U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

29–814PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

U.S. POLICY TOWARD A

TURBULENT MIDDLE EAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 18, 2018

Serial No. 115–124

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable David M. Satterfield, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................... 5

The Honorable A. Wess Mitchell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .............................................. 14

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable David M. Satterfield: Prepared statement .................................. 7

The Honorable A. Wess Mitchell: Prepared statement ........................................ 16

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 58

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 59

The Honorable Daniel Donovan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 61

Written responses from the Honorable David M. Satterfield to questions 

submitted for the record by: 

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York ...................................................................................................... 62

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California ...................................................................................................... 68

The Honorable Ted Lieu, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California ...................................................................................................... 71

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD A 

TURBULENT MIDDLE EAST 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. 

In announcing military strikes against Syria last week, the 

President made clear the people of the Middle East must shape 

their own destiny. 

He’s right. But that doesn’t mean that we don’t have vital national interests in the region or a reason to promote stability, tolerance, and respect for human rights. 

The U.S. and our allies were justified in taking limited military 

action against Bashar al-Assad. We took that action in response to 

his barbaric use of chemical weapons. 

Hopefully, the Syrian dictator gets the message. If not, I have no 

doubt there will be more military strikes. The world has enough security challenges without the breakdown of the 100-year norm 

against the use of chemical weapons. 

That said, military force cannot be the only means of responding 

to these atrocities. We need a strategy to get a political solution, 

one that moves beyond Assad to secure a lasting peace. 

The previous administration did not have one. That’s part of the 

reason why we’re confronting this crisis today. The stakes in Syria 

are high. This chaos goes far beyond its borders, threatening allies 

and partners. 

And I again commend Ranking Member Engel for his steadfast, 

years-long commitment to addressing this conflict. 

There is no excuse for the Senate’s failure to act on the Caesar 

Syria Civilian Protection Act. This bill, passed twice unanimously 

by the House, would make those supporting Assad’s killing machine, and its barrel bombs and gas attacks, pay a real cost. 

The committee also recently passed the No Assistance for Assad 

Act, which prohibits the regime and prohibits its allies from profiting from any reconstruction. 

Both these bills would give our diplomats real leverage. If the 

U.S. isn’t engaged in the Middle East, Iran will certainly take advantage. 

2

Tehran is already aggressive and capable, as this committee has 

highlighted. The regime is using its bolstered position from a windfall of cash from the nuclear deal to help Hezbollah amass missiles 

along Israel’s borders. 

They are seeking, obviously, to establish a land bridge across 

Syria to Israel’s doorstep and they are moving fighters and weapons across that land bridge to new bases on Israel’s borders. 

This is shoring up Assad, yes, and it is also threatening our 

troops that are fighting ISIS. And remember, Iran is also fueling 

the humanitarian disaster in Yemen with its support for the 

Houthis. Our closest partner in the region, Israel, is increasingly 

threatened by Iranian expansion but so are our other U.S. friends 

and allies in the region. 

The Iran nuclear deal has serious flaws so let me speak to this 

for a moment. This committee has closely examined them. The administration is rightly working to address Iran’s ballistic missiles, 

to strengthen inspections, and to fix the deal’s sunset problem. 

The British, the French, and the Germans need to stand with us. 

Meanwhile, the list of the region’s other challenges is long. Our relationship with NATO ally Turkey is strained as never before. Its 

military offensive against the Kurds in Syria, frankly, has benefitted ISIS. 

The Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces we back now have to divert their operations from the offensives they were taking against 

ISIS to defensive actions, defending themselves from Turkish military attacks. 

Turkey’s increasing engagement with Russia and Iran is very 

concerning. 

In Libya, radical jihadists remain strong. Neighboring Egypt is 

a critical partner in the fight against ISIS and should be supported, but its repression of civil society risks backfiring, and 

Hamas terrorists are inciting violence in Gaza. 

As tempting as it is to say enough and retreat to our shores, 

smart, focused, and a determined engagement in the Middle East 

must be our approach. We need to talk strategy with the administration today about the Middle East and we appreciate them being 

here with the committee. 

And I will now turn to the ranking member for his comments. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. 

To our witnesses, welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee and 

thank you for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Mitchell, for being here today and it’s good to see 

you again. I appreciate the excellent work you’re doing. 

Ambassador Satterfield, our first work on Syria reaches back 

about 15 years or so, so I appreciate your service as well. 

Still, I wish we had a permanent Assistant Secretary in place. 

Nearly 15 months into this administration the White House only 

sent a nomination to the Senate last week. 

Syria has been a larger focus of mine. Many years ago—I think 

it was more than 15—Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and I introduced the 

Syria Accountability Act, which was passed into law with bipartisan support. 

So we have a huge number of concerns about the Middle East. 

But today I am going to focus on Syria. 

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It’s a shame that it takes a chemical weapons attack to grab the 

world’s attention when it comes to Syria. After all, the vast majority of Assad’s 1⁄2 million victims didn’t meet their ends in a chemical attack. It often wasn’t sarin or chlorine that drove millions 

more from their homes. 

For those who have lost love ones in these 7 years of brutal 

slaughter, the pain and the grief are no different whether they died 

in a chemical attack or in a hospital that was leveled to the ground 

or in a crowded street when a barrel bomb detonated. 

Assad’s a murderer, a butcher. His brutality is sickening and it 

goes on every day. Yet, I want to be clear. Assad’s most recent use 

of chemical weapons is an abhorrent crime that demanded immediate consequences. 

Late last week, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 

France acted together to dole out these consequences. The use of 

the weapons cannot stand and whoever would use them and whoever would support those who do cannot go unpunished. 

But I want to be equally clear. If the administration plans ongoing military action, Congress must first authorize it or prevent it. 

Even under the most generous interpretation of the War Powers 

Resolution, the 60-day clock started ticking when the President notified Congress of the attack. 

Now, if anyone hear feels a sense of deja vu, you’re not alone. 

A year ago, we were debating the same issue. Assad uses chemical 

weapons, the United States fires off some missiles, but the killing 

still continues. 

Why is history repeating itself? Mainly because the administration seems to have no strategy for dealing with the crisis in Syria. 

That’s why regardless of what happens next we need to hear from 

the administration. 

Even if the President intends for last week’s air strike to be another one-off response, the White House is still past due in laying 

out its strategy for Syria to Congress and the American people. 

As part of last year’s defense authorization bill, we require the 

White House to come to us with a strategy by February 1st. That 

deadline has come and gone. I hope you’ll tell us today if the strategy will be sent to Capitol Hill without any more delay. 

The incoherence is plain to see. Over the last year, the President 

has publicly disagreed with his top advisors about our path forward 

in Syria and is off-the-cuff remarks about leaving Syria and reckless rhetoric have at times emboldened Assad. 

Just prior to last year’s chemical weapons attack, the President 

said we would have to accept Assad as a fact of life, and shortly 

before the most recent attack the President suggested a precipitous 

withdrawal from Syria. 

Rather than forming the policy that would help to resolve this 

crisis, I feel that the President has only made it worse. I am not 

holding my breath, but I continue to hope that the administration 

will bring us a plan that will push for an end to violence that will 

ease a political transition and that will help lay the groundwork for 

a future for Syria in which Bashar-al Assad has no role whatsoever. 

This is certainly no easy task and I’d be the first one to acknowledge that the previous administration should have done more. 

4

But there are still plenty of good ideas to help craft a policy like 

this. In fact, as the chairman mentioned, I’ve introduced two bills 

that I think would move us toward those goals. 

The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act passed the House 

unanimously last year. It started with bipartisan good work, as 

usual, from this committee. 

This bill would crack down on Assad’s enablers, namely Moscow 

and Tehran, who serve as lifelines to the barbaric regime. 

I have to say after the President personally overrode his own administration’s plan to sanction Russia for its support of Assad, I 

think this bill is needed now more than ever. 

I hope the Senate will act on it soon. The other bill, as the chairman mentioned, is my No Assistance for Assad Act, which I introduced with Mr. Kinzinger and which this committee voted to advance a few weeks ago. 

This bill would restrict reconstruction funding for any area still 

controlled by Assad. One bill would help end the violence now. The 

other would make sure that when this crisis has ended no American tax dollars are going to help Assad cling to power. 

We cannot overstate the scope of the tragedy in Syria. Assad has 

the blood of hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrian men, 

women, and children on his hands. 

That this catastrophe has been allowed to go on for so long is a 

global failure that will leave a black mark on this era of human 

history. But we cannot throw up our hands in resignation. 

If America is to remain a leader on the global stage, we must 

continue working to end the bloodshed. 

I again thank our witnesses. I thank the chairman. I look forward to hearing how the administration intends to tackle this problem and the range of other challenges with which we are challenging in the Middle East. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

So this morning we are pleased to welcome David Satterfield. 

He’s Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, 

and Wess Mitchell is Assistant Secretary of State for European and 

Eurasian Affairs. 

Mr. Satterfield served in many senior positions within the department including as U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, as Chief of 

Mission in Cairo, and Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq. 

Dr. Mitchell, prior to his current position at the State Department, was the co-founder and president and CEO of the Center for 

European Policy Analysis and we appreciate them being here with 

us today. 

Without objection, gentlemen, your full prepared statements will 

be made part of the record. Members here will have 5 calendar 

days to submit any statements or questions to you or any extraneous material for the record. 

So if you would, Mr. Satterfield, please summarize your remarks 

and after the 5 minutes we will go to Mr. Mitchell and then to the 

questions. 

5

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID M. SATTERFIELD, 

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity for me, my colleague, Assistant Secretary Mitchell, to testify. 

From the Arab Spring in 2011 to the current civil wars in Syria 

and Yemen, the rise and fall of ISIS’ so-called caliphate, no one 

would argue the many significant challenges the United States and 

our allies face in the region. 

However, I want to say at the beginning in many places the U.S. 

has made positive strides. We are supporting the growth of a nascent democracy in Tunisia. 

Economically, the region continues to support and we aggressively pursue American opportunities for business that generate 

American jobs. 

We have supported billions of dollars of sales to our partners in 

the Gulf, power generation solutions in Libya, Algeria, and Iraq, 

major sales of locomotives and other power sources in Egypt, and 

we have made significant dramatic progress against ISIS. 

However, this said, we are not blind to the continuing issues in 

the region and the U.S. is taking all possible steps to find solutions 

to this region’s enduring challenges. 

On April 7th, after weeks of heavy Syrian and Russian bombardment on the people of Douma and adjacent areas, the regime deployed chemical weapons, killing dozens and injuring hundreds of 

innocent men, women, and children. 

On April 13th, the militaries of the United States, France, and 

the United Kingdom executed strikes on three chemical weapons 

facilities in Syria. 

Russia has failed to live up to its guarantee in regards to the 

2013 framework agreement that Syria would cease all use of chemical weapons and fully declare its entire stockpile for verifiable destruction, and Iran acts malignly in Syria and through Syria, pouring resources and forces to support Assad and advance its regional 

ambitions including in Lebanon. 

The targeted military action by the U.S., France, and the U.K. 

was a measure to deter and prevent Syria’s illegal and unacceptable use of chemical weapons. 

This sends, we hope, a positive and powerful message to the Syrian regime, Russia, Iran, and the international community that 

chemical weapons will not be tolerated and there will be real consequences for their use. 

While preventing the use of chemical weapons in Syria is our immediate concern, the administration’s priority remains the defeat of 

ISIS. ISIS has lost nearly all of the territory it once controlled in 

Iraq in Syria. But the fight in Syria still has to be pursued to its 

conclusion. 

More broadly, the United States supports a unified and territorially whole Syria. This objective is served by U.S. support for the 

U.N.-led Geneva political process established by U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 2254 in which process the U.S. believes strongly 

6

that representatives of all Syrians including all its Kurdish components should fully participate. 

Our strategic partnership with Iraq including the Kurdistan region remains essential to ensuring the goal of a lasting defeat of 

ISIS and encountering Iran’s malign influence in the region. 

The Iraqi Government is stabilizing communities including minority communities that suffered greatly from ISIS and now we are 

beginning private sector-led investment-driven reconstruction. 

On May 12th, all Iraqis, including Iraqi Kurds, will participate 

in parliamentary elections, the country’s fourth since 2005. 

Iran’s malign influence in the region continues to threaten our 

allies such as Jordan and Israel, and feeds violent conflicts in Syria 

and Yemen through Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps facilitation 

and work. 

The Houthis have repeatedly used in Yemen Iranian ballistic 

missile and cruise missile technology to threaten Saudi Arabia, including over 80,000 U.S. citizens in that country. 

U.S. military support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen serves 

a clear purpose—to reinforce Saudi and Emirati action on behalf of 

the Yemeni Government in the face of intensified Houthi threats 

and to expand the capability of our Gulf partners to push back 

themselves against Iran’s destabilizing actions. 

We all agree, as does the Congress, that the humanitarian crisis 

in Yemen is unacceptable. Last month, the Governments of Saudi 

Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provided $1 billion to Yemen’s humanitarian response appeal, and this complements the U.S. 

Government pledge of $87 million and more than $854 million contributed since beginning of fiscal year 2017. 

The Iranian regime is taking advantage, as I said, of regional 

conflict and instability to expand its influence and threaten its 

neighbors. We remain focused on neutralizing Iran’s influence, particularly its support for terror and militance, cyber warfare, ballistic missiles, and use of proxy forces. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, the 

Middle East is a complex landscape and the people in the Middle 

East deserve an end to violence, hunger, and uncertainty. 

We are working with our allies inside and outside the region to 

find solutions. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I welcome the opportunity to respond to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Satterfield follows:]

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Testimony 

Before the House Foreign Atlairs Conunittee 

U.S. Policy Toward a Turbulent Middle East 

Statement of 

David. M. Satterfield 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastem Affairs 

Aprill8, 2018 
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Chainnan Royce, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished Members of the 

Committee, thank you for inviting me and my colleague, Assistant Secretary Wess 

Mitchell, to testifY. As you know, the Middle East is a critical region and in recent 

years we have witnessed many changes. From the Arab Spring in 2011, to the 

current civil wars in Syria and Yemen, the rise and fall ofTSTS's so-called 

"Caliphate," no one would argue the many challenges we face in the region. 

However, in many places the United States has made positive strides. We have 

supported the grmvth of a nascent democracy in Tunisia. 

As 1 mentioned, there are challenges in the region and there are critical tmderlying 

needs. We are pressing for effective and democratic governance, vibrant civil 

societies, respect for the rule oflaw, protection of religious minorities and human 

rights. All of these issues form the fmmdation for long-term peace, stability, and 

prosperity in this region, which will play a critical role in advancing U.S. national 

security interests. 

Economically, the region continues to be a major destination for key U.S. exports, 

supporting American jobs. For example, we have supported arrangements for 

billions of dollars of sales to our partners in the Gulf; power generation solutions in 

Libya, Algeria, and Iraq; and locomotives in Egypt. And, as this Committee is 

well-aware, we have made significant progress against ISIS since 2014, when they 

first emerged, sweeping across Iraq and Syria, inflicting suffering on millions of 

civilians in the region and beyond. Now, they are barely holding on to only two 

percent ofthe territory once under their control. 

However, we are not blind to the continuing issues in the region, and the United 

States is taking the necessary steps, politically, militarily and economically to find 

solutions, along with our allies, to the region's greatest challenges. 
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On April 7, after weeks of heavy Syrian regime bombardment on the people of 

Douma, the last opposition-held enclave in East Ghouta, the regime deployed 

chemical weapons, killing dozens and injuring hundreds of innocent men, women 

and children. Unsurprisingly, the Russian and Syrian disinformation campaign 

began, blaming the opposition, smearing the names of heroic first responders and 

doctors such as the White Helmets and the Syrian American Medical Society, and 

even going further by claiming no chemical attack happened. 

On April 13, the militaries of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom 

executed strikes on three chemical weapons facilities involved in the research, 

production, and storage of chemical weapons in Syria. These strikes were focused 

on crippling Syria's chemical weapons capabilities and deterring the further use of 

chemical weapons, consistent with U.S. policy on Syria, and were taken atler 

considerable deliberation and intemational consultations and coordination. 

The United States has tried repeatedly to use diplomatic, economic, and political 

tools to stop the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons as Assad's supporters 

tum a blind eye. Russia has failed to live up to its guarantee in regard to the 2013 

Framework Agreement that Syria would cease all use of chemical weapons and 

tully declare its entire stockpile for verifiable destruction. And, Iran acts malignly 

in Syria - pouring resources and militias to support Assad and advance its regional 

ambitions. Against this backdrop, the targeted military action by the United States, 

France, and the United Kingdom against military targets cmmected to the Syrian 

chemical weapons program was justified and legitimate as a measure to deter and 

prevent Syria's illegal and tmacceptable use of chemical weapons. This targeted 

military action sends a powertul message to the Syrian regime, Russia, Iran, and 
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international community that chemical weapons will never be tolerated and there 

will be consequences for their use. 

While preventing the use of chemical weapons in Syria is our immediate concern, 

the Administration's priority remains the defeat ofTSIS. ISIS's so-called 

"Caliphate" is crumbling. lt has lost nearly all- approximately 98 percent- of the 

territory, it once controlled in Iraq and Syria. Coalition-backed military operations 

have liberated over 107,000 square kilometers ofterritory and millions of people 

from ISIS's oppressive rule in Iraq and Syria. However, we recognize current 

challenges, such as in Manbij, Syria, where U.S. forces are located. We have made 

it very clear to the Turkish government that we will continue to operate there and 

are working hard with our NATO ally to find a roadmap to a resolution. 

Our strategic partnership with Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, remains 

essential to ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS and to countering Iran's malign 

influence in the region. The Iraqi government is stabilizing communities, including 

minority communities that suffered greatly from ISIS, and now are beginning 

private sector-led, investment-driven reconstruction. Divisions in Iraq remain, but 

are healing. With our encouragement, strong leadership and guidance, after only 

six months, following the tmconstitutional referendum that caused tensions 

between the Iraqi Government and Kurdistan Regional Government, the two 

Governments have re-opened airports and resumed salary payments. Sorting out 

disputed bmmdaries and revenue sharing will take longer, but the parties are on the 

right path and the United States will remain engaged. All Iraqis, including the Iraqi 

Kurds, will participate in parliamentary elections on May 12, the country' s fourth 

since 2005. 
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Iran's malign influence in the region continues to threaten our allies like Jordan 

and Israel and exacerbates violent conflicts in Syria and Yemen with TRGC 

facilitation. The Houthis have repeatedly used Iranian ballistic missile and cruise 

missile technology and, as we saw as recently as April 11, have launched missiles 

toward Riyadh's international airport, Aramco facilities, and in the Red Sea 

shipping lanes. Moreover, the Houthis launch rockets along and into Saudi 

Arabia's southern border, threatening its population on an almost daily basis; this 

includes over 80,000 Saudi-based U.S. citizens. In this context, U.S. military 

support serves a clear purpose: to reinforce Saudi and Emirati action on behalf of 

the Yemeni govemment in the face of intensifying Houthi threats and to expand 

the capability of our Gulf partners to push back against Iran's regionally 

destabilizing actions. 

Long-tenn stability in Yemen depends on a sustainable political settlement. The 

new UN Envoy briefed the UN Security Council yesterday on his approach to 

reviving talks between the parties and we are fully supporting his efforts to end the 

civil war. This conflict is into a fourth year. We are urging the Saudis and 

Emiratis to work closely with the UN Envoy as he advances negotiations and a 

cessation of hostilities. 

We all agree the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is unacceptable, and last month, the 

Govemments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provided $1 billion to 

Yemen's humanitarian response. This complements the U.S. government pledge 

of $87 million, more than $854 million since the begitming of fiscal year 2017, and 

an additional $1 billion in contributions from other donors. We also worked with 

the World Food Program (WFP), the Saudi-led Coalition's Evacuation and 

Humanitarian Operations Cell, authorities in Dubai, and others to facilitate 
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delivery of the four U.S.-funded WFP mobile cranes, which arrived in Hudaydah 

port on January 15. Beyond humanitarian assistance, our economic and 

development assistance is helping to restore critical health services and access to 

education, repair community infrastructure, and provide help for the revival of 

production and commercial activities, the collapse of which is a major factor 

contributing to the wide-scale humanitarian disaster. 

The Iranian regime has taken advantage of regional conflicts and instability to 

aggressively expand its influence and threaten its neighbors. Supreme Leader 

Khamenei's primary tool and weapon in remaking Iran into a rogue state has been 

the IRGC. The IRGC has armed and guided Bashar al Assad, who has butchered 

his own people in Syria, and has cynically condoned his use of chemical 

weapons. Their presence in Syria has perpetuated the bloodshed, increased the 

displacement ofi1mocent people, and propped up the barbaric Assad regime. It's 

this attitude of reckless hostility and disregard for the laws and norn1s that tmderpin 

the international order that makes Iran so dangerous. Our partners in the 

international conununity agree with us that Iran's reckless behavior threatens 

international peace and security. They agree that Iran is fanning sectarianism and 

perpetuating regional conflict. They agree that Iran is engaged in corrupt 

economic practices that exploit the Iranian people and suppress both internal 

dissent, human rights and Iran's economic prosperity. For all these reasons, we 

want to work with our partners to constrain this dangerous organization, for the 

benefit of international peace and security, regional stability, and the Iranian 

people. 

The Administration remains focused on neutralizing Iran's threatening influence, 

particularly its support for terrorism and militants, cyberwarfare, ballistic missiles, 

and use of proxy forces in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Moreover, Iran's support for 
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the terrorist group Hizbollah allows it to further destabilize the region and 

threatens the stability and security of Lebanon. 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and Members of the Committee, the 

Middle East is a complicated landscape, and the people of the Middle East deserve 

an end to violence, hunger, and uncertainty and we are working with allies inside 

and outside the region to find the solutions. Thank you for the opportLmity to 

testify, 1 welcome the opportunity answer your questions. 
14

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Satterfield. 

Dr. Mitchell. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE A. WESS MITCHELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MITCHELL. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you. It’s an honor to represent the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs in this hearing. 

In my comments today, I will focus on the strategic dimension 

of the conflict in Syria as it relates to the work of our bureau and, 

specifically, to the part played by the Republic of Turkey and the 

Russian Federation. 

America’s goals in Syria have been to defeat ISIS, to see a Syria 

that is unified and stable emerge from the rubble of this conflict, 

and to prevent Iran, a power that aids and abets Hezbollah and 

that seeks the destruction of the state of Israel, from extending its 

malign influence in the region. 

Let us assess Turkey and Russia as they relate to these goals. 

Turkey is a 66-year member of the NATO Alliance and member of 

the Defeat ISIS Coalition. 

It has suffered more casualties from terrorism than any other 

ally and hosts 3.5 million Syrian refugees. It supports the coalition 

through the use of Incirlik Air Base, through its commitment of 

Turkish military forces against ISIS on the ground in Dabiq and 

Al-Bab, and through close intelligence cooperation with the United 

States and other allies. 

Turkey is publicly committed to a political resolution in Syria 

that accords with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254. 

Turkey has a vested strategic interest in checking the spread of 

Iranian influence and in having a safe and stable border with 

Syria. Despite these shared interests, Turkey lately has increased 

its engagement with Russia and Iran. 

Ankara has sought to assure us that it sees this cooperation as 

a necessary stepping stone toward progress in the Geneva process. 

But the ease with which Turkey brokered arrangements with the 

Russian military to facilitate the launch of its Operation Olive 

Branch in Afrin district, arrangements to which America was not 

privy, is gravely concerning. 

Ankara claims to have agreed to purchase a Russian S-400 missile system, which could potentially lead to sanctions under Section 

231 of CAATSA and adversely impact Turkey’s participation in the 

F-35 program. 

It is in the American national interest to see Turkey remain strategically and politically aligned with the West. Our policy has been 

to combine close engagement with clear messaging that the United 

States will actively defend our interests. 

In the context of Syria, we have engaged in high-level interagency discussions both to address legitimate Turkish security concerns and to avoid inadvertent collisions between our forces. 

These conversations are ongoing. Moving forward, our aim is to 

enlist Turkey as a more active ally in supporting the Geneva process, the defeat of ISIS, and stabilization in Syria, as well as a longVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 May 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\041818\29814 SHIRL
15

term factor in thwarting expansion by Russia and Iran, as outlined 

in the national security strategy and national defense strategy. 

Let us now turn to Russia. It is hard to see how Russia shares 

any of America’s strategic goals in Syria. Moscow professes a wish 

to defeat ISIS but directs its bombs at fighters and even civilians 

who oppose the regime, with little regard to ISIS. 

It professes to want a stable Syria but subverts the Geneva process with separate tracks like the Astana process where it dictates 

the agenda, and Moscow facilitates the spread of Iranian influence 

in Syria and elsewhere in the region. 

Moscow’s primary aims in Syria are not really about the Syrian 

people or the stability of the region. Moscow wants to retain its 

presence in Syria as an entry point through which to influence future events in the Levant and Eastern Mediterranean. 

It wants to inflict a globally visible defeat on the United States 

to create a negative demonstration effect of thwarting our aims 

here to dishearten our friends abroad and to drive wedges between 

us and our allies. 

Moscow is willing to impose catastrophic human costs to achieve 

these goals. Russia has supported the Assad regime’s indiscriminate attacks and siege tactics on civilian neighborhoods, which 

have killed, wounded, and starved thousands of innocent civilians. 

As we have seen in Aleppo and east Ghouta, the Russian Government not only supports, but goes to great lengths to protect, an 

Assad regime that uses weaponized chemicals, horrid killers like 

sarin and chlorine, to slaughter men, women, and children, even 

toddlers and infants. Let us remember that. 

We are pushing Russia to be a constructive participant in the 

U.N.-led Geneva process and to bring Assad to the negotiating 

table. 

So far, Russia has ignored these calls and has instead chosen to 

be a spoiler to Geneva. Its reckless intervention in Syria and support for the Assad regime has raised the risk of confrontation with 

the West. 

The failed attack on U.S. forces by Russian mercenaries recently 

in Syria was one sobering example of this behavior. America has 

done its part to avoid escalatory spirals. 

We have brokered and maintained deconfliction channels to prevent collisions in an increasingly congested and complex battle 

space. Communication between the coalition and the Russians 

helps minimize the risk of miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accidental engagement. 

We do not seek a confrontation, but our forces will not hesitate 

to use necessary and proportionate force to defend themselves as 

they are engaged in operations to defeat ISIS. 

Moscow’s support for the Syrian regime is intolerable for America 

and all civilized nations. In the days and weeks ahead, the United 

States and our allies will degrade and defeat ISIS, support a stable 

Syria, and limit the spread of Iranian malign influence. 

We will work with NATO ally, Turkey, to more fully advance 

these endeavors and push the Russian Government to desist in 

supporting a hateful regime that kills civilians and bring a speedy 

political resolution to this horrible conflict. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

16

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:]


29814b-1.eps

Testimony for Assistant Secretary Wess Mitchell 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Hearing on "U.S. Policy Toward a Turbulent Middle East" 

April18, 2018 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, distinguished members of the 

Conm1ittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. It is an honor to 

represent the State Department's Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs in this 

hearing. In my c011U11ents today, I will focus on the strategic dimension of the 

conflict in Syria as it relates to the work of our Bureau, and specifically, to the part 

played by the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation. 

America's goals in Syria have been: to defeat ISIS; to see a Syria that is lll1itied 

and stable emerge from the conflict; and above all to prevent Iran, that aids and 

abets Hezbollah and that seeks the destruction of the state of Israel, from extending 

its malign influence in the region. 

Let us assess Turkey and Russia as they relate to these goals. 

Turkey is a 66-year member ofthe NATO Alliance and member ofthe Defeat-ISIS 

Coalition. It has suffered more casualties from terrorism in the past several years 

than any other Ally and graciously hosts 3.5 million Syrian refugees. It performs a 

crucial role in support of the Coalition through use oflncirlik Air Base and other 

military facilities, through its commitment of Turkish military forces in 2016 to 

take the tight to ISIS on the grolll1d in Dabiq and Al-Bab, and through close 

intelligence cooperation with the United States and other allies. Turkey is publicly 

committed to a political resolution in Syria that accords with UN Security Colll1cil 

Resolution 2254. Turkey holds influence with key Syrian opposition groups, has 

invested in stabilization efforts in areas under its control, and can promote crossborder economic linkages that will be critical to any sustainable solution for 

liberated territory in northern territory. Turkey has a vested strategic interest in 

checking the spread of Russian and especially Iranian influence and in having a 

safe and stable border with Syria. 

Despite these shared interests, Turkey lately has increased its engagement with 

Russia and Iran. Ankara has sought to assure us that it sees this cooperation as a 

necessary stepping-stone towards progress in the Geneva process and as a means 

of de-escalating the contlict. But the ease with which Turkey brokered 

arrangements with the Russian military to facilitate the launch of its Operation 

Olive Branch in Afrin District - arrangements to which America was not privy - is 
17


29814b-2.eps

gravely conceming. Ankara should be mindful of the risks in making strategic 

concessions to Moscow in order to achieve its tactical objectives in Syria. Ankara 

claims to have agreed to purchase the Russian S-400 missile system, which could 

potentially lead to sanctions under section 231 of CAATSA and adversely impact 

Turkey's participation in the F-35 program. 

It is in the American national interest to see Turkey remain strategically and 

politically aligned with the West, and we believe it is also in Turkey's interests. 

Our policy has been to combine close engagement with clear messaging that the 

United States will actively defend its interests. In the context of Syria, we have 

engaged in high-level interagency discussions, both to address legitimate Turkish 

security concerns and to avoid inadvertent collisions between our forces. 

These conversations are ongoing. Moving forward, our aim is to enlist Turkey as a 

more active ally in supporting the Geneva process, the defeat of lSlS and lasting 

stabilization in Syria, as well as a long-tenn factor in thwarting expansion by 

Russia and lran, as outlined in the National Security and National Defense 

Strategies. 

Let us tum to Russia. 

It is hard to see how Russia shares any of America's strategic goals in Syria. 

Moscow professes a wish to defeat ISIS but directs its bombs at fighters and even 

civilians who oppose the regime. lt professes to want a stable Syria but subverts 

the Geneva process with separate tracks like the Astana process, where it dictates 

the agenda. And it actively facilitates the spread ofTranian influence in Syria and 

elsewhere in the region. 

Moscow's primary aims in Syria are not really about the Syrian people or the 

stability ofthe region. Moscow wants to retain its presence in Syria as an entry 

point through which to influence future events in the Levant and Eastern 

Mediterranean. It also wants to int1ict a globally visible defeat on the United 

States: to create a negative "demonstration effect" of thwarting our aims here to 

dishearten our friends abroad and to drive wedges between us and our allies. 

Moscow is willing to accept and impose catastrophic human costs to achieve these 

goals. Russia has supported the Assad regime's indiscriminate attacks and siege 

tactics on civilian neighborhoods, which have killed, wounded, and starved 

thousands of innocent civilians. As we have seen in Aleppo and now in east 

Ghouta, the Russian government not only supports, but goes great lengths to 

protect an Assad regime that uses weaponi:::ed chemicals- horrid killers like sarin 
18


29814b-3.eps

and chlorine -to slaughter im10cent men, women and children, including even 

toddlers and infants. Let us remember that. 

It has been clear for years now that the only viable path to a safe and secure Syria 

is through a political transition. This solution can only be achieved through a UNled Geneva process to fully implement UNSCR 2254. We are pushing Russia to 

be a constructive participant in this process and to bring Assad to the negotiating 

table. So far, Russia has ignored these calls and instead been a spoiler to Geneva. 

Worse, its reckless intervention in Syria and support for the Assad regime has 

raised the risk of confrontation with the West. The failed attack on U.S. forces by 

Russian mercenaries recently in Syria was one sobering example of this behavior; 

Moscow's aggressive rhetoric in the period leading up to and after the recent U.S.-

led strikes is another. 

America has done its part to avoid these escalatory spirals. We have brokered and 

maintain de-confliction channels to avoid collisions in an increasingly congested 

and complex battlespace. Communication between the Coalition and the Russians 

ensures the safety of our collective aircrews and assets. These eftorts help 

minimize the risk of miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accidental engagement. 

We do not seek a confrontation. But our forces will not hesitate to use necessary 

and proportionate torce to defend themselves as they are in engaged in operations 

to defeat TSTS and degrade ai-Qa'ida. 

Moscow's support for the Syrian regime is intolerable tor America and all civilized 

nations. 

In the days and weeks ahead, the United States and our allies will degrade and 

defeat ISIS, support a stable Syria, and limit the spread of Iranian malign 

influence. We will work with NATO Ally Turkey to cooperate with us more fully 

in these endeavors - and push the Russian govemment to desist in supporting a 

hateful regime that kills im1ocent civilians, and to bring a speedy, political 

resolution to this horrible conflict. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 
19

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Mitchell. 

You know, our delegations have met in many of the capitals 

across the Middle East with government that raised this same concern about the crescent that Iran is pushing now through Syria, 

through Iraq, up to Lebanon. 

And this question we get a lot—is this going to allow Iran to 

threaten Jordan, to threaten Israel? Will it mean the end of an 

independent Lebanon? What will it mean to the other partners, allies in the region? What’s the strategy? 

What’s the strategy, especially in Syria? And also in Iraq, I 

guess, but what is to be done to prevent the consolidation of that 

land bridge, as I said in my opening statement, from which we see 

the transfer now of these heavy weapons, of these missiles, of fighters coming right up to the Israeli border, right up, Lebanon now 

is called into question in terms of their ability to be an independent 

state. 

So I want to ask you about that strategy, and given that 

Hezbollah is Iran’s primary terrorist proxy, why have we not seen 

more designations of Hezbollah front companies, particularly in the 

construction sector, which I think would set them back? 

Ambassador. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, we certainly agree that Iran 

today is a real and imminent threat to our allies in the region, including Israel and Jordan. 

With respect to the strategy to deal with that threat, the first 

priority for the administration was the elimination of the challenge 

posed to all the states in the region and to any effort to constrain 

Iranian expansion and aggression posed by ISIS and its so-called 

caliphate. 

Now, that goal in Iraq has been accomplished and the campaign 

there is focused on what we might call counterterrorism efforts 

rather than an outright military campaign. 

In Syria, as I noted in my opening remarks, the challenge does 

remain. While ISIS’ caliphate has been dramatically reduced in 

terms of geographic scope and numbers, there is a remnant element up against the Iraqi border in the eastern Euphrates Valley 

that still has to be confronted and destroyed as we are confident 

it can and will be. 

But the challenge posed by Iran, the challenges posed by the connection that you note, from Iran, Iraq, Syria, to Lebanon has to be 

dealt with. 

We have been working assiduously in strengthening Iraqi forces 

in their ability to control the border with Syria. We have been 

working as well in northeast Syria where our forces are present in 

ensuring that trade of illicit nature across that border is constrained. 

But there needs to be continued approach by all of the countries 

in the region with the United States to what is a common threat 

not just to the U.S. and our interests, not just to Jordan and Israel 

alone, but to the Gulf as well by Iran’s hegemonistic ambitions and 

proliferation and we are working on mobilizing. 

Chairman ROYCE. Well, it seems to me—if I could just return to 

the dialogue that I think we all need to have on this—there has 

to be a strategy with respect to Syria about how we are going to 

20

deploy additional sanctions, diplomacy in terms of an effort to get 

a political solution, how we are going to perhaps put in safe zones 

and then expand those zones to protect those on the ground who 

are allies right now fighting ISIS that, obviously, will be targets of 

Assad. 

There needs to be a comprehensive strategy here laid out by the 

administration for Congress in terms of the options to pursue because of the urgency and also because of the fact that some of the 

initiatives we’ve taken here. 

We need Engel’s Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, as I said, 

which has unanimous support in the House. It would impose real 

costs on Assad and his backers for these war crimes and those 

backers—those backers are Iran and Russia. 

The administration has said on multiple occasions that Russia 

and Iran are complicit in Assad’s chemical weapons attacks. So I 

would just ask another question here: Does the administration support imposing costs on the Russians and the Iranians for their role 

in the Assad regime’s war crimes against its own people? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the administration has taken 

steps with respect to both Iran, Iranian-supported proxy forces, notably, Hezbollah, and with respect to Russia for engagement vicariously in the kind of proliferation, criminal behaviors, and actions 

both in Syrian and outside Syria that you reference, and we will 

continue to act aggressively to use the authorities available to us 

to that end. 

Chairman ROYCE. One area that I think is—if I could just close 

here—I hope that the Senate, with a lot of pressure from the administration and us, will move quickly on the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act in order to put this into law, and I think that 

that will help protect Syrian civilians but also help lay out a strategy. 

Thank you, and I go to Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I concur with all your remarks and your questions. 

I want to just say that when Secretary Tillerson outlined the administration’s intentions in Syria in his speech at the Hoover Institution, as the chairman mentioned, he laid out a whole list of goals, 

and I just hope that those goals remain goals that we are trying 

to move forward with. 

The problem is while ISIS is, obviously, the worst of the worst, 

the way I looked at Syria and still do is that our goal should not 

have been only the defeat of ISIS. That should have been one of 

our goals but should not have been the only goal. 

I really think that the defeat of Assad was a parallel goal and 

should have had the priority that it had and, unfortunately, I think 

under both the two administrations it really hasn’t been. 

Assad is just a butcher and a murderer and it just breaks my 

heart that we didn’t offer support to the Syrian people when they 

needed it the most. 

The Wall Street Journal reported this week that the administration was looking to set up an Arab force to take the place of U.S. 

troops in Syria. 

So let me ask either of you some questions. Who would contribute fighters to this force? How would the transition take place? 

21

Who would train the fighters? Would the United States continue to 

have some holding force? To what extent is this feasible, considering how thin the region is? 

Spread in Yemen, would Egypt send fighters to Syrian areas not 

controlled by Assad? Would the United State continue to provide 

air cover? How effective would these fighters be, considering we 

haven’t seen these forces be effective in Yemen or the Sinai? 

Those are just some questions about this. Can either one of you 

tell me about this Arab force and how much have we thought this 

out? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Ranking Member Engel, the President has 

made clear he wishes to see the U.S. continue and complete the 

campaign against ISIS in northeast Syria. 

The President has also made clear he believes that regional and 

local forces need to take on this struggle as they themselves are directly exposed to the consequences of the resurgence of ISIS. 

Therefore, we are reaching out to partners across the region to 

see what form of contribution, and not just financial, they may 

make to sustaining this fight beyond the destruction of ISIS. 

Mr. ENGEL. You see, while I agree with everything you have 

said, Ambassador, to me, ISIS is one prong of something—an important prong, but one prong of what we should be doing, and I 

really think to rid Syria of the butcher Assad ought to be as important as the—as our ISIS concerns. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I strongly agree with you that a Syria in which 

Assad remains as leader—this regime—is not a Syria which we 

would predict to be meaningfully secure or stable or not a source 

of generation threat and violent extremism under whatever name 

in the future and it’s why we have strongly supported a political 

process led by the U.N. 

Unfortunately, that political process has been blocked and the 

parties responsible for blocking it are quite clear it’s the Syrian regime itself and the Russians who, through their absence of pressure on the regime in Damascus, contributes to enables this freezing of a Geneva process which virtually the entire international 

community supports. 

Mr. ENGEL. And through their veto in the United Nations. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Exactly, sir. 

Mr. ENGEL. Is the State Department satisfied with the current 

communication channels in place with Russia to deconflict issues in 

Syria? 

Since Russia became militarily engaged in Syria, they’ve relied 

extensively on resupply by air. These flights, both military and 

chartered civil flights, cross the airspace of many of our partners 

including Georgia and Iraq. 

What discussions has the U.S. had with our partners about closing their respective air space to such Russian flights? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Ranking Member, our discussions in the 

deconfliction channel, which is quite robust with Russia, have focused on deconfliction of forces on the ground, in the air in Syria, 

but not on the broader areas that you touch on. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

22

We got to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Chairman Royce. Welcome to our panelists. 

I am hoping to get some clarification from the State Department 

on the current status of the PLO office. As we know, it is unlawful 

for the PLO to maintain an office in the United States. 

But for decades, the executive branch has had waiver authority 

to allow the office in DC to remain open. This waiver must be renewed every 6 months, and last November the administration allowed the waiver to lapse. 

The administration then had 90 days to issue a secondary waiver 

to allow the PLO office to remain open. That deadline passed in 

February and no waiver of any kind has been issued since. 

Interestingly, however, the administration issued its PLO commitments compliance report just last week, stating, as it always 

does, that the PLO has not lived up to its commitments. 

We sanctioned it by downgrading the status of the PLO office, 

then immediately waived that sanction in the interests of so-called 

national security, which is used so often. 

So my questions are under what authority is the PLO office currently remaining open? Why has it not been closed in accordance 

with the law? And I expect to hear that State believes this 90-day 

period for the secondary waiver starts the clock and is not the 

deadline. 

In other words, this waiver exists in perpetuity. The administration will never have to issue that secondary waiver and the PLO 

office will never have to close despite the underlying law—is that 

your interpretation? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I would be happy and I think it would be quite 

useful to provide to you a detailed written response on the different 

aspects of the question. But I can give you a broad overall summary. 

In consultation with the Department of Justice, which has the direct authority in interpreting the consequences of the failure to 

waive originally, we have allowed the office to remain not open in 

a formal status as has been downgraded, but to remain able to 

communicate in support of peace negotiations. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Are there such peace negotiations underway? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We believe the continued purposes of the office 

meet that requirement. But, again, I would like to provide you with 

a detailed response to the different aspects of the questions you 

asked. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, I look forward to conversing later with 

you and receiving that correspondence. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Happy to. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Because I am really interested about the authority under which it remains open. It seems to me that it’s very 

unlawful. 

But moving to Lebanon, there are elections in just a few weeks 

in which Iran and Hezbollah will manage to maintain their position, probably strengthen it, and Secretary Tillerson has said that 

we have to recognize the reality that Hezbollah is part of the political process in Lebanon. 

23

Could you unpack that for us, explain State’s position and interaction with Hezbollah? Do we have the same position in regards to 

Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces? 

Thank you. Thank you to both. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We regard Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. We both designate members of Hezbollah and those associated 

with Hezbollah’s support as well as entities that are involved with 

Hezbollah. 

That hasn’t changed. That remains and is vigorously pursued. 

With respect to the Lebanese elections, we certainly support a free 

and fair election in Lebanon. 

With respect to the outcome you will understand I don’t want to 

prejudice by my comments those outcomes. But I would say, broadly speaking, we do not see the likelihood of a dramatic change in 

the political constellation—the balance that marks Lebanese electoral politics or the National Assembly today. 

With regard to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah, I do 

want to be clear. The United States has provided exceptional support for the Lebanese Armed Forces in recent years and not just 

financial support. 

It’s not simply a dollars and sense issue. We have personnel 

working closely with and in the Lebanese Armed Forces. This gives 

us an insight and a view into how those forces function that we’ve 

never had in the past and I can say here on the record we do not 

believe that the Lebanese Armed Forces are anything other than 

a legitimate institution of the Lebanese state, and I would note 

that in strengthening that legitimate institution you effectively 

counter the illegitimate security structures, militias, principally 

Hezbollah, which pose a challenge to the state and its authority. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much for a thorough answer, 

Mr. Ambassador, and I echo the chairman’s desire to see more designation and sanctioning of Hezbollah affiliates. 

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. And we go now to Brad Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Take a breather. I’ve got about 3 minutes where 

I will preview questions for the record. You can answer those later, 

then I will have some questions for you to respond to orally. 

First, when are you going to fill all the important positions at the 

State Department? As the ranking member pointed out, that’s critical. 

As to Qatar, they have diplomatic contacts with Hamas and the 

Taliban. So do we. They have media that some people accuse of 

being pro-terrorist. So do we. So does Israel. 

The real question here is does Qatar currently give money to terrorist organizations or allow its citizens to do so. 

Saudi Arabia wants a nuclear program, wants a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. Just because Saudi Arabia 

is anti-Iran does not mean they’ve embraced the values of Jeffersonian democracy. 

I don’t think a nuclear weapon in Saudi Arabia brings us closer 

to peace. I met the Crown Prince. Many are impressed by the 

Crown Prince. But many were impressed by the Shah of Iran in 

1979 and by 1980 all the weapons he had acquired were in the 

hands of the Islamic Republic. 

24

So my question is, what are we doing to prevent Saudi Arabia 

from engaging in enrichment or reprocessing of fissile material? 

Japan benefits from the U.S. defense umbrella. It seeks a veto 

over the terms of any deal we make with North Korea. Is Japan 

contributing sufficiently to the enormous financial costs that we 

face in the Middle East? 

Next, Turkey—should it continue to enjoy the faster review period for arms exports that we give to other NATO countries, given 

that it is, at best, the least pro-American NATO member? 

Syria—we have three objectives there: Defeat ISIS and enforce 

the chemical warfare convention—those are two objectives that we 

seem to have a reasonable strategy for. 

Our third objective is to help the Syrian people live in safety, 

peace, and with good governance. Congress has proposed a strategy 

here. We had bills passed through this committee. But does the administration have a strategy or is this something we simply can’t 

achieve at a cost the American people will accept? 

Second as to Syria, assuming Assad is in power even 2 or 3 years 

from now, why shouldn’t we allow the Kurds to have sovereignty? 

Why should we insist that they continue to live in a country driven 

by war, Assad, Russia, Iran, Hezbollah? 

Iran—here I will actually have a quesiton—the argument is that 

we should renounce the JCPOA because, well, Obama negotiated 

and it was bad then so it should cease to exist now. 

The question is really what is the legal effect of voiding the 

JCPOA. Well, the legal effect on Iran is that they’re now entitled 

to start enriching. 

The legal effect on Russia is they are the custodian of the many 

bombs worth of fissile material that Iran turned over when they 

got their money at the beginning of the JCPOA and Putin could 

say, well, if the deal is void I am returning the fissile material to 

Iran. 

And third—and this is thought to be the good part—if the 

JCPOA fails to exist, then the United States and its allies are free 

to start new sanctions on Iran. 

So the question is, is that good part of renunciation illusory. 

John Kerry sat exactly where you’re sitting now, Ambassador, and 

told this committee that even after the JCPOA we can adopt harsh 

sanctions on Iran, anything, as long as it’s proportionate to Iran’s 

wrongdoing outside the nuclear arena. 

Well, Iran helps Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, and those 

are just the terrorist organizations that start with the letter H. 

So the question is does voiding the JCPOA or taking an action 

that Putin and Tehran could claim is voiding the JCPOA just play 

into their hands, giving them legal rights—and should we instead 

just sanction them proportionate to their nonnuclear evil? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Mr. Sherman, excellent questions for the 

record and we’ll respond to you in detail on all of those. 

With respect to your last question, it is the intent of the administration at this moment to fix the JCPOA. Those diplomatic efforts 

are underway quite actively with our key European partners. We 

hope they produce a successful result. That’s our focus at the moment, nothing else. 

Chairman ROYCE. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

25

We go to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for convening 

this very important hearing and welcome to Ambassador 

Satterfield and Dr. Mitchell. Thank you for your extraordinary 

service and leadership. 

I would also like to just note that Nick Rahall, former Member 

of Congress from West Virginia, a very distinguished member, is 

here with us and it’s great to see him again. 

Let me just ask a few questions—at least five. I have many more 

but I won’t allow more than that. 

On Monday, American Pastor Andrew Brunson endured a 12-

hour-long hearing on the groundless terrorism charges he faced 

with our Ambassador-at-Large for religious freedom. Sam 

Brownback in attendance as well as Senator Thom Tillis. 

At the end of the hearing, he was remanded in custody until his 

next court date in May. Is it the opinion of the department that 

somehow diplomacy will effectuate his release or is it time, when 

taken together with all the other religious repression that Erdogan 

is practising and other Turkish leaders have done previous, to look 

at Turkey as a CPC (country of particular concern) pursuant to the 

IRFA legislation? 

Second, in 2004, I authored a law to establish a special envoy to 

combat anti-Semitism. Nita Lowey and I just wrote an op-ed that 

has been carried by a number of publications appealing to the administration and the incoming Secretary of State. We could not get 

to first base, unfortunately, with Secretary Tillerson. 

I met with him. We just could not get him to say, let’s do it—

let’s pick. It is congressionally mandated so I do hope that very 

critical position will be filled and filled quickly. 

Third, and just like my good friend Eliot Engel and the frustration of the Senate not taking up a bill, H.R. 390, the Iraq and Syria 

Genocide Emergency Humanitarian Relief and Accountability Act, 

which I worked on for 4 years, held 10 congressional hearings—the 

Christians were not getting help from the previous administration, 

despite promises to look at it. 

I went over there and met with a number of the Christians. I 

know that the Vice President has been—as well as the head of 

USAID, Mark Green, looking at this. Those people need help. 

If it wasn’t for the Knights of Columbus and others providing upwards of $60 million of private aid, we would have had dead children and very sick adults and elderly in—who—you know, the 

Christians who escaped ISIS. 

So, please, that legislation needs to pass. It also has an accountability piece so that we can bring charges with facts against those 

who have committed these crimes. 

Fourth, on UNRRA, I just looked at some recent very, very, compelling testimony about the anti-Semitism and the anti-Americanism that’s contained in the textbooks. 

We are going to do a hearing on my subcommittee on this shortly 

joint with Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who has been very, very focused on 

that as well. It’s not getting better. It’s, arguably, getting worse. 

And finally, the cash payments that were made to Iran—the Iranian deal, in my opinion, was egregiously flawed on a number of 

fronts anytime, anywhere, all the other reasons. 

26

But where is that money going? How has it been spent and how 

much? Are we, through that sanctions relief, providing assistance 

to the troops that are being deployed to Syria? 

Hezbollah is getting money, we know, from Iran. Is that part of 

the sanctions relief money? If you could answer those questions I 

would be deeply appreciative. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Congressman, thank you for those questions, and 

you have raised some very important issues. Let me quickly deal 

with two of the issues that you have raised. 

First of all, Pastor Brunson—this is a matter of considerable 

focus and concern for the State Department and from my bureau, 

from me personally. 

I visited with Pastor Brunson’s wife, Noreen, in Ankara not long 

ago. We are in close and continuing touch with Pastor Brunson, 

with his family members, and with the Turkish Government. 

There was a hearing on Monday. Senator Tillis was there and so 

was Ambassador Brownback. I would just say this: The Turks 

claim to have a very high standard of justice. The indictment suggests otherwise. The claims in the indictment were laughable. This 

is clearly an innocent man. 

We are watching to see if the Turks adhere to their stated standards of justice. If that does not happen, we are considering options 

for consequences. 

We are in close coordination, in touch with the Senate and the 

House in talking through some of those possible measures. But I 

want to underscore that we take it very seriously. 

Secondly, on Holocaust issues, anti-Semitism is a growing problem throughout many parts of Europe. The Office of Holocaust 

Issues is housed in our bureau—European Affairs. 

I established for our team, when I came into my job, that this 

would be a very high priority for us. I don’t have anything—any 

comments to make at this time about the role that you have mentioned. 

I will simply say that that matter is under consideration. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. With respect to assistance to the Christian and 

other minority communities in the Nineveh Plains, this is indeed, 

as you noted, an object of special focus for the administration. 

The Vice President has led on this effort and we continue to engage. As you know, I believe, we have provided extraordinary assistance beyond that previously or generally allocated for the communities of Iraq specifically for the purpose of assisting these communities and we see this as a very positive direction. 

On UNRRA, again, the President has made very clear that we 

are examining quite closely every dollar of taxpayer money that 

has been or may be expended for the purposes of support of 

UNRRA, and at present, the administration does not have plans for 

any additional funding. 

We will review that issue based upon that careful consideration 

of where the moneys are going, what other support exists for 

UNRRA amongst regional parties, international parties, and the 

purposes for which it goes. 

Finally, on the JCPOA and the specific question you posed on 

money, I would like to be able to respond to your question in a different format, not here in an open session. 

27

But we can get you responses to your question. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Greg Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, let me just follow up on that dealing with the 

JCPOA, real quick, in your last response to Mr. Sherman. 

I, as the ranking member, I’ve talked to a lot of the E3. I’ve 

talked to folks about our allies in the military, in Israel, et cetera. 

They’ve all come back and said to me that the JCPOA, for the 

limited purpose of which it was agreed upon, is working—that—

and so they have extreme concerns about us moving out. 

They say for the limited purpose of preventing Iran from having 

a nuclear weapon, given the terms of the agreement, they’re much 

better off. They know more about the Iranian nuclear program 

than they’ve ever known before, et cetera. 

So you said that—what needs to be fixed as far as what that purpose is? Can you tell us that? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. There are three critical deficiencies we identify 

both in the JCPOA, more importantly, in the frame around the 

JCPOA. 

One is the absence of sanctions addressed to Iran’s ICBM—that 

is, long-range and their continental range ballistic missile program. 

The second is the matter of inspection authority for IAEA in certain types of institutions in Iran, which are not, in our view, adequately laid out, empowered within the JCPOA text. 

And finally, the so-called sunset clauses—that is the sunsetting 

of restrictions on critical elements of the enrichment program and 

enrichment cycle where we wish to see essentially through a frame 

or follow-on agreement to the JCPOA and elimination of those sunsets. 

Now, we are engaged in detailed discussions with the E3—with 

our critical European partners. Those discussions are ongoing, literally, today and we very much hope they come to a positive resolution. 

Mr. MEEKS. And if they don’t? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We will address that situation at the level of 

the President. But we are focused now on achieving the success. 

Mr. MITCHELL. And can I add a point on that, sir, if I may? 

You mentioned our allies, and I can speak a little bit to that. I 

think there is a recognition in Europe and among our allies that 

the problem of Iran is growing in scale, specifically the ballistic 

missile problem, the problem of Iran’s malign influence across the 

region. Even in the period since JCPOA was brokered, the scale on 

which Iran is exerting its influence across the region has increased 

considerably. I think there’s also a recognition that this is a set of 

problems for which Europe should take increased responsibility. 

That’s a message that I hear on a regular basis in our bureau’s 

interaction with officials from major U.S. allies in Europe. 

Mr. MEEKS. Are we ready to walk away from our allies and we 

are also talking about part of that agreement is China and Russia, 

and given what’s going on with them right now so that we are virtually dividing the signatories of the JCPOA. 

And so you say we’ll take it up at that time but this was a multilateral agreement that, from what I am getting, everyone says Iran 

28

has not violated and, at the same time, we are in about the process 

of negotiating an agreement with North Korea about our word and 

whether we stand by it or not. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Mr. Meeks, I can only reiterate, the administration is focused on success here. We are focused on obtaining support from our critical allies to cure what we regard as significant 

failures both in the agreement and things that were not negotiated 

at the time of the agreement but now pose a real threat. 

And as Assistant Secretary Mitchell said, the dialogue with our 

European allies has been a positive one and we hope it is one that 

leads to a comprehensive resolution. 

Mr. MEEKS. I don’t know about the policies but the President has 

said something else other than what you have said that he’s willing 

to pull out. 

The message we’ve gotten from the President is that we are willing to leave our allies and change what the agreement was because 

I think that’s what the concerns of our allies are that we are fundamentally changing what the agreement was. And so we’ll see 

how it goes and where we’ll end up. But I think it’s a very dangerous situation. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Secretary Mitchell, last month in Kosovo, six 

Turkish nationals were kidnapped and sent back against their will 

to Turkey, where they are imprisoned. They were members of the 

Gulen movement, and it’s somewhat of a scandal in Kosovo. 

We have in Turkey now is a government that’s willing not only 

to oppress its own people which, as we know, has been—they’ve 

been arrested by the thousands but now is projecting itself into Europe and conducting itself in instances like I just described. 

Quite frankly, the tone of your testimony today was certainly not 

someone that seemed to be alarmed about the misdirection of Turkey, and are we going to be giving them those F-35s? 

Do you believe that we should continue treating Turkey as it 

evolves into this radical Islamic government and continue to treat 

them as if they were our allies of 10, 15, 20 years ago? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you for those questions, sir. Let me start 

with the issue of Kosovo and just say that we followed that development very closely. 

It was a very concerning development and we have been in touch 

closely with officials in Kosovo on this matter and underscored the 

importance of the rule of law as it relates to matters of extradition. 

So——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Have we been in touch with the Turkish on 

this? 

Mr. MITCHELL. We are in ongoing conversations with the Turkish 

authorities about a number of matters. With respect to Gulen, that 

is primarily——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, no, no, on a number of matters—on the 

Gulen kidnapping of these people in Kosovo, are we now confronting the Turks on this? 

Mr. MITCHELL. We have raised it in our diplomatic conversations. It’s primarily a matter for the Department of Justice. 

29

But let me take on the broader question that you raised about 

Turkey because I think it’s absolutely essential for today’s discussion and I do want to be clear. 

We are concerned about the track that Turkey is on both with 

regard to democracy and rule of law and the period since the attempted coup, and in a broader geopolitical sense. The coordination 

with Russia and Iran is very concerning. I would also say that the 

track that Erdogan has repeatedly articulated publicly, of closer engagement with the Russians on S-400, we take this seriously and 

have prioritized that in our diplomatic conversations with the 

Turks. 

We have been very clear that if a transaction occurs there will 

be consequences under CAATSA, that we will abide by the law as 

articulated in Section 231. 

We’ve also been very clear with regard to the consequences for 

potential participation in the F-35 program and, more broadly, our 

military industrial cooperation with Turkey. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I would hope that we also are paying 

attention to the fact that Turkey is involved with radical Islamic 

organizations now. I don’t know how deeply. We don’t know how 

extensive that is but we do know that it’s turned that corner and 

heading in that direction. 

Secretary Satterfield, what is our purpose in Syria? Will we accept anything less than—would we accept a compromise that would 

keep Assad in power at least in part of Syria or is our goal and 

our purpose only to totally eliminate the Assad government? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Mr. Rohrabacher, our purpose of our forces in 

Syria, as Secretary Mattis, Chairman Dunford have stated repeatedly, is to defeat ISIS. 

The purpose of our diplomacy of our international engagement 

with respect to Syria is to support a political process which, at its 

end, has a revised constitution, elections conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, and our belief is that those elections, 

if freely and fairly conducted amongst all Syrians including the 

emigre Syrian communities, would not produce the survival of the 

Assad regime. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, let me just note, what you described wasn’t just Syria but probably three-quarters of the countries of the Middle East, and if we made those demands, why is it 

that Syria—we have to make those demands against Syria and not 

against all these other countries in the Middle East? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Because, sir, of the extraordinary depredations 

of this regime in this country against its citizens, because of the 

extraordinary and historically unprecedented in modern times outflow——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You don’t think the rest of the countries in 

the Middle East have similar track records? You’re trying to tell 

me that—well, we heard the same thing, of course, about Saddam 

Hussein. We heard the same thing about Qaddafi and we end up 

creating total chaos—total chaos in that part of the world. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. No regime in modern history in the Middle 

East, including Saddam Hussein’s——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

30

Mr. SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Has killed as many of its own citizens, has produced external and internal displacement of its own 

citizens on the scale of the Assad regime. No. It’s unique, sadly. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me just say, Mr. Ambassador, you 

read history differently than I do. That is an area that is filled with 

dictators. It’s filled with authoritarian regimes, filled with our allies that if the people rose up against them as they’re rising up 

against Assad—he’s a bad guy, he’s a dictator, he’s everything you 

said—but he’s not that different from these other regimes. Once 

they are challenged—once they were challenged don’t tell me the 

Qatar Government wouldn’t mow down all of their guest workers 

if there was an uprising in Qatar, and vice versa, with these other 

regimes. 

I am very disturbed by the fact that we are sliding into a war 

and not having an out that will not lead us to major military commitments to that region. That would be a disaster and I think it’s 

based on the analysis that you just said, that Assad is somewhat 

different than everybody else. I don’t think so. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Assistant Secretary. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Albio Sires of New Jersey. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Chairman, for holding this hearing and 

thank you for being here. 

One of the concerns that I have is the buildup of the Iranians 

as they’re getting closer and closer to Israel. I mean, they now have 

7,000 fighters. Israel lost a plane recently. 

This encroachment—how are we going to respond to this? It just 

seems to be getting bigger and bigger, and my concern is one day 

they’re just going to try to push even closer. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. There is no question that the aggressive Iranian projection of its influence, forces associated with Iran, Iran’s 

Revolutionary Guard Corps directly, and aggressive proliferation of 

advanced systems into Syria and through Syria into Lebanon pose 

a real and, as I said, imminent threat to Israel. 

Israel, of course, is taking its own actions to address this challenge but, more importantly or as importantly, the U.S. and Israel 

are deeply lashed up, and I mean that in every sense of the word, 

in terms of our own cooperation and coordination in trying to better 

address, more effectively address this challenge. 

Mr. SIRES. And it seems like Putin wants the Israelis not to do 

any other strikes against this Syrian backed-group. To me, Putin 

has just, again, injected himself in the middle of this again. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I won’t comment on that assertion. Israel acts 

on its own based on its own calculus regarding risk and benefit. 

But I will say this. 

We’ve made very clear in our dialogue with Russia, and we’ve 

had an extensive dialogue with Russia on the issue of Syria and 

broader questions including that of Iran and Iran’s activities for 

some time. 

We’ve made the basic question to Moscow, how do you see it as 

in Moscow’s interest to entwine yourself with this regime, with this 

Iran, and these Iranian activities. 

We see nothing good in the future for Russia out of this and 

that’s a question, unfortunately, which has not been adequately responded to. 

31

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

Going to Egypt, I note that the North Koreans have their Embassy there and I think, through the Embassy, they do a lot of 

arms sales in this part of the world. 

I was wondering what kind of pressure are we asserting to make 

the North Koreans stop there or have the Egyptians stop this effort. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Former Secretary Tillerson exercised authority 

granted him by the Congress to suspend or withhold, rather, $195 

million from FMF provided to Egypt and that suspension continues. 

There are several conditions, which we have discussed with the 

Egyptian Government at the most senior levels for consideration of 

release of those funds. 

One of those conditions is a downgrading and, in some cases, 

more than a downgrading of the Egyptian diplomatic presence in 

Pyongyang, the North Korean diplomatic presence in Cairo, and 

the general character of that relationship. 

It is absolutely part of a very material discussion with the Egyptians. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

And one concern that I have also in Egypt—my time is running 

out—but I have written a number of letters regarding the situation 

with Coptic Christians in Egypt, in terms of making sure that 

they’re able to express their religion, making sure that they’re safe. 

I was wondering what kind of pressure are we putting in Egypt 

now that el-Sisi supposedly got 97 percent of the vote to help with 

this situation. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We have had a dialogue with all elements of 

the Egyptian Government, including President el-Sisi directly, who 

received significant support from the Coptic community in his reelection with respect to the need for full exercise of Coptic Christian rights in Egypt. 

This is, I don’t have to tell anyone on this committee, a sensitive 

issue in Egypt but is one we continue to pursue. 

Mr. SIRES. I am more concerned about the security of the Coptic 

Christians in this country. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. That is an issue which President el-Sisi himself has repeatedly and publicly expressed as his concern and he 

has, indeed, taken steps to address that particular issue—the 

threat by radical Islamist movements against the Copts. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you very much. 

We go to Joe Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Ed Royce and 

Ranking Member Eliot Engel, for having this important hearing on 

turbulence in the Middle East. 

And first, Dr. Mitchell, I want to thank you for your efforts for 

Pastor Brunson. We appreciate Congressman Chris Smith for raising the issue and then I was very pleased to see your personal interest as significant and all that can be done to address that issue 

with our NATO ally, Turkey. 

32

And as we address the topic of turbulence in the Middle East—

and thank both of you for being here—a concern I’ve always had, 

how do we identify friendly or democratic allies in Syria. 

We have 2,000 troops in Syria. Who are we advising to correctly 

support regime change of the barbaric dictator, Assad? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The purpose of our military deployment of 

those 2,000 troops in northeast Syria is to conclude the campaign 

to defeat ISIS. 

In that campaign, we have associated ourselves with the Syrian 

democratic forces, a Kurdish and Arabic group in the north and 

northeast who have fought alongside us in this campaign. 

We have made very clear the issue of regime change is not a purpose of our military deployment. It is the defeat of ISIS. The purpose of the international political process in Syria is to see the Syrian people, all of them, able to make a choice in a free and fair 

manner to choose the kind of regime, the kind of governance they 

want, and we have said repeatedly we do not believe that choice 

would, in the end, produce a continuation of Assad or his regime. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I want to thank you. That’s about the best description we’ve had over the years of being here and discussing 

Syria. So thank you very much. 

And for both of you, the Revolutionary Guard is one of the main 

elements in spreading Iran’s malign influence in the Middle East, 

such as in Lebanon and in Syria. 

What specific steps does the administration take to diminish the 

Iranian influence across the Middle East? What is the strategy to 

prevent Iran from filling the vacuums created by instability in the 

region, particularly as ISIS is being defeated and withdrawing? 

And how active are the Revolutionary Guards outside of the Middle East, where are they active? And then another point about Iranian-backed militias, why are they not being identified as terrorist 

organizations? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The administration has aggressively pursued 

the sources of IRGC support from a financial standpoint and material standpoint, has designated members of the Revolutionary 

Guard Corps for their involvement in terrorist activities. 

That step by this administration was quite unprecedented, as the 

IRGC is an entity of a government, a state. 

It is extremely unusual to sanction it. We have done for their involvement in terrorist acts. They are a multifaceted multipresent 

organization not just in Syria and Lebanon but in Yemen as well. 

They conduct subversive activities, directly or indirectly, in the 

Persian Gulf. We are dealing with all of these challenges. 

Now, how do we do that? Of course, there are sanctions to get 

at the heart, the arteries of support. But more broadly speaking, 

by strengthening legitimate institutions of legitimate states, you 

push back against a vacuum which Iran takes advantage of. 

By trying—and Yemen is a particular case here—to bring an end 

to the conflict in Yemen you try to heal or close over the cracks, 

the fissures that Iran quite adroitly exploits to its advantage. 

Iran will look like the thief going down a corridor in the night 

for any opportunity to go through a partly opened door, an unlocked door, a fully open door. 

33

We want to close that as much as possible. So it’s a broad approach to a broad and multifaceted problem. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate too that you are recognizing that 

the IRGC (Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) is separate 

from the Iranian military and so, indeed, acting independently but 

achieving, sadly, such turmoil. 

Additionally, the administration has not yet reinforced sanctions 

on any entities where sanctions were lifted on the Iranian nuclear 

deal. 

What steps is the State Department taking to address Iran’s illicit activities including support for terrorism, arms trafficking, 

human rights abuses, and ballistic missile development? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I think the key area or the key sector that 

your question strikes to is in the aviation industry and the administration is actively considering what steps would be appropriate. 

This is not an easy issue because of the extensive involvement 

of many corporate entities in broad support for aviation entities in 

Iran. We are looking at this very carefully. We have reached no decisions. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, we appreciate your service, each of you. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you and 

Ranking Member Engel for ensuring this committee has the opportunity to engage with the administration in the timely manner on 

recent events in the Middle East. 

I would like to echo my colleagues in voicing our concern with 

continued vacancies in key leadership positions at the department. 

I hope that Director Pompeo moves quickly to fill those roles. 

Ambassador Satterfield, we know and we firmly believe that you 

are more than capable of performing the job as Assistant Secretary. 

This is in no way a criticism of your abilities. But we are 15 

months into this administration and there is still no confirmed Assistant Secretary for the Middle East. 

I would also like to associate myself with the ranking member’s 

comments on the international affairs budget. We are deeply grateful to our civil and Foreign Service personnel to commit themselves 

to doing work that is sometimes dangerous, that keeps them away 

from their families, and that doesn’t get a whole lot of credit from 

the American people. 

But diplomacy and foreign aid is immeasurably critical to our national security. Military might is not something that can be exercised in the absence of diplomacy. The two must work hand in 

hand. 

Before I ask my questions, I would also implore both of you to 

make the return of Americans held in Iran, particularly my constituent, Robert Levinson—the longest held American hostage—a 

serious priority. 

Even if the President potentially disengages from Iran, we cannot allow whatever decision is made on the nuclear file to impact 

our efforts to bring Bob home to his family. 

I would ask for the commitment of both of you to make that a 

priority and to engage as much as possible with the Levinson family. 

34

And finally, before turning to my questions, I would just like to 

respond to my colleague who suggested that Assad is doing what 

any leader in the region would do. 

The answer to that is no. We must be horrified and furious about 

the butcher who drops barrel bombs on schools and hospitals, who 

uses chemical weapons against civilians. 

The slaughter of over 1⁄2 million people shocks our conscience in 

Syria as it would and must shock our conscience in any other country in the region or in any place on this planet. 

Now, I have many concerns about the administration’s lack of cohesive and coherent foreign policy in the region. I am confused, to 

say the least, that the administration seems to be actively pursuing 

Middle East peace, bolstering our relations with Israel, acknowledging the reality that yes, Jerusalem is indeed the capital of 

Israel while at the same time seemingly leaving Israel the fend for 

itself by taking real kinetic action when it comes to the Iranian 

presence in Syria. 

The administration has been reluctant to confront Russia in a 

range of areas but particularly for its enabling of Assad and its 

turning a blind eye to Iran and Hezbollah’s actions in Syria. 

And just when it seems like the administration might actually 

take meaningful steps to sanction Russia for its actions in Syria, 

the President pulls back only after Ambassador Haley had made 

the announcement. 

And to put the blame on her for being confused about the policy 

decision only furthers the disjointed mixed message foreign policy 

this administration has been sending to our allies from day one. 

I believe Ambassador Haley when she clearly stated, ‘‘I don’t get 

confused.’’

So I would ask you, Ambassador Satterfield, as the President is 

talking tough on Iran with respect to the JCPOA, he doesn’t appear 

to be acting tough on Iran in Syria. What’s the strategy to actually 

counter Russian and Iran’s very real and dangerous enabling of 

Assad, Iran’s establishment of bases in Syria and support for 

Hezbollah that threaten to seriously destabilize and threaten our 

allies and the region? 

And specifically—I will try to make this as clear as possible—is 

the United States relying on Russia to influence Iran—let’s start 

with that question. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. First, let me affirm, our efforts in support of 

all of the Americans who have been detained, held hostage, missing 

in Iran, will continue. 

We take these concerns very seriously. We are in touch with all 

the families including the Levinsons, and we’ll do all that we can 

to deal with this very difficult and very painful issue. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. With respect to Iran in Syria, we certainly 

identify the threat and the challenge, not just Israel but to the region as a whole, and we have identified those concerns not only in 

our exceptional dialogue with Israel and the Israel security——

Mr. DEUTCH. Ambassador Satterfield, I apologize. I don’t wish to 

be rude. But I just had a few questions. 

So the first one is does the United States rely on Russia to influence Iran in the region? 

35

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We have certainly made clear to Moscow that 

we see no reason, no logic in Moscow enabling either by action or 

inaction what Iran is doing in Syria or elsewhere in the region. 

We see it as a threat to Russia over time, yes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And if Russia is unwilling or unable to provide assurances that the Syrian regime or its associated forces like 

Hezbollah or other Iranian-backed proxy forces will cease violence 

in these areas, what’s the next option for the United States policy 

in Syria? What do we do then? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. With respect to Russia, I will defer to my colleague. But we have a variety of means at our disposal which are 

under constant and active consideration to try to bring about the 

kinds of mitigation of harm, mitigation of risk that we are all seeking on Syria. 

Those decisions lie, in many cases, with the President himself. 

Mr. MITCHELL. I would only—thank you for the question, sir. 

I think that’s a critical issue. I would only add to that that in 

addition to the humanitarian dimension important to the strikes, 

I think a secondary effect was to demonstrate for all parties, including the Russian Federation, the seriousness of the United 

States in this conflict. 

I would add that there are measures under consideration including measures that stem from CAATSA. Those are under ongoing 

consideration and we will take additional steps against the Russian 

Federation as needed. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, with all due respect, why should we believe 

that when there—it was announced that we were going to impose 

sanctions only to have the President or those close to the President 

essentially throw the U.N. Ambassador under the bus, saying that 

she didn’t know what she was doing? 

Why should we believe you when you come here and say that we 

are serious about the possibility of imposing sanctions? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, the reason you should believe me, sir, is 

that since January of last year this administration has implemented sanctions against 189 individuals and entities in Russia including 136 under Ukraine authorities and 24 under CAATSA authorities. 

So for your—the main part of your question, I would say, we 

have credibility with regard to toughness on Russia. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Was our credibility threatened at all by the interaction over the past few days——

[Simultaneous speaking.] 

Chairman ROYCE. If I could make the point—we are over by a 

couple of minutes and—yes. So let’s go to Mr. Scott Perry of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

I just want to respond a little bit to my friend and colleague, who 

I respect, regarding the administration’s dealing with Russia. 

The last administration obliterated decades of foreign policy that 

was bipartisan that generally in large part kept Russia out of the 

Middle East and out of meddling there, and this administration 

has been left to pick up the pieces. 

And with regard to leaving Israel, left alone to be the only one 

providing kinetic activity in Syria, I remind the gentleman that the 

36

last administration provided none except for harsh rhetoric while 

this administration has had rounds impacting on the ground in 

Syria. 

And with that said, I think I want to turn to Dr. Mitchell here. 

Iran provides Hezbollah with approximately $800,000 annually, 

trains thousands of their fighters in camps in Iran. 

Hezbollah possess approximately 150,000 missiles. Hezbollah 

provides construction facilities near Israel to produce more of these 

munitions. 

In that context, Hezbollah is—the former Secretary of State described Hezbollah as part of the political process in Lebanon and 

we are not—I think we’d be foolish to disregard that. 

But I just wonder if there’s any concern from State that this 

tends to legitimize a violent theological extremist group whose stated goal is to destroy Israel. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. In no way do we intend to delegitimize 

Hezbollah. In no way do we distinguish between Hezbollah’s terrorist activities, it’s so-called military wing from its so-called political wing. 

That’s a distinction many in the world make. It is one we reject 

completely and have done historically. It’s the same. 

Mr. PERRY. I want to make sure that there is no—that there’s 

a bright line there and——

Mr. SATTERFIELD. There is. 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. And I appreciate that. 

Let me ask you this, and maybe this for you, Dr. Mitchell, if 

that—I am sorry if I got that wrong. 

The EU seems to resist designated Hezbollah in its entirety as 

a terrorist organization. Even though they are, obviously, wreaking 

havoc in Syria and in Europe as well, what are we doing to persuade the EU to designate, to make this designation? I think it’s 

important. What are we doing? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, thank you for that question. 

We engage with our European partners on a regular basis on 

this matter. 

I would say it’s fair to say, from the U.S. perspective, we have 

a lot of frustration with the Europeans on this particular question 

of Hezbollah. 

I’ve been part of conversations where we’ve talked to the French, 

the Germans, the British, and others. Those are ongoing conversations; I think it’s part of a broader mosaic. 

Mr. PERRY. What is their aversion? What could their aversion 

be? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I would refer you to the capitals of those 

countries for the specifics of their concerns. I think——

Mr. PERRY. Do you have any inclination? I understand I can go 

ask them, but we are paying you to find these things out for us. 

Do you know what—like, do they see them as not terrorist, not 

subversive, not——

Mr. MITCHELL. I am going to resist the temptation, sir, to speak 

on behalf of those governments. 

I would just say from our perspective we make it clear all the 

way up to the level of the President not only on Hezbollah but on 

the broader Iran problem that there can’t only be an American soVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 May 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\041818\29814 SHIRL
37

lution to this, long term—that we have to have greater European 

participation, whether it’s plugging the gaps——

Mr. PERRY. So other than the kind rhetoric and hoping they’ll 

come to the table on this, is there anything the United States is 

doing from the diplomatic standpoint to kind of urge them out, so 

to speak? 

Is there—I get the carrot. Where’s the stick? Is there a stick? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. This government has been in contact continuously with our European partners in Paris and elsewhere. I participated in a number of these talks. 

We have a more extensive focused dialogue on the issue of Iran 

and Hezbollah, the IRGC, than at any point in memory and I have 

been part of this discussion for the last quarter century. 

Mr. PERRY. I appreciate it and I am sure you do. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Now, what have we done? Despite continued 

resistance at a political level for making the same bright line coidentification of political and military parts of Hezbollah that the 

EU maintains, we have achieved much more in the way of actual 

designation and sanctioning by critical European partners than we 

have done in the course of the last many years. 

Is it enough? No. Is it progress? Yes, it is. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, I will just tell you that at least from this point 

on the dais here there’s not enough progress fast enough. I know 

we are impatient. I know it’s hard. 

But you must have success in this regard. We cannot—and 

please know that this is a point of concern and when you come 

back we are going to continue to——

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We agree. 

Mr. PERRY. Let me ask one more question with the chairman’s 

indulgence regarding the train and equip fund. 

It’s my understanding that in 2015 for Iraq $1.5 billion, 2016 

$715 million. I ask this question in the context of I feel like the 

American taxpayer is now left in the position to train and equip 

the IRGC and the Quds Force operating individually as units and 

individuals that have infiltrated the Iraqi army. 

Local municipal elections are looming and I am wondering what 

the number is that we are currently spending on train and equip 

funding in Iraq and what’s going to be done about that? 

Or do you disagree that we are not training and equipping IRGC 

elements and individuals that are operating in uniform in Iraq? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Congressman I strongly disagree with the 

premise that our support for the Iraqi armed forces is support for 

the IRGC or the Shi’a PMF—the Popular Mobilization Forces—

some of which are affiliated with Iran. 

We have supported a legitimate institution of the Iraqi state that 

has performed exceptionally well in the fight against ISIS and in 

the reclaiming and holding of Iraqi territory. 

Now, the issue of whether there are individuals who are present 

within the Iraqi security forces whose allegiance may lie to the 

PMF, undoubtedly there are. 

But there is a confabulation between that reality and saying we 

are facilitating the IRGC or the PMF. Absolutely not. It’s not——

38

Mr. PERRY. So I don’t want to be hyper critical and I am concerned not only for our national security but for the taxpayers and 

the fidelity and the future of Iraq. 

Are you willing to say that there are no IRGC forces using any 

United States-provided military equipment in Iraq right now? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I will review the record. But to my knowledge, 

there is no provision of U.S. military equipment or funding to the 

IRGC. 

Mr. PERRY. I know it’s not the IRGC——

Chairman ROYCE. Here’s a strategy. How about having the Ambassador—Ambassador, if you will review the record and get back 

to General Scott Perry on the issue. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, sir. Happy to—thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Now we go to David Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Like many of my colleagues, I am extremely concerned about the 

implications of Turkish incursions into Syria, particularly Afrin. I 

requested a classified member-level briefing from your offices on 

the situation on February 6th. That was 10 weeks ago. 

And the briefing still has not happened it’s been cancelled again. 

I know there’s a briefing after this hearing on the entire region. 

But I want to start by saying how disappointed I am that it’s taken 

10 weeks and I still don’t have a hearing. 

So I would like a commitment from both of you that you will 

schedule a classified briefing for members on the situation in Afrin 

in the very near future. 

That’s a yes? Thank you. 

Could you speak to how the Turkish incursion has affected the 

U.S. coalition’s fight against ISIS? Obviously, Turkey and the U.S. 

coalition have different priorities in Syria and how is the U.S. supporting our partners on the ground, which include both the Kurdish YPG and our NATO ally, Turkey. 

Because I am hearing a lot of concern from the Kurdish community that they feel that the U.S. has abandoned them after they 

played such an important role in the fight against ISIS. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, sir, for that question and I can assure 

you we will follow up on that request, and I apologize on behalf of 

our bureau that that hasn’t happened yet. 

It’s a crucial matter. I will take the olive branch part of your 

question and defer to my colleague on the Kurdish question. 

I will just keep it simple and say that Operation Olive Branch 

has very much complicated the defeat ISIS campaign by creating 

a demand signal that draws fighters from the Euphrates Valley toward Afrin. 

Our focus has been to call on the Turks to show restraint and 

address the humanitarian crises. I have led the U.S. delegation in 

most of those recent conversations but also to create a sequenced 

approach to some of the areas that the Turkish Government has 

concerns about and to try where possible to balance the Turkish 

and Kurdish equities on this. 

David can say a word about the Kurdish element. 

39

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The situation in north and northeast Syria has 

recently stabilized. We have seen no further movement of Turkish 

forces beyond Afrin. 

Our dialogue with the Syrian Democratic Forces, the SDF, is 

deep, extraordinary and at senior levels and that dialogue is continuing at a senior level, literally as we meet here today. 

We believe that it is possible to continue the fight against ISIS 

with the support and help of the SDF. That, of course, requires not 

just their commitment to us but our commitment to continue to 

work with them. 

We understand that very well. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Thank you, and I look forward to the 

classified briefing. 

Ambassador Satterfield, are you aware of any evidence that Iran 

has violated the terms of the JCPOA? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. It is the assessment of the IAEA that Iran remains in essential compliance with the provisions of the——

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. Thank you. You talked about the ongoing 

discussions with our European partners. 

Is there a plan for that moment when the sanctions waiver is required to be addressed by the President that if that doesn’t happen 

is there a plan in place if—in other words, is the President willing 

to sign the waiver so that this process can play out or is it the May 

deadline and is there a contingency? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The administration is prepared for a number 

of options depending on the circumstances, including the outcome 

of discussions with the E3, and whatever decision the President 

may at the time take. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. So if the negotiations are not complete, 

there’s no assurance that the President is going to issue the waiver 

and that could be the end of the agreement? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Under no circumstances would I prejudge or 

circumscribe the President’s options. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. Okay. 

And I am just turning for a moment now to Egypt. In your view, 

does Egypt’s new NGO law violate the Brown back amendment by 

giving the Egyptian Government veto power over U.S.-funded democracy programs? 

Our ability to operate many assistance programs in Egypt has 

been severely limited since the change in government in 2011 with 

this new law in place. 

What kind of economic development or democracy program is 

even possible for the United States assistance to support in Egypt 

and do you believe that the repeal of this NGO law should be a prerequisite for the United States providing continued economic aid to 

Egypt? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Congressman, there are provisions of that law 

which, if executed, would indeed violate U.S. statute, no question 

about that. 

With respect to our demands of the Government of Egypt, they’ve 

been very clear. Our strong recommendation and one of the basis 

for Secretary Tillerson’s withholding of the $195 million was exactly the issue of a pledge to not implement these offending provisions of that law. 

40

Mr. CICILLINE. Great. And my final question for both of you really, do you think that it is inconsistent—or I am sorry, do you think 

that it is consistent policy that we say that we must intervene militarily in Syria, as we’ve said to the world, because of our grave concerns of the humanitarian situation for Syrians facing chemical attacks by their own government, and at the same time to severely 

restrict refugees from the region that we have only allowed 11 Syrian refugees into the United States in 2018? 

Do you see that as a consistent position and doesn’t it present 

a challenge to the world to take us seriously? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The issue of the administration’s position with 

respect with national security in relation to refugee admission is 

one that we are happy to take back for response to you. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So you agree it’s inexplicable and difficult to defend? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. No. I am simply saying this falls outside my 

area of responsibility. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Yes. I mean, you would say not consistent to say 

we are so worried about the children and women in Syria that we 

have to intervene militarily but, by the way, the administration 

has severely restricted the admission of those very same women 

and children to the United States and in fact only 11 Syrian refugees have come to the United States this year. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Congressman, I understand your question. Our 

focus——

Mr. CICILLINE. I look forward to the answer. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Our focus in Syria is CW use and ISIS. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Ann Wagner of Missouri. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this 

hearing and I thank you to our witnesses for their service. 

The violent Assad regime in Syria continues to perpetuate crimes 

against humanity, aided and abetted by a revisionist Iran. 

Amid regional instability, Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups operate with impunity. 

The United States must continue to exercise leadership in holding bad actors accountable for committing human rights abuses 

and for their terrorist activities. 

Dr. Mitchell, you have been outspoken in your support for NATO. 

Would you advocate for a similar arrangement in the Middle East? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you for the question, ma’am. 

I consider it beyond the remit of my duties to speculate much on 

security arrangements among allies in the Middle East on the 

model of NATO. 

I will say that there are a number of states in the region who 

are threatened by Iran in particular and I think we have both an 

opportunity and responsibility in U.S. diplomacy to strengthen our 

security arrangements with those states. 

Mrs. WAGNER. You have argued for deterrence by denial rather 

than deterrence by punishment. As I understand it, this means 

shoring up defensive forces to discourage adversaries rather than 

relying on threats. 

I agree that we may need to tweak our strategic calculus. Bad 

actors like Syria and Iran have unquestionably undermined the 

United States’ traditional modes of deterrence. 

41

Can you explain what deterrence by denial would look like in the 

Middle East? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Ma’am, I am so flattered that you have read my 

past work. I will point out that this was written in a previous life, 

before I was in this job, and was written with regards to the Baltic 

States specifically. 

I will say, broadly, from the position that I hold now that I think 

a strong American deterrence in many parts of the world is really 

the essential fabric of stability. 

I think strengthening that deterrence in Europe and in NATO 

and in northeastern Europe has a particular set of requirements at 

present. 

I think it’s a very different situation in the Middle East and I 

would defer to Ambassador Satterfield on the specifics of deterrence there. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Ambassador. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We are looking at what more can be done by 

individual states and in a collective sense by parties in the Middle 

East including those parties who have considerable military resources and capabilities of their own. 

The President has made very clear that while we are shouldering 

the responsibility for the destruction of the remnants of the socalled caliphate of ISIS that in the period beyond the maintenance 

of that destruction needs to fall squarely on the shoulders of those 

in the region and we are exploring right now very actively whether 

and how a construct can be made, what we’ve turned in past years 

a regional security architecture that has a real ability to step in 

and take on responsibilities which we do not believe the U.S. 

should have to have indefinitely. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Well, I appreciate that, and to that point, I know 

that the Ambassador to the United States relies on regional partners to counter Iran’s malign influence. 

Traditionally, the United States has worked closely with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC. However, GCC member states—Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—

have cut ties with Qatar, which they maintain secretly supports 

Iran. 

The United States postponed a planned summit with Gulf leaders until September, I believe, of 2018. Do U.S. officials anticipate 

a resolution to the Qatar diplomatic crisis before the summit? 

Are we doing anything as the United States to try and deal with 

this rift? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The President of the United States and every 

official in government has been focused on the issue of closing this 

rift since it occurred. 

The President has directly engaged with the heads of state and 

government of all of the countries involved on both sides of this divide, and his message has been exceedingly clear from the beginning and it has been reiterated in his recent personal and phone 

contacts with that leadership, which is it is high time this get resolved. 

We face a common challenge from Iran. We face a common challenge from other foes in the region and beyond. This rift serves 

42

their interests, not ours. It needs to be mended and we hope very 

much that the states act on this. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank the witnesses for the testimony, and yes, 

Dr. Mitchell, I do my homework. 

And I thank the chairman again for his timeliness of putting this 

hearing together. I thank the witnesses for their tremendous service, and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Lois Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses for your service. 

And I know we’ll all probably agree that the Syrian civil war has 

been one of the greatest humanitarian crises of our time. Over 500 

million dead at the hands of Assad, millions fleeing their homes 

trying to escape to other countries with great impact to those countries. 

And I think it’s fair to say that there’s been a lot of dereliction 

on, I would say, on the world, maybe because—not knowing really 

what to do. 

So you can point fingers in a lot of different places. But since we 

are here now, I am going to talk about this administration because 

I think Mr. Trump has sort of a whackadoo behavior, how he goes 

about all these things. 

So the President acts—I don’t whether it’s impulsively or emotionally or correctly but he—I think all of us, when we see the 

chemical warfare on Assad on human beings it’s horrendous. 

And so I am not critical of the President feeling this is horrendous action, but what I don’t understand is this President only allowed 11 Syrian refugees into this country last year compared to 

15,000 in 2016. 

So my question is, where is the humanity in that? Then he can’t 

decide where he’s pulling—he’s staying in Syria, out Syria. One 

week he’s pulling out of Syria and then the next week we have 

these air strikes. 

So I think this inconsistency is not very helpful. One night of air 

strikes is, as I think many of my colleagues have said, is not a substitute for a comprehensive strategy, which should include robust 

political and diplomatic engagement. 

And one of my questions I also have is was the State Department 

consulted at all and involved in this decision on the air strikes. 

I am the mother of a United States war veteran who went to two 

wars. I came to this Congress purposely because I wanted to weigh 

in on decisions of war and peace. 

And so I can tell you that, in my humble opinion, I think the 

President should have come to this Congress for a military authorization before these air strikes, because it’s not like it was a surprise. 

The President tweeted this out days before. So, I mean, it wasn’t 

exactly that he surprised anybody with these air strikes, and I 

think it’s a dangerous precedent that he is setting. 

So just, if I come back on the question number one is was the 

State Department consulted on these attacks? Why are we not allowing refugees? 

Are we going to allow some more refugees and, if you know, 

could you tell me what the cost of these air strikes were? 

43

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Yes. The State Department was involved 

throughout the deliberative process that led to this decision, as we 

were in all prior considerations of use of military force in Syria. 

Ms. FRANKEL. May I ask you something? Was there any recommendation from the State Department or any member of the administration that you know that the President come to Congress 

for an authorization before the strikes? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I can comment on the authorities that were 

used, not on the deliberative process, and it was Article 2 of the 

Constitution that the President relied upon. 

With respect to the refugee question, which you and your colleague have raised, that’s outside my area of authority but we will 

provide you with a response from the State Department on that. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Do you know the cost of the air strikes, by any 

chance? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. That question has been posed to the Department of Defense. We will refer that question to OSD, the Office of 

the Secretary. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Dr. Mitchell, did you want to respond to any of 

those questions? 

Mr. MITCHELL. I would only add that I appreciate the questions 

and we are happy to take a closer look and get back to you in written form. 

Ms. FRANKEL. And one more quick question. Why did the President change his mind on these sanctions against Russia? 

Mr. MITCHELL. There has been, and continues to be, a discussion 

about future steps with regards to sanctions on Russia. That’s an 

ongoing process, and I would refer you to the White House for any 

more recent developments. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Okay. Well, I guess we are not going to get an answer on that. 

Well, anyway, thank you very much for being here. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go to Adam Kinzinger of Illinois. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both 

for being here. It’s very appreciated. 

You guys have a lot of tough work to do and you have done a 

lot of great work. I’ve always said when it comes to state-related 

issues, you never know what you are able to mitigate, the conflicts 

you were able to stop that never happened, and it’s hard to put a 

price on that. So we appreciate all the hard work. 

Obviously, Syria has been a failed policy since the last administration. In fact, the failure to follow through on the 2013 red line 

had massive implications not just in the Middle East but all over 

the world. 

I think there’s no doubt about it. You look at the foreign policy 

challenges we had before 2013 and the foreign policies we have 

post-2013 and there’s a direct correlation to when bad actors felt 

like they could challenge the United States of America. 

And, frankly, we said a lot of good words for a long time but followed through with no action. 

Now, it’s nice to see a President that’s willing to follow through 

with action. I think the strikes in Syria were correct. 

44

The American people, according to a poll today by two-to-one 

agreed that they were the correct thing to do, and I also don’t think 

the President needed to come to Congress for every military move 

does require—there’s not 535 Commanders in Chief. There’s one. 

Our job is to declare if a state of war exists and then to put the 

funding in to do that to follow through on that war. 

The President has a lot of authority as envisioned and written 

by the Constitution. 

But having served in the Air Force and still continuing to serve, 

Syria’s been one of my big concerns as I’ve gotten to Congress. 

What I worry about is a lack of long-term strategy in Syria. 

I think holding strong that chemical weapons have no place is a 

really good thing to do. But I think on the broader level the question is what is going to be the future of Syria. 

And I think when we talk about the destruction of ISIS in the 

Middle East I don’t think these two exist in a vacuum. I think part 

of the reason ISIS has been able to grow and thrive is because of 

the existence of a terrible dictator that basically creates an environment where somebody feels the only option they have to turn 

to is to a terrorist group because nobody else is coming to help 

them and the Assad family has been the biggest enemy of all time 

and you find yourself in that process radicalized. 

And so when we fight this generational war on terror, we have 

to keep in mind that it’s the seven and the 8-year-olds that are in 

these refugee camps right now that are either going to be the people that reject Islam or reject ISIS within Islam or they are going 

to be the people that, frankly, propagate ISIS or ISIS 2 or al-Qaeda 

3 or whatever that next generation is. 

So you cannot look at Syria and the challenges in Syria in a vacuum in isolation of the fight against ISIS. I think they are together. 

But Ambassador Satterfield, last month the administration ordered the State Department to freeze $200 million in stabilization 

funds that would enable those displaced by the conflict to return 

to their homes, which is exactly what I think is the opposite of 

what needs to happen to create a better environment. 

Early recovery efforts and the restoration of basic services and 

security are critical elements to establishing inclusive local governance outside of Assad’s control. 

What are the specific accounts that have been frozen—economic 

support fund or nonproliferation, antiterrorism, or any related programs. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Representative, we can get back to you with 

the specifics in response for that last part of your question. 

What I will say in general over the funding that was suspended, 

we are reviewing now carefully with the White House, within the 

government, how best to move forward with respect to expenditure 

of taxpayer moneys in Syria. 

Mr. KINZINGER. If you could get back to me with the first part, 

that would be great. 

And what evidence have you seen of partner nations making assurances that no stabilization or reconstruction assistance will benefit the Assad regime? 

45

Mr. SATTERFIELD. In September of last year at the United Nations, then Secretary Tillerson chaired a meeting of the so-called 

like-minded countries on Syria, a broad representative group of 

Arab and non-Arab countries, all of whom supported one fundamental principle—there should be no reconstruction assistance provided to the Assad regime or areas controlled by the Assad regime, 

minus significant progress on the U.N.-led Geneva political process. 

That progress has not taken place. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Right. And let me ask about Iraq specifically. 

I am a veteran of that war. A lot of American blood, treasure, 

toil went into bringing a free Iraq. I believe, as President Obama 

said, we did leave behind a free and fair Iraq and, unfortunately, 

we left them behind and now we have the challenges we have as 

we are back there again. 

One of my concerns is we have an election in a few weeks in 

Iraq. Can you talk about what you have seen, either of you, in 

terms of Iranian influence and how to push back against that? 

Because as somebody that was part of, frankly, fighting Iranian 

influence in Iraq it’s extremely concerning. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We can better address that question in another setting. Suffice it to say we believe there is a vigorous and 

truly democratic political debate in process underway in Iraq. But 

the specifics of your question in another closed setting can be best 

addressed. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Understood. 

Do you have anything to add, Dr. Mitchell, to any of that? 

Mr. MITCHELL. No. Unfortunately, I agree with much of what 

you have said but most of what you have asked falls under Near 

East Bureau and not EUR. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay. You get away with that one, and I appreciate it. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you all for being here. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Norma Torres of California. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, I too want to associate myself with some of the 

comments that my colleagues on this side have stated, regarding 

that we need specific actions that you plan to take and specific outcomes that you expect to see as in regards to the forces in Syria. 

I would really hope that you can follow up. 

Like many of my colleagues, I am very concerned. Iran is provoking Israel into conflict in Syria. Iran is intent on building a permanent presence inside Syria. 

And it’s shocking that the Trump administration has failed to articulate that strategy to deal with Iran’s growing presence in Syria. 

While the most recent missile attacks on Syria and the area 

where they have the chemical weapons has been applauded by 

many, I am very concerned at our lack of care for the children that 

have been injured. 

And I understand that you have stated already that it’s not within your jurisdiction to deal with refugees. But I am curious to know 

if you have given an opinion to that cause since to date this year 

it is my understanding that we’ve only received or allowed 11 Syrian refugees to this country. 

46

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Ms. Torres, the best resolution to the suffering 

of the Syrian people, whether we are speaking about those who 

have been displaced internally and externally or——

Mrs. TORRES. I am sorry. I am talking about the injured children 

that need medical assistance and have been orphaned. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Or with respect to individual cases of suffering 

and hardship is to end this war, to end the brutality of the Assad 

regime. 

That requires a political process, and while we may like to believe that the U.S. simply saying something or deploying U.S. soldiers will fix it, the issue is far more complex than that. It requires 

a comprehensive international approach and that is what we have 

been very active in trying to generate. 

But we have been frustrated. We have been frustrated by Russian efforts, which have blocked every move to place Assad and his 

regime before their responsibilities—every effort to move them to 

Geneva, and we continue to engage. 

We continue to hope that through our engagement, through messages both positive and negative, Moscow recognizes it ought to be 

in their interest to move this forward. 

I know the images are extraordinarily painful they are. We are 

trying to address them. But at the end, they are best addressed 

through changing the character of Syria itself, allowing these people to move forward with lives in peace, security, and stability. 

Mrs. TORRES. So what is our strategy as it relates to Russia? The 

White House, from day to day, from tweet to tweet, you know, they 

seem to have a different opinion. 

I am concerned as to what does that do for your long-term planning strategy. 

Mr. MITCHELL. Russia’s behavior internationally is very concerning. I agree with the premise of your question. 

I would say that this administration takes that seriously in all 

of its forms, in multiple regions. 

Our strategy, broadly, has consisted of two planks. The first is 

cost and position, so to raise the cost of an aggressive foreign policy 

until the Russian Government decides that the cost benefit analysis does not support further aggression. And we’ve done that 

through a variety of tools, from the executive branch, tools that 

were provided to us by Congress. 

And the second plank has been to keep channels of dialogue open 

where possible. The Russians very often do not want to use those 

channels. 

We have diplomatic and military channels on Syria, on Ukraine, 

in a number of fields related to strategic stability. 

So the strategy has been to increase the pressure and point the 

way to a door for dialogue. At the end of the day, the responsibility 

rests with the Russian Government for whether or not they choose 

to embrace those opportunities for dialogue. 

They have not embraced those opportunities and so we will continue to impose costs until they do. 

Mrs. TORRES. So how have we increased the pressure on Russia 

lately? 

47

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, in the period since January of last year, 

this administration has brought forth sanctions against 189 individuals and entities in Russia. We presided over——

Mrs. TORRES. My time has expired. It’s my understanding, 

though, that most recently the President has removed some of 

those sanctions. So I am going to have to——

Mr. MITCHELL. I am sorry. What’s the question? 

Mrs. TORRES. I am going to have to yield back. My time has expired. 

Chairman ROYCE. I thank the gentlelady for yielding back. 

We go to Lee Zeldin of New York. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Satterfield, it’s been asked of you, but just to—I 

don’t want to make any bad assumptions so I will just ask again. 

Has Iran violated the letter of the JCPOA? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The IAEA has not found significant violations——

Mr. ZELDIN. I am not asking the IAEA. I am asking you. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. That is what we rely upon. The IAEA has not 

found significant violations. 

Mr. ZELDIN. So is it—is it the State Department’s position that 

Iran has not violated the letter of the JCPOA? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. That is the judgement of the IAEA, upon——

Mr. ZELDIN. I am not asking the IAEA. I am asking you, sir. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I’ve responded, sir. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. Does Annex 1, paragraph 61 of the JCPOA 

state, ‘‘Iran will only engage in production of centrifuges to meet 

the enrichment R&D requirements?’’ Are you familiar with that? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I would have to respond in formal fashion to 

that. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Okay. Well, formally, that is what that Annex 1 

Paragraph 61 states. Is it true that Iran has acquired more than 

the necessary amount of IR-8 centrifuge rotor assemblies for R&D 

purposes with 16 times more capacity than the IR-1 to enrich uranium? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Again, I would have to respond in a formal 

written——

Mr. ZELDIN. You could respond right now, sir. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I would have to consult. I am not a technical 

expert. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I thought you were the Acting Secretary for——

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I am, sir. But those questions are highly technical and they demand a very technical and specific response, 

which we will provide. 

Mr. ZELDIN. As part of the JCPOA, an enrichment, research, and 

development plan was submitted to the IAEA that permitted, 

roughly, 10 IR-6 centrifuges. 

Are you aware that Iran has assembled 13 to 15 IR-6 centrifuges 

which should have been limited or destroyed under this plan? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Representative, all questions of this character 

can be responded to in the appropriate level of classification in 

writing. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, but you’re stating that Iran has not violated 

the letter of the deal. So what I am going to do right now is go 

48

through all the different ways Iran is violating the letter of the 

deal. 

Is it your position that you’re not going to respond with regards 

to any of the ways that Iran has violated the letter of the deal? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. These technical questions will require a sufficiently classified written response. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Under Annex 1 paragraph 76 of the JCPOA, the 

IAEA can request access to military locations such as Parchin to 

verify compliance. Is that right? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Representative, my response is the same to all 

questions at this time. 

Mr. ZELDIN. It’s a technical question. Is your position you can’t 

tell me whether or not the JCPOA grants access to Iran’s military 

sites for inspection for verification? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. It does, sir. 

Mr. ZELDIN. It does state that? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. That is part of the JCPOA. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Correct. Okay. So you’re able to answer that. 

Now, has it not been crystal clear that it’s Iran’s position both 

before, during, and after the JCPOA was finalized that they will 

not grant any access to their military sites? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I will respond to that question in writing. 

Mr. ZELDIN. You can’t respond to that now? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. No, I cannot. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I mean, Rohani hasn’t had a problem saying this 

over video. I don’t know why that requires a classification. I mean, 

it is well known open-sourced information Rohani has made crystal 

clear that we do not have access to their military sites. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. There is much well-known open-sourced material that is also not correct or is nuanced. I will provide a detailed 

response from appropriate U.S. Government agencies to all of these 

questions. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Has Iran acquired more heavy water than you’re allowed under the JCPOA? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Same response, sir. 

Mr. ZELDIN. What’s the response? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We will provide a detailed response in an appropriate fashion. 

Mr. ZELDIN. See, here’s the problem. You have no problem coming before Congress and others will come before Congress saying in 

no uncertain terms Iran has not violated the letter of the JCPOA. 

But then when you’re asked questions about all the different 

ways Iran has violated the letter of the JCPOA, you have to respond in writing or it’s a technical question that someone else’s expertise—you don’t have the expertise to engage in any answers 

with regards to ways that Iran is violating the letter of the JCPOA. 

Yet, you do have the expertise to come to Congress and say they 

are not violating the letter of the JCPOA and you do have the expertise to come before Congress and explain the justification for 

your position. 

Yet, when asked about all the different ways—Iran collecting 

more IR-6 rotor assemblies than they are allowed to, assembling 

more IR-8 rotor assemblies than they are allowed to—the cenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:12 May 29, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\041818\29814 SHIRL
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trifuges, to deny access to their military sites, to collect more heavy 

water than they are permitted to. 

And that list goes on. When we went to Parchin and we found 

nuclear particles that we wanted to follow up on, Iran’s new position was, you can’t visit Parchin. So we were not able to inspect 

with regards to those particles that were discovered. 

So if you do not have the technical capabilities to answer any 

questions with regard to all the known specifics of how Iran is violating the letter of the deal, then we should not have one witness 

after another coming before this committee and others making the 

flat-out statement that Iran is not violating the letter of the 

JCPOA because that has consequences. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. For the sake of the record, Congressman, my 

comment was the IAEA has in its most recent reporting not found 

significant violations of the provision. 

Mr. ZELDIN. And until the IAEA comes before this committee—

and if they do come before the committee I will be happy to ask 

the same exact questions—but you’re here representing the United 

States State Department and I am asking you about different specific questions. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. And I’ve answered we will provide you detailed 

answers to all of those questions. 

Mr. ZELDIN. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Brad Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, and I want to thank the chairman 

and the ranking member for having this hearing. I want to thank 

the witnesses for your service to our country and your patience 

today and staying to the end. 

Tonight in Israel, in fact, with the time change, as we are speaking this moment, Israelis are celebrating Independence Day, marking the 70th anniversary of the birth of the state. 

Seventy years ago when Israel declared its independence, the 

United States was the first nation in the entire world to recognize 

the new state. 

But there were five armies from five nations—Arab states—who 

immediately attacked—Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 

Syria, and Iraq. 

Today, Israel has peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Today, 

Iran controls, effectively, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. 

Yesterday, the Israeli Government released a map locating five 

Iranian airbases in Syria—two in the south near Damascus, one in 

the north—one in the east, one in the northwest, and one in the 

center of the country, T-4. 

In February, T-4 was the base from which Iran launched a drone 

to attack Israel. Israel responded by destroying some of the base 

and lost a jet and then had to go in and take out much of the Syrian air defenses. 

Over the past weekend, or April 8th, rather, Israel again struck 

at T-4, taking out Iranian weapons, and it was announced yesterday that they believe that Iran was installing advanced sophisticated air defense systems. 

Some of my concern—just quoting a couple of article headlines—

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edly said Trump’s Syria strike failed, didn’t take out much of anything. That’s a quote from the headline. 

Times of Israel on April 14th said Israel fears Trump may see 

job as done in Syria—leave Israel alone to face Iran. 

So my question for you today, as we sit here—and I’ve asked this 

question of others every chance I get—what specifically is the 

United States strategy in ensuring that Iran does not get a permanent presence in Syria to threaten our allies, Israel, and others. 

What are we doing—what more can we be doing? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We, certainly, are concerned with the threat 

which Iran presents in Syria and through Syria to Lebanon, to 

Israel, and to our other allies and partners in the region and beyond. 

Our strategy in working with Israel, with Jordan, with the Gulf 

States, with all the countries of the region and the broader international community is to deny to Iran the ability to proliferate in 

the fashion that it does into and through Syria. 

It’s our work with the Iraqi armed forces and the Iraqi Government on the border. It is our work in the northeast with our own 

forces and our work, more broadly, with the international community to deny the resources and support which Iran and the Revolutionary Guard Corps depend upon for this very threatening activity. 

But I have to challenge the assertion in the opening part of your 

remarks that Iraq and Lebanon are controlled by Iran. They are 

not. They are both independent states. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It’s hard to say that Lebanon is independent 

when it includes in its government Hezbollah, and Hezbollah has 

150,000 rockets increasingly more accurate, increasingly more powerful delivered by Iran. 

Iran is developing indigenous weapons manufacturing capability 

not just in Lebanon but in Syria. Iran has five permanent air bases 

in Syria. 

It’s hard to say that, A, what we are doing is working if Iran is 

increasing its malign influence in the region and I am having a 

hard time understanding what specifically we are doing to push 

back against Iran’s progress. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We are working on Iran’s proliferation, the 

sources of that proliferation, its ability to conduct the physical 

movements of materiel throughout the region and not just in Syria 

or in Lebanon. 

And in all of this we are partnered very closely with the Government of Israel as we are with other governments. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. But when the President of the United States 

said couple weeks ago within 6 months U.S. troops are going to be 

out of Iran, we are washing our hands, what signal does that send 

to all of our allies in the region? 

And as I noted in some of the headlines, Israel is increasingly 

concerned that they are going to be left alone to push back against 

Iran’s malign influence on its borders. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The President has made clear, Secretary 

Mattis, and Chairman Dunford have made clear the primary purpose of our military presence in Syria is the defeat of ISIS and the 

caliphate. 

51

We look to other diplomatic, economic, and cooperative measures 

with Israel, with other states in the region to achieve these broader 

goals. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am running out of time. A quick question. I request a quick response. 

The strike on the three Syrian chemical weapon sites—were they 

a part of a greater strategy or merely a punitive strike for Syria’s 

chemical weapons? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The President has made clear—the Department of Defense and other spokesmen for the U.S. Government 

have made clear they were aimed at both responding to and deterring the use of chemical weapons both in Syria and more broadly. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. But is that a part of our broader strategy in the 

region and——

Mr. SATTERFIELD. It’s an international strategy, sir. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And I believe that we have to do all that we can. 

We have a moral responsibility to do all that we can to make sure 

that not just Syria but the world understands chemical weapons. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. It’s a global—it’s a global——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. But that’s distinct from the strategy of pushing 

back against Iran’s malign influence in the region. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. It is a separate issue entirely. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And so that’s why I have my concern. 

I am over time. I thank the chairman for the indulgence. I do 

want to associate myself with the remarks of the chairman and the 

ranking member, in particular with respect to the Caesar Syrian 

Protection Act, Russian sanction, filling the positions that we have 

at the State Department. 

It is unacceptable 15 months into this administration how many 

open positions remain, and in particular the importance of a robust 

investment of resources, energy, and money, and focus into diplomacy and development. 

Without those two, our defense requirements only grow. Thank 

you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

We now go to John Curtis of Utah. 

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My appreciation to these 

two witnesses for their endurance, for staff, and for yourself and 

ranking member. I have just a few brief questions. Thank you. 

There was an article at Reuters last week that Russia was supporting Assad through civilian aircraft. The House passed the Caesar bill and which would impose sanctions for this type of action. 

So my question is, realizing the bill has not made it through the 

Senate, are sanctions being considered for this, and could you 

speak to the importance of getting this bill through the Senate and 

how helpful that would be to the administration? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. With respect to any assistance being provided 

to Iran or the Assad regime, we are quite keen to use all existing 

authorities to address any states, any entities that may be involved 

and that certainly includes Russia. 

With respect to the Caesar bill, we would have to get back with 

a considered position on this, particularly with respect to the question you just posed. 

Mr. CURTIS. Thank you. 

52

Let me ask you for a moment to consider a different audience. 

Consider my constituents back home who will hopefully be watching this and are struggling to understand war powers and perhaps 

if you could just take a minute and explain the difference between 

Article 2 and the AUMF and what was applied here in a way that 

they might be able to digest that. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I will try to take that on. Volumes have been 

written on this topic——

Mr. CURTIS. Right. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD [continuing]. Over the course of the last 200 

years. 

The Article 2 authority granted to the President by the Constitution as Commander in Chief is quite broad. There are requirements 

which follow upon use of that authority. That is, the White House 

must report use of forces to the Congress within a specified time 

limit. 

But the authority itself is constitutional and it is quite sweeping, 

and AUMF and in the case of Syria, Iraq—we typically deal with 

to extent AUMF—one from 2001, one from 2002—our focus on substance. They deal with certain specified entities or types, categories 

of threat. They are sometimes limited in time. These two were not, 

but they could be. 

So an AUMF is specific to purpose, often to the time they remain 

valid. The Article 2 authorities are not constrained by either of 

those considerations. 

Mr. CURTIS. By way of clarification, I want to make clear that 

the strikes were based on Article 2. Is that correct? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. CURTIS. Right. Help me and my constituents understand at 

what point we go past Article 2. We talked about if this happens 

again we’ll be back with some type of—I don’t want to say retaliation but some type of action, and how do we know where that fine 

line is? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. I am going to give you with some diffidence a 

non-lawyer’s response to your question for the constituents back 

home, which is every President, every administration, in every instance where there is contemplation of the use of military force or 

forces must consider what the appropriate authority, Article 2—in 

extent, AUMF—soliciting from the Congress an explicit and new 

authorization should best be used, depending upon the circumstances, and it is very much circumstance condition-dependent. 

Mr. CURTIS. And I am sure I don’t need to define this, but let 

me, just for my own sake, say that there’s, obviously, some urgency 

in Congress to be involved, balancing, very carefully with this concept of 535 generals, right, and appreciating any involvement in 

this—as we pass the line, right, in understanding that Congress is 

anxious to be supportive but also to be involved. 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Well understood. 

Mr. CURTIS. Let me also ask some questions about our allies. 

I was pleased to hear that we were joined by two of our allies—

the United Kingdom and France. I was pleased that others spoke 

up to support that but kind of the question in my mind why they 

weren’t there to be a part of the strikes. 

53

Can you help me understand that process and how they are in 

or out? 

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you for that question. 

We have had ongoing consultations, certainly, with European allies and with Turkey for a very long time on Syria, broadly. 

There were consultations in the lead-up to the strikes, particularly with France and Britain; and the French and British, for geopolitical and historical reasons and reasons of national interest, 

chose to support us. 

There are certain constraints in the German system on legal constraints, political constraints, on the ability to participate directly 

in a strike. 

I was in Berlin in the lead-up to the strikes and I know that 

there were a lot of consultations internally. The Germans came out 

in their own system with the highest level of and most fulsome 

level of support they could provide. 

The Italians were supportive. Turkey was supportive. But I will 

just say that from our perspective at State Department, we were 

pleased with the level of engagement and material—not only support but in the case of France and Great Britain, this was leadership in showing the way toward both the need for the strikes and 

then taking action and engaging with us when we worked through 

that. 

Mr. CURTIS. I apologize. I am out of time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go now to Adriano Espaillat from New York. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to come in like Mariana Rivera and perhaps close the 

gate, right. 

Yes, it remains an essential axiom of U.S. interests to have Iran 

not obtain a nuclear weapon, and though the President continues 

to suggest terminating the Iran nuclear deal it is necessary to 

maintain it and strengthen it so that we can prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon so that we can further build upon diplomatic efforts to combat Iran’s nuclear program and aggressive actions. 

Iran’s malicious actions are not just confined to nuclear weapons. 

It supports the Houthis rebels in Yemen and poses a threat to the 

stability of that region and the continuation of this war has led to 

one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. 

The U.S. has continued to aid Saudi Arabia in this conflict despite the heavy civilian casualties contributed by all sides in the 

conflict. 

I wanted to ask the first question regarding the JCPOA and the 

issues with the sunset provision. I know that the ballistic missile 

program and the human rights abuse issues are critical. 

But what do you see—do you see this agreement surviving past 

May 2018, Ambassador? Where do you see the JCPOA? Do you see 

it surviving or do you feel that the sunset provision is sort of like 

a line in the sand that will derail the entire agreement? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The President has made very clear there are 

critical areas of the JCPOA and areas surrounding the JCPOA—

missile and ballistic missile technology—that require addressing. 

54

We are working actively to succeed in that addressing of those 

defects. We hope very much that we achieve a success, but with respect to what happens on or around May 12th, that is a decision 

for the President which will be shaped by what in fact is the outcome of the discussions underway now. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. And where do you see our allies? Do they feel 

confident that in fact perhaps attacking the ballistic issue and the 

human rights issue without the—having a concrete agreement on 

the sunset—is that enough for them? Are they with us all the way 

on this or it’s just—are they half stepping us? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. We are mid-stream, sir, in our conversations 

with the European allies about this, and the sense that I have from 

our engagements, at least with the European allies, is that there 

is a greater awareness of the extent of the Iranian challenge than 

there was in the past and there’s a greater political willingness in 

the U.K., France, and Germany to take actions to address the 

shortcomings of JCPOA. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Okay. On the second issue of Yemen, Ambassador, the Obama administration reduced the number of U.S. servicemen there, helping the coalition due to the concerns that I stipulated earlier—the humanitarian crisis that this coalition and others 

have helped create. 

Has this assessment changed under the current administration 

and if so what is the justification for such change? 

Mr. SATTERFIELD. The administration is quite concerned with different aspects of the Yemen crisis. First is humanitarian. This is 

an extraordinarily large humanitarian disaster—one of the greatest 

man-made disasters in modern history. 

And while the coalition campaign is not the exclusive cause or 

sustainer of the crisis, the Houthis themselves bear very significant 

responsibility. 

The fact is we are associated with the Saudi-led campaign, not 

with the Houthis. We have engaged at the highest levels of the government, including the President repeatedly, to impress upon the 

governments involved in this campaign, led by Saudi Arabia that 

there might be every possible action taken first to maintain free 

and full access for humanitarian and commercial goods including 

fuel into Yemen, secondly, that the campaign directed with the purpose of bringing the Houthis to the negotiating table is not, in our 

view, a campaign that can succeed. 

Saudi Arabia has legitimate self-defense needs and requirements 

which do require military action. We work with them to help shape 

and support those actions in a way that mitigates or diminishes civilian casualties. 

But the campaign to force a political resolution is not one that 

we believe has a military calculus to it. It’s political. It should lie 

in enabling the United Nations to move forward. We have the new 

representative of the United Nations for Yemen in Washington 

today, and we hope very much that his efforts can achieve success. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. And so why is the administration so far away 

from reaching the 45,000-person cap on refugees? If we have this 

issue of—not just in Yemen but across the region with so many refugees, why have we not carried our own load, as some of the European countries have done? 

55

Mr. SATTERFIELD. That is an issue which involves various departments of the U.S. Government beyond the Department of State and 

broader security and policy concerns, Congressman. 

Mr. ESPAILLAT. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

And I want to remind committee members of the classified briefing we are holding on these issues immediately following the hearing and I invite them to join us in the SCIF. 

And with that, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before our committee today. We very much appreciate your work on 

these critical issues and we look forward to greater consultation between the committee and the department in the weeks ahead on 

these issues. 

And we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(57)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Edward R. Royce (R-CA), Chairman 

April 18,2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the 

Committee website at http:!hov'.VW,f'oreignAffairsJJOuse.gov): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday. April 18. 2018 

10 00 a.m. 

U.S. Policy Toward a Turbulent Middle East 

The Honorable David M. Satterfield 

Acting Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

The Honorable A. Wess Mitchell 

Assistant Secretary 

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date, __ __::0_,_41'-'1'-"8"'12::.oOC"lcc8c_ __ Room, ___ _:2.::1:_:72:_ __ _ 

Start.ingTime JO:OOAM EndingTimc 12:32PM 

Recesses (._ __ to ___ ) (___to __ ) (___to ___ ) ( __ to __ )( __ ro _)( __ to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Edward R. Royce 

Check all (if the following that apply: 

Open Session [Z] 

F,xecutive (dosed) Session 0 Televised [Z] 

TlTLE OF HEARING: 

U.S. Policy Toward a Turbulent Middle East 

COMMlTTn; MEMin:RS l'RESENT: 

See attached. 

NO:'<-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

N;;t 

Electronically Recorded (taped) [Z] 

Stenographic Record 0 

HEARING WUN!lSSES: Same as meeting notice attach~d? Yes [ZJ NoD 

(If "no". please list belrrw and include title, agency, departmem. or or(ianization.) 

STATEl\'lF.NTS .FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted fOr the record) 

Statements for the Record: Representative Dan Donovan 

Questions for the Record: Ranking Member Eliot Engel and Representatives Brad Sherman and Ted Lieu 

TIME SCIH;DIJLED TO RECONVENE-------:; 

or 

TIMEADJOURNED I 2:32PM 
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PRESElvT 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

i'UII COMMIITHF H~_AJI.!NG 

iffEMBER PRESEVT MElv!BER 

Edward R. Royce. CA X Eliot L. EngeL NY 

Christopher H. Smith, NJ X Brad Shemmn. CA 

Ileana Ros-Lchtincn, FL X Gregory W. Meeks. NY 

Dana Rohrabacher. CA X Albio Sires. NJ 

Ste,·e Chabot. OH X Gerald E. Connolly, VA 

Joe Wilson. SC X Theodore E. Deutch. FL 

Michael T. McCauL TX Karen Bass, CA 

Ted Poe, TX William Keating, MA 

Darrell lssa, CA X David Cicillinc. Rl 

Tom Marino, PA X AmiBera, CA 

Mo Brooks. A L X Lois FrankeL FL 

Paul Cook, CA X Tulsi Gabbard, HI 

Scott Perry. PA X Joaquin Castro. TX 

Ron DeSantis. FL X Robin Kelly. IL 

Mark Meadows. NC X Brendan Boyle. P A 

Ted Yoho, FL X Dina Titus. NV 

Adam Kinzinger,IL X Nomm Torres. CA 

Lee Zeldin. NY X Brad Schneider. IL 

Dan Donovan. NY Tom Suozzi. NY 

James F. Sensenbrenncr, Jr., WI X Adriano Espaillat NY 

Ann Wagner, MO X Ted Lieu, CA 

Brian J. Mast. FL 

Brian K. Fitzpatrick, PA 

Francis Rooney. FL 

llwmas A. Garrett Jr., VA 

John Curtis. UT 
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Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Representative Dan Donovan 

The tive minutes we are allotted for statements cannot begin to scratch the surface of turbulence in 

the Middle East. There are almost too many depraved, repugnant bad actors to name, from ISIS to 

Assad. Iran however, is the scourge of the Middle East, wreaking havoc and leaving a path of 

malevolence in its wake. 

As a result of the Obama Administration, Iran received a windfall not just from the bad Iran Nuclear 

deal, but also from a settlement claim involving weapons that were sold to the Shah by the US but 

never delivered to Iran when the Shah felL Under the settlement, the United States sent Iran the $400 

million balance plus $I.3 billion in accrued interest, for a total of $1.7 billion. The JCPOA lifted 

sanctions which in turn allowed Iran to finally access money in overseas accounts, with the top line 

aggregate approximating $120 billion. 

The Obama Administration naively believed that Iran would use this boon on its dire domestic needs. 

It was wishful thinking then. How Iran has spent its jackpot in the past few years demonstrates just 

how gullible President Obama was on this issue. While keeping in mind that Iran's current youth 

unemployment rate is at about 29%, let's review just a sampling oflran's spending habits on foreign 

soil: 

According to a senior Iranian cleric cited in a 2014 Washington Post article, Iran 

provided over $1 billion in military aid alone to Iraq. 

Iran funds Assad- who has brutally decimated his own population via chemical 

weapons and barrel bombs. Stamm de Mistura, the U.N. special envoy for Syria, estimated in 

July 2015 that Iran gives Assad anywhere between $6 and $35 billion a year. 

Israeli government minister Yuval Steinitz told the Times of Israel that Iran's 

expenditures on Hezbollah alone total to $1 billion per year 

And that's merely the beginning of what's been reported in various media outlets. 

What do Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon hold in common for Iran~ Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon together 

represent a geographic triumvirate for Iran that gives Iran a clear, direct path to IsraeL It's no secret 

that Iran wants nothing more than to destroy IsraeL 

Just this month, Iran launched unmanned aerial vehicle from Syria at the T4 airbase near Horns into 

Israeli airspace. While the Israelis shot down this drone, TDF spokesman Ron en Manelis stated that 

analysis indicated that the Iranian drone was carrying explosives, and Israel retaliated with a strike 

on the T4 airbase that targets Iran's drone program. And yesterday, Israel released an IDF map 

demonstrating not one, but tive Iranian bases in Syria. 

Iran's expansion into Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon represents a dangerous, turbulent development that the 

US must counter. We cannot allow this expansion to continue, and we must stand with our ally Israel 

to counter Iran at every turn. The Iranian regime has only fanned the flames of violence in the Middle 

East to serve its own hateful, tumultuous agenda. The Trump Administration has been a great 

supporter and friend to Israel, and I am looking forward to hearing how the Administration plans to 

counter the Iranians regime's plot to build a bridge to IsraeL 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record from Ranking Member Eliot Engel 

U.S. Policy Toward a Turbulent Middle East 

For the Honorable David M Satterfield 

April18, 2018 

Should the United States continue to have a role in providing reconstruction assistance to 

communities liberated from ISIS inside Syria? Can military gains against ISIS be sustained 

without stabilizing those liberated areas? 

The United States is not providing reconstruction assistance in Syria, including in communities 

liberated from ISIS. The United States continues to advocate for UN-led diplomatic efforts 

consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, while denying the benefits of reconstruction 

assistance and economic normalization to the Assad regime until it commits fully to the UN-led 

transition process. 

The United States is working with Coalition partners to support immediate stabilization and early 

recovery etTorts in areas liberated from ISIS control, including Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) 

removal, the restoration of essential services and building local capacity to support longer-term 

sustainability. The Administration has repeatedly emphasized that we are committed to completing 

the fight against ISIS and rooting out its remaining havens. The President has also made clear that, 

as we move forward, the Administration will continue to engage the international community and 

our partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS to take a greater role in stabilizing liberated 

areas of Syria. 

Question: 

T understand that the UN Development Program (lJNDP) has begun doing some work in Assadcontrolled areas in Syria, including the city of Horns, that goes beyond humanitarian assistance. 

What can you tell us about this work by UNDP and other multilateral agencies? What leverage 

does the US Government have to ensure that US ti.mds are being tunneled to the Assad regime? 

The United States has been clear that we will not support stabilization assistance or international 

reconstruction assistance to any area under control by the Assad regime. We ask our allies to do 

the same, and require our implementing partners to follow this policy. The United States provides 

need-based humanitarian assistance in Syria through the United Nations and direct funding to 

humanitarian organizations. This tunding does not go to nor does it support the Assad regime. 

Question: 

I understand that funding is on hold, pending an interagency review, for the International, 

Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (111M) to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of 
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Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the 

Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. In notifying these funds to Congress, the State 

Department specitically stated that the US. contribution enables the U.S. to leverage other 

countries to contribute on a voluntary basis, including the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, 

Switzerland, and Qatar At a time when the ITIM is necessary TO advm1ce accountability, 

especially after the regime used chemical vveapons against the Syrian people earlier this month, 

why is thnding for the IlJM on hold? 

The Administration maintains its strong support for holding the Assad regime accountable for its 

atrocities. including through mechanisms like the IIIM. In line with the President's request to 

review all foreign assistance, the Administration continually evaluates appropriate assistance 

levels and how best assistance might be utilized. The State Department will continue to suppmi 

an anay of efforts to hold the Assad regime accountable. 

Question: 

The de-escalation zones in Syria were negotiated by Jordan, Russia and the United States. As we 

saw earlier this year, Iran is provoking Israel into conflict in Syria and is intent on building a 

pennanent presence inside that country, including in the de-escalation zones in the Southwest of 

Syria. To what extent can Russia reliably 6'llarantee Iran and Syria's adherence to ceasetire zones? 

Is the United States relying on Russia to influence Iran? If Russia is unwilling or unable to provide 

assurances that the Syrian regime or its associated forces, such as Hezbollah or other Iranianbacked proxy forces, will cease violence in these areas, what is the next option for U.S. policy in 

Syria? What motivation does Russia have to keep Iran in check? 

On November 6, the U.S, Russia, and Jordan signed the '\1emorandum of Principles (MOP) 

regarding the ceasefire in southwest Syria, which builds on and strengthens the existing ceasefire 

signed in July. Pan ofthe MOP enshrines the commitment of the Cnited States, Russia, and Jordan 

that non-Syrian foreign forces leave the southwest ceasefire area. This requirement is meant to 

not only diminish the int1uence ofiran and its proxies in Syria, but also to protect the borders of 

our allies, Jordan and Israel. 

However, we remain realistic regarding Russia· s ability, and even willingness, to stop Syrian 

regime forces or associated forces, such as Hizballah or other Iranian-backed proxy forces, from 

violating the cease±lre in the southwest. The Administration remains focused on neutralizing 

Iran's threatening inl1uence in Syria. Iran is subject to a variety of U.S. sanctions, including a 

broad U.S. embargo on trade with Iran, as well as numerous targeted authorities directed at its state 

sponsorship of terrorism, ballistic missile program, and human rights abuses. 
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Question: 

Administration officials have spoken about how the Syrian Democratic Forces, our local partners 

in Eastern Syria, have begun to incorporate non-Kurdish parties into their rank and file. Can you 

provide specific examples of this? Can you evaluate our assistance partnership with the Syrian 

Kurds? Has the SDF leadership structure changed in the last year to help incorporate non-Kurds? 

Does the SDF continue to require fighters to undergo Kurdish indoctrination? 

The Syrian Democratic Forces has become a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian organization, and 

that is one of the reasons why we are working with them. The SDF is comprised of Kurds, Arabs 

Turkmen, Christians, Assyrians and others, all dedicated to the defeat of ISIS and securing 

liberated areas. 

The US.-led Coalition has conducted the D-ISIS campaign in Syria by, with, and through the 

Syrian Democratic Forces. A key tenet of the D-ISIS campaign is that local forces should play a 

prominent role in D-ISIS operations. We have specifically focused on increasing the Arab element 

of the SDF and this e±Iort has achieved some success. For example, during the battle for Raqqa, 

80 per cent of the assaulting SDF force was Arab. As the SDF has advanced in Syria, it has steadily 

incorporated Arab and other local forces committed to the D-ISIS tight without prejudice to 

ethnicity, religion, or ideology. The US military's presence on the ground and training of Arab 

components of the SDF has also allowed us to continue to shape training, and, by extension, the 

inclusive and cohesive structure of the SDF. The SDF now numbers approximately 60,000 

fighters, half of whom are Arab. 

More than 1,400 SDF fighters have laid down their lives in Syria to liberate millions of Syrians 

from the ISIS scourge. These sacrifices have also helped deny ISIS the opportunity to plan and 

carry out attacks throughout the world. We could not have achieved what we have in the D-IS IS 

tight without the SDF. 

The United States has and will continue to meet with a wide variety of actors in Syria that make 

up its diverse communities and who partner with us in our Defeat ISIS campaign and on 

stabilization e±Iorts in liberated areas. 

Question: 

Turkey and the US.-led Coalition clearly have di±Ierent priorities in Syria. What is this 

Administration doing to strive for a productive relationship with Turkey, despite having varying 

goals? How are we working with our European allies to achieve common ground with Turkey? 

We are committed to working with Turkey as a NATO Ally and a partner to defeat ISIS and other 

terrorist groups. We share with Turkey key goals in Syria: a whole, stable Syria and a political 
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resolution to the Syrian contlict in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, without a role 

for Assad. High level bilateral talks on Syria with Turkish counterparts remain ongoing. 

In support of Turkey's national security concerns and the common struggle against terrorism, we 

have encouraged the Europeans to target the financial networks of the Kurdistan Workers Party 

(PKK), a US.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, and provide other counter-PKJ( 

assistance to Turkey when possible. 

Question: 

Hanin Ghadar, a Lebanese Shiaj ournalist, was sentenced to six months in prison after she was 

found guilly in abstentia of"'defaming the Lebanese army, harming its reputation and accusing il 

of distinguishing between Lebanese citizens.·· Last w·eek, her sentence was thrown out and her 

case referred to a civilian court. But, the damage in Lebanon is done. Whal is the United slates 

doing convey to the Lebanese authorities that U S. support for the Lebanese military at risk if 

the military goes atlerjoumalists or civil society'! 

The Department of State shares vour concerns about this incident and the recent trend of Lebanese 

politicians taking advantage of colonial-era defamation laws in order to target political speech by 

journalists, bloggers, and entertainers. These cases are inconsistent with Lebanon's long history 

of upholding relatively free expression, vvhich is b'llarantecd by its constitotiorL Ambassador 

Richard and other members of the U.S. country team in Lebanon forcefully raised our serious 

concems about \1s. Ghaddar' s case with senior I "ebanese leaders, including Prime Ivfinistcr Hariri, 

Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Joseph Awn, Head Military Prosecutor Peter Gennanos, and 

Presidt~nl of the :Vlilitary Court General Hussein Abdallah. To underscore our concern, we 

withdrcvv an invitation in February to Military Couti President Abdallah, who was scheduled to 

participate in a leadership-training program at the National Defense University in Washing1on, 

DC. We believe this action helped underscore to the Lebanese government and military the extent 

of our displeasure with :VIs. Ghaddar's case. The Military Court ullimatdy detennined in April 

this case was outside its purview. We will continue to raise our concerns about this case and others 

and ensure lhal your team is briefed on the latest developments. 

Question: 

Recently, the Israeli govemment announced that an agreement had been reached between Israel 

and the UN High Commissioner for Retugees (UNHCR) to resettle, over the course of five years, 

at least half of the African asylum seekers in Israel, deporting them to Western countries. 

However, within a few hours the agreement was suspended, then cancelled, and now these asylum 

seekers are in limbo. What is the status of the agreement? Does the United States have a position 

on how the Government of Israel should treat African asylum seekers? Does the United States 

have a position on the agreement between UNHCR and the Israeli government? Will the United 

States commit to resettle some Mrican refugees if Israel agrees to the UNHCR agreement? 
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The United States has long been a world leader in advocating for humanitarian assistance and 

protection for refugees and displaced populations. The Department of State seeks to promote 

protection, ease suffering, and resolve the plight of retugees and displaced populations around the 

world. 

According to a public statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu on April 3, the Government oflsrael 

cancelled an agreement with UNHCR that had established a Framework for Cooperation between 

Israel and UNHCR to promote durable solutions for approximately 39,000 Eritreans and Sudanese 

migrants currently living in Israel. The United States resettled 175 refugees from Israel in FY 2017, 

primarily Eritreans. 

Question: 

Many of us remain concerned about Iranian influence in Iraq, especially as Prime Minister Abadi 

stands for election. Can you provide us some insight into your contingency planning should the 

Iraqi elections result in a partner at Iraq's helm that the United States finds unacceptable? 

We share your concern. We are under no illusions about Iran's destabilizing activities in the region 

and remain committed to reducing Iran's malign influence in Iraq. 

Nearly all Iraqi political leaders recognize that their country's strategic partnership with the United 

States provides much that Iran simply cannot match: word-class security assistance, global 

leadership in marshalling international aid and investment, and a partner, which reinforces Iraq's 

sovereignty, rather than undercuts it. Leveraging these comparative advantages while helping tie 

Iraq more closely to its Arab neighbors and to international tinancial institutions counterbalances 

Iran and diminishes its negative influence. 

The United States has worked closely with each democratically elected Iraqi leader since 2005. 

Our priority is supporting free and fair elections and encouraging high voter turnout, which we 

believe will produce a moderate government more interested in serving the Iraqi people than in 

sectarian identity politics. The Department has allocated $7.1 million in assistance to promote 

voting opportunities for internally displaced persons and provide training for 3,000 civil society 

monitors. We are confident that, both at the voting booth and during government formation, Iraqis 

will weigh the benefits of close relations with the United States. 

Question: 

The Administration announced last year that it would only permit 45,000 refugees to enter the 

country in fiscal year 2018. It now appears that the U.S. will not come anywhere close to meeting 

that number- 20,000 is the current projection. It seems to me that this policy, aside from its failure 

to offer much hope for those humans suffering from war and persecution, also negatively impacts 

our relations with allies, such as Germany, Turkey, or Jordan who are doing much more to help 
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Middle Eastern refugees than the U.S Our severely shortsighted retugee policy also puts us in 

league with other undesirable countries, such as China, which admits very few refugees. 

• How many Middle Eastern refugees are moving to Europe now? Do you expect that 

number to change in the future? 

• Why is the Administration so far away from reaching the 45,000-person cap on refugees 

this year? 

• Gennany has accepted well over a million refugees since 2015 and is willing to accept up 

to 200,000 this year. How many serious security incidents have occurred in Gennany 

attributed to those refugees? 

From 2014-2017, Europe witnessed the largest number of refugees and asylum seekers crossing 

its borders since World War II. About one quarter of the four million asylum claims made in this 

period came from those displaced by the war in Syria, with significant numbers also coming from 

Afghanistan and Iraq. The flow of arrivals has largely subsided. In the first quarter of2018, some 

16,640 individuals arrived irregularly to Europe by sea, compared to nearly 31,000 arrivals in the 

same period of2017. Most of these individuals are likely to seek asylum. For March, the primary 

Middle Eastern nationalities among arrivals by sea were from Syria, Iraq, and Tunisia. We expect 

arrivals this year to remain lower than or consistent with 2017. In the long-term, however, any 

new displacement in the Middle East could again lead to significant movements of asylum seekers 

into Europe. 

The United States continues to resettle vulnerable people who are fleeing persecution and conflict 

while upholding the safety and security of the American people. Additional vetting procedures 

announced in October 2017 and January 2018 are enabling departments and agencies to more 

thoroughly review applicants to identify threats to public safety and national security As a result, 

the processing time for each case is slower as departments and agencies implement these additional 

vetting procedures. 

Germany's crime statistics are compiled by the Federal Police Office for data on the prior year. 

This year's report, covering crimes committed in 2017, is expected to be released in late May. ln 

2017, there was one serious incident involving a Palestinian who had been denied asylum. He 

allegedly killed one and injured five others with a machete in a grocery store. The defendant was 

known to the police, and assessed to be mentally unstable rather than a security risk. ln 2016, 

280,000 asylum seekers entered Germany. That same year there were three serious incidents 

related to asylum seekers. Based on Federal Police statistics from 2016, crime perpetrated by noncitizen residents more broadly, including asylum seekers and refugees, increased by 42 percent 

from 2015 to 2016; is primarily committed by young men under 30; is most likely to be committed 

against fellow non-citizen residents; and encompasses a range of violent and economic crimes. 
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Questions for the Record from Representative Brad Sherman 

U.S. Policy Toward a Turbulent Middle East 

For the Honorable David M Satterfield 

April 18,2018 

Docs Qatar currently give money to terrorist organizations, or allow its citizens to do so? 

Qatar. a key a U.S. counterterrorism partner, has made numerous public C01111llitments to deprive terrorist 

organizations of funds, and is making significant efforts to implement tlwse commitments. However. 

Qatar, along with all countries in the region, has more work to do to combat terrorism finance. Qatar is 

implementing an MOU on counterterrorism cooperation tl1e U.S. and Qatar signed in July 2017. and has 

taken important steps, including increasing the sharing of information on terrorist financiers, conducting a 

review of its charit.'lblc and money services business sectors to identify terrorist financing risks, and 

taking steps toward developing a domestic designations regime in line witll international standards. \Vc 

\viii continue to engage to ensure terrorist organizations cannot use Qatar or its citizens as sources of 

funding or support. 

Saudi Arabia is discussing a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, i.e. the 

Section 123 Agreement required by the Atomic Energy Act, but it has not accepted enrichment and 

reprocessing restrictions in the agreement. Will tile Administration press for such restrictions in any 123 

Agreement with Saudi Arabia, and what is the Administration doing to prevent Saudi Arabia from 

engaging in enrichment or reprocessing of fissile material? 

All 123 agreements include, at a minimum. the legal requirements listed in Section 123 of the Atomic 

Energy Act, as amended, which include restrictions on cnriclmlent and reprocessing of U.S.-obligatcd 

material as well as certain requirements for materials security. Even on their mvn. these requirements 

represent the strongest nonproliferation, safety, and security standards required by any nuclear supplier in 

tile world. 

Beyond these legal requirements. the United States has a policy of seeking to limit the spread of 

enrichment and reprocessing technologies around the world. The United States pursues tl1c strongest 

nonproliferation standards that are achievable ln all 123 agreement negotlatlons. lncludlng negotlatlons 

witll Saudi Arabia. 

Is Japan contributing sufficiently to the enormous financial costs that we face in conflicts in the Middle 

East? What is Japan· s contribution compared to that of other states? 

Japan remains a significant financial contributor to regional stability, humanitarian relief, and 

reconstruction cftorts in the Middle East in support of our foreign policy goals. hl 2015, Prime Minister 
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Abe announced a multi-year commitment for Japan to dedicate an additional $2.2 billion in assistance 

to"ard the Middle East, including assistance for displaced persons and Iraqi reconstruction. In addition. 

Japan has provided over $1. I billion in assistance related to the S}Tian conflict. On May 1. Prime 

Minister Abe pledged an additional $15 million to Jordan to strenb>then the country's waste-processing 

capacity to account for the influx of Syrian rc±ugces. In February, Japan announced a $100 million aid 

package for Iraqi humanitarian assistance and in April announced a new $330 million loan for irrigation 

projects. Japan has provided $7.4 billion in grant and loan assistance to Iraq since 2003. In 2016. Japan 

offered a $500 million loan for Iraqi budgetary assistance. of which approximately half has been 

disbursed to date. 

Japan is also a reliable contributor to Middle East peace. Foreign Minister Taro Kono recently pledged an 

additional $26 million to support the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Japan remains a 

steadfast donor to UNICEF, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 

Near East (UNRWA), and the Palestinian Authority via the World Bank's trust fund mechanism. In 

2017, Japan contributed $43.4 million to UNRWA. ranking seventh out of 57 member state donors. 

Should Turkey continue to enjoy the same arms export terms (such as a shorter Congressional notification 

period) that we give to other NATO countries. given that it is. at best, the least pro-American NATO 

member? 

Despite strains in our bilateral relationship, Turkey remains an important NATO ally and critical partner 

in the Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Turkey's standing in the region, and shared borders with Iran, Iraq, and 

Syria make it strategically important for addressing a number of security challenges including terrorism. 

the proliferation of\Yeapons of mass destn1ction. and regional st:'lbility. "\Vhile \Ve continue to review all 

arms transfers consistent with the President's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. we have conveyed to 

Turkey that its actions in other arenas can affect our consideration of its requested anns transfers. For 

example, a decision to continue with the acquisition of Russian S-400 missile defense systems, which are 

not NATO interoperable. could have severe impacts on our bilateral defense relationship. 

li1 Syria. beyond defeating ISIS and countering the chemical weapon threat. our objective is to help the 

Syrian people live in safety, peace, and with good govemance. Congress has proposed a strategy here on 

this objective and we have had bills passed through this committee. Docs the administration have a 

strategy on this objective? Or is this an objective that we simply can't achieve at a cost the American 

people will accept'' 

The Syrian people should be able to live in a stable country without the il1lll1ense amount of human 

suffering they have had to endure since the conflict began in 2011. As this Administration has said 

before, there is no military solution to the conflict. and we remain committed to the UN-led Geneva 

process pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2254. We arc engaged with the United Nations and 

other parties, including Russia, to encourage all possible efforts to advance the political track as called 

for in UNSCR 2254. l11is resolution demands that all parties immediately cease any attacks against 

civillan targets. urges a11 Member States to support efforts to achieve a ceasefire and facilit:'lte unhindered 
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humanitarian access, and requests the United Nations convene the parties to engage in formal negotiations 

that lead to a political resolution to the con±1ict. 

In Syria. assuming Assad is in po\ver t\vo or three years from nmv. \vhy shouldn't \Ve allo\v the Kurds in 

Syria to have sovereignty? Why should we insist that they continue to live in a country ruled by Assad 

backed by Russia, Iran, and Hczbollah? 

The United States believes that the future of Syria is for the Syrian people to decide_ and we are working 

towards a political solution that supports free and fair elections. The United States is committed to the 

territorial integrity of Syria and believes it is a stabilizing factor for the Syrian people and the region. The 

United States is working with allies and partners both to find a political solution to the conflict in Syria 

through the UN-Ied Geneva process and to diminish malign Iranian influence throughout the region, 

including the presence of Hezbollah in Syria_ 

What is the legal cfl:'cct of voiding the JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran'' By voiding the agreement, 

Iran would be entitled to start enriching uranium, and Russia could return to Iran the fissile material that 

Iran turned over to them under the JCPOA. Also. the United States and its allies would be free to have 

new sanctions on Iran if the JCPOA docs not exist. John Kerry told this committee that even with the 

JCPOA~ \Ve can impose harsh sanctions on Iran. as long as this is proportionate to Iran's \\Tongdoing 

outside the JCPOA 's nuclear arena. such as for Iran's tics with Hczbollah, Hamas. and the Houthi. So the 

question is, do we gain more in tenus of our national security interests if we retain the JCPOA and subject 

Iran to JCPOA enrichment restrictions but still sanction them for their nonnuclear activities of concemthat we are entitled to do under the J CPOA-or do we gain more if we void the J CPOA? 

The Administration's objective is to fix the JCPOA. and there is an active policy discussion arom1d this 

issue that is continuing. The President has been clear that if \Ve are unable to secure commitments from 

our European allies to fix the JCPOA, then he will tenninatc U S. participation in the deal. 

Beyond the nuclear issue, this Administration has aggressively targeted Iranian indiYiduals and entities 

using sanctions to push back against Iran's malign behavior. Since the Trump Administration took office 

in 2017, the Departments of State and Treasury ha\c combined efforts to target more than 110 persons 

and entities for their human rights abuses, support to terrorism~ and other issues under various sanctions 

authorities. 
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Libya: 

Questions for the Record from Representative Ted Lieu 

U.S. Policy Toward a Turbulent Middle East 

For the Honorable David M Satterfield 

April 18,2018 

Regarding Libya, competition between two warring coalitions continues to undermine the restoration of 

stability, hampering Libyan humanitarian relief and counter-terrorism efforts Docs the U.S. fully support 

the UN-led negotiations for a political settlement between these two parties'' What active steps is the 

Department taking, including on the ground in North Africa and in Europe, to ensure the UN-led political 

process moves forward? 

The United States strongly supports a UN-facilitated, Libyan-led political process as the means to achieving 

stability and security in Libya. UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Libya 

Ghassan Salamc is focused on bringing key Libyan actors together to prepare tor credible and secure 

elections. 

Our desired end-state in Libya is a stable, unified govemment capable of providing security and prosperity 

to the Libyan people and partncring with the intcmational community to defeat ISIS and other terrorists. 

As such, the State Department continues to actively engage a broad range of Libyan voices, including the 

Govcmmcnt of National Accord (GNA). to promote dialogue ar1d national political reconciliation. We arc 

also closely coordinating with SRSG Salame and our international partners, through bilateral and 

multilateral engagements. In our engagement \Vlth Libyans and inten1ational actors. we continually 

reinforce that ar1y attempts to impose a military solution or bypass the political process will only further 

destabilize Libya. 

Please assess the involvement of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia in Libya. Has the 

political and military policies of these three U.S. partners undermined or supported the UN negotiations 

process in Libya? 

The United States strongly supports UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General 

(SRSG) Ghassan Salame as he works to advance political reconciliation and help Libyans prepare for 

credible and secure elections. In our engagement with Libym1s m1d international partners, we continually 

reinforce that any attempts to impose a military solution or bypass the political process will only further 

destabilize Libya. h1crcasing intcmational alignment on Libya has been a core goal of our diplomatic 

efforts. Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have a common interest with the United States in denying the 

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other terrorists safe haven in Libya, which requires a stable. 

unified Libyan government that can ultimately stand on its own against terrorism and provide greater 

security ar1d prosperity ±or the Libym1 people. Accordingly. we continue to work with all three partners to 

ensure that our engagement in Libya is coordinated and productiYe with U.S. and other international efforts. 
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The United States maintains an active dialogue with Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia on Libya primarily 

through the expanded "P3+3" grouping_ a diplomatic structure that regularly brings together senior U.S .. 

UK, French_ Italian_ Egyptian, Em irati, Saudi, Algerian, and Tunisian officials to coordinate our efforts. 

We are aware of the UAE"s concern about violent exiremism across the region. We regularly engage the 

UAE on this subject, and working to ensure that all of our c±Iorts in the region supportive of UN political 

medi<Ition <Ind aligned tow<Ird the smne gmls. Egypt hosted a series of recent meetings to promote the unity 

ofLibym1 security institutions. which has been a helpful contribution to international efforts. Saudi Arabia 

supports the UN-facilitated process on Libya m1d a Libym1 political solution. 

Have any nations violated the UN anns embargo on Libya? Tf so_ please identify the violators and describe 

the extent of these violations. 

The Security Council"s Libya Sanctions Committee Pm1cl of Experts (POE) regularly investigates m1d 

reports on non-compliance vvith the UN two-vvay anns embargo on Libya. The UN tvvo-\vay an11s embargo 

on Libya remains m1 important tool for mm1aging the risks of destabilizing and uncontrolled arms flows 

both into and out of Libya_ Member States arc obligated to obtain an exemption from the Sanctions 

Committee for lethal military equipment sales or transfers to Libya, with some exceptions_ 

It has been widely reported that several states- most prominently Egypt m1d UAE- may be supplying arms 

to non-state actors in Libya. Libya's neighbors m1d other countries in region have a critical role to play in 

urging Libyan contacts to exercise military restraint and engage constmctively with the UN -facilitated 

process. We engage regularly with regional actors to align our approach toward bolstering UN-led 

mediation efforts and urging all Libym1 parties to exercise military restraint and support a negotiated 

politic<II solution. 

How has the Departtnent engaged with specific partner nations to address political-militmy interference in 

tl1e Libyan political reconciliation process m1d violations of the arms embargo on Libya? 

Attempts to bypass the Libyan-led, UN-facilitated, political process or impose a military solution will only 

further destabilize Libya m1d undermine the United States' objective of promoting a stable, unified Libya 

able to stm1d on its own against terrorism_ In public m1d private engagements, we emphasize to our partners 

that it is critical that key countries urge their Libyan contacts to exercise military restraint and engage 

constructively with the UN-facilitated political process. Ensuring a coordinated international approach to 

Libya is critical to stabilizing the country, m1d it has been a core goal of our diplomatic c±Iorts. 

The UN anns embargo for Libya is m1 importmll tool for restricting the destabilizing ±low of arms both into 

m1d out of Libya. l11e UN am1s embargo allows for the Govemment of National Accord (GNA) to seck 

UN Sanctions Committee approval for lethal military equipment it needs to secure the country and to 

combat terrorism. The United States is prepared to consider My such request put forward by the GNA. 

Egypt: 
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Reports indicate that the human rights situation in Egypt has dramatically deteriorated under President Sisi. 

Peaceful activists face aggressive repression, thousands of political prisoners are behind bars, and wellsourced allegations oftorture and ·'disappearances" continue to accU111ulatc. How has the State Department 

engaged with Egyptian authorities to relay U.S. concems about the deteriorating human rights situation for 

Egyptian citizens? 

The Trump Administration remains deeply committed to our strategic relationship with Egypt. l11is docs 

not diminish the serious concen1s vve continue to have about the human rights situation, including 

restrictions on freedoms of peaceful assembly, association, and expression and allegations of abuses by 

security forces. We frequently raise our concerns about these issues with senior Egyptian govcrlllllent 

officials, and stress the fundamental importance of the respect for hmnan rights and tl1e need for a robust 

civil society for Egyptian stability and prosperity. 

The Leahy vetting laws arc a tool to prevent tl1c U.S. from training individuals associated witl1 military 

units accused of human rights violations and to provide public visibility of U.S. human rights conccms. 

The Leahy vetting laws require continual updating of the INVEST system when and if allegations come to 

light of gross human rights violations (GHRV). However. it appears tl1at certain abuses by Egyptian units 

arc not being inputted into the system as required by intcmal regulations. How many new cases of GHRV 

by Egyptian forces have been inputted into INVEST in the past three years? Has the Egyptian military unit 

invohcd in the widely-reported extrajudicial killings in the Sinai been included in the INVEST reporting 

system as required by internal regulations? 

In 2015, two Egyptian GHRV cases were entered into INVEST: in 2016, no Egyptian GHRV cases were 

entered; in 2017, 20 Egyptian cases were entered: and, so far in 2018, two additional Egyptian cases have 

been entered. Some of these cases pertain to actions perpetrated in the Sinai. Further information on 

specific Egyptian military unit involvement can be provided in a closed setting. 

What steps does the Department take to investigate well-sourced reports of GHRV and ensure the 

infom1ation is reflected in the Department's reporting systems 'I 

The Department detem1ines the credibility of derogatory information by considering: the reliability of the 

reporting source: the mcm1s by which the reporting source acquired the information, for cxar11plc, through 

direct experience or ±rom witness testimony: the reporting source· s political agenda or biases: corroborating 

reports: the subject security unit's historical patterns of abuse; and the derogatory information's degree of 

detail, especially how that detail links the alleged perpetrator to the victim. 

Leahy vetters at posts and in Washington record the outcome of each Leahy vetting case in the INVEST 

system. 
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Is the current human rights crisis in Egypt fostering the expansion of violent extremist groups and pushing 

othenvise peaceful activists toward violent resistance against the government? 

Egypt's continued repression of non-violent opposition. restrictions on peaceful dissent. and closing space 

for civil society are of continued concem to the U.S. TI1e Administration has consistently stated that when 

we interact with a country that is engaged in human rights violations, actions that are inconsistent with our 

core values. we have an obligation to bring those concerns to light. 

The Trump Administration remains deeply committed to helping Egypt defeat the very real terrorism threats 

that they continue to face. The Administration will continue to urge Cairo to undertake a more effective 

counterterrorism strategy that recognizes the fundamental importance of the respect for hLmlan rights and 

the need for a robust civil society for Egyptian stability while simultaneously addressing the threats facing 

them. 

End-usc monitoring is a statutory requirement of U.S. weapons sales and provision. It ensures that USfunded or U.S.-made equipment and materiel are used for legitimate purposes. As the second largest 

recipient of US-funded military equipment, and as a long-standing ally and friend in the Middle East, I 

would expect cordial cooperation and understanding from Egyptian military authorities tor this legal 

requirement. In the past three years, has the Egyptian govemment provided consistent access for U.S. 

diplomats and security cooperation officials to conduct end-usc monitoring on U.S.-fundcd m1d U.S.-

provided military equipment and materiel" Please characterize the cooperation U.S. authorities have 

received from their Egyptian counterparts to conduct end -use monitoring. 

We continue to comply with U.S. law governing end-use monitoring of U.S. equipment used in Egypt. The 

Department of State. through its Blue Lantem progrmn m1d in coordination with the Department of Defense, 

continues to monitor the end-use of equipment obtained through direct commercial sales. In November 

2016, State Department ofticials visited Egypt to improve understanding ofthe Blue Lantern progrmn. This 

visit helped educate Egyptim1 authorities about the purpose of the progrmn, m1d how working together on 

end-use monitoring serves the interest of both govemments. In February 2016, the Department of Defense 

conducted a Golden Sentry (end-use monitoring program for items sold via the foreign military sales 

process) compliance assessment visit and Egypt received a satisfactory rating, the highest rating possible. 

With regard to monitoring Sinai operations. the Departments of State and Defense continue to engage at 

high levels to press for U.S. official access. However. procedures for the three types of end-use monitoring 

included in the Blue Lantcm progran1 do not require on-site visits to operational areas by U.S. personnel. 

Syria: 

It is deeply conccming that the Administration has failed to provide a comprehensive Syria strategy to 

Congress by Febmary l. 20 I 8. as required by Section 1221 of the Fiscal Year 20 l 8 National Defense 

Authorization Act. What is the status of the Administration's Strategy in Syria and what has the 

Department's involvement been to date? 
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The Administration is deeply concerned about the situation in Syria. Our priority in Syria remains the 

enduring defeat ofTSIS. Separately, the Administration is also working to counter Iranian malign influence, 

prevent the usc of chemical \\Capons, ensure the safety of Syria's neighbors, including Israel, and ultimately 

resolve the SyTian conflict and humanitarian crisis through the de-escalation of Yiolence and a political 

solution in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. We remain committed to supporting a 

diplomatic resolution to the Syrian conflict one which can bring about a more representative m1d peaceful 

Syria. free of terrorism. 

Yemen: 

In January, you told Congress that, "We have now full access to commercial and hmnanitarim1 goods 

through Hodeidal1 and Saleef ports." Yet in m1 early April report, the UN Office for the Coordination of 

Hmnm1itarim1 affairs noted that the number of vessels berthing at Hudaydal1 m1d Salccf is just half of what 

it was before the Saudi-led blockade. Furthermore_ in March of this year, food imports were 57 percent of 

the monthly national requirement, and fuel imports were one-third of the requirement forYemenis. Some 

of this shortage appears to be due to ongoing coalition practices. mtcmational hmnm1itarim1 orgm1izations 

m1d commercial shippers continue to report that access to Hudaydah m1d Salccf ports is partiaL m1d that 

they are repeatedly delayed by secondary inspections conducted by the Saudi-led coalition nmy on top of 

the already rigorous UN V crification m1d mspcction Mcchm1ism (or UNVIM). These secondary inspections 

can delay berth by as much as 10 days, contributing to market uncertainty and dramatically increasing the 

prices of basic staple goods: the process has become so onerous that some importers haYe stopped delivering 

to Hudaydal1 m1d Salccf altogether. Mr. Satterfield. would you say, in April 2018, that we have ''full access 

to commercial and humanitarian goods through Hudaydah m1d Saleef ports?" 

Hudaydah and Saleefports remain open to humanitarian aid, as well as commercial shipments of food m1d 

fuel: however, imports remain below pre-November levels and UN reports indicate that commercial imports 

decreased through Red Sea ports in ApriL The United States has expressed concems about the vessel 

clearm1ce delays at the ports, which has been a contributing factor to the low level of imports. \Ve continue 

to urge parties to allow unimpeded access through all points of entry in Yemen. The United States has 

raised the issue of access at Hudaydal1 m1d Saleef ports with the highest levels of Saudi m1d Emirati 

leadership, including when Secretary Pompeo met with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed 

Al Nal1ym1 on May 14. We have encouraged the Saudi-led Coalition's Evacuation m1d Humanitarian 

Operations Cell to continue to work closely with the UN Verification and Inspection Mcchm1ism (UNVIM) 

to strent,>ihen coordination and communication. The United States is also supporting an expanded 

monitoring and inspections proposal for UNVIM that more rigorously addresses the Coalition's security 

conccms while also ensuring an efficient timely clearance process tor commercial shippers. 

In its most recent report on the conflict. the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen stated that the 

usc oflargc commercial vessels to smuggle weapons into Red Sea ports was "unlikely:' given the UNVIM 

process. Docs the US govcnnncnt view the potential ±or weapons smuggling into Hudaydal1 m1d Saleefas 

severe enough to justifY the coalition-s secondary inspections. which are clearly exacerbating the 

humanitarian crisis? 
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The United States has expressed concerns about the delays that have prevented or delayed humanitarian 

assistance and commercial goods from reaching the Yemeni people. We continue to urge parties to allow 

unimpeded access for luunanitarian aid and commercial goods - including tood, fuel, and medicine - to 

reach Yemen through all points of entry. We have encouraged the Saudi-led Coalition's Evacuation and 

Humanitarian Operations Cell to continue to work closely with the UN Verification and Inspection 

Mechanism (UNVIM) to strengthen coordination and communication. T11e United States is also supporting 

an expanded monitoring and inspections proposal for UNVTM that more rigorously addresses the 

Coalition· s security concerns while also ensuring an etlicient, timely clearance process tor commercial 

shippers. 

Given the strength of the UNVIM process, does the Department view the secondary inspections that the 

Saudi-led coalition conducts on commercial vessels to be duplicative 0 

The United States continues to urge that all parties allow unimpeded access tor humanitarian aid and 

commercial goods - including food. fuel. and medicine - to reach Yemen through all points of entry. We 

have encouraged the Saudi-led Coalition's Evacuation and Humanitarian Operations Cell to continue to 

work closely with the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) to strengthen coordination 

and comnumication. The United States is supporting an expanded monitoring and inspections proposal tor 

UNVTM that more rigorously addresses the Coalition's security concerns while also ensuring an efficient. 

timely clearance process tor connnercial shippers. 

What actions has the administration taken to bring the Saudi -led coalition in line with international 

humanitarian lmv? 

We take all credible reports of civilian casualties seriously and are proactiyeJy engaging with the Coalition 

to reduce the likelihood of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure. We continue to press Saudi-led 

Coalition partners at the highest Jeye)s to mitigate the conflict's impact on ciYilians. We have conducted 

courses for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) that specifically include training on law of armed conflict 

(LOAC) and air-to-grom1d targeting processes. T11c Saudi Ministry of Defense has committed to ftmd 

training for the RSAF from U.S. forces on minimizing ci,ilian casualties. included as part ofa$750 million. 

multi-year FMS training case. We continue to urge the Coalition, and all parties to the conflict, to allow 

full access for humanitarian relief and commercial goods to address Yemen's humanitarian crisis. 

Article 14 of Additional Protocol IT of the Geneva conventions prohibits starvation of civilians as a method 

of combat, including in this prohibition the attack, destruction, remoYal, or rendering useless of '·objects 

indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas tor the 

production of foodstuffs. crops. livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 

networks.'' A nonpartisan civil society organization called the Yemen Data Project has documented that 

coalition air raids have, over the course of the conflict targeted 456 farms, II 0 water and electricity sites. 
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and 63 food storage sites. Additionally, the journalist Tona Craig has reported that, as of late last year, 

coalition air raids had damaged or destroyed over 250 fishing vessels and killed 152 fishermen during the 

conflict. TI1e United States is providing direct logistical support for the Saudi-led coalition's air operations, 

primarily through mid-air refueling of coalition planes and targeting assistance offered to coalition 

missions. Arc U.S. personnel at risk of complicity in violations of Article 14 of Additional ProtocollJ? Is 

there a risk that U.S. personnel could be prosecuted for THL violations? 

The humanitarian crisis in Yemen is dire and unacceptable. However, the Saudi-led Coalition is taking 

incremental, but positive steps to address it. Last month, the Saudis and Emiratis provided nearly $1 billion 

to Yemen's humanit.:'lrian response. The key ports ofSaleefand Hudaydah are currently open and operating. 

We continue to work with Saudi Arabia on its Yemen Comprehensive Humanitarian Operations plan, 

launched on January 22. to ensure that the plan is as comprehensive as possible and responds to the 

immediate needs ofY emenis throughout the country.