Opinion issued December 5, 2018

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 1 8 - 00 485 - CV

——————————— IN THE INTEREST OF K . L .W. , A Child
On Appeal from the 3 1 4 t h District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 20 1 7 - 0 2559 J
MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from the trial court’s final d ecree for t ermination in a suit brought by the Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”) to terminate the parent

- child relationship between appellant s and K
. L
. W . (“the child”). In its decree, the trial court terminated both parents’ parental rights, and appointed DFPS as sole managing conservator of the child. Both the father, R.D.W. , and the mother, B .B. C. , filed notice s of appeal, and the trial court appointe d separate counsel on t he i r2

behal ves to prosecute th is appeal. Both the father and the mother ’s court

- appointed appellate counsel ha ve moved to withdraw and filed separate Anders brief s , stating that, in t he i r professional opinion s , th is appeal is without merit and that there are no arguable grounds for reversal. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). Appellants have filed several pro se motions, including a motion for rehearing of an order of reinstat ement, which were carried with the case. Anders procedures are appropriate in an appeal from a trial court’s final order in a parental

- rights termination suit. In the Interest of K.D., et al. , 127 S.W.3d 66, 67 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet. ). Both c ounsel ha ve certified that they have delivered a copy of the ir respective brief s to the father and mother and informed t he m of t he i r right s to examine the appellate record and to file response s . See In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 403, 408 (Tex. Crim . App. 2008)

. Bot h parent s timely file d response s and DFPS waived its right to respond. The brief s submitted by the father’s and mother’s appointed appellate counsel state t he ir professional opinion s that no arguable grounds for reversal exist and that

an y appeal would therefore lack merit. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400. Counsel’s brief

s meet the minimum Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and stating why there are no arguable grounds for reversal on appeal. See id. at 744; Schulman , 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.3

When we receive an Anders brief from an appointed attorney who asserts that no arguable grounds for appeal exist, we determine independently whether arguable grounds exist by conducting our own re view of the entire record. Johnson v. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs. , No. 01

- 08

- 00749

- CV, 2010 WL 5186806, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 23, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); see K.D. , 127 S.W.3d at 67; In the Interest of D.E.S., et al. , 135 S.W.3d 326, 330 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). If we determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist, we abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court to allow the appointed attorney to withdraw. See Johnson , 2010 WL 518 6806, at *2. Then, the trial court appoints another attorney to present all arguable grounds for appeal. See id. On the other hand, if our independent review of the record leads us to conclude that the appeal is frivolous, we may affirm the trial court’s judgment by issuing an opinion in which we explain that we have reviewed the record and find no reversible

error. See id. Here, w e have independently reviewed the record and conclude that there are no arguable grounds for review, that no reversible erro r exists, and therefore the parents’ appeals are frivolous. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400 (emphasizing that the reviewing court

— and not counsel

— determines, after full examination of proceedings, whether the appeal is wholly frivolous); In the Interest of A.M., et al. , 495 S.W.3d 573, 582 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)

. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s termination decree.4

However, we de n y both counsel’s motion s to withdraw because this is a parental termination c ase . See In the Interest of P.M. , 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (holding that Anders brief in parental t ermination is not “good cause” sufficient to justify counsel’s withdrawal ); A.M. , 495 S.W.3d at 582 . Counsel’s dut ies to t he i r client s extend through the exhaustion or waiver of “all appeals.” T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 107.016(2)(B) (West 2014). If the appellant s choose to pursue a petition for review to the Supreme Court of Texas, “appointed counsel’s obligations can be satisfied by filin g a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” P.M ., 520 S.W.3d at 27

– 28. We deny all of the appellants’ pending pro se motions, including the motion for rehearing of the order of reinstatement

. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Ju stices Higley, Lloyd, and Caughey

.