NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DANIEL VERNON SCOTT, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0382

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300CR201400436

The Honorable Tina R. Ainley, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By W. Scott Simon

Counsel for Appellee

Yavapai County Public Defender’s Office, Prescott

By John Napper, Andrew R. Falick

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. SCOTT

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge John C. Gemmill1 delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

G E M M I L L, Judge:

¶1 Daniel Vernon Scott appeals his conviction and sentence for 

one count of disorderly conduct with a deadly weapon, domestic violence 

related. Scott argues the superior court erred in denying his pretrial 

motions to compel production of ten years of the victim’s mental health 

records for an in camera inspection. He also contends the court erred by 

limiting use of evidence of the victim’s past interactions with law 

enforcement. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in 

the light most favorable to upholding the verdict. State v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 

402, 404 n.2, ¶2 (App. 2015).

¶3 Scott and J.S. (“Victim”), a married couple, were involved in 

a physical altercation on or about May 3, 2014. The State indicted Scott on 

two counts of aggravated assault, domestic violence related, each a Class 3 

felony, and two counts of misconduct involving weapons, each a Class 4 

felony.

¶4 Scott acknowledges Victim was injured and that he 

discharged a firearm during the incident. It is undisputed that Victim

suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and takes medication to subdue the 

effects, including “auditory hallucinations.” On cross examination, Victim 

admitted to a prior arrest for aggravated assault against Scott, a diagnosis 

of paranoid schizophrenia, a prior commitment to a mental institution, and 

a susceptibility toward confusion and memory loss. Scott claimed Victim 

attacked him and his reaction was in self-defense. He was permitted to 

testify to prior attacks by Victim, her descriptions of the violent content of 

 

1 The Honorable John C. Gemmill, Retired Judge of the Court of 

Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.
STATE v. SCOTT

Decision of the Court

3

the voices in her head, and his knowledge of her past diagnoses and 

prescriptions.

¶5 The jury found Scott guilty of a single count of the lesser 

included offense of disorderly conduct with a deadly weapon, domestic 

violence related.

2 The superior court imposed a sentence of two years’ 

imprisonment with 389 days of presentence incarceration credit. Scott 

timely appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

ANALYSIS

I. Denial of Request for Victim’s Mental Health Records

¶6 Scott argues the court erred in denying his pretrial motion to 

compel discovery of Victim’s mental health records for an in camera review. 

He contends the records were crucial to his defense and relevant for 

impeachment purposes. We disagree.

¶7 Whether a criminal defendant is entitled to discovery of 

certain evidence, including mental health records, is a matter entrusted to 

the superior court’s sound discretion. State v. Tyler, 149 Ariz. 312, 314 (App. 

1986). This court will not disturb a ruling on a discovery request absent an 

abuse of that discretion. State v. Fields, 196 Ariz. 580, 582, ¶ 4 (App. 1999).

“To the extent [Scott] sets forth a constitutional claim in which he asserts 

that the information is necessary to his defense, however, we will conduct 

a de novo review.” State v. Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, 557, ¶ 6 (App. 2007).

¶8 It is well-established that there is no general federal or state 

constitutional right to pretrial discovery. State v. O’Neil, 172 Ariz. 180, 182 

(App. 1991). Additionally, a victim of a crime generally “has the right to 

refuse to hand over medical records, pursuant to Arizona’s Victims’ Bill of 

Rights.” State v. Sarullo, 219 Ariz. 431, 437, ¶ 20 (App. 2008); see also Ariz. 

Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(5). This right is not absolute, and in some cases a 

victim’s rights may be outweighed by a defendant’s due process rights. See

State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court (Roper), 172 Ariz. 232, 240 (App. 1992).

¶9 To the extent a victim’s rights restrict a defendant’s access to 

information “essential to preparation for effective, reasonable crossexamination or impeachment of the victim,” such restrictions “must be 

 

2 Upon pretrial motion by the State, the superior court dismissed the 

two allegations of misconduct involving weapons, Counts 3 and 4 of the 

indictment.
STATE v. SCOTT

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proportionate to the interest of protecting the victim as balanced against the 

defendant’s due process right to a fundamentally fair trial.” Roper, 172 Ariz.

at 240. Further, the defendant has to demonstrate a “substantial need” for 

the information that “would, at least potentially, amount to one of 

constitutional dimension.” Connor, 215 Ariz. at 561, ¶ 22. As such, the 

superior court must weigh a defendant’s proffered need with a victim’s 

established rights.

¶10 Before trial, Scott filed motions and offers of proof requesting 

that the court order Victim to disclose all of her mental health records from 

the previous ten years for an in camera review. He argued that the mental 

health records might contain exculpatory evidence and would support his

claim of self-defense. In response, the State argued that Scott failed to meet 

his burden of establishing the necessity of the records because his 

incriminating statements to police on the night of the incident contradicted 

his theory of self-defense, rendering Victim’s mental health issues

irrelevant.

¶11 After an evidentiary hearing on December 3, 2014, the court 

denied Scott’s motion for the following reasons: 1) Victim had not waived 

her physician-patient privilege; 2) Scott’s offer of proof fell short of a 

“constitutional” need as described in Connor; and 3) the court had no 

authority to order the records from the Veterans Administration (“VA”), a 

federal agency. We need not address each of the superior court’s reasons 

for denying the motion because we may affirm such a ruling if the result is 

legally correct on any basis. See State v. Carlson, 237 Ariz. 381, 387, ¶ 7 

(2015). Scott argues on appeal that his rights to present a complete defense 

and to cross-examine witnesses outweigh Victim’s constitutional

protections. We conclude that the superior court did not err in denying

Scott’s request for Victim’s mental health records on the basis of the 

Victims’ Bill of Rights. Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not 

address Victim’s statutory privileges, nor the potential waiver thereof.

3

¶12 Scott speculates that the “records contain information that 

would call into question the victim’s ability to perceive events and would 

have provided impeachment of her testimony.” However, Scott provides

no basis for the court to conclude that the mental health records he sought 

contained impeachment evidence beyond what he already knew, or beyond 

 

3 The State asserts that the records sought were protected by the 

physician-patient privilege, A.R.S. § 13-4062(4), and perhaps also by the 

psychologist-client privilege, A.R.S. § 32-2085.
STATE v. SCOTT

Decision of the Court

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that which Victim admitted in her pretrial interview with the State’s 

investigator, or beyond that which Scott developed during an extensive 

cross-examination of Victim. “[M]ere conjecture without more that certain 

information might be useful as exculpatory evidence is not sufficient to 

reverse a trial court’s denial of a request for disclosure.” State v. Hatton, 116 

Ariz. 142, 150 (1977). Further, the jury received ample evidence from which 

it could infer Victim’s perception and memory of the assault were affected; 

thus, mental health records and prescriptions issued years before the 

assault, offered for impeachment, could properly be excluded as collateral 

and cumulative. See Tyler, 149 Ariz. at 314 (no abuse of discretion in 

denying discovery of medical records where effect of witness’s illness and 

medication on his memory was already known by defendant). Scott was

permitted to cross-examine Victim without restriction regarding her 

mental-health condition and medications, and we therefore discern no error 

in the superior court declining to order an in camera review of her mental 

health records for the past ten years.

¶13 Additionally, the record demonstrates the court’s efforts to 

strike a proper balance between Scott’s rights and Victim’s rights. On April 

4, 2015, the court reconsidered the request for Victim’s mental health

records after learning she had divulged certain mental health issues during 

an interview with a State investigator. Without specifically addressing 

whether the interview constituted a waiver of privilege, the court ruled that

it did not affect its decision to deny Scott’s request for an order compelling

production of the VA mental health records.4 Nevertheless, the court stated 

that it “could see some relevance” in medical information from two months 

prior to and including the date of the incident, and the court therefore 

ordered Victim to disclose to Scott any medical records in her possession,

including prescriptions.5 Further, the superior court considered an 

additional offer of proof on this matter on April 24, 2015, the third day of 

trial, after the State rested its case. The record demonstrates that the court

considered and weighed the evidence presented in Scott’s offers of proof 

and at the evidentiary hearings before denying the request to compel 

 

4 We express no opinion regarding whether a defendant’s due process 

rights may override statutory privileges because, as noted previously, we 

resolve this issue on the basis of the Victims’ Bill of Rights.

5 The record does not reveal whether Victim disclosed any medical 

information pursuant to this order.
STATE v. SCOTT

Decision of the Court

6

Victim’s mental health records for in camera review. We conclude the court 

committed no abuse of discretion or constitutional or legal error.

II. Other Act Evidence

¶14 An appellate court “will not reverse the [trial] court’s rulings 

on issues of the relevance and admissibility of evidence absent a clear abuse 

of its considerable discretion.” State v. Davis, 205 Ariz. 174, 178, ¶ 23 (App. 

2002). A conviction will not be reversed for evidentiary error unless this 

Court determines that there exists a “reasonable probability” that the jury’s 

verdict would have been different had the improperly excluded evidence 

been admitted. State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 416, ¶ 23 (1999).

¶15 When a defendant argues self-defense, specific acts of 

violence by the victim are admissible if known to the defendant and offered

to prove the defendant’s state of mind. See State v. Santanna, 153 Ariz. 147, 

149 (1987); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). When making a Rule 404(b) 

determination, the superior court must determine whether the evidence is

“clear and convincing as to the conduct and that the person alleged to have 

committed it did so, although ultimately those facts are left to the jury to 

decide if the evidence is admitted.” State v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 123, ¶ 43 

(App. 2009). Next, the superior court must determine whether the 

evidence: 1) is offered for a proper purpose; 2) is relevant to prove the stated 

purpose; and 3) has sufficient probative value that is not outweighed by 

undue prejudice under Rule 403. Id.

¶16 Specific acts by the victim that influence the defendant’s state 

of mind are admissible 

only if the defendant knew of them . . . or if they are directed 

toward third persons relating to or growing out of the same 

transaction, or so proximate in time and place and 

circumstances as would legitimately reflect upon the conduct 

or motives of the parties at the time of the affray.

Connor, 215 Ariz. at 559, ¶ 13 (quoting State v. Zamora, 140 Ariz. 338, 341 

(App. 1984)). Evidence of an alleged act may be precluded if it relates to a 

single act and could potentially distract jurors and unfairly prejudice the 

victim. Fish, 222 Ariz. at 121, ¶ 34.

¶17 Scott sought to admit specific instances of Victim’s 

interactions with law enforcement, including complaints, arrests, and 
STATE v. SCOTT

Decision of the Court

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booking photos from 2006-2013.6 The superior court denied Scott’s initial 

motion, finding the acts referenced were not “relevant to prove the issue of 

self-defense, per Rule 403.” Scott filed a motion to reconsider, and, after 

hearing further argument by both parties, the superior court permitted, as 

relevant regarding self-defense, testimony and evidence of Victim’s prior 

arrest for aggravated assault directed toward Scott. The court excluded the 

other instances of other act evidence as irrelevant, explaining:

Now, that doesn’t mean the defendant can’t testify that he 

knew about these other potential incidences, should he 

choose to testify, but I think in purpose of the case-in-chief, 

they’re too old; they’re disorderly, but I don’t find them to be 

aggressive behavior. And you don’t get to act out against 

someone because they’re disrupting the peace. That’s what 

she was charged with, and those issues do not rise to the level 

of 404(b). I don’t think they’re relevant. I think they’re just 

being used to try and muddy the victim, and I don’t think 

that’s appropriate under 404.

The court further clarified that if Scott chose to testify, he could mention 

other known instances of violence, diagnoses, medications and the like, but 

in his case-in-chief, “for purposes of 404(b), to show that . . . his actions were 

based on some prior fear or belief that self-defense was necessary, and 

keeping it to that narrow focus, I’m only finding the [2013 aggravated 

assault] case applies.”

¶18 On this record, the superior court evaluated the evidence in 

accordance with the rules of evidence and acted within its broad discretion 

in precluding some of Victim’s past interactions with law enforcement as 

irrelevant to Scott’s claim of self-defense.

 

6 In support of the initial Rule 404(b) factor, the State did not dispute 

that Victim was the subject of the law enforcement encounters proffered by

Scott.
STATE v. SCOTT

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CONCLUSION

¶19 For the forgoing reasons, we affirm Scott’s conviction and 

sentence.