SHAH BROS., INC., 

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant.

Slip Op. 14 - 

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

OPINION AND ORDER 

[granting in part plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and 

expenses]

Dated: December 15, 2014

Elon A. Pollack and Kayla Owens, Stein Shostak Shostak 

Pollack & O’Hara, LLP, of Los Angeles, CA, for the Plaintiff. 

Edward F. Kenny, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, NY, for the 

Defendant. Also on the brief were Joyce R. Branda, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General, and Amy M. Rubin, Acting Assistant 

Director, International Trade Field Office.

Pogue, Senior Judge: In this action, Plaintiff Shah 

Bros., Inc. (“Shah Bros.”) – the prevailing party1

 – was 

1

 See Shah Bros., Inc. v. United States, __ CIT __, 

953 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1332 (2013) (granting Defendant’s motion 

to confess judgment in favor of Shah Bros. and explaining that 

“the Government has agreed to provide all the relief that is 

legally available to Shah Bros. – by reliquidating the 

merchandise in question at the tariff and tax rates claimed in 

the amended complaint”); Judgment & Order, ECF No. 91 (entering 

judgment for Shah Bros. and ordering U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection to reclassify the merchandise at issue as requested 

by Shah Bros.). 

Before: Donald C. Pogue, 

Senior Judge 

Court No. 10-00205 
Court No. 10-00205 Page 2 

previously awarded, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2012) (“EAJA”), compensation for attorneys’ 

fees and expenses that it had reasonably incurred.2

 Shah Bros. 

now seeks a supplemental award of the additional attorneys’ fees 

it incurred while litigating its EAJA application (the “fee 

litigation”).3

 Because Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney 

fees for work reasonably expended to obtain the amount 

previously awarded, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part. The 

supplemental award is reduced to reflect excess hours and the 

extent of Plaintiff’s success in the fee litigation. 

DISCUSSION

The prevailing party in a civil action brought by or 

against the United States is entitled to an award of the 

2

 Shah Bros., Inc. v. United States, __ CIT __, 9 F. Supp. 3d 

1402, 1409 (2014) (“Shah Bros. EAJA Litig.”) (holding that 

Plaintiff Shah Bros. is entitled to a fees and expenses award 

pursuant to the EAJA “because Shah Bros. is the prevailing party 

in this civil action brought against the United States; because 

the United States has not shown that the agency action upon 

which this civil action is based – i.e., the denial of Shah 

Bros.’ classification protest after confession of judgment in [a 

prior action concerning materially-identical merchandise, 

imported by the same importer shortly prior to this litigation] 

– was substantially justified; and because the Government has

not shown that special circumstances exist in this case that 

would make a fee award unjust”) (quotation marks and citations 

omitted); see id. at 1406 (discussing the legal framework for 

EAJA awards). Familiarity with the facts and procedural posture 

of this case is presumed.

3

 Pl.’s Supplemental Appl. for Att’y Fees Under the [EAJA], 

ECF No. 108. 
Court No. 10-00205 Page 3 

attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred by that party in 

such action, “unless the court finds that the position of the 

United States was substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Here, 

previous rulings have established that Plaintiff was the 

prevailing party in this civil action against the United States, 

and the position of the Government that gave rise to this 

litigation was not substantially justified.4

 This “single 

finding that the Government’s position lacks substantial 

justification, like the determination that a claimant is a 

‘prevailing party,’ . . . operates as a one-time threshold for 

fee eligibility,”5

 such that “absent unreasonably dilatory 

conduct by the prevailing party in any portion of the 

litigation, which would justify denying fees for that portion, a 

fee award presumptively encompasses all aspects of the civil 

action,” including the fee litigation.6

 Accordingly, Shah Bros. 

4

 Shah Bros. EAJA Litig., __ CIT at __, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1407-08, 

1409 & n.13. 

5

 Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 160 (1990).

6

 Id. at 161 (emphasis added, quotation marks and footnote 

omitted); see also id. at 162 (“Denying attorneys’ fees for time 

spent in obtaining them would dilute the value of a fees award 

by forcing attorneys into extensive, uncompensated litigation in 

order to gain any fees . . . .”) (alteration, quotation marks, 

and citation omitted); id. at 164 (“If the Government could 

impose the cost of fee litigation on prevailing parties by 

asserting a ‘substantially justified’ defense to fee 

applications, the financial deterrent that the EAJA aims to 

(footnote continued . . .) 
Court No. 10-00205 Page 4 

is entitled to an EAJA award that includes compensation for the 

fee litigation. The next question before the court is therefore 

the appropriate magnitude of such award. 

As a threshold matter, the EAJA entitles the Plaintiff 

to compensation only for work that was “reasonably expended.”7

In this regard, the Government argues that certain entries 

contained in Plaintiff’s itemized fee litigation bill8

 are noncompensable.9

 Specifically, the Government contests entries that 

reflect 1) a junior attorney working together with a senior 

eliminate would be resurrected.”); cf. Scarborough v. Principi, 

541 U.S. 401, 407 (2004) (“Congress’ aim, in [enacting the 

EAJA], was ‘to ensure that certain individuals, partnerships, 

corporations . . . or other organizations will not be deterred 

from seeking review of, or defending against, unjustified 

governmental action because of the expense involved.’”) (quoting 

H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 4 (1985)).

7

 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (“The district 

court . . . should exclude from [the] fee calculation hours that 

were not ‘reasonably expended,’ . . . [such as] hours that are 

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”) (quoting 

S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976)); Copeland v. Marshall, 

641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (“Any fee-setting 

inquiry begins with the ‘lodestar’: the number of hours 

reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.

. . . Compiling raw totals of hours spent, however, does not 

complete the inquiry. It does not follow that the amount of 

time actually expended is the amount of time reasonably

expended.”) (emphasis in original).

8

 See Ex. A (supplemental EAJA application and itemized fee bill) 

to Decl. of Elon A. Pollack, ECF No. 108 (“Pl.’s Suppl. Fee 

Bill”).

9

 Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Supplemental Appl. for Att’y Fees Under 

the [EAJA], ECF No. 109 (“Def.’s Opp’n”) at 2-5. 
Court No. 10-00205 Page 5 

attorney; 2) work on unfiled motions; 3) performance of more 

than one task; and 4) preparation of the supplemental EAJA 

application.10 Each argument is addressed in turn.

First, the Government’s objection to the 

reasonableness of work performed by a junior and senior attorney 

working together11 is unpersuasive. Indeed “it is the rule 

rather than the exception to have a junior and senior attorney 

working together on a matter,”12 and nothing suggests any 

inappropriate duplication of effort here. On the other hand, 

the Government is correct that no EAJA fees are recoverable for 

unfiled motions, and that this is the law of the case.13

10 Id. 

11 See Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 109, at 3-4 (challenging entries 

billing for “KO” and “EAP” working together); Shah Bros. EAJA 

Litig., __ CIT at __, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1411 n.21 (noting that 

“KO” was the most junior attorney on the team, whereas “EAP” was 

the most senior attorney). 

12 Former Emps. of BMC Software, Inc. v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 

31 CIT 1600, 1649, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1334 (2007) (quoting 

Ross v. Saltmarsh, 521 F. Supp. 753, 760 n.35 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 

aff’d, 688 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1982)); Ross, 521 F. Supp. at 760 

(noting that “this arrangement is the normal partner/associate 

or senior associate/junior associate working relationship in 

most legal firms”).

13 Shah Bros. EAJA Litig., __ CIT at __, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1413

(accepting the Government’s challenge to, inter alia, EAJA 

compensation for work on unfiled motions, for the reasons 

provided in the Government’s annotations to Plaintiff’s initial 

itemized fee bill); Ex. 5 (Plaintiff’s itemized fee bill, 

annotated to reflect hours and rates contested by the 

Government) to Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Appl. for Att’ys 

Fees & Expenses Under the [EAJA], ECF Nos. 96-2 & 96-3 (“Def.’s 

(footnote continued . . .) 
Court No. 10-00205 Page 6 

Accordingly, time spent working on unfiled motions14 shall be 

excluded from Plaintiff’s EAJA award. 

With regard to the billing entries reflecting 

performance of more than one task,15 the particular entries at 

issue here are not so devoid of specificity, and the billing 

time blocks are not so large, as to obscure the reasonableness 

of the work performed.16 Only two of Plaintiff’s supplemental 

Initial Objections”), at 42 (challenging entries reflecting work 

on unfiled motions) (citing Gibson v. Colvin, No. 4:03-cv-90, 

2013 WL 2422611 (S.D. Ga. June 3, 2013)); Gibson, 2013 WL 

2422611 at *4 (“Unfiled motions, whether or not unfiled because 

of strategic judgments by counsel, cannot be compensated. They 

represent miscalculation by counsel and . . . mistakes will not 

be compensated under the EAJA.”) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. 

at 437 (cautioning that counsel must use billing judgment in 

hours worked)); see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (quoting Copeland, 

641 F.2d at 891 (“In the private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is 

an important component in fee setting. . . . Hours that are 

not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly billed 

to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.”) (emphasis 

in original)).

14 See Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 109, at 4 (identifying entry numbers 

56, 57, 58, and 61 as pertaining to unfiled motions (as numbered 

in the Government’s annotated reproduction of the Plaintiff’s 

itemized supplemental fee bill)); Ex. 1 (Plaintiff’s itemized 

supplementary fee bill, annotated to reflect the Government’s 

itemized objections) to Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 109-1 (“Def.’s 

Annotated Fee Bill”) at 5 (showing entry numbers 56, 57, 58, 

and 61 – comprising 2.5 hours in total – as pertaining to 

unfiled motions).

15 See Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 109, at 4 (challenging billing 

entries “attributed to more than one billing event”) 

16 Cf. Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 

82 F.3d 1533, 1554 n.15 (10th Cir. 1996) (“‘Block billing’ 

refers to the time-keeping method by which each lawyer and legal 

assistant enters the total daily time spent working on a case, 

(footnote continued . . .) 
Court No. 10-00205 Page 7 

billing entries exceed 3 hours,17 most contain no more than two 

separate (though often related) tasks, and each entry reflects 

work reasonably expended when the time billed is considered to 

have been divided evenly among the tasks listed therein.18

rather than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks.”); 

Wise v. Kelly, 620 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 

(“Although not prohibited, block-billing [sometimes] makes it 

exceedingly difficult for courts to assess the reasonableness of 

the hours billed.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

17 Cf., e.g., Noel v. Hall, No. 3:99-cv-00649-AC, 

2013 WL 5376542, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 24, 2013) (permitting 

block-billed entries under three hours because, “[a]lthough 

cautioning against this practice, the court may excuse this 

method when the billing period is no more than three hours”) 

(quoting Sterling Savings Bank v. Sequoia Crossing, LLC, Civ. 

No. 09-555-AC, 2010 WL 3210855, at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2010) 

(“[W]hile billing periods of three hours or more may be subject 

to exclusion, the court is more lenient with smaller blocks of 

time, which it may divide by the total number of included tasks 

in order to find the length of time required for each individual 

task.”) (citation omitted)). Here, Plaintiff’s supplemental fee 

bill contains two entries comprising four-hour increments, each 

of which lists two arguably related tasks. See Def.’s Annotated 

Fee Bill, ECF No. 109-1, at 4 (entry nos. 40 and 42) (billing 

4 hours each for “Review Libas case; continue preparing 

submission” and “Discuss issues with EAP; continue preparing 

submission,” respectively).

18 See, e.g., Def.’s Annotated Fee Bill, ECF No. 109-1, at 1 

(entry no. 7) (billing 0.50 hours for “[c]orrespondence with 

Rebecca Demb re: court conference; discuss same with KO”); id. 

at 2 (entry no. 12) (billing 1.75 hours for “[d]iscuss[ing] fee 

application with EAP re: conference with the court; review 

brief”); id. (entry no. 14) (billing 2.25 hours for 

“research[ing] case law cited in opposition; draft[ing] notes 

for teleconference”); id. (entry no. 19) (billing 2.25 hours for 

“[p]repar[ing] for court conference; conferenc[ing] with 

Department of Justice and court re: fee award; review[ing] 

billing documents with KO and formulat[ing] settlement 

strategy”); id. at 4 (entry no. 47) (billing 1.50 hours for 

“[r]eview[ing] final submission; review[ing] government 

(footnote continued . . .) 
Court No. 10-00205 Page 8 

Finally, with regard to Plaintiff’s claim for 

compensation for time spent preparing the supplemental EAJA 

application, the Government argues that such work is noncompensable because “[a]llowing Plaintiff to continue to request 

fees for work performed on supplemental applications would 

permit a never-ending cycle of EAJA fee requests.”19 But “a fee 

award presumptively encompasses all aspects of the civil action” 

(absent unreasonably dilatory conduct by the prevailing party),20

including those aspects related to the compensation to which the 

prevailing party is entitled.21 And compensating Plaintiff for 

time spent in preparing the supplemental EAJA application would 

not “permit a never-ending cycle of EAJA fee requests” because, 

as Plaintiff is not permitted any further briefing on this 

matter, no further work remains to be compensated. 

submission; adjust[ing] submission based on government 

response”).

19 Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 109, at 5 (quoting Belcher v. Astrue, 

No. 1:09cv1234 DLB, 2011 WL 3847181, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Aug. 30, 2011), rev’d in part on other grounds, 522 F. App’x 401 

(9th Cir. 2013)).

20 Jean, 496 U.S. at 161 (emphasis added).

21 Id.; id. at 162 (quoting Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 888 

(1989) (“[Where proceedings are] necessary to the attainment of 

the results Congress sought to promote by providing for fees, 

they should be considered part and parcel of the action for 

which fees may be awarded.”)); id. at 166 (“The purpose and 

legislative history of the statute reinforce our conclusion that 

Congress intended the EAJA to cover the cost of all phases of 

successful civil litigation addressed by the statute.”).
Court No. 10-00205 Page 9 

But determining which of Plaintiff’s fee litigation 

hours were reasonably expended does not end the inquiry.

Because the court must “consider the relationship between the 

amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained,” fee 

litigation awards should reflect the extent to which the 

applicant was ultimately successful in such litigation.22 Thus 

where (as here) the Government’s challenge to Plaintiff’s EAJA 

application resulted in the court’s recalculating and reducing 

the amount of the award initially sought,23 the subsequent fee 

litigation award should generally reflect a reduction reasonably 

proportionate to the applicant’s degree of success.24

22 Jean, 496 U.S. at 163 n.10 (relying on Hensley, 461 U.S. 

at 437); see also Wagner v. Shinseki, 640 F.3d 1255, 1260 

(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Courts should look to the framework 

established in Hensley when calculating an appropriate 

supplemental fee award.”) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435-39; 

Jean, 496 U.S. at 161-63); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436 (“[T]he most 

critical factor [in calculating a fee award] is the degree of 

success obtained.”); cf. Wagner, 640 F.3d at 1260 n.3 

(explaining that “[a]lthough Hensley involved the award of fees 

under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1988, the standards set forth for awarding attorney fees ‘are

generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has 

authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party,’” and that 

“[f]urthermore, although Hensley involved an initial fee 

application, the fee guidelines it provides are applicable to 

supplemental fee applications as well”) (quoting Hensley, 

461 U.S. at 433 n.7, and citing Jean, 496 U.S. at 161-63).

23 See Shah Bros. EAJA Litig., __ CIT at __, 9 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1411-13 (awarding fees pursuant to the EAJA but reducing both 

the hourly rates and the total number of hours initially 

requested by the applicant).

24 Cf. Jean, 496 U.S. at 163 n.10 (“For example, if the 

(footnote continued . . .) 
Court No. 10-00205 Page 10 

Here, the fee litigation proceeded, at least in part, 

because Plaintiff’s EAJA application was overly broad. In its 

opposition, the Government correctly identified numerous entries 

in Plaintiff’s itemized fee bill that were either not 

compensable under the EAJA at all, or else not compensable at 

the claimed hourly rates.25 As a result of the Government’s 

Government’s challenge to a requested rate for paralegal time 

resulted in the court’s recalculating and reducing the award for 

paralegal time from the requested amount, then the applicant 

should not receive fees for the time spent defending the higher 

rate.”); Wagner, 640 F.3d at 1260 (“Because Hensley requires a 

court to calibrate the amount of attorney fees to the degree of 

success a claimant has achieved, it is generally appropriate to 

make an award of supplemental fees that is commensurate with the 

degree of success obtained on the original fee application.”) 

(citing, inter alia, Schwartz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 

73 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming 50 percent reduction 

to supplemental fee request where the applicant had obtained 

approximately 50 percent of the fees claimed in her initial fee 

application); Thompson v. Gomez, 45 F.3d 1365, 1367-69 

(9th Cir. 1995) (affirming 13 percent reduction to supplemental 

fee request where the applicants had received 87 percent of the 

fees claimed in their initial fee application); Harris v. 

McCarthy, 790 F.2d 753, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming 

88.5 percent reduction to supplemental fee request where the 

applicants had obtained only 11.5 percent of the fees claimed in 

their initial fee application); Institutionalized Juveniles v. 

Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 924-25 (3d Cir. 1985) 

(affirming 12.5 percent reduction to supplemental fee request 

where the claimants did not obtain complete success on their 

original fee application); Mercer v. Duke Univ., 301 F. Supp. 2d 

454, 470 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (reducing supplemental fee award by 

20 percent because the initial fee request was reduced by 20 

percent), aff’d, 401 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005)).

25 Shah Bros. EAJA Litig., __ CIT at __, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1413 

(“[T]he Government correctly identified the entries in 

Plaintiff’s itemized attorneys’ bill that are not compensable by 

an EAJA fee award in this case because they were related to an 

(footnote continued . . .) 
Court No. 10-00205 Page 11 

opposition and the ensuing fee litigation, approximately 

11 percent of the attorney hours Plaintiff initially claimed 

were found to be non-compensable.26 Accordingly, the hours 

reasonably and unambiguously expended to litigate Plaintiff’s 

contested fee application (as documented in Plaintiff’s 

supplemental fee bill, excluding the 2.5 hours spent on unfiled 

motions, as discussed above) shall be reduced by 11 percent, to 

reflect the degree of success obtained by Plaintiff in the fee 

litigation.27

unsuccessful separate claim; involved work not reasonably 

related to the case; involved unreasonably vague time entries; 

involved clerical work billed at attorney rates; reflected 

overstaffing or duplicative work; involved work on unfiled 

motions; and involved unnecessary work protracting the 

litigation.”) (citation omitted). 

26 Plaintiff submitted an itemized bill seeking compensation for 

729.5 hours and was granted an award reflecting 650 hours. 

See Ex. A (Plaintiff’s initial itemized fee bill) to Decl. of 

Elon A. Pollack, ECF No. 93-2, at 50; Shah Bros. EAJA Litig., 

__ CIT at __, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1413 (granting all of the 

Government’s suggested reductions to the number of compensable 

hours claimed in Plaintiff’s EAJA application); Def.’s Initial 

Objections, ECF Nos. 96-2 & 96-3 (objecting to a total of 

79.5 hours claimed in Plaintiff’s itemized fee bill as noncompensable).

27 The Government points out that “[t]he difference between the 

fees that plaintiff originally requested ($311,330.00), and the 

fees that plaintiff obtained following [the decision in Shah 

Bros. EAJA Litig., __ CIT __, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1402] ($206,737.00), 

amounts to a 33% reduction of its original request,” Def.’s 

Opp’n, ECF No. 109, at 5-6, and argues that “any supplemental 

fee recovery should be similarly reduced.” Id. at 6. But the 

33 percent reduction reflects a reduction of both the number of 

hours claimed and the claimed hourly rates, whereas the 

magnitude of Plaintiff’s degree of success in the fee litigation 

(footnote continued . . .) 
Court No. 10-00205 Page 12 

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the 2.5 

hours spent on unfiled motions shall be deducted as noncompensable from the 59 fee litigation hours claimed in 

Plaintiff’s supplemental EAJA application,28 and the remaining 

56.5 compensable hours shall be reduced by 11 percent, to 

reflect the degree of success actually obtained in the fee 

is better reflected by the reduction to the claimed number of 

compensable hours, which was based on the clear over-reach 

contained in the EAJA application, rather than the court’s cap 

on the claimed hourly rates, which reflected merely a slight 

modification to Plaintiff’s largely reasonable claim. 

Compare Shah Bros. EAJA Litig., __ CIT at __, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 

1413 (accepting all of the Government’s challenges to noncompensable hours contained in the Plaintiff’s initial EAJA 

application), with id. at 1411 (accepting the Plaintiff’s claim 

to a special factor enhancement of the statutory cap on the 

compensable hourly rate); id. (noting that evidence submitted by 

Shah Bros. corroborates the Plaintiff’s claim that its hourly 

rates were “within the range of rates customarily charged for 

legal work in this field,” and noting also that the Government 

submitted no contradictory evidence); id. at 1412 (granting the 

Plaintiff compensation at hourly rates significantly above the 

rates suggested by the Government); see Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n to 

Pl.’s Appl. for Att’ys Fees & Expenses Under the [EAJA], 

ECF No. 96, at 13-15 (arguing that Plaintiff should not be 

compensated at rates above $125 per hour); id. at 14 (arguing, 

in the alternative, that Plaintiff’s hourly rates should be 

capped at $300 per hour). Cf. Jean, 496 U.S. at 163 (“[A] 

district court will always retain substantial discretion in 

fixing the amount of an EAJA award.”); Wagner, 640 F.3d at 1261 

(“To be sure, a court has broad discretion in awarding attorney 

fees, and is not bound, in all cases, to make an award of 

supplemental fees that is [exactly] proportionate to the degree 

of success obtained on the original EAJA application.”) (citing 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). Moreover, the rates to be awarded 

for the additional fee litigation hours reflect only the basic 

statutory cap. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 

28 Pl.’s Suppl. Fee Bill, ECF No. 108, at 5 (showing total number 

of hours claimed).
Court No. 10-00205 Page 13 

litigation. The remaining 50.5 compensable hours shall be 

compensated at the rate of $125 per hour, in accordance with the 

law of the case.29

CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided above, Plaintiff’s EAJA award 

in this case30 shall be supplemented with an additional 

$6,312.50.31 Therefore, Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff a 

total of $223,636.79 in compensation for attorneys’ fees, 

expenses, and costs reasonably incurred in this action.

It is SO ORDERED.

_____/s/ Donald C. Pogue_____ 

Donald C. Pogue, Senior Judge 

Dated: December 15, 2014 

 New York, NY 

29 Shah Bros. EAJA Litig., __ CIT at __, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 1413 

n.32.

30 See Shah Bros. EAJA Litig., __ CIT at __, 9 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1414 (awarding costs and expenses in the uncontested amount 

of $10,586.79, and ordering the parties to submit a joint 

calculation for the attorneys’ fees total, in accordance with 

the compensable hours and rates specified in the court’s 

opinion); Parties’ Joint Statement of Amount of Fees to be 

Awarded to Pl. Pursuant to Ct.’s Order, ECF No. 107 (“In 

accordance with the Court’s Opinion and Order dated 

September 18, 2014 (Slip Op. 14-109), Plaintiff and Defendant 

hereby submit that Shah Brothers is entitled to a fee award in 

the amount of $206,737.50.”).

31 50.5 compensable hours at $125 per hour.