UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

Case No. 22-cv-23753-MOORE/BECERRA

EDWIN GARRISON, et al., on behalf of 

themselves and all other similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SAM BANKMAN-FRIED, et al.,

Defendants.

/

DEFENDANT GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS, LLC’S INDIVIDUAL BRIEF

IN SUPPORT OF (1) MOVANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS, AND 

(2) DEFENDANT GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS, LLC’S 

MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE IN THE ALTERNATIVE

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As authorized by this Court’s April 11, 2023 order, this brief raises two arguments specific 

to Defendant Golden State Warriors, LLC (“GSW”). First, in addition to the reasons set forth in 

the Movants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) (in 

which GSW has joined), Plaintiffs’ Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act 

(“FDUTPA”) claim against GSW is barred by FDUTPA’s publisher exception. Fla. Stat. 

§ 501.212. Second, in the event the Court denies both of the motions to dismiss filed by GSW—

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim—the Court should transfer the claims against GSW to the Northern District of California

where nearly identical claims against GSW are pending. 

GSW Falls Within the Publisher Exception to FDUTPA. FDUTPA expressly does not 

apply to “publisher[s], broadcaster[s], printer[s], or other person[s] engaged in the dissemination 

of information or the reproduction of printed or pictorial matter, insofar as the information or 

matter has been disseminated or reproduced on behalf of others without actual knowledge that it 

violated this part.” Fla. Stat. § 501.212. GSW fits squarely within this exception. 

GSW’s alleged deceptive act here is its “publishing” or “reproduction” of FTX’s logo at 

its home basketball arena in San Francisco, California through “in-arena . . . and virtual floor 

signage.” FAC ¶¶ 222-23. Yet GSW is not alleged (other than in an entirely conclusory and thus 

insufficient fashion) to have had “actual knowledge” of the alleged deceptive nature of FTX’s

conduct. Fla. Stat. § 501.212. Plaintiffs’ allegations thus do not state a claim against GSW under 

FDUTPA and identical statutes in other jurisdictions for this independent reason.1 See, e.g., 

1

See, e.g., 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 510/4(2); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358–A:3, IV; Ohio Rev. 

Code §§ 1345.01-1345.13.

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Ferron v. EchoStar Satellite, LLC, 410 F. App’x 903, 903 (6th Cir. 2010) (publisher exception 

shielded business from liability because it was not involved in creation of ads, but merely hosted 

them for purposes of later dissemination); Sheridan v. iHeartMedia, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 3d 767, 775

(N.D. Ill. 2017) (internet radio service provider fell within broadcaster exception where it did not 

know facts that rendered its broadcasts deceptive); Karpinski v. Union Leader Corp., 2019 WL 

3203144, at *8 (D.N.H. July 16, 2019) (dismissing consumer protection claims against newspaper 

where there was no plausible allegation that paper had “knowledge” of any deception). 

If They Are Not Dismissed, Plaintiffs’ Claims Against GSW Should Be Transferred. In 

the event the Court denies GSW’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure 

to state a claim, and solely in the alternative to the relief requested in those motions, the Court 

should sever the claims against GSW and transfer them to the Northern District of California where 

a substantially similar action is pending against GSW. See Lam v. Bankman-Fried, et al., No: 

3:22-cv-07336 (N.D. Cal.). This Court has the power to transfer actions to a different U.S. district 

court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. While courts typically transfer an entire action pursuant to Section 

1404, a court may sever specific claims and transfer just those claims. See, e.g., Bruhl v. Price 

WaterhouseCoopers Int’l, 2006 WL 8431803, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2006) (granting motion 

to sever claims and transfer under § 1404). Courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry to determine 

whether an action should be transferred to a different venue under Section 1404. See, e.g.,

Cellularvision Tech. & Telecomm., L.P. v. Alltel Corp., 508 F. Supp. 2d. 1186, 1189 (S.D. Fla.

2007) (Moore, J.). The alternative venue must be one in which the action could originally have 

been brought, and then courts balance private and public factors to determine if transfer is justified, 

including convenience of the parties and witnesses, relative ease of access to sources of proof, 

availability of compulsory process for witnesses, and the public interest. See id. 

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“The first step of the transfer analysis is met . . . because [GSW is a] resident[] in the 

Northern District of California; therefore, the action could have been brought there in the first 

instance.” Damian v. Meftah, 2021 WL 8775762, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2021). 

The private and public factors also weigh in favor of transfer. GSW is defending nearly 

identical claims in the Lam action pending in the Northern District of California. Just like this 

case, the plaintiff in Lam claims that the display of FTX’s logo at Chase Center amounted to the 

unlawful promotion of unregistered securities (namely, FTX’s YBAs). Lam, ECF No. 1 (attached 

as Exhibit 1), ¶¶ 16, 56-57. Courts routinely transfer cases under Section 1404(a) where, as here, 

duplicative litigation is pending in a different district. See, e.g., Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. 

Microsoft Corp., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (transferring action because “‘[t]here 

is no overriding public interest that should require this Court to adjudicate satellite litigation here, 

especially when the resources required to adjudicate this case could be streamlined with the cases 

already pending’” in the transferee district). And the reason is straightforward: “‘[l]itigation of 

related claims in the same tribunal is favored in order to avoid duplic[active] litigation, attendant 

unnecessary expense, loss of time to courts, witnesses and litigants, and inconsistent results.’” 

Imvenco PVBA Antwerp v. Maersk Line, 1992 WL 442695, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 1992)

(citations omitted). This factor alone warrants transfer to the Northern District of California. 

Additionally, all of the relevant GSW witnesses and evidence are in California, where 

GSW and Chase Center are located. FAC ¶¶ 37, 222-223. Convenience of the witnesses is the 

“single most important factor in the analysis whether a transfer should be granted.” Osgood v. 

Disc. Auto Parts, LLC, 981 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citations omitted). The 

balance of factors tilts in favor of transfer. 

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LOCAL 7.1 CERTIFICATION

In accordance with Local Rule 7.1, counsel for GSW conferred with Plaintiffs’ counsel via 

email on April 13, 2023, explaining the grounds for the relief sought and requesting Plaintiffs’ 

position. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded that they oppose the motion.

DATED: April 14, 2023 COLSON, HICKS, EIDSON, P.A.

By: /s/ Roberto Martínez 

Roberto Martínez (FBN 305596)

Stephanie A. Casey (FBN 97483)

Zachary Lipshultz (FBN 123594)

255 Alhambra Circle, Penthouse

Coral Gables, Florida 33134

Phone: 305.476.7400

bob@colson.com

scasey@colson.com

zach@colson.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

Matthew S. Kahn (pro hac vice pending)

Michael J. Kahn (pro hac vice pending)

555 Mission Street, Suite 3000

San Francisco, CA 94105-0921

Phone: 415.393.8379

MKahn@gibsondunn.com

MJKahn@gibsondunn.com

Michael Dore (pro hac vice forthcoming)

Jamila MacEbong (pro hac vice pending)

333 South Grand Avenue

Suite 4600

Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197

Phone: 213.229.7155

MDore@gibsondunn.com

JMacEbong@gibsondunn.com

Attorneys for Defendant 

GOLDEN STATE WARRIORS, LLC 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 14th day of April, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document 

is being served this day on all counsel of record via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing 

generated by CM/ECF. 

/s/ Roberto Martínez

Roberto Martínez

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