualties. Caldwell, subsequently promoted to

lieutenant colonel, and Maj. John O. Clements of CPBC performed

the CWS tasks and worked with the medical officers in the performance

of their duties. A War Department observer reported in April 1945
234 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

that the theater was "quite BW conscious," and he found that intelligence information and defensive plans met the required standard.91

Colonel Unmacht was an unusually dynamic officer who was not

afraid to use his energy in any way he felt might contribute to the war

effort. Few other chemical officers would have believed possible the

overseas development, much less the assembly, of a main armament

flame thrower tank. Unmacht not only believed it possible—he got the

job done. His willingness to undertake large responsibilities in no small

measure contributed to the success of the CWS in the Central Pacific

and to the esteem in which the service was held. The Central Pacific

situation also contributed because the commander, not being also a

supreme commander as in other theaters, had the time to give support

to his services. The Central Pacific Army commander did not command

combat operations, but his support as senior Army commander in the

theater for most of the war made easier the operation of the CWS.92

The CWS also enjoyed an excellent relationship with the POA and

Navy commands in the area because it was able to provide services

and weapons support when the Navy and the Marine Corps wanted

them. The Central Pacific Area and the military facilities in the area

offered a unique opportunity for accomplishment. The CWS administration in the theater was almost ideally suited to these circumstances.

The environment and the area command situation in SWPA, by

contrast, were not amenable to the CWS. The chemical officers in

SWPA strove mightily and ingeniously to provide chemical weapons

and equipment and to insure preparedness. Their contributions were

significant, especially in connection with portable flame throwers and

mortars, but distances and difficulties of communication hampered

them. Even more hampering was the disadvantageous position of the

highest CWS echelon in the SWPA service and supply organization.

While Copthorne maintained that the CWS SWPA was well regarded

in the theater throughout the war, the CWS until late in the war faced

the obstacles in performing its gas warfare preparedness duties of working through two superior echelons. Gas warfare preparedness in the

United States, in North Africa, and in Europe, was a joint and Allied

91

 Rpt, Lt Col W. S. Moore to CMIS, Apr 45, as cited in History, Cml Sec USAFMIDPAC. 92

 The commander of the Tenth Army, which formed in Hawaii for the Ryukyu Campaign, was senior to General Richardson, Central Pacific commander.
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 235

concern, but in SWPA there was no joint or Allied agency through

which Copthorne could work formally.

Copthorne and his subordinates evolved some excellent, indirect

methods, such as the conferences and the intelligence and training

teams, for presenting the contributions of the CWS. Through the use

of these methods, Copthorne accomplished co-ordination of his service.

Unmacht accomplished a similar co-ordination through his relationships with his superior commands. Rowan achieved his co-ordination

through a combination of personal diplomacy and supply control.

Shadle in the MTO did not see the necessity for a close control of his

service. He accordingly emphasized a lesser co-ordination than the

other chief chemical officers through staff work in his own headquarters

and supply troubleshooting on problems which strong field chemical

sections could not handle.
CHAPTER VI

Theater Supply: Pacific

Foundation of Chemical Supply in Australia

Forming a Theater Stock

Chemical warfare supplies available to the United States Army

Forces in Australia in December 1941 consisted of 14,000 empty 100-

pound bomb casings, a small amount of protective equipment in the

hands of troops, and the maintenance allowances brought in by the

3d Chemical Laboratory Company. This company was equipped with

the training gas mask, a light, snout-type mask with canister directly

attached to the facepiece,1 some 11⁄2-quart decontaminating apparatus,

and a little antigas protective ointment. The unit possessed no noncorrosive decontaminating agent for use in the apparatus, no bleach

(chloride of lime) for area decontamination, and no antigas shoe

impregnite. Units and individuals subsequently arriving in Australia

did have personal protective items and decontaminating materials.

Units also arrived with small maintenance stocks.2

USAFIA chemical officers collected the maintenance stocks from

incoming organizations and units and these constituted the first theater

chemical warfare supply. Even Task Force 6814, soon to be the

Americal Division, added to this stock when it stopped over in Melbourne on the way to New Caledonia.3

 The 32d and 41st Infantry

Divisions, on arriving in Australia in the spring of 1942, also contributed. The chemical stockpile further increased as the War Depart1

 For description of the various CWS gas masks, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to

Field, Chapter XIV. 2

 Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 47. 3

 Task force 6814 and the Americal Division are identified in John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The

First Offensive, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1949), p. 215.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 237

ment diverted to Australia supplies which could not be landed in the

Philippines and as theater chemical supply officers bought what they

could in the local market. The USAFIA CWS carefully hoarded all

equipment for the use of forces which at any moment might move

out to fight the enemy. Issues were kept to a minimum in the rear

areas, and some issues of Australian gas masks were made. By 30 June

1942 the CWS inventory stood at 2,098 short tons.4

War Department Policy for the Southwest Pacific Area

The CWS in SWPA was not yet aware, at the end of June, of the

War Department supply policy; they had heard nothing at all from the

United States in the first four months after the establishment of the

USAFIA and were to have no word from the Office of the Chief,

Chemical Warfare Service, until July.5 The basic War Department

plan was dated 22 January 1942, and the specific plan for the forces

in Australia was dated 2 February 1942. The specific War Department

plan called for 90 days' supply of all classes other than ammunition,

computed on the standard tables of basic allowances (TBA); 90 days'

supply of ground ammunition, computed on the basis of a special

ammunition day of supply for weapons in the theater; and five months'

supply of aerial bombs, ammunition, and pyrotechnics, computed according to a special allowance per aircraft in Australia and the Netherlands East Indies. The Adjutant General instructed the technical

services in the United States to compute allowances and set up shipments to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, which was charged

with shipment to the theater. The chiefs of the technical services

were also charged with allotting funds to the theater for the operation

of their services in the theater and for the local procurement of

matériel.6

OCCWS immediately began to set up shipments against the War

Department plan in accordance with strength figures furnished. It

4

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Arthur H. Williams, Jr., 23 Jan 46. (2) Office of the Chief of

Engineers, GHQ, AFPAC, Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, vol. VII, Engineer Supply (Washington,

1949), Table 5, p. 58. 5

 (1) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (2) Personal Ltr, Copthorne, CCmlO USAFIA, to Wilson, Chief

Field Serv OCCWS, 13 Jul 42. CWS 319.1 1942. 6

 (1) Ltr, TAG to CG USAFIA, Chiefs Supply Arms and Servs, et al., 22 Jan 42, sub: Sup of Overseas" Depts, Theaters, and Separate Bases. AG 400 (1-17-42)MSC-D-M. (Later to be revised as WD

Memo W-700-8-42, 10 Oct 42. See above, ch. III). (2) Ltr, AG to CG USAFIA, Chiefs Sup Arms

and Servs, 2 Feb 42, sub: Sup of U.S. Army Forces in the Australian Area. AG 400 (1-31-42 )MSCD-M.
238 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

calculated requirements for toxics according to the allowances for

ammunition and aerial bombs. Only mustard gas was available for

immediate supply. CWS supply authorities questioned the shipment

of mustard gas without the specific authority which had always been

necessary for toxic shipments. They also questioned the quantity to be

shipped because they lacked aircraft strength figures on which aerial

toxic requirements computations were based. General Brett, USAFIA

commander, who was probably unaware of these questions within the

War Department, nevertheless answered them by cabling a request for

1,000 tons of mustard. The Chief of Staff queried General MacArthur

as to his desires and, receiving a confirmation of Brett's request, in

April directed the shipment. The Services of Supply reduced the

quantity to 870 tons because of shipping space shortage. OCCWS

effected shipment on 15 April 1942.7

At the time the mustard was being shipped, the theater forces were

compiling a materiel status report which reached the United States at

the end of May. According to OCCWS figures, most items were in

excess of allowances and only one item, the chemical land mine, was

in short supply. OCCWS attributed excesses to the shipments diverted

from the Philippines and to cabled special requirements, such as the

one for mustard and another for incendiary bombs which the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, had ordered shipped.8

 In fact,

OCCWS apologies for excesses were misleading. Theater chemical officers still considered the supply short because, although they had no

exact knowledge of strength in the theater or supplies in the hands of

troops, they rightly anticipated a considerable build-up in theater

strength.9 Later War Department plans for other theaters provided

for substantial build-up on the basis of anticipated strength far in

excess of current strength, but not until the end of the war in Europe

was in sight did a build-up concept apply to the Pacific. To illustrate,

OCCWS computed the July 1942 report of chemical materials in

Australia according to the theater strength and estimated that the

7

 (1) Ltr, Chief Field Serv OCCWS to TAG, 15 Feb 42, sub: Shipment of Mustard Gas to Australia.

CWS 320.2/45-79. (2) Memo, ACofS OPD for TAG, 28 Mar 42, sub: Mustard Gas in Australia.

OPD 475.92 sec. 1. (3) Memo, Actg Chief Distr Br SOS for CCWS, 19 Apr 42, Shipment of Mustard

Gas to Australia. ASF SP 400(4-19-42). (4) Msg, CCWS to CG USAFIA, 15 Apr 42. CM-OUT

1296, also in CWS 320.2/54-79. 8

 Memo, ACCWS for CG SOS, Attn: Chief Distr Br, 14 Jun 42, sub: Status of Materiel in Australia.

CWS 320.2/75 (6-14-42). 9

 (1) Ltr, Copthorne to Wilson, 13 Jul 42. (2) Williams Interv, 23 Jan 46.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 239

chemical stock had reached 98 percent of the authorized level. There

were, at that time, 95,021 service gas masks for the United States

forces in Australia, and this quantity was estimated to be 9,000 more

than the allowance. Yet, also in July 1942, the Army Service Forces

asked the chiefs of the technical services if they were prepared to

support 1,000,000 men in the Pacific.10 On the assumption that at

least half of this strength would be assigned to SWPA, this would mean

approximately one mask for every five men as opposed to the European

theater planning ratio of one mask in stock for each individual who

would already have an initial issue mask.11 Even though masks and

shipping space were not available at the time, some method of supply

planning that would have anticipated SWPA needs in advance of an

increase in strength would have caused less confusion.

Theater Retaliatory Preparedness for Gas Warfare

There was little that Colonel Copthorne, Chief Chemical Officer,

USAFIA, and in July USASOS, could do to order enough supplies to

meet an increase in SWPA strength except to ask that supplies be sent

in quantities greater than the SWPA allowance. Under War Department supply procedures he could make requests to exceed allowances

only by explaining at length that unusual circumstances would result

in the use of extra supplies or that service operations would require

supplies not listed in the War Department plan for SWPA. The supplies which prepared SWPA for retaliation in case gas warfare should

start were mostly obtained, like the first shipment of mustard gas, by

such requests to exceed the allowances. The CWS SWPA needed toxicfilling plants, which were not on the allowance list, to handle this

first shipment. Copthorne accordingly cabled an order for plants.

The plants arrived in Australia in July but drawings and assembly

instructions, which were not available in Australia, did not accompany

them. The mustard shipment reached Australia in August. In order

to store the gas in newly established toxic gas yards at Darra, Queensland, and Geelong, Victoria, CWS officers assembled the filling plants

10

 (1) Monthly Matériel Status Rpt 403, USAFIA, as of 15 Jul 42, ACofS G-4 WDGS to CCWS,

20 Aug 42. CWS 320.5/54-79. (2) Memo, ACofS Opns SOS for Chiefs of Engrs, CWS, et al, 24

Jul 42, sub: Storage Facilities for Pacific Opns. AFS SPOPN 486.1; also in CWS 320.2/23-26. 11

 The European ratio was determined by comparing 1943 mask authorization (Baldwin, Bingham, and

Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in the Theaters of Operations) with theater projected strength

(Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, I, 128-29).
240 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

by guesswork. The 14,000 100-pound bomb casings were available

for filling only because USAFIA had been unable to ship them to

their original destination, the Philippines. While most of the mustard

was used in filling these bombs, some of it was set aside for filling toxic

land mines which had been procured in Australia. Mio aircraft spray

tanks, which came from War Department allowance to SWPA, arrived

without accessories and mounting instructions. The War Department

also shipped some toxic-filled artillery shell from allowances.12

In March of 1943, when the first gas warfare plan was produced,

toxics had been further dispersed to six toxic storage yards. One, near

Charters Towers, Queensland, contained 115 tons of bulk agents, 5,900

filled 100-pound bombs, about 1,000 empty spray tanks, and 600

empty bombs. Another, at Kangaroo, north of Townsville, contained

5,500 mustard-filled 100-pound bombs and more than 20,000 artillery

shells. The enlarged Darra yard held nearly 435 tons of bulk agents,

nearly 90,000 artillery rounds, a small supply of toxic smoke candles,

and empty bombs, spray tanks, and land mines. A new Columboola

yard 200 miles west of Brisbane held 11,000 mustard-filled loo-pound

bombs, and a new yard at Kingswood near Sydney stored only artillery

shell (approximately 53,000 rounds). The original yard at Geelong

stored 400 tons of bulk mustard and 3,160 toxic smoke candles. The

CWS SWPA estimated that in the event of gas warfare the stock at

Charters Towers would be sufficient for an immediate retaliatory strike.

Then, within seven hours, spray tanks could be filled and delivered for

a 16-plane spray mission. The spray mission could thereafter be sustained from other stocks for 63 plane missions. More missions could

be flown only if some spray tanks were returned after the flights and

this was not expected because spray tanks were normally jettisoned.

The artillery shell could not be used prior to movement to forward

areas, and no time estimate was given for that movement, presumably

because the time could not be calculated in the face of uncertainty as

to the available forms of transport. There was at the time no assurance

that forward artillery would be on hand to fire the shell since only one

American artillery piece had gone forward for the recently ended

Papua Campaign.13

12

 (1) Ltr, Copthorne to Wilson, 13 Jul 42. (2) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (3) Williams Interv,

23 Jan 46. 13

 CinC GHQ SWPA to TAG, 7 Apr 43, Rpt, Theater Plans for Cml Warfare (hereafter cited as

Theater Plans, Mar 43). GHQ AG 381 (12-8-42)C.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 241

Theater Defense Preparedness for Gas Warfare

On the defensive side, as noted above, every individual in the theater

was allotted a gas mask, and there was a small reserve, adequate on the

TBA basis, of service masks.14 In the opinion of the chemical officers,

one undoubtedly shared by the troops, the 5-pound service mask was

of very limited utility in the tropics. It could not be worn for any

length of time in a hot climate with even an acceptable degree of discomfort, and it was too heavy and bulky to be carried by troops, who

could function efficiently only under a minimum burden. The SWPA

Chemical Section accordingly requisitioned 228,000 training masks or

lightweight substitutes for the equipment of, at least, all assault echelons, and the 2,000 training masks in the theater were earmarked for

this purpose.15 OCCWS shipped 139,000 training masks which represented the available supply since training masks were also in demand

elsewhere. The masks arrived, as requested, waterproofed; that is,

both ends of the canister were sealed. The difficulty with the waterproofing job done in the United States was that the seals were paper

and had to be torn off to put the mask in ready condition. The seals

could not be restored by the individual user of the mask even if the

materials had been provided. SWPA chemical officers thereupon set

out to design restorable seals. Capt. Stephen Penler, commander of the

412th (later 62d) Chemical Depot Company, suggested a "milk bottle

cap" for the valve (outer) end of the canister.16 A Sydney paper manufacturer succeeded, after several attempts, in producing the bottle

cap seal. These seals were packed in small cans and the can inserted

into a pocket sewn into the mask carrier. The open (mask end) of the

canister was sealed with a rubber plug, and Capt. John Senter designed

a quick acting clamp for securing the canister to the facepiece. Both

plug and clamp were also locally procured. The 10th Chemical Maintenance Company set up a production line and performed the not

inconsiderable task of modifying masks and carriers.17 More than a

year later the CWS in the United States provided a reusable rubber

cap which could be attached to the valve end of the canister.

14

 Theater Plans, Mar 43. 15

 Ibid.

16

 Captain Penler was killed in an air accident in December 1942. 17

 (1) Ltr, Copthorne to Hist Off, 16 Feb 51. (2) Lt Col Irving R. Mollen, Chemical Warfare

Sup—SWPA, World War II, 16 May 52. MS in CMLHO. This article also appeared in Armed forces

Chemical Journal, vol. XI, No. 2 (March-April, 1957), pp. 34-36, and No. 3 (May-June, 1957), pp.

31-33.
242 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Furnishing protective clothing was an even greater problem than

supplying the mask. In SWPA, as elsewhere in the world, protective

clothing storage and issue was a quartermaster responsibility, but impregnating the clothing with antigas chemicals was a CWS responsibility.18

 Also in SWPA, as elsewhere, the CWS and the Quartermaster

Corps worked in close co-operation. The first supply of protective

clothing came from the United States in July 1942. Because fighting

would be in the tropics, it was unfortunate that much of the clothing,

including underwear, was woolen. Just as the supply arrived instructions were received that all garments must be modified by the insertion

of gussets and double flies to afford increased protection at trousers

and shirt openings.19 Quartermaster employees made the gussets and

flies and inserted them; the CWS rented a dry-cleaning establishment

in Melbourne for the dual purpose of impregnating the gussets and

flies and of testing an improvised impregnating process. Copthorne

secured the formula for the American impregnite from the Australians

who got it from the chemical warfare experimental station in England.

The direct channels of communication with the United States had

again failed.20

The experience in the rented dry-cleaning plant proved the improvised impregnating process acceptable. The CWS acquired two English-made Maja trichlorethylene dry-cleaning plants and three commercial laundry dryers, and by the middle of October had this

equipment in operation in a factory in Sydney. There the CWS impregnated such clothing as the quartermaster had in stock.21

Copthorne, writing to Brig. Gen. Alexander Wilson in OCCWS,

questioned the sense of providing prescribed double-layer (long underwear, outer garments, gloves, sox, leggings, and hood) protection in a

climate where that much clothing could certainly not be worn.22

Wilson replied that the War Department was working on worldwide

protective policy and that, for the time being, the SWPA CWS could

18

 See Alvin P. Stauffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1956), pp. 202-03. 19

 Ltr, TAG to CINC SWPA et al, 14 Jul 42, sub: Cml Warfare Protective Clothing. AG 420

(5 Jul 42) MS-SPOPS-M. 20

 (1) Ltr, Copthorne to Hist Off, 16 Feb 51. (2) Personal Ltr, Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42. 21

 Ltr, Copthorne to Porter, 14 Aug 42. 22

 A survey made in 1943 disclosed that 38 percent of rear area troops in New Guinea wore no underwear whereas the figure for combat area troops who dispensed with these items was 100 percent.

Grothaus and Brady to CCWS, 29 Mar 44, Rpt on Visit to Southwest, South and Central Pacific Areas.

CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts.)
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 243

only furnish the prescribed level under the assumption that the area

commander would weigh the risk of gas warfare against the efficiency

of the soldier and instruct subordinate commanders as to his policy on

wearing protective clothing. The question of policy was never settled

to theater satisfaction. The March 1943 SWPA gas warfare plans

provided only that outer garments and leggings would be stocked in

forward areas while underwear was held in rear reserve.23 The worldwide policy adopted over a year later, in April 1944, provided that

only 15 percent of SWPA soldiers would have double-layer protection

available.24 Other forward area combat and service troops, or 35 percent of the area command, were given one and a half layer (outer garments, gloves, leggings, and hood, plus cotton drawers) protection, and

the rear area troops, estimated at 50 percent of the command, were

not provided with any protective clothing.25 Copthorne believed that

mid-thigh length knit cotton shorts would afford nearly as good protection as the cotton drawers and would be bearable in the tropics.26

The 1944 plan permitted the use of knit shorts, when available, for

one and a half layer protection.

Other items of protection against gas warfare were the decontaminants and the equipment to disperse them. The decontaminants included personal protective ointment, noncorrosive decontaminant for

vehicles and equipment, and bleach, the area decontaminant. Since

the M1 protective ointment was in short supply and regarded by

SWPA officers as of doubtful effectiveness, the CWS SWPA improvised

an individual protective kit consisting of swabs, kerosene (a solvent for

vesicant gases), an alkaline soft soap produced locally, and a half

measure of M1 ointment.27 General Porter advised Copthorne that the

M1 ointment had been reappraised and redesignated M4 and that new

techniques for its use had been evolved. OCCWS at the time considered

the M4 ointment effective without a solvent or soap to accompany it.28

The solvent and soap in the SWPA kit served as a substitute for ointment until a sufficient quantity of M4 ointment was received late in

23

 Theater Plans, Mar 43. 24

 Ltr, TAG to CINC SWPA et al., 24 Apr 44, sub: Cml Warfare Protective Clothing Accessories and

Equip. AG 420 (28 Mar 44) OB-S-SPOPP-M. 25

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. IV. 26

 Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 29 Jan 43, sub: Use of Jockey Midway Shorts. CWS USASOS

422.

27

 Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42. 28

 Pers Ltr, Porter to Copthorne, 12 Nov 42.
244 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

1942. The War Department at the same time sent enough noncorrosive

decontaminating agent and its disperser, the 11⁄2-quart apparatus.

Bleach supplies were growing, but the theater was still short of full

allowance. Chemical officers believed that bleach would deteriorate in

the tropics. Although the first tests proved that American bleach was

standing up well, SWPA officers found after a few months that both

the bleach and its containers deteriorated. To fill shortages, the CWS

bought bleach from the Australians. The supply men discovered a

double benefit in this procurement. Not only was the bleach more

readily obtained, but also it was more stable in the tropics and the

containers could better withstand the inevitable rough handling. The

supply was unfortunately limited by the small production of chlorine

in Australia. As for the dispersing equipment—the 3-gallon hand

decontaminating apparatus and the 400-gallon power-driven apparatus

—the hand apparatus was available in considerable quantity, more than

a thousand in excess of allowance in February 1943, and the stock of

powered apparatus, 115 in February, was sufficient for critical needs

even though 18 short of allowance. It is very doubtful that much area

decontamination would have been possible in the jungle in any case.

Gas detection devices and gas alarms were not available although the

latter could be improvised.29

The one protective item of which there was a definite overage was

the gasproof curtain. The curtain was designed for World War I trench

warfare and was still issued on a World War I basis of two curtains

for 20 men. The SWPA CWS asked the San Francisco port to stop

shipping curtains and suggested to area forces that those on hand

might be used for foxhole covers in event of vesicant gas attack, since

the individual protective cover was not yet available to serve that

purpose. OCCWS soon changed the basis of issue to two per 200 men

and designated the curtains for use at command posts, communications

centers, and medical installations.30

29

 (1) Copthorne to Wilson, 13 Jul 42. (2) Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42. (3) Mollen,

Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II. (4) Monthly Materiel Status Rpt 403, USAFIA, as of 15

Jul 42. (5) Theater Plans, Mar 43. (6) Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare

in Theaters of Opns, app. B.

30

 (1) Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42. (2) Porter to Copthorne, 12 Nov 42.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 245

Theater Chemical Supply Status—End of the Preparatory Phase

In sum, the CWS SWPA had by the end of 1942 reached the status

of gas warfare supply, both offensive and defensive, reflected in the

area gas warfare plans reported to the War Department on March 1943.

That is, except for gas detection, SWPA could defend against any gas

warfare emergency involving troops likely to be in direct contact with

the enemy. Offensively, the air forces could make an immediate retaliatory strike and although they could sustain retaliation for only a

brief period, this might have been sufficient considering the distances

which isolated individual enemy forces in the theater. The big problem

was service in the event of gas warfare. The only available facility

for clothing impregnation was the improvised Sydney plant. The CWS

estimated that in the event of gas warfare, it would need several chemical impregnating companies, three additional air service units, and

one chemical composite company per forward area division. The

ability of services other than the CWS to handle gas warfare was also

dependent upon increasing service capability. For example, Australian

hospitals would have to bear the load of gas casualty treatment because

the American hospitals did not then have enough manpower and

facilities. Forward area medical service would have been sadly deficient

for the same reasons although the chief chemical officer and the SWPA

surgeon had co-operated in improvising a field gas treatment kit which

would have afforded assistance to medical officers in the field.31

While the SWPA supply of most gas warfare items could be considered adequate, the supply of nongas warfare chemical items was

clearly inadequate. There were few hand grenades and little smoke

equipment. In fact, smoke munitions were so scarce that Colonel

Copthorne ordered the improvisation and testing of a smoke apparatus

using FS mixture procured in Australia. There were some flame

throwers of the kind that had proved unemployable in the Papua

Campaign, but there were no mortars and only 1,000 rounds of mortar

shell. The general chemical inventory, which from July to December

1942 had grown from 2,098 short tons to 5,093 short tons, was therefore mostly gas warfare items. The greatest gain, from 299 to 1,641

tons, had been in Class V, ammunition, the class into which the toxics

31

 (1) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CWS, 26 Jan 43, sub: Directions for Use of Cml Warfare Sups.

CWS USASOS 461 APO 501 (Directions). (2) Williams Interv, 23 Jan 46. (3) Theater Plans,

Mar 43.
246 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

fell. During the last six months of 1942, the CWS had received 4,983

short tons of materiel. The bulk of this total, 4,645 short tons, came

from imports, mostly from the United States, but 139 tons, the greater

portion of which was laboratory equipment and production supplies,

had come from distress cargoes (cargoes landed in Australia because

they could not reach destinations in the combat zone), and 199 tons

came from local procurement. Although the latter figure was small,

its size is not the measure of its importance since most of the items so

procured were critical.32

The Tyranny of Climate and Distance

Establishment of a New Guinea base in August 1942 and the events

of the Papua Campaign brought sharply into focus the problems dealing

with the condition of both gas warfare and nongas warfare chemical

materiel. SWPA chemical officers had been aware from the first that

much of the equipment received was rushed production not of the

highest quality, but conditions of storage and issue in New Guinea

demonstrated that every weakness in design, manufacture, inspection,

packaging, and shipment was magnified many times when items were

subjected to the extremes of heat, humidity, and rough handling unavoidable in the tropics and semitropics. Sometimes these problems

could be resolved or reduced to manageable proportions in SWPA;

sometimes they could be met by improvements in the United States;

sometimes area forces simply had to adjust to living with the problems.

Often a combination of these solutions applied, as in the case of the

flame throwers, for example.

Bleach

The deterioration of bleach, mentioned above, was another problem

which called forth a joint effort but which was never solved with complete satisfaction. SWPA received and stored bleach in light-gauge,

painted and unpainted steel drums of 70-, 100-, 140-, and 300-pound

capacity. Handling the larger drums was a problem, but it became

apparent, late in 1942, that the handling difficulty was insignificant

compared to the problem arising from corrosion of the containers and

32

 (1) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (2) Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42. (3) Office of the Chief of

Engineers, GHQ, AFPAC, Engineer Supply, pp. 57-58, Tables 4 and 5.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 247

deterioration of the bleach. Copthorne in December 1942 ordered a

survey of bleach in semitropical and tropical storage to determine howgreat the loss might be. Base section chemical officers found that all

the 100-pound nonpainted drums surveyed had corroded and that the

bleach had deteriorated below the standard acceptable for decontamination. Corrosion of larger unpainted drums, for some unexplained

reason, was negligible while 77.2 percent of 100-pound drums painted

brown had corroded. Orange-painted drums in both 70- and 100-

pound sizes had stood up well. In all, the CWS turned over 25 tons

of deteriorated bleach to the engineers for water purification use. A

few weeks later the New Guinea base reported corroding drums and

deteriorating bleach. Copthorne could only advise that, since there was

probably no solution other than the impractical one of lacquering the

drums inside and out, deteriorated bleach should be turned over to

other services and replacement requisitioned. A part of the replacement could come from Australian sources, but the bulk would have

to come from the United States.33

OCCWS was at work on the problem when Copthorne informed it

of his experience. The War Department CWS finally succeeded in

obtaining a more stable bleach and in improving the container,34 but

the tropical climate continued to take its toll in every storage place

from Australia to the Philippines. Fortunately, the deteriorated bleach

was still adequate for the hygienic uses to which the Quartermaster

Corps and the Corps of Engineers could put it. Because of this secondary use, the demands on critically short transportation were no greater

than they would have been had each service obtained its own supply.

The CWS SWPA was forced to adjust to the demands of continuous

survey of stocks and handling transfers.35

Noncorrosive Decontaminating Agent

Another decontaminant problem concerned the noncorrosive decontaminating agent (DANC). The agent was a mixture of solvent,

acetylene tetrachloride, and a dry chemical known as RH 195. The

33

 (1) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 10 Dec 42, sub: Corrosion of Chloride of Lime Containers

(CWS USASOS 470.6), and 1st Ind, CCWS to CCmlO USASOS, 24 Feb 43. CWS SPCVO 470.6

(12-10-42). (2) Ltr, CWO Serv Comd APO 502 to CCmlO USASOS, 14 Jan 43, no sub, and 1st

Ind, CCmlO USASOS to CWO Serv Comd APO 502, 2 Feb 43. 34

 Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, from Laboratory to Field, ch XVI. 35

 Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War IL
248 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

two components were shipped and stored unmixed in a 2-compartment

6-gallon drum with the RH 195 packed in the compartment above

the acetylene tetrachloride. The dry chemical apparently corroded the

seal between the two compartments allowing the contents to mix; the

resulting mixure had a life of about three months. Drums dented in

shipment almost inevitably corroded because the lacquer on interior

surfaces scaled off around the dent. After the first discovery of this

packaging deficiency in October 1942, base section chemical depot

troops opened dented drums and transferred serviceable RH 195 to

bottles. If the chemical had combined with the solvent, the mixture

was stored for its serviceable life, and when manpower and equipment

were available the solvent was reclaimed at the end of that life. The

area CWS obtained a crimping machine to reseal drums containing new

and reclaimed solvent. The War Department CWS strengthened the

RH 195 compartment, made it of a metal more receptive to preservative lacquer, provided a corrosion-proof plastic gasket between compartments, and, eventually, designed a new dual container. But still

the CWS in the Pacific had trouble—the old container continued to

come through the supply system. One base section received 14,000

old containers in the four months ending in September 1943. The

noncorrosive decontaminating agent problem was one that the CWS

SWPA learned to live with.36

The one and a half quart decontaminating apparatus for dispersing

the noncorrosive decontaminant and the 3-gallon apparatus were poorly

crated. The crate consisted of a wooden frame with a cardboard liner;

both cardboard and wood frequently failed with almost disastrous

results when the crates were used as a base in warehouse stocks.37

Another minor but annoying packaging defect was in the pack for

shoe impregnite. The War Department CWS shipped the preparation

in small cans packed in cardboard boxes. The boxes were too heavy

for one man to handle, and the cardboard simply disintegrated after

brief exposure to the weather. The CWS solved this problem by

switching to small wooden boxes.38

36

 (1) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 16 Nov 42, sub: Deterioration of RH 195 Containers.

CWS USASOS GSCW 400.2. (2) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO USASOS, 18 Dec 42, sub: Deterioration of

RH 195 Containers. CWS SPCVO 470.6 (12-18-42). (3) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 29 Sep

43, sub: Defective DANC Containers (CWS USASOS GSCW), with 1st Ind, ACCWS Field Opns to

CCmlO USASOS, 25 Oct 43. CWS SPCVO 457 APO 501 (29 Sep 43). (4) Grothaus-Brady Rpt. 37

 Grothaus-Brady Rpt. 38

 Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 249

The Gas Mask.

A considerably more serious problem arose from the effect of the

jungle climate on gas masks and carriers. Fungi attacked the glass

lens of the Australian gas masks which American troops were using.

Molds and mildew covered and rotted gas mask carriers and the harness

of the mask itself. Rust and corrosion ate away canisters, buckles, and

rivets. In the 41st Infantry Division the chemical officer, Colonel

Arthur, prescribed a daily brushing of the carrier, but this only retarded

the growth of mold and mildew. Furthermore, brushing was possible

only for masks kept by individuals, who usually had them only for

short periods. Assault troops carried masks in landing and dropped

them as soon as the risk of initiation of gas warfare was determined to

be slight. These masks were uncared for until chemical officers could

assemble details or obtain service troops to collect, inspect, and store

them. In early operations losses were large, as much as 45 percent in

one assault, and the number of recovered masks rendered unserviceable

was also large. Better recovery techniques, especially those evolved

when service detachments landed with assault troops, reduced losses

to 5 percent and greatly increased the number of serviceable masks

recovered.39

OCCWS believed that the SWPA mask problems might be solved

by the introduction of the lightweight service mask in 1943. The

lightweight mask and its carrier were more rugged than the training

mask then in use in SWPA, and the carrier was water resistant and

therefore was more resistant to mold and mildew. Also, the CWS

provided an adhesive tape waterproofing for the canister. Colonel

Arthur set up a wearing test of the mask in the 41st Division. The

facepiece was plainly superior to that of the training mask, but the

canister rusted as badly, and the adhesive tape waterproofing tended

to remove the paint, thus accelerating rusting. With waterproofing

clamp in place the rubber hose from canister to facepiece softened and

distorted in twelve days, and the adhesive tape waterproofing proved

of doubtful value under tropical conditions. Also, the carrier, although

apparently more resistant to deterioration, proved somewhat bulky to

39

 (1) Ltr, CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO USAFFE, 7 Jun 43, sub: Mold on Gas Mask Carriers.

Sixth Army 475—Weapons for Jungle Warfare. (2) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War

II. (3) Ltr, CO 42d Cml Lab Co SWPA to Chief Tech Div OCCWS, 1 Sep 43, sub: Transmittal of

Mold Cultures.
250 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

wear and, as in Normandy, offered a target for sharpshooters. Arthur

recommended that the SWPA-devised training mask and waterproofing

be retained but that the lightweight facepiece be substituted for the

training facepiece. The War Department approved Arthur's suggested

modification of the training mask, and supplies were furnished to make

theater modifications. The CWS tried again with an assault mask with

cheek-mounted canister, but no significant number of these masks

became available in the theater before the end of the war. In sum,

this was again a problem that the SWPA CWS tried to overcome

with various expedients but without a real solution, for it was unable

to find a means of preventing mold, mildew, and corrosion.40

Protective Clothing

As noted above, storage and issue of antigas protective clothing was

a quartermaster responsibility, but the CWS was vitally involved in

providing impregnation services and in prescribing the use and care of

protective clothing. The SWPA chief quartermaster issued instructions, in the name of the Commanding General, USASOS, on protective

clothing in December 1942, in January 1943, and in March 1943. The

last of these instructions repeated the then current War Department

policy of providing as yet undesignated "double layer" protection

based on the cotton herringbone twill "fatigue" uniform as "minimum"

and with an additional impregnated woolen or cotton khaki uniform

as "complete" protection.41

Patently, complete protection was beyond the SWPA capacity, and

the instructions provided that only one set of outer garments plus

accessories per individual should be issued or should be held in forward

depots for issue to combat troops. Forward depots were also authorized

to hold normal replacement quantities to be called forward when

needed by operational organizations. The instructions also prescribed

storage and maintenance procedures including provision for CWS

inspection of clothing in storage.42

40

 (1) Ltr, CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO I Corps, 16 Jun 43, sub: Rpt on Field Test of M4-10-6

Gas Mask (41st Div 470.6), with 2d Ind, forwarded by Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CCWS, 9 Jul 43,

sub: Lightweight Service Masks. USAFFE FECW 470.72. (2) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CG Sixth

Army, 22 Oct 43, sub: Wearing Tests on New Type Masks. Sixth Army AG 470.72—Protective

Apparatus. 41

 Ltr, AG USASOS to CG's Sixth Army et al, 26 Mar 43, sub: Cml Warfare Protective Clothing.

USASOS GSQMS 421 in Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing. 42 Ibid.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 251

USASOS elaborated the storage, requisition, and issue procedures

for protective clothing in May 1943. At the end of the month, the

commanding officer of the subbase at Oro Bay, which had officially

opened late in April, informed the Commanding General, 41st Infantry

Division, that 70 percent of the base protective clothing stock, most

of which was held for the division, was unserviceable.43 The unserviceable clothing had rotted or the fabric had lost its tensile strength.

Much of the unserviceable clothing was that dyed jungle green on

which chemical service units in Australia had expended so much effort.

Since CWS officers had made the serviceability tests, the CWS SWPA

was aware of the problem. In a little more than a week after the first

notification, Copthorne asked Sixth Army to determine the extent of

damage. Sixth Army replied that almost all clothing in loose storage

or in the hands of individuals had deteriorated. Clothing received from

the United States and stored in its original waterproof bales and packages off the ground and under cover had not deteriorated. Similarly,

those sets of clothing in the hands of individual soldiers which had been

stored, as prescribed, in the bottoms of barracks bags hung so that air

would circulate under the bag had not deteriorated. Since all troops

did not have the opportunity to hang barracks bags in positions where

air would circulate, Sixth Army ordered protective clothing withdrawn

from individuals for storage in unit supply, but storage conditions in

unit supply were far from ideal. The best that unit storage could

accomplish was slightly to prolong garment life and, perhaps more

importantly, to make garments available for regular serviceability

inspection.44

CWS officers soon learned that the effective life of protective clothing

was likely to be six months and that the best which could be expected

was a year.45 Colonel Smith, then chief of the USASOS Chemical

Section and later Copthorne's deputy, undertook the direct supervision

of protective clothing distribution plans and liaison with quartermaster

43

 Ltr, CO Advance Subbase B to CG 41st Div, 30 May 43, sub: Impregnated Clothing. USAFFE

Advance Subbase B 422 in Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing. 44

 (1) Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, 9 Jun 43, sub: Impregnated Clothing. USAFFE

FECW 420, cited in Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG USAFFE, 29 Jun 43, sub: Impregnated Clothing.

Sixth Army AG 420W in Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing. (2) Ltr, CmlO 41st Div to CG 41st

Div, 22 Jun 43, sub: Inspection of Impregnated Clothing. 41st Inf Div 470.6 in Sixth Army 422.3

Protective Clothing. (3) Memo, CmlO Sixth Army CO Hq Co Sixth Army, 23 Jun 43, no sub. In

Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing. 45

 Also see Stauffer, Operations in the War Against Japan, p. 202.
252 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

on the subject. In the circumstance, Smith had no choice but to

provide protective clothing for forward area troops and to plan replacing it every six months. Replacement was provided either from

the United States or from stocks impregnated in SWPA. In order to

carry on impregnation in the area, processing units were required. The

105th Chemical Processing Company arrived in SWPA in June 1943

just as the extent of the clothing problem was becoming known. Since

the unit did not receive its own plants for another six months, it

worked at processing in the improvised theater plant to rebuild the

theater reserve. Copthorne and Smith sought to move the 105th and

the eighteen companies received in 1944 into forward areas so that

impregnating facilities, both for building up clothing reserves and for

reimpregnation in the event of gas warfare, could be close to the

organizations with the greatest need, but obtaining USAFFE or GHQ

authority and transportation for these forward moves was extremely

difficult.46

The SWPA protective clothing reserve problem diminished during

late 1944 and early 1945 as stocks were continuously reconstituted by

shipments from the United States. Anticipated reserve demands were

also reduced by the War Department directive of April 1944 which

assigned protective clothing only to 50 percent of the area force.

Clothing still deteriorated although better packaging and the use of

the M2 water emulsion impregnating process somewhat lengthened

the serviceability period. The CWS still sought to move processing

units forward as reimpregnation insurance against a gas warfare emergency, and the units, even in forward areas, were diverted to secondary

missions which would permit readiness to operate in such emergency.47

In the last year of the war, most of the area protective clothing reserve was stored in the Hollandia, New Guinea, base while organizational

allowances were carried in unit supply when commanders would permit,

or in forward bases when they would not. The forward bases also

stored organizational maintenance stocks. As the fighting progressed

farther and farther from Hollandia transportation for resupply became

more difficult to obtain, and, in event of gas warfare, the transportation

situation might have been desperate. Chemical officers were confident,

however, that had gas warfare been initiated there would have been

sufficient air transportation available in the interim before the process46

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Irving R. Mollen, 28 Apr 53. 4 7 Ibid.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 253

ing companies could move forward and commence operation. Certainly

SWPA was adequately supplied with processing units. Because of the

SWPA storage problems and the estimated threat of gas warfare in

forward areas, SWPA had more units than any other theater.48

Defective Equipment and Spare Parts

Some SWPA chemical supply problems were common to all theaters.

For example, the power-driven decontaminating apparatus was widely

used for water carrying and giving showers, but the parts supply, as

elsewhere, was critical. No spare parts of any description arrived in

the theater before Colonel Morgan returned to the United States after

the middle of 1943. Even when parts did begin to arrive, there were

few for the large apparatus. Some vehicles were cannibalized to keep

others in operation, but even this expedient failed because many parts

were not interchangeable among the four different makes of apparatus

and because the same type of parts wore out on all apparatus. CWS

officers arranged with their Ordnance colleagues, late in the war, to

replace worn-out decontamination motors with jeep motors, and this

local adaptation permitted some apparatus to be returned to service.49

Other munitions also failed because of faulty manufacturing, faulty

inspection, or poor packaging in the United States. Examples are the

early shipments of the M33 smoke tank, which air chemical units

rebuilt, and of M14 and M8 chemical hand grenades of which such a

large percentage malfunctioned that Colonel Grothaus, the OCCWS

observer, recommended the destruction of entire lots.50 Another major

problem which was at least aggravated by SWPA storage conditions

was that concerning the 100-pound toxic bomb.

Toxic Munitions

As noted above, bombs were early stored in three toxic gas yards

in Australia. Leakers were soon discovered among the thin-cased

bombs, and sizable detachments from two service units were required

to segregate the leakers, decontaminate the storage areas, and vent and

paint nonleaking bombs. After a time it became evident that the

48

 (1) Mollen Interv, 28 Apr 53. (2) For information on processing company assignments, see

Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H-11. 49

 (1) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (2) Grothaus-Brady Rpt. (3) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—

SWPA, World War II. 50

 Grothaus-Brady Rpt.
254 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

mustard filling of some bombs was itself deteriorating. Copthorne

asked for replacement by distilled mustard, which was not so much

subject to deterioration, but OCCWS replied that the production authorities in the United States could not afford the time and effort to

distill mustard when the undistilled product proved satisfactory elsewhere. Concentrated SWPA CWS effort kept most of the bombs in

serviceable condition. Copthorne was anxious, as the war progressed,

to move the bombs closer to the scene of fighting. Finally, in 1944,

transportation was secured to establish a considerable stock in New

Guinea. When Copthorne's own section moved to Leyte, he again

attempted to move the bombs forward, but transportation could not

be obtained. Toward the end of hostilities, after a toxic gas yard had

been established in the Philippines, another effort was made to move

the stock forward, but a detailed inspection revealed that few bombs

were then serviceable, and the Chemical Section, Western Pacific, arranged for the disposal of bombs remaining in Australia and New

Guinea.51

The deterioration of stocks did not mean that SWPA was without

supplies for gas warfare retaliation. General MacArthur requested that

stockage be maintained on the west coast pending the availability of

shipping. Shipping would have been allotted at once in case of emergency. Also, bombs and other toxic munitions declared unserviceable

were replaced so that minimum area reserves were maintained until

near the end of the war. The area reserves, equal to four or five days'

retaliation, were in any case inadequate since the plans made late in

the war were based on the west coast stock.52

Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Southwest Pacific Area

Tactical Supply Policy

Just as many problems in chemical supply in SWPA arose from the

difficulties imposed by climate, terrain, and distances, so was the

51

 (1) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (2) Grothaus-Brady Rpt. (3) Personal Ltr, Waitt to Copthorne,

13 Jan 45. (4) Ltr, CCmlO AFWESPAC to CWS, 2 Sep 45, sub: Destruction of M47A2 H-Filled

Bombs, with 4th Ind. AFWESPAC CSCW 470.6 (2 Sep 45) in CWS 314.7 Misc files, WESPAC,

AFPAC, SPBC. (5) Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of

Opns, pp. 474-75. (6) Mollen, History of Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II. 52

 (1) Ltr, CINC GHQ SWPA to TAG, 19 Dec 43, sub: Revised Theater Plans for Gas Warfare.

GHQ AG 381 (19 Dec 43) APO 500 in OPD 385 CWP sec. II-B. (2) Baldwin, Bingham, and

Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Opns, pp. 457-75. (3) Mollen, History of Cml

Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 255

organization for supply dictated by these conditions. Other factors,

such as War Department priority, perpetual shortage of manpower,

and the nature of the SWPA organization also played a part. In theory

SWPA supply operated just as it did in other theaters. SWPA was first

concerned with insuring TBA and tables of organization and equipment allowances for all its organizations and units. It was secondly

interested in establishing regular maintenance quotas, usually 30 days'

supply, which moved forward with combat units, or were held in rear

area depots or unit supply for rear area units. A third task was establishing theater reserves set at 60, 90, 150, or 180 days' supply by the

War Department (OPD), as calculated against the War Department

approved troop basis. All this was the normal business of supply which

was handled and computed in just about the same way by SWPA

personnel, by the office of the chief of the War Department technical

service, and by the responsible port of embarkation.

In the CWS SWPA, as mentioned above, once the initial problems

of determining area strength and authorizations and initial supply

status of units and organizations had been solved, "normal" supply

became a matter of forwarding requisitions for shortages in initial

equipment, maintenance, and area reserves. The complication here

became one of knowing what to ask for since poor communication

frequently left SWPA chemical officers in the dark as to what was

available, or what changes had been made in equipment and allowances,

or what new items had been added to the system. Part of this burden

was removed by the port of embarkation which automatically filled

shortages disclosed by the theater's materiel status reports, but this

and other automatic supply created problems in unwanted equipment

such as gasproof curtains, and 20,000 horse gas masks in a virtually

horseless area.53 Materiel status report supply also frequently arrived

in the theater so many months after the report went forward that the

conditions cited and basis for stockage no longer existed.54 But these

"normal" supply problems existed in every theater and were only

more difficult in degree in SWPA because of serious shortages and

failures of communications. Much more difficult were the special

requisitions problems.

Again in the special requisitions area, the theaters operated on the

same basis. All theater chemical officers submitted special requisitions

53

 Grothaus-Brady Rpt. 54

 Ibid.
256 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

to build up gas warfare preparedness, and in all theaters special requisitions or special projects originating with combat organizations were

the very basis of tactical supply. In the North African-Mediterranean

theater special requisitions sometimes brought wanted tactical requirements, but when special requisitions failed, organization chemical officers like Colonel Barker, with the help of service chemical officers like

Colonel Coblentz, improvised their own requirements and handled

them through their own channels. In the European theater special

requisitions seldom brought the items the theater wanted from the

United States, but General Rowan and his staff controlled chemical

supply through an individual system that had matured for two years

before it was put to the test of combat. Rowan and his staff could call

upon the comparatively abundant resources of the European build-up

and of the British allies. The chemical special operational projects in

Europe were evolved in close co-ordination between combat and service

elements, and the bulk of supply came from theater stocks managed

in the theater by the service elements. For example, base section chemical officers could come in for weekly conferences with their theater

chief, and, on the Continent, service elements, such as Colonel Stubbs's

ADSEC Chemical Section, were in daily contact with the combat

organizations. Transportation and communication in Europe were

overburdened, but the distances were shorter and the road and other

facilities vastly superior to those of the Pacific. The differences in

degree in SWPA were so great as to be almost differences in kind.

When Sixth Army became the major SWPA American ground element, on a level co-ordinate with USASOS, in February 1943, it

assumed responsibility for tactical supply. Colonel C. L. Marriott,

Sixth Army chemical officer, arrived in Australia with the second

echelon of the army in April but remained only a short time before

moving forward to Milne Bay with ALAMO Force, a task force

created in June 1943 from Sixth Army troops, and in fact a forward

echelon of the army. Marriott's office was thus separated by 1,200

air miles from Copthorne's. Marriott's assistant, Major McKinney,

remained in the Sixth Army headquarters. The only expeditious means

of communication was by radio, but with such heavy demands on the

radio net, normal communication was by letter or informal memo.55

55

 (1) Mary H. Williams, Chronology 1941-1941, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1960), pp. 93, 114. (2) General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon

(Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1953), pp. 6—10, and app. 1.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 257

Responsibility for CWS operational supply projects rested with Marriott. Since he had very little assistance and since, after the move to

ALAMO Force at Milne Bay, even his own section was divided, most of

the supply policy load fell directly upon his own shoulders. But even this

was not difficulty enough in the difficult Pacific area. He lacked the

logistic information and means of transportation, and his ability to

improvise locally was practically nil, since there was no available civilian

source of transportation and no substitute line of communication to

Allied forces such as many field chemical officers had. New Guinea

had no motor roads, no industry, and only a little unskilled manpower.

Air transportation carried very high priority and water transportation

was at a premium. Until 15 November 1943, he could deal with the

Chemical Officer, Advance Section, USASOS, at Port Moresby. From

15 November until 31 March 1944 he dealt with chemical officers of

Advance Section at Lae and Intermediate Section at Port Moresby.

But miles of water or air lay between the USASOS sections and his

office in ALAMO Force headquarters, which was at Milne Bay until

October, at Goodenough Island until December, and near Finschhafen

until May 1944.56

Requirements and Transportation

Marriott spent much of his time in 1943 simply in determining how

SWPA interpreted chemical supply, what channels existed, how much

subordinate elements wanted, and where to store the immediate supply

demands of organizations. In June 1943 USASOS provided that requisitions for TBA equipment should be submitted to base section chemical

officers who could fill them without further reference. Requisitions

for supplies in excess of TBA had to be approved by Marriott and forwarded to USASOS. The availability of non-TBA items in USASOS

depended upon the ability of the USASOS Chemical Section supply

officers to predict unusual issues and to persuade the United States

authorities to ship them. Transportation could be obtained either by

theater allotment of space, which was controlled in GHQ, or by San

Francisco Port of Embarkation allotment. USASOS sometimes issued

credits for controlled (non-TBA or scarce) items to Sixth Army for

Marriott's suballotment, but each issue against credit had to be approved

56

 (1) Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, pp. 12-15. (2) Mollen, History of Cml Warfare

Sup—SWPA, World War II.
258 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

by USASOS through the issuing base.57 Unusual issues of TBA, such

as for the 1st Marine Division which arrived from South Pacific area

fighting minus much of its equipment, were approved through

USAFFE, Sixth Army's administrative (not operational) command

channel, to USASOS.58

Sixth Army forwarded operational projects to GHQ SWPA and

in the course of preparing such a project in June, Marriott, bypassing

technical channels, pointed out to the supreme command that confusion

existed as to the meaning of the term CWS supplies.59 He indicated

that the prohibition against the use of toxics led some staff officers to

believe that smoke and incendiary shells and grenades, chemical ammunition then issued by Ordnance, were also prohibited. The belief also

existed that protective equipment and chemical ammunition were

restricted to a 30 days' supply, and problems arose because some protective equipment (such as protective clothing and covers) were issued

by Quartermaster on a 90 days' supply basis while other equipment

(gas mask, protective ointment, and shoe impregnite) were issued by

CWS, apparently on a 30 days' basis. USAFFE, where Copthorne's

office was then located, replied without reference to GHQ that the

Ordnance-issued items were to be used since they were not toxics.

The theater administrative headquarters also indicated that tactical

planning should encompass TBA plus 30 days' maintenance and 30

days' reserve for Classes II and IV. For ammunition supply USAFFE

prescribed basic units of fire for initial issue and provided that maintenance and reserves be calculated in days of supply.60

 Reserves were

parceled out among intermediate bases by the combat organizations.

The headquarters regretted confusion resulting from the issue of protective equipment by two services and indicated that action had been

initiated to make all protective equipment the responsibility of one

service.61

With the possible exception of information on specific day of

57

 Ltr, CmlO USASOS to Base Sec and Subbase CmlO's, 6 Jun 43, sub: Requisition Channels for CWS

Sups. USASOS GSCW 400.312 in Sixth Army 400 Sups (General). 58

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG USASOS through CG USAFFE, 18 Jun 43, sub: Cml Warfare Equip

for 1st Marine Div (Sixth Army AG 400W), with 1st Ind, CG USAFFE to CG USASOS, 27 Jun 43

(USAFFE FECW 470.6), and 2d Ind CG USASOS through CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, n.d.

(USASOS GSCW 457/29). All in Sixth Army 400 Sups (General). 59

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG SWPA through CG USAFFE. 60

 For definitions of days of supply, units of fire, and classes of supply, see above, Chapter III. 61

 1st Ind, CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, 27 Jun 43, on basic Ltr above. USAFFE FECW 475 in

Sixth Army 400 Sups (General).
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 259

supply and unit of fire allowances, Marriott certainly learned nothing

he did not already know. His letter was undoubtedly prompted by a

desire to "get something on paper" which would establish an operational

planning base and at the same time set headquarters thinking about the

assignment of responsibilities. The responsibility for protective items,

despite the USAFFE assurance, remained divided between CWS and

Quartermaster, but the SWPA responsibility for storage and issue of

chemical grenades was transferred from Ordnance to CWS in September. Chemical and incendiary bombs remained an Ordnance responsibility, but the CWS was newly charged with inspection and

servicing of the munitions.62 If Marriott had indeed sought a transfer

of responsibility for all chemical items to CWS supply authority, he

learned, as the following events demonstrated, to regret it, because he

found that the CWS had acquired so much responsibility as to make

handling the forward supply job a huge burden.

Supply Procedures and Their Application

Just two days before the transfer of responsibility from Ordnance

to CWS, ALAMO Force prescribed supply procedures for combat troops.

Each special staff section was assigned to prepare requirements and to

oversee and record distribution of the items in its province. The

USASOS requisition procedure was followed in that units would

requisition directly on base commanders while approval channels were

through the army staff section.63 Marriott was launched into a hectic

period of dealing with loading and unloading, storage, maintenance,

and combat replacement of the small quantities of the comparatively

few chemical items which were so easily misplaced, misappropriated,

and misspent among the vast quantities of material moving over the

vast distances of the Pacific.

Probably as much at Marriott's behest as for his own use, Copthorne

attempted, also in September 1943, to obtain the latest logistics tables,

TBA's, and TOE's from the CCWS.64 This information was not imme62

 Ltr, CG USAFFE to CG's Sixth Army, Fifth Air Force, and USASOS, 8 Sep 43, sub: Allocation of

Ordnance and Cml Warfare Functions (USAFFE ECW 321.011), with 1st Ind, CG Sixth Army to

Distr, 22 Sep 43 (Sixth Army AG 322-W), in Sixth Army 400 Sups (General). 63

 CG ALAMO Force to Distr, 6 Sep 43, sub: SOP for the Sup and Resup of Outlying Forces. Sixth

Army 400.311—Req-Proc and Sup. 64

 Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CCWS, 25 Sep 43, sub: Logistic Planning Tables, CWS. USAFFE FECW

400.301.
260 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

diately forthcoming, but McKinney did get USAFFE unit of fire data

which he sent to Marriott and subordinate chemical officers on 4 October, and Marriott promptly issued an ALAMO Force version.65

 But

he still lacked information on grenades. A month later he wrote to

McKinney that it was embarrassing not to know the particulars on

these items for which he was responsible. Declaring that someone must

have the information, he briefly ordered, "Shell out."

 66

Preparations for the forthcoming Arawe-Cape Gloucester-Saidor

offensive were more important than obtaining a set of logistical data.

Organizations were about to move out from Australia. McKinney, at

a conference in Copthorne's office (Copthorne had now returned from

USAFFE to USASOS) apparently charged that not enough was being

done for the combat forces. He particularly urged that division chemical officers be given advance information on their supply status.67

Copthorne's men, who were older hands at fighting the battle of Pacific

transportation, must have appeared un-co-operative since there was

little they could do that had not already been done. USASOS elements had only limited ability to provide transportation and no official

power to assess tactical supply preparations. Movement and allotment

priorities must come from Sixth Army, and, since supply was strictly

interpreted as a command function in SWPA, only Sixth Army could

furnish supply status data to combat organizations. Furthermore,

USASOS chemical officers never knew when materiel would move. It

was their legitimate practice to ship maintenance with outgoing units

so that it might be withdrawn to stock forward bases. There it would

be available to supply the same units or others in critical need. The

point was that conditions of movement and storage in SWPA were so

poor that the area command could not afford to permit combat organizations to attempt to carry along all their supplies into an assault.

The only result would be wastage, and wastage as high as 90 percent

of protective items had already been experienced in assaults.68

Sixth Army was not long in seeing the point. On 12 October 1943,

Marriott notified the Chemical Officer, Advanced Echelon, USASOS,

65

 (1) Ltr, ACmlO Sixth Army to CmlO ALAMO Force et at., 4 Oct 43, sub: Cml Warfare Unit of

Fire Table. Sixth Army 400.314 Estimated Rqmts. (2) Memo, CmlO ALAMO Force, 13 Oct 43, sub:

Approved Unit of Fire Table for Cml Warfare Ammunition. OCmlO Sixth Army—Memos from

Forward Echelon. 66

 Memo, Marriott for McKinney, 14 Nov 43. Sixth Army AG 300.6 Misc Memos. 67

 Memo, McKinney for Marriott, 3 Oct 43. Sixth Army AG 300.6 Misc Memos. 68

 (1) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II. (2) Grothaus-Brady Rpt.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 261

of his intended distribution of Sixth Army ammunition supplies among

the New Guinea subbases, and he indicated the initial issues that would

be required from each base.69 McKinney's principal task then became

getting the transportation that USASOS could not get. Base section

chemical officers had become adept at locating and using any nook or

cranny not spoken for in any kind of shipping headed for New Guinea,

but supply of the scope required by Sixth Army called for more space

than they could find. McKinney appealed to the Regulating Officer,

GHQ, who was in charge of all SWPA transportation allottments, and

also appealed to Sixth Army general staff members to assist in obtaining

priorities for chemical items.70

Procedures Questioned

Marriott was naturally concerned about having McKinney do a transportation job which he felt should be done automatically in connection

with operational planning. He further objected to being separated

from his own section by 1,200 miles and to doing business with the

USASOS main echelon from the same distance. Copthorne made a

tour of New Guinea bases at this time and talked these points over

with Marriott. Copthorne agreed that Marriott should deal with the

chemical element of Intermediate Section at once and with that of

Advanced Section as soon as that section was set up to handle his

requests. Copthorne emphasized, both while in New Guinea and in a

letter upon his return, that under the circumstances planning must

come from Marriott and that only Marriott was in a position to clear

information to the combat elements on the one hand and to the

USASOS base elements on the other. He forcefully pointed out that

the base elements could be prepared to meet demands upon them only

if they knew the complete supply plan—how much material had been

issued, how much was to be issued and maintained, and who was authorized to receive supplies. During his trip Copthorne discovered

that one base chemical officer had reissued ammunition TBA to a

division since he did not know that the division had already received it.

Another division refused to relinquish an overage of flame thrower fuel

69

 Ltr, CmlO ALAMO Force to CmlO Adv Echelon USASOS, 12 Oct 43, sub: Stockage of CWS Class

V Items. Sixth Army 475 Weapons for Jungle Warfare. 70

 (1) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II. (2) Memo, Cml Sec for ACofS G-4

through ACofS G-3 Sixth Army, 12 Nov 43, no sub. Sixth Army 400 Sups (General). (3) Memo,

McKinney for Marriott, 14 Nov 43. Sixth Army AG 300.6 Misc Memos.
262 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

because it feared future unavailability. At least part of this fear was

justified, but if every organization was not supplied on the same basis,

the supply system would soon fail. Copthorne had neither the authority

nor the channels to correct these situations. Marriott chided Copthorne

for ordering base chemical officers to suspend issue in some cases, but

Copthorne could do no less in trying to prevent misapportionment of

resources.71

Except for the instances of maladjustment in issue and lack of

knowledge by the base chemical officers of specific resupply requirements for ammunition, the base supply status met minimum requirements (30 days' for Sixth Army's 180,000 strength) at the time of

Copthorne's visit. The only items deficient were the 11⁄2 -quart decontaminating apparatus (19.9 days) and the M15 white phosphorus grenade, of which there were none.72

 The WP grenade deficiency was

not a local failure; there were no stocks in any theater. When WP

grenades did become available SWPA got them first, and a supply of

these was in the forward bases by 15 December.73 The Oro Bay base

was below 30 days' Class II supply in October and just above 30 days

in November, but, presumably at Marriott's direction, the Port

Moresby base compensated with 67 days in October and 76 days in

November.74 The only supply complaint noted in the period was one

from the 24th Infantry Division pointing out a shortage of SWPAmodified training masks, but again this was not a local failure. The

10th Chemical Maintenance Company was awaiting the arrival of new

canisters from the United States in order to begin waterproofing.75

During the combat operations a shortage of hydrogen cylinders for

flame throwers developed, but this too was a problem which was not

solved locally for some time since there was no regular channel of

supply for commercial gases.76

71

 (1) Memo, Marriott for McKinney, 27 Oct 43, no sub. CCmlO Sixth Army Memos from Forward Echelon. (2) Memo, Marriott for McKinney, 1 Nov 43, no sub. (3) Personal Ltr, Copthorne

to Marriott, 13 Nov 43. (4) Memo, Marriott for McKinney, 21 Nov 43, no sub. All in Sixth Army

AG 300.6 Misc Memos. 72

 Memo, CmlO Intermediate Sec USASOS, for G-4 Intermediate Sec, 24 Nov 43. USASOS Intermediate Sec 400.314 in Sixth Army 400.314 Estimated Rqmts. 73

 Memo, ACmlO Intermediate Sec USASOS for G-4 Intermediate Sec USASOS, 17 Dec 43, no sub.

Intermediate Sec 400.314 in Sixth Army 400.314 Estimated Rqmts. 74

 Ibid.

75

 Ltr, CmlO Sixth Army to CmlO 24th Div, 23 Nov 43, sub: Training Masks, Waterproofed for

24th Infantry Div. Sixth Army Cml Warfare 470.72 in Sixth Army 470.72, Gas Masks No. 4. 76

 Memo, ACmlO Intermediate Sec USASOS for G-4 Intermediate Sec USASOS, 17 Dec 43, no sub.

Intermediate Sec 400.314 in Sixth Army 400.314 Estimated Rqmts.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 263

Tactical Procedures Set

By the end of the first week in December there was little more that

Marriott and McKinney could do. Fighting in the Pacific was savage

and intense but usually brief, so that once forces were committed in a

campaign there was practically no hope of getting even resupply from

distant bases or from the United States unless it was already on the way.

Sixth Army Chemical Section planning turned to supplying training

munitions for the next break in combat, and support of the combat

forces consisted of juggling supplies at the forward bases to permit

maximum availability.77

Marriott took the occasion to write to chemical officers at subordinate

echelons asking that statements of requirements for future operations

come early and in full detail. The only way to avoid the last-minute

hustle which had just been experienced was to plan far enough ahead

so that CWS claims on shipping and storage could be entered months

in advance. Marriott realized that the supply element of Copthorne's

office should not be placed in the position of having to outguess the

combat elements in order to place requisitions on the United States

in time to receive any material.78

As new campaigns began in early 1944, it became obvious that it

was no longer possible to start from scratch. In order to keep supplies

moving, the Sixth Army Chemical Section had to know what had been

expended and what was on hand. Marriott and McKinney experienced

considerable difficulty in obtaining expenditure and status reports from

task forces in widely scattered locations. This failure was particularly

frustrating since, at the expense of much effort, they had secured

service detachments or at least junior officers to accompany those task

forces without chemical sections. The primary duty of these detachments was flame thrower service, but the officers were also charged

77

 (1) Memo, Cml Sec ALAMO Force for CmlO Advance Base A, 7 Dec 43, no sub. Sixth Army

300.6 Memos (ALAMO Supply Point No. 1). (2) Ltr, CmlO ALAMO Force to CmlO Advance Base B,

1 Dec 43, sub: Routing of Requisitions. Sixth Army 400.311 Requisitions. (3) Ltr, CmlO ALAMO

Force to CWSO BACKHANDER Task Force, 2 Dec 43, sub: Routing of Requisitions. Sixth Army

400.311 Requisitions. (4) Memo, Marriott for Riegelman, CmlO I Corps, 13 Dec 43, no sub. Sixth

Army AG 300.6 Memos—I Corps. (5) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CmlO ADSOS, 30 Dec 43, sub: Shipment of Sups by ALAMO Force. Sixth Army AG 300.6 Memos—ADSOS.

78

 (1) Memo, Marriott for Lt Col K. W. Haas, CmlO 1st Cavalry Div, 30 Nov 43. (2) Memo,

Marriott for Riegelman, 30 Nov 43. Both in Sixth Army AG 300.6 Memos.
264 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

with handling supply. It was finally necessary to secure a command

letter to get some of the reports.79

By the end of February 1944 Marriott was thoroughly disgusted

with the detailed supply operation which had been the lot of the Sixth

Army Chemical Section. He wrote to Copthorne that he had come to

the conclusion that "we were sweeping water up hill."

 80

 Considering

the small quantity of chemical supply, he believed that Ordnance would

feel no additional strain on handling chemical ammunition, and he

felt that Ordnance would not need a separate system as did the CWS.

He wanted more time to devote to tactical policy and gas warfare

protection and he felt he could get the time only by disposing of a

part of his supply burden.81

There was some justice in Marriott's comments. The quantity of

chemical supply was very small, but perhaps precisely for that reason,

chemical materials tended to be lost when handled by another service.

But Marriott was not to be relieved of his supply burden; if anything,

it increased. USASOS did offer some help. The Distribution Division,

USASOS, had been created in January specifically to handle Sixth

Army's most vexing problems—transportation and distribution policy.

The veteran CWS supply manager, Maj. Arthur H. Williams, Jr.,

moved into the position of Chemical Officer, Distribution Division.

The Distribution Division operated as a field element of USASOS and

it moved forward ahead of the main echelons.82 The USASOS commander, Maj. Gen. John L. Frink, also redefined the duties of USASOS

Advance and Intermediate Sections. Effective 1 March 1944, Advance

Section became a transportation and handling agency and Intermediate

Section took over the command of all forward bases and the supervision

of supply policy.83 Since the Distribution Division soon moved into

Intermediate Section, the Sixth Army Chemical Section at last had

79

 (1) Ltr, ACmlO ALAMO Force to CmlO US Forces APO 321, 21 Jan 44, sub: CWS Resup

MICHAELMAS. Sixth Army 471.6 Grenades. (2) Memo, McKinney for CmlO ALAMO Base 2, 21 Jan

44, no sub. Sixth Army 400 Sup. (3) Ltr, ACmlO ALAMO Force to CCmlO USASOS, 25 Jan 44,

sub: Ammunition Status Rpts. Sixth Army 471 Ammunition. (4) Memo, Col Marriott for Col R. N.

Gay, CmlO ADSOS, 31 Jan 44, sub: CWS Units. Sixth Army AG 300.6 Memos, (5) Ltr, CG

ALAMO Force to CG Dir Task Force, 2 Feb 44, sub: Cml Ammunition Rpts. Sixth AG 471W in Sixth

Army 470.71 Ammunition. 80

 Personal Ltr, Marriott to Copthorne, 26 Feb 44. Sixth Army 472.4—4.2 inch Cml Mortar. 81

 Ibid.

82

 History of Distr Div USASOS. OCMH MS. 83

 Ltr, CG USASOS to CG's ADSOS and Intermediate Sec, 25 Feb 44, sub: Functions and Responsibilities of ADSOS and Intermediate Sec. Sixth Army 323.31 Development of Bases.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 265

USASOS officers with considerable resources close at hand. Still, the

Sixth Army Chemical Section devoted much of its time to supply and

service.

Marriott issued a new unit of fire table on 1 March because he was

still responsible for tactical requirements and planning.84 Also, now

that some support problems were handled by USASOS, the forward

area problems increased. The inexperienced, young junior officers with

the task forces lacked the knowledge to handle supply, and Marriott's

office was frequently called upon to give detailed instructions at the

regimental combat team level. In many cases Marriott sent out the

officers of his own section to inspect or to clear up a field supply

problem.85

The introduction of chemical mortar battalions to the Pacific and

the increased use of the flame thrower also added to supply duties.

Every task force chemical section whether of divisional size or smaller

was now more than ever engaged in combat loading and unloading, in

collecting supplies on beachheads, and in furnishing support, such as

flame thrower fuel mixing, in forward areas. These elements all reported expenditures and special requirements and problems. In each

case the Sixth Army Chemical Section had a function of planning,

reviewing, or directing operations.86

By the middle of 1944 replacement factors had been increased, supply

was more plentiful, and items received were in better shape. The first

block-loaded ships were then being prepared in San Francisco, and the

Sixth Army Chemical Section took advantage of this means to resupply

ammunition. Block-loaded ships were those vessels with loads specially

designed to support a task force with a balanced variety of supplies.

The materiel was loaded so that discharge could be effected easily and

expeditiously, and loads were so marked that accounting and reporting

problems were greatly reduced. Each block-loaded ship came into a

USASOS base and waited there to be called forward for the support

84

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Distr, 1 Mar 44, sub: Unit of Fire Table for Cml Warfare Ammunition.

Sixth Army AG 471 W. 85

 (1) Memo, SupO Sixth Army Cml Sec for CmlO ALAMO Force, 24 Mar 44, no sub. (2) Memo,

CmlO ALAMO Sup Point No. 1 for CmlO ALAMO Force. (3) Memo, Marriott for Riegelman, 11 Apr

44. (4) Memo, CmlO ALAMO Sup Point No. 1 for CmlO ALAMO Force, 3 May 44. All in Sixth

Army AG 300.6 Memos. (5) Ltr, CmlO ALAMO Force to CO Det 93d Cml Composite Co, 8 Mar 44,

sub: Maintenance Factors. Sixth Army 470.72 Protective Equip. 86

 (1) CmlO 41st Inf Div, n.d., Rpt, Cml Phase and Sec Hist Red of HORLICKS [Biak] Opn.

Sixth Army 350.05 Biak.
266 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

of an appropriate task force. The block-loaded procedure facilitated

supply on Leyte.87

Colonel Marriott was invalided home in July 1944, so that he did

not see the effect of the block-loaded ships upon his supply operation.

By the time of his departure the pattern of supply was well set, and

although there were problems, such as the inability of USASOS to

move bases forward fast enough when combat reached the southern

Philippines and a critical supply shortage late in 1944, there was no

essential change in the chemical tactical supply operation until the end

of the war.88

Chemical officers in the Southwest Pacific faced the most difficult

supply task experienced by the CWS during World War II. The hardships faced by chemical officers in other theaters—lack of supply information, immensely complicated requirements, requisitioning, and review systems, shortage of critical items, and the early poor condition

of equipment—were all compounded by distance, tropical conditions,

and lack of channels and facilities in SWPA. As a result SWPA chemical officers developed a series of expedients which were at times unusual

and often ingenious. By employing these expedients they did build up

area reserves and they did provide the combat forces with both materiel

and service. It does seem possible in retrospect that their task, which

was never an easy one because of the unpredictable and almost overwhelming difficulties of tropical warfare, might have been somewhat

more simply and more expeditiously handled had logistical planning

received more emphasis both in the theater and in the War Department.

The Theater Supply System, Central Pacific

Supply in the Emergency Period

The CWS Hawaiian Department in December 1941 stocked more

chemical items than any other overseas element of the Army.89 Major

87

 (1) Memo, Cml Sec Sixth Army for Mollen, 30 Jun 44, no sub. In Sixth Army 400 Supplies.

(2) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II. 88

 (1) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II. (1) Ltr, CmlO Base K to Distr, 4 Dec

44, sub: Critical Items CWS Class II and IV. Base K KCWS 400.301 in Sixth Army 401.1 Critical

Items. (3) Ltr, CmlO Base K to CmlO Subbase K and Cml SupO Base K, 5 Dec 44, sub: Issue of Cml

Warfare Equip and Sups. Sixth Army 400 Supplies. 89

 Unless otherwise noted, this and the following sections are based on the History of the CWS in the

Middle Pacific.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 267

McMillin, Chemical Officer, Hawaiian Chemical Depot, was prepared

to issue 60,000 service gas masks when, less than an hour after the

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began, Colonel Unmacht, department

chemical officer, ordered distribution. The departmental CWS also

stocked about 90 tons of bleach, no tons of chemicals for impregnating

permeable protective clothing, and nearly 25,000 gallons of noncorrosive decontaminating agent. Several thousand hand decontaminating

apparatus and a completely inadequate supply of personal protective

ointment completed the defensive stock.90

The CWS stored some ammunition, smoke agents, and toxic agents,

about eleven tons of FS smoke, 3,000 HC smoke pots, and nearly 500

tons of bulk toxics almost evenly divided between persistent and nonpersistent gases. The departmental ordnance officers stored some toxic

and smoke-filled ammunition. The departmental CWS carefully

hoarded 32 4.2-inch chemical mortars, aware that the whole Army

had only 44.91Since Unmacht's first responsibility was to insure gas warfare protection and a defensive potential for troops, as noted above, he at

once directed that impregnating and bleach production operations start,

and he also set out to procure cans to be filled as chemical land mines.

On 10 December 1941 he cabled the Chief, CWS, for funds to procure

materials and to operate and to convert plants. The theater CWS

assumed that the War Department would immediately ship TBA

equipment for the known troop strength in the Hawaiian Department,

but in case such material should not be en route, Unmacht on 17 December cabled for 60,000 suits of protective clothing, 25 tons of impregnite, nearly 200,000 tubes each of shoe impregnite and protective

ointment, and training masks, dust respirators, gasproof curtains, and

chemical mortar shell. The request was amended on the following day

to include more mortar shell, bleach, children's masks, and respirators

for babies.

By the end of December most of the protective equipment on hand,

including all but about 5,000 service masks and 5,000 training masks,

had been issued to troops, and issues to civilians began. The War

Department emergency shipments including training masks for civilians began to arrive in January. Within ten days 15,673 masks had been

90

 Weekly Rpt for the CofS, CWS Munitions on Hand as of 12 Dec 41, OC CWS, dated 20 Dec 41.

CWS 319.1/2249. 91

 Ibid.
268 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

issued to civilians, and by 1 March 1942 393,680 of the eventual

425,699 had been distributed. Local workers added nearly 38,000

"bunny" hoods, substitutes for nonavailable children's masks, to the

total.

Chemical Supply Reserve

The first department report on supply status to the War Department G-4 in October 1942 revealed no serious supply problem except

the lack of service personnel. The depot was severely handicapped in

the operation of 3 subdepots on Oahu, 3 in outlying islands, and 5

production plants. In Unmacht's opinion the one chemical depot company activated in the theater in March and the one decontamination

company which arrived in June were already overburdened. Theater

stock was not up to the prescribed 75-day reserve level, but the San

Francisco port was keeping the theater informed on the progress of

requisitioned shipments, and automatic supply on less important items

was steadily building toward the stockage goal. There is little sense of

urgency in the report, probably because the department was enjoying

a lull between the emergency period and the combat period.

The March 1943 report does reflect a sense of urgency. Requisitioning responsibility had been transferred from the depot to the departmental chemical office because supply planning for CENPAC combat

forces was now in prospect. The failure to maintain authorized stock

levels had become serious because large-scale issues of TBA equipment

contemplated would deplete area reserves. The departmental CWS

had run into the problem of requisitions edited in the United States,

a problem which plagued all theater chemical officers. The port had

supplied in the requested quantity only two items of a 19-item requisition placed in November 1942; fourteen items were disapproved without statement of cause. Even more serious in the view of departmental

chemical officers was the fact that training ammunition supplies were

running out in a period of intensive training.

The CWS in Hawaii could report no improvement in June, but in

September 1943 the theater reported that relief had been received.

The War Department authorized for the Central Pacific Area a 60-day

operating level in addition to the 75-day reserve level, and the port

authorized an additional "pipeline" factor. The "pipeline" factor allowed the Hawaiian Department to requisition additional supplies to
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 269

maintain levels during order and shipping time. TBA issues for combat

forces, of which the first was then mounting, could then be handled

without difficulty.

On 1 July 1944 the Chemical Office, Central Pacific Base Command

(CPBC), assumed the logistics functions except for broad policy and

long-range planning which remained the province of Unmacht's chemical office. This transfer placed stock level and TBA issue problems in

CPBC hands. It also gave the Chemical Office, CPBC, supervision of

the combat supply and resupply system which had been inaugurated

for the earliest theater operation against the enemy in the Gilbert

Islands in November 1943.

Toxic Supply

Another reserve problem was that of toxic supply. As the first gas

warfare plan indicated, the 500 tons of toxic on hand at the time of

the Pearl Harbor attack would have been sufficient, taking into account

the retaliation then possible. As strength grew and weapons and aircraft became available, the CWS in CENPAC realized that 500 tons

represented hardly a token amount for retaliation even under the

assumption that retaliation would take place on one of the small

Pacific islands. The CWS consequently persuaded Army and Army

Air Forces commands to requisition toxics. Some were received and

stored by Ordnance with CWS maintaining the responsibility for inspecting munitions in storage. Between July and November of 1944

the peak stock of 498.5 short tons of bulk lewisite was on hand as well

as the peak stockage of 1,126.5 tons of toxics that went into bombs.

Other peak stockages for bulk mustard, artillery shell, and chemical

mortar shell were attained in the first half of 1945.

CWS officers judged the 100-pound mustard-filled bomb as the

most important munition for retaliation. The peak stock on this item,

attained in July 1944, was 1 5,244 bombs with 541.2 tons of toxic filling.

This supply was token only. If, for example, this entire supply had

been used on Iwo Jima, which had an area of seven and one-half square

miles, it would only have contaminated a little more than half, or four

and one-half square miles.92 Considering the vapor effect of mustard

and the fact that the entire island would not have been regarded as a

target, the stock would have been sufficient for one contamination. In

92

 These computations were made using the standard World War II manuals.
270 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the opinion of most chemical officers one contamination would have

been enough to end all enemy resistance on the island. The question

of resupply for other objectives would then arise. According to

Generals Porter and Waitt an actual initiation of gas warfare would

have given the CWS sufficient priorities to effect resupply, by air if

necessary, from the west coast.93

From the point of view of supply on hand the CWS in CENPAC

was only prepared to make an initial gas warfare strike. But, since

CENPAC had better lines of communication to the United States than

most overseas areas, gas warfare could have been sustained.

Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Central Pacific

Tactical Supply Policy

The essence of the combat supply and resupply lay in the nature of

Central Pacific combat. The Joint Chiefs of Staff scheduled area forces

to take a number of small and fiercely defended islands and atolls lying

across the expanse of the Pacific. Early supply base development in

most of these objectives was out of the question—they were too small

and too far away from main bases, or even if they were large enough

for base development the distance between them was so great that it

was impossible to establish a string of forward bases in the SWPA

pattern. Each ground and sea combat operation had to be complete

in itself. The assigned combat force took the objective as rapidly as

possible and withdrew leaving a small or, in the case of Marshalls and

Marianas, a large garrison to clean up and prepare the objective for

such use as could be made of it. Any resupply was destined for the

garrison only. These island garrisons sometimes built large bases but

they usually served the air forces rather than ground combat forces.

The U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific formed seven provisional

garrison battalions before a single objective was taken. Each supply

plan was made on the assumption, which proved correct, that the

ordinary requisition or allotment procedures used in other theaters

would not work. All supply for the combat forces must be at sea

before the forces arrived at their objective, and garrison force supply

had to be in the area as soon as garrison forces could receive it. In this

93

 (1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 271

circumstance, supply could hardly be a function of the combat command. Logistic plans for each operation were a joint product of

combat, garrison force, and theater planners. Tight logistical control

was essential. Consequently, supply plans were originated by the

combat staffs working with the technical service staffs. These preliminary plans were approved and co-ordinated at general staff echelons

and forwarded to the Commander in Chief, POA, for the strategic,

tactical, and logistical last word. The tight control came from the

management of transportation by the Commander in Chief, POA.

Every inch of transport space had to be allocated by strict priorities

since shipping was short, since all essentials had to be carried, and since

an amphibious force operating at such distances from a base had to be

of an easily manageable size.

The First Test—The Gilberts Operation

In the Gilberts operation assaulting troops carried full initial allowances plus 30 days' essential maintenance and five units of fire computed

according to War Department replacement factors.94 An additional

30 days' maintenance accompanied garrison force troops. Then additional shipments were set up to give the garrison forces a 30-day operating level and a 60-day reserve by D-day plus 60 days. The CWS

computations were involved because each of these levels had to be

computed on the basis of troop strength expected to be at the objective

when supplies arrived. Since strength would decline rapidly with the

withdrawal of combat forces once the objective was taken, a descending

schedule of strength was drawn up.

All CWS supplies for the Gilberts operation were loaded in Hawaii.

Shipments totaled 93 measurement tons (40 cubic feet per ton), most

of it for the Marine Corps assault forces. There were no serious CWS

supply problems, but there were a number of lessons for the future.

Assaulting forces wanted more flame throwers and more smoke in

forthcoming operations although the CWS made a special allowance

of smoke pots for the Gilberts.

Assault troops on the Gilberts used the power driven and 3-gallon

decontaminating apparatus to spray sodium arsenite on the dead since

it was impossible to provide mortuary services in the assault. The

94

 For an account of the Gilberts operation, see: Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the

Gilberts and Marshalls, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955).
272 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

chemical aided in control of disease-bearing insects and the arresting

of nauseous odors.95 An extra allowance of the apparatus was indicated.

The Gilberts operation also pointed up some handling problems.

Combat troops found flame thrower fuel mixing and repair difficult,

partly because 55-gallon drums of fuel were too heavy to handle, and

partly because repair parts could not be adequately distributed and

used during tactical operations. The Navy and the marines requested

the installation of racks on landing craft so that smoke pots could be

carried in a ready position for immediate firing. The Army's 27th

Division chemical officers indicated that chemical supplies were insufficiently waterproofed.

Supply System Refinement

The USAFICPA CWS took these problems from the Gilberts into

account in planning the Marshall Islands invasion for January, February, and March of 1944. Flame fuel was provided in 5-gallon cans.

Waterproofing was improved and allowances for smoke and flame

munitions and for the decontaminating apparatus were raised. Even

the basic supply system underwent refinement. USAFICPA set up

block loads to be shipped directly from the United States to the

Marshalls. The CWS shared in the theater system revision by computing a block-load on the basis of 20 days' supply for 1,000 men.

Since War Department factors were usually stated on a 30-day basis

and were often not computed in a per-man requirement, CWS

USAFICPA was forced to convert War Department figures into perman-per-day requirements according to theater experience in order

to determine the more convenient 20-day block. Chemical officers

worked up shipment blocks which would provide 90 days' supply for

the garrison forces on D-day plus 90 days in the Marshalls.

In the actual Marshalls operation, the tactical commander held

resupply offshore until he could determine that it could be landed

without clogging the beaches. The only CWS supply problem arising

in the Marshalls was that so many portable flame throwers were provided that not all could be used. The allowance per division for subsequent operations was cut from 192 to 141 weapons. The physical condition and handling of supplies otherwise met demands, demonstrating

that the CWS had learned to operate its share of the theater supply

95

 Stauffer, Operations in the War Against Japan, pp. 252-55.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 273

system. For example, the CWS supplied only end-item replacements

to the combat echelons since it was apparent that spare parts could

not be handled and used until the garrison forces were set up. Waterproofed packaging and palletized loads assembled by the Hawaiian

Chemical Depot and the combat troops themselves before the operation

proved to answer other equipment and handling needs. Although space

could not be provided for chemical service troops to handle supply, the

sanitation problem was so great that the excess decontaminating apparatus were provided and manned by troops of the 29th Chemical

Decontamination Company under the supervision of a medical officer.

The theater and CWS supply system was substantially complete at

the end of the Marshalls operation. In subsequent operations, the only

major refinement was a differentiation between assault and garrison

resupply. The practice previous to the Marianas operation in June was

to provide resupply on a per-man basis without regard to whether the

men supplied were in combat or garrison echelons. POA experience

made it clear, however, that combat troops would not be in any area

long enough to need resupply on some items, such as gas mask repair

kits and gasproof curtains, even in the event of gas warfare. The

garrison forces who collected and reconditioned equipment would be

in greater need of reconditioning supplies and base development supplies. The CWS USAFICPA accordingly determined assault and garrison resupply blocks on the basis of probable need and scheduled

shipment of these blocks so that assault forces would handle only

essential resupply.

The Final Test—Okinawa

The great test of the Central Pacific supply system came with

invasion of Okinawa in April 1945. Tenth Army was organized in

Hawaii in preparation for the Ryukyus Campaign of which the Okinawa invasion was a part, and the Tenth Army Chemical Section, then

under Col. Thomas A. Doxey and later under Col. John H. Harper,

set to work with the theater (now U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean

Areas—USAFPOA) and CPBC Chemical Sections. CWS supply

troubles both in providing basic equipment and in resupply were intensified because units and organizations scheduled for the operation

were mounting in places varying from the west coast of the United

States to the recently captured Palaus and some were still committed
274 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

in other operations. The CWS planners prepared supply plans which

could be rapidly adjusted to new situations. They provided this flexibility by planning for "type" units and organizations rather than

for specific named units and organizations, according to earlier

practice. The theater command arranged that requisitions for "type"

unit supplies could be placed on the San Francisco port. The port then

forwarded supplies to holding and reconsignment points to await

theater designation of receiving organizations. The theater further

directed the assemblage of an emergency reserve stock in the Marianas

to be used in event the "type" supplies fell short of filling basic requirements for the designated specific unit. The CWS logisticians, on the

basis of their own experience, estimated shortages for organizations

which were known but which could not be consulted because they

were still committed to combat. The logisticians computed resupply

blocks according to the theater system as usual.

The chemical service manpower requirement was greater than the

theater had ever experienced. There were not enough service units

available in the theater, and repeated pleas to the United States resulted

in the scheduling of two chemical service units on redeployment from

the European theater and one unit from the United States. But these

units could not arrive before the operation was well under way, so

Unmacht activated two service companies and a provisional chemical

detachment in Hawaii. He also secured the assignment of a quartermaster service company to chemical work pending the arrival of other

units in the target area.96

Assault on Okinawa's Hagushi beaches began on Easter Sunday

morning, 1 April 1945. Contrary to expectations, no significant resistance was encountered, and a much larger area was taken than had

been originally planned in the first three days. As far as the CWS was

concerned, the easy advance immediately posed the problem of collecting chemical equipment dropped on the beachhead by incoming troops.

Initially, division personnel established beach dumps. On L-day plus

three, XXIV Corps took over the operation of the dumps, and the

4342d Quartermaster Service Company which had been assigned to

the CWS arrived with the 1st Provisional POA Chemical Detachment

(later the 411th). Elements of the service company and the detach96

 (1) Cml unit files, 147th and 148th Cml General Serv Cos and 231st Cml Depot Co. (2) Ltr,

CG Tenth Army to CG Island Comd, 20 Jan 45, sub: Plan for CWS Sup. Tenth Army AG 475 Cml.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 275

ment were attached to division chemical sections to assist in dump

operation. On 10 April 1945 Island Command, the garrison force for

Okinawa, whose chemical officer was Lt. Col. Emory A. Lewis, took

over the supervision of the dumps and service personnel.97 Island Command Chemical Section and its service units had the mission of receiving, storing, and issuing CWS materiel to service echelons and to Tenth

Army ASP's and dumps.

The most serious problem of the CWS which developed during the

Okinawa operation was the shortage of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition.

The 4.2-inch chemical mortar was increasingly acknowledged by commanders and troops alike as a valuable weapon. Because of extensive

use, especially in such operations as the Battle of the Bulge,' 4.2 ammunition was in short supply in the zone of interior and in all theaters of

operations when the Okinawa operation was being formulated. The

USAFPOA CWS had planned on having ammunition resupply for

Okinawa arrive in the block-loaded ships from the west coast, but

because of the shortage, ammunition had to be collected in the Hawaiian

Islands and the Marianas and then forwarded to Okinawa. In all, approximately 50,000 rounds of heavy M4 shell were forwarded and

another 20,000 rounds of M3 shell were acquired from the Navy at

the target. The M4 shell weighed 3 5 pounds as opposed to 2 5 pounds

for the M3 HE and WP shell. The heavier shell decreased mortar range

by 1,000 yards and caused greater strain and wear upon the guns.

Breakdowns occurred and a greater replacement of parts than had

been anticipated was required. It was a case, however, of using the

M4 shell or having none. Fortunately, the end-item and spare parts

replacement allowances were sufficient to cover necessary repairs, but

this was not the end of the shell problem.98

The mortar units in combat soon discovered that fuzes had corroded

in many of the shells, causing premature bursts. Tenth Army called

for replacement fuzes. The USAFPOA responded to eleven emergency

requests by air, shipping 46,502 pounds of fuzes from the United States

and from Hawaii.

97

 (1) Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: The Last

Battle, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp. 68-76. (2) Action

Rpt, XXIV Corps, Ryukyus Campaign, 1 Apr 45, dated 30 Jun 45, Incl to Barker to CCWS, 28 Sep 45,

Rpt, Visit to Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands. CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts. 98

 1st Lt John A. Landt, CO B 88th Cml Mortar Bn to CG 1st Marine Div, Opnl Rpt of Action

With the 1st Marine Div on Okinawa, 30 June 45.
276 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Neither ammunition nor fuze problems could be attributed to the

USAFPOA chemical supply system, for shells and fuzes were not available in the United States according to plan. It is possible that the

requirements stated for ammunition resupply were low, but since there

was a shell shortage this point could not be proved. On the whole, the

system worked well for the Okinawa operation.

The administration of all CWS activities in the Central Pacific

proved to be more effectively and economically handled than in other

theaters because circumstances in the area permitted greater centralization of procedures and more command support of the CWS. The

CWS supply system in the area also reflected this administrative efficiency. In supply the CWS did not have the independence in the

Central Pacific that it had in other theaters—the service had to work

through the well-oiled Army-Navy machine. But under Central

Pacific conditions this lack of independence was not a significant

drawback, for it brought the benefits of working as a part of, rather

than in spite of, the theater organization. Independence in other

theaters, on the other hand, brought the frustrating problems of trying

to operate a very small supply service in a company of giants. In final

analysis the CWS supply job was accomplished both through the

independent CWS supply systems evolved in other theaters and through

the centralized system of the Central Pacific and neither type of

system proved to be perfect. But the Central Pacific system which

provided logistical control from the top, although it was less responsive

to the desires of field commanders, offered the CWS the best and most

consistent employment of theater resources and talents.
CHAPTER VII

Chemical Warfare Service Units

The Chemical Warfare Service provided service units for all theaters

of operations during World War II. In so doing, it had in mind primarily its responsibility for providing the United States Armed Forces

with the capability of defending themselves against gas attack and

retaliating effectively in kind. The task of maintaining readiness for

gas warfare in the field embraced a number of contributory missions.

Chemical warfare materiel, whether defensive, like gas masks and protective clothing, or offensive, like toxic agents and the munitions to

deliver them, had to be provided through depots and dumps; this

required units trained to handle, repair, and issue such items. Teams

trained and equipped for the systematic decontamination of service

area installations after gas attack were essential in a gas warfare

situation. Defensive measures also included the availability of freshly

processed permeable protective clothing for troops called on to execute

missions in a contaminated area; hence the need for processing teams

and equipment to insure an adequate supply of impregnated uniforms.

Gas warfare intelligence was dependent on the presence in theaters of

technicians and laboratories capable of determining the nature of gas

attacks and assessing the significance of captured materiel. Finally,

the prosecution of a gas offensive demanded close maintenance and

supply support for the combat elements responsible, whether they were

mortar battalions or Air Forces bombers.

The needs of gas warfare readiness, therefore, set the pattern for

prewar CWS planning for service units. The prescribed standard for

a wartime situation, in which the existence or at least the imminence

of gas warfare was taken for granted, called for the assignment of a

chemical depot company, decontamination company, laboratory company, impregnating company (as the processing company was then

called), and maintenance company to each field army, with additional
278 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

base depot chemical facilities under the control of the army communications zone.1

 By the time the United States entered the war, the

CWS had come, perforce, to adjust its standards to meet the needs of

gas warfare preparedness in situations which, for the time being, at

least, did not include gas. The normal basis of assigning maintenance

companies remained the field army, but the other units were henceforth to be assigned to theaters of operation, either for retention under

direct theater control or for further assignment to agencies within the

theater. CWS air service units were provided for assignment to theater

air forces. In addition to these specialized companies, the CWS began

at the outset of the war to provide composite companies capable of

undertaking all of these service missions for field armies through a

system of specialized teams of platoon size or less.

Somewhat more than a year after Pearl Harbor, with large-scale land

action against the enemy taking place as yet only in the Southwest

Pacific and North Africa, a CWS report showed a total of 19 service

units of all types sent to all overseas destinations, including some in

the Western Hemisphere. Of these 19, the Southwest Pacific had

received a composite company, 2 decontamination companies, a laboratory, a maintenance, and a depot company. A depot company, a

maintenance company, and a decontamination platoon had gone to

North Africa. Only 2 processing companies had left the zone of

interior; both were in the United Kingdom.2 By the middle of 1944,

with major Allied offensive campaigns in process all over the world,

the current troop basis included an authorization for 128 CWS ground

service units, about 2 5 more than the total number included in theater

CWS plans, so far as these had been formulated. There were 102

service units actually in the theaters as of 31 July 1944, compared with

the 101 deemed necessary by the Chief, CWS, for a nongas situation.

A total of 64 additional CWS units were on duty overseas with the

Army Air Forces. In general, the supply of CWS service units was

adequate for "insurance" purposes, considering the fact that gas had

not been used by the enemy and that there was no particular indication

of a sudden change in that situation. Had there been a sudden shift to

gas warfare conditions, service unit requirements would have been

seriously above existing theater capabilities in some instances, most

1

 FM 3-15, Sup and Field Serv, 17 Feb 41. 2

 USCWC, Rpt on Gas Warfare Preparedness, U.S. Army, 2 Feb 43.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 279

notably in the need for processing companies. The European and

Mediterranean theaters alone would have required a total of two dozen

additional processing companies to meet an all-out resort to gas warfare

by Germany.3

But with gas warfare no more than a grim possibility, it was not

surprising that theaters were willing to spread their chemical service

units somewhat thin. It was inevitable, also, that those service missions

which were not directly dependent on the presence or threat of gas

should come to the fore. Two of these, both unanticipated in prewar

planning, came to be of particular importance: the provision of close

maintenance and supply support for 4.2-inch mortars firing HE and

the storing, mixing, filling, and loading of airborne incendiary munitions. The hard-won acceptance of the flame thrower as an effective

weapon in the Pacific theaters brought with it the need for flame

thrower maintenance and fuel supply. The demonstrated value of

CWS screening smokes led to the requirement for stockage of smoke

mixtures and maintenance of smoke generators. The immediate relevance of all these services to the needs of combat gave them prominence,

but the basic gas warfare readiness mission was not forgotten. Depot

companies continued to see to it that a gas mask in good working

order was available for every soldier, processing companies maintained

theater reserve stocks of impregnated clothing, and laboratory companies worked steadily at the tasks of evaluating enemy chemical warfare materiel and providing technical surveillance for American stocks.

As one of the consequences of serving as insurance against the outbreak of gas warfare CWS service units acquired an assortment of

responsibilities of immediate urgency, but often unrelated to their basic

missions. The decontamination companies, which never functioned as

such overseas, were particularly prone to this sort of development.

Their equipment, which lent itself to the carrying and dispensing of

water, became the basis for their utilization as shower units, among

other things. Similarly, the impregnating plants of the processing

companies bore enough of a functional relationship to laundry machinery to enable companies to supplement quartermaster laundry

service when their own processing mission was in abeyance. Sometimes

it was CWS training rather than organic equipment that seemed to

point the way to new missions for service units. More than one chemical

3

 USCWC, Rpt of Readiness for Cml Warfare as of 1 Jul 44.
280 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

service company found itself, after a brief training period, operating

smoke lines, and in two cases CWS service troops joined mortar units.

Laboratory companies turned to developing or testing field expedients

ranging from camouflage dye to flame thrower tanks and found time

to perform an impressive variety of miscellaneous technical chores for

other services.

The development of new missions, even more than the ordinary

exigencies of active theaters, frequently demanded a high degree of

flexibility in CWS service units. More often than not, flexibility in

response was obtained at the expense of the proper organization of the

unit and consequently with a good deal of difficulty. For the most part,

each type of company was set up to operate as a unit under the control

of the company commander. Each subordinate element was organized,

manned, and equipped for a specific range of specialized tasks contributory to the main task. Ad hoc rearrangement of manpower and

equipment to meet new demands resulted in administrative problems

which often interfered with the unit's effectiveness. The requirement

for flexibility was met to some degree by the formation of the composite companies, with their cellular structure designed to permit each

cell to operate independently of the others. The experience of the

Pacific theaters was to lead to greater reliance on these all-purpose

organizations and to demands for still more flexibility of structure and

employment. In this respect this experience pointed the way toward

postwar doctrine.

The Chemical Laboratory Company

Seven Chemical Warfare Service laboratory companies saw service

overseas between 1941 and 1945. The essential mission of the laboratory

company in the field was to analyze and evaluate enemy chemical

materiel and to maintain technical surveillance over CWS supplies.

These functions made it a major source of technical intelligence, both

as to enemy capabilities for chemical warfare and the storage life of

CWS ammunition and protective items. At first conceived of as a more

or less mobile entity capable of following an army in the field, it was

in practice treated as a semifixed installation of a theater communications zone, a status better suited to its more than ten tons of laboratory

equipment.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 281

However bulky its equipment, a laboratory company was not a

large unit. Its prescribed strength at the time the United States entered

World War II was only 86—14 officers and 72 enlisted men—and the

tendency of subsequent years was toward a still more restricted personnel roster. Indeed, the first laboratory company to go overseas,

en route at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, was authorized no

more than 78 officers and men in its movement orders.4 By the end

of 1943, in accordance with a TOE of the preceding July, laboratory

companies were reorganized to consist of 8 officers and 51 enlisted men.

The enlisted strength was set at 50 the following year.5 The original

laboratory company was organized rather loosely into headquarters,

chemical, and physical sections, the headquarters organization including, in addition to the major commanding, an officer in charge of

chemical intelligence. The 1943 reorganization, while cutting the

strength of the company, doubled the number of its subdivisions.

There were, henceforth, in addition to the headquarters unit, sections

designated organic, analytical, chemical engineering, toxicology, and

intelligence. This setup was designed for a more effective division of

labor in handling the work facing a company in the field.

Once established and operating, usually in or near a major urban

center, the chemical laboratory company acted as a research center

and technical clearinghouse for the entire theater. In performance of

its principal mission, it examined captured enemy chemical munitions

and protective items, studied the behavior of American chemical

materiel under theater conditions, surveyed items in storage for possible

deterioration, collected chemical intelligence from captured enemy

personnel and documents, and made regular reports of its various findings and activities to OCCWS. It was from the reports of the 45th

Chemical Laboratory Company in the spring of 1945 that the Chemical

Warfare Service first learned of the existence and structure of the

new German nerve gases, the so-called G agents. When not engaged

in its principal chemical mission, the laboratory served the theater as

a general-purpose research establishment, carrying out whatever projects its equipment and technical personnel were capable of handling.

4

 History of the 42d Cml Lab Co. 5

 TOE 3-97, 6 Jul 43 and 3 Jun 44.
282 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

These tasks ranged from tests of Army Air Forces engine coolants to

manufacture of a camouflage skin dye for jungle troops.6

The oldest of the laboratory companies was typical in its overseas

experience. The 41st Chemical Laboratory had begun its existence as

the 1st Chemical Company (Laboratory) in 1940 in the days before

the laboratories were assigned the forties for numerical designation.

From its ranks while in training at Edgewood Arsenal had come cadres

for the second and third laboratories to be activated. In the spring

of 1943 the company took ship for North Africa, arriving at Mers el

Kébir near Oran early in May, as the Tunisia Campaign was approaching its end. Assigned at first to Fifth Army, the company spent several

months at Marina, Algeria, just over the border from Fifth Army's

Moroccan headquarters, working under the supervision of the Fifth's

Chemical Officer, Colonel Barker. When Fifth Army embarked for

Italy in September 1943, the 41st was retained in Africa at the disposal

of theater headquarters in Algiers. After several weeks in a staging

area near Oran, under assignment to Mediterranean Base Section, the

company moved to more permanent quarters at Sidi Ferruch, near

Algiers, and took up its role as a theater laboratory assigned to AFHQ.

It remained there until after the fall of Rome.7

The principal business of the 41st in North Africa turned out to

be surveillance of CWS materiel held in storage. When stored items

developed unexpected reactions to aging in depots the laboratory was

called upon for an explanation. An instance of this occurred in the

spring of 1944 when the chemical officer of Seventh Army asked for

an investigation of certain phosgene detector tubes, which had turned

black. The 41st determined that the tubes, taken from the detector

kit, M9, contained a highly unstable indicator chemical which had

decomposed, and recommended replacement with tubes of a newer

type.8 For the most part, though, surveillance consisted of sending

inspection teams to the depots. A typical team might consist of an

officer and two enlisted men.9 A surveillance program drawn up by

the 41st in the spring of 1944 and scheduled for accomplishment before

6

 (1) Ltr, ACCWS Field Opns to Theater CmlO's, 10 Jun 44, sub: Rpts of Lab Units. (2) 42d

Cml Lab Co, 29 Oct 43, Rpt, Problems Submitted to the 42d Cml Lab Co. Both in CWS 314.7 Unit

Files. 7

 History of the 4151 Cml Lab Co. 8

 Tech Rpt 30, 4151 Cml Lab Co, 8 Jun 44 . 9

 Memo, CmlO Fifth Army for CmlO AFHQ, 14 Jun 43, no sub. CWS MTOUSA 400.112 Analyses,

Tests, Trials, Equivalents, Experiments.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 283

the end of the year included thirty-four item examinations, ranging

from bulk mustard to antidim sticks (for preventing mist on gas mask

eyepieces).10

In July 1944 a few weeks after the fall of Rome, the 41st moved

from its Algerian home to new quarters in the Italian capital. There

it shared with a British Expeditionary Forces outfit, the South African

23d Antigas Laboratory, the facilities of the Italian Military Chemical

Institute. The surveillance responsibilities continued, including now

a program for the test firing of mustard-filled mortar shells, instituted

for the purpose of checking the ballistic properties of chemical ammunition kept in storage over long periods.11

 Intelligence reports increased

as more chemical equipment from enemy depots in Italy fell into

American hands. Captured items included not only German materiel

but also defensive chemical warfare items from countries occupied or

controlled by the Germans. The 41st had the opportunity of studying

and reporting on individual gas mask canisters, decontamination kits,

and the like from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia in addition to German and Italian materiel. Nevertheless, as

might have been expected in a less extensive theater, the intelligence

functions of the 41st did not match in magnitude those of some of

the laboratory companies in western Europe and the Pacific.12

In contrast to the comparatively routine transfer overseas of the

41st Laboratory, the process of getting the 3d Chemical Field Laboratory Company (later redesignated the 42d Chemical Laboratory

Company) to a theater of operations was far from typical. The company came into being at Edgewood, Md., on 15 May 1941 with a

complement of Reserve officers and a cadre drawn largely from the

1st Laboratory. After filling out its ranks with newly inducted selectees, the unit spent the summer and early fall in basic and specialized

training. Rather suddenly, at the end of October 1941, it was ordered

to the west coast to prepare for shipment overseas. On 21 November,

the company embarked and sailed westward, the first CWS unit of

the war to be dispatched overseas. The destination was given simply

as PLUM, but it was not reached on schedule. PLUM was the Philippines,

10

 Ltr, CO 41st Cml Lab Co to CCmlO NATOUSA, 24 May 44, sub: Surveillance Program for U.S.

Cml Warfare Materiel. CWS MTOUSA 400.112 Analyses, Tests, Trials, Equivalents, Experiments. 11

 Interv, Hist Off with Maj James B. Goodson, CO 41st Cml Lab Co, 14 Aug 59. 12

 CWS Technical Notes for Laboratories (a series of monthly compilations of major laboratory field

reports and other items of interest, published monthly from July 1944 until the end of the war by

CWS Technical Command).
284 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and the troops were still at sea when the Japanese turned the Philippines into a theater of war. The convoy received orders diverting it

to Australia and, as indicated above, docked at Brisbane on 22

December. The company was not to reach the Philippines for three

and a half years.

In Brisbane the company settled down to work as a unit of Base

Section 3, U.S. Army Forces in Australia. By the end of February

the laboratory equipment had been set up in permanent quarters and

organized technical work was under way. At first a substantial number

of laboratory personnel were detailed for general duty with base section

headquarters, but these demands slackened after the first few months

and by midyear the company was able to pursue its mission at approximately full strength. It had become in the interim the 42d Chemical

Laboratory Company by redesignation effective April 12, 1942, and

had moved to new quarters in buildings formerly occupied by a

Brisbane hospital.13

According to one of its commanding officers, the 42d possessed

neither a clearly defined mission nor an effective training for field

operations when it arrived in Australia.14 This did not prevent the

company from serving as an all-purpose technical unit from the very

outset. Before it had finished unpacking its equipment, it had received

and responded to Air Corps queries on oxygen and rust inhibiters,

Australian Army problems with Kieselguhr water filters, and base

section demands for an ant exterminator. Not long thereafter it was

at work on practical studies of petroleum bomb fillings. In September

1942, the 42d took on a major assignment for the Quartermaster

Corps—turning 100,000 pounds of fatigue uniforms into jungle green

camouflage suits. A formula and procedure for dyeing the uniforms

were developed in the course of a day by a 5 -man team, and the dyeing

itself was carried out under the supervision of company personnel.

By midsummer the 42d, in addition to its routine analytical work,

was engaged in several CWS research problems of a more generalized

nature, including studies of nitrogen mustard, low temperature studies

of mustard for high altitude spraying, and tests of the action of mustard

and impregnite on fabric. Colonel Copthorne, chief chemical officer

of USASOS, regarded this type of work as a necessary supplement to

13

 History of the 42d Cml Lab Co. 14

 Interv, Hist Off with Maj Hugh W. Hillis, CO 42d Cml Lab Co (1942-44), 25 Sep 45.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 285

the technical information he was receiving from the United States, so

much so that he recommended to General Porter that field laboratory

companies be declared branches of the Technical Division of Edgewood

Arsenal. This attempt to formalize a research and development mission

for the laboratory companies was met with a prompt and firm reminder

that the mission of field laboratories was properly confined to testing

friendly and captured chemical warfare equipment and identifying

enemy toxic agents, should any be used. While this reminder may

have served to set the record straight, it had little direct application

to the multitude of miscellaneous technical problems which the 42d

by now regarded as its responsibilities. In a subsequent letter General

Porter admitted as much; pure research aside, he said, the work of the

42d could not be precisely circumscribed so as to deprive SWPA of

the services it was performing.15

Fortified with official approval, the 42d Chemical Laboratory Company increasingly continued to handle the theater's laboratory needs.

A report prepared in October 1943, summarizing the problems outside

the normal mission area which the 42d had undertaken since its arrival,

listed over fifty tasks performed for the other technical services and

the Air Corps. Some of these were of considerable magnitude. A skin

dye for camouflage purposes was developed to meet a Quartermaster

Corps requirement, and enough of it was manufactured to fill 150,000

2-ounce bottles. For Ordnance a considerable amount of analysis of

defective items was done: propellant cartridges, mortar charges, and

AN-M103 bomb fuzes. In addition, captured enemy explosives were

analyzed, both for Ordnance and for the Navy. Counter Intelligence

Corps received help from the laboratory in checking on several instances

of suspected sabotage. Industrial analyses of many types were made—

steels for the Air Corps, sand for the Engineers, soldering flux for

Ordnance, soaps for Quartermaster. Even the Chemical Warfare

Service benefited from the 42d's nonmission labors, if the manufacture

of some 3,500 detonation tubes of assorted toxic agents for troop

training be so considered.16

The miscellaneous field work of the 42d, varied as it was, did not

15

 (1) Ltr, CCmlO Hq USASOS SWPA to CCWS, no sub, 17 Aug 42. (2) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO

Hq USASOS SWPA, no sub, 17 Sep 42. (3) Ltr, CCmlO HQ USASOS SWPA to CCWS, no sub,

24 Nov 42. (4) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO Hq USASOS SWPA, no sub, 14 Jan 43. All in CWS 314.7

Pers Files. 16

 52d Cml Lab Co, 29 Oct 43, Rpt, Problems Submitted to the 42d Cml Lab Co. CWS 314.7 Unit

Files.
286 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

prevent the company from carrying out the primary responsibilities

of its mission. Its regular technical intelligence reports on captured

Japanese chemical equipment began to appear as soon as its laboratory

was set up, and continued thereafter, to the number of nearly fifty,

during the two and a half years that elapsed before it prepared to leave

Australia. Surveillance of theater stocks of CWS equipment was a

continuing responsibility.17

Toward the end of September 1944 the 42d was instructed to prepare

itself and its equipment for transfer forward. Much of the regular

laboratory work was accordingly discontinued, and the company spent

the following months largely on garrison duty while waiting for movement orders. For a time it conducted advanced chemistry courses for

its own personnel. Finally, in June 1945, with the reconquest of the

Philippines nearly complete, the 42d embarked for Luzon. It arrived

in Manila on 21 June. By the time the laboratory was set up once

again, the war had come to an end.18

Just as the experience of the 42d demonstrated a tendency for the

work of the laboratory in an isolated theater to broaden, the 43d Chemical Laboratory, in a somewhat comparable situation, exemplified to

a striking degree the ability of such a unit to extend its usefulness.

In this case the functions of the unit were construed by the theater,

at least in practice, to include a measure of research and development.

Despite the official CWS policy which regarded development as the

prerogative of the Technical Division at Edgewood, the 43d, in the

course of its work on "field expedients," tended to make itself a

development unit in the field.

The 43d Chemical Laboratory Company, activated at Edgewood

Arsenal on 26 August 1942,19 was ordered to Hawaii in December of

1943. Upon its arrival it was assigned to theater headquarters (Central

Pacific Area) and stationed at Schofield Barracks, where the theater

chemical officer, Colonel Unmacht, had laboratory facilities (manned

by 8th Chemical Depot Company personnel) already in operation.

The 43d took over the existing laboratory functions, added its own

equipment, and set to work.20 The immediate tasks were predominantly

within the intelligence portion of the mission—the study and descrip17

 History of the 42d Cml Lab Co. 18

 Ibid.

19

 Hq CWS Edgewood Arsenal GO 17, 26 Aug 42. 20

 History of Cml Sec AFMIDPAC, I, an. I-b, 8-11.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 287

tion of captured Japanese chemical equipment. Nearly one hundred

technical reports on captured materiel were to be made by the 43d in

the succeeding twenty months. Surveillance of theater chemical stocks

led the company into a detailed study of deterioration in impregnated

clothing. But before long larger problems began to absorb its attention.

At the time the 43d arrived in the Pacific theater, Army, Navy,

and Marine Corps personnel were becoming increasingly anxious to

acquire armored vehicles equipped with flame throwers for use against

Japanese island emplacements. Rather than wait for Edgewood Arsenal,

entangled in conflicting priorities and requirements, to provide the

weapons, the theater went ahead on its own.21 The work was in its

early stages when the 43d appeared on the scene. In February 1944,

after tests of the Anglo-Canadian Ronson flame thrower mounted on

a Bren gun carrier had proved inconclusive, the project was placed in

the hands of Colonel Unmacht, who assigned it to the 43d. A task

force from the company succeeded in redesigning the Ronson to make

it a practical main armament weapon for the M3 tank. Mounted in a

shroud simulating a howitzer, the Ronson flame thrower turned the

quondam M3 into the Satan. By mid-May 1944, the task force had

supervised the completion, test firing, and combat readying of twentyfour Satans for use by the marines in the Marianas.22

From flame throwers the 43d moved on to an extensive consideration

of flame thrower fuels. The development of thickened fuel—gasoline

thickened to jelly by the addition of certain aluminum soaps—had

proved to be essential to the effectiveness of flame throwers in the field.

Napalm had been adopted as a standard thickener during the war, but

in practice it appeared that field-thickened fuels tended to vary in

characteristics and performance. Flame thrower fuels mixed in Hawaii

and sent to the front lines, for example, were sometimes found to have

had their viscosity more or less reduced by absorbed water, and any substantial change in viscosity involved an unacceptable lack of certainty

of flame thrower range and performance. Assigned this problem, the

43d determined that drying gasoline before mixing, and adding finely

divided activated silica gel to the mix, would produce a fuel stabilized

enough to be packaged, stored, and shipped successfully. This work,

accompanied by a series of papers on the theory and manufacture of

stabilized fuel, was completed in the summer of 1945, whereupon the

21

 See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, ch. VII. See also, below, ch. XIV. 22

 History of Cml Sec AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-c, 2-6.
288 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

company proceeded to supervise the building of an activating plant

at the chemical warfare depot and the mixing of 150,000 gallons of

fuel, using silica gel salvaged from packaged motors, in which it had

been enclosed as a desiccant.23

The research and development activity which these accomplishments

characterized went beyond the specific mission of the laboratory, but

was typical of the manner in which Colonel Unmacht as head of the

theater CWS encouraged independent action to meet theater needs.

It played a major role in winning for the 43d a Meritorious Service

Unit Award at the conclusion of hostilities.24

The Chemical Maintenance Company

Twenty maintenance companies were supplied to the ground forces

overseas by the CWS before the end of the war. Though designed to

serve field armies, they could also be, and frequently were, assigned

to the Communications Zone. Their mission was third and fourth

echelon maintenance of all CWS equipment and materiel, which could

and did include everything from salvaging discarded gas masks to

manufacturing parts for the 4.2-inch mortar. While maintenance

companies were intended to function as salvage and repair centers near

CWS Class II and IV depots, in practice some maintenance units assigned to field armies found it necessary to send their men forward

beyond the army service area for close support of the front, in order

to keep mortars and smoke generators in combat condition.

T/O 3-47, 1 April 1942, set the authorized strength of a maintenance

company at 4 officers and 119 enlisted men, organized into a headquarters outfit, a 3-unit repair platoon, and a salvage platoon. The

repair platoon was supposed to include all of the company's skilled

mechanics not assigned directly to headquarters, leaving the salvage

platoon to operate principally with laborers. A revised organization

table published in November 1944 showed a maintenance company

pared down to 93 officers and men. The two platoons were redesignated

gas mask repair and equipment repair, respectively, and nearly all the

enlisted personnel authorized were classified according to specific skills.

23

 (1) Ibid., pp. 35-37. (2) 43d Cml Lab Co Tech Rpts 81, 10 Jul 45, and 90, 22 Aug 45. CWS

314.7, Unit Files. 24

 Ltr, CO 14th Cml Sv Bn to CG CPBC, 22 Aug 45, sub: Recommendation for the Meritorious

Service Unit Award. CWS 314.7 Unit Files.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 289

The platoons were organized into functional sections.25 Nevertheless,

experience in the field throughout the war showed that under the

pressure of combat requirements the work of maintenance companies

often left prescribed organizational patterns behind.

One of the more noteworthy service records of the war was that

of the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company, which acquired eight

battle credits in the course of assignments ranging from Tunisia

through Sicily and Italy to central Europe. Activated 1 May 1942 at

Fort Custer, Mich., the 12th went overseas in March 1943, landing

at Casablanca on the 18th. It was assigned to Atlantic Base Section

and its first job was running CWS supply dumps. In the last month

of the Tunisia Campaign it operated in conjunction with advanced

supply depots at Bone and Ouled Rahmoun in eastern Algeria and at

Tabarka in Tunisia. It began to undertake more orthodox maintenance work—salvage and repair—in the days after the Tunisia Campaign ended.26

An advance detachment of the 12th, assigned to 3d Division, landed

in Sicily on 10 July 1943 at the outset of the invasion, in order to get

a CWS supply dump functioning as soon as possible near the combat

area. The rest of the company was in Sicily by the middle of July.

During the month or so of fighting that followed before Sicily was

won, the company provided the first example of close maintenance

support of combat units by the CWS. The 12th's maintenance and

repair officer, Lieutenant Notorangelo, took a 10-man detachment

into the combat zone near Sant'Agata in the second week of August

to carry out on-the-spot maintenance for the 4.2-inch mortars of the

2d Chemical Battalion. The battalion was supporting the infantry

advance along the north coast of Sicily on the left wing of Seventh

Army. The maintenance detachment later proceeded south to Randazzo, on the right wing, to perform the same service for the 3d

Chemical Battalion, after getting needed parts from a rear depot. At

the same time, Lieutenant Notorangelo utilized this experience to

provide the Chemical Officer, Seventh Army, with the first detailed

figures available on attrition rates of mortar parts in combat.27

After a period of salvage and repair work in Palermo, marked by a

concerted effort to get the required number of serviceable gas masks 25

 TOE 3-47, 22 Nov 44. 26

 Hist of the 12th Cml Maint Co. 27

 Draft Ltr, CO 12th Cml Maint Co to CG NATOUSA, 17 Nov 43, sub: Recommendation for

Award. CWS 314.7 Unit Files.
290 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ready for the coming campaign, the 12th followed the Allied forces

into Italy early in November 1943. Setting up shop at the Fontanello

Caves near Naples, the company reverted to its role of depot operator,

storing incoming CWS supplies for Peninsular Base Section. It found

time to re-establish its gas mask repair line, though, with the aid of

some Italian civilian labor. In December the 12th responded to an

emergency report from Fifth Army that mortar propellant charges

were too damp to give accurate ranging. Discontinuing its gas mask

line, the company set to work improvising a powder ring dryer and a

shell reconditioning line and repacking the propellant rings in waterproofed cases. Two weeks after the operation began an explosion and

fire wrecked the shops, though fortunately there were no major casualties. The 12th put its equipment together again at another depot near

Casandrino, devised a more reliable powder ring dryer, and had its

lines operating again within a week.28

Meanwhile, a mortar repair detachment had settled at Capua to

service the mortar battalions attached to Fifth Army. In April 1944,

the remainder of the company also moved to Capua. There they found

the weapons repair section, commanded by Lieutenant Notorangelo,

established at the erstwhile Royal Italian Arsenal, which the retreating

Germans had wrecked before moving out. The section had joined other

Fifth Army service troops in getting the installation in working order

by salvaging usable machinery and acquiring additional equipment,

Italian, American, or German, wherever possible. In effect, the 12th

now had an arsenal of its own. It was fortunate that this was so, for

the demands for smoke generator and mortar spare parts rose sharply

under the pressure of the bitter Italian campaign of 1943—44. When

the depots could not supply enough parts, the 12th's Capua arsenal

manufactured them. The Weapons Repair Section, making full use

of the skills of a large working force of Italian civilian machinists,

inaugurated this new mission with the fabrication of mortar cup forks.

A number of other items were soon added to the list as the rugged

terrain, long usage, and high ranges took their toll of the overworked

4.2-inch mortars. Shock absorber slides proved especially vulnerable.

To keep the mortars in working condition, the 12th cast and machined

new slides of bronze—after liberating the bronze from Italian naval

28

 (1) History of the 12th Cml Maint Co. (2) 12th Cml Maint Co, Activities During the Italian

Campaign, 1943-44. CWS 314.7 Unit Files.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 291

CAPUA ARSENAL, AS THE GERMANS LEFT IT. Within thirty days it was producing

mortar parts for the Fifth Army.

vessels in Naples harbor—which subsequently proved to be more durable than the brass slides they replaced. Tube caps and steel recoil

springs were also prominent in the mortar parts output of the Capua

arsenal. For the mechanical smoke generators and the power-driven

decontaminating apparatus the weapons repairmen fabricated sprocket

gears of several types, along with nuts, couplings, and the like.

The usual repair functions of a maintenance company were carried

on side by side with the manufacture of spare parts. The Capua arsenal,

as reconstructed by the 12th, contained a cradle rack for repairing

400-gallon tanks from power-driven decontaminating apparatus, a

welding shop, a repair shop for vehicular components and chemical

handling trucks, and sections for work on Esso and Besler mechanical

smoke generators. The 12th's gas mask repair sections occupied a

shop of its own, with two production lines for the disassembly, repair,

and reassembly of damaged or salvaged masks. A group of Italian
292 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

soldiers assisted in the operation of this facility, which turned out

over 150,000 reconditioned masks in less than five months.

In September 1944, the 12th was assigned to Seventh Army, then

engaged in pushing up the Rhone Valley from the coast of southern

France to join the armies in the European Theater of Operations. By the

end of the month, the company was in Dijon, serving as a unit of

Continental Advance Section. A weapons repair group, designated as

Detachment A, moved on to Épinal to resume close support of the

mortar battalions. More work was done to improve the Capua shock

absorber slide, including the addition of small amounts of phosphoric

tin to the original bronze alloy. Mortar cup forks continued to be

made. Portable flame throwers were reconditioned. By December the

rest of the company reached Épinal, whereupon a reorganized and

somewhat smaller Detachment A moved out to the front. It took up

quarters near the command post of the 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion,

then supporting Third Division on the Colmar front. Here, within

range of German artillery, the detachment kept the battalion's mortars

in operating condition. The detachment remained with the battalion

throughout the winter, and in March 1945, moving forward across

the Saar with the front, became the first portion of the 12th to enter

Germany. Before the end of the month it was across the Rhine. By

the time the Germans surrendered, it had accompanied combat troops

deep into southern Bavaria.29

A second close support group, Detachment B, left the main body

of the 12th in mid-March to join the 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion

in Germany. The 87th had begun to take part in the advance across

the Rhineland, and the detachment had to carry out its mission between

rapid movements forward. Once across the Rhine, and before moving

ahead to the 96th Chemical Mortar Battalion, Detachment B performed

a final individual maintenance mission for the 87th on the eve of the

battalion's transfer to First Army. Together with the other forward

elements of Seventh Army it had penetrated Austria before hostilities

ended.30

Chemical maintenance companies were not as extensively utilized

in the Pacific war as they were in Europe. Only two maintenance companies got west of Hawaii, and one of these, the 10th, ended the war

29

 Hist of 12th Cml Maint Co. 30 Ibid.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 293

as a CWS general service company, a type of all-purpose support

organization much favored in the Southwest Pacific Area. Before its

conversion, however, the company had made important contributions

in its original role. The 10th Chemical Maintenance Company, activated 1 July 1940 at Edgewood Arsenal, was sent overseas three months

after Pearl Harbor as part of the forces assigned to rebuild Allied power

in the Southwest Pacific. It reached Australia early in April 1942, and

like the 42d Chemical Laboratory Company joined Base Section 3 in

Brisbane.

As an early arrival in the theater, one of the 10th's original tasks

was to assist the 62d Chemical Depot Company in the operation of

CWS depots in Australia. It was not long before special maintenance

problems resulting from waging war in a tropical environment began

to dominate the scene. A major example was the discouraging failure

in combat of the M1A1 portable flame thrower in the course of the

Papua Campaign. The 10th spent the greater part of 1943 putting

the discredited weapon through an extensive series of tests, in the

course of which all flame throwers in the SWPA were thoroughly overhauled.31

 It became clear that tropical heat and humidity were the

flame thrower's chief enemies. Pinhole corrosion of the nitrogen, hydrogen, and fuel cylinders, occurring in 75 percent of the weapons examined, led to leakage, low pressure, and consequent failure in the

field. Corrosion resulting from moisture attacked other components

as well, and batteries deteriorated readily when exposed to jungle

climate.32

The 10th set to work to clear up as many of these defects as possible.

There was no quick solution for the problem of pinholes in the cylinders. All that could be done was to repair those cylinders which were

not excessively corroded and replace the rest, insofar as supplies permitted. In order to make it possible for troops to spot flame throwers

with defective cylinders before attempting to use them in combat,

pressure gages and adapters to fit all types of commercial pressure

31 (1) Ltr, CmlO USASOS SWPA to CmlO's Base Secs 2, 3, 4, and 7 and CO 10th Cml Maint Co,

16 May 43, sub: Flame Throwers. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower. (2) Ltr, CG USASOS

SWPA to CO 10th Cml Maint Co, 6 Feb 44, sub: Commendation. History of the 10th Cml Maint Co. 32

 (1) Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CmlO USASOS SWPA, 12 Apr 43, sub: Auxiliary Equip for Flame

Throwers. FECW 470.71/6 in CWS SPCVO 470.71 APO 501. (2) 3d Ind, CO 10th Cml Maint Co

to CCmlO USASOS SWPA, 29 Dec 43. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower.
294 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

cylinders were added to the flame thrower service kits.33 The problems

resulting from wet electrical systems were met by waterproofing the

weapon effectively enough to enable it to stand total immersion and

still retain its usefulness. The company's own tests of the results of

its waterproofing project included the firing during rainfall of random

samples of waterproofed weapons after keeping them under water for

about seventeen hours. It was able to report by October of 1943 that,

given adequate pressure in the cylinders, the flame throwers which it

had waterproofed and checked would function as intended regardless

of moisture.34

While the work on flame throwers was of major importance, it was

far from constituting the only large-scale project of the 10th in Australia. Reconditioning of depot stocks was a continuing task. Providing

waterproof seals for gas mask canisters kept the company busy on

more than one occasion. Some 180,000 canisters of one type were

waterproofed in late 1943 and early 1944; the company historian pertnitted himself the remark that the job had become somewhat monotonous after the first hundred thousand. By April 1944, however, the

10th found itself somewhat short of CWS assignments and tending

more and more toward ordinary garrison details as the focus of war

moved northward toward the Philippines. At last the company itself

moved northward, to New Guinea, in August 1944, and shortly thereafter was reorganized. Pressure toward the streamlining of rear area

service units in the theater had been reflected in proposals to replace

the CWS depot, maintenance, and decontamination units with general

service companies capable of meeting all of these requirements as they

arose. Though the European theater commanders had been unimpressed

with the idea, it seemed sufficiently attractive in the special circumstances of the Southwest Pacific to cause it to be adopted in the case

of a few selected units, as soon as an appropriate table of organization

was published. This event occurred in the summer of 1944, and the

10th, just arrived in New Guinea and past the critical period in its

33

 Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CmlO USASOS SWPA, 10 Jun 43, sub: Flame Thrower Testing Equip.

Sixth Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower. 34

 (1) 10th Cml Maint Co, Instrs for Changing the Battery in the Flame Thrower and Rewaterproofing, 28 May 43. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower. (2) Rpt, CO 10th Cml Maint Co

to CCmlO USASOS SWPA, 25 Oct 43, sub: Rpt of Serviceability of Flame Thrower, Portable, M1A1,

Waterproofed. CWS 314.7 Unit Files. (3) Ltr, Maj John J. Shaffer, USAR, to Hist Off, 19 Sep 56.

Major Shaffer, then a captain, commanded the 10th Chemical Maintenance Company for the greater

part of its service in Australia.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 295

maintenance mission, was one of the units to experience the change.

As of 1 November 1944 it was reorganized as the 10th Chemical Warfare General Service Company. The remainder of its war service,

including an additional eight months in New Guinea and the last month

of the war in Luzon, was spent under that name.35

The Chemical Depot Company

Chemical depot companies played a key role in the movement of

CWS materiel in the overseas theaters. The basic mission of these

units, some twenty of which saw overseas service, was to act as CWS

supply centers, either for field armies or for communications zone

commands. This included receiving, storing, and issuing chemical supplies, certain salvage operations, and operating filling lines for certain

chemical munitions. A depot company was a good-sized outfit, with

a total strength of almost 200 men. When in the field, it was not

unusual for a company to resolve itself into a group of detachments

handling a series of assignments simultaneously. A company assigned

to a theater headquarters, on the other hand, was also capable of serving

many needs, ranging from technical training to theater supply.

As organized under TOE 3-67, 28 May 1942, the 184 officers and

men of a depot company constituted a small headquarters unit, an

administration platoon controlling three record, storage, and maintenance sections, and three service platoons for guard and labor functions.

This plan was substantially altered by the next edition of the TOE,

6 October 1943, which shifted administrative functions to an enlarged

headquarters unit, turned the former administrative platoon into a

52-man maintenance organization, and assigned all remaining storage,

surveillance, and handling responsibilities to the service platoons, now

reduced to two. By the end of the following year emphasis was being

placed on the supply and munitions filling missions, with a consequent

conversion to a uniform 3-platoon organization totaling 155 officers

and men.36 Operating under a headquarters unit charged with basic

administration, the three service platoons, each divided into ammunition, toxic gas, and general supply sections, were nonetheless capable

35

 (1) History of the 10th Cml Maint Co. (1) Draft Memo, CCWS to CofS, attn: ACofS G-3,

7 Jan 44, sub: Proposed Cml Warfare General Serv Co. CWS 314.7 Unit Files. (3) TOE 3-1378;

Cml Warfare General Serv Co, 9 Aug 44. 36

 (1) FM 3-65, Cml Depot Co, 1 Dec 44. (2) TOE 3-67, 6 Jan 45.
296 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

of acting independently if the need arose, providing the company commander with three ready-made units for detached service.

The 8th Chemical Depot Company had a notable record as one such

theater supply agency. It was activated at Fort Shafter in March of

1942 for the specific purpose of operating the supply functions of the

Hawaiian Chemical Warfare Depot for the department chemical officer.

These were of considerable magnitude. Under Colonel Unmacht's vigorous leadership, the depot had already completed the substantial task

of obtaining and distributing enough service gas masks to provide

adequate protection to troops in the event of a new Pearl Harbor in

chemical warfare.37 By the time the 8th was activated the depot was

in full swing as the only central distribution agency in the department

for CWS supplies. It maintained subdepots for local troops on the

islands of Hawaii, Kauai, and Maui. In addition to discharging its

supply mission, the depot served as a third and fourth echelon maintenance center, a function performed in 1944-45 by the 10th Chemical

Maintenance Company.38

Along with its other responsibilities, the 8th found itself on activation

with an impregnating plant already in full operation. Colonel Unmacht had had an experimental impregnating plant—one shipped to

Hawaii at some earlier date—put in operating condition shortly before

Pearl Harbor. One of his first acts after the attack was to order the

plant into active operation, in order to provide protective clothing

for the troops then in Hawaii. The plant, designated No. 5, was

manned by men of Company A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion, the

only force then available for the purpose. When Colonel Unmacht

got his depot company activated, it was given the additional duty of

running No. 5 until an impregnating company should arrive. As

Plant No. 5 demonstrated a high degree of mechanical unreliability,

the depot company was generally engaged in emergency repairs. For a

time it took over and operated two small Navy impregnating plants

at Pearl Harbor. By January 1943 a new plant, No. 8, had been

shipped to the Islands, and a new building had been constructed to

house it. The new facilities tended to ease the task of the depot company somewhat, but not until January 1944 was the 8th finally able

to turn this unscheduled responsibility over to a newly arrived unit,

37

 See above, pp. 220, 267. 38

 History of Cml Sec AFMIDPAC, II, an. I-d, 2-23.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 297

the 1 10th Chemical Processing Company, and concentrate on its supply

mission.39

As a supply unit, the 8th was responsible for seeing to it that all

troops sent forward from Hawaii were properly equipped with CWS

materiel. It kept subdepots and forward areas supplied. The unit sometimes found it necessary to handle bulk toxics in operations involving

transfer from damaged containers, or from ton containers to drums.

In the course of these handling operations, three enlisted men of the

8th designed and built a handling cart for more expeditiously moving

150-pound cylinders.40

The 8th assisted the 43d Laboratory Company in manufacturing

the first batches of the stabilized flame thrower fuel (napalm plus

activated silica gel) developed by the latter unit in 1945. In the

summer of that year the Hawaiian Chemical Warfare Depot built its

own unit for the activation of the silica gel. The 8th had this unit

operating at a rate of one ton per day during the last weeks of the war.

Between May and August of 1945 the depot manufactured a total of

226,343 gallons of fuel.41

Of great importance to the theater CWS was the 8th's secondary

mission of training cadres for new units. Among these were supply

detachments activated to help shoulder the burden of CWS depot

management in Hawaii and general service companies destined for

combat support in the Western Pacific. In the last year of the war

the 8th trained and supplied to other units enough officers and enlisted

men to have doubled its own authorized strength.

In contrast to the role of the 8th as a theater headquarters supply

element was that of the 6th Chemical Depot Company, a unit which

operated many installations without ever permanently establishing itself

at any of them. It was a depot company on the move, following

American combat forces from England to Germany by way of North

Africa, Italy, and France.

The 6th was activated at Fort Sam Houston on 25 March 1942.

After a brief training period, the company embarked for an overseas

assignment on the 1st of July and arrived in Scotland on the 12th.

Within a few days the company, the first of its kind to reach the

European theater, was in quarters at two points in southwestern Eng39

 Ibid., V, an. II-k, 1-6. 40

 Ibid., V, an. III-a, 50-51. 41

 Ibid., pp. 104, 107.
298 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

land, under assignment to the newly created Southern Base Section of

the theater Services of Supply. It set to work almost at once, sending

out detachments to establish chemical sections at general depots for

handling Class II and IV CWS supplies, as well as for constructing two

depots for chemical munitions. This procedure of operating several

installations at once through self-sufficient detachments was to be a

consistent pattern in the operation of the 6th throughout its service

overseas.42

The 6th was the CWS unit depot assigned to II Corps in the fall of

1942 for operations in North Africa. It arrived in Oran from England

early in December 1942, and immediately took over a depot previously

established by corps headquarters. As the North African campaign

developed, the 6th began setting up new installations, after the manner

of its English experience. The Oran depot, for Class II and IV supplies, remained company headquarters for the time being, while detachments set up and operated depots eastward along the North African

seaboard as far as the Tunisian border, turning them over in due

course to relieving units. The company used anything available for

storage—garages, factories, sheds—and resorted to open storage when

necessary. For chemical munitions, however, open storage was the

rule, rather than the exception.43

The 6th remained in North Africa during the month-long Sicilian

campaign, but was reassigned to Fifth Army immediately afterwards

in anticipation of the invasion of Italy. Nine of the company's enlisted

men, temporarily attached to the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment,

went ashore at Salerno on D-day, 9 September 1943, with the assault

troops. Operating in two groups, they took charge of identifying,

storing, and issuing CWS materiel brought over the beaches on the

first three days of the invasion. By the 8th of October the 6th was in

Naples.

The 6th spent almost a year in Italy, in the course of which it was

at one time or another responsible for over thirty supply points. It had

general responsibility for all chemical depot needs of Fifth Army.

Company headquarters, originally in the Naples area, was shifted

northward repeatedly, reaching Piombino in northern Tuscany by

midsummer of 1944. In the interval the company supplied two de42

 (1) History of the 6th Cml Depot Co. (2) Ltr, Maj Levin W. Lane to CmlC Hist Off, 28 Mar

50. Major Lane was commanding officer of the 6th, 1943-45. 43

 History of the 6th Cml Depot Co.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 299

tachments for service with the Anzio-Nettuno assault force. The first

of these landed at Nettuno on D-day, 22 January 1944, the second

joined it on 23 January. During the months of bitter fighting that

followed, the beachhead detachment of the 6th, augmented from time

to time, handled 12,000 tons of CWS munitions. In the same period,

Headquarters Detachment was enlarging the scope of its usual duties

by manufacturing some 10,000 Molotov cocktails out of napalm and

glass bottles.44

In July 1944, the 6th was assigned to Seventh Army, in order to

participate for a third time in an invasion—in this case the assault on

the Mediterranean coast of France. Three detachments, attached respectively to the 3rd, 36th, and 45th Divisions, VI Corps, landed with

the initial assault forces on 15 August and carried out the unusual

mission of organizing chemical supply on the beaches. Company headquarters followed two weeks later and moved northward almost at

once to Grenoble, where it set up a depot for Class II and IV CWS

supplies before moving forward again. Meanwhile a detachment had

gotten a base depot at Marseille under way for Continental Base

Command, the supply and service agency of the invasion period. Other

detachments handled CWS supply at successive ammunition supply

points as Seventh Army advanced toward Alsace.45

The 6th remained with Seventh Army through the winter of 1944-

45 (during which the partial withdrawal of American forces in Alsace

to meet the threat of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes

temporarily forced the 6th, like some other forward units, to move

its headquarters back), and advanced with it into Germany in the

spring. In the meantime, it found time to organize and conduct a

training program to convert a French smoke generator company to a

chemical depot unit.46 The end of the war found the company operating several depots in the Seventh Army area of the southern Rhineland. Immediately after the end of hostilities, the 6th set up Rheinau

CWS Depot before preparing to go home.47

41

 (1) Ibid. (2) Lane Ltr, 28 Mar 50.

45

 History of 6th Cml Depot Co.

46

 Ltr, CO 6th Cml Depot Co to CG Seventh Army (Through CmlO Seventh Army), 9 Nov 44,

sub: Rpt on Cml Warfare Depot School . . . CWS 3 14.7 Unit Files.

47

 Hist of the 6th Cml Depot Co.
300 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Chemical Decontamination Company

The chemical decontamination company was a specialized organization designed to counter the threat of crippling gas attacks on rear

area service facilities. While the services of a company were expected

to be available to combat troops under gas attack if the situation permitted, the primary mission was confined to installations in the service

area, on the assumption that combat units should have the capability

to meet a tactical gas situation with their own resources. Deconamination companies were not assigned by any precise formula (the recommended ratio was one company per 100,000 strength) and were intended, while maintaining a headquarters in a service area, to send out

detachments to either service or combat zones at their own discretion.

As organized under TOE 3-217 (1 April 1942), a company included

4 officers and 200 enlisted men, functioning as three 60-man platoons

of three sections apiece, plus company headquarters. The table was

changed on 12 October 1943 to provide for four 33-man platoons,

reducing the total company strength to 170, and making the 10-man

section the smallest operating unit, instead of having a further subdivision into squads, as formerly provided. The basic function of the

section was to operate a 400-gallon power-driven decontaminating

apparatus, a truck-mounted sprayer designed to heat and distribute a

slurry of bleaching powder and water.

The abstention of the belligerents from gas warfare left the decontamination companies without a primary mission to perform. In

consequence, while keeping themselves in readiness for possible future

gas emergencies, the companies sent overseas found themselves assigned

to a variety of tasks. Theater and army chemical officers welcomed

their presence when CWS-trained units were needed for munitions

handling, smoke screening, or depot labor. Other elements of the

armed forces discovered that the power-driven decontaminating apparatus had more than one use; thereafter, decontamination units were

sometimes engaged in giving showers, handling water, and wetting

down dusty roads. Occasionally, decontamination companies were

pressed into service totally unrelated to their training or equipment.

One such unit eventually became part of a G-2 task force in ETO.

The 21st Chemical Decontamination Company was one of the most

active of those whose overseas service lay principally in the CWS

mission area. The 21st, activated at Camp Bowie, Tex., in March 1942,
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 301

began its overseas experience when its 1st Platoon, detached for the

purpose, joined Western Task Force in Casablanca on 18 November

of the same year, ten days after the first assault forces had landed

in North Africa. The task force chemical officer, Colonel Barker, used

the platoon to set up his CWS depot. The platoon had had no specific

training for this mission, but with the administrative aid of a detail

from the task force chemical section it set up a depot nonetheless. By

January 1943 it was able to find the additional time to assist in the

program of CW schooling begun by Colonel Barker.48

In May 1943 the rest of the 21st reached Casablanca. By that time

the company's 1st Platoon had gone forward to Algeria, and the company itself followed within a month. The company and platoon alike

were destined for the Sicily Campaign and accordingly were earmarked

for assignment to Seventh Army.49 They arrived in Sicily during July,

the 1st Platoon going direct to Palermo (which had been occupied on

the 22d), the remainder of the company landing on the south shore.

By August the company had been reunited at Palermo, but only to

split up into detachments stationed along the Sicilian north coast where

they handled CWS supplies. Together with elements of the 63d Chemical Depot Company and the nth Chemical Maintenance Company,

the several platoons of the 21st implemented the CWS supply plan by

setting up and operating a series of ammunition supply points extending

as far east as Campofelice, some thirty miles beyond Palermo.50 The

21st also supervised the operation of the CWS Class II depot in Palermo

until relieved by the 63d Depot Company in October.

The 21st remained in Sicily for about ten months after the conclusion of the Sicily Campaign, under assignment to Island Base Section.

During the period it was kept busy on various CWS tasks under the

supervision of the IBS chemical officer, including such work as gas

mask reconditioning and the maintenance of a smoke line as part of

the defense plan for Palermo harbor.51 By June of 1944 CWS stocks

in Sicily had been closed out, and the 21st went to Italy to prepare for

reassignment to Seventh Army and the campaign in southern France.

The role of the 21st in the Seventh Army's campaign from the

beaches of the Riviera to the heart of Germany was to be that of a

48

 Hist of the 21st Decontamination Co. Seventh Army 322. 49

 Seventh Army Rpt of Opns in Sicilian Campaign, an. H. 50

 Ibid.

51

 History of IBS.
302 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

smoke unit. There was time for only a brief training period before the

company joined the assault forces. In the initial assault, a platoon of

the 21st accompanied each of the three assault divisions, company

headquarters and the remaining platoon being held in reserve.52 The

mission in this instance was to provide smoke cover for supply dumps

on and near the beaches, as needed. On D-day, August 15, groups of

men from the 21st went ashore with the first assault wave carrying

(or towing) smoke pots with them. Smoke lines were set up several

hundred yards inland as soon as possible. Two weeks later the 21st

was moved, in two installments, to Marseille to provide smoke cover

for the port. For its work on the beaches, the company received a

commendation.53

As the campaign advanced northward toward Alsace and Germany,

the 21st continued to function as a smoke generator outfit. Equipped

with smoke pots and M2 mechanical smoke generators, it provided

detachments for smoke coverage throughout the autumn of 1944 for

the Army supply routes. Toward the close of the winter campaign in

Alsace, the company once again found itself in a battle zone when it

provided screening for the troops, American and French, of the XXI

Corps front during the final cleaning up of the Colmar Pocket.54

Though the 21st had become accustomed to its smoke mission by

the spring of 1945, it had reverted to its original role by the end of

the war. As American troops drove across Germany in April and May

of 1945, they seized intact a number of chemical warfare depots. The

task of safeguarding and managing these important and potentially

hazardous acquisitions was an appropriate one for a decontamination

company. Accordingly, a detachment of the 21st took over initial gas

security and munition inventory responsibility at the Wildflecken site

in April. By the time the war ended, the company was in charge of

gas security for the principal German chemical depot at St. Georgen,

deep in Bavaria.55

The overseas experience of the 31st Chemical Decontamination

Company was in decided contrast to that of the 21st. Both gained

52

 Seventh CWS Staff Sec Rpt, T Jan-13 Oct 44. 53

 GO 64, Hq Seventh Army, 24 Feb 45. 54

 CO 21st Cml Decontamination Co to CmlO Seventh Army, 25 Feb 45, Rpts, (1) Opns with XXI

Corps and 75th Infantry Div, (2) Opns with the 3d Inf Div. CWS 314.7 Unit Files. 55

 (1) Memo, CmlO Seventh Army to CO 21st Cml Decontamination Co, 20 Apr 45, no sub. (2)

Memo, Div CmlO 42d Inf Div to CmlO Seventh Army, 14 May 45, sub: Opn of 21st Cml Co (Decontamination). Both in CWS 314.7 Unit Files.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 303

honors for front-line combat. But while the 21st served in direct

support of CWS missions as supply and smoke troops when not fulfilling their original purpose, the secondary missions ultimately acquired

by the 31st turned out to be somewhat farther afield.

The 31st was activated at Camp Bowie, Tex., in July 1942. After

a training period which included some instruction in amphibious operations, it embarked for Great Britain, arriving early in January 1944.

Its assignment was to First Army's 6th Engineer Special Brigade, a

collection of units destined for the assault wave of the Normandy

invasion. With them it underwent further training in invasion tactics

throughout most of the two months immediately preceding the start

of the campaign.

Shortly after noon on D-day a 25-man detachment from the 31st

landed in Normandy with the 149th Engineer Combat Battalion and

joined the battle which had been in progress on OMAHA Beach since

dawn, its primary mission being reconnaissance against the possible

gassing of the landing site by the Germans. By the time the remainder

of the company landed on the following day, seven of the detachment's

personnel, including its commander, 1st Lt. Stanley Boggs, had been

wounded. When the absence of gas warfare had been confirmed, the

company joined other service troops in policing the beach and unloading

ammunition. It was able to move to a bivouac area on 12 June (D plus

6), by which time it was busy with a variety of emergency tasks—

assembling supply dumps, guarding prisoners, and finding new uses

for its big power-driven decontaminating tanks. It employed them to

wet down dust, to haul water, to fight fires, and to provide showers.56

In the last week of July the battle moved out of Normandy, and by

mid-August the Germans were rapidly retreating across France. As

the German policy of abstention from gas warfare continued to be

confirmed by events, the necessity for the retention of decontamination

units by the engineer special brigades declined. On August 20th, the

31st was reassigned, this time to an unexpected destination. It was

detailed to Headquarters, Special Troops, 12th Army Group, to serve

as headquarters troops for a special intelligence force being organized

by the 12th Army Group G-2. This so-called T-Force was designed

to operate as a front-line agency directly behind the advancing combat

troops, where they were to seize enemy documents and round up agents

56

 History of the 31st Cml Decontamination Co.
304 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and collaborators before they escaped.57 The 3 1st turned in all its CWS

unit equipment, including its decontamination tanks, drew in exchange

an additional supply of cargo trucks and jeeps, and departed, for practical purposes no longer a CWS unit, for the first T-Force objective—

Paris. On August 23, it reached the front line at Rambouillet. The

objective was entered on August 25th, in the vanguard of the Allied

troops. The 3 1st, one of the first American service units in the liberated

capital, had T-Force headquarters set up in the Petit Palais before midnight of that day. That action marked the beginning of more than

eight months of constant movement. T-Force headquarters left Paris

for the east on 7 September. Between that date and the German

surrender the following May, the 31st occupied fourteen successive

stations in France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Germany. It had all

the usual headquarters administrative duties to keep it occupied—

operating messes, providing mail and payroll services, supplying the

force with clerks, maintaining a motor pool, and assuring internal

security.

The 31st continued in its new role until T-Force ceased to function

on 6 May 1945, the day before the instrument of surrender was signed

at Reims. The company was en route for Wiesbaden at the time. On

its arrival it joined 12th Army Group's Special Troops and performed

such missions as operating trucks and guarding prisoners of war for

three weeks until it was returned to the United States for redeployment

to the Pacific. It was training for that purpose when the war ended.58

The Chemical Processing Company

The chemical processing company was a basic element in defense

against gas warfare. Its primary mission was to keep available to

theater chemical officers a supply of permeable protective clothing

adequately and recently impregnated with chlorinating compounds so

as to protect the wearer from the effects of vesicant vapor or droplets.

Companies were designed for assignment to theaters for location in the

communications zone, generally near a chemical depot.

A company consisted of a total of 146 men, organized on a 2-platoon

basis. Each platoon was the organizational equivalent of a processing

plant and contained three functional sections for continuous 3-shift

57

 12th Army Group Rpt of Opns, IV, 3-6. 58

 Hist of the 31st Cml Decontamination Co.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 305

operation. Accordingly, the company possessed two impregnating

plants (either the M1 type employing acetylene tetrachloride as a solvent or the M1 water suspension type).59

 The impregnating plants

were semifixed industrial installations of impressive size, not unlike

commercial laundries. An M1 plant, for example, included two 400-

gallon solution tanks, a predryer, two final dryers, and an impregnator,

recognizably related to laundry-type drying and washing machines

respectively, solvent recovery apparatus, a steam generator unit, complete with boiler and oil burner, an electric generator unit, a fuel tank,

a water pump, and such auxiliary items as work tables, tool kits, and

spare parts—the total equipment load approximating fifty tons. It

could be installed only in a building with a floor heavy enough to

support it and large enough to provide adequate work space. In

practice, this meant a building with the equivalent of a 4-inch reinforced concrete floor and about 3,600 square feet of floor space.

Installation required the skills and labor needed to handle heavy

machinery, four or five separate piping systems, and electrical wiring.60

The equipment and techniques involved in the impregnation of clothing

were enough like those of quartermaster laundries to provide the processing companies with ready-made secondary missions—laundering,

dry-cleaning, waterproofing, dyeing, and comparable service functions

—which were to keep many companies profitably occupied during

periods when their primary mission was not in requisition. But less

obvious duties were not wanting. Like other service troops, processing

companies were drawn upon for whatever labors were required at the

time. Depot assignments were not uncommon. Two units, the 113th

and the 120th Chemical Processing Companies, had nearly all their

men detailed for a time to the 87th and 8 1st Chemical Mortar Battalions

respectively to provide additional support for the mortar teams. They

served with the battalions throughout the Normandy and Northern

France Campaigns. Another, the 109th, did construction work with

the engineers. But a due regard for the possible outbreak of gas

warfare and the corresponding requirement in every theater for reserve

supplies of impregnated clothing kept processing companies occupied

with their primary mission fairly often.

The experience of the 105th Chemical Processing Company may be

cited to demonstrate the work of a typical unit. The 105th was ac- 59

 TOE 3-77, 1 Mar 44. 60

 TM 3-270, Clothing Impregnating Plant M1 (Theater of Opns), 4 Feb 44.
306 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

PLANT OF 105TH CHEMICAL PROCESSING COMPANY, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA

tivated in August 1942 at Edgewood Arsenal and trained there and at

Camp Sibert. In mid-May 1943, the company embarked from New

York for Brisbane, Australia, via the Panama Canal. It arrived a

month later, marched out to Camp Doomben, and went to work for

the chemical warfare depot and base section headquarters pending

arrival of its impregnation plants.61

Personnel of .the 105th got their first taste of processing in the field

when the bulk of the company's first platoon went to Sydney to help

the theater provide a reserve of some 70,000 protective uniforms for

its troops. The 62d Chemical Depot Company was in charge of the

effort, which consisted of getting a nonoperating improvised impreg- nating plant in working condition. The detachment spent a week on

the task before the setup, manufactured from standard laundry equip- ment, was ready for its first load. Thenceforth, the unit kept the

plant running at full prescribed rates, some 8,000 pounds of clothing

per 24-hour run. It remained on the job until mid-February 1944,

61

 History of the 105th Cml Processing Co.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 307

when, with the mission virtually complete, it rejoined the rest of the

company.62

The rest of the 105th had been kept busy, meanwhile, on details for

the theater chemical officer. One detachment, for example, went to

Columboola, two hundred miles west of Brisbane, to provide storage

and perform surveillance for 29,000 mustard-filled bombs, a task involving a good deal of decontamination work when leakers were found.

The company's first organic impregnating plant, an M1, arrived in

January 1944, and the men went to work to provide a building for it

at the CWS center near Brisbane. Before the end of March, after

essential piping was finally acquired, the plant was ready for operation,

and the 105th proceeded with its primary mission.

Not long thereafter the 1st Platoon was again detached, this time

for duty at Base A, Milne Bay, New Guinea. At this more forward

base it set up an impregnating plant to help protect the combat forces

clearing the way to the Philippines against possible gas attack. The 2d

Platoon continued operating the company's M1 plant in Brisbane, for

the most part on a 24-hour basis. Its output of protective clothing

continued until the beginning of October 1944, when it was ordered

to cease operations and prepare for movement. For the next few

months, while awaiting movement orders, the 105th kept itself busy

with miscellaneous jobs for the 62d Chemical Service Company and

the local Ordnance service center. At Milne Bay, meanwhile, the company's 1st Detachment, now well behind the new front in Leyte, had

been diverted to laundry and dry-cleaning operations, together with

depot work.63

In mid-June 1945, the 105th finally received its long delayed orders

and moved forward to Luzon. At the same time the 1st Detachment

left Milne Bay and rejoined the company at the CWS training center

near Manila. The training center needed them, but not for processing;

it was in the midst of a hurried construction program to house a CWS

school and garrison. The 105th, well accustomed to construction jobs,

pitched in and was hard at work building facilities when hostilities

ended.

Another processing company in the Southwest Pacific Area, the

103d, though its overseas experience was much like that of the 105th,

62

 (1) Ibid. (2) History of Cml Sec Hq USASOS SWPA. Orgn Files, AFWESPAC, Folder

USASOS History of Cml Warfare School, APO 923, Jul 42-May 44. 63

 History of 105th Cml Processing Co.
308 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

found itself for a time with a new mission. The 103d, which had also

been activated at Edgewood in August 1942, was sent to Hollandia,

New Guinea, in July 1944. There, at a base captured from the

Japanese only three months before, it was to be comparatively close

to combat organizations.

An immediate need of the combat troops was protection against

mite-born scrub typhus. The answer appeared to be impregnation of

uniforms with an insecticide. Accordingly, the 103d, once it had its

two impregnating plants set up, was put to work mite-proofing all

available uniforms with dimethyl phthalate. Not until this task was

complete, in mid-October, did the company turn to its normal processing missions. But by that time theater requirements for protective

clothing were taking second place to more routine needs. The base

quartermaster required assistance in meeting his laundering mission,

so that the 103d began devoting the bulk of its time to laundry. By

December 1944, the company's plants were working full time as laundries for base units and hospitals. These duties, continued for the next

six months at rates in excess of 150,000 pounds of laundry per month,

earned the 103d a Meritorious Service Unit Plaque before it went to

Luzon for miscellaneous service assignments just before the Japanese

surrender.64

The Chemical Service Company

For the greater part of the war the type of unit ultimately designated

as a chemical service company was known as a chemical composite

company.65 The purpose of the composite company was to provide

field organizations of divisional size with a CWS service organization

capable of simultaneously operating supply points, doing third and

fourth echelon maintenance, running a field laboratory and a field

impregnating program, and providing at least a nucleus of trained

men for decontamination. Furthermore, the composite company was

expected to be able to put its entire manpower of over 200 into any

one of these tasks should the situation require. The goal was flexibility:

a versatile unit, not too tightly organized, which could meet CWS

service needs for smaller combat forces or isolated fronts. The war in

the Pacific was emphatically of such a nature, and it was in the Pacific

that most composite companies saw service.

64

 History of the 103d Cml Processing Co. 65

 Composite companies were redesignated service companies in March 1945.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 309

The first organizational scheme for composite companies provided

for specialized sections of considerable bulk, averaging almost forty

men apiece, fairly closely tied in to company headquarters, and presumably meant to remain intact during operations.66

 Within a short

time reports from the Southwest Pacific declared that more flexibility

was needed and that in actual practice existing units were usually split

up into smaller groups. Such detachments usually suffered from the

lack of an appropriate administrative organization and organic equipment. The problem was that the concept of cellular structure had

been modified by too great a dependence on the administrative and

internal support capabilities of the unit as a whole. The cells were

not self-sufficient, and clearly they needed to be. In July 1943 a

new organization plan was devised, making more explicit use of the

principle of cellular structure—that is, of flexible organization based

on small specialized teams capable of extended independent operations

—than had previously been the case. The new pattern, applicable alike

for separate platoons, companies, or battalions, was promulgated by

TOE 3-500, 19 July 1943, and provided a choice of several types of

such teams, varying in size from one to sixty-six men, for the CWS

functions of maintenance, depot operations, decontamination, processing, and laboratory work. The War Department also authorized

teams which could operate as headquarters for units composed of

operational teams and support teams to operate messes and to provide

automotive maintenance. Separate equipment allowances were listed

for each type of team. This arrangement was intended to make possible

the formation of composite units of a size directly related to the type

of mission required and the size of the force to be supported. A

further refinement of cellular organization was made when the TOE

was reissued in December 1944 in order to provide still greater flexibility, principally in the area of administrative and maintenance

teams.67

Hence, the service units that the CWS placed overseas, for the most

part in the Pacific, were far from uniform in size, makeup, or functions. In some cases, rather than maintain company organizations for

scattered service detachments, companies were inactivated and their

66

 TOE 3-277, Cml Composite Co, 1 Apr 42. 67

 (1) Ltrs, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 27 Jan 43 and 6 Mar 43, sub: Cml Composite Cos. CWS

320.2 CWS Units. (2) TOE 3-500, Cml Warfare Serv Orgns, 19 Jul 43, 15 Dec 44.
310 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

93D CHEMICAL COMPOSITE COMPANY TESTING FLAME THROWER FUELS,

Milne Bay, New Guinea.

elements reconstituted as separate service platoons, as TOE 3-500 had

provided for.68 Sixth Army, in the course of its campaign on Luzon in

1945, attached chemical service platoons to its divisions; the missions

of such a divisional platoon included reconditioning 4.2-inch mortar

ammunition (the checking and cleaning of shells being of particular

importance in the corrosive environment of the tropics), service and

maintenance of portable flame throwers (together with training their

operators), manning a smoke pot line, repairing gas masks, preparing

napalm, performing second and third echelon maintenance of mortars,

providing chemical warfare intelligence, and using the power-driven

decontaminating apparatus as a water carrier and portable shower.

Such an attached platoon was regarded by Sixth Army as an essential

part of the combat division.69

68

 The 94th Chemical Composite Company, for example, assigned to SWPA in the fall of 1943, operated as four separate units from January 1944 onward and was at length disbanded in November 1944

to form the 272d, 273d, 274th, and 275th Composite Platoons. 69

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG USAFFE, 26 Dec 44, sub: Shortage of Cml Serv Troops. Sixth Army

322 CWS Orgns.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 311

One of the few exceptions to the rule that CWS composite companies

went to the Pacific was the 92d Chemical Composite Company.

Activated at the end of 1942 at Camp Sibert, the 92d was organized

on the basis of TOE 3-277 when it went overseas the following spring.

It was destined for the North African theater. Its debarkation point,

reached on 10 May 1943, was Casablanca, but it soon moved forward

to Mateur in newly won Tunisia. There its depot section took over

the CWS section of General Depot 6, Eastern Base Section, and its

impregnation section set up an open storage depot. The laboratory

section assembled its equipment in a garage and went to work on

captured chemical materiel. The maintenance section set up a repair

shop and began work on gas masks, flame throwers, and decontaminators, both portable and power driven. During the summer the units

followed EBS headquarters from Mateur to Bizerte but otherwise they

maintained their activities through 1943 uninterrupted, save for an

occasional air raid. The company formed a principal CWS rear

echelon support for both the Sicilian and the Italian invasions.

In February 1944 the 92d was reorganized under the new TOE

3-500, utilizing an organizational scheme under which the laboratory

section was discontinued entirely, leaving the company with a repair

team, a maintenance and salvage section, a decontamination team, and

three supply (depot) teams, as well as a headquarters and mess.70 The

following month, despite the new organization, a detachment amounting to about half of one of the supply teams (and taking about half

of the team's equipment) left for depot duties with Northern Base

Section in Corsica, not to rejoin the company until January 1945.

Another depot team, together with the decontamination team, was

sent, as Detachment A, to Island Base Section in Palermo. The bulk

of the company spent a few weeks closing out its depot and maintenance installations before being itself transferred in May to Mediterranean Base Section at Oran.71

The 92d's mission at Oran was primarily the creation of a consolidated CWS depot near MBS headquarters. Four outlying depots were

closed out and their stocks moved to the new central installation, a

former engineer storage center with ample facilities. It took more

than a month to get the 4,000 tons of CWS materiel crated, consoli70

 Ltr, AGO to CG NATO, 17 Feb 44, sub: Reorgn of 92d Cml Composite Co. AG 322 (14 Feb 44)

OB-I-SPMOU-M. 71

 History, 92d Cml Composite Co.
312 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

A CHEMICAL SERVICE COMPANY LABORATORY, NEW GUINEA

dated, stored, and properly maintained. When the job was complete

and the depot, plus an attached CWS maintenance shop, was in good

running order, the 92d turned the facilities over to another unit and

prepared to leave for its next assignment, Peninsular Base Section in

Italy.72

In Italy the 92d served again primarily as a depot unit. Upon its

arrival in mid-August 1944, it was sent to the CWS depot near

Bagnoli; Detachment A had already arrived from Sicily to take over

the depot at Santa Maria and move its stocks to Bagnoli for consolidation. The maintenance mission was resumed in September, when a

detachment went north to set up and run a CWS maintenance shop

at PBS Forward Echelon, Leghorn. This left the rest of the company

with the Bagnoli depot as its sole responsibility, except for the gas

mask repair section, which operated in conjunction with the storage

facility. The decontamination team had become, in effect, another

depot team. Depot administration, however, came to include training

72

 Ibid.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 313

as well. An Italian service battalion was stationed at the depot under

control of the 92d for training in depot operation, as well as for the

sake of the additional labor supply. Depot work included both Class II

and IV storage at the main installations and open storage of Class V

materiel at a site near Naples. The provision of trained security details

for shipment and storage of toxic munitions gave men of the decontamination team recurring practice in their primary mission. A less

common opportunity for the use of their skills came in spring, when

the team decontaminated the area used by the 41st Chemical Laboratory

Company for testing mustard-filled mortar shells.73

The 92d remained on the job as a depot-maintenance outfit at Bagnoli

and Leghorn for the remainder of the war. The cessation of hostilities

in Europe did not reduce the company's workload for some time. The

Leghorn detachment, much depleted by personnel transfers, acquired

control of a German prisoner of war battalion to help it rehabilitate,

box, and ship materiel to the Far East, a task accomplished ahead of

schedule. The Bagnoli portion of the company celebrated the end of

the war by disposing of its supply of toxics through the winter of

1945-46, sinking the materiel in deep water off the island of Ischia.

It was not until the spring of 1946 that the 92d, by then possessed of

a Meritorious Service Unit Plaque, was ready for inactivation.

More typical of the experience of composite companies was the

overseas record of the 240th. Activated in August 1943, at Camp

Sibert, the 240th Chemical Composite Company was reorganized under

TOE 3-500 the following February. Under this setup, the company

had a total of no less than twenty-two cellular teams, including at

least one for each of the following CWS service missions: maintenance,

supply, decontamination, and processing. The last of these was represented by only a single unit, and the laboratory function was omitted

altogether, leaving the company organized primarily for depot and

maintenance work, with decontamination capabilities when needed.

The 240th, after reorganization, had a total strength of just over 200

men. Toward the end of May 1944, it embarked from Portland, Ore.,

for the Southwest Pacific Area, and arrived in Finschhafen, New

Guinea, a month later for assignment to Sixth Army.

On arrival, the 240th went into bivouac at Cape Cretin and began

functioning for the time being as a depot unit, helping out with the

78 Ibid.
314 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

operation of the CWS depot at Finschhafen's Base F. Meanwhile, the

Chemical Officer, Sixth Army, decided that the 240th, like other composite companies so assigned, could be best utilized as four separate

service units, of a size and composition suitable to the support of a

reinforced division. Accordingly, in mid-August, the company became

the parent of Units 1 through 4. Unit 1 was weighted toward the

maintenance and depot functions, as was Unit 4, though the latter also

had impregnation specialists. Unit 2 was largely drawn from the

impregnation team, with smaller numbers representing the other

service missions. Unit 3 was almost entirely a maintenance outfit,

except for one small depot team. Company headquarters personnel

were divided between units 1,2, and 4.74 All four units were destined

to participate as divisional support elements in amphibious assaults.

Unit 1, suitably enough, was the first to be committed. Toward the

end of August it was earmarked for the mid-September invasion of

Morotai, midway between New Guinea and the Philippines. Its mission

was to set up CWS supply dumps on the beaches to collect, store, and

salvage CWS materiel and to provide second and third echelon maintenance for chemical equipment.70

 The Morotai task force, named

TRADEWIND, assembled for staging at Maffin Bay in Wakde-Sarmi

sector of northwestern New Guinea before the end of August. On 11

September the unit's depot team, including five maintenance men

attached to infantry regiments to support flame thrower operations,

embarked with the assault forces and landed with them on Morotai

on the morning of 15 September. There was little organized Japanese

resistance on the island as the combat troops moved rapidly forward

and the service units, after some initial trouble with the approaches

to the beaches, began organizing support areas.76

 The depot team of

Unit 1 of the 240th, working like the rest of the task force under

sporadic enemy air attack, brought up ammunition to a CWS mortar

platoon, set up its bivouac area, and arranged for its dump to be situated near the ordnance supply site. It was busy for the next few days

locating and storing materiel, principally signal and incendiary

grenades.77

74

 History of the 240th Cml Composite Co. 75

 An. 5, Admin Order i, Hq TRADEWIND Task Force, 23 Aug 44, cited in History of the 240th Cml

Composite Co. 76

 See Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 480-93. 77

 History of the 240th Cml Composite Co.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 315

The remainder of Unit 1 joined the depot team on Morotai on 11

October, by which time the operation had been declared over and the

work of building an air base was well under way. The unit continued

operation of the CWS dump, put up warehouses with space for maintenance operations, and did a brisk business in picking up and reconditioning gas masks. The unit remained in place on Morotai, attached to

the 31st Division, until the last week in January 1945, when it joined

the 33d Division and embarked for Luzon.78

Unit 2's first mission was not long behind that of Unit 1. This unit

left New Guinea for Los Negros in the Admiralties at the beginning

of October 1944, to join the 1st Cavalry Division as part of Sixth

Army's invasion force for the reconquest of the Philippines. It

promptly reembarked to join the Leyte invasion convoy. A-day for

Leyte was 20 October, and that morning the 1st Cavalry Division

landed as the northernmost element of the assault, securing White

Beach just south of Tacloban, the island's capital. Unit 2 reached

Leyte and landed at White Beach on A plus 2, 22 October, by which

time the division was driving the enemy out of the Tacloban area.

The unit's first task was getting 4.2-inch mortar ammunition to the

85th Chemical Mortar Battalion, in the course of which operation it

ran a beach ammunition dump. By mid-November it was in Tacloban,

setting up a divisional CWS depot. The operation of this supply point

constituted Unit 2's mission for the remainder of the Leyte Campaign.

At the end of January 1945 the unit was attached to XI Corps, which

joined Sixth Army's Luzon Campaign by landing near San Narciso

on 29 January to cut off Bataan. Unit 2 landed with the corps and

set up a corps chemical warfare depot.

Unit 3, after being first assigned to and then withdrawn from the

Morotai invasion force, remained at the Maffin Bay staging area for

the time being, providing depot support and flame thrower maintenance

for the 123d Regimental Combat Team, then engaged in local operations against the Japanese. In mid-November the unit went to

Sansapor, at the northwest tip of New Guinea, to join the 6th Division,

part of the force being staged for the invasion of Luzon. It spent the

next weeks loading mortar shells and other CWS supplies on ships;

inspecting, reconditioning, and test firing flame throwers; and training.

The task force of which it was a part embarked on 30 December 1944-

78

 Ibid.
316 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

On the morning of 9 January 1945 the combat troops landed on the

shores of Lingayen Gulf, north of Manila, 6th Division holding the

center of the beachhead. There was no immediate enemy opposition.

The men of Unit 3 began reaching the beaches some three hours after

the first assault and immediately set to work organizing a CWS beach

dump. A consolidated chemical dump for the 6th Division's beachhead was in operation by the next morning, supporting the division's

4.2-inch mortar companies. Five days later a detachment set up an

advance depot fifteen miles inland, and the task of moving mortar

shells, grenades, and flame thrower fuel off the beaches was begun.

A second inland depot was set up the following week, replacing the

first. Regular forward movements of supply points followed at intervals of a few days. The unit's repairmen were kept busy maintaining

the division's flame throwers. Supply and maintenance operations in

close support of 6th Division continued without a break until the

division was relieved on 30 April after three and a half months in

action.79

Unit 4 remained at Cape Cretin, New Guinea, until mid-November

1944. At that time, having been attached to the 40th Division, it

proceeded to the division's stage area at Cape Gloucester, New

Britain. The 40th, like the 6th, was scheduled to participate in the

Luzon landings, and Unit 4, like Unit 3, spent the last weeks of

November 1944 checking and loading mortar ammunition. The unit

also placed 15-man teams on detached duty with each of two mortar

companies attached to the division. The 40th Division landed on the

southwestern flank of Sixth Army's assault on the shore of Lingayen

Gulf on the morning of 9 January. Two hours after the first assault

wave hit the beach, personnel of Unit 4 began arriving ashore. The

unit soon had a depot for Class II and Class IV CWS supplies in the

town of Lingayen and an ammunition dump operating in conjunction

with the divisional ordnance supply point. Both depot and ammunition

dump were moved forward after two weeks, by which time the detachments had rejoined the main group, bringing Unit 4 up to its full

strength. It continued in support of the 40th Division throughout

February 1945.80

By that time the 240th Chemical Composite Company had long

ceased to be a unit in any operational sense. Its four segments were

79

 History of the 237th Cml Serv Platoon. 80

 History of the 238th Cml Serv Platoon.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 317

all on Luzon, but each was in support of a different outfit. Sixth Army

had already come to the conclusion that it required nothing of composite companies save the provision of platoon-size detachments for close

divisional support. Under the circumstances there was little reason to

retain company organization, especially in view of the fact that the

basic TOE 3-500 could apply as well to an independent platoon as to

a company. As had already happened in other cases, the decision was

made to disband the 240th as a company and activate its units as

separate composite platoons. Accordingly, as of 12 February 1945 the

240th Chemical Composite Company ceased to exist. In its place there

appeared, organized under the current TOE 3—500 (15 December

1944), the 240th Chemical Service Platoon, formerly Unit 1, and the

236th, 237th, and 238th Chemical Service Platoons, the erstwhile

Units 2, 3, and 4, respectively. From then on the four platoons were

for all practical purposes divisional chemical warfare elements and

served through the remainder of the Philippines campaign in that

capacity.81

Chemical Air Service Companies

As in other respects, so in the field of chemical service operations the

Army Air Forces functioned as a separate entity. The Air Forces had

major CWS functions, as a potential principal user of toxic agents in

the event of gas warfare, as a participant in smoke missions, and as the

utilizer of the new CWS strategic weapon, the incendiary bomb. To

assist in the execution of these chemical missions, the CWS organized

and sent into the field several types of service units especially designed

for Air Forces needs. Included among those seeing overseas service were

chemical depot companies, chemical maintenance companies (both

types bearing the additional designation "Aviation"), and the many

chemical companies designated simply "Air Operations," one hundred

of which were activated between 1942 and 1945. Half of these saw

service in overseas theaters. Four of the fourteen maintenance companies, aviation, and all of the twenty depot companies, aviation, also

went overseas.

The air depot companies, like their ground counterparts, had as their

principal mission the storage, surveillance, and preparation for issue

81

 The 236th (formerly Unit 2) was attached to the 38th Division, an element of XI Corps, on 23

March 45.
318 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

LOADING LIQUID SMOKE INTO AN M10 SMOKE TANK FOR AIRCRAFT, New

Guinea.

of CWS materiel, in this case primarily bulk toxics, smoke mixtures,

and incendiaries. Normal assignment was on the basis of one per AAF

general depot when, as was usually the case, the depot in consideration

was intended for storage and issue of chemical supply in appreciable

quantities. A typical air depot company, the 754th, assigned to the

VIII Air Force Service Command in England, had four sections: administrative, chemical, incendiary, and security maintenance.82

 The

last three of these were respectively in charge of storage, surveillance,

and filling of chemicals and chemical ammunition, storage and surveillance of incendiaries, and repair, maintenance, defense, and security

details for the depot. The proper execution of these tasks called for a

good deal of technical proficiency, especially in the handling and surveillance of toxics. Another air depot company in that command, the

82

 T/O 3-418, 28 Feb 42.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 319

763d, found that a depot company might be responsible not only for

filling mustard bombs but for making up such items as M4/Ai incendiary bombs as well, using bomb casings, gasoline, and thickener.83

Chemical companies, air operations, in their organization and mission

presented certain parallels to the composite companies of the ground

forces. Like the latter, they were meant for close support of combat

units and were organized on a cellular basis, with platoons (four to

the company) capable of performing like missions on a self-sustaining

basis when attached separately to units of appropriate size. The major

missions of air operations companies were to maintain CWS ammunition storage dumps, to prepare and arm chemical munitions for combat

use and (in practice) to load such munitions on the using aircraft. The

recommended normal basis of assignment was one air operations company per group or one platoon per squadron. A platoon consisted of

a headquarters team and four identical operations teams, which were

essentially toxic-filling outfits. In addition to its headquarters and

its four platoons, the air operations company included a distributing

point section to operate its dump; this group included at least two

men trained in decontamination techniques and equipped with a

power-driven decontaminating apparatus.84 The processes involved in

handling, arming, and loading CWS bombs, bomb clusters, and spray

tanks required a good deal of technical training and special equipment.85

Air operations companies were not infrequently faced with unanticipated tasks. For example, companies in the SWPA used a newly

developed spray tank (the E2B25, produced by the Far East Air

Force Service Command) not only for smoke operations but for the

spraying of DDT over areas rendered hazardous by the presence of

insect-borne malaria or typhus.86

In the last months of the Pacific war aerial incendiaries played an

increasingly important role in both the strategical and tactical spheres.

The assault on Iwo Jima, for example, was preceded by a 10-week

bombardment by planes based in the Marianas; incendiary bomb

clusters formed a significant part of their load. Air operations com83

 Conf Rpt, The Opn, Duties, and Function of a Cml Depot Co, Avn, 22-23 Feb 43- Eighth AF

520.805-Nov 43. 84

 TOE 3-457, 29 Sep 44. An earlier version, 1 July 1942, differed in providing for platoons with

two large operations teams apiece. 85

 Capt Louis E. Schueler, 876th Cml Co AO, The Cml Co, Air Opns. Eighth AF 520.805-Nov 43. 86

 Col Augustin M. Prentiss, Jr., Cml Warfare History of Fifth Air Force-Far East Air Forces.

CWS 314.7 Fifth AF.
320 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

panics supporting the bomber formations increased the supply of

incendiaries by improvising fire bombs from 55-gallon drums filled

with napalm and armed with an M15 WP grenade and an all-ways

fuze. The fuzing of this unfamiliar weapon was the source of so much

concern to the air crews that at first they insisted that CWS personnel

accompany the flights to keep an eye on the incendiaries. The air

operations companies always loaded incendiaries into planes and, when

necessary, were called upon to modify bomb bays to accommodate

particular types of incendiary bomb clusters.87 In the early months of

1945 incendiary raids on a vast scale carried the war direct to the

industrial centers of Japan. In their support of these crippling blows,

the air operations companies contributed significantly to the final

victory.

87

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Alfred J. Green, USAR, 15 Sep 59.
CHAPTER VIII

Large Area Smoke Screens in the

MTO

It was the fate of the Chemical Warfare Service to enter World

War II with rather ill-defined responsibilities, a circumstance accented

by the absence of its most clearly defined mission—gas warfare. As a

consequence, responsibilities were delineated and missions took shape

as the necessity for meeting new conditions actually arose in the theaters

of operations. A case in point was large area screening. The tremendous

development in air power between the world wars produced a situation

which made the concealment of ground targets a prime necessity.

Clues pointing to this development were apparent in the 1930's but

for various reasons little had been done to prepare for large area

screening. The first adequate American smoke generator did not

appear until 1942. Once the generators were in the theaters, a chain

of circumstances created smoke missions which were unknown even

in the tentative doctrine of the prewar period.

Background of Large Area Screening

Experiment and Trial

Although the employment of small quantities of smoke in combat

was an ancient military technique, its use to conceal extended areas

was a twentieth century innovation. The term large area screen is

quite imprecise. The size of a large area screen depends upon the

nature and size of the target to be obscured. The screen had to be

large enough to baffle enemy bombardiers; if it were too small it would

merely pinpoint vital areas. The technical aspects of large-scale smoke

screening had been a CWS concern from the time that service received

the smoke mission in 1920. The most immediate interest was in the

development of agents and munitions to support tactical operations.

Because initial CWS experiments in area screening along the Panama
322 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Canal were unsuccessful, the search for agents and means of disseminating area screens continued sporadically until 1936 when the War

Department decided that with the means available large area screening

was not practicable.1

The high importance placed on hemisphere defense by the RAINBOW

plans of 1939

 2 revived War Department interest in providing passive

defense for the vulnerable areas of the Panama Canal. On 1 July 1940

the War Department directed Maj. Gen. Walter C. Baker, Chief,

Chemical Warfare Service, to submit an estimate of the costs of development, installation, and maintenance of smoke screening apparatus

required for concealing the three locks. By the end of the month the

War Department sent this estimate to the commanding general, Panama

Canal Department, for comments. The Air Corps commander in the

Canal Zone favored the project in principle but had some reservations.

The commanding general of the Panama antiaircraft defenses opposed

any extensive use of smoke which might nullify the effectiveness of

antiaircraft fire. The department chemical officer advised his commander that in view of the lack of information about the effectiveness

of large area screens it would be unwise to plan a costly screening

installation for the three locks. The matter was held in abeyance.3

Nevertheless, two points had emerged from the Panama studies. First,

technical means for generating artificial clouds were inadequate.

Second, there was serious opposition by commanders to the employment of smoke during air raids. Until a better means of smoke production was devised, a mutually satisfactory decision about smoke employment was impossible.

At that time, the war in Europe provided actual combat tests of the

use of smoke. Before mid-1940 British interest in large area screening

had been rather theoretical—an interesting proposition but hardly

practicable.4 When the German invasion of the Low Countries and

1

 (1) Phosphorus, Chlorosulfonic acid, and hexachlorethane (HC) had been the agents tested. (2)

For a review of large area smoke tests at Panama from 1921 to 1939, see OCCWS Tech Study 23, Use

of Smoke to Screen Panama Canal Locks, 18 Jul 40 (rewritten 9 Jul 41). (3) Special Folder on

Smoke Screen Experiments in Panama [1921-31], CWS Ret 470.6/2491. 2

 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 7-8. 3

 (1) Ltr, CmlO Panama Canal Dept to CCWS, 1 Oct 40, sub: Use of Smoke to Screen Panama

Canal Locks. (2) Memo, CmlO PCD for ExecO OCCWS, 8 Oct 40, no sub. Both in CWS Ret

470.6/57-231. 4

 (1) Statement, Dir of Weapons and Vehicles (Br) for Asst Chief Imperial General Staff, ca. 1 May

43. CWS 314.7 Smoke Opns. (2) The various smoke devices developed by the British are discussed

in TDMR 396, Jun 42. Tech Lib ACmlC, Md.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 323

France in the spring of 1940 provided the Luftwaffe with airfields

within easy reach of the United Kingdom, the British gave serious

attention to the possibility of using smoke to conceal vital installations.

At first, the British Ministry of Home Security, responsible for screening vulnerable targets, provided oil-burning orchard smudge pots for

targets in Birmingham and Coventry. It waived smoke abatement

orders so as to increase the industrial haze, no longer the public nuisance

it had been in time of peace. The Admiralty Fuel Experimental Station

at Haslar, England, later developed the first large-capacity oil-burner

generator, cumbersome and inefficient but the best smoke producer

available at the time.

The typical British large area smoke installation in 1941 consisted of

several thousand stationary smudge-type oil pots and a few Hasler

generators which gave body to the screen from upwind positions.

Although requirements for oil, all of which had to be imported, and

manpower were heavy, area screening proved well worthwhile. In

addition to military advantage, smoke became an important factor in

maintaining the morale of factory workers, especially in munitions

plants. Employees sometimes demanded smoke, despite its inconvenience, as the price of continuing to work at night.5

Beginnings of Large Area Screening in the United States

The gradual transition of area screening from theory to practice was

observed with interest in the United States. The Chemical Warfare

Service carefully surveyed the development of European equipment

and screening techniques and, with the Army Air Corps and other

Army elements, investigated the problems which would accompany

the development of large area screening.

In mid-1940 the only smoke-producing munitions available to the

U.S. Army were smoke shells, pots, grenades, and airplane smoke tanks.

These munitions were satisfactory for establishing transitory curtains

and could be used to a limited extent for blanketing enemy positions,

but they were unsuitable for maintaining smoke screens over wide areas

of friendly terrain because of the limited amount of smoke they produced and because artillery and mortar shells could not be impacted

5

 (1) Thomas K. Sherwood, NDRC, Div B, Rpt 197 (OSRD 435), Rpt on Screening Smokes, CWS17, 3 Mar 42, passim. Tech Lib ACmlC, Md. (2) British Historical Monograph, Special Weapons

and Types of Warfare, Part II A, gives a complete picture of the development of smoke missions and

munitions in Great Britain.
324 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

near friendly troops. Moreover, smoke from the HC-filled pots was

harassing at best and in concentrated amounts could be quite toxic.

Following the British lead, the CWS adapted the commercial smudge

pot which was standardized as the M1 stationary oil generator. CWS

scientists and later those of the National Defense Research Committee

(NDRC) became interested in more efficient smoke production techniques. In 1942 there appeared an entirely new type of smoke generator, one which emitted a "smoke" composed of small particles of

oil created when a superheated oil-vapor mixture condensed upon

ejection into the air. Production began on this generator in September

1942, and it was standardized as the M1 mechanical smoke generator

(often called the Esso, after the company which produced it) in the

following December.6

In December 1941 the Chemical Warfare Board undertook a study

of large area smoke concealment with particular application to Edgewood Arsenal. Within a few days after the Pearl Harbor attack

General Porter instructed the board to expand its objectives to include

the general principles and techniques of screening, a project which was

given highest priority.7 The investigations of the Chemical Warfare

Board soon had proceeded far enough to establish several tentative

principles of rear area screening. Observation from the air revealed

that smoke at night changed the appearance of both natural and artificial terrain features. Smoke was of less value during daylight and

might even accentuate vital targets. Blackouts would still have to be

maintained at night because bright lights were visible through the

smoke; in other words, rear area screening was supplementary to the

blackout, not a substitute for it. And, finally, screening, while appreciably reducing visibility, would not eliminate observation from the

air.8

After the completion of the Edgewood tests, the CWS felt better

prepared to provide technical supervision of smoke installations in the

zone of interior, which the Operations Division, War Department

General Staff, was finding difficult to establish because of shortages of

6

 (1) See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, for a detailed account of research

and development activities and technical details of these generators. (2) James P. Baxter 3d, Scientists

Against Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1947), pp. 282-89. (3) Barker Ltr, 13 Dec 58. 7

 Ltr, Chief Field Serv OCCWS to President Cml Warfare Bd, through CG Edgewood Arsenal, 19

Dec 41, sub: Study of Large Area Smoke Screen Technique. CWS 470.6/1554 CWB Proj 251. 8

 Ltr, President Cml Warfare Bd to Chief Phila Ord Dist, 2 Jan 42, sub: Smoke as Protective Concealment. CWS 470.6/1554 CWB Proj 251. Further tests early in 1942 substantiated these findings.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 325

men and materiel. The commanding generals of the several defense

commands forwarded screening requests, arranged in order of importance, to the War Department, which compiled all requests, giving

each a priority rating. The CWS aided OPD in this task by performing

feasibility surveys for each proposed installation.9

Meanwhile, the CWS recommended the activation of thirty-four

chemical smoke generator companies. On 8 April the first three units

(the 75th, 76th, and 77th Companies) were formed and, before their

training was completed, received the mission of concealing aircraft

plants in California. By the end of May the War Department had

authorized the activation of 11 companies to be stationed as follows:

6 with the Western Defense Command; 3 in Panama; one at the

Sault Ste. Marie Locks; and one, an experimental unit, at Edgewood

Arsenal.10 By 20 July a total of 14 companies had been activated, 9

located on the west coast of the United States.

Each of these early smoke units, organized under a table of organization calling for 4 officers and 196 enlisted men and 3,600 M1 stationary

smoke generators (the smudge pot type)11 was capable of blanketing

an area of about four square miles. Generators were employed in two

or more concentric smoke lines which completely surrounded the vital

area, allowing for wind from any direction. By the proper placement

of additional generators and by use of an electrical ignition system, a

substantial amount of smoke could be formed in about ten minutes.

When the United States entered the war the long-standing Panama

Canal screening project was immediately revived. At the time, the

smoke pot was the only screening munition available and it required

too many men to make a Panama smoke installation feasible.12 The stationary generator proved more satisfactory, and, as a consequence, Lt.

Gen. Frank M. Andrews, Caribbean Defense Command, recommended

that plans for screening in the Department be implemented as soon as

possible.13 By 1 January 1943 two smoke generator companies had

9

 Memo, Maj D. R. King, OCCWS, for Col James W. Rice, Cml Warfare Bd, 5 May 42, sub: WD

Policy With Reference to Rear Area Smoke Screens. CWS 470.6/1554 CWB Proj 251. 10

 Ltr, TAG to CCWS, 25 May 41, sub: Request for Authority for Activation of Cml Smoke Generator Cos, and 1st Ind. CWS Ret 320.2/207. 11

 T/O 3-267, 1 Apr 42. 12

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Harold Walmsley, 23 Feb 48. 13

 Ltr, CG AGF to CG SOS, 19 Jun 42, sub: Stationary Smoke Generators for Large Area Screen, and

2d Ind, CCWS to CG SOS. CWS Ret 470.6/2711-2754. An electrical ignition system further reduced the necessary manpower.
326 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

arrived in Panama equipped with the M1 mechanical generator. Used

in conjunction with the stationary generator, this new equipment

greatly eased the situation on the smoke lines.

In July 1942, with a practical means of screening assured, General

Porter made several recommendations on plans for rear area screening

which were approved by the General Staff. The War Department

ordered that additional smoke generator companies be activated to

bring the total to 42. These new units were to train at the CWS

Replacement Training Center at Camp Sibert, where large area screening exercises could be freely conducted.14

 By August 1942 troop basis

planning provided for the employment of 12 companies in theaters of

operations, 3 in Panama, and 14 by the defense commands in the zone

of interior. Activation of chemical smoke generator companies continued at the rate of about 3 a month until February 1943, when a

total of 40 had been organized.

Defensive screening operations during 1942 consisted of the establishment of zone of interior smoke installations and the development

of screening readiness in Panama. Operations at the Sault Ste. Marie

locks

 15

 and at Camp Edwards, Mass., were primarily for experimental

purposes, both tactical and technical. The requirement for smoke

installations in the Western Defense Command began to decline after

the defeat of the Japanese fleet in the Battle of Midway in June 1942

and ended with the increase in American air power during the early

months of 1943. Smoke was never made in anger in the United States.

But the anxious period after 7 December 1941 provided the impetus

for rapid progress in the development of materiel and the organization

of units. This was a necessary prelude to overseas screening operations.

Initial Operations: The Northwest African Ports

Early on the morning of 8 November 1942 British and American

forces attacked Northwest Africa. The assault operations consisted

of three distinct parts. The Western Task Force, entirely American

and combat loaded in the United States, struck the coast of French

Morocco in the vicinity of Casablanca. The Center and Eastern Task

14

 (1) Memo, CCWS for ACofS OPD WDGS, 20 Jul 42, sub: 1942 Over-all Plan for Rear Area

Smoke Screen Protection. (2) 1st Ind, ACofS for Opns SOS to CCWS, 11 Aug 42. Both in CWS Ret

320.2/207. 15

 Originally the purpose of smoke operations at Sault Ste. Marie was protection, not testing. Memo,

Capt Howard P. McCormick, CWS, for Gen Wilson, 3 1 Mar 42.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 327

Forces, mounted in Great Britain, had as their respective targets the

Mediterranean ports of Oran and Algiers.16 The initial French resistance soon ceased, and the British-American forces turned east toward

Tunisia.

By then the United States Army had attained a capability in large

area screening which a year earlier would have seemed impossible. A

new generator, the M1, had been devised, units were being activated

to operate it, and the doctrine for its employment—the concealment

of vital rear area installations—had become an accepted feature in the

defense against air attack. The Northwest African campaign was to

provide the crucial test of combat for this generator, these units, and

this mission.

Although the Luftwaffe failed to react to the landings in Northwest

Africa, enemy planes in the succeeding months raided Algiers and other

ports to the east in an effort to disrupt Allied supply lines. Both the

United States and Great Britain supplied troops and munitions for the

large area screening mission. Shortly before, the British No. 24 smoke

pot had been dubbed "the savior of Malta" for its part in shielding the

island's harbor from concentrated enemy air attacks.17 The Americans

provided the M1 smoke pot and the M1 mechanical smoke generator,

smaller and more efficient and maneuverable than the large British

Haslar.18 These two generators, the primary equipment of the units

performing the smoke mission, were to form the nucleus of the smoke

installations at the Northwest African ports.

Because smoke was not required, no American smoke units participated in the initial landings, a fortunate circumstance in view of the

limited number of available units. Elements of the 78th Smoke Generator Company did arrive at Casablanca on 13 November, five days

after the shooting began.19 The company set up a smoke installation

on 23 November which served principally for demonstration purposes.20

16

 Howe, Northwest Africa, provides the complete story of the Northwest African campaign. 17

 London Mil Attaché Rpt 56781, 12 May 43, sub: Area Smoke Screening, app. B. 18

 The M1 mechanical generator weighed 3,000 pounds empty and 5,400 pounds when filled, that is,

complete with fog oil, fuel oil, and water. Troops could operate in its smoke with no adverse effects.

The M1 smoke pot contained 10 pounds of HC smoke mixture and burned from 5 to 10 minutes. An

improved model, the M1A1, appeared in 1944. The longer burning M5 pot was developed later in the

war.

19

 78th Cml Smoke Generator Co History, 1942, p. 1. This detachment of the 78th embarked in six

different vessels and had smoke generators ready for emergency use. 20

 Ltr, CO 78th Smoke Generator Co to CmlO Western Task Force, 30 Nov 42, sub: Report of Test

Run. . .. CWS 314.7.
328 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The first smoke company to see action in Northwest Africa was the

69th Smoke Generator Company. It landed at Oran on 25 December,

and on the following day it relieved a detachment of engineer troops

which, using British No. 24 smoke pots, had maintained a smoke line

in the harbor since 9 November.21 By February 1943 both the 78th

and the 69th Companies were at Algiers where they successfully

operated their M1 mechanical generators in conjunction with a British

company equipped with Haslars.22

All told, ten major North African ports had the benefit of smoke

installations manned by troops from the United States, Great Britain,

and France.23 These operations were not simultaneous but represented

a steady movement eastward as the Allied troops, in conjunction with

those under Generals Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander and Montgomery,

converged on the Axis concentrations in Tunisia. Bizerte, although

captured just before complete victory in Northwest Africa, served as

one of the chief marshaling ports for the invasion of Sicily and later

Italy, thus becoming one of the Mediterranean's most heavily screened

ports. A British smoke unit was waiting on the outskirts of Bizerte

on 7 May as the II U.S. Corps was capturing the city, and within

twelve hours the port was screened. By the end of June all four of the

American smoke generator companies in the theater were providing

the smoke defenses for Bizerte. In addition to the 69th and 78th these

were the 168th and 172d, just arrived from the United States and still

without generators.24

Smoke installations usually consisted of two rings, the size of-which

depended upon the area to be screened. An inner ring of smoke pots

provided for the quick concealment of vital targets while an outer

ring of mechanical generators built the main element of the smoke

blanket. Pots were also used to fill in gaps in a blanket caused by

shifting winds or by other unforeseen conditions. Smoke was made

at night only; during the day fighter aircraft provided protection for

the dock areas of the harbors.

21

 69th Cml Smoke Generator Co History, Jun 42-Apr 44, p. 2. 22

 CWS TofO Ltr No. 12,31 Mar 44, Incl. 4. 23A detailed account of the screening operations in Northwest Africa as well as of those in Italy,

described later in this chapter, can be found in Paul W. Pritchard, CmlC Hist Study No. 1, Smoke Generator Opns in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Opn, 1949, pp. 36-83. 24

 Also arriving in June were the 24th and 25th Chemical Decontamination Companies, in the theater

as insurance against the introduction of gas by the enemy but well trained in the smoke mission.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 329

Early on the morning of 6 July 1943, with Bizerte's port, channel,

outer harbor, and bay crowded with ships for the impending invasion

of Sicily, the Luftwaffe attacked with a force of more than sixty

aircraft. The smoke units had nine minutes warning. At 0409 the

German bombers began their run on the smoke-obscured targets.

Despite intense antiaircraft fire the enemy kept up an almost uninterrupted attack for thirty-six minutes. At 0445 the bombers withdrew,

and the order to "cease smoke" came shortly after. During the

65-minute smoking period the units expended 4,135 gallons of fog

oil and 535 British smoke pots. Although the enemy bombed several

dumps and inflicted about a score of casualties outside the screen, no

bombs fell within the vital area. The ships and docks were untouched

and the channel remained open.25

In August two of the four American smoke units were alerted for

the Sicilian operation. In September the remaining American companies sailed for Italy, and British troops manned the Bizerte screen

until their relief by French units in January 1944.

By concealing the harbors and port facilities from Algiers to Sfax

from enemy air bombardment, American and British smoke companies

played a limited yet important part in the Northwest African campaign. The extent of the smoke operations depended upon the clearness

of the night, the military traffic at a port facility, and the degree of

enemy air activity. The Luftwaffe succeeded in sinking a few ships

in these harbors and caused some damage to port installations, but its

attacks on the ports in Northwest Africa were largely without effect.28

This first combat experience entirely justified the hopes of the

designers of the mechanical generator. It produced substantial clouds

of persistent white "smoke" with comparative speed. Although the

weight of the generator required vehicular transportation and its fuel

requirements were substantial, these were but modest logistical considerations compared with the results obtained.

Perfecting the Technique: The Italian Ports

The port of Naples was the initial Allied objective after AngloAmerican forces had secured a foothold in southern Italy. The logistical

25

 (1) 69th Cml Smoke Generator Co History, Jun 42-Apr 44. (2) 78th Cml Smoke Generator Co

History, 1943. 26

 Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, 30 Nov 45, pp. 106-07.
330 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MAP 3

considerations that demanded taking the port city naturally required

the uninterrupted flow of supplies into its spacious harbor. The smoke

installation that aided in this task was the most comprehensive of its

kind in the war. And it had the benefit of the experience gained in

screening the ports of Northwest Africa.

The vital shipping area at Naples included the port and harbor of

the city itself, the port area at suburban Bagnoli, and the fine harbor

at Pozzuoli in the Bay of Baiae. (Map 3) The smoke installation

began operations in October 1943, reached a climax late in the year,

and tapered off by the following summer as Allied successes farther

to the north helped reduce the possibility of heavy enemy air attacks.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 331

At its height the smoke lines were manned by the 163d, 164th, 168th,

172d, and 179th Smoke Generator Companies, the 24th Decontamination Company, and the British 807th (SM) Company—in all, about

1,000 officers and enlisted men.

At first, no common headquarters existed to direct the activities of

these units, a fact which soon led to the establishment of a provisional

smoke generator battalion headquarters.27 Although an improvement,

this "provisional" headquarters was not the answer. The lack of status

and the inadequate capability of this provisional unit, led by the senior

smoke generator company commander, finally impelled the theater

in March 1944 to request the assignment of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, chemical smoke generator battalion. This unit

was urgently needed, the theater said, to provide centralized control

over the several smoke companies in such matters as technical operations

and administrative and logistical support. As a result, Headquarters

and Headquarters Detachment, 22d Chemical Smoke Generator Battalion, was activated on 5 May 1944.28

The smoke installation in the Naples complex included three sectors,

each with inner and outer rings. The inner ring at Naples proper

consisted of 370 British smoke pot positions and 14 Besler generators, a Navy generator, small, efficient, and much like the Army's

M2 which would appear later. The outer ring, about six miles long,

included 86 mechanical generators. The Bagnoli sector had 100 smoke

pot and 3 8 mechanical generator positions, the Pozzouli, 48 mechanical

generators. The smoke from these installations blended into one massive

screen extending at times for a distance of twenty miles. As in the

case of the North African ports, smoke was used during the night and

during the periods of twilight. The prevalent winds at these times

were offshore, an ideal condition for the land-based generators, although

ten craft loaded with floating M4 smoke pots were ready to cover any

gaps caused by occasional breezes from the sea. Air turbulence from

two nearby land masses created constant difficulty in the development

of an adequate screen. One of these was the volcano Vesuvius whose

mass and glow, according to captured German pilots, provided the

27

 Technical and administrative problems of the American companies initially were handled by

Colonel Barker, Fifth Army chemical officer, and later by Colonel Coblentz of the Peninsular Base

Section. 28

 (1) CM-IN 13125, 18 Mar 44. (2) Ltr, TAG to CG NATO, 30 Mar 44, sub: Constitution and

Activation of Hq and Hq Detachment, 22d Cml Smoke Generator Bn. AG 322 (28 Mar 44) OB-LSPMOU-M. (3) GO 80, Peninsular Base Sec, 4 May 44.
332 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

additional disservice of furnishing guides to attacking enemy bombers.29

Smoke orders came from the British 45th AA Brigade charged with

the port defense.30

Enemy air raids were frequent and heavy at Naples, but its defenses

—fighters, flak, and smoke—combined to blunt the effectiveness of

the attacks. On the night of 26 November, for example, the screen

confused and delayed the enemy flare laying aircraft to such an extent

that the bomber formation released its load without benefit of flares.

As a result, none of the bombs did damage, most of them falling into

the bay.31

Although there was a letup in the number of air raids on Naples

during the last half of March and April 1944, the tempo increased in

May with the Allied drive on Rome, and the port was screened fourteen

times. During one of the spring raids about 113 merchant ships and

60 naval craft were shielded by smoke in the ports and anchorages at

Naples, all of which escaped damage.32 According to the AFHQ

intelligence bulletins this was not exceptional; the screening activities

at Naples were generally effective.33

As the Germans fell back before the Allied offensive their air attacks

against Naples practically ceased. The smoke installation was gradually

reduced to a single ring of pots around the harbor, manned by Italian

personnel. Some of the American smoke units began to prepare for

operation against southern France; others moved north to new ports,

now that Naples was no longer able to supply efficiently the troops

above Rome. During the advance northward the Fifth Army captured

Civitavecchia, Piombino, and Leghorn, ports which upon repair were

pressed into service to relieve the supply situation. Civitavecchia

required but a small screen and that for a short time. The 179th Smoke

Generator Company saw brief service there before moving to Piombino,

where in June it joined with the 172d Company in manning the smoke

installation.34

29

 Colonel Barker toyed with the idea of concealing Vesuvius with 4.2-inch mortar shell, a plan soon

discarded as impracticable. 30

 Fifth Army Cml Sec Daily Jnl, 18 Dec 43. 31

 CWS TofO Ltr No. 12, 31 Mar 44, p. 48. 32

 AFHQ, History of AA and Tactical Smoke Screening in North Africa and Italian Theaters Between

1 Jan and 31 Dec 44, pp. 7-8. 33

 An evaluation based upon about fifty AA intelligence bulletins issued between October 1943 and

May 1944 by the 12th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. 34

 AFHQ, History of AA and Tactical Smoke Screening in North Africa and Italian Theaters Between

1 Jan and 31 Dec 44, p. 8.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 333

SMOKE SCREEN SHIELDS UNLOADING OPERATIONS DURING AIR RAID ALERT,

Salerno.

Activity at both of these ports subsided when the facilities at

Leghorn, captured on 19 July, were repaired and gradually put into

operation. Within a week the 179th Smoke Generator Company, to

be joined shortly by three British companies, erected a screen at

Leghorn. Initially, Leghorn represented a unique example of rear area

screening in that it remained for some time within range of enemy

artillery on the north bank of the Arno River. On 28 July the 172d

Company moved up from Piombino and deployed in a 7-mile arc at

a distance approximately five miles north and northeast of the city.

The haze from the generators, just as in the Anzio operation,35 denied

to the enemy observation of port and road traffic. The company maintained the line, sometimes despite the objections of the Royal Navy

in the port, for thirty-eight days, by which time the enemy had with35

 See below, pp. 336-40.
334 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

drawn from his Arno River positions. The smoke installation at the

port itself was continued until April 1945.36

Leghorn marked the end of American participation in port screening

in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Rear area missions gradually petered out with the diminished effectiveness of the Luftwaffe.

The 172d and 179th Smoke Generator Companies, by now the only

U.S. smoke units in Italy, turned to a type of employment that had

evolved earlier in the theater—the use of smoke in forward areas. But

before the development of that mission smoke units had been used in

assault landings.

The Changing Mission: Smoke in Amphibious and

Beachhead Operations

Salerno

The fighting in Italy proper saw an immediate extension of what

had been the normal mission of smoke units. Thus far, in doctrine and

experience, large area screens had concealed rear area installations

exclusively. At Salerno smoke troops landed on D-day in support of

the combat elements.37

The Fifth Army landings in the Gulf of Salerno, just around the

Sorrento Peninsula from Naples, represented the first foothold of

American troops on the mainland of Europe. Two corps participated

in the attack—the British 10 on the left and the U.S. VI on the right.

The 36th Infantry Division, forming the assault element of the

American corps, drew as its objective the beaches near the town of

Paestum.38

Each of the assault battalions, storming ashore early on 9 September

1943, carried about 200 M4 smoke pots.39 Dropped in the water by

36

 (1) Ltr, CO 172d Cml Smoke Generator Co to CG Adv Hq Allied Armies in Italy, 13 Sep 44,

sub: Report on Smoke Haze North of Leghorn. (2) Fifth Army Cml Sec Daily Jnl 28 Jul 44. (3)

AFHQ, History of AA and Tactical Smoke Screening in North African and Italian Theaters Between

1 Jan and 31 Dec 44, pp. 8-9, 11-12. 37

 The Salerno action is based on: (1) Fifth Army Cml Sec Daily Jnl, 9, 10, 25 Sep 43, CMLHO;

(2) Memo, Barker for CMLHO, 4 Feb 47, sub: Answers to Questions; (3) Lt Harrie A. James,

USNR, Observations During Opn AVALANCHE, Center Task Force Southern Task Force, 24 Oct 43,

CWS 314.7 Smoke Opns. 38

 Details of this operation may be found in Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, a volume in

preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR IL 39

 The M4 floating smoke pot (and improved models M4A1 and M4A2) consisted of a 5-gallon pail

containing twenty-six pounds of HC. This amount filled but one-third of the container, thus creating

the necessary buoyancy.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 335

infantrymen, the floating munitions helped conceal succeeding landing

craft; placed on the beaches they screened exposed flanks. Navy personnel also employed smoke. Some support craft dropped pots; others

were equipped with the Navy Besler smoke generator. This artificial

smoke, combined with the morning mist and the haze of battle, created

limited visibility. As a consequence, the enemy, with limited observation, resorted to a curtain of unobserved fire placed just off the beaches.

This was in decided contrast to the initial situation wherein individual

landing craft were reported to have been sniped at by enemy 8-inch

guns.40

One CWS unit landed on D plus 2 as part of the beach force of VI

Corps. The 24th Decontamination Company, under the direction of

the naval task force, used M1 and M4 smoke pots to screen the

beaches and anchorages. Later, the Navy gave the unit eight Besler

generators, a number gradually increased to thirty-six. Standard practice during the first week, when the issue was often in doubt, was to

create smoke during the hours of evening and morning twilight and

during moonlight, favorite times for German bombers to attack.

During air raid alerts the smoke of the 24th Company usually was

abetted by generators on naval craft. So effective was the smoke screen

that beach and harbor were often concealed within three minutes of

the alert. During the nights smoke came to assume the primary position

among antiaircraft defenses.

Average daily expenditures during the first week on the Salerno

beaches were 250 M1 and 100 M4 smoke pots and 5,000 gallons of fog

oil. One of the principal difficulties encountered was the burning glow

of the smoke pots which often served as aiming points for enemy

bombers.41

Despite this handicap the smoke mission received new respect in the

strongly contested battle for the Salerno beachhead. Troops and landing craft welcomed anything that would make them less vulnerable,

and the pots and generators manned by infantrymen, sailors, and CWS

40

 (1) James, Observations During Operation AVALANCHE. (2) Professor Morison does not mention

smoke in his account of the battle although he includes a photograph (opposite page 282) of a PT

(patrol boat, motor torpedo boat) boat laying smoke. (Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United

States Naval Operations in World War II," vol. IX, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, January 1943-June 1944

(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1954). 41

 This objection was voiced by several Navy observers as cited in CWS Theater of Operations Letter

No. 15, 21 June 1944, pages 26-27.
336 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

troops provided effective concealment from enemy fire.42 It was the

opinion of naval officers with the shore control party at Salerno that

the smoke screen saved many lives and landing craft.43

Anzio

The bold end run of Fifth Army's VI Corps at Anzio has provoked

much debate among postwar strategists, both armchair and professional.

At the time, its planners felt that this maneuver would be the best way

to break the stalemate encountered in front of the formidable German

defenses which formed the Gustav Line. Unfortunately, Operation

SHINGLE fell far short of expectations. The enemy responded quickly

to the "abscess" in its flank and contained the beachhead in beleagured

impotency from its establishment on 22 January 1944 until the Allied

breakout in the following May.44

As at Salerno, provision was made for a large area screen for the

Anzio beachhead. Again as at Salerno, the 24th Decontamination

Company was assigned this mission. The company, equipped with M1

and M4 pots and with eight Navy Besler generators, landed on D-day.

On its first night ashore the unit smoked the beaches and anchorage,

and within two days it had set up a smoke line almost two miles long.

As the beachhead forces were augmented, other smoke troops, including

a British unit and the U.S. 179th Smoke Generator Company, moved

to Anzio to increase the size of the screen.45

Initially, smoke at Anzio was intended to be part of the antiaircraft

screen. Experience had shown that a favorite enemy tactic was low

level bomber attacks at dawn and at dusk. Consequently, it soon

became standard practice to screen the port each day during the

periods of dawn and dusk. The smoke troops also operated during red

alerts at night, for smoke again proved to be the best antiaircraft

defense during the hours of darkness. Throughout the first three weeks

the Luftwaffe made at least one raid each night. Flares dropped by

42

 (1) AGF Board Rpt, pt. V, NATO, 10 Nov 43, cited in CWS TofO Ltr No. 9, 31 Dec 43, p. 10.

(2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 12, 31 Mar 44, p. 32. 43

 James, Observations During Opn AVALANCHE. 44

 Nevertheless, the Anzio landing had a concrete effect on the over-all German war strategy, for the

enemy interpreted it as the first of a series of peripheral attacks aimed at dispersing German reserve

forces in Europe. The enemy also reacted with special vigor in order to gain the prestige of destroying

an Allied beachhead. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 232-33, 234. 45

 (1) Fifth Army History of Activities, 22 Jan 43. (2) AFHQ, History of AA and Tactical

Smoke Screening in North African and Italian Theaters Between 1 Jan and 31 Dec 44, p. 11.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 337

lead planes seemed to be extinguished as they dropped into the screen.

During daylight raids antiaircraft artillery and fighter planes constituted the sole defense.46

The decrease in the number of enemy air raids after mid-February,

caused by effective antiaircraft defenses, brought little relief to the

port and beachhead at Anzio, for the reduction of air attacks was

accompanied by an increase in long-range artillery fire. Along the

periphery of the beachhead and in the bordering mountains were

innumerable enemy observation posts. Farm houses suspected of harboring German observers were demolished with 8-inch howitzers, and

towers and nearby ridges were blanketed by chemical mortar and

artillery smoke shell. But the mountains in the background continued

to afford the enemy unrestricted view of beach installations and ships

in the harbor. Although the entire Allied beachhead lay within range

of enemy guns, the air defense, artillery, and naval commanders at

first objected to smoking the beach and harbor during daytime because

of possible interference with observation for friendly gunfire and with

the unloading of the ships in the anchorage. This valid complaint was

something to be reckoned with. Yet the losses incurred from enemy

bombers and artillery were also worth taking into account. From 22

January through 10 February, for example, a daily average of almost

twenty-eight tons of Allied ammunition was blown up by these means.47

To resolve this problem chemical officers, with the approval of Maj.

Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., the corps commander, came up with a

new technique for the mechanical smoke generator—the production

of a light haze in the area between the harbor and the front lines, thin

enough to permit normal operations within it, thick enough to prevent

German observation from the encircling hills.48

To apply this technique the 179th Smoke Generator Company on

18 March moved from the harbor area toward the forward positions.

The smoke line, now forming a 15-mile arc around the port, included

nineteen generator positions on land and two generators mounted on

Navy patrol craft in the harbor. (Map 4) The latter prevented enemy

observation from the flanks of the concave contour of the coast line.

46

 Col Walter A. Guild, "That Damned Smoke Again," vol. LIV, No. 10, Infantry Journal (October,

1944) pp. 25-28. (Colonel Guild served as VI Corps chemical officer during the Anzio operation.) 47

 Anzio Beachhead, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES (Washington, 1947), p. no. 48

 (1) Ltr, CmlO AFHQ to OCCWS, 11 Mar 44, sub: Smoke at Anzio Bridgehead. (2) Guild,

"That Damned Smoke Again," Infantry Journal (October, 1944).
338 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MAP 4

After a period of trial, error, and compromise the smoke line was

established just beyond the antiaircraft positions of the port and just

short of the field artillery observation posts. The line was divided into

four sections with generators spaced at 1,000-yard intervals. Smoke

positions were connected by telephones, and each section had radio

communication with the command post. The amount of smoke needed

was determined by an observation tower in Nettuno, abetted at times

by liaison planes borrowed from the artillery. Each hour an Air Forces
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 339

meteorology section provided weather data. Operations began one-half

hour before dawn and ended one-half hour after sunset.49

The result was a light haze which, regardless of wind direction,

denied observation to the enemy without restricting movement within

the beachhead. Under concealment of this haze trucks were driven

off LST's (landing ships, tank) onto the beach, unloaded, and returned

to the ships unmolested. This was a particularly important operation

as the Allied troops at Anzio received an average of 3,500 tons of

supplies a day for the 6 months after the January landings.50

Radio interception disclosed that German artillery was on the alert

during daylight hours to take advantage of sudden wind changes which

afforded brief views through the screen. Objections to the daylight

screen which commanders had raised during the planning stage disappeared after the smoke operation began. Allied artillery units even

requested and obtained additional daylight screening to hide the flash

of guns, thus inaugurating a new mission for smoke generators.51

Another unusual mission of the 1799th was in the interest of health.

Generators, run at a reduced temperature for fifteen minutes during

the morning and evening, spread a thin film of oil over the area. This

oil film settled on the water and killed the larvae of the malarial mosquito, long a menace in the area.52

Soldiers going ashore at Anzio sometimes did not realize that smoke

was being used. Lt. Raymond C. Stillger, who landed with the 34th

Infantry Division three days after the daylight screening began, thought

that the haze was a result of either a natural morning mist or smoke

and dust from the battlefield. He noted that the mountain ranges were

not visible from the harbor and that the artillery fire which dropped

offshore was ineffective. When his unit moved forward, Stillger saw

that the haze rarely drifted to within a mile of his position, usually

remaining well to the rear. This was good; the infantry did not want

the smoke to its front lest the Germans counterattack under cover of

the screen. During the two months which Stillger spent in the line, it

49

 (1) Guild, "That Damned Smoke Again," Infantry Journal (October, 1944). (2) 179th Smoke

Generator Co, Opnl Memo No. 1, 1 Aug 44, sub: Method and Lessons Learned on the Anzio Beachhead.

(3) Interv, Hist Off with Capt Morris W. Lofton, 13 Mar 46. (Captain Lofton, the author of the

operational memo, served as operations officer of the 179th at Anzio.) 50

 Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, 30 Nov 45, p. 106. Beach gradients at Anzio permitted this ship-to-shore unloading. 51

 Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to CCWS, 14 Apr 44, sub: Status of Cml Units in the Fifth Army. 52

 Opnl Memo No. 1, 179th Smoke Generator Co.
340 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

was necessary to request a reduction of smoke in his sector on only

two occasions. At the rear it was a different story. After fighting in

the mountains of southern Italy, the average infantryman felt uncovered on the Anzio plain and welcomed the concealment of smoke

haze.53

While the large area screen at Anzio was not as decisive as some commentators would have one believe—"It [the mechanical smoke generator] probably saved the Anzio beachhead. . . ."—54

 its value was

nonetheless considerable. General Truscott commented on the effectiveness of the smoke, which was used extensively "to limit German

observation and reduce the effectiveness of their artillery fires."55

German sources after the war testified to the effectiveness of the "well

prepared and conducted" screening operations at Anzio which obstructed observation and interfered with defensive and direct fire.56

Perhaps the situation was best summed up in the observations of Bill

Mauldin's incomparable Willie and Joe.

The Invasion of Southern France

With the successful completion of the Sicilian operation in the summer of 1943 the Seventh U.S. Army became nonoperational, its headquarters reduced to caretaker status.57

 Then in January 1944 Allied

Force Headquarters directed it to form a planning group for an operation against southern France to be mounted sometime in the following

May. After considerable debate at the highest echelons DRAGOON

(it was first called ANVIL) was given a definite time, place, and

implementing force. These were 15 August 1944, a series of beaches

east of Toulon, and Seventh Army's VI Corps.58 The corps got three

experienced infantry divisions for the operation, the 3d, 45th, and 36th.

Because of the mountains bordering the narrow beaches of the assault areas, the enemy could have excellent observation of the landing

53

 Interv, Hist Off with Capt Raymond C. Stillger, 29 Nov 50. 54

 Baxter, Scientists Against Time, p. 287. 55

 Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Command Missions: A Personal Story (New York: E. P. Dutton,

1954). P. 457. 56Herman Ochsner (formerly a major general in the German Army), CmlC Hist Study No. 2,

History of German Cml Warfare in World War II, pt. I, The Military Aspect, p. 30. 57

 For a complete account of the invasion of southern France, see Robert Ross Smith, The Riviera to

the Rhine, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. 58

 Report of Operations—The Seventh United States Army in France and Germany, 1944—1943 (hereafter cited as Seventh Army Opns in ETO) (Heidelberg, Germany: Heidelberg Gutenberg Printing Co.,

May 1946), I, chs. I-V, 1-115.

342 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

force. Cognizant of the terrain and with the experience of Salerno and

Anzio behind it, the Navy was eager to screen the assault force and

anchorage from artillery fire and bomber aircraft. Its smoke plan,

drawn up to provide concealment for beach and bay, was quite complete. Each Navy and merchant vessel had several means of producing

smoke—with smoke pots, liquid smoke, and fog oil for the Besler

generators furnished by Seventh Army's Chemical Section.59 CWS

troops attached to the assault divisions were prepared to land at Hhour, screen the flanks of the several beachheads, and be ready to

conceal the assault boats in case of offshore winds. Once the landings

were secure these CWS parties, under control of the engineer shore

groups, would be ready to shield supply dumps and anchorage from

air attack.60

The smoke troops again were to come from a chemical decontamination company, this time the 21st. On 25 March 1944 the unit's 2d

Platoon moved from Palermo to a beach near Oran, where it was attached to the 40th Engineer Combat Regiment to prepare for the

invasion. Practice in assault landings and in the erection of beachhead

smoke lines constituted the bulk of this unit's training. In turn, the

Engineers gained the experience of working in a haze limiting visibility

to fifty yards. By June the platoon rejoined the 21st in Italy where it

passed on its recently acquired amphibious experience to its three

sister platoons.61

During the last weeks of July and the first week of August the three

divisions which were to make the assault and their supporting troops

underwent brief but effective practice for the appointed task.62 The

culminating point was a full dress exercise in which the conditions

expected on the beaches of southern France were realistically duplicated.

Live ammunition, beach obstacles, and smoke screens helped to achieve

authenticity.63

59

 Seventh Army Cml Sec, Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 44 to 31 Oct 44. A unique employment of the liquid

smoke saw LCM's (landing craft, mechanized) equipped with a contraption which forced the FS smoke

through an ejection pipe where it was dispersed in a cloud by the blast of an airplane propeller. 60

 (1) Ibid. (2) Cml Annex to Field Order, 40th Engineer Combat Regt, 23 Jul 44 (included as

an. 4 to the Seventh Army report.) 61

 Seventh Army Cml Sec Hist Rpt, 1 Jan—31 Oct 44, an. 199, in R. G. 207.3. 62

 Assignment of the platoons of the 21st Chemical Decontamination Company was as follows: the

1st Platoon to the 36th Engineer Shore Group, 3d Division; the 2d to the 40th Engineer Shore Group,

45th Division; and the 3d to the 540th Engineer Shore Group, 36th Division. The 4th Platoon was

held in corps reserve. (1) Ibid. (2) Seventh Army Opns in ETO, III, 909-10. 63

 Seventh Army Opns in ETO, I, 71-89.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 343

The 1st Platoon, 21st Decontamination Company, received an extra

amount of training because the 3d Division had detailed plans for the

use of ground smoke during the initial phases. The additional work

for the platoon, and for a detail of two officers and thirty enlisted men

from the 3d Chemical Mortar Battalion which augmented the division's

smoke troops, was aimed at producing physical hardness, self-reliance,

and proficiency in tactics of the infantryman.

The 3d Division's target area was the St. Tropez Peninsula. Elevations here reached 1,000 to 1,500 feet, providing the defenders with

excellent observation of the sea, the beaches, and the narrow strip of

wooded dunes. The 3d Division's assault areas on the peninsula, designated Red Beach and Yellow Beach, were both flanked by capes, a

situation which enhanced the possibilities of German observation and

provided the motive for the flanking screens of the attacking force.

But if the terrain was unpropitious, its defense was another matter.

Intelligence sources indicated that the enemy would not defend the

area too strongly because of commitments in northwest France. Moreover, the rather skimpy fixed defenses of the area were manned by nonGerman and limited service troops.64

Preceded by heavy naval and air bombardment the VI Corps landed

on 15 August against light resistance. During the actual assault the

Navy used smoke only in the 3d Division sector. Here smoke pots and

generators in landing craft screened the flanks of the boat lanes and

concealed incoming craft from enemy fire. Each of the four smoke

details, two per beach, was to land at H-hour in an LCT. Training

trials had demonstrated that under favorable conditions the detachments with their allotments of 1,200 M1 smoke pots could unload in

about five minutes. It was hoped that the final stage of the trip to

the beach would take place in specially buoyed medium tanks which

were on the LCT's. If this were not possible the pots were to be

floated ashore in rubber boats, or, in an extreme case, the packing boxes

64

 The account of smoke operations in the 3d Division sector is based on: (1) Ltr, CmlO 3d Div to

CmlO Seventh Army, 20 Sep 44, sub: Ground Use of Smoke Pots, M1A1, During Opn DRAGOON; (2)

Ltr, ACmlO 3d Div to CmlO 3d Div, 18 Sep 44, sub: Use of Smoke on Red Beach for the DRAGOON

Opn; (3) Ltr, Platoon Leader, 2d Platoon, 21st Cml Decontamination Co to CO 21st Cml Decontamination Co, 16 Sep 44, sub: Platoon Opn; (4) Ltr, Platoon Leader, 1st Platoon, 21st Cml Decontamination Co to CO 21st Cml Decontamination Co, 16 Sep 44, sub: Opns of 1st Platoon, 21st Cml

Decontamination Co, 15-30 Aug 44; (5) 3d Cml Mortar Bn, Histories, Italy, 1—14 Aug 44, and

Campaign of Southern France, 15-31 Aug 44.
344 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

with the pots enclosed could be tied in tandem and towed ashore by

hand.

The smoke detail on the left flank of Red Beach was led by Lt.

Frank J. Thomas, commanding the 1st Platoon, 21st Company.

According to plan, four amphibious tanks carried the men across the

beach to the railroad about 150 yards beyond. Fanning out to four

positions at loo-yard intervals, the detail began operations within ten

minutes of landing. The smoke line was gradually pushed inland to

a road 250 yards from the beach. Until this time the smoke troops

had not received enemy fire, but now mortar and small arms fire caused

one casualty. No casualties were suffered in the heavily mined

woods through which the smoke troops passed to reach the road.

The detachment from the 1st Platoon, which landed on the right

flank of Red Beach, was led by Capt. Sam Kesner, assistant chemical

officer of the 3d Division. For some reason the landing craft dropped

its amphibious tanks some 1,000 yards from shore. Consequently,

Kesner's party, which remained in the LCT, had to unload its pots

the hard way. Some were thrown into two 6-man rubber boats and

towed to the beach. The rest of the smoke munitions were tossed overboard and floated ashore in their crates, an expedient made necessary

by the pressure of enemy small arms fire. The situation was made more

difficult because the LCT had landed 400 yards to the right of its

assigned area in order to avoid mines. The smoke plan called for four

positions on the beach, a number soon increased to twelve because of

the adverse winds. The smoke detail soon pushed inland about 100

yards, suffering four casualties in the early hours.

The two smoke details in 3d Division's Yellow Beach came from the

3d Chemical Mortar Battalion. Each of the one officer-fifteen enlisted

men details landed at H-hour, meeting conditions not unlike those

found on Red Beach. Because of the offshore mines, the LCT carrying

the right flank party beached south of the assigned area. The group

worked northward into position using smoke grenades for concealment

from small arms fire. Opposition was heavier near the center of the

beach but the smoke screen helped to eliminate observation, with the

result that enemy fire became erratic, ceasing about H plus 30 minutes.

The total length of the two screens on Yellow Beach was 2,000 yards.

Although the smoke mission for DRAGOON was extremely well

planned and executed there was still room for improvement. Captain
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 345

Kesner felt that the eggs should not have been placed in so few baskets—

that a larger number of craft should have carried the members of the

smoke details during the assault. In this way the sinking of any LCT

would not have been an irreparable disaster. Maj. Albert L. Safine,

Chemical Officer, 3d Division, suggested that in landings where enemy

opposition would be substantial (resistance at DRAGOON was weak)

the smoke detail should land at H plus 30 and that the equipment

include amphibious mounted generators.

Smoke in Normal Forward Area Operations

In the struggle for Italy it seemed that the dice were always loaded

in favor of the defense. As a rule the German defenders controlled

the high ground which typified the Italian terrain and thereby kept

the Allies under excellent observation. Such a situation called for a

considerable amount of smoke.

There were several methods for laying smoke under such circumstances. The firing of artillery smoke shells upon enemy observation

points was an old technique, abetted by the introduction of the efficient

4.2-inch mortar. The trouble in Italy was the abundance of observation points, making the blanketing of all of them impracticable.

Another method of preventing enemy observation was the somewhat

difficult job of placing a curtain of smoke between the opposing forces.

More feasible was the covering of friendly positions and movements

by smoke, a technique obviously requiring emplaced rather than projected smoke. Smoke pots were immediately available for this type

of mission, although the harassing, if not toxic, nature of the HC

filling hardly commended them for extensive or extended use. More

often a combination of pots and shells was used. To illustrate, early

on the morning of 13 October 1943, as VI Corps' 3d and 34th Divisions

attacked across the swift moving Volturno River, the 2d and 84th

Chemical Mortar Battalions routinely fired smoke shells on enemy

observation towers in the distant hills. More unusual was the detail

from the 84th Battalion which manned smoke pots for the concealment of bridging sites and exposed approaches. The mission was not

uniformly successful. On the evening of 13 October, for example,

smoke pots set off to conceal bridge building activities drew enemy

artillery fire to the area, a circumstance which made construction impossible. Even though smoke in some cases, particularly in inadequate
346 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

amounts, could thus be a mixed blessing, Company D, 84th Chemical

Mortar Battalion, kept alerted a 100-man detail equipped with 1,000

smoke pots to cover bridge sites.65

Another example of a screen formed by pots and shells occurred in

mid-January 1944. II Corps captured the high ground east of the

Rapido River and began to move up troops and supplies in preparation

for an assault crossing. Because the main supply route, Highway No. 6,

passed through relatively level terrain, it was exposed for a considerable

distance to observed artillery fire from enemy positions on the mountain heights beyond the Rapido.66

 On 18 January troops from the

headquarters of the 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion, under the supervision of Colonel Burn, II Corps chemical officer, screened a section of

the highway with M1 smoke pots. At noon this force was supplemented

by three smoke pot stations manned by troops from one of the firing

companies of the battalion. During that day more than 1,000 enemy

shells fell into the screened area with practically no damage and little

interruption of traffic. Although the smoke interfered with the observation of American artillery, the corps commander considered the

screen essential, and an entire company of the 3d Battalion went forward with 185 tons of smoke pots.67

These two examples demonstrated the need that existed for concealment in the forward areas in Italy and the immediate steps taken to

adapt the smoke pot to the large area mission. These initial attempts,

while generally successful, called attention to the possibilities of the

use of the mechanical generator in similar situations—possibilities which

were soon to be realized.

Smoke on the Garigliano

On 9 March the 88th Infantry Division relieved a British unit on

Fifth Army's extreme left. The sector included the area southeast of

the town of Minturno where Highway No. 7 crossed the Garigliano

not far from where the river emptied into the Tyrrhenian Sea. About

65

 (1) From the Volturno to the Winter Line, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES (Washington, 1944), P. 48. (2) Co D 84th Cml Mortar Bn, Field Jnl, 10-17 Oct 43. (3) Memo, Barker

for Hist Off, 4 Feb 47. (4) Interv, Hist Off with Capt Ernest H. Davis, former CO Co C 84th Cml

Mortar Bn, 27 Jun 45. 66

 See Fifth Army at the Winter Line, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES (Washington,

1945), illustration, p. 66. 67

 (1) 2d Cml Bn S-3, Jnl, Jan 44. (2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 11, 9 Mar 44, p. 15. (3) Fifth Army

Cml Sec Daily Jnl, 19 Jan 44. (4) Co C 2d Cml Bn Jnl, 19 Jan 44.
EFFECT OF SMOKE CURTAIN, ITALY. Bridge site before screening (above). Same

bridge after screening, with background obliterated (below).
348 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

CARRYING SMOKE POTS INTO POSITION IN THE RAPIDO RIVER AREA

five miles up the coast stood Mount Scouri which, with the hill masses

above Minturno, provided the Germans with excellent observation of

the road network in the valley. Particularly vulnerable was Highway

7 along which passed all troops and supplies for the II Corps front.

The British had used smoke pots around the river's main bridge, a practice continued by American troops. On 28 March the 172d Smoke

Generator Company, recently freed from duty at Naples, undertook

the large area smoke mission in this area.68 The new smoke installation

also centered on the bridge. (Map 5) This vital point was encircled

by a ring of 10 smoke pot positions having a 200-yard radius. The

nucleus of the screen was a circle of mechanical generators 600 yards

from the bridge. Just offshore, generators in small craft lent substance

68

 The account of the Garigliano screen is based on: (1) Fifth Army Cml Sec Rpt, n.d. (ca. April

44), sub: Defensive Smoke in Current Fifth Army Opns; (2) Col. Maurice E. Barker, "Smoke for

River Crossings," Infantry Journal, LVIII, No. 1 (January, 1946), 37-41; (3) Interv, Hist Off with

Maj Richard C. Burn, formerly CO 172d Smoke Generator Co, 30 Jan 47.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 349

MAP 5

to the left flank of the screen, an expedient made necessary by the

prevailing onshore winds.

In an effort to nullify the effectiveness of enemy artillery each generator had three prepared positions. Under cover of darkness the crews

moved their generators from position to position always eschewing

regularity and pattern in a generally successful attempt at hiding exact

locations. The area between the river and the enemy lines was dotted

with other pot and generator positions picked primarily to deny observation between the bridge and Minturno. The most advanced of
350 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

these were within 500 yards of the enemy and about 200 yards beyond

friendly infantry strongholds. Lesser installations concealed other

bridges over the Garigliano and road junctions and portions of the highway farther to the rear. From his post at Minturno a smoke control

officer supervised the installation, regulating the emission of smoke so

that a uniform haze was maintained during all daylight hours as well

as during moonlight nights and nocturnal air raids.

In this its first forward area mission the 172d Company quite naturally met with problems not found in rear area screening. For one

thing, the unit worked in two shifts because of the necessity of a

constant daytime screen as well as the possibility of operations at night.

(Installations at the rear, it will be remembered, did not include smoke

among their daytime antiaircraft defenses.) The problem of security

was greater because of the danger of enemy patrols. Communications

maintenance increased appreciably and the need for continuous fog oil

resupply in an area both difficult and dangerous to reach involved

problems unknown at the port screen at Naples.

Large Area Screening in Northern Italy

Stymied by swift German reaction to Operation SHINGLE (Anzio)

on one hand, and by the strong Gustav Line on the other, the Fifth

Army did not capture Rome until early June 1944. Later that summer,

the much debated invasion of southern France became a reality and

drew off in the process a large part of Fifth Army strength, in fact,

the entire VI Corps. Six of the nine CWS companies capable of

smoke operations were included in the departing force; remaining

were the 172d and 179th Smoke Generator Companies and the 24th

Chemical Decontamination Company, the latter experienced in smoke

operations but soon diverted to chemical depot operations. As a result,

the means to pursue a successful forward area smoke mission were

seriously impaired, especially when the recently won ports of Civitavecchia, Piombino, and Leghorn were requiring what were to be the

last vestiges of port screening in the Italian campaign. By September

the 172d and 179th were released from the Leghorn operation and

placed in support of II and IV Corps, respectively, attachments which

were to last until the end of the war.

That same month saw the beginning of a concerted effort by the

15th Army Group to penetrate the Gothic Line to which the Axis
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 351

had withdrawn after the fall of Rome. The natural strength of this

position, which crossed Italy between Florence and Bologna, combined

with the weakened state of the Allied forces, resulted, after an initial

Fifth Army penetration, in eventual stalemate.

During the first month of the offensive the 172d Company concealed

bridge sites on the Sieve and Santerno Rivers. In each case, accurate

German artillery fire became ineffective once smoke was employed.69

The divisions in the II Corps sector at first made spectacular gains,

reaching a point on Highway No. 65 above Livergnano within twelve

Miles of Bologna. Here the advance stopped, and there was to be

little change in the front line until the following April. On the left

shoulder of this penetration, strong German resistance denied Fifth

Army Mount Adone and the hill mass at Monterumici, with the resultant variation on a Familiar theme—from these vantage points the enemy retained direct observation of Highway No. 65, the main supply

route for the section.70

In partial answer to this threat on the supply route, the 172d Smoke

Generator Company maintained a smoke line from 16 October 1944

until 14 April 1945. For 181 days, except when the weather made

screening unnecessary or when II Corps for one reason or another

needed perfect visibility in the area, the smoke haze concealed friendly

movements along a 2-Mile stretch of the highway. Periods of bright

moonlight sometimes forced the 172d to operate on a 24-hour basis.

Although the enemy was only about two Miles away vehicles drove

along the road without difficulty. The smoke was also of value to

patrols and other troops moving across exposed areas. By reducing

the danger and dread of observed fire the operation on Highway No.

65—the longest continuous forward area smoke screen in World War

II—was both a material and psychological aid.

The 172d, with some outside help, performed another important

Mission while at Livergnano. From 25 January to 27 March 1945 a

detachment from the company screened the road network in the

Sillaro Valley which supplied both the U.S. II Corps and British

Eighth Army sectors. The most vital part of this network was the

69

 See photographs on page 347, above. 70

 This section on operations in northern Italy is based on: (1) 172d and 179th Smoke Generator Co

Journals; (2) Fifth Army Cml Sec Jnl, 25 Feb-3 Mar 45; (3) Lt. Col. Houston Joyner, CWS, "They

Couldn't See Down Into the Valley," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, III, No. 2 (October, 1948).
352 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

SMOKE SCREEN CONCEALS MOVEMENTS ALONG HIGHWAY

crossroads at San Clemente, the site of a smoke pot screen manned

first by the 88th Division and then by British troops, since the capture

of the town in October. The undesirable characteristics of the HC

pots led to a successful January trial of a smoke installation featuring

the recently developed M1 mechanical generator. Captured enemy

patrols admitted the effectiveness of this installation which concealed

vehicular traffic, troop concentrations, supply dumps, and artillery

positions of American and British forces.

On the IV Corps front the 179th Company supported operations

ranging from the Ligurian coast to the Serchio Valley and Highway

No. 64. Because of the distance between these Missions—in the IV

Corps sector Highway 64 was over forty Miles from the sea—the unit's

two platoons operated separately. The 1st Platoon, between Highway

No. 1 and the sea, screened the coastal plain north of Viareggio.

Detachments from the platoon were split off to fulfill other Missions:

screens for bridge sites and tank attacks and hazes for daylight patrols.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 353

On 5 November, the 2d Platoon began a 102-day haze to cover an

exposed stretch of Highway 64, as well as several supply installations,

in the right sector of IV Corps. Just as in the case of Highway 65

south of Bologna, before the haze daytime traffic on the road always

drew fire. Afterward, the amount of enemy fire noticeably decreased,

bridges were built and strengthened without interruption, and traffic

passed with little interference.

As World War II began, the large area screen was designed to

conceal rear area installations. American and British smoke units and

equipment in North Africa successfully demonstrated the validity of

this Mission and the adequacy of the smoke munitions. Once the scene

of fighting shifted to the mainland of Italy doctrine for large area

screens saw a drastic expansion. True, the old Mission remained—as

witness the smoke installation at the Naples complex, the largest of its

kind of the war. But added to this was the use of smoke in assault

landings and during the more conventional type of front-line operations. The evolution of the front-line Mission was dependent upon

several factors. First was the peculiar nature of the terrain in Italy,

where circumstances and geography conspired to have the Allied forces

continually advance under the superior observation of the enemy and

against his deadly fire. The second factor was the Limitations of conventional front-line smoke munitions—artillery and mortar shells and

the smoke pots. And last, the gradual diminution of the power of the

Luftwaffe and the consequent lessening of the need for port screening

released smoke units, never in abundance in Italy, for the fulfillment

of the new Mission.

Forward area screening encountered the stiff and legitimate objections of such diverse sources as the field artillery and the supporting

naval units. The problem, of course, was observation. Smoke did

contend with these effective and established elements, and CWS officers

took great care to see that the nature of these smoke screens was complementing, not competing.
CHAPTER IX

Large Area Smoke Screens

in the ETO

The Invasion of Normandy

Almost from the very beginning of their labors Allied planners for

the cross-Channel attack contemplated the use of smoke for the beaches

in France and the ports that were to be developed there. In 1942 the

combined British-American planning organization included an antiaircraft committee which, in turn, had a smoke subcommittee. The

logistical computations for the British Haslar generator, the best model

then available to the Allies, indicated such large requirements for oil

as seriously to limit extensive use of the technique of large area screening. Fortunately, at this time the National Defense Research ComMittee brought out the M1 mechanical generator, news of which sent

a Mission hurrying from England to the United States. Colonel Montgomery, the American representative, reported that the new generator

was five times as efficient as any existing smoke device. Substitution of

the M1 for the Haslar enabled smoke planners to draw up oil requirements which were far more reasonable.1

The development of the new generator prompted attempts by CWS

staff officers in England to get a smoke generator company for the

theater. War Department inquiries about the requirements for such

units got little response from the Eighth Air Force, which came to

the conclusion that the advantages of airdrome concealment were

equaled or outweighed by the interference of smoke with operations.

But SOS authorities in the theater showed interest in smoke as a means

of concealing supply installations and later included the ports in

1

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Col MacArthur, 23 Nov 45. MacArthur participated in the smoke

planning for the invasion, later becoming Chemical Officer, 12th Army Group. (2) Col Montgomery

to CG ETO, 14 Oct 42, Rpt of American Representatives, British-American Large Area Smoke Mission

to the U.S. CWS Ret 470.7-2815.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 355

Great Britain through which flowed the build-up of troops and supplies

from the United States. Diminishing German air raids reduced theater

interest in this type of activity, although during Mid-1943 planners

envisioned the use of some twenty or twenty-four smoke companies

to conceal continental ports once the invasion was under way.2

With the return of General Eisenhower to London from the Mediterranean area in January 1944, planning for the cross-Channel attack

began to take final shape. The troop basis for U.S. smoke generator

troops now totaled twelve companies, organized into three battalions.

Although these were originally listed as SOS units with a primary

Mission of rear area screening, Colonel MacArthur, CWS representative in the planning group, insisted that one smoke battalion be earmarked for tactical employment with the combat forces.3

 And it was

to be in this role, rather than through their part in the concealment

of rear areas, that smoke units were to make their most effective

contribution.

Brigadier G. H. Pennycock, director of chemical warfare for the

British 21 Army Group, co-ordinated Allied smoke screening plans for

the initial phase of the invasion. Colonel Coughlan, FUSA chemical

officer, was in turn responsible for the operational plans for American

forces. One problem which had been troubling First Army, the difficulty of landing the heavy M1 generators on the Normandy beaches,

was eliminated almost on the eve of the assault with the arrival of the

M1 generator which had a dry weight of only 172 pounds. Smoke

troops received the first M2 on 13 May, 7 more on 24 May, 50 on the

28th, and 27 between that date and 3 June.4

Final plans for the use of large area smoke screens during the crossChannel attack provided for smoke over the ports of England from

which the invasion would be mounted and smoke over OMAHA and

UTAH beaches in Normandy. In both cases the screens would be used

as a means of concealing activity from German aircraft. The companies

of the 24th and 25th Smoke Generator Battalions received the English

port assignment; the 23d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. William

M. Fiske and including the 79th, 80th, 84th, and 161st Smoke Generator Companies, was earmarked for duty at OMAHA Beach, but not

2

 Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, pp. 85-87. This monograph contains a

detailed account of smoke planning and operations in the European theater. 3

 MacArthur Interv, 23 Nov 45. 4

 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn Unit Diary, 18 Apr-3 Jun 43.
356 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

for the first three days of the operation. Chemical decontamination

troops, scheduled to go ashore with the initial landings, were at first

to use smoke pots and M2 generators to provide any necessary smoke.

The 23d Battalion, with two companies on land and two on offshore

trawlers, would assume responsibility for the antiaircraft smoke at

OMAHA Beach on D plus 3.5

Once these general plans for smoke operations were completed, the

units which were to take part could begin realistic training for their

projected tasks. The 30th, 31st, and 33d Decontamination Companies

received such training and were attached to engineer special brigades

for the operation. The 79th and 80th Smoke Generator Companies,

designated as the sea group of the 23d Battalion, had to become accustomed to working and living on trawlers. Their offshore employment

also presented communications problems which had to be worked out

by the battalion. In order to insure the necessary timing and co-ordination the 23d was attached to the 49th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade

which had control of smoke although subject to the approval of the

naval command and the veto of the tactical air command.

The two smoke generator battalions assigned to the English ports

naturally began operations before the actual day of the invasion. The

25th, comprising the 85th, 86th, 165th, and 171st Smoke Generator

Companies, furnished smoke in the Weymouth-Portland area. During

the last part of May the Luftwaffe attacked the area three different

times inflicting damage only during raids when the battalion was not

ordered to make smoke. The 24th Battalion (81st, 82d, 87th, and

167th Smoke Generator Companies), part of which saw action in the

vicinity of Brixham, made smoke on fewer occasions than did the

25th.6

The 33d Chemical Decontamination Company landed on UTAH

Beach on D-day with the multiple Mission of decontamination reconnaissance, smoke, and CWS supply.7

 Although by that afternoon the

unit was prepared to provide smoke on call from VII Corps, the

German Air Force failed to appear in strength and the need for smoke

never materialized. As a consequence, the 33d's main Mission became

that of supply; the CWS dump maintained by the unit handled over

5

 Final area smoke plans for the invation appear on FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44, an. 17,

Cml Warfare Sec. 6

 Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, pp. 93-94. 7

 For details of the invasion, see Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 357

5,000 tons of CWS Class II and IV supplies during the first three weeks

on the beachhead.8

Both the 30th and 31st Decontamination Companies saw action on

OMAHA Beach. The former's 1st Platoon landed at H plus 16 Minutes

in the Midst of the most rugged fighting of the invasion with the

Missions of decontamination, smoke, and supply. At first, the platoon

fought along side the infantry using small arms and grenades and later,

when the beachhead was secured, it aided in evacuating wounded and

in clearing Mine fields. During the afternoon the portable generators

that had been lost in the surf at the time of the landings were retrieved

and put into operating condition. As at UTAH, there were no calls

for smoke. The 1st Platoon suffered 25 percent casualties on D-day

and was cited for outstanding performance of duty.9 At 1300 the

3d Platoon landed on OMAHA to be joined by the remainder of the

30th Company on D plus 1. A 25-man detachment of the 31st

Decontamination Company came ashore at H plus 7 hours on 6 June

and was reunited with the rest of the company on the next day. In

activities which followed the pattern set by the other decontamination

companies, the men of the 31st performed a series of secondary duties

in the absence of gas warfare and the need for smoke.10

According to plan, the companies of the 23d Smoke Generator Battalion were to have assumed the smoke Mission at OMAHA on D plus 3.

The land contingent of the battalion, the 84th and 161st Companies,

arrived off the beach on the afternoon of D plus 2 and came ashore

that evening. Both companies experienced a great deal of difficulty.

Men and equipment became separated; some roads indicated on the

map were nonexistent and others were heavily Mined or subject to

enemy fire. Fortunately, few German planes appeared over the area

and smoke was not required.11

The 79th and 80th Smoke Generator Companies, with their men and

M1 smoke generators aboard thirty of His Majesty's trawlers, on 9

June arrived off OMAHA Beach, where they served as the offshore

element of the 23d Battalion smoke installation. But they received no

requests for smoke. The great storm of 18-21 June wrecked some of

8

 (1) 33d Cml Decontamination Co Hist Resume. CMLHO. (2) Pritchard, Smoke Generator

Opns in MTO and ETO, p. 94. 9

 (1) WD GO 21, 30 Mar 45. (2) The 1st Platoon also received the French Croix de Guerre with

Silver-Gilt Star. DA GO 24, 10 Dec 47. 10

 31st Cml Decontamination Co, Hist Resume. 11

 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn Unit Diary, June 44.
358 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

M2 SMOKE GENERATOR

the trawlers and others returned to England for repair and refueling,

never to return to OMAHA. Some offshore smoke troops did provide

screens at Port en Bessin where both British and Americans were bringing ashore fuel oil and lubricants. Here, in co-ordination with the

British, the smoke trawlers stood ready to provide screens at twilight

and during nocturnal red alerts as long as this important facility seemed

threatened.12

During the critical period while the Allies were fighting to secure a

firm foothold in Normandy, the landing beaches were virtually free

from bombing from the air, and the need for beachhead and port

screening did not materialize. Equipped with M1 generators, the companies of one smoke battalion did take positions around Cherbourg and

remained on the alert until Mid-August, although the need for smoke

never arose. Under circumstances such as these, smoke units received

12

 (1) 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn Unit Diary, Jun-Jul 44. (2) 79th and 80th Smoke Generator

Cos Unit Diaries, Jun 44.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 359

unrelated secondary Missions, mostly involving trucking duties. Consequently, when an opportune time did arise for using smoke in close

support of tactical operations the companies were busy performing

other tasks.

The Generators, Units, and Missions

The most influential factor in the development of the Mission of

forward area screening in the European theater was the appearance of

the M1 mechanical smoke generator. This compact, efficient generator

enabled chemical troops to establish effective smoke installations in those

areas of the battlefield subject to enemy small arms fire. For example,

the M1 could be emplaced on the near bank in an assault river crossing

and ferried to the far side as soon as that area was cleared of enemy

opposition. The M1 mechanical generator, as already mentioned,

weighed only 171 pounds as compared to the ton and a half figure of

the M1. Employing the same principle as its predecessor, the M1 drew

its fog oil from an external source, usually a 55-gallon drum, and was

capable of producing smoke one Minute after it started operation,

whereas it took the M1 five Minutes. The new model consumed about

fifty gallons of fog oil in an hour compared to twice that amount for

its predecessor.13

A total of five smoke generator battalions saw action in the European

Theater of Operations. The need for some organization for the admin istratio-n 

evident in Italy in connection with the complex Naples installation

with its several smoke companies. Consequently, three battalion headquarters and headquarters detachments, the 23d, 14th, and 15th, were

organized just before the cross-Channel attack. Later the 22d Smoke

Generator Battalion entered the theater as a supporting unit of Seventh

Army, and the 27th Battalion, activated in the zone of interior in July

1944, was placed in support of Ninth Army.

The basic smoke unit was the smoke generator company, 15 of which

saw action in the European theater. A smoke company consisted of a

company headquarters, headquarters platoon, and operations platoon.

The operations platoon comprised 4 sections, each section having 6

squads. A company equipped with M2's had a total of 50 generators,

13

 For more on the development and characteristics of the several CWS mechanical smoke generators,

see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field.
360 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

2 per operations squad and 2 with company headquarters. Personnel

of this smoke company numbered 4 officers and 131 enlisted men.14

The same company with the identical number of troops would have

been equipped with only 24 M1 generators, or one per operations squad.

The mission which smoke units had originally considered their most

important, the concealment of ports, never materialized in the European Theater of Operations. Experience at the time of the crossChannel attack indicated that the Luftwaffe was not strong enough

to jeopardize these basic supply installations, and this situation did not

change throughout the rest of the war. Seventh Army did maintain

a rather extensive smoke installation at Marseille during the period

September to November 1944, but at no time did the Luftwaffe seriously threaten the port.15

The large area screening mission in the European theater did not

undergo the slow transition from rear to forward areas that had

marked the fighting in North Africa and Italy. The absence of any

great threat by the enemy air force and the development of a mobile

generator meant almost from the first that the smoke companies in the

ETO would play their most significant role in the forward areas,

that is, if they were to play a smoke role at all. Initially, when the

German air threat failed to materialize, the smoke units found themselves assigned to a series of secondary missions— transportation, guard,

and security details. Early in the fall of 1944 only four of the twelve

companies assigned to the theater were available for forward area

smoke operations.16 While at times the assignment of smoke companies

to other missions was understandable in the absence of tactical situations

which called for concealment, in other cases the transfer was not

justified. The First Army, for example, could often have used smoke

units in forward operations but refused to do so until the time of the

Rhine crossings.

But gradually smoke companies began fulfilling forward area missions as the situation warranted. These could be of several kinds.

Screens were used to conceal main supply routes. Seventh Army employed smoke units in this manner as much as any other army in the

14

 TOE 3-267, 4 May 44. 15

 (1) See Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, pp. 215-19. (2) Two U.S. smoke

companies operated with the British at Antwerp for more than two months and smoked the Scheldt

River and the approaches to the city. 16

 Ltr, CCmlO ETO COMZ to CCWS, 20 Sep 44, sub: Tactical Use of Smoke Generator Cos. CWS

314.7.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 361

theater, perhaps because of its previous experience in Italy. Commanders occasionally used smoke haze to cover the advance or withdrawal of troops or to cover a unit attacking a fortified position.17

But there can be no doubt whatever that mechanical smoke generators

played their most important role in the theater by concealing American

troops as they crossed many of the rivers which had temporarily

blocked the way to eventual victory. The first such operation took

place early in September at the Moselle River.

The Use of Smoke at River Crossings

General Patton's Third U.S. Army became operational on 1 August

1944 and shortly thereafter began its rapid advance across France. By

the end of August its forward units, outrunning their supplies of oil

and gasoline, ground to a halt east of the Meuse. When the advance

resumed early in September, Third Army faced an enemy with a

second wind and rather good defensive positions behind the Moselle

River.

As long as the Third Army had been rolling forward it doubtless

had been more concerned with fuel oil than fog oil. Its rapid advance

of August left little room for the tactics of concealment, smoke or

otherwise. Consequently, those smoke troops which had been assigned

to Third Army had left their generators and turned to transportation

duties on the supply line, whose tail extended clear back to the Normandy beaches.

On 6 September Patton's XX Corps renewed the advance with the

7th Armored Division in the van, its mission the seizure of crossing

sites over the Moselle. The 5th Infantry Division, following hard on

the heels of the 7th, prepared to force a crossing if the armored attack

failed. On 7 September the corps commander, Maj. Gen. Walton

Walker, ordered the 5th Division to pass through the 7th Armored

and establish a bridgehead on the east bank of the Moselle at Dornot,

six miles southeast of the fortress city of Metz. This initial attack

across the Moselle proved abortive and two days later, 10 September,

the 5th Division abandoned the precarious bridgehead. On the same

17

 For details of these operations, see Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO.
362 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

day the 10th Infantry, 5th Division, crossed the Moselle at Arnaville,

three miles south of the site of the unsuccessful crossing.18

The Arnaville Crossing

The 84th Smoke Generator Company was hastily recalled from its

transportation duties to support the Arnaville crossing. The excellence

of German artillery and observation was such as to recommend the

possibilities of smoke as a means of concealing the exposed crossing site.

At this time the possibilities of the M1 generator were not widely

known in Third Army; in fact large area smoke screens in tactical

situations had evolved rather recently. This screen at the Arnaville

assault and bridging sites was thus to provide new experiences for the

various people involved—the infantry, the engineers, and the men of

the smoke company.19

At the site of the crossing in the narrow valley of the Moselle, a

railroad, a canal, and the river roughly parallel each other in a 500-yard

belt. A small stream, the Rupt de Mad, flows through the Arnaville

gap, passes under the railroad and canal, and empties into the river.

East of the river lay a strip of open land beyond which rose the hills

which were occupied by the enemy. North-south roads on each side

of the river mark the division between river flats and the beginning

of the hills. On clear days the Germans had observation of the Arnaville area from 5 or 6 miles down (north) the river and from 3 or 4

miles up the valley.

18

 Two other volumes in the series U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II provide additional material on

this battle and on the campaign of which it was a part. Hugh M. Cole's excellent The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, 1959) deals with Third Army Operations in Lorraine during the period SeptemberDecember 1944. In the volume Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt, by Charles B. MacDonald and Sidney T. Mathews (Washington, 1952), MacDonald gives a detailed and graphic account

of the Arnaville crossings. Both can be profitable to a reader desiring further information on operations

of Third Army in the Lorraine Campaign. For additional details on the use of smoke at Arnaville, see

again Pritchard, Smoke Generator Operations in the MTO and ETO, pages 107-25, a work on which this

present account relied heavily. 19

 Chief sources for this account are: (1) CO 84th Cml Smoke Generator Co, Opn Rpt, Vicinity

Arnaville, France, 17 Sep 44; (2) CO 84th Cml Smoke Generator Co, Final Opns Rpt, Arnaville,

France, 10-21 Sep 44; (3) Lt Col Levin B. Cottingham, Employ of a Smoke Generator Co in an

Assault Crossing of the Moselle River, n.d. (ca. 21 Sep 44); (4) 12th Army Group Immediate Rpt

No. 68, I, Use of Smoke in Crossing of the Moselle River, 28 Sep 44; (5) Intervs, Cottingham (formerly CmlO 5th Inf Div), 1 Oct 45, 9 Oct 45, 19 Mar 46, 25 Sep 46; (6) Rpt of Lt Col William H.

Greene (formerly CmlO XX Corps) on the smoking operations at Arnaville, France, 10 Sep 44, dated

11 Nov 47, all in CMLHO; (7) TUSA AAR, I, 68-81; (8) 5th Inf Div G-3 AAR, Sep 44,

Orgn Files, ETO; (9) 5th Division Historical Section, The Fifth Division in the ETO (Atlanta: Albert

Love Enterprises, 1945).
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 363

Early on 9 September Col. Robert P. Bell, commanding the 10th

Infantry, and a party went forward to examine the crossing site.

Despite the presence of enemy mines they were able to select suitable

approaches and found two footbridges over the canal. They also determined that the river banks were suitable for the launching of assault

boats and the erection of adequate bridges once the area was secured.

In quest of surprise, the artillery plan stipulated that there would

be no preparatory fire preceding the crossing. But smoke from the

generators of the 84th Company was expected to conceal the crossing

sites as dawn broke on the 10th. Lt. Col. Levin B. Cottingham, chemical

officer of the 5th Division, arranged for a meteorological study of the

area as an aid to the smoke operations. He scanned the daily weather

reports of the Air Forces and the local weather supplements of the

division artillery. Arnaville residents verified that the prevailing winds

were westerly and of low velocity. After a reconnaissance Cottingham

and the commander of the 84th Smoke Generator Company decided

on a line of generators behind Hill 303, some 2,300 yards west of the

crossing site. (Map 6). They expected that the prevailing winds

would carry the smoke from these positions over the crossing sites

and over the flat areas on the far side of the river. Concealed from

enemy air and ground operations, engineers could erect and maintain

the necessary bridges in support of the operation. Generators were not

placed at the crossing site at first because of the unlikelihood of wind

change and because of the 84th's lack of experience under fire. Hill

303 protected the generators from direct enemy artillery and small

arms fire, an important consideration for smoke troops who, far from

battle hardened, had been driving trucks across a quiet countryside

only a few days before. One smoke observation post was established

at the OP of the 10th Infantry's Cannon Company on the crest of

Hill 331, south of Arnaville. Another was located on Hill 303. Cottingham, the smoke control officer at the crossing site, used radio to

keep in touch with the observation posts. The 1103d Engineer Combat

Group, commanded by Lt. Col. George E. Walker, charged with the

bridge building operation, had tactical control of the screen.

Fog oil for the M2 generators was available at the Third Army depot

at Troyes, 180 miles to the rear. Because the organic transportation of

a smoke company was inadequate to cope with such lengthy supply

lines, the division quartermaster lent the trucks for fetching the fog
364 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MAP 6

oil to a company supply area four miles to the rear of the forward

dump behind Hill 303. Company vehicles hauled the oil drums the

rest of the way. In addition to generator smoke, the 84th had a supply

of M1 and M4 smoke pots to be used for patching gaps in generator

smoke and for supplemental screening.

The 84th moved into its positions during the night of 9-10 September and was ready to produce smoke at dawn. Initially the company

set up only twelve generators at Position 1, a number which could be

increased or decreased as the situation demanded since the full complement of fifty generators was available.

At 0115 on 10 September troops of the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry,

began loading into the boats on the near bank of the Moselle. They
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 365

SMOKE SCREEN BEGINS To FORM ON THE MOSELLE RIVER

encountered scattered small arms fire immediately and machine gun

and mortar fire as they advanced over the flat open terrain across the

river, but the first German artillery fire did not fall until daybreak.

By this time the 2d Battalion had also begun its crossing, assisted by

the smoke of the M2 generators which opened up at 0600. Under this

concealment the 2d Battalion completed its crossing, the wounded

were evacuated from the far shore, and supplies and ammunition were

sent across to the embattled troops. By 0800, after close fighting and

heavy casualties, the two battalions had taken two hills. Suddenly at

1000 the wind shifted, causing the screen to dissipate. Enemy artillery

concentrated on the crossing site, now laid bare.

Within an hour Colonel Cottingham and Lt. Frank W. Young, of

the 84th Company, moved four generators down to the side of an

abandoned railroad embankment (Position 2 on the map). Smoke

pots helped conceal the generators as they began to build up a screen,
366 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and by 1200 the crossing site was again covered by smoke. Shortly

before noon Brig. Gen. Alan D. Warnock, assistant division commander, and Cottingham looked for the commanding officer of the

84th Smoke Generator Company to tell him to keep the generators

running continuously, 1st Lt. George R. Lamb, the company executive

officer, was across the river reconnoitering for new emplacements, and

Lieutenant Young continued to direct operations along the near bank.

The company commander could not be found. At this point, Col.

William H. Greene, XX Corps chemical officer, present to inspect the

screening operation, joined Cottingham in a search for company personnel. There were many barrels for fog oil at the dump west of

Arnaville, but no sign of smoke generator troops. The two CWS

officers eventually located a group under control of the 1st sergeant

who, not without difficulty, organized details to move generators and

fog oil to the crossing site. Without preparation for this type of operation and without company leadership, a number of the smoke troops

had to be urged to take up positions down by the river bank. Upon

making his appearance in the late afternoon, the company commander

was relieved and replaced by Lieutenant Lamb.

The number of generator positions was soon increased in order that

an effective screen might be maintained, regardless of the direction of

the wind. Position 3 paralleled a short stretch of the Arnaville-Noveant

road and was later augmented by a jeep-mounted generator which patrolled the road on the lookout for any gaps in the screen. That night

eight generator crews crossed the Moselle with their equipment, dug

in their generators, and were ready to start operations at Position 4

at dawn of 11 September. The new smoke plan also included emergency

Positions 5 and 6, located south of Arnaville, but these were never

needed in the operation.20

At daybreak on 11 September the 84th began smoking operations

at Position 3 on the far bank of the river. For several hours activity

at the bridgehead was essentially unmolested; enemy shelling had practically ceased. The engineers had hauled several pieces of heavy equipment to the near bank and were about to begin bridge construction.

Around 0900 an unidentified engineer, doubtlessly influenced by the

absence of opposition and the interference of smoke with bridging

20

 It was also during the night of 10-11 September that the smoke company tested the feasibility of a

screen against artillery observation and air bombardment on moonlight nights, although the bridgehead

was neither bombed or strafed during any night of the operation.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 367

activities, ordered the smoke generators to shut down.21 As soon as

the screen dissipated, hell broke loose on the bridge site. German artillery made direct hits on two pieces of heavy engineer equipment and

killed or wounded several engineers. Cottingham ordered the screen

re-established at once, and the engineers shifted their efforts 300 yards

downstream inasmuch as the enemy had pinpointed the original bridge

site. To avoid any future interference with smoking activity, the

division commander assumed control at the bridge site, to be exercised

by his chemical officer.

The engineers rated the value of smoke at Arnaville less highly than

did the participating chemical officers. After the war, Colonel Walker

expressed the view that enemy fire on the crossing site was limited

more by a shortage of ammunition than by American smoke.22

 Undoubtedly the enemy did suffer from a limited supply of ammunition

and could not make lavish use of shells for missions of harassment and

interdiction. But his interest in lucrative targets of opportunity, as

evidenced by this experience on 10 and 11 September, was enough to

convince the 5th Division that a smoke screen should be maintained.

A 15-hour screen on 12 September was featured by the use of a jeepmounted generator on the valley road east of the river. About noon

engineers completed a treadway bridge at the north site but had to

withdraw temporarily because of heavy shelling. The screen continued

on 13 September although from time to time enemy fire made the

location almost untenable. That day German guns inflicted four casualties and destroyed two generators of the 84th Company and two of

its trucks.

Again on the 14th enemy fire forced the engineers to evacuate the

bridge site from time to time. Fluctuating winds frequently exposed

generator emplacements to direct enemy observation, and the crews

hurriedly moved their generators after such an exposure. Smoke pots

hid upwind generators, filled gaps in the line, and maintained the screen

while crews replaced or repaired generators. Enemy fire killed one

man of the smoke company and wounded another. Late on the 14th,

engineers completed the bridge at the south site making possible one21

 (1) Colonel Walker of the 1103d Engineer Combat Group was not the officer who gave the order.

Three Battles, p. 74n. (2) Some engineer accounts place the time of heavy shelling several hours

earlier, but MacDonald in his Arnaville account, after a careful study of the after action reports, agrees

that 0900, the time set by Cottingham, must have been the approximate hour. Ibid., p. 74. 22

 MacDonald in Three Battles, page 67, cites this opinion by Colonel Walker.
368 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

way traffic across the Moselle. That day there was some decrease in

enemy fire. On the 15th the 5th Division captured the dominating

hill in the area, and German artillery fire further diminished with the

advance of the infantry and armor. Thus the bridgehead was secured

at a cost of 725 casualties in the 10th Infantry, 13 killed and 100

wounded in the 1103d Engineer Combat Group, and 2 killed and 7

wounded in the 84th Smoke Generator Company.

Securing the bridgehead did not eliminate the need for smoke, for

the Arnaville bridges, which became integral parts of the main supply

route for succeeding operations of XX Corps, remained under German

observation from Fort Driant and neighboring points in the vicinity

of Metz. The 161st Smoke Generator Company, under the command

of Capt. Charles D. Underwood, relieved the 84th on 21 September

and maintained a screen at Arnaville until the 25th, when XX Corps

decided that smoke was no longer necessary. Enemy artillery promptly

destroyed the treadway bridge and damaged the ponton structure,

stopping all traffic. In response to an engineer request for the resumption of the screen a section of the 84th returned on the 29th and

established "a very comforting smoke screen."

 23

 Enemy guns at Fort

Driant, with much of the Moselle Valley in range, continued to fire

indiscriminately but failed to damage seriously the heavy ponton

bridge.24

The Lessons Learned at Arnaville

The operation at Arnaville demonstrated for the first time in the

European theater that smoke generators could give effective support

to an opposed river crossing. The experience also served notice that

certain improvements were desirable.

Even before the operation began it was evident that a smoke company

had enough organic vehicles for transporting fog oil and supplies from

company dumps to forward positions, but too few 21⁄2-ton trucks

to haul oil from the army supply point. The 5th Division solved the

problem of fetching oil from the army supply by augmenting the five

company trucks with additional vehicles. This matter of limited organic transportation and its effect on resupply remained a constant

23

 Col. William C. Hall, CE, "Harassing Fire," The Field Artillery Journal, vol. 35, No. 2 (February,

1940. PP. 68-69. 24

 TUSA AAR, vol. II, pt. III, p.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 369

problem for smoke generator companies in the fighting in France and

Germany.25 The Arnaville experience also pointed out that definite

plans had to be made to get generators and fog oil across the river at

an early hour. This meant making an initial assignment of boats and

rafts to the smoke company for that specific purpose, an assignment

which quite possibly would have been made if a section of the 84th

Chemical Smoke Generator Company had been a component part of

the river crossing assault team.

The operation focused attention on the need for definite control of

area screening. Tactical control of the screen by the engineer unit

responsible for the bridge appeared logical at first. But the action of

the engineers in shutting down the screen in the course of the operation

caused all elements to suffer and demonstrated that in certain tactical

situations it was highly desirable to clear smoke interference complaints

through division headquarters where a decision could best be made.

In fact, in subsequent river crossing operations the 5th Division kept

control of the screen in the hands of the commanding general until

his rear boundary had advanced beyond the bridge. If screening was

still necessary, as it was at Arnaville, control reverted to the corps

engineer unit charged with maintaining the bridge.

One of the most important lessons learned at the Moselle was the

fallacy of depending upon prevailing winds and the necessity of planning for winds from any quarter. On 10 September the prevailing

wind remained constant for the first four hours and then turned

variable and remained so for several days. Five valleys converged near

the vital point, and at times the smoke from generators only several

hundred yards apart drifted in opposite directions. Matters were made

worse by difficulties in the observation and adjustment of the Arnaville

screen. Colonel Cottingham decided to experiment with aerial observation because the hills which rose beyond the far bank were too

insecurely held for the establishment of observation posts. Beginning

on 14 September he made at least three flights daily: one at 0800,

another at 1300 when convection currents began raising havoc with

the screen, and the last at 1700 when the air temperature began

dropping. Aerial observation revealed defects which could not be

noticed from the ground, enabling the observer to anticipate the

25

 (1) Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, p. 119; (2) USFET Study 69, Smoke

Generator Opns and Orgns, pp. 10-11.
370 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

effects of wind change. He could note smoke drift from fires in

villages and streamers from artillery smoke shell and thus direct generator shifts before the development of any serious gaps. Usually such

a trip in a liaison plane, borrowed from the artillery, took about fifteen

minutes, but on one trip conditions were so miserable that the necessary

adjustments required almost two hours.

Maintenance proved a problem despite the fact that a continuous

screen required only a few generators operating simultaneously and

that the average generator hours of operation in a day was only fortyfour. Experience indicated that extra generators, strategically placed,

obviated the need of shifting others when variations and veerings appeared in the wind or when a generator failed to operate. And as a

rule three generators a day were replaced because of mechanical failures,

burned-out coils for the most part. Consequently, before the end of

the operation all forty-eight generators had to be employed. In

subsequent operations, assignment to the division of mechanics from

a chemical maintenance company brought about improvement in

maintenance.

The experience at Arnaville indicated the need for additional smoke

generator operators. One man per generator sufficed for rear area

screening but the conditions encountered in the front lines made two

operators mandatory. The additional man enabled proper reliefs and

insured that someone was available for relaying messages to the next

position along the smoke line. In case of a casualty, one operator could

administer first aid and keep the generator operating. And two men

at a position were better for morale.

Troops coming directly from the communications zone into a sector

under enemy artillery and small arms fire had to make a rapid mental

and emotional adjustment. A few men cracked under the strain, but

the majority held up well. Nonetheless, this initial experience demonstrated that a smoke company should have combat training and a

period of indoctrination before commitment to an assault crossing

operation.26

The 84th Chemical Smoke Generator Company began its Arnaville

operations under the additional handicap of inefficient direction before

its attachment to the 5th Division. Both personal and organizational

26

 The 90th Division chemical officer reached the same conclusion about another smoke generator unit.

See Ltr, CmlO 90th Div to CCmlO ETO, 20 Jan 45, sub: Opns of Smoke Generator Company in

Support of River Crossing. CWS 3 14.7.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 371

equipment were below standard, with a number of men lacking articles

of clothing, rifle belts, helmets, and canteens. Some trailers had been

left at the last bivouac before reaching the division. Training in the

important areas of communications and map reading was below

standard. All these factors, combined with the examples of poor leadership on the part of the company commander once the 84th was

committed to action, contributed to make more difficult the company's

introduction to combat. A few shifts in leadership and the example

set by officers and men who did respond to demands of the situation

helped mold the unit into an efficient team. That the performance of

the 84th improved is indicated by the fact that General Walker

awarded Bronze Star medals to an officer and four enlisted men and

by the statement of the 5th Division Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,

after the operation, that "a Smoke Generator Company must be included in making a river crossing.27

The Third Army Crossing of the Saar River

After the successful campaign against Metz, which fell in late

November 1944, XX Corps was ready to begin its advance into Germany.28

 By 1 December the corps had reached the west bank of the

Saar River and was preparing to establish bridgeheads on the east bank,

in the face of the West Wall defenses of the enemy. Before reaching

the West Wall, one of the most strongly fortified areas in Europe,

Third Army would have to cross the open river flats, a tactical situation

which could well call for a considerable use of smoke.29

The XX Corps plan for the Saar operation called for assault crossings in the Dillingen-Saarlautern sector by the 90th and 95th Divisions

while the 10th Armored Division feinted a crossing near Hilbringen.

The 161st Smoke Generator Company, attached to the 10th Armored

Division, was ordered to screen the vicinity of the partially destroyed

Merzig bridge, which, for all the enemy could know, might already

have been repaired for a crossing operation.30 Beginning on 4 December

the 84th Smoke Generator Company screened both flanks of the 95th

27

 5th Inf Div G-3 AAR, Sep 44. Orgn Files, ETO. 28

 The Metz campaign involved assault crossings of the Moselle, Seille, and Nied Rivers, all of which

were effectively supported by the 84th and 161st Smoke Generator Companies. For a discussion of the

use of smoke in these operations, see Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in the MTO and ETO. 29

 Elements of XII Corps crossed the Saar on the right of XX Corps. 30

 (1) TUSA AAR, II, pt. II, 9. (2) 10th Armored Div CWS Sec AAR, 1-31 Dec 44.
372 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Division as it crossed the river in the vicinity of Saarlautern. The

division also called for generator smoke on the captured bridge at

Saarlautern and over the construction activities at Lisdorf.31

The most extended screening missions of the Saar crossing were

those in the Dillingen-Pachten area, several miles north of Saarlautern,

in support of the 90th Division. These operations involved the 84th

and 161st Smoke Generator Companies, and elements of the 81st

Chemical Mortar Battalion. The infantry began crossing before dawn

on 6 December, and smoke operations began at daybreak. Entrenched

behind the West Wall on the far side of the Saar River, the Germans

could observe all feasible crossing sites and the road nets leading to

them. Artillery and mortar fire hit throughout the river area during

the whole period of the operation, and in the early phase enemy small

arms fire covered the crossing sites. The smoke troops at the ferry

site were still within range of small arms fire as late as 10 December.32

So heavy was hostile fire that for the sixteen days of the assault, engineers of the 90th Division were unable to erect a vehicular bridge and

operated ferry traffic only with great difficulty. The variable winds

which prevailed for the first six days tore gaps in the screen, so that

mortar and artillery smoke shells had to be used as supplements.33

On 19 December the 90th Division began to withdraw from the

east bank as part of Third Army regroupment to oppose the German

breakthrough in the Ardennes. This maneuver involved the movement

of nine battalions of infantry and more than 100 vehicles through a

restricted crossing site which was still within range of enemy artillery

and which was serviced by only a single ferry, one foot-bridge, and a

few assault boats. The 84th and 161st Smoke Generator Companies

screened the withdrawal successfully and were among the last troops to

return to the near bank.

Screens for the crossing and withdrawal at the Saar resulted in

expenditures of 151,000 gallons of fog oil and 8,500 HC smoke pots.

The smoke line near Dillingen had extended for more than 2,000 yards

31

 (1) 84th Cml Smoke Generator Co, Summary of Smoke Opns in the ETO, 12 May 45. (2) For

an account of the spectacular capture of this bridge by the 1st Battalion, 379th Infantry, see Cole, The

Lorraine Campaign, pages 517-19. 32

 During these operations seven enlisted men of the 161st and one officer and three men of the 84th

received a total of two Silver Star and nine Bronze Star medals for valor under fire. 33

 (1) 90th Inf Div, Rpt of Opns, Dec 44, pp. 7-26. Orgn Files, ETO. This report furnishes a

detailed account of the difficulties of screening and bridging the Saar River at Dillingen during both the

assault and the withdrawal phases. (2) Ltr, Div CmlO 90th Inf Div to CCmlO ETO, 20 Jan 45. (3)

81st Cml Mortar Bn AAR, Dec 44.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 373

and covered troops and vehicles moving up to, as well as across, the

Saar River and had effectively concealed traffic along roads to Saarlautern and other points. Enemy sources reported that U.S. "artificial

fog" along the Saar interfered with German observation and diminished

the effectiveness of his artillery fire.34

Smoke Operations at the Roer

As early as December 1944 Ninth Army was aware of the desirability

of smoke support for its contemplated Roer River crossing, and it

was at this time that it had secured the services of the 74th and 83d

Smoke Generator Companies.35 These units, commanded respectively

by Capt. George B. Warren, Jr. ,and Capt. Augustus H. Shaw, Jr.,

were attached to XIII and XIX Corps. Both companies underwent

training for front-line operations since preparations in the zone of

interior had been directed toward the rear area mission. The German

counteroffensive in the Ardennes delayed the scheduled Roer crossing.

During this interval Ninth Army held smoke demonstrations in the

rear area of the 29th Division to acquaint infantry and engineer commanders with the capabilities and limitations of the mechanical

generator.36

With the defeat of the Germans in the Ardennes, the Allies again

focused their attention on the Rhine. But the immediate objective

was to cross the Roer, and Ninth Army, flanked on the right by the

First Army, was to launch an assault crossing of that river and advance

northeast to join forces with the First Canadian Army, which was to

drive southward along the Rhine and clear its west bank. The Ninth

Army sector was a broad, flat region cut by the Roer and other streams

which flow generally in a northward direction. Entrenched on the far

bank the enemy had excellent observation of the western approaches

to the river. He also was able to flood the Ninth Army sector by the

controlled release of water from the dams up the valley. As a consequence, the 10 February target date for the crossing was postponed

until 23 February when Ninth Army assaulted on a 2-corps front—the

34

 Interv, Hist Div ETOUSA with Maj Gen Kurt von Muehlen (former commander of Kampfgruppe

Muehlen), Apr 46. MS # A-972 in OCMH. 35

 These were the first smoke units assigned to the Ninth Army which became operational on 5

September 1944. 36

 (1) 83d Cml Smoke Generator Co Opns Rpt, 19-30 Dec 44. (2) 29th Div AAR, Dec 44.
374 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

XIII on the left near Linnich and the XIX on the right in the vicinity

of Jülich.

The 74th Smoke Generator Company supported the crossing of the

84th Division in the XIII Corps sector. On the night of 22-23 February the 74th used smoke pots from 2000 to 0315 while engineer and

infantry troops concentrated on the near bank; the assault began at

the latter hour under concealment of smoke which drifted toward

the far side. At first, the smoke company used only pots for fear that

the noise and placement of the mechanical generators would disclose

the position and intention of the infantry, separated from the enemy

only by the Roer River. But after the crossing the 74th used both

mechanical generators and pots in smoking the bridge sites. Each day

it stood by prepared to smoke on call. Each night from 1700 to 0700

hours it screened several bridges in the vicinity of Linnich from enemy

aircraft. The 74th continued these missions until 3 March, first in

support of the 102d Division and then while attached to the 19th

Antiaircraft Artillery Group. The screening at Linnich was generally

successful despite understandable complaints about the irritating effect

of HC smoke and some interference with traffic and friendly artillery

observation. The smoke materially aided bridging operations and, according to infantrymen of the 1st Battalion, 333d Infantry, effectively

concealed the flash from their 60-mm. mortars.37

While the Linnich assault was in progress, XIX Corps crossed the Roer

upstream on a 2-division front, the 29th Division on the left at Jülich

and the 30th Division on the right in the Pier-Schophoven area. Corps

assigned the 83d Smoke Generator Company (less one section) to the

29th Division which in turn attached it to the 121st Engineer Combat

Battalion. The smoke plan for the operation stipulated that Company

A, 92d Chemical Mortar Battalion, use white phosphorus shells to

supplement the generator smoke in the event of unfavorable winds.

Screening began at 0350, twenty minutes after the initial assault, along

a 2-mile smoke line opposite Jülich. Under cover of this smoke engineers worked with little hindrance by the enemy. A request by the division engineer that smoke be continued after daybreak to keep observed

enemy fire away from the bridge sites was overruled by corps because

37

 (1) 74th Cml Smoke Generator Co Rpt of Smoke Generator Opns (5 Feb-3 Mar 45), 9 Mar 45.

(2) Ltr, CO 27th Smoke Generator Bn to CmlO Ninth Army, 25 Feb 45, sub: Smoke Opns of the 74th

Smoke Generator Co. (3) 84th Inf Div AAR, Feb 45, pp. 13-25. Orgn Files, ETO.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 375

of interference with the observation of corps artillery.38 Shortly after

the screen lifted hostile artillery fire destroyed one of the bridges under

construction. It was the opinion of the division engineer that smoke

might well have saved the bridge, and the XIX Corps staff was convinced that better smoke co-ordination was needed in future

operations.39

Several miles upstream the 30th Division planned to cross the Roer

River in the vicinity of Schophoven and Pier and drive north to the

Cologne-Jülich highway along which the enemy might launch a counterattack against the Jülich bridgehead of the 29th Division. It expected that the crossing would be difficult because of the swollen

channels, the many pools of water from the recent floods, the spongy

soil, and the lack of cover. In fact, during November Ninth Army

had considered a crossing in that vicinity impracticable.40

The infantry began the crossing by boat at 0330 23 February after

a 45-minute artillery preparation reported to have been one of the

heaviest concentrations of fire experienced in the European theater.41

Along the 8,000-yard division front 246 artillery pieces, 35 mortars of

the 92d Chemical Mortar Battalion, and 36 guns of the 823d Tank

Destroyer Battalion participated in the preparation. The initial assault

force encountered only light opposition. The 119th Infantry crossed

at the north site, opposite Schophoven, while one battalion of the

120th Infantry crossed to the south, opposite Pier. A mile of low,

boggy ground and water separated the two sites.

The smoke plan called for screens over both these sites, as well as

over the area between them, during the twelve daylight hours of 23

February. If conditions should prevent the effective screening of both

bridge sites, the northern bridge was to have priority. The division

commander maintained control of the use of smoke, while the division

chemical officer supervised its operation. The critical observation posts

of the enemy were in the towns on the far bank and along the low

ridge of hills to the northeast. At first, only one section (twelve gen38

 (1) Ltr, Col John B. Cobb to Hist Off, 18 Jan 50. (2) Ltr, Col Charles H. Gerhardt to Hist

Off, 9 Feb 51. Gerhardt, as a major general in command of the 29th Division during this operation,

wanted the screen continued during daylight hours but was overruled by corps. 39

 (1) Cobb Ltr, 18 Jan 50. (2) Ltr, CmlO 29th Div to CmlO XIX Corps, 7 Mar 45, sub: Smoke

Generator Opn in Roer River Crossing. CMLHO. (3) 83d Cml Smoke Generator Co, Notes on Roer

River Screening, Koslar, Germany, 23 Feb 45, n.d. 40

 Robert L. Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front: The Story of the 30th Infantry Division

(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 212-13. 41

 Ibid., pp. 215-16.
376 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

erators and crews) of the 83d Smoke Generator Company was available, supplemented by a detachment of seventeen infantrymen, several

mechanics from the 57th Chemical Maintenance Company, and two

men from the division chemical section. For several nights preceding

the jump-off, smoke troops went forward and dug foxholes, established

supply dumps, and prepared generator emplacements.42

The smoke troops moved into position at 0245 on 23 February. The

din of the heavy artillery preparation drowned the noise of movement

and darkness hid the exact location of the bridging area. Smoking

began at 0630. The generators provided good concealment at the

northern site but unexpected winds at the south site tore gaps in the

screen. The smoke line was extended to the southeast. In mid-morning

engineers ceased construction on the south bridge because of accurate

artillery fire, which was probably adjusted when gaps appeared in the

screen. After one battalion crossed on boats and Alligators, the 120th

Infantry transferred its effort to the northern site where the 119th,

under effective smoke concealment, was crossing without much

difficulty.

Smoke concealed the northern crossing throughout the day. While

engineers worked on a treadway bridge, infantrymen crossed a foot

bridge and overran enemy positions on the east bank of the river.

Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs, commanding the 30th Division, ordered

the screen continued during the coming night and the next day. The

request for the night screen was prompted by the Luftwaffe which had

been rather active during the previous two nights and which was using

a number of jet-propelled planes. Another section of the smoke company came from the 29th Division at Jülich to help maintain the screen.

During the night of 23—24 February the 30th Division extended the

bridgehead to the northeast, capturing the towns of Hambach and

Niederzier and eliminating enemy observation of bridge sites from the

east. The northern bridge was opened to passage of armor at midnight.

By dawn the wind was from the north and smoke troops established

pot positions on the far bank along the western edge of the

Krauthausen-Selgersdorf road. Troops and armor advancing over this

route were exposed to observed fire from the woods beyond Hambach,

so the smoke line was moved eastward across the road, 100 yards into the

42

 CmlO 30th Div Rpt on Roer River Smoke Screen, Schophoven, Germany, 23-24 Feb 45, n.d. This

report covers in detail the planning and operational phases of screening for the 30th Division at the

Roer crossing, and is the chief source for the discussion of that crossing.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 377

fields. For the same reason, other smoke positions were established

north of the Selgersdorf-Daubenrath road. Chemical troops captured

four prisoners while setting up these final positions in an area infested

with enemy mines.

Division headquarters ordered smoke over both the northern and the

southern bridges for the night of 24-25 February. But the supply of

smoke pots was exhausted by about 1530 hours and the M2 generators

were in need of repair after a long period of continuous operation.

Moreover, the crews were fatigued from thirty-three hours of continuous duty. Consequently, the decision to use smoke that night was

canceled. By morning the 30th Division had driven the enemy beyond

range of observation, and smoke was no longer necessary.

Large area screening activities along the Roer contributed to the

success of 30th Division operations in several ways. Smoke over the

northern area enabled the engineers to start construction of a vehicular

bridge five hours earlier than had been anticipated. The enemy never

had an opportunity to deliver observed fire, a circumstance that enabled

the 295th Engineer Combat Battalion to maintain uninterrupted bridging operations. In fact, there was not a single engineer casualty from

enemy fire at the northern bridge. As a result of this building feat, the

first armor moved across the Roer River at H plus 21, fifteen hours

ahead of schedule.43 Another benefit of the screen was the concealment

of infantry and armor units moving up to, across, and beyond the

river, particularly those units in the vicinity of Selgersdorf. In two

instances the infantry called for extension of the smoke coverage near

the front line. Captured prisoners stated that, while they believed the

Roer offensive was imminent, the darkness at the time of the initial

attack and the subsequent screening confused the Germans as to the

exact location of the American effort. The plan for the Roer crossing

had called for only twelve hours of smoke, but during operations

screening continued without cessation for thirty-three hours. This

extension was indicative of the effectiveness of the screen and the value

which General Hobbs placed upon smoke.44

First Army crossed the Roer on the right of Ninth Army. The VII

Corps, on the left, crossed near Düren and advanced northeastward

43

 Combat Observer XIX Corps to CG ETOUSA, 28 Feb 45, Observers Rpt No. 155 (Roer River

Crossing). 44

 (1) CmlO 30th Div Rpt on Roer River Smoke Screen, Schophoven, Germany, 23-24 Feb 45, n.d.

(2) Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, p. 221.
378 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

to protect the right flank of Ninth Army. The 104th and 8th Divisions

spearheaded the corps attack. The other two corps of First Army, the

III in the center and the V on the right, initially remained on the

defensive but were prepared to advance on or after D plus 2.45

Forward area screening developed slowly in the First Army. There

was none during 1944, with the exception of an August operation at

Mayenne, France, which shielded a bridge against enemy air bombardment. But the smoke tests that Col. Kenneth A. Cunin, army chemical

officer, ran at Liege in late 1944 impressed at least one high ranking

commander, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, commanding VII Corps.

Collins and his engineer officer, Col. Mason Young, both saw great

possibilities in using the mechanical smoke generator in assault river

crossings and the general attempted to get some to support his corps'

assault of the Roer. Circumstances prevented the use of smoke generators in the Roer crossing. Col. Jack A. Barnes, VII Corps chemical

officer, had too little time to collect the equipment or to assemble

suitable trained troops. In fact, the only trained smoke units were the

79th and 80th Smoke Generator Companies and these, the First Army

commander decided, could not be released from the secondary duties

to which they had been assigned. Any screening operation would

therefore have to depend upon the smoke pot and the white phosphorus

shells of the chemical mortar. The plan for using smoke in the sector

of the 104th Division was abandoned when its artillery commander

objected to possible interference with observation.46

The 8th Division planned to cross south of Düren with the 28th

Infantry on the right at Lendersdorf and the 13th Infantry on the left.

After the crossing, the 28th Infantry was to protect the corps right

flank until III Corps entered the fight. The 13th Infantry did not

plan to employ smoke at the crossing, but the 28th Infantry made

provisions for using HC pots to conceal the initial assault and the

subsequent bridge construction. S/Sgt. Robert J. Cesari of the 80th

Smoke Generator Company gave training in smoke tactics to the

infantrymen of the reserve battalion who were to man the pots. On

the eve of the attack Capt. Kirk J. Ruger, commanding the 80th, was

attached to the division as smoke observer and adviser. He was especially concerned with screens planned for the two bridges which were

45

 FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44-22. Feb 45, p. 160. 46

 Interv, Hist Off with Barnes, 27 Jun 50. Barnes believed that division objection to smoke would

have been overruled had mechanical generators been available.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 379

to be built by the 294th Engineer Combat Battalion in the vicinity

of Lendersdorf.47

The 28th Infantry jumped off near Lendersdorf early on 23 February. The smoke from HC pots, the haze from shell fire, and the

morning mist concealed the crossing site until shortly after 1000.

During this phase the two bridge sites (Nos. 9 and 10) received sporadic

and unobserved small arms and mortar fire. But at 1000 the west wind

ceased, the screen lifted, and accurate enemy artillery fire began to

come in on bridge site 10. Captain Ruger's suggestion to have Company

D, 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion, fire WP shells against enemy

positions on the right flank across the river was ruled out for fear that

friendly troops might be in the impact area. In the absence of wind

the use of smoke pots would have been ineffective.

There was also trouble at the bridge site No. 9, visited by Ruger in

midafternoon. Engineers had suspended all activity on this treadway

bridge because of the direct fire from an enemy self-propelled gun

on the opposite bank, accompanied by small arms fire. The division's

assistant commander, Brig. Gen. Charles D. W. Canham, insisted that

the bridge be started promptly, regardless of cost, and asked Ruger

to recommend the use of smoke so as to conceal renewed attempts at

construction. A light northwesterly wind had set in by this time and

Ruger suggested a smoke installation through Lendersdorf augmented

by floating pots which, because of the curve in the stream, would

establish a semicircular smoke line around the crossing site. But in

the meantime enemy fire had increased so much that all work was

postponed at this site and concentrated on bridge No. 10. Company

D, 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion, was then ordered to establish a

smoke screen on the far bank where the Roer River intersected the

III-VII Corps boundary. Sergeant Cesari had already set up a smoke

line around bridge No. 10 and his smoke detail of ten men from the

28th Infantry had placed the pots. The heavy fire, however, had

scattered the detail and Cesari had to light the pots himself. The

smoke drew additional fire, but the engineers were able to resume work

on the footbridge. Chemical troops maintained HC and WP screens

47

 (1) 2d Ind, CmlO First Army to CmlO 12th Army Group, 5 Apr 45, on Ltr, CO 80th Smoke

Generator Co to CO 23d Smoke Generator Bn, 28 Feb 45, sub: Rpt on Smoke Opns 23d, 24th, 25th

Feb, Roer River Assault and Crossing. CWS Unit Files, 23d SG Bn. CMLHO, (2) 23d Cml Smoke

Generator Bn Unit Diary, 18-24 Feb 45. (3) 294th Engr Combat Bn AAR, 1-28 Feb. 45. Orgn

Files, ETO.
380 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

from 1630 until darkness. That night the Luftwaffe bombed and

strafed the bridge site while enemy artillery continued to fire into the

area.48 Next morning the commanding officer, 28th Infantry, on the

advice of Captain Ruger, ordered Company D, 87th Chemical Mortar

Battalion, to continue the screen on the high ground to the southeast.

German artillery fire on the bridge sites lessened but did not cease.

Obviously the enemy knew the location of the engineers. Later in the

day jet fighters strafed the bridge sites, by now without smoke probably because the pot supply was exhausted. That night enemy planes

dropped flares and continued to bomb and strafe the area, damaging

the bridge at site No. 9 and some engineer equipment. The air effort

which continued until noon of the 25th had as many as twenty planes

over the area at one time.49

Smoke was not effectively used to support the Roer crossing of the

28th Infantry. VII Corps correctly estimated during the planning

stage that the enemy could seriously oppose any crossing in the 28th

Infantry sector for at least three days. The two bridge sites remained

within mortar range of an enemy-held area on the right flank which

was not engaged by American forces until 26 February, or three

days after the 28th Infantry attack. Projected smoke could have been

employed here profitably, as Captain Ruger suggested, if suitable coordination had existed. Under the prevailing northwest wind mechanical generators could have concealed the bridges effectively without

seriously interfering with infantry or artillery operations. For the

most part, the smoke would have drifted into enemy-held territory

opposite III Corps. The area to be covered was too large to be effectively hidden by smoke pots. The 4.2-inch chemical mortars placed

smoke on observation points to the southeast, but only after the enemy

had ranged in on the bridges. And none of these screens could conceal

the bridge sites from an attack. German artillery fire and bombing

delayed the construction of the two bridges, so that they were not

finished until more than forty-eight hours after the fighting began, and

then at a cost of 23 wounded engineers.50 Smoke, if properly employed,

undoubtedly would have reduced enemy observation and probably

48

 Interv, 2d Info and Hist Serv, First Army, with Ruger and Cesari, 1 Mar 45. 49 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, CO 80th Cml Smoke Generator Co to CO 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn,

28 Feb 45, sub: Rpt on Smoke Opns, 23d, 24th, 25th Feb 45, Roer River Assault and Crossing. 50

 Part of the delay was due to the rapid current and high water. At other crossings of VII Corps,

however, bridges were completed much sooner. Just a few miles down the Roer the 30th Division

(Ninth Army) completed a vehicular bridge in twenty-one hours under the cover of smoke.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 381

would have lessened the time required for construction and the number

of engineer casualties suffered in the process.51

The Use of Smoke at the Rhine River Crossings

When the Allies terminated the Rhineland Campaign on 21 March

1945 they found themselves, with one exception, poised along the west

bank of the Rhine, ready for the final assault. The exception was the

Remagen bridgehead in the First U.S. Army sector, where a combination of fortuitous circumstances and aggressive action by the leaders

and men of Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, secured on

7 March the only Rhine River bridge taken intact by the Allies. During

the fourth week in March the Ninth, Third, and Seventh U.S. Armies

successfully assaulted the Rhine. In each case, units of the four armies

used smoke generator companies to conceal either their actual assault

crossing or the crossing sites during the period of build-up.

The unexpected capture of the Ludendorf railroad bridge on 7

March and the rapid expansion of the bridgehead radically changed

the First Army plans for the Rhine crossings. Under the new plan

VII Corps would expand the Remagen bridgehead northward to the

Sieg River. As army forces cleared the far bank of the Rhine, its

engineers, under the concealment of smoke, would build bridges first

at Rolandseck, then Konigswinter, then Bonn. Because of success at

Remagen, conventional assault crossings in the VII Corps sector were

unnecessary. Bridge sites might be subject to artillery and mortar

fire but not to any serious amount of small arms fire.52

The day after the capture of the Ludendorf bridge the engineers at

the bridge site requested a smoke generator unit. When First Army

replied that none was immediately available the engineers at Remagen

had to depend upon whatever pots they could hurriedly gather. Finally,

on 10 March, First Army relieved its smoke units from other duties

and gave them five days to be ready for screening missions, whereupon

the 79th and 80th Smoke Generator Companies retrieved their smoke

51

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Martin F. Massoglia, formerly ExecO 238th Engr Bn, 1 Dec 49.

(2) History of VII Corps During Opns in Belgium and Germany, 1-28 Feb 45. Orgn Files, ETO.

(3) 294th Engr Combat Bn AAR 1-28 Feb 45. Orgn Files, ETO. (4) Ltr, CO 80th Cml Smoke

Generator Co to CO 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn, 28 Feb 45, sub: Rpt on Smoke Opns, 23d, 24th,

25th Feb 45, Roer River Assault and Crossing. 52

 (1) 3d Ind, Deputy CCmlO ETO, 26 Apr 45 on Ltr, CmlO VII Corps to CmlO FUSA 7 Apr 45,

sub: VII Corps Smoke Opns for Bridging the Rhine River. CMLHO. (2) History of VII Corps,

1-31 Mar 45. Orgn Files, ETO.
382 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

equipment from its six months' storage. On 15 March the two units

received march orders and, early next morning, the 79th departed for

Remagen and the 80th Company headed for VII Corps in the vicinity

of Rolandseck.53

During the early phase of the Remagen operation the Germans held

the high ground on the east bank with observation over the bridges

and the approaches thereto. Artillery fire continually impeded, and

at times halted, the movement of First Army troops through the area.54

To provide for the increased traffic, III Corps engineers built two

bridges which the enemy attempted to destroy by artillery and mortar

fire, by bombing, and even by demolitions. Mechanical smoke generators would have expedited the erection of the bridges, according

to an engineer officer, but by 16 March, when the 79th Smoke Generator Company (Capt. Morris W. Kane) arrived, the urgent need

for smoke had ended.55

The first VII Corps units passed through the Remagen bridgehead

on 15 March and within two days they had cleared the area opposite

Rolandseck. Engineers started bridging the Rhine at Rolandseck on

the night of 16-17 March and at dawn the 80th Smoke Generator

Company began concealing the bridge site. The next afternoon most

of the company departed for another bridge site at Konigswinter

although several squads remained at Rolandseck until 23 March.

Meanwhile, the 79th Company had moved from Remagen to Konigswinter and set up generators on the east bank of the Rhine. Smoke

operations at this site, featured by the use of boat-mounted generators,

also ended on 23 March.56

An extensive First Army screening operation took place along the

Rhine at the southern outskirts of Bonn. Under technical control of

the 23d Smoke Generator Battalion, smoke was started at 0501, 21

March, and continued without interruption for sixty-one hours. After

53

 (1) Armor School Research and Evaluation Div, Study: The Remagen Bridgehead, 7-17 Mar 47.

CmlC School. (2) 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn Unit Diary, 11-24 Mar 45. (3) Ltr, Cunin to

Hist Off, 1 Feb 50. 54

 Capt. John F. Hyde, CMP, "Armored Bridgehead Operation," Armored Cavalry Journal, LVIII,

No. 4 (July-August 1949), 37-38. 55

 (1) Massoglia Interv, 2 Dec 49. (2) 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn Unit Diary, 10-24 Mar 45. 56

 (1) Ltr, CmlO VII Corps to CmlO FUSA, 7 Apr 45, sub: VII Corps Smoke Opn for Bridging the

Rhine River. (2) 79th Cml Smoke Generator Co S-3 Rpt 51, Mehlem, Germany, 18-24 Mar 45, dated

25 Mar 45. (3) 80th Cml Smoke Generator Co S-3 Rpt 30, Bonn, Germany, 18-24 Mar 45, dated

25 Mar 45.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 383

23 March the smoke troops remained alerted for five days, ready to

operate against bombers, but the threat never was to materialize.

By 21 March the Third Army had reduced the Saar-Palatinate triangle, except for the mopping-up phase, and three of its corps had

reached the Rhine. General Patton insisted that the enemy be given

no chance to recover from the defeat in the Palatinate. Third Army

planned to secure crossings over the Rhine River promptly and then

advance to the northeast. The VIII Corps, on the left, would attack

between Koblenz and Bingen and XII Corps was to cross the Rhine

between Bingen and Worms. XX Corps, on the right flank, would

continue mopping-up activities and then cross through the bridgehead of either VIII or XII Corps.57

The XII Corps attached the 84th and 161st Smoke Generator Companies to the 5th and 90th Divisions, respectively, for the assault

crossings. The 162d Smoke Generator Company was to support the

87th and 89th Divisions of VIII Corps operating north of Bingen. The

81st Company was trucking for XX Corps but would be available for

smoke operations on short notice. With four smoke generator units on

hand, the Third Army could not only use smoke at the crossings but

could also lay deceptive screens. There was some thought of placing

a large dummy screen at Mainz because the enemy apparently believed

that an initial crossing attempt would be made at that point.58

Previous Third Army smoke generator operations had emphasized

concealment from artillery observation, as enemy aircraft had been

relatively inactive. During February, for example, only thirty-two

enemy planes were reported over the entire Third Army zone, and

of these only two made attacks, both of them strafing.59 But as the

Army approached the Rhine, enemy air activity increased. On 20

March large numbers of German aircraft, including the new jetpropelled Me262, attempted to bomb bridges and strafe troops. On

that date the Luftwaffe made a total of 314 sorties in the XII Corps

zone alone.60 This increased enemy air activity, even though temporary,

was a distinct threat to the Rhine bridging operations and suggested

that the crossing sites be screened against air as well as against artillery

observation.

57

 TUSA AAR, I, 311-12. 58

 George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co, 1947), p. 266. 59

 TUSA AAR, I, 279. 60

 Ibid., I, 310.
384 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The 5th Division made the first crossing of the Rhine for the Third

Army on the night of 22-23 March in the Oppenheim-Nierstein area.

Two regiments had already crossed when, at dawn, the 84th Smoke

Generator Company provided smoke from both sides of the river.

Each day thereafter the 84th established a heavy screen at dawn and

dusk, the periods when the engineer bridges were most vulnerable from

the air. During the night the 84th maintained a haze which could

be readily thickened in case of attack. In daylight, fighter planes and

AA guns fought off enemy aircraft. A number of the generator positions along the near bank were atop a hill and the smoke, although

blanketing the bridges from the air, was not dense enough on the

ground to hinder traffic.61 Additional generators were mounted on

Dukws, but were not needed.

The importance of screening the Oppenheim-Nierstein area can be

judged by the traffic which crossed the Rhine at that point. Five divisions, with supplies and supporting troops, passed over its three bridges

between 23 and 27 March. And between 24 and 31 March, 60,000

vehicles crossed in support of the XII Corps assault. The smoke screen

which initially concealed this area was approximately two and a half

miles long and three-quarters of a mile wide. None of the bridges

sustained damage during the area's four major air attacks.62

For several days after the crossing at Oppenheim-Nierstein the increased activity of enemy aircraft necessitated the continuance of

smoke generator operations. On 24 March, 138 enemy planes attacked

bridges, installations, and troop concentrations in the XII Corps sector.

During the next day the sorties increased to 231. Heavy enemy aircraft

losses and the overrunning of many fighter fields by the Third Army's

advance soon reduced the threat posed by the Luftwaffe, and on 26

March only three German planes appeared over the XII Corps.63 As a

matter of precaution, smoke generator operations continued at Oppenheim-Nierstein until 31 March.

While the 5th Division was crossing at Oppenheim, the 90th Division

was cleaning up Mainz and threatening to cross the Rhine either there

or to the north. In support of this feint the 161st Smoke Generator

61

 84th Cml Smoke Generator Co, Summary of Smoke Opns in the ETO, 12 May 45. 62

 Brig Gen P. H. Timothy, The Rhine Crossing—Twelfth Army Group Engineer Operations (Hereafter cited as The Rhine Crossing), (Ft Belvoir, Va., Jul 46), p. 38. 63

 TUSA AAR, I, 315-17. Another factor in the sudden reduction of Luftwaffe activity may have

been the shifting of enemy planes to the crossing sites of other Allied armies.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 385

Company, on 23 March, made smoke at several points between Bingen

and Mainz. On the same day the 90th Division swung south, crossed

the Rhine at Nierstein, and assumed control of the southern portion of

the 5th Division bridgehead, an action which obviated the need for

smoking the Rhine between Mainz and Bingen. Two days later a detachment of the 161st moved into Nierstein and extended the smoke

line which the 84th Smoke Generator Company had already established

there.64 By 26 March all major units of XII Corps were well beyond

the Rhine and were attacking points along the Main River in the

vicinity of Frankfurt. The 161st Smoke Generator Company then

moved forward and screened the bridges.

The divisions of VIII Corps crossed the Rhine between Bingen and

Koblenz. The precise sites were Rhens and Boppard in the 87th

Division sector, and Oberwesel, St. Goar, and Wellmich in the sector

of the 89th Division. The 162d Smoke Generator Company divided

its generators and crews between the two divisions. The smoke plan

at Boppard called for screens for the assault crossing of the 345th

Infantry and for the ponton bridge building activities of the 1102d

Engineer Combat Group. The 162d made the first smoke at Boppard

on 25 March from 0620 to 0635, just before the 345th Infantry attack.

The generators smoked again at 0650 and remained in operation until

late that night. With a favorable wind, the cloud traveled across the

river and filled the valley. That night the wind shifted from southsoutheast to northeast and the 162d, in order to conceal the bridge operations, moved its generators across the river. The smoke crews continued the screen throughout the next day, 26 March, under a steady

rain of enemy artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. The operation

ended 26 March.65

Meanwhile, on the night of 24 March one section of the 162d set

up a smoke screen in support of a deceptive move made by the 353d

Infantry, 89th Division. The ruse was successful in that the enemy

directed a large amount of artillery and small arms fire into the

screened, but unoccupied area. The actual assault came early on 26

March; smoke operations ceased after half an hour because of inter64

 TUSA AAR, I, 314-22; II, pt. 11, 15. 65

 (1) 162d Cml Smoke Generator Co, Final Opn Rpt, Boppard, 24-27 March 45. (2) Smoke was

not employed in the crossing of the 347th Infantry, 87th Division, at Rhens.
386 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ference with forward observation. The crews of the 162d remained

in position, until 28 March, in case the enemy shelled the bridge site.66

The 162d Smoke Generator Company also provided smoke for the

assault of the 354th Infantry, 89th Division, opposite Wellmich, on

the morning of 26 March from 0600 to 0630. Enemy artillery and

small arms fire at the time of the successful crossing was heavy but

unobserved.67 At the same time, the company set up five generator

positions near Oberwesel for the crossing of the 355th Infantry, 89th

Division, and smoked from 0550 to 1700 hours, 26 March, while two

battalions crossed the river. The screen not only covered the crossing

site but also denied observation to enemy forces located at Kaub, upstream on the far side of the Rhine.68

 The Luftwaffe was not as active

against VIII Corps bridge sites as it was against those of XII Corps

although artillery and small arms fire were heavier. But despite heavy

initial resistance the 85th and 89th Divisions advanced rapidly to the

east, and by 28 March the Rhine mission of 162d Smoke Generator

Company was over.

The 81st Smoke Generator Company supported XX Corps, which

did not enter the picture until 27 March, when the 80th Division

attacked across the Rhine and Main just southeast of Mainz and cleared

the area around Kastel and at the junction of the two rivers. As soon

as the infantry cleared the far bank, the smoke company screened the

bridging operations, with half of the unit on either side of the river.

Under smoke, the Third Army engineers built a 1,896-foot steel treadway bridge, probably the longest floating tactical bridge of the war.69

The 81st continued to operate at Mainz until the evening of 1 April.70

Early in March 1945 the 3d and 45th Divisions of Seventh Army

began preparations for the Rhine crossings. These divisions and various

supporting organizations converged on Lunéville, France, to make use

of the several lakes in the area for specialized training. Among the

units supporting the 3d Division was the 540th Engineer Combat

66

 162d Cml Smoke Generator Co Final Opn Rpt, St. Goar, 25-28 Mar 45. CMLHO. Col. James V.

Montgomery, VIII Corps chemical officer, was killed during this operation. 67

 162d Cml Smoke Generator Co, Final Opn Rpt, Wellmich [Germany], 25-26 Mar 45. CMLHO.

There were no bridging activities at Wellmich. 68

 (1) 162d Cml Smoke Generator Co, Final Opn Rpt, Oberwesel [Germany], 25-27 Mar 45.

CMLHO. There were no bridging operations at Oberwesel. (2) Timothy, The Rhine Crossing, p. 42. 69

 Timothy, The Rhine Crossing, p. 40. 70

 TUSA AAR, I, 322 ; II, pt. 11, 15.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 387

Group with the 69th Smoke Generator Company attached. Supporting

troops of the 45th Division included the 40th Engineer Combat Group

and the 78th Smoke Generator Company. These attachments were to

carry through the entire period of the Rhine crossings so that trained

and co-ordinated teams would be ready to support the assault.71

Divisions of XV Corps led the Seventh Army assault across the

Rhine. The initial crossings were to be made between Gernsheim and

Ludwigshaven by the 45th Division on the left and the 3d Division

on the right, the first crossing north, the second south of the city of

Worms.72 All five companies of the 22d Smoke Generator Battalion

received screening assignments for the assault crossing, the first time

all had been committed to the same forward area operation. Battalion

headquarters was relieved from all other duties on the eve of the

crossing and placed under direct control of the Seventh Army chemical

officer. Previously, the battalion commander had occasionally participated in the Rhine crossing preparations, but generally his headquarters

had performed other duties. As it turned out, the most important

battalion function at the Rhine was logistical, the co-ordination of the

supply of fog oil to the various smoke companies.73

Early on 26 March, for a brief period just before as well as during

the assault crossings, the 163d and 168th Smoke Generator Companies drew German attention from the actual sites by maintaining

feint screens in the sectors of the 71st and 36th Divisions. Meanwhile,

the 45th and 3d Divisions crossed the river in the Worms areas on

2-regiment fronts. Enemy opposition to the 45th Division petered out

quickly and no smoke was needed although the 78th was in position.

This was not the case with the 3d Division in its Ludwigshaven-Worms

sector. Here initial resistance to the early morning attack was weak,

but by 0400, an hour and a half after the assault began, hostile artillery

pinned down all troops in the area, and engineer operations at the

upstream crossing site stopped. One engineer company suffered fiftyfour casualties. Although German artillery fire hit three smoke company vehicles, the unit lost no men to enemy action. The intense

71

 (1) The same two smoke generator companies had attended an engineer school at La Valbonne,

near Lyon, during the previous October, with the mission of screening engineer river operations. (2)

69th Cml Smoke Generator Co, History (May-Dec 44). (3) 78th Cml Smoke Generator Co, History,

1 Oct-3 1 Oct 44, 12 Nov 44. 80th in Orgn Files, ETO. (4) Seventh Army Cml Sec History,

1 Jan-31 Oct 44. 72

 Seventh Army Opns in ETO, III, 741-45. 73

 Seventh Army Cml Sec History, Mar 45.
388 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

artillery fire did prevent a platoon trying to take over smoke pots

in assault boats from reaching the west bank. Fortunately, the

southwest winds eliminated the need for pots across the river. At 0700

the 1st Platoon, from positions in the near bank generated a fog oil

screen between the enemy on Friesenheimer Island and the crossing

site, a maneuver which effectively blocked German observation of

troop and boat movement. At 1030 the 1st Platoon with six generators

crossed the river in Dukws only to be pinned down for several hours

by enemy fire with four generators still on the craft. The two that

were gotten off maintained a haze between Sandhoffen and the crossing

site which "greatly reduced the accuracy of enemy fire on the engineer

operations.74

The two assault battalions in the 30th Infantry sector completed

their crossings by 0305, and the 2d Platoon, 69th Smoke Generator

Company, set up a smoke pot line on the far bank two and a half

hours later. Just before daylight smoke began to pour from the pots

across the river and from mechanical generators on the near shore.

The variant winds caused smoke to be needed on all sides. The smoke

haze denied observation to German troops on an island in the river

which held out until several hours after daylight. Because the infantrymen took over the storm boats which had been allotted to the smoke

troops, their own being destroyed by enemy artillery, the supply of

smoke pots and the crossing of the generators were both delayed. By

0930 the smoke troops had four generators in operation across the river

and half an hour later a wind shift to the southwest minimized the

problem of smoke supply to the far bank.75

During the day the commanding general, 3d Division, ordered that

smoke be made over both sites on a 24-hour basis. After 27 March the

Luftwaffe, not hostile artillery, became the greater threat. The 2d

Platoon, 69th Smoke Generator Company, continued to smoke the

ponton and treadway bridges, which the engineers built near Worms,

until 31 March. The 1st Platoon concealed the heavy ferry site with

smoke until 30 March then moved to Ludwigshaven and screened the

74

 (1) 2832d Engr Combat Bn Opns Rpt, Mar 45. Orgn Files, ETO. (2) 69th Smoke Generator

Co Opns Rpt No. 3, 5-31 Mar 45. Except for the omission of meteorological information and data on

expenditures, this is a model report. It outlines the general situation, the special training, the special

organization of the company for the operation, the preliminary moves, the operations of both platoons,

and includes a discussion, an evaluation, and overlays of the smoke lines. 75

 (1) 69th Smoke Generator Co Opns Rpt No. 3, 5-31 Mar 45. (2) 2833d Engr Combat Bn

Journal, Mar 45. Orgn Files, ETO.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 389

bridge which connected that city with Mannheim. The 78th Smoke

Generator Company moved to Mannheim on 1 April and set up a

smoke line around the bridge which was erected over the Neckar

River, but smoke was not needed. CWS troops maintained both installations until 5 April.76

On the eve of the Rhine crossing the Ninth U.S. Army was still

with the British 21 Army Group, an attachment which had taken

place at the time of the German counteroffensive. On its left was the

British Second Army with a boundary near Wesel; on its right, just

upstream from Dusseldorf, was the First U.S. Army, holding the left

sector of General Bradley's 12th Army Group. Ninth Army designated

its XVI Corps to make an assault crossing in the sector between Orsoy

and Buderich. Initially, XIII and XIX Corps were to hold the west

bank of the Rhine opposite the Ruhr, later to follow through the

XVI Corps bridgehead. Chemical units available to XVI Corps for

screening operations included the 27th Smoke Generator Battalion and

the 74th and 83d Smoke Generator Companies. The 89th and 93d

Chemical Mortar Battalions also were to contribute to the smoke

mission.

Ninth Army screening operations along the Rhine River were divided into two phases, those before the crossing and those in connection with the assault. The purpose of smoke in the first phase was

to conceal movement on the west bank and confuse the enemy as to

Army intentions and crossing preparations. For eight days before

the assault, smoke intermittently covered sixty-eight miles of the

front north of Dusseldorf held jointly by British and American troops.

The plan provided for "smoking" days and "nonsmoking" days, according to a schedule which was co-ordinated with air reconnaissance

activities. In the Ninth Army sector the 74th and 83d Smoke Generator Companies and provisional personnel performed these preliminary missions with smoke pots, the mechanical generators being conserved for the main crossing effort. Enemy reaction to the employment

of smoke during the first phase was varied. Prisoners stated that at

first the Germans expected the assault after each smoke operation,

but after continued feints they became confused as to Allied intentions.

In some localities the Germans were extremely sensitive to smoke and

76

 (1) Ibid. (2) 69th Smoke Generator Co History, Mar 45. (3) XV Corps, AAR, Mar 45, pp.

71ff. Orgn Files, ETO. (4) Memo, CO 22d Smoke Generator Bn to CmlO Seventh Army, 29 Mar 45.

Orgn Files, ETO. (5) Cml Sec Seventh Army History, Mar 45.
390 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

replied promptly with inconsequential fire. A German radio broadcast

boasted that an American attempt to cross the Rhine under smoke had

been repulsed. On the whole, however, the enemy showed little

reaction. A more important result of the smoke was expediting Allied

troop and supply movements, particularly in the British and Canadian

sectors where many dumps were located in exposed areas.77

The XVI Corps plans for the Rhine operation called for a 2-

division crossing in the vicinity of Wallach, Mehrum, and Milchplatz.

Naval craft were available for the initial assault and the engineers were

ready to bridge the Rhine, a task which they anticipated would be no

more difficult than that of bridging the Roer River under flooded

conditions. After the crossing, the Ninth Army was to drive eastward,

contain the enemy in the Ruhr pocket to the south, and maintain

contact with the British Second Army on the left.

Smoke plans for the crossings provided for concealing the bridge

sites for forty-eight continuous hours, if necessary. Under no circumstances was smoke to interfere with the airdrop of the First

Allied Airborne Army at Wesel, scheduled to begin at 1000 hours on

the first day. Maj. Robert H. Kennedy, commanding the 27th Smoke

Generator Battalion, supervised the activities of the two smoke generator companies and operated the corps smoke control center. The

artillery agreed to furnish liaison planes for observation of the screen.

With the additional assistance from the artillery meteorological sections,

the smoke control center would be advised of screening conditions anywhere in the army area at any particular moment. Any complaints

about the interference of smoke with operations were to be referred

to the smoke control center, with the matter reconciled by the G-3.

Elements of the 89th Chemical Mortar Battalion would screen the

right flank of the corps sector, opposite Orsoy, along the Rhein-Herne

Canal.78 The 83d Smoke Generator Company and two sections of the 77

 This account is based upon: (1) Lt Col W. R. Sawyer, GSO 1 Rpt on Smoke Screens Carried

Out by First Canadian Army (R) (printed in the field by 1 Canadian Mobile Printing Sec RCASC,

15 Jul 45), pp. 33-34; (2) 21 Army Group, Cml Warfare Liaison Ltrs, No. 8, 25 Mar 45, No. 9,

24 Jul 45, CmlC School 461/2514; (3) Interv, Hist Off with Col Harold Walmsley (formerly

CmlO Ninth Army) and Capt Joel B. Marangella (formerly IntellO Cml Sec Ninth Army), 14 Feb 47;

(4) Ltr, CO 74th Cml Smoke Generator Co to CG Ninth Army, 13 Mar 45, sub: Rpt of Smoke Opns;

(5) Ltr, CG 84th Div to CG XIII Corps, 7 Apr 45, sub: Smoke Opns; (6) Ltr, ACmlO 102d Div to

CmlO XIII Corps, 7 Apr 45, sub: AAR on Smoke Used on Rhine River, all in CMLHO; (7) Hewitt,

Work Horse of the Western front, pp. 234-38. 78

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Andrew M. Bishop, Lt Col Joseph C. Prentice, Capt Clyde H.

Westbrook, Capt Ralph R. Wance, and Mr Charles E. Miller, 1 Mar 50. (2) For more information on

chemical mortar smoke operations, see below, Ch. XII.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 391

74th would conceal the crossing sites of the 30th Division near Wallach

and Mehrum, while the other two sections of the 74th Smoke Generator

Company were to smoke at Milchplatz for the 79th Division crossing.

Generator positions, as far as practicable, were to take advantage of

the protection afforded by the dike on the west bank. Where necessary,

the smoke troops were to use pots over the low land between the dike

and the river. The first smoke was to appear at dawn on 24 March.79

The Ninth Army assault crossing of the Rhine River began on the

night of 23-24 March. After heavy preparatory fire the initial waves

of the 30th and 79th Divisions jumped off at 0200 and 0300 hours,

respectively. Resistance was not serious and by daybreak thirteen battalions of infantry had crossed and secured four bridgeheads, several

thousand yards deep. Within twenty-four hours the front lines had

advanced approximately six miles beyond the Rhine.80

At dawn, smoke from the generators along the dike line concealed

the ferrying operations of the assault boats from enemy ground and

air observation. Fear that the haze might drift over the Wesel airdrop

area and impede paratroop operation proved groundless. In midmorning the wind shifted from west to east, through south, and the smoke

troops moved pots and generators across the river and screened from

the far bank. Smoke continued on the first day until after dark. On

25 and 26 March smoke covered the bridges in the 3Oth Division sector

during the daylight hours. But at Milchplatz, in the sector of the 79th

Division, the generators remained idle until enemy guns had ranged in

on the bridge site.81 From 27 to 31 March the smoke troops operated

only during the periods from 0500 to 0800 and from 1700 to 2000

hours, when the bridges were most vulnerable to air attack. Enemy

aircraft strafed the generator lines during the nights of 24, 25, and 26

March, and artillery fire lasted through 24 and 25 March, but the

smoke troops suffered only two casualties. The only damage to smoke

equipment occurred during the movement of Alligators and tank

destroyers during the hours of darkness of the initial assault. Smoke

was not required after 31 March.82

79

 (1) Ltr, CmlO XVI Corps to CmlO Ninth Army, 1 Apr 45, sub: Smoke Opns—FLASHPOINT.

Reproduced in Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, pp. 313-15- (2) WalmsleyMarangella Interv, 14 Feb 47. 80

 (1) Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, pp. 238-42. (2) 30th Inf Div G-3 After Battle

Report, Mar 45, pp. 4-5. Orgn Files, ETO. 81

 Interv, Hist Off with Capt Warren (formerly CO, 74th Smoke Generator Co), 27 Jun 50. 82

 Ltr, CmlO XVI Corps to CmlO Ninth Army, 1 Apr 45, sub: Smoke Opns—FLASHPOINT.
392 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Planned as a 48-hour operation, smoke actually was used at the

Rhine crossings for a period of eight days. During the first two days of

the crossing the frequent shifts of wind direction made screening

difficult, especially at Milchplatz, although the concealment of crossing

activities was generally effective.83

Summary

The outstanding mission of the chemical smoke generator company

for all armies in the European theater was the concealment of bridge

and river crossing sites. Next in importance was the screening of

main supply routes. Only as the Allies approached the Rhine did the

Luftwaffe become a threat to operations. There were no calls for

smoke to hide the flash of friendly artillery, as had been the case in

Italy. Occasionally, an area screen concealed a flank of an armored

or infantry advance or withdrawal.

Smoke generator companies generally operated as a unit, under the

control of either the division or of the engineer unit charged with the

bridging activities. When the need for area screening was anticipated,

the division commander secured one or more smoke units from either

corps or Army. Only in rare instances was the smoke generator kept

available at regimental level, or lower, to be used as an instrument of

opportunity.

European experience in large area screening revealed several principles which govern successful smoke operations. First, adequate time

should be allowed during the planning of any operation to insure thorough reconnaissance and supply. Second, the control of a screen should

be in the hands of the commander of the highest echelon concerned.

Smoke can be a two-edged sword, simultaneously harmful and beneficial. A high level arbiter is necessary to balance its benefits against

its disadvantages and come up with a decision most likely to insure

ultimate success. Third, a smoke plan should provide for a smoke

installation which completely surrounds the vital area, a factor which

requires the planned transfer of men and equipment to the far bank

83

 (1) Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western front, pp. 238-42. (2) 30th Inf Div G-3 After Battle

Report, Mar 45, pp. 13. (3) Lt. Col. John C. Dalrymple, "Engineer Combat Group in the Rhine River

Crossing," Military Review, XXVIII (August 1949), 5. (4) Ltr, CO 57th Cml Maintenance Co to

CmlO Ninth Army, 29 Mar 45, sub: Maintenance of M2 Smoke Generators During Opns (Rhine

River). CWS 314.7 Unit Files, 57th Cml Maint Co.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 393

during the initial plan of a river crossing operation. And, finally,

screening operations should begin before the enemy observes activity

in the vital area and should cover considerably more territory than that

area.

American armies gradually applied these principles to their European

smoke operations. At first, the divisions of Seventh Army were more

adept in the technique because of their experience in Italy. But before

long the Third Army units resorted to corps area screens even more

often than those of Seventh Army. Of the four armies in the European

theater only the First failed to employ area screening when the occasion

seemed to demand it, due in large part to a policy which kept smoke

units at other tasks from which they could not be quickly relieved.

On the whole, American forces in Europe learned the technique and

principles of forward area screening rather quickly, especially considering the late development of the M1 generator which enhanced the

possibilities of such employment.
CHAPTER X

Large Area Smoke Screens

in the Pacific

Large area smoke operations in the Pacific contrasted sharply with

those in Italy, France, and Germany. By concealing rear area installations and forward area operations, CWS smoke generators in Europe

had performed a vital service. The few smoke units in the Pacific, on

the other hand, were inactivated while still in the training stage. The

role of smoke in the Pacific was restricted mainly by geography and

by the decision which gave the war against Germany priority over

the Japanese conflict. Geography was an especially limiting factor.

It dictated that a good deal of the fighting in the Pacific would be

done by the naval arm. The most effective use of smoke in the Pacific

was in the form of anchorage screens maintained by the Navy to

conceal the vulnerable vessels involved in the numerous island hopping

campaigns so typical of the war against Japan.

Early Attempts To Introduce Area Screening in SWPA

In the early phases of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area commanders who considered area screening as a means of concealing airfields from enemy air attack ran up against several serious problems.1

These included not only a lack of a suitable means for static screening

and a shortage of smoke materials but also a scarcity in shipping,

both within the immediate area and from the United States to SWPA.

If smoke was to be used the means and material would have to be

devised locally.

When an industrial survey disclosed that large quantities of the FS

smoke material could be produced in Australia, Colonel Copthorne,

Chief Chemical Officer, USASOS SWPA, assigned the 42d Chemical

1

 Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 16 Nov 42, sub: Tech and Intell Work. AGO CWS Ret 319.1/

3006. This letter reviews the background of the early requests for screening.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 395

Laboratory, then in Brisbane, the mission of developing both a large

and a small smoke generator which could employ this chemical smoke.

Tests in the summer of 1942 revealed deficiencies in the large model

which was dropped entirely later in the year after word came that the

newly developed mechanical smoke generator would soon be made

available to the theater. The 42d Laboratory Company went on to

develop a small smoke generator which was to see limited use in the

theater.

In January 1943 the Commanding General, USASOS SWPA, approved a project for concealing an advanced base or port with smoke

and requisitioned two smoke generator companies from the United

States to carry out the project. The harbor at Port Moresby, New

Guinea, was chosen as the site for the first smoke installation, although

military authorities realized that another port might be more critical

by the time the smoke units arrived. After an on-the-spot survey of

Port Moresby, Colonel Copthorne recommended that some generators

be mounted on barges or power boats to insure adequate smoke

coverage.2

In May 1943 the theater asked the Chief, CWS, to comment on its

tentative plans for a smoke installation at Milne Bay, which, as had

been foreseen, was now a more exposed harbor than Port Moresby.

These plans, which included the employment of generators both on

land and on water to conceal shipping activity in the harbor, suffered

from a lack of power boats on which to mount the generators which

were to be waterborne. The theater requested the War Department

to send several craft suitable for this purpose along with the two smoke

companies requisitioned earlier in the year.3

In July SWPA pressed the War Department for the immediate shipment of the two smoke companies and speculated on the reduced requirement for smoke pots if three smoke generator battalions were

assigned.4 People in the Southwest Pacific Area were also concerned

with the possibility that the two companies, which by September had

not yet arrived, would be equipped with the 3,000-pound M1 generator,

instead of the new lightweight M2.5 Meanwhile, in response to the

2

 Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS,30 Jan 43, sub: Rear Area Smoke Screens. CWS 314.7. 3

 Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CCWS, 21 Jul 43, sub: Smoke Generator Cos. AGO CWS Ret 320.2-

USAF in the Far East. 4

 (1) CM-IN 257, Brisbane to WAR, 1 Jul 43. (2) CM-IN 7666, Brisbane to WAR, II Jul 43. 5

 CM-IN 1601, Brisbane to WAR, 3 Sep 43.
396 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

SMOKE GENERATOR IN A DUKW ON MILNE BAY

theater's interest in large area screening, General Porter in August

1943, sent Maj. Roy E. Halverson, a trained smoke officer, to the

Southwest Pacific Area.6 Major Halverson made surveys at Milne Bay,

Oro Bay, and Goodenough Island, concluding that the establishment

of smoke installations at any of these locations would be a difficult

proposition. He confirmed Colonel Copthorne's view that the lack

of road nets at advanced ports would entail heavy dependence upon

water transportation. Not only were appropriate craft in short supply

but the M1 smoke generator was rather bulky for this type of employment. In fact, the successful screening of port facilities in the Southwest Pacific seemed to require an amphibious smoke unit, a type that

so far had not been foreseen by planners in Washington.7

By mid-1943 the Japanese were raiding Goodenough Island regularly

and Milne Bay, New Guinea, occasionally. The theater proceeded with

its plans to station the two smoke generator units temporarily at

Milne Bay where they could be adapted to island employment and

6

 CWS USAFFE, Info Bull, No. 15, 24 Aug 43. 7

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Morgan, former theater CWS liaison officer with the Australian Army,

30 Jan 46. (2) Interv, Burke, former CmlO Base A, Milne Bay, New Guinea, 30 Jan 46.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 397

trained for more difficult operations at a more advanced port.8 But

the 70th and 17Oth Smoke Generator Companies landed at Sydney,

instead of Milne Bay. Shortage of shipping and the higher priority

of other units precluded the immediate transshipment of these units to

Milne Bay, and the two companies remained in Australia for almost

two full months after their arrival in October 1943. As a result, smoke

company training at Milne Bay did not begin until January 1944 and

then only under the greatest difficulties. The base commander could

not permit a considerable amount of smoke over the area because his

installation was operating under pressure, day and night. Of even

greater importance was the lack of craft on which to mount the smoke

generators. Boats could be borrowed for short periods, but none could

be assigned to the smoke troops. General Porter, Chief, CWS, arranged

to ship four J boats which, shortly after arrival, were severely damaged

by a storm.

By April 1944 it was evident that smoke training operations would

have to be shifted to a less active port. Chosen was Base E at Lae, on

the northeastern coast of New Guinea, where ships anchored while

awaiting a call to a more exposed port9 and, consequently, where

practice screens would not interfere with normal port operations.

Another advantage was the short distance to the air base at Nadzab, up

the Markham River from Lae. The air base was an ideal place to test

screening of air installations and a source of aircraft from which to

observe the practice screens. The companies moved to their new location in mid-July and immediately experienced greater success with their

training program. The road net facilitated land training, and boats

were available for working out problems in the bay. In mid-August

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 26th Smoke Generator

Battalion, under the command of Maj. Allen H. Williams, arrived

from the United States and took charge of the two smoke companies.10

A Question of mission

In June 1944 the commanding general, USASOS, recommended to

General MacArthur the employment of smoke generator units during

the early stages of an amphibious operation for screening supply dumps

8

 Burke Interv, 30 Jan 46. 9

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Joseph S. Terrell, Jan 46. 10

 (1) Ibid, (2) Burke Interv, 30 Jan 46.
398 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

as well as for concealing ships engaged in unloading.11 He proposed that

the 70th and 170th Smoke Generator Companies be equipped with

suitable craft and trained to use the new lightweight M1 generators,

then en route to the theater. General MacArthur agreed that the

smoke troops could be profitably employed in future operations and

suggested the transfer of the two companies to the Sixth Army for

amphibious training under an engineer special brigade.12

Col. Carl L. Marriott, Sixth Army chemical officer, opposed this

suggestion, indicating that the USASOS recommendation was merely

an admission that it had been unable to interest the14th Antiaircraft

Command in the value of the smoke units. Reasons given by Colonel

Marriott for this lack of interest included inappropriate equipment,

the fact that the Esso generators were too unwieldy, and the reputation

of the two smoke companies at Milne Bay for "smashing up" their

equipment.13 CWS officers at Milne Bay refuted this last argument,

attributing damaged equipment to the work of the elements, not to

careless maintenance.14 In arguing against the assignment of the two

smoke companies to Sixth Army, Marriott also brought up the matter

of control. In an assault landing these units initially would be controlled by the naval task force commander. On the other hand,

smoke operations to conceal ships just off the beaches would have to

be co-ordinated by a second agency, the one charged with the control

of antiaircraft artillery and fighter aircraft. Marriott recommended

that USAFFE should clarify the question of control and assign the

smoke units to the 14th Antiaircraft Command, a troop unit not

under Sixth Army.15

Early in September 1944, and before any decision was reached on

the control of the smoke units, a group of Sixth Army officers witnessed a smoke demonstration at Lae which featured the recently

arrived M1 mechanical generator, smaller and more economical and

efficient than its predecessor. Without exception, the officers were

most enthusiastic about the capabilities of the new mechanical gen11

 Ltr, CG USASOS to CG USAFFE, 4 Jun 44, sub: Assignment of Craft to Provisional Smoke Generator Bn. Sixth Army, 470.71-SG. 1 2 1st Ind, CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, II Jul 44. 13

 Memo, CmlO Sixth Army for G-3 Sixth Army, 16 Jul 44. Sixth Army 470.71-SG. 14

 Ltr, Lt Col Joseph S. Terrell to Hist Off, 19 May 1950. 15

 Memo, CmlO Sixth Army for G-3 Sixth Army, 16 Jul 44. Sixth Army 470.71-SG.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 399

erator and requested that every effort be made to obtain smoke companies for Sixth Army to be used on beachheads and airstrips.16

It seems that the final decision regarding the assignment of the CWS

smoke companies pleased no one. The two companies were not assigned

to the Sixth Army, nor to an antiaircraft artillery command, as recommended by Colonel Marriott. In October the commander of the USA

Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, unaccountably ordered

that the 70th and 170th Chemical Smoke Generator Companies be

inactivated and that the personnel so released be used to activate two

quartermaster truck companies.17 This decision marked the end of

efforts to prepare the two units for combat and prompted Navy officers

to question the wisdom of eliminating the smoke units in face of the

increasing need for smoke in beach operations.18

The officers and men of the headquarters of the recently arrived

smoke generator battalion received assignments with the chemical

warfare school at Oro Bay. There they taught and prepared studies

for the employment of smoke in future operations. The new lightweight M2 generators, which arrived in the theater in August, were

turned over to the Navy along with the supply of fog oil and most

of the floating smoke pots.19

Renewed Interest in Smoke

The smoke companies had hardly been inactivated before ground

commanders in the area began inquiring about their availability. The

XI Corps, for example, became interested in smoke after learning of

the successful employment of the mechanical generator at Anzio.20

Chemical officers at the CWS conference at Oro Bay wanted to know

how long it would take to train combat troops in the use of the lightweight M1 generator for forward area operations. At this time, October 1944, about 100 of these generators were in or en route to the

theater.21 A month later Lt. Col. David D. Hulsey, Chemical Officer,

16

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Allen H. Williams, formerly CO 26th Smoke Generator Bn, 5 Jun 50. 17

 (1) Ltr, Secy War to CINCSWPA, 16 Oct 44, sub: Disbandment, Constitution and Activation of

Certain Units. AG 322 (12 Oct 44). (2) CM-IN 12423 (13 Nov 44) CG USAFFE, 12 Nov 44. 18

 Williams Interv, 5 Jun 50. 19

 Burke Interv, 30 Jan 46. 20

 Ltr, CmlO XI Corps to CmlO Sixth Army, 22 Aug 44, sub: Smoke Generators, and 1st Ind

thereto, CG Sixth Army to CG XI Corps, 30 Aug 44. ORB Sixth Army 470.71-SG. 21

 CCmlO USASOS, Rpt of CWS Conf, 10-13 Oct 44, p. 30.
400 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

6th Infantry Division, asked Col. Harold Riegelman, Chemical Officer,

I Corps, whether any smoke troops were available to screen river crossings. The answer was: in the absence of smoke units ground troops

would continue to rely on mortar smoke shell and smoke pots for that

type or mission.22

Meanwhile, various units of the Sixth Army resorted to limited area

screening with whatever smoke weapons or equipment was available.

The 2d Engineer Special Brigade used the small FS generator developed

by the 42d Chemical Laboratory Company to conceal LCM's unloading

at Colasion Point from rifle and machine gun fire.23 But the M1 and

M4 smoke pots proved to be the mainstays for area screening. Smoke

from these munitions successfully concealed the Tacloban airstrip on

Leyte from Japanese bombers during the full moon period of November

I944-24 In the Zamboanga operation in western Mindanao Colonel

Arthur, chemical officer of the 41st Infantry Division, organized a

smoke pot line along one side of an airstrip then under construction

after Japanese artillery had damaged heavy engineer equipment.25

During the Luzon Campaign, the Sixth Army used smoke pots far

more extensively than previously to conceal road and bridge construction from enemy observers.26

 The increased use of smoke in the

Sixth Army resulted from the stepped-up activity of the Japanese

air force; the shift to larger land masses for maneuvering, along with

a decrease in the amount of jungle fighting; the availability of smoke

weapons and munitions; recent emphasis by commanders and chemical

officers on the importance of smoke in combat; and the fact that the

use of smoke had proved beneficial in saving lives and equipment.

Another possible mission for large area screening, the concealment

of airfields, was beginning to take shape in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

22

 Ltr, CmlO I Corps to CmlO 6th Inf Div, 8 Dec 44. In Riegelman's private files. 23

 (1) Memo, Actg CmlO for ACofS Sixth Army, 23 Nov 44. Sixth Army 470.6-Smoke. (2)

In the Biak operation, I Corps had used this same item for harassing effect; when the generators were

placed in the windward openings of caves, the smoke not only drove out the Japanese but disclosed

other entrances to the cave. CG I Corps, History of Biak Opn 15—27 Jun 44, G-3 Rpt, an. 2, Cml,

p. 47. AGO HRS 201-11.4 (15459). General Krueger cites the testimony of Japanese generals

after the Philippines campaign attesting to the usefulness of smoke and white phosphorus in driving

Japanese soldiers out of their caves. From Down Under to Nippon, p. 327. 24

 Comdr Amphib Group 8 Seventh Fleet Action Rpt, Leyte Opn, pt. V (D), Special Comments,

Smoke. 25

 Interv, Hist Off with Col Frank M. Arthur, former chemical officer of the 41st Division and I

Corps, 1 Jul 46. 26

 Sixth U.S. Army, Rpt of the Luzon Campaign, 9 Jan 45-30 Jun 45, III, Rpts of the General

and Special Staff Secs, Rpt of the Cml Warfare Officer, 90.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 401

In the summer of 1944 United States forces captured Guam, Tinian,

and Saipan in the Marianas group and immediately began constructing

airfields from which to stage bombing attacks against Japan. These

bases became operational in the fall and early winter of 1944, and

B-29's of the XXI Bomber Command began their assault on the Japanese homeland.27

 In turn, these airfields in the Marianas were subjected

to enemy air raids, infrequent and largely ineffective, but nonetheless

"an expensive nuisance, which, if unchecked, could have become more

costly."

 28

Even as the Advanced Echelon, XXI Bomber Command, was staging

at Hickam Field, Oahu, its chemical officer, Maj. John Barrows suggested the use of smoke generators to conceal the B-29's when they

reached the Marianas. The Commander in Chief, POA, turned down

this request on the ground that the available shipping space was needed

for more vital supplies.29 General Waitt, Assistant Chief CWS for

Field Operations, brought the subject up again during his November

1944 visit to Saipan. Noting the vulnerability of the B-29's to Japanese

attack—several of the planes had already been destroyed by enemy air

action—Waitt insisted that the use of smoke could conceal the expensive aircraft without interfering with the antiaircraft screen. Later

on in Hawaii, he urged Admiral Nimitz and General Richardson to

adopt this plan.30 Despite the merits of the case, and the fact that

eleven B-29's had been destroyed and forty-three others damaged, the

plan for screening the Marianas airfields against enemy attack never got

off the ground. The interests of the strong antiaircraft artillery defenses were considered paramount.31

 In any event, enemy air attacks

ceased early in 1945 when Iwo Jima with its air bases fell to U.S.

Marine forces, thus eliminating the trouble at its source.

The question of employing smoke troops at airfields arose again in

27

 The XXI Bomber Command was an element of the Twentieth Air Force, which, under Joint Chiefs

of Staff control, had as its mission the strategic bombing of Japan. For the complete picture of these

operations, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., THE ARMY FORCES IN WORLD

WAR II, vol. V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). 28

 Craven and Cate, eds., Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p. 582. 29

 Interv, Hist Off with Grothaus, former CmlO, Seventh Air Force, 27 Apr 50. 30

 Rpt on Trip of Waitt and Javits to POA and SWPA, 24 Sep-21 Nov 44, dated 15 Dec 44. CWS

314.7 Observer Rpts. 31

 (1) CM-IN 930, CG AAFPOA to WD, 1 Dec 44. (2) Grothaus Interv, 27 Apr 50. Colonel

Grothaus felt that the shortage of available shipping remained a factor in the decision not to employ

smoke.
402 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

connection with Operation ICEBERG, the campaign against the Ryukyus

chain. Because of the proximity of the islands to the Japanese homeland, American planners correctly anticipated that their assault would

provoke a great amount of enemy air action. The Navy made excellent

use of smoke at Hagushi Beach, Okinawa, during the earlier phases of

the operation, but withdrew its smoke personnel in the postamphibious

phase when Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, commanding Tenth Army,

assumed leadership ashore of the land forces of the operation. Originally, the Army planned to use smoke generators to conceal airfields

and beaches during Phases II and III of ICEBERG, during the occupation

of Ie Shima and the establishment of control over northern Okinawa,

and during the seizure of additional islands in the Nansei Shoto. The

28th Smoke Generator Battalion, comprised of the 67th, 68th, and

71st Smoke Generator Companies, received the Okinawa assignment.

Unfortunately, the 71st Smoke Generator Company was not available

in time for operations on Ie Shima. Although the Headquarters and

Headquarters Detachment, 28th Chemical Smoke Generator Battalion,

and elements of the 67th and 68th Smoke Generator Companies arrived

at Okinawa on 12 June, Phase III of the operation was canceled. The

remainder of the two companies arrived on Okinawa early in July,

but Japanese air activity had diminished considerably, and the need

for smoke no longer existed.32

Although the planning for the invasion of Kyushu, the southernmost island of the homeland of the enemy, had not been completed

when Japan surrendered, it appeared certain that smoke generator

troops would have seen extensive use had the invasion been mounted.

Colonel Copthorne, now Chemical Officer, Army Forces, Pacific, arranged with representatives of the operations officer of his headquarters

and with the commander of Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, for the

use of five chemical smoke generator companies during the early stages

of OLYMPIC, as the operation was dubbed. Earmarked for the eastern

shore of Kyushu were the three companies of the 28th Smoke Generator Battalion. The two quartermaster truck companies which had

formerly been the 70th and 170th Smoke Generator Companies were

to be reconverted to smoke units and earmarked for operations on the

western shore of Kyushu. During the initial stage of the operation

32

 (1) Unit records in CmlC Hist Off. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Lucius F. Lincoln, formerly

ExecO 28th Smoke Generator Bn, 12 May 50. (3) CG Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar30 Jun 45, vol I, ch. 11, sec. XIII, par 1a(2).
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 403

and under control of the Navy, the companies were to screen ship

concentrations, harbors, and beaches. Once the invasion forces had

successfully landed, smoke troops would revert to Army control. How

these units were to be assigned in support of tactical operations on

Kyushu was still a matter of conjecture when the war came to an end.

Upon orders of AFPAC, Eighth Army prepared a study on the use

of smoke troops in land operations on the island. It recommended in

July 1945 that twelve M2 mechanical generators be issued to the

chemical service platoon assigned to each combat division and that

two smoke generator battalions, each with four companies, be redeployed from Europe and assigned, one each, to the two invading

armies.33

Colonel Copthorne approved the idea of giving mechanical smoke

generators to chemical service platoons, calling attention to the growing

tendency of combat troops to demand larger and larger smoke screens

and arguing that the use of fog oil by the service platoon would reduce

the tonnage of mortar and artillery smoke ammunition. The chemical

officer of Sixth Army, Colonel Burns, opposed the plan. He felt that

the chemical service platoons had neither the men nor the transportation for the conduct of screening operations. Moreover, he considered

impractical any attempt to substitute a fog oil screen for a projected

smoke screen because they served "different tactical purposes."34

There could be no doubt that chemical service platoons in the combat

area were fully occupied in the supply and maintenance of chemical

supplies and were already short of transportation facilities. But Burns's

statement concerning tactical screening ran counter to the experience

of U.S. forces in Europe who frequently used fog oil to save mortar and

artillery ammunition. V-J Day found still unanswered this question

of how the combat divisions in the Pacific could best be supported by

smoke generator personnel.

33

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Williams, 5 Jun 50. Colonel Williams of the AFPAC Chemical Section

had a part in this smoke planning. (2) Lt Col William R. Maull to CCWS, 28 Sep 45, Rpt of Official

Travel, pp. 35-36. CMLHO. Colonel Maull stated that AFPAC was to activate only one additional

smoke company.

34

 Ltr, CCmlO AFPAC to CmlO Sixth Army, 4 Aug 45, sub: Smoke Generators as Additional

Equip for Cml Serv Platoons, and 1st Ind CmlO Sixth Army to CCmlO AFPAC, 11 Aug 45. Sixth

Army 400.34—Equipment—Special T/E & T/BA.
404 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Navy's Use of Smoke

Naval operations in Pacific waters, particularly in the last two years

of the war, were accompanied by an extensive use of smoke. Although

the Navy had its own arsenal of smoke munitions, including HC pots

and the Besler mechanical generator, its use of CWS equipment was

not uncommon. CWS personnel also contributed to the fulfillment

of the Navy's smoke mission.

The question of concealing Pearl Harbor with smoke was one of

long standing, and the Army, before World War II, had discouraged

at least one Navy suggestion for screening that most important installation.35

 It was natural that the matter would assume a much

greater significance after 7 December 1941. Although early in 1942

a special smoke board set up by Admiral Nimitz recommended against

screening the Pearl Harbor area, the M1 mechanical smoke generator

was scarcely off the assembly line before the Navy obtained fifteen of

the items for use in the Hawaiian Islands.36 Knowing little or nothing

about the generators, Navy officials at Pearl Harbor requested Colonel

Unmacht to service and demonstrate the machines. By March 1943 he

had gotten possession of all fifteen generators, trained men from the

91st Chemical Mortar Company in their operation, started a program

for training Navy personnel, and had demonstrated the generators

along the Honolulu waterfront and at Pearl Harbor.37

The Navy's interest in area screening prompted General Richardson,

commanding the Hawaiian Department, to take a renewed interest in

smoke equipment. Earlier, he had attempted unsuccessfully to secure

fifty generators without taking any smoke troops. The Chief, Chemical

Warfare Service, had strongly opposed this suggestion, arguing that

the efficient operation of the generators required trained men available

on a 24-hour basis.38 Richardson was still unwilling to substitute smoke

generator troops for others on his troop basis for Hawaii. Again the

War Department replied that the Hawaiian Department could not

have the equipment without the troops, although as a compromise it

was willing to send a cadre of smoke specialists, provided that General

35

 Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 470-71. 36

 Ltr, Waitt to Unmacht, 18 Nov 42. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr file, AFMIDPAC. 37

 Ltrs, Unmacht to Waitt, 11 Dec 42, 3 Mar, 5 Mar 43. 38

 Ltr, Waitt to Unmacht, CmlO Hawaiian Dept, 18 Nov 42.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 405

Richardson activate a smoke unit within the theater.39 During the

negotiations, Colonel Unmacht argued that the need for smoke was

far greater in Hawaii than along the west coast of the United States,

where smoke units were then stationed. He believed that the situation

justified 500 smoke troops despite the presence at Honolulu and Pearl

Harbor of 10,000 men assigned to fighter, antiaircraft, and barrage

balloon units. Unmacht's arguments that smoke troops, man for man,

contributed more to antiaircraft defense than those of any other service

were not persuasive enough to cause the Hawaiian Department to

substitute smoke troops for other types.40

The Navy made one more attempt to secure a smoke installation for

Pearl Harbor, suggesting that its facilities be screened with existing

equipment—15 mechanical generators and 1,100 obsolete stationary

generators. General Richardson referred the proposal to Colonel Unmacht who pointed out that, in comparison with mechanical generators, the stationary models consumed too much oil and required

too many men to operate. Besides, he argued, there was not enough

equipment on hand to screen Pearl Harbor effectively. Unmacht used

this opportunity to try again to convince the Hawaiian Department

to ask for smoke generator companies.41 The diminishing need for

smoke at the islands served to nullify this last attempt to get a fullscale smoke installation at Pearl Harbor.

After mid-1943 smoke screening activities in the Pacific Ocean

Areas were confined to the combat zones. The first of the island campaigns in the Central Pacific Area was the V Amphibious Corps' assault on the Gilberts. Plans for Tarawa, the objective of the 2d

Marine Division, called for curtains of smoke laid by carrier planes,

as well as the use of Army M1 and M4 smoke pots loaded on landing

craft, to conceal mine sweeper activity and the assault waves of

marines as they rendezvoused for the final run. The actual operation

saw limited use of smoke. The aircraft screens were deemed unnecessary, although the pots on the landing craft did obscure the assault

craft from enemy observation. Smoke activity during the difficult

days after the assault proved to be of more importance. Six landing

craft, stationed at various positions to the windward, used smoke pots

39

 Ltr, CG Hawaiian to CG ASF WD, 23 Apr 43, sub: Smoke Generator Equip and 1st Ind,

Secy War to CG Hawaiian Dept. AG 400 (4-23-43) OB-S-E. 40

 Ltr, Unmacht to Waitt, 30 Mar 43. CMLHO. 41

 Ltr, Unmacht to Waitt, 13 Jul 43. CMLHO.
406 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

to shield ships anchored in the lagoon during enemy night air attacks,

at times aided by LST's equipped with smoke pots.42

Area screening of anchorages became accepted procedure for operations in the Marshall Islands, the next step up the island ladder. The

Navy rehearsed the planned smoke procedures during January 1944

and put them into practice during the invasions of Kwajalein, RoiNamur, and Eniwetok. In brief, small craft burned M1 and M4 HC

pots, furnished by the CWS depot in Hawaii, while the cargo and personnel ships employed the Navy's Besler mechanical smoke generators

for the first time. The glare from the pots and their fire hazard emphasized the need for a small lightweight generator which could be

mounted on small craft for this type of operation.43

The Marianas campaign in the summer of 1944 saw further Navy

successes with anchorage screening. Between 15 June (D-day) and

7 July, the Saipan anchorage had a total of 19 hours of smoke entailing

57,000 gallons of fog oil and 11,400 smoke pots. The commander of

the Joint Expeditionary Force called it "the greatest factor in the

extremely effective defense of the transport area against air attack.

During the repeated attacks 100 bombs were dropped in the vicinity

of the transport area, but were obviously dropped blindly. . . .44

The Navy set up a most complete smoke installation at Guam.

Emplaced mechanical generators lined the landlocked harbor while

small craft with mounted generators patrolled the entrance. Resembling

those established during 1943-44 at Bizerte, Naples, and Anzio in the

Mediterranean theater, this was one of the few smoke installations in

the Pacific which depended upon land-based mechanical generators

as the primary means of screening. Ironically, enemy air forces never

tested the smoke defenses.45

42

 (1) Comdr TF 53, app. 3 to an. A to CTF 53 OPORD A 104-43 (revised). CMLHO. (2)

Comdr, Transport Div 4 Tarawa, in Extracts from Naval Rpts on Use of Smoke by the Navy in

Amphib Opns to Date, Jan 44. Sixth Army 470.6—Smoke. (3) Rpt of Tarawa Opn (AGO 370.2

(31 Dec 43)), cited in CWS TofO Ltr 11, 9 Mar 44, p. 12. (4) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the

Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 129. (5) Capt. James R. Stockman, USMC, The Battle for Tarawa

(Washington, 1947), p. 13. 43

 (1) Extracts from Naval Rpts on Use of Smoke by the Navy in Amphib Opns to Date Marshall

Islands Opn. Sixth Army 470.6—Smoke. (2) Ltr, CmlO Sixth Army to Div CG's, 24 Jun 44,

sub: Marshall Islands Campaign. Sixth Army 3 14.7—Rpts, Hist. 44

 CWS TofO Ltr 22, 28 February 1945, pages 23-24, cites comments made by the Commander of

the Joint Expeditionary Force in Report of Amphibious Operations for the Capture of the Marianas

Islands, 25 August 1944. 45

 (1) Lt. Comdr. V. C. Alexander, USNR, "Area Smoke Screen in Harbor Defense," Naval Harbor

Defense (OPNAV 30-3-A), No. 3, May 1945, pp. 11-15. (2) Interv, Hist Off OCCmlO with

Comdr Alexander, member of the Amphib Smoke Committee, 25 Sep 45. CMLHO.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 407

On 20 October 1944 Sixth Army launched its operations against the

Philippine Islands with the assault on Leyte. The Japanese response

was immediate, including the commitment of a substantial part of

Japan's air reserves.46 During the first stage of the operation U.S.

carrier-based planes twice laid screens over the invasion beaches of

X and XXIV Corps. Floating smoke pots enabled two beached LST's

to resume unloading after an interruption caused by enemy mortar fire.

For the first four days the Japanese concentrated their air activity

during the hours of daylight. Antiaircraft defenses during this period

consisted for the most part of U.S. carrier-based fighters which prevented any serious damage to the ships or the targets onshore. This

procedure restricted smoke to the twilight periods and night alerts.

In the next four days, when enemy planes averaged 175 sorties, the

Navy used smoke extensively during day as well as twilight and night

attacks. After 27 October the smoke again was restricted to twilight, moonlight, and nocturnal alerts. This return to former tactics,

which were continued in operations at Lingayen Gulf and Okinawa,

came about for several reasons: the ineffectiveness of the daytime

screens except under ideal low-speed wind conditions, the fear that the

smoke generators would not hold up under extended use, a shortage

of fog oil, the establishment of an airstrip at nearby Tacloban, and the

fact that daytime smoke precluded observation by the antiaircraft

batteries at the same time that it allowed enemy aircraft glimpses of

the masts of the assembled ships.47

Antiaircraft defenses at Leyte Gulf were largely successful. Few, if

any, ships received hits while hidden by smoke although several destroyers outside the screen suffered damage. This accomplishment was

the greater because Leyte marked the first appearance in force of the

Japanese kamikaze planes. By preventing Japanese pilots from sighting

individual targets, smoke did much to reduce the effectiveness of these

suicide missions. After the operation the commander of Southern

Attack Force commented that "area smoke, properly employed, is

46

 CG Sixth Army, Rpt of the Leyte Opn, 20 Oct-25 Dec 44, pp. 40-41. CMLHO. 47

 (1) Ltr, Comdr TF 79 to Comdr Seventh Fleet, sub: Seizure of Leyte—Rpt of Participation of

TF 79. Bur Yards & Docks File No. FFI-D-NB (503). (2) Comdr Amphib Group 6, Pacific Fleet,

TF 79.2, Rpt of Leyte Opn, 4 Nov 44. CMLHO. (3) Comdr Amphib Group 8, Seventh Fleet

Action Rpt—Leyte Opn—Rpt On, pt. V, Special Comments (d) Smoke (extract undated). Both

in CMLHO.
408 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

invaluable for protecting a transport area from enemy air attack at

night or at twilight."

 48

The landings at Lingayen Gulf in Luzon saw some use of smoke pots

to conceal the beaches from direct observation by enemy artillery

until American counterbattery fire could silence the opposition.49

Once the beachhead was secured the Navy regularly screened the

anchorage at dawn and dusk for a daily total of about two hours.

The Leyte experience led to improvements in the screens at Lingayen

Gulf. Smoke boats arranged in lines at distances of 500, 1,000, and

2,000 yards windward from the ships resulted in a more uniform

screen than had been the case at Leyte. Ships under smoke at Lingayen

suffered no damage from the dawn and dusk air raids, despite the frequent 15- to 20-knot sea breeze. Denied observation of the anchorage,

the Japanese planes made several hits on destroyers and escorts patrolling outside the concealed area. The supply situation at Lingayen Gulf

was much better than that at Leyte which had seen the near depletion

of fog oil and smoke pots.50

The naval commander at Lingayen Gulf strongly recommended

that LCVP (landing craft, vehicle and personnel) smoke boats should

be fitted with the CWS lightweight smoke generator as soon as possible.

The smoke cloud produced by this mechanical generator not only was

more persistent, but it was without the toxicity of HC smoke. Frequently, both at Leyte and at Lingayen, men aboard ships became ill

when ventilating systems drew in the HC-laden air. And there was

always the storage problem and fire hazard presented by smoke pots.51

In preparing for the campaigns of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the Navy

in the Pacific received technical assistance from members of the

Amphibious Smoke Committee. Capt. N. F. Chamberlain, CWS, and

three naval officers of the committee reported to the Commander,

Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, on 5 November 1944 for

48

 (1) Comdr Southern Attack Force (TF 79), Rpt of Philippine Opn: Tactical Use of Smoke 13

Nov 44. Bur Yards & Docks, FFI-D-NB (503) (AL). (2) CmlO X Corps, Hist Data, LeyteSamar Campaign, app. G, n.d. Sixth Army 319.1—Leyte Opn. 49

 Ltr, CmlO 43d Inf Div to CmlO I Corps, 23 Jan 45, sub: Misc Summary Rpt, 23 Jan 45.

Sixth Army 319.1—Weekly Activity Rpts, Divs. 50

 (1) Rpt, Comdr TF 79, Lingayen Gulf Opn, n.d., sub: Tactical Use of Smoke. Bur Yards & Docks

FFI-D-NB (503) (AL-1), and in ORB Sixth Army 370.2-Luzon Opns Rpts. (2) Ltr, Copthorne

to Hist Off, 23 May 50. Naval officers remarked to Colonel Copthorne that smoke operations at

Lingayen Gulf showed a great improvement in technique. 51

 (1) Ibid, (2) Capt Walter Karig, Battle Report: Victory in the Pacific (New York: Rinehart

& Co., 1949), pp. 30-31.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 409

temporary duty as smoke specialists. In Hawaii they lectured on the

experimental work done at the Amphibious Training Base, Fort Pierce,

Fla.,52 trained air and naval crews and infantry troops in the employment of smoke munitions and equipment, prepared training directives,

and assisted in writing smoke plans for scheduled operations. The

committee appeared in Hawaii at a rather opportune moment, for

interest in smoke screening had reached a high point with the news

of how kamikaze pilots had been baffled at Leyte.53

On 22 December 1944 the committee, before many high-ranking

combat commanders in the POA, including ten admirals and a number

of Marine and Army generals, successfully staged in Hawaii a largescale demonstration on the use of smoke in landings. Vice Adm.

Richmond K. Turner, Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet,

was among those impressed by the capabilities of smoke. As a result of

the demonstration members of the smoke committee were requested

to participate in subsequent landing operations as smoke advisers.54

At Iwo Jima the Navy used a limited quantity of smoke during the

initial assault, including screens laid by carrier-based planes as the

first wave approached the beach.55 Later, screens concealed ships in

the anchorage from kamikaze planes during sixteen different night

raids. No vessel under the screen suffered damage, although five enemy

bombs straddled the USS Auburn.56 Beach and shore party personnel

had been specially trained for the employment of portable smoke generators on the island, but none actually made the landing.57

 The

satisfactory performance of waterborne generators negated the need

for landing the palletized generators, an operation which would have

been imperiled by the heavy sea and currents.

The most extensive and prolonged area screening operation in the

Pacific took place at Okinawa. Anticipating that the Japanese air

forces would desperately oppose any landing so close to the homeland,

framers of the task force smoke plan specifically provided for night

coverage of the anchorage and further directed the commanders of

52

 The naval doctrine on use of smoke in amphibious operations was published in Commander in

Chief, U.S. Fleet, Smoke Screens for Amphibious Operations, 8 Nov 44. 53

 Memo, Chamberlain for CO Research and Development Center Amphib Tng Comd U.S. Atlantic

Fleet, 22 Jun 45, sub: Summary of Activities of the Amphib Comd in Forward Areas. CMLHO. 54

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, CmlO POA to ACCWS for Field Opns, 23 Dec 44. CWS 314.7 Personal

Ltr file, AFMIDPAC. 55

 Karig, Battle Report: Victory in the Pacific, p. 303. 56

 Comdr Amphib Group 2, Iwo Jima, Action Rpt, pt. VIII, Smoke. CMLHO. 57

 Ibid., pt. X, Force Beachmaster's Rpt, sec. B (K), Smoke Generators.
410 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

attack forces and groups to draw up detailed plans for other uses of

smoke. The latter provision resulted in limited use of smoke in connection with underwater demolition team activities, landing feints,

the assault on Ie Shima, and mine-sweeping activities. But the anchorage screens were another matter. Okinawa saw the kamikaze campaign

reach a crescendo,58 and in an effort to minimize the terrible destruction caused by these riders of the "heavenly wind" the Navy expended

more fog oil and smoke pots at the Hagushi Beach anchorage than in

any other single operation of World War II.59

In addition to the customary means of smoking from small craft

and ships the Navy on L-day plus 1 took ashore forty-five mechanical

generators and divided them between the north and south sectors of

Hagushi Beach. Next day these generators went into operation. The

southern line, commanded by Captain Chamberlain of the Amphibious

Smoke Committee, had twenty-five emplacements; the northern line

had about fifteen. Limited training of the generator operators did

not prevent the shore contingent from maintaining an adequate screen

over the anchorage.60

A word about the operation of the screen. The senior officer present

afloat ordered smoke when unidentified planes, as shown by the radar

screen, seemed likely to attack. All ships under the screen withheld

antiaircraft fire, because smoke was an ample safeguard against the

few planes which penetrated the outside fighter defense and because

AA fire might disclose the location of the ships.61 During the night of

L-day (1 April) smoke covered the anchorage for a total of 6 hours

and 32 minutes. Smoke concealed the anchorage and beaches during

40 of the 46 nights between L-day and 16 May, with the average screen

lasting slightly more than 2 hours. From 17 May until 21 June, the

day the island was secured, the Navy resorted to smoke practically

58

 For details on the kamikaze attacks, see: (1) Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, pp.

97-101; (2) Maj Charles S. Nichols, Jr., and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific

(Washington, 1955), pp. 82-86. 59

 (1) Comdr (Adm Turner) Amphib Forces Pacific Fleet, Action Rpt, Okinawa Gunto, pt. V,

Special Rpts; sec. C, Naval Ordnance and Gunnery; IV—Protective Smoke Cover (1 Apr-16 May 45).

CMLHO. (2) Memo, Chamberlain for CO Research and Development Center Amphib Tng Comd,

U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 22 Jun 45, sub: Summary of Activities of the Amphib Comd in Forward Areas. 60

 (1) Beachmaster Hagushi Beaches to Comdr Amphib Group 12, Rpt, Smoke Generator Opn,

Hagushi Beaches, Okinawa. (2) Comdr (Turner) Amphib Forces Pacific Fleet, Action Rpt, Okinawa

Gunto, pt. V, Special Rpts; sec. C, Naval Ordnance and Gunnery; IV—Protective Smoke Cover (1 Apr16 May 45). 61

 Ltr, Maj N. F. Chamberlain, CmlC Res, to Hist Off, 1 May 50.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 411

every night for an average of one hour and 27 minutes, although one

night of unusual Japanese air activity resulted in an 8-hour screen.

Estimated expenditures of smoke materials for the Okinawa operation

were 2,475,000 gallons of fog oil, 35,000 land smoke pots, and 47,500

floating smoke pots, or floats as they were known to the Navy.62

Comments on smoke operations at Okinawa were of special importance because of their influence on planning for the invasion of Japan.

Captain Chamberlain reported that the initial skepticism among ship

captains as to the value of smoke over the anchorage quickly changed

"to an almost frantic clamor for smoke cover when it was found that

only those ships outside the smoke screen were being hit by suicide

planes."

 63

Admiral Turner made a number of recommendations for future

smoke operations, which, for the most part, concerned logistics. Again,

planning for the Okinawa operation had not provided adequate quantities of fog oil and pots, either in the forward area or in reserve.

Consequently, supplies were almost exhausted several times during an

operation. He advocated equipping all merchant ships with fog oil

generators and expanding the maintenance facilities for smoke equipment. Both measures would further increase the requirements for fog

oil to 8,000 barrels (approximately 400,000 gallons), an amount he

considered a minimum for planning an operation the size of the one

at Okinawa. This weekly replenishment figure was double that requested (although not always supplied) for Okinawa. Turner also

emphasized that smoke personnel should be recognized as specialists and

urged that CWS smoke generators units be provided for onshore

assistance.64 It seems that if the Pacific war had continued, smoke

would have played an important role on sea as well as on land.

Screens for Airborne Operations

Airborne operations in the Pacific differed considerably from those

in the war against Germany. The difference was largely a matter of

62

 (1) Comdr (Turner) Amphib Forces Pacific Fleet, Action Rpt, Okinawa Gunto, pt. V Special

Rpts; sec. C, Naval Ordnance and Gunnery: IV—Protective Smoke Cover (1 Apr-16 May 45). (2)

Comdr V Amphib Force, CTF 51, Rpt of Capture of Okinawa Gunto, Phases I and II (17 May-21 Jun

45).

63

 Memo, Capt Chamberlain for CO Research and Development Center Amphib Tng Comd U.S.

Atlantic Fleet, 22 Jun 45, sub: Summary of Activities of the Amphib Comd in Forward Areas. 64

 Comdr (Turner) Amphib Forces Pacific Fleet, Action Rpt, Okinawa Gunto, pt. V, special Rpts;

sec. C, Naval Ordnance and Gunnery; IV—Protective Smoke Cover (1 Apr—16 May 45).
412 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

size; the geography of the Pacific area, as noted earlier, dictated that

most ground operations there would be on a smaller scale than those

on the land mass of Europe. The forces in the Pacific received more

modest allotments of men and matériel than did those in Europe.

Perhaps the very small size of the Pacific airborne operations made

them more suitable for support by air-land smoke screens. In any

event, in contrast with experience in Europe, half of the six airborne

operations in the war against Japan had the benefit of smoke.65

The first of the air-screened paratroop landings, indeed the first

airborne operation in the Pacific, took place in eastern New Guinea

at the airstrip near Nadzab, a village some twenty-five miles up the

Markham River from the coastal town of Lae.66 The landing at the

Nadzab strip, an overgrown facility about a half a mile north of the

river, took place on the morning of 5 September 1943, the day after

an Australian-American amphibious task force went ashore near Lae.

The successful completion of these missions would lead to control of

New Guinea's Huon Peninsula and increased control of the straits

between New Guinea and New Britain. More immediately, the seizure

of Nadzab would prevent Japanese reinforcement from the Wewak

area and would enable C-47's to fly in the Australian 7th Division for

a move down the Markham River to Lae.67

The 503d Parachute Infantry regiment made the jump at Nadzab.

Little enemy opposition was expected, but because the Japanese did

have troops in the vicinity of Lae and at the Heath Plantation, between

Lae and the immediate objective, there was some chance of encountering one of the daily patrols which scouted the Nadzab area. To take

care of any such possibility the airdrop was preceded by B—25's which

worked over the area with .50-caliber machine guns and parachute

fragmentation bombs. Seven A—20's followed armed with smoke tanks

to screen each of the three drop zones from possible enemy observation.

(Map 7) Eighty-one C-47's fell in behind the smoke-laying A—20's.

The troops began jumping at 1020 and within five minutes the entire

65

 For a detailed account of the use of smoke in Pacific airdrops, see John Christianson, "The Use

of Smoke with Parachute Operations," Military Affairs, XXV, No. 3 (Fall, 1961) 47-56. 66

 For a full treatment of this operation and the general strategic picture of operations in eastern

New Guinea, see John Miller jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 189-221. See also, Wesley Frank Craven and James

Lea Cate, eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War II," vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan

(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 180-86. 67

 Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 189, 194.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 413

MAP 7

force was on the ground. No Japanese were encountered; casualties

were minor.68 No doubt the distinct success of the landings was the

result of the total lack of opposition at Nadzab.

The smoke phase of the operation, while generally successful, revealed the expected inadequacies in procedure which accompany any

such pioneering effort. Each of the seven A-20's carried four M10

smoke tanks, a versatile munition which served also as a spray tank

for toxic agents. Slung under the wings of aircraft, the M10 tank

68

 (1) Ibid., p. 208. (2) General George C. Kenney in General Kenney Reports, A Personal History

of the Pacific War (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943), page 233, states there were ninety-six

C-47's in the Nadzab operation.
414 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

had a capacity of thirty gallons and when filled with the smoke agent

FS weighed a total of almost 550 pounds.69

On the morning of the Nadzab operation weather conditions were

almost ideal for putting down a curtain of smoke. The wind was

blowing from northwest to southeast at an estimated five miles an hour.

Although the sky was clear there was a high overcast. The 80° temperature was accompanied by a humidity of 85 percent, a favorable

condition for a good curtain, dependent as FS is on the moisture in

the atmosphere.70

In 2 groups of 2 and one of 3, the A-20 attack aircraft laid the

screens over Nadzab at an altitude of 250 feet and a speed of 225 miles

an hour. Each of the tanks was filled with 19 gallons of the agent,

or a total for the 28 tanks of approximately 532 gallons. In each

formation the pilot of the lead plane discharged 2 tanks, counted 4

seconds, and discharged the remaining 2. Staggered slightly to the rear,

the other A-20 went through the same procedure, allowing for a

slight overlap to insure the continuity of the screen. The smoke settled

quickly to the ground and then rose to an average height of 400 feet

along each of the three 4,500-foot screens. Each screen lasted about

2 minutes, the length of time prescribed in the operational plan. Still

effective after 5 minutes, the smoke rose, bunched, and dispersed after

10 more minutes had passed.

How effective would these smoke curtains have been if the paratroopers had landed in the face of enemy opposition? Maj. Tristram J.

Cummins, Jr., Chemical Officer, Fifth Air Force, felt that two of the

screens were too close to the wooded areas to have screened the observation of Japanese had they been located in the outer fringes of the woods.

If the screen had been placed 2,000 feet from the woods, the troopers

could have landed and organized with a potential enemy still cloaked

by the drifting smoke. The operation also disclosed shortcomings in

filling equipment and difficulty with the attachment of tanks to the

aircraft.

It seems that little use was made of the lessons learned at Nadzab

in the application of air smoke to the next Pacific airborne operation—

69

 FS, a solution of sulphur trioxide in chlorosulfonic acid, was a standard smoke agent. When

atomized it reacted with water vapor present in the air to form a dense cloud of droplets of sulphuric

acid.

70

 Cml Warfare Opns Rpt 1, CmlO Fifth AF, 14 Sep 43. Sixth Army 470.6 Smoke. The remainder

of the Nadzab account is based upon this report.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 415

SMOKE SHIELDS A PARATROOP DROP, NEW GUINEA

the jump at Kamiri airdrome on the island of Noemfoor. Capture of

the island, which lay just off the coast of northwestern New Guinea,

would neutralize the Japanese on nearby Biak and provide airstrips for

the Allied advance on the Vogelkop Peninsula. Again, the jump was

made by paratroopers of the 503d Parachute Infantry regiment; their

3 July 1944 airborne attack followed by one day the amphibious

landing of the 158th Regimental Combat Team (RCT).71 Because

of the success of the assault landing, the troopers of the 503d landed

without encountering enemy opposition. Two smoke missions preceded

the airdrop. B-25's used M47A2 white phosphorus bombs to blanket

nearby Kornasoren airdrome and its antiaircraft batteries. Then three

A-20 attack bombers, each with two M10 smoke tanks, moved in the

van of the C-47's with their cargo of paratroopers.

71

 Smith, in Approach to the Philippines, pages 397-424, presents a detailed description of the Noemfoor operation.
416 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The weather, similar to that at Nadzab but with a bit more humidity,

favored the use of smoke. But the six smoke tanks on the three attack

bombers, not enough to lay a screen for the required two and a half

miles, produced a patchy, hole-filled curtain over the airdrome. Consequently, the troopers jumped into a undeveloped screen and were still

jumping as the smoke began to dissipate and as a southeasterly wind

blew it directly over the drop zone, creating hazard and confusion.

The hard surface of the airstrip, the debris with which it was cluttered,

and the low altitude from which the jump was made combined to

produce casualties totaling 10 percent, an abnormally high rate. Next

day another battalion jumped onto the same airstrip, this time without

a smoke screen. Casualties were 8 percent, high enough for the task

force commander to call off a scheduled third jump.72

By way of explanation for the rather shoddy smoke operation, the

Fifth Air Force chemical officer cited insufficient notice of the impending mission and the lack of opportunity for the wing chemical

officer to participate in the operation's logistical planning. Whatever

the fault, the fact remained that not only was smoke for the mission

inadequate but no planes were in reserve to patch up the screen once

it got spotty.73

The last use of smoke in Pacific airborne operations took place on

23 June 1945 over the Camalaniugan airstrip in northern Luzon. The

airdrop, carried out by a reinforced battalion of the 511th Parachute

Infantry, coincided with a drive down the Cagayan River valley by

Sixth Army's 37th Division and the occupation of the coastal town of

Aparri by a Ranger task force. Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, Army commander, expected that this combination of actions would pinch out

the remaining Japanese forces in northern Luzon.74

Smoke was needed to conceal the troopers from the observation of

Japanese forces suspected to be in positions in the wooded hills four

miles to the southeast of the airstrip. Three B—25's, each equipped with

a single tank, laid down an intervening screen. The E1 tank, developed

in the Southwest Pacific by the V Air Force Service Command,

72

 Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 413-16. 73

 (1) Cml Warfare Opns Rpt 5, CmlO Fifth AF, n.d., no sub. (2) See also unsigned report, Use

of Smoke at Noemfoor Island. Both in CWS 314.7 Air Smoke. 74

 Robert Ross Smith, in Triumph in the Philippines, finds fault with General Krueger's conclusion,

pointing out that most of the contemporary intelligence sources, which proved to be right, indicated

that the Japanese forces were not retreating down the valley but into the mountains both east and

west of the valley.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 417

carried 167 gallons of liquid FS smoke and featured a discharge valve

which could be opened and closed during the course of a mission.75 This

was in decided contrast with the M10 smoke tank, used at Nadzab and

Noemfoor, which expended smoke all at one time.

The weather over northern Luzon was ideal for the smoke mission.

The three B-25's took off from an airfield to the south and arrived

over the target at 0855. A pair of planes made the initial run, one a

scant 10 feet above the grassy surface, the other, 25 feet. They flew

parallel to one another, 30 yards apart and one echeloned 100 feet to

the rear, at speeds between 230 and 240 miles an hour. After an interval

of several minutes the third plane reinforced the screen by laying

smoke between the existing streamers at an altitude of 50 feet.

Within a matter of minutes the original planes made a return run,

this time at altitudes of 75 and no feet. The third B-25 completed

the mission by making its second pass at 120 feet. The net result was

a dense screen which was effective for over an hour. The first wave

of C-47's dropped its paratroopers a little after 0900, and within half

an hour the second and third waves landed. The operation was featured

by seven gliders which brought in artillery and heavy equipment.

Jump casualties came to 7 percent of the participating force. There

was no enemy opposition.76

All of the air screening operations in the Pacific were carried out

unhampered by enemy opposition, certainly a factor which contributed

to their over-all success. But this much can be garnered from the

Pacific experience: given proper planning, an adequate amount of

smoke correctly placed, and good weather conditions, smoke delivered

by air could add great insurance to the success of any airborne

operation.

75

 Ltr, ACCmlO for Field Opns to CmlO FEAF, 29 Jan 45, sub: Airplane Spray Tank E-1 for

B-25 Aircraft. CWS 314.7 Air Smoke. 76

 (1) Rpt, CmlO 309th Bomb Wing to CmlO Fifth AF, 26 Jun 45, sub: Cml Warfare Tactical

Opns Rpt. CWS 314.7 Air Smoke. (2) Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 29-30.
CHAPTER XI

The 4.2-Inch Mortar in the MTO

On 10 July 1943 American, British, and Canadian forces landed on

the southern and eastern coasts of Sicily, and in the ensuing 38-day

campaign the 4.2-inch chemical mortar met its first test in combat.

This CWS weapon, still untried in battle nineteen months after the

entry of the United States into the war, by 1945 was to become an

important part of the Army's arsenal.

The 4.2-inch chemical mortar was a multiple-purpose weapon employed in close support of ground troops. Its versatility was indicated

by its ability to fire toxic agents, smoke, and high explosives. In

original tactical concept it was a basic ground weapon for offensive

gas warfare. No other weapon approached the gas-delivering capacity

of the 4.2-inch mortar; eight of them could fire over a ton of toxic

agent in a span of two minutes.1 The smoke mission was also a part

of the original tactical concept of mortar employment and was one

of the reasons for its success in World War IL But the real key to the

popularity of the weapon was its ability to fire high explosive shell, a

johnny-come-lately as far as chemical mortar missions were concerned.

The 4.2-inch mortar was the culmination of attempts to improve the

4-inch British Stokes Brandt (SB) mortar. With American-made SB

mortars and with shell and propellants purchased from the British after

World War I, the CWS sought to obtain increased range, accuracy,

and mobility.2 By 1924, experiments under the direction of Capt.

Lewis M. McBride (later colonel) produced the rifled 4.2-inch chemical

mortar with a range of over 2,000 yards, and by the end of World War

II this distance had been doubled.3

The Chemical Warfare Service saw the 4.2-inch mortar as a weapon

which possessed mobility and flexibility, which could go in and out of

1

 Memo, CCWS for AcofS G-3, 13 Apr 36. 2

 Chemical Mortars, 4-inch and 4.2-inch, in Summary of Activities of the Mechanical Division, Edgewood Arsenal, 1920-1928 (hereafter cited as EATR 189) Proj E8a 29 May 35, p. 63. 3

 (1) EATR 189, p. 62. (2) For a full description of the research and development of the 4.2-inch

mortar, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 419

action quickly, and which was capable of delivering mass fire in an

unusually short time. Compilation of firing data was simple, and the

communications system was efficient and rapid. Its high angle enabled

it to reach targets in defiladed positions, inaccessible to most types of

artillery. The short minimum range of the mortar and its mobility

enabled it to give support to infantry units. The low silhouette of

this easily concealed weapon offered a difficult target to the enemy.4

Despite the potentialities of the 4.2-inch mortar the War Department showed little interest in the weapon and in 1935 suspended its

manufacture. For about a year preceding September 1941 the 81-mm.

mortar and not the 4.2-inch was the authorized weapon for the chemical battalions. These developments were typical and help reveal the

over-all status of the CWS during the 1930's. Later, during the war,

a theater chemical officer was to maintain: "It can be readily understood that our service cannot be too greatly criticized, for at no time

during the days of peace were we permitted to try out our equipment

during field maneuvers, etc., which would have given us a great amount

of experience,"

 5

 an opinion concurred in by General Porter, Chief of

the CWS.

The Authorization of the High Explosive Mission

If the high explosive mission had not been authorized, activity of

chemical mortar units in a nongas war probably would have been confined to screening operations.6

 While the CWS saw the chief function

of the mortar as firing gas shells, it did not overlook the possibility of

using the weapon to fire high explosives. As early as 1934 these shells

were fired in experiments.7 After the outbreak of World War II the

infantry's need for a good medium-range close support weapon became

evident, and General Porter and his staff took vigorous steps to get the

HE shell standardized and to make the firing of such a shell a major

mission of the chemical mortar battalions.

4

 Memo, ExecO OCCWS for CCWS, 17 Dec 34. CmlC Bd. 5

 (1) Ltr, CCmlO AFHQ to Chief Opns Div CWS, 26 May 43. (2) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO

NATOUSA, 4 Jun 43. Both in CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, NATOUSA. 6

 For an expanded account of the matter of authorization of the HE mission and the early activation of mortar units, see (1) Opnl History of Cml Bns and the 4.2-Inch Mortar in World War II, pt.

I, To the End of the Sicilian Campaign (Aug 43); (2) Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp.

302-04. 7

 Memo, Lt Col Rollo C. Ditto ExecO OCCWS for CCWS, 17 Dec 34, in Mortars (4.2-Inch), Development of Mechanized Transportation. CRDL Tech Library, Edgewood Arsenal.
420 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The determination, mentioned above, to convert the chemical weapons units to the 81-mm. mortar naturally interrupted negotiations

regarding the HE 4.2 mortar shell. A personal conference between

General Porter and General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, resolved

the issue in favor of the 4.2-inch mortar, a decision followed by steps

to equip the mortar battalions with the approved weapon.8 Later came

the authorization to produce a high explosive filling for the 4.2-inch

mortar shell.9

This was only half the battle. There remained the double problem

of securing War Department approval for the necessary doctrinal

change and convincing the ground commanders that mortar battalions

were worthy inclusions on troop lists that already must have looked

pathetically thin. The doctrinal matter involved the revision of

FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations. Actually, the manual

change would merely reflect the tacit approval of the War Department

of the new mission for the 4.2-inch mortar. The CWS presented its

case at a February 1943 conference with representatives of the Army

Ground Forces and the Services of Supply. The latter agreed with

the CWS point of view but the Army Ground Forces demurred,

advocating a Field Artillery Board test of the mortar. If it passed,

the weapon should be given to the Field Artillery to be employed only

in those theaters which were without 105-mm. howitzers, just about

eliminating any effective employment of the mortar.10

The Training Division, Services of Supply, in a strong statement of

nonconcurrence, called attention to the substantial increase in firepower which would be enjoyed by a division supported by 4.2-inch

mortars. For example, the mortar could place almost four and a half

times as much high explosive on a target in a given period of time as

could the 105-mm. howitzer, albeit at shorter ranges. The mortar

weighed 305 pounds, the howitzer over 2 tons. And mortar units were

extremely economical in demands upon manpower. To support its

case by actual combat experience, SOS cited the excellent war record

of the British chemical mortar with its high explosive mission.11

8

 Memo, Chief Field Serv OCCWS for CmlO GHQ, 19 Jan 42. Cited in CWS, Monograph, Opnl

Hist of Cml Bns and the 4.2-inch Mortar in WW II, pt. I, p. 19. 9

 (1) CWTC Item 515, 26 Apr 42. (2) Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, p. 45. 10

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Graydon C. Essman, 30 Oct 44. (2) Memo, Dir of Tng SOS

for CofS SOS, 27 Feb 43. (3) Memo, CG AGF for CofS, 13 Feb 43. All in CMLHO. 11

 (1) Memo, CofS SOS for CofS, 27 Feb 43. CMLHO. (2) The 12,000-yard range of the

105-mm. howitzer was three times that of the 4.2-inch mortar.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 421

Opposition to the CWS SOS point of view gradually waned, and on

19 March 1943 the War Department authorized the use of HE by

the 4.2-inch mortar and directed that necessary amendments be made

in the tactical doctrine.12

There remained the difficulty of selling the mortar battalion to the

field commanders. To them the idea of firing high explosives from the

chemical mortar was untried and unproven. An accompanying difficulty was the fact that the 4.2-inch mortar was a chemical weapon.

The general impression of most ground force officers was that the

functions of CWS were confined to "gas and gas masks and . . .

smelly clothing."

 13

 These officers were surprised and dubious about

including in the troop basis chemical units which would fire WP and

HE in close support of the infantry.

Obviously, CWS officers had a job on their hands, particularly those

staff officers assigned to commands just entering combat. In North

Africa Colonel Barker, chemical officer of the Western Task Force,

was effective in convincing ground commanders of the worth of the

4.2-inch mortar. Barker pressed for chemical mortar units for support

of the North African operations, calling attention to the tactical

demands for such a weapon. "This country (and north) is mostly

open except for farmhouses and country villas which are in fact rather

strong little forts. Trenches within these rock walls give lots of protection to the inhabitants thereof and [machine guns] in such places

command a lot of ground."

 14

 Barker was not to get his mortar units

in time for North African operations, but as Fifth Army chemical

officer he got four chemical mortar battalions with which to begin the

Italian campaign, fought in terrain even better suited for use of the

4.2-inch weapon.

Activation of Chemical Mortar Units

In mid-1941 there was only a handful of mortar units, consisting

of regiments, separate battalions, and companies. The 1st and 2d

Chemical Regiments had only one active company between them; the

two separate battalions, also the 1st and 2d, each had an active company.

Completing the roster were two separate chemical companies, one of

12

 Memo for Red, 18 Mar 43, by Essman, on Memo, CofS SOS for CofS. CMLHO. 13

 Ltr, CmlO Atlantic Base Sec NATO to Chief Opns Div, 25 Feb 43. 14

 Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to CCWS, 9 Jan 43. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, Barker, 1942-43.
422 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

which was to be lost on Bataan and the other to be inactivated shortly

after the United States entered the war.15 This unimpressive list, with

its regiments, battalions, and companies, indicated some indecision

about the size of the basic type of weapons unit. Indeed, the brigade

also had its supporters. By 1941 it had been pretty well decided that

the basic unit of the mortar organization would be the battalion, composed of organic companies. The exception was the several separate

mortar companies which saw action in the Pacific fighting.

As of January 1942 there were two chemical mortar battalions, the

2d and 3d, on active duty.16 Four more, the 81st, 82d, 83d, and 84th

were activated by mid-year.17 During the ten-month interval from

June 1942 until May 1943 the number of mortar battalions remained

at six.

Meanwhile, the series of plans prepared in the United Kingdom for

the cross-Channel attack included the possibility of chemical weapon

support.18 The 1942 plan, for example, which called for a force of a

million men included a recommendation for twenty mortar battalions.19

While there was far less than this number available, the lack of reality

between plans for the use of mortar battalions and the number of

units on hand was tempered by several factors. At that time the

mission of these units was restricted to gas and smoke, and thus far

it was a gasless war. Moreover, ground force commanders, operating

within the limits of the troop basis, were reluctant to give up units

of known potential for a type untested in combat.

By March 1943 the persistent work done by the Chemical Warfare

Service in selling its battalions was beginning to prove embarrassing

because by this time theater requests for weapons battalions exceeded

the 6 on hand. The CWS pointed out that, unless other activations

15

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H. 16

 Chemical mortar battalion was the designation prescribed by the last of several wartime tables of

organization. Earlier names included separate chemical battalions, chemical battalions (separate),

and chemical battalions (motorized). For the sake of simplicity, the designation chemical mortar battalion will be used throughout the text. 17

 (1) Ltr, TAG to CG Third Army and CG SOS, 25 Mar 42. (2) 1st Ind, Asst AG to CCWS,

7 Apr 42. (3) Ltr, Asst AG Third Army to Chief CWS, 11 Apr 42. (4) 83d Cml Bn GO 1, 10

Jun 42. (5) The War Department General Staff based future activations on a schedule which called

for a total of 6 battalions by the end of 1942, 12 more in 1943, and another 12 in 1944. Except

for 1943, when only five battalions were activated, this schedule was met. Memo, Troops Div OCCWS

for Chief Field Serv, 28 Mar 42. 18

 Memo, McCormick for Chief Troops Div, 2 Apr 42. 19

 Memo, Chief Planning Br Opns Div SOS for Supply Arms and Services, 7 May 1942.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 423

4.2-INCH CHEMICAL MORTAR CREW IN ACTION during the Italian campaign.

were authorized before the existing units were shipped, there would

be no battalions in the United States, trained or in training, and no

sources of cadres for units activated later. As all of the 6 existing

battalions were committed for the months of March and May 1943,

the CWS urgently recommended that 19 additional battalions be activated by the end of 1943, 6 of them at once to replace a like number

being sent overseas.20 Soon after the final decision to commit four

battalions for operations in Sicily, the War Department authorized the

activation of four additional battalions—the 86th, 87th, and 88th in

May and the 85th in June.21

20

 Ltr, Actg CCWS to OPD WDGS, 11 Mar 43. 21

 (1) Memo, Chief Field Rqmts Br OCCWS for Chief Sup Br, 16 Apr 43. (2) TAG Ltr, 4 May

43. AG 320.2 (5-1-43). (3) CWS Units Activated, 1 Oct 44. CMLHO.
424 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Sicily

Preparation for Combat

The mortar battalions selected for participation in HUSKY, the

invasion of Sicily, were the 2d, 3d, 83d, and 84th.22 The latter three

sailed almost immediately, arriving in North Africa early in May.

These battalions finished their training in the theater although about

half of the available time was spent in acquiring their full complement

of organizational equipment and in staging. At this time the 3d, 83d,

and 84th Battalions were placed in support of the 3d, 1st, and 9th

Infantry Divisions, respectively.23

Unfortunately, the pressure of preinvasion activities and the late

date of attachments left little time for the kind of training most

urgently needed by the mortar battalions—combined exercises with the

infantry units to which they were attached. Most mortar units also

lacked amphibious training. Of the early arriving battalions, only two

companies of the 3d, commanded by Lt. Col. Edgar D. Stark, had

received this specialized training before leaving the United States, and

that was limited to a few weeks at the Amphibious Training Center,

Camp Carrabelle, Fla., later known as Camp Gordon Johnston.24 The

three battalions received "only sketchy preparation for the problem

of amphibious maneuvers" at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center

after they arrived in North Africa.25

The fourth mortar unit earmarked for Sicily fared better in its

preparations. While undergoing training at Fort Bragg, N. C., the

2d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert W. Breaks, had been

able to arrange locally for joint training with infantry units also located

at Fort Bragg. The 2d Battalion was attached to the 45th Infantry

Division in February 1943 during final training preparations for overseas movement, preparations which included work in mountain and

amphibious operations. This experience constituted what until then

22

 Unless otherwise noted, the section on Sicily is based upon the combat reports of the participating

battalions: (1) Journal of 2d Cml Bn (Motorized) in World War II, to 10 Aug 1943; (2) History

of 3d Cml Bn in Campaign of Sicily, 10 Jul 43-30 Aug 43; 83d Cml Bn, Battle Rpt, The Battle

for Sicily, 5 Nov 1943. See also: (4) Lt Col Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, Sicily

and the Surrender of Italy, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1965). 23

 Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily. 24

 (1) Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, p. H-1. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Robert W.

Breaks and Col Fellenz, 23 Oct 44. (3) Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. XIII. 25

 Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, p. H-1.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 425

were probably the only cases of joint 4.2-inch mortar-infantry training in the United States. The 45th and its supporting units sailed for

North Africa combat-loaded, arriving near Oran just twelve days

before embarkation for Sicily. During this brief stay the 2d Battalion

completed a 15-day training program in less than half the allotted

time.26

CWS officers in North Africa exerted every effort to acquaint infantry commanders with the chemical mission, including the 4.2-inch

mortar and its proper employment. Even before the arrival of the

chemical battalions they conducted demonstrations with 4.2-inch

mortar WP shells, colored grenades, and flame throwers. With the

arrival of the first three battalions CWS officers were able to hold

mortar demonstrations for the chief of staff of Seventh Army and other

high ranking officers.27

Despite the limited time to prepare for the invasion the participating

infantry divisions gave some thought and effort to use of mortar units

during the assault phase. Three platoons of the 3d Battalion mounted

mortars on landing craft and actually accompanied the assault waves

of three of the four landing teams of the 3d Infantry Division. Complete surprise in that sector eliminated any need for the 4.2-inch

mortars.28 Plans to use 2d Battalions mortars in the assault phase were

canceled because of the limited number of landing craft. No thought

was given to the amphibious employment of the 83d Battalion because

of that unit's lack of specialized training.29 The 84th Battalion was

not committed to the fighting in Sicily, but was kept in reserve.

The experience in Sicily prompted some of the participating CWS

officers to predict the unlikelihood of mortar employment in subsequent

landing operations.30 The Fifth Army chemical officer felt that "when

one is making a landing at a distance from his base, shipping space is

so precious that I doubt if it will ever be possible to mount the 4.2-inch

26

 (1) Journal of 2d Cml Bn. (2) Col. Breaks Comments on draft of this volume, 3 Feb 61,

declared that senior commanders such as Maj. Gen. Omar Bradley and Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton

gained an early appreciation of the 4.2-inch mortar from observing these exercises. 27

 (1) CWS TofO Ltr No. 5, 3 Sep 43 and Incl, 1, p. 2. (2) Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily,

p. A-4. 28

 History of 3d Cml Bn in Campaign of Sicily, 10 Jul 43-30 Aug 43. (2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 6,

8 Oct 43, p. 14. 29

 (1) Breaks-Fellenz Interv. (2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 6, 8 Oct 43, p. 14. 30

 (1) Ltr, CO 83d Cml Bn to ACCWS for Field Opns, 12 Sep 43. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files,

NATOUSA. (2) Breaks-Fellenz Interv.
426 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

on landing craft," a correct prediction for the war against Germany,

if not for the operations in the Pacific theaters.

Upon entry in combat each of the mortar battalions was composed

of 1,010 men: 36 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 973 enlisted men,32

distributed among a headquarters, a headquarters company, a medical

detachment, and four weapons companies. Each company had 2

platoons, each platoon 2 sections, and each section 3 squads. On the

basis of one mortar per squad, the battalion complement of mortars

was 48. Transportation of the battalion consisted of 88 21⁄2-ton trucks

and 36 vehicles of varying smaller sizes. Chemical mortar carts were

present in case of rough terrain. Side arms for the battalion included

820 .45-caliber automatics.33

The Initial Test of Battle

H-hour for HUSKY was 0230, 10 July 1943. With one exception

the mortar units landed in their assigned sectors without incident. The

exception was the 83d Battalion, commanded by Colonel Cunin, three

companies of which supported a Ranger task force which was attached

to the 1st Infantry Division and which had as its objective the coastal

town of Gela, with its complex of strong defenses.34 The three mortar

companies encountered false beaches in front of the true landing area.

Although the assault craft carrying Company A managed to push

across the sandbar and reach its proper objective, the vessels carrying

the other two companies extricated themselves only with difficulty.

During the first days of the battle chemical mortars fired against

every type of target that presented itself. Some of the hardest fighting

took place at Gela where a series of enemy tank thrusts threatened

Ranger units, and, surprisingly enough, where 4.2-inch mortar fire

was used with a great deal of success against armor. On D-day mortar

fire from Company C, 83d Battalion, helped throw back a tankinfantry attack, and later a group of Italian light tanks broke into

town only to be repulsed by antitank guns, bazookas, and pole charges.

31

 Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to ACCWS for Fld Opns, 26 Sep 43. 32

 T/O 3-25, Cml Motorized Bn (Separate), I Apr 42. 33

 The 2d Battalion substituted .30 carbines for the .45's in order to have a better local defense capability. Breaks Comments, 3 Feb 61. 34

 (1) 83d Cml Bn, Battle Rpt, The Battle for Sicily, 5 Nov 43, pp. 2-5. (2) Maj. William S.

Hutchinson, Jr., "Use of the 4.2-Inch Mortar in the Invasion of Sicily," Chemical Warfare Bulletin,

vol. 29, No. 8 (December, 1943-January, 1944).
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 427

PULLING A 4.2-INCH MORTAR CART OVER RUGGED TERRAIN

In this skirmish the bazooka team of Company A disabled one tank

which was immediately blown up by a Ranger with a pole charge.35

Next day chemical mortars, firing without aiming stakes or prepared

emplacements, were not quite accurate enough to destroy any of a

group of nine tanks but were threatening enough to force the tanks

to withdraw to positions where they were dispatched by friendly

artillery and naval gunfire.36

Actually, the chemical mortars had the necessary accuracy to engage

targets as small as a tracked vehicle. Just before dawn on one of the

early days of the Sicily campaign, a temporarily disabled German tank

began harassing an infantry position with automatic fire as the crew

made repairs. Asked for help by the infantry, a 2d Chemical Battalion

company commander called for one sensing round and then for a volley

of eight. The tank was silenced. Daylight examination of the tank

found all mortar rounds within an area fifteen yards in diameter, with

35

 Hutchinson, "Use of the 4.2-Inch Mortar in the Invasion of Sicily," Chemical Warfare Bulletin,

vol. 29, No. 8 (December, 1945-January, 1944). 36

 (1) Ibid. (2) 83d Cml Bn, Battle for Sicily, 5 Nov 43.
428 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

one of them down the open turret of the vehicle.37 Once the beachheads were consolidated, chemical mortars fired preparations preceding

infantry attacks, interdicted enemy lines of communications, and fired

on machine guns, mortars, ammunition dumps, and barracks.38

One of the most significant chemical mortar smoke missions in

Sicily was a series of screens fired for the 3d Infantry Division during

the period 6-8 August. The Germans held a strong ridge line east of

the Furiano River, which flows northward to the sea. The 7th Infantry

received the mission of seizing the heights dominated by Hill 715.

The 2d Mortar Battalion supported the attack with smoke and high

explosives; Companies A and D fired HE concentrations and Company

B carried out the smoke mission.39 From 0530 to approximately 0900

on 6 August B Company maintained a 3,500-yard screen to conceal

the advancing infantry. Firing from positions west of the river the

mortarmen gradually increased the range of the smoke curtain from

1,000 to 3,200 yards to keep pace with the progress of the attacking

troops. The smoke mission terminated upon orders of the commander

of the assault infantry battalion. At about 1000, as the mortars were

firing on call, enemy artillery began pounding the American positions.

Enemy shells hit 4 of the 6 mortar positions (knocking over 3 weapons,

but damaging only 1), 2 platoon-size ammunition dumps, and generally raised havoc with the wire communications of the battalion.

That afternoon D Company fired a smoke mission which helped 2

infantry battalions under heavy counterattacks to withdraw to the

west side of the river.

Early next morning the infantry tried again, and one B Company

platoon concealed the advance to the attack position with a 1,000-yard

screen. The mortars maintained this screen for almost fourteen hours

despite difficulties caused by shifting winds.40 Once the screen was

established it was kept up by two WP rounds a minute, although for

a short period around noon weather conditions made it necessary to

raise this number to five. The mortar crews lifted the screen several

37

 Journal of of Cml Bn, 14 Jul 43. (2) Lt Col Robert C. Breaks, "My Men Had Guts," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 1 (February-March, 1944), (3) The journals of the three battalions contain frequent references of the direct or indirect destruction of tanks by 4.2-inch mortar fire. 38

 Ltr, ACmlO 45th Div to CmlO 45th Div, 31 Jul 43. 39

 Because of its proficiency in dispatching enemy troops the 4.2-inch mortar in Sicily acquired

the nickname Goon Gun. As a tribute to the part these mortars played in this operation, Hill 715

became known as Goon Gun Hill, at least in CWS circles. The infantry called it Million Dollar Hill

because of the large number of rounds fired on it. The artillery also participated in the smoke mission. 40

 Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, p. B-18.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 429

times during the day to permit friendly dive bomber attacks on the

enemy positions. On the third day the infantry succeeded in taking

the heights east of the Furiano, again with the help of chemical mortar

smoke and high explosives.41

Of the three mortar units committed to HUSKY the 2d Chemical

Battalion saw the most action. In fact, it was said to have been the

only combat unit on the island that saw no relief during the entire

operation.42 After reaching Palermo the 3d Battalion was transferred

to II Corps, an attachment which terminated its combat activities for

the campaign. Thereafter the battalion performed a number of rear

area duties, principally those dealing with transportation. It also

guarded prisoners of war and ammunition dumps, collected ammunition, and generally participated in assignments which failed to utilize

its capabilities as a mortar unit.43 On the other hand, the limited activity of the 83d Battalion, attached to both the 2d Armored and

82d Airborne Divisions after the initial stages of the campaign, resulted

primarily from a lack of suitable targets.44

Despite early difficulties faced by the chemical mortar battalions in

their first combat action, they made a creditable record during the

Sicily Campaign. The absence of established doctrine and, with the

exception of the 2d Battalion, the lack of joint infantry-mortar training, resulted not only in some misuse of the battalions but in the failure

to use them "where they could have been employed to exceptional

advantage."

 45

Nevertheless, reaction of ground commanders who had been supported by the chemical mortars was generally favorable, and most of

them advocated chemical mortar support for all divisions committed

to action.46 Among their comments were "the equivalent of real artillery," which the chemical mortar was not, and "the most effective

single weapon used in support of infantry,"

 47

 a statement to which

it had fair claim.

41

 Breaks, "My Men Had Guts," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 1 (February-March, 1944). 42

 (1) Ibid. (2) Upon its relief from attachment to the 45th Division, the 2d Battalion was attached

to the 3d Division. 43

 (1) History of 3d Cml Bn in Sicily. (2) Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, pp. H-1—3. 44

 Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, pp. H-1—3. 45

 CmlO Seventh Army, Rpt of Cml Warfare Opns—Sicilian Campaign, 24 Sep 43. 46

 Ltr, CO 83d Cml Bn to ACCWS for Field Opns, 12 Sep 43. 47

 Extracts from Training Notes from the Sicilian Campaign, in Ltr, CCmlO NATOUSA to ACCWS

for Field Opns, 6 Nov 43. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, NATOUSA.
430 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Problem of Transportation

General Shadle, Chief Chemical Officer, NATOUSA, put his finger

on one of the main shortcomings revealed by this first test of combat

when he said there was nothing seriously wrong with the 4.2-inch

mortar or the chemical battalion except transportation.48 The principal means of motor transport in the mortar battalion was the 21⁄2-ton

truck, often too big and too conspicuous to operate adequately in

positions as near the front as the 4.2-inch mortars were emplaced.

The 1⁄4-ton truck and trailer seemed more appropriate, and at times

infantry commanders gave up some of their own jeeps in order to

insure chemical mortar support.49 Because man-handling the mortar

carts was an arduous task, crews sometimes attached them to jeeps, an

unsatisfactory practice because of damage to the wheels and handles

of the smaller vehicle. Once an infantry battalion commander directed

his reserve riflemen to help mortar crews struggling with their carts,

an unorthodox move which illustrated as well as anything how highly

infantrymen esteemed the mortar.50 Often mortar crews commandeered mules in order to keep up with the infantry advance. These

animals not only made up for inadequate basic transportation but

reached places inaccessible to vehicles,51 a fact that led General Patton

to opine at the end of the campaign that the pack animal still had a

role in modern warfare.52

The mortar battalion tables of organization and equipment published shortly after the Sicilian campaign provided for % -ton trucks

and trailers as the basic means of transportation. But because of delays

in acquiring the new vehicles and because of the type of terrain and

fighting encountered in Italy, this change did not prove to be the

expected panacea.

Efforts To Increase the Range

The other serious difficulty encountered in the first combat employment of the mortar was that of its range. The introduction of the

48

 Ltr, CCmlO NATOUSA to ACCWS for Field Opns, 26 Aug 43. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files,

NATOUSA. 49

 Journal of 2d Cml Bn. 50

 Breaks, "My Men Had Guts," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 1 (February-March, 1944). 51

 Journal of 2d Cml Bn. 52

 Notes on the Sicilian Campaign.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 431

M5A1 propellant in January 1943 increased the range of the mortar

from 2,400 to 3,200 yards.53 The M6 propellant, standardized in

March 1943, raised the maximum range to 4,500 yards although the

item was not in production in time for use in Sicily. Meanwhile, in

July 1943 OCCWS froze the range of the 4.2-inch mortar at 3,200

yards, despite repeated requests from North Africa for increased range.

Washington headquarters answered: "It has been decided, for practical purposes, and in view of manufacturing and materiel difficulties,

the chemical mortar is to be considered as having a maximum range

of 3,200 yards. ... It is considered that this is a satisfactory range,

and any additional work done is to be confined to further perfecting

the performance of this weapon within this range."

 54

At the end of hostilities in Sicily a conference of Seventh Army

CWS officers agreed that a range of 4,500 was required,55 an opinion

which was reflected in the other important reports of the Sicilian

campaign.56 These recommendations, combined with an urgent request

from theater headquarters for a chemical mortar range of at least

4,500 yards, led the OCCWS to reverse its decision.57 Shortages of

certain ingredients for the M6 propellant added to the delay involved

in getting the Army Ground Forces blessing for the increased range,

so that supplies of the M6 propellant did not reach the theater until

the end of the year.

Among the lesser problems arising in Sicily were certain shortcomings

of the M2 mortar sight. This piece of equipment was unsatisfactory

for night employment because it lacked a means of illumination. Moreover, it could not be employed from deeply defiladed positions. In these

positions sighting stakes had to be placed to the rear of the mortar

position rather than to the front, because of the small traverse (200

mils) of the M2 sight. This limited traverse also caused excessive

re-emplacements. Captured Italian 81-mm. mortar sights with 360°

traverse proved much superior to the American model.58

53

 CWS TofO Ltr No. 1,3 Mar 43. 54

 CWS TofO Ltr No. 3, 23 Jun 43. 55

 Conf of Cml Warfare Officers of Seventh Army. CMLHO. 56

 (1) Rpt of Cml Warfare Opns, Sicilian Campaign, 24 Sep 43. (2) Notes on the Sicilian Campaign. 57

 (1) CM-IN 18330, 24 Aug 43. (2) CM-OUT 11648, 28 Aug 43. (3) IOM, ACCWS to

ACCWS Field Opns, 26 Aug 43. 58

 (1) Ltr, CO 83d Cml Bn to ACCWS Field Opns, 12 Sep 43. (2) Conf of Cml Warfare Officers

of Seventh Army. (3) Memo, ACmlO Seventh Army for CmlO Seventh Army, 23 Aug 43.

CMLHO.
432 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

There was little difficulty with mortar maintenance during the operation as the equipment was new and not seriously overtaxed. Ammunition was in good supply in Sicily although inadequate waterproofing

initially resulted in numerous corroded fuzes.59 And transportation

difficulties resulted in low ammunition reserves at forward positions,

even though the over-all supply of mortar shell in Sicily was ample.60

The Salerno Landings

The 2d, 83d, and 84th Chemical Mortar Battalions took part in the

fighting at Salerno, the first of a series of punishing campaigns fought

in the rugged terrain of Italy.61 Companies C and D of the 83d supported American Rangers and British Commandos of the 10 British

Corps, Fifth Army's left unit during its assault at Salerno. Originally,

the 84th Chemical Battalion was to have supported the 36th Division,

the assault force of the VI U.S. Corps on the army's right. These

plans went awry. According to the battalion commander, Lt. Col.

Harrison Markham, Seventh Army orders releasing the 84th to VI

Corps were lost, and by the time the confusion cleared no shipping

space was available with the 36th Division. Three companies of the

battalion did find room with corps reserves and eventually fired for

the 45th Division, which also had the support of the 2d Chemical

Battalion.62

Although the enemy reacted vigorously to the Salerno landings, so

that a period of sanguinary fighting resulted in which the fate of the

beachhead was sometimes uncertain, the attack began auspiciously.

Company A, 2d Chemical Battalion, landed at 0300, 10 September,

(D plus 1) with the 179th Infantry, 45th Division.63 Next day violent

enemy counterattacks pushed the American force back from its advanced position, and in the course of the withdrawal Company A's

1st Platoon lost eleven men. Company B, in support of elements of

59

 (1) Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, p. H-1. (2) CM-IN 4819, 8 Jun 43. 60

 See Journal of 2d Cml Bn, pp. 28, 33, 40, 52. 61

 For general accounts of the fighting in Italy, see (1) Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, and Ernest

F. Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, volumes in preparation for the series U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II; (2) see also, Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy. 62

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with Markham, 16 Jan 45. (2) Opnl History of Cml Bns and the 4.2-

Inch Mortar in World War II, pt. II, The Italian Campaign, p. 53. This is a detailed study of chemical

mortar operations in Italy. 63

 Unless otherwise noted, the 2d Chemical Battalion S-3 Journal serves as the basis for the account

of that unit's operations in Italy.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 433

another regiment of the 45th Division near the town of Persano, also

ran into trouble. Suddenly faced with direct enemy fire, the mortarmen

had no alternative but to pull back. In the confusion that followed

some of the mortars were left behind, to be recovered, fortunately, at

a later time. Company C supported the 157th Infantry, 45th Division;

for some unaccountable reason Company D remained in reserve during

the entire Salerno operation.64

The first troops of the 84th Battalion came ashore near Paestum on

D-day, but congestion in shipping space forced them to land without

equipment. It was not until 12 September that these companies received

their full complement of men and mortars.65 By this time the situation

of the Fifth Army was serious. The German attack which had turned

the right flank of the 45th Division also cut off elements of the 36th

Division north of the Calore River.66 Orders received by a company

commander of the 2d Mortar Battalion indicated the grave plight of

the American forces. If the enemy should come too close for effective

mortar fire, the mortar troops were directed to stand fast and defend

their positions with rifle fire and, if necessary, bayonets.67

Virtually every available American element was thrown into the

line on 14 September when the enemy renewed his heavy infantry and

tank attack. One of the companies of the 2d Chemical Battalion fired

1,152 rounds during the day. Over 500 of these were white phosphorus used to set fire to the dry brush, making those areas untenable

to the enemy. Early that afternoon the company helped repulse an

enemy tank attack in an action which saw the mortar forward observer

direct artillery fire as well as that of his own weapons. The stalwart

defense on 14 September blunted the German counterattack and secured the beachhead.

Meanwhile, companies of the 83d Battalion supported the American

Rangers and British Commandos in action in the 10 Corps sector.68

On Sicily this mortar unit had earned the sobriquet Artillery of the

Rangers. This expression was equally apt for the unit's service with

the Commandos, who also operated without organic heavy weapons.

64

 (1) Co A 2d Cml Bn, Rcd of Events. (2) 2d Cml Bn Casualty Rpt, 11 Sep 43. (3) Fifth Army

Cml Warfare Sec Journal, 26 Sep 43. (4) Ltr, Fifth Army CmlO to CCWS, 25 Sep 43. 65

 Unless otherwise noted, the operations of the 84th are based on the battalion field journal. 66

 VI Corps Opns Rpt, Sep 43. 67

 Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Journal. 68

 Unless otherwise noted, the 83d Battalion Operations Report is the basis for account of unit operations in Italy.
434 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Commandos and Company D landed at Vietri sul Mari at 0400,

9 September, with the task of blocking the northern approaches to

Salerno. In addition to performing missions of harassment and interdiction, the 4.2-inch mortars fired on troops, tanks, and emplacements.

An impressive action took place on 18 September when D Company

fired a preparatory barrage of 1,194 rounds on two strongly defended

hills north of Salerno. The hard fighting in the Vietri area continued

for about ten days until the Germans began their withdrawal.69

At this juncture, the Commandos, having suffered casualties of

almost 75 percent, were pulled from the line. Company D stayed on,

reinforcing Company C, which had landed at Mairoi on D-day in

support of the three battalions of American Rangers. This small, elite

force of 1,500 advanced inland and seized Chiunzi Pass and Mt. St.

Angelo, which commanded the German supply route south of Naples.

Charged with holding the entire peninsula the Ranger force held out

for three weeks against attacks in which the enemy sometimes had

a numerical superiority of eight to one. As a consequence, the Rangers

were so thinly spread that mortar units not only performed their own

mission as artillery of the Rangers but also held front-line positions

as regular infantry. Sometimes mortar crews were stripped down to

one or two men and the rest sent to repel counterattacks or on patrol.

These crews engaged enemy 88-mm. guns and 240-mm. howitzers

at distances 2,000 yards or more beyond the authorized range of their

mortars. Companies C and D of the 83d fired over 14,000 rounds in

the first two weeks of the campaign, a total, according to Colonel

Barker, which equaled that of all the other mortar units.70 One result

of this heavy firing at excessive ranges was the rapid breakdown of the

weapons. In spite of the combined efforts of both CWS and ordnance

maintenance units, at the end of the first three weeks in Italy there

were only three mortars in action in one company and six in the other.71

Naples fell to the British 10 Corps on 1 October and the first phase

of the Italian fighting was over. The important role of 4.2-inch mortars in the over-all success is indicated by Col. William Darby of the

Rangers who reported that his forces were able to hold Chiunzi Pass

"largely due to the chemical mortar battalion attached to the unit."

 72

69

 Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col William S. Hutchinson, Jr., 26 Jan 45. 70

 Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to CCWS, 25 Sep 43. 71

 (1) Ibid. (2) Hutchinson Interv, 26 Jan 45. 72

 Notes on Interv with Darby, 18 May 44. AG-OB-S, Log 2704.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 435

From the Volturno to the Winter Line

Crossing the Volturno

By 6 October the Fifth Army had advanced to a line running generally along the south banks of the Volturno and Calore Rivers inland

to the town of Benevento. The British 10 Corps held the western part

of this front, the U.S. VI Corps the eastern sector. These units crossed

the Volturno on the night of 12-13 October. The 84th Chemical Mortar Battalion (less Company A) supported the 3d Division and Company A, 2d Battalion, supported the 34th Division.

Of these mortar units, the 84th Battalion probably received the most

calls for support. Company D fired both screening and high explosive

missions for a regimental crossing and later screened bridge-building

activity of the engineers. During the daylight hours of 13 October

Company B used 2,805 rounds of white phosphorus to conceal the

corps left flank from enemy observation from the heights above the

town of Triflisco. The mortarmen carried out this mission by firing

the WP directly on these heights using the maximum authorized range

of the 4.2-inch mortar—3,200 yards. At first, Company B employed

one platoon of four mortars for the screening operation but the required rapid rate of fire made barrels so hot that propellants ignited

before the rounds reached the firing pin. The commitment of another

platoon reduced the rate of fire and eliminated the trouble.73 In addition to these normal mortar missions, the 84th Battalion furnished a

detail of 3 officers and 100 men which expended 400 M1 smoke pots

to conceal bridging sites and their exposed approaches.74

Fifth Army carried the assault of the Volturno with swiftness and

skill, and for a brief time thereafter chemical mortar activity was

characterized by relatively light firing. It was during this period that

problems arose which were to confront mortar units throughout most

of the Italian campaign. One of these involved communications.

Mortar battalions used a tremendous amount of wire to maintain

contact among units, the radio playing a secondary role because of

the excessive amount of dead space typical in mountainous terrain and

because of the danger that its use would reveal exact positions to the

enemy. Mortarmen usually laid two lines of wire from the company

73

 (1) Fifth Army Chemical Warfare Sec Journal, 16 Oct 43. (2) Markham Interv, 16 Jan 45. 74

 For an account of the use of smoke pots by mortar units, see above, Chapter VIII.
436 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

command post to the platoon firing positions and at least two lines (by

different routes) from each gun position to the observation post. In

heavy fighting enemy fire frequently shot up the wire—the communication lines of one mortar platoon were interrupted six times during

a single day in the Mount Acero region, permitting it to fire only two

missions with a total expenditure of eighteen rounds.75 The wirecutting capabilities of friendly vehicles, particularly those with tracks,

also proved discouraging to good communications. In fast-moving

situations there was no alternative to the radio. The SCR-284, used

principally between battalion and company command posts, proved

reasonably satisfactory but poor performances by SCR's 193 and 194

brought a great many complaints.76

It was also at this time that the need for animal transport began to

increase. Poor roads characterized the rocky, mountainous terrain in

which the fighting took place, forcing the 84th to use oxen to haul

its mortars over the steep slopes near Venafro. Mules were the usual

beasts of burden. Upon crossing the Volturno, the 84th Battalion,

failing to get these animals from the 3d Division to which it was attached, captured its own mules and successfully improvised pack saddles.

Because the U.S. Army mule pack was too large and heavy for the local

animals, the Italian model became the pack usually employed.77

Early Fighting in the Winter Line

After being driven from positions north of the Volturno the enemy

fell back to his Winter Line which extended along the Garigliano River

and thence into the mountainous region from Mignano to Venafro and

on toward Isernia. This series of defensive positions was designed to

hold Fifth Army's advance and allow the Germans to fortify further

the more formidable Gustav Line. Allied forces reached the Winter

Line during the first week of November, but the rather rapid advance

ground to a halt in front of stiffened resistance and in face of the

increased difficulties caused by winter weather.78

The initial attack on the Winter Line saw all four chemical mortar

battalions committed to action. The 3d Battalion, which had remained

75

 Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary, 15 Oct 43. 76

 (1) History of 3d Cml Bn, Jan 44, pp. 10-11. (2) ASF Bd Rpt, NATO, No. 71, 6 Nov 43, Rpt of

45th Inf Div. (3) Breaks-Fellenz Interv, 23 Oct 44. (4) Markham Interv, 16 Jan 45. 77

 (1) Markham Interv, 16 Jan 45. (2) AGF Bd Rpt, NATO, No. A-112, 23 Dec 43. 78

 Fifth Army History, II, 47.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 437

behind in Sicily, joined the Fifth Army on 30 October. Company A

of the 84th and Companies A and B of the 83d rejoined their parent

units for the first time on Italian soil.79 Until then the operations of

the Fifth Army had not been marked by extended static situations,

and the chemical mortar units were of only limited value in rapidly

moving situations. Strong enemy defenses and the approach of winter

promised a different sort of campaign, one which would make good

use of the capabilities of the 4.2-inch mortar.

The key position in the American sector opposite the Winter Line

was a gap in the mountains at Mignano through which ran Highway 6.

This presented an avenue to the Liri Valley, called the Gateway to

Rome, and the ultimate objective of the operations. To the left of the

Mignano gap loomed Mount Camino and to the right, Mount Sammucro. In between were several lesser land masses which effectively

served as "stoppers" for the break in the east-west mountain chain.80

The VI Corps had reached the Winter Line in early November and

had bloodied its nose in its attempt to break through. In the various

engagements in the Mount Difensa-Mount Sammucro-Mount Santa

Croce area the 2d and 83d Chemical Mortar Battalions saw action

in support of the 3d Division and Ranger and parachute troops. The

mortars fired preparatory barrages, sometimes followed by screens for

the advancing infantry. On 12 November one platoon of Company

C, 2d Battalion, in conjunction with the artillery and in support of

a 3d Division attack on Mount Difensa, laid down a preliminary barrage on a point just beyond the summit, an area which could not have

been reached by the artillery. During the last three minutes of the

barrage, the platoon fired forty-nine rounds of WP to conceal the

infantry assault. Twenty-four rounds of white phosphorus screened

the American withdrawal when the attack failed.81

On 13 November a German counterattack against the 4th Ranger

foothold on Mount Sammucro initially rolled back that unit's right

and left flank. Some of the shells of the protective concentrations of

Company B, 83d Battalion, fell within 100 yards of friendly positions.

The company fired 3,605 rounds of HE and 163 WP so rapidly that

one of the mortar firing pins became fused. In the course of this

fighting German artillery scored two direct hits on Company B ammu79

 Fifth Army Cml Warfare Sec Journal, 1, 9, 22, 30 Oct 43. 80

 Fifth Army at the Winter Line, p. 8. 81

 Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary.
438 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

nition dumps, destroying 1,000 rounds of ammunition.82 The Rangers

thwarted the attack, and artillery, mortar, and small arms fire prevented the enemy from reorganizing for another assault.83

In mid-November Fifth Army paused to regroup. II Corps moved

to the middle of the line, and VI Corps shifted to the right. For

two weeks, while army planned for a continuation of the assault

on the Winter Line, its troops remained on the defensive. The missions

of the 4.2-inch mortars—the prevention of enemy observation and

disruption of his troop concentrations and counterattacks—reflected

this lull in operations. It was during this period that water-damaged

propellants became a serious problem. In the 84th Battalion 80 percent

of these items were found to have moisture enough to cause shorts or

"poop outs." An investigation of this condition by the chemical

officer of the Fifth Army led to the manufacture and operation of a

dryer for propellants by the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company

at Capua.84

Fifth Army plans for overcoming the Winter Line defenses consisted

of three phases: an attack on Mount Camino on the left of the Mignano

gap; an attack on Mount Sammucro on the right of the gap; and,

finally, the drive into the Liri Valley. The first phase, appropriately

called Operation RAINCOAT, combined assaults by the British 10 and

the American II Corps on Mount Camino and its neighboring peaks,

Mounts Difensa and Maggiore. Company A of the 83d Battalion and

Company B of the 2d supported the 1st Special Service Force85 and

the 142d Infantry, 36th Division, in this operation. The second phase,

the attack on the Mount Sammucro complex, began on 8 December.

During this difficult fighting Company B, 83d Chemical Battalion,

supported the 3d Ranger Battalion in an attack against Hill 950, a

lesser land mass adjacent to the main objective. Although at first successful, the Rangers were finally swept off the hill by a violent enemy

counterattack. Company B mortarmen placed heavy concentrations

on the hill in rebuttal, attracting intense enemy artillery and mortar

fire in the process. This concentration killed two men, wounded ten,

hit the company ammunition dump, and temporarily put one platoon

82

 83d Cml Bn Casualty Rpt, 14 Nov 43. 83

 Co B 83d Cml Bn Action Rpt, 23 Nov 43. 84

 (1) Fifth Army Cml Warfare Sec Journal, 10 Dec 43. (2) See above, Chapter VII, for more

on the Capua facility. 85

 Composed of Canadians and Americans, this regiment-sized unit was a specially trained task force

and not, as the name implies, a service force in the normal sense.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 439

out of action. Next morning the Rangers again took Hill 950, abetted

by heavy artillery and 4.2-inch mortar preparations, but their losses

were so heavy that they were replaced by the 504th Parachute Infantry

regiment. The 4.2-inch mortar company remained in position and

supported the new unit until 23 December, by which time Mount

Sammucro was in American hands.

Problems and Improvisations

On 15 December the 3 6th Division attacked the remaining enemyheld heights of Mount Sammucro and the stronghold of San Pietro,

a town located off the southwest slope of the mountain. The four

companies of the 2d Battalion ran into trouble in supporting this

attack with smoke and high explosives. Tanks broke the communication

wire of two companies, and spongy soil caused the mortars of another

to bounce so badly that they had to be re-emplaced every five or six

rounds. Mortar breakage was a serious problem; when Company A

completed its mission on 16 December only three mortars remained

in action, and the elevating screw of each of these was locked.86 Much

of the breakage resulted from frequent use of mortars against German

heavy mortars and Nebelwerfers, whose ranges exceeded that of the

American weapon. Firing at excessive range caused failure of many

parts of the mortar—elevating and traversing screws bent, the brass

barrel housings split, locking forks bent, base plates broke, and recoil

springs lost their resilience.87 The new M6 propellant, promised during

the Sicily Campaign, and a strengthened base plate combined to increase

the maximum authorized range of the 4.2-inch mortar from 3,200 to

4,400 yards. The battalions in Italy began receiving the new propellants in December 1943, and their successful tests prompted the Fifth

Army chemical officer to request that all future shipments of propellants be of this type.88

A feature of the fight for San Pietro was the introduction of a selfpropelled 4.2-inch mortar, designed to provide the infantry with a

means of more mobile support and armored units with a weapon with

a high angle of fire. Developed by Colonel Barker and the 3 6th Division ordnance officer, at the instigation of the latter's commander,

86

 (1) Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit History, 15 Dec 43. (2) Co A 2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events. 87

 Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to CCWS, 24 Nov 43. CMLHO. 88

 (1) 3d Cml Bn Journal, 5 Dec 43. (2) Fifth Army Cml Warfare Sec Journal, 5 Dec 43, 21

Jan 44. (3) Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to CCWS, 22 Jan 44. (4) CM-IN 20511, 31 Jan 44.
440 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

this roving gun was simply a 4.2-inch mortar mounted on an M7

half-track. Upon first lumbering into position at San Pietro, its noise

brought down a heavy enemy artillery concentration. Moving to a

defiladed position the self-propelled mortar fired with good results

fifty rounds of WP at a range of 3,000 yards.

The weapon and chassis came through this initial test with moderate

success. The mortar mount suffered some damage and the blast effect

against the sides of the vehicle proved exceedingly uncomfortable to

the gun crew. But it appears that little subsequent use was made of

the self-propelled mortar. Its size and silhouette precluded emplacement where close support weapons were needed. And any weapon

which attracted too much enemy fire was not popular with the infantry.89

While II Corps was overcoming the stubborn German defenses

around Mignano, VI Corps, occupying the right flank of Fifth Army,

found the going equally rough in the mountains to the north. Heaviest

fighting in the 45th Division sector took place near the village of

Lagone. In an engagement on 15 December a forward observer for

Company B, 84th Battalion, attached to the 180th Infantry, sighted

the enemy forming for a counterattack in the sector of the adjacent

regiment. The 209 rounds of high explosive and 454 rounds of white

phosphorus shell dumped upon this formation aided in throwing back

the enemy assault. One prisoner disclosed that the attack was going

well until the German troops suddenly encountered intense mortar

fire which killed the prisoner's officer and a number of his fellow soldiers. "We wanted to surrender . . .," the German continued, and the

"mortar fire scattered our troops all over the hill and gave us a chance

to get away and give ourselves up."

 90

Mount Pantano was the scene of the heaviest action in the sector of

the other VI Corps division, the 34th. Fighting seesawed among the

four knobs of the mountaintop for days, supported on the American

side by the effective fire of a company and a half of the 3d Chemical

Battalion. During a 2-day period at the end of November the mortar

crews used so much ammunition, over 1,500 rounds, that fire was

temporarily suspended. This was one of the few cases of such curtailment in the Italian campaign.91

89

 Fifth Army Cml Warfare Sec Journal, 5, 7, 8, 11, 16 Dec 43. 90

 84th Cml Bn Field Journal, 15 Dec 43. 91

 (1) History of 3d Cml Bn, Nov 43. (2) Co D 3d Cml Bn Journal 29, 30 Nov 43.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 441

Action With the French Expeditionary Corps

The capture of the heights of Mount Sammucro, to the northwest,

and of Mount Lungo, to the southeast, made San Pietro untenable for

the Germans. The 36th Division occupied the destroyed and deserted

village on 17 December. There remained the third phase of the Fifth

Army attack on the Winter Line, a II Corps drive to the Rapido, accompanied by a similar move through the mountains to the river by the

French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) on the north. The fighting here

provided a unique attachment for the 3d Chemical Mortar Battalion.

The FEC, composed of a Moroccan and an Algerian division, replaced

the VI U.S. Corps early in January 1944 when the corps withdrew from

the right sector of Fifth Army to prepare for the impending Anzio

operation. The 3d Chemical Mortar Battalion joined the FEC in an

attachment which, with brief exceptions, lasted until June 1944.

Preparatory to this attachment Fifth Army screened the four mortar

battalions in Italy for French-speaking personnel, assigning those who

qualified to the 3d Battalion. The mortar unit carried out its assignment well, being only mildly affected by the difficulties of adjusting

to the operational procedures of the French.92 Its troubles came from

another quarter.

On 12 January the French Expeditionary Corps began a 3-day attack

which successfully carried it through the northeastern vestiges of the

Winter Line. Initially, Company B supported a regiment of the 2d

Moroccan Division. During the course of the morning's firing a shell

exploded in a mortar barrel, killing one of the crew and wounding three

others. As it turned out, this was but a prelude for worse things to

come. The command post of Company C, 3d Battalion, was located in

the town of Cerasuolo, a focal point for action in that particular

sector. Colonel Stark, the battalion commander, was at this command

post to insure the necessary close mortar support and to co-ordinate the

fire of Companies C and D. At 1430 12 January Colonel Stark held an

impromptu conference, attended by two company commanders, two

acting company commanders, and a company executive officer. Eighteen minutes after these officers assembled enemy aircraft bombed the

town. The command post sustained at least one direct hit. All the

attending officers and seven enlisted men died instantly. Despite the

virtual elimination of the command element of the battalion, prompt

93

 3d Cml Bn Journal, Dec 43, Jun 44.
442 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

reorganization permitted the unit to continue its mission, in fact, Company C fired 157 rounds within two hours of the bombardment. The

next day, however, the battalion reverted to Army control and went to

a rest area near Naples.93

The Gustav Line

While defending the Winter Line the enemy had been working

furiously on his positions behind the Rapido and Garigliano Rivers.

Known as the Gustav Line, these defenses extended from Mount Marrone on the northeast, through the mountains to Belvedere Hill, and

south to Cassino. The line then followed the Rapido and Garigliano

Rivers across the Liri Valley and continued along a formidable mountain barrier curving back to its terminus, Mount Scouri, on the Tyrrhenian Sea. The mountains on both ends of the Gustav Line, tremendous obstacles in themselves, were supplemented by well-emplaced

weapons and mine fields. The center of the line, although lacking

natural impediments, was a skilfully organized defense of mine fields

and wire, pillboxes, and automatic weapon emplacements, all of which

were covered by enemy artillery farther up the valley. The Fifth Army

History succinctly summarizes the strength of the position: "The area

of the Gustav Line had long provided the Italian General Staff with

ideal terrain for field exercises. In these problems forces representing

the enemy had never been able to penetrate the defense. The Italians

considered the area as an impregnable obstacle to any army attempting

to capture Rome from the south. The Germans were determined to

prove the validity of that assumption."

 94

On 15 January the enemy line before II Corps extended from Belvedere Hill along the right bank of the Rapido and Garigliano Rivers

to the junction of the Liri and the Garigliano. Highway 6, the road to

Rome, passed through the level terrain in the center of the corps sector,

exposed as far back as Mount Lungo to observed artillery fire from

enemy positions on the mountain heights in back of Cassino.95 The 2d

Chemical Battalion used smoke pots to conceal this vulnerable area

93

 3d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Jan 44.

94

 Fifth Army History, VI, 7-8. 95

 See Fifth Army at the Winter Line, illustration on p. 66.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 443

during the build-up for the II Corps attack across the Rapido, the

initial American thrust against the Gustav Line.96

The Fifth Army plan for its drive on Rome consisted of two parts:

a 3-corps attack against the Gustav Line followed a few days later

by an amphibious maneuver south of Rome and in back of the Gustav

Line defenses—the SHINGLE operation at Anzio. Army planners hoped

that the pressure on the main German position, combined with the

threat to his rear, would force the enemy into a general withdrawal.

The assault on the Gustav Line began on 17 January when the British

10 Corps attacked across the Rapido. Successful on the left and in the

center, the British forces were unable to win their objective on the right.

So it was that when II Corps attacked three days later, it did so with an

exposed left flank. South of Cassino the Rapido is a narrow, swiftmoving stream varying in depth from nine to twelve feet. Sant'Angelo,

the objective of the 3 6th Division, the assault force of II Corps, stands

on a 40-foot bluff above the west bank of the river. The 141st Infantry,

supported by Company A of the 2d Chemical Battalion, was ordered to

cross the Rapido north of the town and then attack south and west.

Companies B and C of the mortar battalion fired for the 143d Infantry which was to cross the river south of the town and then, after

reaching initial objectives, assist the 141st in the seizure of Sant'Angelo.

Company D, assigned to a regiment of the 34th Division, was located

in a position from which it could support the 141st Infantry.

The night of 20 January was one of pandemonium. Attacking at

2000 without surprise through mine fields and the fire of artillery,

mortars and automatic weapons, both regiments encountered terrific

resistance. All four mortar companies fired barrages just before or immediately after the time of attack. One half hour before the assault,

Company A used 400 rounds of white phosphorus to lay down a smoke

screen which, in the total absence of wind, rose to a height of 150 feet.

Between 2030 and 2100 Company C placed 119 rounds of WP on

enemy positions. Next day Company A laid down smoke screens for

the men of the 141st who had been stranded on the far bank of the

Rapido while Company C fired 204 rounds of WP to cover the withdrawal of elements of the 143d Infantry which had been given up for

96

 For an account of these screening activities by the 2d Battalion, see above, Chapter VIII.
444 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

lost on the previous night. That afternoon, on the resumption of the

attack, further 4.2-inch mortar fire supported the infantry units.97

One of Company C's forward observers participated in this action

as a member of the command post party of the 1st Battalion, 143d

Infantry. Meeting with heavy German rocket and automatic weapons

fire on the near side of the river, the battalion commander ordered a

barrage of 4.2-inch white phosphorus. At midnight the small party

crossed the Rapido. The battalion commander was wounded, and the

lieutenant who took charge ordered the men to dig in for the night.

At dawn he went in search of the missing infantry Companies A and B

and upon his return announced that they were the only ones remaining. With the radio out, the small group made its way back across

the Rapido under cover of fog. It was a thorough defeat; the regimental commander reported that the combat efficiency of his unit was

destroyed.98

The situation was just as bad with the 141st Infantry. Mortar Company A fired smoke missions on 21 and 22 January to screen two infantry battalions on the far side of the river. Next day the company

expended 441 rounds of WP on a screen to cover the withdrawal of

some forty men of the 141st Infantry. The abortive attack had been

costly.99

Unfortunately, the smoke screen mission fired for the men stranded

on the far bank of the Rapido seriously interfered with the observation

of the corps artillery. With communications out and with infantry

positions unknown, effective artillery support was impossible.100 There

were also misunderstandings regarding the use of smoke. In a 23

January conference between the 36th Division chemical officer and

Capt. James O. Quimby, Jr., commanding Company A, 2d Chemical

Battalion, the former commented on the density of enemy smoke at

the site of the bridgehead. Quimby had to explain that this was his

smoke, not German, a fact unknown to division as well as corps.101

A 24 January mission of Company C demonstrated that some commanders receiving support continued to be unfamiliar with the cap97

 (1) 2d Cml Bn Journal, 15-20 Jan 44. (2) Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary, 20-21 Jan 44. (3)

Co A 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary, 21 Jan 44. 98

 (1) Co C 2d Cml Mortar Bn Unit Diary, 21 Jan 44. (2) 143d Inf Opns Rpt, Jan 44. 99

 (1) Co A 2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events, 22 Jan 44. (2) 141st Inf Opns Rpt, Jan 44. 100

 Fifth Army History, IV, 47. 101

 Statement, Maj James O. Quimby, Jr., to CMLHO, 17 May 50.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 445

abilities of the chemical mortar. The infantry battalion commander,

for example, called for smoke to screen a patrol which was about to

feel out enemy defenses and search for American wounded. Several

times during the course of this mission he called for target changes

requiring gun re-emplacements and once he wanted it without cessation

of fire. The commander also requested an increase in the rate of fire

at a time when mortarmen were already firing twenty-one rounds per

mortar per minute. When the smoke ascended directly into the air,

he called upon the mortar commander to rectify the situation. In the

words of the custodian of the company diary: "We are still wondering

if he wanted us to come down and blow on it."

 102

 Reactions to this

impromptu mission were mixed. The captain with the infantry patrol,

which brought back two wounded American soldiers, praised Company

C for the effective screen. On the other hand, II Corps immediately

informed the mortar company that no more smoke was to be fired

without its approval.103

The Anzio Beachhead

Fifth Army launched the second phase of its winter offensive on

22 January on the beaches near Anzio and Nettuno, seaside resort

towns located barely thirty air miles south of Rome. The objective of

VI Corps was to cut the historic roadway known as the Appian Way

and Highway 7, as well as other German supply routes. With these severed, the enemy in the Gustav Line would be left to choose between extermination and withdrawal. Two mortar battalions saw action at Anzio, the 83d, initially in support of Colonel Darby's Ranger forces, and

the 84th, which landed late on D-day with the 3d Infantry Division.

The 83d had undergone a month of training in preparation for the

assault. Companies A and B, loaded in Dukws, went in with the second

wave but received no calls for fire until H plus 6 because of the achievement of complete surprise. An enemy 88-mm. gun which had been

shelling the beach supplied the mortars with their first target. In firing

on this gun at a range of 2,000 yards and forcing it to withdraw,

Company B provided an excellent example of its usefulness at times

when the artillery had not yet come into position.104 That the mortars

102

 Co C id Cml Bn Unit Diary, 24 Jan 44. 103

 Ibid. 104

 (1) 83d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Jan 44. (2) Hutchinson Interv, 26 Jan 45.
446 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

did not need specific targets to be effective was well illustrated at

Anzio by the tactics of the Ranger commander. Colonel Darby, who

had received mortar support both on Sicily and at Salerno, met the

first elements of the 83d Battalion with orders to set up weapons and

start firing in the general direction of the Germans. His logic was:

"I want the bastards to know I have something heavy, so they will start

digging in. That will give me a chance to maneuver."

 105

On the morning of D plus 1 Company B moved into position 2,000

yards north of Anzio to support the advance of the Rangers, while

in the afternoon Company A advanced to a position 10,000 yards north

of the town on the east side of the Anzio-Rome highway. From 24 to

28 January these companies fired on wooded areas and troop concentrations, on roads and rail junctions, and on houses and haystacks in support of Ranger attacks on Carocetta and Aprillo. Bedevilled by excessive mortar breakage from emplacements in the spongy ground, Lt.

Col. William S. Hutchinson, Jr., commanding the 83d, ruefully concluded that the 4.2-inch mortar was far better suited to mountain

fighting than for operations "in the mucky, ill-drained soil of the

Anzio beachhead."

 106

Although it landed on D-day, the 84th Chemical Battalion did not

undertake its first missions until three days later, 25 January, when

Company A, with its mortars emplaced on an abandoned railway bed,

fired 100 rounds against houses, haystacks, roads, and ditches, all places

that were suspected of concealing Germans. Two days later the same

unit expended 750 rounds of ammunition, hindered all the while by

excessive mortar breakage.107

Meanwhile, on 26 January Companies C and D met with tragedy.

While en route from Naples to the beachhead the LST carrying these

units struck a mine and caught fire. The explosion of mortar ammunition magnified the danger. Many of the survivors who escaped this

small hell were picked up by an LCI (landing craft, infantry) which in

turn hit a mine and went down with all on board. The two companies

lost a total of 293 officers and enlisted men; the survivors were taken

to a rest camp near Naples.108 Augmented, reorganized, and retrained,

105

 Cml Warfare School Tng Memo No. 6, 31 Oct 44. 106

 83d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Jan 44. 107

 84th Cml Bn Field Journal, 25, 27 Jan 44. 108

 83d Cml Bn Unit Journal, 31 Jan 44.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 447

these units were to see some combat action with the 88th Division near

Minturno before joining the parent battalion at Anzio in mid-April.

One of the objectives of the 30 January drive by VI Corps toward

the Alban Hills was cutting Highway 7 at the point where it passes

through Cisterna. The 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions set off toward the

town at 0100, an hour before the main effort, which would be made by

the 4th Ranger Battalion and elements of the 3d Infantry Division.

Companies A and B, 83d Chemical Battalion, were in support of the

Ranger battalions. Creeping along a ditch which led to Cisterna, the

Rangers reached the outskirts of town by dawn. There they fell into

an enemy ambush. The units making the main effort failed to advance

sufficiently to be of any aid to the embattled Ranger forces. Company

B placed mortar fire on the encircling Germans in a vain attempt to

cover a withdrawal. Only six Rangers made it back.109

Not only did the VI Corps attack fail but it was soon clear that a

German counterattack was imminent. From 1 February until the

eventual breakout in May, the corps mission was essentially defensive.

Both mortar battalions were called upon for heavy fire against enemy

attacks and were subjected to frequent enemy artillery and mortar

shelling and air bombardment. Because of excellent German observation of the beachhead and all routes leading to Allied positions, there

was a great demand for smoke screens laid by mortars, pots, and generators.110

During the period of containment at Anzio it was usual for three

mortar companies to stay in the line, while one remained in reserve

near battalion headquarters. Unlike the situation near Venafro and

San Pietro on the southern front, rear areas at Anzio were well within

the range of enemy artillery. Reports were that some men preferred

their emplacements to the battalion areas on the beaches. Nevertheless,

rotation did give the men a change of scene and diet and also allowed

commanders to inspect equipment and to supervise the integration of

replacements.

From the time of the landing until 20 May the 84th Battalion fired

50,166 rounds (8,019 WP) of ammunition; the 83d from February

109

 (1) Company A supported the 4th Ranger Battalion on 30 January in its attempt to relieve

its sister units at Cisterna. (2) Rounds Away!—The Story of the 83d Cml Bn, pp 8-9. CWS 314.7

Unit Files. (3) Hutchinson Interv, 26 Jan 45. (4) CmlO Fifth Army Rpt of Cml Warfare Activities, 8 Jan-21 Jan 44. 110

 See above, Chapter VIII, for smoke generator operations at Anzio.
448 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

until 20 May expended 14,326 rounds (4,716 WP). Casualties for the

two battalions in the Anzio beachhead were 30 dead and 87 wounded.111

Cassino

With the failure of the 3 6th Division attack across the Rapido, General Clark directed II Corps to shift to the north, with the town of

Cassino, Monte Cassino, and the eventual drive into the Liri Valley as its

objectives. By 1 February the 34th Division, which was to serve as the

main striking force, had established a bridgehead across the Rapido near

the town of Cairo, about two miles north of Cassino.

The town of Cassino lies on Highway 6 at the foot of the main mountain barriers to the Allied advance through the Liri Valley. Rising

behind Cassino is Castle Hill, an elevation of some 633 feet. Overshadowing both is Monte Cassino upon which stands the historic monastery. Together they offered the enemy excellent observation of the

movements of the Allied army in its attempt to break into the Liri

Valley. A few miles north of Cassino were the towns of Cairo and

Villa, the latter being the site of a group of Italian barracks which at

different times in the tug of war which followed were to shelter both

German and American forces. Four miles northeast of Monte Cassino

massive Mount Cairo towers 5,500 feet above sea level. This small area

to the north and west of Cassino was to be the scene of some of the

bitterest battles fought during the Italian campaign, for it was here that

the German forces battled to protect Monte Cassino and the entrance

to the Liri Valley.112

Commanded now by Maj. James R. Chapman, the 2d Chemical

Battalion supported the 34th Division in the February attacks against

the Cassino defenses. On 1 February Company D fired ninety-seven

rounds of WP before a successful infantry assault on the barracks area

at Villa. But next day the lack of communications and the absence of

adequate observation precluded mortar support for men of the 135th

Infantry as they worked their way southward along a ridge line. This

situation repeated itself during the period 4—6 February in the bitter

engagement on the headland and plateau north of the abbey. In three

days of costly fighting the infantry won Hill 593 (Abaneta Farm)

111

 (1) 84th Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Jan-May 44. (2) 83d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Feb-May 44. 112

 Fred Majdalany, The Battle of Cassino (Boston: Houghton Miffiin Co., 1957), gives a graphic

account of this action.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 449

which dominates the approaches to the abbey but the fluid, even confused, situation dictated that there could be little or no mortar support.

In further attacks toward the abbey on 8 February Companies B and D

did fire 840 rounds in casualty and screening missions. On the same

day Company A used limited amounts of WP to screen the advance of

supporting tanks, a mission abruptly halted when the smoke spread over

infantry positions on the flats near the river.113 On 11 February, in rain,

sleet, and snow, the troops of II Corps made another effort to take

Monte Cassino. Companies B, C, and D, hampered by the weather

and disrupted communications, supported individual regiments of the

34th and 36th Divisions. Fighting in the craggy terrain before the

abbey was at such close quarters that Company C received no calls from

the regiment it supported. The other two mortar companies fired

less than 100 rounds each.114

Mid-February saw British, New Zealand, and Indian troops committed to the fighting around Monte Cassino. Allied bombers struck

the famous abbey on 15 February in an operation conspicious for its

lack of positive results. In fact, Allied troops moved back from the

hard-won Hill 593 just before the bombardment, and it was the German forces that reoccupied the position when the air strike was over.

It took three days for British and Gurkha troops to retake the hill, during which time the British requested and received support from Company C, 2d Chemical Battalion. The mortar unit delivered a 20-minute

barrage of 246 rounds against a row of trees near the abbey among

which the enemy had emplaced a number of machine guns. After

completion of this mission the commanding officer of the 141st Infantry, to which the mortar company was attached, telephoned his congratulations and those of the British to the mortarmen of Company C.

This gesture, as well as expression of thanks upon the relief of Company

C on 27 February, was particularly gratifying for the mortarmen

since this same infantry officer had previously announced, when a

short mortar round fell within fifty yards of his command post, that

he would never again request a mission from a chemical mortar unit.115

During the last days in February all of the weapons companies of

113

 (1) 2d Cml Bn Opns Rpts, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 Feb 44. (2) 135th Inf Opns Rpt, 2 Feb 44. (3) 2d

Cml Bn S-3 Journal, 8 Feb 44. (4) Co A 2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events, 8 Feb 44. (5) 133d Inf Opns

Rpt, Feb 44. 114

 (1) Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary, 10 Feb 44. (2) 2d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, 11 Feb 44. 115

 (1) Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary, 14, 18, 20 Feb 44. (2) Co C 2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events,

17, 18, 27 Feb 44.
450 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the 2d Chemical Battalion reverted to the control of the parent unit.

One hundred and seventy consecutive days in the line had been culminated by the difficult fighting at Cassino, the roughest time experienced by the battalion to date. The Germans were not the only

enemy; the terrain, the weather, the lack of shelter, and the limited

supply of suitable clothing combined to make life miserable.116

Small satisfaction was gained at Cassino from the over-all contribution of the mortars. There were times when disrupted communications

and the fluid nature of the fighting meant that the chemical companies

could offer only limited support.

The Drive on Rome

During March and April 1944 the Allied forces in Italy paused,

trained, refitted, and regrouped in preparation for another assault

against the Gustav Line defenses. A greatly contracted Fifth Army

held a narrow sector from the Tyrrhenian coast to the Liri River;

II Corps, composed of the recently arrived 85th and 88th Divisions,

was on the left and the French Expeditionary Corps was on the right.

The sector of the British Eighth Army now extended from the Liri

River to the Adriatic, including the strong German defenses which

centered at Monte Cassino.

The 2d and 3d Chemical Battalions maintained their attachments to

the II Corps and the FEC. After leaving the lines at Cassino in late

February, the 2d Battalion passed into II Corps reserve for a period of

rest, training, and repair and replacement of equipment. On 13 March

Company D joined the 88th Division in its quiet zone near Minturno

for a 2-week attachment that served to familiarize the new unit with

the 4.2-inch mortar and its capabilities. During April the entire battalion, again in corps reserve, underwent a vigorous training program.

Elements of the 3d Battalion participated in smoking operations on

the upper Garigliano in the FEC sector. Abetted by a detail from the

172d Smoke Generator Company, successive companies of the mortar

battalion maintained an extensive smoke installation in the vicinity of

the Tiger Bridge across the Garigliano.117

On the eve of Fifth Army's 11 May attack on the Gustav Line 3d

Battalion communication equipment was augmented by the issue of

116

 History of Second Mortar Battallion (Salzburg, Austria, n.d.) p. 24. CMLHO. 117

 3d Cml Bn Opns Rpts, 30 Apr 1-13 May 44.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 451

sixteen SCR-300's. The successful use of this radio prompted the battalion commander to regard it as the only set which might tend to

reduce the telephone to the rank of a secondary means of communication in battle. The exchange just before the attack of 10 21⁄2-ton

trucks for 32 jeeps and 48 1⁄4-ton trailers increased the mobility of the

mortar battalion and its ability to get ammunition forward.

The 3d Battalion fired 7,000 rounds of ammunition in twelve hours

of preparatory fire. Each of the four companies supported a French

division, three of them by direct attachment to the infantry and the

fourth through the control of division artillery. The latter company

did the least firing, primarily because of delays encountered in securing

firing data, a circumstance which prompted the battalion commander

to recommend strongly that this company also be placed under infantry

control.118 The enemy lines broke by the middle of the second day, and

mortar support decreased. By 27 May the pursuit became so rapid that

the battalion was placed in corps reserve and remained there until

relieved from attachment to the FEC on 11 June.

The 2d Chemical Battalion went into action on the Minturno front

on II May in support of II Corps' 85th and 88th Divisions. After

expending more than 10,000 rounds in a 7-hour preparation, the battalion fired missions for the two divisions as the situation required.119

For example, the initial objective of the 339th Infantry, 85th Division,

was San Martino Hill which had an importance all out of proportion

to its modest height of 200 feet because it dominated an important

enemy supply route. Within a 15-minute period late on II May the

battalion fired 1,267 rounds against this objective.120 The fight for San

Martino Hill lasted several days. On 13 May all four mortar companies

fired high-explosive and smoke missions in support of the attacking

infantry. The hill fell next day, and II Corps placed the 2d Battalion

in support of the 88th Division attacking Santa Maria Infante. In this

engagement the mortars made good use of smoke to blind enemy observation from nearby Pulcherini. In fact, WP made up about one-third

of the 13,575 rounds fired by the battalion between 11 and 14 May.

Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the German commander in

Italy, commented on the effectiveness of these American screens. Be118

 Hist of 3d Cml Bn, May 44. 119

 Col. Maurice E. Barker, "Mortars Are the Man-Killers," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No.

4 (August, September, October, 1944). 120

 2d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, May 44.
452 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

cause of the extensive use of smoke along the Garigliano, he wrote, German artillery had to fire on American river crossings "without the

least observation."

 121

The May experiences of Company A may be taken as typical of

those of the entire 2d Chemical Battalion once Allied forces breached

the Gustav Line defenses. On the 14th the company moved forward

by jeep with a regiment of the 88th Division, firing 191 rounds of white

phosphorus in midafternoon. Two days later the company used a

pack mule train to move overland with the infantry; even then it took

overnight marches to keep up with the assault battalions. During the

period 21-22 May Company A fired 165 rounds against enemy troops.

There were more marches, more difficult terrain to traverse, more

changes in position and attachment. All in all, events and units moved

so swiftly that there could be little employment of the 4.2-inch

mortars.122

Fifth Army co-ordinated the VI Corps breakout of the beachhead

at Anzio with the southern front's attack on the Gustav Line. Companies A and B, 83d Chemical Battalion, supported the 1st Armored

Division and Companies C and D, the 45th Infantry Division. All

four companies fired mass concentrations in support of the initial attack, those with the 45th Division aiding greatly in the successful

resistance to two German counterattacks. Once the breakthrough was

achieved the mortar units supporting the armored division found they

could keep pace only by frequent displacements. Consequently, corps

placed these companies in support of the 36th Division, which had

moved to Anzio by sea, for the drive that broke the German line at

Velletri, twenty miles southeast of Rome.123

Meanwhile, the 84th Chemical Battalion on 23 May expended 3,081

rounds in support of 3d Division. After the initial breakthrough the

84th Battalion, as had the 83d, found it impossible to keep up with the

infantry. The battalion commander blamed this on the large and unwieldly 21⁄2-ton trucks and the scarcity of jeeps and trailers. Communications also broke down during the swift movement, for there

was no time to lay wire and the SCR-284 proved unreliable. But

121

 Quoted in Fifth Army History, V, 204. 122

 Co A 2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events, May 44. 123

 (1) The Story of the 83d Cml Bn, pp. 10-11. (2) Lt. Col. William S. Hutchinson, "The Forgotten Front," vol. 31, No. 1 Chemical Warfare Bulletin (January, February, 1945). (3) Hutchinson Interv, 26 Jan 45.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 453

these complications mattered little; the rapid retreat of the enemy

meant that the mortars found little use. As the 83d Chemical Battalion

commander summarized it: "The pursuit was so fast-moving and resistance so weak that the use of the 4.2-inch mortars was unwarranted."

 124

Both mortar battalions participated briefly in the pursuit beyond

Rome before reverting to army control on 10 June. The 2d and 3d

Battalions returned to army control a day later. After about a month's

rest three of the battalions, the 2d, 3d, and 83d, went with VI Corps

from the Fifth Army to the Seventh Army and began training for the

invasion of southern France.125

The Invasion of Southern France

The three chemical mortar battalions which participated in the assault on the beaches of southern France were veteran units which

had taken part in one or more amphibious landings in Sicily and

Italy.126 Consequently, preparations for DRAGOON for the most part

consisted of perfecting teamwork with the infantry. The exceptions

were Company A, 2d Chemical Battalion, and Company D, 83d Battalion, which were part of an airborne task force created especially

for the operation. Activated in July, this force included American

and British parachute and glider units.127 The mortar companies received their assignment to the airborne task force on II July and

moved to training sites at airfields in the vicinity of Rome. Here

they trained in glider operations and prepared loading lists for personnel, equipment, and vehicles.128

Late on the afternoon of D-day, 15 August, the two airborne mortar

companies landed in the vicinity of Leluc, France, with the glider units

of the provisional airborne task force. None of the gliders was lost

through enemy air or antiaircraft action but many were wrecked by

the sawed-off utility poles—Goering asparagus—with which the Germans studded some of the most likely landing sites. One glider hit

124

 (1) 84th Cml Bn Opns Rpt, May 44. (2) 83d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Jun 44. 125

 (1) Hist of 3d Cml Bn, Jul 44, incl 5. (2) Markham Interv, 16 Jan 45. 126

 For a detailed description of the invasion of southern France, see Smith, Riviera to the Rhine. 127

 Rpt of Opns, Seventh U.S. Army in France and Germany (hereafter cited as Rpt of Opns, Seventh Army), I, 110-11. Other supporting units were antitank, engineer, signal, and medical companies. 128

 CWS TofO Ltr No. 23, 3 Apr 45. This document includes the loading lists and tables of individual equipment.
454 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

with such impact that the jeep load in its nose catapulted through the

front end of the aircraft, seriously injuring the three men sitting in the

vehicle.

Elements of Company A, landing between 1845 and 1900, had assembled at their predesignated area by 2130 and were prepared to fire

on the town of Le Muy. Next morning the company fired 200 rounds

of HE on the town and 48 rounds of WP on its southern exits. Le Muy

fell by midafternoon. Later that day the airborne troops made contact

with reconnaissance elements of the 45th Division. After this junction

the mortar companies remained attached to the task force as it pushed

to the French-Italian border, being relieved from this attachment on

17 September at Nice, France.129

The gliders of Company D, 83d Chemical Battalion, were released

over the drop zone near Le Muy at seven minutes after seven on the

morning of D-day. Fourteen mortarmen received light injuries during

the landings. The company did not fire on that first day but expended

650 rounds in support of the 517th Infantry on 16 August. The mortar

unit remained in support of this unit until the end of the month doing

relatively little firing in the drive to the Italian border.130

A mortar company accustomed to normal attachments encountered

problems in adapting itself to glider operations. Techniques of loading

and securing equipment had to be formulated and mastered. Men and

equipment had to be distributed in such a way as to allocate weight

equally among the several gliders. Moreover, it was necessary to allocate the material so that the loss of one glider would not destroy all

the equipment of the same type. The exigencies of glider operations

caused a number of changes in the normal organization and equipment

of a mortar company based mostly on the fact that a company, landing

by gliders, often had to operate as an independent unit until such time

as contact could be made with other elements. Because of this fact

medical aidmen joined each mortar platoon and automatic weapons

were added to provide means for independent defense. In the table of

equipment for an airborne mortar company drawn up after DRAGOON

by Capt. Raymond J. Lakey of the 83d Battalion, the responsibility

for unit security accounted for all additions to the complement of

weapons. Captain Lakey recommended that 4 light machine guns, 8

129

 (1) Rpt of Opns, Seventh Army, I, 110-14. (2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 23, 3 Apr 45. (3) Co A

2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events. 130

 83d Bn Rpt of Action, Aug 44.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 455

BAR's, 16 tommy guns, and 18 .45-caliber pistols be added to the

arsenal of an airborne company. And whereas the table of equipment

of a motorized company called for 5 bazookas, 7 should be carried by

a glider-borne company.131

Since the assault operation against the beaches of southern France

met only light opposition, the mortar battalions found they had relatively few missions to fire as they accompanied their divisions to the

west and north.132 Because fire was not needed in such a rapid advance,

some of the units were given jobs involving supply. A company of

the 83d Battalion established and operated a railhead to St. Maximin in

order to ease the serious logistical problems of the 45th Division. And

at one time companies of the 2d Battalion hauled supplies for the 36th

Division.133 For the 3d Battalion August was a period of long, fast

movements with little fighting. The low rate of ammunition expenditure mitigated the shell supply problem which otherwise would have

been acute since army supply dumps were frequently 100 miles to the

rear.134

These mortar battalions continued to support the troops of the

Seventh Army as they fought to the north and northeast—the Vosges,

Belfort, Bitche, Colmar were familiar names to the mortarmen. Some

mortar units fired for divisions of the 1st French Army which, with the

U.S. Seventh, made up Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Dever's 6th Army Group.

Offensive action came to a temporary halt in mid-December 1944 when

the Germans launched their Ardennes counteroffensive.135

The Fighting Ends in Italy

The departure of the 2d, 3d, and 83d Chemical Mortar Battalion for

southern France left only the 84th in support of the divisions of Fifth

Army from July until the end of October 1944. This unit found

itself scattered along the entire army front.136 In an effort to make up

for this lost support the theater in June 1944 converted two antiaircraft

131

 Capt Raymond J. Lakey, Rpt on 4.2-Inch Mortar Airborne Company, pt. II, 15 Oct 44. CmlC

School Lib. 132

 For an account of mortar battalion participation in the D-day screening, see above, Chapter VIII. 133

 (1) Rounds Away: Two Years of Combat with Eighty-Third Chemical Mortar Battalion (Innsbruck, 1945), pp. 41-42. (2) History of Second Chemical Mortar Battalion, pp. 33-34. 134

 3d Cml Bn Rpt of Opns, Aug 44. 135

 See below, Chapter XII, for details on the German counteroffensive. 136

 Ltr, CCmlO NATOUSA to CCWS, 26 Oct 44. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, NATOUSA.
456 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

artillery automatic weapons units to the 99th and 100th Chemical Mor- tar Battalions. After completing a period of intensive training under

the direction of Colonel Hutchinson, a former commander of the 83rd, the 99th, commanded by Lt. Col. Gordon A. Dixon, left for France

and the 100th, commanded by Lt. Col. Russell E. McMurray, joined

Fifth Army in Italy.137

July had seen the 84th reorganize under the long ignored tables of

organization and equipment of September 1943, a move which reduced

the number of officers and enlisted men of a mortar battalion from

1,010 to 622. The new tables also cut the number of 21⁄2-ton trucks

and increased the number of 1⁄4-ton trucks (jeeps) assigned to a bat- talion. The long delay between the publication of the tables and actual

reorganization was the result of several factors. For one thing, mortar

battalions in Italy had scant time away from the front line to put the

required changes into effect. Moreover, for a long while there were

not enough jeeps to make the substitution in vehicles. Finally, mortar

commanders feared that because of the cut in personnel their units

would find it impossible to operate efficiently if reorganization took

place.138

While the Italian campaign was in progress the War Department

drew up still another TOE based upon the recommendations received

from battle-experienced CWS officers.139 The salient feature of this

revision was the elimination of one weapons company, a move which

placed the battalion on the triangular basis characteristic of the in- fantry division.140

 The new organization became effective in Septem- ber 1944, and two months later the 84th and 100t h Battalions re- organized accordingly.141

After his rapid retreat above Rome, the enemy defended positions

north of the Arno River, called the Gothic Line, which were not

137

 (1) Ibid. (2) 100th Cml Bn Opns Rpts, Jul-Nov 44. 138

 (1) Hist of 3d Cml Bn, Jun 44, p. 44. (2) Markham Interv, 16 Jan 45. (3) See Opnl History

of Cml Bns and the 4.2-inch Mortar in World War II, pt. II, The Italian Campaign, pp. 101-19. (4)

The fighting in Italy had altered mortar commanders' views as to the desirability of the 1⁄4-ton truck.

Too much had been expected of these vehicles. The 21⁄2-ton trucks were still needed to haul ammunition from army supply points to the mortar battalion dumps and on to company dumps. Earlier

thoughts on transportation had been conditioned by the experience of the fast-moving Sicilian campaign; operations in Italy, characterized by slow movements and static situations, brought about the

change. Opnl History of Cml Bns and the 4.2-inch Mortar in World War II, p. II, Italian Campaign,

p. 106. 139

 Ltr, ACCWS for Field Opns to CCmlO NATOUSA, 12 Feb 44. 140

 Other features of this TOE are discussed in Chapter XII, below. 141

 CWS TofO Ltr No. 21, 31 Jan 45, p. 35.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 457

breached by Allied forces until late September 1944. During that

month the 84th Battalion expended about 6,500 rounds of ammunition, over half of which was white phosphorus. New infantry divisions,

unfamiliar with the mortars and particularly their high-explosive mission, seemed to make more frequent calls for smoke. Each of the four

companies of the 84th supported a different division of II Corps, which

was fighting its way northward through the mountains. Despite transportation difficulties, the 84th gave heavy support during October,

firing some 16,000 rounds (5,000 HE), mainly against enemy counterattacks and emplacements and also as a screen for American positions

and supply routes.142 On 31 October the 84th Chemical Battalion

passed into Fifth Army reserve to be replaced by the 100t h Battalion,

companies of which supported, at one time or another, each of the

infantry divisions of II Corps.143

In January 1945 Fifth Army received reports of the hardships encountered in other theaters and in the United States with the fuzes for

the M3 4.2-inch mortar ammunition which, unfortunately, made up

the bulk of 4.2-inch ammunition in the theater. Nonetheless, during

February the 84th and 100th Battalions used over 11,000 rounds of the

suspected ammunition without particular difficulty. On 9 March a

shell burst three feet from the barrel of one mortar, killing one man

and wounding four others. Thereafter, mortar crews used lanyards

to fire suspected ammunition, a precaution which at first reduced the

efficiency of mortar crews.144

From the conclusion of the Gothic Line fighting in the fall of 1944

until the spring of 1945 Fifth Army troops remained in relatively the

same positions. April saw an army offensive which cracked German

defenses in a matter of a week. The 84th and 100t h Battalions supported the IV and II Corps, respectively, in this operation until the

infantry advance was too swift for effective support. It was at this

time that 4.2-inch mortar operations in the Mediterranean theater

came to an end.145

142

 84th Cml Bn Opns Rpts, Sep, Oct 44. 143

 100t h Cml Bn Opns (for Nov 44), 5 Dec 44. 144

 (1) 84th Cml Mortar Bn Opns Rpt, Feb, Mar 45. (2) 100th Cml Mortar Bn Opns Rpts, Feb

45. (3) 84th Cml Mortar Bn Field Journal, 9 Mar 45. (4) Fifth Army Cml Sec, Cml Warfare

Activities, 11-17 Mar 45. 145

 (1) 84th Cml Mortar Bn Opns Rpt, Apr 45. (2) 100t h Cml Mortar Bn Opns Rpt, Apr 45.
458 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Fighting in Italy was as bitter and the enemy defenses as stubborn as

any experienced by American forces in World War II. The mountainous Italian terrain, with its abundance of defiladed positions inaccessible to artillery fire, placed a heavy demand on high trajectory

weapons, particularly the 4.2-inch mortar. In addition, 4.2-inch

mortar units were indispensable to Ranger and Commando units which

lacked organic heavy weapons. Most infantry commanders were at

first unaware of the potential of the 4.2-inch mortar, but once they

had seen the weapon in action they were usually anxious for mortar

support. In Italy the chemical mortar truly came of age.
CHAPTER XII

The Chemical Mortar in the ETO

Getting chemical mortar battalions for the European Theater of

Operations, U.S. Army, proved to be a complicated and difficult problem. Colonel Rowan, chief chemical officer in the theater, had recommended a total of 24 battalions for the theater troop list, a figure based

upon the formula of 2 battalions per corps (18) and 2 additional battalions per army (6). His commander approved this recommendation,

including the figure in the over-all troop list, which was forwarded to

Washington early in 1943.1

The War Department took no action on the troop basis recommended by the theater commander. In November 1943 it sent an

officer to England to inform the theater commander on War Department troop basis policy—the establishment of an over-all theater

personnel ceiling within which the theater commander could set up

his own troop basis. The officer produced a list of those units which

were immediately available, those which were in training, and those

which were scheduled for activation. He stated that the theater commander could take his pick, staying, of course, within his over-all

ceiling. Because the list admittedly had no relation to the one submitted by the ETO, a situation which negated a large amount of detailed theater planning, the War Department agreed to activate and

train units not on the list, with the understanding that this would take

additional time. Unfortunately, there were only seven chemical mortar

battalions on the list.

Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commander of the U.S. army group in

the theater, received the job of determining the final troop list. Rowan

pointed out to General Bradley that the seven chemical mortar

battalions bore no logical numerical relation to the number of armies

and corps on the list, that they could not be distributed equitably,

1

 (1) Ltr, ACCWS for Field Opns to CCmlO ETOUSA, 16 Nov 43. (2) Ltr, Rowan to Hist

Off, 3 Dec 51. CWS 314.7.
460 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and that they were far too few to achieve their full potential. Rowan

then asked Bradley for the twenty-four mortar battalions of the original troop list. Bradley replied that he would like to have more mortar

units but, because the troop ceiling had just about been reached, adding

them would mean giving up other units that were equally valuable.

This he was reluctant to do.

At the time of these negotiations the only mortar battalion located

in the European theater was the 8 1st. Attempts to secure one of the four

combat-experienced units from the North Africa Theater of Operations were turned down as "impossible and impracticable"; the mortar

battalions in Italy already were overworked. Colonel Shadle, chief

chemical officer of that theater, stated that the battalions were so

highly regarded that "the sticking of my fingers into this question

would be practically the same as putting them in a 'bandsaw'."

 2

A change in the table of organization for the mortar battalion

promised an unexpected source of men. Under the existing table the

authorized strength was 1,010; a revised table of September 1943 reduced this number to 622.3

 Colonel Rowan was informed that the

battalions in the United States were organized under the older table.

Taking into consideration the battalions then existing and those which

could be formed from the men excess by reorganization under the

new table, Colonel Rowan came up with a total of eleven potentially

available battalions. If General Bradley asked for but one battalion in

addition to the War Department troop list, there would be enough to

equal just half of the original request, or one per corps and army. General Bradley acceded, requesting twelve mortar battalions for the

theater troop list.

Although it began auspiciously, the plan for capitalizing on battalion

reorganization as a source for new units soon turned sour. The theater

received permission in December to activate a mortar battalion in England manned in large part by the men freed in the reorganization of the

81st Battalion.4 But Rowan learned to his dismay that the battalions

in the United States earmarked for his theater had already been reorganized under the new table of organization, thus cutting off an

important supply of personnel.

With only two battalions in England as late as February 1944 the

2

 Ltr, CCmlO NATO to ACCWS for Field Opns, 2 Dec 43. 3

 See above, ch. XL 4

 (1) CM-IN 7606, 12 Dec 43. (2) CM-OUT 7110 16 Dec 43.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 461

shortage of such units became critical. Although the troop basis for

the ETO now included 12 battalions> only 7 were listed as available in

1944. What was worse, only 4 of these would be in the theater in time

for the Normandy landings—the 81st, the 92d, activated in England,

and the 86th and 87th, both of which arrived in April.5

Preparations for OVERLORD

Of these four battalions the 92d was least prepared for combat operations in France. The other three units concentrated on amphibious

training in the winter and spring of 1944, having undergone basic and

unit training in the United States. The 92d, activated in England in

February 1944, had to start from scratch.6

From the beginning the training activities of the battalion were

hampered by the type of men it received. Of the first 373 assigned

to the unit, 308 were of average intelligence or less. Fifty-six had

AWOL records, 22 had been court-martialed for other offenses, and

12 had had VD. About 15 of the group were suffering from some

disability or were on limited service; 13 others went immediately to

the hospital. Throughout its period of activation the 92d usually received those men declared surplus by other units.7

The battalion devoted the last two weeks of February to making its

camp at least partially fit for human habitation. The first part of

March saw the enlisted men screened for a selection of potential NCO

material and subjected to a review of all basic subjects. Small arms

instruction, mortar drill, and the training of 162 drivers followed.

By the end of March companies had been organized, squads knew

something about their mortars, and the battalion was able to pack

and move with some degree of order. Training intensified in April,

with special emphasis on field work and marksmanship. Morale

reached its lowest point at this time; few realized that the rigorous

conditioning was necessary for their own survival. Work on mortar

ranges began on 10 April and continued into May. The month of

5

 (1) Memo, MacArthur, CmlO FUSAG, for Brig Gen James E. Wharton, ACofS G-1 FUSAG, 25

Mar 44. (2) CM-OUT 1365 3 Feb 44. 6

 The only other mortar battalions activated overseas were the 99th and 100th , converted from

antiaircraft artillery units in Italy, and the 98th converted from a tank destroyer battalion on New

Guinea. 7

 Unless otherwise noted, the unit material in this chapter has been taken from the histories, journals,

and after action reports of the several mortar battalions.
462 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

May also saw the battalion undergo a two-and-a-half-week period of

intensive training while attached to a field artillery group. There was

no time for amphibious training before the invasion, and as a consequence the 92d did not participate in the initial landings. Nor did

the 86th Battalion receive assault training in time for D-day activity.

The 81st Battalion was the chemical unit most adequately prepared

for the D-day operation. It had trained at the amphibious center at

Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla., before leaving the United States. From

December 1943 until the following April it participated in intensive

exercises at the Assault Training Center in Devonshire and in other

maneuvers along the western and southern coasts of England. The

87th Battalion was also well prepared for the invasion; thoroughly

trained in the United States, it took part in two amphibious exercises

in England that spring. The latter training had indicated that the

increased problems in communications and supply in amphibious operations made greater demands on unit personnel. (Battalion commanders

already were finding that the reduced complement of men in the

new TOE was inadequate to keep forty-eight mortars in action even

in normal operations.) Consequently, each of the two mortar battalions earmarked for the invasion was temporarily fattened by 125-

man detachments from two chemical processing companies.

The Normandy Campaign

The 81st and 87th Chemical Mortar Battalions landed in Normandy

early on D-day in support of the V and VII Corps, respectively, on

OMAHA and UTAH Beaches. Companies A and C of the 81st were

attached to battalions of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division, and Companies B and D landed with battalions of the 116th Infantry, 29th

Division. As it approached the shore, the landing craft carrying the

forward battalion group received heavy shelling which killed a sergeant

and seriously wounded the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Thomas H.

James. Without benefit of engine or rudder the craft drifted aimlessly

until currents providentially beached it at a protected spot along the

shore.

Company A, landing at H plus 50, lost some of its equipment in the

heavy seas. Even worse, Capt. Thomas P. Moundres, its commander,

was mortally wounded before reaching the beach. The senior lieutenant

assumed command and succeeded in getting the platoons into firing
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 463

SMOKE SCREEN DURING THE OMAHA BEACH LANDINGS

positions. First day missions included a smoke screen for advancing

infantry and the destruction of an enemy machine gun. Company C

did not land until midafternoon because the infantrymen in preceding

waves were pinned down on the edge of the beach. The unit finally

got ashore at 1500 and made its way to positions about 200 yards

inland. It received no requests for supporting fire.

The four LCVP's carrying Company B were unable to find a route

through the heavy obstacles in their assigned sector, and two of these

vessels were disabled by artillery fire as they headed toward another

landing area. Despite a heavy sea and enemy opposition, all troops and

equipment aboard the stricken craft were transferred to an empty

LCT. Company D landed between H plus 50 and H plus 60, but its

commander, Capt. Philip J. Gaffney, was killed when his landing craft

struck a mine. Before finding an outlet off the dangerous strip of beach

the unit changed its position three times and fired one mission. Night

found the mortars dug in at St. Laurent-sur-Mer. Thus, on 6 June
464 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

CHEMICAL MORTARS AT UTAH BEACH

1944 3 officers of the 81st were killed and 2 others, including the

battalion commander, were seriously wounded. One company lost its

total complement of transportation while each of the other three companies lost two vehicles.

Trouble developed on D plus 1 as enemy snipers allowed leading

infantry elements to pass through, firing on units which followed.

To meet this threat the battalion formed details to wipe out the sniper

nests. The mortarmen learned another trick of combat during these

early days in Normandy. The enemy, having retreated from the area

in which American mortars were to be set up, had marked on its firing

charts all logical positions for these weapons. The men of the 81st

soon found it was best to avoid reverse slopes and similar accepted

mortar sites in favor of unconventional open terrain.

The 87th Chemical Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. James H.

Batte, was attached to VII Corps in the D-day assault of UTAH Beach.

Three of the firing companies supported the three battalions of the
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 465

8th Infantry, 4th Division, and the fourth company supported a

battalion of the 22d Infantry of the same division. Forward observers

of the mortar companies landed with the initial waves of infantry,

and the units themselves came in at H plus 50. Shortly after landing,

the battalion fired 140 rounds and then followed the infantry in moving

off the beach. For almost six hours the 4.2-inch mortars were the only

ground weapons capable of delivering heavy fire support.8 Targets

during the first twenty-four hours of action were enemy machine gun

emplacements, concrete emplacements, and pillboxes.

Quinville Ridge, some ten miles northwest of UTAH Beach and a

D-day objective for VII Corps, was not taken until 14 June. The

companies of the 87th Battalion supported the 4th Division in the

fight for this objective, expending 16,870 rounds and suffering 36

casualties in the process. The mortar units continued in support of

the 4th Division as it drove north to Cherbourg. On 23 June Company

C fired a spectacular rolling barrage in support of a battalion attack

which prompted Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt to telephone his congratulations back to the mortar positions.9

The attack on Cherbourg included several other noteworthy 4.2-inch

mortar missions. On 23 June Company A blended its fire so that white

phosphorus showered German troops just routed from their positions

by high explosives. That evening twenty men from Company D fought

as infantry troops while the rest of the unit delivered heavy fire against

an enemy counterattack. On 24 June the mortars of Company B

successfully dueled with German artillery, assumed to be 88-mm.

guns, which had been shelling an American regimental command post.

On the same day, Company C aided in repelling a vigorous enemy

counterattack by getting off 300 rounds before the division artillery

could come into action. Expressing his view that the two mortar

companies with his division had materially aided the success of the

advance, Col. Kramer Thomas, chief of staff of the 79th Division,

emphasized an inherent characteristic of the mortars—that of quick

response to a given mission. On several occasions, he stated, the chemical

mortars, because of the rapidity with which they went into action and

the availability of ammunition at gun positions, were the only artillerytype support available.10

8

 87th Cml Bn Journal, 6 Jun 44. 9

 87th Cml Bn Opns Rpt, 6-15 Jul 44. 10

 87th Cml Bn Journal, From D Day to D plus 20.
466 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

After the fall of the port of Cherbourg half of the battalion supported the 9th Division during the several days required to mop up

the Cap de la Hague. By 1 July, when this operation ended, the 87th

Battalion had been in continuous combat for twenty-five days. Nineteen man had been killed and 75 had been wounded; battalion ammunition expenditures totaled 19,129 rounds of HE and 11,899 rounds of

white phosphorus.

The nature of the fighting in Normandy was determined by the

predominant feature of the Norman terrain, the hedgerow. As described by Colonel MacArthur, Chemical Officer, 12th Army Group:

"The country is gently rolling grazing land, consisting of rectangular

grass fields generally about 100 yards deep in the direction of our

advance and 150 to 200 yards wide." The colonel stated that these

hedgerows were actually earth walls about four feet high surmounted

with bushes and dotted with small trees. They were natural obstacles

which could be put to excellent use in warfare, and the enemy fully

exploited their defensive possibilities. Machine gun emplacements were

located at the corners of hedgerows, and their lengths bristled with

machine pistols, rifles, and antitank weapons. Mines with trip wires

sometimes supplemented the already imposing defenses. Naturally, an

advance over this ground was as slow as it was dangerous; units measured their progress by hedgerows, not miles. This was a form of

position warfare with bocage replacing the traditional role of trenches.11

The terrain was particularly dangerous for mortar forward observers, a fact emphasized by the following notation from the journal

of the 87th Battalion for 13 July 1944: "Scarcely a day passes that

some one, if not all the forward observer party, are either wounded

or killed. Yet, all officers of this battalion operate as forward observers

and there are always volunteers among the men."

The 86th Battalion arrived in Normandy on 29 June. Attached to

First Army, the companies of this unit initially supported elements of

the 90th Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions. Company B was an

exception. The ship which was taking this unit across the Channel

sank after either striking a mine or being struck by a torpedo. One

man was listed as missing and 26 were injured; most of the equipment

was lost. Refitted in England, the unit rejoined the 86th on 18 July.

11

 Memo, MacArthur for ACofS G-3 Hq 12th Army Group, 28 Jul 44, p. 2. CWS 314.7 Unit Files.

CMLHO.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 467

Although created for combat support, chemical mortar battalions

found themselves at times in something other than a supporting role.

The experience of Company A of the 86th on the night of 6-7 July

is a case in point. One of its platoons was firing for a battalion of the

359th Infantry; another was in the immediate vicinity. Wire connected the mortar company with the infantry battalion. The mortar

company liaison officer at the forward infantry observation post reported that the situation there was uncertain and appeared to be

getting out of control. An urgent mission, requested by an adjacent

battalion, prompted the mortar company commander to withdraw

his security element and send it for more ammunition. Although three

infantry companies were thought to be in front of the mortars, enemy

machine gun fire suddenly pierced the air above the mortar crews.

The mortar company commander called the infantry battalion but

could get no definite word about the situation. The infantry battalion

agreed that a mortar barrage would probably help, and the two platoons

fired at a range of 700 yards. When the machine gun fire crept closer,

the commander again tried to contact the infantry command post.

Finding it had moved, he ordered one of his platoons to withdraw, a

maneuver accomplished with difficulty because of the heat of the

barrels and the firm emplacement of the base plates. Soon the mortar

positions were swept by enemy machine gun fire and the other platoon

received the march order. As the company withdrew, 5 men fell into

enemy hands, escaping when the Germans were driven off by the company's sole remaining .50-caliber machine gun. The next morning all

equipment was recovered with the exception of one destroyed jeep.12

Although not involved in D-day operations, the 92d Chemical Battalion soon participated in the Normandy fighting. Attached to XIX

Corps and supporting the 30th Division, the unit first saw action in

the opening days of July along the Vire River. On 8 July the 92d

supported the 29th Division which was spearheading the XIX Corps

drive on the centers of German resistance around St. Lo. This and one

other attack proved unsuccessful; fourteen days and two attachments

later the battalion was poised for the breakthrough operation.

COBRA, the offensive to break out of Normandy, began on 25 July.

The VII Corps, with three divisions abreast, led the attack. Companies

A and B, 92d Battalion, were firing preparatory missions in support

12

 86th Cml Bn AAR, 1 Jul-31 Jul 44, pp. 5-6.
468 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

of units of the 30th Division when Allied heavy bombers droned in

to soften German resistance. To the dismay of the American troops,

about 3 5 of the planes dropped their bomb loads within friendly lines.13

Nearly 200 bombs fell in the 92d Battalion area alone. Lt. Gen. Lesley

J. McNair, Army Ground Forces commander, was instantly killed

while observing the action from a point just in front of Company A.

Battalion losses were 5 dead and 23 wounded. Company A lost 9 mortars, half of its ammunition, and all of its vehicles. Company B fared

better, managing to salvage 8 of its 12 mortars. On the following day

Company C relieved Company A and the latter unit drew back to

reorganize; three days later Company A, in turn, relieved Company B.

By 3 August all units returned to the battalion area for rest and

refitting.

Operational Problems

Despite the complaints heard throughout the Normandy Campaign

about the lack of trained mortar battalion replacements, there was no

over-all shortage of CWS officers in the European theater. Colonel

St. John, Chemical Adviser, G-3, SHAEF, reported in June 1944 that

so many CWS officers were in the theater that they were "sitting in

each other's laps and standing on each other's feet."

 14

The root of the trouble was the existence of two distinct types of

CWS officers, technical and combat, whose roles were usually not interchangeable. Misassignment not only resulted in a waste of talent but

usually in a substandard performance. An officer whose training and

background fitted him for a chemical laboratory assignment probably

made a poor mortar platoon leader. Because these facts were understood neither by the Ground Forces Replacement Command in England,

nor by the personnel officers of the higher commands, it was not

unusual for trained mortar officers to find themselves in depots or in

branch immaterial positions, while the mortar battalions had to settle

for unqualified replacements.15

This situation was verified by the commander of one of the mortar

units which saw action in Normandy. Colonel Batte reported that

during the course of one week in the latter part of June he received

13

 Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, pp. 231-34. 14

 Rpt, St. John for CCWS, 28 Jun 44. 15

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 24 Feb 45, no sub. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, ETO.

(3) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 469

two CWS officers and one infantry officer as battalion replacements.

Batte stated: "The two CWS officers admitted they had never so much

as touched a mortar in their entire army experience; before entering

OCS they were in the Medical Corps. The greater part of their service

in CWS after finishing OCS had been in pools and at the Military

Police Training Center, Ft. Custer, Mich."

 16

 The accuracy of these

comments made by graduates of the CWS officer candidate school

might be open to question, since the OCS curriculum included fifty

hours of 4.2-inch mortar training.17 But whatever the explanation,

these men were not psychologically prepared to enter combat.18

They probably lacked technical proficiency, as well, for the Chemical

Warfare School came to consider fifty hours as an inadequate period

of mortar training, and in the summer of 1943 inaugurated a Battalion

Officers Course, with the specific purpose of producing qualified mortar

battalion officers. Because the battalions in combat were not receiving

these officers as replacements, Colonel Batte had been requesting and

usually getting infantrymen.19 Similar problems were encountered

with enlisted men. Lt. Col. William B. Hamilton, commanding the

86th Battalion, stated that the replacements received by his unit were

not trained CWS mortarmen but were "basics from the infantry or

most any other branch."

 20

Efforts were made to overcome the lack of suitable mortar battalion

replacements. General Rowan established a Chemical Training Battalion in England which began operations in August 1944. Until its

termination in October 1944 this unit, which doubled as a replacement

organization, trained 125 officers and 700 enlisted men for assignment

with mortar battalions. This fine record was in part vitiated by two

factors: the heavy demands permitted only a fraction of these troops

to receive all of the prescribed three weeks of training, and despite

16

 Memo, Batte to Porter, 26 Jun 44. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, ETO. 17

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. XV. 18

 Colonel Batte had some first lieutenants who actually broke down and cried at the prospect of being

sent into battle. Ltr, Batte to CMLHO, 28 Jul 60.

19

 Memo, Rowan, no addressee, 26 Aug 44, sub: Notes on Trip to Far Shore, in Ltr, Rowan to

Waitt, 2 Sep 44. 20

 Ltr, CO 86th Cml Bn to CCWS, 18 Jul 44, sub: Employ of Cml Combat Bn.
470 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

all precautions these men continued to become lost in the Ground

Forces Replacement Command.21

The personnel situation remained critical throughout the winter of

1944-45. December found the mortar battalions in the 12th Army

Group understrength by twenty-five officers and the theater replacement center seemingly devoid of qualified chemical mortar officers.22

The 92d Battalion, earlier unaffected by replacement problems, now

reported that "trained officer and enlisted replacements have been unavailable and consequently a continuous training program has been

found necessary."

 23

An urgent message from the theater to the War Department in

February 1945 called attention to the need for chemical mortar

officers. Within the theater further steps were taken to rectify the

replacement situation. All CWS officers assigned outside the service

had been located and a number of them were now serving in their

proper capacities. Also, the willingness of the Ground Forces Replacement Command to work with the informal advice of General Rowan's

office lessened greatly the chance of misassignment of officers.24

A personnel problem of a different sort had existed even before the

battalions entered combat. The revised table of organization of September 1943, it will be recalled, reduced the battalion strength from

1,010 to 622. Battalion commanders were of the opinion that this

number was below that required to man, supply, and provide communications for the forty-eight mortars within the unit. Although

there was disagreement as to the composition of an appropriate table

of organization, all of the commanders considered the 6-man squad

too small to keep a mortar in action. A popular remedy was to withdraw several mortars and reinforce the remaining squads with the

men thus freed. Lt. Col. Ronald LeV. Martin took more drastic

measures with the 92d Battalion. He received permission to eliminate

one of the four companies of his unit, thus anticipating the revised

21

 (1) Ltr, Maj Otis P. Gray to CCmlO ETOUSA, 15 Jan 45, sub: Rpt on Cml Training Bn, Incl

to History of Plans and Tng Div Cml Sec ETOUSA, 6 Jun 44-9 May 45. Admin File 545B, Hq

ETO, WW II Div NA. (2) Memo, St. John for Comdt Cml Warfare School, 21 Sep 44. (3) Ltr,

Rowan to Waitt, 22 Dec 44, no sub. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, ETOUSA. 22

 Ltr, CmlO 12th Army Group to CCWS, 11 Dec 44, no sub. 23

 92d Cml Bn AAR, Dec 44. 24

 (1) CM-IN 22090, 22 Feb 45. (2) Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 24 Feb 45, no sub. CWS 314.7

Personal Ltr files, ETO.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 471

table of organization which was to become effective in the fall of

1944.25

Another difficulty which emerged in Normandy involved the tactical

employment of chemical mortar units, or more precisely, the matter

of mortar battalion control. The resulting controversy provoked two

schools of thought, one holding that mortar units should be directly

responsible to the infantry which they supported, the other maintaining

that they should operate under artillery control. Influential in this

dispute was the background and training of the participants. The

commander of the 92d, for example, had been a field artillery officer

until transferring to the CWS; moreover, the last training phase of

his unit had been supervised by the artillery officer of the corps to

which the battalion was attached. It was not strange that this battalion

commander became a leading exponent of the artillery control school.

One of the main benefits of the artillery control system was the

efficiency with which the battalion could operate as a unit. In defensive

situations mortar fire could be readily massed, and the unit's fire could

be effectively integrated with that of the artillery. In the European

theater, however, the limited number of mortar battalions generally

precluded the maintenance of battalion integrity.26

Most of those concerned, CWS and otherwise, favored the close

infantry support method. This fact was confirmed in a CWS theater

of operations letter which stated that although applicable artillery

techniques and practices should be used, the normal role of the chemical battalion "should be considered as part of the Infantry team ...

furnishing close support with a heavy and powerful mortar."

 27

The Drive Toward Germany

The Fall of Aachen

After the breakout at Avranches, the Allied advance to the east

sharply accelerated. The tactical value of the 4.2-inch mortar usually

decreased in fast-moving situations, and such was the case during most

25

 (1) Brig. Gen. Hugh W. Rowan, "Mortars in Normandy," Chemical Warfare Bulletin (JanuaryFebruary, 1945). (2) 92d Bn History. 26

 (1) Rowan, "Mortars in Normandy," Chemical Warfare Bulletin (January-February, 1945). (2)

Memo, CCmlO 12th Army Group for G-3 12th Army Group, 28 Jul 44. CWS 314.7 (3) Rowan

Interv, 26 Sep 58. 27

 (1) CWS TofO Ltr No. 18, 14 Sep 44, p. 3. (2) This view was substantiated by a postwar

study in chemical mortar battalions by the General Board, U.S. Forces European Theater.
472 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

of the campaign in northern France. Although there were periods of

intense action, most of the mortar battalions enjoyed a breathing spell.

Some battalions temporarily acted as trucking units to help ease logistical problems which accompany any army in rapid movement. Time

was available for rest, rehabilitation, and training, as well as for the

opportunity to enjoy the enthusiastic reception of the liberated French

people. It was a well-deserved respite coming between two taxing

campaigns.

The American forces first came into contact with the Siegfried Line

in September 1944. At that time there were still only four chemical

battalions assigned to the 12th Army Group, an insignificant number

for such a formidable force. And the stiffening enemy bore little resemblance to the German troops who had recently fled across northern

France. First Army, lacking the logistical support it had recently enjoyed, began a series of limited probes against the German defenses.

The objective of one of these attacks was Aachen.

The 92d and 87th Chemical Mortar Battalions supported First Army

in this difficult operation which took the form of a double envelopment.

The 92d Battalion fired for the 30th Division in the XIX Corps drive

to the north, and the 87th supported elements of VII Corps in the

southern sector.

The attack on Aachen, set for September, was delayed by the wet,

miserable weather until early October. During the ensuing lull the

92d improved its gun positions, perfected plans for prearranged missions, and fired a number of probing missions. Finally, on 2 October,

the 30th Division attacked the Siegfried Line in the direction of

Ubach, Germany. In preparation for the assault the 92d Battalion

placed a destructive barrage upon wire barriers of concertinas and

double aprons which lay in the route of advance of two infantry regiments. Over 1,200 high-explosive shells fell in these two areas whose

combined size measured 1,700 by 300 yards, cutting broad swaths

through the obstacles. The mortars then kept a rolling barrage 150

yards ahead of the advancing troops. Subsequent missions included

those of interdiction, harassment, general support, and smoke screens

on the flanks to hamper enemy observation. Targets of opportunity

were numerous. One forward observer used mortar fire to chase a

German weapons platoon into a pillbox and then adjusted 8-inch

artillery fire to bring about the destruction of the concrete fortification.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 473

The battalion expended 25,000 rounds of ammunition and suffered

30 casualties in the Aachen operation, which ended with the fall of

the city on 23 October.28

The 87th Battalion supported the 1st and 9th Divisions in the lower

jaw of the pincers attack against Aachen. Frequent re-emplacements

of the mortars resulted because of the soft, wet ground, a condition

which also contributed to the heavy breakage of parts. Missions of

interdiction were frequent; tanks, personnel, machine guns, and mortars were targets of opportunity for the 4.2-inch weapons. White

phosphorus effectively screened observation from the formidable enemy

positions which protected Aachen. Later, mortar fire was placed upon

the enemy's vigorous counterattacks as he attempted to fight out of

the beleaguered city. Against one counterattack on 16 October Company B disabled 2 tanks, knocked out 1 self-propelled gun, and killed

between 70 and 80 of the enemy. The captain of the infantry company

thus aided declared that the mortar support prevented the enemy from

overrunning his unit. Against another counterattack the chemical

mortars fired white phosphorus shells behind the supporting enemy

tanks, silhouetting them for the benefit of American tank destroyers.

One German tank was knocked out, two others were damaged, and

the rest withdrew. Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, commanding the

1st Division, praised the chemical mortars for the part they played in

stopping these counterattacks.29

The 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion at Metz

While assigned to the First Army, the 81st Battalion crossed northeastern France into Belgium and Luxembourg, and in September got

its first taste of fighting among the fortifications of the Siegfried Line.

Here it learned that while the prepared concrete and steel positions were

impervious to mortar shell, smoke did prove effective in preventing

observation from these strongpoints.30

28

 (1) 92d Cml Mortar Bn, History, 1944. (2) History of 30th Inf Div Arty, 1-31 Oct 44. (3)

Col. Ronald L. Martin, "92d Chemical Mortar Battalion History," Armed Forces Chemical Journal

(October, 1951). 29

 87th Cml Bn Rcd of Events, pp. 87, 91. 30

 (1) The Eighty-First Chemical Mortar Battalion (booklet, 1945), pp. 44-51. (2) 12th Army

Group, Battle Experiences No. 88, 9 Nov 44. White phosphorus shell, apart from its utility as a

screening agent, sometimes had a psychological effect when used against enemy fortifications. The

crew of at least one enemy pillbox, for example, surrendered when one of its members, seeing the WP

smoke, called out, "Gas!"
474 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

In mid-September the battalion was reassigned to the Third Army,

also recently halted by logistical difficulties. Lt. Gen. George S. Patton

ordered a series of limited operations which would place his forces in

a more favorable position once the drive to the Rhine was resumed.

Attached to XX Corps, the 81st Battalion was in the vicinity of Metz,

preparing to support the 5th and 90th Divisions in attacks against

Fort Driant and Maizieres-les-Metz, an industrial town located north

of the city.31

The first attempt against Fort Driant was made on 27 September by

the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, 5th Division. This hurriedly planned

attack proved abortive, primarily because the strength of the objective

was not fully appreciated. Located on the dominant height in the area

south of Metz, Fort Driant was one of the most important elements

of the fortifications which encircled the city. It consisted of four

casemates and a central fort whose concrete walls were 7 feet thick

and whose various components were connected by a labyrinth of underground tunnels. Wire obstacles and a dry moat, 60 feet wide and 30

feet deep, surrounded the over-all complex.

The infantry battalion attacked the fort under a pall of smoke which

Company D, 81st Battalion, placed on the installation and on the

observation posts behind it. By late afternoon the futility of the attack

was fully revealed, and the infantry troops were ordered to withdraw.

Plans were immediately made by the division commander for a more

systematic attack on the fortification.

Company D was to remain in support of the 11th Infantry, but its

attachment was changed from the regiment itself to the supporting

19th Field Artillery Battalion. From positions two miles north of the

town of Onville, the mortars began to register on targets in the Fort

Driant area in preparation for the coming attack. Occasionally, other

missions were fired. Targets of opportunity included mortar and

machine gun positions and harassing rounds were placed on the road

network. In turn, the mortar positions were subjected to sporadic

but effective enemy artillery fire.

On the evening of 2 October Capt. Arthur R. Marshall, the company

commander, attended several conferences with artillery officers to

settle certain details of the attack. Late that night two 21⁄2-ton trucks

31

 Cole, Lorraine Campaign, pp. 257-75. This volume contains an excellent description of the Fort

Driant action.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 475

brought an extra 866 rounds of white phosphorus to a forward position

where they were met by jeeps and trailers from the company. A

platoon from Company C was attached to Company D for the operation.

A great deal more planning went into the 3 October attack on Fort

Driant, again made by the 2d Battalion, 11th Regiment, than was

given to the one a week earlier. Tankdozers were called on to fill in

portions of the encircling moat, and "snakes"—long pipes filled with

explosives—were brought forward to be used against the wire obstacles

in front of the fort. Again, fighter bombers attacked the fort and

corps and division artillery battered its concrete defenses. More mortar

smoke was used than in the earlier attack.

H-hour for the second Fort Driant attack was 1100. Company D

and its attached platoon immediately began the smoke screen in order

to prevent enemy observation of the assault. An irregular 15-mile-anhour wind made this an extremely difficult mission. At times four

distinct screens had to be maintained in order to achieve the proper

placement of smoke. Company D continued the screen for five and

one half hours, expending 1,600 rounds of white phosphorus ammunition. Despite these well-laid plans the infantry had but limited success.

One company did reach positions within the fort, but the enemy

reacted strongly, making reinforcement impossible. Again on 11

October Company D's mortars maintained a 7-hour, 1,400-yard smoke

screen, this time with 1,975 rounds of white phosphorus. Elements of

the 11th Infantry fought on and around Fort Driant until the night

of 12-13 October, when a decision was reached to withdraw. No other

large screens were required in the ensuing days although target of

opportunity and harassment missions were frequent.

The high-explosive shell fired by the mortar company proved just

as ineffective against the fortifications around Metz as it had against

Siegfried Line installation at Aachen. This result was not surprising;

500 and 1,000-pound aerial bombs also bounced harmlessly off the

concrete and steel of the fortifications.32

One of the handicaps under which the 81st Battalion operated in

front of Fort Driant was the high incidence of mortar breakage. Not

only did the weaker parts of the mortar (the recoil slides and elevating

screws) give way, but the sturdier components (the base plates and the

32

 81st Bn, Metz Campaign, 18 Sep-21 Nov 44.
476 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

standards) as well. During the afternoon of 5 October, for example,

the breakage became so severe that only one mortar per platoon was

available for firing. On that day 10 base plates, 6 standards, 1 barrel,

1 elevating screw, and 1 collar were damaged. Blame for this equipment failure was attributed to the extreme range at which missions

were fired and to the mixed rock and shale in which the base plates

were emplaced, resulting in uneven pressures and a consequent shearing

effect.33

Meanwhile, Company A of the 81st Battalion supported the 35th

Infantry, 90th Division, in an attack on Maizieres-les-Metz. The mortars laid smoke to screen friendly attacks and to cloud enemy observation while mine fields were being removed. Other missions included

those of interdiction and targets of opportunity.

The operation against the town proceeded slowly. At one point the

infantry was content to use the situation as a realistic training ground,

each day setting up platoon and squad attack problems against a house

or two.34 Company A accomplished an extraordinary mission during

the house-to-house fighting. When an infantry battalion was held

up by a single enemy machine gun, the battalion commander, located

in a cellar across the street from the enemy position, called for 4.2-inch

mortar fire. Company A adjusted a single mortar on the machine gun;

its fourth or fifth round landed directly on the sill of the second story

window from which the enemy weapon was firing.35

Maizieres-les-Metz fell on 30 October, and the all-out drive on the

city of Metz began early in November. As at Aachen, the attack took

the form of a double envelopment, each arm of which was supported

by companies of the 81st Battalion. In this operation Company C

found itself attached to Team Cherry of the 10t h Armored Division,

a most unusual arrangement. During the initial stages of the attachment mine fields and roadblocks kept the advance at a relatively slow

pace, and the mortar company was able to assume its normal role.

But as the pace quickened, the problems of the supporting unit increased. In order to insure constant support, the two mortar platoons

leapfrogged forward, one of them ready to fire while the other advanced

to the next appropriate position. A liaison officer stayed with the team

commander to insure prompt response to any calls for fire. This leap33

 (1) Co A 81st Bn War Diary, 1-7 Oct 44. (2) 81st Bn, Hist Rpt, 24-30 Sep 44. 34

 Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p. 278. 35

 Memo for Rcd, Maj James H. Watts, 5 Mar 52.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 477

frogging technique was abandoned when Team Cherry split in two,

and a platoon joined each of the new elements.

This employment of a mortar unit in support of an armored team

was not altogether satisfactory. The battalion commander, Lt. Col.

Jack W. Lipphardt, questioned the practice, calling attention to the

difficulties of replacing mortar parts and of resupplying ammunition

in fast-moving situations and to the relative vulnerability of mortar

equipment.36 As the battalion operations officer, who accompanied

Company C during this attachment, put it: "The mortar is a close

support weapon for the doughboy and is of much more value to the

infantry regiment than to a combat command."

 37

In support of the entire Metz operation the 81st Chemical Battalion

fired 51,118 rounds of ammunition. During part of the time a shortage

of artillery shell enhanced the role of the 4.2-inch mortar.38

Mortar Parts and Their Maintenance

Maintenance of the 4.2-inch mortar, which became such a grave

problem during the autumn fighting along the Siegfried Line, had

bothered battalion commanders since the Normandy landing. In the

early days of fighting in France the chemical mortar assumed an important role as a primary means of heavy weapon support. Missions

were fired from undesirable positions at ranges far in excess of the

4,500 yards for which the mortar was designed, a circumstance which

contributed in a large way to mortar part breakage.

The 87th Chemical Battalion, during its first twenty days in Normandy, for example, expended 114 complete sets of springs and bent

100 elevating screws beyond repair.39 The failure of the springs was

not entirely the result of equipment fatigue and firing at excessive

ranges. According to Colonel Batte the difficulties experienced with

the mortar springs were "due to faulty and inferior material and

workmanship." New springs were known to stay contracted an inch

or so under normal length after only five or six rounds had been fired.

This weakness compounded the over-all vulnerability of the mortar,

36

 81st Bn, Hist Rpt, 5-11 Nov 44. 37

 Co C 81st Cml B, Metz Campaign, 18 Sep-21 Nov 44. 38

 (1) The Eighty-First Chemical Mortar Battalion, p. 60. (2) 81st Bn Hist Rpt, 5-11 Nov 44. 39

 Ltr, Batte to CG First Army, 25 Jun 44, sub: Replacement of Parts for 4.2-inch Mortar. CWS

314.7 Personal Ltr files, ETO.
478 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

for other parts—shock absorber slides, elevating screws, and even

standards—suffered when springs functioned improperly.40 The situation was greatly alleviated when the CWS devised new and stronger

rectangular springs.41

Mortar breakage was not confined to Normandy but continued

through the campaigns of northern France and the Rhineland. A

number of circumstances accounted for such breakage. For one thing,

in the fast-moving fighting across northern France, which was more

in the nature of pursuit than combat, mortars were almost always

called on to perform at excessive ranges.42 Another factor was the

emplacement of weapons in soft ground, a situation which plagued

the 86th Battalion, in September and October. In some cases, the

mortar crews of the 86th, after firing only two or three rounds, had

to dig through the mud to the base plate and haul it out with a jeep.43

A similar problem was the presence of hard shale rock in the soft clay

which provided uneven support for the base plate and produced a

shearing effect. The 81st Battalion particularly experienced this difficulty. But as the damage was much less frequent with the new mortar

than with the old, part of the weapon mortality must have resulted

from equipment fatigue.44

As mortar parts continued to break, battalion commanders began

to criticize the design and construction of the weapon, claiming that

it should be able to withstand the rigors of combat without an extraordinary amount of repairs and replacement.45

 They were especially

critical of the construction of the base plate. The standard base plate

weighed 150 pounds, a heavy item when carried by hand. In the

European theater where hand-carry was at a minimum (the weapons

and ammunition were usually conveyed by jeep trailer) it would have

been practicable to have a heavier base plate if the additional weight

would have added to its strength.

Upon the recommendation of Colonel Batte of the 87th Battalion

steps were taken to devise such a base plate. One model, constructed

40

 (1) Ibid. (2) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58. 41

 (1) Ltr, Waitt to CCWS ETOUSA, 14 Aug 44. (2) Memo, Col Harry A. Kuhn for CG ASF,

7 Aug 44, sub: G-4 Per Report ETO, Quarter Ending 30 Jun 44. CWS 319.1. (3) 81st Cml Bn

AAR, 4 Nov 44 (for Oct 44), p. 4. 42

 81st Cml Bn Hist Rpt, 30 Jul-5 Aug, 13-19 Aug, 10-16 Sep 44. 43

 86th Cml Bn Hist, 11 Oct 44. 44

 81st Cml Bn Hist Rpt, 1-7 Oct 44. 45

 (1) Ltr, CCmlO ETO to CCWS, 21 Feb 45, sub: Bn Comdrs' Comments on the Cml Mortar Bn

and Its Equip. (2) 92d Cml Bn AAR, Dec 44, Battle Lessons and Conclusions.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 479

in a Belgian steel mill, weighed 275 pounds and was 7 inches longer

and broader than the standard item. Several were issued to mortar

units of the First Army, where the reaction among the crews was

favorable. The use of this base plate resulted in fewer re-emplacements,

in better accuracy, and in less damage to other parts of the mortar.

Modifications were also made in the tie rod. Instead of welding this

part to the standard, it was secured by a loop, nut, and belt arrangement which, by allowing greater flexibility, resulted in less breakage.46

Manufacture of the base plate in Europe resulted from a search for

improvement, but other parts were produced there for the specific

purpose of relieving shortages.47 Among these items were cup forks,

elevating and traversing screws, connector rods, standards, base and

tube caps, shock absorber and traversing slides, and spring guides.

Unfortunately, no manufacturers could be found for the most critical

mortar part, the spring.48 The Seventh Army also made spare parts

for CWS equipment, preventing at one time, at least, a crisis in the

resupply of certain items. This work took place at Épinal at an army

maintenance installation which used the students and facilities of a

former vocational school.49

The shortage of mortar spare parts harassed battalion commanders

from the early days of the Normandy fighting and remained unsolved

throughout most of the European operations. The solution of this

problem was a primary mission of a CWS spare parts team which

visited the Continent during the winter of 1944-45. In its final report

the Spare Parts Team praised the work done by the chemical maintenance companies on the component parts of the mortar. With ingenuity and versatility these companies improvised, cannibalized, and

even manufactured sufficient spare parts to permit the continued

46

 (1) Ltr, CmlO First Army to CCWS, 11 May 45. (2) Ltr, CmlO First Army to CCmlO

ETOUSA, 1 May 45, sub: Shipment of Strengthened ADSEC COMZ 4.2" Cml Mortar Baseplates to

Edgewood Arsenal for Test. (3) Memo, Batte for Hist Off, 4 Apr 52. 47

 (1) Memo, Capt Robert O. Myers for CmlO Seventh Army, 17 Jan 45. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Ingalls

S. Bradley, Deputy CWO ADSEC COMZ to CCWO ETOUSA, 9 Jan 45, sub: Procurement of Spare

Parts for 4.2-inch Cml Mortar. (3) One of the plants at which mortars were produced was located

about twenty-five miles north of Namur, Belgium. Full advantage was taken of local skilled labor

and the mass production facilities of the plant. Ltr, CO 11th Cml Maint Co to CmlO Seventh Army,

16 Feb 45. 48

 (1) OCCWS, Final Rpt, Spare Parts Team in MTO and ETO, pp 108-09. CMLHO. (a)

Ltr, Bradley to CCWS ETOUSA, 9 Jan 45, sub: Procurement of Spare Parts for 4.2-inch Cml Mortars. (3) Rowan, panel comments. 49

 Seventh Army Cml Sec Hist Rpt, 1-31 Dec 44.
480 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

PREPARING A 4.2-lNCH MORTAR

SHELL FOR FIRING, Ardennes counteroffensive.

operation of the mortar battalions.50

 Despite occasional criticism

about the distance between the

mortar battalions and the maintenance companies,51

 effective liaison was generally maintained between these units. Seventh Army

insured prompt maintenance by

the unprecedented device of attaching 17-man detachments of

the chemical maintenance companies directly to the mortar battalions under army control. The

rest of these companies were responsible for the maintenance of

other chemical equipment, as well

as of mortar carts and ammunition, and for fourth and fifth

echelon maintenance on the mortars themselves.52

The German Winter Offensive

Progress of the Allied armies, slow and costly during the fall of 1944,

came to a complete halt on 16 December as the Germans launched

their surprise winter offensive through the Ardennes. In one of the

many readjustments hurriedly made to meet the threat of the Bulge,

the 3d Chemical Battalion was shifted from the 6th to the 12th Army

Group.53 There it fought with Third Army's III Corps to relieve the

50

 (1) OCCWS, Final Rpt, CWS Spare Parts Team in the MTO and ETO, p. 11. (2) The 11th

Chemical Maintenance Company (Seventh Army) developed and manufactured a pneumatic shock

absorber which aided in the reduction of breakage of mortar parts. Hist Rpt, Cml Sec Seventh Army,

1-30 Dec 44. 5l

 In November, Lt. Col. Ronald LeV. Martin of the 92d Battalion requested that the maintenance

company be moved farther forward as it took a day to take damaged parts to the rear for repair. The

colonel also considered excessive the length of time taken to make the repairs. Ninth Army Cml Sec,

p. 1, Notes on Visit, 28 Nov 44, by Lt Joel B. Marangella and Capt Cooney. 52

 Ltr, Maj J. J. Heffner, Office of CmlO Seventh Army, to CO 11th Cml Maint Co and CO 12th

Maint Co, 22 Dec 44, sub: Responsibilities of Seventh Army CWS Maintenance Cos. App. A, Hist

Rpt Cml Sec Hqs Seventh Army, 1 Dec-31 Dec 44). 53

 The 2d, 3d, and 83d Chemical Mortar Battalions participated in the Seventh Army invasion of

southern France and eventually were assigned to the 6th Army Group. The 99th Battalion, activated

in Italy, joined the 6th Army Group in December 1944.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 481

encircled forces at Bastogne. Mortar companies initially were attached

to 2 infantry divisions, an armored division, and a cavalry squadron.

During December units of the battalion operated under 2 armies, 2

corps, 6 infantry divisions, and a cavalry group. They expended

17,499 rounds of ammunition and, surprisingly enough, suffered no

casualties.54

Farther to the north the 86th Chemical Battalion supported V Corps

in the First Army sector. There it was touch and go. The enemy had

broken through a neighboring unit and had then cut into the V Corps

sector. German paratroopers landed in the corps rear area intent on

the disruption of communications and the seizure of installations.

86th Battalion headquarters organized eight patrols to comb the area

for these enemy troops. The patrols found no paratroopers, but they

did come across a house with a cache of enemy equipment and weapons.

The rear area of Company D was overrun during the confusion of

the breakthrough, and 14 of its men were listed as missing in action.

Company C of the 86th lay in the direct path of the German drive.

Never had the unit experienced such a critical situation; never had its

efficiency, morale, discipline, and resourcefulness been so tested. Units

which had protected the mortar company suddenly turned to it for

protection. Mortar fire halted enemy advances and covered friendly

movements; mortarmen maintained communications for and with

isolated and threatened units and stayed at their guns while these units

withdrew to safety. One mission fired on 19 December enabled a hardpressed infantry company to withdraw safely from a position that had

become untenable. The mortarmen placed smoke and high-explosive

shell in a narrow gap which separated the infantry unit from the enemy

and continued to fire while all other units passed to the rear. Then

they, themselves, withdrew. At times during this period division artillery, armor, and infantry withdrew under Company C's protective

fire—fire which "was largely responsible for holding up the enemy

advance and almost solely responsible for the safe manner in which

these withdrawals, were effected.55

During the first week of the Ardennes offensive the 86th Battalion

expended 7,380 rounds of ammunition. However, the service given

by the battalion could not be measured in rounds. Its value during

54

 (1) Hist, Hqs 3d Cml Bn, 25 Dec 44, p. 20. (2) 3d Cml Bn Rpt of Opns, 1-31 Dec 44, p. 2.

Both in 3d Cml Bn History, Dec 44. 55

 86th Cml Bn Hist, 17-23 Dec 44, p. 4.
482 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

those trying days can be appreciated only with the knowledge that the

4.2-inch mortar was an important source of artillery-type fire—fire

which enabled the infantry in its sector to gain some order out of the

chaos caused by the German attack.

During December the mortar battalions began to reorganize under

new tables of organization and equipment. Dated 29 September, the

revised TOE triangularized the battalion by eliminating Company D.

This change had long been advocated by CWS officers, although there

had been a recent move to retain the fourth company as a replacement

and training unit.56 The designation of the three companies was

changed from "weapons" to "mortar." Each had 3 platoons of 4 mortars, or a total of 36 for a battalion; the previous organization provided

for 4 companies, each with 2 platoons of 6 mortars, or a total of 48.

Battalion commanders had long complained of insufficient men; now,

despite the reduction in the number of weapons, battalion strength rose

from 622 to 672. What formerly had been the headquarters detachment with 63 men was changed to a headquarters company with 155.

The inclusion of nine 11⁄2-ton trucks in the new TOE provided a

slight increase in the amount of organic transportation.

All of the chemical mortar battalions (they previously had been

designated "chemical battalions, motorized") did not convert to the

new organization immediately but did so throughout the winter of

1944-45 and the following spring, as they enjoyed an infrequent relief

from front-line activity. The 2d and 92d, for example, converted in

December, the 91st in January, and the 87th in May.

Mortar Shell Malfunctions

The period of the Ardennes counteroffensive saw the start of a series

of mortar shell malfunctions which were to plague the battalions for

most of the winter of 1944-45. These malfunctions were of two types:

barrel bursts, in which the round prematurely exploded within the

barrel; and muzzle bursts, in which the round exploded after leaving

the barrel but still within the vicinity of the mortar emplacement.

In December 1944 ETOUSA impounded several lots of chemical

mortar ammunition suspected of containing faulty shells. Periodically

thereafter, as muzzle and barrel bursts occurred, other ammunition

56

 (1) CM-OUT 19799, 28 Mar 44. (2) CM-OUT 8007, 19 Mar 44. (3) 12th Army Group

Immediate Rpt 39, Batte Interv. (4) St. John, Chemical Opns in France.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 483

was withdrawn from supply channels. By the middle of January 1945

a combined list of restricted ammunition included 90 percent of the

available supply. Sometimes the pressure of the tactical situation forced

the release of suspected ammunition. In these cases the mortar crews

took particular precautions to minimize danger; some chemical mortar

battalions fired their weapons with the use of lanyards and others built

sandbag emplacements along side of the mortars.57

A conference of mortar battalion commanders of both the 12th

and 6th Army Groups was held in January in the office of General

Rowan, with defective 4.2-inch mortar shell as one of the main topics

of discussion. Consensus was that most of the blame for malfunctions

was attributable to the mortar fuze. One solution initiated by Seventh

Army was the substitution of an artillery fuze for the suspected CWS

item. Test firing of shells with this alteration proved successful, and

30,000 of these fuzes were obtained for the conversion of an equal

number of impounded mortar shells. A difference in threads made the

substitution of fuzes no easy job. One big advantage resulted from the

new combination; the artillery fuze included a delayed action setting

(not found in the CWS M3) which had long been sought by chemical

units for use against buildings, pillboxes, and other structures.58

Mortar shell misfires reached a peak in January 1945. In one 10-day

period two mortar battalions attached to First Army experienced a

total of five barrel or muzzle bursts resulting in serious injury to four

men. These accidents happened despite careful checking and the

observance of precautionary measures. One serious result of these

malfunctions was that mortar crews were beginning to show fear of

their weapon.59

Concern for this serious situation in the theater naturally extended

to the Office of the Chief, CWS, in Washington. The few zone of

interior malfunctions had been thoroughly investigated and were

found to have been caused in practically every case by a faulty fuze.

The increase of misfires overseas prompted General Porter in January

1945 to send to Europe an investigating mission headed by General

Bullene. A definite correlation between extreme cold weather and

57

 (1) Seventh Army Cml Sec Hist Rpt, 1-31 Jan 44, 25 Feb 45, p. 4. (2) OCCWS Rpt of Malfunction of the 4.2" Cml Mortar Ammunition, Their Cause, Effect and Measures Taken to Correct

Deficiencies (hereafter cited as Rpt of Malfunctions), 12 Aug 46, VIII, 75. 58

 Seventh Army Cml Sec Hist Rpt, 1-31 Jan 45; 1-28 Feb 45. 59

 Rpt on Malfunctions, VIII, 55.
484 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

malfunctions, particularly barrel bursts, had been established by tests

in the zone of interior. The experience in Europe substantiated these

findings, as there were no more barrel bursts after 29 January when

the cold spell ended. The Bullene mission attributed the muzzle bursts,

which were not related to the temperature, to a series of weaknesses

and defects in the mortar fuze. Corrective measures were recommended

in all cases, some of which had been anticipated by the zone of interior

investigations.

Actually, the over-all malfunction record of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition during World War II was not bad. Of the approximately four

million rounds expended both in training and in combat a total of

63 exploded prematurely, causing the death of 38 and the injury of

127 American soldiers. This averaged 1.58 premature rounds in every

100,000 fired.60

The Final Drive

By the end of January 1945 the Allies had regained the ground lost

during the enemy's Ardennes offensive. In February the 12th Army

Group prepared for attack along the Roer and Sauer Rivers, an attack

whose impetus would carry to the Rhine. This latter obstacle, the

last great defensive barrier for the enemy, was surmounted in March.

After that, victory was but a matter of time.

Much of the fighting of February and March involved river crossings. The Roer, the Erft, the Sauer, the Moselle, the Rhine—these

were the larger rivers which blocked the American forces in their

drive to the east. The chemical mortar battalions, by both smoke and

high explosive missions, provided valuable support in this series of

important operations.

One of the most spectacular smoke operations in Europe involving

chemical mortar battalions was staged in the Third Army sector during

the XII Corps attack across the Sauer and Our Rivers. This attack,

which began on 7 February 1945, was supported by the 91st Chemical

60

 Rpt of Malfunctions, Abstract, pp. I-II. (2) See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, from Laboratory to Field, Chapter XV, for more on mortar shell malfunction.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 485

Mortar Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Roy W. Muth.61 Companies

B and C fired for regiments of the 5th Division; Company D supported

the 417th Infantry, 76th Division, attached to the 5th Division for

the operation; and the two platoons of Company A supported, respectively, the 905th and 314th Field Artillery Battalions of the 80th

Division.

These mortar units moved to positions to the west and south of the

Our-Sauer Rivers line several days before the attack was to begin.62

This movement in itself was difficult. The roads, heavy with traffic in

support of the impending attack, were subject to enemy fire from the

heights east of the rivers. The positions of Company D were in the

town of Echternach on the south bank of the Sauer, an area which

had not been occupied in strength by American forces because the

commanding ground just across the river was studded with pillboxes

of the Siegfried Line. This fact was driven home when the mortar

officers who. reconnoitered Echternach quickly attracted enemy machine gun fire. The company moved into the town, two vehicles at a

time, under the cover of darkness and with chains and reflectors removed from the jeeps and trucks.

Company B, in support of the 10t h Infantry, had less trouble getting

to its attack position despite the traffic-clogged roads leading to the

river. Four hours after receiving march orders on the morning of

5 February, the platoons of the unit traveled ten miles and set up

their mortars in the town of Berdorf. Company C supported the

11th Infantry also from positions near Berdorf. Anticipating heavy

enemy artillery opposition, the unit placed its switchboard and fire

direction centers near the mortars to reduce the expected difficulty in

keeping wire communications intact.

The XII Corps met strong resistance along the Our and the Sauer.

The Germans, ensconced in the strong defenses on the heights on the

east, dominated the valley. The swift-moving rivers were additional

61

 The 91st Battalion was committed to action in December 1944, a month which saw the beginning

of a steady influx of new mortar battalions. By the end of the war the 12th Army Group had a

total of twelve, the number previously decided upon for the European theater. In addition to those

units already mentioned in the text, the following chemical mortar battalions saw action with the

12th Army Group: the 89th, commanded by Lt. Col. Donald E. Yanka; the 90th, Lt. Col. Edgar V. H.

Bell; the 93d, Lt. Col. Jacquard Rothschild; the 94th, Lt. Col Benjamin D. Williams, Jr.; the 95th,

Lt. Col. Earl L. Shepherd; the 96th, Lt. Col. Farleigh E. Smith; and the 97th, Lt. Col. Edwin S. S.

Hays, Jr. The 6th Army Group had four battalions. 62

 The Our River branched off from the Sauer River about ten miles or so below the town of

Echternach, making the two, in effect, a continuous waterway.
486 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

obstacles. Given the excellent German observation and the relative

impregnability of his positions, it is understandable that smoke missions

assumed a great importance in the XII Corps operation.

All four of the companies fired screening missions for the American

attack. The 10t h Infantry found the going exceedingly rough. On

the second day of the attack Company B maintained two major

screens to obscure enemy observation, one parallel to the front and

one perpendicular to it. In addition, one of the platoons successfully

blanketed an enemy observation post and placed fire on several troop

concentrations. In all, 2,357 rounds of WP were fired that day. Operations were impeded by abnormal wind conditions which caused the

smoke to rise vertically, a phenomenon called "pillaring." On the following day the company expended 2,232 rounds of white phosphorus

on a 9-hour smoke screen. At one point the screen was lifted and the

effectiveness of smoke was dramatically demonstrated as enemy artillery

and machine guns opened fire on American troops. The screen was

resumed at once, and the enemy activity abruptly ceased. During the

two days action just described the 1st Platoon alone expended 3,287

rounds of white phosphorus, or roughly 41⁄2 tons.

One platoon of the smoke generator company attached to corps

supported the Echternach crossing. After a short period of operation

the smoke troops claimed that twelve generators were out of order

and their unit commander sent the equipment back to a maintenance

company for repair. There the generators were examined by Colonel

Cottingham who found all but one to be in perfect operating condition.

And the exception was in need of very minor adjustment. Apparently,

the lack of training, discipline, and leadership prompted the smoke

troops to take this action in an effort to be relieved from front-line

duty. At Bollendorf, to the west, smoke generator troops effectively

established a curtain between the crossing site and the high ground to

the northwest from which the Germans had excellent observation.63

Among the problems confronting the 91st Battalion during the

Sauer-Our operation was the dirty ammunition with which the battalion was supplied. During the two days of intense firing reported

above, all available officers and men, from cook to company commander,

63

 (1) Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, p. 140. (2) According to Colonel

Cottingham, XII Corps, after Echternach, requested Third Army to see to it that the smoke company

not be attached to it in future operations until the company had proper training and leadership. Cottingham Interv, 17 Dec 56.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 487

were compelled to assist in cleaning the rounds and preparing them for

firing. Communication was likewise a problem. The wire and radio

communication of a platoon of A Company, for example, was also

used by two engineer units and the medical detachment and heavy

mortar platoon of an infantry battalion. Even the matter of feeding

the men proved difficult. The road leading into Echternach was a

gantlet that had to be run daily by the mess personnel of Company D.

Pfc. Richard Stubblefield had two jeep tires shot out from under him

by shell fragments during one such mission, but continued to take

hot food to the men.

As evidence of the severity of fighting against the obstacles of the

Sauer and Our Rivers and the Siegfried Line, the companies of the 91st

fired for five days from their initial positions. During this period units

of the battalion completed twenty-four smoke missions ranging in

duration from thirty minutes to nine hours and requiring almost

10,000 rounds of shell.

In another February operation the 87th Battalion supported VII

Corps in the First Army attack across the Roer River in the vicinity

of Düren. Early in the month the battalion's four mortar companies,

two attached to the 8th Division and two to the 1O4th, moved into firing

positions on the west side of the river. Here they waited for two weeks.

The Germans, before relinquishing control of the area, destroyed the

sluice valves of the Roer River dams. The raging waters of the river

rose five feet, forcing postponement of the attack until 23 February.

The period of waiting was not idly spent by the mortar companies.

Some fired on targets of opportunity and others interdicted road junctions. Company D, during the last days before the attack, set up feint

smoke screens in the hope that the enemy would be less apprehensive

when screens appeared for the actual crossing. On the night before

the attack the company blanketed the eastern bank of the Roer to

cover four patrols sent out to clear mines from the far side of the river.

Smoke was necessary because of the bright moonlight.

Supporting fire for the First Army attack began early on the

morning of 23 February. After the assault began the mortar companies

laid smoke screens to cover the infantry in its drive across the river.

One company fired four smoke screens which progressively covered

an attacking battalion, enabling it to cross the river and an expanse

of flat terrain with negligible casualties. Again moonlight made this
488 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ROER RIVER BRIDGE BEHIND A SMOKE SCREEN

concealment necessary. Company C for over fifteen hours maintained

a continuous 1,500-yard screen which blocked enemy observation from

the high ground near Düren and allowed ferrying and bridge construction operations to continue without the hazard of observed artillery fire. On this first day alone the 87th Mortar Battalion fired over

4,000 rounds of ammunition.

The VII Corps, spearheading the First Army's advance to the Rhine,

eliminated all enemy resistance in its zone on the west side of the river

by 9 March. On the following day the 87th Battalion received word

that it was to be sent from the First to the Seventh Army, which on

15 March was to initiate a drive through the imporant Saar-Palatinate

triangle.64 This operation was to involve the penetration of the Sieg64

 The 87th Battalion made this move as a unit, the first time it had assembled or moved as a battalion entity since it had left England. The 162-vehicle convoy covered the 317 miles and was in

position with mortars ready to fire in 33 hours. Only 3 vehicles failed to complete the move because

of mechanical failures, (1) 87th Cml Bn Rcd of Events, 13-14 Mar 45. (2) Ltr, Batte to Hist Off,

25 Jul 60.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 489

fried Line and the drive to and the ultimate crossing of the Rhine.

Twice before the 87th had supported divisions which penetrated the

Siegfried Line—near Aachen in September 1944 and near Malmédy

in February 1945. And, as before, the battalion supported a vanguard

corps, this time the XV. By 23 March divisions of the corps had penetrated the Siegfried Line and were ready for the Rhine crossing. All

four companies of the 87th Battalion were in support of the 3d

Division which was to cross in the vicinity of Worms. Intense artillery

and mortar preparations preceded the assault across the 1,000-foot-wide

river.

Companies A and B consolidated their fire in support of the 7th

Infantry. Between 0200 and 0315 on 26 March they fired twenty-three

concentrations entailing 1,200 rounds of ammunition. Thereafter

various targets of opportunity—machine guns, self-propelled guns,

mortars—were hit by the 4.2-inch mortars. At dawn the combined

companies laid two 10-hour screens (600 and 2,200 yards) which

concealed bridge-building operations from direct enemy observation.

Companies A and B expended 3,615 rounds of WP and 462 rounds of

HE during the first day of the attack.65 The effectiveness of the fire

was made a matter of record by the operations officer of the 3d Division.

The Ninth Army, north of First Army and still under control of

21 Army Group, crossed the Rhine in an area just north of the Ruhr

Valley. The army attack was concentrated on the XVI Corps front,

with another corps poised to exploit initial successes, and a third lending

support by fire and demonstration. In keeping with the decision

temporarily to bypass the great Ruhr industrial area, XVI Corps

attacked with an exposed right flank. To prevent enemy observation

from the many potential observation posts in the Ruhr Valley, Ninth

Army called for a 2-mile smoke screen along its exposed right flank.

The XVI Corps attacked with two divisions abreast, the 30th on the

left and the 79th on the right. The 89th Chemical Mortar Battalion,

Colonel Yanka commanding, supported the 79th Division.66

 Colonel

Yanka initially divided his battalion into two parts, one for each of

the attacking regiments of the 79th. Company A, with the 3d Platoon

of Company B attached, supported the 313th Infantry on the division's

right; Company C, augmented by the other two platoons of Company

65

 Company C was not called upon for fire on 26 March and Company D expended only 457 rounds.

Both units crossed the river on the first day. 66

 The 92d Battalion was attached to the 30th Division.
490 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ARTIFICIAL HAZE OBSCURES VEHICLES CROSSING THE RHINE

B, fired for the 315th Infantry on the left. These inflated companies

reported to their respective regiments on 12 March. As this mortar

battalion was without experience in river crossings, forward observer

teams, two of which were to cross with the assault elements, joined the

infantry for specialized training.

The 79th Division began to cross the Rhine in the Milchplatz-Orsoy

area at 0300 on 24 March. Companies A and C of the 89th Chemical

Mortar Battalion joined artillery units in pre-H-hour preparations and

then, for seventy-five minutes after the attack began, fired prearranged

concentrations. Upon completion of the preparatory fire the platoons

of B Company reverted to company control. At 0600 Company A,

firing from Orsoy, began its 3,500-yard screen along the division's

right flank. Each mortar fired a volley of fifteen rounds to establish

the screen and then fired a round every fifteen seconds to maintain it.

This rate was found to be excessive and was reduced to an average of

one shell per mortar per minute. At times the screen thinned, and

additional rounds were fired. The screen was maintained until dark.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 491

One mortar was reserved for any targets of opportunity reported by

the forward observers. Late in the day Company C crossed the river

as did the first platoon of Company B, now in support of the 314th

Infantry. Company A remained in position.67

Several problems arose during the first day. The soil gave way under

rapid fire, causing frequent re-emplacement of base plates. The heavy

rate of fire also caused considerable damage to mortar parts. Overheated barrels caused premature ignitions; in one instance a barrel

became so hot that it bent. Shock absorber mechanisms broke down,

base cap pins sheared, and locking forks broke or bent. On the other

hand, tie rods and standards held up well.

On the morning of D plus 1 (25 March) heavy enemy fire from

the right hastened the resumption of the flanking smoke screen. During

that day the length of the screen was reduced by 700 yards because

of the high rate of attrition of mortar parts. The next afternoon Capt.

Clyde H. Westbrook, commander of Company A, reconnoitered the

east bank of the Rhine for new mortar positions. That night the

company crossed the river on Alligators and floating bridge sections

and continued the smoke screen at dawn the next day. On 27 March

the tactical situation was such that the use of smoke on the right flank

was no longer required.68

With the Rhine behind them the Allies pushed deeper into German

territory, and although there was some bitter resistance left in the

enemy, it was to be only sporadic. Chemical mortar battalions accompanied the armies in their advance but much of the time, as in northern

France, the rapid movement eliminated the need for their employment.

And so, as the European war came to an end, some of these battalions

were already serving in nonoperational and occupational capacities.

This was as it should have been; they had done their measure of fighting

and had acquitted themselves well.

67

 Part of the 74th Smoke Generator Company supported the 315th Infantry at Milchplatz. There

were no generators at Orsoy until 26 March. See above, Chapter IX, for details of smoke generator

activities during the Rhine crossing. 68

 (1) Notes of Conf Held at Hist Off, 1 March 50, sub: 89th Cml Bn and the Rhine Crossing, (1)

89th Cml Mortar Bn History, 24 Mar 45.
CHAPTER XIII

The Chemical Mortar in the Pacific

The employment of chemical mortar units in the Pacific differed

considerably from that in the Mediterranean and European theaters.

With the halt of the general Japanese advance at Guadalcanal, Allied

forces faced the prospect of subjugating or bypassing the many island

groups that lay between them and Japan. Because some of the islands

were not very large certain of the campaigns were to be fought by

small task forces, with a single mortar platoon attached to a regimental

combat team. The islands also dictated that there would be a great

many amphibious operations in which the 4.2-inch mortar, mounted

on landing craft, was gradually to assume an important role. In many

cases the advancing Allies were confronted by thick jungle growth

which hindered the use of artillery and enhanced the value of the

more mobile 4.2-inch mortar. This terrain, consisting of dense vegetation broken only by an occasional path, created problems of observation and transportation even for chemical mortar units. The climate

of the Pacific added to the difficulties of mortar operations; the heavy

rain, intense heat, and high humidity of the tropics made it difficult

to insure effective employment of the mortar and proper maintenance

of the weapon and its ammunition.

South Pacific Area

The initial combat employment of chemical mortar units in the

war against Japan took place in September 1943 during the fight for

New Georgia in the South Pacific Area.1 It must be re-emphasized

that the CWS did not receive authorization for the high explosive

mission for 4.2-inch mortars until 19 March 1943, nearly seven months

1

 The South Pacific Area lay south of the Equator, east of longitude 159° east, and west of longitude

110° west. It was a vast expanse and included more than one million square miles of ocean and

thousands of islands, among them New Zealand, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and the Santa

Cruz, Fiji, Samoan, Tongan, Cook, and Society Island.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 493

after U.S. forces first landed on Guadalcanal. For the Allies the

Guadalcanal operation was the beginning of the road back. More

immediately it had the mission of blunting the Japanese advance and

protecting the vital lifeline between Australia and the United States.2

With Guadalcanal secured, American forces looked northwest up the

Solomon Island chain that led to New Britain and the important

Japanese base at Rabaul. The Russell Islands fell first; then came the

New Georgia campaign with its focal point at Munda, the site of an

enemy airfield. The attack on the island of New Georgia began on

2 July 1943.

The 82nd Mortar Battalion was the first and only battalion in the

South Pacific Area. Under command of Lt. Col. William H. Shimonek,

the unit arrived at New Caledonia on 19 July 1943, too late to see

action in the Munda operation. After a few weeks of training on

Guadalcanal, elements of the 82d Battalion entered the mopping-up

operation on Arundel and Kolombangara Islands in the New Georgia

group. Assigned to XIV Corps and attached to the 43d Infantry Division, a platoon of B Company landed on what was to be known as

Mortar Island in the Stima Lagoon area. This platoon fired its first

combat rounds on the morning of 10 September when, under control

of the division artillery, it delivered harassing and interdictory fire

against the enemy, some of it on enemy barges operating between Kolombangara and Sagekarasa Islands.3

Meanwhile, in close support of the 27th Infantry, 25th Division,

another platoon of the mortar battalion, moved up to Bamboe Peninsula on Arundel Island. The men used jeeps, hand carry, and a variety

of boats to negotiate the difficult terrain. Once in position the mortars

fired at enemy barges and troops. Despite the extreme range mortar

fire destroyed three barges, causing the loss of enemy troops and supplies. From 25 September to 4 October the mortars placed crosschannel fire on the airfield on Kolombangara Island and on enemy shipping in the narrow waters between the islands.

These initial mortar operations were accompanied by certain problems, notably those involving transportation and supply. Major Mc2

 For details on the Guadalcanal operation, see Miller, Guadalcanal: The first Offensive. 3

 Unless otherwise noted, material for this section was based on the after action reports and unit files

of the 82d Chemical Mortar Battalion and supported units. The latter include XIV Corps, 43d, 37th

and 25th Divisions, 182d and 24th RCT's, and 135th Field Artillery Battalion. These records may be

found in the Sixth Army Rcds, CMLHO. Military Intelligence Division, War Department, World

War II, A Chronology, and CWS Theater of Operations Letters, 7, 10, 18, 19, have also been used.
494 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Kaig, chemical officer of the 25th Division, improvised methods to

provide the transportation and manpower necessary to resupply mortar

units. Shipped from Guadalcanal to New Georgia by LST and from

New Georgia to the northern end of Arundel Island by LCT (landing

craft, tank), the ammunition was then transferred by LCM's to a

battalion dump at the west end of Sagekarasa Island. From there

engineer ponton boats took the ammunition across a lagoon to the mortar platoon's unloading points at the other end of the island.4

Although infantry commanders were unfamiliar with the capabilities and limitations of the mortar, most troops recognized the satisfactory performance of both the mortar crews and the weapon. And it

was the opinion of a prisoner of war that the Japanese feared mortar

barrages more than those of the artillery. One criticism by supported

units was the great number of tree bursts which occurred in the heavy

jungle canopy and which resulted from a lack of a delayed action fuze.5

The 82d Battalion next saw action on Bougainville, the largest of the

Solomon group. Operations on this island began on the first day of

November 1943 when the 3d Marine Division spearheaded the assault

landings of the I Marine Amphibious Corps, with the 37th Infantry

Division landing a week later. The XIV Army Corps, composed of

the 37th and Americal Divisions, took over from the marines on 15

December. The corps commander, Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold, indicated his desire to employ chemical mortar units in place of corps

artillery in situations where the use of the latter was impracticable.

During and after the all-out enemy counterattacks on the American

perimeter around Empress Augusta Bay in March 1944, infantry divisions attached mortar platoons to regiments or battalions. Control of

the weapon varied. In the Americal Division mortar units operated

directly under the supported infantry organizations, while in the 37th

Division the mortarmen received firing instructions through the fire

direction center of the artillery battalion to which they were attached.

Both methods were satisfactory, but direct contact with the supported

infantry seemed preferable since it allowed greater responsiveness during changing situations and provided closer liaison with responsible

4

 Ltr, Col McKaig to Hist Off, 27 Dec 50. 5

 (1) Ltr, Dir Intell ASF to Distr, 21 Jan 44, sub: Opns Against Treasury Island and Munda.

CWS 319.1-Treasury Island. (2) Ltr, CO Co B 82d Cml Bn to CCWS, 2 Oct 43. (3) 43d Inf Div

Rpt of Opns During Arundel Campaign (29 Aug-23 Sep 43).
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 495

commanders.6 Heavy barrage missions were normally co-ordinated

with corps and division artillery.

The jungle foliage on Bougainville was so thick that forward observers, compelled to employ sound-sensing methods of observation,

were often located only 30 yards from the enemy and directed fire to

within 20 yards of their own observation post and of the front lines.

During the height of one enemy attack, the mortars placed smoke

shell directly in front of enemy forward elements while troops of the

182d Infantry, only 30 yards away, withdrew without casualties. This

was one of the few uses of WP on Bougainville, since the smoke further

reduced the jungle's limited visibility.

Infantry commanders soon recognized that the mortars could engage, with a weight of shell comparable to that of 105-mm. artillery,

many targets which could not be reached by the 105's and 155's. To

insure adequate fire coverage of the entire 13-mile perimeter, thirty

mortar positions were established which were linked together by more

than 150 miles of communications wire. The necessity for this unusual

number of gun positions was well demonstrated during one 4-day

period in March by simultaneous requests from the 129th, 145th, and

182d Infantry for supporting fire from the platoons of Company A.

Daily battalion expenditure of mortar shell on Bougainville during

March was extremely heavy; during the last three weeks of the month

Company A alone expended 20,250 rounds in defense of a hill held by

elements of the Americal Division. In an 11 March mission Companies

A and D massed fire with 75-mm. and 105-mm. howitzers and with

60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars in a preparation which helped repel an

enemy attack. Twelve days later Companies C and D joined with seven

artillery battalions and two cannon companies in the heaviest general

supporting fire laid down in the South Pacific fighting.

Field artillery officers were impressed by the amount of effective

fire produced by a chemical mortar company as compared to that of

an artillery unit. Maj. John D. Tolman, who commanded the 82d

Chemical Mortar Battalion from 26 April until the close of the Luzon

Campaign, disclosed that infantry commanders felt they could not

"properly accomplish [their] mission [without] 4.2-inch mortar sup6

 XIV Corps, Extracts, Rpt on Lessons Learned in Bougainville Opn (hereafter cited as XIV Corps,

Extracts, Rpt on Bougainville), p. 3. CMLHO.
496 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

port."

 7 The 37th Division considered the 4.2-inch mortar "a powerful

and devastating supplement to the division's artillery and mortar

fires," and commanders of the Americal Division, while recommending

reduction of the minimum range to increase the weapon's flexibility,

commented on the effectiveness of the chemical mortar in perimeter

defense and for fire on reverse slopes.8 Captured Japanese documents

revealed the enemy's fear of the weapon; enemy artillery was instructed

to concentrate on American mortars.9

Infantry and chemical battalion commanders on Bougainville indicated that they were unfamiliar with each other's organization,

tactics, and procedures and recognized the need for joint unit training.

This reciprocal unfamiliarity continued to be a problem whenever a

mortar unit was committed for its first engagement or a division had

a chemical mortar unit attached to it for the first time.10

Beginning at Bougainville securing mortar crews against enemy infiltrations became a serious problem, particularly during night missions. Because of the absence of infantry perimeter guards and the

frequency of enemy infiltrations, the battalion provided for day and

night shifts both at the gun positions and at forward observation posts.

Single and double apron fences surrounded emplacements. Automatic

rifles and grenades were the chief means of repulsing Japanese attempts

to overrun mortar positions.

The relatively static nature of the battle for the perimeter around

Empress Augusta Bay eased the problem of maintenance. On the coral

rock soil of Arundel, Company B had broken five base plates, bent five

or six tie rods, and cracked several barrel cups and base plate spades.

On Bougainville, despite the heavy and continuous fire, the softer

ground and the fact that time was available to construct adequate emplacements resulted in a minimum of damage to mortar parts. The torrential rains, high humidity, and intense heat of South Pacific islands

created serious problems both in the maintenance of mortar shell and its

7

 (1) Ltr, CO 82d Cml Mortar Bn to ACCWS for Field Opns, 22 Apr 44, p. 4. (2) CWS TofO

Ltr No. 19, 24 Oct 44, p. 38. 8

 (1) Ltr, CG 37th Div to CO 82d Cml Mortar Bn, 20 Apr 44, sub: Commendation, (1) XIV

Corps, Extracts, Rpt on Bougainville, pp. 2, 9, 9

 (1) Ltr, CO 82d Cml Mortar Bn to ACCWS for Field Opns, 22 Apr 44 (2) TofO Ltr No. 15,

21 Jun 44, pp. 3-4. 10

 (1) 37th Div AAR Bougainville, 8 Nov 43-30 Apr 44, p. 59. (2) Lt. Col. Orbie Bostick (formerly CmlO SOPAC), "Twenty-one Months in the South Pacific," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol.

29, No. 8 (December, 1943—January, 1944).
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 497

components. During the heaviest downpours, firing ceased because

excessive water in the barrel resulted in "poop-outs." The extreme heat

melted the filling of white phosphorus shells, creating a lateral void

for those rounds stored in a horizontal position. These rounds tumbled

badly when fired. A lack of adequate waterproofing combined with

dampness caused the malfunction of cartridges and propellants and

corrosion of fuzes while shells were in storage. In an attempt to minimize these difficulties on Bougainville mortarmen placed their ammunition dump, featured by sheltered racks and a double-decked roof,

as far inland as possible. Even then ammunition had to be checked and

rechecked, particularly the fuzes. Although heat, rain, and dampness

continued to be a problem throughout operations in the South and

Southwest Pacific, the situation improved in late 1944 with the introduction of metallic containers for propellants and cartridges.

At least one difficulty with mortar shells was not brought on by the

weather. This was the occasional absence of the steel balls which prevented the premature arming of the fuze. Despite close inspection

of mortar ammunition short rounds and premature bursts resulted in

several casualties to both mortarmen and infantry.11

Southwest Pacific Area

New Guinea

Early in 1943 the Chemical Warfare Service,12 the War Department,

and Southwest Pacific Area headquarters considered the possibility of

shipping chemical mortar units to the Southwest Pacific.13 The area's

demand for these units grew more insistent after a weapons demonstration held in October 1943. At the demonstration General Krueger,

Commanding General, Sixth Army, told Maj. Gen. William H. Gill,

Commanding General, 32d Infantry Division, that the 4.2-inch chemical mortar was the weapon needed to clean the enemy out of tenaciously

11

 (1) Ltr, CG USAFISPA to CCWS, 10 Apr 44, sub: Faulty 4.2 Cml Mortar Shell Fuzes. CWS

314.7 Unit Files. CMLHO. (2) Rad CM-OUT 24933, 19 Apr 44. (3) Rad CM-IN 14685,

20 Apr 44. (4) The 82d remained on Bougainville until December 1944, when it sailed for Luzon.

82d Cml Mort Bn, Hist Data Cards. 12

 References used for this section, unless otherwise noted, include: (1) Unit Rcds, 98th Cml Mortar

Bn (CMLHO); (2) Sixth Army AAR's (Sixth Army Rcds, ORB, CMLHO). 13

 (1) Ltr, CmlO USASOS to ExecO OCCWS, 18 Jan 43. (2) Personal Ltr, CmlO I Corps to

ACCWS for Field Opns, 26 Jan 43. (3) Ltr, ACCWS for Field Opns to Chief OPD WDGS, 11 Mar

43, no sub. All three in CMLHO.
498 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

held positions.14 Several other high-ranking commanders who had

participated in the Buna campaign in Papua, where mortar battalions

had not been available, echoed this opinion. They suggested that a

chemical mortar battalion be made a part of army troops for attachment to corps and divisions.15

In April 1944 General MacArthur launched a new offensive along the

northern coast of New Guinea in a series of operations which, in collaboration with Admiral Nimitz' drive through the Central Pacific,

would place American forces in a position to retake the Philippine Islands. On 22 April MacArthur's initial objectives, Hollandia and

Aitape, were attacked by I Corps operating as RECKLESS Task Force.16

The elements of RECKLESS Task Force had chemical mortar support

for the Hollandia operation, but this support came from a rather odd

source. Because of a shortage of mortar units in the zone of interior the

War Department in February 1944 authorized the SWPA to convert

a tank destroyer battalion to a chemical mortar battalion at the earliest

practicable date. Almost immediately the theater reorganized the 641st

Tank Destroyer Battalion which, after a brief period of training, participated in the Hollandia operation, under command of Lt. Col.

Alexander Batlin. But redesignation waited until June 1944, producing

the anomalous situation of a so-called tank destroyer unit firing 4.2-

inch chemical mortars.17

The mortars played an extremely minor role at Hollandia, the entire

four companies firing less than 350 rounds during about one week in

the line. At the request of a regimental commander one company

dragged a single mortar and 120 shells on carts for twelve miles along

a narrow, muddy mountain trail, across a 2,000-foot ridge, through

swamps, and over three rivers—only to arrive too late to support the

fight for Hollandia Airdome. It was fortunate that expenditures were

low because ammunition was limited. On the night of 23 April enemy

planes bombed the beachhead dumps at Humboldt Bay destroying 6,550

14

 Memo, ACmlO Sixth Army for CmlO ALAMO Force, 8 Oct 43. 300.6—Misc Memos and Ltrs,

Sixth Army Rcds. 15

 Excerpt from AGF Bd Rpt on SWPA, No. 31, 25 Feb 44. CMLHO. 16

 For details of the strategic decisions and tactical aspects of these operations along New Guinea's

northern coast, see Smith, Approach to the Philippines. 17

 (1) Rad, CM-IN 8408, 12 Feb 44. (2) Ltr, AG to CINCSWPA, 25 Feb 44, sub: Reorgn and

Redesignation of 64151 Tank Destroyer Bn. (3) CM-IN O238Z, Jul 44.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 499

rounds of 4.2-inch mortar shell, or about 78 percent of the available

supply.18

Subsequent New Guinea operations utilized but one mortar company at a time. Company B of the 98th, commanded by 1st Lt. Vernon

E. Woebbeking and attached to the 191st Field Artillery Group, successively supported the 163d, 158th, and 20th Infantry Regiments during the Wakde Islands-Maifin Bay fighting which took place in May

1944. During the assault phase of this operation, the LCM's carrying

the 4.2-inch shell grounded over fifty yards from the beach and the

mortar crews had to carry their cargo through chest-deep water.19

During the cross-channel firing on the Wakde group the chemical

mortars massed fires with the 81-mm. mortars and with the artillery

from the mainland. When attached to artillery units the mortar platoons were divided into 2-gun sections with weapons placed approximately 1,000 yards apart. Chèmical officers and Sixth Army headquarters vigorously criticized this practice because it prevented the units

from massing their fires and giving close support to the infantry. They

insisted that platoons be employed as units under direct infantry

control.20 Later, mortar units were assigned to the infantry and remained so attached for the rest of the operation.

In June 1944 HURRICANE Task Force, principally composed of two

of the three regiments of the 41st Division, assaulted the island of Biak,

located west of Wakde off New Guinea's northern coast.21 The Allied

forces wanted the island, as they had Wakde, as a site for airfields for

bombing operations against the enemy. Company D, 98th Battalion,

commanded by Capt. Jalmar Gertulla, supported the attacking forces

with missions for perimeter defense, beachhead extension, and harassment. On one occasion the 2d Platoon covered the withdrawal by

water of a tank-led infantry battalion and then, after destroying their

mortars and ammunition, withdrew itself. Early in June observers of

the mortar platoon directed fire from landing craft on cave mouths

18

 (1) AGF Bd Rpt on SWPA, No. 74, 9 Jun 44, Employ of 4.2" Cml Mortars. (2) Cml Sec 41st

Div, n.d., Hist Rpt, LETTERPRESS Opn (22 Apr-5 May 44). AGRO-H (7945) 341-11.7. (3)

Smith, Approach to the Philippines, p. 66. (4) Lt. Col. John E. Clarke, "The Longest 12 Miles on

Earth," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 31, No. 1 (January-February, 1945), pp. 47-49. 19

 Personal Ltr, CmlO TORNADO TF to CmlO Sixth Army, 22 May 44. 300.6—Memos to and from

APO 565 Unit 1, Sixth Army Rcds. 20

 Ltr, Cml Warfare Intell Team 4 to CmlO USASOS, 24 Jun 44, sub: Rpt on Use of Cml Warfare

Weapons and Munitions. 21

 See Riegelman, Caves of Biak, for a personal account of the Biak operation. During World War

II Colonel Riegleman served as I Corps chemical officer.
500 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

invisible to both air and ground observers. Unfortunately, when the

1st Platoon fired 180 rounds of high explosive at cave mouths for an

antitank company on 7 June, 10 out of 12 rounds with T-89 delay

fuzes were duds, while other rounds with point-detonating fuzes exploded as tree bursts above the caves.

What might be considered classic examples of combined all-mortar

preparations took place on 16 and 27 June. Chemical mortar barrages

preceded advances of the 186th Infantry near the village of Mokmer

on Biak; this fire was then lifted and was followed sucessively by the

81-mm. and the 60-mm. mortars. On both dates, the infantry advanced against minor resistance to objectives which, before these preparations, had been vigorously defended.22

With the Wakde experience in mind the 20th Infantry inquired

whether a chemical mortar company could be assigned to the 6th

Infantry Division. After Biak, supported battalions in the 162d and

186th Infantry Regiments stated that because of its greater range and

blast effect on area targets, the 4.2-inch mortar filled the gap between

the 81-mm. mortar and artillery. Because of the higher angle of fire,

the infantry preferred the 4.2-inch mortar to 75-mm. and 105-mm.

howitzers for firing on sharply defiladed and densely wooded terrain.

In open terrain the mortar was equal in effectiveness, if not range, to

the 105-mm. howitzer. On the other hand, two battalion commanders

considered the 4.2-inch mortar less accurate than the 81-mm. weapon

and complained of the slow displacement of the former over rough

terrain during a fast-moving advance.23

The 98th Battalion encountered some of the same tribulations on

New Guinea that had marked the fighting in the South Pacific Area.

These included the unfamiliarity of infantry commanders with the

capabilities and limitations of the weapon, the inadequate training of

mortar personnel in infantry tactics and procedures, the excessive

length of time firing personnel remained in the line without relief, and

the deleterious effects of dampness on mortar shell components and their

containers. The disadvantages of attaching mortar units to artillery

22

 Ltr, CmlO U.S. Forces to CmlO ALAMO Force, 19 Jul 44, sub: Preliminary Tech Rpt 5, p. 6.

350.05-Biak, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB. 23

 (1) Ltr, CmlO TORNADO TF to CmlO Sixth Army, 22 Jun 44. 472.4—4.2" Cml Mortar, Sixth

Army Rcds, ORB. (2) Ltr, CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 27 Jul 44, sub: Preliminary

Tech Rpt 16, pp. 1-2. 350.05—Biak, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 501

organizations, realized in the South Pacific, were emphasized in the

Southwest Pacific.24

Beginning with the fighting on New Guinea, one of the most persistent of the bottlenecks facing mortar units was the lack of adequate

motor transportation. Several times the units were unable to keep up

with supported infantry in fast-moving actions. At Hollandia and on

Wakde ship-to-shore movement suffered seriously from a shortage of

amphibious vehicles. In the former operation, one company failed to

land in time to carry out its mission in support of an infantry regiment.

The value of adequate motorized equipment from ship to shore and

from the shore inland was again illustrated on Biak where assignment

to the company of 4 Dukws and 3 additional 21⁄2 -ton 6x6 trucks

insured prompt and speedy landing of men, weapons, and shell;

facilitated leapfrogging of platoons during movement of the company

along beach areas; and resulted in satisfactory ammunition resupply.

Colonel Arthur, Chemical Officer, 41st Division, as well as the G-3

of I Corps, felt that mortar units should be committed with complete

organic transportation and urged that the companies be provided

with either 2 LVT's (landing vehicles, tracked) or 4 Dukws for amphibious movement.25

Leyte

In September 1944, with the northwest coast of New Guinea in the

hands of General MacArthur and with the Marianas Islands secured

by Admiral Nimitz, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deciding to skip three

planned intermediate objectives, set their sights directly on the island of

Leyte in the Philippines.26 In a move that speeded up the Pacific time

24

 (1) Cml Sec 41st Div, n.d., Hist Rpt, LETTERPRESS Opn (22 Apr-5 May 44), p. 10. (2) CmlO

41st Inf Div, n.d., Hist Rcd, Cml Sec 41st Inf Div, p. 4. CMLHO. (3) An. 2 to G-3 I Corps,

History of Biak Opn, 15-27 Jun 44, n.d., p. 40. (4) Ltrs, CmlO PERSECUTION TF to CmlO Sixth

Army, 27 Apr, 22 May 44. 300.6—Memos to and from APO 565 Unit I, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB.

(5) CM-IN 14904. 17 Aug 44. 25

 (1) An. 2 to G-3 I Corps, History of Biak Opn, 15-27 Jun 44, p. 40. (2) Ltr, CmlO 41st

Inf Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 12 May 44, sub: Cml Phase of LETTERPRESS Opn. (3) Sixth Army

Cml Warfare Activities During the Biak Opn, pp. 6-7. 350.05, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB. 26

 Unless otherwise noted, references for the Leyte operation include: (1) Unit Histories, Rpts, and

Rcds of 85th and 88th Cml Mortar Bns, in Sixth Army Rcds; (2) Sixth Army, Rpt of Leyte Opn,

30 Nov 45, and Rpt of G-4 and Cml Sec of same headquarters; (3) CmlO X Corps, Rpt of Leyte

Campaign, 3 Jan 45, in Sixth Army Rcds; (4) Ltr, CG 24th Div to CG X Corps, 18 Dec 44, sub:

Rpt, Chemical Warfare Activities Leyte Opn, CMLHO; (5) 19th Inf Hist Rcd, Leyte Campaign,

8 Sep-22 Nov 44.
502 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

table by exactly two months, they directed MacArthur and Nimitz to

assault Leyte on 20 October.27

At the time of the Leyte invasion Sixth Army included X Corps and

XXIV Corps. The latter had been at Pearl Harbor preparing for the

assault on the island of Yap when the change of plans eliminated that

particular operation. Thereupon Admiral Nimitz turned over the

XXIV Corps to General MacArthur. Major elements of XXIV Corps

were the 77th and 96th Divisions, having among their supporting units

the 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion (less companies C and D), and

the 7th Division, supported by the 91st Chemical Company. The

latter, one of two separate mortar companies to see action in World War

II, had been stationed for some years at Schofield Barracks on Hawaii.28

Chemical mortar units already with Sixth Army were the 98th and

the 85th Battalions. The former, having participated in the Wakde

and Biak fighting, had entered a period of rest and rehabilitation. The

85th Chemical Mortar Battalion, a recent arrival from the United

States, supported X Corps in the Leyte operation, specifically the 1st

Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions.

Commanded by Lt. Col. Kenneth K. MacDonald, the 85th Battalion landed on the beaches of Leyte with the early waves of the 20

October assault. The battalion was divided into two groups, corresponding with its attachments—the headquarters detachment and Companies A and B with the 1st Cavalry and Companies C and D with the

24th Division. Company C ran into immediate difficulty. Coming in

with the fourth wave the two landing craft carrying the 3d Platoon received direct hits from enemy fire. One man was killed and 10 others

were wounded. But in general, enemy resistance was light, and this

circumstance, combined with a lack of transportation, limited initial

activity for the companies of the 85th Battalion. Companies C and D

had landed without organic vehicles and were to operate under that

handicap for the entire campaign.

During the second and third weeks of November, Company C supported the 21st Infantry, 24th Division, in the extremely bitter fighting

for Breakneck Ridge, southwest of the town of Pinamopoan located

on the northern coast of Leyte. The Japanese defended this position

27

 See M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), for the strategy behind this decision and for an account of

the actual operation. 28

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 503

with a tenacity that gave the hill formation its nickname. For a time

the rugged terrain limited artillery support, a situation which enhanced

the value of the CWS weapon. The mortar platoons fired nearly 2,800

rounds of ammunition during the period 7-15 November, including

missions against troop concentrations, entrenchments, pillboxes, mortars, machine guns, and light artillery.

On 14 November the 32d Division relieved the 24th Division and,

as so often was the case, Company C of the 85th Battalion remained

in the line in support of a new infantry regiment, this time the 128th.

Within four days an incident occurred which marred good relations

between the supporting and supported units. On the morning of 18

November the mortars of Company C, along with other supporting

weapons, fired about 375 rounds against an enemy strongpoint. Despite the testimony of the mortar forward observer, the division chemical officer, and the regimental commander himself, Company C was

charged with a short round burst that killed one infantryman of the

128th and wounded seven others. The X Corps commander, Maj. Gen.

Franklin C. Sibert, ordered the relief of the mortar company, an action

which took place six days later with the arrival of Company B. Unfortunately, this incident destroyed the confidence of the infantry in

the chemical mortar; for quite a while thereafter the division employed

the 4.2-inch mortar only for road interdiction.29

Company B, 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion, commanded by Capt.

Henry A. Kitselman, came ashore with elements of 96th Division

(XXIV Corps) over the beaches near Dulag.30 During the first two

weeks of combat the platoons of the company operated separately in

support of infantry battalions in attacks in the vicinity of the landing

beaches, against enemy positions on Labiranan Head, Labir, and Catmon

Hill, and inland near the villages of Tabontabon and Dagami. Initially,

the swamp and poor transportation prevented the mortars from getting

inland and thereafter transportation proved to be a major problem.

During this period, which coincided with the rainy season, the vehicles

of the mortar company became mired, while advancing infantrymen

29

 (1) It was a matter of small irony that General Sibert was the son of the first Chief, Chemical

Warfare Service, Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert. (2) Ltr, CG 32d Div to CG X Corps, 19 Dec 44,

sub: Rpt of Cml Warfare Activities in the Leyte Opn. Sixth Army Rcds, 319.1 Leyte Opn Rpts.

(3) Lt John K. King, Rpt of Inspection of Forward Position during A+27 - A+31, Nov 1944.

Sixth Army Rcds, 333 Inspection Rpts. 30

 The troops of XXIV Corps also had the support of eight mortar boats.
504 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

were calling for fire now beyond mortar range. The mortars did complete some missions. On 22 October one of the mortar platoons repulsed an attack of a Japanese patrol killing 52 of the enemy and itself

suffering 2 killed and 6 wounded. Later, on 27 and 28 October, the

mortars silenced enemy 75-mm. mortars in defilade on Catmon Hill,

burned four sniper-infested pillboxes, and screened the withdrawal of

an infantry company pinned down on Catmon Hill.

From 5 to 20 November Company B, firing as a unit, supported the

382d Infantry and then, until 28 November, the 381st, which was

slowly advancing through the swamps, rice paddies, and hilly terrain

west of Dagami. Mortarmen, with the aid of Filipinos, carried their

weapons and ammunition by hand, or placed them on the backs of

plodding Carabao. The intense rain continued to hamper all ground

operations. It caused base plates to sink into the soft mud and resulted

in mortar breakage and the consequent suspension of firing.

Company A, 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion, landed with the 77th

Division early in December 1944 and remained with that unit for two

months. The 91st Chemical Mortar Company supported the 7th Division throughout the Leyte Campaign. Although placed under control

of division artillery, each of its three platoons supported one of the

three regiments of the division. During this 41-day commitment, two

platoons used artillery forward observers and one used its own. In the

drive on Ormoc the division artillery assumed control of the mortar

company. Although no missions took place under this arrangement the

platoon fired for registration every evening. In mid-December two of

the platoons reverted to regimental attachment, a step which in the

opinion of the company commander, Capt. Eugene F. Them, resulted

in a far better utilization of the unit.31

The performance of the 4.2-inch mortars on Leyte was not an unqualified success. Infantrymen frequently complained that the mortar

units could not keep pace with them in rapid advances over rough terrain, a situation resulting as much from the rainy season in which the

operation took place as from the lack of complete organic transportation among the mortar units. This lack stemmed directly from the infantry's unfamiliarity with the needs of mortar units—only one of

the six divisions which saw action had had previous chemical mortar

support. As a result, most of them failed to allot sufficient shipping

31

 Ltr, CO 91st Cml Co (Motorized) to CmlO XXIV Corps, 14 Dec 44, sub: Rpt of Mortar Co

Activities. Sixth Army Rcds, 319.1 Leyte Opn Rpts.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 505

space for the mortar units and most organic vehicles were not taken

aboard.32 Only when the supported divisions and regiments assigned

additional transportation to the mortar companies did the latter recover their mobility.33

 At the conclusion of the Leyte operation chemical officers not only recommended the use of Dukws for mortar units in

assault landings, but also the employment of tracked vehicles in swampy

terrain.34

Luzon

Turning his attention from Leyte, where he left the newly activated

Eighth Army, to Luzon, General MacArthur directed General Krueger

to seize a beachhead on Lingayen Gulf, drive southward and free

Manila, and, eventually, liberate the entire island.35 The decision to

take Luzon had come only after prolonged debate at the highest level of

strategic planning. S-day for the operation was 9 January 1945.36

Sixth Army operations on Luzon had the support of three mortar

battalions.37 The 98th Chemical Mortar Battalion supported I Corps

on the left of Sixth Army's beachhead and the 82d fired for the divisions of XIV Corps on the right. The 85th Battalion was released from

the Eighth Army later in January and attached to XIV Corps. These

three mortar battalions provided continuous close support throughout

the fighting on Luzon. As on Leyte, the corps normally reattached

mortar companies to divisions which, in turn, assigned platoons to

assault regiments.

Initially, XIV Corps faced but token resistance as it headed down

the central plain of Luzon toward Manila. Enemy opposition increased

in the last week of January, particularly in the Zambales Mountains on

32

 (1) Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Distr, 25 Nov 44, sub: Rpt on Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in

K-2 Opns, pp. 20-21. 314.7 Hist Rpts, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB. (2) Ltr, ACmlO Sixth Army

to CmlO I Corps, 29 Oct 44. 300.6 Memos, I Corps, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB. 33

 (1) Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Distr, 25 Nov 44, sub: Rpt on Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in

K-2 Opns, pp. 20-21. (2) Co A 88th Cml Mortar Bn Journal, Leyte. 34

 Ltr, CmlO POA to CCWS, 4 Apr 45, sub: Observer Rpt of Action of Co B 88th Cml Mortar

Bn on Leyte. CMLHO. 35

 Sources for this section include: Unit Histories and Rpts of 82d, 85th, 88th, and 98th Cml

Mortar Bns, in Sixth Army Rcds ORB and CMLHO; XIV Corps M-7 and M-1 Opns, Luzon; Rpts of

25th, 32d, 33d, 37th, and 43d Divs, of 5th, 7th, and of 8th Cav Regts, and 20th and 63d Inf Regts. 36

 For details on the strategy behind the Luzon decision as well as for a comprehensive account of

the entire campaign, see Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1963). 37

 As in the case of Leyte the assault troops of I and XIV Corps were accompanied by 4.2-inch

mortar boats.
506 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the right flank of the corps. After a week marked by effective mortar

fire against personnel, weapons, tanks, and supply dumps, three companies of the 82d turned southward to join in the struggle for Manila.

The fourth, Company B, remained behind in the hills west of Fort

Stotsenburg, successively supporting elements of the 40th, 43d, and

38th Divisions from 28 January to 18 March. Mortar operations in

support of a 40th Division attack on Snake Hill North were featured

by some unusual action on the part of forward observers. On 7 February, after enemy fire wounded a platoon forward observer, Cpl. Edward A. Yehle of the mortar observation party successfully directed

chemical mortar and artillery fire against enemy opposition in front of

a battalion of the 160th Infantry. Next morning another mortarman,

Pvt. Herbert H. League, took charge in a similar situation, simultaneously directing 4.2-inch mortar, 81-mm. mortar, and artillery fire

in action which resulted in the destruction of at least one enemy machine gun and which served as a screen for the evacuation of friendly

casualties. Later, League directed similar fire which proved instrumental in the death of 40 Japanese and in repulsing an enemy attack.

Meanwhile, the main body of the 82d supported the 37th Division as

XIV Corps pushed down Route 5 toward Manila. The approach to the

city was uneventual in comparison to the resistance encountered once

the American forces entered Manila. Fire missions for the mortars

picked up immediately. The weapon screened regimental crossings

of the Pasig River, which bisects the city, and fired support, incendiary,

and neutralization missions, mostly in conjunction with infantry mortars and the artillery. After witnessing the chemical mortars in action

before the High Commissioner's residence, the Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-3, 37th Division, declared that "direct support infantry weapons,

particularly 4.2-inch mortars, falling close to our own lines, were found

to neutralize the enemy where penetration took place."

The 85th Battalion was triangularized just prior to landing near San

Fabian in the Lingayen Gulf on 28 January with the 1st Cavalry Division.38

 By early February, its mortars were in Manila supporting

cavalrymen from emplacements on city pavements, vacant lots, lawns,

golf courses, even tennis courts. From 22 to 25 February elements of

Company B fought as infantry in defense of a regimental perimeter

within the city.

38

 As in the fighting in Europe, the mortar battalions in the Pacific reorganized under the new

tables of organization whenever it became convenient.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 507

Certain supported commanders, particularly in the 7th Cavalry

Regiment, refused to use chemical mortars for close support missions,

claiming that the old M2 sight was inaccurate.39 But it was with this

sight that elements of the 85th massed fire, along with 81-mm. mortars,

in the final assault on the Agriculture Building and brought fire to

within 200 feet of the mortar observation post. After the cavalry took

its objective, a regimental operations officer called the chemical mortar

fire "the most accurate fire support we've ever had." Battalion casualties, the highest for a 30-day period of any chemical mortar battalion

on Luzon, totaled 7 men killed and 13 wounded.

During the last part of February and before resistance had ended in

Manila, XIV Corps gave the 1st Cavalry Division (less one brigade)

and the 6th Infantry Division, until recently a part of I Corps, the

mission of clearing the Manila watershed and attacking Japanese forces

in the Sierra Madre Mountains about ten miles east of the city. These

enemy troops, comprising the major enemy concentration in central

Luzon, had not taken part in the Manila fighting but had withdrawn to

the east with the approach of the American troops. Ensconced in the

so-called Shimbu Line, Japanese forces put up fanatic resistance in the

rugged and rocky foothills of the Sierra Madres.

The 82d and 85th Chemical Mortar Battalions fired in support of

these operations. Company A, 85th Battalion, saw a good deal of action

with the 7th and 8th Cavalry regiments west of Antipolo. Early in

March a squadron commander refused to have one of the mortar platoons engage a target because it was within 500 yards of his troops.

Instead, he gave the mission to his 81-mm. mortars, despite the fact

that these weapons had a greater dispersion than did the 4.2's. This

show of hesitancy regarding mortar support by the 85th Battalion was

not the first to come from supported troops. A succession of battalion

commanders—there were three incumbents during the first six weeks

of 1945—provides another clue to the fact that not all was right with

the unit. As of 16 March the firing companies of the 85th reverted to

battalion control and underwent an intensive 2-week training period

under the new commander, Maj. Maurice G. Green, recently operations

officer of the 82d Chemical Mortar Battalion.

The 82d Chemical Mortar Battalion supported the Shimbu opera39

 Memo, CmlO Sixth Army for ACofS G-3 Sixth Army, 12 Mar 45. S-3 Rpts, 85th Cml Mortar

Bn, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB.
508 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

tions from 25 February until 30 April. In mid-March the XIV Corps

relinquished control of this fighting to XI Corps, and the 82d utilized

this transfer of command to reorganize under the latest table of organization. Battalion support in the vicinity of Mount Mataba, one

of the bastions of the Shimbu Line, resulted in some of the heaviest 4.2-

inch mortar fire in the Pacific war. During the 2-week period between

23 March and 5 April the 82d fired nearly 190 missions with an expenditure of over 22,000 rounds. On 6 April two platoons of Company B and one from Company C, in support of an attack by the 63d

Infantry, laid a 6,000-yard smoke screen southeast of Mount Mataba

and maintained it for eight hours. The smoke masked the advance

of the infantry from enemy observation posts on Mount Mataba and

a lesser hill which was an immediate objective of the attack. The mortars maintained this screen by firing a total of 16 rounds a minute the

first hour and 10 rounds a minute thereafter. Unfortunately, a shortage of ammunition brought a halt to the screen before the troops

reached their objective. Three hours later ammunition requested from

XI Corps four days earlier arrived at the mortar positions.40

On 21 April Company B (less the 3d Platoon), while in support of

the 145th Infantry, participated in one of the heaviest preparations fired

on Luzon. In order to cover an infantry advance on the slopes of

Mount Pacawagan, another of the keys to the Shimbu positions, the

mortar company fired 2,525 rounds of white phosphorus to set up a

7-hour screen, supplemented by two B-25 aircraft laying a 8,000-yard

FS screen. Six days later the crest of Pacawagan fell to troops of the

145th Infantry after a combined weapons preparation and with the

aid of a chemical mortar screen.

That the reputation of smoke increased on Luzon is suggested by

the following entry in a 6th Infantry Division operational report:

"The outstanding use for chemical warfare weapons in the Shimbu

Line battle was the use of screening smokes..."

 41

 One of the mortar

battalions called attention to the high ratio of white phosphorus used on

Luzon,42 indicative of quite a departure from previous Pacific practice.

40

 (1) 2d Ind, CmlO 6th Inf Div to CmlO Sixth Army, 12 Apr 45, on Ltr, CmlO XI Corps to

CmlO 6th Div, 8 Apr 45, sub: Smoke Opn. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.6 Smoke Missions. (2) Artillery

as well as mortar units had difficulty with ammunition supply. 41

 Digest of Staff Sectional Rpts, 6th Div, Luzon Campaign, 9 Jan-30 Jun 45, p. 126. Opns Rpts,

AGO 306 - 0.3 (12490). 42

 82d Cml Mortar Bn Hist Rpt Luzon Opn, 9 Jan-3o Jun 45, The First 120 Days (hereafter cited

as 82d, First 120 Days Luzon), p. 6. CWPN 82 - 0.3 (24515).
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 509

Infantry commanders had long been reluctant to request WP fire.

Smoke as a means of concealment was often superfluous in the jungle

fighting during the early years of the war, and casualties were produced

by high explosives. As a consequence, white phosphorus ammunition

remained unused while stockpiles of high explosives were bled white.

Actually, white phosphorus ammunition was a versatile munition.

In addition to its ability to produce screens and inflict casualties, it

served as an incendiary agent. A fourth characteristic, really an extension of its antipersonnel capability, was the tremendous psychological

effect it had on the enemy. The main reason for its unpopularity was

that infantry commanders were unfamiliar with its many attributes,

especially the casualty and incendiary effects.43

Several factors contributed to the increased use of smoke shell on

Luzon. One of these was the limited supply of high explosive shell

which served to call attention to the white phosphorus munition. In

February 1945, for example, Col. Richard R. Danek, Chemical Officer,

XIV Corps, declared that the supply of chemical mortar ammunition

had "reached a critical stage."

 44

 Several months later Maj. David D.

Hulsey, 6th Division chemical officer, stated that during one period

in April chemical mortar operations in his sector were "practically nil"

because of the "unavailability of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition from

XI Corps."

 45

 Causes for the shortage included limited transportation

and deterioration of shell through improper storage, but, more basically,

the critical nature of the supply of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition on

Luzon resulted from the fact that half of the shells received from the

United States were on the list of ammunitions frozen by the War Department because of the possibility of defective fuzes.46

Other reasons for the increased use of WP involved matters of terrain

and education. In the Philippines, American forces for the first time

in the Pacific encountered a battle area of rather extended dimensions

and one that featured mountain and hill masses from which the enemy

had excellent observation. The Sierra Madres east of Manila and the series

43

 85th Cml Mortar Bn in the M-1 Opns (Luzon) Hist Rpt, 9 Jan-30 Jun 45. CWBN 85 - 0.3. 44

 Memo, Danek for CofS XIV Corps, 25 Feb 45, no sub. XIV Corps File, Rpt, Cml Munitions. 45

 Ltr, CmlO 6th Div to CmlO Sixth Army, 1 May, sub: Cml Warfare Weekly Opns Rtp.

319.1 Sixth Army Rcds, Weekly Activity Rpts, Divs. 46

 (1) Ltr, CG 6th Div to CG Sixth Army through CG XIV Corps, 5 Mar 45, sub: Unsatisfactory

Condition of 4.2-inch Cml Mortar Ammunition, and 1st and 2d Inds thereto. XIV Corps File — Rpts,

Cml Munitions. (2) Memo, Sixth Army CmlO to Sixth Army G-4, 6 Feb 45. Sixth Army Rcds,

400.34 Equip.
510 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

of mountains confronting I Corps in its drive to the northeast were

typical of the Luzon terrain. A 6th Division report gave examples of

the use of screening smokes: " ... to deny the enemy observation during infantry attacks, to cover the construction of supply roads, and to

screen carrying parties and evacuation of wounded."

 47

 As for the

matter of education, supported commanders, once they had seen the

results of WP as an antipersonnel and incendiary agent, were much less

loath to call for WP rounds in support of their operations.

Perhaps the best barometer of the reputation of white phosphorus was

the official HE-WP ratio for mortar ammunition which fluctuated back

and forth between 80-20 and 60-40, in favor of high explosives. In

August 1945 General MacArthur's headquarters established the ratio

at 60 HE-4O WP, based upon the experience of the major combat

commands of the theater.48

While XIV Corps landed against light resistance and faced only

token enemy forces until the Fort Stotsenburg fighting, I Corps had a

tough time almost from the start. The enemy had established strong

defenses on I Corps left flank, made more formidable by the rugged

mass of hills and mountains. The fact that the Japanese headquarters

lay to the rear of these defenses tended to make enemy resistance all

the more tenacious. The divisions of I Corps faced not one but a series

of difficult missions. Elements were to drive southeast across central

Luzon, cover the left flank of the southward advance of XIV Corps,

and advance north and northeast in the direction of the towns of

Damortis and Rosario and an important road junction just beyond.

An immediate I Corps objective was the enemy position in the

Cabaruan Hills, fifteen miles inland from the Lingayen beaches in

the sector of the 6th Division. On 22 January Company A, 98th

Chemical Mortar Battalion, operating as a unit for the first time on

Luzon, supported the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, in what was expected to be the culminating effort against Japanese resistance in the

Cabaruan Hills.49 The mortar platoons went into positions about 200

yards from one another in defiladed terrain. Each unit maintained its

own observation post on one of the highest hills in the area. These OP's

47

 Digest of Staff Sectional Rpts, 6th Div, Luzon Campaign. 48

 (1) Ltr, Gen Hq USAFPAC to CG's First, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth Armies, et al, 16 Aug 45.

Sixth Army Rcds, 471 Ammunition. (2) The ETO arrived at the same percentage although no

ratio was definitely prescribed. Rowan comments, 19 Jan 61. 49

 See Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, for a description of this action.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 511

were located about 350 yards in front of the mortars and overlooked the

enemy positions 600 yards to the front. Wire connected the observation posts with the mortars, although once the platoons moved forward they would have to rely exclusively upon radio communication.

At this stage in the fighting the forward observers of all three platoons

fired at targets selected by the infantry battalion commander. Ammunition resupply was the province of the regimental supply officer

who delivered the shells directly to the platoon positions. When the

mortar units displaced forward the regimental supply trucks kept pace.

After laying down a heavy barrage on an area of ten artillery squares,

Company A placed white phosphorus on the corners of the enemy

position to mark it for aerial bombardment. After the air strike the

mortars blanketed the enemy area with WP as the rifle companies of

the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, moved forward. Companies E and F

advanced along opposite sides of a ridge that led into the right flank

of the Japanese positions. Company G, located initially in front of

the objective, used the smoke to move through a ravine and into the

left flank of the enemy-held hill mass. The 1st and 2d Platoons of the

mortar company displaced forward in rear of the cannon company; the

3d remained ready to fire on any target of opportunity. The three

mortar forward observers as well as the mortar company commander,

Capt. G. B. Doolittle, accompanied Company G. During the advance

radios served as the only means of communication.

Company G experienced initial success in its flanking maneuver but

was suddenly hit on three sides by Japanese fire. At the same time the

enemy pinned down Companies E and F. This unexpected opposition

came from two sources, from the enemy that survived the preattack

bombardments and from those who had slipped into positions under

the very smoke that concealed the American advance.

Losing all of its officers, Company G began to scatter without regard

for dead, wounded, and equipment. Captain Doolittle of the mortar

company managed to halt the withdrawal. He contacted the infantry

battalion command post with his radio, the only means of communication left on the hill, and received orders to take charge. The support

infantry platoon maneuvered to the left of the enemy's position, relieving pressure on the front. Doolittle called for fire from his three mortar

platoons, which by this time had all withdrawn to their original firing

positions. White phosphorus mortar rounds not only blinded the
512 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Japanese positions but set fire to brush and grass in which they had

taken cover. As enemy opposition ceased, Captain Doolittle organized

parties to evacuate the wounded and then led the force in an orderly

withdrawal back to the positions from which the attack began. Several days later Cabaruan Hills fell to another infantry battalion.50

During the fighting with I Corps the mortars of the 98th Battalion

won a fair reputation for their ability to cope with enemy armor.

Chemical mortarmen received credit for destroying at least 25 tanks,

some of them dug in, and shared credit with the smaller mortars for

knocking out 15 or 20 more. On 31 January, for example, after withdrawing from the edge of the town of Munoz with elements of the

20th Infantry, a mortar platoon forward observer directed fire on two

enemy tanks. A direct hit knocked out one of the vehicles and subsequent mortar fire disabled a second. The mortar platoon observer

crept up to this tank, jumped upon it, and hurled a grenade inside. As

the tank burst into flames, the observer escaped unharmed. Four days

later two Japanese tanks raced along a road directly toward a chemical

mortar observation post, firing as they came. The observer directed his

mortars at the first tank, setting it afire less than fifty yards from his

position. The other tank turned and fled, only to be bracketed by mortar rounds. Stalled and with broken tracks, the enemy tank was set

aflame by a final mortar round.51

Infantry commanders expressed satisfaction with the support given

by the 98th. The 6th Division stated its preference for 4.2-inch mortar

support against emplaced tanks and field pieces. After the fall of

Lupao, a town vigorously defended by the Japanese, the commander

of the 35th Infantry declared "the battle would have lasted days longer

if the 4.2's had not been available."

 52

During mid-February 1945 I Corps began what proved to be a 4-

month drive to the north to rout the enemy from the tenacious posi50

 (1) Entry No. 1, 20th Inf Unit Journal, 21-22 Jan 45. 306 - INF(20)-0.7 (26300) 16-25

Jan 45. (2) Ltr, CO 98th Cml Mortar Bn to CmlO I Corps, 20 Mar 45, Rpt of Cml Warfare

Activities. CWBN 98-0.3 (24423). This source mistakenly dates this action as 23 January 1945

when, in fact, it took place a day earlier. (3) Battle of the Cabaruan Hills, 12-25 Jan 45. CMLHO.

(4) Lt. Col. Alexander Batlin, "98th Chemical Mortar Battalion," Armed Forces Chemical Journal,

vol. VII, No. 2 (October, 1953). 51

 Another technique was the use of the fire of one mortar to drive tanks into preregistered areas,

to be neutralized or destroyed by the weapons of the whole platoon. 52

 (1) Ltr, CG 6th Div to Distr, 17 Jul 45, sub: Rpt by Hq 6th Div, p. 32. (2) 98th Cml

Mortar Bn, Fifth Month Luzon.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 513

tions of his mountain fastness.53 In this slow, gruelling campaign the

33d Division advanced toward the port of San Fernando and toward

Baguio, summer capital of the Philippines. The 32d Division crept

relentlessly along the tortuous Villa Verde Trail toward the heavily

fortified Sante Fe—Imugan area, while the 25th Division moved north

along Highway 5 from San Jose to Digdig and eventually Sante Fe.

During the second week of February the companies of the 9 8th

Battalion received assignments which were to last almost until the close

of the Luzon operation: Company A was attached to the 32d Division,

Company B to the 33d, and Company C remained with the 25th. On

21 April Company C, 85th Chemical Mortar Battalion, joined the

forces of I Corps, supporting the spectacular drive made by the 37th

Division from Sante Fe to Aparri on the northern coast of Luzon.

The 98th Battalion had to contend not only with the enemy but with

the terrain and weather. The mountainous region in which the enemy

held commanding positions, many of them prepared in advance, gave

every advantage to the defenders. These positions, often in defilade,

provided ideal targets for the accurate, high angle fire of the 4.2-inch

mortars. Forward observation by ground parties, the normal procedure,

was hazardous and difficult because of the superiority of Japanese observation posts. Sometimes the mortar platoons overcame this disadvantage by using artillery observers in liaison planes to conduct registration and to fire for effect.54

 During March and early April the rain and

muddy ground curtailed mortar shell expenditures by bogging down

ammunition resupply and by compelling the constant re-emplacement

of the base plates which sank out of sight after one or two rounds.

Nonetheless the weapon proved effective. Company C fired 19,000

rounds (the two other companies fired about the same number) and

received credit for sealing about thirty-five caves and killing more than

250 Japanese caught in the open. The unit marked eight targets for air

strike with a precision that brought praise both from Fifth Air Force

and infantry commanders.

In fighting along the Villa Verde Trail, Company A fired several missions to repel enemy counterattacks, most of them during hours of

darkness. Mortarmen at one time manned infantry battalion defense

53

 Unless otherwise noted, the account of this part of the campaign has been based upon unit records

of the 98th and 85th Chemical Mortar Battalions and on After Action Reports of the 25th, 32d,

and 33d Divisions and their components. 54

 98th Cml Mortar Bn, First 120 Days on Luzon, p. 44.
514 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

positions, at the same time maintaining uninterrupted fire support

of the front-line companies. Smoke shell was used for screening and

casualty effect as well as for burning off occasional grassy slopes, capable

of concealing the enemy, which lay in the path of the advancing

infantry.

In situations like those found on Luzon, where the weapons companies of the mortar battalions were placed under the operational control of the supported divisions, battalion headquarters played an

inconspicious but important role. In the case of the 98th, for example,

the headquarters and headquarters company established a permanent

camp in the town of Carmen where the unit could support its weapons

companies equally well. Here was the battalion rest area, and here

were the battalion personnel, including weapons company clerks, an

arrangement which permitted the battalion commander maximum

utilization of his administrative personnel. Headquarters controlled

the companies by radio and by liaison officers. The Signal Corps Radio

284 served as the basis for this communications network, proving

satisfactory at times at distances twice its normal range of thirty miles.55

Liaison officers made daily visits to each of the weapons companies, contacting as many platoons as time and the situation allowed. During the

course of these visits the liaison officers assisted with administrative

problems, brought forward maintenance parts and certain supplies

from the battalion stock, and exchanged information about the situation as it affected operations. Battalion maintained both a motor pool

and radio maintenance facilities which repaired company equipment.

Repairs of 85th Battalion equipment involving third and fourth echelon

maintenance were turned over to ordnance maintenance organizations

because of the lack of appropriate CWS units. Ideally, a chemical service platoon attached to division took care of the maintenance of ammunition at division dumps.

The mortar company commander set up his command post in the

vicinity of the division command post or occasionally with the regiment

in reserve. The mortar platoons fired for the assault battalion in each

of the three regiments. Displacement forward, in 1⁄4-ton trucks and

55

 (1) 98th Cml Mortar Bn, Sixth Month Luzon. (2) Batlin, " 98th Chemical Mortar Battalion,"

Armed Forces Chemical Journal, vol. VII, No. 2 (October, 1953). (3) The 85th Battalion experienced

difficulties with SCR-284 during the hours of darkness when its effective range was reduced to six or

seven miles. 85th Cml Mortar Bn in the Luzon Campaign, The First 120 Days (hereafter cited as

85th, First 120 Days Luzon).
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 515

trailers, came upon orders of the infantry battalion commander. As

in the action described at Cabaruan Hills, the mortar platoons maintained communications with the supported infantry during displacement by SCR-300 radios. Mortar platoons of the 98th Battalion maintained 35 rounds for each gun, while a 21⁄2 -ton truck loaded with 300

rounds stood by at the company command post ready to be sent forward whenever the need arose. Location of the firing positions of the

mortar platoons varied from unit to unit. In the 98th Battalion, Company A's platoons usually were established within the infantry battalion

perimeter, most likely with the support infantry company. Company

C, on the other hand, often set up its mortars within the infantry battalion CP perimeter.

One of the difficulties faced by the chemical mortar units on Luzon

was an almost constant shortage of manpower. The 98th Chemical

Mortar Battalion operated for the six months of the campaign understrength by 5 officers and 130 enlisted men. The 82d Battalion, while

possessing a surplus of enlisted men until mid-March, was below

strength from that date until the end of the campaign. The 85th Battalion experienced similar troubles.56

 The lack of men was aggravated

by a most inadequate number of mortar companies for the simultaneous

support of 4 divisions in I Corps, 4 in XIV Corps, and 3 in XI Corps.

Reciprocal familiarity between chemical mortar and combat infantry personnel continued to be less than perfect. It was often a twoedged situation; infantry officers were unacquainted with 4.2-inch

mortar potentialities, and chemical personnel, from division chemical

officers to those of the mortar company, were unfamiliar with the

combat techniques of the infantry. All chance had passed of attaining

the ideal solution—joint training for chemical and infantry personnel,

or at least familiarization lectures and demonstrations, before attachment in actual combat.57

56

 (1) 82d, 85th, and 98th Cml Mortar Bns S-3 Rpts, passim. Sixth Army Rcds. (2) 85th,

First 120 Days Luzon, p. II. (3) 98th Cml Mortar Bn, Hist Data Cards.

57

 (1) 82d, First 120 Days Luzon, pp. 13-14. (2) 85th, First 120 Days Luzon, p. 7. (3) 98th,

Fifth Month Luzon, pp. 17-19. (4) Personal Ltr, CmlO I Corps to ACCWS for Field Opns,

2 Aug 45.
516 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Central Pacific Area

The Central Pacific Area lacked adequate mortar battalion support

throughout the entire war.58 Despite the efforts of Colonel Unmacht,

theater chemical officer, the only mortar unit available prior to May

1944 was the 91st Chemical Company (Motorized) which had been

stationed in Hawaii under various designations since 1920. This unit

was used in field tests, demonstrations, and joint training exercises, including amphibious assaults with several infantry divisions.

The over-all shortage of chemical mortar battalions and the higher

priority of other theaters prevented shipment of these units to the Central Pacific Area until the arrival early in May 1944 of the 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion. Four months later the theater activated the 189th

Chemical Mortar Company (Separate). The only other mortar units

in CENPAC were the 71st and 72d Chemical Mortar Battalions

which did not reach Hawaii until mid-1945, too late to see action

before the war ended.59

The first chemical mortar action in the Central Pacific took place

during the fighting on Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands when the 91st

Company commanded by Capt. Joseph E. Atchison fired in support

of the 7th Division. During five days in early February 1944 the unit,

hampered by an ammunition shortage and severed communications

lines, expended about 500 rounds while losing 1 man killed and 14

wounded.60 The next mortar unit to see action was Company C, 88th

Chemical Mortar Battalion, which landed on Saipan in the Marianas

with the 27th Infantry Division. Company A of the 88th played a

minor role in nearby Guam. In mid-September 1944 Company D of

the same battalion fired for the 81st Infantry Division on Angaur and

Peleliu in the Palau group. Unlike Companies A and C, rushed to

the Marianas within a month after arriving in the theater, Company D

received an adequate period of orientation in Hawaii. Offsetting the

advantage of thorough and extensive training was a shortage of enlisted men and motor transport. The virtual certainty that mortars and

58

 References used in this section consist of: Unit Rcds of the 88th Cml Mortar Bn, 91st Cml

Mortar Co (Separate), AAR's of Tenth Army; 96th, 77th, and 7th Divs; 32d and 184th Inf Regts;

and the 5th Marine Regt. 5 9AG Hist Data Cards, 91st and 189th Cml Mortar Cos and 88th, 71st, and 72d Cml Mortar Bns. 60

 (1) Ltr, CO 91st Cml Co to CG 7th Div, 18 Feb 44. (2) MPR CWS Ammo Sup, Sec 2F,

Feb 44, p. 2a.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 517

ammunition would often have to be man-hauled led to the decision to

divide the company into two 5-gun platoons.

Company D landed in the ninth wave on Red Beach, Angaur Island,

on 17 September and supported the 322d Infantry in the Solome Lake

and Ramanantelo Hill areas. Attached to division artillery, the platoons

fired under the direction of artillery air observers. Captured Japanese

documents referred to the 4.2-inch as "that high caliber mortar," while

supported infantry commanders reported that the weapon caused heavy

enemy casualties.

Company D's 1st Platoon moved to Peleliu on 16 October, followed

in a week by the 2d Platoon and company headquarters. Attached to

the 321st Infantry and later the 323d Infantry Regiments, Company D

fired normal night missions of harassment and defense as well as fourteen barrages which ignited napalm from fire bombs dropped by planes

among the innumerable enemy caves and trenches.

The final campaign in the Central Pacific—operations in the Ryukyus group—saw the participation of the entire 88th Battalion as well

as the 91st Company.61 In order to gain a limited fleet anchorage and

seaplane base before the invasion, the 77th Division, with Company A

attached, made an unopposed landing on Kerama Retto. The assault on

the main objective, Okinawa, took place on 1 April 1945. Companies

B and C of the 88th, attached to the 96th Division, landed about H

plus 1 in the ninth and eleventh waves, respectively, in the vicinity of

Chatan. Company B, commanded by Capt. Edward L. Lockman, Jr.,

supported the 383d Infantry moving south along the west coast to

the strong enemy defenses on Kakazu Ridge. Company C, under the

command of Capt. Rutherford H. Spessard, Jr., supported the 382d

Infantry in its advance south to Nishibaru Ridge. The 91st Company,

Captain Them commanding, went in on the eighth wave with the 7th

Division across Purple and Orange Beaches opposite Kadena Airfield and

supported the division advance to the east coast and down to the eastern

approaches of the Shuri Line. At first, chemical mortar support was not

available for the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions.62

Chemical mortars on Okinawa, although effective, were used almost

entirely for little outside of normal missions fired according to standard

methods. The only exceptions occurred when the 91st Company fired

61

 For a complete description of the campaign, see Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle. 62

 (1) Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Campaign, Cml Warfare, pp. II-XIII-1-2. (2)

7th Div, Opn Rpt, pp. 1-2. (3) 96th Div, Action Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign, sec. VII, pt. I, p. 3.
518 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

a few times under direction of a Navy liaison observer, and when Sound

Locator Teams Nos. 3 and 5 were attached to Companies C and D.

From 12 April to 8 May these teams directed some firing at point targets but the extreme ranges of these targets limited the use of the mortars. During the first week, at least five Japanese night attacks, supported by tanks and artillery and directed against the 96th Division's

perimeter, were repulsed with the help of combined 4.2-inch mortarartillery fire. In even lighter firing in support of the 7th Division, the

mortars laid down small preparations by day and fired to repel Japanese

infiltration raids at night. From the second week in April until midJune, the pattern of chemical mortar support included preparations

preceding infantry advance, followed, in many cases, by screens to

cover U.S. troops engaged either in consolidating their positions or withdrawing with their casualties under murderous Japanese artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. The 4.2-inch mortars than engaged in

counterbattery and neutralization missions during the remaining daylight hours, followed by night harassing and interdictory fire.

On 21 April a mortarman from the 91st Chemical Mortar Company

played a prominent role in repulsing a Japanese attack on the Skyline

Ridge positions of the 7th Division. Here is a graphic account of this

action:

When, east of the road cut, a man in the stalled third platoon, Company E, was

killed, Sgt. Theodore R. MacDonnell, a 91st Chemical Mortar Company observer, was

impelled to drastic action. MacDonnell had frequently joined men on the line and

shown qualities of a determined infantryman. Now, infuriated, he gathered up a handful of grenades and ran in the face of the machine-gun fire along the slope to a point

underneath the spot where he believed the enemy gun to be located, and then started

up the 20-foot embankment. When he looked over the crest he failed to spot the gun,

but he did see three enemy soldiers and grenaded them. He made two trips to the

bottom of the embankment for fresh supplies of grenades, but it was not until his third

trip to the crest that he located the machine gun. MacDonnell then slid back to the

bottom, grabbed a BAR, and mounted the embankment with it, only to have the

weapon jam after the first shot. He skidded to the bottom, seized a carbine, and went

back up for the fifth time. On reaching the crest, he stood up and fired point-blank

into the machine-gun position, killing the gunner and two covering riflemen. MacDonnell then hurled the machine gun down the slope behind him. A mortar that he found

in the position was also sent crashing down the hillside. Sergeant MacDonnell was

later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on this occasion.63

63

 Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, p. 226.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 519

In an average period of seventy days in the line, each mortar company on Okinawa fired approximately 25,000 rounds, a fourth of which

was WP shell. Even this rather limited amount of smoke shell appeared

excessive to Tenth Army field artillery officers, particularly as in their

opinion an "indiscriminate use of smoke, not only by artillery, but by

other supporting weapons, obscured both air and ground observation."

Most of the Army and Marine divisions participating in the operation

commented favorably on the performance of the chemical mortars and

their crews. Both the 96th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division recommended that a chemical mortar company, and preferably a

battalion, be attached regularly to a division. The Tenth Army suggested that each division receive the support of a mortar battalion and

that the battalion be employed as a unit only and not fragmented by a

series of attachments.64

Of the problems encountered by chemical mortar units on Okinawa,

shortage of ammunition was unquestionably the most serious. The 88th

Battalion took in three units of fire and the 91st Company took in five

on the basis of 100 rounds per unit of fire, at the ratio of 7O-percent

HE and 3O-percent WP. After this initial supply was consumed, a

shortage, which varied from limited to critical, prevailed for the balance of the operation. On at least four separate occasions, mortar companies had to reduce expenditures or cease firing altogether for periods

of from a few days to two weeks. Rain and mud, particularly after 1

May, bogged down ammunition resupply and made it difficult for the

chemical mortars, as well as other supporting weapons, to keep up with

the infantry. The over-all shortage of chemical mortar shell was partly

a result of the higher priority of the European theater. But as in the

case on Luzon, 35,000 of the 87,400 rounds of high explosive ammunition received from the zone of interior were in lots suspected of having

defective fuzes. Indeed, a muzzle burst was reported by Company B of

the 88th on 13 May, the date on which 14 men were listed as wounded

in action. The Navy transferred 27,000 rounds of HE shell not em64

 (1) 10th Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Campaign, ch. X, sec. 3; ch. II, sec. 6. (2) 1st

Marine Div, Special Action Rpt, Okinawa Nansei Shoto, ch. X, p. 13. (3) History of Cml Sec

AFMIDPAC and Predecessor Comds, 7 Dec 41-2 Sep 45, 4 vols., IV, an. II-i, 22, 33, 49. (4)

383d RCT S-3 Rpts, 10, 29 Apr 45.
520 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ployed in amphibious support operations, but the use of much of this

was "restricted to military necessity." The average mortar company

expenditures of approximately 335 rounds per day was made possible

only by substitution of WP for HE shell, by the above Navy transfers,

by dispatch of 50,000 heavy-weight M4 rounds from Hawaii, and by

the replacement of all defective fuzes, shipped by high priority air shipment from Hawaii and the United States.65

Amphibious Employment of the 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar

Before the War Department authorized the high explosive mission for

the 4.2-inch mortar and before any chemical mortar units reached the

theaters of operations, the CWS was developing doctrine for the use

of the mortar in assault landings. Beginning in the summer of 1942

this doctrine was developed at the Amphibious Training Center, Camp

Edwards, Mass., and continued at Camp Carabelle, Fla. (later Camp

Gordon Johnston). Overseas, the U.S. Assault Training Center in

England advocated the use of 4.2-inch WP shell for smoke screens for

assault landings except in the case of offshore winds, when only high

explosives would be used.66 Elements of the 3d Chemical Mortar Battalion sailed from North Africa for Sicily prepared to support the 3d

Division with mortars mounted on six assault craft, a measure made

unnecessary with the attainment of tactical surprise.67

Despite these preparations in the European theater the amphibious

employment of the 4.2-inch mortar occurred only in the Pacific. Colonel Unmacht first suggested the technique to Navy officers in July

1943 at the Makua, Oahu, demonstrations. The Navy liked the idea

and played around with it for almost a year. The advantage of the mortar boat plan was that it provided assault troops with heavy effective

fire during that period in the landings when they were most vulnerable

—the time between the lifting of the naval bombardment and the establishment of supporting weapons on shore.

65

 (1) Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Campaign, ch. II, sec. XIII, Chemical Warfare,

pp. II-XIII-4, 7. (2) Tenth Army Island Comd, Action Rpt Okinawa, 30 Jun 45, pp. 8-XII-3, 4.

(3) History CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. I-d, 63, 69-71, 82; V, an. II i, 22. (4) Rad CM-IN 535.2,

6 May 45. (5) Rad CM-IN 22045, 23 May 45. 66

 (1) Ltr, Chief Field Serv CWS to CG SOS, 27 May 42, sub: Amph Use of 4.2-inch Cml Mortar.

(2) USATC ETO, Conf on Landing Assaults, 24 May-23 Jun 43, 2-c. See addresses by Maj Gen

Roberts, Brigadier Wales, and Col Rowan. (3) USATC Tng Memo AMPH-4A CWS, Jan 44. 67

 History of 3d Cml Bn in Campaign of Sicily, pp. 1-2.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 521

In a remarkable case of CWS-Navy co-operation, the kind which

typified the activities of Colonel Unmacht on Oahu, there emerged

a new type of craft, one armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. It

was not born without difficulty. The Navy provided three LCT's for

the project and later several LCI's. The latter, dubbed LCI (M) (the M

for mortar), were to become the standard mortar-landing craft combination.68

One of the principal mechanical difficulties in firing the 4.2-inch

mortar from the deck of a ship was the development of a suitable

mount. The Navy experimented with various devices including one

which mounted the mortar solidly in the deck of an LCT. Fourteen

rounds fired from the weapon were sufficient to shear the bolts holding

the base cap cup to the deck. The mount finally adopted consisted

of a wooden box reinforced with steel and filled with a mixture of sand

and sawdust. Upon this mixture sat a wooden subbase, the top of

which was notched to receive the spades of the base plate. These mounts

proved adequate, although excessive firing, such as at Iwo Jima, caused

them to break down.

The first attempt to get the mortar boats into action proved abortive.

Favorably impressed with these vessels during seven tests again run at

Makua in the spring of 1944, the Navy decided to use three of the 4.2-

inch-mortar-equipped LCT's in the invasion of Saipan. These plans

went awry during the assault rehearsal off Kahoolawe, one of the

Hawaiian group. Each of the three LCT's was lashed to the deck of

a landing ship tank, for the decision had been made for the smaller

vessel to make the long journey to the scene of operations in this piggyback fashion. During an extremely heavy sea two of the LCT's broke

their lashings and were washed overboard. The third LCT escaped this

fate only to be destroyed at Pearl Harbor when its LST suddenly exploded. Fifty-nine people lost their lives in the resulting holocaust.69

Before the end of the Marianas campaign, the Navy revived the

mortar boat project. This time the weapons were to be mounted on

landing craft, infantry (LCI), four of which were fitted out, each

with three 4.2-inch mortars.70 One weapon was mounted forward in

the center of the ship, the others were amidships, one on the port side

68

 Ltr, CCmlO CENPAC to ACCWS for Field Opns, 24 Apr 44, sub: Use of 4.2 Mortars in LCT's. 69

 (1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-d, 37-38. (2) Maj. Carl W. Hoffman, Saipan: The

Beginning of the End (Washington, 1950), pp. 32-33. 70

 Ltr, CCmlO Central Pacific Area to ACCWS for Field Opns, 24 Jul 44.
522 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

FIRING 4.2-lNCH CHEMICAL MORTARS FROM THE DECK OF AN LST in the Pacific.

and one on the starboard. All fired forward, over the bow. Beneath

the mortar mounts the deck was reinforced with steel plating. The

two forward troop compartments served as magazines for mortar ammunition, a normal complement being 1,200 rounds. Maj. Leland

E. Anderson of the 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion commanded the

mortarmen who had come from diverse sources: 4 officers from the

88th, 12 enlisted men from the 91st Chemical Mortar Company, and

4 officers and 88 enlisted men from the 111th Infantry Regiment.

Designated as LCI (M) Nos. 739, 740, 741, and 742, the mortar boats

were earmarked for the campaign in the Palaus. The four boat crews

prepared for the operation by test runs at the Makua site in the Hawaiian Islands and by participation in the invasion rehearsal at Guadalcanal.71

71

 (1) Maj Leland E. Anderson, Rpt on Mortar Activity Aboard USS LCI (M)'s 739, 740, 741, 742,

30 Jul-30 Sep 44, dated 10 Oct 44. (2) History, AFMIDPAC, CWS IV, an II-d, 39, 74-75.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 523

Palau Islands

The first combat employment of chemical mortar boats took place

on 15 September 1944 in the Palau Islands.72 Led by Major Anderson,

mortar boats 739, 740, 741, and 742 supported the III Amphibious

Corps landings on Peleliu made by the 1st Marine Division. During

the initial run on the island LCI (M) 's, moving in at a speed of less than

three knots, fired 100 rounds of high explosive ammunition from

positions 3,000 to 1,300 yards offshore at the very slow rate of one

round per mortar every two minutes. As the mortar boats drew closer,

the range of the weapons was decreased by reducing the number of

increments.73 This method of fire was sometimes known as Plan BAKER.

Mortar fire covered the northern flank of White Beach for a depth of

200 to 300 yards, with only a few water bursts being observed. These

supporting boats lifted their fire as friendly aircraft strafed the beach

only to resume it from fixed positions 900 to 1,300 yards offshore.

The mortars then placed harassing fire upon the dense woods, areas

of defilade, and possible enemy observation posts and installations on

the hill to the northwest. Good dispersion resulted from this fire,

delivered at ranges varying between 2,100 and 2,610 yards, although

the thick foliage and defiladed areas precluded effective observation.

The employment of mortar boats from fixed offshore positions was

often designated Plan CHARLIE.

A second mission at Peleliu began about an hour after the end of

the first run and consisted of the bombardment of the same hill area

northwest of the beach area, its rocky top by now a mass of rubble.

Firing at ranges of 3,200 yards, each mortar delivered two rounds of

high explosive shell a minute from more or less stationary positions

1,800 to 2,100 yards offshore. While winds and currents at Peleliu

were not strong enough to cause excessive drift, the little movement

which did occur made precise firing difficult. Radar ranges taken by

LCI (M) 741, the flagship, as well as visual cross-bearings and fall of

shot observations, helped to fix the ship positions and to determine

ranges as the vessels drifted or maneuvered. In any event, the resulting

dispersion was not detrimental to the general mission of laying down

72

 For a complete account of the use of mortar boats in this operation, see Maj. Leland E. Anderson,

Employment of LCI (M) in Peleliu and Anguar Operation, Chemical Corps School Monograph, 1949-

50 series. 73

 Mortar range is determined by elevation of the barrel and by the addition of increments, small

rectangles of powder-impregnated paper, which serve as the propellant charge.
524 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

area harassing fire. Enemy mortar fire during the two runs proved

ineffective, most rounds falling short.

Firing from a moving boat had little effect upon the accuracy of

the mortar. In rough seas lateral, but not vertical, accuracy was impaired. And the latter was the more important factor because of the

possibility of hitting friendly troops as they advanced inland.74

Two days later, on 17 September, the same four mortar boats supported the 81st Division assault on the island of Angaur, also in the

Palaus. Instead of executing Plan BAKER immediately, as had been

done at Peleliu, all craft fired on abbreviated Plan CHARLIE—6 to 10

rounds per mortar per minute for 7 minutes from positions 2,400

yards offshore. The group of gunboats then moved toward shore at

a speed of four knots. It took 10 minutes to come within 1,000

yards of the beach, during which time each of the mortars fired at

the rapid rate of 20 rounds per minute. Excessive noise made the

commands of the fire control officer virtually inaudible while smoke

did much to hinder observation. Despite these handicaps most of

the 2,345 rounds landed in the target area and inflicted extensive

damage.

On the following day infantry troops on shore, pinned down by

rifles and machine guns, called for supporting fire. There was time

for only 2 runs, one of 6 and the other of 8 minutes, at speeds of 4

and 3 knots, respectively. The target area, located on the northwest

end of the island, varied in width from 500 to 850 yards and extended

from the shore to a depth of 900 yards. At an average firing rate of

5 rounds per mortar per minute, 830 rounds fell in the area. Mine

fields prevented the mortar boats from approaching closer than 1,500

yards from shore, but the effectiveness of the mortar barrage was

such that 3 minutes after it had been lifted the troops, previously

pinned down by enemy fire, encountered no opposition on advancing

into the heavy woods.

At the end of the Palau operation CWS officers recommended that

mortars on boats making the run toward the shore maintain a constant

elevation of 1,000 mils with traverse dependent upon the course of

the craft. They also suggested that mortar fire be kept within 400 74 (1) CmlO Central Pacific Base Comd to CmlO USAFICPA, 14 Jul 44, Rpt of Tests on Use of

4.2-inch Mortars in LCT's. (2) Action Rpt Comdr Amphib Group 2—Iwo Jima, pt. IV, Naval

Gunfire Support, sec. B, Comments and Recommendations on Fire Support Employ of Gunboat,

Mortar, and 5-inch Rocket LCI's. Both in CMLHO.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 525

yards of the assault troops and that mortar ships maintain an offshore

range of between 3,200 and 2,000 yards as a precaution against enemy

fire. The latter recommendation was disregarded; subsequently, mortar ships came within 500 yards of the shore. Suggestions about the

more effective installation of the mortars on the ships were either not

adopted or proved to be without merit.75

Leyte Gulf

Two groups of mortar ships supported the landings at Leyte Gulf

on 20 October 1944. Each group was composed of four LCI(M)'s,

with two LCI (A)'s serving as ammunition ships. Maj. Richmond H.

Skinner, CWS, exercised over-all command of mortar firing personnel

of the groups. Men from the 98th Infantry Division stationed at

Hawaii manned all twenty-four mortars in the two groups and fired

in support of the 7th and 96th Divisions under XXIV Corps in the

Leyte landings made near Dulag. From the date of departure from

Manus Island on 11 October until the objective was reached, these

new mortar crews received training in firing methods and commands.

One of the groups (it was known as Group 2) executed Plan BAKER

at Orange Beach 2 as mortar boats moved in at a speed of 11⁄2 knots,

firing from 2,200 to 400 yards offshore and expending about 480

rounds of HE in 20 minutes. A slow rate of fire of two rounds per

gun per minute was maintained while the range was gradually decreased

from 2,600 to 740 yards. Twelve hundred yards from the shore enemy

mortars or howitzers straddled the mortar boats without causing casualties or damage. The weather was ideal and the sea relatively calm.

After execution of Plan BAKER these mortar boats fired from fixed

positions (Plan CHARLIE) on enemy positions in the ravines and on

reverse slopes of the Labiranan Head Ravine and Catmon Hill area,

silencing the Japanese guns which had been plaguing the troops on

the beaches. According to one Navy observer, this mission, completed

without observation from computed data and fired at distances from

1,000 to 1,900 yards offshore, proved accurate beyond expectations.

Later, Group 2 moved back to the transport area, twelve miles to the

75

 (1) ExecO 88th Cml Mortar Bn, Rpt on Mortar Activity Aboard USS LCI(M) 739, 740, 741,

742, 30 Jul-30 Sep 44, dated 10 Oct 44, pp. 4-6, 15-17, 21-28. (2) Comdr Admin Comd Amphib

Forces U.S. Pac Fleet, Plans for Delivery of 4.2" Mortar Fire from LCI(M)'s Equipped With M-1

Modified Cml Mortar Mounts, 11 Jul 45, p. 1. (3) Excerpts from Opns Div, Info Bull, vol. III,

No. 7, 13 Dec 44. (4) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an II-d, 61, 78, 79.
526 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

rear, for resupply. It received no further missions that day. Thereafter, until they withdrew on the morning of A plus 5, the mortar

boats of this group used smoke pots to screen the large vessels from

air raids during the hours of both morning and evening twilight.

On the morning of the attack on the Leyte beaches the other group

of mortar boats (known as Group 3) fired on targets south of Yellow

Beach as far as the mouth of the Daguitan River near the town of

Dulag. Spaced from 50 to 75 yards apart the mortar boats began firing

1,500 yards from shore and continued as they slowly moved in to a

position 400 yards from the beaches. This bombardment blanketed an

area 800 yards wide and 900 yards deep. Fifteen minutes after this

beach shelling phase, the mortars began firing on call. Within the next

five hours infantry requests for support resulted in the expenditure of

almost 4,500 rounds. The ships slowly drifted to the left directing

their fire on enemy targets on the south bank of the Daguitan River

and on the approaches of a bridge across that river, an effort which

drove enemy tanks from the road leading to the bridge.

Both mortar boat groups received written commendations from the

leaders of the flotillas which they supported, as well as from the commanders of Amphibious Groups 3 and 6. Admiral Forrest B. Royal,

commander of Group 6, stated: "The performance of LCI's equipped

with 4.2" Army mortars was excellent. The mortar fire was delivered

in a rapid, accurate, and effective manner." Admiral Royal compared

the effectiveness of the mortar ships and the rocket ships.76 While

praising the "highly successful accomplishments" of both weapons, he

pointed out that the rocket ships were of no further use after their

single crash concentration because they were unable to reload in time

to continue covering the assault waves. On the other hand, the mortars

could fire without letup.77

Lingayen Gulf

For a short time after the recall of the mortar boats from the Leyte

fighting, future plans for their use were hazy because of the lack of

76

 3d Ind, Adm Forrest B. Royal, USN, Comdr Group 6 Amphib Forces U.S. Pac Fleet, to CINCPAC,

21 Nov 44, to Ltr, CO USS LCI 660, 31 Oct 44, sub: USS LCI(M) 660—Action Rpt of Leyete Opn.

Cited in History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-d, 100. 77

 (1) Comdr Amphib Group 6 and Task Unit 79.2, Rpt of Leyte Opn, 4 Nov 44, pp. 5, 7-8. (2)

Ltr, Comdr Task Unit 79.6.21 and Comdr Group 17 to COMINCH, 4 Nov 44, sub: Action Rpt.

(3) Ltr, Comdr LCI (M) Group 18 Temp and Comdr Task Unit 79.7.3 to COMINCH, 23 Oct 44,

sub: Action Rpt, Invasion of Philippines, Island of Leyte. All in CWS 314.7.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 527

information regarding the Luzon operation.78 Both groups did proceed

to New Guinea to pick up men from the 98th Chemical Mortar Battalion, a step made necessary when four landing craft, infantry, which

had served as ammunition carriers during the Leyte action, were converted to mortar boats. All mortar craft participated in the midDecember training exercise in Huon Gulf, which simulated the landings

that were to take place at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon.

As it turned out, three separate mortar boat groups supported the

Sixth Army landings on Luzon. One of these was Task Unit 79.8.1,

composed of six LCI (M)'s and commanded by Lt. Comdr. G. W.

Hannett and accompanied by Maj. Richmond Skinner. A second group

was formed from the converted ammunition carriers, with mortarmen

from the 98th Chemical Mortar Battalion. A third group of three

LCI (M)'s had its mortars manned by marines, trained by and under

the supervision of a detachment from the 98th Chemical Mortar

Battalion.79

The six mortar boats of Task Unit 79.8.1 supported the XIV Corps

landings on the beaches of Lingayen Gulf and then stood ready to

furnish fire on call of the 185th Infantry, 40th Division, in its movement inland. The mortar boats were to be ready for any special mission

that might arise, as well as to smoke the transport areas during the

hours of morning and evening twilight.

The fire plans for support of the assault wave were quite elaborate,

including time, range, and rate of fire for the period beginning thirty

minutes before the assault until fifteen minutes after the troops had

landed. White phosphorus ammunition was put aboard to be used

only in case of an onshore wind. General control of the mortar ships

was in the hands of the task group and task unit commanders, but

individual vessels maintained the responsibility for engaging specific

targets. Each mortar ship carried 1,200 rounds of HE, 100 rounds

of WP, as well as an ample supply of 20-mm. ammunition. Training

of the mortar crews continued even while en route to the objective.

Navy men received instruction in the handling of the mortars in the

event that casualties would bring a need for extra hands.

S-day for Luzon, 9 January 1945, found climatic conditions favor78

 Unless otherwise noted, this account of the Lingayen Gulf operation is based on Hist, CWS

AFMIDPAC, vol. IV, an. II-d. 79

 (1) 98th, First 120 Days on Luzon, p. 1 (2) CO USS LCI (M) 359 to COMINCH, 15 Jan 45,

Action Rpt, Luzon Opn.
528 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

able, with a mild offshore wind and visibility ranging from fifteen to

twenty miles. The swell of the sea caused some difficulty with landing

operations but did not seriously affect the mortar missions. Shortly

after 0600 the six mortar ships broke off from the main body, maneuvering in zigzag fashion through the armada of support ships to their

initial positions 2,500 yards from shore. A few minutes later, an enemy

suicide bomber swooped down in attack. The Japanese plane itself

inflicted no damage, but five men from an LCI(M) received wounds

from a 20-mm. shell fired at the enemy by another vessel in the

formation. At 0845 the six mortar ships moved into their attack

positions; fifteen minutes later they began their scheduled fire.

The LCI (M)'s moved forward, blanketing the beaches to a depth

of almost 350 yards with accurate and devastating fire. As the craft

approached the shore the number of propellant charges on the mortar

shells was progressively decreased. Precise ranges were determined by

radar on several of the LCI(M)'s and passed on to the others by

prearranged visual signals. The only return fire came from enemy

mortars whose shells fell 600 yards offshore. Upon reaching a position

400 yards from shore the mortar boats laid to, but continued their

fire on the beaches as the first wave of assault troops passed through.

It was now 0934, the time when small arms fire support on the gunboats and mortar ships ceased; naval gunfire had been lifted when the

first wave reached a position 800 yards from shore.

The mortar crews continued their support from this close-in position.

At one stage a radio message was misinterpreted and four LCI(M)'s

ceased fire. Thick smoke precluded visual signals and fire was not

resumed until several minutes later, when the noise and smoke had

abated. During the initial phase of the assault the mortar unit expended

3,345 rounds of high explosive ammunition. Because of an offshore

breeze, only seven rounds of WP were fired, this for ranging in at a

position 2,600 yards from shore.

According to plan, the mortar ships ceased fire at 0951 and proceeded

obliquely to the port to take up positions some 800 yards offshore

where they could fulfill the second part of their mission. Although

the mortar boats stood ready to support the 185th Infantry shortly

after 1000 on S-day, they received no calls for fire because the infantrymen pushing inland to the Agno River encountered no enemy opposition. The mortar group spent the night of S-day anchored just off
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 529

the mouth of the river, and next morning placed area fire on enemy

troops which, according to the shore fire control party, effectively

routed the opposition. Some of the LCI (M)'s replenished their ammunition supply from an LST standing by with a reserve of 4.2-inch

shells.

From S plus 1 until S plus 8 the group of mortar ships provided

twilight smoke concealment and escort service for the Liberty and

Victory ships in the San Fabian transport area, a mission which terminated operations of Task Unit 79.8.1 at Luzon. During this period

its mortars fired more than 5,000 rounds of 4.2-inch ammunition; the

20-mm. guns of the unit expended almost 7,700 rounds during antiaircraft operations.

The second group of mortar boats, the four converted from the

ammunition detail, supported I Corps landings east of Dagupan. As

in the case of Task Unit 79.8.1, these LCI(M)'s provided the ships

in its vicinity with the concealment of smoke during the twilight

hours so susceptible of enemy air attack. On S plus 3 the group went

out of action, its mortar crews returning to their parent unit, the

98th Chemical Mortar Battalion. As far as casualties were concerned

this small unit fared rather badly; on S plus 1 an enemy E-boat torpedoed the radar equipped flagship with a loss of 2 officers and 2

enlisted men.80

Group 78.1.8, the smallest of the three mortar boat units, also supported the I Corps landings near Dagupan. From positions within

3,000 yards of the beach, each of the group's three mortar boats fired

about 100 rounds of high explosives onto a road and railroad track

just in from the shore. Advancing to within 1,000 yards of the beach,

the mortar boats engaged unspecified targets on both the forward and

reverse slopes of the low-lying hills, then retired to await call fire from

the 98th Battalion. No enemy fire was received from the beach. On

S plus 3 this group shelled a group of the enemy and the railroad station

south of Damortis.81

Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, in command of the Lingayen landings, was especially pleased with the work of the mortar boats, reporting

80

 98th, First 120 Days on Luzon, pp. 1-2, 4. 81

 CO USS LCI(M) 359 to COMINCH, 15 Jan 45, Action Rpt, Luzon Opn, pp. 1-2.
530 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

that they were more effective for beach neutralization than were escort

carrier-based planes.82

Iwo Jima

The success of the mortar ships in Pacific assault operations prompted

the Navy to increase the number of this type of vessel.83 Some were

acquired and equipped in California, others at Pearl Harbor. The men

who were to fire the mortars on these boats were exclusively Navy men,

trained in Hawaii by a cadre from the 189th Chemical Mortar Company under the direction of Lt. Col. Joseph E. Atchison. Naturally,

the Navy crews had much to learn; many had never seen the mortar

before. To some this lack of knowledge meant apprehension of the

weapon, to others it meant incorrect employment, with damage and

danger as a consequence. There were several examples of a second shell

being placed in the mortar barrel on top of a misfire and one case

where the crew attempted to jam in three rounds. The training in

Hawaii, which included two test runs off the coast of Kahoolawe, went

a long way in correcting these inadequacies.

On 22 January 1945 the fourteen mortar boats left Pearl Harbor

for Iwo Jima where they were joined by the LCI(M) 's which had seen

action at Lingayen Gulf. Four CWS officers from the 189th Chemical

Mortar Company accompanied the Pearl Harbor contingent, attached

for the operation to the mortar group—five units of six ships each.

On the morning of 19 February 1945 the 4th and 5th Marine

Divisions landed on the beaches of the island of Iwo Jima in the face

of the heaviest enemy beach resistance since Tarawa.84 The bombardment of the island that preceded the attack was the heaviest of the

Pacific war, one that benefited from the experiences of the island

assaults that had taken place before. Three of the five mortar units,

Numbers 1, 2, and 5, took part in the actual assault phase.

82

 (1) Cited in Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, ch. IV. (2) In his final report, General Richardson commented on the "devastating mortar fire" which mortar boats placed on the beaches during

initial stages of the assault. Final Rpt of CG AFMIDPAC to CofS USA, 15 Mar 46. 83

 Unless otherwise noted, the account of operations at Iwo Jima is based on:(1)CWS TofO Ltr

No. 25, 30 May 45, incl 4; (2) Hist, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an II-d, 127, V, an III-a, 87; (3) Ltr,

Lt Louis L. Mikolajewski, 189th Cml Mortar Co to 14th Cml Warfare Composite Bn, 10 Apr 45,

Observations From Aboard LCI(L) Mortar Ships During Invasion of Iwo Jima. All in CMLHO. 84

 For an excellent account of the Iwo Jima operation, see Lt. Col. Whitman S. Bartley, Iwo Jima:

Amphibious Epic (Washington, 1954).
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 531

From H-hour minus 3 5 until H-hour minus 10 the mortars on these

vessels expended 3,240 rounds to bombard specific area targets on the

slopes of Mount Suribachi, the 550-foot extinct volcano which dominated the southern end of the island. These mortar groups used a

maneuver sometimes described as Plan ABLE. In this plan five LCI (M) 's

of a mortar group moved counterclockwise in an elliptical pattern

around the sixth vessel, which served as the reference point. Each ship

fired only during the period of the run when it was pointed toward

the target area. The advantage of this maneuver was the attainment

of the high degree of accuracy needed for interdictory fire, accuracy

which could not be realized from the decks of sporadically moving

ships attempting to maintain a stationary position.

At H-hour Units 2 and 5, proceeding in columns, entered the boat

lanes from the west, turned shoreward, formed a line parallel with

the sixth wave, and followed it toward the beaches. Reaching a

position 2,000 yards from shore, the mortars began firing at a rate

of 6 rounds per minute and at a constant range of 3,200 yards. Stopping

1,000 yards from the beaches the mortar ships, now 200 yards apart,

maintained fire on a line 1,800 yards inland until H plus 60, when they

joined Mortar Support Units 3 and 4 in the rear to repair the damage

sustained by the mortar mounts and await further assignment. Group

1, still employing the elliptical maneuver of Plan ABLE, resumed action

at H plus 10 with almost four hours of neutralization fire. When this

mission terminated Group 1 joined the other units in the rear, thus

marking the end of mortar boat support during the assault landings

at Iwo Jima.

After this first day the LCI(M)'s, with but few exceptions, fired

only night-time missions of harassment and interdiction.85 The small

size of Iwo Jima (its surface area is only 71⁄2 square miles) and its

triangular shape made sea support of land operations singularly appropriate. Mortar Units 2 and 5 complied with requests from the forces

on land for harassing mortar fire during the first night on shore.

Stationed off the eastern and western side of that point of the island

tipped by Mount Suribachi, the two mortar units placed fire on the

area between the opposing forces to prevent large-scale counterattacks

by the enemy. These missions saw the first significant use of white

phosphorus shell; as an aid to observation during these hours of dark85

 Ibid., p. 83n.
532 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ness every fifth round was WP. On subsequent nights mortar units

fired similar missions using Plan ABLE and also Plan CHARLIE. Because

of heavy counterbattery fire received by the mortar groups they were

sometimes directly supported by heavier vessels. The destroyer, USS

Shannon, for example, covered Mortar Unit 2 as the LCI(M)'s delivered harassing fire on the night of 23 February.

Three mortar boat groups departed on 26 February, and the two

that remained reorganized into 5-boat units. Thereafter this sort of

support gradually decreased until 3 March, by which time all mortar

boats had been recalled. During these last days individual LCI(M)'s

provided direct daylight support to shore battalions designated by the

Headquarters Landing Force.

Ammunition expenditure of all mortar boats at Iwo Jima came to

about 60,000 rounds, of which 20 percent was white phosphorus. The

resupply of mortar ammunition from LST to LCI(M) in a fairly

rough sea was not always an easy matter. Occasionally the boxes of

shell dropped a substantial distance to the deck of the mortar boat,

a circumstance which spoke well for the safety feature of the mortar

shell fuze. Weapon breakage in this operation caused little alarm

although the heavy firing frequently broke down the mortar mounts,

taking the weapon out of action for the extent of the mission. Iron

straps welded along the sides of the mounts eliminated some of this

weakness. Sometimes it was necessary to place bands over the subbase

of the mortar to keep it from jumping out of the mount. From all

accounts, the mortar crews performed in an exemplary manner; Rear

Adm. Harry W. Hill of Amphibious Group 2 termed the successful

use of "mortar gunboats" in the early phases of the assault "one of

the outstanding features of the operation."

 86

 According to CWS

sources, the Marine Corps expressed its enthusiasm for massed fire from

mortar boats during the early days of the landings.87

Operations in the Ryukyus

CWS-trained Navy crewmen manned a total of 60 LCI(M) 's which

supported Tenth Army in the Ryukyus Campaign. Six days before

the main assault of Okinawa, two 6-boat mortar groups supported the

diversionary effort against Kerama Retto made by the 77th Infantry

86

 Quoted in CWS TofO Ltr 25, p. 16. 87

 History, CWS AFMIDPAC, I, sec. 3, 34.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 533

Division. On 1 April 1945 the XXIV Army Corps and the III Amphibious Corps successfully carried out the main landings on the

western coast of Okinawa. Prior to H-hour on that morning seven

groups of LCI(M)'s, each comprised of six boats, lined up parallel to

the beach behind the assault troops. Each LCI(M) carried 1,000

rounds of HE and 200 rounds of WP. Using Plan BAKER, the 42 boats

moved through a calm sea at about one knot, their 126 mortars

opening up at a point 1,600 yards from shore at a rate of 10 rounds

per gun per minute. Firing over the heads of advancing troops the

mortars, in less than an hour, placed about 28,000 rounds on a beach

area 1,000 feet deep and 51⁄2 miles wide. The mortar boats themselves

received no enemy fire.

Another group of LCI(M)'s supported the 2d Marine Division's

L-day feint against the southeast coast of Okinawa. Subsequent 77th

Division landings at Ie Shima on 16 April received the support of two

groups of mortar boats, while three days later a single group fired for

the ruse landing made by the same division in southern Okinawa. From

7 May until 27 June LCI (M) 's, in support of Army and Marine troops,

shelled the city of Naha and enemy installations in the vicinity of the

capital.88

The amphibious use of the 4.2-inch mortar was one of the major

contributions of the CWS to the Pacific war. The mortar boat proved

extremely effective for close infantry support just before, during, and

immediately after amphibious landings. It was then that the assault

troops, running the gantlet of enemy fire while attempting to secure

a foothold on the beach, benefited from all the support fire that

could be provided. The effectiveness of the mortars in this support

is best reflected in the steady increase in the number of mortar boats

committed to Pacific assault operations. Only four LCI(M)'s saw

action in the Palau fighting in September 1944; seven months later a

total of sixty supported Tenth Army operations in the Ryukyus.

88

 (1) Tenth Army, Action Rpt Ryukyus, 25 Mar-30 Jun 45, vol. I, pp. 11-V-5, 7-III-2,

7-III-11. (2) Combat Rpt, 1st Lt John R. Ralston, CWS, 189th Cml Mort Co, sub: Use of

LCI(M)'s During the Okinawa Campaign, quoted in History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an II-d,

132-35. (3) 77th Inf Div Opns Rpt ICEBERG, Phase I, Ie Shima, 1-27 Apr 45.
CHAPTER XIV

The Flame Thrower in the Pacific:

Guadalcanal to the Marshall Islands

The U.S. Army in World War II used two types of flame throwers,

the portable, carried on the soldier's back, and the mechanized,

mounted on an armored vehicle, usually a tank. Because flame could

penetrate ports and apertures and could be made to turn corners,

these special-purpose weapons proved extremely useful in overcoming

a determined enemy in strong, stubbornly held defensive positions,

invulnerable in most cases to conventional weapons.

The prototype for the portable flame thrower was devised by German

engineers sometime between 1900 and 1910. Introduced in World

War I against the French at Malencourt, it saw some service on the

Western Front where it proved to be a startling, if unreliable, assault

weapon. The British and French developed flame throwers of their

own by 1916, but the weapon, because of its short range, vulnerability,

and lack of tactical doctrine, had limited combat success. It was never

used by American troops.1

During the interwar period the United States devoted little attention

to flame thrower research and development. Military men considered

it the least valuable incendiary munition and regarded its World War I

performance as a total failure, a fact which led the Chief of the

Chemical Warfare Service to remark: "In the Chemical Warfare

Service it has been the habit for a long while not to mention the flame

thrower at all, unless questions were asked about it."

 2

Other nations did not concur in this appraisal. The weapon reappeared in the Abyssinian war of 1935—36, when the Italians employed

1

 Capt. Henry Sorenson, "Flame Warfare," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 2, Nos. 5 & 6 (August

and September, 1948), pp. 31-32. 2

 Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 401. Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries was Chief, CWS, from

1920 to 1929.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 535

the first tank-borne flame thrower. Then in 1937 the Italians demonstrated the use of flame throwers mounted in combat cars and other

armored vehicles. The civil war in Spain produced a few German

flame tanks. By mid-1940 intelligence reports revealed that the

Germans had employed flame throwers in Poland, in their attack on

the Belgian fort of Eben Emael, and in their drive across the Low

Countries and France.3 As these reports were scattered, often undocumented, and usually highly colored, doubt remained as to the extent

of Axis preparation for the employment of flame throwers. But that

such weapons might be useful could no longer be denied by American

planners.

In 1940 the United States Army took steps toward the development

of a portable flame thrower. On 12 August 1940, the Secretary of

War charged the Chief of the Chemical Warfare with the development,

manufacture, storage, and issue of the weapon, and during the next year

the CWS developed two experimental models.4 The first, the E1, was

quickly discarded; the second, the E1R1, was tested and issued to

troops. This model, with slight modifications, was standardized as the

M1 portable flame thrower in August 1941. When certain basic

deficiencies appeared in this weapon and in the M1A1, an improved

version, CWS scientists produced an entirely new flame thrower, the

M2-2. This was the group of portable flame weapons used by the

U.S. Army in World War II. They were frequently ineffective and

faulty, particularly in hands of troops ill trained in matters of operations and tactics. But with the development of a better flame thrower,

and with the gradual improvement in tactics and training, this CWS

weapon came to play an important part in coping with the unique

conditions of the war against Japan.

3

 For reports of flame thrower employment from 1935 to 1940, see: (1) Sorenson, "Flame Warfare,"

Canadian Army Journal, vol. 2, Nos. 7 & 8 (October and November, 1948), pp. 18-19; (2) Dept

of National Defense, Army (Canada), Cml Warfare Intell Summary, 3 Feb 42, sec. on Germany,

pp. F1-F5; (3) British Hist Monograph, Special Weapons and Types of Warfare, pt. III, Flame

Warfare Including Incendiaries, p. 110.

4

 (1) Correspondence leading to the portable flame thrower directive is found in CWTC Item 221,

10 Sep 40. (2) For a full discussion of the development and manufacture of the various portable

flame thrower models, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 139-47.
536 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Portable Flame Thrower in the South Pacific

Guadalcanal

The American portable flame thrower made its first successful combat appearance on 15 January 1943 at Guadalcanal, five months after

United States forces began the assault of this South Pacific island.

Although the weapon was not available at first, its potentiality against

enemy bunkers encountered on the islands—defenses which defied

ordinary weapons—soon became apparent. In speaking of the fighting

on nearby Tulagi, Maj. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding

the 1st Marine Division, stated that flame throwers would have been

"practical and effective'* against the strong Japanese defenses.5

The fortifications encountered on Guadalcanal were typical of those

to be found in subsequent fighting in the Pacific. These well camouflaged defenses were made of indigenous material reinforced by whatever metal was available. The compartment of a bunker could be

from 4 to 5 feet high, from 6 to 30 feet long, and from 3 to 10 feet

wide. Foot-thick coconut logs served as columns and crossbeams, the

latter covered by several layers of logs and, later in the war, by

quarter-inch sheets of steel. Walls were strengthened by iron or steel

rails and sheeting, log pilings, or oil drums filled with sand. The whole

elaborate framework was covered with earth and thoroughly camouflaged. Fire trenches, connected by shallow crawl tunnels, usually

adjoined the bunker, and entrances were placed in the rear end in

positions capable of being covered by other bunkers. Consequently,

Japanese bunkers were mutually supporting and practically impervious

to the effects of artillery and mortar fire. And they were manned by

an enemy who refused to be driven out, but who chose instead to fight

until death.6 There was an obvious and pressing need for a weapon

which could reduce such positions instantly and effectively. The

flame thrower offered a possible solution to the problem.

Late in 1942 the Americal and the 25th Infantry Divisions and the

2d Marine Division arrived on Guadalcanal to bolster the slackened

pace of the American offensive. Each carried a limited number of

flame throwers. Beginning in December 1942 a CWS officer conducted

5

 Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, pp. 65n, 244, 279n. 6

 (1) Ibid., pp. 243-44. (2) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 141-43. (3) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps

to CmlO USAFFE, II Aug 43, no sub. Sixth Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71, Portable Flame Throwers.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 537

on-the-spot training of flame thrower operators, and by mid-January

1943 the troops were ready to give the weapon its initial combat test.7

On 15 January 1943 combat engineers of the 8th Marines, 2d Marine

Division, attacked enemy defenses surrounding a beach installation.

Late in the afternoon they encountered a particularly stubborn Japanese pillbox, and 2 marines equipped with a flame thrower went forward

to silence it. Covered by automatic rifles, they crawled to within

25 yards of the position and fired the flame thrower at the bunker.

All resistance ceased, and the marines found 5 dead Japanese inside.

Although 2 of the enemy had managed to get out, neither had escaped

the effects of the flame. One lay 3 feet from the escape hatch, the

other had run about 15 feet before collapsing. Encouraged by this

result, Marine combat engineers went forward and within 20 minutes

wiped out 2 more enemy strongpoints with flame throwers.8

The 25th Infantry Division used flame throwers on the same day

with far less success. Employed by units of the 35th Infantry, the

weapons failed to wipe out enemy pillboxes or to materially aid the

assault. Since casualties were high, and malfunctions frequent, the

regiment decided not to employ its flame throwers in future engagements.9

 Nevertheless, the weapon was used throughout the moppingup phase of the campaign by other units and often proved a quick and

effective means of reducing difficult enemy positions.

If at the conclusion of the Guadalcanal operation the intrinsic merit

of the flame thrower was still in doubt, this combat experience with

the weapon did provide answers to several important tactical problems.

Units discovered that the flame thrower, because of its limited range

and short duration of fire, had to be used in conjunction with other

weapons in order to be effective. A trained security detachment armed

with rifles, automatic rifles, and smoke grenades was needed to keep the

enemy under cover long enough for the flame thrower operator to

approach and flame his target. Experience also showed that the engi7

 Lt Col Leonard L. McKinney, CmlC Hist Study 4, Portable Flame Thrower Opns in World

War II, 1949, p. 39. 8

 (1) Lt. Col. Orbie Bostick, "Mercy Killers," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 1 (FebruaryMarch, 44), 16-17. (2) Miller, Guadalcanal: The first Offensive, p. 279. 9

 (1) Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, p. 295. (2) Rpt, Opns of the 25th Inf Div on

Guadalcanal, 17 Dec 42-5 Feb 43, p. 81. 25th Div 325-11.5.
538 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

neers were too busy with other jobs to handle the flame thrower; that

the weapon would be better utilized in the hands of the infantry.10

To take advantage of these lessons, the division on Guadalcanal,

under the direction of the recently activated XIV Corps, set up ambitious training programs. On 27 March 1943 the 25th Division published a training memorandum which withdrew the weapon from the

combat engineers and gave it to the ammunition and pioneer platoon

of the infantry battalion. The division then organized a series of oneday flame thrower schools to train eight men from each of these

platoons to use the weapons.11 Other units, many of whose chemical

and regimental gas officers had themselves been trained by the 25th

Division Chemical Section, organized similar training programs. By

mid-1943 the general state of flame thrower readiness of Army units

on Guadalcanal was relatively good.

New Georgia

Unfortunately, the two divisions on Guadalcanal which had received

the least amount of flame thrower training were to employ the weapon

on New Georgia. As elements of the 37th and 43d Divisions attacked

the western end of the island following their 30 June 1943 landings,

they discovered an extensive series of small enemy fortifications similar

to those encountered on Guadalcanal. Thoroughly camouflaged, these

pillboxes were hard to locate, and once located, even more difficult to

neutralize. Since they were organized in depth and mutually supporting, it was almost impossible to approach them from the rear.

On 26 July 1943 three such positions, barely visible in the deep jungle

foliage, blocked the advance of the 103d Infantry, 43d Division, with

deadly machine gun fire. Capt. James F. Olds, Jr., a XIV Corps CWS

staff officer, suggested to the regimental commander the possibility of

using flame throwers. The co-ordinated attack which followed began

with a 30-minute artillery preparation. As this fire lifted, 6 flame

thrower operators from Company C of the 118th Engineer Combat

Battalion, supported by infantrymen, crawled toward the bunkers.

Reaching a point twenty yards from their target, 2 operators opened

fire, crisscrossing their streams of flame to burn off the covering

10

 (1) Ltr, McKaig, to Hist Off, 26 Dec 56. Colonel McKaig was 25th Division chemical officer

on Guadalcanal. (2) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, p. 40. 11

 25th Inf Div Tng Memo No. 6, 27 Mar 43. Reproduced as App. 1 in McKinney, Portable

Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 230-32.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 539

vegetation. The enemy positions for the first time became clearly

visible and the 4 other operators discharged their flame directly on

target. Resistance ceased in a matter of seconds, and the infantry

resumed its advance.12

News of this success reached other units and they too began to

employ their flame throwers. Two days later, Pvt. Frank Kordeleski

of the 145th Infantry, 37th Division, burned out three Japanese pillboxes with a single flame thrower filling. The XIV Corps chemical

officer, Col. Robert Gay, reported that during the first six weeks on

New Georgia flame throwers had been employed against enemy positions on no fewer than fifty-four occasions.13

On New Georgia, as on Guadalcanal, the flame thrower's record

was not one of uninterrupted success. Often the inherent weaknesses

of the M1's and M1A1's were a source of considerable trouble to the

troops who used them. Alike in basic design, these models had two

major components, a fuel unit and a gun unit. The fuel unit, which

was strapped to the operator's back, consisted of two storage tanks for

fuel and one for compressed nitrogen. The nitrogen propelled the

fuel from the storage tanks, through the gun unit, onto the target.

The gun unit included a fuel tube, a long bent nozzle, a trigger, and

a valve to regulate the flow of fuel. The compact electrical system

included a battery, spark plug, and a small hydrogen cylinder. When

the trigger was pressed, a stream of hydrogen was released, the spark

plug ignited the hydrogen, and the resultant flame in turn ignited the

fuel as it passed through the gun unit. The complete flame thrower

weighed thirty-two pounds empty and seventy pounds filled. Since it

held only 5 gallons of fuel, its duration of fire was a mere eight to ten

seconds. The M1 had a range of 15 to 20 yards while the M1 Al, using

fuel thickened with napalm, was capable of firing 40 to 50 yards.14

The inefficiency of the ignition system was particularly bothersome.

Operators found it expedient to carry thermite grenades for emer12

 (1) Opn Journal, 118th Engr Bn, 29 Jun-21 Aug 43, dated 20 Sep 43. 118th Engr Bn 20433,

343-43.3. (2) Capt. James F. Olds, Jr., "Flame Throwers Front and Center," Chemical Warfare

Bulletin vol. 30, No. 3 (June-July, 1944), pp. 5-8. (3) Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of

Rabaul, p. 148. 13

 Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CmlO USAFFE, 11 Aug 43. 14

 TM 3-375, May 1943, Portable Flame Throwers M1 and M1A1.
540 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

gency use, as these grenades when hurled forward on unignited flame

thrower fuel would cause instantaneous ignition.15

Mechanical failure was not the sole factor contributing to unsatisfactory performance. Of even greater significance was the fact that

neither the 37th nor the 43d Infantry Division had been extensively

trained in the use of the flame thrower before it was committed on

New Georgia. The operators in the 26 July attack, albeit successful,

had received but one hour of instruction and this a scant three hours

before the assault! Commanders and operators had little understanding

of the proper tactical employment of the weapon. Adequate infantry

support was not always provided; in some cases not a single rifleman

was assigned as protection. Often there was no satisfactory reconnaissance before the mission, and operators who had been ordered to go

forward and clean out a lone machine gun emplacement, on reaching

a firing position, found several bunkers in front of them. In such

situations a single flame thrower was useless. Many company commanders, ignorant of flame thrower tactics, selected untrained men

and ordered them to take a flame thrower and "burn out the Japs," a

mission which promised little chance of success. Chemical officers

reported that the casualty rate among flame thrower operators was

directly related to the inadequate infantry support and planning

afforded flame thrower missions.16

It was apparent that further training of operators and infantry

commanders in the tactical uses and limitations of the weapon was

essential. Equally obvious was the need for co-ordinated flame thrower

teams composed of operators and supporting riflemen.17

Bougainville

Though divisions soon began intensified flame thrower training programs designed to overcome the shortcomings revealed on Guadalcanal

and New Georgia, few such projects were totally complete by 1

November 1943, the date of the Bougainville landings. But progress

15

 (1) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CmlO USAFFE 15 Sep 45, no sub. Sixth Army Cml Sec Rcds,

470.71 Portable Flame Throwers. (2) CmlO 25th Div to CCWS, 25 Apr 43, Rpt of Cml Warfare

Activities on Guadalcanal Island. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File. 16

 (1) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CmlO USAFFE, 15 Sep 43, no sub. (2) Ltr, ACmlO XIV Corps

to Cml XIV Corps, 30 Jul 43, sub: Rpt on Use of Flame Thrower. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71

Portable Flame Throwers. 17

 CmlO 25th Div to CG 25th Div, 20 Nov 43, Rpt, Flame Thrower Opns During the New Georgia

Campaign.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 541

had been made, and when Army and Marine units encountered formidable Japanese defensive installations on Bougainville improvised flame

thrower teams generally were available.

On 11 December 1943 the forward advance of the 21st Regiment,

3d Marine Division, was halted by an enemy position on Hill 1000.

One of the Marine Corps officers described the obstacle as follows:

The reverse slope position was encountered here, fox-holes at the

foot of a knoll with a ten-yard field of fire to the top of the knoll ...

Interlocking lines of grazing automatic fire were integrated such that

approach to the knoll from any direction was cleverly and effectively

covered. Little room existed for maneuver on the ridge and due to the

height and number of trees 60 and 81 mm. mortars were relatively

ineffective. The hill mass likewise constituted a partial mask to the

supporting artillery.18

The marines hammered at this position for seven days without

success. Finally, on 18 December 1943, Hill 1000 was hit by two

heavy air strikes. Right after this, six flame throwers, their operators

organized in teams, accompanied riflemen in a converging action on

the position. The flame throwers supported the infantry advance and

aided substantially in destroying enemy positions.19

Less successful was the experience during November and December

of the 19th Marine Regiment, which found the weapon incapable of

neutralizing enemy strongpoints because of its short range. Nevertheless, flame terrified the enemy and on several occasions caused him

to flee from his defensive positions.20

The 37th Infantry Division found little use for flame throwers

during its first two months on Bougainville. The division's 8-man

flame thrower squads (one per battalion ammunition and pioneer

platoon) suddenly became busy in March.21 In heavy action on Hill

700 eleven separate flame thrower attacks took place, each resulting in

18

 Lt Col Frank M. Reinecke, USMC, MS, Hellsapoppin Ridge, 8-18 December 1943, The Bougainville

Campaign: A Study of Offensive Principles, 1947, p. 10. Marine Corps School, MOS LOG #208-48(c). 19

 (1) Ibid., pp. 17, 19-32. (2) CO 21st Marines to CG 3d Marine Div, 31 Jan 44, Rpt of Opn on

Bougainville, in 3d Marine Div Combat Rpt, 1 Nov-28 Dec 43, dated 21 Mar 44. Marine Corps

Archives, A 5-2. 20

 CO 19th Marine Regt to CG 3d Marine Div, n.d., Rpt of Opns, Nov-Dec 43. 3d Marine Div

Combat Rpt, 1 Nov-28 Dec 43, dated 21 Mar 44. Marine Corps Archives, A5-2. 21

 (1) Ltr, CmlO 37th Div to CmlO XIV Corps, 11 Jan 44, sub: Informal Combat Rpt of Lessons

Learned in Combined New Georgia & Bougainville Opns. XIV Corps Rpts. (2) Maj Gen Oscar W.

Griswold, Bougainville: An Experience in Jungle Warfare, pp. 37-44.
542 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the reduction of a pillbox. In one assault flame thrower teams reduced

two adjacent pillboxes, killing 20 Japanese in one and 25 in the other.22

The Americal Division, also committed on Bougainville, set up an

extensive organization for flame thrower operations. Recalling the

haphazard organization on Guadalcanal, the division decided to build

within each of its regiments a provisional flame thrower platoon. Under

the supervision of the division chemical officer, Maj. Woodson C.

Tucker, the first of these units was formed and assigned to the 132d

Regiment Headquarters Company on 18 February 1944. The platoon

had a 5-man headquarters and six 4-man squads, each allotted two

flame throwers. Similar units were organized within the 182d and

164th Regiments, and all three underwent extensive training to develop

squad and platoon teamwork and to familiarize individuals with all

the weapons of the squad. Exercises stressed co-ordination of rifle

units and flame thrower teams, since tacticians had decided that should

flame thrower targets appear, squads from the platoon working in

conjunction with the infantry units would be detailed to attack them.23

Only two of the three provisional flame thrower platoons, those of

the 132d and the 182d Regiments, saw combat action on Bougainville.

Both units took part in the bitter fighting in March 1944 on Hill 260

and during April in the battle of Mavavia in the eastern part of the

island. The provisional flame thrower platoons were highly successful

in each action. In its first commitment in combat on Hill 260 the

132d Regiment's flame unit reduced eight enemy pillboxes in one

hundred seconds of actual firing. The platoon reduced two more on

11 March 1944 while supporting the assault of Company B, 182d

Regiment, on an observation post on the same hill.24 From 7 to 9 April,

the provisional flame thrower platoon of the 182d Infantry regiment

supported troops of the 93d Division at Mavavia. Assigned primarily

22

 XIV Corps Rpt on Lessons Learned in the Bougainville Opns, n.d., pp. 4-5. CWS 314.7

Portable Flame Thrower File. 23

 (1) History, Flame Thrower Platoon of the 132d Inf Regt, Apr 44. CWS 314.7, Portable

Flame Thrower File. (2) CmlO, Americal Div to ACofS G-3 Americal Div, 7 Nov 44, Rpt, Flame

Thrower, and Incls. CWS 3 14.7 Portable Flame Thrower File. 24

 History, Flame Thrower Platoon of the 132d Infantry Regiment, Apr 44. CWS 314.7 Portable

Flame Thrower File. (2) Griswold, Bougainville: An Experience in Jungle Warfare, pp. 96-114.

The Griswold account (pages 119-20) tells of another use of flame in the fierce fighting for Hill 260.

Two Navy men got 200 feet of flexible pipe, connected it to a drum of gasoline, and used oxygen

pressure to pump the liquid into Japanese pillboxes. The gasoline was ignited by white phosphorous

grenades. See also Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 372. For further attempts

at this type of improvisation, see below, pp. 567-68.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 543

to mopping-up activities, flame thrower operators followed tanks and

fired into all pillboxes and suspicious holes. Later in April the platoon

supported its parent unit, the 182d Regiment, this time during the

fighting in the upper Laruma Valley.25

The portable flame thrower's highly impressive record on Bougainville, coupled with its earlier performance on Guadalcanal and New

Georgia, clearly demonstrated the value of the weapon in jungle fighting. Despite its shortcomings the flame thrower had made a fairly

auspicious beginning. Work remained to be done; as late as April 1944

the XIV Corps recognized that " ...the tactical capabilities of this

weapon have not yet been fully developed."

 26

 In preparation for the

move to the Philippines the XIV Corps and the four Army divisions

in the South Pacific (the 25th, 37th, 43d, and Americal) intensified

their training efforts and reorganized their flame thrower teams.27

The Southwest Pacific: The First Years

While the portable flame thrower was winning a good name in

the South Pacific theater, it was getting a reputation of a wholly

different sort in the Southwest Pacific. The origins of its notoriety

go back to December 1942 and the Papua Campaign.

Papua

On 6 December Col. Clarence M. Tomlinson, commanding officer

of the 126th Infantry, 32d Division, asked the 114th Engineer Combat

Battalion for several flame throwers and operators to help overcome

enemy machine gun emplacements near the village of Buna. The

engineers, equipped with the E1R1 flame thrower, immediately set

about testing and servicing these weapons. Although the inspections

showed that several of the gas cylinders had developed leaks, some

from rust, some from defective material, the flame throwers functioned

reasonably well, if at a maximum range of only 20 yards.28 Five

25

 Ltr, CO 182d Inf Regt to CmlO Americal Div, 31 Oct 44, sub: Present Status of the Flame

Thrower Platoon. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File. 26

 An. No. 3 to XIV Corps Tng Memo No. 8, 29 Apr 44, sub: Tng in the Use of Flame Throwers.

Reproduced as app. 3 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, p. 248. 27

 (1) Ibid., pp. 251-52. (2) Incl 2 to 37th Div Tng Memo No. 7, 26 Sep 44, sub: Tng in the

Use of Flame Throwers. Reproduced as app. 4 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp 253-57. 28

 (1) Ltr, CO 114th Engr Bn to CmlO MAPLE Base (Port Moresby), 19 Dec 42, sub: Malfunctioning of Flame Throwers. CWS SPECVI 470.71/92. (2) Ltr, Col Frank M. Arthur to Hist Off,

3 Mar 59.
544 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

operators with two weapons, two refill tanks, and 25 gallons of fuel,

reported to the regiment on 7 December, and the next day the regimental operations officer ordered the flame throwers into action.29

The target was an enemy machine gun bunker ingeniously concealed

at the edge of a kunai grass flat. While the flame throwers were being

brought forward, M/Sgt. John K. King, of the division chemical section, and one of the company officers, Lieutenant Davidson, performed

the necessary reconnaissance. They identified the bunker in the midst

of its natural and artificial camouflage and exposed themselves in

order to draw fire and pinpoint the location of its ports. A partially

demolished breastwork about 35 yards from the bunker furnished

cover for anyone approaching the position. It was possible to advance

a bit farther toward the bunker in comparative safety through a

shallow trench which extended 5 yards out from the breastwork. This

would give the operator an attack position only 30 yards from his

target.

After the reconnaissance Lieutenant Davidson went forward again,

this time accompanied by Cpl. Wilber G. Tirrell, the engineer flame

thrower operator. Once more he drew fire from the bunker so that

the corporal could see the exact location of the ports.

The plan of operation was practicable and uncomplicated. Corporal

Tirrell, his weapon concealed in a burlap sack, was to advance as far

as possible in the shallow trench, thirty yards from his objective. As a

diversion, three men with automatic weapons were to crawl around

on the left flank and fire at the rear of the bunker. Lieutenant Davidson, Sergeant King, and four riflemen were to take positions behind

the breastwork, ready to rush the bunker with rifle fire and grenades

in the wake of the flame thrower. Corporal Tirrell was to advance

at least five yards beyond the end of the trench before releasing the

flame and was to keep advancing until the fuel was exhausted.

Before the men took their stations, they checked the flame thrower's

ignition system. At the proper moment, the group on the left flank

began its diverting fire. The enemy did not answer. Corporal Tirrell

moved from his position at the end of the shallow trench and headed

toward the bunker. Seven yards beyond the trench he released the

initial burst of flame and immediately Lieutenant Davidson and his

29

 The following account is based on: Ltr, Actg Div CmlO 32d Div to CG 32d Div, 18 Feb 43, sub:

Rpt on the Activities of the 32d Inf Div Cml Sec During the Papuan Campaign. CWS 314.7

Portable Flame Thrower File.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 545

party rushed out from behind the breastwork, only to find themselves

in serious trouble. Instead of a powerful burst of flame, the flame

thrower emitted a feeble 10-foot squirt, and the Japanese inside the

emplacement began pouring machine gun fire into the advancing

group. One of the riflemen was hit as soon as he left the cover of the

breastwork, Lieutenant Davidson was killed, and the others withdrew.

Corporal Tirrell continued to advance, trying vainly to get his weapon

to function properly. When he was less than fifteen yards from the

bunker he was stunned by a bullet which struck the front of his helmet

and he fell to the ground out of sight. During the night he crawled

back to safety.30 Two days later the infantry overcame the position

by direct assault.31

The cause of the Buna fiasco was never absolutely determined, but

its effect was immediate. The infantry's confidence in the flame

thrower was shattered. In January 1943 Colonel Copthorne, Chief

Chemical Officer, USAFFE, informed General Porter that "the way

the flame throwers let the infantry down at a critical point brought

them into such ill-repute that I am afraid that they may never want to

use them again."

 32

 In Washington Colonel Benner, chief of the CWS

Field Requirements Branch, stated that a weapon such as the flame

thrower with its "temperamental nature has no place in modern warfare

where ruggedness and reliability are essential."

 33

But if the flame thrower was too temperamental to rely on, it was

potentially too useful to abandon. Back on New Guinea, Sergeant

King made one last effort to make flame throwers serviceable. New

weapons were flown in from Port Moresby, across the mountains, but

these, too, were unfit for use. They were checked and serviced and

30

 (1) Initial reports of the action listed Corporal Tirrell as having died in the encounter. He

actually "played dead" after regaining consciousness and waited until dusk before returning to his

position. He did suffer a leg wound inflicted by an enemy rifleman as he escaped, but contrary to early

reports he survived and was recommended for citation for his valiant, though unsuccessful efforts.

(2) Ltr, Actg Div CmlO 32d Div to CG 32d Div, 18 Feb 43, sub: Rpt on Activities of the 32d Inf

Div Cml Sec During the Papuan Campaign. (3) Ltr, CO 114th Engr Bn to CmlO MAPLE Base APO

929, 19 Dec 42, sub: Malfunctioning of Flame Throwers. CWS SPECVI 470.71/92. (4) The

account of the Buna flame thrower operation found in Milner, Victory in Papua, page 250, based on

the earliest reports of the action, gives an incomplete account of the casualties. 31

 On 15 December 1942 a flame thrower was employed against another enemy bunker near Buna.

The result was the same as at Buna the week before: the flame thrower "fizzed out and the Japanese

shot it up." Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 253. 32

 Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CCWS, 6 Jan 43, no sub. CWS 319.1/101. 33

 Ltr, Chief Field Rqmts Br to Chief War Plans and Theater Br, 18 Jan 43, sub: Malfunctioning

of Flame Throwers. CWS SPCUR 470.71/92.
546 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

parts interchanged in an attempt to get at least one weapon that

would function properly, but all efforts were unsuccessful.34

Matters of Maintenance, Supply, and Training

During the first nine months of 1943 the 10t h Chemical Maintenance

Company at Brisbane, commanded by Capt. John J. Shaffer, conducted extensive flame thrower tests in order to locate the major sources

of trouble, a project which included the thorough overhaul of all flame

throwers in the Southwest Pacific Area. The unit discovered that most

malfunctions resulted from deteriorated cylinders and batteries which

had succumbed to the deleterious temperatures and humidity of the

tropics. All flame throwers shipped to the Southwest Pacific or carried

as equipment by units arriving in the area were thoroughly tested,

repaired, and waterproofed by trained technicians under the direction

of Colonel Copthorne and his staff. Though fundamental defects

remained, the work of the SWPA Chemical Section went a long way

in effectively preventing a repetition of the mishaps suffered on Buna.

Meanwhile, Sixth Army began a comprehensive analysis of the

Papua Campaign in an attempt to discover an effective means of

reducing Japanese bunkers. The experience of its subordinate units

indicated that these fortifications generally could not be destroyed by

artillery or mortar fire. Only the foot soldier armed with normal

infantry weapons could do the job. Having located a bunker, infantrymen either had to outflank it or to launch repeated frontal assaults

until the enemy was overcome. Either tactic normally resulted in

heavy casualties.

Although the flame thrower had performed dismally at Buna, Sixth

Army had received reports of the successful use of the weapon on

Guadalcanal and New Georgia.35 On the basis of these reports it

appeared that a dependable flame thrower could be the answer to the

problem of pillbox destruction. By October 1943 the rigorous tests

conducted by the 10t h Chemical Maintenance Company demonstrated

that the flame thrower could be made reliable. Sixth Army therefore

decided to include the weapon in its future combat operations and

asked that Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Far East, increase the

34

 Ltr, Actg Div CmlO 32d Div to CG 32d Div, 18 Feb 43, sub: Rpt on the Activities of the 32d

Inf Div Cml Sec During the Papuan Campaign. 35

 (1) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CmlO USAFFE, 11 Aug 43, no sub. (2) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps

to CmlO USAFFE, 15 Sep 43, no sub. Both in Sixth Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 547

allotment of flame throwers from twenty-four to sixty per infantry

division. This request was approved on 19 October 1943.36

Welcome as these decisions were to the CWS, they raised serious

problems for chemical officers in the Southwest Pacific. The first difficulty was related to supply. Flame throwers, spare parts, accessory

kits, and fuel had become exceedingly scarce at the beginning of 1943.

Colonel Morcock, Chemical Officer, USASOS SWPA, had requisitioned

308 M1A1 flame throwers from the United States in March 1943,

and had repeated his plea two months later.37 In July the first shipment

of M1A1's arrived to replace obsolete E1R1 and M1 models and by

August supplies of M1A1's were sufficient to cover the authorized

allowances of Sixth Army units.38 This balance of supply and demand

was upset in October when, as just noted, General MacArthur's headquarters approved Sixth Army's request for the sixty flame thrower

allotment for each infantry division. Not until the beginning of 1944

did enough M1A1's again become available to meet increasing combat

and training needs. Supplies of spare parts and accessories never did

catch up with requirements and both continued in critical demand for

the duration of the war.39

Two additional factors complicated the supply picture. First, many

of the new flame throwers were unusable because of missing or defective

parts or because of improper packing or waterproofing.40 Upon arrival

from the United States, these weapons had to be turned over to

chemical units for inspection, servicing, and rewaterproofing. Second,

it was exceedingly difficult to obtain needed quantities of compressed

hydrogen and nitrogen. Because of the shipping shortage, these gases

were not sent from the United States and had to be procured at great

36

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG USAFFE, 4 Oct 43, sub: Portable Flame Throwers, and Inds.

Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower. 37

 Ltr, CmlO USASOS SWPA to SupO Cml Br Overseas Sup Div San Francisco Port of Embarkation,

(Oakland, Calif.), 7 Jun 43, sub: Portable Flame Throwers, New M1A1, and Accessories. GSWC

470.7 in CWS SPCVO 470.71 APO 501.

38

 Ltr, CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, 21 Aug 43, sub: Flame Throwers, Portable, M1A1, Sixth

Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Throwers.

39

 See above, ch. VI. 40

 (1) Ltr, CG 41st Inf Div to CG USASOS SWPA 27 Oct 43, sub: Condition of Flame Throwers.

(2) Ltr, CmlO USASOS SWPA to CmlO's Intermediate and Adv Secs USASOS and CmlO's Bases

A, B, D, E, and F, 15 Dec 43, sub: Flame Throwers. Both in Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower.
548 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

expense and trouble either from naval or air units in the area or from

Australian firms.41

Even more serious than the problem of supply was that of training.

Since the flame thrower was a comparatively new weapon, and until

1943 one largely assigned to the engineers, few of the troops in the

Southwest Pacific had been trained to use it. With the allotment in

October 1943 of 12 flame throwers to each infantry regiment, it for

the first time became necessary to extend flame thrower training to

the infantry. The magnitude of the job can be judged by the Sixth

Army requirement that each rifle company, cavalry troop, and ammunition and pioneer platoon have at least 4 trained flame thrower operators; this was to be in addition to the 4 trained men for each authorized flame thrower in each engineer company and battalion.42

 Since

most commanders wanted to train men in excess of these minimum requirements, the training burden on both the individual unit and the

CWS was exceedingly heavy.

Because the dispersal of American units throughout Australia and

New Guinea made a single flame thrower training center impracticable,

schools were established in several different locations. Flame thrower

operators for I Corps' 24th and 41st Infantry Divisions trained at a

jungle assault school near Rockhampton, Queensland.43 The 10t h

Chemical Maintenance Company held classes for personnel of other

units stationed in Australia at the Chemical Warfare Training Center

at Brisbane.44 The Sixth Army Chemical Section provided several

traveling teams to teach flame thrower operation to Marine and Army

organizations in forward staging areas. These teams, made up of one

officer and two enlisted men, conducted a series of three 2-day flame

thrower schools for units in New Guinea and the Trobriand Islands.

41

 (1) Ltr, 1st Lt Robert P. Rockway to Col Carl L. Marriott, 22 Oct 43, no sub. (2) Memo,

CmlO U.S. Adv Base A for CmlO ALAMO Force, 31 Oct 43, no sub. Both in Sixth Army Rcds,

470.71 Flame Thrower. 42

 Sixth Army Tng Memo No. 8, 1 Oct 43, sub: Tng in the Use of Flame Throwers. Sixth Army

Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower; reprinted as app. 5 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns. 43

 Under the leadership of its chemical officer, Colonel Riegelman, I Corps had taken an early

lead in the development of flame thrower doctrine and had been the first to issue a training publication

on the employment of the weapon in the Southwest Pacific. See: (1) Incl 1 to Ltr, CG I Corps to

CG's 24th, 41st (32 d Divs, 27 Sep 43, sub: Employ of Flame Throwers, CVS 314.7 Portable Flame

Thrower File; (2) I Corps Tng Memo No. 17, 10 Dec 43, sub: Tng in the Use of Flame Throwers,

CWS 314.7 File; also reprinted as app. 7 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 265-67;

(3) Riegelman, Caves of Biak, pp. 73-75. 44

 (1) 1st Ind on Ltr, 29 Aug 43, CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, 21 Aug 43, sub: Flame Thrower,

Portable, M1A1. Sixth Army Rcds, Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower. (2) Shaffer Ltr, 19 Sep 56.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 549

Under the leadership of 1st Lt. Robert P. Rockway, the teams had

trained 582 flame thrower operators by February 1944.45

The flame thrower schools stressed operation, maintenance, and

servicing as well as tactics. Based upon past experience, current Sixth

Army doctrine prescribed that the flame thrower be included as part

of the arms and equipment of an organized assault party rather than

be employed as an individual weapon. Sixth Army suggested that an

assault party be made up of eighteen men, armed with demolition

charges, bangalore torpedoes, rocket launchers, and signal projectors,

in addition to regular infantry weapons. These groups were to be

trained and readied in order to be immediately available when needed

in combat. Three flame thrower teams, each consisting of an operator

and assistant operator, were allotted to each assault party.46

Improving the flame thrower and training operators to employ it

occupied most of 1943. Achievements in both fields were substantial,

but since the weapon had not yet performed satisfactorily in the

Southwest Pacific, lingering doubts remained as to the ultimate value

of such efforts. Flame thrower successes in a variety of operations in

the theater between December 1943 and July 1944 helped dispel such

doubts.

New Britain and the Admiralties

The first combat use of the flame thrower in the Southwest Pacific

after Buna occurred on 15 December 1943 at Pilelo, a tiny island off

the coast of New Britain. Troop B of the 112th Cavalry RCT had

landed and was moving inland when the leading platoon was halted

by fire from two caves. A bazooka quickly silenced one, but the other

was so protected by log pilings as to be impervious to both bazooka

and machine gun fire. The troop commander then organized an assault

party with a flame thrower as its principal weapon. While rifle and

automatic weapons fire covered the cave, the flame thrower operator

worked his way up and fired his entire charge into the entrance. The

rest of the party then rushed the position with hand grenades. When

45

 (1) Ltr, CmlO Hq ALAMO Forces to ACofS G-3, Sixth Army, 9 Feb 44, sub: Trained Flame

Thrower Pers. (2) Ltr, ACmlO ALAMO Force to CmlO U.S. Forces, Unit 3, 4 Nov 43, sub: Flame

Thrower School. (3) For detailed course of instruction at these mobile flame thrower schools, see

114th Engineer Battalion Training Memorandum No. 14, Annex 1, 6 October 1943, Flame Thrower

School Schedule. All in Sixth Army Cml Sec Rcds, 353 Flame Thrower Tng. 46

 Sixth Army Tng Memo No. 8, 1 Oct 43, sub: Tng in the Use of Flame Throwers.
550 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the party reached the cave, it found 5 dead and 2 wounded Japanese,

all with their clothing ablaze.47

Marine units had less success with the flame thrower in the Cape

Gloucester section of New Britain. Misfires and mechanical malfunctions were frequent. The M1A1's, despite their waterproofing, became

damp and undependable from the incessant rain.48 The dense foliage

and jungle growth on Cape Gloucester normally absorbed the first

burst of flame thrower fuel, preventing the flame from reaching its

target and further exposing an already vulnerable operator to enemy

fire.49

Flame throwers made an equally inauspicious beginning in the Admiralties campaign. The 2d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division landed

on Manus Island on 15 March 1944 with sixteen flame throwers filled

and ready for action. Since opposition to the landing was negligible

and the first few days produced no suitable flame thrower targets,

many units discarded these weapons. But on the fourth day after the

landing, advancing troops were harassed by fire from a bunker which

had been bypassed by assault troops. It was a perfect target for flame

throwers, but none was available. They were found scattered along

the route from the beach, and hydrogen and nitrogen cylinders were

located near the airstrip, even farther from the front.50

The brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Verne D. Mudge, corrected the

situation by ordering his chemical officer, Lt. Charles Land, to collect

all flame throwers and equipment and take personal charge of flame

thrower operations. From then on, the weapons were carried immediately behind the attacking troops. Lieutenant Land accompanied

the forward elements, ready to organize and direct flame thrower

assault groups against suitable targets. Such targets did not appear until

the closing days of the Manus Island operation. It was discovered in

47

 (1) Ltr, CmlO Task Force (93d Cml Composite Co) to CmlO Sixth Army, 30 Dec 43, sub:

Official Rpt on Tactical Use of Flame Thrower. Reprinted in CWS 314.7 Observers Rpts (GrothausBrady Rpt), SWPA, SOPAC, CENPAC, 29 Mar 44, as an. 4, sec. 5. (2) Miller, CARTWHEEL:

The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 285. 48

 (1) Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, and Maj. John A. Crown, USMC, The Campaign on

New Britain (Washington, 1952), p. 54. (2) 93d Cml Composite Co, 30 Dec 43, Official Rpt on

Tactical Use of Flame Thrower. CWS SPCWS 5205 8-6. 1605/44. 49

 (1) Ltr, Cml Warfare SupO BACKHANDER Force to Cml Warfare IntellO USASOS SWPA, 1 Jan

44, sub: Cml Intell. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File. (2) Memo, ACmlO ALAMO Force

for G-3, G-4, 16 Feb 44, no sub. Sixth Army Rcds, 333 Inspection Rpts. 50

 Rpt, CmlO 1st Cavalry Div, 3 Jul 44, sub: Use of Flame Throwers in the Admiralty Campaign.

CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 551

mopping up the island that numerous Japanese had quietly remained

in their bunkers and allowed the leading elements of the attack to

bypass them. Flame thrower teams and demolition squads eliminated

these pockets by flaming and blasting every bunker they encountered.51

Wakde, Maffin Bay, and Biak

The flame thrower proved its effectiveness anew in May 1944 on

Wakde Island, of the Wakde group, off the New Guinea coast. There,

after two days of intense fighting, the 163d Infantry, 41st Division,

managed to clear out most of the enemy forces. The remaining Japanese took refuge in a network of connecting tunnels and caves in a

coral shelf which sloped up sharply from the northeast shore line.

Company A of the 27th Engineer Combat Battalion was ordered to

clean them out. To do the job the company used dynamite, bazookas,

white phosphorus grenades, and flame throwers, but only the flame

thrower proved successful against both caves and tunnels. On at

least eight separate occasions flame thrower assaults either killed the

Japanese defenders outright or drove them from their hiding places into

the open, where they became easy targets for riflemen.52

Company B of the 27th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached to the

158th Infantry, did equally well with flame throwers in the Maffin

Bay area of the New Guinea mainland, across from Wakde Island.

On 24 May the engineers, supported by two tanks, destroyed a machine

gun emplacement, which had pinned down an infantry company for

over three hours.53 This was the first recorded instance of a co-ordinated tank-flame thrower attack in the Southwest Pacific. A month

later, farther to the east at Lone Tree Hill, the pattern was repeated.

On 18 June 2d Lt. Theodore Frankel, antitank platoon leader, 1st

Infantry, 6th Division, supported by two tanks, knocked out three

51

 (1) Ibid. (2) Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Haas, "The Pacific Is Another War," Chemical Warfare

Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 5 (November-December, 1944), p. 17. 52

 (1) Ltr, CW Tech Intell Team 4 to Chief CmlO USASOS SWPA, 24 Jun 44, sub: Rpt on Use of

Cml Warfare Weapons and Munitions. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File. (2) McKinney,

Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 69-70. 53

 (1) Smith, Approach to the Philippines, p. 239. (2) Ltr, Cml Warfare Tech Intell Team 4 to

Chief CmlO USASOS SWPA, 24 Jun 44, sub: Rpt on Use of Cml Warfare Weapons and Munitions.

CWS 314-7 Portable Flame Thrower File. (3) Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Corps and Divs et al., 6 Sep 44,

sub: Cml Warfare Activities During Wakde-Maffin Bay Opns. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower

File.
552 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

enemy bunkers with a single flame thrower.54 Six days later Frankel

used the flame thrower in an entirely different kind of attack. The

target was an enemy 70-mm. artillery piece emplaced in a cave high

on Rocky Point. Frankel organized an assault party consisting of

an antitank grenadier, a TNT-armed demolitions man, and several

riflemen; he himself carried a flame thrower. The party crawled to

a shell hole about twenty yards in front of the cave, from which point

Frankel fired several bursts from the weapon. Next the demolition

man placed his charge, which knocked out the enemy field piece and

buried its crew under the resulting debris. In a 2-day period, Lieutenant

Frankel took part in nearly two dozen flame thrower assaults.55 But

the lieutenant's record in this regard was not unique, since engineers

of the 6th Engineer Combat Battalion and infantrymen of the 1st

and 20th Infantry regiments of the 6th Division carried out scores

of successful flame attacks in June 1944, especially in the Lone Tree

Hill and Rocky Point sections of the front.56

While the battle for Maffin Bay was still in progress, elements of the

41st Infantry Division invaded Biak Island. This island, about 100

miles from New Guinea, was a mass of coral with a veneer of dense

jungle vegetation. It abounded with caves ranging in size from shallow

cavities just large enough to contain two or three men to networks

of caverns capable of accommodating eight or nine hundred. Japanese

ingenuity had turned this maze of natural cave and connecting tunnels

into an extensive and formidable defensive installation, relatively impervious to the effects of air, naval, and artillery bombardment.57

 The

flame thrower played a vital role in the destruction of these powerful

defenses. From 27 May to 19 August 1944 it was fired more often

than in any other previous campaign in the Southwest Pacific. Fiftynine flame throwers sprayed 236 gallons of fuel against enemy positions.

54

 (1) Ltr, Task Force CmlO U.S. Forces Unit 1 to CmlO Sixth Army, 21 Jun 44, no sub. Sixth

Army Rcds, 470.7 Flame Throwers. (2) Frankel and 2d Lt James J. Harnes, 13 Jul 44, Rpt on Use

of Flame Throwers in Maffin Bay Area, Dutch New Guinea. Sixth Army Rcds, 350.05-Wakde. 55

 Frankel and Harnes, Rpt on Use of Flame Throwers in Maffin Bay Area, Dutch New Guinea. 56

 Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Distr, 6 Sep 44, sub: Cml Warfare Activities During the Wakde IslandMaffin Bay Opns. Sixth Army Rcds, 415.3. 57

 (1) Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Distr, 3 Sept 44, sub: Cml Warfare Activities During the Biak Opn.

Sixth Army Rcds, 415.3. (2) Riegelman, Caves of Biak, pp. 145-47.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 553

They were used to burn combustible Japanese stores and against a

variety of other targets.58

Introduction of the Portable Flame Thrower in the

Central Pacific Area

Although it was in the South and Southwest Pacific that flame

throwers were first employed, it remained for troops in the Central

Pacific to demonstrate the full potential of the weapon. This they proceeded to do in a long series of amphibious assaults that, paralleling

MacArthur's drive in the Southwest Pacific, carried Army and Marine

units from the Gilberts and Marshalls to the very doorstep of Japan.

From the start commanders in the Central Pacific, especially Marine

leaders, showed an interest in and an enthusiasm for the flame thrower

unmatched in other theaters. Forces in the area were also blessed with

an adequate and sometimes overabundant supply of the weapon, a

relative absence of technical problems that plagued the Southwest

Pacific, and sufficient time between engagements to train operators and

assault teams. These factors helped to produce the success achieved by

the flame thrower in the Central Pacific.

During the last week in July 1943 the Hawaiian Department

 59

 presented a portable flame thrower demonstration, based on an analysis

of operations in the South Pacific, to approximately 1,400 Army, Navy,

and Marine officers and enlisted men. The display, demonstrating how

Japanese fortified defenses might be attacked and destroyed by assault

parties armed with the flame thrower, generated considerable interest.60

Later, when plans were being made for the invasion of the Gilbert

Islands, the Hawaiian Department chemical office prepared detailed

studies of types of Japanese defenses that might be encountered. An

examination of these studies convinced planners that the flame thrower

would be a desirable weapon in the coming operations; accordingly, the

27th Infantry Division received twenty-four and the 2d Marine Divi58

 (1) CmlO 41st Inf Div, n.d., Rpt, Cml Phase and Sec Hist Rcd of HORLICKS Opn. CVS 314.7

Portable Flame Thrower File. (2) CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 11 Aug 44, Preliminary

Tech Rpt—Rpt No. 9. Sixth Army Rcds, 350.05 Biak. 59 The Hawaiian Department soon became U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, and later U.S.

Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, and U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific. Colonel Unmacht served

as chemical officer of these headquarters throughout the war. 60

 Memo, Quigley, OACofS G-3 Hawaiian Dept, for Keliher, ACofS G-3, 4 Aug 43, sub: Rpt on

Dept Cml Field Exercise. History, CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. II, an. I-c.
554 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MARINES USING CWS FLAME THROWER ON A TARAWA BEACH

sion sixty.61 Members of the engineer battalion of each division underwent training in flame thrower operations, although even at this time

there was some feeling that it might be wiser to assign the weapons to

infantry rather than to engineer troops.

Portable throwers went into action on 20 November 1943 when the

165th RCT, 27th Division, landed on Makin Atoll and the 2d Marine

Division attacked Betio Island of the Tarawa Atoll. On the former,

enemy opposition was fortunately limited, for flame throwers, drenched

in the landings, failed to function.62 On Betio marines faced strong

Japanese positions. Here, enemy beach fortifications consisted of numerous concrete, steel, and sand and coconut log pillboxes, plus a number of excellent bombproof shelters. These emplacements were con61

 (1) History CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-b, 3-5. (2) Ltr, Unmacht to Hist Off, 27 Jun 51.

CWS 314.7. 62

 Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 93.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 555

nected by means of an intricate and highly developed trench and tunnel

system.63

Flame throwers proved invaluable against these defenses. During the

first three days of fighting, the weapon burned out a score of enemy

pillboxes, and, surprisingly, permitted marines to take a number of

frightened Japanese prisoners. On 22 November a large concrete bombproof shelter was assaulted by men of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines.

The marines, using flame throwers, overran the top of the shelter but

the Japanese counterattacked within minutes. Flame throwers quickly

drove back the enemy and inflicted heavy casualties.64 As at least two

historians of the Pacific fighting have commented: "Perhaps the most

valuable weapon on Tarawa proved to be the flame thrower."

 65

Although other units used these weapons with equal effectiveness,

there were, unfortunately, far too few flame throwers available. The

1st Battalion, 6th Marines, which had been assigned six flame throwers,

used two in close support of tanks and attached the remaining four to

the rifle platoon engaged in mopping-up activities. The battalion

recommended that it be allotted twelve for future engagements, a desire reflected in the reports of several other units.66

As a result of the Gilbert experience, the 7th Infantry Division's

allotment of portable flame throwers for the Marshall operations was

increased to 192; the 4th Marine Division's to 72.67 The 7th Division

immediately began an intensive training program in these weapons.

A squad of combat engineers armed with flame throwers, demolitions,

wire cutters, and bangalore torpedoes was assigned to each rifle platoon.

Realistic exercises were conducted in assaulting replicas of fortifications

likely to be encountered in the Marshalls. The engineers soon learned

to move freely under friendly fire and to depend on the infantrymen's

63

 CO 2d Marine Regt to CG 2d Marine Div, 17 Dec 43, Rpt of Opns GALVANIC. Combat Team

2 in 2d Marine Regt, Rpt of Opn—Tarawa, Marine Archives A8-1. 64

 (1) CO 2d Bn 8th Marines 2d Marine Div to CO Combat Team 2, 13 Dec 43, Rpt of Tarawa Opns,

2d Marine Regt—Rpt of Opns Tarawa. Marine Corps Archives A8-1. (2) Stockman, Battle for

Tarawa, p. 47. 65

 Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 163. 66

 (1) CO 1st Bn 6th Marines to CO 6th Marine Regt, 3 Dec 43, Special Action Rpt, 6th Marine

Regt—Special Action Report—Tarawa. Marine Corps Archives A9-1. (2) CO 8th Marine Regt to

CG 2d Mar Div, 1 Dec 43, Special Action Report—Tarawa. Marine Archives AIO-I. (3) CO LT

3/2 3d Bn 2d Marine to CG V Amphib Corps, 20 Dec 43, Rpt of Opns GALVANIC. 2d Marine Regt—

Rpt of Opns—Tarawa. Marine Archives A8-1. 67

 (1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. I-d, 30. (2) CG 4th Marine Div to CG V Amphib Corps,

17 Mar 44, Final Rpt on FLINTLOCK Opn, incl J, p. 17, Final Rpt, Roi. Marine Corps Archives

A22-1.
556 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ability to cover them. The latter, in turn, acquired confidence in the

engineer's competence in using flame throwers and in placing demolitions rapidly and effectively.68

The 4th Marine Division, also readying itself for the Marshall Islands

campaign, placed emphasis on assault team training. Equipped with

seventy-two portable flame throwers, the division faced the almost

impossible task, suggested by higher headquarters, of training two men

per infantry platoon,69 as well as the engineer personnel who normally

operated the weapon.70 The division trained as many individuals as it

could, but put its greatest emphasis on organizing assault parties within

its combat teams. Typical of these units was the 19-man party organized by the 24th Marines. This team was led by an officer and consisted of a flame thrower group including a flame thrower operator, an

assistant operator, and a fuel carrier; a 5-man demolition group; a 3-

man bazooka group; and a support group of 7 riflemen and BAR men.

Engineer troops comprised the flame thrower and bazooka groups.71

The inclusion of a fuel carrier in the assault team was an innovation.

Formerly, a flame thrower operator had to leave the forward area and

return to a servicing point to refill his weapon. This extra man in the

assault team made it possible to insure more rapid weapon refueling.

Chemical officers in the Marshalls also adopted the system of supplying

additional flame thrower fuel in 5-gallon cans, with an extra pressure

cylinder attached, instead of the normal 55-gallon drums, thus expediting the handling of fuel from transports to refilling points and

permitting the weapons to be serviced much nearer the front lines.

The actual combat employment of the flame thrower in the Marshall

Islands failed to justify fully the extensive preliminary training program. Happily, Japanese defenses on Roi, Namur, Kwajalein, and

Eniwetok, pounded by a 3-day preinvasion bombardment, proved less

formidable and Japanese resistance less stubborn than had been anticipated. As a consequence, the flame thrower was not needed in the assault phases of the amphibious landings, but was confined to mopping68

 (1) Sixth Army Combat Notes No. 2 15 Aug 44, 106-11.6 (7076). (2) Rpt of the 7th Inf

Div Participation in FLINTLOCK Opn, 8 Feb 44. 7th Inf Div, 307-0.3 (1037). 69

 V Amphib Corps Tng Memo No. 13-43, 21 Dec 43, Demolition and Flame Thrower Tng.

Reprinted as app. 13 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 284-85. 70

 V Amphib Corps Tng Order No. 17-43, 21 Dec 43, Flame Throwers. Marine Corps School, Log

60-27, reprinted as app. 14 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 286-92. 71

 CG 4th Marine Div to CG V Amphib Corps, 17 Mar 44, Final Rpt on FLINTLOCK Opn, Incl E,

Rpt of Combat Team 24. Marine Corps Archives, A22-1.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 557

up operations and to the elimination of enemy personnel from underground shelters and fortifications.72

 The 4th Marine Division reported

the weapon most effective in this work when used in combination with

explosives. Flame was hurled at the embrasures and slits of the fortification forcing the occupants to take cover. Next, pole or shaped charges

were used to breach the side of the structure, after which grenades,

satchel charges, or more flame was used to destroy the occupants.73

Because operations in the Marshalls demonstrated that 192 flame

throwers were more than an infantry division needed or could adequately handle, Army divisions slated for the Marianas campaign received 141 flame throwers and Marine divisions 81.74

 An analysis of

the Marshall campaign also indicated to Army and Marine leaders that

trained infantrymen as well as engineer troops were required to operate

the flame thrower. This conclusion, similar to that reached independently by commanders in the South and Southwest Pacific, was based

on the realization that engineers were normally too busy with other

essential duties to devote their full attention to the flame thrower.

After the Marshall Islands operation infantrymen became the primary

users of the weapon in the Central Pacific.

72

 (1) Rpt, Marshall Islands Japanese Defenses and Battle Damage, prepared by WD Mission for CG

CENPAC, 1 Mar 44. 98-USF3-0.3. (2) Maj. Leonard D. Frescoln, "Post-Mortem on the Marshalls,"

Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 2 (April-May, 1944), pp. 33-34. 73

 CG 4th Mar Div to CG V Amphib Corps, 17 Mar 44, Final Rpt on FLINTLOCK Opn. Marine

Corps Archives A22-1, incl, 1, p. 17. 74

 (1) History CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. 1-D, 40. (2) CG 3d Marine Div to Comdt of the

Marine Corps, 21 Aug 44, Special Action Rpt, FORAGER Opn (Guam), an. B to D-3 Rpt, Marine

Corps Archives, A17-1.
CHAPTER XV

The Flame Thrower in the Pacific:

Marianas to Okinawa

The Need for a Mechanized Flame Thrower

The stimulus for the development of the mechanized flame thrower,

as for the portable, came from the war against Japan where the enemy's

excellent defenses and stubborn resistance called attention to the utility

of flame. Although the portable flame thrower gradually proved to be

an effective weapon against the Japanese, one of its inherent disadvantages, the vulnerability of the operator, suggested the portable's installation in an armored vehicle. It is not to be inferred that CWS engineers

in the United States had been unmindful of the possibilities of a machanized flame thrower; the Chemical Warfare Technical Committee

had advocated the development of such a weapon in May 1940. But

for various reasons, work on the mechanized models in the zone of

interior proceeded slowly and fitfully throughout the entire war.1

There were several attempts in the Pacific to mount portable flame

throwers in some sort of armored vehicle, a combination made the more

appealing by the lack thus far of cannon or other antitank weapons in

the enemy bunkers. In the South Pacific Area, for example, the commander of a tank battalion in New Caledonia installed a flame gun in

the pistol port of a tank, and a chemical officer on New Georgia modified the flame gun so that it could be fitted into the aperture for the

tank's bow machine gun. The 1st Marine Tank Battalion, serving in

the Southwest Pacific, mounted several portable flame throwers on its

tanks in preparation for the New Britain operation. None of these

improvisions could have been called successful. The portable flame

thrower was not constructed to withstand the vibrations and jarrings

1

 For a discussion of the research and development of mechanized flame throwers, see Brophy, Miles,

Cochrane, from Laboratory to Field.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 559

of a moving tank, and its fuel capacity was much too limited.2 Word

came from Washingon pointing out the disadvantages of range and fire

hazards from such modifications and counseling patience until the arrival of perfected mechanized flame throwers from the zone of interior.3

After the bloody battle of Tarawa, which opened Allied offensive

operations in the Central Pacific Area, an even greater clamor arose

for a mechanized flame weapon. The portable flame thrower had done

its part in that battle, but new weapons and techniques were urgently

needed to help prevent the repetition of such staggering casualties. In

preparation for the Marshall Islands operation scheduled for February

1944 both the 4th Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division installed M1A1 portable flame throwers, modified by the chemical section

of the 7th Division, in light tanks and LVT's, an amphibious tractor.

Included in the 7th Division's version were special fuel containers

manufactured in Honolulu. But the attempts to waterproof the guns

on the LVT's were unsuccessful, and the electrical systems of those

flame weapons, drenched on landing, failed completely. The tankmounted versions, plagued with the basic weaknesses of fragility and

low fuel capacity, had but modest success.4

The poor results of flame thrower improvisation in the Pacific

theaters was no cause for criticism of the responsible chemical officers

and tank commanders; the portable flame thrower was basically unsuited for tank adaption. If nothing else, these efforts clearly indicated

that improvisation was not the answer and underlined the real need

for a mechanized flame thrower in the Pacific fighting.

The Marianas

After the experience at Tarawa, General Richardson, Commanding

General, U.S. Army Forces in Central Pacific Area, asked the War Department if mechanized flame throwers were available in the zone of

interior. Upon receiving a favorable reply, Richardson requisitioned

2

 (1) CWS TofO Ltr No. 6, 8 Oct 43, p. 10. (2) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CCWS, 26 Aug 43,

sub: Rpt of Mounting Flame Throwers in Tanks. CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Throwers File.

(3) Maj John N. Rentz, Marines in the Central Solomons (Washington, 1952), p. 156. (4) Ltr,

CmlO ALAMO Force to Cml SupO APO 323, 24 Jan 44, no sub. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame

Throwers. 3

 CWS TofO Ltr No. 16, 12 Jul 44, p. 12. 4

 (1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-c-1, 2-3; I, sec. 3, pp. 21-22. (2) Crowl and Love,

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 233. (3) USAFICPA, Participation in the Kwajalein and

Eniwetok Opns, p. 194.
560 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

forty auxiliary bow gun flame throwers (E4—5) for use in the Marianas

operation.5 When these failed to arrive, he utilized local resources

to fashion substitutes.6 It was fortunate that this need arose in the

Central Pacific, for Hawaii had factories and machine shops and an

eager and able chemical officer—Colonel Unmacht, who approached

the problem of the mechanized flame thrower with the same efficiency

he had shown for the portable.

At this time the marines in the theater were perhaps even more

interested in flame weapons than were the Army troops. Late in January 1944 the V Amphibious Corps, preparing for the Marianas, obtained twenty Ronson vehicular flame throwers from Canada. The

development work involved in adapting these British-designed weapons for installation in M3A1 light tanks was to fall primarily upon

Colonel Unmacht, who utilized CWS, Ordnance Department, Naval,

and private facilities for this undertaking. The resulting main armament flame thrower, dubbed Satan, had a range of from 40 to 80 yards,

a fuel capacity of 170 gallons, and a duration of fire of 2 minutes,

enough, according to Unmacht, to reduce 40 or 50 pillboxes based

on 2-second bursts.7 At a demonstration held for interested officers on

15 April 1944, the marines fully recognized the potential of the mechanized flame thrower. The V Amphibious Corps managed to get ten

more Ronson units from Canada, and its commander, Lt. Gen. Holland

M. Smith, asked the Army authorities in Hawaii to install the Ronson

units in M3A1 light tanks in time for the Marianas operation.8 Although medium tanks would have had advantages of better protection

and more space and mobility, none could be made available in time

to meet the required deadline.9 The Chemical Section, CENPAC, with

the co-operation of the 14th Naval District, the V Amphibious Corps,

and the Seabees, equipped twenty-four light tanks with the flame

5

 In an auxiliary mechanized flame thrower the flame weapon supplemented the normal armament

of the vehicle; in a main armament mechanized flame thrower, as the name implies, the flame thrower

was the principal armament. 6

 History, CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-c-1, 70. 7

 (1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-c-1, ref 14, 4-12. (2) See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane,

From Laboratory to Field, for details of the development work in Hawaii. (3) In his brief 8-page

final report to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, General Richardson paid tribute to this "resourceful

and inventive" CWS group which developed a flame-throwing tank that was of "incalculable value."

Final Rpt of CG AFMIDPAC to CofS USA, 15 Mar 46. 8

 Memo, CmlO CENPAC for G-3 DCofS and CofS CENPAC, 17 Apr 44, sub: Installation of

Ronson Flame Thrower in Light Tank. History, CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. III, ref. 6. 9

 43d Cml Lab Co, 16 Aug 44, Demonstration of Ronson and Navy Mark I Vehicular Mounted

Flame Thrower and Mobile Mechanical Servicing Equip. History, CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. III, ref. 14.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 561

thrower units. As the Satans were being produced Colonel Unmacht

conducted a series of 40-hour classes on flame tank operation which

were attended by Marine Corps and Army officers and men. By midMay the weapons were tested, waterproofed, and loaded on ships.

The invasion of the Marianas began early on 15 June 1944 when the

V Amphibious Corps, known as the Northern Landing Force and consisting of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions, invaded Saipan.10

 Each

division had 12 Satan tanks. These 12 plus 3 conventional tanks

formed a company of three platoons. Each platoon (4 Satans and 1

light tank) was attached to a company of medium tanks—the organic

armored support of a marine regiment. Landing on D plus 2 (17 June)

the flame tanks saw infrequent use during their first day of battle and

then only for the purpose of mopping up. Next day the tanks took

part in front-line action and thereafter, as tankers and infantrymen

alike quickly learned flame tank techniques, the Satan proved to be an

effective weapon.

Targets were varied—pillboxes, brush, canefields, buildings, and

caves. Typical action against stiff opposition saw flame tanks neutralizing targets under cover of medium tanks. A tank commander, interviewed shortly after the end of the operation, told of one such action

in which the Satan, supported by conventional tanks, came forward

to flame a well defended pillbox. As the target started burning, two

Japanese sprang out, only to be cut down by rifle fire. Resistance ceased.

An examination of the bunker revealed ten other Japanese, grotesquely

dead at their firing positions. The tank commander added that the

mechanized flame thrower proved to be the only effective weapon

against caves.11

After the fall of Saipan the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions immediately

started preparations for the invasion of Tinian which was to begin on

24 July. In this attack the M3A1 light flame tanks, loaded aboard

LCT's and LCM's, followed hard on the heels of the first assault wave.

The composition and attachment of flame tank units during the fight -

10

 Admiral Turner's Joint Expeditionary Force was composed of the Northern Landing Force (V

Amphibious Corps) scheduled for Saipan and Tinian, the Southern Landing Force (III Amphibious

Corps) earmarked for Guam, and a Reserve Force, consisting of the 27th Infantry Division afloat and

the 77th Division in Hawaii. 11

 (1) CmlO POA, 21 Aug 44, Rpt, Opns of Armored Flame Throwers by the 4th Marine Div on

Saipan and Tinian. History CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. IV, an. II-c-3, ref. 1. (2) Intervs of 4th

Marine Div Pers by Tenth Army officers, 4 Sep 44. History CWS MIDPAC, vol. IV, an. II-c-3,

ref s. 1 and 3.
562 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

ing were just as they had been on Saipan.12 The terrain on Tinian

proved much more favorable to tank employment, and this, combined

with the recently acquired combat experience, resulted in a profitable

use of flame vehicles. The Satans again combined with the medium

tanks against the more tenacious points of resistance. They also were

successful against caves and when used to burn vegetation concealing

enemy positions.13

The Southern Landing Force, as the III Amphibious Corps was designated for the Marianas campaign, assaulted Guam on 21 July with the

3d Marine Division, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and the 77th

Infantry Division as its principal combat elements. The 3d Tank Battalion, which landed on the first day, had among its armament six

M4A2 medium tanks equipped with E4-5 auxiliary bow gun flame

throwers. These weapons had arrived from the zone of interior for

service tests shortly before the operation began. One of the flame tanks

met the enemy at Assan Point on the second day of the battle. Supported by a conventional tank the flame vehicle approached an enemy

cave and fired half of its 25-gallon charge into the mouth. Seventeen

Japanese soldiers were incinerated. A similar attack near Chonito Cliff

resulted in 30 enemy dead. During the next five days the auxiliary

flame tanks continued to burn out resistance on Guam.14

A few logistical difficulties arose during these flame operations in

the Marianas. Planners for the invasion had estimated that the daily

expenditure of each flame tank would be one load of fuel; actually,

two loads were required. A shortage of napalm meant that most of

the flame fuel was either diesel oil mixed with Bunker C fuel obtained

from the vessels, or, at times, straight Bunker C. A postcampaign

recommendation called for adequate amounts of thickened fuel for

future operations to insure a longer, more effective range for the mechanized flame thrower.15

Flame tank crews, contrary to some pessimistic predictions, suffered

no casualties as a result of actual flame operations, although two men

were injured when a vehicle struck an enemy land mine. Fatigue be12

 Maj. Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, The Seizure of Tinian (Washington, 1951), p. 53. 13

 lbid., pp. 60, 96. (2) Philip A. Crowl, The Campaign in the Marianas, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1960), p. 298. 14

 Ltr, CO 3d Tank Bn to CG 3d Marine Div, 12 Nov 44, sub: Rpt and Recommendations on

Flame Thrower E4-5 in M4A2 Tanks by This Battalion in Guam Opn. CWS 314.7 Mechanized

Flame Thrower File. 15

 (1) Hoffman, Seizure of Tinian, p. 131. (2) Interv, 4th Marine Div Pers, 4 Sep 44.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 563

came a problem because of the extremely cramped positions within the

light tanks. While the marines were generally impressed by the flame

tank performance, they were critical of the range of the flame gun, the

limited visibility and light armor of the tanks, the lack of special tools

and spare parts, and the manner in which the Ronson was installed in

the tank. And experience in the Marianas substantiated the preinvasion

opinion that flame throwers should be mounted in medium tanks.16

The successful debut of the mechanized flame thrower in the Marianas campaign generally overshadowed the accomplishments of the

portable model. The truth was that the two types of flame throwers

supplemented one another; the mechanized afforded greater protection

to the operator and delivered larger amounts of flame for longer distances, while the portable, capable of quicker and more flexible employment, attacked targets inaccessible to the tank-mounted type. Portable flame throwers saw action on Saipan on D-day before the tanks

were landed and proved invaluable during the street fighting in the

village of Garapan. Later, these weapons helped overcome stubborn

resistance of cave defenses located in Saipan's cliff formations, defenses

which the tank-mounted flame throwers could not reach. On Guam

the portable flame throwers were committed against the cave defenses

of Chonito Cliff within an hour of the actual landings, and they remained busy during the entire three weeks of fighting.17

On at least one occasion the two types of flame thrower were employed in the same action. During the battle for Tinian, marines first

used the cannon of a medium tank to blast defended caves, then the light

flame tanks to spray the openings, and finally assault teams with demolitions and portable flame weapons to actually reduce the positions.18

Of the two Army divisions in the operation the 27th continued to

assign the weapons to the combat engineers while the 77th gave them to

16

 (1) Interv, 4th Marine Div Pers, 4 Sep 44. (2) CG 4th Marine Div to Comdt Marine Corps, 18

Sep 44, Opn Rpt—Saipan, an. E, p. 11. Marine Corps Archives A14-1 (S&C 48430). (3) Hoffman,

Saipan: The Beginning of the End, p. 254.

17

 (1) CO 8th Marine Regt to CG 2d Marine Div, 20 Jul 44, Special Action Rpt, FORAGER.

Marine Archives A20-1. (2) Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, chs. V, IX. (3) Hoffman, Saipan:

The Beginning of the End, p. 196. (4) CG 3d Marine Div to Comdt Marine Corps, 21 Aug 44,

Special Action Rpt, FORAGER Opn, D-3 Rpt, Narrative of the Campaign.

18

 (1) Lt Col B. A. Hockmuth, USMC, n.d., Rpt, Flame Throwers at Saipan. CWS 314.7. (2)

CG 4th Marine Div to CINCPAC and CINCPOA, 25 Sep 44, Opn Rpt—Tinian, an. C, p. 20. Marine

Archives, A14-3. (3) Hoffman, Seizure of Tinian, p. 96.
564 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the infantry. The marines, prompted by previous experience, assigned

the portable flame throwers to the infantry.19

Although the portable weapon stood up well under hard usage in the

Marianas, weather conditions caused innumerable problems. Many

flame throwers were deadlined through battery and spark plug failure

and because of inadequate waterproofing. The former difficulty was

greatly relieved with the introduction of the new M2-2 flame thrower

(flown from the zone of interior) and its improved ignition system.20

There was a good supply of flame throwers present, but no provision had

been made for transporting them or the heavy service equipment needed

for their maintenance.21

Peleliu

Tarawa had called the Navy's attention to the possible use during

the initial stages of an assault landing of a mechanized flame thrower

mounted in some sort of landing craft. The National Defense Research

Committee provided a speedy solution to this problem. The organization had recently developed the Q model flame thrower for light tanks

only to find that vehicle out of favor. It now adapted the Q flame unit

to fill the Navy's needs. Newly christened the Navy Mark I, five units

of the flame thrower reached Hawaii in April 1944. The Army inherited these units when Navy authorities turned down the model as

unsuitable for amphibious operations because of its excessive weight.

The 43d Chemical Laboratory also found that this flame unit, with a

fuel capacity of 200 gallons, a firing time of 74 seconds, and a maximum range of over 100 yards, was too bulky and heavy for installation

in tanks.22

Interest in the Mark I flame thrower then arose in another quarter.

Early in June 1944 a Navy flame thrower detachment from the United

States joined the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal which was preparing for the invasion of the Palau Islands. This detachment, con19

 McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 150-54. 20

 The ignition system of the M2-2 consisted of a plastic cylinder with five patches of incendiary

material. A trigger on the front handle activated a match-mixture-coated pin which ignited one of the

incendiary patches. The entire system was waterproof. The M2-2 weighed seventy pounds when filled

and had a capacity of four gallons. 21

 McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 150-54. 22

 (1) Memo 2, CmlO CENPAC to TankO G-3 DCofS CENPAC, 6 May 44. (2) 43d Lab Co, 19

May 44, Rpt Demonstration U.S. Navy Flame Thrower Mark I. Both in History, CWS, AFMIDPAC,

vol. III, refs. 11, 13.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 565

FLAME THROWER ON AN AMPHIBIOUS TRACTOR BLASTS CAVE on Peleliu Island.

sisting of one officer and three enlisted men and attached to the division's amphibian tractor battalion, mounted its three Mark I flame

units on LVT (4)'s, the armored amphibian tractor. Tests soon revealed that there were certain drawbacks to this combination. The

severe vibrations of the vehicle operating on land shook loose the gunner's protective shield and cracked the porcelain of the spark plugs,

failures which were only partially remedied by improvisation and substitution. The naval detachment began to instruct the marines in the

operation and maintenance of the flame tractors but, unfortunately,

a shortage of napalm prevented adequate training of men and testing of

weapons. Three flame units which arrived from Hawaii shortly before

embarkation were held in reserve.23

23

 (1) Rpt on Activities of the Navy Flame Thrower Detachment in the Palaus Opn, n.d. History,

CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-c-3, 6-7. (2) Maj. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, The Assault on Peleliu

(Washington, 1950), p. 32.
566 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The island of Peleliu was the principal objective of the 1st Marine

Division attack in the Palaus. Each of the three assault regiments was to

have a flame tractor in support. Crews of these flame vehicles received

briefings on the over-all operation and detailed instructions in their

own particular mission. The flame tractor with the 1st Marine Regiment would advance just behind the initial wave of landing craft.

Upon reaching the beach it was to fire on targets of opportunity, following the infantry as it pushed inland. Any infantry officer could

commandeer the flame tractor if an appropriate target appeared. The

flame vehicle with the 5th Regiment would land and advance with the

first wave of assault troops, and the 7th Regiment's flame support

would accompany a flanking group of landing craft.

The three flame tractors, plus two service tractors carrying an air

compressor and extra fuel, were loaded in a landing craft, tank, which

in turn made the 2,000-mile journey from Guadalcanal to Peleliu on

the deck of a landing ship, tank.

On the day of attack, 15 September 1944, the elaborate plan for

using the flame tractors completely broke down. The 1st Marine Regiment was stopped by stiff resistance just beyond the beach, and its flame

tractor waited five hours for some kind of order. The flame vehicles

with the other regiments were told to stand offshore out of danger.

When the three flame tractors eventually landed they stood idle on the

beaches, a result no doubt of extreme confusion and the unfamiliarity

of the marines with the weapon. Inactivity on the second day was

caused by the fact that the air compressor had not yet landed. The

flame vehicles saw action on the third day, and from then on their commitment was regular.24

The troops used the flame tractor principally to neutralize caves,

pillboxes, and dugouts and to burn the cover from the battleground.

Japanese, hidden in defiladed positions, were often caught by arching

rodlike streams of burning, thickened fuel which hit the reverse slopes.

The marines controlled this type of fire by radio from observation posts.

In the first phase of the fighting the flame tractors usually worked

ahead of the infantry, even ahead of the tanks. As the attack slackened

upon reaching the hills, the tanks and infantry provided support for

the flame weapons. The latter could have been more effective, particularly from commanding positions on hills and cliffs, but for their

24

 Rpt on Activities of the Navy Flame Thrower Detachment in the Palaus Opn.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 567

light armor plate and their lack of all around protection. After the

first few days on Peleliu the employment of the six flame tractors was

steady until about D plus 40 and then sporadic until D plus 75. The

flame weapons attacked about 100 caves and twenty-five pillboxes and

dugouts. They burned off some forty acres of cover, expending fifty

loads of fuel in the process.

The over-all usefulness of this mechanized flame thrower suffered

from the inadequacies of the tractors. Damage to the flame units themselves was negligible and usually repairable within several hours. But

the amphibious tractors could not withstand the rugged terrain and

were constantly out of action with engine troubles, torn tracks, and

broken final drives. The 6 flame throwers were employed for 61 days

(or a total of 366 flame thrower days), and almost one-third of the

time was spent on tractor maintenance. This unfortunate situation

occurred despite the fact that the detachment had a total of 19 tractors

in which to mount the 6 flame units. In addition to these frequent

breakdowns, insufficient training of the crews hampered efficient operations. Gunners sometimes were unable to estimate the range of the

target, and incomplete knowledge of the flame gun prevented the crew

from taking care of small malfunctions in the field. All in all, experience on Peleliu demonstrated that the LVT was not a suitable vehicle for flame throwers; this was the conclusion of the Navy flame

thrower detachment. But despite the failure of the mount, the marines

were impressed by the Navy Mark I flame thrower. In some respects

they considered it superior to the Ronson flame gun used in the Marianas, especially in length of range.25

An interesting sidelight to the Peleliu operation was the use of a

high pressure hose to carry flame to targets beyond the range of mechanized flame weapons. During the fighting at Umurbrogol Pocket,

engineers attached a 300-yard hose to a fuel tank and, with pressure

provided by booster pumps, operators sprayed Japanese positions with

flame much as firemen direct water on burning buildings.26 So impressed was General Richardson with this weapon that he asked Colonel

Unmacht to continue the investigation of its combat potential. In

subsequent tests the chemical section attached a 400-foot length of

25

 (1) Ibid. (2) Hough, Assault on Peleliu, pp. 32, 147, 148, 180-81. (3) Hoffman, Saipan:

The Beginning of the End, p. 254. (4) See also Robert Ross Smith, Approach to the Philippines,

pp. 539, 545, 563, 571-72. 26

 Hough, Assault on Peleliu, p. 175.
568 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

standard 11⁄2-inch rubber fire hose to a flame thrower tank and attained

a range of 60 yards. Following a demonstration of the device in February 1945 Tenth Army ordered three sets of these hoses, all of which

were to see service on Okinawa.27

The Philippines

Preparations for the Portable Flame Thrower

In May 1944 Sixth Army's commander, General Krueger, expressed

to his staff chemical officer some misgivings about the past performances

of the portable flame thrower.28 As a consequence, a study was made

under the aegis of Sixth Army's G-3 to determine what revisions

should be made in the Army's official flame thrower doctrine.29 This

study revealed several reasons why the flame thrower had been used

with less than maximum effectiveness. Commanders had incomplete

understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the weapon; as a

result, it was often committed to action without any chance of success

or, conversely, was not introduced into situations where it might have

been helpful. A corollary to this was the failure of unit commanders

to comply with Sixth Army doctrine requiring the employment of

portable flame throwers as an integral part of the assault party.30 A

commander, upon brief reconnaissance, would send forward a poorly

protected flame thrower on a mission that would have been difficult

for a much larger force. Or flame thrower operators would be accompanied by a security detachment which had been hastily formed for

the emergency. These improvised groups seldom jelled into the efficient

teams envisioned by the writers of Sixth Army's training memo on

flame thrower operations.

Commanders had difficulties even when they tried to adhere to the

established doctrine. During training, an assault party working as a

unit might attain a high standard of proficiency. But in the interval

27

 (1) History, AFMIDPAC, II, an I-d, 66; an. II-c-1, 46-48. (1) See below, p. 587. 28

 Ltr, CmlO ALAMO Forces to CmlO I Corps, 17 May 44, no sub. Cited in McKinney, Portable

Flame Thrower Opns, p. 91. 29

 This doctrine was expressed in Sixth Army Training Memorandum No. 8, 1 October 1943, sub:

Training in the Use of Flame Throwers, reprinted as Appendix j in McKinney, Portable Flame

Thrower Operations, pages 258-60. 30

 (1) Memo, CmlO ALAMO Force for ACofS G-3 Sixth Army, 8 Jun 44, no sub. Sixth Army

353 Cml Warfare Tng. (2) Memo, CmlO Sixth Army for ACofS G-3 Sixth Army, 21 May 44, no

sub. Cml Warfare Sixth Army 353 Flame Thrower Tng.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 569

between the completion of training and the test of battle, the group

normally was so broken up by promotions, transfers, and casualties

that the maintenance of organizational integrity was impossible. To

complicate the situation still more, the flame thrower was officially

classified as a secondary weapon. This meant that with the close of the

training period flame throwers were returned to unit supply. Thereafter, whenever an attacking force unexpectedly encountered a fortified defensive installation, an assault party could not be sent forward

at once. Instead, flame thrower operators first had to go back to the

unit supply point to pick up and fill their weapons. Such delays were

often costly.31

Chemical and other officers concerned with flame thrower operations

recognized the inadequacies of Sixth Army flame thrower doctrine,

especially as it applied to assault parties. As a remedy they suggested the

establishment of permanent units whose principal mission would be

attacks on fortifications and to whom the flame thrower would be assigned as a primary weapon. Specifically, some recommended the conversion of chemical processing, 4.2-inch mortar, or antitank units into

chemical flame thrower companies or platoons attached to regimental

headquarters.32

 Although flame thrower platoons of this type had already been organized with success by regiments of the Americal Division on Bougainville, Sixth Army rejected this idea for its own units.

It issued instead, on 22 June 1944, new instructions which emphasized

the technical and tactical training of assault teams.33 Each infantry

battalion and cavalry squadron was to form and maintain on a permanent basis at least one assault party, to include a leader, an assistant

leader, 4 flame thrower operators, 2 demolitions men, 2 rocket launcher

men, 2 BAR operators, and 4 riflemen. Trained to reduce fortified

enemy positions, the assault party was to be held in reserve during combat until appropriate targets appeared. Company and battalion commanders and executive officers were expected to familiarize themselves

31

 (1) Ltr, CmlO 1st Cav Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 6 Dec 43, no sub. Sixth Army, AG 300.6

Misc Memos (1st Cav). (2) Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Sixth Army, 23 Jun 44, sub: Flame Throwers.

CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File. (3) CmlO 41st Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 30 Jun 44,

Preliminary Tech Rpt-Ltr, Rpt 2. Sixth Army 350.05 Biak. 32

 (1) Ltr, CmlO I Corps to CmlO Sixth Army, 13 Jun 44, no sub. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame

Thrower File. (2) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CmlO Sixth Army, 9 Jun 44, no sub. Sixth Army

Rcds, 353 Flame Thrower Tng. (3) Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Sixth Army, 23 Jun 44, sub: Flame

Throwers. 33

 Sixth Army Tng Memo No. 18, 22 Jun 44, no sub. Reprinted as app. 9 in McKinney, Portable

Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 273-75.
570 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

with the capabilities, limitations, and tactical employment of these

assault parties, so that they would be committed with maximum effectiveness.34

Having resolved the question of tactical employment, Sixth Army

turned to flame thrower servicing problems. It had always been difficult to refill fuel tanks, replace empty gas cylinders, and test and repair

flame throwers rapidly and efficiently near the front lines. But as long

as demands for the weapon were infrequent, speedy servicing had been

a minor consideration. The difficulty reached critical proportions only

on Biak, where for the first time flame throwers were in almost daily

use.

As an interim measure, Lt. Col. Frank M. Arthur, 41st Division

chemical officer, devised a plan for mounting two charging sets, each

consisting of two hydrogen and five nitrogen cylinders and a fuel mixing kit, on jeeps and trailers. Teams of technicians from the 94th

Chemical Composite Company operated these sets and serviced flame

throwers down to the regimental level. Experience proved this system

inadequate, since it was at the battalion and the company level that

servicing was found to be most desirable.35

Although Sixth Army agreed that the assignment of CWS personnel

to lower combat units was the most likely solution to the servicing problem, the limited number of chemical troops prevented such dispersal.

In planning for the Leyte operation Sixth Army therefore decided that

battalion and company personnel would service the flame throwers

and perform first echelon maintenance. The task of second and third

echelon maintenance and the preparation of proper fuel mixtures was

assigned to chemical service platoons attached to corps and divisions.

This arrangement was to work even more successfully on Luzon than

it did on Leyte, primarily because of the presence on Luzon of a greater

number of chemical service platoons.36

Employment of the Portable Flame Thrower

The return to the Philippines took place on 20 October with the assault on Leyte by Sixth Army's X and XXIV Corps. The portable

34 Ibid.

35

 CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 30 Jun 44, Preliminary Tech Rpt-Ltr, Rpt No. 2. 36

 (1) Sixth U.S. Army Rpt of the Luzon Campaign, 9 Jan-3O Jun 45, III, Rpt of the Cml Warfare

Officer, 87, 91. (2) CG Sixth Army to Distr, 10 Apr 45, Rpt Cml Warfare Activities During the

Leyte Opn.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 571

flame thrower saw action the first day and continued to play a significant role throughout the operation. In all, 229 weapons were on hand

and, except for the 11 th Airborne, each of the divisions on Leyte used

the flame thrower in combat.37

The campaign demonstrated the validity of the new Sixth Army

policy on tactical doctrine and servicing. Flame thrower operator

casualties were light, malfunctions rare, and assault teams successful in

the large majority of their missions.38 Japanese bunker, cave, and dugout defenses on Leyte were elaborate and often ingenious. The success

of the flame thrower pointed up the merits of the weapon and the training and skill of the operators.

On 29 October a battalion of the 17th Infantry, 7th Division, encountered the strangest defensive position of the campaign. During the

fight for Dagami, Company L came upon a cemetery south of the town

which was overgrown with weeds and filled with stone crypts built

above the ground. Encountering no resistance the leading elements of

the company passed through the graveyard. The support platoon followed. When the platoon was halfway through, a headstone tilted

back revealing four Japanese in the grave, armed with rifles and an

American BAR. The enemy troops could not be dislodged until a

flame thrower came forward and burned them out. The platoon broke

up into small details and pushed its way through the rest of the cemetery, eliminating enemy fighters as they were located. Company K,

following Company L, also received fire from the stone crypts. It

became evident that the enemy had removed the bodies from their

tombs, punched holes through the stone, and had thus established a

series of small pillboxes. The company commander withdrew to a path

in the cemetery and, lining up his men shoulder to shoulder, sent them

through the cemetery behind a battery of six flame throwers. This

effective, albeit unorthodox, formation burned its way through the

macabre defenses, destroying about 30 of the enemy in the process.39

Flame thrower assaults by other units on Leyte, though less bizarre,

were no less successful. Regiments of the 96th Division, equipped with

the new M2-2 flame thrower, found it useful in burning off kunai

grass which hid Japanese emplacements. On one occasion a flame

37

 CG Sixth Army to Distr, Cml Warfare Activities During the Leyte Opn. 38 Ibid.

39

 (1) 17th Inf, 1 Jan 45, Rpt of KING II Opn. 7th Inf Div 307-Inf (17)-0.3 (15035). (2)

Cannon, Leyte, The Return to the Philippines, pp. 143-44.
572 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

thrower was used at close quarters to repel an enemy attack on American tanks.40

 The division reported that Japanese troops were reluctant

to stay in positions attacked by flame throwers and that the weapon

was "a very important factor in overcoming the enemy's inherent will

to resist."41

Reports from the 1st Cavalry Division and the 32d Infantry Division

substantiated this estimate of the portable flame thrower. In midDecember an element of the 1st Cavalry Division encountered an enemy emplacement on a narrow ridge in the Mount Minoro sector which

commanded the approach along the mountain trail. Repulsed in several frontal attacks cavalrymen, supported by an assault team, circled

wide and approached the position from the rear. The flame thrower

sprayed the emplacement, and the defenders were cut down by small

arms fire as they fled from their position.42

On 15 December troops of the 126th Infantry, 32d Division, were

halted in the Ormoc corridor by strong resistance from a pillbox and

riflemen situated about twenty yards below the crest of a hill. After

one attempt to overcome these defenses had failed, the regiment formed

an assault party of fifteen riflemen, a bazooka team, and two flame

thrower operators. The party crept around the enemy and opened fire

simultaneously with grenades, bazookas, and flame throwers. One flame

thrower operator directed his fire on the pillbox, while the other sprayed

the rifle positions. The attacking riflemen found that the badly burned

and demoralized Japanese offered little resistance.43

Units on Leyte for the most part adhered closely to Sixth Army

flame thrower doctrine. Those who did not soon came to grief. Some

unit commanders, for example, continued to use but one flame thrower

in an assault party. By thus failing to allow for possible misfires or

casualties they endangered the success of their mission. Moreover, despite repeated warnings, weapons were occasionally committed to action

without sufficient servicing. The 3 2d Division, which arrived on Leyte

on 14 November 1944, unloaded its flame throwers and sent them directly to the front line without a check. Misfires and malfunctions

40

 382d RCT AAR, 7 Nov 44, KING II (Leyte) Opns. 296-Inf (382)-0.3 (15465). 41

 96th Div AAR, n.d., KING II, Oct-Dec 44, p. 85. 396-0.3 (11816). 42

 CG X Corps to CG Sixth Army, 13 Jan 45, Rpt of Cml Warfare Activities. 43

 Ltr, CG 32d Div to CG Sixth Army, 27 Feb 45, sub: Cml Warfare Activities in the Leyte Opn.

319.1 Sixth Army Rcds, Leyte.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 573

resulted. Not until the weapons were called back and properly serviced

did they function satisfactorily.44

The Leyte Campaign was followed in January 1945 by the invasion

of Luzon, the largest and most populous island in the Philippines.45 Although suitable flame thrower targets did not develop during the 9

January landing at Lingayen Gulf, they began to appear a week later

in I Corps sectors north and east of the beachhead. Three units of I

Corps had particular success with the weapon. On the 26th a company

of the 158th RCT, operating in mountainous terrain, encountered a

series of long, curved, and defended tunnels which ran about thirty

feet into a slope. An assault team moved toward the entrances under

cover of smoke from white phosphorus grenades. The flame thrower

operator fired a long burst of fuel into the opening of the first tunnel

and flushed a number of burning Japanese, who were killed by small

arms fire as they fled from the entrance. The other openings were

treated in a like manner. Japanese bodies, victims of burns and suffocation, were found along the smouldering corridors in the most remote

parts of the tunnels.46

Although other units reported similar success with the portable

flame thrower, the weapon was not ideally suited for combat in many

parts of Luzon. The 43d Division, for example, reported that in the

open terrain which featured much of the island, flame thrower operators found their approach much more hazardous than in the undergrowth of the jungle. As a consequence, weapons with longer ranges

had to be used in the reduction of enemy fortifications.47

The flame thrower proved more effective against urban targets. The

bitter battle for Manila marked the first extensive city fighting in the

Southwest Pacific, and flame throwers, although untested in this kind of

combat, saw much use in the street-to-street struggle. The weapon

proved particularly valuable in routing the enemy from the intricate

positions of the Intramuros, the old walled city of Manila.48 The portable flame thrower also played a part in the fighting in the Philippine

44

 (1) Ibid, (2) CG X Corps to CG Sixth Army, 13 Jan 45, Rpt of Cml Warfare Activities. 45

 For a general account of the Luzon campaign, see Smith, Triumph in the Philippines. 46

 Cml Sec 158th RCT, Cml Intell Rpt, 28 Jan 45. Sixth Army Rcds, Luzon Intell Rpts, 350.05. 47

 43d Div Hist Rpt, Luzon Campaign, 9 Jan-30 Jun 45, pp. 102-03. 43d Inf Div 343-33.4

(12281). 48

 (1) AAR, Opns of the 37th Inf Div, Luzon, P.I., 1 Nov 44-30 Jun 45. 37th Inf Div 337-3

(22871). (2) AAR, XIV Corps, M-1 Opn (Luzon), pp. 130-32. XIV Corps 214-33.4 (3469).

(3) See Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, chs. XV, XI.
574 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

General Hospital, the Legislative Building, and the General Post Office

—fighting which often turned into a series of fierce room-to-room and

floor-to-floor battles. American troops blasted holes in walls with explosives and then used flame throwers against the enemy in the next

room. The 37th Division reported that it used over three hundred

fillings during the Manila operation, or an average of more than four

fillings for every flame weapon in the division.49

The capture of Manila did not end the fighting on Luzon. There

remained the task of clearing out the more remote mountainous regions

of the island. In this type of action flame throwers were infrequently

used. Units reported that the flame thrower was too heavy, making it

difficult for one man to carry for prolonged periods, and, since few

extra men were available to haul the weapons, they often were left

behind. On several occasions I Corps resorted to Filipino carriers to

transport the weapons from the service point to the line of departure,

a distance of several thousand yards and at times over steep mountain

trails. Under such conditions flame thrower employment was limited

to reasonably accessible targets.50

The policy of using flame thrower assault parties worked out successfully as long as infantry casualties were low. But when casualty

rates mounted and every available man was wanted for the immediate

needs of combat, it became impossible to hold these organized teams in

permanent reserve. Commanders broke up these groups and sent their

personnel to line companies. Missions for which assault parties had been

organized fell to the rifle squad or platoon closest to the action.51

Sixth Army, disturbed by this situation and desirous of avoiding

similar difficulties in its forthcoming campaign on the Japanese mainland, changed its training doctrine somewhat. Representing the accumulated experience of several years of combat, a new directive was

issued which differed in only one significant respect from its predecessors—it rejected the concept of "organized assault parties in permanent

reserve." Instead, it stipulated that at least three squads from each rifle

49 (1) CG XIV Corps to CG Sixth Army, 1 Jul 45, Rpt, Japanese Defense of Cities as Exemplified

by the Battle of Manila, p. 21. Sixth Army G-2 files. (2) AAR, Opns of the 37th Inf Div Luzon,

P.I., 1 Nov 44-30 Jun 45. 50

 I Corps, History of the Luzon Campaign, Philippine Islands, 1945, an B-1. I Corps 201-33.4

(21700). 51

 (1) Hist Rpt, 38th Inf Div, Avengers of Bataan, 19 Jan-30 Jun 45, pp. 189-90. 38th Inf Div

files 338-33.4 (17806). (2) Hist Rpt, A History of the 63d Inf Opns on Luzon, P.I., 9 Jan-30 Jun

45. 306 Inf (63)-0.3 (26302).
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 575

company be trained to use special assault weapons and that four men

in each of these squads be flame thrower operators. These trained

groups were to operate as normal rifle squads until a situation arose in

which they were needed to perform their specialty.52 This change did

not alter the basic concept of using flame throwers solely as component

elements of an assault team. What was attempted was a further integration of the flexible assault team within the organizational framework

of the normal infantry unit. The war ended before this new system

could be tested in combat.

American forces began the Philippine campaign only partially

equipped with the new M2-2 flame thrower. As these weapons became

available, and as stocks of the M1A1 model were exhausted, the new

weapons were issued to combat troops.53 Supplies of the M2-2 flame

thrower never were sufficient to enable the M1A1's to be completely

withdrawn from service, but by V-J Day the newer type was in the

hands of the majority of units operating in the Philippines.

Those who were obliged to carry the M1A1 had to maintain a

vigilant servicing policy, especially during the rainy season, for despite

waterproofing the ignition system of the weapon was still unreliable.

Those equipped with the M2-2 also had problems. The pressure regulator proved to be entirely unsatisfactory and before the end of the

Philippine operations had been replaced by an entirely new type.54

Flame thrower operators complained that the M2-2 could not maintain

pressure long enough, a result of inherent deficiencies in the weapon as

well as of poor maintenance procedures. Troops who filled the flame

thrower forgot that heat was generated when a cylinder was charged

and the subsequent cooling-off process could result in a drop of as much

as 200 pounds in pressure. Conversely, pressure built up in the fuel

tank when the tank was exposed to the direct rays of the sun, blowing

out the safety discs in extreme cases.55

52

 Sixth Army Tng Memo No. 30, 6 Aug 45, reprinted as app. 12 in McKinney, Portable Flame

Thrower Opns, pp. 281-83. 53 (1) Ltr, CG USAFFE to CG's Sixth Army, XIV Corps, and USASOS SWPA, 2 Sep 44, sub:

Portable Flame Throwers. (2) Ltr, CG USAFFE to CG's Sixth and Eighth Armies, 21 Sep 44, sub:

Flame Throwers. Both in Sixth Army 470.71, Flame Throwers. 54

 Ltr, CmlO Sixth Army to CmlO I Corps et al., 6 Apr 45, sub: Regulators, Pressure Assembly

B81-1-778, Grove Type. Sixth Army Rcds, Cml Warfare 470.71. 55

 Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CofS War Dept, 3 Jan 46, sub: Employ of Flame Throwers in the

Visaya Campaign, with inch. Eighth Army AG 470.71 (Far East).
576 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Mechanized flame Thrower

Not counting a limited use of improvised models, the first employment of the mechanized flame thrower in the Southwest Pacific took

place in the Philippines. The XXIV Corps had been slated for the

assault on Yap, in the Central Pacific Area, when the Joint Chiefs

of Staff canceled the Yap operation and ordered General MacArthur

and Admiral Nimitz to invade Leyte on 20 October 1944, two months

to the day before the planned date of the operation. The XXIV Corps,

which was now to take part in the assault on Leyte, had already embarked for Yap, when this change took place. A terrain study of that

island had recommended the utility of the mechanized flame thrower

particularly during the assault, and ten Ronson flame throwers, nine

on light tanks and one in an amphibious tractor, were in the convoy.56

Not only was Leyte's terrain far less suitable for tracked vehicles

than that of Yap, but the invasion of Leyte took place during the

rainy season, a circumstance which all but immobilized the mechanized

vehicles. During the landing one resisting enemy bunker was quickly

neutralized by the lone flame tractor, and during the first few days on

Leyte the light tank flame throwers burned off the foliage from a number of concealed enemy positions. But the fighting soon reached the

mountains, which put the tanks at further disadvantage.57

The Luzon fighting saw the arrival of both auxiliary and main armament flame throwers from the zone of interior. The XIV Corps included a tank battalion, equipped with bow gun flame throwers, that

was employed in the house-to-house fighting in Manila. In one instance

a flame tank neutralized in a few minutes a barricaded building which

had defied the infantry for two days. Twenty-five more bow gun

flame throwers reached the Sixth Army in mid-April.58

On 3 April 1945 the first and only main armament flame throwers

from the United States to see action with Army troops overseas arrived

on Luzon. These were four NDRC Q model (E7-7) flame throwers

mounted in M5A1 light tanks and scheduled for service testing. The

flame throwers and a service truck were assigned to the 13th Armored

56

 (1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-c-1, 21-22. (2) Cannon, Leyte: The Return to

the Philippines, pp. 8-9. 57

 Tech Intell Rpt 271, 5 Feb 45, p. 2, cited in McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, p. 93. 58

 (1) Rpt of CmlO Sixth Army, Luzon Campaign, 9 Jan-1 Jul 45, pp. 13-15. (2) McKinney,

Portable Flame Thrower Opns, p. 24. (3) These bow gun auxiliary flame throwers were of the E4-5

series, standardized as the M3-4-3 in 1945.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 577

Group.59 By this time the fighting on Luzon had reached its final

stages, and the combat activity at Ipo Dam, Balete Pass, Villa Verde

Trail, and Baguio took place in mountainous terrain, which made even

the maneuvering of light tanks difficult. Moreover, the enemy artillery

and mortar fire limited the activity of the thin-skinned M5A1's. In

mid-April these main armament tanks were attached to I Corps for

25th Division operations at Balete Pass. Following a demonstration

before officers of the division, the tanks, which were assigned to the

27th Regiment, saw action almost at once. The objective was an enemy

position located on the reverse slope of a ridge. One of the flame tanks

moved along the narrow ridge which provided the only avenue of approach and, when even with the target, turned down the slope and

attempted to flame the Japanese. Thwarted by the limited maximum

depression of the gun, the tankmen fired two quick bursts and withdrew.60

Mechanized flame throwers experienced the usual difficulties of tankinfantry communications. Close contact between the two was particularly important because of the limited visibility in the mountains

where infantrymen often had to guide the tank to its objective. A

power telephone on the rear deck of the tank was rigged to the turret,

allowing the turret operator to communicate with the infantry but

only at the cost of cutting off turret traversing power whenever he

spoke.61

The four main armament flame tanks advanced to the front lines

several times during the next twelve days, but remained uncommitted.

On 27 April the advance of Company K, 27th Infantry, was stalled

for more than twenty-four hours by deadly machine gun and 47-mm.

fire from enemy emplacements on the ridge's forward slope and the

valley beyond. Thick underbrush, which made friendly grenades ineffective, covered the entire defensive position, while fire from U.S.

tanks and artillery was unable to reach the enemy's defiladed position.

In this situation the commanding officer of the flame detachment

suggested the use of his tanks. The heavy underbrush made the approach exceedingly difficult and a medium tank and then an armored

FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 577

Group.59 By this time the fighting on Luzon had reached its final

stages, and the combat activity at Ipo Dam, Balete Pass, Villa Verde

Trail, and Baguio took place in mountainous terrain, which made even

the maneuvering of light tanks difficult. Moreover, the enemy artillery

and mortar fire limited the activity of the thin-skinned M5A1's. In

mid-April these main armament tanks were attached to I Corps for

25th Division operations at Balete Pass. Following a demonstration

before officers of the division, the tanks, which were assigned to the

27th Regiment, saw action almost at once. The objective was an enemy

position located on the reverse slope of a ridge. One of the flame tanks

moved along the narrow ridge which provided the only avenue of approach and, when even with the target, turned down the slope and

attempted to flame the Japanese. Thwarted by the limited maximum

depression of the gun, the tankmen fired two quick bursts and withdrew.60

Mechanized flame throwers experienced the usual difficulties of tankinfantry communications. Close contact between the two was particularly important because of the limited visibility in the mountains

where infantrymen often had to guide the tank to its objective. A

power telephone on the rear deck of the tank was rigged to the turret,

allowing the turret operator to communicate with the infantry but

only at the cost of cutting off turret traversing power whenever he

spoke.

 61

The four main armament flame tanks advanced to the front lines

several times during the next twelve days, but remained uncommitted.

On 27 April the advance of Company K, 27th Infantry, was stalled

for more than twenty-four hours by deadly machine gun and 47-mm.

fire from enemy emplacements on the ridge's forward slope and the

valley beyond. Thick underbrush, which made friendly grenades ineffective, covered the entire defensive position, while fire from U.S.

tanks and artillery was unable to reach the enemy's defiladed position.

In this situation the commanding officer of the flame detachment

suggested the use of his tanks. The heavy underbrush made the approach exceedingly difficult and a medium tank and then an armored

59

 (1) Ltr, CmlO Hq AFMIDPAC to Chief Info Br OCCWS, 10 Aug 45. (2) Rpt of CmlO

Sixth Army, Luzon Campaign, pp. 13-14. 60

 USAFFE Bd Rpt No. 296, 17 May 45, Rpt of Opns of Flame Throwers E7-7 in Light Tanks

M5A1. CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower File. 61

 (1) Ibid, (2) Rpt of First Combat Mission Fired by E7-7 Flame Gun on M5A1 Light Tank,

16 Apr 45. CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower File.
578 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

bulldozer were pressed into service to clear a way. Two flame tanks

were at the assembly point 200 to 300 yards from the principal target—

a pillbox across a ravine at the foot of a large tree. Because of the narrow approach, only one flame tank could advance at a time and, as

there was no room for armored support by the medium tanks, two rifle

platoons from Company K furnished protection. An infantryman,

walking behind the tank, guided it over the crest of the ridge. When the

enemy resisted with hand grenades, the bow gunner sprayed the suspected areas with machine gun fire. Approximately fifty yards from

the target the tank ran on a log twelve inches in diameter. The driver

carefully maneuvered the vehicle until it balanced just forward, thus

permitting direct aim down toward the target. The first burst of

flame flushed eight Japanese who were killed by supporting infantrymen. Several short bursts, fired across the target, caused the entire area

to burn briskly for about five minutes. When the smoke cleared, another dugout became visible and received what was left of the flame

fuel. The infantry advanced promptly, and by dusk Company K had

taken its objective of Lone Tree Ridge, 200 yards beyond. There were

53 enemy dead in the area, 6 dying in the flame attack and the rest

killed by the infantry as they ran from cover. Friendly forces suffered

no casualties.62

The flame tanks had varying success in the subsequent fighting on

Luzon. Sometimes they burned out the enemy; other times they were

stymied by their vulnerability to the heavier Japanese weapons. There

were few mechanical difficulties and, in spite of heavy rains, no ignition

failures. Although infantrymen and tankers were enthusiastic about

the flame tanks' ability to rout the enemy from strong positions, these

combat tests indicated that the thinly armored light tank was not a

satisfactory mount for the flame thrower.63

Iwo Jima

The V Amphibious Corps invaded Iwo Jima in February 1945. It

was a costly campaign waged against an enemy entrenched in a superlative defensive system. But as one Marine Corps historian has stated:

62

 (1) Ltr, CmlO 25th Inf Div to CmlO I Corps, 2 May 45, sub: Rpt on Use of Flame Thrower.

CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower File. (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt 296, 17 May 45. 63

 (1) USAFFE Bd Rpt 296, 17 May 45. (2) Ltr, CO 13th Armored Co to CG Sixth Army, 31

May 45, sub: Combat Testing of Flame Throwers E7-7 in Light Tanks. Cited in McKinney,

Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, p. 149.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 579

"Never before in the Pacific War had troops engaged in amphibious

assault been able to see so clearly the immediate importance of the objective."

 64

 The tiny island would provide an intermediate base for

fighter escorts for the bombers headed toward Japan. It would also be

a haven for crippled B-29's unable to make it to airfields in the Marianas.

The preinvasion preparations of the three Marine divisions earmarked

for Iwo included work with both the portable and the mechanized

flame throwers. For the smaller weapon this preparation consisted

mostly of integrating the flame throwers with the assault teams. It was

3d Marine Division policy to have in each of its battalions an assault

platoon made up of 6 men from each rifle company and 2 men from

the battalion headquarters company. These 20 men, specially trained

in the use of flame throwers, rocket launchers, and demolitions, were

placed under the immediate control of the battalion commander. The

commander in turn could attach the whole platoon, or a part of it,

to his assault companies as the situation required.65 Other Marine divisions devised similar platoons. Regiments of the 4th Marine Division

organized 39-man platoons which were attached to each battalion landing team. Squads from these platoons were then assigned to companies

for specific missions.66

A plentiful supply of M2-2 portable flame throwers made possible

these elaborate preparations—the battalion had 27 weapons or 243 for

the division. A battalion usually assigned 1 flame thrower to each of its

9 rifle platoons, 9 to the battalion supply section, and the remaining 9

to the regimental service platoon. This arrangement insured the rapid

replacement of lost or damaged weapons. It also made possible a reserve

flame thrower for every one in use, a justifiable ratio because of the

weapon's vulnerability to enemy fire and the fact that it was difficult

to service.67

The 4th and 5th Marine Divisions each received four Hawaiianmade main armament mechanized flame throwers. The development

and procurement of these flame throwers was undertaken by the

64

 Bartley, Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic, p. 23.

65

 3d Marine Div Tng Order, No. 45-44, 16 Dec 44, Orgn for Employ of Flame Throwers, Rocket

Launchers and Demolition in the Inf Bn, reprinted as app. 16 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower,

pp. 304-06. 66

 CG 4th Marine Div to Comdt Marine Corps, 18 May 45, Opns Rpt, Iwo Jima, an. G (24th RCT).

Marine Corps Archives.

67

 Ibid., an. C and an. F (23d RCT).
580 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

NEUTRALIZING A CAVE, Iwo JIMA

Chemical Section, Pacific Base Command, with help from the Navy,

the Marine Corps, other Army elements, and civilians. Briefly, the

flame unit, designated the POA CWS H1, consisted of a Ronson flame

thrower installed in a salvaged 75-mm. gun tube and mounted in a

medium tank. It had a maximum effective range of about 100 yards

(with thickened fuel), a capacity of nearly 300 gallons, and a firing

time of 150 seconds.68

Meanwhile, the Japanese defenders of Iwo Jima had been busy

strengthening their defenses. Engineers well versed in fortifications

came from Japan to supervise the work. They added a series of trenches

and pillboxes to the natural caves which formed the backbone of the

island's defenses. Whenever possible these features were integrated

68

 (1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC vol. III, refs. 29, 45-47, and vol. IV, ans. II-c-2 and II-c-3.

(2) Ltr Rpt, CO 3d Bn 21st Marines to CO 21st Marines 3d Marine Div, 11 Apr 45, sub: Action

Rpt. Marine Corps Archives.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 581

into a single network permitting troops to move from one place to

another without exposure. Some of the strongpoints had multiple entrances and apertures which were invulnerable to artillery fire.

The Japanese did their work well. Not only did it take a month to

capture this tiny island, but during the course of the operation marines

actually saw very few of the enemy. The Japanese commander expressly forbade banzai charges and other mass heroics, ordering his

troops to stick to their positions to the last. Moreover, once a position

had been silenced, it was by no means safe to assume that it would give

no further trouble. The Japanese infiltrated at night, both above and

below ground, and re-occupied defenses which previously had been

neutralized.69

On 19 February 1945 the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions landed on

the south coast of Iwo Jima with the 3d Marine Division in reserve.

From the beginning, portable flame throwers were a big help in cleaning

out caves and pillboxes. A battalion in the 3d Division described the

usual employment of the portable weapon. Covered by rifle and BAR

fire, the flame operator moved to a firing position on the flank of a

target. He then fired across the face of the cave or embrasure, advancing quickly under his own fire until he could shoot directly into the

opening. This tactic consistently silenced the position, which was then

destroyed by demolition charges.70

At the end of the campaign some units commented on the superiority

of the M2-2 model over its M1A1 predecessor, particularly in regard

to its ignition system. The familiar cry for greater range continued to

be heard. As far as maintenance was concerned, experience varied—

one battalion reported no difficulty or malfunctions, while others

lamented the complete absence of spare parts.71

Because enemy emplacements were difficult to approach, flame

thrower operator casualties shot upward. The casualty rate on Iwo

Jima was probably higher than in any other campaign in the Pacific.

69

 (1) "The Jap Holes In," Intelligence Bulletin, III, No. 12 (August, 1945), 60-62. (2) McKinney,

Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 159-60. 70

 (1) 1st Bn 21st Marines 3d Marine Div AAR, Iwo Jima, 6 Apr 45. (2) CO 9th Marines to

CG 3d Marine Div, AAR, Iwo Jima, 20 Apr 45. (3) Ltr Rpt, CG 4th Marine Div to Comdt Marine

Corps, 18 Mar 45, sub: Opns Rpt, Iwo Jima, an. F (23d RCT) and an. G (1st Bn 24th RCT). All

in Marine Corps Archives. 71

 Ltr Rpt, CG 4th Marine Div to Comdt Marine Corps, 18 Mar 45, sub: Opns Rpt, Iwo Jima, 19

Feb-16 Mar, an. G (24th RCT), an. H (25th RCT), apps. III, IV. Marine Corps Archives.
582 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

One battalion reported 92-percent losses.72 As a result, there was a scarcity of competent and experienced operators, particularly as the battle

reached its final stages. By way of correction, commanders recommended greater emphasis on flame thrower training and suggested that

all enlisted men be given at least a working knowledge of the weapon.73

The eight main armament flame throwers were lightly used during

the first few days of the operation, largely because of the rough terrain.

But within the week the marines became dependent upon flame tank

support and constantly requested its use.74 Typical tactics were as follows: the Marine infantrymen advanced, drawing fire from enemy

positions; armored dozers then pushed ahead and, protected by tank

and small arms fire, prepared a road to points within range of enemy

positions; flame-throwing tanks moved forward and neutralized the

enemy positions with flame and machine gun fire so that the infantry

could advance; engineers followed closely behind with demolitions

and destroyed the enemy caves and pillboxes to prevent their further

use. This was a slow and laborious process, but any attempt on the

part of the marines to continue the advance before bypassed positions

had been destroyed resulted in heavy casualties, and no real gain could

be made as long as the Japanese could fire on American troops from

the rear.75

The northern area of the island was featured by deep gullies, sawtoothed ridges, sheer cliffs, and eroded, boulder-strewn plateaus, and

here the Japanese holed up for their last desperate stand. A liberal use

of portable and mechanized flame throwers helped to eradicate this

kind of resistance, although the formidable terrain made it hard to get

the flame tanks within effective range of enemy targets. Generally, a

tank dozer nudged out a few yards of roadway and moved aside. The

flame tanks then advanced, sometimes two or three in rapid succession,

and fired while regular tanks stood back and provided cover. This

operation was repeated so often that on some days the 5th Marine Tank

72

 Co 2d Bn to CO 21st Marines, 12 Apr 45, Action Rpt, Iwo Jima Opn, 3d Marine Div Rpt, Iwo Jima, incl D. Marine Corps Archives. 73

 (1) Ibid. (2) CO 21st Marines to CG 3d Marine Div, 10 Apr 45, Action Rpt, Iwo Jima Opn.

Marine Corps Archives.

74

 Armored Force Bd, Rpt of Conf on Mechanized Flame Thrower, E12—7R1 , 23 Mar 45. CWS

314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower File. 75

 (1) 26th RCT 5th Marine Div, AAR, Iwo Jima, an. QUEEN. (2) Bartley, Iwo Jima: Amphibious

Epic, p. 187.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 583

Battalion used between 5,000 and 10,000 gallons of thickened gasoline

in its three or four flame tanks. The limited supply of flame tanks and

tank dozers was a big handicap. And despite the intricate procedure

outlined above the rugged terrain often defied all attempts at penetration.76

The fixed assignment of flame tanks to tank companies proved to be

impracticable on Iwo. Placed in a battalion pool and stationed at the

refueling area, flame tanks were made available by the battalion

wherever needed. Tank companies or platoons sent requests through

battalion, the infantry companies through liaison personnel. As soon

as a flame thrower exhausted its fuel, it returned to the refill station

for a new load and possibly a new assignment. In spite of all these

measures, troop advances were frequently held up because all flame

tanks were engaged elsewhere.77

The 4th and 5th Marine Divisions emphasized the greater effectiveness of the main armament type as opposed to the auxiliary flame

thrower, of which the 4th Division had twenty-four. These divisions

recommended more large capacity flame throwers and their incorporation as organic equipment in all tank battalions.78

 Although the 3d

Marine Division entered the Iwo Jima operation without main armament flame throwers, it was later on able to borrow some from the other

divisions. In its opinion this type was better against enemy defenses

than the auxiliary bow gun flame throwers with their shorter range

and limited traverse.79

After-action reports for the Iwo Jima operation attested to the value

of the flame weapons. Of the two types, the mechanized flame thrower

seemed to have come out on top. One battalion commander called it

the "best single weapon of the operation."

 80

 The V Amphibious Corps

report referred to the mechanized weapon as the "only effective means"

76

 5th Marne Div, Action Rpt, Iwo Jima, 19 Feb-24 Mar 45, an. LOVE. Marine Corps Archives.

77

 (1) Ibid. (2) For a day-by-day log of flame thrower operations on Iwo Jima, see: (1) History,

CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-c-3, 5-32, and McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, app. 4,

pp. 286-300.

78

 Comments, 4th Marine Div, Iwo Jima, and 5th Marine Div, Iwo Jima Opns. History CWS

AFMIDPAC, IV, an II-c-3, 27-32.

79

 3d Marine Div, AAR, Iwo Jima. History, CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. IV, an. II-c-3.

80

 CT-28, Action Rpt, Iwo Jima Opn, an. CHARLIE (Opn), see VIII LT-328 Action Rpt, p. 40.

Marine Corps Archives.
584 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

of reducing many of the concrete pillboxes and blockhouses encountered on the island.81

Okinawa

Okinawa was the last battle of the war and one of the hardest. Conducted by Tenth Army on the very doorstep of Japan, it was to involve

more CWS equipment than any other Pacific campaign. Each of the

four Army divisions of XXIV Corps had 141 portable flame throwers;

each of the three Marine divisions of III Amphibious Corps had 243,

the same number as had been taken to Iwo Jima. The 713th Tank

Battalion, converted to a provisional flame thrower unit for the operation, received a complement of 54 POA main armament flame

throwers.82

All seven of the divisions to see action on Okinawa were combat

tested and experienced in portable flame thrower operations. Employment of the portable weapon closely paralleled that of earlier actions.

Especially significant was the fighting in the southern portion of the

island where enemy positions most closely resembled those which had

been found on Iwo Jima.83 Despite these successes the portable flame

thrower was overshadowed on Okinawa by its mechanized counterpart.

The 713th Tank Battalion changed over to a flame battalion in Hawaii, and its own troops had assisted in the installation of the POA

flame throwers in the medium tanks. Tank crews test fired and adjusted their flame weapons, while others of the battalion received instruction in mixing the fuel. A tentative table of organization and

equipment was drawn up to reflect the differences inherent in a flame

tank unit.84

In general, each of the three companies of the 713th was attached

to a standard tank battalion in support of a division. In turn, flame

platoons joined tank companies, and sections joined standard platoons.

81

 Hq V Amphib Corps Landing Force, Iwo Jima, General Staff Sec Rpt, app. 3, G-3 Rpt, pp.

56-57. Marine Corps Archives.

82

 (1) Ltr, CG Tenth Army to CG USAFPOA, 6 Oct 44, sub: Tank Bn Flame Thrower Primary

Armament, and 1st Ind, n.d. History, CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. III, ref. 51. (2) History CWS

AFMIDPAC, vol. II, an. II-b. 83

 XXIV Corps Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45, ch. 7, p. 88. XXIV Corps File 224-0.3

(48295). 84

 (1) This TOE is reproduced in History, CWS AFMIDPAC, volume III, Reference 53. (2) For a

popular account of the growing pains of the 713th and its combat experience, see Joseph Morschauser

III, "Blowtorch Battalion," Armor, LXIX, No. 2 (March-April, 1960), pages 30-33.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 585

FLAME-THROWING TANK ATTACKS ENEMY INFANTRYMEN dug in along an old

road on Okinawa.

A tank platoon, including a section of three flame tanks, was placed

in support of an infantry battalion. Flame tank deployment differed

within these tank-infantry teams. Sometimes they operated alone with

the infantry; sometimes they formed an integral part of the tank

platoon; most frequently they waited at forward positions until called

upon for particular missions by the tank platoon. When the latter

tactic was used the flame tanks, supported by conventional tanks,

operated ahead of the infantry until an area had been cleared for the

latter's advance. The troops followed closely, protecting the tanks

and occupying the ground before the enemy could recover. This support was extended to both Army and Marine divisions.85

85

 (1) 713th Tank Bn Armored Flame Thrower (Provisional) AAR Phase I-Nansei Shoto. This

70-page report is reproduced in toto in McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 307-77.

(2) Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, Okinawa, The Last Battle, p. 456.
586 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Japanese troops defending Okinawa first faced mechanized flame

throwers on D plus 18 (19 April 1945), when thirty-one flame tanks

expended 3,500 gallons of napalm in the attack on a hill known as

Rocky Crags. Conventional tanks led the assault, with flame tanks and

infantry from the 7th Infantry Division close behind. The flame

throwers continued in support throughout the 6-day battle for the

Crags, which extended from the northwest and covered the approaches

to Hill 178 and the high ground west to Tanabaru, the division objective.

From 20 to 29 April 1945 other main armament flame throwers, in

support of various units of the 7th, 27th, and 96th Infantry Divisions,

continued to fire on rocky ridges, fortified caves, dugouts, pillboxes,

machine gun nests, and villages. When the Japanese withdrew, they did

so in many cases only because of the devastating effect of the flame.

American forces appreciated the psychological value of flame; the

commanding officer of one tank battalion reported that the infantry in

many cases preferred to advance behind a flame tank rather than behind

a standard one.

 86

During May the fighting took place along the defensive position in

the high ground north of Shuri, the ancient capital of Okinawa. For

the first ten days flame tanks supported divisions in the battles for Kochi

Ridge, Flattop, Dick Hills, Hill 60, and Nan Hill. Meanwhile, other

flame tanks neutralized the network of caves on the reverse slopes of

the Maeda escarpment. Still others supported the marines in the savage

fire fight for Shuri Heights. The last ten days of May saw torrential

rains turn the ground into a quagmire of soft clay that immobilized

tanks and other vehicles, while the Japanese 32d Army executed a successful withdrawal to the high ground on the southern tip of Okinawa.

Until the rains came, the flame tanks had used about 75,000 gallons of

flame fuel. Only 28 of the 54 original main armaments flame tanks

were still in operating condition.

The weather cleared in June and on its ninth day a battle began

in which mechanized flame throwers played a significant role. Facing

the XXIV Corps on its 6,000-yard front was a strong rocky line running from Yuza-Dake on the west to its eastern anchor, Hill 95. On

this end vertical cliffs 250 to 300 feet high rose to a plateau topped by

knobs, coral buttresses, and pinnacles. The 7th and 96th Infantry

86

 McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, p. 115.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 587

Divisions made little progress in their first attack against the 11,000

troops of the 32d Army which defended this line.

On 10 June naval gunfire, artillery, and tanks pounded the cliffs, but

the 7th Infantry Division advancing upon Hill 95 met accurate machine gun and sniper fire from at least 500 Japanese deployed in depth

in that section of the escarpment. Five flame tanks then maneuvered

into position and burned off the cover to the approaches to Hill 95.

Finally, two skeleton companies of infantry struggled to the top only

to be pinned down by enemy fire from farther up the ridge. The commanding officer and two men of Company C, 713th Tank Battalion,

scaled the ridge to within thirty yards of the enemy position, pulling

a 200-foot fire hose after them. From this point they burned out the

defenders who were then slain by the infantry.87

The next day the attack was resumed. At one point a section of tanks

and flame tanks attacked a 500-yard frontage of the escarpment, driving the Japanese from their position and cutting them down with machine gun fire. Several days later two flame tanks came to the front

lines and an extension hose was hauled up a 50-foot high section of the

escarpment by means of a rope. The flame, hurled over the far edge,

was blown by the wind into the caves on the reverse slope. By moving

the hose from one flame tank to another the men destroyed ammunition dumps, fortified positions, and a large number of Japanese troops.

That same afternoon five flame throwers lined up at the base of the

cliff and fired on caves in its face. The infantry pushed forward slowly

and by 1600 hours Hill 95 was wholly in American hands. On the right

flank the 17th Infantry advanced with support from flame tanks to

capture the village of Azato before nightfall on 13 June 1945 and to

tie in with units of the 3 2d Infantry. Although some mopping up remained to be done, the battle for Hill 9 5 was over, a typical struggle

on Okinawa in which flame tanks helped turn the tide of battle.88

Hill 89, the last major strongpoint of southern Okinawa and headquarters of the Japanese 32d Army, was attacked by the 7th Division

on 20 June 1945. Here again was almost unbelievably difficult terrain

cut up by natural caves, tunnels, and crevices. For weeks the area had

been systematically pounded by naval gunfire, long-range artillery,

rockets, and aerial bombing. A number of Japanese surrendered but

many others fought to the bitter end.

87

 Ibid., p. 119.

88

 History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-c-3, 66-70.
588 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Before the infantry attack the flame thrower and conventional tanks

moved out to burn off the remainder of the foliage from Hill 89 and

its approaches, which they left an ugly blackened mass of jagged coral.

On the second day the flame-throwing tanks advanced in increasing

numbers to pour thousands of gallons of burning fuel into caves and

crevices. Then the infantry, supported by flame tanks, medium tanks,

and artillery, successfully stormed the hill.

Between 22 and 24 June the infantry continued to mop up the

top of Hill 89. Flame thrower tanks, used in conjunction with loudspeaker tanks, encouraged soldiers and civilians to surrender. As a

team, infantry and flame tanks killed over 100 Japanese and persuaded

three times as many to surrender. From the top of the cliff flame tanks

repeated the technique of firing toward the sea so that the wind could

blow the flaming napalm back into caves too high to be reached from

the beach. Concealed ammunition dumps blew up in loud explosions.

Load after load of fuel was fired into a huge cavern in which over

1,000 Japanese soldiers were thought to be hiding. Thus the remnants

of the Japanese 32d Army were destroyed, although some mopping

up remained in the rest of the island. The battle for Okinawa was

over.89

During the Ryukyus Campaign the 713th Tank Battalion saw almost

continuous action for seventy days and officially received credit for

the death of 4,788 Japanese and the capture of 49. At the same time

the battalion lost 7 men killed and no men wounded, injured, or

missing. No one was killed inside a main armament flame tank as a

result of enemy action, although 41 tanks were knocked out during

the 630 flame tank sorties.90

The XXIV Corps reported that the main armament flame tank was

one of the most effective weapons used on Okinawa and that the

Japanese fear of flame was greatly exploited by the flame tanks. The

7th Infantry Division spoke of the outstanding success of the flame

tanks.91 The periscope mounted flame thrower found little use in the

fighting on Okinawa as the large-capacity flame tanks were available.

89

 Combat Opns Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign, 32d Inf Regt (7th Inf Div), n.d. Quoted in History,

CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-c-3, 87-91. 90

 713th Tank Bn Armored Flame Thrower (Provisional) ARR Phase 1—Nansei Shoto, 30 Jun 45.

CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower File. 91

 (1) XXIV Corps AAR, Ryukyus Campaign. History CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-c-3, 101.

(2) 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign. Both in History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an.

II-c-3, p. 97.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 589

Tank crews developed a fear of the periscope type after the fuel container of one burst and ignited upon being struck by an enemy shell,

burning the tank crew to death. This type of auxiliary flame thrower,

therefore, was never fully tested in battle.92 Nor was the bow gun

type, with which the III Amphibious Corps was equipped, put to much

use, for main armament flame tanks of the 713th Tank Battalion were

preferred by Marine as well as Army units.93

The 713th Tank Battalion suggested that, instead of having separate

armored flame thrower battalions, commanders should replace the light

tank company in each standard tank battalion with a flame thrower

tank company or else that the latter be added to each battalion. This

system, it was thought, would simplify administration and supply,

since a flame thrower tank company was normally attached to standard

tank battalions for operations. Some general mishandling of the

weapon brought forth the recommendation that infantry commanders

familiarize themselves with the use and limitations of armored flame

throwers and learn how to co-ordinate these weapons with other supporting weapons and infantry.94

The Tenth Army and the 713th Tank Battalion agreed that the

75-mm. gun should be retained in flame tanks and mounted coaxially

with the flame thrower, but that there should be no reduction in fuel

capacity and no decrease in the effectiveness of the flame gun.95

Preparations for the Invasion of Japan

During the summer of 1945 United States planners were concerned

with the problem of holding down casualties in the invasion of the

main Japanese islands. Such battles as Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa

had illustrated how costly victory in the Pacific could be. The assault

on Japan could be expected to exact a heavy toll of American lives

unless some means were found for reducing casualties. One of these

92

 Ltr, CmlO Tenth Army to CmlO CPBC, 9 Jun 45, sub: Mechanized Flame Throwers. History,

CWS, AFMIDPAC, III, ref. 114, 3-4. 93

 Each of the four Army tank battalions had eighteen periscope flame throwers; each Marine tank

battalion carried sixteen E4R2-5R1's. Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar-30 June 45, p. 4. 94

 713th Tank Bn Armored Flame Thrower (Provisional) AAR ch. IX, in McKinney, Mechanized

Flame Thrower Opns, app. 6, p. 374.

95

 Ltr, CofS Tenth Army to CG POA, 27 May 45, sub: Recommended Changes in Construction of

POA CWS-H1 Mechanized Flame Thrower. Tenth Army 400 Cml.
590 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

was the full utilization of the main armament mechanized flame

thrower.

According to U.S. intelligence reports the terrain of the next

objective, the island of Kyushu, was well suited to the type of defense

which the Japanese had used so advantageously on Iwo Jima and Okinawa—caves, crevices, fortified reverse slopes, pillboxes, and interlocking fields of fire from mutually supporting positions. Information

gleaned from enemy prisoners taken on Okinawa revealed that many

positions on Kyushu would be difficult or impossible to reduce with

conventional weapons. But flame throwers, particularly mechanized

flame throwers, could rout the Japanese from these otherwise impregnable fortifications with a minimum of casualties. Experimental use

of extension hoses showed that positions hitherto inaccessible to armor

could now be attacked. A large number of flame tanks might burn

the Japanese from their well-prepared positions and keep the battle

from dragging on interminably.

On 1 July 1945 the Sixth Army, relieved of all combat operations

in the Philippines, received directions to prepare four corps, consisting

of twelve divisions, and two additional divisions as army troops, for

an assault on southern Kyushu on 1 November 1945.

For the Kyushu operation (OLYMPIC) over twice as many main

armament flame tanks per division were to be used as had been employed

on Okinawa. A tank battalion was to be attached to each assault

division and Sixth Army requested sufficient main armament flame

throwers to equip one company in each of these battalions.96 At this

time the Sixth Army understood that some 600 main armament flame

throwers were being manufactured in the zone of interior, but that

only 40 of these would be available in time for OLYMPIC.97 Therefore,

the plan called for the distribution of armored flame throwers in equal

lots to each tank battalion as soon as the weapons arrived in the theater.

Some 56 additional main armament flame throwers of the POA model

were to be obtained from Hawaii.98 Thus a total of 96 main armament

96

 (1) Rpt of Official Travel, Maull to CCWS, 28 Sep 45, sec. III, p. 21. CWS 314.7. (2) Each

flame tank company was to have seventeen tanks. 97

 (1) TWX, ASF to CG WESPAC, 10 Jul 45. (2) Ltr, CG USAFPAC to CG Tenth Army, 4 Aug

45, sub: Replacement Tank Mounted Flame Throwers for 713th Tank Bn. Hist CWS AFMIDPAC,

vol. III, an. II-c-1, ref. 143. (3) Rpt of Official Travel, Maull to CCWS, 28 Sep 45, sec. III, p. 34.

(4) The main armament model from the zone of interior was the E12-7R1. 98

 CM-IN 439, CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific to CINCPOA, 3 Jan 45, and Ltr, CmlO POA to

G-3 POA, 4 Jan 45, sub: Flame Thrower Tanks for Fleet Marine Forces. Hist CWS AFMIDPAC,

vol. III, an. II-c-I, refs. 94-95.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 591

flame throwers would be used in the initial assault. Since this number

was considered insufficient to meet the expected needs for flame, the

Sixth Army also decided to equip each medium tank platoon with two

auxiliary flame throwers of the bow gun type. The conclusion of

hostilities on 15 August 1945 negated the need for these plans.

In the trial of battle the Army and Marine Corps in the Pacific

discovered that the value of the flame thrower lay in its ability to reach

the enemy in his prepared positions, which were for the most part

impervious to conventional weapons. The excessive infantry casualties

ordinarily incurred in rooting the Japanese from their defenses were

thereby reduced. It appears certain that had the war not come to a

sudden close the mechanized flame thrower would have demonstrated

its ability to cut these losses to an even greater degree—not to mention

the casualties which would be inflicted upon the enemy.
CHAPTER XVI

The Flame Thrower in the War

Against Germany

The Portable Flame Thrower in the MTO

Although the combat engineer battalion of each U.S. division invading Northwest Africa carried ashore twenty-four portable flame

throwers, American troops did not use the weapon in that campaign.

For one thing, no positive need existed for the portable flame thrower

in Northwest Africa where much of the fighting was characterized

by fast-moving tactics. As the enemy rarely made use of pillboxes or

other fixed fortifications and house-to-house combat was negligible,

the combat situations in which flame throwers were most valuable did

not arise.1

Even had conditions been favorable, it is unlikely that flame throwers

would have been effectively employed. The campaign took place at a

time when the tactical doctrine for the flame thrower was nascent and

its supply and maintenance procedures but poorly conceived. If a

situation favoring the use of the weapon had suddenly come up, the

flame thrower, usually back with the organizational equipment, would

not have been readily available.2

The inherent technical deficiency of the portable flame thrower

itself also stood in the way of effective employment. The models taken

to Africa were the E1R1 and the M1, neither of which, it will be

recalled, was capable of firing thickened fuel. Not until the spring

and early summer of 1943 did the longer ranged M1A1 portable flame

thrower become available in the theater as a replacement for the early

models.3 And flame thrower training for the African landings, gen1

 Ltr, CmlO WTF to CCWS, 21 Dec 42, no sub. CWS 319.1/88. 2

 Ltr, CmlO WTF to CCWS, 2 Dec 42. CWS 320.2/100.

3

 Informal Routing Slip, Maj Perry M. Moore, CWS ExecO NATOUSA, to Engr, G-4 AG, 14

Nov 43, sub: Flame Throwers. 470.71—Apparatus for Using.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 593

erally superficial, was, nonetheless, extensive enough to reveal the

deficiencies of the weapon. Although it is difficult to assess the importance of any one of these conditions there can be no doubt about

their cumulative effect.4

The napalm-firing M1A1 arrived in the theater in time for the

preparations which were being conducted for the invasion of Sicily.

Although demonstrations revealed a weapon with a range of forty or

fifty yards, some Seventh Army units remained unconvinced of any

appreciable improvement in the new model. The engineer battalions

of two divisions returned their flame throwers to the base depot before

embarking for Sicily.5

There was only one recorded use of the portable flame thrower by

American troops in Sicily. In an action reminiscent of the burning

of the Philistine grain fields by Samson, 1st Division engineers burned

a Sicilian wheat field in which enemy infantry had taken position.6

American troops in Sicily soon learned that white phosphorus and high

explosives could neutralize the fortifications encountered on the island;

flame throwers were not used again throughout the operations.7 At a

2-day critique after the fighting, division chemical officers expressed

doubts about the value of the flame thrower and recommended it be

declared an item of Class IV supply, or, in other words, be relegated

to the classification of a special-purpose weapon.8

Flame thrower training given to Fifth Army units before the Salerno

landings consisted of demonstrations and enough technical training

to familiarize operators with the weapon. Some units did not even

consider it worthwhile to exchange the M1 flame thrower for the

newly arrived M1A1, although Salerno-bound engineer battalions did

carry their full quota of the weapon.9 The series of extremely strong

German defensive positions across the Italian peninsula aroused enough

4

 McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, p. 181. 5

 (1) Status of Equip Rpt, MTOUSA, 30 Jun 43. (2) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns,

p. 182. (3) 1st Ind, 3 Dec 43, to Ltr, CmlO ETOUSA to CmlO AFHQ, 18 Nov 43, sub: Use

of Flame Throwers in Sicilian Campaign. Seventh Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71, No. 1, Jan-Feb 45.

(4) Status of Class H, IV, and V Supplies, MTOUSA, 31 Jul 43. 6

 CmlO Seventh Army, Rpt of Cml Warfare Opns, Opn HUSKY, n.d. MTOUSA Cml Rcds, 370,

Employ, Opns, and Mvmt of Troops, 1942-44. 7

 McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, p. 183. 8

 Conf of Army, Corps, and Div CmlO's and CO's of all CWS Units in the Seventh Army, 28, 29

Aug 43.

9

 Informal Routing Slip, Cml NATOUSA to Engr G-4, 14 Nov 43, sub: Flame Throwers. MTOUSA

Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus for Using.
594 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

interest in the portable flame thrower to cause VI Corps in December

1943 to ask the chemical officer of the Fifth Army, for a 2-day school

to familiarize troops with the operation and tactical employment of

the weapon.10

Units engaged in the difficult fighting at Cassino and at Anzio used

the weapon with some success against fixed fortifications, particularly

when other means had failed to overcome this type of defense.11 An

experience of the 85th division in the Gustav Line helps to illustrate

this use. In May 1944 a platoon of Company G, 339th Infantry, had

been held up for two days near Tremensuoli by a series of enemy pillboxes which stretched across a dominant ridge two hundred yards

away. Finally, Lt. Robert T. Waugh, the platoon leader, secured a

portable flame thrower from regimental headquarters. Under the

covering fire of small arms and automatic weapons, Sgt. Fred Juliano,

an assistant squad leader, crawled with the flame thrower to within

fifteen yards of the key pillbox. Three short bursts killed all of its

defenders, and the platoon swiftly overcame the other positions with

the help of white phosphorus grenades.12

The portable flame thrower, for various reasons, saw little use in

Italy.13 To begin with, the reputation of the early models was not

such as to commend the weapon to combat commanders, and there

had been little experience of any kind in Africa and Sicily to recommend its use in Italy. Moreover, there was hardly any need for the

weapon in Italy. The Italian terrain and climate contributed additional

problems for the employment of the flame throwers. The rugged

mountains encountered throughout most of Italy made it difficult, if

not impossible, to man-carry the cumbersome weapon to the front line

10

 (1) Daily Journal Fifth Army Cml Sec, 21 Dec 43. (2) Other Same thrower training stemmed

from special situations. Before the invasion of southern France, for example, the 36th Division

Chemical Section trained over 200 men in portable flame thrower operations. There is no evidence

that any of these weapons were used against the enemy, who had put up but token opposition. Ltr,

Col Claude J. Merrill, formerly CmlO 36th Div, to Brig Gen James A. Norrell, Chief of Mil History,

5 Jan 61. 11

 A Mil Encyclopedia Based on Opns in the Italian Campaigns, 1943-45 (hereafter cited as A Mil

Encyclopedia), prepared by G-3 Sec Hq 15th Army Group, sec. 23, p. 187. 12

 (1) Memo, Lt Col Houston C. Joyner, former CmlO 85th Div, for Hist Off, 2 Aug 48. (2)

Sergeant Juliano received the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action; Lieutenant Waugh

that day began a series of heroic exploits for which he was awarded the Medal of Honor. 13

 (1) Rpt 359, AGF Bd MTOUSA, 27 Mar 45, sub: Current Questions Regarding Inf Opns.

Theater Cml Sec Files NATO-MTO, 319.1 AGF Rpts. (2) A Mil Encyclopedia, p. 529. (3)

OCCWS, Final Rpt, CWS Spare Parts Team in MTO and ETO, p. 43.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 595

or to keep it apace of the advancing troops once it got there.14 The

cold, wet climate had almost the same deleterious effect as the heat

and moisture of the tropics; and, despite numerous reports of misfires,

no means was ever devised to waterproof the electrical ignition system

as had been done in the Southwest Pacific.15

Probably because of the limited opportunity for employing the

flame thrower, matters of doctrine and training were somewhat neglected. Although in April 1944 the Fifth Army published a training

memorandum 16 which recommended an integrated 8-man team for

the deployment of the portable flame thrower (illustrated with examples of successful use on Guadalcanal), there seemed to be as many

schemes for employing the weapon as there were divisions. A survey

conducted early in 1945 concluded that there was no theater standard

for organizing and equipping flame thrower teams.17

Assault teams, usually armed with rifles, automatic rifles, bazookas,

and antitank grenades, saw a great deal of action against dugouts and

fortified houses. Flame throwers were seldom added to this armament

because a bazooka shell or antitank grenade fired through a window

or door usually sufficed. Pillbox-type fortifications impervious to more

conventional weapons, however, were considered appropriate targets

for flame throwers.18

Closely related to the problem of doctrine was the status of flame

thrower training. Despite several 2-day flame thrower schools sponsored by Fifth Army, the lack of adequately trained operators remained

a problem throughout the campaign. These shortcomings in doctrine

and training occasionally added up to situations wherein untrained

operators received poor support from improperly oriented assault teams

with the consequent failure of the mission.19

14

 McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 186-87, 190.

15

 (1) Ibid., (2) Fifth Army Cml Sec, Hist Rpt, 1 Mar 45.

16

 Fifth Army Tng Memo No. 8, 5 Apr 44, sub: Technique and Tactical Use of Flame Thrower,

reprinted as app. 18, McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 312-16. 17

 Rpt 283, AGF BD MTOUSA, 31 Jan 45, sub: CWS. This report and Report 359, cited above,

included the policies for flame thrower teams promulgated by IV Corps, the 34th, 88th, and 92d

Divisions, and the 1st Armored Division. All differed. 18

 A Mil Encyclopedia, p. 187. 19

 Ibid., pp. 189, 529.
596 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

The Portable Flame Thrower in the ETO

Normandy

Pre-Normandy preparations included more effort directed toward

the training of flame thrower operators and the preparation of tactical

and logistical procedures for the weapon than had been attempted

before the invasion of Italy. In October 1943 Headquarters, ETOUSA,

published detailed instructions for all units under its control in the

tactical use of the portable flame thrower. This training memorandum

suggested the assignment of three men—operator, assistant operator,

and refill carrier—to each weapon and urged that twice that number

be trained. This document stressed the tactical necessity of covering

the flame thrower operator with small arms and smoke, but it did not

specify the exact composition of the assault party.20

As the date of the invasion approached, ETOUSA increased the

tempo of its flame thrower preparations. New instructions, in the

form of another training memorandum, did little more than reiterate

the memo which it superseded.21 Of more help was the allocation of

150 portable flame throwers to each of the assault divisions of First

Army,22 a number far in excess of the 24 flame throwers which the

theater suggested for an infantry division in normal operations.23

The assignment of such a large number of flame throwers to the

assault regiments naturally increased the problem of training. In

general, the status of flame thrower training within the divisions in

England was poor. Engineer battalions had received limited doses, but

infantry division troops, even of the veteran units, were generally

unfamiliar with both the technical and tactical aspects of the weapon.

Divisions of the First U.S. Army conducted schools in an effort to

correct this deficiency. Third Army units, slated for commitment

later than those of First Army, suffered from a lack of flame throwers

20

 ETOUSA, Tng Memo No. 33, 6 Oct 43, sub: Portable Flame Thrower, sec. II, reprinted as app.

19 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns.

21

 ETOUSA, Tng Memo No. 10, 5 Apr 44, sub: Portable Flame Thrower, sec. I, reprinted as app. 20

in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns.

22

 FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44, bk. VII, p. 190. 23

Rcds (1,) 470.71—Apparatus Ltr, CmlO SOS ET. (2 O to) Th CmleO theate FUSAGr mad , 5 Jue thi n 44s, recommendatio sub: Flame Throwers n afte,r

 12t the portabl h Army Grou e flampe

thrower became an item of Class IV issue. WD Cir No. 204, 23 May 44. Other support bases of

issue were: airborne division, 15; armored division, 18; Ranger battalion, 6; and engineer combat

battalion, 24.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 597

(in August 1944 Third Army's supply of the weapon was described

as "practically nil"),24 and a consequent lack of trained operators.25

These preparations went for nought; there is no record that the

flame thrower was used during the Normandy landings. Many of the

weapons were lost in the rough surf, and infantrymen perforce abandoned others in the struggle to get across the beaches in the face of

heavy enemy fire. The i4th Chemical Maintenance Company, which

landed in Normandy at the end of June, repaired and returned to

depot stock over 100 portable flame throwers which it had picked up

from salvage piles on the beaches. In any event, German positions

encountered on the beachheads usually were not suitable flame thrower

targets.26

As the initial weeks of the campaign wore on and units moved

inland, some flame thrower targets did appear. Cities and towns presented obstacles which occasionally called for flame thrower action,

although the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions reported that the weapon

was not particularly useful in ordinary street fighting. The V Corps

stated that the limited range of the portable flame thrower restricted

its usefulness in fighting in the hedgerows, that ubiquitous feature of

the Normandy terrain.27

Brittany

The flame thrower was used more in the August and September

fighting on the Brittany peninsula, particularly in and around the port

of Brest, than at any other time in France. On one occasion the 1st

Battalion, 121st Infantry, 8th Division, was held up near Brest by a

series of three concrete positions within a two-acre area. Although

artillery had failed to reduce the strongpoint, it had left many large

shell holes in the vicinity. Using the cover afforded by these craters

24

 Ltr, CG 12th Army Group to CG COMZ ETOUSA, 16 Aug 44, sub: Request for Flame Throwers.

12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus.

25

 (1) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 192-93. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Col

W. H. Greene, 12 Jul 48. During World War II Colonel Greene served successively as chemical

officer of the 26th Division and the XX Corps. 26

 (1) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 195-96. (2) FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43-

1 Aug 44, bk. VII, p. 197. (3) Informal comments of CWSO 21 Jun 44. CWS 317.4, Portable

Flame Thrower. 27

 Observer's Rpt 1, Flame Thrower E4-5, Incl to Ltr, CmlO 12th Army Group to Comdt Cml

Warfare School, 14 Nov 44, sub: Flame Thrower Rpts. This report consists of a series of replies

by First Army units to a questionnaire on flame thrower operations submitted by Colonel St. John,

Chemical Adviser, G-3, SHAEF.
598 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

two flame thrower operators, covered by the small arms fire of ten

men, were able to crawl within thirty yards of the fortifications. A

short burst of flame directed at each pillbox in turn resulted in the

hasty surrender of the occupants. The psychological effect of the

flame throwers was the determining factor in the success of the

operation. Not one enemy soldier had been burned.28

A platoon of the 116th Infantry, 29th Division, had a similar experience in the same area. Halted by opposition from a pillbox, the

men brought up a portable flame thrower to help cope with the

situation. Although the fuel tanks were only partly filled, the operator

fired three good bursts into the doorways. The five occupants immediately panicked but were prevented from coming out by the intense

heat engulfing the strongpoint. It was a full ten minutes before the

fire and heat subsided enough to allow the enemy to emerge, hands in

the air. None of them was seriously burned but their nerves were

shattered; as the bewildered men passed the flame thrower they shook

their heads.29

The introduction of the flame thrower did not always spell success.

On 27 August 1944, the 38th Infantry, 2d Division, encountered

strong enemy positions which dominated an area near Brest. The

majority of the strongpoints consisted of heavy reinforced concrete

pillboxes, well protected, as German defensive positions usually were,

by bands of interlocking fire. The positions seemed impervious to

artillery fire. In this extremity three flame thrower teams came forward, each consisting of an operator, assistant operator, and two BAR

men. The first team reached its contact point only to have the

operator killed and the fuel tanks of the weapon punctured by enemy

machine gun fire. The second team reached its firing position but had

to withdraw when it found that the weapon's hydrogen line had been

torn loose. The third team alone accomplished its mission, eliminating

one of the enemy positions.30

Lest it be thought that these examples were typical of the fighting

in France, the 8th Division action described was one of three times the

unit used the flame thrower between 6 June and 25 September 1944

28

 Ltr, CG 8th Div to CG VIII Corps, 23 Sep 44, sub: Employ of Vehicular and Portable Flame

Throwers. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower. 29

 Ltr, CmlO 29th Div to CmlO Ninth Army, 21 Oct 44, sub: AAR on Portable Flame Thrower.

T-17, B, Portable Flame Thrower (Tactical) 9th Army.

30

 Ltr, CmlO 2d Div to CmlO VIII Corps, 25 Sep 44, sub: Use of Flame Throwers During Brest

Campaign. T-17, B, Portable Flame Thrower (Tactical) 9th Army.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 599

and the 2d Division employment was one of two such instances during

the entire Brest campaign.31

The Siegfried Line

Fast-moving situations did not favor the employment of the flame

thrower, and this was the type of operations experienced by the Allied

forces once they broke out of Normandy. Matters of logistics, terrain,

and stiffening enemy resistance caused this advance to grind to a halt

in September 1944. In large part, the stiffening German resistance

resulted from the strength of the Siegfried Line, or West Wall, positions which stretched from the southeastern corner of the Netherlands

to the Swiss frontier. New techniques and special weapons had to be

employed against this maze of dragon tooth obstructions and the

intricate complex of concrete and steel and pillbox fortifications. One

of these special weapons was the portable flame thrower.

The V Corps, in anticipation of the assault on the Siegfried Line

fortifications, investigated the availability of portable flame throwers

and found that Army depots had enough to provide each division of

the corps with fifty weapons.32 In XIX Corps, the 30th Division

chemical officer secured ninety-nine M1A1 portable flame throwers

for the same purpose. He also found that the men who had been

trained as operators while the division was still in England were no

longer available. Consequently, the division's chemical section and

engineer battalion trained enough infantrymen to operate the twentyfive flame throwers allotted to each of the regiments.33

 Some divisions

conducted training in assault tactics before moving against the Siegfried

Line. This training usually included the employment of the portable

flame thrower. Third Army's XX Corps realistically used captured

Maginot Line fortifications to work out techniques for overcoming

the German defenses.34

The actual technique employed to neutralize strongpoints by means

of flame throwers varied somewhat among the divisions, but in most

cases flame thrower teams went to work after the infantry had ad31

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, CG 8th Div to CG VIII Corps, 23 Sep 44, sub: Employ of Vehicular and

Portable Flame Throwers. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower. 32

 V Corps AAR Sep 44. 207.03 V Corps. 33 CmlO 30th Div, 30 Oct 44, Rpt on Use of Flame Throwers on the Siegfried Line. T-17, B,

Portable Flame Thrower (Tactical) 9th Army.

34

 Greene Interv, 1 Dec 47.
600 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

MEN TRAINING WITH FLAME THROWER against a captured German pillbox.

vanced to within about twenty-five yards of its objective. At this

point the flame thrower operator, accompanied by men armed with

bazookas, white phosphorus grenades, and pole charges, and supported

by small arms fire, made the final assault against the fortified position.

The flame thrower was capable of penetrating certain embrasures or

causing the enemy to close gun ports and other openings, thus allowing

the placement of explosives at the vulnerable points of the fortifications.35

The 22d Infantry, 4th Division, found an early opportunity to use

the flame thrower in operations against West Wall defenses in the

area of the Schnee Eifel, just within the German border. During the

third week in September, the regiments encountered a series of pillboxes at 100-yard intervals which were either unmanned or had poor

35

 (1) Rpt on Breaching of the Siegfried Line, prepared by Engr Sec, XVIII Corps (Airborne), 28

Jan 45, p. 3. Documents of the Siegfried Line, ORB, First Army. (2) Rpt, Lt Thomas W. Leland,

CWS, to CmlO First Army, n.d., no sub. Misc Rpts E4-5R1 Flame Thrower, 12th Army Group.

This report served as an unofficial manual on flame thrower operations for First Army units.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 601

fields of fire. Flame thrower operators moved to within effective range

without too much difficulty. Despite these circumstances, the division

reported only one successful flame thrower operation; other attempts

failed because of weapon malfunction.36

One regiment of the 9th Division reported that flame throwers were

of little value against the Siegfried Line positions; and the 30th Division

chemical officer stated in November 1944 that he had heard of only

one successful use of the flame thrower. The 117th Infantry, 30th

Division, reported that the portable weapons were of no value against

large bunkers, a judgment affirmed by the engineer battalion of the

9th Division. The engineers of VII Corps stated that although they

were equipped with flame throwers and pole charges, these weapons

were unnecessary once the neutralizing fire of armored vehicles was

brought upon the target. In October 1944 the 1st Division reported

that while extra pole charges and flame throwers were kept accessible

at all times, the flame thrower was too heavy for use by assault troops.37

On the other hand, there were some notable examples of the successful use of portable flame throwers against Siegfried Line fortifications.

Despite the adverse comment on the weapon made by the 1st Division,

the 26th Infantry reported on 12 October that Company L had

"cleaned up" three pillboxes, after they had "worked on them with

flame throwers."38 The same regiment reported further successes with

the portable flame thrower in February 1945. On the third of the

month the regiment reported that it had "cleaned up a pillbox with

flame throwers," flushing out twenty men and three officers in the

process. During the next several days the 26th Infantry went on to

neutralize a number of additional pillboxes guarding the high ground

near Hollerath, Germany, in operations which featured the successful

use of portable flame throwers.39

36

 (1) Combat Intervs, 4th Inf Div, Schnee Eifel Ridge, 14-20 Sep 44. HRS-CI 33. (2) Charles

B. MacDonald describes the Schnee Eifel engagement in The Siegfried Line Campaign, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1963). 37

 (1) Immediate Rpt 61 (Combat Observations), 12th Army Group, 22 Sep 44. 99/120-0.4,

12th Army Group, Nov 44. (2) Ltr, S-3 2d Bn 117th Inf to ACofS G-2 30th Inf Div, 14 Oct 44,

sub: Documentation of Siegfried Line. First Army Rcds, Documents of Siefried Line. (3) Memo,

S-3 15th Engr Combat Bn for ACofS G-3 9th Inf Div, 23 Oct 44, sub: Assault Methods Employed

by Engrs on Siegfried Line. First Army Rcds, Documents of Siegfried Line. (4) Engr Sec XVIII

Corps (Airborne) Rpt on Breaching of the Siegfried Line, 28 Jan 45. (5) 1st Inf Div G-3 Rpt of

Opns, 1-31 Oct 44. 301-3 (22345) G-3 Opns Rpt, European Campaign, 1st Inf Div, Oct 44. 38

 1st Inf Div G-3 Rpt of Opns, 1-31 Oct 44. 39

 26th Inf AAR, Feb 45. 301-Inf (26)-0.3 Opns Rpt 26th Inf Regt 1st Inf Div (European

Campaign).
602 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

In a February action in the Seventh Army sector near Bitche, Company B, 399th Infantry, l00th Division, used a flame thrower team

as the nucleus of a combination raiding-assault party. This party, led

by Lt. Harry G. Flanagan, consisted of the flame thrower operator and

assistant, two automatic rifle teams, two men armed with M15 white

phosphorus grenades, and riflemen. Its target was a German outpost

in a Maginot Line blockhouse. Although enemy sentries detected the

approach of the patrol and fired flares in an attempt to pinpoint it,

the flame thrower operator, Cpl. Boyd R. Pike, was able to crawl to a

position within fifteen yards of the open rear door of the emplacement.

From this vantage point Pike fired three bursts at the enemy position,

killing a sentry standing in the doorway. Enemy machine guns opened

up at once on the patrol. Pike attempted to fire on the source of some

of the enemy opposition, the steel turret surmounting the blockhouse,

but he ran out of fuel and withdrew. The grenadiers lobbed their white

phosphorus grenades against the blockhouse before retiring. On the

way back Pike, exhausted by the ordeal, abandoned his flame thrower.

All patrol members returned without injury, and even the flame

thrower was eventually recovered.40

Actually, the number of fortifications against which flame throwers

were used was few as compared to the total number assaulted. The

incident just cited represented the first use of a portable flame thrower

which came to the attention of the chemical officer of Seventh Army.

By way of explanation for the limited use of the weapon consider the

number of portable flame throwers carried by the units with Seventh

Army in February 1945: of the 8 U.S. infantry divisions so assigned,

2 had no flame throwers on hand whatsoever, 1 division had 4, 3

divisions had 6, and 2 others had totals of 12 and 34.41 It should be

remembered that at the beginning of operations the theater had recommended a complement of 24 portable flame throwers.

Evaluation

Portable flame throwers contributed as little to the success of operations in the European theater as they had in the Mediterranean. The

weapon was infrequently used, and not always successfully. Some

40

 (1) Ltr, CG 100th Div to CG Seventh Army, 14 Feb 45, sub: Use of Flame Thrower With

Raiding Party. 470.71-3 AG Rcds, Sixth Army Group. (2) Seventh Army Cml Sec, Hist Rpt,

Feb 45. CWS 314-7. 41

 IOM, CmlO to G-4 Seventh Army, 22 Feb 45, sub: M2-2 Portable Flame Throwers.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 603

infantry divisions never used the flame thrower; few considered it

valuable. Reasons for this situation, which was in decided contrast

to the successful role played by the portable flame thrower in the

Pacific campaigns, are not difficult to find.

Foremost was the fact that the fighting in Europe never developed

the need for the portable flame thrower, particularly when compared

with operations in the Pacific. The latter theaters saw a fanatical enemy

determined to resist to the last in defensive positions which were almost

impregnable to the normal complement of infantry weapons, even to

artillery fire and air action. Moreover, the jungle terrain in which

much of the Pacific fighting took place permitted the flame thrower

operator to advance to within effective range if he was protected by

adequate supporting weapons. The situation was different on the

European battlefields. As German defenses featured interlocking bands

of fire and long, uninterrupted fields of vision, the utilization of

weapons with limited range was difficult. The absence of concealment

along the approaches drew attention to the size of the portable flame

thrower and particularly to the unique silhouette of an operator with

his weapon strapped to his back.42 The small size of the fuel load was

another handicap, particularly when the flame thrower was used against

the Siegfried Line fortifications where the enemy might avoid the flame

by moving to another room of the emplacement.43

The makeup of the German soldier, as contrasted with that of his

Axis ally in the Pacific, had an effect upon flame thrower operations.

The Japanese infantryman often fought until death, and flame weapons

were needed to insure that he was dead. The German soldier, on the

other hand, skilled and valorous as he was, surrendered when conditions

provided no alternative.44

In addition to, and sometimes because of, the factors just related,

matters of training, supply, and maintenance conspired against the

successful use of the portable flame thrower. Although the assault

divisions of the First U.S. Army did receive some training in England

42

 (1) 12th Army Group Immediate Rpt 91 (Combat Observations). 99/12-0.4 Immediate Rpts

12-32, 34-92, 12th Army Group, Jul-Nov 44. (2) 76th Div AAR, 10 Oct 44. (3) Notes of

Flame Throwers (Portable), Incl 3 to Rpt on Tour, 26-30 Dec 44 (hereafter cited as Roos Rpt), by

2d Lt Edwin G. Roos, 31 Dec 44. (4) CmlO 30th Div, 30 Oct 44, Rpt on Use of Flame Throwers

on the Siegfried Line. 43

 (1) 76th Div AAR, 10 Oct 44. (2) 12th Army Group Immediate Rpt 61 (Combat Observations),

22 Sep 44. 44

 (1) CmlO 30th Inf Div, 30 Oct 44, Rpt on Use of Flame Throwers on the Siegfried Line. (2)

Immediate Rpt 91 (Combat Observations). (3) Roos Rpt. (4) 76th Div AAR, 10 Oct 44.
604 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

before the Normandy landings, the supply of flame throwers was

critical during this period and none was available for other units, the

divisions of Third Army, for example. Even when Third Army depots

received stocks of portables in anticipation of operations against the

Siegfried Line, troops received little training in the weapon.45 As

late as October 1944 some divisions of II Corps had not been furnished

with this item, and its low status in Seventh Army units early in 1945,

as mentioned above, was not a reflection of extensive use.46 Seventh

Army also reported that use of the weapon was at times limited by the

lack of batteries and ignition assemblies; in October 1944 approximately

80 percent of its depot stock of flame throwers was deadlined because

of these shortages. In December a shipment of twenty of the M1A1

models included three with defective fuel tanks and others with defective spark generator assemblies.47

 The 5th Division reported the

receipt from depots of flame throwers with loose electrical connections

and with paint-filled discharge ports.48

Commanders and troops in Europe never had the same confidence

in the portable flame thrower exhibited by their Pacific counterparts.49

Infrequent use of the weapon meant not only the neglect of doctrine

and training, but that supply and maintenance practices would not

be tested and improved. Employment of the weapon often ended

disastrously, a circumstance which only added to its shaky reputation.

In cases where it might have been effectively used it was sometimes

discarded in favor of another weapon.

The Mechanized Flame Thrower

The Requirement for an Auxiliary Model

The role played by the U.S. mechanized flame thrower in the war

against Germany was of even less consequence than was that of its

portable counterpart. American-made flame throwers were not used

at all in the Mediterranean theater. After the Sicily Campaign General

45

 (1) Greene Interv, 12 Jul 48. (2) Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p. 180n.

46

 Ltr, CmlO III Corp to CmlO Ninth Army, 10 Oct 44, sub: Rpt of Flame Thrower Activities.

Ninth Army Cml Sec Files. 47

 Seventh Army Cml Hist Rpt, 1-31 Dec 44. 48

 7th Engr Combat Bn 5th Div AAR, 21 Oct 44. 305-Engr—0.3 (6618) Master, Jul-Dec 44.

49 Army (1) OCCWS Final Rpt, CWS Spare Parts Team in MTG and ETO, pp. 43-44. (2) Conf of , Corps, and Div CmlO's and CO's of all CWS units in the Seventh Army, 28 and 29 Aug 43.

(3) Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p. 180n.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 605

Patton expressed doubt about the tactical value of a mechanized flame

thrower. A September 1944 demonstration of two models of the newly

developed auxiliary flame thrower for the medium tank elicited no

requirement for the weapon. A series of conferences on the mechanized

flame thrower led Allied Force Headquarters in December 1944 also

to report that no requirement existed for the auxiliary model. One of

the major factors in this conclusion was the fact that the Italian terrain

was most unfavorable for the use of tanks.50

U.S. armored units used the mechanized flame thrower in France

and Germany but only in a modest degree. Because the United States

had not as yet produced a mechanized flame thrower, American planners for the Normandy invasion turned to the possibility of adapting

the British flame thrower unit, then under development, to the U.S.

medium tank. The British mounted the flame assembly in the hull of

a Churchill Mark VII tank, retaining the 75-mm. gun of the armored

vehicle. This flame weapon had a range of something around 120 yards.

Called the Crocodile, it featured an armored trailer which held 400

imperial gallons of fuel. In 1943, the Commanding General, ETOUSA,

submitted a request for 100 of the British flame throwers for installation in U.S. Sherman tanks. Development and testing of the ShermanCrocodile proceeded slowly, and the first production model did not

appear until March 1944.51

In the zone of interior the Armored Force Board had never been

enthusiastic about any flame-throwing tank that was a special-purpose

weapon, that is, if it had the flame thrower as its main armament, or

if it had a distinguishing silhouette. The British Crocodile met the

first requirement, but its fuel-carrying trailer certainly made it readily

identifiable. In any event, the board urged the Chemical Warfare

Service to concentrate its efforts on the auxiliary model, one that main-

-tained the normal armament of the vehicle, which was then under

development.52 The result was an auxiliary flame thrower which was

interchangeable with the bow machine gun of either the light or

medium tank.

On 9 March 1944 General Eisenhower requested that one of these

50

 McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 30-31. 51 (1) History of the "Crocodile," 4 Mar 44. ETO Rcds, 470.71—Flame Thrower, ORB. (2)

Colonel Magness, project officer of the Sherman-Crocodile flame thrower tank, states that the range

was between 175 and 200 yards.

52

 Ltr, Armored Force Bd to CG Armored Comd, 3 Feb 44, no sub. CMLHO.
606 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

new bow gun flame throwers be sent to England for testing, inquiring

at the same time when 100 more units could be made available. The

War Department replied that the ETOUSA could have the single

unit by mid-April and 200 flame throwers by I June 1944, 100 units

for medium tanks, the E4-5, and 100 designed for light tanks, the

E5-5.53 This was heartening news, especially as the requirements of

the British Army precluded the delivery of the complete order of

Sherman-Crocodiles until sometime in October.54

The theater chemical section quickly installed the first auxiliary

unit in a medium tank and demonstrated it to interested officers from

General Eisenhower's headquarters in late June.55 In contrast to the

long-range Crocodile the auxiliary flame thrower gave a poor performance. Perhaps the strongest point in favor of the American model

was its availability. First Army, planning on nine flame throwers per

medium tank battalion, asked for 200 auxiliary flame throwers and

canceled its requirement for Sherman-Crocodiles.56 Meanwhile, because

of the lack of trained personnel and its somewhat limited mobility, the

British Crocodile flame thrower had not lived up to expectations in

the first month on the Continent, and General Eisenhower soon canceled the American requirement for the flame tank. The fact that

E4-5's were understood to be available and that they had no identifying, mobility-hampering trailer, were doubtless other considerations in

the decision.57

On 23 August 1944 Lt. Col. G. C. White, OCCWS, conducted a

second demonstration of the E4-5 auxiliary flame thrower before high

ranking officers of the First and Third Armies. This time the latest

model with a capacity of fifty gallons was shown, and the equipment

53

 (1) Rads, CM-IN 7411, 9 Mar 44, and CM-OUT 6014, 15 Mar 44. (2) Memo, CCmlO ETOUSA

for CmlO FUSAG, 30 Mar 44, sub: Small Flame Throwers for Installation in Tanks. USFET CWS

470.71—Apparatus for Using Smoke and Gas (1942-44).

54

 (1) Memo, CCmlO ETOUSA for CmlO FUSAG, 30 Mar 44, sub: Small Flame Throwers for

Installation in Tanks. (2) Rad, CM-IN 7231, 9 Jun 44. (3) Magness Interv, 5 May 59. 55

 There was no theater interest in the auxiliary unit for the light tank.

56

 Ltr, CG First Army to CG ETOUSA, 11 Jul 44, sub: Tank Mounted Flame Throwers. 470.71—

Flame Throwers (1944-45) Hq USFET Armored Sec. 57

 (1) Ltr, CG SHAEF to British Under Secy of State (Dir Special Weapons and Vehicles), 13 Aug

44, sub: Crocodile Flame Throwers. 12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus. (2) Ltr, Cml

Adviser G-3 SHAEF to ACCWS for Field Opns, 22 Jul 44, no sub. ETO Personal files, Feb 44-Dec 44.

(3) Memo, Cml Adviser G-3 SHAEF for CmlO's in ETO, 16 Sep 44. CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame

Thrower. (4) Ltr, CCmlO ETOUSA to CCWS, 28 Aug 44, sub: Flame Thrower Tank Development.

CWO 470.71/303.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 607

BRITISH CROCODILE WITH FUEL TRAILER, firing at a target 200 yards away during a test in England.

functioned perfectly at an effective range of fifty yards.58 The increased capacity came from the addition of a 25-gallon flame fuel tank

located over the transmission of the vehicle. The original tank of the

same size was situated on the right sponson.59 The 12th Army Group

soon established a requirement for 3 3 3 of these auxiliary flame throwers,

of which 150 were understood to be immediately available in the zone

of interior. First Army, about to assault the Siegfried Line in the

vicinity of Aachen, Germany, requested the prompt delivery of the

weapons.60 One hundred and fifty of the E4-5 flame throwers reached

the ETO in October 1944 but they were equipped with only one of

the two 25-gallon fuel tanks. This caused some concern as the 50-

58

 (1) Interv, Hist Off with White. (2) Memo, CmlO 12th Army Group for ACofS G-3 12th

Army Group, 25 Aug 44, sub: Flame Thrower Demonstration. 12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—

Apparatus. This was the E4R2-4R3-5R1 model with two 25-gallon fuel containers.

59

 For the history of the development of this and other mechanized flame weapons, see Brophy, Miles,

and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field. 60

 (1) Ltr, AG Central Group of Armies to CG COMZ (Forward), 6 Sep 44, sub: Flame Throwers

E4-5. AGRO-H, 12th Army Group 470.71—Apparatus. (2) Ltr, Asst AG ETOUSA to CG First

Army, 22 Sep 44, sub: Tank Mounted Flame Throwers. AGRO-H, 12th Army Group 470.71—

Apparatus.
608 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

gallon fuel capacity was a popular feature of the flame throwers. The

missing transmission fuel tanks finally arrived in November.61

The Main Armament Flame Thrower

If the theater's interest in the auxiliary flame thrower could have

been called mild, its concern for the main armament version was

almost nonexistent. Army commanders indicated their reluctance to

give up standard tanks for main armament flame throwers not only

because of the reduced fire power but also because of the additional

tanks needed to protect the vulnerable special weapon. And, as General Rowan pointed out, matters were all the worse because tanks and

other armored vehicles remained in short supply.

It was not until January 1945 that General Bradley, 12th Army

Group commander, requested twelve main armament flame throwers

(E12-7R1) for operational testing.62 The armored forces in the 6th

Army Group declined to give up voluntarily any of the regular tanks

in order to provide for main armament flame throwers. The Army

Group Commander, General Devers, stated that any value gained in

the use of the flame thrower would be more than offset by the consequent shortage of regular tanks and personnel.63

Word came in late February that ten, not twelve, of General Bradley's flame throwers would be shipped to Europe on the first convoy

in May.64 They were on shipboard ready to sail when the Germans

surrendered at Reims on 7 May 1945.

Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations

The American forces did not have mechanized flame throwers when

they were first committed to action in France, nor did they have them

in any numbers for almost five months after the Normandy landings.

This initial lack of experience and training with flame-throwing tanks

probably did as much as anything to set the pattern for the insignificant

role the weapon was to have in Europe, a role in decided contrast to

61

 Rcd of Telephone Conv, Gen Rowan and Col Norman Gillet, 5 Nov 44. CWS 314.7 Mechanized

Flame Thrower.

62

 Ltr, CG 12th Army Group to CG ETOUSA, 14 Jan 45, sub: Mechanized Flame Thrower, 12th

Army Group Rcds, 470-71—Apparatus.

63

 1st Ind, 1 Feb 45, to Ltr, CCmlO ETOUSA to Cml Adviser G-3 6th Army Group, 3 Jan 45,

no sub. Seventh Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71—Flame Thrower Fuels, Jan 43-Feb 45. 64

 Rad, CG COMZ to CG 12th Army Group, 22 Feb 45, sub: Flame Throwers, Mechanized, E12-7R1.

12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 609

that in the British and the Canadian Armies, which used the mechanized flame thrower successfully and on a fairly large scale.

 65

Initially without flame tanks of their own, American forces in

France received occasional support of British Crocodile squadrons. In

September 1944 Squadron B, 141st Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps,

consisting of a headquarters troop and four flame thrower troops, each

with three Crocodile flame tanks, reported to Ninth Army's VIII

Corps. Three of these flame tanks supported elements of the 29th

Division in operations against Fort Montbarey, a key enemy stronghold

in Brest. On 14 September these flame tanks participated in the attack

on a series of pillboxes near the fort. Although two were knocked out

by mines before reaching the objective, the third flamed the pillboxes,

which capitulated with a yield of 60 prisoners. Two days later, in the

assault on Fort Montbarey itself, Crocodiles fired against the moat and

the wall until their fuel was exhausted. Even then the tanks remained

in position, their crews throwing white phosphorus hand grenades to

cover the final infantry assault. The fort capitulated that evening.

Prisoners indicated that the use of flame materially reduced the will to

resist.66

Favorably impressed by the work of the Crocodiles in the Brest

operation, the commanding general of Ninth Army, Lt. Gen. William

H. Simpson, on 31 October urged General Bradley to make one squadron available to Ninth Army for the impending operations against the

Siegfried Line.67 At this time the British flame tank squadrons were

in great demand by 21 Army Group and Ninth Army received only

four Sherman-Crocodile flame throwers, with well-trained crews.

These four tanks, issued to a platoon of the 739th Tank Battalion,

Special (Mine Exploder), were the only large capacity flame throwers

used by American forces in the European Theater of Operations. In

support of the 29th Division, which had also worked with flame tanks

at Brest, the Sherman-Crocodile platoon crossed the Roer River on

24 February 1945. It then received orders to join in the assault on

the citadel at Jülich where enemy small arms fire had impeded the 65

 For a description of British and Canadian flame tank operations, see McKinney, Mechanized Flame

Thrower Opns.

66

 (1) Col Claude A. Black, Chief Armored Sec Ninth Army, 20 Sep 44, Rpt on Employ of Churchill

"Crocodiles" at Brest, 20 Sep 44. (2) Roos to CmlO Ninth Army, 31 Dec 44, Rcds Incl 2, Notes on

Churchill Flame Thrower Tanks (Crocodiles). Both in CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower.

67

 Ltr, CG Ninth Army to CG 12th Army Group, 31 Oct 44, sub: Special Equip (Flame Throwing

Tanks). 12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus.
610 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

advance for several days. In the plan of attack, the four Crocodiles

were to flame the south wall of the sixteenth century citadel from

across the moat and fire 75-mm. shells to demolish the gate. Two of

the tanks developed trouble before reaching the target, but the remaining two lumbered to within seventy-five yards of the citadel

and fired flame over the wall, forcing the defenders underground.

Twenty rounds from the 75's sufficed to smash the steel door and

permit the tanks to flame the opening. The last German defenders

fled just as infantrymen from the 29th Division poured over the moat

into the burning citadel.68

The only American-made, mechanized flame thrower used by U.S.

troops in the European theater was the E4-5, later standardized as the

M3-4-3, the auxiliary model which initially had arrived without the

transmission fuel tanks. Four of these flame thrower units arrived in

the summer of 1944 and saw action with First Army in September.

In November, 12th Army Group allotted the 150 E4-5 units on hand

as follows: First Army, 75; Third Army, 30; Ninth Army, 45. Third

Army had never established a requirement for the flame-throwing

tank and held its 30 E4-5 flame throwers in an Army depot.69

As a matter of fact, comparatively little use was made of the E4-5

in France and Germany. Unfortunately, the first reported action was

a complete failure, a circumstance which may have helped discourage

wider use of the weapon. Two medium tanks with E4-5 flame throwers

reported to the 741st Tank Battalion, First Army, on 15 September

1944. At the time, both tanks were improperly equipped and one had

a defective engine. The 741st Tank Battalion repaired and equipped

the vehicles and attached them to Company C. When further trouble

developed, one of the tanks was evacuated to an ordnance repair shop.

On 18 September, the remaining E4-5 flame tank supported an infantry

attack on an enemy pillbox. Because of inadequate pressure the tank

had to get within twenty-five yards of the fortification before the

flame could reach the embrasure. This action failed to reduce the pillbox, and the infantry did not take the position. In fact, there was

doubt whether or not the enemy suffered any casualties from the attack. 68

 Ltr, Adjutant 739th Tank Bn, Special (Mine Exploder) to CmlO Ninth Army, 22 Mar 45,

sub: Flame Throwers. ARBN-739-0.1 (7763) History, 739th Tractor Bn, 1 Mar 43—21 Nov 45.

69

 (1) Rad, CG Third Army to CG 12th Army Group, 22 Nov 44, sub: E4-5 Flame Throwers. (2)

Memo, Chief Armored Sec 12 Army Group for CWS, G-4, G-3, 12 Oct 44, sub: Flame Throwers

E4-5. 12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 611

The tank battalion commander was decidedly unimpressed with the

possibilities of the flame tank, although he admitted that the lack of

training experience of the crew (it had had one day of preparatory

training) might have contributed to the inefficiency of the weapon.

Another factor was the distinct, if unwarranted, reluctance of the

crews to enter combat with the flame tanks, a reluctance also attributable to a lack of training and indoctrination.70

In December, Company B, 709th Tank Battalion, with Ninth Army,

attacked hasty entrenchments near the town of Vossenack, Germany.

The battalion had received and installed the two flame units just before

the action. Unfortunately, there was no time for training the bow

gunner-operators; they merely received verbal instructions on how

to operate the weapon. The enemy fortifications were in a V-shaped

position in a woods near the town. The plan of attack called for

clearing the left half of the wedge, followed by a tank and flame tank

attack on the right side. The vehicles, with infantrymen clinging to

them, approached the objective in a line. As the flame tanks came

within range of the positions they opened fire; when the flame fuel

was exhausted the infantrymen dismounted and quickly took the

positions. Though the operation was a success and the flame tanks

achieved the expected result, their performance was nonetheless something less than spectacular. The ignition system worked well, but the

range—only twenty yards—was extremely short. The officer in charge

blamed this poor performance not so much on the E4-5 as upon the

inexperience of the gunners.71

Seventh Army issued nine E4-5 flame throwers to the 14th Armored

Division but only one had been installed by January 1945. When this

flame tank and three standard tanks advanced abreast against a wooded

area north of Strasbourg, they encountered an enemy machine gun nest

holding up the infantry on the flank. The flame gunner fired his

weapon even though the German position was well out of range. The

flame traveled only halfway to the position but the defending enemy

immediately surrendered. The division promptly installed the eight

remaining flame throwers.72

70

 Combat Observer with V Corps to CG 12th Army Group, 13 Oct 44, Observers Rpt 4. CWS

314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower. 71

 Roos to CmlO Ninth Army Rpt, Mechanized Flame Thrower Activities (E4R2-5R1). CWS

314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower. 72

 Ltr, CmlO Seventh Army to Cml Adviser G-3 6th Army Group, 1 Feb 45, sub: Use of E4-5

Flame Thrower. Seventh Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71—Flame Thrower, Jan 43—Feb 45.
612 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Another example of the psychological impact of a flame attack took

place during the advance of the 743d Tank Battalion from the Roer

River to the Rhine. One tank fired several high explosive shells at a

German antitank gun, closed in, and poured flame on the position.

The defending Germans immediately fled into the shelter of a nearby

woods. Flame against troops in the open or in hasty entrenchments

usually was extremely successful.73

Despite the advantages which resulted from the employment of

flame, tank battalions and armored divisions remained unconvinced

of the merits of the flame throwing tank. As a consequence, the few

examples just cited represent a fairly substantial proportion of the

reported flame actions. First Army, realizing that the weapon was

seeing little use, acknowledged to its tank battalion commanders the

"considerable difficulties . . . encountered with ignition, fuel and first

echelon maintenance." Admitting that the shortcomings in the flame

thrower had no immediate solution, the Army left the way open for

the tank battalion commanders to store the flame throwers. The response to this frankly worded communication was significant. Six tank

battalions requested permission to store most of their flame units; only

two desired to keep the equipment until a tactical situation afforded

the chance of a combat test.74

In summary, American forces in Europe used flame-throwing tanks

very sparingly. Flame would have been more successful had there been

adequate tactical and technical training in the proper use of mechanized

flame throwers. Within the tank battalions the constant strain of

combat, as contrasted with the intermittent battles in the Pacific,

hindered the proper installation of flame-throwing equipment. Units

often had to be committed to combat during the period of installation

and training, and therefore training in flame thrower maintenance

and tactics was often inadequate or entirely lacking. Moreover, the

continuing shortage of medium tanks made armored commanders very

reluctant to remove tanks from battle for the installation of the flame

throwers.

For these reasons, the armored forces made but sporadic gestures at

73

 Ltr, CmlO Ninth Army to CmlO 12th Army Group, 30 Apr 45, sub: Mechanized Flame Thrower

Activities (E4R2-5R1). CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower. 74

 Ltr, First Army Armored Sec to CO Tank Bns, 3 Jan 45, sub: E4-5 Flame Throwers. CWS

314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower.
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 613

establishing a requirement for a mechanized flame thrower, a fact

which did little to expedite the development of an acceptable flame

unit in the zone of interior. The late arrival of flame units caused little

stir among the using forces, and defects of equipment and problems

of maintenance did not help the reputation of the weapon. The end

result was understandable. Caught in a vicious circle the mechanized

flame thrower, much like the portable model, was able to contribute

but little support to American forces in Europe.
CHAPTER XVII

Fire From the Air

Aerial incendiaries probably caused as much death and destruction

as any other weapon used in World War II. Certainly they were the

most important chemical munitions employed, considering their contribution in bringing the war to a successful conclusion. The record

of these munitions is all the more remarkable because most of them

were investigated, designed, and developed after the United States

had entered World War II. Aerial incendiaries, for practical purposes,

may be divided into two categories: the incendiary bomb, usually

dropped by bomber aircraft on targets far behind enemy lines, and

the fire bomb, a type which fighter-bombers used against targets at

or near the front. Of the two, the incendiary bomb was by far the

most important.1

The Incendiary Bomb: The Strategic Weapon

Pre-World War II Developments

The aerial incendiary was used for the first time in World War I.

The earliest German incendiaries, dropped on England from zeppelins

and airplanes, were shaped like buckets and consisted of a core of

thermite wrapped with tarred cotton waste and tarred rope. These

crude bombs were unsatisfactory both in incendiary action and ballistic quality. A torpedo-shaped bomb filled with gasoline and paraffin

replaced the bucketlike munition, and before the end of the war

German scientists had perfected the electron bomb. This 2-pound

bomb was composed of a magnesium-thermite filler in a magnesium

alloy casing. Though not used in World War I, it is nonetheless im1

 For details of the research, development, and production of aerial incendiaries, see Brophy, Miles,

and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field.
FIRE FROM THE AIR 615

portant as the prototype of a very effective group of World War II

incendiaries.2

Great Britain's principal incendiary bomb, the Baby Incendiary,

weighed but two-fifths of a pound. Filled with a special thermite mixture these small bombs were carried in containers capable of holding

either 272 or 144 units. Great Britain used few of its Baby Incendiaries

during World War I, although these bombs were in production and

were found to be effective.

The United States developed several types of incendiary bombs

during World War I. Two bombs, the Mark II and Mark III, were

of the intensive type, that is, munitions with a high degree of penetrability and an intensive incendiary action. Both bombs contained

a thermite charge which ignited the main incendiary, solidified oil.

They differed mainly in size, and hence penetrability; the former

weighed approximately forty pounds and the latter about 100. The

Mark I, a scatter-type bomb, was intended for use against very inflammable targets. In outward appearance the Mark I resembled the

Mark II bomb, but, whereas the latter was filled with solid oil, the

Mark I contained a number of waste balls saturated with an inflammable mixture. Two explosive charges ignited these pellets and cast

them for a radius of twenty feet.

The United States also developed two incendiary darts, the impetus

for which came from the success of the British with their Baby

Incendiaries. The first American dart, the Mark I, consisted of an

elongated 12-gauge shotgun shell filled with an incendiary material.

This munition, which ignited on impact, was designed for use against

grain fields and forests. The heavier Mark II dart, composed of a zinc

body, a thermite and solid oil filler, and a steel nose, possessed the penetrability needed in a munition to be used against buildings.

Neither the incendiary darts nor the other three American aerial

incendiaries saw use in combat. United States air units in France used

a French munition, the Chenard, reported to be the most efficient of

all Allied incendiary bombs.3

2

 (1) George J. B. Fisher, Incendiary Warfare (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), pp. 119-21. (2)

Memo, Col Zanetti for Maj Gen Claude E. Brigham, n.d., sub: Thermite Incendiary Bombs. 3

 (1) Cml Warfare Monographs, Incendiaries (vol. 43), pts. I, II, June 19. CMLHO. (2) Fries and

West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 336-47. (3) "Chemical Warfare Service Materials Used by the Air

Service," Chemical Warfare, VIII, No. 1 (January 15, 1922), 3-4. (4) Aviation Material, Lecture

by Gen W. L. Sibert, General Staff College, 11 Mar 20, p. 44.
616 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

There was little interest in the United States in an incendiary bomb

program during the period between the two World Wars. This

neglect resulted largely from an overly optimistic evaluation of the

capabilities of high explosive (HE) bombs. In 1934 an Ordnance

Department study on the relative effectiveness of incendiary and demolition bombs concluded that "everything that can be accomplished

by an incendiary bomb can, in most cases at least, be accomplished as

well or better by either a smoke bomb loaded with white phosphorus

(WP) or a demolition bomb loaded with a high explosive."

 4

There was one authoritative voice which did call attention to the

possibilities of the incendiary bomb. Colonel Zanetti, a CWS Reserve

officer on the faculty of Columbia University, insisted several times

in the 1930's that the incendiary bomb had a great potential. Colonel

Zanetti had worked with these munitions in World War I and had

become perhaps the greatest American technical expert in the field.

In 1936, when some people were dwelling on the horrors of aerial gas

attacks in cities, he graphically pointed out that fire, not gas, was the

greatest danger:

The small size of these [incendiary] bombs may appear almost ridiculous, particularly

after considering the tons of gas that are required to produce lethal concentrations;

but here comes the essential difference between gas and incendiaries that makes fire

far more dangerous to a large city. Gas dissipates while fire propagates. Each of these

small bombs held within itself the devastating possibilities of Mrs. O'Leary's cow.5

Moreover, the Army Air Corps was becoming increasingly interested

in the potentialities of the incendiary bomb. As early as November

1934 the commandant of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell

Field, Ala., recommended to the Chief of Air Corps a project aimed

at developing a filling for an incendiary bomb, and one month later

he sent the Chief, CWS, the military characteristics for such a munition.

By April 1936 the CWS Book of Standards showed a military requirement for an incendiary filling for the 25-pound chemical bomb, and

on 30 December 1936 the CWS established a project to find an incen4

 Memo Study by Maj Hermann H. Zornig, Ord Dept, 17 Jan 34, quoted in Brief Review of Work

Done to Date on Incendiaries, by Alton L. Kibler, 10 Apr 34. 5

 J. Enrique Zanetti, "The Forgotten Enemy," The Independent Journal of Columbia University, vol.

3, No. 6 (January 10, 1936).
FIRE FROM THE AIR 617

diary bomb filling.6 Despite these preparations, the eve of the United

States' entry into World War II found it with only one standardized

incendiary bomb, the gasoline filled, 100-pound M47. This situation

existed because of the continuing belief in the superiority of high explosives over incendiaries.7

The outbreak of war in Europe called attention as never before to

the possibilities of aerial incendiaries. German planes began to shower

London with magnesium electron bombs and 110-kilo oil bombs, and

the English replied with their 4-pound magnesium munition. The

United States Army could no longer afford to neglect the development

and production of incendiary bombs.8

In July 1941 General Porter, Chief, CWS, recalled Colonel Zanetti

to active duty and sent him to London to obtain firsthand information

on the research, development, and production of the British 4-pound

incendiary bomb. Colonel Zanetti returned with formulas for fillings,

blueprints for casings, and procedures for manufacturing, and a period

of extensive work on aerial incendiaries ensued.9 But there was still a

roadblock to be overcome. Since 1920 the responsibility for incendiary

munitions had been divided between the Ordnance Department and

the Chemical Warfare Service. The former had charge of the procurement of the containers and the storage and issue of the complete incendiary bomb whereas the latter developed the incendiary material

and filled the munition.10 General Porter strove to consolidate the

incendiary mission under the CWS. His last two assignments, before

he became Chief, CWS, had been with the Army Air Corps so that

he was fully aware not only of the value of aerial incendiaries but also

of the necessity for their undivided control. The argument for a unified

responsibility was especially strong in the case of the magnesium bomb

for the container and incendiary material were one and the same.11

6

 CRL Corresp File, Proj A8.5-1, Incendiary, FE (formerly Incendiary Filling for Bombs and

Incendiary, Thermite Type), Nov 32-Jun 38. KCRC. 7

 Rpt of Activities of the Tech Div During World War II, 1 Jan 46, p. 88. 8

 Memo, Chief Plans Div Air Corps for DCofS for Air, 8 Apr 41, sub: Incendiary Aircraft Munitions. 9

 Activities of Tech Div, WWII, pp. 88-90.

10

 WD GO 54, 28 Aug 20. 11

 Notes of Conf in Office of Maj Gen Richard C. Moore, DCofS, 15 Jul 41. TAGO G-4 File 32748.
618 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

In September 1941 the CWS received the complete responsibility for

the entire incendiary bomb program.12

Experiences of the Eighth Air Force

Most new weapons and munitions initially experience difficulty in

gaining the confidence of the using arm, and the incendiary bomb

proved no exception. Moreover, the early bombs produced by the

CWS were far from perfect, an understandable situation when it is

realized that most of the work was done in the hurry and bustle after

the United States entered World War II. Factors favoring the munition, among which were Germany's success with and Great Britain's

respect for aerial incendiaries, did little to lessen the Air Corps' initial

apathy, particularly at operational levels.

The British realized the merits of incendiary bombs much sooner

than did the United States, for not only had they entered the war

earlier but their cities had been targets for bombing raids of the German

Luftwaffe. Almost immediately Great Britain established an operational research organization, known as RE/8 (Research and Experiment

Station, Section 8), under the Ministry of Home Security. Gathered

together there were scientists, statisticians, photo interpreters, and other

experts whose duty it was to study the effects of bombing. American

personnel, military and civilian, were soon attached to this division

whose findings were available to both British and American air commanders.13

RE/8 scientists soon found that, in attacks against the industrial

cities of Germany, properly employed incendiaries were more efficient

12

 As a matter of fact War Department General Order No. 10, 10 September 1941, which provided

for this change neglected to transfer the procurement responsibility for "incendiary munitions which

are in general consumed in the incendiary process, and substitutes therefor" from Ordnance to the

CWS. War Department General Order No. 13, 24 November 1941, corrected this. More on the

question of responsibility for incendiaries may be found in Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War,

pp. 45-46. 13

 Later, when the utility of RE/8 had been proven, operational research sections were established

within the U.S. Army Air Forces. The impetus for this action came in the summer of 1942 when the

Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that a study be made of the British experience with operational research

activities. General Arnold approved the resultant report and recommended that the commanding generals of the Army Air Forces establish operational research sections within their commands. The Eighth

Air Force set up such a section in the VIII Bomber Command in October 1942. (1) Rpt, Lt Bradley

Dewey, Jr., to Chief Tech Div CWS, 14 Sep 44. (2) Col John M. Harlan, The Opnl Research Sec

at the Eighth AF, 18 Jul 44. Both in CMLHO.
FIRE FROM THE AIR 619

than high explosives.14 The Royal Air Force in a series of raids against

Hamburg in the summer of 1943 went a long way in establishing the

validity of this conclusion. Between 24 July and 3 August the RAF,

at times supplemented by American bombers, attacked that German

city seven times, proving beyond all doubt the destructive power of

the incendiary bomb. Almost 11⁄2 million bombs were dropped on

Hamburg, the large majority (1 1/3 million) being 4-pound incendiaries.15

 German officials stated that 45,000 people lost their lives,

although this number was admittedly inaccurate: "Exact figures could

not be obtained out of a layer of human ashes."16 Of the 122,000

houses standing before the raids, 35,719 were demolished and 4,660

were heavily damaged.17

Despite the British success with incendiaries, the Eighth Air Force

remained unconvinced of their efficacy. Colonel Kellogg, the first

chemical officer of the Eighth Air Force, played an important part in

convincing his organization of the usefulness of incendiary bombs. A

group of RAF officers who had extensive and successful operational

experience with incendiaries vigorously supported his cause. These

same RAF officers sparked the organization of an informal AmericanBritish discussion group, known as the Zoroastrian Society, which

materially aided the Eighth Air Force in defining the nature and characteristics of incendiaries possessing the greatest potential. Meanwhile, both the RAF and the Eighth Air Force carried on an extensive

program of munitions trials. As a result of these trials, the U.S. 6-

pound incendiary oil bomb, the M69, was rejected and the British 30-

and 250-pound incendiaries were accepted as interim weapons pending

14

 Final Rpt on Proj AN-23, Effectiveness of U.S. Incendiary and High-Explosive Bombs, Div 2,

NDRC of OSRD, 914 NDRC Rpt A-386 and OSRD Rpt 6445. Air University Lib Maxwell Air

Force Base, Ala. 15

 RAF and Eighth AF Statistical Rpt, Bombs Dropped on Hamburg, 24 Jul-3 Aug 43, Incl 1 to

Ltr, Armament Officer, U.S. Strategic AF in Europe to Air CmlO AAF, 6 Aug 45, sub: Air Attacks

on the City of Hamburg. Tech Lib ACmlC, Md. 16

 Rpt, Hamburg Civil Defense, p. 29, Incl 3 to Ltr cited in n. 15, above. 17

 Rpt of "Fire Storm" Air Raids (Office, Chief of Fire Brigade, Hamburg), pp. 1-3, Incl. 2 to

Ltr cited in n. 15, above. (2) The most devastating raid (the night of 27-28 July) produced a fire

storm. This phenomenon is born of a great mass of fire combined with little or no surface winds.

A huge pillar of heated air and gases rises vertically over the inferno, and cold air rushes in from all

sides of the base of the pillar to replace the hot ascending blast. The velocity of these newly created

surface winds can tear the clothes from a person's back and uproot trees three feet in diameter.

Casualties are great because death comes not only from the flames, but from asphyxiation, the inhalation

of the intense heat, and carbon monoxide poisoning. Horatio Bond, "The Fire Attacks German Cities,"

pp. 84-85, and Anthony J. Mullaney, "German Fire Departments Under Air Attack," p. 100, in Fire

and the Air War (Boston: National Fire Protection Assn., 1951), edited by Horatio Bond.
620 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

the availability of more suitable American bombs and clusters. The

most desired U.S. munitions in the early period were the 100-pound

cluster of 4-pound magnesium bombs and the 100-pound M47 bomb

with an oil and crepe rubber filling. But these desires could not readily

be translated into supply since much of the process of development

and manufacture had yet to take place in the United States.18

The first 100-pound clusters of the M50 bombs arrived in England

in 1942. This triumph of adequate supply was short-lived; chemical

officers found a great many defective M50's in these early shipments

and started a testing program to determine the bad lots. Defective

bombs were only part of the problem. The 100-pound incendiary bomb

adapter, which clustered the M50's into a convenient package, was

operationally unusable because of the danger of released adapter parts

striking other planes in the formation or even, in some cases, the tail

of the plane that carried it. This was dramatically revealed during the

Eighth Air Force's first use of incendiary bombs on 14 May 1943, when

falling cluster parts damaged other planes in the formation. Moreover,

it was impossible to obtain any degree of accuracy with bombs released

from their clusters at such high altitudes. Because of these deficiencies

Eighth Air Force suspended the use of the M50 pending receipt of aimable clusters.19

Until the adequate clustering device for the M50's appeared, the

Eighth Air Force relied to a great degree on the M47. This versatile

100-pound bomb (it actually weighed only sixty-nine pounds) was the

sole American aerial incendiary available when the United States

entered World War II. In a desperate attempt to provide incendiaries,

Colonel Kellogg late in 1942 located a supply of empty M47 bomb

casings in Iceland, managed to get them shipped to the United Kingdom,

and had 10,000 filled and assembled by air chemical units. At first the

M47 contained unthickened gasoline or oil, but later a thickener was

added. The outstanding features of the munition were its aimability,

penetrability, and its sizable load (forty pounds) of incendiary material. But the M47 also had its problems. While the munition itself was

effective, bomb bay suspension arrangements were such that one bomb

18

 History, Cml Sec, Eighth AF. (2) Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for CG Eighth AF, 27 Nov 42,

sub: Use of Incendiary and HE Bombs. App. G, History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (3) Interv, Hist Off

with Col J. A. Martin, formerly OpnsO Cml Sec Eighth AF, 28 Aug 51. (4) See above, ch. IV, for

more logistical details on incendiaries. 19

 (1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) History, Cml Warfare Sec 1st Bomb Div. (3) Martin

Interv, 28 Aug 51.
FIRE FROM THE AIR 621

occupied a space which could carry a much heavier bomb. By July of

1943 the air chemical sections provided a field expedient to solve this

loading difficulty. They paired the bombs by the use of a cable loopsling. The loop-sling method permitted the suspension of forty-two

M47's in a B-17 bomb bay. This was an economical load, and the

number of bombs falling together improved the bombing pattern.

Furthermore, clustering supplies were readily obtained since the Eighth

Air Force prepared slings in the great air repair depot at Burtonwood.

Subsequently, Colonel Baum, who succeeded Colonel Kellogg as Eighth

Air Force chemical officer in 1943, modified the loop-sling into a short

cable toggling device which permitted the suspension of fifty-two

bombs in a bomb bay and in effect made an enormous cluster of M47's

which was more aimable and made a better bombing pattern.20

In the spring of 1943 Eighth Air Force headquarters requested

mixed loadings of incendiary and high explosive bombs in a single

aircraft on operational missions. The VIII Bomber Command declared

this request unfeasible because uneconomical loads would result and because of the danger of mixing the two munitions in the same aircraft.

The chemical officers agreed with the bomber command on mixed

loadings but renewed their proposals of incendiary loads in view of the

new development with respect to the M47. During the summer, Colonel Kellogg persuaded Col. Curtis E. LeMay to authorize M47 incendiary loadings for missions against industrial targets in occupied

France. These missions conclusively demonstrated the effectiveness of

incendiary bombing in general and the M47 incendiary in particular.

Although a lack of fuzes caused the suspension of the employment of

M47's for a month during this critical period, the Eighth Air Force

was now firmly committed to the use of incendiaries, and the outstanding success of the first major incendiary raid in October, against a

factory at Heddernheim, Germany, reinforced that decision. The

Eighth Air Force analysis of the Heddernheim mission indicated that

the incendiaries were far more effective, weight for weight, than high

explosives.21 For the next three months, the M47 was the favored incendiary, and keeping a supply on hand became a major problem as all

20

 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Robert N. Isbell, ExecO Cml Sec USSTAF, to Air CmlO AAF WD,

15 Sep 44, sub: Correction to the Rpt of the AAF Bd, Proj (M-5) 261. Eighth AF 519.225. 21

 (1) Ltr, CG Eighth AF to CG VIII Bomb Comd, 10 Mar 43, sub: Use of Incendiary Bombs, and

1st Ind, CG VIII Bomb Comd to CG Eighth AF, n.d. Eighth AF 471.6 in Eighth AF 519.225-4. (2)

History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (3) Martin Interv, 28 Aug 51.
622 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

incendiary expenditures mounted from 408.2 tons in September 1943,

to 1,292.6 tons in October, 2,382.9 tons in November, and 4,189.6 tons,

40 percent of the total bomb load, in December.22

The M17 500-pound cluster for the M50 bomb was first put into

operational use in January 1944. This aimable cluster eliminated most

of the difficulties inherent in those clusters which were quick opening

and made the M50 one of the most effective incendiary bombs of World

War II.23 An M50 (technically the AN-M50A1 and later the ANM50A2) was a 4-pound bomb based on the plans brought back from

England by Colonel Zanetti. Consisting of a core of thermate and a

casing of magnesium alloy, the M50 had a high degree of penetrability

and an intensive burning action. These qualities made it particularly

suitable for use against construction in Germany, 9 5 percent of which

consisted of brick and stone.24 Because of this construction, fire divisions (that area which will be burned out by an unchecked fire) could

be not only buildings but their individual rooms. The M50 had to have

great penetrating power in order to pierce the heavy roofs, and the

fact that it was small meant that a bomber, in seeking out the numerous

fire divisions, could carry many more than if the bomb were larger.

In direct contrast with the M50 was America's largest incendiary

bomb, the 500-pound M76, popularly known as the Block Burner.

The M76 resulted from an Army Air Forces request for a large, highly

aimable incendiary bomb for use against industrial targets. It contained incendiary gel (PT) which, upon the detonation of an explosive

charge, was scattered in large gobs over a 100-foot radius. The M76

was used against Berlin on 6 March 1944 with moderate success, enough

at least to warrant a request from the Eighth Air Force to the zone

of interior for a priority shipment of these heavy incendiaries. Subsequent operations, however, proved that the efficiency of the bomb did

not warrant its employment. Because of its size, there were relatively

few targets against which it could be used. Moreover, there was a low

percentage of incendiary fuel as contrasted with the total weight of the

bomb. By September, because no future operational use of the M76

22

 Statistical Summary of Eighth AF Opns, European Theater, 17 Aug 42-8 May 45. 23

 Cml Warfare Sec Eighth AF, Jan 44-Jul 45. 24

 (1) Memo, C. W. Tyson, 28 Nov 41, sub: Info Gained from Messrs H. F. Allen and H. Austin

on Building Construction Abroad. CRL Corres File Proj A8.6-1—Incendiaries, Solid Oil, FY 1942.

KCRC. (2) Thermate was a mixture of 80 percent thermite and 20 percent of the Ordnance Department's M8 flare mixture.
FIRE FROM THE AIR 623

LOADING 500-POUND CLUSTERS OF MAGNESIUM BOMBS INTO A B-24 of the

Eighth Air Force, somewhere in England.

was anticipated, the stations of the Eighth Air Force had returned most

of their M76 bombs to Air Forces depots.25

All together the Eighth Air Force dropped 97,046 tons of incendiary

bombs on German targets compared with 569,751 tons of high explosives and 20,352 tons of fragmentation bombs. The large majority of

the incendiaries were M50's, in M17 clusters, and M47's.26 Taken as a

reflection of the role of the incendiary bomb in the Eighth Air Force's

campaigns against Germany, this figure is little more than modest.

The RAF expended many more aerial incendiaries than did the American air unit. To explain this, the essential difference between the two

air forces must be borne in mind. The RAF was devoted to a policy of

night, area raids against the cities of Germany. The Eighth Air Force,

25

 Cml Warfare Sec Eighth AF, Jan 44-Jul 45. 26

 Statistical Summary of Eighth AF Opns, European Theater 17 Aug 42-8 May 45.
624 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

on the other hand, confident in its bomb sight and in the protection derived from fighter escort and formation flying, pursued a policy of

daylight raids against specific industrial targets. Urban areas were more

susceptible to incendiary bombs than were the individual plants and

factories. And while the Eighth Air Force only gradually realized that

incendiaries had a part in industrial bombing, the RAF quickly saw

the efficacy of the incendiary against larger area urban targets. The

Eighth Air Force's use of aerial incendiaries was effective, but not

spectacular, and most of the damage to German cities resulted from

RAF operations. This relative lack of success cannot be construed as

a criticism of the American air unit, whose mission was different from

that of the RAF.

The Incendiary Bombing of Japan

The war in the Pacific was marked by the most spectacular and effective use of the aerial incendiary bomb. After March 1945, General

LeMay's all-out incendiary attacks against the vulnerable Japanese

cities brought to a culmination the recognition which the incendiary

bomb had gradually been winning throughout the war. It was air

power which played a very important part in Japan's decision to

capitulate, and it was the incendiary bomb which helped to make air

power such a decisive force.

The use of aerial incendiaries against Japan varied considerably from

that against Germany and German occupied Europe. For one thing,

air fields for the bombardment of Japanese cities were not immediately

available as in the case of the Eighth Air Force, which had English bases

well within range of German cities. It was not until the Mariana Islands, located some 1,500 miles south of Tokyo, had been taken that

American bombers found themselves within bombing range of the

Japanese capital and the other important cities on the island of Honshu.

Up till that time, the targets throughout the island chains on the road

back, and even in Japanese-held China, were not particularly appropriate for incendiary bombing missions.

Another great difference between the air war against Japan and

that against Germany was the extreme vulnerability of the Japanese

cities to fire. Although fire destruction could be and was wrought

on many German cities, they were less likely targets for the incendiary

bomb than those of Japan. Ninety-five percent of German construc-
FIRE FROM THE AIR 625

tion, as noted earlier, was brick and stone, and the roofing material, a

very vital consideration in starting fires, usually consisted of tile or

slate. In contrast, 80 percent of the construction in Japan made use of

wood and paper. There was a nucleus of modern fireproof ed buildings

in the business areas of most Japanese cities, but, generally speaking,

the structures of urban areas were made of very inflammable materials.

These areas were so compact, so devoid of fire barriers, that an uncontrolled fire could spread very quickly.

The Twentieth Air Force supervised the incendiary blow against

Japan. This unusual organization was activated in Washington on 4

April 1944, with General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General,

AAF, as its commander or "executive agent." The Joint Chiefs of Staff

were to make all major decisions about the deployment, missions, and

target objectives of the Twentieth Air Force. Its weapon was the

very long range bomber, the B-29, and its two principal subordinate

units (the actual operating units) were the XX and XXI Bomber

Commands.27

Oddly, the XX Bomber Command saw the light of day and in fact

delivered its first bombs against Japanese targets before the activation

of the Twentieth Air Force. The first major contingent of the (command left the United States on 5 January 1944 and arrived at New

Delhi, India, eight days later. Permanent bases for the XX Bomber

Command were in India and the advanced bases were located in the

vicinity of Chengtu, in western China. Plagued by logistical difficulties

and hindered by the fact that the advanced bases were within range of

only the cities of Kyushu, among the Japanese targets, the operations

of the command were not particularly effective. In fact, it was soon

realized that these missions would be little more than "shakedown"

training preparatory to the time that B-29 bases could be constructed

in the Mariana Islands.

The summer of 1944 saw the American conquest of the greater part

of the Marianas, including the islands of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian.

This meant that B-29 bases could be located within range of the important cities of Honshu. Even as the three islands were being mopped up, the XXI Bomber Command began constructing airfields for its

27

 Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, pp. 38-39. Unless otherwise noted,

the background material concerning the Twentieth Air Force is based on this excellent volume.
626 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

five wings. The first strategic mission was flown from Saipan on

24 November 1944.

From November 1944 until the early days of the following March,

the XXI Bomber Command used conventional strategic bombing

tactics against the cities of Japan. In Europe the Eighth Air Force had

developed the concept of precision bombing and to some it seemed

to be the solution for the air war against Japan. With a large percentage

of the bomb load consisting of high explosives, planes flew high altitude

daylight missions against individual industrial targets. For example,

on 14 January 1945 B-29's dropped ninety-four tons of HE on the

Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant in Nagoya with only fair results. That this

industrial target was attacked seven more times in a period of several

months is some indication of the comparative ineffectiveness of these

raids.28 European experience was being translated to Pacific use, and

not too successfully.

Precision bombing was not the solution for Japanese targets. The

physical construction of Japan's industrial and urban areas was much

more combustible than that of Germany. Japanese cities frequently

experienced peacetime conflagrations; German cities did not. Industry

and labor in Japan were far more concentrated than in Germany.

Moreover, area incendiary attacks against Japan would give its "household" industries, upon whose products the larger plants depended, a

tremendous setback.29

In December 1944 General Arnold's headquarters, aware of the

vulnerability to fire of Japanese cities, requested that the XXI Bomber

Command mount a full-scale incendiary attack against Nagoya. Brig.

Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, commanding general of the air unit and a

firm believer in daylight, precision bombing, protested but nevertheless

ordered incendiary missions against that city, the first being directed

against the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works. Encountering bad

weather, the force of forty-eight planes bombed the target using radar

and inflicted little damage. Early in January 1945, fifty-seven B-29's,

with an incendiary-fragmentation bomb load, struck urban Nagoya,

but smoke from the fires made observation and hence evaluation of the

results impossible. For the Japanese, probably the most unfortunate

28

 Col Theodore P. Gahan, The Status of Incendiaries in the Army Air Forces Thesis prepared at

the Air Command and Staff School, Air University, Maxwell Field, Ala.), May 1947, pp. 6-7. 29

 "Fire Blitz," Impact (August, 1945), p. 14.
FIRE FROM THE AIR 627

effect of this rather mediocre mission was the development of an overly

optimistic opinion of their inefficient fire-fighting system.30

General LeMay replaced General Hansell on 20 January 1945. At

first this move brought little change in the tactics and results of the

missions of the XXI Bomber Command. Some success resulted from

the high altitude precision bombardment of particular Japanese industries, but this success fell far below the expectations almost everyone

had for the VLR bomber, the B-29. In an effort to achieve better results, General LeMay made radical changes in his bombing techniques.

First, he planned to send his planes not against individual plants and

factories, but against Japan's combustible cities, filled with home industries as well as with various military installations. Although this

plan was itself a departure from the established routine, the courage

LeMay needed in making his decision came not from changing targets

but from his faith in new methods by which the targets would be attacked. The innovations in tactics all were based on the idea of dropping the most damaging payload on the crowded, inflammable enemy

cities.

The planes were to attack at altitudes of from 6,000 to 7,000 feet

instead of the usual 20,000 and 30,000, a change partly prompted by the

weather encountered over the island of Honshu. At the higher altitude

strong winds buffeted the aircraft causing not only an unduly large

consumption of gasoline but inflicting punishment on men and planes

as well. Moreover, cloud formations over Honshu prevented the visual

bombardment of targets on all but a very few occasions. In another

change, the planes were to make individual runs against the target instead of attacking in formation. Formation flying was the established

practice of the Eighth Air Force, and it provided an all-around defense

against attacks by enemy fighter planes. But it also involved rendezvous points for the planes and hence a greater consumption of

gasoline. In still another innovation. LeMay ordered the B-29's to attack under the cover of darkness, a tactic expected to achieve surprise

and take advantage of the enemy's weak defensive weapons, night

fighters and radar gun-laying devices. Finally, the aircraft were to

be stripped of all armament. The savings in weight resulting from the

absence of armament and the lesser demands for gasoline meant that a

30

 Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, pp. 563-65.
628 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

greater amount of payload could be carried. And this payload was to

consist exclusively of incendiary bombs.31

The XXI Bomber Command first used these tactics on its historic mission No. 40 flown against Tokyo on the night of 9-10 March 1945.

The planes carried two types of incendiary bombs, the M47A2 and the

M69.32 The Pathfinder units, one squadron of each of the three participating wings, carried the M47's which served not only as aiming points

but which also started appliance fires—those fires large enough to be

controlled only by special fire-fighting apparatus. The M69's used by

the rest of the force started a multitude of small fires that soon joined

to form large ones.33 The M47 had been used extensively in Europe,

but the M69, because of its poor penetrating power, had proved unsuitable for German targets. This very characteristic made it particularly appropriate for use against the flimsy construction of Japanese

buildings.

The ingenious M69, unlike most other American incendiaries, was

not based on a European prototype but was strictly an American development. The over-all weight of this hexagonal shaped, light-cased

munition was six pounds; its incendiary filling, napalm, weighed

three pounds. The bomb, having a terminal velocity of 225 feet per

second, was stabilized in flight by cloth streamers rather than by fins.

A delay fuze, activated by the impact, ignited an ejection charge which

expelled the incendiary material through the tail of the bomb. Thus

when the bomb came to rest it functioned like a small mortar; when

flat on the floor it could eject flaming napalm as far as 100 feet until

it struck an object in its path.34

The first B-29's left Guam at 1735 on 9 March, and by 2020 the

entire attacking force was airborne. Although the planes encountered

some bad weather on the way to Tokyo, they identified the coast initial

point and target without difficulty. The first bombs landed on Tokyo

at 001 5 on the following morning. It took but thirty minutes for the

31

 (1) "The B-29ers," Impact (September-October 1945), pp. 78-79. (2) Twentieth AF, Special

Rpt on the Incendiary Attacks Against Japanese Urban Industrial Areas (hereafter cited as Twentieth

AF Special Rpt on Incendiary Attacks) n.d., pp. 5-6. 32

 The M47 bombs were toggled together, six to a 500-pound bomb station by the T19 cluster

adapter, developed by the Chemical Section of the XXI Bomber Command. Twentieth AF Special

Rpt on Incendiary Attacks, p. 6. 33

 (1) Twentieth AF Special Rpt on Incendiary Attacks, p. 6. (2) USSBS, Effects of Incendiary

Bomb Attacks on Japan, Apr 47, p. 117. 34

 NDRC (Div 11), 3 Oct 45, Comparative Effectiveness of Small Incendiary Bombs on Industrial

Targets, pp. 9-10.
FIRE FROM THE AIR 629

TOKYO, AFTER THE INCENDIARY BOMBING OF 9-10 MARCH, 1945

development of fires of conflagration size, and by that time the situation was so far out of hand that efforts to combat the flames were fruitless. The multitude of bombs (1,665 tons were dropped on Tokyo),

the combustible nature of the structures, and the high winds all contributed to the creation of the inferno.

Some people were able to escape through the wide fire lanes, but

many others were encircled by the flames and died of suffocation and

burns. Those who fled to the canals faced death in the scalding water

or were crushed by the terrified mob which crowded in on top of them.

This raid alone caused the death of an estimated 83,793 people and almost 41,000 more received injuries. Over one million people lost their

homes.

The fire destroyed 15.8 square miles in the center of Tokyo. All

buildings in the area were entirely destroyed or seriously damaged. Al-
630 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

though some of the modern, fire-resistant structures were not totally

destroyed, the majority of even this type was left as sagging skeletons.

Glass, steel bars, and concrete melted in the intense heat; wooden

buildings went up in flames before the fire front had reached them.

Such was the havoc wrought by the first of the "blitz" raids against

the cities of Japan.

The results achieved by the XXI Bomber Command left no doubt

as to the validity of the revolutionary tactics of General LeMay. Tokyo

had been surprised by both the low altitude and the magnitude of the

attack. The command suffered but moderate losses; 14 of the 279

planes over Tokyo failed to return. These losses came not from enemy

fighter opposition, which failed to damage a single B-29, but from flak.

The combination of bombs used was excellent.

Following the Tokyo raid at about 2-day intervals, Nagoya, Osaka,

Kobe, and again Nagoya received the terrible punishment of incendiary

bombing. Throughout the rest of the Pacific war a total of sixty-nine

Japanese cities were subjected to these "blitz" attacks.35

The Fire Bomb: The Tactical Weapon

Incendiary munitions were useful in tactical air missions—those

flown in the combat zone for the purpose of influencing the local tactical situation. Enemy strongholds, motorized vehicles, troop concentrations, and military stores were targets particularly vulnerable to fire.

Sometimes tactical aircraft used M47 and M50 bombs against these

targets, and occasionally they dropped an M76, but another type of

incendiary munition, the fire bomb (often called the napalm or blaze

bomb), proved most effective against tactical targets.

Employment in Europe

A fire bomb was simply a large capacity container filled in the field

with napalm gel.36 It began as a field improvisation. Fighter planes

carried jettisonable fuel tanks for long missions, and it became customary for the pilots, on the trip homeward, to drop these tanks on targets

35

 (1) Twentieth AF Special Rpt on Incendiary Attacks, pp. 6-9. (2) USSBS, Effects of Incendiary

Bomb Attacks on Japan, pp. 94, 97, 102. (3) USSBS, Final Rpt Covering Air-Raid Protection and

Allied Subjects in Japan, Feb 47, p. 70 (4) "B-29ers" and "The Z-29 Payoff," Impact (SeptemberOctober, 1945), pp. 78, 79, 85. 36

 Fire bombs were of a variety of sizes, depending upon the kind of containers on hand. The bombs

which saw the most use were of 165-, 75-, 100-, 108-, and 110-gallon capacity.
FIRE FROM THE AIR 631

ATTACHING AN EMPTY 108-GALLON FIRE BOMB TANK TO THE FUSELAGE of

a P-47.

of opportunity, igniting the gasoline with tracer ammunition. It was

only a small step to provide these tanks with igniters more convenient

and reliable than tracer ammunition. The CWS devised an igniter from

an all-ways fuze and a shortened section of a 2-pound magnesium bomb

which was clamped on the side of the gasoline tank. It was soon realized

that thickened fuel would provide a more satisfactory fire than ordinary gasoline, so air and chemical officers in Europe began thickening

gasoline in spare tanks with oil, or rosin oil and lime, or when they

were available, with the approved thickeners, British perspex and

American napalm. Because the thickened fuel required a better igniter,

chemical officers adapted the white phosphorus grenade for the purpose.

One of the most favorable features of the bomb was the ease with which

it could be constructed from materials which were relatively abundant,

since the spare tanks, often made of process paper, were stocked in

quantity. The ratio of filling to the over-all weight of the munition was

high. The extreme accuracy with which the fire bomb could be placed

on small targets was another major advantage, although this precision
632 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

was possible only when the bombs were released from a low altitude,

something pilots under heavy antiaircraft attack could not always do.37

An example of the effectiveness of the fire bomb against point targets

took place on 25 August 1964 when sixteen fighter planes, carrying

twenty-four 165-gallon napalm bombs and eight 500-pound HE

bombs, attacked the headquarters of Generalfeldmarschall Guenther

von Kluge, German Army Group commander, at Verzy, France.

Twenty-two of the napalm tanks made direct hits on the buildings

comprising the headquarters; eight houses were completely destroyed.38

Although men were more vulnerable than material to the fire bomb,

motorized vehicles, marshaling yards, warehouses, and other combustible buildings made excellent napalm bomb targets. Fighter planes

carrying this munition flew frequent missions against the Germans

while the latter were attempting to escape encirclement at Falaise.

During this period twelve P-38 fighters, each carrying two 165-gallon

fire bombs, attacked a concentration of enemy trucks and armor, destroying or damaging an estimated thirty or forty vehicles. At the

time of the Ardennes counteroffensive American planes used fire bombs

effectively against German motor transportation and armored concentrations in the wooded sections of the area. When fighter planes

dropped seventy-two fire bombs on the marshaling yards at St. Quentin,

France, 400 of the 500 railway cars in the yards were destroyed.39

The munition was sometimes used in conjunction with artillery or

high explosive bombs in attacks against fortified towns or strongpoints

consisting of open emplacements and earth and log fortifications. In

one approved sequence, these positions first were subjected to artillery

fire or high explosive bombing. Then planes dropped fire bombs on

the rubble forcing the enemy into the open. Just before the infantry

assault, the artillery placed its fire on the exposed enemy troops.40 The

fire bomb, however, had little or no effect against heavy fortifications

such as the pillboxes of the Siegfried Line. And, reports to the contrary,

37

 (1) Broughton Weekly News Letter No. 26A, 7 Dec 44, and No. 40A, 12 Apr 45. (2) Msg MF

01268, CG USSTAF to CG Eighth AF, 11 Oct 44. Eighth AF 519.225.1. (2) Craven and Cate, eds.,

Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, pp. 654-55. 38

 (1) Cml Warfare Munitions Used by Ninth Air Force, Incl 3, CWS TofO Ltr No. 26, 30 Jun 45.

(2) Fire Bomb Opns, Incl 5, CWS TofO Ltr No. 19, 3 Nov 44. 39

 (1) Cml Warfare Munitions Used by Ninth Air Force, Incl 3, CWS TofC Ltr No. 26, 30 Jun 45.

(2) Ninth AF, Use and Effectiveness of Napalm Fire Bombs, 9 Feb 45, Incl 4, CWS TofO Ltr No. 23,

3 Apr 44. (3) Broughton Weekly News Ltr No. 26A, 7 Dec 44. 40

 (1) Ninth AF, Use and Effectiveness of Napalm Fire Bombs, 9 Feb 45, Incl 4, CWS TofO Ltr

No. 23, 3 Apr 44. (2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 28, 31 Aug 45, p. 20.
FIRE FROM THE AIR 633

the Operational Research Section of the IX Bomber Command found

that the fire bomb was not instrumental in the surrender of the fortress

of St. Malo on the French coast.41

Use in the Pacific

In the war against Japan, the fire bomb saw use from the mainland

of Asia to the many small islands of the Pacific. As in Europe, the

munition gave best results when used to produce casualties. Some

observers in the Pacific went as far as to say that matériel destruction

should be but a secondary mission for the fire bomb and then only if the

target were highly combustible. Apart from its casualty potential the

fire bomb had definite psychological effect on enemy troops; ground

commanders agreed that enemy morale suffered an obvious decrease

after a fire bomb attack. The Japanese on Tinian, after experiencing

several fire bomb attacks, broke from their positions upon the approach

of fighter planes with belly tanks and ran in a direction that was at right

angles to the flight of the planes. But whether used against troops or

other targets, fire bombs to be effective had to be dropped in adequate

numbers. Prisoners of war stated that widely dispersed fire bomb hits

had little or no effect on the morale of a unit.42

When used against emplacements the fire bomb performed the additional service of burning off the dense foliage and camouflage which

so often surrounded Japanese positions. The Commanding General,

81st Infantry Division, stated, "Napalm bombing serves as an excellent

means of uncovering hostile strong points in jungle and cave warfare.

Unless the enemy is prepared to meet it by special provisions in his

caves, this fire will drive him into the open where he can be reached with

HE shells."

 43

Used in collaboration with regular incendiary and HE bombs, the

napalm bomb burned cities and towns in Burma and China whose

wooden buildings housed supplies for Japanese operations. For example,

the Fourteenth Air Force struck Paoching with M50 and M69 incendiary bombs and demolition and napalm bombs. In this particular

41

 (1) Brougham Weekly News Ltr No. 26A, 7 Dec 44; No. 15, 16 Sep 44. (2) Craven and Cate

state that although the fire bomb strike at St. Malo was "spectacular, and much photographed," the

napalm "though burning out one surface shelter, produced little effect on the garrison." Craven and

Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, p. 262. 42

 Fire Bomb Opns, Incl 5, CWS TofO Ltr No. 19, 3 Nov 44. 43

 Quoted in Use of Napalm (Fire) Bombs in the Palaus Opn, Incl 5, CWS TofO Ltr No. 23, 3 Apr 45.
634 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

case the results (the destruction of 20 percent of the city) were substandard because of the mud and brick walls of the buildings and because many of the bombs fell on previously burned areas. In Burma,

fire bombs alone received credit for the evacuation of one Japaneseheld city.44

During the Luzon campaign American air units dropped on the

enemy a total of 1,054,200 gallons of napalm-thickened gasoline, of

which an estimated 989,000 gallons were effectively placed on targets.

The failures were the result of defective igniters and of faulty release

mechanisms. While on certain missions there may have been an unusually high percentage of duds (these, likely as not, were ignited by

strafing), in the over-all picture the fire bomb performed efficiently.45

The most effective use of the fire bomb took place during the fight

for Ipo Dam, north of the city of Manila.46 After the fall of the Philippine capital the Japanese forces withdrew to this area and augmented

the natural defensive features of the terrain with a network of trenches

and fortified caves. The low supply of water in Manila made the recapture of the dam imperative, and fighter-bombers of the Fifth Air

Force supported troops of XI Corps as they attacked to take this important facility. During the initial stage of the operation (3-5 May

1945), 238 planes dropped demolition and fire bombs on the outlying

defenses of the dam with good results. The final all-out effort to seize

the dam took place on 17 May. On the day before, fighter planes again

struck the Ipo defenses, this time with 50,000 gallons of napalm. On

the day of the attack 240 fighter-bombers dropped 62,500 gallons of

napalm. A Fifth Air Force report described the technique:

Five enemy strong points were selected as target areas, each one consisting of about

3,000,000 square yards. Obviously, in a target of this size, the term saturation bombing is used in a tactical rather than physical sense, meaning that sufficient bomb coverage was provided to negate enemy opposition. To administer the blanket of fire treat44

 (1) Incendiary and Fire Bomb Attack on Paoching, China, CWS TofO Ltr No. 26, 30 Jan 45, p. 11.

(2) CWS Munitions Used Operationally by First Tactical Air Force, CWS TofO Ltr No. 25, 30

May 45, p. 17. 45

 (1) Rpt, CmlO Sixth Army, Luzon Campaign (9 Jan-1 Jul 45), pp. 15-16. (2) An. to Cml

Opns and Tech Per Rpt 8, CmlO I Corps, 21 Jun 45, sub: Rpt of Napalm Bombings. (3) An. I to

Cml Opns and Tech Per Rpt No. 7, CmlO I Corps, 13 Jun 45, sub: Rpt on Napalm Bombings. All

in CMLHO. 46

 (1) Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p. 436. (2) Smith, Triumph in

the Philippines, ch. XXI.
FIRE FROM THE AIR 635

ment, 200 to 250 5th AF fighters came in low, wave after wave, four to eight

abreast, with air and ground controllers giving target information and regulating

traffic. At first, the closely spaced fighters found that smoke from preceding waves

obscured the target. The problem was overcome by directing the bombing runs downwind, with each successive wave dropping its bombs on the near side of the bursts

from the wave which preceded it. The fighter bombers followed each other at 10- to

15-second intervals. A-20's then came in, showering the area with parafrags and

winding up with a thorough strafing.47

Positions in the area which had withstood infantry attacks for almost

a week, were taken after only feeble resistance and minimum casualties.

Whether these results were entirely due to the use of napalm is not

certain. One chemical officer, for example, viewing one of the attacks

from the air, concluded that its effect was little more than harassing.

But most observers were inclined to place greater emphasis on the

effectiveness of the fire bomb, and General Krueger, Sixth Army commander, went so far as to say that these attacks "made possible the early

capture of the vital Ipo Dam."

 48

All together during World War II the American Army Air Force

dropped about 37,000 CWS fire bombs (14,000 tons) on German and

Japanese targets. Two-thirds of the bombs and an even higher percentage of the tonnage were used in the Pacific war. No matter where

the fire bombs were used reaction to their method of employment

seemed to be the same. To insure the best results they had to be dropped

in adequate numbers and from altitudes ranging from 50 to 100 feet;

the efficiency of a napalm strike was increased when co-ordinated with

HE bombs, artillery fire, or strafing; the most effective targets for

the munition were enemy strongholds and troop concentrations, extremely inflammable material, and motorized vehicles.49

47

 Quoted in "Napalm—Fire Bombs Turn Trick Against Holed-Up Nips in Luzon," Impact (August,

1945), pp. 48-53. 48

 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, CmlO, I Corps for CofS I Corps, 18 May 45, no sub. Sixth Army File,

471.6. (3) After the war, General Yamashito, Japanese commander on Luzon, stated that napalm

had little effect against the rain-soaked terrain of the island. Quoted in Craven and Cate, eds., The

Pacific: From Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p. 443. 49

 (1) CWS Munitions Used Operationally by First Tactical Air Force, CWS TofO Ltr No. 25,

30 May 45, p. 18. (2) Ninth AF, Use and Effectiveness of Napalm Fire Bomb, 3 Apr 45, Incl 4, CWS

TofO Ltr 23. (3) Broughton Weekly News Ltr No. 40A, 12 Apr 45.
CHAPTER XVIII

CWS Overseas—An Evaluation

The CWS had much to learn in World War II. The service entered

the war as the custodian of one of the most awesome weapons to come

out of World War I. Even while experiencing the diplomatic, political,

and military antipathy to gas that was manifest during the years between the wars, many CWS officers, military analysts, and strategists

(and many pacifists) believed that gas and air power would rule the

next global conflict. When war broke out in Europe gas was not used

in spite of the fact that England must have presented a tempting target.

This state of affairs affected the CWS in the United States in two ways:

the service had to adjust to the idea of preparing for a gas war which

might never be fought and for a nongas war which involved missions

hitherto either secondary or nonexistent.

The problems of a nongas war, such as was fought in World War II,

centered about use of smoke, flame, and incendiaries, natural appendages

to the mission of a technical service which dealt largely with the products of the science of chemistry.

The CWS did in fact prepare for both kinds of war. Its staff officers

and combat and service units performed usefully, even while fulfilling

their insurance roles. To do this, to achieve the goal of effective participation in the war effort, involved ingenuity, resourcefulness, and

adaptability of the highest order.

Attendant upon both of these differing objectives was the matter

of meeting demands for a rapid expansion, for the activation of new

organizations and units, and for the mass production and distribution of

new weapons and materials. The CWS, like other elements of the

Armed Forces, received resources of men and money undreamed of in

the difficult years through which it had just passed. In 1940 the CWS

had an active strength of 93 officers and 1,035 enlisted men; in 1943

these figures were 8,103 and 61,688. Within the space of these three

years the civilian rolls increased twentyfold. Appropriations for 1940

were just over two million dollars; two years later they exceeded one
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 637

billion. This transition from famine to feast was not an easy one to

make. The development and efficient management of programs to provide for the greatly expanded mission of the CWS involved many problems, not the least of which, according to General Porter, was the

effective use of all the money allotted to the service. It was necessary

to balance funds against priority schedules and limited allocations of

men, materials, storage space, and transportation.

The CWS branches established by the Army in each of the overseas

areas of war operations also dealt with problems of priorities and allocations. But the CWS overseas, perhaps even more than the CWS

at home, felt the full impact of preparing for a kind of war which

was not being fought while contributing significantly to the war which

was being fought.

Administration and Manpower

Among other things the CWS in World War II had to learn about

the character, structure, and channels of overseas organizations. In

spite of between-the-wars planning and training, the CWS on the eve

of conflict was essentially as unprepared to form its overseas branches as

it was for waging gas warfare. Part of this difficulty was the lack of

manpower—there were not enough senior officers even to form the

nuclei of several theater of operations staff sections. So it was that

Colonel Copthorne went to SWPA without the support of even one

other Regular officer. Only two other Regulars supported Colonel

Unmacht in the Hawaiian Department. The European theater was deprived of all but three of its senior CWS officers to make their experience available for the North African forces. While nearly all of

the leading CWS officers in the United States and overseas—Porter,

Waitt, Rowan, Copthorne, and Shadle—highly praised the energy,

resourcefulness, and intelligence of Reserve and temporary officers,

most of these emergency officers, during the critical phase of the formulation of overseas organizations, were inexperienced and they lacked

a knowledge of current policies and plans. It is a tribute to the Reserve

and temporary officers that they learned so quickly and performed so

well.

A part of CWS unpreparedness to establish overseas branches

stemmed from the changes imposed upon the Army by global warfare.

It became impossible to have the direct communication with the
638 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

OCCWS which many officers had expected. It became necessary to deal

with the Allies, to act within the framework of international policy.

Although acting within this framework, most overseas chemical officers,

with the notable exception of Shadle, found themselves set apart from

the Allied agencies, operating even below the joint Army-Navy-Army

Air Forces level, at the level of the Army supply services. Even in

Shadle's case, his presence in an Allied headquarters isolated him to

some extent from the field agencies and to a greater extent from the

War Department. Furthermore, there was the necessary but nevertheless restrictive requirement for OCCWS to deal formally with its overseas branches through ASF and OPD.

The lack of administrative preparedness was also due in part to the

fact that the CWS did not "fit" into the organizational patterns of

World War II. The service was in the anomalous position of being

both a supply and technical service; an organization which furnished

staff advice, conceivably even in tactical and strategic fields; a service

legally responsible for firing-line units; and a service equipped to do

research in the field. Most of the other technical services had a similar

range of responsibilities, but none was spread so thin, none had combat

units primarily equipped with their own weapons; moreover, all other

services had supply and service support as a primary mission. World

War II organizational doctrine tended to categorize activities into

those of "service" or those of "combat." The CWS overseas never

succeeded in persuading some field commanders that its activities and

units, even front-line smoke generator units, were not in the supply

and service category.

In the face of such determined categorization, most CWS overseas

branches worked outside or on the fringes of the official organization.

The CWS in each area or theater became highly individualistic. In

the European theater Rowan used his personal persuasion with command and staff elements and his close personal ties with other CWS

officers to maintain a unity of service and accomplish his mission. He

and his subordinates, insofar as they were able, operated their own administrative system, their own intelligence activity, their own technical

and liaison organization, and their own supply service. Such independence was possible only because the European theater and theater Communications Zone headquarters permitted and even encouraged it. The
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 639

ASF inspectors did not approve of this independence, but without it the

CWS ETO could not have accomplished its missions.

The CWS administrative effort overseas most nearly like that in the

European theater was in the Central Pacific Area. There Colonel Unmacht vigorously asserted CWS independence with the active concurrence and support of first the senior Army headquarters and later the

combined and joint Pacific Ocean Areas headquarters. Unmacht was

the only overseas chief chemical officer who also commanded CWS

troops other than the theater or area laboratory company. Unmacht

was also the only overseas chief chemical officer who was specifically

designated to co-ordinate and compile a joint Army, Army Air Forces,

and Navy gas warfare plan although Rowan, as Porter's representative,

and Copthorne, on temporary duty in GHQ SWPA, participated in

both combined and joint planning while Shadle, as a staff officer in a

combined headquarters, had advisory functions in the joint and combined field. Unmacht and his subordinates certainly maintained a very

close connection between research and development and the firing line

even to the extent of carrying on research, development, and manufacture in the theater of operations.

Colonel Copthorne in SWPA likewise saw that new developments

reached combat chemical officers, but he did so in a different manner

from that of either Rowan or Unmacht. Copthorne and his CWS

colleagues had far fewer resources than did the CWS branches in Europe

or the Central Pacific; they did not have as close a relationship with

the combined and joint headquarters; and they had to contend with

the considerable problems of enormous distances and a tropical environment. Copthorne could not, therefore, unify his service and assert

its independence in the same way that Rowan and Unmacht did, but

he could co-ordinate his services by providing the mechanisms for

understanding and common effort among field and rear area chemical

officers. These mechanisms were area and even theaterwide conferences, the creation of a centralized area training facility, the provision

of centralized technical intelligence activities, and a continued emphasis

on the problems of chemical warfare in the tropics. Copthorne and

the field chemical officers in SWPA operated in greater isolation from

the CWS in the United States and even from their colleagues in their

own area than did other chemical officers overseas. Their solutions

to problems, except for the determination of tropical gas warfare doc-
640 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

trine in which they co-operated with the CWS in the United States,

were ordinarily their own. Consequently, field army, corps, and division chemical officers in SWPA acted as independently as did their

colleagues anywhere else in the world, and, with one exception, they

operated through a wider range of chemical responsibilities. This is not

to say that they did more and better work than their colleagues elsewhere, but that they did have a more varied experience in the chemical

field.

The only elements having just as great a variety of chemical experience were to be found in the field armies in North Africa, Sicily, and

Italy. Since Shadle preferred to emphasize his own staff role and to give

field elements their head, Colonels Barker and Guild in Fifth Army

and Colonel Humphreville in Seventh Army found themselves, again

by their own preference, operating a CWS of their own. Barker and

Coblentz, in a unique partnership, carried on development and manufacture and operated their own supply system. As a result, there was

less co-ordination and unity in the CWS in the North African and

Mediterranean theater than elsewhere in the world, but again the required job was done. The much lesser threat of gas warfare in the

Mediterranean area made it particularly appropriate to accomplish

the CWS administrative task differently there.

In summary of the worldwide CWS administrative experience, it

can be said that every overseas branch of the CWS surveyed found some

means of creating a service that accorded with the concepts held by

Fries and Porter. The lot of the chemical technician in what was supposed to be a technician's war was not an easy one, but the chemical

technician managed to do what he was called on to do by dint of much

improvisation and ingenuity.

Logistics

In logistics, as in administration, the CWS branches overseas dealt

with the two problems of gas warfare supply and nongas warfare supply. Also as in administration, each CWS overseas branch created its

own supply system according to geographical environment and according to the kind of combat forces to be supported in its area. In

the European theater, where the build-up of forces and materials went

on for nearly two years before the attack, there was time to develop
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 641

for chemical supply a system of centralized CWS control over a

decentralized operation.

The sophisticated CWS ETO credit system of distribution, while

by no means original with the CWS, was admirably suited to a small

service handling only a small number of fast-moving items. Since a

combat commander using this system could ask for materials credited

to his organization when and where convenient, the system gave the

combat commander control over the forward movement of supplies.

The big stumbling block was in having supplies ready for call. The

CWS ETO distribution system, through no basic fault of the system

itself, tended to break down when supplies were unavailable or when

depots and dumps could not be organized and stocked as desired. When

strains were put on the system, General Rowan and all of his subordinates, often acting informally, jumped in to make the system function

by obtaining and moving supplies. Aided by such application of energy

at all levels, the CWS ETO supply system for the most part did manage

to carry on. Supply failures or near failures arose in connection with

mortar shells, incendiary bombs, and spare parts, but in each case the

trouble was that materials were unavailable in the United States. And

in each case of failure or near failure the CWS ETO was able to make

adjustments which at least eased matters.

CWS ETO supply problems were slightly easier to handle because

that theater had the most men and facilities. Distances were shorter

and transportation, while nearly always in critical demand, was more

plentiful than elsewhere in the world. North Africa was quite another story in this respect. Distances were great and existing road and

rail nets were few and poor. These natural drawbacks, the inexperience

of the Army in global supply at this early stage, and enemy submarine

and air warfare helped shape the CWS NATOUSA supply system. The

independence and isolation of CWS elements in the theater also had an

effect. Base sections and combat organization chemical officers created

their own supply system which eventually became the "impetus from

the front" system. What materials Colonels Barker and Coblentz could

not get from the theater SOS or from the United States, they manufactured or reclaimed. When necessary the combat organization chemical officers reinforced their requests for materials through command

channels. General Shadle meanwhile handled the "impetus from the

rear" supply system and did his part in fighting the battles of overages
642 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

and shortages. Both CWS NATOUSA-MTOUSA supply systems

worked, but only because the chemical officers made them work against

considerable odds.

CWS SWPA officers were able to make their supply system work in

the face of even greater odds. Enormous distances, chronic shortages

of transportation and communications facilities, and the almost unbelievable deterioration of materials in the tropical environment

plagued them from the time combat began. For at least the first

half of the war they could rely on the economy of neither the United

States nor Australia to furnish enough materials in usable condition.

They were hampered by low priorities and force-level allocations

which did not permit building up area reserves. Again, improvisation

and ingenuity provided the answers. Again, items were built, reclaimed,

and rebuilt through area efforts. In SWPA the area SOS and even GHQ

stepped in to provide procedures for forward organization and transportation. Eventually, as more ships and more equipment became available all over the globe, the United States provided ships block-loaded for

balanced resupply of combat forces. Area supply problems, while still

difficult, became a simple matter of computing necessary block loads,

of receiving, handling, and maintaining the materials in these loads.

The War Department policy restricting the build-up of area reserves

threatened to become a CWS problem in POA just as in SWPA, but

shortages did not become critical because anticipated demands were

larger than actual demands and because Hawaiian Department resources

were large enough to allow for improvisations and substitutions. In

POA combat supply, transport space allocation and loading were carefully controlled by the area joint headquarters. The POA CWS soon

learned to work within the joint system, and the result, admittedly

under relatively ideal circumstances, was the smoothest CWS supply

operation of World War II.

Excepting the supply of toxics, which was a preparedness matter, the

CWS managed to accomplish its major logistics mission. The overseas

branches displayed enough ingenuity to prevent any of the supply

shortages, except for spare parts, from becoming more than temporarily

critical. Yet, there is little doubt that more supplies would have been

used had the CWS been able to furnish them sooner and in greater

quantities. For example, no area anywhere in the world was ever provided with enough chemical mortar shells. More mortars could have
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 643

been employed in most cases. Demands for white phosphorus grenades

were frequently not met, and probably many more power-driven

decontaminating apparatus could have been used for carrying water,

providing showers, and the like. POA experience indicates that a flamethrowing tank could have been extensively employed if it had been possible to provide an adequate model at an early date.

Many more CWS service units could also have been employed. The

CWS overseas could have used more maintenance units in the field, and

experience demonstrates that chemical laboratories could easily have

become general-purpose overseas research and development agencies.

More decontaminating units could have been used in general services

work, and more processing companies could have been doing laundry

and dry cleaning.

The use of CWS units and materials in secondary missions raised the

question of whether it was indeed a CWS function to furnish equipment and units for these missions and whether it would have been

practical and reasonable to provide them had they been available.

World War II experience does not give definite answers to these

questions or to the corollary and perhaps overriding question of

whether the CWS should have had any logistics functions overseas.

All the other technical services were larger and all had established

logistics procedures. The Quartermaster Corps handled impregnated

clothing and protective covers: why should it not handle all protective

items? Quartermaster provided bath and laundry units: why should it

not provide all such services? Ordnance stored and issued vast quantities of ammunition including, in some areas, chemical toxics: why

should that service not handle all ammunition items? The Corps of

Engineers provided and employed heavy equipment, like the chemical

decontaminating apparatus and commercial gases: why should it not

provide all such equipment and the attendant services?

The tentative answer, based on World War II experience is, as Fries

found in World War I, that these services were already overburdened

with their responsibilities and were unable or unwilling to handle

the detailed problems connected with chemical supply and service.

The antigas impregnation of clothing is a highly technical and even

hazardous process. The Quartermaster Corps in all areas was willing to

work out a co-operative arrangement with the CWS for handling protective clothing, but it was unwilling to undertake the impregnating
644 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

task. Since the CWS had the impregnating units, it would have been

grossly wasteful not to use them, in the absence of gas warfare, to help

Quartermaster with its laundry and dry cleaning. It would likewise

have been wasteful not to use the decontaminating units and apparatus,

which the other services would have been hard pressed to employ in

event of gas warfare, in any way possible to improve the comfort or

well-being of troops in the field. Ammunition supply was a thorny

problem which at least some CWS officers felt should have been handled

by Ordnance, particularly since the CWS frequently found gas warfare

preparedness and planning a full time mission, and some chemical officers did persuade their Ordnance colleagues to handle it. In most

cases, however, Ordnance had enough to do in supplying the artillery

and the infantry without also handling a relatively few grenades and

smoke and mortar shells. The chemical items also posed technical problems. Potentially explosive smoke pots could not be safely stored with

other ordnance items, and leaking toxic munitions required expert

attention. In the European theater, in SWPA, and in the Mediterranean area, these technical problems led Ordnance to turn over much

of its toxic storage responsibility to CWS. In POA the toxic storage

mission was officially transferred to CWS. In sum, the answer to the

question of functions and responsibilities seemed to be that, since the

CWS had to be overseas to guide preparations for gas warfare, there

was no reason why it should not perform related secondary tasks, particularly when training and equipment permitted CWS units to accomplish certain of these tasks more expeditiously than units of its

sister services.

The Weapons

The development of the large area smoke mission during World

War II can be traced with greater precision than can that of most

munitions. The need for concealment of extensive targets in rear areas

arose in World War I with the introduction of bomber aircraft. In

the period between the wars Chemical Warfare Service attempts to

develop a way to conceal vulnerable rear area targets were made meaningful by the growing increase in the range of airplanes and by the

development of the air arm of the Navy. But the CWS was generally

unsuccessful in these attempts—means were not on hand for the production of smoke in needed amounts. And covering a target with too
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 645

little smoke did nothing more, of course, than attract an enemy

bombardier's attention.

Early in 1942 the CWS produced smoke apparatus which met the

necessary requirements, the M1 mechanical generator which created

an artificial fog not by combustion but by the condensation of water

and oil. Its principal drawback was its 3,000-pound weight and its

awkward size. The small, compact M2 model, which appeared in 1944,

overcame both of these handicaps.

Smoke generator companies first saw overseas action in Northwest

Africa, providing screens for the ports through which flowed the men

and material for the fight against Rommel's and other German forces.

In this capacity, there still prevailed the basic mission of the large area

screen—concealment of rear area targets from observation. The smoke

installation at Naples, the largest of the war, also concealed a vital

harbor from the bombers of the Luftwaffe. But at about this point

in the conflict the smoke units were given a new mission, which, by

the end of the war, was to assume paramount importance. There were

two reasons for this change in emphasis. As the war progressed the

Allies gradually won control of the air, a circumstance which diminished the need for rear area concealment. At the same time American

troops were fighting up the boot of Italy, always, it seemed, in the

face of superior German observation. As a consequence, smoke units

freed from rear area duty were shifted to the forward zones.

An effective employment of this kind of smoke screen in Italy was

somewhat hampered by bulk and weight of the M1 generator. Smoke

troops in France and Germany were spared this difficulty for they had

the compact M2 generator in time to use it in support of the crossings

of the many rivers which lay between the Americans and eventual

victory.

This is not to imply that the transition from rear area to forward

area operation was easy and uncomplicated. There were lessons to be

learned by both the supporting and the supported units and tactics

and techniques had to be developed for the rather radical change of

arenas. Not the least challenge was the need for smoke troops, whose

duties changed almost overnight from rear support to action in the

foremost areas of the combat zone, to adapt themselves to their new

role.

The 4.2-inch mortar brought the World War II infantryman into
646 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

closer contact with the CWS than did perhaps anything else. The

splendid reputation of this weapon depended on a mission change

dictated by uncertainty over the possibility of gas warfare. Originally

designed to fire toxic chemicals and smokes, the mortar would have

been rather expensive insurance in a gasless war. The logical step, of

course, was the addition of the high explosive mission. Chemical

mortar battalions thereby filled a dual capacity: they stood ready in

the event of the introduction of gas warfare by the enemy, and they

supported infantry units with smoke and high explosive. Although

the gas warfare readiness of the mortar units never received the test

of battle, there can be no doubt about the successful accomplishment

of the second mission. Few in number and greatly overworked, the

chemical mortar battalions served as the infantry commander's hip

pocket artillery, capable of placing accurate and heavy fire upon

targets within a range of 4,000-5,000 yards. The limited number of

units (as late as December 1944 there were only four with the 12th

Army Group), meant that they continued in the line while a succession

of supported units was relieved. Infantry divisions would come and

go but the mortar units seemed part of the terrain.

The CWS in World War II had mixed success with flame throwers,

the portable as well as the mechanized. With regard to the mechanized

model there was some indecision on the part of the using arm as to the

characteristics, indeed as to the very necessity, for such a specialized

vehicle. Moreover, in no other field of CWS endeavor was there so

little liaison between the users in the field and the developers in the

zone of interior. Because of this lack of liaison and because of available

facilities and vigorous CWS people in Hawaii, the mechanized flame

thrower support in at least one Pacific area came principally from local

sources, not from the United States. And this support resulted in the

most effective combat employment of the mechanized flame thrower

in the war.

The war against Japan also saw the most effective use of the portable

flame thrower. Reasons for the usefulness of flame weapons in the

Pacific are not hard to find. American forces found themselves confronted by a stubborn enemy who was taught to believe that death for

the Emperor was something worthy of aspiration. This kind of enemy

ensconced in skillfully constructed fortifications would not be routed

by artillery and mortar fire. Quite often the flame thrower, capable
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 647

of delivering a lethal stream of fire through narrow apertures, was

the only effective weapon for use against these formidable defenses.

It must also be remembered that much of the fighting in the early

days of the Pacific war took place in jungle terrain, and the resulting

concealment enabled the operator to carry his bulky, easily recognized

portable flame thrower much closer to the enemy without being

observed. Credit must be given to CWS staff officers and service

troops who, by the formulation of tactical doctrine and by the application of maintenance procedures, were instrumental in making the

portable model the effective munition it was.

The war against Germany was a different story, for neither the

mechanized nor the portable flame throwers contributed much to that

phase of the conflict. European battlefields and German defenses were

often typified by excellent fields of fire which boded ill for the relatively short range of both types of flame weapon. In Europe, unlike

in the Pacific, no situation ever arose wherein the flame weapon provided

a vital key in overcoming the enemy. Consequently, there was no

impetus for overcoming the weapon's initial drawbacks—short range,

lack of tactical doctrine, problems of maintenance, and the lack of

knowledge on the part of the using arms.

The incendiary bomb had the distinction of being one of the most

effective munitions employed strategically by United States forces in

World War II. Ranging from a compact 4-pound, metallic model to

an oil-filled 500-pounder, these bombs, developed and procured by

the CWS and employed by the Army Air Forces, wrought almost unparalleled destruction. The fire bomb, the tactical corollary of the

incendiary, proved effective when dropped by fighter-bomber aircraft

on a variety of targets in the forward areas.

The Army Air Forces expended nearly a quarter-million incendiary

and fire bombs on German and Japanese targets. The accounts of the

devastation resulting from incendiary missions leave no doubt as to

the important part played by these munitions in achieving Allied

victory. Because of a long-standing faith in high explosives and

because of defects in some of the early bombs, the Air Forces was slow

to accept the new munition. Indeed, it was not until the last six

months of the war that the aerial incendiary really came into its own.

Back of this record were two important factors. First, the stress of

war eliminated certain peacetime lethargies and led to the development
648 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

of some good, even ingenious, incendiary bombs. And second, courageous operational leadership, exemplified by the role of General LeMay,

proved beyond all doubt the importance of the aerial incendiary.

To attempt to select the most important reason for Japan's capitulation is to tread uncertain ground. Many factors were involved, the

atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki being by far the most

spectacular. Yet, the testimony of Japanese leaders and the mute

evidence of her burned-out cities certainly point to the incendiary

campaign of the XXI Bomber Command as an important element in

the defeat of Japan.

Readiness for Gas Warfare

There is no easy measurement for CWS overseas accomplishments

in gas warfare preparedness since plans, men, and materials were not

put to the test. It is possible to assess the factors upon which chemical

officers during World War II believed preparedness depended. The

first of these factors was an administrative and organizational pattern

which would have permitted chemical officers to function in all their

areas of interest from tactical and strategic advice to decontamination

service in the field.

Administratively and organizationally the CWS was only partially

prepared for gas warfare. In Europe, while the chief chemical officer

held a staff position under the theater commander, he did not have

a position in the supreme tactical and strategic headquarters, SHAEF.

Colonel St. John's presence in SHAEF would have helped so far as

the function of providing advice is concerned, but his lack of a direct

and formal channel to the chief chemical officer might have proved a

handicap. The informal relationship which existed between Rowan

and the air chemical officers and between Rowan and the United States

Navy officers with interests in the chemical field would probably have

served as a basis for co-operative effort among the U.S. forces.

General Shadle, from his position in the combined headquarters,

AFHQ, would have been able to co-ordinate both Allied and American

gas warfare activities in the Mediterranean area. Colonel Copthorne

in SWPA would undoubtedly have had a tough problem in making the

necessary expansion into USAFFE and GHQ since he lacked the

required staff and since his relationships with the Allies and even
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 649

the Army Air Forces and the U.S. Navy were informal and tenuous

at the best.

Colonel Unmacht, enjoying the confidence and support of his Army

commander, and from 1943 as official Co-ordinator of POA chemical

planning for all forces, would have been in as good a position as Shadle's.

Unmacht's drawback would have been his lack of staff officers.

In all areas, army group, army, corps, and division, chemical officers

would in most cases have been ready for the administrative load of gas

warfare. Only the advent of such warfare could have tested Rowan's

contention that the secondary and unrelated tasks performed in the

absence of gas warfare would in most instances lessen the readiness and

effectiveness of the chemical staff officers. It would probably have

been necessary to augment chemical sections at all levels, but it seems

likely that officers and men of other arms and services could have

been diverted from tasks of lower priority in the case of gas warfare.

Below the division level the inauguration of gas warfare would likely

have resulted in a wild scramble to select, train, and retrain unit gas

officers and unit gas noncommissioned officers, but, in view of the

fact that nearly every soldier received some gas warfare training, the

roster should soon have been filled. More chemical mortar battalions

and chemical service units would certainly have been required, but,

assuming a high priority for gas warfare activities and the availability

of equipment, other units could have been converted, possibly in a

matter of days, probably in a matter of weeks. Areas having a lesser

variety of units and a smaller total strength would have been hard

put to find units for conversion since the advent of gas warfare would

probably have intensified rather than lessened other forms of combat.

The second factor regarded by chemical officers as basic in gas warfare preparedness—training—was from the CWS point of view the

least difficult preparedness activity to handle. The theater school in

Europe, the area CWS school in SWPA, the army schools in the

Mediterranean area, and Unmacht's series of courses in POA provided

chemical training for thousands of soldiers. Most of these trainees

would have required refresher courses were it not for the fact that,

as a senior technical services officer told a chemical officer in Europe,

soldiers learn fast and remember well when their lives depend on

learning. These area schools and combat and service organization

schools could have been quickly expanded with a minimum of effort,
650 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

because most CWS officers and men, at least in the combat organization chemical sections, had some experience in conducting chemical

training. Since few chemical officers ever believed they had been

allotted enough training time, most had prepared short courses which

they were ready to present in almost any location on almost no notice.

The third factor in preparedness—intelligence—was one which presented many difficulties. There had been no active Army intelligence

agency in the United States before World War II. The Office of the

Assistant Chief, WDGS, G-2, was so restricted that it could not even

begin to meet the demands for all sorts of technical intelligence until

late in the war. By that time the technical services had trained and

sent out their own teams or had, like Colonel Copthorne, activated teams

overseas. These teams and combat chemical officers did an outstanding

job of collecting enemy equipment, and the various theater and area

laboratories produced complete analyses. The indications were that

the enemy, both Germans and Japanese, were defensively well prepared.

Direct evidence of German or Japanese intentions on use of gas was

lacking.

While technical intelligence was well done, it was not enough. Only

the British and the U.S. Office of Strategic Services were able to gather

more direct information. Their reports were useful but fragmentary,

incomplete, and misleading. There were rumors of a new German

gas, but neither British or Americans even guessed at the composition,

toxicity, and possible means of employment of the German organophosphate compounds, the so-called G or nerve agents, until some

toxic munitions were captured at the close of the war. The intelligence

agencies reported stocks of German toxics in France before the invasion,

but none were found until Allied troops reached the German homeland.

In sum, the enemy never discovered Allied intentions and the Allies

never discovered enemy intentions. It was cold comfort to CWS

officers to know at the end of the war that enemy intelligence was no

better than American.

Planning was the fourth factor bearing on gas warfare preparedness.

The early theater gas warfare plans, required by the War Department

in December 1942, were poor because not enough was then known

about the character of World War II fighting to make adequate plans,

and because materials and chemical units had not yet been provided in

sufficient quantity to form a basis for planning. In the next two years
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 651

the plans became detailed and specific, and in most areas they originated

in or were approved by the highest Allied headquarters. Plans were

therefore comprehensive. These theater plans almost never reached

or were known to chemical officers in the field. It is consequently not

possible to judge whether field chemical officers believed the plans could

be carried out in event of gas warfare. Since some plans, like those in

POA, actually identified target areas and since the logistics and operational requirements were carefully checked by overseas staffs and

OCCWS, it seems probable that plans were both realistic and feasible.

But, however good the plans were, they were only as good as the

supply of gas munitions for retaliation.

Supply was the fifth and probably most important factor in gas

warfare preparedness. After the first year of the war the supply of

gas masks was ample in all areas of the world. That supply improved

further with the provision of the new lightweight mask late in 1943

and early in 1944. The CWS produced enough protective clothing

in the United States or overseas to furnish reasonable protection by

late 1943. Protective clothing resupply, especially in SWPA, could

have been delivered by air only through high priority, but such priority

could probably have been obtained. Even had delivery been slow in

coming, all units could have reimpregnated their own clothing in the

field in an emergency. Collective protection and decontamination

would probably have been inadequate according to World War II

standards, but some CWS officers, including General Porter, maintained

that the standard was unrealistically high. In the opinion of these

officers, it would have been necessary to bypass areas heavily contaminated with persistent gases in any case, so that the need for decontamination would be confined to strategic roads, airfields, and supply points.

The supply of toxic agents overseas admittedly amounted only to

token quantities. At the time of President Roosevelt's 1942 pronouncement, his threatened swift retaliation for enemy initiation of gas warfare would have been impossible. The fourteen days of aerial toxic

munitions in Europe after the fall of 1943 represented a substantial

first-strike capability, but for resupply, air delivery on high priority

would have been necessary. By the time of the Rapido and Winter

Line operations in Italy early in 1944, the U.S. forces possessed enough

toxic munitions to lay alternate bands of persistent and nonpersistent

gases most of the way across the Italian peninsula. Again, resupply
652 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

would have been by air. In the Pacific areas first-strike capabilities

were even lower—with toxic munitions supplies in POA equal to an

attack on an area the size of Iwo Jima and in SWPA to but five days'

operation. Porter and Waitt, along with USCWS officers, were confident that these token amounts would have served for initial retaliation

and that aircraft and fast ships could have created a resupply pipeline.

Under their plan, stocks in the United States would have sustained the

overseas offensive until new stocks could have been built up. They

calculated that U.S. enemies would not have been able to initiate gas

warfare on all fronts at the same time, and that gas warfare initiated

in the Pacific could have been confined to a small area for a considerable

period.

Why Gas Was Not Used

Why was gas not used in World War II? To pin down all the

reasons is difficult if not impossible. Some of the factors were not

constant; they underwent alterations as the war progressed and situations changed. Different factors affected different nations.

The principal factor deterring the United States from initiating

gas warfare was clearly national policy. Although the United States

was not a party to any international agreement outlawing gas warfare,

its policy throughout World War II was set in precise terms. Twice

during the early years of the conflict President Roosevelt categorically

stated that the United States would use gas only in retaliation against

an enemy nation using it. This statement by the President and Commander in Chief became the official United States position throughout

the war. The United States policy on gas was, in fact, largely determined by the deep feeling of its President about that particular kind

of warfare.1

But other elements enter the picture. Notwithstanding the tremendous influence of President Roosevelt and his predominant place

in policy and decision making, military leaders would have presented

arguments in rebuttal had they entertained any deep-seated doubt as

to the wisdom of the Presidential point of view. But, with the excep1

 Roosevelt, in vetoing a 1937 bill aimed at changing the name of the Chemical Warfare Service

to Chemical Corps, wrote: "It has been and is the policy of this government to do everything in its

power to outlaw the use of chemicals in warfare. Such use is inhuman and contrary to what modern

civilization should stand for. . . ." See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 21-22.
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 653

tion of minor stirrings near the end of the war, gas warfare had no

advocates in high places.

Military reluctance began with the experience of the AEF in World

War I. Despite the excellent leadership of General Fries, it would

appear that many of the higher unit staffs and commanders placed

little reliance on the gas arm, in sharp contrast to their German,

British, and French counterparts. Incidents demonstrating the reluctance of some unit commanders to employ gas for fear of retaliation

and the possible injury to friendly troops have already been related.

A survey of the records of First Army indicate that a real understanding of the use of gas, particularly persistent, did not occur until

late in the war. For example, the initial First Army field order for

the St. Mihiel operation included no gas plan whatsoever. And although

First Army used gas effectively in the Meuse-Argonne fighting, there

is nothing in the records to indicate that its corps and divisions were

aware of an over-all plan.2

It will be remembered that in the fight for a permanent CWS,

General Fries found support in Congress, industry, and civil servants—

not in the Army. Generals Pershing and March both opposed the

creation of a chemical service. There is no evidence to suggest that

top commanders ever acquired much faith in gas warfare. In fact,

it is hard to believe that the War Department in the period between

the wars would have reduced CWS activities to those of a primarily

defensive nature had it had faith in gas warfare.

Another factor to be considered in reviewing American gas warfare

policy is the part played by public opinion. There can be no doubt that

gas warfare emerged from World War I with the reputation of a

horror weapon even when field experience did not substantiate this

view. Although reasons for this reputation are varied, one source of

opprobrium could very well have been the Allied propaganda program

waged against the German introduction of large-scale gas warfare.

The pros and cons on gas were also debated at the time of the two

international conventions of the 1920's which considered its status in

the realm of international law. While that status was not officially

determined as far as the United States was concerned, the deliberations

2

 Rexmond C. Cochrane, The 78th Div at the Kriemhilde Stellung, Oct 18, Study 2, U.S. Army

CmlC Hist Studies, Gas Warfare in World War I, Jul 57, pp. 76-78. Cochrane states that no Army,

corps, or division record examined makes mention of the most important Army gas decision—the use

of mustard on the flanks and drive through the center.
654 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

within these conventions could hardly have been without influence in

a world turning toward pacifism. Little evidence has yet been produced

to show that public opinion actually was a positive force contrary to

gas warfare, but the important thing is that public opinion was

believed to be contrary to gas warfare. President Roosevelt, usually

an astute judge of the public temper and a leader of public opinion,

certainly encountered no widespread opposition to his pronouncements

on gas warfare.

Whatever the reasons, American military leaders paid little attention

to gas in World War II. In the early years of the war, it would have

been an unwise risk because the enemy had been on a wartime footing

much longer and had a trump card in air superiority. Besides, two

decades of neglect could not be undone overnight, and the American

wherewithal for offensive gas warfare was slim, indeed. Later, when

the tide turned in favor of the Allies, it seemed unnecessary to introduce gas. The war was being won without it. The greatest pause for

reflection on the employment of gas took place after the series of

costly American victories in the war against Japan. Use of gas was

contemplated to overcome stubborn Japanese defenses and thus reduce

American assault casualties, but the war ended before any positive

action arose.3

The British gas policy during the war was based on the same principle

as that of the United States—retaliation. In the early days of the

conflict, the lack of an offensive capability and the predominance of

the Luftwaffe (and consequent vulnerability of British cities) permitted no alternative to this policy. Britain would have been unlikely

to change her policy as long as German air attacks continued on

England. These attacks were followed, after the Luftwaffe became

ineffective, by German missile bombardment nearly to the end of

1944. By this time the Allies had long been on the offensive. Apparently

many British military leaders shared the idea common among the

belligerents that gas was a weapon to be used only in defensive or

static operations. Even had commanders welcomed the employment

of gas in the assault, its use would have brought further strains upon

the overburdened British economy. While gas defensive preparations

improved in the United Kingdom throughout the war and while she

maintained a small retaliatory capacity to complement that of the

3

 See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 86-88.
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 655

United States, all-out gas warfare would have required significantly

increased effort. Furthermore, the British, who had ratified the Geneva

Protocol and had reaffirmed this stand in 1939, felt that international

agreement prohibited their initiation of gas warfare.

Although Germany had no policy prohibiting the employment of

gas warfare during World War II, there was a strong trend of official

opinion against German initiation of gas warfare. This trend was

based on several constant factors and a series of factors which arose

from appraisals of Germany's situation during various periods of the

war.

The constant factors were: (1) Hitler had a personal antipathy to

gas warfare; (2) the military High Command and the field commanders devoted their attention to strategy, tactics, and weapons which

excluded gas warfare; (3) the High Command believed that international public opinion would be outraged should Germany become

a gas warfare aggressor in contravention of international agreements.

Given the Axis record, it is doubtful that the public opinion factor

would have had much weight in a decision not to wage gas warfare

had the military situation been favorable to its use.

At no time during World War II, in the opinion of the German

military leaders, was the situation favorable for the initiation of gas

warfare. In the early period of the war when both ground and aerial

blitzkrieg tactics were so successful, gas warfare either would have

hampered the German advance or would have posed technical and

logistical problems which Germany was not then prepared to face.

Later, when Germany was forced into the defensive, the use of gas

would have been decidedly to Germany's advantage, especially in the

defense of the continental coast. But by this time (1944-45) the Allies

had air superiority, and German leaders feared decisive retaliation in

kind against the German homeland. The Germans estimated correctly,

as a captured German general told General Shadle, that Allied, and

particularly American, defensive equipment was far superior to the

German (Germany had no large stock of protective clothing, for

example). The Germans apparently overestimated Allied offensive

capabilities, and they apparently believed that the Allies, like themselves, had discovered new gases. In both stages of the conflict, logistics

played an important part in the German decision not to wage gas

warfare. Early in the war, Germany had neither gases nor gas troops
656 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

in any appreciable quantities. Later in the war, the toxic stockpile

was adequate for defensive action, but the transportation and communications systems were strained to the point of collapse, and on

some occasions did break down. Also, it was questionable whether

overburdened German industry could manufacture gases rapidly

enough and in sufficient quantity to sustain gas warfare both offensively and defensively on all fronts.

As in the case of Germany, the reasons for the failure of Japan to

initiate gas warfare in World War II are varied and complex. There

was no moral compunction on the part of the Japanese for not using

gas; they had used it in isolated cases against the Chinese. Early in the

war, forging ahead against little resistance, the Japanese had no reason

to use gas. When the Japanese began to experience reverses, they did

so in areas which could well have called for gas warfare; mustard gas

would have been appropriate for use by troops retreating through a

jungle terrain. But by this time the Japanese faced enormous shipping

problems. A logistical system which failed to provide food for

Japanese troops in New Guinea could hardly have supported gas

warfare. Later, the predominance of American air power must have

been another factor in Japan's decision not to resort to gas. Japanese

civilians were ill prepared to defend themselves against gas attacks,

and B-29's on the Marianas were within easy range of the homeland.

Although early in the conflict the Japanese had the resources and

facilities for producing war gases, these diminished as the years wore on.

After the war U.S. investigators found that the Japanese were poorly

prepared for modern large-scale chemical warfare, offensive or defensive. Rather limited amounts of war gases were on hand.

Had Allied intelligence been able to divine the intentions of the

Germans and Japanese, a large portion of Allied preparations for gas

warfare might have been abandoned. On the other hand, if the Allies

had been any less prepared than they were, the Germans might have

used—and General Bradley felt that this would have been decisive—a

light sprinkling of persistent gas on OMAHA Beach. Although lacking

sustained offensive capability, the Japanese could have put an equally

decisive sprinkling of mustard on the approaches to Buna and Gona

or on the Lingayen beaches. If the Japanese had not believed their

homeland vulnerable to gas, they might have launched a kamikaze gas

attack on the storm-battered U.S. Navy force off Okinawa. It is
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 657

therefore probable that United States gas warfare preparedness in

World War II was worth the effort. Certainly the nongas warfare

efforts of the CWS justified the activities of the service. The incendiary

bomb was the mainstay of the aerial assault on the Japanese homeland.

In acknowledgment of its contribution, the chemical mortar became

an infantry weapon following the war. Artificial smoke often proved

a great boon in Korea, and the Marine Corps entered the Korean

battles with World War II CWS flame tanks assembled in Hawaii.

General Porter sums up the World War II CWS experience by saying

that the CWS maintained a strong service which contributed to the war

effort everywhere—from the laboratory to the fighting line. The

"Chemicals in Combat" did their job so well that in 1946 the service

was redesignated the United States Army Chemical Corps and fully

accepted by the Military Establishment.

Bibliographical Note

Despite a measure of War Department standardization during World

War II, little consistency was found in the zone of interior or theater

of operations records relating to the Chemical Warfare Service in

World War II. Sources of great importance for one overseas area

would prove useless or nonexistent for another. Consequently, while

administration and organization records proved most fruitful, portions

of this work depend heavily on historical reports, monographs, studies,

secondary works, and interviews.

The following is a listing of the archives with an indication of the

collections used:

Military Branch, Federal Records Center, General Services Administration, Region No. 3, Alexandria, Virginia—Files of the Office, Chief

of the Chemical Warfare Service. These files are cited by using the

prefix CWS in the file number. CWS 314.7 and CWS 319.1, properly

a part of this collection, are temporarily in the custody of the Office

of the Historian, U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal (formerly U.S. Army

Chemical Corps Historical Office), and will be transferred to official

archives.

Office of Military Archives, National Archives and Records Service—

Files of Operations Division and G-4 Division, WDGS; files of Army

Service Forces; overseas unit and organization historical files. File

number citations for WDGS records are prefixed by the abbreviated

designation of the specific staff division; those for Army Service Forces

by the letters, SOS or ASF. Although the War Department Adjutant

General's Office was a part of the ASF organization, references to the

files for that office are cited with the prefix AG. Overseas unit and

organization historical files are not arranged by the normal Army

decimal file system, but are cited by the abbreviated unit or organization designation.

Kansas City Records Center—Unit and organization administrative,

decimal files. These records are identified in citations by abbreviated

unit or organization designation and the decimal file number. They

can be distinguished from unit and organization historical files in

Office of Military Archives, National Archives, by the presence of the
660 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

decimal file number. Several forays were made into the Kansas City

collection; the most notable find there were the records of the Chemical

Section, Headquarters, North African-Mediterranean Theater of

Operations.

Archives of the Air University—Army Air Forces unit and organization records, including administrative, decimal files, and draft histories. Citation is in the same form as those for ground, service, and

headquarters organizations and units.

The Marine Corps Archives—Marine Corps unit and organization

reports. Citation is in same form as Air Forces and ground units and

organizations.

A number of monographs, studies, technical reports, draft histories,

and published histories proved to be invaluable for background material, for basic information, and for clues to the location of archival

sources. Some of these monographs and studies were prepared by the

U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office and are now available

in the Office, Chief of Military History. Among these, particular note

should be made of the World War II series, especially Dr. Paul W.

Pritchard's Smoke Generator Operations in Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operations (Study No. 1); History of German

Chemical Warfare in World War II, Part I, Military Aspects, by

Generalleutnant Herman Ochsner (Study No. 2); and Lt. Col. Leonard

L. McKinney's two studies, Portable Flame Thrower Operations in

World War II (Study No. 4) and Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations in World War II (Study No. 5). Particularly useful among the

draft or partially completed Chemical Corps studies are: Paul W.

Pritchard, Ben R. Baldwin, and Alfred J. Bingham, Readiness for Gas

Warfare in Theaters of Operations, and Ben R. Baldwin, Operational

History of the Chemical Battalions and the 4.2-inch Mortar in World

War II, Parts I and II, the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. Rexmond C.

Cochrane's series of monographs on gas warfare in World War I were

also used.

The Office, Chief of Military History, provided several other groups

of studies and histories. The Army Service Forces monographs on

logistical problems were of great assistance as was the History of Allied

Force Headquarters. The histories and after action reports of a

number of organizations and units from army groups to chemical

mortar battalions and even service units were extensively used. In the
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 661

group was also the Logistical History of the North African Theater

of Operations-Mediterranean Theater of Operations. The unpublished group included draft histories of communications zone, base

section, and base organization, especially for the North African-Mediterranean theater and the Southwest Pacific area. The prize of the

unpublished group, from the CWS point of view, is the History of the

Chemical Section, U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific and Predecessor

Commands. This history provides considerably more information on

that area than does any other source, and, except for gaps in treating

preparedness, it is amazingly comprehensive.

The CWS technical reports, along with many evaluations of munitions and plans, both for the United States and its Allies, were deposited

in the Technical Library, Army Chemical Center, Md., and have been

identified and described in From Laboratory to Field.1 The best World

War I source, pending the preparation of an official volume on gas

warfare in World War I, is the draft History of the Chemical Warfare

Service, American Expeditionary Forces. Copies of this study are

available in the Technical Library and in the Office of the Historian,

U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal. Finally, as regards monographs and

studies, special note should be made of the excellent Marine Corps series

on operations in the Pacific. Also worthy of special note is the American

Forces in Action series, which has been useful although documented

and more complete accounts have in most instances appeared in the

series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The volumes

published in this series have proved invaluable, and the following have

been particularly important:

Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugelar, and John

Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, 1948).

Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, 1961).

Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps:

Operations Overseas (Washington, 1957).

Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

(Washington, 1951).

Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas (Washington, 1960).

———— and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

(Washington, 1955).

1

 Brophy, Miles, Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 455-58.
662 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, 1951).

George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the

West (Washington, 1957).

Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and

Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, 1955).

Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign (Washington,

1963).

Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition War fare, 1942-1943 (Washington, 1953).

Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-

1944 (Washington, 1959).

John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul (Washington, 1959).

————, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington, 1949).

John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service

Forces (Washington, 1954).

Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua (Washington, 1957).

Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, 1953).

Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, 1954).

Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

(Washington, 1953).

————, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II (Washington,

1959).

Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines (Washington,

1953).

————, Triumph in the Philippines (Washington, 1963).

Alvin P. Stauffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War

Against Japan (Washington, 1956).

In addition to these published works, the authors also consulted

Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and

Strategy, 1944—1945, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

Other secondary works consulted were:

Horatio Bond, ed., Fire and the Air War (Boston: National Fire

Protection Assn., 1951).

General Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry

Holt and Company, Inc., 1951).
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 663

Wesley Frank Craven and James L. Cate, eds., "The Army Air

Forces in World War II," especially vol. II, Europe: TORCH to

POINT BLANK, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); vol. III, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E

Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1951); vol. V, The Pacific: MATTERHORN to Nagasaki,

June 1944 to August 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1953). General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1953).

Harold Riegelman, Caves of Biak (New York: Dial, 1955).

C. H. Foulkes, "Gas!" The Story of the Special Brigade (Edinburgh

and London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1934).

Amos A. Fries and Clarence J. West, Chemical Warfare (New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1921).

Rudolph Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg (3d ed., Berlin:

Mittler, 1939).

Victor Lefebure, The Riddle of the Rhine (New York: The Chemical Foundation, 1923).

Alden H. Waitt, Gas Warfare (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,

1942).

Henri le Wita, Autour de la Guerre Chimique (Paris: Tallandier,

1928).

The authors, with the assistance of other members of the U.S. Army

Chemical Corps Historical Office staff, interviewed or corresponded

with as many overseas CWS officers as could be contacted. While the

quality of these interviews varied greatly from individual to individual,

most were very helpful. Those which have been cited, and many others

used to provide general background material, are presently filed in the

Office of the Historian, U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal. Copies will be

included in the permanent historical files when those files are transferred to official archives.
List of Abbreviations

AA Antiaircraft

AAR After action report

ACCWS Assistant Chief, Chemical War Service

ACmlC Army Chemical Center

ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff

ADSEC Advance Section, Communications Zone

ADSOS Advance Services of Supply

Adv Advance

AEAF Allied Expeditionary Air Forces

AEF American Expeditionary Forces

AF Air Force

AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters

AFMIDPAC U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific

AFPAC U.S. Army Forces, Pacific

AFSC Air Force Service Command

AG Adjutant General

AGF Army Ground Forces

AGWAR Adjutant General, War Department

Amphib Amphibian; amphibious

AO Air officer

ASC Air Support Command

ASF Army Service Forces

ASP Ammunition supply point

BADA Base Air Depot Area

BAR Browning automatic rifle

Bomb Bombardment

BW Biological warfare

ca. circa

CCWS Chief, Chemical Warfare Service

CENPAC Central Pacific Area

CG Commanding general

CinC Commander in Chief

CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

CINCSWPA Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area

CCmlO Chief chemical officer

CM-IN Classified message, incoming

Cml Chemical
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 665

CmlC Chemical Corps

CMLHO Chemical Corps Historical Office

CmlO Chemical officer

CM-OUT Classified message, outgoing

CPBS Central Pacific Base Command

CO Commanding officer

Co Company

CofOrd Chief of Ordnance

CofS Chief of Staff

CofT Chief of Transportation

Comdr Commander

COMINCH Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

COMZ Communications Zone

CONAD Continental Advance Section

Contl Control

Corresp Correspondence

COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander

CP Command post

CPBC Central Pacific Base Command

CTF Center Task Force

CWS Chemical Warfare Service

CWSO Chemical Warfare Service Officer

CWTC Chemical Warfare Technical Committee

DA Department of the Army

DANC Decontaminating agent, noncorrosive

DCCWS Deputy Chief, Chemical Warfare Service

DF Disposition form

Dir Director

Dist District

Distr Distribution

EBS Eastern Base Section

EEIST Enemy equipment intelligence service team

ETO European Theater of Operations

ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

ExO Executive officer

FEC French Expeditionary Corps

FECOMZ Forward Echelon, Communications Zone

FETU Far Eastern Technical Unit

FM Field manual

FS CWS symbol for a solution of sulphur trioxide in Chlorosulfonic

acid, a smoke mixture

FUSA First U.S. Army
666 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

FUSAG First U.S. Army Group

G-1 Personnel section of divisional or higher staff

G-2 Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff

G-3 Operations section of divisional or higher staff

G-4 Supply section of divisional or higher staff

GHQ General Headquarters

GO General Orders

Gp Group

HC Symbol for hexachlorethane, a smoke mixture

HE High explosive

Hist Historical

Hq Headquarters

Incl Inclosure

Ind Indorsement

Instr Instruction

Intell Intelligence

Interv Interview

IOM Interoffice memo

Lab Laboratory

LCI Landing craft, infantry

LCI (A) Landing craft, infantry (ammunition)

LCM Landing craft, mechanized

LCT Landing craft, tank

LCVP Landing craft, vehicle and personnel

Lib Library

LST Landing ship, tank

LVT Landing vehicle, tracked

LVT (4) Landing vehicle, tracked, unarmored

Maint Maintenance

MBS Mediterranean Base Section

Mil Military

Min Minutes

MPR Monthly progress report

MSR Material status report

MTOUSA Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

NATO North African Theater of Operations

NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

NCO Noncommissioned officer

NDRC Nation Defense Research Committee

NYPE New York Port of Embarkation

OCCWS Office of the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service

OCS Officer candidate school
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 667

Off Office

OP Observation post

OPD Operations Division

Opn Operation

Ord Ordnance

Orgn Organization

OSRD Office of Scientific Research and Development

PBS Peninsular Base Section

PCD Panama Canal Department

Per Periodic

Pers Personal; Personnel

Phila Philadelphia

POA Pacific Ocean Areas

POW Prisoner of war

PROCO Projects for continental operation

Proj Project

PT Patrol boat, motor torpedo boat

RAF Royal Air Force

Red Record

RCT Regimental combat team

Rpt Report

Rqmts Requirements

S-3 Operations officer or section of regimental or lower staff

Sec Section

Serv Service

SG Smoke generator

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces

SOLOC Southern Line of Communications

SOPAC South Pacific Area

SPBC South Pacific Base Command

SPOBS Special Observer Group

SOS Services of Supply

Sup Supply

SWPA Southwest Pacific Area

T/A Table of allowances

TAG The Adjutant General

TBA Table of basic allowances

TDMR Technical Division Memo Report

Tech Technical

TF Task Force

TM Technical manual

Tng Training
668 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

TOE Table of organization and equipment

TofO Theater of Operations

TUSA Third U.S. Army

UGNCO Unit gas noncommissioned officer

UGO Unit gas officer

USAFBI U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles

USAFFE U.S. Army Forces in the Far East

USAFIA U.S. Army Forces in Australia

USAFICPA U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area

USAFISPA U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area

USAFMIDPAC U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific

USAFPOA U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas

USAR U.S. Army Reserve

USATC U.S. Assault Training Center

USASOS U.S. Army Services of Supply

USCWC U.S. Chemical Warfare Committee

USFET U.S. Forces in the European Theater

USSBS U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey

USSTAF U.S. Strategic Air Forces

VLR Very long range

WD War Department

WDGS War Department General Staff

WP White phosphorus

WPD War Plans Division

WTF Western Task Force

ZI Zone of interior
Code Names

ALAMO Force Code for U.S. Sixth Army while operating as a special ground

task force headquarters directly under GHQ SWPA.

ANVIL Early plan for invasion of southern France.

AVALANCHE Invasion of Italy at Salerno.

BACKHANDER Task force for operations on Cape Gloucester, New Britain.

BLACKSTONE Unit of Western Task Force which landed at Safi, French

Morocco.

BOLERO Build-up of U.S. forces and supplies in United Kingdom for

cross-Channel attack.

COBRA U.S. First Army operation designated to penetrate the German

defenses west of St. Lo and secure Coutances, France.

DRAGOON The plan for the Allied invasion of southern France, code name

that replaced ANVIL.

FLINTLOCK The Marshall Islands operations.

FORAGER Operations for the capture of the Mariana Islands.

HORLICKS Allied operation against Biak Island, 27 May-30 August 1944.

HURRICANE Assault force for Biak, New Guinea.

HUSKY Allied invasion of Sicily, July 1943.

ICEBERG Invasion of the Ryukyu Islands.

MAPLE Base Port Moresby.

OLYMPIC Plan for March 1946 invasion of Kyushu, Japan.

OMAHA Normandy beach assaulted by troops of U.S. V Corps, 6 June

1944.

OVERLORD Allied cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe, June 1944.

PERSECUTION Assault force for Aitape operations, New Guinea.

PLUM Code name for the Philippines.

QUEEN 12th Army Group operation on Roer Plain between Wurm and

Roer Rivers.

RAINBOW Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet Axis

aggression involving more than one enemy.

RAINCOAT Assault on Camino hill mass, Italy.

RECKLESS Assault force for Hollandia operation.

ROUNDUP The name by which plans for cross-Channel invasion were known

until the summer of 1943.
670 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

SHINGLE Amphibious operation at Anzio, Italy.

TORCH The Allied invasion operation in North Africa, November 1942.

TRADEWIND Task force for Morotai.

UTAH The Normandy beach assaulted by the U.S. VII Corps on 6

June 1944.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive
The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume H

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan


Index

Aachen, 472-73, 475, 476, 489, 607

Abaneta Farm, 448-49

Abyssinian war, 534

Acetylene tetrachloride, 247, 248, 305

Acker, Col. Lewis F., 37, 102

Adelaide, 190

Admiralties, the, 315, 550

Admiralty Fuel Experimental Station, 323

Advance Section, Communications Zone (ADSEC), 64,

65, 69, 71, 164, 175, 177, 178, 179, 185, 256

Aerial incendiaries, 614, 648. See also Bombs; Fire bombs;

Incendiary bombs.

Aerial observation, 369, 390

Agno River, 528-29

Air Force Service Commands

V, 206,416

VIII, 42, 153, 157, 318

IX, 159

XII, 96, 98, 106, 130

Air Forces

Fifth, 190n, 202, 206, 216, 414, 416, 513, 634

Seventh, 229

Eighth, 37, 38, 42, 56, 57, 62, 141, 149-58, 160, 161,

354,618n, 619-24, 626 627

Ninth, 64, 67, 154, 158, 159, 161

Twelfth, 43, 89, 96, 97n, 98, 107, 115, 116, 121, 130,

161

Thirteenth, 216

Fourteenth, 633

Twentieth, 401n, 625

Airborne Divisions

11th, 571

82d, 429, 466

Airborne operations, 390, 391, 411-17, 453-55

Aircraft

A-20's, 412-15, 635

B-17's, 621

B-25's, 412,415-17, 508

B-29's, 401, 579, 625-28, 630, 656

C-47's, 412,415,417

P-38's, 632

liaison, 369-70, 390, 513

smoke screen laying, 206, 405, 407, 409, 412-17, 508

Airplane smoke tanks. See Smoke tanks.

Aitape, 498

ALAMO Force, 256-57, 259-60

Alban Hills, 447

Alexander, General Sir Harold R. L. G., 328

Algiers, 93n, 103, 327-29

Aliamanu Crater, 220

Allied Air Forces, 202

Allied Airborne Army, First, 390

Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF), 67

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), 41, 86-88, 90, 97,

99, 102-04, 116, 118-21, 135, 196, 219, 282, 340,

605, 648. See also Shadle, Brig. Gen. Charles S.

Alligators, 376, 391, 491

American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), 4, 16—19, 21—24,

26

American School Center, Shrivenham, 42, 43, 64

American Special Observer Group (SPOBS), 36

Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 402, 408, 409

Amphibious Groups

2, 532

3, 526

6, 526

Amphibious Smoke Committee, Navy, 408—10

Amphibious training centers, 409, 424, 462, 520

Anderson, Maj. Leland E., 522, 523

Andes, Lt. Col. James O., 204.

Andrews, Lt. Gen. Frank M., 49, 55, 325

Angaur Island, 516, 517, 524

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 160

Antiaircraft Artillery Brigades

12th, 332n

49th, 356

Antiaircraft Artillery Group, 19th, 374

Antiaircraft Command, 14th, 398

Antiaircraft defenses, 322, 335, 338, 350, 401, 405, 407,

410

Antidim sticks, 283

Antipolo, 507

Antwerp, 360n

ANVIL, 340

Anzio, 128, 299, 333, 336-40, 342, 350, 399, 406, 443,

445-48,452, 594

Aparri, 416, 513

Aprillo, 446

Arawe-Cape Gloucester—Saidor offensive, 260

Ardennes counteroffensive, 74, 77, 184, 275, 299, 372,

373, 455, 480-82, 484, 632

Argonne, 4

Armies

First (World War I), 653

First, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81n, 164, 174-

75, 177, 179, 183, 292, 303, 355, 360, 373, 377, 378,

381, 382, 389, 393, 466, 472-73, 479, 481, 483,

487-89, 596, 603, 606-07, 610, 612

Third, 67, 69, 71, 76, 78-80, 164, 179, 361-62, 371-

72, 381, 383-84, 393, 474, 480, 484, 486n, 596-97,

604, 606, 610
676 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Armies—Continued

Fifth, 100, 102, 122, 124, 128-29, 133, 282, 290, 298,

332, 334, 336, 346, 350, 421, 424-25, 432, 433,

435-37, 439-43, 445, 450, 452-53, 455-57, 593-95,

640

Sixth, 200n, 201, 211-13, 251, 256-58, 260-65, 310,

313-15, 317, 398-400, 403, 407, 497, 499, 502, 505,

546-49, 568-72, 574, 576, 590-91, 635

Seventh, 76, 80, 109-10, 109n, 127, 133, 282, 289,

292, 299, 301, 340, 342, 359-60, 381, 386, 387,

393, 425, 431-32, 453, 455, 479-80, 483, 488, 593,

602, 604, 611, 640

Eighth, 211-12, 403, 505

Ninth, 76, 80, 359, 373, 373n, 375, 377-78, 381, 389,

390, 390n, 391, 489, 609, 610-11

Tenth, 234n, 273, 275, 402, 519, 532-33, 568, 584,

589

Armored amphibian tractors. See LVT (4)'s.

Armored Divisions

1st, 452

2d, 429

7th, 361

9th, 381

10th, 371, 476

14th, 80, 611

Armored Force Board, 605

Armored Group, 13th, 576

Army Air Corps Tactical School, 28, 28n, 616

Army Air Forces (AAF), 67, 69, 87, 115, 149, 161, 168,

238, 278, 282, 284, 285, 317, 322-23, 338, 616, 618,

622, 625, 635, 647, 649

Army Ground Forces (AGF), 87, 141, 420, 431

Army Groups

1st, 64, 65, 67, 69, 183

6th, 76, 455, 480, 483, 485n, 608

12th, 71, 76, 78, 79, 156n, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185,

303, 304, 354n, 389, 466, 470, 472, 480, 483, 484,

485n, 607-08, 610, 646

15th, 350

Army Service Forces (ASF), 32, 33, 38, 49, 50, 53, 57,

61, 87, 89, 91, 101, 106, 113, 129, 134, 142, 168-

73, 239, 638-39. See also Services of Supply (SOS).

Arnaville, 362-71

Arno River, 333, 334, 456

Arnold, General Henry H., 618n, 625, 626

Arras, 13

Arthur, Lt. Col. Frank M., 196, 198, 204, 213, 249, 250,

400, 501, 570

Artillery shell, toxic, 3, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 34, 107,

240, 269, 283

Arundel Island, 493-94, 496

Ashchurch, 138, 145

Assan Point, 562

Atchison, Lt. Col. Joseph E., 516, 530

Atkinson, Maj. Earle J., 18

Atlantic Base Section, 99, 100, 112, 113, 115, 289

Auburn, USS, 409

Audouville-la-Hubert, 177

Australia, 35, 192, 193, 201, 207, 236-37, 239, 240, 244-

46, 253, 254, 256, 260, 293-94, 394, 397, 548, 642

Australian Antigas School, 195

Australian Army, 203, 216, 284, 412

Australian Chemical Warfare Experimental Station, 207

Australian Division, 7th, 412

Avranches, 471

Azato, 587

Bagnoli, 312-13, 330-31

Baguio, 513, 577

Baker, Newton D., 24, 25

Baker, Maj. Gen. Walter C., 322

Balete Pass, 577

Bamboe Peninsula, 493

Bari, 122

Barker, Col. Maurice E., 91, 93, 95, 96, 99, 100, 102,

104, 124, 129, 133, 134, 256, 282, 301, 331n, 332n,

421, 434, 439, 640, 641

Barnes, Col. Jack A., 378, 378n

Barnes, Brig. Gen. Julian F., 189

Barnham, 153

Barrows, Maj. John, 401

Barry, 147

Barta, Col. Edward J., 81n

Bartlett, Lt. Col. John L., 213

Base Air Depot Area, 159

Base E, Lae, 397

Base F, Finschhafen, 314

Base Section 3, USAFIA, 203, 284, 293

Base sections, 51, 61, 75, 76, 94, 101-03, 106, 110n,

112, 116, 118, 123, 124, 141, 179-80, 190, 193, 256,

257, 261

Bastogne, 481

Bataan, 188, 315, 422

Batlin, Lt. Col. Alexander, 498

Batte, Lt. Col. James H., 222, 464, 468, 469, 477, 478

Battle of the Bulge. See Ardennes counteroffensive.

Baum, Col. Harold J., 62, 67, 162, 621

Bay of Baiae, 330

Becque, Maj. John H., 220

Belfort, 455

Bell, Lt. Col. Edgar V. H., 485n

Bell, Col. Robert P., 363

Belvedere Hill, 442

Benevento, 435

Benner, Col. Ralph C, 212, 545

Berdorf, 485

Berlin, incendiary attack on, 622

Betio Island, 554

Biak, 214, 400n, 415, 499-502, 552, 570

Bilicke, Lt. Col. Albert C, 64

Bingen, 383, 385

Biological warfare, 26, 53, 75, 84, 119, 227, 232-34

Birmingham, 323

Bitche, 455, 602
INDEX 677

Bizerte, 311, 328-29, 406

Blackburn, Lt. Col. Chester O., 54, 62

Blackstone Subtask Force, 91

Blaze bomb, 630

Bleach, 107, 130, 188, 221, 236, 243-44, 246-47, 267

Block Burner, 158, 622

Blohm, Lt. Willard H., 220

Blythe Colour Works, 166

Boggs, 1st Lt. Stanley, 303

BOLERO, 90, 90n, 140, 140n, 142-43, 147, 163, 170

Bollendorf, 486

Bologna, 351, 353

Bomb fuzes, 157, 285. See also Fuzes.

Bombardment Division, 1st, 157

Bomber Commands

VIII, 42, 157, 618n, 621

IX, 633

XX, 625

XXI, 401, 401n, 625-28, 628n, 630, 648

Bombs, 4, 11, 150-52, 154, 155, 240, 253, 269, 307, 475,

623, 626, 632. See also Blaze bomb; Bomb fuzes;

Fire bombs; Incendiary bombs.

Bône, 289

Bonin Islands, 191

Bonn, 381, 382

Boothby, Capt. Walter M., 17, 18

Boppard, 385

Bougainville, 494-97, 540-43, 569

Boyles, Lt. Col. Samuel J., 81n

Bradley, Maj. Ingalls S., 47, 64, 175, 177

Bradley, General Omar N., 69, 76, 183, 425n, 459-60,

608, 609, 656

Bramlet, Col. Hubert B., 65, 73, 75n

Breakneck Ridge, 502

Breaks, Lt. Col. Robert W., 424

Bren gun carrier, 287

Brest, 597-99, 609

Brett, Lt. Gen. George H., 190, 238

Bridges and bridging. See Smoke screen operations, bridges

and bridging sites.

Brisbane, 189, 190, 191n, 193, 194, 200, 203, 210, 212n,

284, 293, 306-07, 395, 546, 548

Bristol, 138, 146

British Expeditionary Forces (WWI), 8, 15

British forces, 119, 123, 327-29, 348, 449, 453, 609,

619, 653

British units. See also Royal Air Force; Royal Navy.

Antiaircraft Brigade, 45th, 332

Armoured Regiment, 141st, 609

Army, Second, 389, 390

Army, Eighth, 351, 450

Army Group, 21, 76, 81, 355 , 389, 489, 609

Commandos, 432-34, 458

Corps, 10, 334, 432-35, 438, 443

Crocodile squadrons, 609

(SM) Company, 807th, 331

Special Brigade (WWI), 12, 15, 16

Brittany, 597

Brittany Base Section, 75n

Brixham, 356

Brody, Maj. Richard T., 206, 206n, 207

Brown, Capt. George W., 174

Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon B., 402

Buderich, 389

Bullene, Brig. Gen. Egbert F., 219, 483-84

Buna, 199, 498, 543-45, 545n, 546, 549, 656

Bureau of Mines, 24n

Burke, Maj. Carl V., 192, 193, 194, 203, 205, 211

Burkitt, Lt. Col. Joel L., 204

Burma, 633, 634

Burn, Col. Walter P., 89, 96, 97, 346

Burns, Col. John R., 211, 212, 403

Burtonwood, 621

Cabaruan Hills, 510, 512, 515

Cagayan River valley, 416

Cairo (Italy), 448

Caldwell, Lt. Col. R. Beverly, 227, 233

Calore River, 433, 435

Camalaniugan airstrip, 416

Camouflage, 134n, 282, 284, 285, 633

Camp Bowie, 300, 303

Camp Doomben, 306

Camp Edwards, 326, 520

Camp Gordon Johnston, 424, 462, 520

Camp Sibert, 306, 311, 313, 326

Campofelice, 301

Canadian Army, First, 373

Canadian forces, 438n, 609

Canham, Brig. Gen. Charles D. W., 378

Cap de la Hague, 466

Cape Cretin, 313, 316

Cape Gloucester, 316, 550

Capua arsenal, 129-30, 290-92, 438

Caribbean Defense Command, 325

Carmen, 514

Carocetta, 446

Casablanca, 95, 97, 100, 301, 326, 327

Casablanca Conference, 48, 143

Casandrino, 290

Cassidy, 1st Lt. James W., 174

Cassino, 442-43, 448-50, 594

Castle Hill, 448

Casualties, Allied

flame thrower operators, 540, 571, 581-82

premature mortar bursts, 457, 484, 497, 503

World War I gas attacks, 5, 5n, 14

Casualties, Axis

from flame throwers, 562, 589

Hamburg raids and fire storm, 619, 619n

Tokyo raids, 629

World War I gas attacks, 5
678 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Catmon Hill, 503-04, 525

Cavalry Brigade, 2d, 550

Cavalry Division, 1st, 315, 502, 506, 507, 550, 572

Cavalry regiments

7th, 507

8th, 507

112th RCT, 547

Caves, 400n, 500, 513, 517. See also Flame throwers,

against Japanese defenses.

Center Task Force (CTF), 89, 92, 93, 93n, 142, 326

Central Pacific Area (CENPAC), 191, 203, 220, 231,

234, 268-70, 286, 516, 560, 639

Central Pacific Base Command (CPBS), 227, 230, 233,

269, 273

Cerasuolo, 441

Cesari, S/Sgt. Robert J., 378-79

Chamberlain, Capt. N. F., 408, 410, 411

Chamier, Lt. Col. G. des C, 120

Chapman, Maj. James R., 448

Chapman, 1st Lt. Rubert D. 220

Charron, Col. Roy C., 65, 177, 179

Charters Towers, 240

Chatan, 517

Cheltenham, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 51, 54, 55, 58, 59,

60, 64, 65, 73

Chemical air depot companies, 317

Chemical air operations companies, 161, 162, 191, 317,

319, 319n, 320

Chemical air service companies, 116, 245, 278, 317

Chemical Base Depot Companies, 278

9th, 178

66th, 178

Chemical Battalion, 1st Separate, 220, 296, 421

Chemical Company, Air Operations, 875th, 116n

Chemical Composite Companies, 92, 245, 278, 280, 308-

09, 309n, 310-17, 319

92d, 116n, 311-13

94th, 310n, 570

240th, 313-17

Chemical Composite Platoons

272d, 310n

273d, 310n

274th, 310n

275th, 310n

Chemical Decontamination Companies, 70, 92, 93, 172,

277, 279, 294, 300-304, 356-57

21st, 93n, 116n, 300-303, 342, 542n, 343, 344

24th, 116n, 328n, 331, 335, 336, 350

25th, 116n, 328n

29th, 273

30th, 70, 173-74, 356, 357

31st, 302-04, 356, 357

33d, 174, 356

Chemical Depot Companies, 70, 79, 92, 147, 277, 279,

294-99, 317, 319

6th, 93, 93n, 98, 138, 145, 297-99

7th, 146, 178

Chemical Depot Companies—Continued

8th, 286, 296-97

9th, 147

60th, 147, 174

61st, 147

62d, 194, 241, 293, 306

63d, 116n, 301

64th, 147

65th, 147, 178

412th, 241

Chemical Depot Companies (Aviation)

751st, 116n

753d, 116n

754th, 318

758th, 116n

761st, 147

763d, 319

Chemical Detachment, 1st Provisional'POA, 274

Chemical Detachment, 411th, 274

Chemical general service companies, 293—95

Chemical impregnating companies, 92, 245, 277

Chemical Impregnating Company, 51st, 138, 145

Chemical Laboratory Companies, 70, 123, 206, 277, 279,

280-88

1st, 282

3d, 189, 193, 236, 283-84

41st, 116n, 282-83, 313

42d, 192, 193, 205, 231, 283-86, 293, 394-95, 400

43d, 286-88, 297, 564

45th, 281

Chemical land mines, 91, 238, 240, 267

Chemical Maintenance Companies, 70, 131, 146n, 166,

177, 182, 277, 278, 288-95, 317, 479-80, 480n

10th, 194, 241, 262, 292-95, 546, 548

11th, 116n, 480n

12th, 116n, 133, 289-92, 301, 438

14th, 597

20th, 296

57th, 376

711th, 178

Chemical mortar, 4.2-inch, 110, 134, 267, 279, 288, 420,

437, 457-58, 515

against armor, 426-27, 428n, 512, 512n

against Japanese cave positions, 400n, 500

ammunition for, 34, 84, 107, 128-30, 133-34, 137,

155, 175, 180-81, 213, 269, 275-76, 310, 428n,

433, 434, 435, 440, 447-48, 451, 455, 457, 465-66,

473, 475, 477, 481, 486-87, 489, 495, 503, 508,

509, 510, 510n, 513, 519-20, 528, 532

artillery support mission, 420, 420n, 465, 471—72, 477,

482, 494, 495, 499, 500, 503, 646

breakage and maintenance problems, 133-34, 182, 432,

434, 439, 446, 473, 475-80, 480n, 491, 496-97,

504, 513, 521, 532

carts, 426, 430, 480, 498

communications problems, 435—36, 439, 448—52, 485,

487, 495, 511, 514
INDEX 679

Chemical mortar, 4.2-inch—Continued

defective shell, 133, 134, 180-81, 457, 482-84, 497,

500, 509, 519-20

demonstrations of, 425, 497, 520

field commanders reaction to, 421-22, 425n, 429, 458,

494

gas-delivering capacity, 418

high-explosive mission, 26, 207, 418, 420, 492, 520,

646

infantry support, 430, 449, 477, 495-96, 499, 500,

503, 504, 506-07, 515, 518-19

Japanese fear of, 494—96

jungle warfare problems, 494—97

on landing craft, 232, 425-26, 492, 500, 520-21, 533.

See also Mortar boats,

limitations, 453, 471-72, 500, 504

M2 sight, 431, 507

M3 shell, 275, 457, 483

M4 shell, 275, 520

on M7 half-track, 439-40

modified from Stokes mortar, 3—4, 418

propellants, 290, 431, 435, 438, 439, 497, 500

range and accuracy of, 427, 430-31, 434, 435, 439,

440, 477-78, 493, 500, 507, 513, 518, 525

rapid firing problems, 437, 491, 496

in Sicily Campaign, 418

sites and emplacements, 464, 496, 506

smoke mission of, 337, 345-46, 380, 400, 418, 509, 520

spare parts, 168-69, 178-79, 182, 275, 288-92, 478-

79, 479n

stock in 1941, 34, 267

support of armored team, 476—77

tactical control of, 494-95, 500-501, 504, 505, 514

transportation problems, 426, 430, 436, 451, 452, 456,

456n, 493-94, 501-05

Chemical mortar battalions, 70-72, 78—79, 81, 82, 127,

137, 265, 480, 484, 491, 646, 649

employment of, 73-74, 429, 471, 499, 500, 514-15,

519

replacement problems, 468—70

requirements for and allotment of, 70, 77, 107, 168,

211-12, 229, 421-22, 422n, 423, 459-61, 497-98,

516

tables of organization and equipment, 426, 430, 456,

460, 462, 470-71, 482, 506n

unit and manpower shortages, 218, 460—61, 515—16,

646

Chemical Mortar Battalions

2d, 289, 345, 346, 422, 424, 425, 426n, 427-29, 432,

433, 435, 437-39, 442-44, 448-53, 455, 480n, 482

3d, 289, 343, 344, 346, 421, 422, 424, 425, 429, 436,

440-41, 450-51, 453, 455, 480, 480n, 520

71st, 516

72d, 516

81st, 305, 372, 422, 460-64, 473-78

82d, 422, 493-96, 497n, 505-08, 515

Chemical Mortar Battalions—Continued

83d, 422, 424-26, 429, 432-34, 437-38, 445-48, 452-

56, 480n

84th, 345-46, 422, 424, 425, 432, 433, 435-38, 440,

445-48, 452, 455-57

85th, 315, 423, 502-03, 505-07, 513, 514, 514n, 515

86th, 423, 461-62, 466-67, 469, 478, 481

87th, 292, 305, 379, 380, 423, 461-62, 464-66, 472-

73, 477, 478, 482, 487-88, 488n, 489

88th 275n, 423, 502-04, 516-17, 519, 522

89th, 389, 390, 485n, 489-91

90th, 485n

91st, 482, 484-85, 485n, 486-87

92d, 374, 375, 461-62, 467-68, 470, 471-72, 480n,

482, 489n,

93d, 389, 485n

94th, 485n

95th, 485n

96th, 292, 485n

97th, 485n

98th, 461n, 499, 500, 502, 505, 510-15, 529

99th, 292, 456, 461n, 480n

100th, 456-57, 461n

Chemical Mortar Companies, 422, 481

glider operations, 453—55

91st, 404, 502, 504, 516-19, 522

189th, 516, 530

Chemical officers, 266

base sections, 73, 75-76, 256, 261, 641

field command, 81-84, 213-15

liaison, 82, 100

replacement of, 118, 468—70

shortage of, 104, 207, 468

with task forces, 263, 265

theater chief officers, 30, 35, 38, 43n, 45-46, 50-51,

196, 232-33, 255-57, 637-38, 648—19

Chemical Processing Companies, 166—67, 252—53, 277,

278, 279, 304-08

51st, 166

52d, 116n

53d, 116n

103d, 307-08

105th, 252, 305-07

109th, 305

110th, 297

113th, 305

120th, 305

Chemical Regiments

1st, 421

2d, 421

Chemical service companies, 70, 279-80, 308-09, 308n

Chemical Service Companies (Aviation)

3d, 191

5th, 220

Chemical Service Company, 62d, 307
680 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Chemical Service Platoons, 310, 403

236th, 317, 317n

237th, 317

238th, 317

240th, 317

Chemical service units, 212, 229, 268, 274, 277-80, 314,

643

Chemical Smoke Generator Battalions, 70, 229

22d, 331, 359, 382, 387

23d, 355-57, 359, 382

24th, 355, 356, 359

25th, 355, 356, 359

26th, 397

27th, 359, 389, 390

28th, 402

68th, 402

Chemical Smoke Generator Companies, 172, 325—27, 354—

55, 359-60, 363, 368, 392, 395, 399, 400

67th, 402

69th, 93n, 328, 387, 388

70th, 397-99, 402

71st, 402

74th, 373, 374, 389, 391, 491n

75th, 325

76th, 325

77th, 325

78th, 93n, 95, 327, 327n, 328, 387, 389

79th, 355-57, 378, 381-82

80th, 355, 357, 378, 381-82

81st, 356, 383, 386

82d, 356

83d, 373, 374, 376, 389, 390

84th, 355-57, 362-71, 371n, 372, 372n, 383-85

85th, 356

86th, 356

87th, 356

161st, 355, 357, 368, 371, 371n, 372, 383-85

162d, 383, 385-86

163d, 331, 387

164th, 331

165th, 356

167th, 356

168th, 328, 331, 387

170th, 397, 399, 402

171st, 356

172d, 328, 331, 332, 333, 334, 348, 350, 351, 450

179th, 331-34, 336-37, 339, 350, 352

Chemical Training Battalion, 469

Chemical Warfare Board, 324

Chemical Warfare General Service Company, 10th, 295

Chemical Warfare Service. See also Porter, Maj. Gen.

William N.; Waitt, Brig. Gen. Alden H.

active strength, 1933—43, 26, 636

appropriations for, 26, 636—37

and ASF/OPD controls, 32, 34, 61, 101, 106, 173,

638

BW research mission, 26

Chemical Warfare Service—Continued

and chemical mortar, 418-21, 431, 471, 492, 520

and chemical mortar battalions, 420, 422—23, 459—60,

497

and chemical shell failures, 181

and flame thrower, 534-35, 545, 558-59, 605-06, 646

gas and nongas missions, 636—37, 648—51, 657

GHQ concept, 28, 30

and incendiary bomb program, 616—18, 647

logistics mission, 642—44

as a permanent service, 1920, 24—25, 27

pre-World War II missions, 25-26, 419

and redesignation as Chemical Corps, 652n, 657

smoke mission, 321—22, 644

Spare Parts Team, 129, 182, 479

supply and logistical compilations, 113—14

supply planning for TORCH, 90—92

and theater CWS, 35, 56-57, 61, 100, 201, 203, 208,

637, 639—40

Chemical Warfare Service, AEF, 19, 21-24, 29, 38, 40,

52

Chemical Warfare Service, ETOUSA, 40-62, 64-65,

67-69, 72-85, 85n, 89-90, 104n, 105, 113-14, 123,

136-48, 152, 156, 163-73, 178-82, 185, 256, 482,

596, 638, 641

Chemical Warfare Service, National Army, 19, 22, 24

Chemical Warfare Service, NATOUSA/MTOUSA, 34-

35, 102-05, 114, 116, 118-20, 122-24, 127, 129,

130, 134, 135, 137, 178, 256, 430, 460, 640, 644

Chemical Warfare Technical Committee, 558

Chenard incendiary bomb, 615

Chengtu, 625

Cherbourg, 178, 358, 465-66

Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander

(COSSAC), 59, 68

China, 624, 633

China-Burma-India Theater, 216

Chiunzi Pass, 434

Chloracetophenone, 3

Chloride of lime. See Bleach.

Chlorine gas, 5, 9, 11

Chloropicrin, 13

Chlorosulfonic acid, 322n, 414n

Chonito Cliff, 562, 563

Christensen, Col. Christian O., 75n

Church, Lt. Col. James R., 17, 18

Cinderford, 146, 154

Cisterna, 447, 447n

Civil defense, 221, 224

Civilian Conservation Corps, 221

Civitavecchia, 332, 350

Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W., 89, 129, 448

Clark Field, 187

Clements, Maj. John O., 233

Clifton, M. Allegra, 222

Clough, Lt. Col. Lyle A., 204
INDEX 681

Cobb, Col. John B., 81n

Coblentz, Col. Siegfried P., 100, 110n, 113, 114, 115,

116, 124, 133, 134, 256, 331, 640, 641

COBRA, 467

Colasion Point, 400

Colleville sur Mer, 174

Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton, 378

Colmar, 292, 302, 455

Cologne-Jülich highway, 375

Columboola, 240, 307

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 48, 111

Communications Zone (COMZ), ETO, 65, 67, 71, 73,

132, 162, 164, 177-80, 185, 638

Cone, Capt. Richard H., 197

Containers, 151, 155, 162, 244, 246-48, 272, 293, 297,

320, 497, 500, 556

Continental Advance Section (CONAD), 185-86, 292

Continental Base Command, 299

Copthorne, Col. William A., 215, 637, 650

and administration of theater CWS, 203, 235, 639, 648

biography, 193

and chemical materiel supply, 193, 207, 238, 242, 243,

247, 251, 252, 254, 259, 261-64

chemical officer, USAFIA and USASOS, 189-94, 200-

208, 210-12, 216, 218, 224, 234, 256, 258

chief chemical officer, AFPAC, 219

and field laboratories, 196-97, 206, 284-85

and flame thrower malfunction, 545—46

and smoke generators, 394—96, 402-03, 408n

Corps

I (World War I), 18

I, 197, 198, 213, 214n, 400, 400n, 498, 499n, 501,

505, 505n, 507, 510, 512-13, 515, 529, 548, 548n,

573-74, 577

I Armored, 109n

II, 89, 96, 97, 98, 298, 328, 346, 348, 350, 351, 429,

438, 440-43, 445, 448-51, 457, 604

III, 378, 380, 382, 480

IV, 350, 352, 353, 457

V, 37, 70, 378, 462, 481, 597, 599

VI, 81n, 299, 334-37, 337n, 343, 345, 350, 432, 435,

437, 438, 440-41, 445, 447, 452-53, 594

VII, 70, 356, 377-78, 380, 380n, 381, 382, 462, 464-

65, 467, 472, 487-88, 601

VIII, 383, 385, 386, 386n, 609

X, 407, 502, 503, 570

XI, 213, 315, 399, 508, 509, 515, 634

XII, 80, 317n, 383-86, 484-86, 486n

XIII, 373-74, 389

XIV, 204, 213, 213n, 493-94, 505, 505n, 506-10,

515, 527, 538-39, 543, 576

XV, 80, 387, 489

XVI, 389, 390, 489

XVIII, 81n

XIX, 81n, 373-75, 389, 467, 472, 599

XX, 361, 366, 368, 371, 383, 386, 474, 599

XXI, 302

Corps—Continued

XXIV, 274, 407, 502-03, 503n, 525, 533, 570, 576,

584, 586, 588

Corregidor, 188-90

Corrosion problems, 293, 432, 497

Corsica, 311

Cottingham, Lt. Col. Levin B., 81n, 363, 365-67, 367n,

369, 486, 486n

Coughlan, Col. Joseph D., 67, 67n, 69, 71, 78, 175, 355

Counter Intelligence Corps, 285

Coventry, 323

Crawford, Maj. Robert W., 19

Crawford, Lt. Col. Thomas B., 81n

Cresswell, 166

Crocodile tanks. See Flame thrower tanks, Crocodile.

Croen, Maj. Herbert F., Jr., 89, 96, 99

Cummins, Maj. Tristram J., 414

Cunin, Col. Kenneth A., 78, 78n, 81n, 378, 426

Cunningham, Sgt. John J., 174

Cylinders, Gas, 3, 4n, 7, 8, 9, 13, 262, 293, 539, 546,

547, 550, 570

Dagami, 503-04, 571

Daguitan River, 526

Dagupan, 529

Damortis, 510, 529

Danek, Lt. Col. Richard R., 213, 213n, 509

Darby, Col. William, 434, 445-46

Darra, 239-40

Darwin, 190

Dasman, Sgt. Raymond F., 198-200

Davidson, Lieutenant, 544—45

Day, Col. Alfred C, 65, 71, 76

DDT, 319

Decontaminating agent, noncorrosive (DANC), 125, 236,

243, 244, 247-48, 267

Decontaminating apparatus, 71, 75, 108, 171, 178, 236,

244, 248, 262, 271-73

hand, 139, 182, 244, 267

M3, 168

M3A1, 130, 132

M4, 132, 168

power-driven, 107, 130-33, 168, 174, 175, 182, 244,

253, 271, 291, 300, 303, 310, 319, 643-44

Defandorf, Col. James H., 53, 54

Deimling, General von, 10n

Delta Base Section, 129

Demolitions, 426, 427, 549, 552, 555-57, 563, 579, 582,

600-601

Depots, 61, 90, 95, 97-99, 137-38, 146-48, 154, 177-

78, 185, 185n, 288, 298, 301, 302, 313, 315-16,

318-19. See also Chemical depot companies; Dumps.

Detection devices, 75, 139, 167, 244-45

Detector kit, M9, 282

Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L., 455, 608

Dichloroethyl sulfide. See Mustard gas.

Dick Hills, 586
682 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Digdig, 513

Dijon, 292

Dillingen, 371, 372, 372n

Dimethyl phthalate, 308

Diphenylchloroasine, 14, 14n

Distinguished Service Cross, 518, 594n

Dixon, Lt. Col. Gordon A., 456

Dodds, Col. Russell W., 81n

Doolittle, Capt. G. B., 511-12

Dornot, 361

Doty, Lt. Col. Edouard R. L., 221, 222, 225, 227

Doxey, Col. Thomas A., 273

DRAGOON, 340, 344, 453-54. See also Southern France,

invasion of.

Dukws, 384, 388, 445, 501, 505

Dülag, 503, 525-26

Dumps, 70, 96, 129, 148, 148n, 174, 177, 274-75, 299,

302, 314-16, 342, 356-57, 497. See also Depots.

Düren 377, 378, 487-88

Dusseldorf, 389

Dust respirators, 126, 175, 182, 267

Dyes and dyeing, 282, 284, 285, 305

Eaker, Maj. Gen. Ira C., 56

Eastern Base Section (EBS), 106, 112, 141n, 311

Eastern Task Force, 93n, 142, 326

Eben Emael, 535

Echternach, 485, 485n, 486-87

Edgewood Arsenal, Md., 26, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 293,

306, 308, 324, 325

Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L., 197

Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 40, 86, 87, 102, 110,

121, 183, 355, 605, 606

Electron bombs, 614, 617

Elliott, Col. Lowell A., 40, 41, 43, 96, 98, 99

Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos C., 225

Empress Augusta Bay, 494, 496

Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Team (EEIST)

Number One, 79-80, 84

Engineer Combat Battalions, 592

6th, 552

27th, 551

114th, 199, 543

118th, 538

121st, 374

149th, 303

294th, 379

295th, 377

Engineer Combat Groups

40th, 387

540th, 386

1102d, 385

1103d, 363, 367n, 368

Engineer Combat Regiment, 40th, 342

Engineer Gas and Flame Regiment, 30th, 17, 18, 23

Engineer operations. See Flame throwers; Smoke screen

operations.

Engineer Shore Groups

36th, 542n

40th, 542n

540th, 542n

Engineer Shore Regiment, 531st, 174, 298

Engineer Special Brigades, 70, 356, 398

2d, 400

6th, 303

Engineers, Corps of, 17, 24n, 27, 247, 558, 643

Eniwetok, 406, 556

Enz, Maj. Walter W. F., 192, 195, 201, 202, 205, 210

Épinal, 292, 479

Erft River, 484

European Theater of Operations, United States Army

(ETOUSA), 35, 40, 43, 136, 164, 519, 596, 605,

610, 638, 644

Eyeshields, 108, 112, 167, 175

Falaise, 632

Far East Air Force, 190, 190n, 216, 319

Far Eastern Technical Unit (FETU), 210

Fedala, 95

Fellenz, Lt. Col. Lloyd E., 120

Field, Capt. Harold L., 114n

Field Artillery Battalions

19th, 474

314th, 485

905th, 485

Field Artillery Board, 420

Field Artillery Group, 191st, 499

Fighter Commands

VIII, 159

IX, 159

Filling apparatus and plants, 153, 221, 239

Fincke, Lt. Melvin, 220

Finschhafen, 257, 313, 314

Fire bombs. See also Incendiary bombs.

165-gallon, napalm, 630n, 632

in European operations, 149, 631—32

expenditures, 632, 634, 635, 647

igniters for, 159, 631, 634

improvised, 320

in Pacific operations, 320, 517, 633-35

shortage of, 160-62

sizes of, 630n

tactical missions and employment, 159, 160, 614, 630,

635, 647

Fire storm, Hamburg, 619n

Firenzoulo, 351n

Fiske, Lt. Col. William M., 3 5 5

Flame, psychological value of, 541, 572, 586, 588, 598,

609, 612, 633

Flame thrower tanks, 657. See also Flame throwers;

Flame throwers, mechanized; Ronson flame thrower.

Crocodile, 605-06, 609-10

development of, 230, 232, 234, 287, 535, 643, 646
INDEX 683

Flame thrower tanks—Continued

flame tank battalion, 576, 584-85, 589

M3 series, 287, 560-61

Satan, 287, 560-63

Sherman-Crocodile, 605, 605n, 606, 609-10

training, 561, 567, 579, 589, 608, 611-12

Flame throwers, 81, 109, 171-72, 177, 177n, 178, 265,

279

in amphibious assaults, 271, 553, 597

in city fighting, 573-74, 576, 597

defective parts, 199, 245, 547, 604

demonstrations, 425, 553, 560, 577, 593, 605, 606

early development and use, 534—35, 558—60, 560n,

579-80

ETO use of, compared with use in Pacific, 603—04,

612, 647

fuel and expenditures, 159, 169, 232, 272, 287, 297,

316, 539, 547, 552, 556, 562, 570, 574, 583, 586,

592, 607-08

against German fixed fortifications, 594, 597—603

improvised, 189

against Japanese defenses, 536—38, 541-42, 542n, 543—

46, 549, 551-57, 561-63, 566-67, 569, 571-74,

577-78, 580-84, 586-88, 590-91

maintenance of, 182, 292-94, 310, 316, 537, 539-40,

543-45, 545n, 546-47, 550, 554, 559, 564, 570-72,

575, 581, 595, 601, 610, 647

range of, 537, 541, 563, 573, 581, 611, 647

shortages, 169, 547, 604

transportation problems, 564, 574, 594

unit allotments of, 272, 555, 557, 579, 584, 590, 596,

596n, 599, 602, 610

waterproofing of, 294, 546, 547, 550, 559, 564, 575,

595

World War I projectors, 15, 534

Flame throwers, mechanized, 169, 535, 583, 646. See also

Flame thrower tanks; Flame tractors,

auxiliary (defined), 560n

communications problems, 577

E4-5 auxiliary, 560, 562, 576, 576n, 583, 588-89,

591, 605-07, 610-11

E4R2-4R3-5R1, 589n, 607n

E5-5, 606

E12-7R1, 590n, 608

in Europe, 169, 608-09, 612-13, 647

flame hoses, 567-68, 587, 590

on landing craft, 564—65

M3-4-3, 576n, 610

main armament (defined), 560n

Mark I, Navy, 564-65, 567

periscope mounted, 588-89, 589n

POA CWS H1, 580, 584, 590

Q Model (E7-7), 564, 576

Flame throwers, portable, 88, 135, 169, 230, 234, 534,

535, 584, 646-47

discarded by advancing troops, 175, 550, 597

Flame throwers, portable—Continued

doctrine for employment, 213, 568—72, 574—75, 595,

596, 647

El, 535

E1R1, 535, 543, 547, 592

failure in Papua Campaign, 199, 245, 293

an infantry/engineer weapon, 213, 537—38, 548, 554,

555-57, 563-64

Ml, 535, 539, 547, 592, 593

M1A1, 293, 535, 539, 547, 550, 559, 575, 581, 592-

93, 599, 604

M2-2, 535, 564, 564n, 571, 575, 579, 581

in North Africa and Sicily, 592-93

training for, 213, 230, 537-38, 540, 542-43, 548,

548n, 549, 553-56, 568-69, 579, 582, 593-94, 594n,

596, 599, 603-04, 647

Flame tractors, 565-67, 576

Flanagan, Lt. Harry G., 602

Flare mixture, M8, 622n

Flattop Hill, Okinawa, 586

Florence, 129

Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, 87

Fog oil. See Smoke screen operations, fog oil for.

Foley, Lt. Col. William, 64, 81n, 83

Fontanello Caves, 290

Formosa, 187

Fort Bragg, 424

Fort Custer, 289, 469

Fort Driant, 368, 474-75

Fort Montbarey, 609

Fort Sam Houston, 297

Fort Shafter, 220, 224, 296

Fort Stotsenburg, 506, 510

Forward Echelon, Communications Zone (FECOMZ),

65, 69, 71, 73, 164, 175, 177

Foster, Col. Ferris U., 51n, 75n

Foulkes, Brigadier Charles H., 9, 14, 15, 16

Fournier, Maj, Roland P., 221, 222, 227

Frankel, 2d Lt. Theodore, 551-52

Frankfurt, 385

French, Sir John, 9

French Expeditionary Corps (FEC), 441, 450-51

French forces, 299, 302, 327, 329, 455

French forces (World War I), 7-8, 8n, 10-12, 15-16,

534, 653

Fries, Maj. Gen. Amos A., 73, 82, 200, 640

as Chief of Gas Service, AEF, 17, 17n, 18-19, 22-24,

37, 38, 41, 51, 52

and CWS research role, 74, 85, 111

"Fries-trained" officers, 27, 32, 32n

and a permanent CWS, 24, 30, 653

and World War I operations, 4, 14, 643

Friesenheimer Island, 388

Frink, Maj. Gen. John L., 216, 264

FS smoke, 106, 188, 245, 267, 342, 342n, 394, 395, 400,

414, 414n, 417, 508. See also Smoke tanks.
684 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Fuel, thickened, 158, 159, 161, 169, 562, 580, 583, 592,

620, 631, 634. See also Incendiary bombs; Napalm.

Fuel mixing, 160-61, 265, 272, 287-88, 570, 584

Furiano River, 428-29

Fuzes, 133, 134, 275-76, 285, 432, 457, 482-84, 497,

500, 509, 519-20, 532, 621

G-agents, 281, 650

Gaffney, Capt. Philip J., 463

Garapan, 563

Garigliano River, 346, 350, 436, 442, 450, 452

Garrison forces, 270, 272-73, 275

Gas alarms, 75, 139, 168, 221, 244

Gas attacks, fear of, 77, 177, 200, 475n

Gas masks, 36, 70, 75, 108, 165, 166, 172, 182n, 237,

279. See also Protective equipment.

canisters, 241, 249, 262, 294

discarded, 71, 76, 175, 180, 183, 198, 249, 288, 315

maintenance and repair of, 133, 179, 184-85, 185n,

249-50, 273, 289-92, 310

service, 34, 126, 138, 165, 179, 185, 187-88, 221, 239,

240, 249, 255, 267-68, 296, 651

as sniper target, 175, 250

supply of, 34, 34n, 76, 77, 183-84, 651

training, 187-88, 221, 236, 241, 249-50, 262, 267

World War I, 4, 8, 10-11, 11n, 13, 14, 14n, 17-18

Gas reconnaissance, 174, 303

Gas Regiment, 1st, 18, 23, 65

Gas Service, AEF, 16-19, 21

Gas warfare

Allied policy on, 25, 28, 48, 77-78, 88, 107, 111, 652-

64

German policy on, 50, 69-70, 79-80, 108, 122, 156,

177, 183-84, 279, 303, 650, 655-56

Japanese policy on, 187, 197, 200, 206, 220, 652, 656

preparedness for, 42, 47, 50, 69, 76-78, 84, 187, 200-

201, 227, 234, 269-70, 277, 317, 648-52, 656-57

theater plans for, 48, 55-57, 68, 77, 88, 107, 139,

201-02, 208, 210, 218, 228-29, 231-32, 234, 240,

245, 254, 269, 650-51

World War I, 3-15, 653

Gassing, accidental, 122

Gay, Col. Hobart R., 93

Gay, Col. Robert N., 204, 211, 213, 213n, 539

Geelong, 239-40

Gela, 426

Gelb Kreuz, 14n

General Depot 6, EBS, 311

Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, 25, 25n, 28, 655

Gerhard, Col. Frederick W., 78n

Gerhardt, Maj. Gen. Charles H., 375n

Germany. See Gas warfare, German policy on; Luftwaffe.

Gernsheim, 387

Gertulla, Capt. Jalmar, 499

Gilbert Islands, 191, 269, 271, 405, 555

Gill, Maj. Gen. William H., 497

Glider operations, 417, 453-55

Goering asparagus, 453

Gona, 656

Gondrecourt, 18

Goodenough Island, 257, 396

Goon gun, 42 8n

Goon Gun Hill, 428n

Gorrill, Lt. Col. F. S., 201

Gothic Line, 350, 456, 457

Grant, Capt. Carl E., 106

Greeley, Col. Leonard J., 204, 216

"Green Light Supply" plan, 165

Green, Maj. Maurice G., 507

Greene, Col. William H., 366

Grenades

HC smoke, 107

incendiary, 84, 91, 96, 133, 159

M8, 126-27, 169, 253

M14, 253

M15 WP, 126-27, 262, 320, 602

No. 79, British, 169

smoke, 84, 169, 172, 199, 323, 537

thermite, 106, 539-40

white phosphorus, 107, 126-27, 262, 320, 542n, 551,

573, 594, 600, 602, 609, 631, 643

Grenoble, 299

Griswold, Maj. Gen. Oscar W., 494

Grothaus, Lt. Col. Donald G., 206, 206n, 207, 253, 401n

Ground Forces Reinforcement System, 72

Ground Forces Replacement Command, 62, 468, 470

Guadalcanal, 493, 494, 522, 536-40, 542-43, 546, 564,

566, 595

Guam, 401, 406, 516, 561n, 562-63, 625, 628

Gurkha troops, 449

Gustav Line, 336, 350, 436, 442-43, 445, 450, 452, 594

Guild, Col. Walter A., 337n, 640

Haber, Fritz, 6, 6n, 7, 8n

Hague Peace Conference, 6

Hagushi Beach, 274, 402, 410

Halverson, Maj. Roy E., 396

Hambach, 376

Hamburg, incendiary raid on, 619, 619n

Hamilton, Col. Stuart A., 187, 188, 189

Hamilton, Lt. Col. William B., 469

Hammond, Col. William C., 81n

Hannett, Lt. Cmdr. G. W., 527

Hansell, Brig. Gen. Haywood S., 626, 627

Harbord, Maj. Gen. James G., 21n

Harmon, Maj. Gen. Ernest N., 91

Harper, Col. John H., 273

Hawaii, 34, 191, 222, 273-75, 286, 296-97, 409, 516,

520, 530, 560, 564, 584, 657

Hawaiian Air Force, 220

Hawaiian Chemical Depot, 220, 267, 268, 273, 296, 297

Hawaiian Department, 35, 219-22, 224, 227, 228, 231,

266-68, 404-05, 553, 553n, 637, 642, 646

Hayes, Maj. John J., 41, 139, 140, 143
INDEX 685

Hays, Lt. Col. Edwin S. S., Jr., 485n

Heath Plantation, 412

HC smoke, 322n, 374, 408

Heddernheim, 621

Heffner, Capt. James J., 95

Hexachlorethane (HC). See HC smoke.

Hickam Field, 220, 401

Highway 1 (Italy), 352

Highway 5 (Luzon), 506, 513

Highway 6 (Italy), 346, 437, 442, 448

Highway 7 (Italy), 346, 348, 350, 445-47

Highway 64 (Italy), 352-53

Highway 65 (Italy), 351

Hilbringen, 371

Hill, Rear Adm. Harry W., 532

Hill, Capt. Tom B., USN, 225

Hills

60, 586

89, 587-88

95, 586-87

178, 586

260, 542, 542n

303, 363

331, 363

593 (Abaneta Farm), 448-49

700, 541

715, 428, 428n

950, 438-39

1000, 541

Hilsea, 147

Hingle, Maj. Arthur T., 47, 64, 164, 175, 177

Hiroshima, 648

Histon, 147

Hitler, Adolf, 36, 655

Hobbs, Maj. Gen. Leland S., 376, 377

Hollandia, 213, 218, 252, 308, 498, 501

Hollerath, 601

Holmes, Capt. Jerome K., 227, 232

Honolulu, 404, 405, 559

Honshu, 624, 625, 627

Hooker, Lt. Col. Albert H., 153

Howitzers, 420 420n, 495, 500

Huebner, Maj. Gen. Clarence R., 473

Hughes, Maj. Gen. Everett S., 121

Hulett, George A., 16, 17

Hulsey, Lt. Col. David D., 214n, 399, 509

Humboldt Bay, 498

Humphreville, Lt. Col. Bruce T., 80, 95, 96, 109, 640

Huon Gulf, 527

Huon Peninsula, 412

HURRICANE Task Force, 499

HUSKY, 424, 426, 429. See also Sicily.

Hutchinson, Lt. Col. William S., 446, 456

Hypochlorite, 188

ICEBERG, 402

Iceland, 620

Ie Shima, 402, 410, 533

Imperial Chemical Industries, 153

Impregnating facilities, 71, 166-67, 171, 187-88, 221,

225, 242, 245, 252, 267, 279, 296, 305-07, 643-44.

See also Chemical impregnating companies; Protective clothing.

Imugan, 513

Incendiary bomb clusters, 151, 319, 320, 621

adapters for, 620, 628n

aimable, 620

M17, 500-pound, aimable, 157, 518, 622, 623

M52, 500-pound, 107

M54, 100-pound, 107

maintenance problems, 133

100-pound, of 4-pound magnesium bombs, 157, 620

100-pound, of M50 bombs, 620

Incendiary bombs, 135, 149, 238, 279, 317, 614, 647.

See also Bombs; Fire bombs.

British, 151, 152, 156, 157, 618-19, 623

AN-M50A1, 107, 622

AN-M50A2, 107, 622

combat operations requirements, ETO, 153—54, 156

defective, 620

development of, 26, 616—17, 647—48

Eighth Air Force, first use by, 620

electron, German, 614, 617

expenditures, 154, 157, 158, 619, 622, 623, 629, 647

filling for, 151, 152, 158, 284, 614-17, 620, 628

and HE, compared, 616-17, 621, 647

improvised, 197

loop-sling suspension in B-17, 621

maintenance problems, 133

M47, 100-pound, 151, 154-58, 617, 620-21, 623, 630

M47A1, 319

M47A2, 628

M50, 4-pound, 620, 622, 623, 630, 633

M69, 6-pound, oil, 619, 628, 633

M76, 500-pound, Block Burner, 158, 622-23, 630

tactical air missions, 319, 630

use against German targets, 157, 619, 621—24, 628

use against Japan, 320, 624—30, 657

World War I types, 614-15

and Zoroastrian Society, 619

4-pound magnesium, 150, 617, 647

25-pound, 616

110-kilo, oil, 617

500-pound, oil, 647

2,000-pound, 152

Incendiary darts, 615

Incendiary gel (PT), 158, 622

India, 625

Indian forces, 449

Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, 40, 89

Infantry Divisions

1st (World War I), 17

1st, 70, 81n, 83, 424, 426, 462, 473, 593, 597, 601
686 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Infantry Divisions—Continued

2d, 597, 598-99

3d, 289, 292, 299, 340, 542n, 343-45, 386, 387, 388,

424, 425, 428, 435-37, 445, 447, 452, 489, 520

4th, 70, 465, 600

5th, 81n, 361-63, 367-71, 383, 384-85, 474, 485, 604

6th, 214n, 315, 316, 400, 500, 507, 508, 509-10, 512,

551-52

7th, 502, 504, 516-18, 525, 555, 559, 571, 586-88

8th, 81n, 378, 487, 597-98

9th, 424, 466, 473, 601

24th, 220, 262, 502-03, 548

25th, 215, 220, 231, 493, 494, 513, 536-38, 543, 557

26th, 81n

27th, 272, 516, 553-54, 561n, 563, 586

29th, 70, 177, 373-75, 375n, 376, 462, 467, 598, 609-

10

30th, 70, 374-76, 376n, 377, 391, 467-68, 472, 489,

489n, 599, 601

31st, 315

32d, 195, 196, 198, 204, 213, 214n, 236, 497, 503,

513, 543, 572

33d, 315, 513

34th, 339, 345, 435, 440, 443, 448-49

35th, 81n

36th, 299, 334, 340, 542n, 387, 432-33, 438, 439,

441, 443-44, 448-49, 452, 455, 594n

37th, 416, 494, 496, 506, 538-41, 543, 574

38th, 317n, 506

40th, 316, 506, 527

41st, 195, 196, 198, 236, 249, 251, 400, 499, 501, 548,

551-52, 570

43d, 493, 506, 538, 540, 543, 573

45th, 299, 340, 542n, 386, 387, 424, 425, 432, 433,

440, 452, 454-55

65th, 81n

71st, 387

76th, 485

77th, 502, 504, 517, 532-33, 561n, 562, 563

79th, 391, 465, 489-90

80th, 81n, 386, 485

81st, 516, 524, 633

84th, 374

85th, 450-51, 594

87th, 383, 385, 385n, 386

88th, 346, 352, 447, 450-52

89th, 383, 385-86

90th, 371, 372, 383, 384-85, 466, 474, 476

91st, 81n

93d, 542

95th, 371

96th, 502, 503, 517-19, 525, 571, 586

98th, 525

100th, 602

102d, 374

104th, 378, 487

106th, 81n

Infantry Divisions—Continued

Americal, 236, 494-96, 536, 542, 543, 569

Infantry Regiments

1st,, 551-52

7th, 428

8th, 465

10th, 362-64, 485-86

11th, 474-75, 485

13th, 378

16th, 462

17th, 571, 587

20th, 499, 500, 510-12, 552

21st, 502

22d, 465, 600

26th, 601

27th, 493, 577

28th, 378-80

30th, 380n, 388

32d, 587

35th, 476, 512, 537

38th, 598

63d, 508

103d, 538

111th, 522

116th, 462, 598

117th, 601

119th, 375-76

120th, 375-76

121st, 597

123d, 315

126th, 543, 572

127th, 200

128th, 503

129th, 495

132d, 542

135th, 448

141st, 443-44, 449

142d, 438

143d, 443-44

145th, 495, 508, 539

157th, 433

158th, 415, 499, 551, 573

160th, 506

162d, 500

163d, 499, 551

164th, 542

165th, 554

179th, 432

180th, 440

182d, 495, 542-43

185th, 527-28

186th, 500

313th, 489

314th, 491

315th, 490, 491n

321st, 517

322d, 517
INDEX 687

Infantry Regiments—Continued

323d, 517

333d, 374

339th, 451, 594

345th, 385

347th, 385n

353d, 385

354th, 386

355th, 386

359th, 467

381st, 504

382d, 504, 517

383d, 517

399th, 602

417th, 485

517th, 454

Intelligence, 43, 54, 75, 78, 79-80, 84, 119, 122, 189,

202, 205, 207, 231-32, 279-81, 283, 285, 286-87,

303-04, 639, 650

Inter-Service Chemical Warfare Committee, 61

Intramuros, 573

Ipo Dam, 577, 634-35

Irritant powders, 7

Ischia, 313

Isernia, 436

Island Base Section (IBS), 301, 311

Island Command, Okinawa, 275

Italian campaign, 114, 122, 127, 290, 298-99, 311, 353,

360, 393, 421, 453, 456, 456n, 458, 534, 594, 645,

651

Italian Military Chemical Institute, 283

Iwo Jima, 269, 319, 401, 408-09, 521, 530-32, 578-84,

589, 590, 652

J boats, 397

James, Lt. Col. Thomas H., 462

Japan. See also Gas warfare; Kamikaze attacks,

incendiary raids on, 320, 624-30, 648

planning for invasion of, 402-03, 411, 589-91, 654

Japanese 32d Army, 586-88

Javits, Lt. Col. Jacob K., 216

Jennings, Lt. Col. Maurice E., 220

Johnson, Col. Leonard M., 42, 43, 46, 47, 53, 100

Johnson, Col. Ragnar E., 80

Johnson, Lt. Col. William A., 208

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 111, 191, 270, 401n, 501, 576,

618n, 625

Joint Expeditionary Force, 406, 561n

Juliano, Sgt. Fred, 594, 594n

Jülich, 374-76, 609-10

Jungle warfare. See Tropical warfare.

Kadena airfield, 517

Kahoolawe, 521, 530

Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, 6

Kakazu Ridge, 517

Kamikaze attacks, 407, 409-11, 656

Kamiri airdrome, 415

Kane, Capt. Morris W., 382

Kangaroo, Australia, 240

Karger, Col. Alfred G., 81n

Kastel, 386

Kauai, 296

Kaub, 386

Kellogg, Col. Crawford M., 37, 42, 43, 43n, 48, 57, 62,

149, 150, 153, 157, 216, 619, 620, 621

Kennedy, Maj. Robert H., 390

Kerama Retto, 517, 532

Kesner, Capt. Sam, 344, 345

Kesselring, Generalfeldmarschall Albert, 451

Kieselguhr water filters, 284

King, Brig. Gen. Edgar, 232

King, M/Sgt. John K., 198, 199, 200, 200n, 544, 545

Kingswood, 240

Kinkaid, Vice Adm. Thomas C., 529

Kitchener, Lord, 8

Kitselman, Capt. Henry A., 503

Klaswick, Capt. Julius F., 119n

Kluge, Generalfeldmarschall Guenther von, 632

Kobe, 630

Koblenz, 383, 385

Kochi Ridge, 586

Kolombangara, 493

Konigswinter, 381, 382

Kordeleski, Pvt. Frank, 539

Korea, 657

Kornasoren airdrome, 415

Krauthausen-Selgersdorf road, 376

Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter, 400n, 416, 416n, 497, 505,

568, 635

Kwajalein, 406, 516, 556

Kyushu, 402-03, 590, 625

La Sénia, 98

La Valbonne, 387n

Labir, 503

Labiranan Head, 503, 525

Lagone, 440

Lae, 257, 397, 398, 412

Lakey, Capt. Raymond J., 454

Lamb, 1st Lt. George R., 366

Land, Lt. Charles, 550

Landing craft, 272, 395-98, 425. See also LCI's;

LCI(M)'s; LCM's; LCT's; LCVP's; LST's; Mortar

boats.

Lane, Maj. Jack F., 206, 298n

Langres, 18

Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B., 103, 110

Laruma Valley, 543

Laundry operations, 167, 279, 305, 307, 308, 644

LCI's, 446, 521. See also LCI(M)'s.

LCI(M)'s, 521-33

LCM's, 542n, 400, 494, 499, 561

LCT's, 343-44, 463, 494, 521, 561, 566
688 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

LCVP's, 408, 463

Le Mans, 178

Le Muy, 454

Leach, Capt. Howard S., 220

League, Pvt. Herbert H., 506

LeCraw, Maj. Roy, 45

Lee, Maj. Gen. John C. H., 38, 40, 44, 49, 50, 51, 59, 67

Leggin, Maj. Alexander, 64, 65, 76

Leghorn, 129, 312-13, 332-34, 350

Leluc, 453

LeMay, General Curtis E., 621, 624, 627, 630, 648

Lemnitzer, Brig. Gen. Lyman L., 88

Lend-lease, 41, 61, 150, 152, 153, 168

Lendersdorf, 378, 379

Lennon's Hotel, 212, 212n

LeRoy, Lt. Col. Warren S., 41, 47, 48, 53, 55, 59, 60,

62, 137, 140, 142, 143, 143n, 144

Lewis, Lt. Col. Emory A., 275

Lewisite, 3, 269

Leyte, 218, 254, 266, 315, 400, 407-09, 501-05, 525-27,

570-73, 576

Libby, 2d Lt. Ralph I., 220, 222

Liberty ships, 529

Liège, 378

Lingayen, 316, 407-08, 408n, 505-06, 527-30, 573, 656

Linnich, 374

Lipphardt, Lt. Col. Jack W., 477

Liquid smoke. See FS smoke.

Liri River, 442, 450

Liri Valley, 437-38, 442, 448

Lisdorf, 372

Livens, Capt. William H., 12

Livens projector, 3, 4n, 12-13, 188

Livergnano, 351

Livesey, Lt. Col. Herbert B., Jr., 81n

Lockman, Capt. Edward L., Jr., 517

Lofton, Capt. Morris W., 339n

Loire Base Section, 75n

London, 35, 40-45, 55, 59, 617

Lone Tree Hill, 551-52

Lone Tree Ridge, 578

Longueville, 177

Loos, gas attack, 9, 11

Los Negros, 315

Lost, 14n

Loton Deer Park, Alderbury, 147, 154

Loucks, Brig. Gen. Charles E., 36, 48-50, 101, 105, 219

LST's, 339, 406, 407, 446, 494, 521, 529, 532, 566

Ludendorf bridge, 381

Ludwigshaven, 387, 388

Luftwaffe, 323, 327, 329, 331-32, 334, 336, 353, 356,

360, 376, 380, 383, 384, 384n, 386, 388, 392, 618,

645, 654

Lunéville, 386

Lupao, 512

Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy, 173

Luzon, 218, 286, 315-17, 416-17, 505-15, 519, 527-29,

570, 573, 576-77, 634, 635n

LVT's, 501, 559

LVT(4)'s, 565, 567

MacArthur, General Douglas, 136, 191, 196, 219, 238,

254, 397, 398, 498, 501, 502, 505, 553, 576

MacArthur, Col. John C., 40-45, 54, 58, 60, 62, 65, 71,

76, 183, 354n, 355, 466

McBride, Col. Lewis M., 418

MacDonald, Lt. Col. Kenneth K., 502

MacDonnell, Sgt. Theodore R., 518

McKaig, Lt. Col. Nelson, 215, 231, 493-94

McKinney, Maj. Leonard L., 211, 256, 260, 261, 263

McMillin, Maj. James M., 220, 221, 267

McMurray, Lt. Col. Russell E., 456

McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J., 468

Maeda, 586

Maffin Bay, 314, 315, 499, 551, 552

Maginot Line, 599, 602

Magnesium, 150. See also Incendiary bombs.

Magness, Lt, Col. Thomas H., Jr., 54, 605n

Main River, 385, 386

Maintenance, 109, 109n, 114, 128, 131-34, 182, 288-

89, 293, 370, 434, 514. See also Chemical Maintenance Companies; Waterproofing.

Mainz, 384-86

Mairoi, 434

Maizières-lès-Metz, 474, 476

Makin Atoll, 230, 554

Makua, 520-22

Malencourt, 534

Maling, Col. Edwin C., 40, 42, 43, 97n, 115, 121

Malinta Tunnel, 188

Malmédy, 489

Malta, 327

Manila, 187, 210, 286, 505-07, 573-74, 576, 634

Mannheim, 389

Manus Island, 525, 550

Marangella, Capt. Joel B., 390n

March, General Peyton C., 24, 25, 653

Mariana Islands, 191, 270, 273, 275, 287, 319, 401, 406,

501, 516, 557, 560-64, 567, 579, 624, 656

Marina, 282

Marine Amphibious Corps

I, 494

HI, 523, 533, 561n, 562, 584, 589

V, 405, 560-61, 561n, 578, 583

Marine Brigade, 1st Provisional, 562

Marine Corps, 225, 532, 553, 560, 563, 564, 580, 585,

591

Marine Divisions

1st, 258, 275n, 517, 519, 523, 536, 564, 566

2d, 405, 533, 536, 537, 553-54, 561

3d, 494, 541, 562, 579, 581, 583

4th, 530, 555-57, 559, 561, 579, 581, 583
INDEX 689

Marine Divisions—Continued

5th, 530, 579, 581, 583

6th, 517

Marine Regiments

1st, 566

5th, 566

6th, 555

7th, 566

8th, 537, 555

19th, 541

21st, 541

24th, 556

Marine Tank Battalions, 589n

1st, 558

3d, 562

5th, 582

Markham, Lt. Col. Harrison, 432

Markham River, 397, 412

Marne, 7

Marriott, Col. Carl L., 36, 37, 201, 204, 211, 212, 256-

66, 398, 399

Marriott, Lt. Col. Ian A., 87, 120

Marseille, 299, 302, 360

Marshall, Capt. Arthur R., 474

Marshall, General George C., 32, 38, 51, 420

Marshall Islands, 191, 270, 272-73, 406, 516, 555-57,

559

Marston Magna, 138

Martin, Lt. Col. Ronald LeV., 470, 484n

Mateur, 311

Mattingly, Col. Benjamin F., 76

Maui, 296

Mauldin, Bill, 340

Maull, Lt. Col. William R., 403n

Mavavia, 542

Maxwell Field, 616

Mayenne, 378

Medal of Honor, 5 94n

Medical Corps, 230, 233, 245

Medical Department (World War I), 17, 24, 24n

Mediterranean Base Section (MBS), 47, 89, 96, 97, 98,

98n, 99, 100, 109, 110n, 112, 282, 311

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 121. See also North

African Theater of Operations.

Mehrum, 390, 391

Melbourne, 189, 190, 203, 236

Melchbourne Park, 153

Meritorious Service Unit awards, 288, 308, 313

Mers el Kébir, 282

Merzig bridge, 371

Metz, 368, 371, 371n, 474, 476-77

Meuse-Argonne Campaign, 653

Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy, 425n

Mignano, 436-38, 440

Milchplatz, 390-92, 490, 491n

Miles, Col. John L., 81n

Miller, 1st Lt. Bernard, 173

Miller, Maj. Leonard C., 67

Million Dollar Hill, 428n

Military Police Training Center, Fort Custer, Mich.,

469

Milne Bay, 256, 257, 307, 395-98

Milton, Col. Hugh M., II, 213n

Mindanao, 400

Ministry of Aircraft Production (British), 153

Ministry of Home Security (British), 323, 618

Ministry of Supply (British), 153

Minturno, 346, 348-50, 447, 450-51

Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant, 626

Mokmer, 500

Mollen, Maj. Irving R., 203, 205

Molokai Island, 232

Molotov cocktails, 189, 199, 299

Moneymore, 147

Monte Cassino, 448—50

Montebourg, 177

Monterumici, 351

Montgomery, General Sir Bernard L., 76, 328

Montgomery, Col. Edward, 40-43, 43n, 44, 46, 104, 137,

152, 354

Montgomery, Col. James V., 386n

Moore, Capt. Milton M., 174

Morcock, Lt. Col. John C, Jr., 201, 203, 547

Morgan, 1st Lt. Charles A., Jr., 188

Morgan, Lt. Col. John C., 189, 190, 191, 200, 203, 253

Morison, Samuel Eliot, 335n

Moroccan Division, 2d, 441

Morotai, 314-15

Mortar, Stokes, 3, 11-12, 13, 15, 23, 418

Mortar boat groups, 525—26

Mortar boats, 232, 503n, 505n, 521-33

Mortar Island, 493

Mortar support units, 530—32

Mortars. See also Chemical mortar, 4.2-inch.

60-mm., 374, 495, 500, 541

81-mm., 419, 420, 495, 499, 500, 506-07, 541

Moselle River, 361-69, 371n, 484

Mosles, 174, 177

Moundres, 462

Mount Acero, 436

Mount Adone, 351

Mount Cairo, 448

Mount Camino, 437, 438

Mount Difensa, 437, 438

Mount Lungo, 441, 442

Mount Maggiore, 438

Mount Marrone, 442

Mount Mataba, 508

Mount Minoro, 572

Mount Pacawagan, 508

Mount Pantano, 440

Mt. St. Angelo, 434

Mount Sammucro, 437—39, 441
690 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Mount Santa Croce, 437

Mount Scouri, 348, 442

Mount Suribachi, 531

Mudge, Brig. Gen. Verne D., 550

Mules. See Pack animals.

Munda, 493

Munn, Capt. James. F., 79

Muñoz, 512

Mustard gas, 3, 4, 14, 14n, 16, 17, 26, 238-40, 254, 269,

283, 284, 307, 319, 656

Muth, Lt. Col. Roy W., 485

Myers, 1st Lt. Robert D., 95

Nadzab, 397, 412-14, 416, 417

Nagasaki, 648

Nagoya, 626, 630

Naha, 533

Namur (Belgium), 479n

Namur (Marshall Islands), 406, 556

Nan Hill, 586

Nansei Shoto, 402

Napalm, 159-61, 287, 297, 299, 310, 320, 517, 539, 562,

565, 586, 588, 593, 628, 630-33. See also Fire

bombs.

Naples, 124, 130, 133, 290, 298, 313, 329-32, 353, 359,

406, 434, 645

National Defense Act of 1920, 25, 30

National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), 216,

324, 354, 564

National Oil Refining Company, 160

Naval District, 14th, 560

Navy, U.S., 86, 95, 216, 222, 225, 234, 272, 276, 285,

519, 649

and flame thrower development, 560, 564, 580

and mortar boats, 232, 520-21, 530

and use of smoke, 335-36, 342, 394, 398-99, 403-11

Nebelwerfers, 439

Neckar River, 389

Nerve agents, 281, 650

Netherlands East Indies, 190n, 191, 237

Nettuno, 299, 338, 445

New Britain, 316, 412, 493, 549-50, 558

New Caledonia, 191, 236, 558

New Delhi, 625

New Georgia, 492-94, 538-40, 543, 546, 558

New Guinea, 198, 200, 206, 254, 257, 261, 315, 316,

395-97, 412, 415, 498, 500-501, 527, 545, 548,

656

New Guinea Base Section, 210

New Guinea Force School, 199

New York Port of Embarkation (NYPE), 105, 106, 125,

179

New Zealand, 191

New Zealand forces, 449

Nice, 454

Nied River, 371n

Niederzier, 376

Nierstein, 384—85

Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 191, 225, 401, 404, 498,

501, 502, 576

Nishihara Ridge, 517

Noemfoor Island, 415, 417

Normandy Campaign, 69, 70, 163, 167, 173-75, 177-78,

181, 250, 303, 355-58, 461-68, 477-79, 597, 599,

604, 605, 608

North African Theater of Operations, USA, 35, 41, 46,

86-87, 88, 94, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108-09,

113, 121, 122, 123, 137, 149, 151, 165, 298, 326-

30, 421, 592, 594, 645. See also Chemical Warfare

Service, NATOUSA/MTOUSA; Services of Supply,

NATOUSA/MTOUSA.

North Pacific Area, 191, 191n

Northern Base Section, 311

Northern Ireland Base Section, 141n

Northern Landing Force, 561, 561n

Notorangelo, 1st Lt. Anthony, 129, 289, 290

Noyes, W. A., 216

Oahu, 220, 268, 521

Oberwesel, 385, 386, 386n

O'Brien, Capt. John J., 177

Office of Gas Service, War Department, 24

Office of Strategic Services, 650

Oil bombs. See Incendiary bombs.

Oil-perspex filling, 157

Oise Base Section, 75n

Okinawa, 273-76, 402, 407-11, 517-19, 532-33, 568,

584-90, 656

Olds, Capt. James F., Jr., 538

OLYMPIC, 402, 590

OMAHA Beach, 70, 173-74, 177, 303, 355-58, 462, 656

Onville, 474

Operational research, 618, 618n, 633

Operations Division, WDGS, 33, 48, 53, 61, 89, 170,

255, 324-25, 638

Oppenheim, 384

Oran, 89, 96, 97, 103, 109, 282, 298, 311, 327, 328,

342, 425

Ordnance Department, 107, 134, 154, 155, 214, 253, 258,

259, 264, 269, 285, 560, 616, 617, 644

Ordnance Department (World War I), 17, 24, 24n

Ormoc, 504, 572

Oro Bay, 210, 216, 251, 262, 396, 399

Orsoy, 389, 390, 490, 491n

Osaka, 630

Oujda, 100

Ouled Rahmoun, 289

Our River, 484-85, 485n, 486-87

OVERLORD, 163, 461. See also Normandy Campaign.

Pachten, 372

Pacific Base Command, 580

Pacific Guano and Fertilizer Company, 221
INDEX 691

Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), 191, 222, 224, 229, 234,

271, 401, 409, 642-44, 649, 651, 652

Pack animals, 430, 436, 452, 504

Packing and packaging, 133-34, 144, 248, 253, 273,

547. See also Containers.

Paestum, 334, 433

Palatinate, 383

Palau Islands, 273, 516, 522-24, 533, 564, 566

Palerno, 289, 301, 311, 342, 429

Palmer, Lt. Col. John Me A., 17

Panama, 34

Panama Canal, smoke screening, 321—22, 322n, 325—26

Paoching, 633

Papua Campaign, 198-200, 213, 240, 245, 246, 293, 498,

543, 546

Parachute Infantry Regiments

503d, 412, 415

504th, 439

511th, 416-17

Parafrag bombs, 412, 635

Paris, 73, 180, 304

Parker, Lt. James W., 197

Pasig River, 506

Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr., 80, 91, 93, 110, 361,

383, 430, 474, 605

Pearl Harbor, 28, 225, 267, 269, 296, 404-05, 502, 521,

530

Peerenboom, Lt. Col. Maurice A., 214n

Peleliu, 516, 517, 523-24, 566-67

Peninsular Base Section (PBS), 115, 122, 129, 134n, 290,

312, 331n

Penler, Capt. Stephen, 241, 241n

Pennycock, Brigadier G. H., 3 5 5

Perkins, Lt. Col. Melville F., 54

Persano, 433

Pershing, General John J., 16, 23-25, 653

Perspex mix fuel, 157, 160, 631

Perth, 190

Philippine Army, 188

Philippine Chemical Depot, 188—89

Philippine Department, 35, 187, 193

Philippine Islands, 187-89, 218, 237-38, 240, 254, 266,

283-84, 315-17, 407, 501, 509, 543, 570, 573, 575,

576, 590

Philippine Scouts, 187

Phipps, Col. Francis H., 213

Phosgene, 3, 10-11, 13, 14n, 152, 282

Phosphorus, 322n

Pier, 374, 375

Pike, Cpl. Boyd R., 602

Pilelo, 549

Pinamopoan, 502

Piombino, 298, 332, 333, 350

PLUM (Philippines), 283

Poland, 36, 535

Port en Bessin, 358

Port Moresby, 198, 199, 257, 262, 395, 545

Porter, Maj. Gen. William N., 27, 28, 229, 243, 245.

See also Chemical Warfare Service,

and Bullene Mission, 483

and CWS status in the 1930's, 419

and gas warfare protection and retaliation, 77, 85, 270,

651-52

and HE mission for 4.2 mortar, 419-20

and incendiary bomb program, 617

and missions and value of CWS, 74, 200, 285, 637, 640,

657

named Chief, CWS, May 1941, 26

opinion of Reserve and AUS officers, 104n, 637

and shortage of chemical mortars, 178

and smoke screening plans, 324, 326, 396—97

and theater CWS officers, 40, 44, 50, 53, 56, 68, 100-

101, 104, 115, 639

theater inspection trips, 48—49, 51, 52, 69, 71, 101,

105

and World War I gas attacks, 8n

Portland (England), 356

Porton Experimental Station, England, 45, 54, 242

Powell, Col. Frederick E., 44, 60, 185

Powers, Col. Patrick F., 76, 77, 78, 183, 184

Pozzuoli, 330-31

Prentiss, Brig. Gen. Augustin M., 68, 69

Prentiss, Lt. Col. Augustin M., Jr., 206, 207n, 216

Projects for a Continental Operation (PROCO), 170-73,

256

Propellants, mortar, 290, 431, 435, 438, 439, 497, 500

Protective clothing, 70, 75, 166-67, 175, 183, 187-88,

218, 242, 242n, 243, 250-52, 267, 279, 287, 304,

308, 643, 651. See also Impregnating facilities.

Protective equipment, 93, 106-07, 107n, 108, 126, 152,

167, 177-78, 180, 185, 213, 236, 243-44, 258, 260,

267-68, 273, 651. See also Eyeshields; Gas masks.

Pulcherini, 451

Quartermaster Battalion, 107th, 199

Quartermaster Corps, 166, 167, 175, 214, 242, 247, 250,

251, 258, 259, 284, 285, 643-44. See also Laundry

operations.

Quartermaster Service Company, 4342d, 274

Quimby, Capt. James O., 444

Quinine sulfate, 188

Quinville Ridge, 465

Rabaul, 493

Radios

SCR-193, 436

SCR-194, 436

SCR-284, 436, 452, 514, 514n

SCR-300, 451, 515

RAINBOW plans, 322

RAINCOAT, 438

Ramanantelo Hill, 517

Rambouillet, 304

Randazzo, 289
692 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Ranger Battalions

1st, 447

3d, 438-39, 447

4th, 437-38, 447, 447n

Ranger forces, 426, 432-34, 437, 445-46, 458

Rapido River, 122, 346, 441-45, 448, 651

RE/8 (Research and Experiment Station, Section 8)

(British), 618, 618n

Reagh, Lt. Col. John D., 210

RECKLESS Task Force, 498

"Red Ball Express," 165, 165n, 182

Regulating stations, 185—86

Reilly, Lt. Col. James E., 220, 220n, 225, 231

Remagen, 381-82

Remember Pearl Harbor Group, 189

Rennes, 178

Replacement Training Center, Camp Sibert, 326

RH 195, 247-48

Rhein-Herne Canal, 390

Rheinau CWS Depot, 299

Rhens, 385, 385n

Rhine River, 74, 292, 360, 373, 381-92, 484, 489-91,

612

Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C, Jr., 225, 234n, 401,

404, 405, 530n, 559, 567

Riddick, Maj. John A., 202, 205, 207

Riegelman, Col. Harold, 198, 200, 201, 204, 213, 214,

400, 499n, 548n

River crossing operations. See Smoke screen operations,

river crossings.

Rocket ships, 526

Rockhampton, 548

Rockway, Lt. Robert P., 549

Rockwood, Col. Alfred L., 103, 104, 116, 121, 128

Rocky Crags, 586

Rocky Point, 552

Roer River, 373-80, 390, 484, 487, 609, 612

Roer River dams, 373, 487

Rogers, Maj. Arthur C., 102

Roi, 406, 556

Rolandseck, 381-82

Rome, 282-83, 332, 350-51, 437, 442-43

Ronson flame thrower, 287, 560, 563, 567, 576, 580

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 28, 32, 37, 651, 652, 652n, 654

Roosevelt, Brig. Gen. Theodore, 465

Rosario, 510

Rothschild, Lt. Col. Jacquard, 485n

ROUNDUP, 140, 140n

Rowan, Brig. Gen. Hugh W., 23n, 40, 74, 77, 85, 104,

104n, 118, 121, 205, 235, 469, 470, 637-39, 648-49

appointed chief chemical officer, ETO, 43-44, 68, 69

biography, 44—45

and chemical mortar battalions, 71-74, 459-61, 483

and ETO supply, 48, 56-57, 167, 179-80, 182, 256,

641

and German gas retaliation, 156, 183

and main armament flame thrower, 608

Rowan, Brig. Gen. Hugh W.—Continued

organizes CWS, ETO, 41, 44-47, 50-55, 58-62, 65,

67-69, 72, 75-76, 79-83, 120

Royal, Admiral Forrest B., 526

Royal Air Force (RAF), 152-54, 619, 523-24

Royal Italian Arsenal, 290-91

Royal Navy, 333, 357

Ruger, Capt. Kirk J., 378-80

Ruhr, 389-90, 489

Rupt de Mad stream, 362

Russell Islands, 493

Rust inhibiters, 284

Ryukyu Islands, 191, 273, 402, 517, 532-33, 588

Saar River, 292, 371-73

Saar-Palatinate triangle, 383, 488

Saarlautern, 371—73

Sabotage, 285

Safi, 95

Safine, Maj. Albert L., 345

Sagekarasa Island, 493—94

St. Georgen, 302

St. Goar, 385

St. John, Col. Adrian, 68, 68n, 69, 71, 72, 73, 76, 76n,

166, 168, 169, 178, 179, 183, 184, 468, 648

St. Laurent-sur-Mer, 463

St. Lô, 467

St. Malo, 633, 633n

St. Maximin, 455

St. Mihiel, 653

St. Quentin, 632

St. Tropez Peninsula, 343

Saipan, 401, 406, 516, 521, 561-63, 625, 626

Salerno, 298, 334-36, 342, 432-34, 446, 593

Salvage, 198-99, 249, 273, 274, 288-89, 315, 550, 597

San Clemente, 352

San Fabian, 506, 529

San Fernando, 513

San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 237, 255, 257, 268,

274

San Jose, 513

San Martino Hill, 451

San Narcisco, 315

San Pietro, 439-40, 447

Sandell, Capt. Edward H., 196, 198, 199, 199n, 200

Sandhoffen, 388

Sanitation, 271, 273, 319, 339

Sansapor, 315

Sant'Agata, 289

Sant'Angelo, 443

Santa Fe, 513

Santa Maria, 312

Santa Maria Infante, 451

Santerno River, 351

Sarmi, 314

Satan tanks. See Flame thrower tanks.

Sauer River, 484-85, 485n, 486-87
INDEX 693

Sault Ste. Marie Locks, 325, 326, 326n

Savernake Forest, 138

Schaf, Lt. Frank L., Jr., 189

Scheldt River, 360n

Schnee Eifel, 600

Schofield Barracks, 220, 286

Schophoven, 374, 375

Scott, Lt. Col. Walter M., 45, 54

Scrub typhus, 308

Seabees, 560

Seille River, 371n

Seine Base Section, 75n

Selgersdorf-Daubenrath road, 377

Senter, Capt. John, 241

Service, Chimique de Guerre, 16

Services of Supply (SOS), 32, 33, 142, 238, 420-21. See

also Army Service Forces (ASF).

AEF, 21, 21n, 22

ETOUSA, 41-42, 45-47, 50-52, 55, 57-61, 64-65,

67, 71-72, 89, 132, 141, 141n, 143, 146-47, 154,

159-60, 164, 298, 354-55

NATOUSA/MTOUSA, 94, 102, 103, 107, 109, 110,

112, 113, 114n, 115-16, 121, 127, 132

SWPA, 191, 196-97, 200-205, 208, 210-13, 216, 218-

19, 239, 250-51, 256-61, 264-66, 395, 397-99, 547

Sfax, 329

Shadle, Brig. Gen. Charles S., 637, 655

attache and chemical officer in England, 37, 40

and chemical administration and supply, 98—100, 102—

04, 107-08, 112, 114-16, 118-22, 125-27

and chemical mortar use, 430, 460

as CW officer, AFHQ, 41, 87, 88, 135, 196, 219, 638-

39, 648-49

and handling of CWS field elements, 135, 235, 640,

641

and tactical smoke planning, 88, 92

Shaffer, Maj. John J., 294n, 546

Shannon, USS, 532

Shaw, Capt. Augustus H., Jr., 373

Shepherd, Lt. Col. Earl L., 485n

Shepton Mallet, 147

Sherman-Crocodile tanks. See Flame thrower tanks,

Sherman-Crocodile.

Shimbu Line, 507—08

Shimonek, Lt. Col. William H., 213n, 493

SHINGLE, 336, 350, 443. See also Anzio.

Shrivenham, 42, 43

Shoe impregnite, 108, 125, 167, 236, 248, 258, 267

Shortages, 125, 266, 641-43

chemical service personnel, 268, 274

containers, 151, 162

decontaminating apparatus, 107, 130, 132, 133, 139,

168, 253, 262

flame throwers, 169, 547, 604

incendiaries, 157, 160-61, 562, 565, 621

landing craft and amphibious vehicles, 395—97, 425,

501

Shortages—Continued

mortars and ammunition, 84, 128-30, 133, 168—69,

178-82, 218, 275-76, 460-61, 479-80, 509, 515-

16, 519, 642, 646

protective equipment, 90, 107, 138, 139, 168

shipping, 86, 394, 401, 401n, 547

smoke materials, 245, 353, 394

spare parts, 182

tanks, 608, 612

WP grenades, 84, 107, 126-27, 262, 643

Shower facilities, 130, 168, 174, 253, 279, 310, 643

Shuri Line, 517

Sibert, Maj. Gen. Franklin C., 503, 503n

Sibert, Maj. Gen. William L., 24, 503n

Sicily, 109, 114, 122, 127, 133, 289, 298, 301, 311,

328-29, 418, 423, 425-33, 439, 446, 453, 456n,

520, 593, 604

Sidi Ferruch, 282

Sieg River, 381

Siegfried Line, 472-73, 475, 477, 485, 487-89, 599-601,

603-04, 607, 609, 632

Sierre Madre Mountains, 507, 509

Sieve River, 351

Signal Corps, 24n, 27

Silica gel, activated, 287-88, 297

Sillaro Valley, 351

Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H., 609

Skinner, Maj. Richmond H., 525, 527

Skipper, Capt. Howard E., 207

Skyline Ridge, 518

Smith, Lt. Col. Farleigh E., 485n

Smith, Lt. Gen. Holland M., 560

Smith, Lt. Col. Robert W., 203, 205, 206, 251, 252

Smoke, colored, 106

Smoke, target area marking, 511, 513

Smoke candles, 9, 240

Smoke demonstrations, 327, 373, 378, 398, 404, 409, 425

Smoke generator units, 72, 74, 79, 85, 88, 92, 93, 331,

361, 393, 402-05, 411. See also Chemical Smoke

Generator Battalions; Chemical Smoke Generator

Companies.

Smoke generators, 172, 279, 321, 395. See also FS Smoke;

Smoke screen operations, smoke pots and generators.

Besler, 291, 331, 335, 336, 342, 404, 406

boat-mounted, 93, 335, 337, 343, 345, 348, 357-58,

382, 395-98, 406, 409-11

Dukw-mounted, 384, 388

emplacements, 349, 366, 376, 406, 410

Esso, 291, 324, 398

FS types, 395, 400

fuel for, 169, 329, 354

Haslar (British), 323, 327, 328, 354

jeep-mounted, 366, 367

maintenance problems, 370, 377, 486

mechanical, 72, 88, 91, 110, 134, 331, 337-40, 346,

348, 361, 373-74, 378, 382, 389, 410
694 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Smoke generators—Continued

M1 mechanical, 169, 324, 326-27, 327n, 328-29, 354-

55, 357-60, 395-96, 404-05, 645

M1 stationary, 324, 325, 326, 405

M2 mechanical, 169, 174, 302, 331, 352, 355-56, 359,

362-68, 370, 377, 393, 395, 398, 399, 403, 645

need for two operators, 370

No. 24 (British), 169

portable, 357, 409

spare parts manufacture, 129, 290-91

Smoke grenades. See Grenades.

Smoke pots, 85, 88, 92, 107, 110, 169, 174, 213, 302,

310, 323, 328, 342, 346, 348, 356, 374, 377, 378,

380-81, 388-89, 391, 395, 400, 410-11, 435, 442,

526

as bomber target, 335

British, 92, 323, 327, 329, 331

fire hazard problems, 97, 408, 644

floating, 379, 399, 407, 411

for Gilberts assault, 271-72, 405

HC, 199, 267, 324, 345, 352, 372, 374, 378, 379, 404,

408

installed on ships and craft, 272, 342, 343, 405—06

M1, 133, 170, 327, 327n, 335, 336, 343, 346, 364, 400,

405-06, 435

M1A1, 327n

M4, 133, 170 335, 336, 364, 400, 405

M4, floating, 331, 334, 334n, 407

M5, 327n

Smoke screen operations

air installations, 354, 394, 397, 400-402

Anzio beachhead, 336-40, 342, 447

and artillery observation, 333, 335, 337, 339-40, 346,

351, 353, 373-75, 377, 380, 383, 386, 388, 391, 435,

444, 452, 519

assault landings, 334, 335, 342, 353, 398, 402, 403,

405, 409, 520, 526-27, 529

bridges and bridging sites, 345-46, 348-53, 362, 366-

68, 372, 374-92, 400, 435, 488

British, 322-24

Central Pacific landings, 405—06

daylight, 324, 337, 339, 350, 375, 375n, 407, 435

deceptive, 383, 385, 387, 389

fog oil for, 72, 329, 335, 342, 350, 354, 359, 363-64,

366, 368, 369, 372, 387, 388, 399, 403, 406, 407,

408, 410, 411

Fort Driant attack, 474—75

forward area missions, 350, 353, 360-61, 428-29, 435,

437, 451-52, 457, 473, 481, 508, 510, 645

haze production, 333, 337-40, 342, 350-53, 361, 384,

388

to hide gun flash, 339, 374, 392

Italian ports, 329-34, 350, 353, 359, 645

large area mission, 321-27, 334, 346, 353-55, 360,

362, 392-93, 394, 400, 403, 644-45

misuse of, in New Guinea, 213

Moselle crossing at Arnaville, 362-71

Smoke screen operations—Continued

night and twilight operations, 324, 331, 335—36, 350,

366n, 376, 527, 529

Normandy, 163, 169, 170, 173, 174, 354, 356-58

northwest African ports, 327-29, 331, 645

Okinawa, 409—11

Pacific airborne missions, 412—17

Pacific anchorages, 394, 398, 400, 405-11

Panama Canal, 321-22, 322n, 325-26

Philippines, 407-08, 416-17, 529

"pillaring" effect, 486

plants and factories, 323, 325

ports and harbors, 92, 93, 95, 109-10, 169-70, 301,

302, 327, 353, 358, 360, 395, 396

proposed for Pearl Harbor, 404—05

Rapido River crossing, 442—45

Rhine River crossings, 381-92, 489-91

river crossings, 74, 79, 361, 368, 371, 378, 392-93,

400, 435, 645. See also rivers by name.

Salerno landings, 334-36, 342

Sauer-Our and Roer crossings, 486—88

smoke control center, 390

smoke pots and generators, 328, 331, 348, 367, 374,

388

smoke pots and shell mixture, 345—46

southern France landings, 302, 342—44

supply installations, 302, 354, 390, 397

supply routes, 302, 346, 348, 351-52, 360, 392, 457

tactical control of, 366-67, 369, 374-75, 380, 390,

392, 398, 444-45

tank and TD attacks, 352, 473

troop movements, 351, 377, 389, 390, 392

U.S. west coast, 405

use of aircraft, 206-07, 405, 407, 409, 412-17, 508

wind effect on, 331, 339, 365, 367, 369-70, 372, 374,

376, 379, 380, 385, 388, 391-92, 407, 414, 416-17,

428, 443, 486, 520

World War I, 9, 9n

Smoke tanks, 151, 253, 319, 323. See also FS smoke.

E-1, 416-17

E2B25, 319

M-10, 240, 412-17

M33, 253

Snake Hill North, 506

Sodium arsenite, 271—72

Solome Lake, 517

Solomon Islands, 493—94

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 32, 38, 59, 125

Sound locator teams, 518

South African Antigas Laboratory, 23d, 283

South Pacific Area (SOPAC), 191, 191n, 204, 207, 213n,

222, 229, 492n, 493, 500

Southern Attack Force, 407

Southern Base Section, 51n, 75n, 141n, 298

Southern France, invasion of, 299, 301, 340, 342—44,

350, 453-55, 480n

Southern Landing Force, 561n, 562
INDEX 695

Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), 181

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 191, 193-94, 196, 202,

204-07, 211, 216, 218, 222, 234-35, 239, 240, 242,

252-55, 293, 319, 395, 399, 497-98, 501, 637, 639-

40, 642, 644, 651

Spain, civil war, 535

Special Service Force, 1st, 438

Spessard, Capt. Rutherford H., Jr., 517

Spray tanks, aircraft. See Smoke tanks.

Stark, Lt. Col. Edgar D., 424, 441

Stillger, Lt. Raymond C., 339

Stima Lagoon, 493

Stokes mortar, See Mortar, Stokes.

Storage, 107, 152-55, 239-40, 246, 249-54, 281-83,

286-87, 290, 307, 318, 497, 509, 644. See also

Depots.

Strasbourg, 611

Stubblefield, Lt. Col. Henry I., 119

Stubblefield, Pfc. Richard, 487

Stubbs, Maj. Gen. Marshall, 64, 65n, 175, 256

Sudbury, 147

Sudbury Egginton, 146

Sulphur trioxide, 414n

Sulphuric acid, 188, 414n

Supply. See also Depots; Shortages.

ammunition planning factors, 109n, 144, 258—60, 265,

271

ammunition supply points (ASP's), 124, 275, 299, 301

block-loaded shipments, 265-66, 272, 273, 275, 642

chemical warfare stock in 1941, 34, 236-37, 267

for combat forces special requirements, 110, 170—73,

255-56, 270-71

computation of requirements, 90-93, 99—100, 109,

109n, 114-15, 128, 139-40, 143-44, 149-56, 156n,

162, 164, 168-69, 172-73, 181, 218, 237-39, 263,

265, 271, 274, 275

controlled items, 140, 140n, 141, 257-58

credit allocation systems, 137, 137n, 140—43, 145, 185-

86, 257, 641

CWS-Ordnance-Quartermaster division of responsibility, 34, 107, 214-15, 258-59, 264, 269, 643-44

local procurement, 182, 237, 244, 246, 290-92, 479,

479n, 548, 560

logistics data compilations for field use, 100, 113, 143-

145, 150, 259

materiel status report supply, 125, 255

"pipeline" factor, 268

planning for "type" units, 274

spare parts, 105, 109, 123, 127-29, 132, 168-69, 178-

79, 182, 253, 272-73, 275, 288-92, 478-79, 479n,

547

stock overages, 125-26, 132, 158, 166

task force problems, 263—65

theater CWS supply systems, 94, 95, 105, 106, 110-

11, 114, 254-55, 261, 263, 272, 273, 276, 640-43

Supply—Continued

of toxics, 3, 34, 48, 56, 68, 77-78, 107-08, 151, 155,

218, 229, 239-40, 253-54, 258, 267, 269, 313, 642,

643, 651-52

"War Department Shipping Document" form, 142

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces

(SHAEF), 67, 68, 68n, 76, 76n, 77, 166, 183, 184,

468, 648

Sutton, Lt. Col. James P., 214n

Sydney, 190, 197, 241, 245, 306, 397

T-Force, 303-04

Tabarka, 289

Tables of basic allowances, 90, 99, 109, 144, 237, 241,

255, 257-59, 267-69

Tables of organization and equipment, 90, 99, 144, 255,

259

chemical air operations company, 319, 319n

chemical composite company, 309—11, 313, 317

chemical decontamination company, 300

chemical depot company, 295

chemical general warfare service company, 294—95

chemical laboratory company, 281

chemical maintenance company, 288

chemical mortar battalion, 426, 430, 456, 460, 462,

470-71, 482, 506n, 508

chemical mortar company, glider-borne, 454—55

chemical processing company, 305n

chemical smoke generator company, 325

flame tank battalion, 584

Tabontabon, 503

Tacloban, 315, 400, 407

Tanabaru, 586

Tank Battalions

709th, 611

713th, 584, 587, 588-89

739th, Special (Mine Exploder), 609

741st, 610

743d, 612

Tank Destroyer Battalions

641st, 498

823d, 375

Tanks. See also Flame thrower tanks.

amphibious, 343, 344

Churchill Mark VII, 605

light, 559, 561, 564, 578, 606, 606n

M3, 287

M3A1, 560, 561

M4A2, 562

M5A1, 576-77

medium, 560, 561, 563, 580, 584, 605, 606, 610, 612

Tanks, storage, 152, 153, 155

Tanner, 1st Lt. William J., 220

Tarawa, 405, 530, 554-55, 559, 564, 589

Tarr, Lt. Col. Philip R., 43, 45, 54, 79

Task Force, South Pacific, 189
696 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Task Force 6814. See Infantry Divisions, Americal.

Task Unit 78.1.8, 529

Task Unit 79.8.1, 527-29

Taunton, 138, 145

Team Cherry, 476—77

Tear gas, 3, 7n, 8n, 107

Thatcham, 138, 145

Them, Capt. Eugene F., 504, 517

Thermate, 622, 622n

Thermite, 614, 615, 622n

Thomas, Lt. Frank J., 344

Thomas, Col. Kramer, 465

Thuillier, Brig. Gen. Henry, 16

Tiger Bridge, 450

Tinian, 401, 561-63, 625, 633

Tirrell, Cpl. Wilber G., 544-45, 545n

Tokyo, incendiary attack on, 624, 628—30

Tolman, Maj. John D., 495

Tomlinson, Col. Clarence M., 543

Toowoomba, 195

TORCH, 43, 44, 87, 89, 90, 92, 140n, 142-46. See also

North African Theater of Operations.

Toulon, 340

Townsville, 190, 191n, 203, 240

TRADEWIND task force, 314

Training, 77-78, 83-84, 297, 649-50

assault operations, 342, 356, 386, 409, 424, 462, 490,

520, 527, 555, 599

chemical field maneuvers, 224, 230

civil defense, 165, 221-22, 232

CWS schools and teams in the Pacific, 193-96, 210,

214, 224, 230-32, 235, 307, 399, 548, 649

flame tank, 561, 567, 579, 589, 611-12

mortar units, 424-25, 429, 450, 453, 461-62, 469,

490, 496, 500, 507, 515, 527, 530

for smoke operations, 326, 356, 387n, 397—99, 404,

409

Transport, chemical units, 363, 368, 426, 430, 436, 451-

52, 456, 456n, 478, 482, 501-05, 516, 570

Tremensuoli, 594

Trench rattle, 168

TRIDENT Conference, 143

Triflisco, 435

Triner, Col. Joseph, 67

Trobriand Islands, 548

Tropical warfare, 203-04, 206, 208, 218, 246, 249-50,

266, 293-94, 310, 497, 546

Troyes, 363

Truscott, Maj. Gen. Lucian K., Jr., 337, 340

Tucker, Maj. Woodson C, 220, 542

Tulagi, 536

Tunisia, 98, 114, 289, 298, 327, 328

Turner, Vice Adm. Richmond K., 409, 411, 561n

Turpinite, 7n, 8n

Tyrrhenian Sea, 346, 442, 450

Übach, 472

Umurbrogol Pocket, 567

Underwood, Capt. Charles D., 368

Unit gas noncommissioned officers (UGNCO's), 83—84,

214, 224, 228, 230

Unit gas officers (UGO's), 83-84, 202, 214, 224, 228,

230

United Kingdom, 43, 46, 61, 142, 166, 654-55

CW production and storage, 151—55

incendiary bombing of England, 36—37

smoke screening, 322—23

use of aerial incendiaries, 618—19

United Kingdom Base Section 73, 75n

United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), 189—

92, 196, 236-40, 284

United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI),

36, 37, 38, 40

United States Army Forces, Central Pacific Area

(USAFICPA), 224, 224n, 225, 229, 230, 232, 270,

272-73, 553n, 559-60

United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE),

188-89, 200-205, 216, 252, 258-60, 398, 546, 648

United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC),

224, 553n

United States Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC), 219, 402,

403, 403n

United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (USAFPOA), 216, 224, 273, 275-76, 553n

United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area

(USAFISPA), 203-04

United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, 219, 254

United States Chemical Warfare Committee (USCWC),

171, 201, 229

United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF),

62, 67, 159, 161, 162

University of Melbourne, 195

University of Queensland, 193

Unmacht, Col. George F.

and chemical mortar use, 232, 516, 520—21

and flame thrower and flame tank development, 234,

287, 560-61, 567

and gas and BW preparedness, 221, 224, 227-33, 267,

268, 296, 649

and need for smoke in Hawaii, 404—05

organization of theater chemical office, 222, 225, 227,

269, 286

and Pearl Harbor attack, 219-21, 267

position as theater chemical officer, 216, 224—25, 234,

235, 288, 521, 553n, 637, 639, 649

and service manpower shortage, 274

UTAH Beach, 174, 355-57, 462, 464, 465

Valognes, 178, 179

Vandegrift, Maj. Gen. Alexander A., 536

Velden, 80

Velletri, 452

Venafro, 436, 447
INDEX 697

Verzy, 632

Vesuvius, 331, 332n

Viareggio, 352

Victory ships, 529

Vietri sul Mari, 434

Villa, 448

Villa Verde Trail, 513, 577

Villedieu, 178

Vincennite, 10

Vire River, 467

Vogelkop Peninsula, 415

Volturno River, 345, 435-36

Vosges, 455

Vossenack, 611

Waitt, Brig. Gen. Alden H., 28n, 155, 216, 218, 270,

637, 652

as Assistant Chief, CWS, for Field Operations, 33, 56,

57, 77, 85, 100, 101, 104, 106, 171, 179

and plan for screening airfields, 401

and the replacement system, 118n

and spare parts supply, 182

and SWPA toxic munitions investigation, 210

and a unitary CWS organization, 32n

Wakde Islands, 314, 499, 501, 502, 551

Walker, Lt. Col. George E., 363, 367, 367n

Walker, Maj. Gen. Walton, 361, 371

Wallach, 390, 391

Wallington, Col. Edward C., 67, 67n, 78, 79, 80

Walmsley, Col. Harold, 80, 390n

War Department General Staff (WDGS), 25, 33, 422n,

650. See also Army Service Forces; Operations Division, WDGS.

Warnack, Brig. Gen. Alan D., 366

Warren, Capt. George B., Jr., 373

"Washington Command Post," 30—32

Washington Conference, 1921, 25

Waterproofing, 272, 273, 290, 294, 305, 432, 546, 547,

550, 559, 564, 575, 595

Waugh, Lt. Robert T., 594, 594n

Weather. See also Smoke Screen operations, wind effect

on.

Army-Navy study, Pacific, 231

and smoke operations, 339, 363, 369, 390

Weber, Maj. Walter C., 202, 206

Wellmich, 385, 386, 386n

Wesel, 390, 391

West Wall, 371-72, 599-601

Westbrook, Capt. Clyde H., 491

Westbury, 147

Western Base Section, 141n

Western Defense Command, 325, 326

Western Task Force (WTF), 89, 91-93, 93n, 94-96,

98-99, 301, 326, 421

Wewak, 412

Weymouth, 356

Wheeler Field, 220

White, Lt. Col. G. C., 606

White phosphorus (WP), 72, 106, 172, 400n, 415, 421,

433, 440, 495, 497, 509-12, 514, 527, 531, 593.

See also Chemical mortar, 4.2-inch; Grenades, white

phosphorus.

psychological effect of, 475n, 509

smoke missions, 374, 378, 379, 428, 435, 437, 443,

473, 486, 495, 500, 616

Whitesides, Col. Sterling E., Jr., 219

Wildflecken, 302

Wilhelmshaven, 157

Williams, Maj. Allen H., 397

Williams, Maj. Arthur H., Jr., 192, 193, 201, 264

Williams, Lt. Col. Benjamin D., 485n

Willis, Col. Burton D., 191n, 193, 194, 203

Wilson, Brig. Gen. Alexander, 242

Wilson, Maj. Alfred J. P., 103, 110, 112, 115

Wingard, Lt. Robert E., 231, 232

Winter Line, 122, 436-42, 651

Woebbeking, 1st Lt. Vernon E., 499

World War I, 3-18, 534, 614-15, 653

Worms, 383, 387, 388, 489

Wright, Lt. Carroll W., 174

Wright, Lt. Col. Maurice H., 41, 46, 54, 59, 68

Yamashito, General, 63 5n

Yanka, Lt. Col. Donald E., 485n, 489

Yankhauer, Capt. J. R., 175

Yap, 502, 576

Yehle, Cpl. Edward A., 506

Young, Lt. Frank W., 365

Young, Col. Mason, 378

Youngman, Lt. Col. John P., 206

Yperite, 14n

Ypres, gas attack, 5, 7, 8, 8n, 9, 10, 184

Yuza-Dake, 586

Zambales Mountains, 505

Zamboanga, 400

Zanetti, Col. J. Enrique, 37, 43, 45, 54, 616-17, 622

Zoroastrian Society, 619

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1990 242-456/00023